Main Editorial Panel

D. J . Littler, BSc, PhD, A R C S , CPhys, FInstP, CEag, FIEE (Chairman)

Professor E. J . D a v i e s ri^^". PhD, CEng, FIEE
F. K i r k b y , BSc, CEng, M i M e c h E , A M i E E
H. E. J o h n s o n
P. B. M y e r s c o u g h , CEng, FIMechE, FINucE
W . W r i g h t , M S c , ARCST, CEng, FIEE, FIMechE, FInstE, F B I M

Volume Consulting Editor

^ Professor E. J . D a v i e s , D S c , PhD, CEng, FIEE

Volume Advisory Editor

F. B e a c h , BSc(Eng), A C G I , DIC, CEng, FIEE, M I M e c h E

Authors
Chapter 1 A. E. C l e g g , CEng, FIEE
E. C. A d a m s , DipEE, A M I E E
R. A. Colley, DipEE, CEng, MIEE
J . E. D u r r a n t , BSc(Hons), CDipAF, CEng, MIEE
T. Lepojevic, DiplNG(Belgrade), A M I E E
J . E. S i m p s o n , BSc(Hons), CEng, MIEE
P. J . S i m p s o n , CEng, MIEE

Chapter 2 J . N. D o d d , CEng, MIEE

F. J . W . P r e e c e , BSc, M S c , CEng, MIEE
G . T. W i l l i a m s , DipEE, CEng, MIEE

Chapter 3 M . J . H e a t h c o t e , BEng, CEng, MIEE

Chapter 4 L. T. S m i t h , BSc(Hons), CEng, MIEE

Chapter 5 D. F. O l d f i e l d , CEng, MIEE

Chapter 6 Ń F. P a r t r i d g e , BSc, CEng, MIEE

F. B e a c h , BSc(Eng), A C G I , D I C , CEng, FIEE, M I M e c h E
B. R. H i l l , BSc, CEng, MIEE
C. W . Poole, BSc(Hons), D i p M S , CEng, MIEE
D. L. T h r e l f a l l , BSc, CEng, MIEE

Chapter 7 B. Barker, CEng, MIEE

Chapter 8 E. C. F i t z G e r a l d , CEng, MIEE

F. A s h u r s t , MIEE

Chapter 9 C. H. S p e a r , BSc(Eng), CEng, FIEE

Chapter 10 M . Baliinger, MIEEIE

Chapter 11 J . G . H a d w i c k , BEng, MIEE

W . M o r g a n , BSc, CEng, MIEE

Chapter 12 B. R. H i l l , BSc, CEng, MIEE

Series Production
Managing Editor P. M . Reynolds
Production Editor H. E. Johnson
Resources and T. A . Dolling
Co-ordination J. R. Jackson
 MODERN
POWER STATION PRACTICE
Third Edition

Incorporating Modern Power System Practc

ie

British Electricity International, London

Volume D
Electrical S y s t e m s a n d E q u i p m e n t

PERGAIVION PRESS
OXFORD · NEW YORK · SEOUL · TOKYO
U.K. Pergamon Press pic, Headlngton Hill Hall,
Oxford 0X3 OBW, England
USA Pergamon Press, Inc., 395, Saw Mill River Road,
Elmsford, New York 10523, U.S.A,
KOREA Pergamon Press Korea, KPO Box 315, Seoul 110-603,
Korea
JAPAN Pergamon Press Japan, Tsunashima Building Annex,
3-20-12 Yushima, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113, Japan
Copyright © 1992 British Electricity International Ltd
All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored In a retrieval system or transmitted
In any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic,
magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording or
otherwise, without permission In writing from the copy­
right holder.
First edition 1963
Second edition 1971
Third edition 1992
library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Modern power station practice: incorporating modem
power system practice/British Electricity International.--
3rd ed. p, cm.
Includes index.
1. Electric power-plants. L British Electricity Inter­
national.
TK1191.M49 1990 62.31'21 — dc20 90-43748
British Library Cataloguing In Publication Data
British Electricity International
Modern power station practice.-^ 3rd. ed.
1. Electric power-plants. Design and construction
I. Title II. Central Electricity Generating Board
621.3121.
ISBN 0-08-040510-X (12 Volume Set)
ISBN 0-08-040514-2 (Volume D)

Printed in the Republic of Singapore

by Singapore National Printers Ltd
 Colour Plates
(between pp 496 and 497)

FIG. 3.11 Large core being built (GEC Alsthom)

FIG. 3.12 Completed core, showing frame bolts (GEC Alsthom)

FIG. 3.58 Core and windings of single-phase CEGB generator transformer (GEC Alsthom)

FIG. 3.60 800 MVA generator transformer bank at Drax power station (GEC Alsthom)

FIG. 3.64 Cast-resin transformers for installation in 415 V switchgear (GEC Alsthom)

FIG. 5.11 Two poles (of a three-phase group) of a forced-air cooled generator circuit-breaker installed at Dinorwig
pumped-storage power station (British Brown-Boveri Ltd)

FIG. 5.12 One pole of a forced-air cooled generator circuit-breaker, with side covers and the connection to generator
busbar removed (British Brown-Boveri Ltd)

FIG. 5.13 Three-phase water cooled generator circuit-breaker showing connection into the generator phase-isolated
busbar system (British Brown-Boveri Ltd)

FIG. 5.14 Generator circuit-breaker control panel (British Brown-Boveri Ltd)

FIG. 5.15 Cooling water plant (British Brown-Boveri Ltd)

FIG. 5.18 Air plant control panel (British Brown-Boveri Ltd)

FIG. 5.29 Typical 3.3 kV switchboard of Reyrolle manufacture

FIG. 5.48 3.3 kV switchboard of Reyrolle manufacture. The three left hand units are *fused equipment Class S14A'
and the three right hand units are *air circuit-breakers Class S A \

FIG. 5.49 Typical 415 V switchboard of GEC manufacture

FIG. 5.51 Typical 415 V switchboard of Electro-Mechanical Manufacturing Co manufacture

FIG. 5.69 Switchboard formation of control gear featuring vacuum interrupters in association with HBC fuse
protection for 3.3 kV service (GEC Industrial Controls Ltd)

FIG. 5.70 Example of control gear featuring vacuum interrupters in association with HBC fuse protection — for
3.3 kV service, showing the demonstration of the circuit earthing switch (GEC Industrial Controls Ltd)

VI
 Foreword
G. A. W . Blackman, CBE, FEng
Chairman, Central Electricity Generating Board
and Chairman, British Electricity International Ltd

F O R OVER THIRTY YEARS, since its formation in 1958, the Central Electricity Generating
Board (CEGB) has been at the forefront of technological advances in the design,
construction, operation, and maintenance of power plant and transmission systems. During
this time capacity increased almost fivefold, involving the introduction of thermal and
nuclear generating units of 500 M W and 660 M W , to supply one of the largest integrated
power systems in the world. In fulfilling its statutory responsibility to ensure continuity of a
safe and economic supply of electricity, the C E G B built u p a powerful engineering a n d
scientific capability, and accumulated a wealth of experience in the operation and
maintenance of power plant and systems. With the privatisation of the C E G B this
experience and capability is being carried forward by its four successor companies —
National Power, PowerGen, Nuclear Electric and National Grid.
At the heart of the CEGB's success has been an awareness of the need t o sustain a n d
improve the skills and knowledge of its engineering and technical staff. This was achieved
through formal and on-job training, aided by a series of textbooks covering the theory
a n d practice for the whole range of technology to be found on a modern power station. A
second edition of the series, known as M o d e r n Power Station Practice, was produced in
the early 1970s, and it was sold throughout the world to provide electricity undertakings,
engineers and students with an account of the CEGB's practices and hard-won experience.
The edition had substantial worldwide sales and achieved recognition as the authoritative
reference work o n power generation.
A completely revised and enlarged (third) edition has now been produced which updates
the relevant information in the earlier edition together with a comprehensive account of
the solutions to the many engineering and environmental challenges encountered, and which
puts on record the achievements of the C E G B during its lifetime as one of the world's
leading public electricity utilities.
In producing this third edition, the opportunity has been taken to restructure the
information in the original eight volumes to provide a more logical and detailed exposition
of the technical content. T h e series has also been extended t o include three new volumes o n
'Station Commissioning', ¸ Ç Ő Transmission' and 'System Operation'. Each of the eleven
subject volumes had an Advisory Editor for the technical validation of the m a n y
contributions by individual authors, all of w h o m are recognised as authorities in their
particular field of technology.
All subject volumes carry their own index and a twelfth volume provides a consolidated
index for the series overall. Particular attention has been paid to the production of draft
material, with text refined through a number of technical and language editorial stages and
complemented by a large number of high quality illustrations. T h e result is a high standard
of presentation designed to appeal to a wide international readership.
It is with much pleasure therefore that I introduce this new series, which has been
attributed t o British Electricity International o n behalf of the C E G B a n d its successor
companies. I have been closely associated with its production and have n o d o u b t that it will
be invaluable to engineers worldwide who are engaged in the design, construction,
commissioning, operation and maintenance of m o d e r n power stations and systems.

March 1990

VII
 Preface

The review of the original M o d e r n Power Station Practice series carried out a few years
ago revealed large gaps in its treatment of electro technology within power stations. Not
unnaturally much of the content was also badly out of date. It was clear that a straight­
forward revision of the previous book would not suffice and that a totally new work was
required. It was therefore with much enthusiasm that the team of authors of Volume D
set out to write it since we all felt it was very timely to d o so.
The re-organisation of power station design and construction within the C E G B in 1971
created the Generation Development and Construction Division ( G D C D ) . The Division set
up an Electrical Branch which pulled together previously dispersed skills a n d experience
in all aspects of power station electrical engineering covering power systems and plant as
well as control, communications, data and instrumentation systems and equipment. T\vo
of the volumes of M P S P , Volumes D and F, are largely based o n the work d o n e over many
years by G D C D Electrical Branch. Volume D deals with the work of some 50 electrical
design specialists in the power engineering field while Volume F covers a similar level of
activity in the C and I field.
One of the major tasks of the Electrical Branch has been to rationalise electrical system
and plant design and development, and produce designs which meet operational needs in
the most economic way and with the required level of reliability and performance. As the
H e a d of the branch for many years I have felt privileged to edit Volume D. T h e twelve
chapters describe in appropriate detail the design philosophies and techniques which have
underlain the work of the Branch. They describe the solutions to the large number of design
problems which have been identified and the plant which has been chosen and developed
to equip electrical systems b o t h within the different types of new power station which have
been built as well as for replacement and modification tasks at existing stations.
Since the formation of G D C D , C E G B projects have included most types of generating
plant including A G R and P W R nuclear stations, fossil-fired stations (both oil a n d coal),
gas turbine and diesel driven generators and a major hydro plant at Dinorwig. While most
of the electrical equipment for these different sorts of power station is similar, the electrical
system needs vary widely. The designs described in Volume D therefore deal with the
requirements for all types of power station electrical plant and systems.
Furthermore, while the rate of change of electrical power plant technology is not as
fast as that in the light current area, there has nevertheless been considerable equipment
development a n d a n even greater change in design techniques a n d methodology. This is
especially true in the analysis of electrical system design and performance and in some areas
of plant development such as cable system design.
Since the Electrical Branch has also been responsible for control, instrumentation,
communication and data systems it has been possible to ensure co-ordinated complemen­
tary development of both heavy and light current systems. The many interfaces, e.g.,
cabling, power supplies, instrumentation, protection and metering have been engineered
with a coherent systems approach. T h e light current technology in the control, instrumenta­
tion and data systems area is described in Volume F. The Advisory Editor for that volume,
Mr M.W. Jervis, and I, as colleagues in Electrical Branch, have always striven to maintain
a close co-operation on all aspects of electrical systems design. We h o p e that this integration
of design effort will be apparent to the readers of Volumes D and F.
I would like to record my most sincere thanks to my many colleagues who have produced
Volume D and also Volume F. They have undertaken the work in parallel with their day
to day responsibilities a n d have seen the task as a n opportunity to p u t in writing a review
of the results of their work for CEGB. I also wish to express my gratitude to Professor

IX
Preface

J o h n Davies and Mr. Peter Reynolds for the great help and support which they have
given me in the preparation of the volume.
I believe that Volume D stands as a record of many years of high quality electrical design
activity and that it will remain relevant as an exposition of the science for a long time.

F. BEACH

Advisory Editor — Volume D

 Contents of All Volumes

V o l u m e A — S t a t i o n P l a n n i n g a n d Design
Power station siting and site layout
Station design and layout
Civil engineering and building works

V o l u m e  — Boilers a n d Ancillary P l a n t
Furnace design, gas side characteristics and combustion equipment
Boiler unit — thermal and pressure parts design
Ancillary plant and fittings
Dust extraction, draught systems and flue gas desulphurisation

Volume C — Turbines, Generators and Associated Plant

The steam turbine
Turbine plant systems
Feedwater heating systems
Condensers, pumps and cooling water systems
Hydraulic turbines
The generator

V o l u m e D — Electrical Systems a n d E q u i p m e n t
Electrical system design
Electrical system analysis
Transformers
Generator main connections
Switchgear and controlgear
Cabling
Motors
Telecommunications
Emergency supply equipment
Mechanical plant electrical services
Protection
Synchronising

Volume Ĺ — Chemistry and Metallurgy

Chemistry
Fuel and oil
Corrosion: feed and boiler water
Water treatment plant and coohng water systems
Plant cleaning and inspection
Metallurgy
Introduction to metallurgy
Materials behaviour
Non-ferrous metals and alloys
Non-metalhc materials
Materials selection

XI
Contents of All V o l u m e s

Welding processes
Non-destructive testing
Defect analysis and life assessment
Environmental effects

Volume F — Control and Instrumentation

Introduction
Automatic control
Automation, protection and interlocks and manual controls
Boiler and turbine instrumentation and actuators
Electrical instruments and metering
Central control rooms
On-line computer systems
Control and instrumentation system considerations

V o l u m e G — Station O p e r a t i o n a n d M a i n t e n a n c e
Introduction
Power plant operation
Performance and operation of generators
The planning and management of work
Power plant maintenance
Safety
Plant performance and performance monitoring

Volume Ç — Station Commissioning

Introduction
Principles of commissioning
C o m m o n equipment and station plant commissioning
Boiler pre-steam to set commissioning
Turbine-generator/feedheating systems pre-steam to set commissioning
Unit commissioning and post-commissioning activities

Volume J — Nuclear Power Generation

Nuclear physics and basic technology
Nuclear power station design
Nuclear power station operation
Nuclear safety

Volume Ę — E H V Transmission
Transmission planning and development
Transmission network design
Overhead line design
Cable design
Switching station design and equipment
Transformer and reactor design
Reactive compensation plant
H V D C transmission plant design
Insulation co-ordination and surge protection
Interference
Power system protection and automatic switching
Telecommunications for power system management
Transmission operation and maintenance

XII
 C o n t e n t s of All V o l u m e s

Volume L — System O p e r a t i o n
System operation in England and Wales
Operational planning ^ demand and generation
Operational planning — power system
Operational procedures — philosophy, principles and outline contents
Control in real time
System control structure, facilities, supporting services and staffing

Volume Ě — Index
Complete contents o f all volumes
Cumulative index

XIII
 Evan John Davies
Emeritus Professor of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
at Aston University in Birmingham, died on 14 April 1991.

John was an engineer, an intellectual and a respected author

in his own right. It was this rare combination of talents that
he brought to Modern Power Station Practice as Consulting
Editor of seven volumes and, in so doing, bequeathed a
legacy from which practising and future engineers will
continue to benefit for many years.

XV
 C H A P T E R 1

Electrical system design

1 Introduction 5.5.3 Other safety interlocking

5.5.4 Nuclear safety
2 System needs
5.6 Quality assurance
2.1 Station operating criteria 5.6.1 Design quality
2.2 Grid system operation criteria 5.6.2 Product quality
2.3 Plant and personnel safety needs
2.4 Nuclear hazard needs Uninterruptable power supply (UPS) systems
6.1 Introduction
3 System descriptions 6.2 Earlier UPS and GIS schemes
3.1 Main generator and station systems 6.2.1 Motor-generator (MG) set schemes
3.1.1 Main generators 6.2.2 Static inverter schemes
3.1.2 Generator transformers 6.3 Development of UPS systems
3.2 Electrical auxiliaries systems 6.3.1 Littlebrook D power station schemes
3.2.1 Auxiliaries system transformers 6.3.2 Drax power station schemes
3.2.2 Interconnection 6.3.3 Heysham 2 power station
3.2.3 Essential systems 6.4 System configuration and method of operation
3.2.4 Emergency generation 6.5 System considerations and components
3.3 Types of stations 6.5.1 Voltage regulation
3.3.1 Fossil-fired power stations 6.5.2 UPS system loads
3.3.2 Magnox nuclear power stations 6.5.3 Step-down transformers
3.3.3 AGR nuclear power stations 6.5.4 Standby and spares philosophy
3.3.4 PWR nuclear power stations 6.6 UPS equipment specification
3.3.5 Hydro and miscellaneous 6.7 UPS equipment performance requirements
4 System performance DC systems
4.1 Station and unit start-up 7.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Plant required 7.2 DC system duties
4.1.2 Synchronising to the grid 7.3 DC system design
4.1.3 Synchronising unit to station 7.3.1 250 V DC systems
4.2 Shutdown and power trip 7.3.2 220 V DC systems
4.2.1 Controlled shutdown 7.3.3 110 V DC systems
4.2.2 Power trip 7.3.4 48 V DC systems
4.3 The effects of loss of grid supplies 7.3.5 250 V, 220 V and 110 V DC circuit earthing
4.4 Station plant outages and faults 7.4 DC system analysis
7.5 Battery chargers and batteries
5 System choice
5.1 Operational requirements Electrical system monitoring and interlocking schemes
5.2 Reliability of main and standby plant 8.1 Introduction
5.3 Economics 8.2 Operational interlocking, monitoring and indications
5.4 Plant limitations 8.3 Relay systems
5.4.1 Switchgear current rating 8.3.1 Switchgear auxiliary contacts
5.4.2 Switchgear short-circuit rating 8.3.2 Application of interlock schemes
5.4.3 Large electric motors 8.4 Computer-based systems
5.4.4 System performance calculations 8.5 Maintenance interlocking equipment
5.5 Maintenance and safety 8.5.1 Key exchange boxes
5.5.1 Operational 8.5.2 Scheme application
5.5.2 Maintenance 8.6 Other safety interlocking

1 Introduction boundaries. T h e total electrical systems therefore inter­

The various electrical systems within a power station
include those associated with the connection of the
generating plant to the grid system a n d the very much
larger number which are provided to distribute power
supplies around the auxiliary plant within the station
face with the whole of the power station installation.
The systems can be summarised as follows:
• Generator primary system a n d grid, typically 23.5 kV
(660 M W ) or 26 kV (900 M W ) for units with grid
voltages of 275 kV a n d 400 kV.

1
Electrical system design
• Station board system from grid, typically 11 kV
derived from 132 kV, 275 kV or 400 kV.
• Station and unit auxiliaries systems, typically at 11
kV, 3.3 kV and 415 V.
• Emergency power supplies systems, typically gas-
turbine/diesel-driven generators connected at 11 kV,
3.3 kV, 415 V.
• DC systems, typically at 250 V, 220 V, 110 V, 48 V.
• Uninterruptable power supply systems (UPS), typi­
cally at 415 V single and 3 phase, 110 V single-phase.
The security required of the electrical supplies is deter­
mined by the importance of the power station plant
or equipment. For example, auxiliaries associated with
the main unit which if lost would immediately cause
loss of unit output, clearly require more secure supplies
than services such as sump pumps used occasionally.
The nature of the supplies also requires careful con­
sideration by way of voltage and frequency limits,
susceptibility to transients caused by faults or switch­
ing operations and the consequences of short breaks
in supplies. As a matter of course, most items of
plant and equipment are specified and tested for com­
pliance with known standards. This will include their
electrical performance. If the need for new types of
equipment is identified then performance limits should
be defined at the outset of any development work,
where standards cannot be quoted. The degree of
security must also be taken into account since parts
of nuclear power stations will warrant a much higher
level than, say, a small hydro station.
It is necessary then, to recognise from the outset
the importance of each item of plant when determining
the nature and degree of security of electrical supplies
it requires. The sources for auxiliaries supplies range
from the grid-derived A C supplies, through to battery-
backed A C and D C supplies and the 'short break'
supplies.
The bulk of the electrical auxiliaries load is nor­
mally arranged to be taken from the grid-derived
A C suppHes. This will mean that the outHne design
of the electrical auxiliaries system can benefit from
previous knowledge and experience when considering
alternative supply arrangements to a certain level at
an early planning stage of a project. The alternatives
will include, for example, unit and station transformer
schemes, generator voltage switchgear schemes and
HV switch isolator schemes. Detailed descriptions of
these and other schemes are given later in this chapter.
The timely and accurate design of electrical systems
is always easiest if at the outset, and at appropriate
stages of the project, full details of electrical loading,
rating and duty information can be established from
the plant specialists, particularly for the major items,
e.g., reactor, boiler, turbine-generator and operational
ancillary plant. One way of achieving this is by in­
Chapter 1
cluding standard electrical loading, rating and duty
schedules in all the plant enquiry specifications, thereby
committing tenderers to identify their design loads.
It also assists in forming a comparison between com­
petitive tenders and should be followed u p with more
accurate and detailed information at defined stages
of the contract by the chosen contractors. By this
means, the electrical system loadings can progressively
be assembled and refined, enabling design ratings of
transformers, switchgear, cables, etc., to be established
for comparison of the various possible alternative
electrical systems.
The system designer would always present a recom­
mended scheme by comparing the alternatives on a
basis of first and lifetime costs and suitabiHty for
duty. Until this stage is reached, the electrical plant
specialists cannot seriously begin to specify their re­
quirements. It is possible, however, that the system
designer has already taken account of the commercially
available equipment, which will make the specifying
of electrical components more straightforward.
This chapter explains the approach and criteria used
in determining the most suitable electrical systems for
the various duties required at nuclear, fossil-fired and
hydro power stations. There is a brief reference to
other forms of generation, generally referred to as
alternative sources of energy.
2 System needs
2.1 Station operating criteria
In c o m m o n with all other areas of design in power
stations, the electrical system designers must have a
clear definition of what operating criteria need to be
achieved. In the case of the C E G B , station development
particulars are formulated at the early planning stages
which incorporate the Station Technical Particulars
(STPs). The STPs contain the requirements for the main
plant availability, operating flexibility and the control
of units. In addition, they will include the technical
requirements for the generator transformers, the plant
auxiliaries supplies and the station protection arrange­
ments. Various appendices will detail the specifications
to be met and the finite limits to be achieved. From
these, it will be apparent what minimum features need
to be built into the electrical systems to achieve the
station output while at the same time ensuring the safety
of personnel and plant, a more onerous requirement on
nuclear power stations. Further documentation is pre­
pared for nuclear power stations to cover the safety
aspects in the form of a Prehminary Safety Report.
The interpretation of the STPs into electrical require­
ments becomes the designer's check list and generally
will incorporate the following as typical:
(a) Station rated output is required over a supply
frequency range of 4 9 . 5 - 5 0 . 5 Hz, with pro-rata

decrease in the range 4 9 . 5 - 4 7 H z . Operation below
48.8 Hz will be very infrequent and for periods
not longer than 15 minutes.
(b) A fault, including a fire, in any section of any
auxiliaries system shall not cause more than one
main generator to trip under all normal operating
conditions.
(c) The plant auxiliaries systems shall remain stable
for three-phase faults of duration u p to 200 ms
on *close-up' sections of the supergrid and grid
busbars and the adjacent system, over a specified
range of operating conditions.
(d) The plant auxiliaries supply arrangements shall
be designed to meet all the operating flexibility
requirements, e.g., two-shifting, part-loading and
load rejection.
(e) The plant auxiliaries system shall satisfactorily with­
stand any internally generated switching or other
transient overvoltages.
(f) The plant auxiUaries system shall accommodate the
generator operating with a terminal voltage in the
range of 9 5 % to 105% of the rated value.
In addition to the needs that the auxiliaries electrical
system must meet as requirements of the S T P s , the
designer may incorporate system features to improve
availability by supplementing those required by the
STPs. For example, the incorporation of alternative
supplies to selected switchboards could reduce outage
time and consequently lost revenue from a main
generator following an electrical fault; such a design
feature will be subjected by the designer to economic
justification. This and other 'additional requirements'
will be explained in more detail in Section 4 of this
chapter.
2.2 Grid system operation criteria
While the power station has specified operating criteria,
the grid system into which it generates also has such
criteria defined for it. The significant ones are those
associated with frequency, voltage and total or partial
loss of the grid connections in the vicinity of the power
station.
The frequency ranges have been outlined in Section
2.1 of this chapter. In addition however, looking
from the grid into the power station, it must be
remembered that below 47 H z the auxiliaries system
may be protected by an automatic trip, although an
excursion of this sort has a very low probability. There
are also the onerous transient frequency excursions
as a result of full-load rejection and possibly periods
of steady high frequency u p to 52 H z , which the
auxiliaries system will be expected to withstand with­
out tripping for periods not exceeding 15 minutes.
To put the Hkelihood of local frequency excursions
S y s t e m needs
in perspective, outside the range of 50.5 Hz, it is
generally expected at the following estimated rates:
• Greater t h a n 50.5 H z , 1 incident per year.
• Greater than 52 Hz, 0.2 incidents per year.
In addition to the frequency ranges above, the aux­
iliaries system will be required to accommodate the
network voltage variations. The 400 kV supergrid
system voltage will normally remain within the range
400 kV ± 5 % . The m a x i m u m voltage which can arise
is 440 kV, but this condition would not be permitted
to last longer than 15 minutes. The 132 kV system
voltage can vary between the limits of 132 kV ± 1 0 % .
Internally generated switching or other transient
overvoltages on the auxiliaries system were mentioned
above, but added to these will be any transferred surges
from the grid system. The ampHtude of step changes
of voltage on the 400 kV system are not expected to
exceed ± 6 % .
The effects of total or partial loss of the grid con­
nections to power stations vary depending on the
type of station, the most significant effects being on
nuclear power stations. It is essential to re-estabUsh
A C supplies within known timescales in these instances
to maintain nuclear safety. This is described more
fully in Section 2.4 of this chapter. In the case of
conventional power stations, the safety of plant and
personnel is normally taken care of by the D C systems
if A C supplies are lost. Re-estabHshing the A C suppHes
does not usually require the same emphasis other than
for returning the main generators to service.
2.3 Plant and personnel safety needs
It will be appreciated that maximising the output from
power stations must be achieved within recognised
standards, codes of practice and rules to ensure the
safety of the power station plant and personnel. In
electrical system design terms, adequate safeguards
must be incorporated to meet the statutory require­
ments of the Electricity Regulations and the Health
and Safety at W o r k Act, relating these to safety
rules. The C E G B Safety Rules set out the mandatory
requirements for estabhshing the safety of persons
at work. The electrical systems must build-in means
of achieving operational and maintenance regimes to
comply with all necessary safety requirements.
Operationally, the major considerations are to ensure
that the normal and a b n o r m a l duties and prospec­
tive fault capabilities for circuits and system configu­
rations are not exceeded. The circuits must be rated
for required voltage and for normal and fault currents
calculated during the design, and in the case of the
switchgear must be capable of making and breaking
current during normal and fault operations. Interlock­
ing or monitoring schemes need to be incorporated to
ensure that ratings are not exceeded due to operator
Electrical system design
error. Descriptions of such schemes are contained
later in this chapter. For maintenance of plant and
equipment there is a C E G B mandatory requirement
to isolate and earth all circuits at voltage levels of 3.3
kV and above before work can commence. At 415 V
and below, proof of isolation must be established.
Details of these features are described later in this
chapter.
Protection of the plant must be arranged to prevent
damage without resulting in an increased loss of avail­
ability. For example, should a turbine-generator trip
as a result of loss of A C supplies or trip and cause
loss of A C supplies, the lubricating oil systems are
maintained by means of D C motor-driven p u m p s .
Other means of maintaining the safety of plant will
be described later in this chapter when considering
what safeguards need to be incorporated into the
system.
2.4 Nuclear hazard needs
The electrical systems provided at nuclear power
stations must relate to the plant and equipment re­
quired to prevent the release ultimately of radioactivity
to the atmosphere. Initially the favoured source of
electrical supplies to these safety systems would be
derived from the grid network. This network has finite
limits of its own, the voltage and frequency limits
having been described in Section 2.2 of this chapter.
However, when these limits are exceeded they can,
particularly in the case of nuclear power stations, be
regarded as being the equivalent to a total loss of grid
supplies. The likelihood of this *total loss' must be
considered in relation to the time factors associated with
maintaining nuclear safety. For example, in the case of
the Sizewell Β pressurised water reactor (PWR) station
time bands of 0 to 2 hours, 2 to 12 hours and greater
than 12 hours have been considered. The probability
can be related to the required stage by stage availability
of the plant needed to meet the safety case.
Consideration of the needs of the safety related
plant to the probabilities of losing grid supplies in­
variably leads to the provision of a supplementary
A C source of supply by means of on-site generation.
In most cases this has been provided by either gas-
turbine or diesel-driven generators. The choice between
the two will depend on several factors including the
rating and availability of the auxiliary generation
required. For example, the C E G B have utilised gas-
turbine generators of 17.5 M W rating on earlier
A G R nuclear power stations. For the later Hey sham
2 A G R power station, diesel generators u p to 8 M W
rating have been installed. A significant factor re­
garding the Heysham 2 diesel generators was the
need for a fast start-up/loading requirement. This
influenced the generator parameters, e.g., a low sub-
transient reactance value was chosen to achieve fast
start-up while still containing the prospective fault
contribution to an acceptable level. The manner in
Chapter 1
which each has been utilised is described later in
Section 3 of this chapter.
3 System descriptions
The generating units of each power station deliver
their electrical output to the National Grid via con­
nections at 400 kV or 275 kV, although at some older
generating stations the generators are connected to
the grid at 132 kV. As part of the design of new power
stations, dependent on the network and capacity re­
quirements of the transmission system in the area,
consideration may be given to building a new 400 kV
substation at locations where existing generating plant
is connected at lower voltages, i.e., 275 kV or 132 kV.
The present policy is to use SF6 insulated metalclad
400 kV switchgear, often mounted indoors, particularly
on coastal or polluted sites. If extensions to existing
substations is the economic method of connecting
new generators, then Open' busbar design would be
employed using SF6 circuit-breakers.
The stations require supplies to be available at all
times for supplying ^station' auxiliaries and depend­
ing on the system design, for providing a supply to
the 'unit' auxiliaries for starting up and shutting down
of the units as shown in Fig 1.1. In the cases where
generators are connected to the grid via a generator
voltage switch, the units are normally started and
shutdown via the generator/unit transformer route,
though a separate source for 'station' supplies would
still be provided for the station auxiliaries and for
standby to the unit transformer as illustrated in Fig 1.2.
If available, this would normally be derived from a
132 kV source since, for the rating of 500 M V A a n d
below, the transformers are well proven, economic
and the switchgear is cheaper. If however, 132 kV
is not available on the site, to create a 132 kV sub­
station might require long cable routes or overhead
lines and possibly provide additional intergrid rein­
forcement. This may be more costly than considering
station transformers connected at 400 kV.
3.1 Main generator and station systems
3.1.1 Main generators
Generators of 660 M W (776 MVA) rating having a
nominal output voltage of 23.5 kV. The output of the
machine to the generator transformer is via phase
isolated connections, naturally air cooled and rated
at 20000 A , either directly connected or switched by
purpose built generator voltage switchgear, depending
on the auxiliaries system design. Details of the gen­
erator main connections and generator voltage switch-
gear are given in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively.
At present these are the largest generating sets
installed in the UK. Designs are being developed for
generators rated at 900 M W , in which case the gen-
 S y s t e m descriptions

400kV 132/275/400kV

9 GENERATOR TRANSFORMER
23.5/400kV

STATION
TRANSFORMER

MAIN G E N E R A T O R ©

23.5/11kV
UNIT T R A N S F O R M E R
AUXILIARY G E N E R A T O R (u<i

11kV UNIT B O A R D

11kV UNIT D R I V E S ( M ) ( M ) (M)

8; UNIT AUXILIARY T R A N S F O R M E R
1/3.3kV

C I R C U I T BREAKER N O R M A L L Y O P E N

3.3kV UNIT AUXILIARY B O A R D

• C I R C U I T BREAKER C L O S E D
3.3kV UNIT /j*N
DRIVES ^
UNIT S E R V I C E S T R A N S F O R M E R S
3.3/415V

I I Τ I 415V UNIT SERVICES BOARD

CM) (M)

f f
FIG. 1.1 Typical unit station system for a 660 MW generator

erator terminal voltage will probably increase to 26 kV. u p of 3 single-phase units. The intention of the re­
The present style of main generator connection ar­ gistered design is to achieve a high level of reliabi-
rangements will be capable of carrying the increased Hty by avoiding all but essential change to proven
output current, although forced cooling by either air systems in detail design, materials or components (see
or water may be required. The Umiting factor for Chapter 3).
naturally cooled connections would be accommodation The 800 M V A rating is based on taking the main
of the greatly increased size, particularly within the generator 776 M V A rating plus the possible 44 M V A
generator terminal centres. This is fully described in output from a gas-turbine generator, contributing from
Chapter 4. the 11 kV level via a unit transformer, less a minimum
unit auxiliaries load of 20 M V A . For the generating
units being considered at 900 M W (nominal) rating, a
3.1.2 Generator transformers
generator transformer rated at 1145 M V A , also in 3
Each generator is connected to the grid system via single-phase tanks, is being developed, taking into
a generator transformer with the appropriate voltage account an overload capability from the main unit. As
ratio. The C E G B fit on-load t a p changers to accom­ with the 800 M V A rating, on-load tapchangers will be
modate the grid voltage variations and the voltage fitted for the same reasons.
operating range of the generator. It has established a There have been instances on nuclear power sta­
'registered design' of generator transformer for the tions using generator voltage switchgear, where the
660 M W generating units rated at 800 M V A and made on-load tapchanger has been arranged with an auto-
Electrical system design
•GRID
Θ GENERATOR
TRANSFORMER
GENERATOR
8
VOLTAGE [
SWITCH UNIT
TRANSFORMER
INTERCONNECTOR
11kV
UNIT
BOARD Ρ Π
(Μ) ® (M)
UNIT AUXILIARIES
CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED
FIG. 1.2 Typical generator voltage switch system for a 6 6 0 M W generator
matic feature. This has been done to deal with the
problem that arises when a generator trip results in
the opening of the generator voltage switch but retains
the grid connection. Under these circumstances, the
11 kV switchboard voltage could fall to a level such
that the direct on line starting of a boiler feed p u m p
may not be achieved. The auto-tap facility raises the
voltage in a timescale and to a level capable of achiev­
ing a p u m p start thus securing an initial boiler feed
without relying on the emergency feed p u m p s . Should
this scheme not achieve boiler throughput, the emer­
gency pumps connected to the 3.3 kV system will still
ensure reactor safety.
3.2 Electrical auxiliaries systems
These systems provide the power for the station
auxiliaries and are nowadays almost always designed on
the unitised principle. In the past, in some cases,
particularly early magnox and A G R stations, this
principle was not strictly followed, the former consortia
who built the stations having used criteria different
from present day practice.
The general arrangements for electrical auxiliaries
systems are described below, and in their design due
cognisance is taken of the limits and constraints im­
posed by the equipment commercially available which
is or could be type approved for the particular
application.
In the unit principle, all auxiliaries associated with
Chapter 1
•GRID
STATION , ^
TRANSFORMERCJ
11kV STATION
' BOARD
STATION AUXILIARIES
CIRCUIT BREAKER NORMALLY OPEN
starting and running the unit at C M R output are
connected to the unit electrical system. This must be
designed such that one fault including a fire, does not
lose the output of more than one generating unit.
Similarly, plant which does not have an immediate
effect on the running of the unit, will be connected to
the station electrical system. It is required that a fault
on this plant will not immediately propagate into the
unit electrical system and affect unit output.
T o achieve this, the electrical and mechanical plant,
switchgear and cabling is segregated between the units,
and between the two halves of the station system,
(normally known as ^station A ' and 'station B'). Se­
gregation is not normally provided between the unit
and station systems.
Standard voltage levels of 11 kV, 3.3 kV and 415 V
have been selected to accommodate the very wide range
of plant drives and equipment.
In the case of the 11 kV unit system, a major
constraint is the thermal current rating of the largest
circuit-breaker commercially available and approved
for use on C E G B systems. The present nominal rat­
ing is 3150 A which, when calculated in relation to
the transformer standard BS171 requirements, relates
to an incoming transformer rating of approximately
60 M V A . Therefore, if the unit load is in excess of
this, two unit transformers are required. The fault
interrupting capability of the switchgear also adds a
constraint, which is discussed under 'system choice'
in Section 5 of this chapter.

Supplies to the unit board are derived from a unit
transformer on the basis of one per switchboard, the
primary of which is teed-off the generator voltage main
connections system.
All auxiliaries requiring electrical motor drives, whose
combined operation is necessary to keep the unit
generating, are connected to the unit system. Large
motors rated at 1500 kW and above are generally
connected to the 11 kV system, e.g., electrical boiler
feed pumps, circulating water p u m p s , gas circulators
at nuclear power stations and boiler fans at fossil-fired
power stations.
In the case of nuclear power stations, particularly
early AGRs (and some magnox), the 11 kV unit systems
form part of the nuclear safety case. This is because
the 11 kV provides a preferred source of supply to the
essential system, and in some cases feeds essential plant
directly, e.g., gas circulators. In this context, essential
plant is that which is required following a reactor trip
to shut down the reactor safely and remove post-trip
decay heat. Back-up emergency generating facilities are
provided at the appropriate voltage level should the
grid connection fail. If the emergency drive is greater
than 1500 kW and therefore requires connecting to
the 11 kV system, emergency generation at 11 kV is
provided. This is described in more detail later in this
section.
The 11 kV unit switchboard as well as supplying
large motors also provides a feed to the 3.3 kV unit
system via 11/3.3 kV oil-filled unit auxiharies trans­
formers located outdoors. For nuclear stations there
is, in addition, an 'essential system' which normally
derives supplies from 11/3.3 kV 'essential transformers'.
If grid derived supplies are not available, the essential
system is suppHed by on-site generation (gas turbines
or dieseis). The thermal current limits applicable to
unit transformer incoming circuit-breakers apply equal­
ly to the auxiliaries and essential transformers, which
are limited by the largest approved circuit-breaker at
3.3 kV, rated at 2400 A , giving the largest practical
size of transformer rating of a r o u n d 14.5 M V A .
Unit related auxiHaries in the range 150-1500 kW
are connected at 3.3 kV, although motors outside this
range may be connected for special cases.
The 3.3 kV system also provides feeds to the 415 V
unit system via 3.3/0.415 kV unit services transformers.
These transformers are normally naturally air cooled
'AN' type and mounted in the switchboards. The 415 V
system is distributed around the power station, with
switchboards located in switchrooms as close to the
load as possible. Motors up to approximately 150 k W
are connected to this system although motors above
this rating may be considered in special cases. T o
maintain a high availability of electrical supplies to
auxiliaries, duplicate feeds are supplied to each switch­
board. This may be achieved by two incoming supplies
and a bus section switch, or by one incoming supply
and a cabled interconnector to another switchboard
which has its own incoming supply. For both these
S y s t e m descriptions
methods, each transformer feeding the switchboards
must be rated to include the standby requirement of
the other transformer.
Those auxiHaries which are c o m m o n to two or more
units or are not necessary to maintain unit output, are
connected to a 'station' electrical system, i.e., not
specifically associated with any one unit.
The 11 kV station system has several duties, and the
rating chosen will reflect the duty it is called on to
perform. It does however share the same constraints
as the 11 kV unit system brought about by the circuit-
breaker ratings.
The station system may be required to provide a
source of supply to large 11 kV 'unit' drives, directly
in some system arrangements or in a standby mode in
others to cater for a unit transformer outage. The
station transformer rating must be chosen accordingly.
The different duties expected of station transformers
are outhned in Section 3.2.1 of this chapter.
Feeds from the 11 kV station system are provided to
a station 3.3 kV system via 11/3.3 kV station auxiUary
transformers. C o m m o n station services, such as coal
handling plant at fossil-fired power stations, would be
supplied at this voltage level. The rating of motors at
3.3 kV would be on the same basis as the unit system.
Station supplies at 415 V are derived from the 3.3 kV
switchboards via 3.3/0.415 kV services transformers,
usually of the ' A N ' type, m o u n t e d in the switchboards
and located in switchrooms as near to the load centre
as layout permits.
On some nuclear power stations while the station
system is not required ultimately in the safe shutdown
case, in many cases it may provide grid derived sup­
plies to nuclear plant and relieve the demands on the
essential system. For example, at Heysham 2 A G R ,
the 132 kV grid derived supplies can be made available
from the station system to the main gas circulator
motors via converters following a reactor trip. As such
it would be required to be engineered with this duty
in mind.
3.2.1 Auxiliaries system transformers
Unit transformers
As mentioned above, the supply to the 11 kV unit
board is via a dedicated 23.5 k V / 1 1 kV unit trans­
former, with a rating chosen to match the unit load,
but limited to 60 M V A due to the largest approved
rating of 11 kV circuit-breaker. Another consideration
the designer must take into account is the choice
of transformer impedance. A unit transformer has a
typical impedance of approximately 1 5 % on rating.
When this value is used in the analysis of the station's
electrical auxiHaries system, it may require alteration.
For example, the electrical system regulation may be too
high, making the starting of large 11 kV squirrel-cage
induction motors direct-on-line (DOL) difficult. The
maximum rating suitable for D O L starting at 11 kV
Electrical system design
is about 11 M W . Also, unacceptable voltage conditions
may be experienced at the lower voltage levels. In
this case the impedance may need to be reduced. In
conflict with this, too low an impedance may give
rise to unacceptable fault levels on the 11 kV system,
especially when unit and station supplies are paralleled
during station start-up and shutdown procedures. The
subject of parallel operation is discussed more fully
in Section 4 of this chapter.
Solutions to this conflict are seldom easy and almost
always cause complications and additional expenditure.
The options are:
• Use assisted starting techniques, i.e., 'soft' starting,
for the largest motors by utilising static or rotary
converters. This may also be combined with wound-
rotor motors, rather than squirrel-cage.
• Use automatic fast transfer systems when switch­
ing between unit and station supplies to reduce the
transfer time to one or two cycles. This permits break
before make without allowing the speed of running
motors to drop below recovery times. If make before
break is ever regarded as an acceptable option, it
would limit the time during which prospective fault
levels exceed ratings.
• Use generator voltage switchgear to provide start-up
supplies via the generator and unit transformer.
• Use HV connected unit transformers, with HV dis­
connection of the generator/generator transformer
combination.
• Increase the system voltage to say 15 kV thereby
increasing the possible transformer rating. This is
not being pursued in present designs, mainly because
it would mean either creating a 15 kV system with
a separate unit transformer for the very large drives
only or raising the voltage for all the motors catered
for at 11 kV, e.g., induced and forced draught fans,
CW pumps.
These problems have become more pronounced with
the proposed introduction of larger generating sets,
e.g., 900 M W , without steam-turbine-driven boiler
feed pumps and relying on large full duty electric feed
pumps in a 3 X 5 0 % configuration each rated at
13.5 M W . It should be noted that past practice has
been to design systems whereby unit and station systems
are capable of being paralleled for start-up/shutdown
a n d / o r standby duty without exceeding fault levels
(see Section 4 of this chapter).
Station transformers
The supply for the 11 kV station boards is via a
132 kV, 275 kV or 400 kV/11 kV station transformer,
the rating of which is chosen to provide a starting facih-
ty for the unit, and standby capacity to the unit
transformer in the case of its being unavailable, due to
an outage.
8
Chapter 1
The station transformers' duties may be summarised
as follows:
• Supply the total 'station' load (due to outage of the
other station transformer) as well as supplying the
starting load of a unit.
• Supply its proportion of the station load and the
C M R unit load when acting as replacement for a
unit transformer.
It should be noted that to accommodate the single
fault criteria (that one fault should not lose all station
supplies), a minimum of two station transformers will
be required for the station. The above duties become
more complex when more than two station transformers
are used on multi-unit stations. However, the above
principles remain the same.
Similar to the principles outlined in the section on
unit transformers, the impedance of the station
transformer must be chosen to enable paralleling with
the unit transformer, for start-up and shutdown and
to allow the largest electric m o t o r (normally the feed
pump) to be started. As mentioned above, the use of
higher rated sets may preclude paralleling and alter­
native methods may be required to achieve successful
methods of changeover for start-up and shutdown
supplies.
It should be noted that the above criteria are a
general guide, and each proposed electrical system is
designed with the particular requirements of the station
addressed specifically. More information is given in
the following sections.
3.2.2 Interconnection
T o enable flexibility of operation and to cater for
planned or forced outages, interconnection between
different switchboards at the same voltage levels is
normally provided. These are usually cabled inter­
connections with circuit-breakers at each end. The
associated circuit-breakers are arranged such that one
is normally closed. This energises the cable perma­
nently, so that any cable fault is detected and cleared
by the protection immediately, rather than when the
circuit is energised just prior to being required. Inter­
connection may be one of two distinct types:
• Where the two supplies may be paralleled, thereby
giving continuity of supply.
• Where an alternative supply is required but the
two sources may not be paralleled due to a paral­
leled fault level in excess of the switchgear certified
rating.
Where interconnection is provided between supplies
which may be paralleled (as there is no fault level
restriction) but may be out of phase and frequency,
check synchronising facilities will be provided at the
normally open circuit-breaker. Where interconnection

would produce unacceptable fault levels at the switch­
board, an indication or interlocking system is provided
to ensure that the circuit-breaker is not closed. Indi­
cation and interlocking systems are discussed further
in Section 8 of this chapter.
3.2.3 Essential systems
All power stations require essential systems, but a
fundamental difference exists between fossil and nu­
clear plant.
Fossil plant only requires essential electrical systems
to maintain unit output and to protect plant from
damage following a loss of supply. The consideration
of these systems only needs to examine economic and
personnel safety issues, and the systems are designed to
achieve these objectives.
Nuclear plant requirements are much more onerous,
due to the fission product decay heat which requires
removal to avoid an unacceptable risk of a radiological
hazard and expensive plant damage.
Essential systems for all the power stations are
based on additional on-site prime movers, either diesel
generators or gas-turbines, together with batteries and
chargers providing no-break supphes. Present designs
also use uninterruptable power supplies (UPS) to pro­
vide instrumentation and power supply requirements
which are battery-backed. These systems are also used
in normal operation since they provide a stable voltage
and frequency supply 'isolated' from the transients
experienced by the main auxiliaries system. They are
based on centralised schemes of static or rotary in­
verters, with a battery backing for a timescale in the
region of 30 minutes to cater for loss of the battery
charger or its A C supplies. For more details on U P S
see Section 6 of this chapter.
The D C system voltage levels are chosen for se­
lected duties such as emergency drives and emergency
lighting at 250 V, switchgear with the higher current
closing solenoids at 220 V, protection, direct control
and switchgear tripping at 110 V and telecommunica­
tions, remote control and indications at 48 V. The
batteries are usually of the lead-acid Plante type.
The D C systems are described later in Section 7
of this chapter, and the batteries and chargers in
Chapter 9.
3.2.4 Emergency generation
As mentioned previously, on-site generation is pro­
vided for emergency supplies to the auxiliaries system
on all power stations. There are many differing types,
dependent on the type of station and the needs which
have to be met. Generators may be powered by gas
turbines, or dieseis and may be at voltages of 11 kV
or 3.3 kV.
On-site generation for large fossil-fired stations since
the early 1960s has been provided by gas turbines at
11 kV, and has satisfied the following needs:
S y s t e m descriptions
• T o provide an independent supply to the auxiliaries
of the main steam units in the event of unacceptably
low frequency on the Grid system.
• Use as output plant capacity to meet system require­
ments. In this m o d e of operation the gas turbines
will normally be used for T e a k generation' purposes,
and will also act as 'hot standby'.
• Ability to start-up a station without external Grid
supply.
• T o provide an independent supply in order to ensure
the operation of essential drives, such as the main
bearing lubricating oil, in the event of loss of nor­
mal supplies. This duty is, in effect, a back-up to
the D C battery system.
On-site generation for nuclear power stations assumes
a more important role as it becomes part of the
nuclear safety case. All plant required to safely shut
down and cool the reactor is normally supplied from
an essential system, which derives its preferred supply
from the grid supply. Failure of the off-site connection
requires the on-site generation to connect, usually auto­
matically, to the essential system. The large quantities
of decay heat in the reactor core/boiler system cause
prolonged requirements for feedwater, steam dumping
and reactor core cooling after the turbine-generator has
been tripped.
3.3 Types of stations
The C E G B have a wide variety of power stations from
base load coal-fired and nuclear power stations to
oil-fired, hydro, pumped-storage and gas turbine types,
and gas-fired and wind power pilot installations. The
bulk of the demand is of course met by the base
load stations which this section will concentrate on.
The present design policy to take the C E G B into the
twenty-first century is to have both large coal-fired
stations and nuclear stations of the P W R design. Com­
bined cycle gas-turbine (CCGT) installations are also
a future possibility.
The coal-fired stations will be at the 2 χ 900 M W
size and the first P W R will be at Sizewell Β with
a single reactor and 2 χ 660 M W turbine-generator
units.
With the increasing concern for controlHng the
emissions from coal-fired stations, retrofitting of Flue
Gas Desulphurisation (FGD) plant is taking place at
selected existing coal-fired stations and included at
the design stage for the new 2 χ 900 M W designs.
The additional loading imposed by F G D on the aux­
iliaries system is very significant, resulting in the
designers assessing different schemes for meeting the
various methods of providing F G D plant. F G D is an
international problem being tackled in various ways,
but initially the C E G B are employing the limestone/
gypsum method. The additional auxiliaries system load-
Electrical system design
ing for this process at a 2 χ 900 M W station is of
the order of 45 M W for the entire plant.
Considering now the auxiliaries systems for the
various types of stations, this section describes the
different aspects associated with each.
3.3.1 Fossil-fired power stations
The majority of existing C E G B fossil-fired plant is
fuelled by coal or residual oil with a small number
capable of being fired by either. There are a few gas
turbine stations with units of about 70 M W using
distillate fuel, and H a m s Hall C power station which is
dual-fired, using coal or natural gas. The latter example
using natural gas was a pilot conversion scheme to
assess its feasibility.
Basically for a given location and station output,
the electrical auxiliaries system for a coal-fired or
oil-fired station would differ only in respect of the
loads associated with the fuel handling and combustion
plant. For a coal-fired station, this plant consists of
the unitised draught plant (induced draught, forced
draught and primary air fans), coal mills and feeders
and the precipitators together with the c o m m o n services
associated with coal handling, dust handling and ash
disposal systems. For a 2000 M W coal-fired station of
4 X 500 M W units, operating at C M R , the auxiliaries
load is typically 31 M V A per unit plus a station load
of 20 M V A . The comparative figures for a similar
sized oil-fired station are 20 M V A and 13 M V A re­
spectively since the unit load will not have the P A
fans, precipitators and coal mills and the station loads
will not have the coal, ash and dust handling systems.
The fuel oil system does not make the same load
demands as the coal fuel systems.
Take as an example, the electrical auxiliaries system
provided for the 2000 M W (3 χ 660 M W ) Littlebrook
D oil-fired station. The outline of the auxiliaries sys­
tem is shown in Figs 1.3 and 1.4. An important
consideration in the adoption of the most economic
station supplies arrangement was the availabihty of
an existing 132 kV substation on the site.
One of the STP requirements was for the output
from the three gas turbines, for system reasons, to
be available to the grid independent of the operation
of the main units. Each gas turbine generator rating
is 35 M W , which required three station transformers,
since one transformer circuit (maximum rating 60 MVA)
could not accommodate more than one gas turbine
generator for thermal reasons nor could the auxiliaries
system for prospective fault level reasons. The use of
three station transformers however does lend itself
to a simpler and more flexible system configuration
than is possible with the more general two station
transformers scheme. At the 11 kV level, the station/
station interconnections maximise the availability of
the station transformers across all three units and their
gas turbines. These interconnections are an example
of how an auxiliaries system design can economically
10
Chapter 1
justify providing facilities beyond what could be pro­
vided to meet only the S T P requirements.
Each 3.3 kV unit auxiliaries board is supplied by
duplicate 8 M V A transformer feeders, each capable
of supplying the 3.3 kV auxiliaries load and thereby
providing standby to each other. The transformer
impedance was chosen to enable both transformers to
be in service at the same time. There was n o need
therefore to provide any unit/station interconnection at
the 3.3 kV level.
At the 415 V level, a sectionalised unit services/
station services switchboard was introduced, each sec­
tion fed from its respective 3.3 kV auxiliaries b o a r d .
This provides a better utilisation of transformer capa­
city at this level than having separate unit and station
415 V boards with duplicate supplies for each from the
respective 3.3 kV unit or station auxiliaries system;
thus reducing the cost, space and maintenance require­
ments. Transfer of loads from one transformer to its
standby is carried out off-load since the prospective
fault level at 415 V does not permit carrying this out
on-load.
For the fossil-fired stations, slightly different aux­
iliaries systems have evolved as the C E G B moved from
the 500 M W unit period to the 660 M W units of the
late 1960s. All systems used the unit/station principle.
Most of the stations with 500 M W units had four units
each with two station transformers, typically shown in
Fig 1.5.
Drax power station was designed as a 6 x 660 M W
unit station, with three units initially installed, followed
in the early 1980s with the three remaining units. The
station auxiliaries system catered for the six units from
the outset by providing four station transformers.
Despite the long time interval between the construction
of the first and second halves of the station, there was
great emphasis placed on replication wherever possible
for the completion phase to ensure the operational
and maintenance convenience of the station as a whole.
The outline of the auxiliaries system for the six-unit
station (to 11 kV level) is shown in Fig 1.6.
The auxiliaries systems for the present 900 M W unit
coal-fired station designs are being assessed as for past
stations against their S T P requirements and economics.
The alternative systems considered include using gen­
erator voltage switchgear, which the C E G B first used
at Hartlepool and Heysham A G R stations, but which
to date has not been used at fossil-fired stations.
All generator voltage switchgear used by the C E G B
on their modern large units has been the 3 χ single-
phase airblast type, designed and manufactured by
Brown Boveri. A description of the design, construction
and performance of the types used by the C E G B is
given in Chapter 5.
It has not been a requirement at fossil-fired stations
to make grid supplies available via the generator
transformer, and generator voltage switchgear has not
been economically justifiable compared with a u n i t /
station transformer scheme.

400kV 400kV
FIG. 1.3 Littlebrook D electrical system
The introduction of F G D plant follows the C E G B
policy decision to reduce the overall sulphur emission
from its power stations. T o achieve this, it is pro­
posed in the first instance to retrofit F G D equipment
to existing coal-fired stations starting with Drax. In
addition, the C E G B will be providing F G D equipment
on all their new coal-fired stations. For a 2000 M W
station burning 2 % sulphur content coal, the load
consumption of the F G D plant using the limestone/
gypsum process is of the order of 53 M V A . When
compared with a nominal station load of 51 M V A , this
represents 104% additional auxiliary power required,
which constitutes a significant increase in capital and
through-life costs for the station. The electrical aux­
iliaries system currently proposed for a 2 χ 900 M W
subcritical coal-fired station design, which includes
the F G D plant, is shown in Figs 1.7 and 1.8. It will
S y s t e m descriptions
400kV
132kV
CIRCUIT BREAKER NORMALLY O P E N
be seen that the F G D plant electrical supplies have
been derived from the unit/station electrical systems.
All voltage levels of 11 kV, 3.3 kV and 415 V are
required t o a c c o m m o d a t e the loads, including large
booster fans fed at 11 kV.
Cabling system design is m a d e m o r e complex with
this arrangement since the unit/station system is deter­
mined by the layout of the generator, station and unit
transformers and major switchboards. These are lo­
cated at the opposite end of the station to the F G D
auxiliaries and plant.
Alternatively, the F G D plant can be considered
as a separate entity, giving rise to the provision of
a dedicated F G D electrical auxiliaries system centred
on a location adjacent to the F G D plant and with its
own Grid connections. The comparison between the
two approaches is mainly one of economics. For new
11
Electrical system design Chapter 1

3 5 5
' >-JGENER*TOR TRANS STATION TRANS 4β
^ 4 0 0 / 2 3 S>V eOO ^
GENERATOR 2 i^G^

φ30
V STATION BOARD ι ' UNIT BOARD 2
7 Τ Τ — R - - ^ ^ Γ - - -R 1 — I — - " R — Τ — Τ — ®
i> "
{^?400 φΐ?00^^|]'200 φ ' 2 0 0 φ ΐ 2 0 0 φ ΐ 2>. φ ) 2 0 0 φ ΐ 2 0 0 - φΐ200 φΐ?00 φΐ200 ¡^2*00 [^2400 φΐ200
-""S φ2400 φΐ200 φΐ200 φΐ200 • ΐ 2 0 0 φΐ200 φι200

$ 1 Sí

I" II S

J 1
5
Ii ñ Ii

^ » II

φΐ600 φ.0, φΐ600

3 311 ν STATION t BOARD I
•i • I BOARD I
7 ! Γ^Τ Τ ! Τ Τ — γ Γ Τ — Τ — Τ — ! — Τ — Τ — Τ — Τ — Τ — R
φ β Ο θ φ 5 0 φ 5 0 φ 5 0 φ β Ο φ s D [^SD φ 5 0 φ s D
φβοο φβοο φβοο
ί φβΟθφ50 φ50 φ50 φ50 φ50 φ50 φβΟΟ φ 5 0 [^SO φ50 φ50 φβΟ φ50 φ50 QsO

si

si

Ι 25
i si

I I

ί oí
2 9 f
ι- J > II . 2 i
is §¿ 3| Δ Ii

φ . 3 3I.V FUEL OIL PLAI

..οοφΙ
3 3KV UNIT AUX. BOARD 2
τ —BOARD
r iftOC V
" Τ — Γ Τ—Τ—τ—I—r
¿so φ50 0SO C^so ¿-SO ¿SO φβοο ¿«oo¿SD ¿SO φso ¿so φίο ¿so

r
tí

4 í1»i Sí
φ ¡l
tiz5
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I i Y I l
I ^ I I α I I
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α
5 t
SI
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5 o

i i' α α
11
5 i is S I i 18 :i ii
— (6)
i i

FiG. 1.4 Littlebrook D electrical auxiliaries system

projects the most economic approach utilises the u n i t / eved differently for each station and differently from
station electrical system, although the separate electrical those which would be adopted today. However the
system has clear benefits for retrofit F G D schemes. fundamentals for reactor safety remain the same. They
are:

3.3.2 Magnox nuclear power stations • T o ensure a main coolant flow over the reactor
internals, so cooling the reactor core and fuel.
The C E G B has eight magnox reactor nuclear power
stations. These stations were commissioned over a • T o ensure a flow of feedwater to extract the heat
period spanning eleven years, from Bradwell in 1962, developed in the reactor, and hence provide steam
to Wylfa in 1973. The stations were built by different to power the main turbine-generators.
consortia as 'turnkey' contracts, and hence have many
• To provide reactor auxiliaries and services, e.g.,
differences in terms of output and design. The design
pressure vessel cooling water flow.
measures which ensure reactor safety, which is the
most onerous requirement on system design, are achi­ • T o provide controls and indications for the above.

12
 System descriptions

l3;kV IBUSBAR I 400I.V I BUSBAR 3) l3a>V(BU5BAB 2)

GENERATOR 3 ( G

lOOOA 30 SEC
' UNIT BOARD 3 STATION eOAAO 3
(!>T<-0: Τ τ Ύ f
STATION BOARD 2
f Τ- T-
φΐ200 φ 2 4 0 0 φίΣΟΟ φ ΐ 2 0 0 φΐ200 φΐ200 φΐ200 φΐ200 φΐ200 „ Φ·200 φ ΐ 2 0 0 φΐ200 φ 2 4 0 0 φί400 φ ΐ 2 0 0
ΠΐίΟΟ ΠΐίΟΟ ¿]I200 ¿ ] a 4 0 0 ¿ ] 2 4 0 0 [ J I 2 0 0

!8 -
i - t;t;«I
I i i SSE
Í | í ?zs
>L >r_
iis

. 3 3liV STATION AUX. βΟΑΒΟ 3

—I—X—i—i—l ' l l "1" i—Τ—I—J—Γ . . Τ—τ—τ—τ—5Τ^Τ—Τ—Τ—I—I—I—ι—Γ
5ΦΒOOΦSO φ $ 0 φ 5 0 φ s O φ δ Ο φ & 0 φ β O o φ s O φ 5 0 φ 5 0 φ s O φ 5 0 φsO nsO ñ s D φβ00φβ00φβ00φl600φβ00φsD [|]SD {^SD \^SD φ $ 0 φ 5 0 φ » φ $ 0

.,5

i
I % -5 ! 5$

ii t
i
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5i

Ι:
h L i
8 ?S Ii í¡

STATION AUX. BOARD 2

φ·ΟθφβΟθηβΟθφΐ6ΟθφβΟθφ$0 QiD φ $ 0 φ β Ο φ s O φ $ 0 φ 5 0 φ $ 0 NSD NSD φ50

υ Ι υ υ I í y υ 1.2: Τ υ υ υ y > y > y ü ! v υ

i:
II II

i
?

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í

I il
ίί hí%\ iei.ii
• SD - ARE FITTED WITH 3 3kV MOTOR SWITCHING DEVICES

F i g . 1.4 (cont'd) Littlebrook D electrical auxiliaries system

These requirements apply t o a reactor whether it is operated at full or part output with the best possible
operational, or in the initial period of shutdown, when efficiency a n d operational flexibility. T o achieve all
fission product decay heating occurs, during the post- of the above objectives, t h e electrical system is struc-
trip cooHng period. tured into t w o parts:
Adequate post-trip cooling must be available for
(a) T h e main electrical system.
all credible faults a n d accidents that can be sustained
by the reactor, a n d sufficient redundancy a n d diver- (b) T h e essential electrical system.
sity of mechanical plant a n d systems ensures this.
Clearly, electrical equipment, where required as t h e T h e main electrical systems of all magnox stations are
power source for the mechanical plant a n d systems, based on the unit a n d station system principle. This
must also be capable of meeting the redundancy a n d has already been described in Section 3 of this chapter.
diversity requirements. In the case of the m a g n o x stations however, different
Having satisfied the demands of reactor safety, the voltage levels (e.g., 6.6 kV) a n d sometimes discrete
electrical system must also enable the station t o be systems for a particular purpose (e.g., gas circulator

13
Electrical system design Chapter 1

FIG. 1.5 Typical electrical system for 4 χ 5 0 0 MW coal-fired units

supplies) are used. Although the details of the design
are different in each case, the objectives are the same,
viz safe and economic operation of the power station
as a whole.
The essential electrical system is an integral part of
the main electrical system, but is designed so that it
can operate independently of it.
The safety of the reactor is dependent on the es­
sential electrical system as all items of plant necessary
for post-trip cooling are connected to this system, e.g.,
emergency boiler feed p u m p s , pony motors for gas
circulators, necessary auxiliaries, etc.

14
 S y s t e m descriptions

• D -
τ τ Ν

e SOMVA
14.5%
(MIN)
50 MVA-
14.5%
(MIN) \

AS UNIT No 1

IlkV
' 750MVA

• TO UNIT No 3

• TO UNIT No 4

3.3kV STATION SERVICES

BOARDS. COAL & ASH
PLANT. GENERAL SERVICES

Λ
>o< 10 8MVA
%
r

. _ » 3.3kV
• χ

i i i X

t- Η ι- r
i i I
CM CO ir
i i i

O p ρ

I U I
.ί. STANDBY
SUPPLIES

L-rJ «-rJ l-H --r-

y i i
3 5 5

OJ CD it
i i έ

Ρ Ρ Ρ

CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED

CIRCUIT BREAKER NORMALLY OPEN

FIG. 1.5 (cont'd) Typical electrical system for 4 χ 5 0 0 MW coal-fired units

The main electrical system provides the preferred diesel generators are used for this purpose.
supply to the essential electrical system, via unit or There are certain items of plant which can tolerate a
station auxihary transformers. If there is a loss of short interruption of supplies, and these will be
grid causing loss of supplies to the essential electrical connected to A C switchboards supplied by the on-site
system, then on-site generation will provide supplies generation. The short break in suppHes due to the
to the essential system only. Usually, gas turbine or starting period of the on-site generation is acceptable

15
Electrical system design Chapter 1

- O

e UNIT
TRANSFORMER 1

Q 2 B U S T A T I O N Q STATION Q
( J ( } T R A N S F O R M E R 1A T R A N S F O R M E R 2A (Γ)

X -L JL SSTTA
; TION
SWITCHBOARDS

@βΒ (^5B © 4 Β ® 3 B ® 2 B @ , B
CW PUMP 8
EMERGENCY BOILER EMERGENCY BOILER
FEED PUMPS FEED PUMP

CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED

CIRCUIT BREAKER NORMALLY OPEN

SOOTBLOWER
COMPRESSORS

FIG. 1.6 Drax power station electrical system to 11 kV level

from reactor safety considerations. Plant items which
cannot tolerate any break in suppHes (e.g., instru­
mentation, controls and indications) are connected to
suppHes derived from a D C system, i.e., battery-
backed. Normally the D C supplies are provided from
the essential system A C switchboards via rectifier units,
the battery being maintained in a fully charged state.
Following a loss of supplies to the essential system,
the battery maintains supplies to the plant items con­
nected to the no-break system during the short period
of time while the on-site generation is starting u p . When
the on-site generation is fully available, the D C supplies
are again provided from this source, and the battery
is recharged to a fully charged state.
The main and essential electrical systems thus pro­
vide supplies for both reactor and plant safety, and
economic operation of the station when supplying
power to the National Grid.
3.3.3 AGR nuclear power stations
The choice and ratings for the auxiliaries systems for
the A G R stations are similar to the fossil-fired stations
and provide supplies in the same way on a unit and
station basis. Although the electrical auxiliaries system
is a single integrated design, it has two major con­
stituent parts namely the main electrical system and
the essential electrical system.
The most recent of the C E G B A G R stations is at
Heysham 2 and its design has followed C E G B design
philosophies evolved over the period since the first
A G R s were designed. Heysham 2 as described repre­
sents the latest design aspects of the A G R s . The main
electrical system function is primarily to operate the
station in producing its output, while the essential
system is to ensure that the C E G B meets the required
safety criteria in supplying safety related reactor aux­
iliaries plant both following a reactor trip and in the
general longer term. Heysham 2 (2 χ 660 M W ) is the
largest auxiliaries power system for a two-unit station
installed by the C E G B . Considering first the main
electrical system, the auxiliaries power system for the
two units, numbered 7 and 8, are illustrated in Figs 1.9
and 1.10.
Unlike Heysham 7, the grid connections have been
made to both the 400 kV and 132 kV grid substations.

16
 S y s t e m descriptions

τ τ
400kV

- a -

τ
400/27g132kV

y
GENERATOR GENERATOR
STATION TRANSFORMERS
TRANSFORMER 1 TRANSFORMER 2
120/60/60MVA
1145MVA 1145MVA

GENERATOR 1 G E N E R A T O R 2|
900MW 900 M W

MVAC^

UNIT UNIT
TRANSFORMERS TRANSFORMERS

i
UNIT STATION STATIONI STATION STATION • UNIT

BOARD 1A BOARD BOARD BOARD 2A BOARD 2B BOARD 2A

UNIT UNIT
Κ BOARD1Β BOARD 2B

CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED

(φ) CIRCUIT BREAKER NORMALLY OPEN

FIG. 1.7 Electrical system for 2 χ 9 0 0 M W coal-fired units

This enabled t h e setting u p of an electrical system
which matched the reactor quadrant concept a n d pro­
vided higher integrity grid connections. Each r e a c t o r /
generator has four 11 kV switchboards; A , B, C and D .
Station boards A a n d Β deriving supplies from t h e
132 kV system and unit boards C a n d D from t h e 400
kV system.
In this way, there is an 11 kV switchboard asso­
ciated with each reactor quadrant a n d it is at this
level that the four-trained electrical system starts a n d
is continued t o t h e lower voUages.
The auxiliaries associated with each quadrant all
derive supplies down through the various voltage levels
from the same 11 kV source. The lower voltage levels
are 3.3 kV a n d 415 V. T h e drives connected at each
voltage level a r e :
• 415 V u p t o a n d including 150 k W .
• 3.3 kV u p t o a n d including 1500 k W .
• 11 kV above 1500 k W .
The gas circulators (5220 k W ) , C W pumps (1700 kW)
and emergency boiler feed p u m p s (10 500 k W ) a r e
therefore supplied at 11 kV.
At the 3.3 kV level, t w o systems are established,
the X system for cooling the reactor by forced circu­
lation a n d t h e Y system t o feed water into t h e main
boilers, after a trip. The 415 V system continues with
X and Y systems.
In addition, at 3.3 kV there are auxiliaries asso­
ciated with t h e turbine-generator for which the elec­
trical needs are similar t o most 660 M W units, a n d
a unit auxiliary a n d station auxiliary system has been
created by deriving supplies from the appropriate 11 kV
level (D a n d B). This follows through t o t h e 415 V
level a n d in addition provides supplies for t h e reactor
services auxiliaries.
Each generator output at 23.5 kV passes t o the grid
via a generator switch a n d a generator transformer
to 400 kV. The generator also feeds its auxiliaries via
two unit transformers (23.5/11 k V ) .
Each unit transformer normally suppUes o n e 11 kV
board b u t it is rated (60 M V A ) t o b e capable of sup­
plying t h e normal loads of two 11 kV b o a r d s , via t h e
11 kV interconnectors. It can be seen that each unit
b o a r d is interconnected t o a station b o a r d , i.e., D t o A
and C t o B . This makes possible either a 400 kV or
132 kV derived source. Likewise the two station trans­
former secondaries are each rated t o supply the normal
load of a unit/station b o a r d .
The t w o station transformers are also intercon­
nected at 11 kV. Again each secondary winding is rated

17
Electrical system design Chapter 1

) 1145MVA GENERATOR
) TRANSFORMER

-<n>- -ΟΙΟ­
GENERATOR 1
) 900MW

Ψ Η Η Η U AΗ Η Η Ψ Ψ
Ι 1kV U N I T B O A R D 1 A 11kV U N I T B O A R D I B

LSCEJ UCEJ

(Μ) ® (Μ) (ά) (Μ) (Μ) (Μ)

ELECTRIC FEED
PUMPS
12.5MVAG

3.3kV r h FGD
i Λ 3.3kV FGD

ώ
6 ώ ό ό6 6 6ά ó 6 ά άά ó ώ ó ώ
AUXILIARY ν BOARD A 3.3kV U N I T A U X I L I A R Y B O A R D A 3.3kV U N I T A U X I L I A R Y B O A R D Β AUXILIARY' BOARD Β V

5 Τ

¿ ® (M) ¿ 4 é
x6 V

415V FGD 415V FGD

SERVICES BOARD A SERVICES BOARD Β

415V
PRECIPITATOR
BOARD A
i .
4 1 5 V MILL
SERVICES BOARD A
415V FAN
SERVICES BOARD A
415V FAN
SERVICES BOARD Ε
4 1 5 V MILL
SERVICES BOARD Β Ζ PRECIPITATOR
BOARD Β

415V TURBINE 4 1 5 BOILER 415V BOILER 415V TURBINE

BOARD A BOARD A BOARD Β BOARD Β

FIG. 1.8 Electrical auxiliaries system for 2 χ 9 0 0 M W units including F G D plant supplies

to supply the normal loading of t w o 11 kV station The decision t o have a total of eight diesel generators
boards. Two conditions need t o be considered here: for the two reactors was taken o n cost grounds. T h e
initial proposal had been for sixteen, which allowed one
• A station transformer can only act as standby t o
to be associated with each X a n d Y system b u t could
the other station transformer if its o w n reactor is
not be economically justified. The restriction t o eight
shutdown.
diesel generators caused connection design problems
• A station transformer can only act as standby t o both for operation and for cabling as each is connected
one unit transformer at any o n e time o n t h e basis and rated to supply the post-trip needs of corresponding
that generating with more than o n e normal 11 kV XoT Y systems of both reactors. This fixed the X diesel
source unavailable is n o t permitted. generator rating at 5.2 M W and the y diesel generator
rating at 6.735 M W . Y is the larger rating because the
This leads t o the three-winding station transformer emergency feed p u m p s a r e much larger than a n y X
having t w o secondary windings rated at 60 M V A , system drive.
whereas the primary is rated at only 90 M V A . The X system diesel generators, as well as supplying
The essential electrical system is a n integral part 3.3 kV and below, supply the main gas circulators via
of the main system and is centred o n the 3.3 kV level. converters with variable frequency output, 1 H z t o 50
The diesel generators are the ultimate back-up for the H z , u p t o a voltage of 3000 V.
provision of electrical supplies. They are connected The diesel generator supplies are regarded as short
at 3.3 kV since the critical safety auxiliaries are at this break supplies, i.e., loading of them cannot take place
level a n d below. for approximately 26 s. There is however, a need for

18
 S y s t e m descriptions

TRAN¡roRMER 1 ( ψ ) 120/60/60MVA

T011kV
-STATION
BOARD 2B

11kV STATION 11kV STATION

BOARD 1A BOARD 1Β '

TO 11 kV STATION
" BOARD 2A

(M) ®
ELECTRIC
FEED PUMP 8MVA
12.5MVA

BOARD 2 BOARD 2

5" ϊΊ^ΕΓϊ
3.3kV STATION AUXILIARY BOARD 1
3.3kV
COAL PLANT
BOARD 1
6FGDJ£ÜARV¿ ώώώώύύίιύύύύ PLANT BOARD 1

(ώ)

COAL
PLANT
BUNKER
BOARD 1
Li FGD SERVICES
415V
• BOARDS ASH
PLANT
DUST
PLANT

9
BOARD 1 BOARD 1 BOARD 1

ó
BOARD 1
OIL

t
HEATER 1

BOARD 2 BOARD 2
BOARD2 BOARD2

OARDÍ lOARD

I 415V OIL

iL
415V
CWPH BOARD 1 ' PLANT BOARD 1

415V GENERAL 415V LIGHTING 415V ADMINISTRATION 415V DEAERATOR 415V WATER 415V TRANSMISSION
SERVICES BOARD 1 BOARD 1 BUILDING BOARD 1 HEATER BOARD 1 TREATMENT BOARD 1 SUBSTATION BOARD 1

BOARD 2
( T F F I STATIC Γ Ί CIRCUIT BREAKER (ΓΊ) CIRCUIT BREAKER NORMALLY OPEN
' ^ ^ ^ J CONVERTER Ψ CLOSED

FIG. 1.8 (coni*d) Electrical auxiliaries system for 2 χ 9 0 0 M W units including F G D plant supplies

supplies to some loads which do not suffer a break,
i.e., an uninterruptable power supply system (UPS).
The U P S supplies at Heysham 2 are derived from
battery-backed static inverters. The X system has a
large U P S load requirement, including 3-phase drives.
To maintain the 'trained' design concept, each X and
each Y system has an appropriately rated U P S system;
at 100 kVA, 3-phase 415 V output for each X system
and 6.3 kVA single-phase 110 V output for each Y
system. Additionally, each unit has unit and station
U P S systems of 200 kVA, single-phase 415 V output
for other than essential loads, e.g., unit guaranteed
instruments and unit computer.
As at all other stations, D C systems are provided
both for normal usage and also for those situations
when D C is absolutely essential, such as switchgear
operation. For this reason all X and Y systems have
discrete closing (220 V) and opening (110 V) batteries.
In fact, the closing batteries are solely dedicated to that
duty.
The unit and station D C system design needs to
have in addition, a 250 V D C system for emergency
lighting and turbine-generator emergency drives.
3.3.4 PWR nuclear power stations
The C E G B has embarked on a series of nuclear power
stations of the P W R type and have based the station
design on the American S N U P P S system. The lead
station is at Sizewell Β in Suffolk, where there is
an existing magnox station. The electrical auxiliaries
system, however, accommodates a UK design evolved
a r o u n d a twin-generator/single-reactor system, whereas
the S N U P P S design has a single generator. The
electrical system chosen provided a grid connection
at 400 kV for each generator and a similar 400 kV grid
connection for each of the two station transformers.
Although the grid connections are to a c o m m o n
substation, each connection can be electrically segre­
gated from the other by means of isolators and circuit-

19
Electrical system design Chapter 1
UJ 2 oo
(ΛΟ - , <
UJCD
(OCC
>Ζ
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Ii
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βο
Γ»-0 _ Q 1-5 OC^
if P i l i
"u- in DC ><Λ _iL
8
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in DC
Si
o
Ε
Ε
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9
>J Si ät
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o" So
20
S y s t e m descriptions
o
i
c
c
8
t-l
O
Β
Β
o
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00
c
o
"ω
I
Β
cd
X
o
tu
21
Electrical system design
breakers. This is important since any fault on the grid
system or on one of the units should not jeopardise
the single reactor operation or affect the output of
the healthy unit. The electrical system is illustrated
in Figs 1.11, 1.12 and 1.13.
The 11 kV system is arranged into four 11 kV
sections, each fed by one of the four off-site (grid)
connections. Each unit and station pair of 11 kV
sections is normally run paralleled through an inductor
(to Umit the fault current), so that the loss of one
connection does not cause a total loss of 11 kV for
that unit. The generator is connected to the generator
transformer via a generator voltage switch, across which
the generator is automatically synchronised. The loss
of any of the reactor coolant pumps causes a reactor
trip which is a prime reason for running the unit and
station boards in parallel.
Each of the four 11 kV switchboard sections provides
a supply to one of the four functionally independent
essential electrical 'trains', and is the normal and pre­
ferred source of supply. Each 'train' includes a 3.3 kV
switchboard normally supplied from an 11 kV switch­
board section via a 11/3.3 kV essential transformer.
A diesel generator is connected to each 'train' 3.3 kV
switchboard, and is started and connected to it in the
event of failure of the preferred electrical supply from
11 kV. All the plant required to remove post-trip decay
heat is connected to the essential system at 3.3 kV
and 415 V.
It is considered a credible fault sequence that all
four dieseis may fail to start on demand following a
complete loss of A C power from the Grid. The defence
against this occurrence must ensure that the P W R is
maintained in a safe condition, post-trip, by producing
the following:
• Feedwater to the steam generators via the auxiliary
feed system.
• A supply of water to the reactor coolant p u m p (RCP)
seal to maintain the integrity of the primary circuit.
The manner in which this is achieved is described in
Section 4 of this chapter.
3.3.5 Hydro and miscellaneous
Hydro stations are not c o m m o n in the C E G B , al­
though the Scottish Boards have a number of smaller
stations. The advantage of the hydro station is that
a very fast response in station output is achieved to
meet sudden load demands on the grid network, e.g.,
due to the loss of a generating set elsewhere. The
output of a traditional hydro station is determined
by the replacement of the stored water in the top
reservoir by natural means. Its value is therefore finite
and dependent on how readily the stored water can be
replenished. The electrical system for this type of
station is relatively straightforward and met by pro­
viding a small station supplies system and appropriate
22
Chapter 1
grid connection for transmitting the station output.
However, the most recent hydro station designed and
built by the C E G B is a p u m p e d storage scheme at
Dinorwig. This is an 1800 M W station consisting of
6 X 300 M W generator-motor sets.
All six sets are capable of generating full output
using water stored in a high level lake which is dis­
charged into a lower lake at about station level. The
machines can also act as motors running in the op­
posite rotational direction to p u m p water from the
b o t t o m lake back into the top reservoir at a time when
the grid system is lightly loaded.
The electrical system design principles at Dinor­
wig took account of the following specific design as­
pects. The station is sited at a location where no grid
substation existed previously and therefore a new
400 kV substation was required for connection of the
generator-motor sets. Each generator-motor has its
own three-phase, 340 M V A transformer. The H V
windings of these transformers are connected in pairs
to the 400 kV switchhouse. This consists of two section
circuit-breakers between the three generator-motor
transformer circuits, and two hne circuit-breakers for
the two 400 kV connections to the Pentir substation
some 11 km distant from the power station. For
environmental reasons these connections use 400 kV
oil-filled cable. The outline of the station electrical
system is illustrated in Fig 1.14. T o run the sets up
as p u m p s , starting supplies are derived from either
of two dedicated starting transformers and associated
variable frequency sets, with a c o m m o n starting busbar.
The starting transformers derive their supplies from
the 400 kV grid via two of the generator-motor
transformers. The busbar is sectionaHsed however so
that any faults can be isolated. Each of the two start­
u p equipments is rated to start-up one machine at a
time. There is also an alternative means of starting-up
a set as a p u m p by back-to-back connection to another
machine running as a generator.
Machine excitation is derived from an excitation
transformer. The excitation supply must be available
prior to starting the machine in the pumping m o d e ,
whether using the starting equipment or the back-
to-back alternative it should not be subject to phase
reversal. Each machine therefore has its own ex­
citation transformer connected to the H V side of the
generator-motor transformer. In the absence of grid
supplies, a machine can be run-up as a generator
by deriving excitation from the 240 V station D C sys­
tem until it becomes self-excited via the excitation
transformer.
Each generator-motor is connected to its trans­
former via an air-blast circuit-breaker and reversing
isolators incorporated into the 18 kV busbar connec­
tions system. The circuit-breaker is necessary to allow
disconnection of the machine for phase reversal or
shutdown, while still keeping the generator-motor trans­
former in service to maintain the electrical supplies to
the station.
 S y s t e m descriptions

- T O A STATION-
132 KV 132 KV
\
132KV

EHV GRID
CONNECTIONS

1 400KV

'I ( ( {
GENERATOR ) GENERATOR
TRANSFORMER ) TRANSFORMER 3 2

GENERATORQ—00— 23.5KV V - 0 0 — 6 ^ GENERATOR

31 ^ ^ 32
UNIT UNIT
TRANSFORMER 3 8 TRANSFORMER 3 2

STATION STATION
TRANSFORMER
TRANSFORMER
0 32

}}}}}) Ϊ)—hni w U
\ ^ — c m
I II
n
u
n
FEED RC CW FEED FEED CW RC FEED
CW CW
PUMPS PUMPS
PUMPSl

3.3KV I ^ I J_ _[ Í Í 3.3KV

γ γ Y TURBINE γ
y '/ ' / AUXILIARIES '/
\ AUXILIARIES \ ' \ V

TURBINE HOUSE OTHER AREAS TURBINE HOUSE

DIESEL
GENERATORS

Γ 1 .

-ESSENTIAL P U M P S "

1—Γ- - 1 — r
ESSENTIAL PUMPS, HEATERS. FAN COOLERS ETC -

- BATTERY CHARGERS AND LOW VOLTAGE SYSTEMS

FIG. 1.11 PWR electrical system showing inter-relationship with off-site systems

Earthing of the generator system is achieved in
the normal manner using generator neutral earthing
modules. T o cater for the period when t h e generator
circuit-breaker is open, system earthing, i.e., o n the
generator transformer side of t h e disconnector, is
achieved by earthing the unit transformer H V winding
rather than using a dedicated earthing transformer or
a system earthing module connected to the 18 kV
system.
T h e number a n d rating of t h e unit auxiliaries led t o
the adoption of 415 V as the unit system voltage. O n
the station system however, because of some larger
motors (up t o about 850 k W ) , a station system voltage
level of 3.3 kV was chosen.
The system design incorporates three station trans­
formers, each rated at 10 M V A a n d teed off t h e 18 kV
main connections t o three of the six machines. In this
way, station transformer capacity is available such that

23
Electrical system design Chapter 1

23.5/11 kV UNIT
TRANSFORMER 1

NEUTRAL EARTH
RESISTOR IB

U 415V
, , RADWASTE BLDGVt
¿1
_fs_
V LOAD CENTRE 1 V J—P-

Y^415V FUEL BLDG. LOAD CENTRE 1 ^ J[^>-

TRANSÍ 415V WATER TREATMENT PLANT LOAD CENTRE 1 V

FIG. 1 . 1 2 PWR unit/station electrical auxiliaries system

Y 415V CW PUMPHOUSEyHYPOCHLORITE PLNT LOAD CENTRE 1 Y

the total station services requirements can be met,
even with a 3.3 kV tail works feeder outage, using
only two transformers and leaving the third trans-
former to act as a standby. Each is therefore rated
to meet the simultaneous duties of supplying half
the cavern 3.3 kV and 415 V station services, the
headworks and tailworks services and, when the nor-
mal Area Board supply is unavailable, the 400 kV
cable cooling plant.
T o meet the requirements of the STPs, diesel gen-
erators are provided in order that the station can be
started in the generating m o d e in the absence of grid
supplies. In addition, the diesel generators maintain
essential services in the cavern such as lighting, heating
and ventilation plant to the personnel areas, battery
chargers and normal drainage.

24
 S y s t e m descriptions

GENERATOR I ^OOkV
TRANSFORMER 2

23.5/11kV UNIT
TRANSFORMER 2

FIG. 1 . 1 2 (cont'd) P W R unit/station electrical auxiliaries system

The electrical system design has to recognise the machine availability.

function of the pumped-storage scheme to provide
very rapid response to extra load demand. The start-up
supplies are arranged such that a fault on any machine
being started will not affect a unit which is operating
in a generating or pumping m o d e by the provision
of section isolators. This also enables starting busbar
maintenance to be carried out with minimum affect on
Considering the miscellaneous forms of power gen­
eration, the C E G B has considered several renewable
energy sources. Of these sources, the most cost effec­
tive being pursued is wind turbine-generators (WTGs).
These are mostly located in very remote locations and
as such are generally u n m a n n e d . The C E G B has tried
several sites, including the Orkneys, C a r m a r t h e n Bay

25
 Electrical system design Chapter 1

FROM 11 kV FROM 11 kV
STATION BOARD 1 STATION BOARD 2

ESSENTIAL ESSENTIAL
DIESEL DIESEL _
GENERATOR 1 (¿^ GENERATOR 4
ESSENTIAL ^ ESSENTIAL ><?< ^
I TRANSFORMER 1 TRANSFORMER A V á t V Q]
NEUTRAL , NEUTRAL
i EARTHING hH EARTHING
J RESISTOR L I RESISTOR
^ NER ^ NER

3.3kV ESSENTIAL BOARD 1

ϊ Λ
ΓΤΤΤΤΤΤΤ~^~Π
3.3kV ESSENTIAL BOARD 4

Π ΓΤΤΤΤΤΤΤ^
φ lb [] É φ [] [] φ φ

ΤΟ PLANT
PROTECTION
BOARD 1
i TO PLANT
PROTECTION
o o BOARD 2

^1
>
I
DC UJ
15

si
o
<α:
b ge
I
uj (fíZ u.

ii
IU=)
ÜQ.
415V ESS. DIESEL LOAD CENTRE 415V ESS. DIESEL LOAD CENTRE ^
Γ "

Λ Y RUHS LOAD CENTRE 1 Τ RUHS LOAD CENTRE

415V ESS. DIESEL M C C 1 415V ESS. DIESEL MCC ^

YpRFSSHTRSinAnr.FNTRE1 'RESS. HTRS. LOAD CENTRE 4

415V ESSENTIAL LOAD CENTRE 1 415V ESSENTIAL LOAD CENTRE 4

ÍTTT ΓΓΤΤ
415V ESSENTIAL M C C 1 Ε 415V ESSENTIAL M C C 4 E

415V ESSENTIAL MCC 1 0 415V ESSENTIAL MCC 4 0

15V ESSENTIAL M C C 1 A 415VESSENmA|^CC4^

415V ESSENTIAL M C C 1 415V ESSENTIAL M C C ^

FIG. 1.13 PWR essential electrical AC systems

26
 S y s t e m descriptions

FROM 1 1 kV FROM 1 1 kV
UNIT BOARD 1 UNIT BOARD 2

ESSENTIAL ESSENTIAL
DIESEL DIESEL
GENERATOR 2 GENERATOR 3
ESSENTIAL ESSENTIAL
TRANSFORMER 2 TRANSFORMER 3

M , NEUTRAL I I I NEUTRAL
r i EARTHING ΓΊ EARTHING
y RESISTOR y RESISTOR
V NER V NER

•3kV ESSENTIAL BOARD 3

i i i 1 i 1 i Γ Τ Τ Τ Τ Τ Τ Τ
ΰ I 1 ώ iti É dl
• φ

f f ( f {
415V ESSENTIAL MCC 2F
Í Í ÍÍ i415V ESSENTIAL MCC 3F

415V ESSENTIAL MCC 2E JM5J^SSE^I^ΊAU^JCC3^

415V ESSENTIAL MCC 2C 415VESSE¡ÍTIALJJCC3C^

415V ESSENTIAL MCC 2A J¿¿VJEggE¡IT¡ALJ¡CC3/^

415V ESSENTIAL MCC 2B 415V ESSENTIAL MCC 3B

NOTES

MOTOR RATINGS (SHOWN IN SHAFT kW)

ARE INDICATIVE ONLY

FIG. 1.13 (cont'd) PWR essential electrical AC systems

27
Electrical system design Chapter 1

(é) • • •
•"HI.

^ -

é 3
Θ Θ
STARTING STARTING
EQUIPMENT 1 EQUIPMENT 2

400/18kV \ 400/18kV
><=>/ GENERATOR-MOTOR ' GENERATOR-MOTOR
^ TRANSFORMER 1 I TRANSFORMER 2
' 3 4 0 MVA ^3^^
18 kV

(X) IBkV/llkV
STARTING
(I) TRANS-
FORMER 1

18kV/3.3kV 18kV/415V
STATION UNIT SERVICES
' y \ TRANSFORMER 1 TRANSFORMER 2
1.6 MVA

18kV/717V
18kV/415V GENERATOR-MOTOR
UNIT SERVICES EXCITATION
TRANSFORMER 1 TRANSFORMER 2
1728 kVA
18kV/717V
GENERATOR-MOTOR
. EXCITATION
Δ TRANSFORMER 1

IBkV GENERATOR- 18kV GENERATOR

MOTOR 1 GENERATOR-
MOTOR MOTOR 2
CHANGE-OVER CHANGE-OVER
ISOLATORS EXCITATION
ISOLATORS
CUBICLE

1M3G 2M3PP \ 2M3G

18kV GENERATOR-MOTOR 1 18kV GENERATOR-MOTOR 2

CIRCUIT BREAKER CIRCUIT BREAKER

1M0 2M7\ 2M0

18kV GENERATOR-MOTOR 1 GENERATOR-MOTOR 2
STARTING ISOLATORS STARTING ISOLATORS
1 \ 18kV GENERATOR-
-,18kVGENE 2M2 18kVGENERAT0R-
t — - ο Λ ^ - ^ MOTOR 2
t ^iA3—^ MOTOR 1 I 2A3 BRAKING SWITCH
BRAKING SWITCH
-||i18kV GENERATOR- Hli 18kV GENERATOR-
1M1 MOTOR 1
EARTHING SWITCH
I 2M1 " MOTOR 2
EARTHING SWITCH
1S4> 2S4>
18kV STARTING 18kV 18kV STARTING
BUSBAR GENERATOR- BUSBAR
MOTOR 2 SECTION ISOLATORS
SECTION ISOLATORS
\1Y3 STARTING EQUIPMENT
18kV STARTING OUTPUT TRANSFORMER 1
EQUIPMENT 1 BY-PASS ISOLATOR
OUTPUT ISOLATOR

FIG. 1.14 Dinorwig electrical system

28

and Richborough. In all these sites, the wind turbines
have had ratings of between 1 and 3 M W . Present
thinking is to develop 'wind parks', each wind park
will have about 1 5 - 2 0 machines feeding into the Area
Board system at 33 kV and 66 kV.
The 'needs' for an electrical system for such gen­
erators are very much less onerous than for a conven­
tional power station, especially as they are intended
to be u n m a n n e d . The machines will be self-starting
and will synchronise themselves onto the Area Board
network automatically. A simple switching system is
envisaged, with tee-off connections to supply 'unit'
services, if required. Battery capacity will be installed
in a limited form to provide essential lighting, heating
and any control suppUes which may be required.
The main W T G is mounted on t o p of a cylindrical
steel pole which, at the b o t t o m , houses the switch-
gear, etc. Power is transmitted to the wind park dis­
tribution network from the machine via a 'twisting'
cable, necessary as the rotor and machine assembly
follows the wind a r o u n d .
4 System performance
4.1 Station and unit start-up
For all types of power stations, start-up can only be
achieved if there is sufficient electrical power avail­
able from either a grid connection or a large on-site
power source such as a gas-turbine generator.
Grid connections will be either 132 kV, 275 kV or
400 kV depending on the availability at the site. 132 kV
would be preferred, due to the cost savings in switch-
gear cables and transformers. However this decision,
made at the planning stage, must take into account
factors such as:
• Is 132 kV available at the proposed site?
• Will the 132 kV system need to be reinforced to
supply the power station requirements?
• If present, is it intended to be kept for the life of
the new station (due for example to Area Board bulk
supply requirements)?
• Is the 132 kV in the correct geographical location
on the proposed site to avoid long and compHcated
cable runs?
• Are there sufficient spare circuit-breakers or bays
available or the capacity for extension to feed the
station requirements?
Another consideration is the phase angle difference
between the 132 kV system and the 400 kV system, since
the unit system will be connected to 400 kV via the
generator transformer and there may be some electrical
distance between the two voltage levels. In some cases
this can be quite excessive and may well be outside
S y s t e m performance
the range of the approved check synchronising equip­
ment (see Chapter 12). In addition, large phase angle
differences cause large circulating currents when the
unit and station systems are paralleled. This will be
reflected in a short time requirement for a high rating
of the unit transformer which may well lead to un­
acceptable constraints. Phase angle differences of about
10° are considered acceptable.
Whichever primary voltage levels are chosen, start­
u p power is usually supplied to the power station
via station transformers. However, where, generators
are connected to the system via generator voltage
switchgear, start-up power may also be provided via
the generator transformer/unit transformer route. Al­
though stations have been built with generator voUage
switchgear and n o station transformers, it is not a
practice which would be recommended today. This is
because a complete loss of supplies to half the station
could occur following the tripping of a generator
H V circuit-breaker as a result of a major fault in
the zone protected by the overall unit protection (see
Chapter 11 on Protection), causing immediate and
longer term operational restrictions.
If a station requires start-up power when external
grid supplies are not available, i.e., black start, it will
be necessary to provide power sources at the 11 kV
voltage level by means of on-site generation of suffi­
cient capacity dieseis or gas-turbines, or off-site genera­
tion, e.g., gas-turbines at another adjacent generating
station with local interconnection. It -should be noted
that GTs may have other duties such as 'peak lopping'
or 'frequency support' or emergency generation. This
is discussed m o r e fully in Section 6.1 of this chapter.
For start-up conditions, the station electrical system
is interconnected to the unit electrical system usually
at 11 kV t o provide power from the station trans­
former t o the unit system. T h e generator transformer
H V circuit-breaker and unit transformer LV circuit-
breakers are open at this time. This arrangement is
shown in Fig 1.15.
The method of achieving this differs from station
t o station, but the principle is the same. Most fossil-
fired stations have unit boards interconnected by cable,
but nuclear stations have a variety of arrangements.
Early magnox and A G R s differed widely in the meth­
od of achieving start-up supplies, but A G R s such
as Hartlepool and Heysham 1 and 2 introduced a
generator voltage switch, allowing the generator/unit
transformer combination t o provide starting power
(see Fig 1.10).
A n electrical auxiliaries system arrangement for
start-up with a generator voltage switch is shown on
Fig 1.16.
4.1.1 Plant required
All power stations require at least one C W p u m p and
one SO^Q electric boiler feed p u m p available and
running to start u p a unit. In addition, fossil plant
29
Electrical system design Chapter 1

' GRID ' GRID

GENERATOR
W TRANSFORMER

. STATION
0 W UNIT
TRANSFORMER TRANSFORMER

11kV STATION
BOARD

UNIT AUXILIARIES STATION AUXILIARIES

CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CIRCUIT BREAKER NORMALLY OPEN

FIG. 1.15 Arrangement for station start-up (direct connected generator)

"GRID •GRID

GENERATOR
TRANSFORMER

GENERATOR^
VOLTAGE
SWITCH UNIT STATION
TRANSFORMER TRANSFORMER
INTERCONNECTOR

11kV . 11kV STATION

UNIT BOARD BOARD

^ V '
UNIT AUXILIARIES STATION AUXILIARIES

CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED CIRCUIT BREAKER NORMALLY OPEN

FIG. 1.16 Arrangement for station start-up (generator connected by a generator voltage switch)

requires either coal mills or oil pumps and draught
plant, e.g., F D and ID fans, P A fans, etc. Gas-cooled
nuclear plant requires gas circulators running on main
motors or pony motors at approximately 1 5 % speed,
whereas water reactors require reactor coolant p u m p s .
Both nuclear types require various supporting aux­
iliaries to be available during the run-up stages, the
poor quality steam being d u m p e d until the correct
quality is achieved.
When steam of correct quality is being produced,
the turbine-generator will be run u p to speed with
all the unit supporting auxiliaries being powered from

30
 S y s t e m performance

the station transformers via the unit/station inter-
connectors.
4.1.2 Synchronising to the grid
When the turbine-generator is run u p to the correct
speed, it is synchronised to the grid via the generator
transformer H V circuit-breaker (see Fig 1.17) if the
generator is directly connected t o the generator
transformer, or at the generator voltage switch if one
is provided (see Fig 1.18). This is normally achieved
using dedicated automatic synchronising equipment,
control of which is located in the main control r o o m .
However, the turbine automatic run-up equipment
could well contain an automatic synchroniser and in
this case the synchronising equipment mentioned above
would n o longer be required. M a n u a l check synchro­
nising may be achieved using portable check synchro­
nising trolleys in the main control r o o m .
4.1.3 Synchronising unit to station
W h e n the generator is synchronised to the grid and
lightly loaded, it is appropriate to transfer the unit

GRID (TYPICALLY 400kV) GRID (TYPICALLY 132kV)

I AS MS I
Θ GENERATOR
TRANSFORMER

Θ UNIT
TRANSFORMER

MS MS
STATION
•^TRANSFORMER

11kV 11kV
UNIT «STATION
BOARD BOARD

MANUAL CHECK SYNCHRONISING

M S VIA SYNCHRONISING TROLLEYS

A S AUTO SYNCHRONISING VIA

DEDICATED EQUIPMENT

FIG. 1.17 Synchronising points for a direct connected generator

GRID (TYPICALLY 400kV) GRID (TYPICALLY 132kV)

~ r

STATION
^TRANSFORMER
MS

0
MS MANUAL CHECK SYNCHRONISING
VIA SYNCHRONISING TROLLEYS

AS AUTO SYNCHRONISING VIA

DEDICATED EQUIPMENT

FIG. 1.18 Synchronising points for a generator connected via a generator voltage switch

31
Electrical system design
loads to the unit transformer. This is achieved by
paralleHng the unit and station boards for a short
time via the 11 kV interconnector. Check synchro­
nising facilities, by means of control r o o m located
synchronising trolleys, will be necessary, as the two
sources may be out of phase and frequency. The check
synchronising relay has limits of ± 2 0 ° within which
successful paralleling will be achieved.
For stations with generator voltage switchgear, the
unit transformer usually provides start-up supplies.
However, the station transformer still supplies the
station loads and the unit to station interconnection
at 11 kV can provide a standby facility to the unit
transformer (if it is out of service). Again, check
synchronising facilities will be required to enable the
supplies to be transferred without interruption. Details
of the synchronising equipment are described in
Chapter 12.
4.2 Shutdown and power trip
There are basically two types of shutdown:
• A controlled shutdown, due to a request for a re­
duction in generation or prior to an outage.
• An emergency shutdown, following an internal or
external fault requiring disconnection of the unit
from the grid.
4.2.1 Controlled shutdown
A controlled shutdown is basically the reverse of a
start-up sequence. The unit power output is reduced to
a level appropriate to the design, when the unit and
station supplies may be paralleled and all unit aux­
iliaries transferred to a station transformer source. In
the case of a generator voltage switch arrangement,
the supplies do not need to be transferred, providing
a grid connection is maintained. Section 4.3 of this
chapter describes what is the expected sequence of
events following a loss of grid supplies.
The A G R nuclear plant is arranged to have one
generating unit associated with one reactor. The P W R
differs in as much as present UK designs have two
generators with one reactor. All nuclear plant requires
post-trip cooling to remove the fission product decay
heat, but due to differing reactor/turbine configura­
tions, the functional requirements will vary from sta­
tion to station. As post-trip cooling forms part of the
safety function, it is quite normal to arrange for the
emergency or essential system prime-movers to start
for every reactor trip whether accompanied by loss of
grid or not.
4.2.2 Power trip
There are a number of types of trip which may be
experienced on power station plant. These are discussed
briefly below and a more exhaustive treatment is given
in Chapter 11:
32
Chapter 1
(a) Grid fault disturbances on the national grid sys­
tem may cause a loss of connection to a single
generating unit, or all power station connections.
This is discussed in more detail in Section 4.3 of
this chapter. A n electrical fault may occur which
requires the power station to grid substation circuit-
breaker to open.
(b) Generator system electrical faults in the generator
unit zone, i.e., the generator, unit transformers
and the main connections, will require both the
generator H V and unit transformer LV circuit-
breakers to open instantaneously.
(c) Generator mechanical faults on the generator or
turbine such as loss of lubricating oil or control
fluid, loss of condenser vacuum, require shutdown
of the unit, but not necessarily instantaneous elec­
trical disconnection. Indeed some benefit can be
gained in limiting turbine-generator overspeed if
the generator is left connected to the off-site power
system for a short time.
(d) Electrical auxiliaries system faults on the electrical
system at 11 kV or lower, may cause an unaccept­
able reduction in the plant necessary to continue
running the unit. It should be noted here that the
design philosophy is such that one fault should
not cause the loss of more than one unit.
(e) Consequential trip due to loss of steam generation,
i.e., failure of the steam raising plant will require
the unit to be tripped.
Faults in group (a) above, normally subject the gen­
erator to 100% load rejection. The turbine-generator
unit will accelerate due to the excess of input energy
over demand. The steam (governor) and excitation
(AVR) control mechanisms are designed to cope with
this situation but some overspeed will occur, depending
largely on the inertia constant of the unit and the speed
of the control systems. Back-up overspeed protection,
in the form of centrifugal force-driven bolts, is provided
to trip the steam valves, should the control systems
fail to control the unit below about 10% overspeed.
Faults in groups (c) above, leave the generator elec­
trically connected to the grid and the unit load, so
that the overspeed due to entrained steam is Hmited.
Completion of unit trip by disconnection from the
electrical system is achieved by a power measurement
relay detecting low forward power, see Chapter 11.
In certain of the fault trip cases considered here,
the auxiliaries system will be subjected to voltage and
frequency transients. The safeguards are designed such
that the mechanical systems are not subjected to tran­
sients outside their design codes.
For stations with direct connected generators, faults
in groups (a)-(e) will generally cause a loss of supply
to the whole unit electrical system. Essential plant is
supplied from battery-backed systems or by local
generation using diesel generators or gas turbines.

For stations with generator voltage switchgear, some
faults in the above groups may allow the unit electrical
system to remain connected to the grid system.
Steam raising plant to generating plant intertrips
are simple to design for steam generation/turbine
units, as a trip of the steam raising plant will trip the
generator and vice versa. For stations where c o m m o n
steam raising plant feeds more than one generating
unit, logic must be introduced to detect that only one
generating unit has tripped if the design allows the
steam raising plant to r a m p down to 5 0 % load. This
applies to the present design of P W R .
4.3 The effects of loss of grid supplies
Loss of grid supplies is a generic term which covers
events from the loss of a single generator connec­
tion, to the total collapse of the local grid network.
Grid disturbances, which cause the voltage a n d / o r
frequency to go outside their operating limits, must
also be considered in this category. The following
sections examine the various mechanisms which lead
to grid disconnections.
A power station connected to the National Grid will
experience all the voltage and frequency transients
which occur on the surrounding grid system from time
to time. F r o m a system operation point of view, it
is desirable to keep generation connected through­
out these disturbances to support the system and its
stability. However, the design and operation of gen­
erating plant will be specified to limits of voltage and
frequency in the station technical particulars. These
limits (as detailed in Section 5.1.(d) of this chapter)
are those which are expected during normal operation.
For conditions which may be considered a b n o r m a l ,
which will probably be outside the specified limits, the
power station designer must consider deliberate dis­
connection of the station from the abnormal grid. This
action is necessary to avoid possible overstressing of
the electrical auxiharies system or subjecting the me­
chanical plant to conditions outside its specified limits.
This is of particular importance in nuclear plant which
is nuclear safety-related, but is also of importance
from an economic standpoint on conventional plant as
repairs and outage time are very costly.
In present nuclear stations, specific voltage/fre­
quency detecting equipment is installed normally at
the 11 kV voltage level, but may also interface with
the essential system which may have its own specific
dedicated monitoring equipment. Should the power
station electrical auxiliaries experience conditions out­
side the preset Hmits for more than the specified time,
automatic disconnection is carried out, the station is
shut down and power is supplied from the essential
supplies generator sets.
Earlier C E G B power stations have their electrical
protection arrangements designed such that faults which
open the generator transformer HV circuit-breaker will
S y s t e m performance
also trip the generating unit. Designs for A G R sta­
tions have specified that a *run through' capability be
provided. This means that on opening the generator
transformer H V circuit-breaker only, thus disconnec­
ting the generator from the grid, the generating unit
will r a m p down to house load. If the grid becomes
available after a short time, the generator can then be
re-synchronised without having to suffer the lengthy
down times necessary t o run u p a machine after a hot
or cold shutdown. This is of particular benefit since
restarting is always a lengthy process due to Xenon
poisoning in the reactor. In practice this operating
regime has been difficult to achieve, mainly due to
limitations in the very rapid control of mechanical
plant a n d / o r the reactor at low power levels. Intended
*run through' periods of approximately 10 minutes
have been aimed at with subsequent shutdown should
grid supplies not be available after that time.
T o achieve this feature, it is necessary to arrange
the electrical protection such that faults which need
only trip the generator transformer HV circuit-breaker
to isolate the fault, will not trip the unit or its con­
nection to the electrical auxiliaries system.
Certain grid disturbances local to power station sites
in relatively weak grid areas, could cause the generators
connected at the time of the fault to go outside their
stability margin. This is because during the clearance
time of the fault, the system voltage is depressed and
n o power export is possible. The excess energy is stored
in the machine as an increase in rotor angle and may,
dependent on the clearance time of the fault, cause
the rotor angle to increase beyond its stability limit,
resulting in pole slipping. Although the plant can be
protected against this condition, the effect on the grid
system from the consequent loss of generation is de­
trimental to its continued stability.
Therefore consideration must be given to taking
certain measures which will improve the transient
stability of the generators in areas of weak grid con­
nections. Several methods have been considered for
adoption and basically fall into two groups:
(a) Those which may be implemented on the turbine-
generator unit.
(b) Those which may be implemented on the grid
system.
Methods in group (a) include fast-acting AVRs and
possibly faster closure of the turbine stop valves, al­
though this latter technique has not been proven on
UK plant.
Methods in group (b) include the addition of switched
shunt reactors at 400 kV, automatic VAr compensa­
tion and static compensation.
A new technique being investigated by the C E G B ,
is the addition of braking resistors connected at gen­
erator voltage. This is a method in group (a) where
the resistors would be connected in the power station.
33
Electrical system design
In this method, a large resistive load (approximately
300 M W ) is connected across the generator terminals
for a very short period of time immediately following
the fault clearance and hence voltage recovery. This
gives the effect of absorbing the excess kinetic energy
stored in the generator rotor, avoiding the power swings
which would otherwise occur. There is a need to
identify the point at which the braking resistor is
to be appHed and the length of application. It is also
necessary to use a switching device which is fast
enough to be compatible with the detection method.
The control scheme envisaged is based on an energy
measurement system which constantly monitors the
generator, and calculates in 10 ms time periods the
energy and compares this against a preset value. The
time at which the braking resistor is required and the
length of application is calculated and the resistor
switch is signalled to close. Typically a fault dura­
tion time of 85 ms would cause a braking resistor
application in the region of 100 to 150 ms.
A prototype has been designed and constructed for
trial at Pembroke Power Station at a relatively weakly
connected part of the grid. Preliminary indications are
that this method will be more effective than shunt
reactors for improving the generator's response to
transient instability conditions.
The loss of grid connection normally means the loss
of electrical supplies to the unit (and possibly station)
auxiliaries. Certain auxiliaries are required to continue
in operation after unit trip to achieve a safe shut down
state. For conventional power stations, the post-trip
requirements are less onerous than for nuclear power
stations.
For conventional stations, battery-backed suppHes
or small diesel generators may suffice. The duty will
include maintaining supplies to drives such as generator
seal oil pumps or barring gear motors.
Nuclear plant however, because of the decay heat
due to fission products, requires more and larger drives
to be maintained for longer periods of time. The post-
trip requirements for most nuclear plant last for days
rather than hours, and hence there is a need for a
much more robust essential electrical system. As post-
trip cooHng is also claimed as part of the nuclear safety
case, redundant plant is provided.
A more detailed description of the post-trip require­
ments for AGRs and P W R s is included in Sections
3.3.3 and 3.3.4 of this chapter respectively.
Previous nuclear stations based their safety cases
on the ability to provide post-trip cooling without a
grid connection being available. The various fault
sequences were examined on a deterministic basis, and
the case was made by demonstrating that there was
sufficient redundant plant available to achieve the
necessary safe shutdown state.
The later A G R s and the P W R designs were examined
using probabihstic analysis techniques using assigned
values of component and system reliability to analyse
various fault sequences against an overall target figure.
34
Chapter 1
In the case of the P W R , a predominant contributor
to the overall frequency of degraded core was the
fault group l o s s of all 11 k V . The value of frequency
for this fault group was found to be dominated by
the frequency of loss of off-site power (LOSP), and
detailed analyses were undertaken to determine the
figure for L O S P frequency for the selected sites.
The P W R safety case is m a d e on the basis of,
interalia, the estimated value of L O S P frequency.
The frequency of L O S P is therefore a major consi­
deration in assessing the reliability requirements for
the on-site generation provided to meet the essential
electrical system duties. The reliabihty assessment must
consider the starting and continued running capabi­
lities of the auxiliary generation to cater for the L O S P
time bands such as those outlined in Section 2.4 of
this chapter.
4.4 Station plant outages and faults
There are two types of outage which have to be
considered in the design of the power station auxiliaries
system. These are:
• Planned outage The C E G B has a policy of regular
maintenance for all power station plant. Although
regular maintenance is normally carried out when
the unit is shut down, there is often a requirement
to maintain a supply to an associated piece of plant.
This is particularly so when considering nuclear
stations. Also some equipment may require main­
tenance more regularly than the unit outage period.
T o reflect these needs the design will normally in­
corporate sufficient diverse and redundant plant to
a level necessary to maintain supplies to essential
plant.
• Forced outage Despite the regular maintenance
poHcy, plant will occasionally become unavailable
for example due to a fault. The repair of faulted
equipment is known as 'breakdown' or 'urgent'
maintenance. The defence against this occurrence,
where it would compromise nuclear or plant safety,
is to design the system with sufficient redundant
items and supply routes to maintain essential sup­
plies and enable equipment to continue operating.
This is especially important for essential nuclear
plant.
The design principles to achieve the necessary level of
security require plant systems to be provided as main
and standby, separated or segregated from each other.
Similarly, the electrical supply routes must be run
separately or segregated, with the electrical supply, as
far as practical, derived from independent sources.
For the nuclear station essential systems, the level
of redundancy required is much greater than for fossil-
fired plant. The present approach is to segregate plant,
supply routes and sources, into functionally independ-

ent groups or 'trains', each train having its own es­
sential system generators. These are normally diesel
driven generators connected at 3.3 kV, dieseis being
chosen for their high starting and operational relia­
bility. For the P W R design, for example, a four train
system has been chosen. Each train has a separation
group allocated to it and all associated plant is physi­
cally separated from other train equipment.
Auxiliary generator sets may be installed at a power
station for the reasons given in Section 3.2.4 of this
chapter.
To meet the requirements for auxiliaries frequency
support, *peak lopping' and 'black start', auxiliary gen­
erators are fitted to the unit a n d / o r station switch­
boards at 11 kV. Due to the ratings required to start
up modern plant, they are likely to be gas-turbine
generators.
For the essential duty, due to the smaller load
demands and more onerous response time and relia­
bility required, diesel generators are nowadays used
at 3.3 kV although gas-turbine generators have in the
past been used to meet essential duties.
As mentioned in Section 3.2.3 of this chapter, the
essential system for the Sizewell Β P W R , for example,
has been chosen on the basis of four functionally
independent trains, with a diesel generator connected
to a 3.3 kV board on each 'train'. Each train is
segregated from the others by fire barriers, and also
all the equipment and cabling is segregated similarly.
5 System choice
5.1 Operational requirements
All power stations operated by the C E G B have their
operational requirements set down by the CEGB's
System Planning Department in the Station Develop­
ment Particulars (SDPs).
The choice of electrical system will be influenced
by these requirements, the major aspects of which are
discussed below:
(a) Most nuclear fuelled plant is operated in a 'base
load' regime especially as the output c o s t / k W from
nuclear plant is cheaper than most fossil-fuelled
plant. Coal-fired plant is, however, more adapt­
able to following the load demand curve. Clearly
the electrical system must facilitate the operational
flexibility where this is required. In nuclear power
plant the overriding consideration is one of nu­
clear safety, and this is always uppermost in the
designer's mind. The system chosen for nuclear
plant must have an inherent ability to be con­
figured in the most appropriate form for post-trip
cooling, bearing in mind the alternative supply
choices available.
(b) The electrical system is required by the SDPs to
be designed such that a single fault will not cause
S y s t e m choice
the loss of more than one generating unit. This
reflects the need to limit the generation loss to the
system due to single faults. The connections to the
grid site must also be examined to ensure that a
single System or substation fault will not cause
more generation loss than the System can tolerate.
This is of particular concern in situations where
more than one station is connected t o a c o m m o n
substation.
(c) Power plant designed and installed in the early
1960s assumed that grid loss could be tolerated
and that the transmission system would not totally
collapse. Subsequent events showed that a condi­
tion could occur which caused 'cascade tripping',
i.e., power stations being tripped in an attempt to
supply loads in excess of rating. This led to power
plant being specified which could be started up in
the absence of external grid supplies.
For the 500 M W units, a twin Avon ( 2 5 - 2 8 MW)
gas-turbine generating set was used, but this was
superseded at the later stations having 660 M W
units by twin Olympus (35 M W ) sets because of the
need for a larger rating. The generator output volt­
age in all cases was nominally 11 kV and the gas
turbines were connected to the 11 kV unit boards.
Gas-turbine generators were installed for duties
summarised as follows:
• Black station starting The gas turbine is run-up
and closed o n t o a dead busbar. Synchronising
is only required for regular testing in parallel
with the grid derived suppHes. Gas turbines
would normally be connected t o the unit board.
• Peak lopping As the gas-turbine generators
have to be paralleled with the grid, automatic
synchronising is provided. GTs would normally
be connected to the unit b o a r d when the asso­
ciated main unit is generating or via the u n i t /
station b o a r d interconnector to the station trans­
former when the main unit is shutdown.
• Frequency support The gas-turbine generator
responds to falling frequency, starts, and is
closed onto the busbar; this is specified to oc­
cur at frequencies down to 40 Hz and auto
synchronising is required.
• Supplies to essential equipment Supplies to
essential drives such as generator seal oil, barring
gear and, if a nuclear plant, electrical supplies to
the post-trip cooling equipment.
The choice of rating, the number of gas turbines
and their connection t o the auxiharies system, are
all influenced by the duty required of them. Con­
sideration must be given in the duty definition to
the requirements for manual a n d / o r automatic
start, a u t o a n d / o r m a n u a l synchronising, and for
the inclusion of centralised control.
35
Electrical system design
The first A G R nuclear stations were fitted with
single Olympus gas turbines at 17.5 M W rating
but these were for nuclear safety needs primarily,
and were not intended for black start purposes,
although some peak lopping duties were performed.
(d) The plant must be designed to meet the voltage
and frequency limits set by the system. Typically
these are as follows:
• All electrical plant must be capable of main­
taining full C M R output within the range 4 9 . 5 -
51 H z . From 49.5 to 47 Hz the output may be
prorata with frequency, but operation below
48 Hz will not be for longer than 15 minutes.
• Frequency excursions between 5 1 - 5 2 . 5 Hz may
be experienced, but these will only be for short
periods.
• The HV system voltage to which the power
station is connected is nominally 400 kV or 275
kV, with typical limits of:
400 kV, ±5%
lis kV, ± 1 0 %
The electrical auxiliaries system must be designed
to recognise these variations, as well as taking into
account the drop in voltage throughout the system
due to varying load and running conditions. Most
modern conventional power plants have three main
nominal voltage levels viz, 11 kV, 3.3 kV and 415
V. The design Hmits of these voltage levels are
typically from 4 - 6 % to - 1 0 % with - 2 0 % under
motor starting conditions. The voltage at all no­
minal levels is maintained by means of optimising
the transformer tap positions, such that the 415 V
drive most remote from the primary (11 kV) busbar
is subjected to a voltage within the tolerance under
the worst condition, e.g., when starting. A check
of the voltage profile under light load conditions
is also made to ensure that the system is not
o ver stressed.
The design stage voltage profile is verified by
system studies which model the system using inter­
active computer programs.
These studies will of course need updating at a
later date when all the manufacturers' data is
known. This is described more fully in Chapter 2.
5.2 Reliability of nnain and standby plant
The design of the electrical system should, in general,
reflect the requirements of the mechanical plant and
should not reduce its reliability. Where important
mechanical systems are provided with redundancy, the
electrical supplies should also be redundant. Therefore
main and standby plant should be supphed electrically
from independent sources, via segregated supply routes.
36
Chapter 1
For nuclear power stations, the mechanical and
electrical plant may well require segregation, and will
ultimately be segregated into independent functional
'trains'. This approach has proved to be the most
robust system of providing defence against the whole
range of credible faults, verified by probalistic analysis
techniques.
The use of diverse equipment in independent
functional trains also benefits by reducing the impact
of c o m m o n m o d e and c o m m o n cause failures. These
techniques can be employed to provide the level of
reliability required for the systems which are associated
with nuclear plant.
The reliability of a system will be analysed by the
use of probaHstic analysis techniques. T o obtain a
meaningful answer, the component reliability must be
assessed. This is not always easy from a historical point
of view, when components may have been in use only
for a few years. However, by using equipment which
has been rigorously and systematically tested, a cer­
tain degree of confidence may be obtained from the
attributed component failure rate. Using a degree of
pessimism in the calculations also expands the confi­
dence factor of the figures used. C o m p o n e n t failure
rates are considered not only for normal conditions
but also for abnormal conditions both natural and
following major plant disruptions. This includes seis­
mic events and extremes of pressure, temperature and
radiation levels, and also missile impact. Equipment
is classified into items which are required to withstand
seismic and environmental conditions and those which
are not. Again verification is achieved by subjective
testing.
The choice of system will depend on the relia­
bility required of it and the availability of suitable
components.
The use of proven equipment, which has demon­
strated a satisfactory performance under varying condi­
tions, will also support the predicted rehability of the
system. New designs of equipment should be avoided
in essential systems, unless they have been developed
and tested to demonstrate standards of technical re­
quirement at least as high as those claimed in the system
design.
The reliability of electrical systems is also enhanced
by ensuring that designs follow the design principles
as outlined in the introduction to Section 3 of this
chapter.
5.3 Economics
The choice of electrical system for a particular power
station project will be influenced by several economic
factors, the main aspects of which are discussed below.
Capital cost
The initial capital cost of an electrical scheme can be
estimated from a cost analysis of the various com-

ponents proposed. This can be achieved using data
from many sources, for example:
• Contract prices of similar equipment on other (pre­
ferably recent) projects.
• Budget prices from possible suppliers or manufac­
turers.
• Standard cost estimating databases.
To enable a true comparitive estimate to be m a d e ,
all prices and costs must be related to a c o m m o n
price basis date. Any adjustment must be m a d e using
standard factors. Where designs are not finalised, a
judgement must be made and an estimated cost at­
tributed to it in the form of provisional sums, to
allow for any variation from the base design.
The C E G B employs a standard capital cost break­
down method for estimating new projects, where costs
are allocated to particular coded plant areas. These
costs are reviewed on a regular basis (usually annually)
and updated as and when more firm information be­
comes available, e.g., tender prices or contract sums.
In this way, close cost control can be applied to ensure
that the project remains within the budget.
In the early stages of a project, when designs are
still subject to change, it is difficult to finalise the
final electrical system due to the lack of confirmed
information regarding the mechanical plant it is re­
quired to supply. However, by use of the estimating
techniques mentioned above, it is possible to compare
one proposed scheme with another for a particular duty
so that the most cost effective scheme may be chosen.
Transformer losses
Transformers associated with modern power stations
are of ratings up to 6 0 M V A for unit and station
transformers, and u p to 1 1 5 0 M V A for 9 0 0 M W unit
generator transformers. Although designs are avail­
able which minimise the losses, they are still significant
when taken over the Hfe of the station. It is there­
fore present practice to include an estimate of the
capitalised losses over the station life in the station
cost estimates. Due regard to this element must be
exercised in the choice of electrical system.
Consequential costs (connection to the National Grid)
To connect the power station into the National Grid
will require extra circuits to be used or provided at
the transmission substation adjacent to the proposed
site. In general, most substations have been in existence
for some time and it is rarely a simple j o b to connect
new generating plant to the existing system. The cost
of the generation circuits, associated circuit-breakers,
isolators, busbars and civil costs are attributed t o
the power station capital estimates. The costs for the
remaining E H V equipment are attributed to the trans­
mission account but, nevertheless, alternative config­
S y s t e m choice
urations will be examined to arrive at the most cost
effective scheme. Some of the options which are likely
to require examination are as follows:
• Grid system voltage It is a policy to connect all
m o d e r n new generating plant t o the 4 0 0 kV system.
The facilities available at the substation will deter­
mine whether a new 4 0 0 kV substation would be
required or the existing equipment extended. It is
also a policy to construct new 4 0 0 kV substations
with metalclad gas-insulated (SFÓ) equipment, and if
at coastal or polluted sites to enclose them within a
building.
• Station transformer primary voltage The station
transformers may be connected at 1 3 2 kV, 2 7 5 kV
or 4 0 0 kV. The choice depends on several factors as
discussed in Section 3 of this chapter. The most
economic option will normally be a 1 3 2 kV connec­
tion. T h e electrical load o n the station transformers
imposed by modern power plant is considerable, it
may therefore be necessary to uprate the 1 3 2 kV
substation by the addition of an extra supergrid
( 4 0 0 / 1 3 2 kV) transformer to support the capacity
required. This reinforcement of the 1 3 2 kV system,
if required only to meet the new power station
load, may m a k e this scheme economically less at­
tractive. Also the position of the 1 3 2 kV substation
may require very long cable connections, again ad­
versely affecting the scheme economics.
Cost analyses showing these considerations will de­
monstrate which is the most economic proposal, but
the final decision will be based on a combination of
economic, technical and operational considerations.
Development
Whilst the C E G B poHcy is to use proven and tested
plant, development work is often required to meet a
need which has hitherto not been identified. The
cost of this development work may be borne by the
project and in that case a capital sum is included in
the project estimates. The choice of system design may
be influenced by the need to develop a particular
piece of plant rather than use an existing alternative.
In this case, a justification would have t o be m a d e to
demonstrate the technical superiority compared with
the cost of the development work.
Sometimes development work is required because
the previous equipment is no longer available, or is
no longer manufactured, and there is n o suitable alter­
native on the market. This situation often is not at­
tributable to a particular project and would be funded
from a general development budget.
Decommissioning
At the end of a power station's life, it will require
decommissioning or dismantUng and the site prepared
for other usage.
37
Electrical system design
For fossil-fired plant, this is a fairly straightforward
exercise. For nuclear stations, however, the j o b is
much more complex and protracted involving removal
of fuel from the reactor, placing it into the cooling
pond and finally removing it from site for processing.
The costs of this work must recognise the need for
an integrity and security of supply during fuel removal,
as well as additional monitoring of the reactor struc­
tures whilst removing contaminated material after fuel
removal. These costs will also be included in the
station's capital estimates.
5.4 Plant limitations
The electrical auxiliaries system must be designed to
meet the needs of the mechanical plant, i.e., the
starting, operational and protection needs of all the
electrically-driven items. The problem the electrical
system designer is faced with is twofold, firstly, the
electrical system can only be finalised when all the
parameters of the mechanical plant are known, and
secondly, electrical plant itself has technical limitations
which must be borne in mind. The following sections
describe some of the major limitations which confront
the system designer on modern power station plant.
It is assumed that the major mechanical drives are
known, at least in principle, and that a fair estimate
of their load demand is available.
5.4.1 Switchgear current rating
As mentioned in Section 3 of this chapter, the primary
auxiliaries system voltage is largely determined by the
largest electrical drive, normally the electric boiler feed
p u m p . In the past, steam turbine feed pumps have
been used, but the new coal-fired designs proposed
for the 1990s are specifying full duty electrically-driven
feed pumps in a 3 χ 5 0 % combination without turbine-
driven pumps. For a subcritical pressure design of boiler
the rating of each 5 0 % p u m p m o t o r is 13.5 M W .
The decision to fit flue gas desulphurisation (FGD)
on all new coal-fired plant and to retrofit it to some
existing stations has meant a considerable increase in
unit and station electrical load.
The C E G B approved ranges of 11 kV switchgear have
a maximum current rating of 3150 A. This leads to a
maximum 11 kV transformer output of approximately
60 M V A . For stadon and unit loads in excess of this,
consideration must be given to using more than one
2-winding transformer or, alternatively, the use of
3-winding transformers, i.e., transformers having two
secondary windings. This will increase the number of
switchboards at the primary voltage level, leading to
more complex start-up/shutdown arrangements. An
example of a calculation for maximum unit or station
transformer rating is shown below.
BS 171 defines the method of rating calculation for
transformers as:
38
Chapter 1
Transformer rating = V3 X 11 kV circuit-breaker
current rating χ open-circuit
voltage of the transformer
secondary winding.
Assuming a typical open-circuit secondary winding
voltage of 11.5 kV and 3150 A , 11 kV circuit-breaker
rating:
Transformer rating = V3xll.5xl0^x3150x
10-6
= 62.57 M V A
It is obvious that this r a d n g is notional as the
transformer cannot provide open-circuit voltage when
on load. Hence the actual transformer capability is
closer to the value obtained by using the transformer
nominal secondary winding rating, i.e.,
Rating = V3 χ 3150 x 11 χ 10^ χ
10-6
= 60 M V A
Similar constraints are imposed at other voltage levels
by the limit of switchgear current rating, restricting
the maximum transformer sizes accommodated by the
system.
5.4.2 Switchgear short-circuit rating
Normal start-up arrangements are such that the unit
s t a r t - u p supplies a r e derived f r o m t h e s t a t i o n
transformer and these are transferred to the unit
transformer after the unit has been synchronised to the
grid and part loaded. This requires paralleling of unit
and station sources at 11 kV. Also, at lower voltage
levels, paralleling may be required to changeover from
one supply source to another should supplies need to
be maintained to the connected plant. Paralleling at
lower voltage levels, however, is not normally part of
start-up procedures.
The fault level at a switchboard is predominantly
Hmited by the impedance of the supply transformer,
although connecting cables also add to the source
impedance, but not significantly. Whilst fed from a
single source, the fault levels normally experienced are
well within the rating of the switchgear. This however
is not always the case when two sources are paral­
leled, but by adjusting the transformer impedances
appropriately, the designer is normally able to arrange
for parallel o p e r a d o n , especially at 11 kV. There are
however other limidng factors, notably, the starting
of large induction motors direct-on-line and the re­
quired system voltage profile. In extreme cases con­
sideration must be given to the addition of inductors
between switchboards, when parallel operation is re­
quired, to Hmit the prospective fault levels. These in­
ductors may have to be designed such that they can
be shorted out to avoid voltage d r o p problems under
standby operation.

For situations requiring additional generation such
as for the emergency provision of essential power (by
either gas-turbine generators or diesel generators), fault
level problems may also occur. If the additional power
generator is connected in parallel with the grid or
another source of supply, care must be taken in the
design of the electrical system to ensure that switchgear
fault levels are not exceeded. Such paralleling may be
required, for example, under peak lopping, frequency
support, or testing conditions. An example of fault
level calculations is shown in Section 5.4.4 of this
chapter.
5.4.3 Large electric motors
As mentioned in Section 5.4.1 of this chapter, the
new coal-fired designs will have 13.5 M W boiler feed
pumps. Motors of this size are difficult to start direct-
on-Hne, due to the starting current experienced caus­
ing unacceptable voltage drops in the lower voltage
systems. The designer is then faced with the conflict
that the transformer impedances must be high enough
to allow parallel operation while limiting prospective
fault levels, but low enough to start large electric motors
without serious voltage regulation problems.
If no satisfactory compromise can be estabhshed,
other solutions must be considered. The most likely
avenue is to employ alternative starting methods for the
large motors, or to achieve transfer of supplies without
paralleling.
Fast transfer
In this method the unit and station supplies are trans­
ferred, but are not paralleled. The interruption time
is sufficiently small that the motors do not slow down
enough to be affected by re-energisation a few milli­
seconds after supply interruption. The use of presently
approved air break circuit-breakers does not, however,
give any confidence that consistent successful change-
overs will be achieved with any degree of reliability.
This is due to the relatively slow and inconsistent
operating times of air break circuit-breakers. The use
of vacuum circuit-breakers having much shorter op­
erating times will overcome this difficulty and are now
being introduced into power stations.
Assisted motor starting
With the introduction of thyristor-based equipment,
the speed control of motors has become very precise
and many manufacturers offer standard systems. With
motors of the size envisaged for the new coal-fired
plant, static conversion equipment may require de­
velopment, but there do not seem to be any technical
limitations and this course would appear to be the
most promising method of current-control starting of
large motors. The additional space required for the
static conversion equipment must be taken into account
S y s t e m choice
when laying out the plant and the additional civil costs
borne in mind.
Another benefit of assisted starting of large motors
is that the fault level contribution under 'making'
conditions should be limited and may be negligible.
If the design is near the switchgear rating limit, static
conversion equipment will assist in reducing the fault
level. A further benefit is the possibility of variable
speed which may be of use for plant operation.
Generator main connections
The largest generating unit connected to the grid system
in the UK is 660 M W . The new coal-fired plant will
introduce larger units of about 900 M W rating.
The present 660 M W generator vokage is 23.5 kV,
with a full load current of 19 100 amperes. The pro­
posal for the 900 M W design is to raise the generator
voltage to 26 kV. The temperature rise allowed on the
phase isolated busbars will Hmit the current rating on
the present designs which, although they are rated at
voltages in excess of 23.5 kV (voltage rating being 33
kV), are at the practical limit of current capacity with
natural air cooHng. The use of forced cooHng methods
will need to be considered, with sufficient redundancy
to attain the necessary reliability.
It is not u n c o m m o n to have to design the layout
and fixing details of the generator end of the main
connections to accommodate the particular wishes of
the generator manufacturer. It is outside the scope of
this section to discuss this in detail, but if the machine
terminals do not have sufficient clearance to accom­
m o d a t e air-cooled phase isolated connections consi­
deration must be given to the use of water cooled
connections at least in part (see Chapter 4 on generator
main connections).
All these considerations have effects on the surround­
ing plant, e.g., the generator transformer will need to
be developed to a suitably increased rating. This will
affect the registered design concept which will need
review (see Chapter 3 on generator transformers).
5.4.4 System performance calculations
In order to assess an electrical system's performance
fully, studies must be carried out using the interactive
computer analysis programs described in Chapter 2
of this volume. These require a considerable amount
of data to be gathered, which may be actual, typical
or estimated values, but may not be available in the
early stages of the electrical system design. The designer
must check his provisional design by traditional hand
calculations. A typical system is shown on Fig 1.19 and
the typical calculations used to check the design are
shown below.
The unit system and station system may be con­
sidered as two separate systems for the purposes of
fauh level calculations.
39
Electrical system design Chapter 1

GRID
CONNECTION GRID CONNECTION
400kV OR 132kV

< GENERATOR TRANSFORMER

MAIN GENERATOR

UNIT TRANSFORMER UNIT TRANSFORMER

UNIT BOARD | |

(M) (M) ® (M) ® @

MOTORS CONNECTED AT 11kV

ELECTRIC FEED PUMP (13.5MW) • 3.3kV UNIT AUXILIARY BOARD 3 3kV STATION AUXILIARY BOARD
F D FAN (2.3MW)
I D FAN(3.3MW)
P A FAN(IMW)
C W PUMP{3.75MW)
FGD BOOSTER FAN (7 OMW)

TYPICAL SYSTEM DATA

400kV SWITCHGEAR FAULT LEVEL RATING = 35,000 MVA

GENERATOR TRANSIENT REACTANCE
GENERATOR TRANSFORMER IMPEDANCE
UNIT TRANSFORMER IMPEDANCE
STATION TRANSFORMER IMPEDANCE
UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER IMPEDANCE
= 0 33 D.U. ON RATING OF 924 MW AT 0.85 p.f.
= 16% ON RATING OF 1145 MVA
= 17.5% ON RATING OF 60 MVA
= 18% ON RATING OF 60 MVA
= 12% ON RATING OF 12.5MVA

FIG. 1 . 1 9 Typical electrical system parameters for a 9 0 0 M W unit

Unit system
SOURCE
The unit system may be represented by a simple GRID

impedance diagram as shown in Fig 1.20, with the

generator and grid being considered as two sources.
This equates to the impedance diagram shown in
Fig 1.21.
The values of impedance are calculated as follows
using a 100 M V A base:
Zgrid Assuming the maximum fault infeed is equi­
valent to the switch gear rating, viz 35 000
MVA, then the p . u . impedance on a 1000
M V A base is
100
therefore Zgrid = 0.0029 p . u .
35 000
Zgen Generator subtransient reactance is assumed to
be 0.20 p . u . on a rating of 660 M W , therefore:
Impedance on a 100 M V A base =
100
0.20 X X 0.95 = 0.0245
776
SOURCE
660 GENERATOR FAULT
(where rating = M V A = 776 M V A and allow-
0.85
ing a 5 % negative tolerance)
FIG. 1 . 2 0 Impedance diagram for unit system
Zgen = 0.0245 p . u .

40
 S y s t e m choice

SOURCE
GRID SOURCE
GRID

Zgrid 0.0029

Zgen 0.0245

Zgent 0.018

FAULT
FAULT Impedances in p.u. on 100 MVA Base

FIG. 1.21 Equivalent impedance diagram for Fig 1.20 FIG. 1.22 Typical impedance values for a 900 MW unit

Zgent Assuming the generator transformer to have SOURCE

GRID
an impedance of 16% on a rating of 800 M V A :
16 100
Zgent = X 0.9 = 0.018 p . u .
100 800
(where a 10% negative tolerance is assumed)
therefore Zgent = 0.018 p . u .

Zut Assuming a unit transformer impedance of

17.5% on a rating of 60 M V A : 0.0245 0.0209

17.5 100
Zut X 0.9 = 0.263 p . u .
100 60
where a 10% negative tolerance is assumed,
therefore Zut = 0.263 p . u .

Substituting these values into the impedance diagram

shown in Fig 1.22. This simplifies to the impedance
diagram shown in Fig 1.23. The equivalent impedance
to the parallel branch is:

0.0245 X 0.0209
FAULT
(0.0245 + 0.0209)
= 0.0092 p . u . FIG. 1.23 Simplified impedance diagram for Fig 1.22

41
Electrical system design Chapter 1

Equivalent source impedance is (0.0092 4- 0.263) p . u . 12.5 M V A transformer impedance on 100 M V A

= 0.272 p . u . base
12.5 100
= X p.u.
The equivalent fault contribution for a fault on the
100 12.5
unit board 11 kV where the circuit-breaker interrupts
the fault is: = 0.96 p . u .
100
MVA Therefore, total 3.3 kV to 11 kV impedance
0.272 = 3.03 + 0.96 p . u .
= 3.99 p . u .
The 11 kV unit system fault contribution = 367 MVA
100
(1.1) 3.3 kV m o t o r contribution = MVA
3.99
Additionally, if a circuit-breaker closes on to a fault, 3.3 kV motor backfeed contribution = 25 M V A
then the contribution from the motors and 3.3 kV (1.3)
system backfeed must be taken into account. This
contribution is calculated as below.
The resultant fault level at the 11 kV unit board being
considered is 529 M V A . This value is a symmetrical
11 kV motor contribution The contributing M V A of making duty that the switchgear must accommodate.
a motor for hand calculations is assumed to be the It should be understood that the switchgear is rated
ratio of the starting M V A to the M W rating and hence on a making first loop current peak which assumes a
the value is obtained from the motor rating and the value of 121 k A . The equivalent R M S symmetrical
multiplication factor specified for motor starting in figure (expressed in M V A for convenience) is calculated
BS4999. For the purposes of the following calculation, as follows:
a figure of 5.5-times for motors u p to 10 M W and
121
5-times for motors greater than 10 M W is assumed. 121 k A peak is equivalent to k A R M S , but
Typical figures for a 660 M W coal-fired unit would 2V2
be: to calculate the R M S value of the absolute peak of
current at the instant of initiating a short-circuit, a
FD fan contribution = 2.3 X 5.5 = 12.7 MVA further factor of 0.9 is applied.
ID fan contribution = 3.3 X 5.5 = 18.15 MVA
Symmetrical R M S equivalent is — kA
PA fan contribution = 1.0 X 5.5 = 5.5 MVA 0.9 X 2V2
CW pump contribution = 3.75 X 5.5 = 20.6 MVA = 47.54 k A
Boiler feed pump contribution = 9.0 X 5.5 = 49.5 MVA
This equates to an equivalent M V A value of
The 11 kV m o t o r contribution is therefore calculated V 3 X 11 X 10^ X 47.54 x 10^ = 905 M V A
by considering the number of motors connected at the
time of the fault. For this example it is assumed that
the following drives are connected A value of 900 M V A is chosen for calculation purposes
as a notional M V A value. The figure of initial peak
current values are unUkely to be seen in practice due
2 ID fans + 2 F D fans + C W p u m p + B F P + P A fan
to the relatively slow operation of the switchgear and
(36.3 + 25.4 + 20.6 + 49.5 + 5.5) = 137.3 M V A
the fact that the fault current will decay during the
(1.2)
switch operating period. Also the voltage is depressed
at the time of the fault and the notional value is unHkely
3.3 kV motor contribution In addition, the contribu­ to be achieved.
tion backfed from the 3.3 kV Unit Auxihary Boards
must be taken into account.
Station transformer system
Assuming that a typical 3.3 kV unit load is 6 M W
fed through a 12.5 M V A 1 2 % , 11/3.3 kV transformer: The station transformer fault contribution is calculated
in a similar m a n n e r to the unit system. The station
3.3 kV starting M V A = 6 χ 5.5 (assuming a starting system may be represented by the simple impedance
M V A / M W ratio of 5.5) diagram shown in Fig 1.24.
= 33 M V A Zgrid may be assumed to be the same value as used
for the unit calculation, viz 0.0029 p . u . This assumes
100 that the station transformer is connected at 400 kV.
on a 100 M V A base, equivalent impedance =
33 However, Zgrid for the 132 kV system when combined
= 3.03 p.u. with the station transformer impedance will result in

42
 S y s t e m choice

39.4 k A with an enhanced making capability of 121 kA

first peak. These values equate to 750 M V A break
SOURCE
GRID and 900 M V A m a k e , symmetrical, but will be tested

Θ to the current value. The combination of power sources

which may be paralleled is limited by these ratings.
The system must be examined for the proposed operat­
ing conditions and the fault contributions determined.
Zgrid
A n example of one of the most onerous operating
conditions is when the unit b o a r d is paralleled with
the station b o a r d during start-up and shutdown. For
Zst this condition the infeeds from contributions (1.1)
to (1.5) (inclusive) are summated and may be shown
diagrammatically as in Fig 1.25.

FAULT UNIT STATION

TRANSFORMER TRANSFORMER

FIG. 1.24 Impedance diagram for a station system

1367 1366

a lower fault contribution. Therefore choosing 400 kV

37 125 122
will give the worst case.
Station transformer impedance (Zst) — assumed to 7
FAULT
be 18% on rating of 60 M V A : 11kV

18 100
Zst = X X 0.9 (assuming 10% negative
100 60 133 T27
tolerance)
= 0.27 p . u .
®
3.3kV 3.3kV
(UNIT) (STN)
Total impedance = 0.27 + 0.0029 p . u .
= 0.273 p . u .
FIG. 1.25 Fault contributions from various sources
Fault contribution from station transformer in MVA

100
= 366 M V A (1.4)
0.273 'Breaking' fault level = 367 -H 366 M V A
= 733
3,3 kVmotor contribution Assuming a station load of
5 M V A on the 3.3 kV system, starting M V A (assuming
'Making' fault level = 733 -h 137 -h 25 -h 22
a starting M V A / M W rating ratio of 5.5) = 5 x 5.5
= 917 M V A
M V A = 27.5 M V A
Assuming a 12.5 M V A unit auxiliary transformer This ' m a k e ' fault level figure is in excess of the sym­
feed to the station auxiliaries load (at 12% on rating), metrical fault level rating of 900 M V A . A significant
the 3.3 kV station auxiliaries m o t o r fault contribution contribution is m a d e by the m o t o r infeeds which are
is: based on pessimistic values.
100 In reality the values used have not taken account of
MVA the initial decrement caused by the X / R ratios during
12 100 100 the first half cycle which have a modifying effect by a
100 12.5 27.5 factor of the order 0.9. Also, n o allowance has been
m a d e for the additional impedance presented by the
21.7 M V A (1.5) connecting cables. This again would justify a reduction
by a factor of 0.95. Therefore the m o t o r contribution
The resultant fault level of the 11 kV board being value is m o r e realistically:
considered is 388 M V A .
(137 + 25 -F 22) X 0.9 χ 0.95 = 157 M V A
Calculation of fault infeed for various conditions
The total ' m a k e ' fault level therefore becomes:
The maximum symmetrical fault level rating of 11 kV
switchgear approved for use on the C E G B system is (157 + 733) = 890 M V A

43
Electrical system design Chapter 1

This value is very close to the maximum switchgear 100

rating and would require corroboration by computer
system studies as described previously.
When carrying out the initial hand calculations,
if it is found that the fault levels are considerably
greater than the capabilities of the system components,
then a review of the influencing parameters should
be carried out. Amongst these are the transformer
impedances and tolerances applied. This may result
in specifying closer impedance tolerances when pur­
chasing the transformers.
Auxiliary generation
Auxiliary generation may be required, for example,
to start up the station without external suppHes, i.e.,
'black start'.
In this case, the auxiliary generator is assumed to be
connected to the station 11 kV board. The impedance
diagram is therefore as shown in Fig 1.26.
Fault contribution = MVA
0.176
566 M V A
Therefore, there is no problem in paralleHng the
auxiliary generator with the grid when restoring the
system to grid-fed station transformers.
5.5 Maintenance and safety
Safety of plant and personnel, which assumes prime
importance in power stations, may be considered under
two plant states, i.e., operational and maintenance.
Section 8 of this chapter describes in more detail the
methods adopted to achieve the objectives, but the
considerations can be outlined as follows.
5.5.1 Operational
The main concerns under this m o d e of activity are:

• Avoiding damage to the plant. This can be caused

SOURCE
GRID by putting the plant into a state whereby continued
SOURCE

Θ AUXILIARY
GENERATOR
operation or the response to a fault condition would
cause permanent damage to the plant. A n example of

0.0029
Θ this would be the paralleling of two electrical suppHes
which would subject the switchgear to short-circuit
conditions outside its rating, were it asked to clear
0.5 a fault.

• Avoiding hazards to personnel. In the example

0.27
quoted above, there is also a danger to personnel
operating the plant and hence another fundamental
.11kV reason for protecting against it.

1 FAULT
Protection is primarily afforded by interlocking, gen­
erally referred to as operational interlocking, and is
achieved by either an electrical relay scheme or a com­
puter based scheme.
FIG. 1 . 2 6 Impedance diagram for an auxiliary
The choice is largely based on the complexity of the
generator connected to the station board
system being interlocked, as the electrical relay based
scheme becomes extremely ponderous and difficult to
design when there are a large number of possible op­
Assume auxiliary generator (GT) having a rating of
erational configurations to consider.
30 M V A at 1 5 % sub transient reactance:

100 5.5.2 Maintenance

ZGT X 0.15 p . u .
30 The concern under this m o d e is essentially personnel
safety. Plant damage is of course possible and must be
= 0.5 p . u . considered, but less likely due to the plant being non-
operational during maintenance.
Zgrid = 0.0029 (from previous)
Essentially, the objective is to aHow safe access for
Zst = 0.27 (from previous) maintenance purposes to electrical equipment, which
is normally alive. Access is controUed by a rigid set of
0.2729 X 0.5 safety rules specifically drawn u p and controlled by
Total impedance p.u. the C E G B , under a formal 'Permit for W o r k ' system.
(0.2729 -F 0.5)
T o ensure that access is denied until all electrical ap­
= 0.176 p . u . paratus has been switched off, isolated and earthed.

44

it is normal to apply a coded key system designed for
each appHcation.
5.5.3 Other safety interlocking
During normal operation it is imperative that all
equipment which contains live metal must be designed
such that access is denied at all times whilst the equip­
ment is energised. Typical examples of this are switch-
gear cubicles where internal access is prevented when
the isolator is O N ' , done by ensuring that the iso­
lator interlocks with the door opening mechanism.
Although these requirements are written in the equip­
ment specification, there are several ways they may
be achieved. The choice must be one of a balanced
design while ensuring safety allows equipment opera­
tion without undue restriction.
5.5.4 Nuclear safety
Although the above requirements apply equally well
to nuclear plant, the systems which have nuclear safety
connotations will be designed with a higher integrity
than their fossil equivalents. In many cases, however,
this does not lead to the scheme being more complex,
as the simplest and most cost effective way of achiev­
ing the operational and personnel safety requirements
will often prove to be robust enough to withstand a
higher analysis standard.
5.6 Quality assurance
Quality assurance (QA) may be considered in two parts,
there being design quality and product quality.
5.6.1 Design quality
Quality assurance structure
The CEGB has always taken great care in the design of
its power stations, with due regard for the specified
requirement of a 30 year life from the plant. This is
based on the cost of ensuring high reliability and
availability, compared with the economic penalty of a
high merit unit outage. More importantly, the design
of nuclear plant has been given even more rigorous
scrutiny in order to attain the high standards required
to satisfy the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate ( N i l ) .
In order to improve further the quality of the design,
the C E G B has adopted the requirements of BS5882
(Nuclear) and BS5750 (Conventional) to formalise its
approach to quahty assurance.
T o manage the design process on the current nuclear
projects (e.g., P W R ) , a set of auditable project p r o ­
cedures have been written to cover all the activities
of the project team and any design/supply support
required from outside the team. Each person involved
in a particular activity will be issued with the relevant
procedures relating to it and will be required to work
S y s t e m choice
to t h e m . Fossil fuel plant design will be covered in a
similar m a n n e r , but to an appropriate and less rigorous
standard.
The design process
The essence of controlling the design process is to
ensure that:
• All specialist and interface departments have an
opportunity to input to the design where their
discipHnes are involved.
• The design proceeds in accordance with the laid
down design strategy.
• The design can be completed within the project
programme.
• T h e design selected is economically justified.
• All aspects of the design process are documented
and m a d e available for the Hfe of the station.
T o achieve the above, it is necessary that for each
topic a design strategy is in place, so that each designer
has a c o m m o n design base from which to proceed. At
each stage of the design, the design statement, be it
document or drawing, will need t o be verified. This
will be achieved by the Verification process'.
Verification is achieved by initially circulating a
*plan' of who will be required to review the document
or drawing. The plan will be created at an early stage
and will be with the document or drawing throughout
the whole life of the design. The document or drawing
is circulated t o each reviewer identified o n the plan.
C o m m e n t s received from reviewers must be considered
by the originator, w h o must agree with the reviewer
how to resolve the c o m m e n t . Each document or draw­
ing will have a 'Fitness for P u r p o s e ' reviewer, who
has the j o b of ensuring that the document or drawing
fulfils the intended purpose and follows the laid down
project strategy. Each document or drawing will have
a record sheet indicating the reviewers involved who
will sign the sheet after agreement is reached. In this
way each stage of the design is reviewed, with any
issues which are unresolved being identified clearly at
each stage.
Periodically the Q A of each section of the project
will be audited to identify whether the procedure is
being violated and point out any corrective measures
necessary.
Independent design audits will be carried out at
regular intervals t o ensure that the design is proceed­
ing at the required standard. Any corrective measures
would be suggested at this point.
Coding and numbering
The development of modern computer databases has
led to much more flexible data handling systems being
available. The large number of items of plant, docu-
45
Electrical system design
ments and drawings associated with modern power
plant has led to a need for quick and accurate identi­
fication of plant and documents. A system is therefore
required which will uniquely 'number' and also 'identify'
the plant/documentation. Identification of plant items
will use system based codes, with additional coding to
identify function, location, separation group, etc.
Several numbering/coding systems are used both in
Europe and the USA. The C E G B is developing a 'next
generation' system which will employ the best features
of the existing systems, with due regard to the power
of the computer systems available.
5.6.2 Product quality
The quality of the manufactured product suppHed by
C E G B contractors for many years has been very high.
This is ensured by constantly monitoring the perfor­
mance of contractors, the use of an 'approved list of
tenderers' and, where appropriate, developing designs
and specifications jointly with prospective tenderers.
New products, if being considered, are assessed by
the C E G B on a technical and commercial basis as are
the manufacturers concerned. All vendor assessments of
this nature are strictly confidential to the C E G B .
The quahty of the product is largely dependent on
the quality of the technical specification and the ability
of the manufacturer to adhere to it. The C E G B operates
a very comprehensive product inspection procedure
during manufacture which ensures that the product
quality is satisfactory.
The technical specification will call for all necessary
routine and type testing of equipment to ensure that
it meets the technical requirements. Standard technical
clauses have been developed by the C E G B to ensure
that the product quality is repeatable, whichever con­
tractor is chosen for a particular piece of plant.
6 Uninterruptable power supply (UPS)
systems
6.1 Introduction
The U P S systems, formerly known as guaranteed
instrument suppHes (GIS) or no-break suppHes, are
designed to provide battery-backed A C supplies of
better quality and continuity of service compared with
the supplies available from the electrical auxiliary
system. They are provided for essential instruments,
controls and computers, which are associated with the
safe and reliable operation of the plant under aU normal
and abnormal operating conditions. The following
loads are usually supplied from the U P S systems:
• Those which are required for post-incident monitor­
ing and recordings foHowing a main unit trip and
loss of station A C suppHes.
46
Chapter 1
• Those which because of stringent supply require­
ments would not give an adequate level of reliability
if operated from the electrical auxiliary system only.
• Those which are required for the main unit shut­
down. D C supplies are preferred for this purpose
because they offer better reHability.
• Those which are essential for 'black start', i.e., in
the absence of normal A C suppHes.
6.2 Earlier UPS and GIS schemes
Before 1978 both battery-backed motor-generator sets
and static inverters were used at various power stations
to provide the U P S systems. Both types of system were
generally unreliable and the various problems experienc­
ed can be summarised as foHows.
6.2.1 Motor-generator (MG) set schemes
A typical motor-generator scheme is shown in Fig
1.27. The disadvantages which emerged in service were:
• Frequent maintenance required, e.g., shutdown and
inspection every 3 m o n t h s .
• Excessive brush wear.
• Parallel operation difficult at low loading.
• Unreliable frequency locking to the station master
clock.
• T o o many components used, resulting in high failure
rates (MTBF of 2 years for a single M G set).
6.2.2 Static inverter schemes
Static inverters have been in use for over 17 years on
large C E G B power stations for supplying power to
instrumentation, controls, computers, alarms, etc.
The subsequent developments of schemes used before
1978 were based on the shortcomings which appeared
during their operational years, namely:
• T o o many components used, resulting in high failure
rates (MTBF of 2 months for a single inverter).
• Ferro-resonance problems when switching trans­
formers onto inverters.
• Load sharing difficulties as well as single inverter
failure caused tripping of all inverters and a total
loss of instrument supplies.
• Excessive component temperature rise leading to
premature failures.
• P o o r short-circuit capability.
Each of these early schemes, iHustrated in Figs 1.28
to 1.32, is described briefly as follows with details of
shortcomings:
 U n i n t e r r u p t a b l e p o w e r supply ( U P S ) systems

415V 3 PHASE STATION SERVICES BOARD

- δ

415V 3 PHASE UNIT BOARD

Wd( TRANSFORMERS

110V DC

MOTOR STARTERS

MOTOR GENERATORS

Ú Ú Ü
CHMD- 110V AC SINGLE PHASE

\ iΪ i
^ .9 SUB-BOARDS
ί [ ]
OR RING MAINS
(NUMBER OFF DEPENDS
ON SITE LAYOUT)

[I [] []

NORMALLY OPEN
NOTE: CIRCUIT BREAKER CAN ONLY BE CLOSED IF THE THREE
MG SET CIRCUIT-BREAKERS ARE OPEN

FIG. 1.27 Motor generator scheme — single line diagram of connections

(a) One inverter per 500 MW generating unit The
load was normally supplied from the unit electrical
(b) Two inverters per 500 MW generating unit
auxiliary system via a step-down 415 V / 1 1 0 V
single-phase transformer shown in Fig 1.28. In the
event of mains failure the load was transferred t o
the inverter. The scheme did not prove reliable due
to inverter failures.
The 240 V D C supply was derived from the
240 V D C station system used t o supply emergency
D C drives, emergency lighting, switchgear a n d clos­
ing solenoids, etc.
One
inverter supplied the load with the other on 'cold'
standby as shown in Fig 1.29.
The D C system was dedicated t o the inverters.
In the event of mains failure the load was fed from
the inverter, which was suppHed from the battery.
If the inverter failed, the changeover contactors
transferred the load t o an alternative supply derived
from the electrical auxiliary system.

47
Electrical system design
415V/110V
TO UNIT 1
C&l SWITCHBOARD
FIG. 1.28 Static inverter scheme (one inverter per main unit)
The scheme proved reasonably reliable, but
over-elaborate and consequently more expensive
compared with present practice.
(c) Four inverters per 660 MW generating unit Three
inverters operate normally in parallel and one on
standby as shown in Fig 1.30. The scheme was
designed such that two inverters could supply the
total load.
The D C system was dedicated to inverters and
was on a per unit basis.
The inverters proved very unreliable and the
design did not achieve inverter redundancy, i.e.,
on failure of one inverter the other inverters could
trip. The standby suppUes derived from the elec­
trical auxiliary system had to be used on many
occasions due to tripping of all inverters.
The equipment was eventually disconnected and
a new development single U P S installed.
(d) One inverter per 660 MW generating unit A DC
system was dedicated to it as shown in Fig 1.31.
In the event of inverter failure the load was
transferred to an alternative supply using change­
over contactors. The main disadvantages of this
scheme were:
• Interruption of supply on transfer from the
48
Chapter 1
Τ
inverter to the alternative supply and vice versa.
• O n transfer from the alternative supply to the
inverter large inrush currents occur on the load
side. Low inrush transformers were subsequent­
ly fitted to avoid the problem, i.e., to prevent
inverter ferro-resonance and trips.
• The scheme rehability was not adequate.
(e) One inverter per 500 MW generating unit A DC
system was dedicated to it as shown in Fig 1.32.
The scheme offered considerably improved re­
liability compared with the previous scheme (Fig
1.31), because a static switch was provided to
transfer the load without interruption on inverter
failure; also on re-transfer from the alternative
supply to the inverter.
A number of inverter trips occurred during grid
disturbances. However, the present version of this
type of equipment has given very Httle trouble.
6.3 Developnnent of UPS systenns
In order to overcome the previous service difficulties
a 30 kVA, 415 V single-phase development static U P S
system (Fig 1.28) was commissioned in May 1978 at
 Uninterruptable p o w e r supply ( U P S ) systems

415V 50Hz 415V 50Hz

m .

HCr-o-

<415V/110V

110V 50Hz

FIG. 1.29 Static inverter scheme (two inverters per main unit)

Drax Power Station together with low inrush (5- T h e step-down transformers have the following basic
times full load current) 8 kVA, 415/110 V distribution parameters:
transformers.
• Impedance 2 % .
The system has proved entirely satisfactory. Further
identical U P S systems have been commissioned at • Flux density of approximately 0.75 T.
Littlebrook D and Drax power stations and similar
• Inrush current when energised from mains of ap­
3-phase and single-phase systems have been commis­
proximately 100 A peak at 415 V, decaying t o full
sioned at Heysham 2 .
load current in 1 0 - 1 2 cycles. The inrush current was
For the Littlebrook D and Drax systems, the inverter
obtained using a point-on-wave static switch.
alone is capable of clearing a short-circuit fault of a
415 V branch circuit protected by a 25 A fuselink to
BS8802, Class Q l , within 4 - 5 cycles. A high performance lead-acid Plante battery is rated for
The static switch is double-pole and is rated at 30 minutes' standby duty at 15°C ambient temperature.
1000 A R M S for five cycles. With assistance from the
bypass supply, the above fuselink can be operated in 6.3.1 Littlebrook D power station schemes
less than 5 ms when clearing a branch short-circuit.
The rotary maintenance bypass switch is solenoid
Unit GIS system
bolt-interlocked to prevent out of synchronous transfer.
The complete equipment was type tested; the tests There are three 660 M W oil-fired units at this station.
included vibration tests, dry heat, d a m p heat and low Each unit has an inverter system including a lead-acid
temperature tests, followed by a 200 hours Jong term battery, 415 V unit G I S switchboard and a distribution
stability test o n full load. network as indicated o n Fig 1.33. Only the unit loads

49
Electrical system design Chapter 1

415V 50Hz

FIG. 1.30 Static inverter scheme (four inverters per main unit)

are connected to this system. (In order to minimise
discharging the battery, the charger is normally suppHed
from the essential/station system on more recent
schemes.)
Each inverter system has the following m a i n
components:
from the 415 V unit switchboard B. Under normal
operating conditions the power flow to the loads con­
nected to the GIS switchboards is as follows:
• 415 V unit switchboard A .
• Charger.

• Charger. • Inverter.
• Battery (rated for a 30 min standby duty). • 415 V unit GIS switchboard.
• Inverter. • Step-down transformer.
• Static switch. • Changeover contactor.
• Maintenance bypass switch as shown on Fig 1.34.
In the event of failure of the charger supply, the load
The charger supply is derived from the 415 V unit continues to be supplied by the battery. If the supply
switchboard A . The inverter bypass supply is derived to the charger is not restored within approximately

50

415V 50Hz 415V 50Hz
Hihli
415V 50Hz
(o)415V/11 ov
110V
[1
FIG. 1 . 3 1 Static inverter scheme with an
electromechanical changeover switch
half an hour, the inverter system is arranged to transfer
the load to the inverter bypass supply automatically
and without interruption u p o n detection of the low
battery voltage.
The load is also transferred automatically from the
inverter to the bypass supply under any of the following
conditions, providing the inverter is synchronised in
both phase and frequency t o the bypass supply:
• Inverter failure or output voltage outside the set
tolerances.
• Excessive inverter overload or load inrush current.
• Short-circuit on the load side.
A break in the supply is expected when transfer is
caused by a fault on any of the outgoing feeders. T h e
GIS system is designed to minimise the break (less than
10 ms), except on the rare occasions when changeover
contactors are used at the load centres.
Under normal operating conditions the inverter is
synchronised in both phase and frequency to the bypass
supply to enable an interruption-free transfer to take
place.
Uninterruptable p o w e r supply ( U P S ) systems
415V 50Hz 415V 50Hz
REGULATING
TRANSFORMER
^IIOV
-r?YÑcv
110V 50Hz
FIG. 1 . 3 2 Static inverter scheme with regulating
transformer
Local distribution units are provided for each 110 V
single-phase supply point, each comprising two single-
phase main and standby transformers, changeover con-
tactors, switches a n d distribution switchboard as in-
dicated on Fig 1.35. These are located a r o u n d the
station, in the control block, etc., at suitable load centre
positions.
Each 110 V A C GIS switchboard has an automati-
cally connected standby supply arranged via changeover
contactors.
Changeover contactor units comprise two adjacent
circuits, arranged to give the highest practicable inter-
circuit segregation to permit work in safety on one
circuit whilst the other remains live. The contactors
are capable of picking u p a n d sealing h o m e with any
incoming supply voltage between 7 5 % and 110% of
the rated value. T h e voltage limits apply over a fre-
quency range between 47 H z and 51 H z . Breaks in
supply of u p to 10 milliseconds should not cause the
contactors to drop-out.
The two contactors are interlocked to give either a
'main' supply or a 'standby' supply, i.e., avoid parallel
operation of the two supplies. Transfer from the 'main'
supply to the 'standby' supply is initiated and com-
pleted automatically for 'main' supply voltages below
8 0 % of the setting value. A n undervoltage relay is
provided for each load centre for this purpose and its
51
Electrical system design
415V UNIT BOARD Β 415V UNIT BOARD A
^l|l|l
HSYNC} 30k VA
415V 50Hz
! φ
FIG. 1 . 3 3 Litdebrook D power station — unit G I S
operating characteristics are such that the minimum
operating time at zero voltage is not less than 10 m s .
The voltage setting range is adjustable in seven equal
steps between 4 0 % and 8 0 % of the nominal voltage.
On complete loss of the 'main' supply for longer
than 10 milHseconds, the transfer to the 'standby' supply
takes place such that the total voltage break time on
the load side does not exceed 100 ms.
Transfer from the 'standby' back to the 'main' sup­
ply is manually initiated following the 'main' supply
restoration. The initiation is from the 415 V unit GIS
switchboard location and is made in stages to avoid
excessive inverter overload, which may arise due t o
inrush current of the step-down transformers. The
total voltage break time on the load side does not exceed
100 ms.
The standby supply is derived from the 415 V
station switchboard. This supply is also used for those
unit loads which require two A C inputs from diverse
sources combining them within the equipment in D C
form.
The 415 V bus section switch is intended to be closed
52
Chapter 1
415V STATION BOARD
LOAD CENTRE
110V 50Hz 110V 50Hz
φ φ φ φ φ φ φ I
J
only if a prolonged outage of the incoming 415 V unit
GIS is expected.
The system is designed to give acceptable security
even during the inverter outage for repair, i.e., two
diverse A C supplies are normally available. The com­
puter system is not designed to tolerate 100 ms breaks,
but it is not essential for unit operation. All other
loads are either designed to tolerate a 100 ms break
in supply or have duplicate A C inputs and power
packs to achieve the high level of reliabihty required.
The GIS system is designed to achieve a reliability
target of no more than one main generating unit trip in
30 years of operation.
Only one inverter system is provided on each unit
GIS system, but in the event of inverter failure auto­
matic transfer to another A C supply occurs, i.e., a
standby redundancy is provided. The standby supply is
not battery-backed.
The outage time for an inverter is small and it was
not considered necessary to provide a second inverter
to cover for the small outage times involved. These are
based on pessimistic figures of the mean repair time
 Uninterruptable p o w e r supply ( U P S ) systems

|ΐ|ΐΗσΘο->-

N - NORMAL POSITION

Τ - TEST POSITION

Μ - MAINTENANCE POSITION

BY-PASS SUPPLY
415V 50HZ (NOMINAL)
RED &BLUE PHASES
ONLY

I TO 415V
GUARANTEED INSTRUMENT
I SUPPLY SW. BOARD

FIG. 1.34 Littlebrook D power station — unit GIS illustrating maintenance by-pass switch

being 48 hours. In order to minimise time to repair Either of the two inverter systems is capable of
a faulty inverter system a spare set of inverter system supplying the total n o r m a l station load and each bat­
components is provided. tery is rated for a 30 min standby duty. This makes
it possible to operate with one out of service if
Station GIS system necessary. Under n o r m a l operating conditions the load
is shared as equally as possible between the two inverter
The station GIS system has two inverter systems, each systems.
including an associated lead-acid battery, 415 V station Transfer of the load from one inverter to another is
GIS switchboard a n d a distribution network as only possible with a break of u p to 100 ms, using the
indicated on Fig 1.36. changeover contactors o n the local distribution units.

53
Electrical system design
UNIT GUARANTEED INSTRUMENT SUPPUES DISTRIBUTION BOARD
FIG. 1 . 3 5 Unit G I S distribution switchboard
Local distribution units are provided for each 110 V
single-phase supply point, each comprising two single-
phase main and standby transformers, changeover
contactors, switches and distribution switchboard as
indicated on Fig 1.37. These are located around the
station at suitable load centre positions.
Each 110 V A C GIS switchboard has an automa­
tically connected standby supply arranged via change­
over contactors.
The changeover scheme is almost identical to that
previously described in the unit GIS section, except
that a supply priority selector switch is provided.
Following a loss of supply from an inverter and its
associated bypass supply, the 415 V interconnector can
be closed if a prolonged outage is expected. The load
54
Chapter 1
OFF
7
Q NOI
distribution units affected are then transferred back to
the 'main' supply in stages.
6.3.2 Drax power station schemes
There are six 660 M W coal-fired units at this station,
also six 35 M W gas-turbine generators.
Unit GIS system Following the problems experienced
with the original scheme fitted to the first three units
(Fig 1.30), a 30 k V A development inverter was installed
on Unit 2 in 1978. The inverter system is identical to the
Littlebrook D power station type.
The unit system for the first 3 units is basically
identical to the Littlebrook D power station unit sys-

415V 50Hz
III
30kVA
415V 50Hz
LOAD CENTRE
[I
FIG. 1.36 Littlebrook D power station — station GIS
tern. Units 4, 5 and 6 have two separate inverter
systems per unit, one for the computer and the second
for all other loads. The total unit load was estimated
to be in excess of one 30 kVA inverter already de­
veloped and proved on Unit 2, hence the reason for
two systems per unit.
Station GIS system This is similar t o the scheme
previously described for the Littlebrook D station GIS
in Section 6.3.1.
Gas turbine inverters Each gas turbine has a separate
single-phase inverter of less t h a n 5 k V A with 110 V
output and 110 V D C input. These supplies are required
to enable the gas turbines to start in the absence of
normal A C supplies.
6.3.3 Heysham 2 power station
This is an advanced gas cooled reactor station with
two reactors and two 660 M W generating units. The
U P S systems can be broadly divided into two groups:
Uninterruptable p o w e r supply ( U P S ) systems
415V 50Hz 415V 50Hz
III
30kVA iSYNCh
110V 50Hz
[] [] []
• Essential U P S systems, i.e., those required for nor­
mal reactor operation and those which are neces­
sary for post-trip cooling of the reactor.
• Non-essential U P S systems, i.e., those which are
not safety related. These are described in the sec­
tion o n unit a n d station U P S systems later in this
chapter.
Each reactor is arranged into q u a d r a n t s , each quad­
rant having two diverse modes of reactor cooling called
X and y . Consequently each q u a d r a n t has four in­
dependent U P S systems. T h e U P S system associated
with one q u a d r a n t is shown o n Fig 1.38.
415 V essential UPS system X The U P S system rating
is 100 k V A and the o u t p u t is 415 V, 3-phase and
neutral, 50 H z (nominal). Only essential loads are con­
nected to this system. These are mainly control and
instrumentation loads and various motors and valves.
T h e previous advanced gas cooled reactors used motor-
generator sets for this duty.
55
Electrical system design
STATION GUARANTEED INSTRUMENT SUPPLIES DISTRIBUTION BOARD
- •
MM
FIG. 1 . 3 7 Station GIS distribution switchboard
The system has been fully type tested to very strin­
gent requirements, including seismic tests and II k W
motor direct-on-hne starts.
The U P S battery is capable of supplying the full
U P S load for considerably longer than the 30 minutes
specified.
110 V essential UPS system Y This system is designed
to provide both 110 V A C and 110 V D C supplies.
The inverter is rated at 6.3 kVA, 110 V, 50 H z and
D C output is rated at 50 A continuous load. The
loads are mainly various control and instrumentation
supplies.
A standby battery and charger are provided, which
can supply the inverter and D C loads of the Y 'train'
56
Chapter 1
or 110 V D C loads of the X train. This equipment
is also seismically qualified and in order to minimise
the c o m m o n - m o d e failure probability diverse equip­
ment is provided for the X and Y U P S systems.
Non-essential UPS systems Unit and station U P S
systems which consist of four 150 kVA, 415 V, 50 H z
single-phase U P S systems are provided at this station.
Each is made u p of 3 χ 50 kVA inverters, a 600 A ,
360 V D C battery charger and a 200 kVA static switch.
The system can be expanded to 200 kVA by adding
another 50 kVA inverter and another battery bank for
which the stands are already installed.
Inverters operate in a redundant m o d e of operation
providing that the load does not exceed 100 kVA limit
 Uninterruptable p o w e r supply ( U P S ) systems

415V ESSENTIAL SERVICES BOARD 7AX 415V ESSENTIAL SERVICES BOARD 7AY
τ:

ó 415V ESSENTIAL NORMALLY 110V ESSENTIAL

71
UNINTERRUPTIBLE OPEN UNINTERRUPTIBLE /
POWER SUPPLY(UPS) POWER SUPPLY 9
7AX 7AY

415V 50Hz
3 PHASE L _ _
100 KVA i
{SYNj

4
TO 110V DC ESSENTIAL
BOARD 7AX
f ESSENTIAL UPS BOARD 7AX
415V 50Hz
3 PHASE & NEUTRAL 110V50HZ
•NGLEPH/'^'-'^
6.3 KVA -{sm}

NORMALLY Π

7
OPEN A
'ESSENTIAL BOARD 7AY ov ESSENTIAL UPS BOARD

SINGLE PHASE
DOUBLE POLE

110V 50Hz NOTE: ESSENTIAL UPS SYSTEM REPEATED FOR EACH QUADRANT
SINGLE PHASE
[I 11 II II DOUBLE POLE

FIG. 1 . 3 8 Heysham 2 power station — essential X and Y U P S systems

(or 150 kVA when up-rated to 200 kVA). The scheme
is illustrated on Fig 1.39.
Unit UPS system Each unit has an U P S , 415 V,
50 Hz, double-pole unit U P S switchboard and a dis­
tribution network. The m a x i m u m step-down trans­
former rating is 16 k V A and the loads are switched-in
sequentially to avoid excessive inrush current and
undesirable transfer to the bypass supply.
The following loads are supplied from this system:
• Those which are required for post-incident moni­
toring and recordings following a main unit trip.
• Those which because of stringent supply require­
ments would not have adequate reliability if op­
erated from the electrical auxiliary system only.
T h e equipment u p o n which the reactor safety case
depends is not connected to this system.
Local distribution units are provided for each 110 V
single-phase supply point, each comprising two single-
phase main and standby transformers, changeover con­
tactors, switches and distribution switchboard.
These are located a r o u n d the station, in the control
block, etc., at suitable load centre positions. This type
of distribution unit is mainly used for loads which
require a single supply of high availability.
Loads which require two battery-backed supplies,
e.g., microprocessor systems with plant input and out­
put, derive one supply from the unit U P S system and
the other from the station U P S system via step-down
transformers.

• Those which are required for the main unit shut­ Station UPS system This comprises two U P S systems,
down. two 415 V, 50 H z , double-pole station U P S boards

57
Electrical system design Chapter 1
0^
JT
D
c
o
-α
cd
3
o
o
α
e
cd
Ü
58

and a distribution network. Either of the two U P S
systems is capable of supplying the following loads:
• Total station load.
• Standby computer for one unit.
• Standby supply to loads of one unit which require
two battery-backed supplies, e.g., microprocessor
system with plant input and output.
Under normal operating conditions the station load is
shared as equally as possible between the two U P S
systems. Transfer of the station loads from one U P S
system to another is off-load at the 110 V load centres.
An interlock is provided using coded keys to prevent
parallel operation of the supplies derived from the two
station U P S systems. Only the following C and I station
loads are connected to the station U P S Boards:
• Those which are required for post-incident moni­
toring and recordings following loss of station A C
suppUes.
• Those which because of stringent supply require­
ments would not give adequate standards of reliabi-
Uty if operated from the electrical auxiliary system
only.
• Those which are required for shutdown of any com­
m o n services.
6.4 System configuration and method of
operation
Each U P S has the foUowing main components (see
Fig 1.34):
• Battery charger.
• Battery.
• Inverter.
• Static switch.
• Maintenance bypass switches.
The charger and bypass A C supplies operate normally
with identical frequency. Under adverse system condi­
tions the suppUes could operate at different frequencies.
Under normal operating conditions the U P S is in
service and the load is normally supplied from the
inverter. The battery charger maintains the battery on
float charge.
In the event of failure of the charger supply the
load continues to be supplied by the battery/inverter.
The load is transferred automatically from the inverter
to the bypass supply without interruption in the volt­
age waveform under any of the following abnormal
conditions, providing the inverter is synchronised in
both phase and frequency to the bypass supply:
• Inverter input D C voltage too low.
Uninterruptable p o w e r supply ( U P S ) systems
• Inverter failure.
• Output voltage outside the set Umits.
• Excessive inverter overload or load inrush current.
• Short-circuit on the load side.
If the inverter is not in phase with the bypass supply
under the above a b n o r m a l conditions, then the load
is transferred automatically from the inverter to the
bypass supply with a break of at least 60 ms and less
than 100 m s .
The load re-transfer, back to the inverter, is com­
pleted automatically without interruption in the voltage
waveform when the inverter has returned to normal
and maintained a stable output for approximately 5
to 10 seconds.
Static switch redundancy
Means are provided within the static switch to parallel
automatically the bypass power semiconductors, fol­
lowing a transfer from the inverter to the bypass
supply, using a contactor or circuit-breaker. The con­
trol and power circuits are arranged to achieve a
matching level of redundancy between the static and
electromechanical portions of the static switch. In the
event of the static portion failing to operate, the
electromechanical portion operates to transfer the load
automatically a n d / o r manually from the inverter to
the bypass supply with a voltage break of at least
60 ms and less than 100 m s . Following a transfer to
the bypass supply, both static and electromechanical
portions usually continue to operate to achieve maxi­
m u m redundancy. Both portions are fully rated.
6.5 System considerations and components
6.5.1 Voltage regulation
With the inverter in service the voltage at the terminals
of any instruments, control equipment and computers
is maintained within + 6 % to - 6 % of nominal (steady
state) voltage. This is achieved as follows for 415 V
U P S systems:
Regulation Voltage
adjustment
Inverter ±2% 95-105%
415 V cable between
inverter and load
centre 2%
415/115 V transformer 2% 100% ± 5 %
110 V cable between
load centre a n d 2%
instrument or computer
terminals
59
Electrical system design
Output voltage and number of phases — 1 lOV, 50 Hz
single-phase output is usually used for ratings up to
10 kVA and where distribution cables are relatively
short. One pole of the output is connected to earth and
a 415/110 V bypass transformer is included.
A 415 V, 50 Hz single-phase output is used for ratings
above 10 kVA, particularly where distribution cables
are long. The largest single module used today is 50
kVA. The inverter output is not earthed, but is con­
tinuously monitored with an insulation monitor.
A 415 V, 50 Hz 3-phase output is used in exceptional
cases where load requires 3-phases, e.g., motors. The
largest rating used at present is 100 kVA.
6.5.2 UPS system loads
In order to specify a U P S system it is necessary to
define the load in detail as follows:
• Load profile versus time.
• Loads requiring or generating harmonic (especially
even) currents.
• Loads requiring the circulation of a D C current.
• Load steps.
At existing installations, a survey of available loads
is undertaken where access is possible. Measurements
are taken using a two-channel digital oscilloscope with
magnetic storage. The analysis of the waveforms ob­
tained is carried out using a portable computer and
a ' H A R M D ' program developed by the C E G B . A
typical waveform and harmonic analysis are shown
in Fig 1.40.
6.5.3 Step-down transformers
These have been developed to minimise the inrush
currents and the associated voltage drops on the sys­
tem, up to a rating of 16 kV. N o ferro-resonance pro­
blems have been experienced with these transformers
when switching them onto inverters.
The transformers are of the naturally air cooled
single-phase double-wound type and are suitable for
operation on a nominal 415 V, 50 Hz supply derived
from a single-phase inverter or from two phases of
the 415 V, 3-phase, 4-wire, 50 Hz (nominal), solidly
earthed system with a maximum symmetrical short-
circuit fault level of 31 M V A .
The transformers comply generally with BS 171,
BS3535 and BEBS T2 (1966) Section 5 where applicable.
The winding insulation is Class F to BS2757 and is
non-hygroscopic, but the design is such that the
temperature rise Hmits given in BS3535, Table 2D are
not exceeded for Class Ε materials. The use of asbestos-
based materials is not permitted.
A metallic screen is provided between the windings,
one end of which is brought out and connected to the
earth terminal of the transformer.
60
Chapter 1
Each transformer is provided with a facility for
off-load tapchanging on the 415 V primary winding.
Voltage variations of ± 5 % in 2 . 5 % voltage steps. The
method of tapchanging is by means of bolted links.
The nominal flux density at rated voltage and fre­
quency and with the transformer connected on the
principal tapping is specified not to exceed 1.0 tesla.
The impedance voltage at rated current and frequency
does not exceed 2 % of the rated voltage on any tapping.
The transformers are capable of operating with non-
Hnear loads having relative current harmonic content
of up to 5 0 % .
The basic transformer parameters are given in
Table 1.1.
6.5.4 Standby and spares philosophy
In the event of inverter failure, automatic transfer to
mains supply occurs. The quality of the mains supply
is acceptable for the U P S outage time, which does not
therefore justify the provision of a standby U P S system.
In order to minimise time to repair, a spare set of
inverter system components is kept at each station.
6.6 UPS equipment specification
As part of the development work on U P S systems,
detailed technical requirements and documents for pur­
chasing U P S equipment have been written to ensure
that identified problems are overcome.
The following are brief details of the main technical
requirements:
• Battery capacity The system should be capable of
maintaining specified conditions for 30 minutes fol­
lowing complete failure of all incoming A C supplies.
• Environmental conditions The equipment should
meet environmental class B3 requirements of spe­
cification CEGB-EES (1980). The ambient tempera­
ture range should be taken to be + 5 ° C to 40°C
with air temperature not exceeding 35°C average in
any one day and not exceeding 20°C average in any
one year.
The equipment enclosure shall provide a degree
of protection to Code IP31 of BS5490.
• Life of equipment All equipment should have a
designed operating life of 30 years.
• Reliability A high degree of reliability and avail­
ability is required and the following reliability targets
are specified:
UPS UPS
3-phase output 1-phase output
MTBF (years) MTBF (years)
Charger 10 10
Inverter 2 3
Static switch 10 15
Reliability calculations are based on mean time to
repair a U P S system of 48 h o u r s .
 Uninterruptable p o w e r supply ( U P S ) systems

DC OFFSET REMOVED

MULTIPLY AMPLITUDES BY: 100.00 V/V AND TIME VALUES BY 0.000020 s

MULTIPLY AMPLITUDES BY: 20.00 A/V AND TIME VALUES BY 0.000020 s

Harmonic Analysis using Program HARMD

Number of points for analysis 1024 Highest harmonic order: 255

Number of cycles averaged 4
Fundamental Frequency (Hz) 50.03 Voltage Current
Total RMS 236.21V 7.31 A
Peak value 319.29V 16.01 A
Peak/RMS ratio 1.35 2.19
Maximum harmonic component (RMS) 236.05V 6.19A
DC level removed -4.28V -0.40A
Relative fundamental content 99.9% 84.7%
Relative harmonic content 3.7% 53.2%
High frequency content >2 k Hz) 0.3% 0.6%
Total apparent power 1.727kVA
Total active power 1 383kW
Power factor 0 801

Voltage Current
Harmonic litude Phase angle Magnitude Phase angle
order .) (deg.) (deg.)
1 100.0 -4.4 100.0 -20.4
2 0.1 -55.3 0.6 -50.2
3 1.8 7.1 54.2 157.2
4 0.0 -70.6 0.4 142.7
5 3.1 177.0 29.6 -50.7
7 1.0 -37.8 7.7 83.4
8 0.0 -156.9 0.4 -104.1
9 0.2 71.3 5.5 146.9
10 0.0 -76.5 0.4 58.0
11 0.3 149.4 5.2 -85.7
13 0.2 -64.3 2.8 48.4
15 0.1 85.8 1.0 170.8
17 0.1 -175.4 0.6 -159.5
19 0.1 -67.0 1.1 -14.2
21 0.1 50.8 0.9 165.4
23 0.1 -171.0 0.6 2.4
27 0.1 37.5 0.5 158.3
29 0.1 176.4 0.7 -39.0
31 0.1 -96.6 0.4 102.2
33 0.1 10.7 0.3 159.4
35 0.1 128.7 0.6 -80.9
37 0.1 -140.0 0.5 51.6
41 0.0 80.5 0.3 -121.2
43 0.0 177.8 0.4 13.2
DC components are excluded from all other parameters

FIG. 1.40 Typical voltage and current waveform analysis

61
Electrical system design Chapter 1

TABLE 1.1
Step-down transformers

BS power rating, kVA 16 10 8 6.3 4 2.5 1.6

Number of phases 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Frequency (nominal), Hz 50 50 50 50 50 50 50

Rated primary voltage, V 415 415 415 415 415 415 415

Rated secondary voltage, V 115 115 115 115 115 115 115

Voltage ratio at no-load 415/ 415/ 415/ 415/ 415/ 415/ 415/
on the principal tapping 115 115 115 115 115 115 115

Maximum impedance on any tapping, % 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

Fuse links current 50 32 25 20 15 10 6

rating at 415 V
(to BS88-2, 1975, Class Ql), A

Maximum inrush magnetising current (peak), A 272 170 136 107 68 43 27

• Maintenance and repair The equipment, excluding (c) Static switch inhibited
batteries, should not require maintenance more fre­
(d) Inverter on battery.
quently than once annually. The mean time to repair
the equipment should not exceed two hours.
6.7 UPS equipment performance
• Transformers and inductors These should have
non-hygroscopic insulation with the temperature rise requirements
necessary to give the specified life at rated output.
Charger output voltage
• Power semiconductor devices The temperature rise The charger output voltage should be automatically
at the device reference point (case) shall not exceed maintained within ± 1 % of the voltage setting when
50°C at the rated output. The maximum permissible operating under any combination of the following
temperature rise should not exceed 70°C under any conditions:
operating conditions. For fan cooling this should
• Load between 0 to 100% of the rated output.
apply with any single fan out of service.
• Nominal input A C voltage ± 1 0 % .
• Remote alarms and indications All locally indi­
cated faults should be grouped into the following • Frequency 50 Hz ± 5 % .
remote alarms or indications:
• Specified environmental conditions.
(a) U P S system failure
Inverter output voltage tolerance (steady state)
(b) Inverter in service
The output voltage should be maintained within ± 2 %
(c) Inverter on battery of the voltage setting when operating under any com­
bination of the following conditions:
(d) Battery in service
• Load between 0 to 100% of the rated output over the
(e) Static switch inhibited.
entire inverter input voltage range.
• Reliability monitoring A non-resetting counter and
• Specified environmental conditions.
elapsed time indicator should be provided on U P S
systems above 10 kVA rating for each of the fol­ • Load power factor between 0.7 lag to unity.
lowing operating conditions:
Output voltage adjustment
(a) Inverter in service
The output voltage and adjustment shall be stepless over
(b) Bypass in service the range of ± 5 % of nominal voltage.

62
 Uninterruptable p o w e r supply ( U P S ) systems

Output frequency side the limits of 50 H z + 0 . 1 H z . Recent practice has

In order t o permit operation of the static switch, the
inverter should normally be synchronised, both in phase
and frequency, t o the bypass supply over the tracking
range of 49.5 H z t o 50.5 H z . The bypass supply
frequency should be continuously monitored a n d if it
goes outside the tracking range, the inverter should
not follow the frequency of the bypass supply. T h e
resulting loss of synchronism should inhibit the static
switch and initiate an alarm.
While the bypass supply frequency is outside the
tracking range, the inverter system frequency should
preferably remain at the appropriate tracking range
limit or return t o the inverter natural frequency.
In the event of failure of the bypass supply, the
earher approach was to synchronise to the charger
input supply. There was a risk that if the inverter was
left free-running, its output frequency would drift out­
been for the inverter t o be free-running with a much
improved accuracy within Hmits of 50 H z ± 0 . 0 1 % by
means of a built-in quartz-controlled oscillator.
When the bypass supply frequency returns within
the tracking range, the inverter system output should
be automatically re-synchronised t o it, both in phase
and frequency.
The transition from one synchronising source to
another should be performed at a rate-of-change of
frequency (slew rate) n o t exceeding one hertz per
second.
Dynamic output voltage effects
For definitions refer t o l E C pubhcation 686: *StabiHsed
power suppUes, A C output'.
The output voltage should not exceed the hmits
shown in Tables 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4.

TABLE 1.2

Load effect

Maximum voltage Recovery Voltage tolerance

Load step referred overshoot amplitude time, limit % of set
to the rated output % of set value ms value

500/0 to 100<ϊ^ο -15 40 5

100% to 50% + 15 40 5

TABLE 1.3

Source voltage effect

Charger input
Maximum voltage Recovery Voltage tolerance
voltage steps referred
overshoot amplitude time, limit % of set
to the set voltage
% of set value ms value
(battery in service)

(a) Loss of short- -10 40 5

circuit of mains
(b) Mains return + 10 40 5

TABLE 1.4

Bypass supply to inverter transfer and vice versa

Inverter output Maximum

Bypass Voltage
voltage before load voltage Recovery
supply tolerance
transfer (battery and overshoot time,
voltage limit
charger in service) amplitude ms
% of nominal % nominal % of nominal <Vo of nominal

100 110 ±10 40 5

100 100 ±10 40 5
100 90 ±10 40 5

63
Electrical system design
Output voltage waveform distortion
For definition refer to l E C Publication 1 4 6 - 2 .
Linear loads
The relative harmonic content of the output voltage
should not exceed 5 % when operating under any com­
bination of the following conditions:
• Load between 0 to 100<7o of the rated output over
the entire inverter input range.
• Specified environmental conditions.
• Load power factor between 0.7 lag to unity.
The maximum individual harmonic component should
not exceed 3^o of fundamental.
Non-linear loads
The relative harmonic content of the output voltage
should not exceed 7 % with a d u m m y load arranged to
represent the service load as closely as possible.
The maximum permitted harmonic components should
be in accordance with Fig 2 of l E C Pubhcation 1 4 6 -
2 (1974).
Periodic output voltage modulation
The periodic variation of output voltage amplitude is
defined as:
Vmaxpeak "~ V m i n p e a k / ^ n o m p e a k
and should not exceed 1% including operation with
the dummy non-linear load.
Rated short-circuit current capability
The inverter alone (bypass supply out of service) shall
be capable of clearing a fault on an outgoing feeder
protected by a fuse hnk to BS88, 1975, Class Q l
in less than 80 ms. The fuse link rating is specified
at approximately 3 0 % of the inverter output current
rating.
Overload capability
The inverter should be capable of carrying 120% of
the rated output for 30 minutes after carrying the rated
output continuously. The output voltage should be
maintained within ± 3 % of the voUage setting when
operating under any combination of the following
conditions:
• Over the entire inverter input voltage range.
• Specified environmental conditions.
• Load power factor 0.8 lag.
64
Chapter 1
After the 30 minutes' overload duty the inverter should
be capable of carrying the rated output continuously.
The inverter should also be capable of carrying 150%
of the rated output for 5 minutes after carrying the
rated output continuously. After the 5 minutes' over­
load duty the inverter should be capable of carrying
the rated output continuously.
Static switch surge capability and protection
The load-to-bypass branch of the static switch should
have a sufficient surge capabihty to withstand at least
10-times the rated output current for 5 cycles and
should be protected by a fuse hnk. The fuse link should
have a total operating I^t below the pre-arcing I^t of
the bypass feeder fuse, which is rated at twice the rated
load current.
With assistance from the bypass supply, the U P S
should be capable of clearing a sohd short-circuit fault
on an outgoing feeder protected by a fuse such that
the interrupting time does not exceed 5 m s . Interrupt­
ing time is defined as the time during which the output
voltage is below 8 0 % of the instantaneous value of
the corresponding portion of the previously undisturbed
waveform.
7 DC systems
7.1 Introduction
The D C supply systems are battery-backed and are
designed to provide acceptably secure power supplies
both with regard to continuity and quality under all
normal and abnormal operating conditions.
7.2 DC system duties
The following specific duties apply to the D C systems:
• T o supply equipment which requires a D C supply
during normal conditions and which also is required
to operate when A C supphes have been lost, e.g.,
essential instruments, control, switchgear closing and
tripping, telecommunications, protection, interlocks,
alarms.
• T o supply standby equipment required to operate
only when A C supphes have been lost, e.g., emer­
gency lighting, emergency oil p u m p s .
• T o supply the starters of starting engine-driven
equipment, e.g., gas turbines or diesel generators.
Under some circumstances, determined by duty, project
needs and particular equipment supply requirements,
selected instrumentation and telecommunications sys­
tems may be connected t o the U P S systems which are
described in Section 6 of this chapter.

7.3 DC system design
The systems are designed t o operate from batteries
for at least 30 minutes following complete failure of
all incoming A C supplies. Sufficient standby capacity
or standby batteries are normally provided to achieve
this period during outages for repair or maintenance,
or boost charging. The main reasons for Hmiting the
period to 30 minutes are:
• It is generally more cost effective to invest in im­
proving restoration time of the essential A C supplies,
rather than use larger batteries.
• The 30 minute period is sufficient to shutdown a
unit safely in the absence of normal A C suppHes.
• There are a number of D C back-up auxiliaries to the
normal A C loads, e.g., turbine barring gear m o t o r s ,
which are required for protracted periods following
the 30 minute period.
The D C systems are generally provided at four voltage
levels of 48, 110, 220 and 250 V D C nominal.
7.3.1 250 V DC systems
The principal duty of this system is to provide secure
D C supplies for the foUowing loads:
• Emergency lighting (DC luminaires), except for re­
mote plant buildings.
• Emergency auxiHary drives, e.g., lubricating oil
pumps for main turbines.
• Emergency valve operation.
• Fire sirens.
The stations designed before 1980 used 240 V D C as
a nominal voltage, this has been replaced by 250 V D C
to line-up with the revised BS and l E C standard
Voltages.
If the battery capacity selected for a given load
permits, the unit systems are interconnected to cover
for a battery or charger outage. A typical scheme is
illustrated on Fig 1.41, used for the Littlebrook D
power station, which has three 660 M W oil-fired units.
The maximum battery rating applicable to the high
performance Planté cells is approximately 2000 A h at
10 hour discharge rate and 15°C.
Operation of more than two 2000 Ah batteries in
paraHel would exceed the switchgear short-circuit rating
of 40 k A . A coded-key type mechanical interlock is
normally provided in such cases to prevent parallel
operation of more than two batteries.
The Heysham 2 power station scheme is illustrated
on Fig 1.42. This is an advanced gas cooled reactor
station with two reactors and two 660 M W generating
units.
D C systems
At each voltage level the system is designed on a
per unit basis. Separate systems are provided for es­
sential loads, i.e., those u p o n which the reactor safety
case depends on nuclear power stations. Each essential
'train' has a separate D C system, which is not inter­
connected to any other *train'.
Each unit has a battery and charger. A standby
battery and charger are provided and can be made
available to either unit when necessary. Each charger
is rated to supply the total load of all D C emergency
auxiliary drives of one unit, plus 2 5 % initial spare
capacity to cover for u n k n o w n loads, future load
additions and the battery finishing rate of one battery
(approximately 7 % of the A h of 10 hour discharge
rate in amperes). This means that the battery can be
recharged on 'float' within 10 hours following on emer­
gency discharge duty. Each battery is rated to supply
the following loads for 30 minutes:
• Total load of all D C emergency auxiHary drives of
one unit.
• Two-thirds of total station emergency lighting load,
excluding remote plant buildings, e.g., C W p u m p -
house.
• 2 5 % initial spare capacity to cover for unknown
loads and future load additions.
T h e m i n i m u m discharge voltage at the end of 30
minutes' duty is approximately 210 V at the battery
terminals. This is to ensure that voltage at the equip­
ment terminals is not less than 200 V D C (80% of
nominal). The m a x i m u m voltage d r o p in cables of 10
V gives sufficient scope for an economical cabling
design.
The 'float' charge voltage is set at 281.3 V, i.e.,
2.25 V/ceH for 125 lead-acid ceUs.
7.3.2 220 V DC systems
The switchgear within C E G B power stations uses
closing mechanisms which are either solenoid driven or
spring operated, the springs being m o t o r wound.
The 11 kV switchgear of one air break type, with
900 M V A m a k e duty and 750 M V A break duty, uses
solenoids rated u p to 47 k W . The voltage Hmits of such
switchgear are much tighter (H- 5 % , - 15%), than those
applicable to motors (-1-10%, - 2 0 % ) . If the whole D C
system is designed a r o u n d the closing solenoids, then
the battery capacity is considerably higher, typically
twice the capacity without the closing solenoids. It
is, therefore, generally more economical to provide
dedicated batteries and chargers for switchgear closing
solenoids of this rating. There is also an added advan­
tage with respect to 'black-start' capability, i.e., the
switchgear can be operated many hours or even for
several days following a loss of A C supplies to the
chargers. This is possible because there are no other
standing loads connected to the battery. The capabiHty
65
 Electrical system design Chapter 1

415V STATION 415V STATION 415V STATION

SERVICES BOARD 1 SERVICES BOARD 2 SERVICES BOARD 3

BATTERY 1 BATTERY 2 BATTERY 3

Ύ
I
I
Η CHARGER 1 CHARGER 2 CHARGER 3

i
Jr 240V DC
BOARD 1

FIG. 1.41 Littlebrook D power station — 240 V DC station system

415V ESSENTIAL 415V ESSENTIAL 415V ESSENTIAL 415V ESSENTIAL

SERVICES BOARD 7CY SERVICES BOARD 7CX SERVICES BOARD 8DX SERVICES BOARD 8DY

250V DC UNIT BATTERY 7

250VDC TURBINE 250VDC TURBINE

EMERGENCY BOARD 7 EMERGENCY BOARD 8

FIG. 1.42 Heysham 2 power station — 250 V DC system

66

to operate switchgear for many hours following a
loss of A C supplies is considered important, because
it is not possible to operate it manually as can be
done with the spring-closed type of switchgear. 110 V
D C (nominal) is normally used for the spring charge
mechanisms.
To match tolerances stipulated by the switchgear
standards, 105 lead-acid cells are required for the 220 V
D C nominal voltage.
A typical 220 V D C system for the non-essential part
of Heysham 2 power station is illustrated on Fig 1.43.
Each battery/charger system is designed to meet the
following criteria:
• With the battery on 'float' up to two circuit-breakers
can be closed simultaneously.
• With the battery on 'float' up to 100 circuit-breakers
can be closed each day; also it should not be ne­
cessary to boost charge the battery to meet this duty.
• Following a loss of A C suppHes to the charger, the
battery is capable of supplying the current of the
highest solenoid rating continuously for 30 seconds.
Each solenoid is normally energised for u p to 500 ms
and it is therefore possible to close many circuit-
breakers consecutively. The minimum discharge volt­
age at the end of discharge duty is usually specified
as 199 V at the battery terminals to ensure that
voltage at the switchboard terminals is not less
than 190 V. The maximum voltage drop in cables
of 9 V gives sufficient margin for design purposes.
The 'float' charge voltage is set at 237 V, which results
in the vokage per cell of 2.26 V.
7.3.3 110 V DC systems
The principal duty of these systems is to provide
secure D C suppHes for the following unit and station
loads:
• Switchgear and control gear tripping.
• Switchgear closing if spring mechanisms are used.
• Interlocks and protection.
• Control equipment.
The arrangement for Heysham 2 unit and station
system is illustrated in Fig 1.44.
Each charger is rated to carry the normal full inter­
connected switchboard load plus the recommended
'float' charge rate of both batteries.
Each battery is rated to supply the total intercon­
nected switchboard emergency load plus 2 5 % initial
spare capacity to cover for u n k n o w n loads and future
load additions. The minimum discharge voltage at the
end of 30 minutes' duty is approximately 102 V at the
D C systems
battery terminals, to ensure that voltage of the equip­
ment terminals is not less than 96 V for switchgear and
control gear and 94 V for aH other equipment.
The 'float' charge voltage is set at 121.5 V, i.e., 2.25
V/cell for a 54-cell battery.
Separate batteries and chargers are normally pro­
vided for remote plant houses; also 120 V D C is used
for gas turbine (35 M W ) starting purposes.
7.3.4 48 V DC systems
The principal duty of these systems is to provide
secure D C suppHes for the foHowing unit and station
loads:
• Sequence equipment.
• Alarm and indication.
• Remote control.
T h e arrangement for the Heysham 2 , 48 V D C system
is illustrated in Fig 1.45. T o reduce cabling cost,
separate systems are normally provided for unit and
station equipment in locations most suited to the loads
being suppHed.
Each charger is rated to carry the normal full inter­
connected switchboard load plus the recommended
'float' charge rate of both batteries.
Each battery is rated to supply the total intercon­
nected switchboard emergency load plus 2 5 % initial
spare capacity. The minimum discharge voltage at the
end of 30 minutes' duty is approximately 46 V at the
battery terminals and 43 V at the load terminals.
The 'float' charge voltage is set at 54 V for a
24-cell battery. Separate batteries, rated for 6 or more
hours, and chargers are provided for telecommunica­
tions purposes.
7.3.5 250 V , 220 V and 110 V DC circuit earthing
A n earth leakage detection system incorporating centre-
tapped resistors and a detection relay is normally pro­
vided in each charger. All 48 V D C systems have their
positive poles earthed.
7.4 DC system analysis
A computer p r o g r a m ('GIDEAN') has been developed
jointly by the C E G B and the University of Manchester
Institute of Science and Technology. The program
contains comprehensive models for batteries, motors,
static loads, battery chargers and r a n d o m momentary
loads as well as reHable and efficient algorithms for
the analysis of the system. Facilities include the quasi-
steady state calculation of the energy evolution in the
battery and voltage profile of the D C network under
the conditions defined by the duty cycle.
The G I D E A N package provides facilities for the
entry of diagrammatic and numerical data of D C net-
67
Electrical system design Chapter 1

415V ESSENTIAL SERVICES BOARD 7CY (DIESEL BACKED) 415V ESSENTIAL SERVICES BOARD 8DY (DIESEL BACKED)

— Γ —

220V DC STATION 220V DC STATION

SWITCHGEAR SWITCHGEAR
CLOSING BATTERY 7 CLOSING BATTERY 8
105 LEAD-ACID
CELLS 300 Ah,-
AT15°C

220V DC STATION 220V DC STATION

SWITCHGEAR SWITCHGEAR
CLOSING CHARGER 7 CLOSING CHARGER 8
20A 20A
FLOAT FLOAT
237V 237V

20A BOOST 20A BOOST

(OFF (OFF
283V LOAD) 283V LOAD)

X®
220V D C STATION SWITCH > 220V DC STATION SWITCH >
GEAR CLOSING BOARD 7 GEAR CLOSING BOARD 8

[] II II 11 11 II [1 II

t7 <7 X7 V V V V

TO 415V TO 415V
SWITCHGEAR
SWITCHGEAR ,

1 Í

C Oi

11 [] [] [1 SOL

TYPICAL 3.3kV SWITCHGEAR

WITH SOLENOID CLOSING

FIG. 1 . 4 3 Heysham 2 power station - 2 2 0 V D C station system

68
 D C systems

415V ESSENTIAL SERVICES BOARD 7CX 415V ESSENTIAL SERVICES 8D.7CY 415V ESSENTIAL SERVICES BOARD 8DY 415V ESSENTIAL SERVICES BD 8DX

160A 160 A 160A 160A

FLOAT FLOAT FLOAT FLOAT
121.5V 121.5V 121.5V 121.5V
28A BOOST 28A BOOST 28A 28A
BOOST BOOST
146V (OFF LOAD) (OFF LOAD) (OFF LOAD) (OFF LOAD)
146V 146V 146V

N O T E S : 1. B L O C K I N G D I O D E S A R E
FITTED IN T H E POSITIVE
POLE ONLY

2. A L L 4 1 5 V E S S E N T I A L
B O A R D S A R E DIESEL-BACKED

i
^ O-y O / O /

(I Id
T Y P I C A L 110V D C U N I T 7 F U S E B O A R D T Y P I C A L 110V D C S T A T I O N S E R V I C E S F U S E B O A R D S T Y P I C A L 110V D C U N I T 8 F U S E B O A R D
(EXCLUDING REMOTE PLANT HOUSES)

FIG. 1 . 4 4 Heysham 2 power station — 1 1 0 V D C unit and station system

works; the storage, retrieval and modifications of these The charger output voltage is automatically main­
networks and the ability to analyse them under a variety tained within ± 1 % of the voltage setting when operat­
of loadings and outage conditions. ing under any combination of the following conditions:
The program helps to minimise the design margins
by optimising battery, charger and cable ratings. This • L o a d between 0 to 100%.
is achieved by repeating a study with different battery, • ± 1 0 % nominal input voltage.
charger and cable parameters until a satisfactory D C
voltage is arrived at. • ± 5 % nominal input frequency.

• Between -h5°C and -h40°C ambient.

7.5 Battery chargers and batteries

The equipment enclosure provides a degree of protec­
The battery chargers are generally of the thyristor tion to BS5490 for code I P 3 1 .
controlled type with a 3-phase input at 415 V, 50 H z . Boost charging is carried out off-load to maintain
The typical ratings used are from 20 A to approxi­ the load voltage within acceptable limits. A coded-key
mately 1000 A . A six-pulse rectifier configuration is type mechanical interlock is provided t o prevent boost
generally used and a two-winding transformer is in­ charging of the battery in service.
corporated into each battery charger. The equipment The batteries used are generally of the high per­
is designed for an operating life of 30 years and any formance Planté type and the ratings are based on an
critical components, e.g., semiconductors and capaci­ ambient temperature of 15°C, except that batteries
tors, are derated as appropriate to achieve this. in remote plant houses are sometimes based on 10°C

69
Electrical system design
415V ESSENTIAL SERVICES BOARD 7CX 415V ESSENTIAL SERVICES BD. 7CY 415V ESSENTIAL SERVICES BOARD 8DY
TYPICAL 48VDCUNIT 7 FUSEBOARD
FIG. 1 . 4 5 Heysham 2 power station — 4 8 V D C system
ambient temperature. Batteries are located in dedicated
rooms as close as possible to the associated charger/
distribution switchboard r o o m s . All battery rooms
are provided with suitable thermostatically controlled
heating to maintain the design temperature. Adequate
ventilation is provided in all battery rooms to keep
the concentration of hydrogen gas within safe limits.
Details of the equipment are given in Chapter 9.
8 Electrical system monitoring and
interlocking schemes
8.1 Introduction
The safety of personnel when using or maintaining
electrical equipment and systems is at all times covered
by rules and administrative procedures, in particular
70
Chapter 1
415V ESSENTIAL SERVICES VB 8DX
NOTES: 1 BLOCKING DIODES ARE
FITTED IN THE
NEGATIVE POLE
ONLY
2. ALL 415V ESSENTIAL
BOARDS ARE
DIESEL-BACKED
TYPICAL 48VDC STATION SERVICES FUSEBOARDS TYPICAL 48VDCUNIT 8 FUSEBOARD
(EXCLUDING REMOTE PLANT HOUSES)
the C E G B Safety Rules. These rules and procedures
are fully considered in the design of the electrical plant
and systems. In addition, interlocking, monitoring and
indication facilities are included in designs to achieve
the following:
(a) Minimise the probability of h u m a n error faults oc­
curring. This is an aid to operators and maintenance
personnel in carrying out their duties to meet the
operating and maintenance rules and procedures.
(b) Safeguard plant and equipment where it is con­
sidered necessary to provide interlocking for this
purpose.
This section describes the interlocking, monitoring and
indication facilities installed at 11 kV, 3.3 kV and 415
V to meet items (a) and (b). These facihties are divided
into two categories:
 Electrical system monitoring and interlocking schemes
• Operational interlocking, fault level monitoring and
indication equipment.
• Maintenance interlocking equipment.
8.2 Operational interlocking, monitoring and
indications
In deciding the type of facihty required, the following
guidelines are used:
• In systems where on-load parallel operation of a
number of circuits is the normal method of opera­
tion, and where the switchgear is not overstressed
when a number of circuits are in parallel, then n o
interlocks should be provided. Administrative rules
and procedures are adequate to cover this method
of operation.
• In systems where on-load parallel operation of cir­
cuits would cause the m a x i m u m specified fault level
limits of the switchgear to be exceeded, operational
interlocking or monitoring and indication equipment
can be installed to prevent the limits from being
exceeded.
Both relay logic and computer logic schemes have been
used. The choice is largely based on the complexity of
the scheme, as the electrical relay logic scheme becomes
difficult to design when there are a large number of
possible interconnections to consider. In such a case,
the number of relays and quantity of cabling between
cubicles of switchgear becomes prohibitive and veri­
fication of the logic is difficult t o achieve. In addition,
changes are extremely difficult to incorporate. An
alternative is to use a computer-based scheme which
continually monitors circuit-breaker states, and calcu­
lates if the next circuit to close will cause an unaccept­
able operating condition. A computer-based scheme
can be either indicative only, or indicative and preven­
tive; and can be programmed to model the whole
electrical system, providing full flexibility in switching
operations.
Relay schemes use circuit-breaker auxiliary contacts
and relay contacts, with any additional relays mounted
or interconnections m a d e , in purpose built boxes
mounted adjacent to the switchboard concerned.
Examples of interlocking schemes used are shown in
Figs 1.46, 1.47 and 1.48.
The example shown in Fig 1.46 illustrates some
of the electrical operational schemes used. They are
provided t o :
• Prevent the two transformer sources being connected
together at 3.3 kV, as this would cause fault level
limits to be exceeded.
• Allow the diesel generator to be connected to either
transformer when testing the diesel generators.
• Ensure that only those circuit-breakers provided
with synchronising equipment are used to connect
different sources of generation.
Figure 1.47 shows a scheme to allow only 3 out of 4
interlocked circuit-breakers to be closed as shown in
Fig 1.46. Figure 1.48 shows how to achieve the cabled
interconnector electrical interlock and the transformer
electrical interlock, as illustrated in Fig 1.46.
8.3 Relay systems
An operational interlocking scheme is required t o :
• Prevent switching activities which could cause the
design fault levels of the systems switchgear to be
exceeded.
• Ensure the correct sequence of circuit-breaker op­
erations for achieving check synchronising.
Interlocking is normally accomplished by directly wiring
together various combinations of switchgear auxiliary
contacts into the operating circuits of other switch-
gear. Thus a particular item of switchgear may only
be operated if the auxiliary contacts of other switches
are in such a configuration as to allow completion of
the operating circuit of the switch in question.
The switchgear contacts used in the interlocking
schemes are generally wired into an interlock box,
containing repeat relays and the interlocking logic, the
box being mounted close to the switchboard to be
interlocked. Connections from the switchgear to the
interlocking box are m a d e via marshalhng cubicles, with
all the cables being muUicore cables having 2.5 mm^
conductors.
Interlock schemes should be designed to be 'fail
safe', i.e., the relays have to operate and positively
drive the interlocks to allow the switchgear to be op­
erated. The equipment is operated from a 110 V D C
battery source and able to operate within the D C
systems specified variations and fluctuations of supply
voltage level. Supply supervision relays are provided
to monitor all fuses, and a clean pair of contacts from
this relay is provided per suite of cubicles to initiate
a remote alarm. Local indication identifying the failed
fuse is provided, arranged to be visible without opening
the cubicle.
8.3.1 Switchgear auxiliary contacts
The open or closed state of each item of switchgear
is determined from an arrangement of switchgear aux­
iliary contacts. A n index of these auxihary contacts
used in interlocking schemes is shown on Fig 1.49.
This drawing shows the latest computer aided drafting
symbols, alongside the old symbols used until recent­
ly, for each type of contact and defines their operating
philosophy.
71
Electrical system design Chapter 1

• 11kV • 11kV

E/\l
3 JCBL
Τ

é Θ
TRANSFORMER 1 DIESEL W TRANSFORMER 2
GENERATOR 1

EAl
I

Υ [CBT]^1s|[cB2] [CB3]^ [CB4] ID [cfe] m

3.3kV- \ / •3.3kV
\ /
\ /
\ /
\ /
\ /

KEY

Circuit breaker fitted with Cabled Interconnector Electrical Interlock.

autornatic synchronising facilities The circuit breaker without synchronising
facilities cannot be closed if the
r - i Circuit breaker fitted with manual remote breaker with check
[SJ synchronising facilities synchronising is closed first. See Fig. 1.50
Indicates electrical
.El Interlocks between a circuit-breaker
group. The figure in the left hand
corner denotes the number of breakers
in that group permitted to be closed Transformer Electrical Interlock.
at any one time. The figure in the right hand The H.V. circuit breaker may only
corner denotes the total 'number' of be closed if the L V . circuit
circuit-breakers in the group breaker is open. See Fig. 1.50

FIG. 1.46 Example system to illustrate the logic of electrical operational interlocking schemes

8.3.2 Application of interlock schemes depending u p o n the number of marshaUing cubicles

Definition of interlock types
The various interlocks that are used to manage different
interlocking schemes are depicted by unique symbols
which can be added to system diagrams. These different
interlock symbols are shown in Fig 1.50.
General interlocking schemes
Certain interlocking requirements on different plant
systems have resulted in c o m m o n interlock schemes
being developed. These common interlock schemes have
been refined and incorporated into an index of basic
schemes, and are shown in Fig 1.51. When developing
a scheme for a particular application, two or more
of these general interlocking schemes may be combined
to produce an overall scheme that will provide the
necessary interlock requirements for the correct and
safe operation of the plant. Variations in the cabHng
requirements can occur for these same basic interlocks,
involved and also the distances between b o a r d s . These
variations are covered by loop diagrams which sup­
port the circuit diagrams. Where synchronising inter­
locking facilities are required on a circuit-breaker
already involved in a separate interlocking scheme,
the synchronising interlocks are incorporated into the
more complex overall interlocking scheme, where they
then form part of that scheme. For more details of
synchronising, see Chapter 12.
Considering some of the more typical configurations
shown in Fig 1.51 in detail:
• Transformers and interconnectors As a general
rule, transformers are introduced into the system by
first closing the H V circuit-breaker, thus energising
both the H V and LV windings, and then closing the
LV circuit-breaker after synchronising checks have
been carried out. T o ensure that this procedure is
followed in the correct sequence, an operational
interlock is fitted which prevents the H V circuit-
breaker from closing if the LV circuit-breaker is

72
 Electrical system monitoring a n d interlocking schemes

SOURCE 1 SOURCE 2

110V DC SUPPLY

0
\ SWITCHBOARD

SECTION A SECTION Β SECTION C

-® » « a 1R

D « ®-

6 « Ä-

-Β

IRC-1

J ÖÖ-
UJBC
4R-1 JRC-2

PLANT
-» 5
PROTECTION <
INTERLOCKS JRC-3
-ÖÖ δ

^ ^ R - 1 J ^ C ^

SUPPLY
FAIL
ALARM ,

-»

FIG. 1 . 4 7 Circuit diagram showing *3 out of 4 ' interlocked circuit-breakers

already closed. Check synchronising interlock faci-
hties are fitted to the LV circuit-breaker which
prevents it closing if unacceptable voltage mismatch
or phase differences exist.
Interconnectors, especially cable interconnectors,
when not in service are usually left energised, from
one end only, so as to monitor the integrity of the
circuit continually. Bringing the interconnector into
service, however, must always be accomplished via
the circuit-breaker fitted with the check synchronis­
ing facilities.
To ensure that this procedure is always followed,
operational electrical interlocks are fitted which pre­
vent the circuit-breaker w i t h o u t synchronising
facilities being closed if the circuit-breaker with the
check synchronising is already closed. Check syn­
chronising interlock facihties operate as described
above.
The circuit and loop diagrams for the transformer
or interconnector arrangement are shown in Figs 1.48
and 1.52 respectively.
W h e n the above interlock scheme has to operate
between local and remote circuit-breakers of such
separation that direct wiring between the plant pro­
tection interlocks would cause excessive voU drop
in the circuit-breakers control circuits, then circuit-
breaker repeat relays are used.
• One out of two Operational electrical interlocks are
fitted to the circuit-breakers of both feeder circuits
connected to the board. These interlocks prevent both
feeder circuit-breakers being closed at the same time,
which would otherwise result in unacceptable paral-
lehng of the supphes. Either of the two feeders may
be selected for duty and closed onto the b o a r d , but
having accomplished this the interlocks then prevent
the remaining feeder circuit-breaker being closed. No
synchronising facilities are required as the above
interlock prevents the two supphes being connected
together. This scheme is shown in Figs 1.53 and 1.54.
• Two out of three This interlock scheme is designed
to prevent the paralleling of supplies without in-

73
Electrical system design Chapter 1

gear in a correct and predetermined sequence with

I l k V , 3.3kV AND 415V
all out-of-sequence operations inhibited.
BOARD 1 BOARD 2 If sequence interlocks are specified on the trans­
former and interconnector circuits, their application
must be developed and incorporated into the opera­

•I tional interlocking scheme as shown in Fig 1.57. It

should be noted that the sequence interlock does not
inhibit the operation of circuit-breaker N o 2 in any
7V1 .1.
way, and it is not therefore an alternative to an
INTERCONNECTOR
operational interlock.

1 8.4 Computer-based systems

As mentioned above, an alternative and more flexi­
ble arrangement for system monitoring is to utilise
a computer-based scheme. The most recent of these
I installed by the C E G B has been at Heysham 2, F r o m
I 11/3.3kV
TRANSFORMER the description of the electrical auxiliaries system in
Section 3.2 of this chapter, it will be apparent that a
relay logic scheme for achieving interlocking could
have proved to be cumbersome and possibly restrictive
TRANSFORMER

1
LvVHs
DIRECTLY CONNECTED INTERLOCKS
OPPOSITE END CB 2 OR
CB HV PLANT PROTECTION
INTERLOCKS
INTERLOCKS VIA RELAY WHERE ROUTE LENGTH
BETWEEN SWITCHBOARDS INTRODUCES UNACCEPTABLE
VOLT DROP
J1
« RRA
J2
1
OPPOSITE END CB 2 OR
CB HV PLANT PROTECTION
INTERLOCKS
-» »-
FIG. 1.48 Circuit diagram showing cabled inter­
connector and transformer electrical interlock
hibiting the operational flexibility of the system. O p ­
erational interlocks are fitted to the circuit-breakers
of both feeder circuits and on the bus section circuit-
breaker of the board. The system may be operated
with both feeders closed onto their respective halves
of the board (as long as the bus section circuit-
breaker is open), or if maintenance is to be carried
out on one of the feeder circuits, both halves of the
board can be coupled together via the bus section
circuit-breaker and the board fed from the remaining
feeder. No synchronising facilities are required as
the interlock prevents any paralleling of supplies.
This scheme is shown in Figs 1.55 and 1.56.
• Sequence operational interlocks Sequence inter­
locks, if required, are to ensure the closure of switch-
in the connections available to the operators. The
decision was therefore made to develop and install a
computer-based monitoring system. The block diagram
for a computer-based fault level monitoring and indi­
cation equipment which has been installed is shown
in Fig 1.58.
This equipment does not prevent any circuit-breaker
from closing. The equipment advises the operator when
it is unsafe to close a circuit-breaker by an indication
at the point of switchgear control. Dual computer
systems operating in a main and standby mode are
provided for main unit failure or routine maintenance.
The equipment is designed for mean time between
failure (MTBF) of 10 years. The computer system
allows changes to be m a d e to the number of circuit-
breakers being monitored and the plant data used in the
computer model without the need to modify the
software.
The fault level calculation and graphical display
software for the system is based on the U M I S T IPSA
package (see Chapter 2) with modifications to enable
the software to run in real-time, providing colour
displays acceptable for use in a central control r o o m
(CCR) and switchgear safety status information (LED
states).
As the software has been specified to be flexible
and allow circuits and switchboards to be added and
removed, it follows that it can be used on future or
existing power stations.
A monitor in the C C R can display the connections
and switchgear for any of the switchboards included
in the system. The display identifies any switchgear
which cannot be closed safely at any instant in time
and gives the potential increase in fault level if this
were to be done. Each switchgear control switch in
the C C R is also provided with a red L E D , which is
illuminated if it is unsafe to close the circuit. A times

74
 Electrical system monitoring a n d interlocking schemes

Old Symbol New Symbol Component description

Withdrawable metalclad switchgear

Circuit-breaker general symbol

Circuit-breaker with HBC tripping fuse

t Off-load Disconnector

Fuses: (LH) general symbol

(RH) with supply side shown by thick line

Relay coil

Relay Contact: normally closed in de-energised state

Relay Contact: normally open in de-energised state

FIG. 1.49 Index of component symbols, old and new

record is also provided for each switchgear change of
state, for confirmation of operation and post-incident
analysis.
The information provided by the computer will be
used as an advisory aid by the operator. Although
a computerised interlocking system has been installed
at the Drax coal-fired power station, it was decided
not to provide full interlocking at the Heysham 2
nuclear power station. This decision was taken so
that the operators would not be inhibited from re-
estabhshing vital electrical supplies under controlled
emergency conditions to ensure reactor safety.
The natural progression of the computer-based sys­
tems is towards full interlocking schemes and elec­
trical auxiliaries system remote control. The C E G B
are investigating several options to this end which, in
the case of the remote control feature, would super­
sede the need for the full mimic panel in the C C R
with discrepancy switch control used at present.
8.5 Maintenance interlocking equipment
Maintenance interlocking is concerned essentially with
personnel safety while maintenance is being performed
on electrical equipment. Plant damage must also be
considered, but is less likely due to the plant being non-
operational during maintenance.

75
Electrical system design
Indicates electrical interlocks between a circuit-
breaker group.
El The figure in the LH corner denotes the total number
3\ / 4 of circuit-breakers in the group permitted to be closed
at any one time. The figure in the RH corner denotes
the total number of breakers in the group.
Indicates electrical interlocks between a circuit-
breaker group.
The figure in the LH corner denotes that a maximum
of 3 out of the 5 circuit-breakers with this symbol may
be closed at any one time. The exception to this would
be when a selected circuit-breaker is open, i.e., the
bus section, under this condition the interlock allows
the remaining 4 breakers to be closed.
Transformer electrical interlock.
This circuit-breaker, (HV) can only be closed if the
remote circuit-breaker, (LV) is open.
Interconnector electrical interlock.
This circuit-breaker can only be closed if
the remote circuit-breaker is open.
Γ­
Synchronising.
ιs Circuit-breaker fitted with synchronising facilities.
Can only be closed if supplies are synchronised.
Ρ­ Ί Automatic synchronising
I A Circuit-breaker fitted with auto-synchronising
facilities. Once this function has been selected the
is breaker will auto close when supplies are
synchronised
Transformer electrical interlock.
E / \ l This circuit-breaker (LV) can only be closed if the
Τ remote circuit breaker (HV) is closed, and supplies
are synchronised.
Interconnector electrical interlock.
This circuit-breaker can only be closed if the remote
circuit breaker is closed, and supplies are
synchronised.
FIG. 1.50 Definition of symbols for types of interlock
Although the C E G B Safety Rules do not require
mechanical interlocking, it is current policy to provide
a system of coded-key interlocks to assist the operator
in applying the Safety Rule requirements. The inter­
locking system is based on the following sequence:
• Isolation at all points of supply.
• Proof of isolation.
• Earthing all items of equipment.
• Proof of earthing.
• Issue of T e r m i t for Work'.
The objective is to allow safe access to electrical
equipment for maintenance purposes. Access is con­
trolled by a rigid set of Safety Rules specifically drawn
up and controlled by the C E G B , under a formal T e r m i t
for W o r k ' system. These ensure that access is denied
until all electrical apparatus has been switched off.
76
Chapter 1
isolated and in the case of H V , earthed. T o assist
the operators in implementing the Safety Rules it
is normal to apply a discrete coded-key procedure
designed for each system. This procedure only allows
access to the next stage, after the previous operation
has released a coded-key which in turn has to satis­
fy the next set of criteria. Following the system ensures
that all the necessary isolation and earthing has been
achieved in accordance with the Safety Rules prior to
allowing m a n access to plant.
The choice of a maintenance interlocking scheme
is largely dependent on the perceived maintenance
requirement and complexity of the plant concerned.
The mechanical interlocking will be based on coded-
keys and key exchange boxes.
The following type of mechanical interlock key
facilities are available to be used:
Symbol Type Function
\ Proof of earthing key
• A key free only when the circuit-
breaker or earthing switch or
switching device where appHcable
is closed in either the busbar
or circuit side earthing location.
Removal of the key shall lock
the circuit-breaker or earthing
switch or switching device in the
earthing location. (Key type *ΑΓ
— circuit earthing. Type Ά 2 '
— busbar earthing.)
Note: Although 3.3 kV circuit-
breakers are provided with circuit
earthing and, where specified,
busbar earthing facilities; 3.3 kV
fused switching devices are p r o ­
vided with facilities for circuit
earthing only.
• Alternatively, a key made avail­
able by an Authorised Person
after the satisfactory application
of portable earths.
O Β Permissive close key
A key which, when inserted, per­
mits the circuit-breaker or switching
device to be closed and is free
only when the circuit-breaker or
switching device is open. Attempted
removal of the key when the circuit-
breaker or switching device is closed
shall not cause tripping of the
circuit-breaker or switching device.
Alternatively for a disconnector, a
 Electrical system monitoring a n d interlocking schemes

I
9
4 is
1¿ 11 kV 3.3kV&415V
BOARD 3 I

11kV3.3kV&415V

11kV3.3kV&415V
SOURCE 2
SOURCES 1 2
BOARD 1 BOARD 2

/
/ \
\
Λ
/ \
/ \
/ \
/ \
/ \

Ϊ. ; II Υ Υ
y
/ \ SWITCHBOARD
SECTION A ^ ^ 2 ^ ^ 3 SECTION C INTERCONNECTOR
SECTION Β

IlkV 3.3kV&415V 11kV3.3kV& 415V

11kV3.3kV&415V

t- 1
|SWITCHBOARD A|
Y
SWITCHBOARD Β BWITCHBOARD C
Ϊ.
ν El ;

11kV3.3kV&415V

ι:γ
SOURCE 2
SOURCE 1 SOURCE 2

γ i 1 1Χ.
11kV3.3kV& 415V 11kV3.3kV&415V
IlkV 3.3kV&415V

SOURCE 2

SOURCES 1 2 3

A 1 A" ΓΑ Λ

1 11kV3
.3kV& 415V
I Ϊ
S

Ϊ.
11kV3.3kV&415V
Υ
BOARDS
I
FIG, 1.51 Index of basic operational interlock schemes

77
Electrical system design Chapter 1

1 MARSHALLING 1 TERM 1 INTERLOCKING 1 TERM 1 110 VOLT DC

CB 1 OR CB LV CB2 OR CB HV 1 MARSHALLING
! CUBICLE ! CUBICLE ! No. ! RELAY PANEL 1 No. ! DISTRIBUTION BOARD
POS

PLANT
PROTECTION
INTERLOCKS
DIRECTLY CONNECTED INTERLOCKS
«—h-» «—
POS
201 101

202 102
-RRÄ"
U 1
203 RRA-1
PLANT ~y
INTERLOCKS VIA RELAY WHERE PROTECTION 204
ROUTE LENGTH BETWEEN INTERLOCKS
SWITCHBOARDS INTRODUCES
UNACCEPTABLE VOLT DROP

SMR

205
SUPPLY
FAIL
ALARM 206

FIG. 1.52 Loop diagram of operational interlocks for transformer or interconnector

SOURCE 1 SOURCE 2
Symbol Type Function

O Β
{cont'd)
key which, when inserted, permits
the disconnector to be closed and
is free only in the 'disconnected'

i
position.
It shall not be possible to close
the disconnector with the key re­
moved. Attempted removal of the
key when the disconnector is closed
shall have no effect. (Key type
ΈΒ'.)

Permissive earthing key

PLANT P R O T E C T I O N
INTERLOCKS CB2
Δ
55- A key which, when inserted, per­
mits the circuit-breaker or earthing
CB2 POS
switch or switching device where
applicable, to be closed in either
the busbar or circuit side earthing
location and is free only when the
PLANT P R O T E C T I O N
INTERLOCKS CB1 circuit-breaker or earthing switch
or switching device is open. At­
tempted removal of the key when
t h e c i r c u i t - b r e a k e r or e a r t h i n g
FIG. 1.53 1 out of 2 circuit-breaker operational switch or switching device is closed
interlock circuit diagram shall not cause tripping of the

78
 Electrical system monitoring a n d interlocking schemes

LOCAL MARSHALLING
CIRCUIT BREAKER 1 CIRCUIT BREAKER 2 CUBICLE
CB PCS

PLANT PROTECTION
INTERLOCKS
-Í6-

CB PCS

PLANT PROTECTION
INTERLOCKS

FiG. 1.54 1 out of 2 circuit-breaker operational interlock loop diagram

SOURCE 2
110V D C SUPPLY

ι
CB1 POS
1 i
LOC »
^ C ^ P O ^

-5? »- 5 »-
CB3 LOC ^

J S IRC-1

CB2 POS
1R-2
-ÖÖ » - HS
CB2 LOC
f
Κ
3R-1
-» »- ^
CB2 >
PLANT
3R-2 PROTECTION
INTERLOCKS
-» »-
no J R C ^
/JJSMR »-
CB3

/
S^^R^

SUPPLY Ä-
FAIL
ALARM

FIG. 1.55 2 out of 3 circuit-breaker operational interlock circuit diagram

79
Electrical system design Chapter 1

MARSHALLING TERM TERM 110V DC DISTRIBUTION

CIRCUIT BREAKER 1 CIRCUIT BREAKER 2 CIRCUIT BREAKER 3 INTERLOCKING RELAY PANEL
CUBICLE No No I BOARD
I^BPOS

KPBLQC

-Θ

CB PCS IF
">1
JKCBLOC

u rn

J_Rai_

PLANT
PROTECTION
INTERLOCKS
(PR!)
213 IRC-3

PPI 214

TLÍLMB

201 J^MR-1

FAIL 202
ALARM
215

216

217
SPARE TERMINALS
218

219

FIG. 1 . 5 6 2 out of 3 circuit-breaker operational interlock loop diagram

Symbol Type Function Symbol Type Function

A
c
(cont'd)
circuit-breaker or earthing switch
or switching device. (Key type ' C T
O ^ and operate the circuit-breaker
or switching device in either t h e
(cont'd)
— circuit earthing, type *C2' — earthing o r isolated locations and
busbar earthing.) to insert and operate the earthing
Although 3.3 kV circuit-breakers switch where applicable in the
are provided with circuit earth­ earthing locations.
ing a n d , where specified, busbar Release of a key type Ό Γ
earthing facihties; 3.3 kV switching must n o t inhibit subsequent cir­
devices are provided with facilities cuit earthing a n d , similarly, re­
for circuit earthing only. lease of a key type *D2' must
not inhibit subsequent b u s b a r
earthing.
O D Proof of isolation key

• A key free only when t h e cir­ • Alternatively, a key free only

cuit-breaker o r switching d e ­ when t h e fixed circuit-breaker,
vice is removed from the service disconnector or earth switch is
location. fully open. Removal of the key
It shall n o t be possible t o shall lock t h e equipment in t h e
insert t h e c i r c u i t - b r e a k e r o r fully open position.
switching device into t h e service
location with the key removed, • Alternatively, a key made avail­
but it shall be possible t o insert able by the Charge Engineer after

80
 Electrical system monitoring a n d interlocking schemes

Symbol Type Function

BOARD ' 11kV3.3kVS415V BOARD 2

• key is trapped until the original

Τ
Η
(cont'd) position or m o d e of operation is
reselected.

HV\ 1

y
A key that is normally in a key

11/3.3kV
TRANSFORMER
INTERCONNECTOR
A exchange box and is released only
when all the permission keys have
been inserted.

v>-- 6 This indicates, on a drawing, the

normal location of the key when
the circuit is in service.

Subscript C H , a key normally in

CH the possession of an Authorised
MARSHALLING
CB 1 OR CB LV
CUBICLE CB2 0 R C B HV Person released only after satis­
factory completion of the specified
activity.

PLANT
Subscript X , a released key in the
PROTECTION
INTERLOCKS secure possession of an Authorised
Person to enable the Permit for
W o r k to be issued.

Subscript R, a key associated with

the red phase of the equipment
FIG. 1 . 5 7 Transformer and interconnector sequence for use in local key exchange
interlock scheme — circuit diagram schemes.

Subscript Y, a key associated with

Symbol Type Function
the yellow phase of the equipment
for use in local key exchange
satisfactory mechanical isolation
schemes.
^ {cont'd) of the main turbine-generator or
diesel generator.

Disconnector position key
A key which, when inserted, permits
the disconnector to be closed or
disconnected and is free in both
'closed' and 'disconnected' posi­
tions. Removal of the key shall
lock the disconnector in the 'closed'
position. Removal of the key in
the 'disconnected' position shall
not prevent complete withdrawal
of the carriage nor access for
maintenance.
Δ Β
Subscript B, a key associated with
the blue phase of the equipment
for use in local key exchange
systems.
8.5.1 Key exchange boxes
The Isolation Earthing Key Exchange Boxes operate
by receiving one key from each specified item of equip­
ment and then releasing one key for each specified
item of equipment to be earthed.
Certain items of equipment will require local key
exchange boxes as each phase of the equipment has
an individual interlock key system.

I I Η Operation facility key 8.5.2 Scheme application

A key which, when inserted, per­ A typical example of applying a coded-key interlocking
mits the desired position or m o d e scheme is illustrated o n Fig 1.59 and the associated
of operation to be selected. The procedure is as follows.

81
Electrical system design Chapter 1

STATION DATA CENTRE CENTRAL CONTROL ROOM

LOGGING PRINTER SYSTEM 1 DISPLAY ALARM SHARED EVENTS MONITOR SYSTEM 2 DISPLAY
(ALARMS/EVENTS) MONITOR & KEYBOARD & KEYBOARD MONITOR & KEYBOARD

UNIT 1 INSTRUMENTATION EQUIPMENT ROOM UNIT 2 INSTRUMENTATION EQUIPMENT ROOM

SYSTEM
TERMINALS FOR
COMPUTER
SYSTEMS 1 AND 2

GRAPHICS HIGH SPEED DATA LINKS

TERMINAL
FOR CHANGING
SWITCHGEAR
CONFIGURATION
AND DATA

PERIPHERAL
TERMINATION PANEL
COMPUTER PROGRAM LOADING COMPUTER
SYSTEM 1 MONITOR CONTROLLERS SYSTEM 2
I 3
MICROPROCESSOR CHANGEOVER UNIT MICROPROCESSOR MICROPROCESSOR
FOR LOCAL I/O FOR LOCAL I/O FOR REMOTE I/O
LOCAL LOCAL REMOTE
INPUT/OUTPUT INPUT/OUTPUT INPUT/OUTPUT
EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT
(SYSTEM 1) (SYSTEM 2) SYSTEM 2
Τ
ΐ Φ Η IOUTPUTI PLUG PANELS I INPUT I I OUTPUT I OUTPUT I PLUG PANELS INPUT I [OUTPUT

CRMC7A CRMC7B CRMC 7C CRMC 7D CRMC8A CRMC8B CRMC 8C CRMC BD

UNIT 1 INPUT AND OUTPUT CABLES TO PLANT UNIT 2 INPUT AND OUTPUT CABLES TO PLANT

FIG. 1.58 Block diagram for computer-based fault level monitoring and indication equipment

3,3 kV Chlorination plant board 7(8)
The following system permits work o n all circuits on
the above switchboard except the circuit spouts of
transformers a n d interconnectors:
(a) Isolate all points of supply from which the bus­
bars can be made ahve, releasing keys as detailed
below:
• Type D l key from 3.3 kV Interconnector t o
Chlorination Plant Board 8(7), the key being o b ­
tained from the remote circuit-breaker in the iso­
lated position.
• Type D l key from 3.3/0.415 kV Chlorination
Plant Transformer 7(8), the key being obtained
from the 415 V circuit-breaker in the isolated
position.
• Type D l key from 11/3.3 kV Chlorination Plant
Transformer 7(8), the key being obtained from
the 11 kV circuit-breaker in the isolated position.
(b) All vohage transformer isolation must be carried
out and checked (no interlocks are provided).
(c) A key exchange b o x will be provided t o accept the
above three keys. When all keys are inserted t w o
Type C2 keys will be released.
(d) T h e t w o Type C2 keys will then be inserted into
any two of the circuit-breakers through which it is
possible t o feed (including backfeed) the switch­
b o a r d . T h e busbars are then earthed through these
two circuit-breakers at t w o circuit positions.
(e) When each circuit-breaker is closed o n t o earth, a
Type A 2 key will be released.
(f) T h e Type A 2 keys will be held by a n Authorised
Person a n d locked away t o enable 'Permits for
W o r k ' t o be issued.
(g) T o allow access t o the busbar spouts of one of
the circuit-breakers used for earthing the busbars,
the Authorised Person will release one of the Type
A 2 keys, permitting the earth t o be removed a n d
the withdrawable portion removed.
It will not be possible t o maintain both circuit-
breakers used for earthing the busbars simulta­
neously. T h e Authorised Person will have t o retain

82
 Electrical system monitoring a n d interlocking schemes

11 kV STATION BOARD 7B (8B)

11/3.3kV
CHLORINATION
PLANT
TRANSFORMER 7 (8)

KEY EXCHANGE BOX

1 .
3.3kV CHLORINATION^PLANT BOARD 7 (8) 3.3kV CHLORINATION

6A
PLANT BOARD 8 (7)

3.3kV/415V
CHLORINATION
PLANT
TRANSFORMER 7 (8)

415V CHLORINATION
PLANT BOARD 7 (8)

FIG. 1.59 Typical coded-key maintenance interlocking scheme

at least one of the Type A2 keys to
the Safety Rule earthing requirements.
(h) Reinstatement of supplies will be established in
the reverse order.
Note: It has been assumed that the Chlorination
Plant Electrolysers are 'dead end feeders' in the above
procedure.
8.6 Other safety interlocking
During normal operation it is imperative that
satisfy equipment which contains live metal must be designed
such that access is denied at all times whilst the
equipment is energised. Typical examples of this are
switchgear cubicles where internal access is not possible
when the isolator is *on', which is done by ensuring
that in this position the door cannot be opened. Al­
though these requirements are written in the equipment
specification, there are several ways t o achieve the
objective. T h e choice must be one of a balanced design,
preventing defeat from the unintentional act but at the
same time not building in complications which makes
all normal operation more difficult.

83
 C H A P T E R 2

Electrical system analysis

1 Principles of electrical system analysis 2.5.2 Component and branch numbering

2.5.3 Branch definition
1.1 Introduction
2.5.4 Criteria of failure
1.2 System design assessments
2.5.5 Analysis control procedures
1.3 Analysis program developments
2.5.6 Deduction of minimal paths
1.4 Analysis techniques
2.5.7 Deduction of minimal cut sets
1.4.1 Reliability evaluation
2.5.8 Types of failure/restoration event
1.4.2 Power system performance analysis
2.5.9 Switching effects of component active failure
1.5 Quality assurance of analysis programs
2.5.10 Markov state-space models
2 Reliability evaluation of power systems 2.5.11 Evaluation techniques (busbar indices)
2.5.12 Evaluation techniques (system indices)
2.1 Introduction
2.5.13 Presentation of results
2.2 Quantitative reliability evaluation
2.6 Quality assurance
2.2. 1 Choice of numerical indices
2.7 Typical applications
2.2. 2 Scope of reliability evaluation assessments
2.7.1 Example of the calculation and use of busbar indices
2.3 Computer programs for reliability evaluation
2.7.2 Example of the calculation and use of system indices
2.3. 1 Batch program — RELAPSE
2.3. 2 Interactive program — GRASP (Version 1) 3 Power system performance analysis
2.3.,3 Interactive program - GRASP (Version 2)
3.1 Load flow analysis
2.4 Data requirements
3.1.1 Introduction
2.4,,1 Active failure rate
3.1.2 Program construction [4,5]
2.4,,2 Passive failure rate
3.1.3 Use of programs
2.4,.3 Total failure rate
3.2 Fault level analysis
2.4 .4 Average repair time
3.2.1 Introduction
2.4 .5 Switching time
3.2.2 Program construction
2.4 .6 Maintenance rate
3.2.3 Use of programs
2.4 .7 Maintenance time
3.3 Stability analysis
2.4 .8 Stuck probability
3.3.1 Introduction
2.4 .9 Time limit of a limited energy source
3.3.2 Analytical and programming considerations
2.4 .10 Common mode failure rate
3.3.3 Use of programs
2.5 Techniques employed
3.4 Future developments of electrical analysis programs
2.5 .1 Graphical representation of the station electrical
system 4 References

1 Principles of electrical system analysis works comply with specified operating performance
and safety criteria.

• Evaluate the comparative performance and cost

1.1 Introduction
The assessment and vaHdation of electrical power
systems in terms of their predicted performance and
comparative levels of reliability and availability are
essential tasks in the early design phases for all major
projects. This is particularly important in respect of
those aspects of the design and performance necessary
for ensuring the safe and satisfactory integration of
various types of power station into the C E G B grid
supply system.
Broadly, the primary functional design objectives of
electrical system analysis are t o :
• Ensure that the designs for plant and system net­
effectiveness of alternative plant designs and system
configurations.
• Determine and optimise plant and system parameters
for technical performance specification purposes.
• Provide the electrical characteristics necessary for
the design of electrical protection systems.
• Define system and plant constraints for operational
and maintenance procedural purposes.
System and plant parameters are currently fully repre­
sented by mathematical models in the design process

84

and, with the evolution of digital computer aided design
facilities over the past fifteen years, the scope and
detailed representation of power system simulation
studies has increased significantly in comparison with
earlier analysis techniques. Also, with the increasing
involvement of computers, there are continuing pos­
sibilities for the development and enhancement of the
computer programs described later in this chapter.
1.2 System design assessments
The design and operation of power systems require
comprehensive analysis in order to evaluate the per­
formance under normal and abnormal conditions of
operation, whilst recognising the defined system per­
formance and safety criteria discussed in Chapter 1.
In this regard, both power system performance and
reliabihty evaluation analysis play equally important
roles in achieving a high standard of overall power
system integrity and ensuring the optimal utilisation of
capital investment in power station plant and systems.
System integrity is particularly important for nuclear
power stations, for which nuclear safety and district
hazard assessments have to be made in support of the
application for an operating licence.
The design assessments must necessarily involve the
rehability evaluation and power system performance
analysis of the interface connections between the grid
system and the power station, together with the station
electrical systems which provide electrical power to the
boiler/reactor, turbine-generator auxiUaries and station
services plant. The station electrical systems comprise
many supply systems of the radial type, including
transformers, switchgear, m o t o r s , gas turbine and diesel
generators, cables and connections.
1.3 Analysis program developments
Power system analysis involves some very complex
numerical processes which, together with the entry of
system data and the extraction of essential results,
constitute a very substantial workload on the design
engineer in making assessments of system performance.
It is important, therefore, that aspects of computing
organisation such as operating procedures and com­
mands are removed, as far as practicable, from the
design engineer's tasks to enable him to concentrate
on the quality of the system design and performance.
T o this end, separate suites of batch m o d e and
interactive computer programs have been specifically
developed to incorporate the following *user-friendly'
features:
• System networks are drawn on the computer ter­
minal screens in diagrammatic form, thereby p r o ­
viding a familiar framework for the engineer t o
identify the correctness of the system for analysis
purposes.
Principles of electrical system analysis
• Data tables are generated automatically from the
diagram information for each of the plant com­
ponents and system connections.
• Self-explanatory help and option menus are dis­
played on the screen and, where necessary, specific
error messages or warnings are displayed.
• Display options allow key resuks to be displayed
either directly on the network diagram or in tabular
and graphical form.
The p r o g r a m s ' 'user-friendly' operating procedures
are particularly enhanced by the extensive apphcation
of computer graphics for the input of system and
plant data, results output and control functions. Typi­
cal examples of system network diagrammatic and
graphical output displays that are capable of being
copied by means of a hard copy unit directly from
the computer terminal screen are shown in Figs 2.1
and 2.2.
Experience in the collaborative development of com­
puter aided system analysis programs, has demonstrated
that the final quality is particularly influenced by how
well the design concepts, needs objectives, and organ­
isational and responsibility arrangements are jointly
established at the inception of the development project.
Particular emphasis is therefore placed on the design
concepts and objectives being formulated on a sound
technical basis, while ensuring that associated important
design functions, such as program structure, controls,
mathematical models, calculation routines, data-base
management, etc., are clearly defined. T o assist further
in the definition and understanding of the overall
p r o g r a m logic, flow charts (typically as depicted in
Fig 2.3) are produced at the commencement of each
development project. The chart displays all the activities
which need to be considered in the development of a
new program and provides the starting point for the
computer software p r o g r a m designer.
The further development of computer aided analysis
programs is an ongoing task in order to keep abreast
with the rapid technological advances being made in
plant and system designs, e.g., the introduction of
m o d e r n electronic speed and vohage controllers for
governors and automatic vohage regulators (AVRs),
thyristor drive controllers, vacuum switches, fast op­
erating electronic protection equipment, etc.
1.4 Analysis techniques
Prior to the development of the computer analysis
facilities described in the previous section, h a n d calcula­
tions formed the main method of analytical solution;
these were supported, whenever possible, by A C and
D C analyser facilities for system load flows, fault levels
and transient fault performance.
Such analysis techniques were inherently time con­
suming and permitted only simplified representations
85
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

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FIG. 2.1 Load flow results for a power station electrical auxiliary system and grid supply system interface connections.
The load flows are expressed in terms of MVA loadings with system voltage profile levels in pu values.

of electrical auxiliary systems and associated plant.
They involved network reduction techniques, with many
design performance approximations and assumptions;
sensitivity and iterative studies, invoking permissible
system and plant design tolerances, were necessarily of
an extremely constrained nature.
With present day computer programs a n d computing
facilities, the analysis techniques are vastly more com­
prehensive, efficient and precise than older methods.
Batch m o d e a n d interactive analysis programs enable
the predictive performance of station electrical system
designs t o be optimised o n an iterative basis, with
much more detail and a higher degree of accuracy than
previously, in an extremely short time.
Batch mode computing systems are capable of ana­
lysing the performance of m o r e than one power system
at a time and are primarily suitable for processing the
extensive amounts of information and results asso­
ciated with the dynamic transient analysis of large
systems. Such studies m a y , for example, involve a
computational time of about 10 minutes for a single
short term transient condition of 5 seconds, but they
can of course be submitted for analysis during computer
off-peak periods at night times a n d weekends.
Interactive on-line computing, by comparison, al­
lows the design engineer t o interface with, a n d directly
control, the analysis process from a computer terminal
in respect of the network representation, type of study
required, system parameters, corrective actions and
output result displays. While interactive computing is
highly user orientated a n d consequently more time
demanding at the terminal for the design engineer,
it is much faster than batch m o d e analysis systems in
the overall turn r o u n d time of producing results,
especially for steady state power system studies.
The availability of separate suites of batch m o d e
a n d interactive computer programs, when coupled with
their respective databases, enables a series of specific
power system performance or reliability evaluation ana­
lysis studies t o be undertaken in a uniform m a n n e r ,
by varying the system parameters a n d the type of study.
As a consequence of the ability t o control the type

86
 Principles of electrical system analysis

7H 1.10 1.0 Η

1.08
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6 H 1.05 Η
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5H
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4 H 0.95 Η
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- GENERATOR TERMINAL VOLTAGE (PU ON 3.3 kV)

- GENERATOR OUTPUT POWER (PU ON RATING)
- GENERATOR SPEED (PU ON 50 Hz - 1000 r/min)
- PONY MOTOR SPEED (PU ON 50 Hz HS OR LS)
- PONY MOTOR CURRENT (PU ON RATING)

FIG. 2.2 Gas circulator pony motor speed change study

of Study and sequence of studies from within a suite
of programs, the efficiency and speed of response in
producing assessments of large complex systems has
increased significantly.
For example, having entered all the system and plant
data, the design engineer is able to produce the results
of a power system steady state analysis or reliabihty
evaluation study within a matter of seconds for a
complete power station electrical system, including the
grid interface connections. It is also a relatively simple
exercise to undertake sensitivity studies to identify the
system components and parameters having a critical
impact on the overall system performance.
One should not, however, overlook the considerable
design effort and time that is involved in setting u p
the system networks and the collation, checking and
entry of the system plant and connection data for
modelhng and simulating complete station electrical
systems fully. This may a m o u n t to something in excess
of eight m a n weeks for a large power system.
1.4.1 Reliability evaluation
A rehability evaluation study forms the n o r m a l starting
point for comparing the effectiveness of alternative
interface connection arrangements between the grid
system, the turbine-generator units and the associated
station electrical supply systems. T h e extent of the
system evaluation undertaken, using interactive com­
puting p r o g r a m s , incorporates the following analysis
features:
• Failure rates.
• Outage durations.
• Outage times.
• C o m m o n m o d e failures.
• Limited energy sources.
• Time dependent reliability.
The basic techniques required to analyse and evaluate
the reliability of the systems include the simulation
of realistic failure events, restoration procedures,
switching actions, maintenance events and operational
constraints.
For multiple turbine-generator power stations with
identical unit a n d station systems, it is more efficient
t o divide the systems into subsystems. This technique,
as explained in detail later, is not only efficient and

87
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

START

Τ
SPECIFY GRAPHIC TERMINAL TYPE

SYSTEM
DRAWING AND
I
1 - CONSTRUCT A NEW SYSTEM
2 - RETRIEVE A SYSTEM
SYSTEM
RETRIEVAL
MODIFYING ROUTINE
3 - EXIT FROM THE PROGRAM

τ
ROUTINE

STOP

I
DO YOU WANT TO QUIT PROGRAM - Y/N?

1,4

1 MAIN OPTIONS
ί
1 - CONSTRUCT A NEW SYSTEM
2 - RETRIEVE A SYSTEM FROM FILE
SYSTEM DATA
3 - FILE THE PRESENT SYSTEM DIAGRAM
FILING EDITING
4 - MODIFY THE PRESENT SYSTEM ROUTINE
ROUTINE 5 - EDIT THE PRESENT NETWORK DATA
6 - OUTPUT PROCESS
7 - EXIT FROM THE PROGRAM

OPTIONS
DISPLAY NETWORK DIAGRAM
DISPLAY FULL LIST OF INPUT DATA
PRINTING OF INPUT DATE

FIG. 2 . 3 Time dependent reliability analysis program — flow chart

precise but reduces the design engineering effort in­ • Transient fault stability performance of systems and
volved in the preparation and input of system com­ motors.
ponent data. • Fast transient switching of systems and m o t o r s .

• Transient recovery voltage levels.

1.4.2 Power system performance analysis
Batch mode and interactive computing programs are
used to assess the performance of integrated and
isolated power systems in respect of:
• Load flows, voltage regulation and
tapchanger optimisation.
• Short-circuit (symmetrical and asymmetrical) fault
levels.
• Dynamic m o t o r starting performance.
• Controller modelHng of A V R s , governors and prime
movers.
• Power system protection co-ordination of relays and
fuses.
transformer
Power system performance analysis is largely based on
load flow, short-circuit and transient stability studies.
The analysis, using nominal plant parameters, com­
mences with the calculation of the steady state power

88

flows, voltage distributions and short-circuit fault levels
throughout the system during no load, minimum load,
start-up and C M R sequence loading (block loading)
conditions of the turbine-generator unit operation. Dur­
ing this stage of the analysis, transformer tap changer
positions are adjusted, as appropriate, to achieve the
optimum system voltage profiles for these conditions
of operation. Dynamic m o t o r starting and system tran­
sient fault stability performance evaluation studies are
also introduced during this process for the optimisation
of system and plant parameters.
Further steady state, dynamic response and transient
fauh stability sensitivity analyses are then performed,
selectively invoking permissible plant manufacturing
tolerances, defined system operating ranges of voltage
and frequency, and credible system and plant outage
operating conditions. Calculation of system dynamic
responses uses a step-by-step approach, starting from
a specified balanced steady state operating condition
produced by a load flow study.
Analysis programs contain a number of models for
the representation of synchronous machines and induc­
tion motors; they automatically select the most suitable
model, according to the a m o u n t of data provided by
the user in terms of the machine model parameters.
The most detailed models of a synchronous machine
include the transient and sub-transient and saturation
function parameters, together with the excitation and
speed governor controller model block diagram transfer
function elements. Other loads are represented as fixed
impedances, while the transformers, transmission and
cable connections are represented by their equivalent
circuit parameters.
Inclusion of the effects of instantaneous voltage and
frequency deviations into the calculations, produces a
more reaUstic assessment of system behaviour under
transient conditions. The widely used diesel or gas-
turbine generator supported essential supply systems in
nuclear power stations are examples of such operating
situations and a special purpose transient analysis pro­
gram has been developed for assessing their dynamic
performance. This program recalculates the plant and
system parameters throughout the transient variations
of instantaneous voltage and frequency, thereby enabl­
ing the systems and plant to be designed and operated
closer to their Hmits, coupled with the abihty to define
the settings of the associated protective devices m o r e
accurately.
Detailed descriptions of power system reliabihty
evaluation and performance analysis are given in the
following Sections 2 and 3 respectively. These descrip­
tions are comprehensively illustrated by authentic com­
puter printouts generated by the software programs
under discussion, i.e., they have not been subjected to
any form of artistic licence.
1.5 Quality assurance of analysis progranns
Particular emphasis is placed on achieving the highest
Reliability evaluation of p o w e r systems
possible standard of quality by instituting rigorous
verification and vaUdation testing disciplines from the
inception of a p r o g r a m up to the stage when it is for­
mally released in a production status version. Test
systems, representative of the wide spectrum of the
electrical systems encountered within power stations,
are used for the quality assurance of all program ver­
sions and enhancements.
Each development and production version of a
program is identified with a unique identification re­
ference, which is displayed on the V D U during analysis
and is subsequently printed automatically on the system
input, network diagrams, graphical and output data
sheets.
At an early period in the development process,
an appropriate level of verification and vaHdation
testing is initiated and formally recorded with respect
to program source codes, models, calculations and
control routines. Verification activities are progres­
sively increased during the development, involving ex­
tensive testing and comparison of the source codes with
the mathematical models by the specialist software
programmer.
The verification and vaHdation tasks are the re­
sponsibility of the design engineer, who undertakes a
comprehensive comparison of the mathematical models
and p r o g r a m results with manual calculations, field
measurements of plant and system performance tests
and, whenever applicable, with earHer versions of the
program and alternative validated analysis programs.
The widespread utilisation of a program by many de­
sign engineers for the analysis of various types of
integrated and isolated power systems is an additional
important contribution to the verification and valida­
tion process.
Notwithstanding the procedures and disciplines out-
Hned it is recognised that the verification, validation and
modification of computer programs may continue for
m a n y years foHowing their formal introduction at a
production status level. Rigid quality control disciplines
must continue to be exercised in this regard in accor­
dance with the procedures outHned.
2 Reliability evaluation of power systems
2.1 Introduction
The reliability of larger turbine-generator units (500
M W and above) in modern power stations is assuming
increasing significance in terms of system security and
the economics of supply, since they are used in the main
to meet the base load requirements of the grid system.
It follows that all the supporting auxiliary plant
and systems within each station must have a similar
high degree of reHability, in order to minimise the
impact of their failure on the overall reliability of the
main units.
89
Electrical system analysis
The Station Electrical System (SES) is an example
of one such internal system: it can be considered to
have three constituent parts:
• The M A I N system, the principal function of which
is to distribute a sufficient supply of electrical power
of the required quality to all the drives and aux­
iliary plant associated with the boilers/reactors and
turbine-generators. Failure of all or even part of this
system could have a direct impact on the availability
of a main generator, causing either the total loss or
reduction of output from the generator to the grid
system.
• The G U A R A N T E E D system which supplies power
of guaranteed quality to computers, instruments,
etc., necessary for the operational control and moni­
toring of the power station. Sometimes this is
referred to as the No-break system and is required
to continue to function during large system distur­
bances, unit start, shutdown, etc.
• The E S S E N T I A L system which comprises standby
generators and associated electrical connections and
drives (some of which are common with the M A I N
system). This is sometimes called the Short-break
system and is generally used (with or without the
standby generators) to supply power to all those
auxiliaries necessary for the safe operation and post-
trip cooling requirements of nuclear stations and
for black starting of fossil-fired stations.
It is important, therefore, that a reliability assessment
of ah three parts of the SES is performed during,
and as an integral part of, the design process and
should cover all the system operating configurations
and station running modes.
Reliabihty assessment, as such, is not a new require­
ment. Engineers have always striven to design systems
that will continue to operate in a safe and reliable
manner. In the past, this reliability has generally been
achieved by drawing on the experience of design and
operational staff and using purely engineering and qua­
litative criteria. Quantitative assessment, due mainly to
the sheer tedium of the calculations involved, tended
to be limited to the evaluation of relatively small
systems (comprised of few components).
2.2 Quantitative reliability evaluation
It is clear that a quantitative evaluation of the SES
reliability is of considerable help in decision making
during the design phases of any power station project.
It consists of the calculation of a set of numerical
indices which provides a measure of the 'goodness' of
the system and can be used during the design phase to
compare one system with another.
2.2.1 Choice of numerical indices
There are many reliability indices that could be cal-
90
Chapter 2
culated and used as a measure of the 'goodness' of
a SES. The following are typical examples of suitable
indices:
FR Failure /?ate, the expected average
number of failures in a specified period
MTBF The M e a n Time between Failures
MTTR The M e a n Time Γο i?epair
AOD The /Iverage Outage D u r a t i o n or average
down time
O T or O D The total Outage Time or total Outage
£)owntime in a specified period
LOG The total Loss Of Generation in a spe­
cified period due to system unreliability
LOR The total Loss Of /Revenue in a specified
period due to system unreliability
ER The e n c o u n t e r i?ate for operation in
various derated states (see (b) below).
The interactive computer programs developed speci­
fically for the quantitative reliability evaluation of
power station electrical systems (described in Section
2.3 of this chapter) calculate, hst a n d / o r display the
reliability indices. The following indices have been
selected as the most useful and appropriate in the
iterative process of system design:
(a) For a particular load point or node of a SES:
FR Expected average number of failures of
supply to the load point in a year (fail­
ures/year)
AOD Average outage duration or downtime —
average time for which n o supply is avail­
able at the load point (hours)
AOT Total annual outage time — total time in
a year when n o supply is available at the
load point — (hours/year).
(b) For the SES as a whole:
ER Expected frequency of operation of the
power station or main generator unit in
various derated states in a year (occasions/
year)
AD Average duration of operation in each of
the derated states (hours)
AOT Total time of operation in each of the
derated states in a year (hours/year)
LOG Expected loss of generation in a year due
to the unrehability of the SES (MWh/year).
2.2.2 Scope of reliability evaluation assessments
The availability of very powerful modern mainframe
computers led to the development of efficient computer

programs containing algorithms which facilitate the
probabilistic assessment of the rehability of very large
electrical systems (systems containing a very large num­
ber of components). With such computing facilities,
the system design engineer is provided with a very
powerful design aid.
Such assessments facilitate the following design
activities:
• The comparison of alternative designs of SES with
regard to the reliabihty of supply to corresponding
nodes or load point busbars in each system to which
it is proposed to connect certain critical plant.
• Indication of how a system may fail, assessing the
consequences of such failures and providing suffi­
cient information to enable the quahty of a system
to be related to agreed reliabihty standards or tar­
gets. Where the agreed standards/targets are not
achieved, sensitivity calculations can be undertaken
during the design phase to enable the design engineer
to decide what improvements to the system should
be made and whether the capital cost of such im­
provements (if any) is acceptable.
• Quantitative assessments of the loss of generation
(in M W h / y e a r ) resulting from the unrehability of
the SES. The unreliability of the SES can thus be
expressed in financial terms by applying the current
figure for the marginal cost of replacement genera­
tion (running alternative plant which is more ex­
pensive in terms of cost per unit output).
• Checking that, for a nuclear station, the proposals
for the provision of local (on-site) standby generation
and the methods of connecting this to the SES,
ensures that the contribution of the SES to the total
probability of a degraded core does not exceed the
agreed design target.
• Inclusion of the effects of c o m m o n m o d e failure
(CMF) in an assessment of the SES (if suitable data
is available) when the proposed physical disposition
of the various components is known. Alternative­
ly (even without such C M F data), the sensitivity
of the system reliabihty indices to the C M F of cer­
tain groups or sets of system components can be
examined.
2.3 Computer programs for reliability
evaluation
The C E G B has undertaken, over many years, the
development of computer analysis programs specifi­
cally for power system rehability evaluation, by adapt­
ing and enhancing any techniques that can be applied
to the numerical evaluation of reliability and incor­
porating these techniques in computer programs for
use in system design.
Reliability evaluation of p o w e r systems
2.3.1 Batch program — RELAPSE
During the first development project, the techniques,
which are described in more detail in Section 2.5 of
this chapter, were incorporated into a computer pro­
gram designed to run in batch m o d e but capable of
analysing only small systems (containing u p to about
15 load point busbars or nodes).
This first batch p r o g r a m (called R E L A P S E —
Reliability Evaluation of Electrical Systems) was not
very 'user friendly'. The data preparation stage was
extremely laborious, requiring the completion of nu­
merous data sheets from which sets of punched cards
were produced. It was necessary for these t o be checked
thoroughly for accuracy and arranged in the correct
order in a deck suitable for computer input via a card
reader. The t u r n a r o u n d for each study took anything
u p to three days.
2.3.2 Interactive program — GRASP (Version 1)
The main objective of the next development project
was an interactive version of the R E L A P S E program,
suitable for running under a time sharing system (TSO)
from a remote graphics terminal. Briefly, this work
entailed the improvement of the R E L A P S E algorithms
to m a k e them m o r e efficient and the development of
new algorithms for the graphics drawing routines,
data entry and editing, file storing and retrieval, etc.,
all of which were designed to m a k e the program more
'user friendly'.
With this interactive program (called G R A S P —
Graphic/interactive Reliability of Auxiliary Systems
of Power stations), once having set u p the system to
be evaluated and entered the appropriate data, fuU
'on-the-spot' control of the analysis study is available
to the user. N o t only can the basic assessment of the
system be undertaken but, due to the flexibility built
into the p r o g r a m , a whole range of sensitivity studies
can very easily and quickly be undertaken by changing
the system topology a n d / o r data and re-running the
study to obtain instant resuUs. Various options are
buiU into the p r o g r a m , which can be exercised by the
user to control both the precision and objectives of
each study.
P a r t of this development also included increasing
the array dimensions within the program to enable
much larger systems (containing u p t o about 50 nodes)
to be evaluated a n d inserting full protection against
malfunctioning of the p r o g r a m , together with appro­
priate error message displays.
The interactive drawing routines developed for the
G R A S P p r o g r a m are very similar (as perceived by the
user) to those of the /nteractive P o w e r Systems /Inalysis
(IPSA) programs described elsewhere in this chapter.
2.3.3 Interactive program — GRASP (Version 2)
During the development and use of G R A S P 1, it
was recognised that the scope and efficiency of re-
91
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

liability assessments could be significantly enhanced Limited energy sources

by the introduction of subsystem concepts, c o m m o n
Although the techniques developed and incorporated
mode failure evaluation and limited energy sources
within the R E L A P S E and G R A S P 1 programs included
representation.
restoration modes which made use of local standby
generators, no account was taken of the fact that such
Subsystem concepts standby plant may only be capable of supplying the
required system power for a limited time. Under cir­
Due to the fact that, for a reHability evaluation, the
cumstances where, for example, a time Hmit was im­
graphical input of a system had to be performed on a
posed by the size of on-site fuel storage tanks, the
component-by-component basis, it became apparent
assessment of the SES reHability would not be correct,
that this was now the most tedious part of the work
if the restoration m o d e involved the use of the standby
required of the user of the interactive program.
plant.
Recognising that, in general, the SES for a typical
New algorithms were therefore developed for the
power station could be broken down into four or five
G R A S P 2 program to take account of this time limit
broadly similar subsystems, the next development pro­
and thereby permit a more realistic representation and
ject included (amongst other things) the provision of
assessment of the real system.
an improved graphics drawing system. The system de­
veloped is known as the Subsystem Drawing Routine,
With this system, implemented in the G R A S P 2 inter­ 2.4 Data requirements
active computer program, it is only necessary to input
The methods of reliability evaluation used within the
the system and data for, say, the SES associated with
G R A S P interactive computer programs require a selec­
one generator unit of a four-unit station and then use
tion of the following component reliability data, ac­
the computer to reproduce this three times and store as
cording to the purpose and wider objectives of each
separate subsystems. It is possible, of course, to retrieve
study.
each of the individual subsystems and make minor
changes in the normal way. For a complete representa­
tion and subsequent analysis of the complete SES for 2.4.1 Active failure rate
a four-unit station, it is then necessary to draw the The average number of times per year that a component
remainder of the SES, i.e., the Station System, separate­ fails actively.
ly as the fifth subsystem and use the Interconnector A component active failure is defined as one which
Drawing Facility to interconnect all five subsystems, as results in the operation of protective devices to isolate
necessary. the entire zone a r o u n d the failed component auto­
The result of this development is to reduce to about matically, e.g., a short-circuit.
one-third, the effort required of the user to input a
large system, compared with that previously required 2.4.2 Passive failure rate
with G R A S P 1. The average number of times per year (failures/year)
that a component fails passively.
Common mode failure evaluation A component passive failure is defined as one which
does not result in the operation of any protective de­
The batch computer program R E L A P S E and the
vice but would nevertheless cause loss of supply to the
first interactive program G R A S P 1 only included over­
busbar under consideration, e.g., an open-circuit or
lapping independent failure events and maintenance
the false opening of a circuit-breaker.
events.
It is a requirement in laying out a power station
that segregation is maintained between the components 2.4.3 Total failure rate
of each power system, and those of all other systems. The average of the total number of failures per year
This is not easily achievable due to space limitations, (for which records are available) that require the
and can be very costly. The close proximity of compo­ removal of the component from service for repair due
nents, such as can occur within cable tunnels, switch- to either of its failure modes (active and passive).
rooms, etc., suggests that certain groups of components
are susceptible to c o m m o n m o d e failure. 2.4.4 Average repair time
To add more precision to the assessment of the
The average time (hours/failure) taken to repair all
reHability of a SES, this development included the
failures (active and passive), for each component.
extension of the algorithms, drawing routines and
models and equations within the G R A S P 2 interactive
program, so that events involving the c o m m o n m o d e 2.4.5 Switching time
failure of certain user specified groups/sets of com­ Following a component active failure, the average
ponents could be included in the evaluation. time (hours) taken to isolate manually the failed com-

92

ponent and restore all possible healthy components
to service.
2.4.6 Maintenance rate
The average number of occasions per year (outages/
year) that a component is taken out of service for
preventive or scheduled maintenance.
2.4.7 Maintenance time
The average duration (hours/outage) of all scheduled
maintenance outages for each component.
2.4.8 Stuck probability
The probability (expressed as a decimal fraction) that
a circuit-breaker or switch will fail to open/close when
called u p o n to operate. Also, the probability that a
standby generator or limited energy source will fail to
start on demand.
2.4.9 Time limit of a limited energy source
The average time (hours) for which a limited energy
source can supply the energy requirements of the
system.
A limited energy source (LES) is a standby energy
source which can only supply the system energy re­
quirements for a limited period.
2.4.10 Common mode failure rate
The average number of times per year (failures/year)
that the particular group or set of components fail
in common mode.
A common mode failure (CMF) is defined as the
simultaneous failure of several components due to a
single external cause. The multiple failure effects must
not be consequences of each other.
2.5 Techniques employed
The techniques employed within the interactive com­
puter programs are described in this section. The
various stages in the process of evaluating a SES are
described in roughly chronological order.
A n explanation is given of the objectives of each
stage and the methods employed for their achievement.
It is not intended to provide here, detailed instruc­
tion in the use of the computer program. For this,
the reader is referred to the User's Manual for the
G R A S P 2 computer program [1].
2.5.1 Graphical representation of the station
electrical system
An engineer traditionally likes to represent any engi­
neering task in which he is engaged in diagrammatic
form. The first stage in the quantitative reliability
Reliability evaluation of p o w e r systems
evaluation of a SES is therefore to input the system
to the computer using interactive graphic techniques.
The system is drawn on the V D U display, component
by component. The symbols used are those normally
recognised by engineers as representing the components
of a SES, for example, two interlocking circles to re­
present a transformer; a filled in rectangle to represent
a busbar, etc.
The drawing routine has been deliberately developed
to ahow fuU flexibility and freedom to construct and
display the system in the most presentable manner
(naturally, it has to be electrically correct to represent
the exact system that is to be evaluated). Full control
can be exercised in respect of the order in which the
components are drawn and their position on the screen.
Mnemonic codes are used to call for the appropriate
symbol to be drawn at the required position on the
screen (selected with cross-hair cursors). A hst of these
mnemonic codes is shown in Fig 2.4.
Whilst the full rules to be followed for the graphical
input of a system are provided (together with step by
step illustrations) in the program Users M a n u a l , it is
appropriate at this point to hst the salient features of
the drawing routine.
• The system is drawn component by component,
branch by branch.
• Mistakes in drawing can easily be rectified by use of
the 'Delete' a n d / o r 'Forget' c o m m a n d s .
• A facility exists to enable the presentation of the
complete diagram to be improved at any stage of
the drawing process by moving components around
on the screen (the associated connections linking
the component to the adjacent components are auto­
matically re-routed).
• Further changes to a completed diagram can be
m a d e by adding complete branches or by deleting
components or branches. If an individual component
is deleted, a connection is automatically drawn to
link its preceding and succeeding components within
the branch.
• A system, once drawn, can be permanently stored,
together with its associated component reliability
data for subsequent retrieval and use.
• A system can be re-centred on the screen a n d / o r
re-scaled to allow additions to the diagram at any
time. O n subsequent storing of the system, the new
scale factor or centre co-ordinates are also stored.
• Branches are designated as either unidirectional
or bidirectional, according to whether power flow
through the branch can be in one direction only or in
either direction as an acceptable operating condition.
2.5.2 Component and branch numbering
As mentioned earlier, the interactive computer pro­
gram (GRASP2) is based largely on digital (number
93
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

CODE COMPONENT SYMBOL

S BUSBAR

U INTERCONNECTION U2

G GENERATOR

I MOTOR
é
τ 2W - TRANSFORMER

c CONNECTION

Β NORMALLY CLOSED CIRCUIT BREAKER

W SOURCE
9
Ρ NORMALLY OPEN CIRCUIT BREAKER

R REACTOR

A AUTOTRANSFORMER

Q CABLE

Ζ ISOLATOR

L LIMITED ENERGY SOURCE

3 3W - TRANSFORMER

FIG. 2.4 List of component codes and symbols

manipulation) techniques. There are many internal
number systems used in the program which are not
displayed to the user.
There are, however, two important number systems,
namely component and branch numbering, which are
displayed and provide the user interface. They are both
automatically applied to the system and can (at the
user's option) be included in the graphic display on the
VDU.
Component numbering
A component numbering system is used to identify
every component of the SES uniquely. As well as
providing a user interface, the component numbering
system provides the interface with the component
reliability database in which is stored the reliability data
to be used in the evaluation.
Since numbering of all components by the user
would be a very tedious task (there can be upwards
of 300 components in a single system), it has been
arranged that the numbering is automatically carried
out by the program. The component numbers can be
displayed at any stage of the drawing process, the num­
bering sequence being continually updated as drawing
proceeds.
The individual component number consists of a pre­
fix which, in general, is the mnemonic code used to
draw the component (see Fig 2.4), followed by a number
representing the order in which components of that
particular type were drawn. Figure 2.5 is an example
of a small system as it would appear on the V D U ,
complete with its component and branch numbering.
Branch numbering
In addition to providing a user interface (branch
numbers can be displayed in the same way as com­
ponent numbers), the branch numbering system plays
a part in improving the efficiency of the p r o g r a m .
Certain types of component are defined within the
program as being ^branch terminators', as follows:

94

NETWORK DRAWING AND MODIFYING ROUTINE
-CN/-
FIG. 2.5 Example of a computer printout of a small SES system complete with component codes and
branch numbering
• Source — a start component.
• Generator — a start component.
• Limited energy source (LES) — a start component.
• Busbar or node — a start or finish component.
• Three-winding transformer — a start or finish
component.
• Induction motor — a finish component.
According to the network topology, components elec­
trically positioned between two terminating compo­
nents are automatically assigned branch numbers. The
branch numbers are shown in parentheses in Fig 2.5.
Branches are numbered upwards from (1). The lower
order numbers in the sequence are assigned to the
unidirectional branches (in the order they were drawn),
followed by the bidirectional branches (in the order
they were drawn). A definition of unidirectional and
bidirectional branches is given in the following section.
Reliability evaluation of p o w e r systems
CRASP-2 THU« Θ2 JUN 1988 1
2.5.3 Branch definition
A branch is a g r o u p of c o m p o n e n t s electrically
connected in series between any pair of terminating
components, as listed in the previous section.
Branches which are terminated at one end with either
a source, a generator, or an LES symbol are referred
to as source branches.
Branches which are terminated at one end with
an induction m o t o r symbol are referred to as load
branches,
A unidirectional branch is one through which, as an
acceptable operating condition, the flow of power is
normally in one direction only. By definition, a source
branch is unidirectional F R O M the source and a load
branch is unidirectional T O the load.
A bidirectional branch is one through which the
flow of power can be in either direction as an acceptable
system operating condition.
With a knowledge of the system and its normal and
a b n o r m a l operating configurations, the engineer defines
95
Electrical system analysis
each branch of the system as uni or bidirectional as
part of the system drawing routine.
On the graphic display unidirectional branches are
distinguished by a smaU arrow just before the branch
termination (finish) component. Bidirectional branches
have no special symbohc notation. In Fig 2.5, branches
(1) and (2), are unidirectional.
2.5.4 Criteria of failure
In performing a rehability analysis of a SES in terms
of its load point busbar indices, the criterion of failure
is regarded as the complete loss of supply to each load
point being evaluated. A Failure event for a particular
load point busbar, is any event that leads to loss of
continuity between the busbar and any source of sup­
ply. The failure events are therefore identified from the
Minimal Cut Sets (MCS) associated with the Minimal
Paths between the load point and all sources of supply
(sources, generators or LESs):
• A Path is a set of components that connects any
input node to the load point being considered.
• A Minimal Path is a path in which no node or branch
is included more than once.
• A Cut Set is a set of components that, when failed,
causes loss of supply to the load point under con­
sideration.
• A Minimal Cut Set is a cut set that causes failure of
supply to the load point but, when any one com­
ponent of the set has not failed, does not cause
failure of supply to the load point.
2.5.5 Analysis control procedures
In performing a quantitative reliabihty analysis of a
SES the engineer, in addition to ensuring that the
SES has been correctly modelled from a topological
viewpoint, has to ensure that the subsequent reliability
calculations reflect any operational constraints and
will be performed with the required precision.
This optional control of the analysis is achieved
through engineer/program interaction in the form of
a series of questions put to the engineer by the pro­
gram at the point where calculation of load point
(nodal) or system indices is about to commence.
A basic set of control questions is displayed in
respect of both load point and system indices calcula­
tion. These, together with the default (most commonly
used) answers, are illustrated in Fig 2.6.
For calculation of the system indices, it is necessary
for the engineer, from his knowledge of the system,
to provide supplementary data prior to commence­
ment of the calculation stage. These data relate to the
continuous maximum rating of the turbine-generator
unit or station (according to the basis on which it is
desired to calculate the system indices) and the impact
that the loss of supply to each load point busbar in
96
Chapter 2
the SES would have on the output of the associated
generator unit or station.
2.5.6 Deduction of minimal paths
The initial stage of the topological part of the analy­
sis consists of the deduction of the minimal paths
associated with each load point to be included in the
evaluation.
Digital techniques are used to deduce all the minimal
paths between each load point being analysed and all
sources of supply to the SES. All paths are deduced
and, when displayed on the VDU screen or listed in a
printed output, the normally closed (NC) and normally
open (NO) paths are listed separately.
Each minimal path is hsted first in terms of node
and secondly in terms of branch numbers, commencing
at the load point being considered and working back
towards the source or input node.
It should be noted that the designation (with due
regard to any system operational constraints) of cer­
tain branches as unidirectional leads to greater effi­
ciency of the path deduction process. Paths containing
branches where the direction of power flow would be
opposite to that specified by the engineer during the
system drawing stages are ignored or excluded. This,
in turn, leads to reduced data storage requirements
within the p r o g r a m . Smaller arrays are set u p and
manipulated, which result in enhanced execution time.
Alternatively, the designation of some branches as
unidirectional can be regarded as a means of allowing
larger SESs to be evaluated within the existing set
program array dimensions.
As an illustration of the path deduction process.
Fig 2.7 shows the hst of minimal paths for the small
system of Fig 2.5. It should be noted that all loop
paths, and also paths involving the flow of power in
the reverse direction through a unidirectional branch,
have been ehminated.
By answering Y (yes) to the sixth control parameter
question (Fig 2.6), it is possible to specify sets of in­
compatible components and thereby preclude the
deduction of unreahstic or impractical paths.
2.5.7 Deduction of minimal cut sets
The next stage of the topological part of the analysis
is the deduction of the minimal cut sets for each load
point under consideration.
A full treatment of the minimal cut set theory as
applied in the reliability assessment of general electrical
networks is provided in [2].
A minimal cut set of order 'n' is a set consisting of
η components. As the order increases, its significance
with regard to its contribution to the load point or
system reliability indices decreases. Using cut set ana­
lysis techniques, it is possible to deduce minimal cut
sets of any order but the algorithm developed for,
and implemented in, the G R A S P computer programs
 Reliability evaluation of p o w e r systems

EXECUTION CONTROL PARAMETERS:-

DO N/0 PATHS FAIL WHEN REQUIRED TO OPERATE?, Ν

MAXIMUM NUMBER OF OVERLAPPING OUTAGES 2
DO YOU WANT TO CONSIDER STUCK BREAKERS? Ν
ARE THE FAILURE EVENTS OF N/0 PATHS OF FIRST ORDER? Y
THE MAXIMUM PERMITTED NUMBER OF N/0 BREAKERS IN A GIVEN PATH 2
DOES THE SYSTEM CONTAIN INCOMPATIBLE COMPONENTS? Ν
DO YOU WANT THE PROGRAM TO DEDUCE THE BREAKERS WHICH TRIP DURING A/F? Y

TO EDIT A PARAMETER ,LOCATE THE CURSORS AT THE ANSWER AND PRESS THE
SPACE BAR

OPTIONS:-
1-REDISPLAY
2-PREPOTTED ANSWERS
3-HELP
^-EXECUTE
5-RETURN TUE, 13 DEC 1988 15:34:17

FIG. 2 . 6 V D U display of a basic set of control questions

only considers cut sets u p t o and including third Step 4 Deduce the second order cut sets by consider­
order. ing all combinations of t w o branches. If any
For a particular study, the order of cut sets included, of these combinations is found t o break all
and hence the precision t o which the reliability indices minimal p a t h s , the combination is a second
are calculated, is controlled by entering a 1, 2, or 3 order cut set.
against the control parameter ^Maximum Number of
Overlapping Outages' in Fig 2.6.
Step 5 Expand each branch of each combination
The algorithm for the deduction of minimal cut
that is found t o be a second order cut set into
sets from the (NC) minimal paths for each load point
its constituent components t o determine the
works as follows:
second order cut sets in terms of pairs of
components.
Step 1 Deduce the first order cut sets by considering
every branch one at a time, checking whether
Step 6 Eliminate any duplicated second order cut sets.
it belongs t o every (NC) path. If it does, then
it is a first order cut set.
Step 7 Deduce the third order cut sets in the same
way, by repeating Steps 4 t o 6 and considering
Step 2 Expand the branches into their constituent
all combinations of three branches.
components t o determine all the first order cut
sets in terms of components.
Figure 2.8 lists the cut sets u p t o second order deduced
Step 3 Eliminate any duplicated first order cut sets. for the system of Fig 2 . 5 . There is only one first order

97
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

LOAD CONNECTED TO NODE NUMBER S 3 /SUBSYSTEM NO. 1

LIST OF SYSTEM PftTHS

NUMBER OF PftTHS ·

COMPONENT NUMBERS
S3/1 Sl/l 82/1 M2/1 2 I 4
5 3 / 1 S 4 / 1 S 2 / 1 U2/1 6 5 4
S3/1 Sl/1 Ul/1 2 3
PATHS NORMALLY OPEN
S3/1 34/1 S2/i W2/1 7 5 4
C0NTINUE7Y/N

THU, 02 JUN 1988 1

FIG. 2.7 Minimal paths for the system illustrated in Fig 2.5

cut set (the l o a d point busbar i t s e l O and 60 second
order cut sets.
Figure 2.9 lists the cut sets up to third order f o r
the same system. It can now be seen that, in addition
to the 61 first and second order cut sets, there are
60 third order cut sets.
Whilst the contribution of an individual cut set of
order greater than one to the overall reHability indices
may be insignificant, the total effect of all higher order
cut sets cannot be ignored.
It can be shown that for power station electrical
systems in general, a very large number of higher
order cut sets are deduced and second order cut sets
contribute significantly to the overall indices.
The simulation of realistic failure events during the
calculation stage requires that failure events where
recovery is from standby or alternative sources, via
(NO) paths, are separately identified.
tected by an algorithm within the program or be
specified by the engineer, using his knowledge of
the actual system protection arrangements.
(c) Forced outages due to component (independent and
c o m m o n mode) failures overlapping a maintenance
outage.
(d) Forced outages due to component active failures
(independent and c o m m o n mode) overlapping the
malfunction of primary protection equipment
(stuck breakers). The back-up protection zones are
detected automatically by the program.
The G R A S P program has been developed to simulate
five basic types of failure/restoration event. They are
categorised according to the component failure mode
and the procedure adopted for the restoration of supply
to the load point being evaluated:

2.5.8 Types of failure/restoration event TYPE 1 A cut set where all components of the set
The following realistic failure/restoration events are are outaged or failed in passive m o d e , e.g.,
included in the evaluation as appropriate to the system for maintenance or repair. Supply can only
topology and the operational effects to be considered: be restored to the load point being evaluated
by returning to service at least one of the
(a) Overlapping forced outages due to component components of the cut set.
(independent and c o m m o n mode) failures involving
repair or replacement.
TYPE 2 A cut set with the same component failure
(b) Forced outages due to component active failure mode as for T Y P E 1, but with at least one
(independent and c o m m o n modes) and their switch­ normally open path available which can be
ing effects on healthy components. The primary used to restore supply to the load point being
protection zones can either be automatically de- evaluated.

98
 Reliability evaluation of p o w e r systems

LOAD CONNECTED TO NODE NUMBER S 3 ^SUBSYSTEM NO.

LIST OF CUTS

NUMBER OF CUTS - 61

CUT COMPONENT NUMBERS

1 S3/1
2 Sl/1 82/1
3 81/Ί H2/1
4 81/1 B3/1
9 Sl/l T2/1
6 Sl/1 B4/1
7 Sl/l 84/1
θ Sl/1 B9/1
9 81/1 R2/1
1Θ Sl/1 Β1Θ/1
1 1 Sl/1 01/1
12 S2/1 B7/1
13 S2/1 02/1
14 S2/1 B8/1
15 82/1 Ml/1
16 82/1 Bl/1
17 82/1 Tl/1
18 82/1 B2/1
19 U2/1 B7/1
2Θ U2/1 02/1
21 H2/1 B8/1
22 H2/1 Ul/1
23 U2/1 Bl/1
24 M2/1 Tl/1
25 U2/1 B2/1
26 B7/1 B3/1
27 B7/1 T2/1
28 B7/1 B4/1
29 02/1 B3/1
38 02/1 T2/1
31 02/1 B4/1
32 B8/1 B3/1
33 B8/1 T2/1
34 B8/1 B4/1
35 B7/1 84/1
36 02/1 84/1
37 B8/1 84/1
38 B7/1 B9/1
39 B7/1 R2/1
48 B7/1 Β1Θ/1
41 02/1 B9/1
42 02/1 R2/1
43 0 2 / 1 Β 18/1
CONTINUE?Y/N
CRA8P-2 THU. Θ2 JUN 1988 1

44 BB/l B9/1
45 Ββ/1 R2/1
46 Β Θ / 1 θ 18/1
47 B7/1 01/1
48 02/1 01/1
49 B8/1 01/1
58 B3/1 Hl/l
51 T2/1 Hl/1
52 B4/1 Ul/1
53 B3/1 Bl/1
54 B3/1 Tl/1
55 B3/1 B2/1
56 T2/1 Bl/1
57 T2/1 Tl/1
58 T2/1 B2/1
59 B4/1 Bl/1
6Θ B4/1 Tl/l
61 B4/1 B2/1
CUTS ΤΗήΤ nRE ELIMINftTED BY CLOSING A NORMALLY OPEN PATH

CUT PATHS THAT MAY BE CLOSED

8 4
9 4
18 4
38 4
39 4
48 4
41 4
42 4
43 4
44 4
45 4

<
46 4

GRA8P-2 THU« 82 JUN 1988

FIG. 2.8 Minimal cut sets for the system illustrated in Fig 2,5

99
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

LOAD CONNECTED TO NODE NUMBER S 3 /SUBSYSTEM NO. 1

LIST OF CUTS

NUMBER OF CUTS -121

CUT COMPONENT NUMBERS

1 S3/1
2 Sl/1 S2/1
3 Sl/1 U2/1
4 Sl/l 83/1
5 Sl/1 T2/1
6 Sl/1 84/1
7 Sl/1 S4/1
8 Sl/1 B9/1
9 Sl/1 R2/1
10 Sl/1 818/1
1 1 Sl/1 01/1
12 S2/1 B7/1
13 S2/1 Q2/1
14 S2/1 88/1
IS S2/1 Ul/1
16 S2/1 Bl/1
17 S2/1 Tl/1
18 S2/1 82/1
19 H2/1 87/1
28 U2/1 02/1
21 H2/1 B8/1
22 W2/1 Hl/1
23 M2/1 Bl/1
24 U2/1 Tl/1
25 W2/1 B2/1
26 87/1 B3/1
27 87/1 T2/1
28 87/1 84/1
29 02/1 B3/1
30 Q2/1 T2/1
31 Q2/1 84/1
32 88/1 B3/1
33 88/1 T2/1
34 ΒΘ/1 84/1
35 B7/1 S4/1
36 02/1 S4/1
37 88/1 S4/1
38 87/1 89/1
39 87/1 R2/1
40 87/1 818/1
41 Q2/1 89/1
42 02/1 R2/1
43 Q2/1 Β 18/1
CONTINUE?Y,'N

CR6SP-2 THU, 82 JUN 1988 1

FIG. 2.9 Minimal cut sets (up to third order) for the system illustrated in Fig 2.5

TYPE 3 A cut set where supply is lost to the load
point being evaluated due to one component
actively failing whilst the remaining com­
ponents of the set are out of service. Supply
is restored by isolating the actively failed
component and closing the circuit-breakers
that were opened due to the active fault.
TYPE 4 A cut set similar to T Y P E 3, but including
one stuck (NC) circuit-breaker in the pro­
tection zone of the actively failed component
(i.e., faihng to operate on demand).
TYPE 5 A cut set with the same component failure
modes as for T Y P E 1, but where the supply
is restored to the load point being evaluated
from an L E S , via a (NO) path.
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 provide separate lists of cut sets
on which failure events of T Y P E 2 are based. It can
be seen that, of the total of 61 first and second order
minimal cut sets, 49 are of T Y P E 1 and 12 are of
T Y P E 2. Of the total of 121 first, second and third
order minimal cut sets, 73 are of T Y P E 1 and 48 are
of T Y P E 2.
One or more of the following restoration proce­
dures are included in the calculation of the A O T index
for the load point being evaluated. The selection of
the appropriate restoration mode(s), from those avail­
able, is on the basis of shortest time for restoration of
supply to the load point from a normal (unlimited
energy) source. Only where an alternative path leading
to an unlimited energy source is not available is re­
storation from an LES considered.
These restoration procedures are:
• Repair.
• Replacement.
• Switching or isolation.
• Reclosing of circuit-breakers.
• Closing of (NO) circuit-breakers to provide an alter­
native source of supply, which may include standby
plant.
The alternative (NO) paths may subsequently be
considered to fail, or not to fail, according to the

100
 Reliability evaluation of p o w e r systems

44 B8/1 B9/1
45 B8/1 R2/1
48 B8/1 Β18/I
47 Β7/Ί Ol/l
48 02/1 01/1
49 B8/1 Ol/l
58 B3/1 Ul/1
51 T2/1 Hl/1
52 B4/1 Ul/1
53 B3/1 Bl/1
54 B3/1 Tl/1
55 B3/1 B2/1
96 T2/1 Bl/1
57 T2/1 Tl/1
98 T2/1 B2/1
59 B4/1 Bl/1
68 B4/1 Tl/l
61 B4/1 B2/1
62 B9/1 84/1 Ul/l
63 Rl/1 84/1 Hl/l
64 B6/1 S4/1 Ul/l
65 B9/1 84/1 Bl/1
66 B9/1 84/1 Tl/l
67 B9/1 84/1 82/1
68 Rl/1 84/1 Bl/1
69 Rl/1 84/1 Tl/l
7Θ Rl/1 84/1 B2/1
71 Θ6/1 84/1 Bl/1
72 B6/1 84/1 Tl/l
73 B6/1 84/1 82/1
74 B9/1 B9/1 Ul/l
75 B9/1 R2/1 Ul/l
76 B9/1 Β 18/I Ul/l
77 Rl/1 B9/1 Ul/l
78 Rl/1 R2/1 Ul/l
79 Rl/1 Β I 8/1 H l / l
88 B6/1 B9/1 Ul/l
81 B6/1 R2/1 Ul/l
82 B6/1 Β 10/1 Ul/l
83 B5/1 B9/1 Bl/l
84 B5/1 B9/1 Tl/l
85 Ββ/1 B9/1 B2/1
86 B5/1 R2/1 Bl/l
87 85/1 R2/1 Tl/l
88 B5/1 R2/1 B2/1
89 B5/1 Β I 8/1 B l / l
9Θ B5/1 Β1Θ/1 Tl/l
91 B5/1 Β I 0/1 B 2 / 1
92 Rl/1 B9/1 Bl/l
93 Rl/1 B9/1 Tl/l
94 Rl/1 B9/1 B2/1
95 Rl/1 R2/1 Bl/l
96 Rl/1 R2/1 Tl/l
97 Rl/1 R2/1 82/1
98 Rl/1 Β1Θ/1 Bl/1
99 Rl/1 Β 18/1 T l / l
1ΘΘ Rl/l ΒΙΘ/Ι 82/1
181 B6/1 B9/1 Bl/l
182 B6/1 B9/1 Tl/l
CONTINUE?Y/N

CRASP-2 THU, 82 JUN 1988 I

FIG. 2.9 (cont'd) Minimal cut sets (up to third order) for the system illustrated in Fig 2.5

requirements of the engineer or the purpose of the
evaluation.
2.5.9 Switching effects of component active
failure
The evaluation of T Y P E 3 and T Y P E 4 failure events
requires the determination of the switching effects of
component active failures (see Section 2.4.1 of this
chapter).
T o calculate the effect of the active failure of each
component that can actively fail on the indices of the
load point of interest, it is first necessary to determine
the extent of the network outage that would be a
consequence of each component active failure.
There is an algorithm in the G R A S P 2 computer
program which, by the use of digital search techniques,
identifies and provides a listing of the protective circuit-
breakers that would trip for active failure of each
system component that has been specified as likely to
suffer an active failure. The algorithm is based on the
assumption that the nearest (NC) circuit-breakers in
all branches adjacent to the actively failed component
would trip to clear the fault.
Since this facility would obviously not be appro­
priate for all the different designs of SES and their
associated protection arrangements, a facility is pro­
vided whereby the protective circuit-breakers to trip
on active failure of each component can be specified
manually. For large systems, this can be a very tedious
operation.
The choice of m a n u a l or automatic specification of
'breakers which trip' is controlled by the answer to
question number 7 of Fig 2.6.
On selection of the manual facility, the engineer
is presented with a display on the V D U , as shown in
Fig 2.10. H e then specifies the appropriate component
numbers of the 'breakers which trip' against each
actively failed component listed.
The automatic deduction of 'breakers that trip'
results in the hsting shown in Fig 2.11 for the system
of Fig 2.5. This listing is optionally available for
viewing on the V D U or for printing with the full study
resuks output (see Section 2.5.13 of this chapter).
2.5.10 Markov state-space models
A state-space model is a diagrammatic representation
of:

101
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

B6/1 B9/1 B2/1

R2/1 Bl/1
B6/1 R2/1 Tl/1
Ββ/Ι R2/1 B2/1
B6/1 Β 1 8 / 1 Bl/1
B6/1 Β 18/1 Tl/1
B6/1 Β1Θ/1 B2/1
B5/1 Ql/1 Hl/1
Rl/1 Ql/1 Ul/1
B6/1 Ql/1 Hl/1
B5/1 01/1 Bl/1
B5/1 Ql/1 Tl/1
BB/l 01/1 B2/1
Ki/l Ql/1 Bl/1
Rl/l 01/1 Tl/1
Rl/l Ql/1 B2/1
B6/1 01/1 Bl/1
se/i Ql/1 Tl/1
ee/i Ql/1 82/1
CUTS THAT ARE ELIHINATED BY CLOSING A NORMALLY OPEN PATH

CUT PATHS THAT NAY BE CLOSED

C0NTINUE7Y/N

CRASP-2 THU, 82 JUN 1988 1

FIG. 2.9 (cont'd) Minimal cut sets (up to third order) for the system illustrated in Fig 2.5

102
 Reliability evaluation of p o w e r systems

COMPONENT S/S BREAKERS WHICH TRIP

PAGE 1 OF 2
SI 1
S2 1
S3 1
S^ 1
Tl 1
T2 1
Bl 1
B2 1
B3 1
Bl 1
B5 1
B6 1
BT 1
B8 1
B9 1
BIO 1
PI 1
Wl 1
W2 1
Rl 1

OPTIONS:-
REDISPLAY
HELP

NEXT PAGE
RETURN CRASP-2 FRI, 03 JUN 1988 1

FIG. 2.10 Manual specification of ^breakers which trip'

• The discrete states in which the components of a cludes a second order C M F . Figure 2.13 represents a
system can reside. two-component, two-state system, including mainte­
nance outages overlapping a forced outage:
• The transition paths between the various states.
• R E P A I R R A T E ( μ ) for a component is the reci­
Events TYPES 1 and 2 procal of its repair time.

Failure events T Y P E S 1 and 2, involving only c o m p o ­ • M A I N T E N A N C E T R A N S I T I O N R A T E for a com­

nent passive failures, are represented by relatively
simple two state models.
In the modeUing of c o m m o n m o d e failures in the
analysis of SESs, the assumption is made that, where
sets of components fail in c o m m o n m o d e , they are
returned to service independently after repair. The
repair process on all failed components (independent
and common mode) is conducted simultaneously and
each is returned separately to service as soon as it has
been repaired.
Two state models for single and two component
systems (components represented by i and j) are shown
in Fig 2.12, where (u) represents *up', the normal
operating state, and (d) 'down', the failed state during
repair. The two-component model (Fig 2.12 (b)) in­
ponent is the reciprocal of its maintenance duration.
• F O R C E D O U T A G E is any outage which is un­
expected.
A two-state model for a three-component system which
includes transitions due to two-component (second
order) C M F s is shown in Fig 2.14.
A similar two-state model for a three-component
system with third order C M F transition is shown in
Fig 2.15.
A M a r k o v model for a three-component system,
including C M F and maintenance outages, is shown
in Fig 2.16. Since the analysis techniques used for
SESs are limited to events u p to and including third

103
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

SWITCHING EFFECTS OF COMPONENT ACTIVE FAILURES

COMPONENT ACTIVELY FAILED BREAKERS THAT TRIP

s 1 β 7 2
s 2 5 4 9
s 3 8 10
s 4 9 5 4
τ 1 1 2
τ 2 3 4
Β 1 2
Β 2 1 6 7
Β 3 4
Β 4 3 5 9
Β 5 β 4 9
Β 6 5 7 2
Β 7 8 6 2
Β 8 7 10
Β 9 10 5 4
Β 10 9 8
W 1 1
W 2 3
Ρ 1 8 10 9
R 1 5 6
R 2 9 10
Q 1 5 4 9
Q 2 7 8

FIG. 2.11 Automatic deduction of ^breakers that trip'

order, it will be noticed that only third order events
which include two commonly failed components can
include a failure due to a maintenance outage over­
lapping a C M F .
In developing all these Markov models to represent
a SES, it is assumed that a maintenance operation
on any component of a minimal cut set would not be
commenced if one or more components of the same
set are on forced outage or have actively failed. It is
also assumed that only one component of each minimal
cut set is on maintenance at any one time.
• The probability of two simultaneous active faults
occurring during switching is negligible. This as­
sumption is justified because the component switch­
ing times are relatively small. Hence the exposure
time of the system to a second active failure is
small and the probability of two overlapping active
failures during switching is negligible.
• The probability of two simultaneously stuck breakers
in the system is also negligible. This is justifiable
since the individual stuck breaker probability is
normally very smah, of the order 1 0 " ^ .

Events TYPES 3 and 4

For failure events involving component active failures
(TYPES 3 and 4) a three-state model is used.
Three-state models for single and two component
systems are shown in Fig 2.17, where (u) represents the
normal operating state, (s) the state after an active
failure but before switching (switching state) and (r)
the state after switching but during repair.
It can be seen that a small increase in the number
of system components gives rise to a significant increase
in the number of system states, particularly for three-
state models. The Markov models become very in­
volved, particularly when second and third order C M F s
are included.
To reduce the number of possible combinations of
component failures leading to state (s), the foUowing
simplifying assumptions are made:
Such states as ^.^^^ in Fig 2.17 are thus excluded from
i(s)
ah three-state Markov models used in the analysis.
A three-state M a r k o v model for three-component
systems is shown in Fig 2.18. The model represents
an active failure of component 1 and overlapping forced
outages of components 2 and 3 due to independent
and c o m m o n mode failures. Similar models can be
drawn for active failure of component 2 overlapping
forced outages of components 1 and 3, and for active
failure of component 3 overlapping forced outages of
components 1 and 2.
Event TYPE 5
The Markov model for second order T Y P E 5 events,
including overlapping forced outages (independent and

104

(a) Two-state, one component
(b) Two-state, two components
KEY
\ = PASSIVE FAILURE RATE COMPONENT i
\ = PASSIVE FAILURE RATE COMPONENT]
= REPAIR RATE COMPONENT i
= REPAIR RATE COMPONENT]
λ = CMF RATE FOR COMPONENTS i AND j
(u) = up
(d) = down
I SYSTEM UP/HEALTHY STATE
I SYSTEM DOWN/UNHEALTHY STATE
FIG. 2.12 Two-state models for single and two
component systems
common mode) and maintenance outages overlapping
forced outages, is shown in Fig 2.19.
2.5.11 Evaluation techniques (busbar indices)
Since passive and active failures are independent fail­
ures, the analysis of a system is divided into the fol­
lowing parts:
Part 1 Analysis considering only overlapping passive
failures and using a two-state model of the
Reliability evaluation of p o w e r systems
system. Failure/restoration events of T Y P E 1
and T Y P E 2 are assessed.
Part 2 Analysis considering only active failure and
active failures overlapping passive failures.
A three-state model of the system is used and
simulation of active failures and active failures
in conjunction with a stuck breaker condition
are performed for each component, the system
configuration being changed for each simu­
lation according to the deduced switching
effects. Failure/restoration events of T Y P E 3
and T Y P E 4 are assessed.
For failure events T Y P E S 1 and 2, the reliability indices
of the load point are obtained by reducing all second
and third order minimal cut sets to an equivalent first
order cut set. All real and equivalent first order mini­
mal cuts are then combined 'in series' to give the
overall load point indices.
Greater precision in the evaluation of the busbar
indices can be achieved if the probability of failure of
the (NO) paths available as the means of restoring
supply to the load point being evaluated (i.e., T Y P E 2
events), during the period they are required to function,
is taken into consideration.
The G R A S P 2 computer program can include this
facility by the use of study control parameters 1 and 4
(see Fig 2.6).
Inclusion of the failure probability of the (NO) paths
requires the calculation of auxiliary indices involving
the simulation of failure events associated with the
(NO) paths u p to the order specified in the study
control parameters. These auxiliary results are then
combined with the main indices for the associated
T Y P E 2 failure event, using the appropriate minimal
cut set equations.
The method of deriving the equations for each event
type is fully discussed in [2].
Second order failure events (TYPE 1 and TYPE 2)
There are three failure sequences for a second order
failure event:
(a) Failure or maintenance outage of component 1 fol­
lowed by the independent failure of component 2.
(b) Failure or maintenance outage of component 2 fol­
lowed by the independent failure of component 1.
(c) A c o m m o n m o d e failure of components 1 and 2.
The equations for the evaluation of T Y P E 1 and T Y P E
2 failure events are shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
Events (a) and (b) involve sequential independent
failures of each component and (c) refers t o c o m m o n
failure of both components in the minimal cut set.
The equations for T Y P E 2 assume that supply can
be restored by either closing a (NO) path in a time tc
105
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

(u) = up
(d) = down
(m) = maintenance

• SYSTEM UP/HEALTHY STATE |_J SYSTEM DOWN/UNHEALTHY STATE

FIG. 2.13 Markov state-space diagram of two components, including maintenance

SYSTEM UP/HEALTHY STATE (u) = up

(d) = down
SYSTEM DOWN/UNHEALTHY STATE

FIG. 2.14 Markov diagram for third order events of TYPE 1 (components 2 and 3 CMF)

106

(u) up
(d) down
FIG. 2.15 Markov diagram for third order events of TYPE 1 (components 1, 2 and 3 CMF)
or by completing a repair process that has already
commenced. A repair process will n o t be started in
preference to closing a (NO) p a t h . This is a realistic
assumption for t w o reasons. First, the greatest effort
will be placed o n recovering supply by the easiest
achievable means, which is normally by switching.
Secondly, repair times are generally much greater than
switching times. Consequently, the outage time of
sequence (a) for T Y P E 2 is t h e overlapping time
between repair of component 1 (already started) a n d
the switching time of the (NO) path, whereas that of
sequence (c) is only the switching time.
Third order failure events (TYPE 1 and TYPE 2)
The equations for evaluating third order T Y P E 1 a n d
T Y P E 2 failure events which include second a n d third
order CMFs are hsted in Tables 2.3 a n d 2.4. They are
based on the Markov model of Fig 2.14, where it is
assumed that components 2 a n d 3 can fail in c o m m o n
mode, and o n the Markov model of Fig 2.15, where
it is assumed that all three components can fail in
common m o d e .
Events (a) t o (f) involve sequential independent
failures of components 1, 2 a n d 3. Event (g) involves
Reliability evaluation of p o w e r systems
SYSTEM UP/HEALTHY STATE
SYSTEM DOWN/UNHEALTHY STATE
the independent failure of component 1, followed by
C M F of components 2 a n d 3 . Event (h) refers t o C M F
of components 2 a n d 3 , followed by the independent
failure of component 1, a n d event (i) refers t o C M F of
all three components.
Equations for the evaluation of third order T Y P E 1
and T Y P E 2 failure events involving overlapping
maintenance outages are shown in Tables 2.5 a n d 2.6.
Only second order component C M F s can be involved in
these events.
Second order failure events (TYPE 3)
The equations for the evaluation of second order T Y P E
3 failure events, involving component active failures
overlapping with forced outages, are shown in Table
2.7. There are obviously n o events involving component
CMFs.
Since it is assumed that a maintenance outage would
not be commenced if o n e or m o r e of t h e components
of a minimum cut set have already actively failed, there
are only t w o event sequences involving maintenance
that need be considered. T h e necessary equations are
shown in Table 2.8. Again, there are n o events involving
component C M F .
107
Electrical system analysis
(u) = up
(d) = down
(m) = maintenance
I SYSTEM UP/HEALTHY STATE
FIG. 2.16 Markov diagram for third order events of TYPE 1 (forced outage overlapping maintenance)
Third order failure events (TYPE 3)
A third order event of T Y P E 3 involves the outage
of one component due to active failure overlapping
with the forced outage of the other two components
of each minimal cut set. T h e forced outage of the other
two components can include a second order component
C M F , if applicable. Equations for the evaluation of
these events are shown in Table 2.9 and are based on
the Markov diagram of Fig 2.18.
Similar equations can be written for T Y P E 3 events
involving active failure of component 2, and also of
component 3, overlapping forced outages.
The equations shown in Table 2.10 are for third order
T Y P E 3 events involving active failure of component 1
overlapping with maintenance a n d / o r forced outages
of components 2 a n d 3 . There can be n o component
CMFs included in these events.
Similar equations can be written in respect of active
failure of component 2 overlapping with maintenance
a n d / o r forced outages of components 1 a n d 3 , a n d also
for active failure of component 3 overlapping with
maintenance a n d / o r forced outages of components 1
and 2.
108
Chapter 2
¡~¡ SYSTEM DOWN/UNHEALTHY STATE
Failure events (TYPE 4)
The equations t o evaluate T Y P E 4 failure events are
not tabulated. They are basically similar t o those for
T Y P E 3 (for first, second a n d third order), with the
active F R of the actively failed component of each mini-
mal cut set multipUed by the stuck probability of one
of the circuit-breakers protecting the actively failed
component.
Failure event TYPE 5
Standby plant is, by definition, always connected t o
the SES through a (NO) circuit-breaker. This applies
so far as reliability evaluation is concerned, even if
the standby system comprises, for example, a battery
or inverter source, continuously float charged a n d con-
nected to the system via a (NC) circuit-breaker (some-
times referred t o as a *No-break' supply system). T o
model the latter with the G R A S P 2 computer program,
the (NC) circuit-breaker would be represented as a
(NO) circuit-breaker with a zero switching time.
If the standby plant can be considered as having
an unHmited capacity t o supply energy to the system.

(a) Three states, one component
(b) Three states, two components I SYSTEM UP/HEALTHY STATE
λ, = FAILURE RATE OF COMPONENT i I SYSTEM DOWN/UNHEALTHY STATE
s = SWITCHING TIME OF COMPONENT i
μ, = REPAIR RATE OF COMPONENT i
FIG. 2 . 1 7 Three-state models for single and two
component systems
for example, a standby generator having an unlimited
fuel supply or a battery having a storage capacity
sufficiently large to meet the load requirements of the
system for a duration greater than the longest compo­
nent repair time, it would be modelled as such by the
engineer and events of T Y P E 2 would apply.
If, however, the standby source has a hmited energy
capacity (see the definition of an LES in Section 2.3.3
of this chapter), the failure events to be considered are
of T Y P E 5.
A conditional probability approach has been used
in the development of the equations for T Y P E 5 events.
The method is fully described in [3].
The following assumptions have been made:
• The standby source (LES) is the only (NO) path
available for supply restoration and it does not fail
when required to operate.
• The failure modes involve either forced outages
(independent and c o m m o n mode) or forced outages
overlapping with maintenance outages.
The LES time limit (t) is measured in hours.
Reliability evaluation of p o w e r systems
• C o m p o n e n t repair rates are exponentially distributed
with time.
The equations for second order T Y P E 5 events are
shown in Tables 2.11 and 2.12 and are based on the
M a r k o v diagram of Fig 2.19.
Table 2.11 contains the equations for overlapping
forced outages, which can include component C M F s ,
if applicable. Table 2.12 contains the equations for
maintenance outages overlapping with forced outages;
there can be n o component C M F s in this case.
Equations for third order events of T Y P E 5 are
derived in a similar way: those in Table 2.13 are for
three independent overlapping forced outages, together
with c o m m o n m o d e failure of components 2 and 3.
For third order events involving three independent over­
lapping forced outages, combined with a third order
component C M F , the relevant equations are shown
in Table 2.14.
Consideration of forced outages overlapping with
maintenance outages results in the set of equations in
Table 2.15, in which C M F of components 2 and 3 has
been included.
2.5.12 Evaluation techniques (system indices)
Evaluation of the reliability of a SES in terms of the
reliability of supply at its individual load point busbars
is just one of the analysis techniques available.
If the emphasis is placed more on the overaU per­
formance of the SES, and it is required to determine
the effect of its reliability on the availabihty of the
associated boiler/turbine-generator unit, the use of
busbar indices to compare different designs of SES
objectively is not appropriate. Objective comparison
becomes difficult, since the various busbars have dif­
ferent importances so far as the output of the unit
is concerned and m a n y failure events are c o m m o n to
more t h a n one busbar.
T o overcome these difficulties, an overall system
approach is used. The independent failure events of
the system busbars are considered as a set of events
that include the unit independent failure events. There­
fore this set of events represents the unit cut sets from
which the unit minimal cut sets must be obtained.
The procedure is quite complicated because cut
sets of different types have to be compared. Also,
the simultaneous loss of two busbars may cause a
derated state of operation of the associated unit which
is different from the effect caused by the loss of each
busbar separately. All these features must be taken
into consideration.
T o calculate the indices of each derated state of
the unit due to the unreliability of the SES, the loss
of each busbar is considered to cause one of the fol­
lowing states:
• Total loss of the unit.
· N o influence on the output of the unit.
109
Electrical system analysis
SYSTEM NORMAL OPERATION
A
I SYSTEM UP/HEALTHY STATE Q SYSTEM DOWN/UNHEALTHY STATE
FIG. 2.18 Failure event of TYPE 3 (component 1 actively fails) third order (components 2 and 3 CMF)
• A loss of x % of the output of the unit, where χ may
have any value and may be different for each busbar
or combination of busbars.
Generally, the loss of two busbars is assumed to create
a derated state that may or may not be equal to the
derated states caused by loss of the busbars individ­
ually. It is assumed that the loss of three busbars causes
total loss of the unit.
The algorithm developed for the evaluation of sys­
tem indices and implemented in the G R A S P inter­
active computer programs is described in [3]. It is
based on the assumption that the independent failure
events of each busbar are already known. The initial
part of the reliability evaluation to calculate the system
indices therefore follows basically the same procedure
110
Chapter 2
as for the calculation of busbar indices, outlined in
the previous section. Here, however, every busbar of
the system that is known to affect the output capa­
bility of the associated unit must be included in the
evaluation.
Having deduced all the feasible failure events for
each busbar of the system, the following additional data
is provided by the engineer from his detailed know­
ledge of the system and its operational characteristics:
• The consequences on the output power capability
of the associated unit of losing the supply to each
busbar.
• The consequences of simultaneously losing the sup­
ply to all combinations of two busbars, both of
which separately lead to a derated state of the
associated unit.

• SYSTEM UP/HEALTHY STATE • SYSTEM DOWN/UNHEALTHY STATE
(u)= up
(d)= down
(m)= maintenance
FIG. 2 . 1 9 State-space diagram of two components, including maintenance — T Y P E 5 . Component repair rates are
exponentially distributed with time
The algorithm uses these data to calculate the average
rate of occurrence or encounter (ER), the average out­
age duration (AOD) and the average annual outage
time (AOT) of each feasible derated state. The overall
loss of generation (LOG) in terms of M W h / y e a r of
operation, due to the unreliability of the SES, is also
calculated.
2.5.13 Presentation of results
The results of a reHability evaluation study are ini­
tially presented as VDU displays selected from the
following:
(a) Failure rate (FR) for each load point busbar
evaluated, displayed on a diagram of the selected
subsystem alongside the appropriate busbar (Fig
2.20).
(b) Average outage duration (AOD) for each load
point busbar evaluated, displayed on a diagram of
the selected subsystem alongside the appropriate
busbar (Fig 2.21).
Reliability evaluation of p o w e r systems
- ( μ, ^ μ η/
(c) Annual outage time (AOT) for each load point
busbar evaluated, displayed on a diagram of the
selected subsystem alongside the appropriate busbar
(Fig 2.22).
(d) A full Hst of the input data for the selected sub­
system (Figs 2.23 and 2.24).
(e) A full list of the minimal paths (NC and N O ) , in
the selected subsystem deduced for each load point
busbar evaluated (Fig 2.25).
(f) A full list of minimal cuts, in the selected sub­
system, deduced for each load point busbar eval­
uated (Fig 2.26).
(g) A full list of nodal failure events (with calculated
indices) in the selected subsystem, for each load
point evaluated. A sample from such a list is shown
in Fig 2.27.
(h) A full list of the calculated busbar indices in the
selected subsystem, for each load point evaluated.
ILL
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

TABLE 2 . 1

Second order overlapping forced outages (TYPE 1 and TYPE 2)

Event Failure rate Residence time

failure
sequence λ r

TYPE 1

(a) 1, 2 λ ι λ 2 Γ ΐ rir2/(ri + i i )

(b) 2, 1 λ2λΐΓ2 rir2/(ri +ΐ ι )

(c) (1 + 2 ) λΐ2 ΓΐΓ2/(Γΐ + r2)

TYPE 2

(a) 1, 2 λΐλ2Γΐ ritc/(ri + tc)

(b) 2, 1 λ2λΐΓ2 r 2 t c / ( r 2 + tc)

(c) (1 + 2) λΐ2 tc

Where: λη = Failure rate of component η

Γη = Repair time of component η

te = Switching time of alternative (NO) path

Indices for TYPE 1 and TYPE 2 events are:

c c
λι = Σλ, Ui = LXr, ri = UiAi
a a
c c
λ 2 = Σλ, U 2 = LXr, r 2 = U 2 / X 2
a a

The hst shows separately the contribution due to
each of the event types (Fig 2.28).
(i) A full list of the system failure events. A sample
from such a hst is shown in Fig 2.29.
(j) A full list of system indices (Fig 2.30).
Figures 2.20 to 2.30 are typical results displays for the
small system of Fig 2.5 in respect of:
• Evaluation of busbar indices for load point S3.
• Overall system indices, assuming that the system
is associated with a 660 M W unit and that each
busbar/combination of busbars has the effects shown
in Fig 2.29.
extensive for a larger system. The hst of failure events
is extremely lengthy, particularly for studies involving
events u p to third order. In practice, therefore, the
most commonly used form of results output consists
of hard copies of each of the busbar indices displayed
on the system diagram, together with hard copies of
the input component rehability data, the study control
parameters, and the summary of busbar a n d / o r system
indices (results (h) and (j) above).
For important rehability evaluation work, for ex­
ample, the assessment of the SESs for nuclear power
stations, where there is a need for long term storage of
results, it is normal practice to obtain a paper listing
of the full detailed results, which is then microfilmed
and archived.

After selective viewing of the results on the V D U , hard

copies of the required pages can be taken for use in
reports, etc.
Alternatively, full paper printed o u t p u t , which
includes the results described in (d) to (j) above, can
be obtained.
Obviously, the full results hsting is much more
2.6 Quality assurance
It is fairly straightforward to check by inspection of
the system diagram that, for a small system such as
that shown in Fig 2.5, the minimal paths and minimal
cut sets of the appropriate order are correctly deduced
by the interactive computer p r o g r a m .

112
 Reliability evaluation of p o w e r systems

TABLE 2.2

Second order — maintenance outage overlapping forced outage (TYPE 1 and TYPE 2)

Event Failure rate Residence time

failure
sequence λ r

TYPE 1

(a) 1", 2 ri'r2/(r|' + Y2)

(b) 2", 1 X^ir^' r^'ri/(r2 + ri)

TYPE 2

(a) 1", 2 λ;·λ2Γ;· r|'tc/(r¡' + tc)

(b) 2", 1 X^Xir^ r^tc/(r2 -f tc)

Where: λη = Failure rate of component *n'

Γη = Repair time of component *n'

tc = Switching time of alternative (NO) path

Components out on maintenance denoted thus (")

Indices for TYPE 1 and TYPE 2 events are:

\\ = Σλ", U¡' = Σ\"τ\ τ'Ι = UJ'AJ'

a a
c c
λ2 = Σλ", = Σλ"r^ rj = ^ ' A ^

For larger systems, due to the greatly increased n u m ­
ber of components and branches, to do so manually
would be very tedious and time consuming. However,
part of the validation process for each version of the
program, involves checking by inspection that the
minimal path and cut set deduction is functioning
correctly for at least one fairly large system.
Verification of the numerical algorithms is carried
out during the program development by undertaking
manual calculations, using the appropriate equations
from Section 2.5.11 of this chapter, of busbar and
system indices for a small system, and comparing the
results with those obtained from using the computer
program on the same system with the same component
reHability data.
2.7 Typical applications
2.7.1 Example of the calculation and use of
busbar indices
This section contains a specific example of the busbar
indices evaluation techniques as they were used to
answer a specific question relating the design of SESs
for future nuclear power stations.
The higher voltage levels (down to 3.3 kV) of the
SES shown in Fig 2.31 was the initial design proposal.
It was put forward as part of an overall exercise to
evolve a standard design of SES a n d grid connection
interface arrangement, which would possibly be suit­
able for future nuclear power stations.
Depending on the exact siting of the power station,
there can be a considerable variation in the reHability
of the available grid connections.
T h e frequency of L O S P (loss of off-site power)
contributes to the overaH summated frequency of de­
graded core and hence forms part of the safety case.
T h e question raised was 'to what extent could the
provision of additional on-site generation compensate
for poor grid reliability?'
T h e procedure adopted was t o assume a figure of
0.075 failures/year for the frequency of loss of aH grid
suppHes for an average duration of 2 hours and to
calculate the busbar indices for the 11 kV and 3.3 kV
levels:
(a) For the basic system of Fig 2 . 3 1 , which only has
standby generators at the 3.3 kV level, designed to
back u p the SES.
(b) For the basic system, with additional standby
generators on the 11 kV station b o a r d s .

113
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

TABLE 2.3

Third order overlapping forced outages (TYPE 1)

E v e n t Failure rate Residence time

failure
sequence λ r

T Y P E 1

(a) 1 , 2, 3 λΐλ2Πλ3ΓΐΓ2/(Γΐ + rí) Γ1Γ2Γ3/(Γ1Γ2 + r2r3 + r s r i )

(b) 1 , 3, 2 XlX3riX2rir3/(ri + r s ) Γ Ι Γ 2 Γ 3 / ( Γ Κ 2 -f r 2 r 3 + r3ri)

(c) 2, 3, 1 λ2λ3Γ2λΐΓ2Γ3/(Γ2 + r i r 2 r 3 / ( r i r 2 + r2r3 + r3ri)

(d) 3, 2, 1 \2,\lr^\\r^r2/iτ^ + vi) Γ1Γ2Γ3/(ΓΚ2 + r2r3 + r3ri)

(e) 2, 1 , 3 λ2ΧΐΓ2λ3Γ2Γΐ/(Γ2 + Π ) Γ1Γ2Γ3/(Γ1Γ2 + r2r3 + r3ri)

(f) 3, 1 , 2 λ3λΐΓ3λ2Γ3Γΐ/(Γ3 + r i ) Γ1Γ2Γ3/(Γ1Γ2 + r2r3 + r 3 r i )

(g) 1 (2 & 3 ) Χ ΐ λ 2 3 Γ ΐ r i r 2 r 3 / ( r i r 2 + r2r3 4- r 3 r i )

(h) (2 & 3 ) , 1 λ 2 3 λ ΐ Γ 2 Γ 3 / ( Γ 2 + Γ 3 ) r i r 2 r 3 / ( r i r 2 + r 2 r 3 4- r 3 r i )

(i) ( 1 & 2 & 3) λ 123 r i r 2 r 3 / ( r i r 2 + r2r3 + r3ri)

W h e r e : λη = I n d e p e n d e n t failure r a t e o fc o m p o n e n t * n '

λ 23 = C M F r a t e f o rc o m p o n e n t s 2 a n d3

λ 123 = C M F r a t e f o rc o m p o n e n t s 1 ,2 a n d 3

rn = Repair time o fc o m p o n e n t * n '

Indices f o rT Y P E 1 events are:

c c
λ ι = Σ λ , U i = Σ λ r , r i = U i A i

(c) For the basic system, with additional standby 57 and S14 — Unit 11 kV switchboards
generators on the 11 kV station and unit boards.
58 and SI5 — Unit 3.3 kV switchboards

The following assumptions were made: SIO and S12 — Station 3.3 kV switchboards.

• The additional on-site generators provided at the Note that the actual method of producing the systems
11 kV level would be standby generators and not run and data for each of the cases studied was to draw the
continuously.
complete system only for case (c) and complete the
• As normal practice in respect of the safety case, n o reliabihty data entry. Case studies (a) and (b) were then
claim is made for on-site generation from the main undertaken as sensitivity studies, using the 'outage'
units. facility of the G R A S P 2 computer p r o g r a m . The plant
outaged for each particular case study is shown by
Description of computer produced system diagrams dotted lines on the appropriate results diagrams.

In all diagrams, the following busbar identification

appHes: Results

SI — A d u m m y busbar to represent the Only two of the busbar indices are of interest to
c o m m o n failure r a t e / r e s t o r a t i o n permit a comparison to be m a d e between the system
times for all the grid hues (irrespec­ with n o additional on-site generation (case (a)) and the
tive number) other two systems (cases (b) and (c)):

S2, S3, S4 — Individual sections of 400 kV busbar • The average failure rate (FR) is of interest, since
and S5 every loss of supply to any of the four 11 kV bus­
S6 and S13 — Generator main connections bars leads to a reactor trip.

114
 Reliability evaluation of p o w e r systems

TABLE 2.4
Third order overlapping forced outages (TYPE 2)

Event Failure rate Residence time

failure
sequence λ r

TYPE 2

(a) 1, 2, 3 XiX2riX3rir2/(ri + r 2 ) ΓΐΓ2ίς/(ΓΐΓ2 + r2tc + tcri)

(b) 1, 3, 2 XiX3riX2rir3/(ri -I- r a ) ritcr3/(ritc + tcr3 + r3ri)

(c) 2, 3, 1 λ2Χ3Γ2λΐΓ2Γ3/(Γ2 + Γ3) ίςΓ2Γ3/αςΓ2 + r 2 r 3 + r3tc)

(d) 3, 2, 1 λ3λ2Γ3λΐΓ3Γ2/(Γ3 + Γ2) tcr2r3/(tcr2 + r2r3 + r3tc)

(e) 2, 1, 3 λ2λΐΓ2Χ3Γ2Γΐ/(Γ2 + Γΐ) rir2tc/(rir2 + r2tc + tcri)

(f) 3, 1, 2 λ 3 λ ΐ Γ 3 λ 2 Γ 3 Γ ΐ / ( Γ 3 + ri) ritcr3/(ritc + tcr3 + r3ri)

(g) 1 (2 & 3) λΐλ23Γΐ ritc/(ri + t c )

(h) (2 & 3), 1 λ23λΐΓ2Γ3/(Γ2 + Γ3) tcr2r3/(tcr2 + r2r3 + rate)

(i) (1 & 2 & 3) λ 123 tc

Where: λη = Independent failure rate of component *n'

λ2 3 = CMF rate for components 2 and 3

λ123 = CMF rate for components 1, 2 and 3

rn = Repair time of component *n'

tc = Switching time of alternative (NO) path

Indices for TYPE 2 events are:

c c
λ 2 = Σλ, U 2 = Σλr, r 2 = U 2 A 2
a a

• Average outage time (AOT) is of interest, since it
gives an indication of the availabihty levels required
of the SES to cater for the reactor post-trip (initiated
by the electrical system) period.
The average failure rate for those events initiated by
failures within the electrical system which cannot be
recovered within 2 hours is also of interest. For the
safety case, this indicates the improvement in the
immediate reactor post-trip period that would be gained
from providing the additional on-site generation.
The diagrammatic results for A O T and FR for case
(a) are shown in Figs 2.32 and 2.33 respectively. Those
for cases (b) and (c) are shown in Figs 2.34 to 2.37.
Table 2.16 summarises both busbar indices and the
( 0 - 2 h) FR for each busbar for all three cases.
The ( 0 - 2 h) FR figures were obtained by manually
sorting the list of failure events and combining only
those events which had A O T s greater than 2 h o u r s .
It can be seen from Table 2.16 that the effect of
adding auxiliary standby generators at the 11 kV level
would be to increase the average failure rates of the
11 kV and 3.3 kV b o a r d s , whilst only showing a
marginal reduction in the corresponding average outage
durations. A similar increase is shown in the ( 0 - 2 h)
average failure rate.
Both these effects are predictable, since they are
due mainly to the addition of the active failure rates
of the 11 kV (NO) circuit-breaker associated with
the additional standby generators, and these events are
recoverable within the ( 0 - 2 h) period by switching/
isolation and the use of alternative sources of supply.
2.7.2 Example of the calculation and use of
system indices
This section contains a specific example of the evalua­
tion techniques for system indices as they were used to
compare the performance of two alternative proposals
for the design of a SES for the Coal-Fired Reference
Design in terms of the availability of the main boiler/
turbine-generator unit.
It was also required to assess the cost of lost gen­
eration caused by failures within the SES over the

115
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

TABLE 2.5

Third order — maintenance outage overlapping forced outage (TYPE 1)

Event Failure rate Residence time

failure
sequence λ r

T Y P E 1

(a) 1", 2 , 3 X ; ' X 2 r ¡ ' X 3 r ¡ ' r 2 / ( r ¡ ' + Γ2) r í r 2 r 3 / ( r ¡ ' r 2 + Γ2Γ3 + r3r¡')

(b) 1", 3 , 2 X;'X3r¡'X2rir3/(r¡' + r3) ΓΓΓ2Γ3/(ΓίΓ2 + r 2 r 3 + r3r¡')

(c) 2", 3 , 1 X2X3r^Xir2r3/(r2 + r3) rir2r3/(rir2 + r2r3 + r3ri)

(d) 3", 2 , 1 X ^ ' X 2 r ^ ' X i r ^ ' r 2 / ( r ^ ' + Γ2) rir2r^7(rir2 + r2r3 + r^'ri)

(e) 2", 1, 3 X2Xiri;X3r^ri/(r2 + r i ) Γ1Γ2Γ3/(Γ1Γ^' + r^r3 + r3ri)

(0 3", 1, 2 λ 3 λ ΐ Γ 3 Χ 2 Γ 3 Π / ( Γ 3 + r i ) rir2r^7(rir2 + r3r3 + r^'ri)

(g) 1" (2 & 3 ) rir2r3/(rj'r2 + r2r3 + r3r;')

W h e r e : Xn = Independent failure rate o f c o m p o n e n t 'n*

X23 = C M F rate for c o m p o n e n t s 2 a n d 3

Γη = R e p a i r t i m e o fc o m p o n e n t 'n'

C o m p o n e n t s o u t o n m a i n t e n a n c e d e n o t e d thus (")

Indices for T Y P E 1 events are:

c c
X¡' = ΣΧ", U¡' = ΣΧ"Γ", r f = UJVXJ'
a a

designed life of the station for use in the cost benefit
exercise to assess whether the capital cost of providing
the interconnection could be justified.
The basic design of SES proposed, is shown in
Fig 2.38 with two variants:
• A system that is purely radial top-to-bottom, with
no switchboard interconnections at any voltage level.
• A system as shown in Fig 2.38, but having normally
open interconnectors between corresponding switch­
boards of each train at each level within the unit
system and also at the 11 kV level between each unit
and station switchboard.
System conditions
Since the exercise was of a comparative nature, all
cables (except those used to interconnect boards in the
one system) were excluded from the studies t o simplify
the analysis.
It was assumed for the purpose of the study that the
station was in the C M R condition. Thus, for example,
all coal mills and fans were modelled as being in opera­
tion, whereas only one sootblower and two oil pumps
were included, the remaining sootblower and oil p u m p
being on standby.
One complete unit system (Unit 1 Trains A and B)
and half of the station system (Station Train 1) were
represented in the computer model.
Figures 2.39 a n d 2.40 show the computer-produced
diagrams for the radial system and Figs 2.41 to 2.43
show those for the interconnected system.
Table 2.17 shows the correlation between the com­
puter-generated busbar numbering system and the in­
dividual system board names.
A grid failure rate of 0.039 failures/year was used
for the 400 kV and 132 kV systems a n d failure rate
data accumulated for generators of 500 M W and above
were used for the 900 M W unit.
It was recognised that plant maintenance policy
would play an important role in this assessment and a
logical maintenance scheme was assumed, which in­
cluded a certain a m o u n t of in-line maintenance.
T o calculate the system indices, a derating factor was
applied to each of the main unit boards (i.e., those at
3.3 kV and above) of each system. For example, it was
assumed that loss of supply t o 11 kV Unit Board l A l
would result in a reduction in output power from the
main generator of 50<^ο. In addition, combinations of
various unit boards were considered; for example, loss
of both 3.3 kV mill boards was assumed to result in
100% loss of unit output, whereas loss of 3.3 kV mill

116
 P o w e r system performance analysis

T A B L E 2.6

Third order — maintenance outage overlapping forced outage (TYPE 2)

Event Failure rate Residence time

failure
sequence λ r

T Y P E 2

(a) 1", 2, 3 XrX2r;'X3r¡'r2/(r¡' + Τ2) ri'r2tc/(r¡'r2 + r2tc + tcr¡')

(b) 1", 3 , 2 λί'λ3Γί'λ2Γί'Γ3/(Γί' + Γ 3 ) rj'r3tc/(r;'r3 + rj'tc + r3tc)

(c) 2", 3, 1 M^3r2Xir^'r3/(r^ + r 3 ) r^r3tc/(r^'r3 + r ^ ' t c+ r3tc)

(d) 3", 2, 1 >^¡>^2r'i\\T¡T2/ÍT¡ + r 2 ) r3r2tc/(r3r2 + t^Íq + r2tc)

(e) 2", 3, 1 X¿'Xir^X3r^'ri/(r¿' + r i ) r^ritc/(r¿'ri + r ^ ' t c + rite)

(f) 3", 1, 2 X3Xir^'X2r3ri/(r^' + r i ) rs'ritcAr^'ri + r ^ ' t c + r ^ c )

(g) 1" ( 2 & 3 ) λΓλ23Γί r¡'tc/(r¡' + t c )

Where: λ η = Independent failure rate of component *n*

λ23 = CMF rate for components 2 and 3

rn = Repair time of component *n'

tc = Switching time of alternative (NO) path

Components out on maintenance denoted thus (")

Indices for T Y P E 2 events are:

c c
λ2 = Σλ", U2 = Σλ"r", r^ = V^/\2

board l A a n d 11 kV fan board I B would result in a
loss of 5 0 % output.
Loss of output d u e t o maintenance of t h e main
generator was n o t included in the system indices cal­
culation, since this is usually a planned outage a n d is
common t o any auxiHary system. F o r the purpose of
this analysis, loss of supply t o unit boards at the 415 V
level was not considered t o cause loss (total or partial)
of output, due t o t h e difficulty of handling t h e large
number of such boards a n d combinations of them with
the G R A S P computer p r o g r a m . However, since t h e
analysis was comparative a n d the omission was made in
both systems, the effects of the omission are negHgible.
Results
The system indices calculated for the radial system E R
and L O G are shown in Fig 2.44 a n d those for the inter­
connected system are shown in Fig 2.45.
The indices show that, although t h e frequency of
encounter E R of the derated states is fractionally higher
for the interconnected SES than for t h e radial system
(0.28 encounters/year at 100% a n d 0.37 at 5 0 % against
0.27 a n d 0.33, respectively), t h e loss of generation
(LOG) is lower by approximately 25 G W h / y e a r . With
replacement generation costs assessed at £25 per M W h ,
there would b e a saving of £625 000 per unit per year
or £37.5 milHon for a two-unit station over a 30 year
Hfe if the interconnected design of SES is used.
3 Power system performance analysis
3.1 Load flow analysis
3.1.1 Introduction
L o a d flow analysis is used t o assist in planning, design­
ing a n d operating power networks. T h e network or
system is modelled in its steady state operating modes,
then t h e voltage at each busbar or b o a r d a n d the power
flow in each branch or circuit is calculated.
Particular attention is being paid here t o t h e analysis
of power station electrical systems. If a SES fails t o
provide sufficient power t o m o t o r drives or other equip­
ment, then generating output may be lost completely or
be significantly reduced. There are economic penalties
associated with the loss of generation and there may be
a hazard t o plant safety. T h u s , it is essential t o have

117
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

TABLE 2.7
Active failure overlapping with forced outages — second order (TYPE 3)

Event Failure rate Residence time

failure
sequence λ r

TYPE 3

(a) la, 2 sir2/(si + r2)

(b) 2, la λ2λ^2 Sir2/(si + r2)

Where: λη = Independent failure rate of component 'n'

λη = Active failure rate of component 'n'

Γη Repair time of component 'n'

Sn Switching/isolating time of component *n'

Indices for TYPE 3 events are:

b b
λ3 = Σλ, Us = ΣλΓ, r3 = UBAB
a a

TABLE 2 . 8
Maintenance outage overlapping active failure — second order (TYPE 3)

Event Failure rate Residence time

failure
sequence λ r

TYPE 3

(a) 2", la ΧμΪΓ2 sir^/(si + r^)

(b) 1", 2 a r¡'s2/(r¡' + S2)

Where: λη = Independent failure rate of component 'n*

λη = Active failure rate of component *n'

rn = Repair time of component *n'

Sn = Switching/isolating time of component *n'

Component on maintenance indicated thus (")

Indices for TYPE 3 events are:

b b

118
 Power system performance analysis

TABLE 2.9

Active failure overlapping forced outages — third order (TYPE 3)

Event Failure rate Residence time

failure
sequence λ r

TYPE 3

(a) l a , 2, 3 XfX2SiX3Sir2/(si + r 2 ) Sir2r3/(sir2+r2r3+r3si)

(b) l a , 3, 2 XfX3SiX2r3/(si+r3) Sir2r3/(sir2+r2r3+r3si)

(c) 2, 3, l a λ2λ3Γ2λ?Γ2Γ3/(Γ2 + Γ3) Sir2r3/(sir2+r2r3+r3si)

(d) 3, 2, l a λ3λ2Γ3λ?Γ3Γ2/(Γ3+Γ2) Sir2r3/(sir2+r2r3+r3si)

(e) 2, l a , 3 λ2λ?Γ2λ3Γ2δΐ/(Γ2+8ι) Sir2r3/(sir2+r2r3+r3Si)

(0 3, l a , 2 X3Xfr3X2r3Si/(r3+si) Sir2r3/(sir2+r2r3+r3si)

(g) l a (2 & 3) XfX23Si Sir2r3/(sir2-f-r2r3+r3si)

(h) (2 & 3), l a λ23λ?Γ2Γ3/(Γ2+Γ3) Sir2r3/(sir2 + r2r3+r3si)

Where: λ η = Independent failure rate of component *n'

\\ = Active failure rate of component 1

λ23 = CMF rate for components 2 and 3

rn = Repair time of component *n*

si = Switching/isolating time of component 1

TABLE 2.10

Maintenance outage overlapping with active failure and forced outage — third order (TYPE 3)

Event Failure rate Residence time

failure
sequence λ r

TYPE 3

(a) 2\ 3, l a X^3r2Xfr^r3/(r;^+r3) Sir2r3/(sir^+sir3+r;jr3)

(b) 2", l a , 3 X^f r^3r;^si/(r;^+si) Sir2r3/(sir2+sir3+r2r3)

(c) 3", 2, 1 X3X2r3Xf r3r2/(r3 + r 2 ) Sir3r2/(sir5 +Sir2+r5r2)

(d) 3", l a , 2 XgXf r 5 X 2 r 3 S i / ( r 5 +si) Sir3r2/(sir5 + S i r 2 + r 5 r 2 )

Where: λ η = Independent failure rate of component *n'

\\ = Active failure rate of component 1

rn = Repair time of component *n'

si = Switching/isolating time of component 1

Component on maintenance indicated thus (")

119
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

TABLE 2.11
Overlapping forced outages — second order (TYPE 5)

Residence time (TYPE 5)

Event Failure Repair Restoration by Restoration

rate rate component from LES
repair
λ ΓΑ ΓΒ

(a) 1, 2 λ ι λ 2 Γ ΐ /Al + n 2 \ /μ ritc/(ri +tc)

(b) 2, 1 λ 2 λ ΐ Γ 2 μΊ + n 2 \ /μ r2tc/(r2+tc)

(c) (1+2) λ ΐ 2 -»-n2 \ /μ tc

For each event: Average repair time r = rAP + rß ( 1 - P )

Where: Ρ = e'^^^
λ η = Failure rate of component *n'
Γη = Repair time of component 'n'
tc = Switching and start-up time of LES
tL = Time limit of LES

Indices for TYPE 5 events are:

λ = Xa + Xb + Xc

U = Xa Ta + Xb Tb + ^c
τ = U/X

well designed power station electrical systems, so their
operating voltage and frequency limits are defined; if
the auxiHary plant is specified to be supplied within
these defined voltage and frequency limits, then its
performance will be acceptable.
3.1.2 Program construction [4,5]
General remarks
The equations defining load flow in a power network
can be stated and digital computation then used to
solve them. A great deal of research has gone into
finding the best methods of doing this. Special
numerical techniques are used, the most popular being
based on nodal methods of network analysis, using
Newton-Raphson based algorithms to solve the network
equations. Gauss-Seidel based algorithms and Z-matrix
methods have also been developed. These methods are
discussed in detail in [6].
A set of complex simultaneous equations is set up
relating currents and voltages within the network.
Although the basic equations are linear, non-linearities
arise for various reasons. Hence the need for an iterative
numerical solution.
There are many ways of describing an electrical
network or power system mathematically: all must
satisfy Kirchoffs voltage and current laws. Nodal ana­
lysis has emerged as the method best suited to digital
computation.
Assuming a balanced three-phase network it is suf­
ficient to use the positive phase sequence impedances
(and hence admittances) of circuit components such as
transmission Hues and cables, transformers, series and
shunt capacitors. These are usually represented in per-
unit (p.u.) notation as lumped linear complex imped­
ances at rated system frequency. Transmission circuits
may be represented by their equivalent 7 r - n e t w o r k s .
In nodal analysis an electrical system comprising
transformers, lines, cables, inductors, series capaci­
tors, shunt capacitors and loads is translated into a
set of 'branches' expressed as impedances or admit­
tances. Admittance values are normally used, because
there are considerable advantages during computation
in using admittance instead of impedance values for
network branches. The busbars a n d switchboards are
separately translated into a set of 'nodes' which serve
as link points for the branches. All voltage sources
(generators) are replaced by current injection at the
appropriate node.

120
 P o w e r system performance analysis

TABLE 2.12

Maintenance outage overlapping forced outages — second order (TYPE 5)

Residence time (TYPE 5)

Event Failure Repair Restoration by Restoration

rate rate component from LES
repair
λ" 'I

(a) 1", 2 1/^" rJ'tcArJ' + tc)

(b) 2". 1 1/μ" r^tc/(ri' + tc)

For each event: average repair time Γ" = r^P" + ΓΒ(1-Ρ")

Where: P" = e-'^''^^

λη = Failure rate of component *n'

rn = Repair time of component *n'

tc = Switching and start-up time of LES

tL = Time limit of LES

Component out on maintenance indicated thus (")

Indices for TYPE 5 events are:

λ" = + λί

Υ" = X'Á r^ + λ bκ Γ^ b

= UVX"

These techniques are employed to reduce the a m o u n t and at least one node is connected to ground (three
of computation needed to obtain the solution to the nodes are connected to ground, in this example).
load flow problem. Using Kirchoffs first law at each node, we have the
foUowing equations:
Nodal analysis
Figure 2.46 illustrates how a voltage source may be Yl (Va - Vb) + Y4 Va = ia

replaced by an equivalent current source. Y2 (vb - Ve) - Yl(Va - Vb) + Y5 Vb = ib

In Fig 2.46 (a) we have vohage source Ε with admit­
tance Y connected to node 1 having voltage to ground Y3 (vc - Vd) - Y2(vb - Vc) = ic

of V. It follows that V = Ε - I / Y and I = Y ( E - V ) ,

Y6 Vd - Y 3 (Vc - Vd) = id
as shown in Fig 2.46 (b). If we define Ii = YE and I 2
= YV, this is shown in Fig 2.46 (c) and the voltage
source has been replaced by a current source. expressing the admittance coefficients in matrix form,
In Fig 2.46 (d), we have a vohage source Ε and an the voltages as a vector and the currents as a vector
admittance Y between nodes 1 and 2, then V 2 - Vi = gives:
Ε - i/Y. If now we define Ii = - E Y a n d h = + E Y ,
this is shown in Fig 2.46 (e), and the vohage source has
been replaced by two current sources. Yl + Y4 - Y l 0 0 Va
To illustrate the formation of the basic equations
used in nodal analysis, consider the simple network - Y l Y1 + Y24-Y5 - Y 2 0 Vb lb

shown in Fig 2.47. Figure 2.47 (a) illustrates a simple

0 - Y 2 Y2 + Y3 - Y 3 Vc
power system which translates to the Fig 2.47 (b)
network. 0 0 - Y 3 Y3 + Y6 Vd
The network has a current injected into each node,
each node is connected to at least one other node, or, i n short f o r m Y V - 1

121
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

TABLE 2.13
Overlapping forced outages — third order (TYPE 5)

Residence time (TYPE 5)

Event Failure rate Restoration by Restoration

component f r o m LES
repair
λ ΓΑ ΓΒ

(a) 1, 2, 3 X l X 2 r i X 3 r i r 2 / ( r i + r 2 ) \ /μ rir2tc/(rir2 + r ^ c + r2tc)

(b) 1, 3, 2 XlX3nX2rir3/(ri + r 3 ) \ /μ rir3tc/(rir3 + rite + r3te)

(c) 2, 3, 1 Χ2λ3Γ2λΐΓ2Γ3/(Γ2 + Γ3) ι /μ Γ2Γ3ΐε/(Γ2Γ3 + r2te + r3tc)

(d) 3, 2, 1 λ3λ2Γ3ΧΐΓ2Γ3/(Γ2 + Γ3) \ /μ Γ2Γ3ΐο/(Γ2Γ3 + n^c + r3tc)

(e) 2, 1, 3 λ2λΐΓ2λ3Γ2Γΐ/(Γ2 + Π ) \ /μ ΓΐΓ2ίς/(ΓΐΓ2 + rite + r2te)

(0 3, 1, 2 λ3λΐΓ3λ2Γ3Γΐ/(Γ3 + Γΐ) ι /μ r3rite/(r3ri + r3te + r ^ c )

(g) 1, 2 + 3 λ ΐ λ 2 3 Γ ι /μ rite/(ri + t e )

(h) 2 -f 3, 1 λ23λΐΓ2Γ3/(Γ2 + Γ3) ι /μ r2r3tc/(r2r3 + r2tc + r3tc)

For each event: average repair time Γ = Γ Α Ρ + Γ Β ( 1 - Ρ )

Where: μ = MI + / a 2 + / a 3

Ρ e - ^ t L

λ η Failure rate of component 'n'

λ23 CMF rate for components 2 and 3

Γη Repair time of component *n*

tc Switching and startup time of LES

tL Time limit of LES

Indices for TYPE 5 events are:

h h
\S = Σ λ , Us = Σ λ Γ , TS = UsAs

It will be seen that nodal admittance matrix Y can be • Each off-diagonal element Yik is the negative of the
written by inspection and that, for larger networks, the branch admittance between nodes i and k.
matrix will he highly sparse (i.e., contains a high
proportion of zero elements). The properties of the • In large networks, many off-diagonal elements will
matrix are: be zero, i.e., the matrix is sparse.

• It is a square of order (n χ n), where η is the number
of nodes in the network.
• It is symmetrical (Yik = Yki, general element i^^
row, k^^ column).
• It is complex, i.e., it may contain conductance and
susceptance terms.
• Each diagonal element Ykk is the sum of the admit­
tances connected to node k, including the branches
to ground.
The matrix equation YV = I defines the injected
currents in terms of network admittances and voltages.
Mathematically speaking, the set of equations YV = I
may or may not have a solution, depending on the
characteristics of matrix Y. N o solution is possible if
matrix Y is singular and thus has no inverse. This
happens if the system has no ground connections. If
matrix Y is not singular, the ease of solution depends
on whether the matrix is well conditioned; if it is,
computational rounding errors will not accumulate
during the numerical process. Fortunately, the admit-

122
 P o w e r system performance analysis

TABLE 2.14

Overlapping forced outages — third order (TYPE 5), with third order CMF

R e s i d e n c e t i m e ( T Y P E 5 )

E v e n t Failure rate Restoration b y Restoration

c o m p o n e n t f r o m L E S
repair

λ ΓΑ ΓΒ

(a) 1, 2 , 3 X l X 2 r i X 3 r i r 2 / ( r i + r 2 ) ι /μ r i r 2 t c / ( r i r 2 + r ^ c+ r2tc)

(b) 1, 3 , 2 Χ ΐ Χ 3 Γ ΐ Χ 2 Γ ΐ Γ 3 / ( Γ ΐ + Γ 3 ) ι /μ r i r 3 t c / ( r i r 3 + r ^ c+ r3tc)

(c) 2, 3, 1 Χ2Χ3Γ2ΧΙΓ2Γ3/(Γ2 + Γ 3 ) ι /μ Γ2Γ3ΐς/(Γ2Γ3 + r2tc + r^ic)

(d) 3, 2, 1 Χ 3 Χ 2 Γ 3 Χ ΐ Γ 3 Γ 2 / ( Γ 3 + η ) ι /μ Γ3Γ2ΐς/(Γ3Γ2 + r3tc + r2tc)

(e) 2 , 1, 3 Χ 2 Χ ΐ Γ 2 Χ 3 Γ 2 Γ ΐ / ( Γ 2 + Γ ι ) ι /μ Γ2Γΐίς/(Γ2Γΐ + r2tc + rite)

(0 3 , 1, 2 Χ 3 Χ ΐ Γ 3 Χ 2 Γ 3 Γ ΐ / ( Γ 3 + Γ ΐ ) ι /μ Γ3Γΐίο/(Γ3Γΐ + r3tc + rite)

(g) 1, 2 + 3 Χ123 ι /μ tc

For each event: average repair time r = r A Ρ + rß (1 - Ρ )

Where: μ = μι + M 2+ M 3

Ρ = Q-t'^L

λη = failure rate of component *n'

X123 = CMF rate for components 1, 2 and 3

rn = Repair time of component *n'

tc = Switching and start-up time of LES

tL = Time limit of LES

Indices f o rT Y P E 5 events are:

g g
λ 5 = Σ λ , Us = Σ λ Γ , rs = UsAs
a a

tance matrices derived from power station electrical
systems are well conditioned, also one or more volt­
ages on the system are specified, usually the super-
grid a n d / o r grid voltage. These factors remove the
problems associated with ill-conditioned admittance
matrices.
The specified voltage can now be eliminated from
the nodal equations. Assuming for convenience that
the first node voltage is known, and considering the
equation I = YV, the new equations become:
Ik - Yki Vi = E YkiVi
i = 2
The set of equations can then be solved using one of the
available techniques, some of which will be briefly
described later.
Busbar type definitions
There are three basic types of busbar defined in load
flow analysis:
• PQ busbar, where net active (real and reactive power)
are specified; i.e., the watts and VARs supphed from
generation sources, minus those consumed by loads
at that busbar. This is normally a busbar where only
load is connected.
• Ρ V busbar, where net active power and voltage mag­
nitude are specified. Net reactive power is not
for k = 2 to k = η specified and its value for the busbar emerges as
part of the load flow solution. Typically, this is a
busbar where generating plant or synchronous com­
pensation is connected a n d the voUage magnitude is
controlled by regulating the reactive power output
of the generator.

123
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

TABLE 2.15

Forced outages overlapping maintenance — third order (TYPE 5)

Residence time (TYPE 5)

Event Failure rate Restoration by Restoration

component from LES
repair
λ"

(a) 1", 2, 3 Xi\2r;'X3r¡'r2/(r¡' + Γ2) ι/μ" r¡'r2tc/{r¡'r2 + r,"tc + Γ2ΐς)

(b) 1", 3, 2 X¡'X3r¡'X2r¡'r3/(r¡' + r3) ι/μ" r|'r3tc/(r;'r3 + r,"tc + rate)

(c) 2", 3, 1 X¿'X3r^Xir^'r3/(r2' + r3) ι/μ" rjrstcAr^rs + r^tc + rate)

(d) 3", 2, 1 λ3λ2Γ3λΐΓ^'Γ2/(Γ3 + Γ2) ι/μ" r3"r2tc/(r3r2 + r"^tc + r2tc)

(e) 2", 1, 3 X¿'Xiri;X3r^ri/(ri' + ri) ι/μ" rjritc/irjri + r^tc + rjtc)

(0 3", 1, 2 X3'Xir^'X2r3ri/(r^' + n ) ι/μ" rj'ntcAr^ri + r^'tc + r i t e )

(g) 1", 2 + 3 λί'λ23 ι/μ" rl'tcAr," + tc)

For each event: average repair time r" = r ; P + r¿ ( 1 - P )

Where: μ" - μ{ + M2 + μ3 or μ\ + μ2 + M3 or μ\ + μι + μi

Ρ ^

λη = Failure rate of component *n'

λ23 • CMF rate for components 2 and 3

Γη Repair time of component *n*

tc = Switching and start-up time of LES

tL • Time limit of LES

Component out on maintenance indicated thus (")

Indices for TYPE 5 events are:

g g
\l = Σλ", U; = Σλ'ϊ",
a a

• Slack busbar. This is a busbar nominated by the defined by the linear nodal equations I = YV a n d the
analyst from the P V busbars for analysis purposes busbar constraints, as follows:
only. There is only one slack busbar on each system.
(a) At a PQ busbar
Voltage magnitude is specified, but the net active
power is designated as u n k n o w n . This is because, VI * = (net active power) + j (net reactive power)
prior to solving the network equations, the system = (net active generated power χ net active
losses are unknown and it is not possible to specify power supplied t o loads) Η- j (net reactive
the total generated power exactly. During analysis, generated power - net reactive power
these losses are assumed t o be taken from the system supplied t o loads) at that busbar.
at this busbar. T h e busbar with the greatest a m o u n t (b) At a PV busbar
of generating capacity connected is usually chosen t o
be the slack busbar. Re VI * = net active power (Re = real part of)
= (net active generated power - net
active power supplied to loads) at the
Complex variables — definitions busbar.
The complex variables in load flow analysis are the and IVI = voltage specified at that busbar (| V |
voltage and current at each busbar or node. These are = modulus of V).

124
 Power system performance analysis

RELIABILITY ANñLYSIS-
FAILURE RnTE(F/YR)

Φ Q

-SV

GRASP-2 FRI, 03 JUN 1988 1

FIG. 2.20 Reliability analysis of failure rate (FR) — presentation of results

(c) At the slack busbar • Vohage magnitude at slack and P V busbars.

V = voltage specified at that busbar • Net active power input at P V and P Q busbars.
• Net reactive power input at P Q busbars.
Footnote: • The impedances of network branches. (Circuits or
transmission hues, transformers, series and shunt
Complex power S = Ρ + jQ, and V = |V| eJ^ and I = | l | eJ^' reactors, static capacitors. Transmission circuits with
I* is defined as | l | e~J^ and called the complex conjugate of I significant charging currents are represented by a
The product VI* = S because VI* = |V| e^^ χ |I| e'J^^ pi network, i.e., a series impedance and two shunt
= IVlllleJ('^-i^)
capacitances, one at each end of the circuit.)
= |V||I|eJ^
= |V||I|cos0+j|V||I| ύηφ The data outputs are:
= Ρ + jQ • Voltage magnitude and angle at P Q busbars.
similarly V* I can be shown to equal Ρ - jQ .
• Voltage angle at P V busbars.
• Active power generation at the slack busbar.

Simplified system representation data requirements and • Reactive power generation at the slack and PV
outputs busbars.
• Power flows at both ends of each network branch.
A simplified system representation has the following
data input requirements for analysis purposes: • Losses in each branch and total system losses.

125
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS-
ñVERAGE OUTAGE TIME(H)

GRASP-2 F R I , D3 JUN 1 9 8 8 1

FIG. 2.21 Reliability analysis of average outage duration ( A O D ) — presentation of results

Solution of network equations Assuming for the m o m e n t that ah busbars other than
the slack busbar are the P Q type, for a P Q busbar:
As mentioned earlier, the solution of the network
equations in matrix form developed from the nodal
Ii = ( Ρ Γ - ]Qf)/y* (Superscript SP =
representation of the power system is done by computer
specified value)
programs, using one of several methods. These include
the Gauss-Seidel method, the Newton-Raphson method and substituting for Ij in the above:
and the fast-decoupled method. These are now briefly
described. V? =

(P^-JO?^) (i-i> ^
Gauss-Seidel method - ^ - ^ - ^ - Yii V i - Σ Yik VP - Σ Yik v P - /Yii
Vf k=2 k = (i+l)
This is one of the easiest methods to p r o g r a m . It is
for k = 2 t o k = η (2.1)
adapted from the Gauss-Seidel iterative method of
solving simultaneous linear differential equations.
This algorithm can be applied iteratively until con­
Nominating the slack busbar as number 1, purely for
vergence is reached.
presentation purposes, the algorithm is:
If there is a P V busbar present, it is necessary t o
calculate Qf^ before the above algorithm can be used.
V? =
(i-l) This is done by calculating:
(Ii - Yi, V i - Σ Yik V P - Σ Yik V P - ^ ) / Y i i
k=2 k = (i + l)
= Σ Yik Vl (Superscript Ρ = the last
where ρ is the iteration number. k=l calculated value(s))

126

RELIABILITY ANñLYSIS-
ñ N N U ñ L OUTAGE T I M E ( H / Y R )
FiG. 2.22 Reliability analysis of annual outage time (AOT) — presentation of results
and Q P - ^ = Im [V?"* χ If"^*]
(Im = Imaginary part of and superscript Ρ - 1 = the
last but one calculated value) and Qi can be used in
Equation (2.1).
Finally, for PV busbars, the calculated value of V?
is reduced to its original specified value without chang­
ing its angle.
A logic flow diagram for the Gauss-Seidel method
is given in Fig 2.48. The diagram illustrates the suc­
cessive stages in the computation. Once the initial data
are read into the computer and the iteration counter
set to zero, the program calculates the voltage at each
node in t u r n . It then compares the set of voltages
just calculated with the preceding set of calculated
voltages. If the two sets of values are within a pre­
defined tolerance, then the solution is said to have
converged. If convergence does not occur, a further
iteration takes place and comparison between the two
most recent sets of voltages is m a d e . At some stage
either convergence is achieved, and the results of the
analysis are displayed, or the preset maximum number
P o w e r system p e r f o r m a n c e analysis
CRASP-2 FRI, 03 JUN 1988 1
of iterations is reached. In that case, a message is
displayed to the user informing him that the maximum
number of iterations has been reached without the
solution converging. (The user then seeks the reasons
for this.)
T o reduce computation time, an acceleration method
can be inserted into the p r o g r a m in conjunction with
the process described. One method is to project each
voltage variable linearly in the direction the solution
is seen to be moving. This may require additional
storage and care must be taken not to Over project'
the variables, otherwise n o solution will emerge.
Newton-Raphson method
This method is based on the Newton-Raphson general
algorithm for the solution of a set of simultaneous non­
linear equations. F(X) = 0, where F is a vector of
functions fi to fη in variables x i , to X n .
At each iteration of this method, the non-linear
problem is approximated by a linear matrix and solved
for Δ Χ .
127
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

INPUT DATn FOR SUBSYSTEH NUMBER

DATn TO CALCULATE PATHS AND CUTS

NUMBER OF BRANCHES -

BRANCH EQUIVALENT
NUMBER SYSTEM NO. S-ENO R-END COMPONENTS

1 < l> S2/1 Sl/1 B5/1 Rl/1 B6/1

2 < 2) Sl/1 S3/1 87/1 Q2/1 B8/1
3 < 3) Wl/1 Sl/1 Bl/l Tl/l B2/1
4 < 4> U2/ 1 S2/1 B3/1 T2/1 B4/1
5 < 5) S2/1 S4/1 Ql/1
6 < 6> S4/1 S3/1 B9/1 R2/1 ΒΙΘ/
7 < 7> S3/1 S4/1 Pl/1

THE FIRST 2 BRANCHES ARE ASSUMED UNIDIRECTIONAL

SOURCES CONNECTED TO NODES :

H I U 2

SWITCHING EFFECTS OF COMPONENT ACTIVE FAILURES

COMPONENT ACTIVELY FAILED BREAKERS THAT TRIP

s 1 6 7 2
s 2 5 4 9
s 3 8 10
s 4 9 5 4
τ 1 1 2
τ 2 3 4
Β 1 2
Β 2 1 6 7
Β 3 4
Β 4 3 5 9
Β 5 6 4 9
Β 6 5 7 2
Β 7 8 β 2
Β 8 7 10
Β 9 10 5 4
θ 10 9 8
Μ 1 1
Μ 2 3
Ρ ι 8 10 9
R 1 5 6
R 2 9 10
Q 1 5 4 9
Q 2 7 8

NORMALLY OPEN COMPONENTS

Ρ 1
0NTINUE7Y/N

FRI, 03 JUN 1988 1

FIG. 2 . 2 3 Input data to calculate paths and cuts, and the switching effects of component active failures

Ρ(χΡ-ΐ) = - J(XP-l) X Δ Χ Ρ and columns are written is changed, and only non-zero
elements of the Jacobian matrix are stored and operated
i.e., ΔΧΡ = -[J(XP-^)]-^ Ρ ( χ Ρ - 0 on. This is difficult to program but improvement in
solution efficiency makes it worthwhile.
X is then updated by X ^ = X ^ - ^ + Δ χ Ρ

Fast decoupled method

The square matrix J is the Jacobian matrix of F(X). This
contains partial derivatives and has general element. Based on the Newton-Raphson method, this solution
takes advantage of two practical characteristics of
power systems:
for i^^ row, k^^ column
5 x k • That active (watt) power flow between nodes is
strongly dependent on the difference in phase angle
There are several ways to write the load flow equations;
between nodes.
one popular way is to substitute for Ii, obtained from
I = YV, into the P Q and PV busbar equations given • T h a t reactive (VAr) power flow between nodes is
earher. strongly dependent on the difference in voltage
The Newton-Raphson method is widely used and is between nodes.
efficient in solving large networks. Convergence is rapid
when approaching correct values. Efficient solution is If Newton-Raphson is formulated as:
very dependent on accurate calculation of the elements
ΔΘ
in the Jacobian matrix. This matrix is sparse, and this ΔΡ
property is exploited by use of sparsity-programmed = [J] Δν
AQ
ordered ehmination. This means the way in which rows

128
 Power system performance analysis

RgLIABILITV PATA

COMPONENT TFR AFR RT ST SP ΜΤ MR

S l Θ. Θ Θ 3 Θ 0.0030 48 0000 1.0000 8.0000 0. 5 0 0 0

S 2 θ. 0 0 3 0 0.0030 48 0000 1.0000 8.0000 0.5000
S 3 θ. 0 0 3 0 0.0030 48 0000 1.0000 8.0000 0.5000
S 4 0.0030 0.0030 48 0000 1.0000 8.0000 0.5000
Τ 1 0. 0 2 0 0 0.0140 120 0000 1.0000 72.0000 1. 0 0 0 0
Τ 2 0.0200 0.0140 120 0000 1.0000 7 2.00 00 1.0000
Β 1 0. 0 1 2 0 0.0050 48 0000 4.0000 0.0010 24.0000 1.0000
Β 2 θ. 0 1 2 0 0.0050 36 0000 1.0000 0.0010 24.ΘΘΟΘ 1. 0 0 0 0
Β 3 0. 0 1 2 0 0.0050 48 0000 4.0000 0.0010 24.0000 1.0000
Β 4 0. 0 1 2 0 0.0050 36 0000 1.0000 0.0010 24.0000 1. 0 0 0 0
Β 5 0.0120 0.0050 36 0000 1.0000 0.0010 24.0000 1.0000
Β 6 0.0120 0.0050 36 0000 1.0000 0. 0 0 1 0 24.0000 1. 0 0 0 0
Β 7 0. 0 1 2 0 0.0050 36 0000 1 .0 0 0 0 0.0010 24.0000 1.0000
Β θ 0. 0 1 2 0 0.0050 36 0000 1.0000 0.0010 24.0000 1. 0 0 0 0
8 9 0. 0 1 2 0 0.0050 36 0000 1 .0 0 0 0 0.0010 24.0000 1. 0 0 0 0
Β 1Θ 0.0120 0.0050 36 0000 1.0000 0.0010 24.0000 1.0000
U i 0. 0 7 5 0 0.0300 2 0000 4.0000 30.0000 1.0000
Μ 2 0.0750 0.0300 2 0000 4.0000 30.0000 1.0000
Ρ 1 0.0120 0.0050 36 0000 1 .0000 0.0010 24.0000 1. 0 0 0 0
R 1 0.0200 0.0140 120 0000 1.0000 72.0000 1.0000
R 2 0. 0 2 0 0 0.0140 120 0000 1,0000 72.0000 1. 0 0 0 0
Q 1 0.0040 0.0040 24 0000 1.0000 0.0000 0. 0 0 0 0
Q 2 0.0040 0.0040 24 0000 1.0000 θ.0000 0. 0 0 0 0

COMMON MODE FAILURE DATA

THERE ARE NOT C.M.F. DATA

INCOMPATIBLE COMPONENTS

NONE

CONTROL PARAMETERS

DO N / 0 P A T H S FAIL W H E N R E Q U I R E D TO O P E R A T E ? .
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF O V E R L A P P I N G OUTAGES
DO YOU WANT TO C O N S I D E R STUCK BREAKERS?
ARE THE FAILURE E V E N T S OF N / O P A T H S OF F I R S T ORDER?
THE MAXIMUM PERMITTED NUMBER OF N / 0 B R E A K E R S IN A G I V E N PATH
DOES THE SYSTEM CONTAIN INCOMPATIBLE COMPONENTS?
DO Y O U WANT THE PROGRAM TO D E D U C E THE B R E A K E R S W H I C H TRIP D U R I N G A/F?

tONTINUE?Y/N

GRASP-2 F R I , 03 JUN 1988 1

FIG. 2.24 Reliability and C M F input data

LOAD CONNECTED TO N O D E NUMBER S 3 /SUBSYSTEM NO. 1

LIST OF SYSTEM PATHS

NUMBER OF PATHS

COMPONENT NUMBERS
S3/1 S l / 1 S 2 / 1 W2/1 2 1 4
S3/1 S4/i S2/1 U2/1 6 5 4
S3/1 S l / 1 Wl/1 2 3
PATHS NORMALLY OPEN
S3/1 S4/1 S 2 / 1 W2/1 7 5 4
C0NTINÜE7Y/N

THU, 02 JUN 1988 1

FIG. 2.25 List of system minimal paths

129
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

LOAD CONNECTED TO NODE NUMBER S 3 /SUBSYSTEM NO. 1

LIST OF CUTS

NUMBER OF CUTS = Gl

CUT COMPONENT NUMBERS

1 S3/1
2 S l / 1 S2/1
3 S l / 1 W2/l
4 S l / 1 B3/1
5 Sl/1 T2/1
6 S l / 1 B4/1
? S l / 1 S4/1
8 Sl/1 89/1
9 S l / 1 R2/1
10 S l / 1 Β 1 0/ 1
1 1 Sl/1 Ql/1
12 S2/1 B7/1
13 S2/1 Q2/1
14 S2/1 B8/1
15 S2/1 Wl/1
16 S2/1 Bl/l
17 S2/1 T l / l
18 S2/1 B2/1
1 9 W2/1 B7/1
20 W2/1 Q2/1
21 W2/1 88/1
22 W2/1 Wl/1
23 W2/1 B l / l
24 W2/1 T l / l
25 W2/1 82/1
26 87/1 83/1
27 B7/1 T2/1
28 B7/1 84/1
29 02/1 83/1
30 Q2/1 T2/1
31 02/1 84/1
32 B8/1 83/1
33 B8/1 T2/1
34 B8/1 B4/1
35 B7/1 S4/1
36 Q2/1 S4/1
37 B8/1 S4/1
38 B7/1 B9/1
39 B7/1 R2/1
40 B7/1 Β 10/1
4 1 02/ 1 B9/1
42 02/1 R2/1
43 Q2/1 Β 10/1
C:ONTINUE?Y/N

THÜ, G2 JUN 1988

44 B8/1 89/1
45 88/1 R2/1
46 88/1 Β 10/1
47 87/1 Ql/1
48 Q2/1 Ql/1
49 88/1 Ql/1
50 83/1 Wl/1
51 T2/1 Wl/1
52 84/1 Wl/1
53 B3/1 81/1
54 83/1 T l / l
55 83/1 82/1
56 T2/1 Bl/l
57 Τ2/ 1 T l / l
58 T2/1 82/1
59 84/1 81/1
60 84/1 T l / l
61 84/1 82/1
CUTS THAT ARE ELIMINATED BY CLOSING A NORMALLY OPEN PATH

CUT PATHS THAT MAY BE CLOSED

8 4
9 4
IG 4
38 4
39 4
40 4
4 1 4
42 4
43 4
44 4
45 4
46 4

<
THU, 02 JUN 1988 1

FIG. 2.26 List of minimal cuts

130
 P o w e r system p e r f o r m a n c e analysis

*
* LOAD CONNECTED TO NODE NUMBER S 3 /SUBSYSTEM NO. 1
*
**********REL1ABILITY RESULTS**•·*••**•

EVENT FORCED F. RATE AV. DURATION TOTAL OUT.TIME

HAINT. F. RATE AV. DURATION TOTAL OUT.TIME

83/1 FAILED 0.3Θ0ΘΘΕ-Θ2 Θ.48ΘΘΘΕ 02 0. 14400E 0

Θ.ΘΘΘΘΘΕ ΘΘ 8.ΘΘΘΘ0Ε 00 Θ.ΘΘΟ00Ε 00
Sl/l S2/1 Θ.9863ΘΕ-Θ7 Θ.24ΘΘΘΕ 02 0.23671Ε-Θ
OUT 0.27397E^85 Θ.68571E 01 0.18787Ε-Θ4
Sl/1 M2/1 0.12842Ε-Θ5 0. 19200E 01 0.24658Ε-Θ
OUT Θ.44521Ε-Θ4 Θ. 5 4 9 1 IE 01 0. 2 4 4 4 7 E - 0 3
Sl/1 B3/1 8.39452Ε-Θ6 Θ.24ΘΘΘΕ 02 0.94685Ε-Θ
OUT 8. 1 3 6 9 9 Ε - Θ 4 8. 1 2 3 4 3 E 02 0. 1 6 9 Θ 8 Ε - 0 3
Sl/1 T2/1 0.115Θ7Ε-Θ5 0.34286E 02 0.39452E-0
OUT 0.3379ΘΕ-Θ4 0. 2 3 Θ 4 3 Ε 02 0. 7 7 8 6 3 Ε - Θ 3
Sl/1 B4/1 0.34521Ε-Θ6 Θ.2Θ571Ε 02 0.71O14E-0
OUT 0. 1 3 6 9 9 Ε - Θ 4 Θ. 1 2 2 1 8 E 02 0. 1 6 7 3 7 Ε - Θ 3
Sl/1 S4/1 0.9863ΘΕ-07 Θ.24ΘΘ0Ε 02 0.23671E-0
OUT 0.27397Ε-Θ5 0.68571E 01 0. 1 8 7 8 7 E - 0 4
Sl/1 B9/1 OUT 0.34521E-06 0.97676E 00 0.33718E-0
N/0 ΡΛΤΗ CLOSED 0. 1 3 6 9 9 Ε - Θ 4 0.93156E 00 0. 1 2 7 6 1 E - 0 4
Sl/1 R2/1 OUT 0. 1 1 5 O 7 E - 0 5 0.98827E 00 0. 1 1 3 7 2 Ε - Θ
N/O PATH CLOSED 0.33790Ε-Θ4 0. 9 5 9 9 7 E 00 0.32437E-04
Sl/1 Β1Θ/1 OUT Θ.34521Ε-Θ6 0.97676E 00 0.33718Ε-Θ
N/O PATH CLOSED 0. 1 3 6 9 9 Ε - Θ 4 0. 9 3 1 5 6 E 00 0.12761E-04
Sl/1 Ql/1 0.9863ΘΕ-07 0. 1 6 Θ Ο 0 Ε 02 0. 1 5 7 8 1 E - 0
OUT 0.18265E-05 0.60000Ε 01 0. 1 0 9 5 9 E - 0 4
S2/1 B7/1 0.34521Ε-0β 0.2O571E 02 0.71014E-O
OUT 0. 1 3 6 9 9 E - 0 4 0. 1 2 2 1 8 E 02 0.16737E-03
S2/1 Q2/1 0.9Θ63ΘΕ-07 0. 160O0E 02 0. 1 5 7 8 1 E - 0
OUT 0. 1 8 2 6 5 E - 0 5 0. 6 0 O O O E 01 0.10959E-O4
S2/1 B8/1 0.34521E-06 0.20571E 02 0.71014E-0
OUT 0. 1 3 6 9 9 Ε - Θ 4 0. 1 2 2 1 8 E 02 0.16737E-03
S2/1 Wl/1 θ.12842E-05 0. 1 9 2 0 0 E 01 0.24658E-0
OUT 0.44521Ε-Θ4 0. 5 4 9 1 IE 01 0.24447E-03
S2/1 Bl/1 0.39452E-06 O.240OOE 02 0.94685E-0
OUT 0. 1 3 6 9 9 Ε - Θ 4 0.12343E 02 0. 1 6 9 O 8 E - 0 3
S2/1 Tl/1 0. 1 1 5 0 7 E - 0 5 0.34286E 02 0.39452E-0
OUT 0.3379ΘΕ-04 0.23043E 02 0. 7 7 8 6 3 E - 0 3
S2/1 B2/1 0.34521E-06 0.2O571E 02 0.71014E-O
OUT 0. 1 3 6 9 9 E - 0 4 0. 1 2 2 1 8 E 02 0. 1 6 7 3 7 E - 0 3
U2/1 B7/1 0.39041E-O5 0. 1 8 9 4 7 E 01 0.73973E-0
OUT O.24658E-03 0. 4 2 6 5 7 E 01 0. 1 0 5 1 8 E - 0 2
U2/1 Q2/1 0.89O41E-06 0. 1 8 4 6 2 E 01 0. 1 6 4 3 8 E - 0
OUT 0. 1 3 6 9 9 E - 0 4 0.13333E 02 0. 1 8 2 6 5 E - 0 3
W2/1 B8/1 0.39041E-05 0. 18947E 01 0.73973E-0
OUT 0.24658E-03 0.42657E 01 0. 1 O 5 1 8 E - 0 2
CONTINUE?Y/N
CRASP-2 FRI, 03 JUN 1988 1

FIG. 2.27 List of nodal failure events

and Jacobian matrix J is partitioned Representation of transformer with off-load taps

A transformer having nominal tap setting is, for nodal
A Β aik = - a A P i / a O k bik = - V k - a A P i / d V k analysis purposes, represented as a simple lumped
J = impedance.
C D cik = - a A Q i / a O k dik = - V k - a A Q i / a v k
However, in power systems, transformer taps are
often set to an off-nominal value. This requires some
then it is sections A and D which strongly influence modification to the nodal analysis techniques pre­
the solution. If sections Β and C are approximated viously described.
to zero, there are now two separate equations: The vast majority of tappings used are in-phase, but
occasionally phase-shifting tappings are used. In-phase
ΔΡ = ΑΔΘ and AQ = DAV/V. tappings can be accommodated by simple changes in
This is known as decoupling. equivalent circuits. Phase-shifts are more difficult. The
admittance matrix Y is n o longer symmetrical and ma­
j o r changes must be m a d e to the analytical processes.
The fast-decoupled method has some advantages over
One method of accommodating off-nominal tappings
Newton-Raphson:
is to incorporate the off-nominal tap representation
• N o recalculation of the Jacobian matrix is necessary. directly into the admittance matrix. This is done as
follows.
• Speed is some 5 times greater.
Consider the general case of a transformer with an
• Higher initial convergence in most cases. arbitary complex t a p ratio a' + j b ' between two bus­
bars (or nodes) i and k (Fig 2.49 (a)).
One disadvantage is worse convergence close to the Replace this by an ideal transformer with nominal
solution. admittance Y i k , inverting the turns ratio for analytical

131
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

RELIABILITY INDICES FOR NODE S 3 /SUBSYSTEM NO. 1

FORCED FAILURE RATE

0.18189Ε-Θ1 (OUTAGES PER YEAR)
FORCED OUTAGE AVERAGE DURATION
Θ.88546Ε ΘΙ (HOURS)
FORCED OUTAGE TIME PER YEAR
0.161Θ6Ε ΘΘ (HOURS PER YEAR)

FAILURE RATE DUE TO MAINTENANCE O.67427E-02 (OUTAGES PER YEAR)

OUTAGE AVERAGE DURATION DUE TO MAINT. 0.94178E 91 (HOURS)

TOTAL OUTAGE TIME PER YEAR DUE TO MAINT. Ο.63502Ε-Θ1 (HOURS PER YEAR)

TOTAL FAILURE RATE O.24932E-01 (OUTAGES PER YEAR)

AVERAGE OUTAGE TIME 0.90069E 01 (HOURS)

TOTAL OUTAGE TIME PER YEAR 0.224S6E 00 (HOURS PER YEAR)

CONTRIBUTION TO THE ABOVE I N O I C E S ( U S I ΝG THE SAME DIMENSIONS)

DUE TO CUTS ELIMINATED BY DUE TO CUTS THAT MAY BE DUE TO ACTIVE FAILURES DUE TO ACTIVE FAILURES

A REPAIR ACTION ELIMINATED CLOSING A N/0 PATH 8 A STUCK BREAKER CONDITION

FFR - 0.313OOE-O2 FFR - G.17096E-04 FFR • 0.15G14E-01 FFR - 0.28O19E-04

ΓΟΑΟ - Θ.46645Ε 02 FOAO - 0.98221E 00 FOAD - 0.99997E 00 FOAD - 0.99998E 00
FOT/Y- 0.14600E 00 FOT/Y- 0.16792E-04 FOT/Y- 0.15O14E-01 FOT/Y- 0.28019E-04

MFR - 0.55G59E-02 MFR - 0.68584E-G3 MFR - 0.55023E-03 MFR - 0.76712E-06

MOAD - 0.11316E 02 MOAD · Θ.96769Ε 00 MOAD - 0.97245E 00 MOAD - 0.97103E 00
MOT/Y- 0.62303E-GI MOT/Y- 0.66368E-G3 MOT/Y- 0.53507E-03 MOT/Y- 0.74490E-0G

TFR - 0.8636GE-02 TFR • G.70294E-03 TFR - O.15564E-01 TFR - O.28787E-04

AOT - 0.24120E 02 AOT - 0.968G4E 00 AOT - 0.999OGE 00 AOT - 0.99921E 00
TOT/Y- 0.20830E GO TOT/Y- 0.68047E-03 TOT/Y- 0.15549E-G1 TOT/Y- 0.28764E-O4
CONTINUE?Y/N

FRI, 03 JUN 1988 1

FIG. 2.28 List of calculated busbar indices

convenience, Fig 2.49 (b). Suppose the transformer is on Equations (2.4) and (2.5) showing the general case,
nominal t a p . The ideal transformer is ehminated and can be compared with Equations (2.2) and (2.3) showing
the nodal equations for the network branch are: a transformer with nominal t a p setting.
Thus, in the case of a transformer with nominal tap
lik = Yik (Vi - Vk) setting, the nodal matrix is constructed by adding Yik
= Yik Vi - Yik Vk (2.2) to each diagonal term YÜ and Ykk, and inserting - Yik
in the off-diagonal terms Yik and Yki. Similarly, for
Iki = - Y i k (Vi - Vk)
the general case with off-nominal taps,
= - Y i k Vi + Yik Vk (2.3)
and lik = -Iki (a^ + b^) Yik is added to diagonal term YÜ
Yik is added to diagonal term Ykk
In the general case, let the voltage on the k side of the - (a - jb) Yik is inserted in off-diagonal term Yik
ideal transformer be Vt, a n d - (a + jb) Yik is inserted in off-diagonal term Yki

then Vt = (a + jb) Vi It can be seen here that, when b ^ 0, the nodal matrix
and Vilfk = -Vtlk*i is no longer symmetrical.
lik = - ( a - jb) Iki In most cases, the off-nominal taps are in phase (i.e.,
b = 0) and the simple π circuit shown in Fig 2.50 can
and Iki = Yik (Vk - Vt) be deduced from Equations (2.4) and (2.5).
A second approach to representing off-nominal
Eliminating Vt transformer taps is to ignore the off-nominal taps in
constructing the nodal matrix and to introduce their
lik = (a2 + b2) Yik Vi - (a - jb) Yik Vk (2.4) effects by modifying the nodal injected currents Ii
Iki = Yik Vk - (a + jb) Yik Vi (2.5) and Ik by amounts Ali and Δ Ik, as in Fig 2.51.

132
 P o w e r system p e r f o r m a n c e analysis

REDUCTION OF POWER DUE TO THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY SYSTEM

REDUCTION or POUER ASSOCIATED WITH EACH BUSBAR OR COMBINATION OF BUSBARS (DATA)

BUSBAR(S> REDUCTION
Sl/l 1ΘΘ.8/
S2/1 88. 8/
S3/1 58.8/
S4/1 38. 8/
S2/1 S3/1 188.9/
S2/1 S4/1 89.9/
S3/1 S4/1 69.9/

OUTPUT CAPACITY OF SY STEM - 669.99MW

IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE:

THE FIRST NUMBER INDICATES ONE NODE AT WHICH THE CUT OCCURS

THE SECOND NUMBER MAY BE:

-1 D E F I N I N G A CUT WHERE EVERY COMPONENT IS OUT
-2 D E F I N I N G A CUT WHERE EVERY COMPONENT IS OUT
B U T T H E C U T MAY B E ELIMINATED CLOSING
A N/0 PATH
-3 D E F I N I N G A CUT WHERE ITS FIRST COMPONENT IS
ACTIVELY F A I L E D AND EVERY OTHER IS OUT
BN D E F I N I N G A C U T W H E R E B R E A K E R BN IS S T U C K , THE
FIRST C O M P O N E N T IS ACTIVELY FAILED AND THE
O T H E R S ARE O U T

CUT 0.RATE<0/YEAR> AV.DUR<HOURS) T.0.TIME<H/YEAR) POWER REDUCTION(/)

S l / l Sl/l Θ.39Θ9ΘΕ-92 9.48999E 92 9. 1 4 4 9 Θ Ε 99 189

S í / l -] H2/1 Wl/l 9.51627E-93 9.18796E 91 9.96575E-93 188
S l / l -1 W2/1 Bl/l G.25171E-93 8.456Θ4Ε 91 0. 1 1 4 7 9 E - 9 2 199
Sl/1 _] W2/1 Tl/l 9.7θ5β2Ε-θ3 Θ.40867Ε 91 9.28845Ε-Θ2 188
Sl/1 _] W2/1 B2/1 Θ.25948Ε-Θ3 9.422Θ8Ε 81 9. 1 9 5 9 2 Ε - Θ 2 199
S l / l _; B5/1 Wl/1 8.2594ΘΕ-Θ3 9.42288E 91 0. 1 0 5 9 2 Ε - Θ 2 189
Sl/1 -1 Rl/l Wl/1 9.7Θ582Ε-93 0.4ΘΘ67Ε 91 0.28845E-02 100
S l / l -: B6/1 Wl/l 0.25948Ε-Θ3 9.4228ΘΕ 91 9. 1 0 5 9 2 E - 8 2 199
Sl/l B5/1 Bl/l 0.67134E-94 9.1531ΘΕ 92 0. 1 0 2 7 9 Ε - Θ 2 109
Sl/l B5/1 T l / l 9. 1 5 7 7 9 E - 9 3 9.22710E 02 0.35814E-92 100
Sl/l _ 85/1 82/1 0.6β937Ε-04 0.14464E 02 0.9e815E-03 100
S l / l R l / l Bl/l 0. 1 5 8 0 3 E - 0 3 0.25908E 02 0.4O942E-02 100
S l / l _ Rl/l T l / l 0.33973E-03 0.45484E 92 0. 1 5 4 5 2 E - 0 1 100
Sl/l - R l / l 82/1 0. 15770E-03 0. 22710E 02 0.35814E-02 100
CONTINUE?"! / N
GRASP-2 FRI, 03 JUN 1988 I

FIG. 2.29 List of system failure events

ENCOUNTER RATE AND DURATION OF THE DERATED STATES

0.RATE<0/YEAR) AV.DUR<HOURS) T.O. T I M E < H / Y E A R ) POWER REDUCTION</)

8.64849Ε-Θ1 0.11922E 92 9.7147βΕ 89 199

9.79362E-92 9.11274E 91 9.Θ4962Ε-92 89
9.57299E-92 9.9952ΘΕ 90 9.56935E-92 59
Θ.22663Ε-94 9.12979E 92 9.27353E-93 69
0.119ΘΘΕ-93 9.96141E 99 0.11517E-93

* EXPECTED LOSS OF ENERGY DUE TO THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE STATION ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT •

* *
* 478.253 MWHR *
C0NTINUE7Y/N

GRASP-2 FRI, 03 JUN 198

FIG. 2.30 List of system indices

133
Electrical system analysis
NETWORK DRAWING AND MODIFYING
B27 R2 Β2Θ
FIG. 2.31 Station electrical system network used for evaluating busbar indices for future nuclear power stations
In this approach, Al\ and Δ Ι ^ have to be recalcu­
lated at each iteration, but the nodal matrix is easier
to formulate and remains symmetrical, even in the case
of out-of-phase taps, because it contains n o turns-ratio
terms.
Representation of transformers with on-load
tapchangers
On-load tapchangers are provided to regulate voltage
or, sometimes, reactive power flow.
When used for voltage regulation, it is usual for
the voltage at the lower voltage side of a transformer
to be monitored and compared with a reference or
target setting. A n error signal is then used to acti­
vate a change in the transformer tap position to re­
store the monitored voltage to the reference setting.
Because tappings are discrete steps, it is not possible
to match the reference setting exactly, so a tolerance
is applied to the reference setting. For example, if
tappings are in 2% steps, a tolerance of ±1% is used
and no automatic tap change takes place if the re­
134
Chapter 2
ROUTINE ΖΙΘ b25 Z U
" " 8
B23 Rl B24
,<22> I
CRASP-2 TUE, 13 DEC 1988 1
ference voltage is within the range 9 9 % to 1 0 1 % of its
setting.
T o represent on-load tapchanging transformers with­
in the load flow solution program, it is necessary to
provide logic to compare target voltage with calcu­
lated voltage, then to alter t a p position to correct the
voltage. It is also necessary to check that the trans­
former tapping range is not violated during this process.
This can be done between iterations until the solution
converges.
Practical experience has shown it is best to leave tap
adjustments until towards the end of the solution pro­
cess. During early iterations, voltage levels can oscil­
late and vary considerably. T a p changing at this stage
does not speed convergence, especially with slowly con­
verging algorithms, such as Gauss-Seidel. Because the
Gauss-Seidel algorithm converges slowly, intuitively it
suggests that tap changes should also be made small.
A n algorithm of the form anew = aoid ± α ( V f ^ -
V f ) can be used, where a is a small constant, typi­
cally 0.05 and aoid is the transformer turns ratio at
iteration p .
 Power system performance analysis

R E L I A B I L I T Y ANflLYSIS-PWR LOSP - BASE CASE

A V E R A G E OUTAGE T I M E ( H )

S2 S4
.Θ.1ΘΘΕ Θ2 1ΘΘΕ Θ2

Τ Τ

11 ^ S14
^ η Θ . 7 9 4 Ε Θ1 794E Θ1 ^ Θ . 794Ε Θ1

IΘ.134E ei

CRnSP-2 TUE. 13 DEC 1988 1

FIG. 2 . 3 2 Reliability analysis of average outage duration ( A O D ) for case (a)

In the Newton-Raphson method, convergence is
rapid at later stages and a higher value of α can be
used, or a different algorithm. When calculated from
the above expression, a n e w requires adjusting to match
the nearest discrete t a p , and needs checking to ensure
that the tapping range is not violated.
Representation of reactive power limitation on
synchronous plant
Generators have defined M V A r output hmits for a
given M W output. The upper limit is imposed by heat
dissipation or exciter capability and the lower limit
by stability considerations. A synchronous compensator
has maximum and minimum VAr output ratings.
When a generator or group of generators is set
to control voltage at a busbar during a load flow
solution, the busbar is designated a P V busbar. A check
is made during the solution that the VAr output Umits
of the plant have not been violated. If the Umits are
exceeded, the busbar is redesignated as a P Q busbar
and the generating plant VAr output is fixed at its
limit of operation. The solution then continues until
convergence at a feasible result is reached.
Experience shows that checking of VAr output being
outside the designated range is best left until rough
convergence is reached.
General analytical considerations
There are many methods of solving a set of simul­
taneous linear differential equations by numerical meth­
ods (Reference [7] is recommended to the reader who
wishes to pursue this topic). The efficiency of these
methods varies and a method which may be acceptable
in solving one type of problem may be inefficient in
solving a different type.
The physical structure of the problem is very im­
p o r t a n t . The set of equations describing an electrical
power system network produces an admittance matrix
which is highly sparse. Typically, the matrix associated
with a network having 100 nodes will have about 3 %
of its coefficients non-zero. T o process the other 9 7 %
is very inefficient and a method which only stores.

135
Electrical system analysis
RELIABILITY fiNfiLYSIS-PWR LOSP - BASE
FAILURE RATE(F/YR)
FIG. 2.33 Reliability analysis of failure rate ( F R ) for case (a)
identifies and processes the non-zero terms has clear
advantages.
Use is also made of methods of transforming an
original set of data into a set of related equations
which may be easier to solve. Triangular decomposition
of matrices — the coefficient matrix is factorised
into a set of upper and lower triangular matrices —
can speed the solution process and is used in many
programs (Reference [8] provides an introduction to
matrix manipulation). Ordered elimination — to keep
calculation processes to near minimum — is also used
extensively, and advantage is taken of the symmetry
of the coefficient matrix. Reference [9] provides further
reading on power system modelling.
3.1.3 Use of programs
Typical electrical auxiliary supply systems
Figure 2.52 shows an analysis diagram of the SES
in an oil-fired power station and Fig 2.53 shows an
136
Chapter 2
CASE
ri5
Θ. 1 4 2 E ΘΘ
CRASP-2 TUE, 13 DEC 1988 1
analysis diagram of the SES in an advanced gas-cooled
reactor nuclear power station.
Unless there are differences between generating units
and their respective electrical auxiliary systems within
a power station, it is sufficient to represent one Unit
with its supply systems.
The diagram is drawn by the analyst onto a com­
puter terminal screen. T o avoid unnecessary detail and
to limit the size of the diagram, the analyst decides
what plant he wants to represent prior to drawing the
network. He will include any plant which has a signi­
ficant effect on system performance; for example, he
will represent all 11 kV m o t o r drives as separate m o t o r s ,
but only represent a limited number of 415 V motor
drives as separate motors. The remainder will be lumped
together for analysis purposes.
A convenient starting point in drawing the analysis
diagram is the high voltage busbar to which the power
station is connected. In Fig 2.52 this busbar is named
'400 k V . Later, it will be nominated as the 'slack'
busbar. A 'reference' or 'source' generator is then drawn

RELIABILITY ñNALYSIS-PWH LOSP - ΰΤ ON EACH 11 KV STN BD
AVERAGE OUTAGE TIME(H)
FIG. 2 . 3 4 Reliability analysis of average outage duration (AOD) for case (b)
connected to this busbar. This nominal generator, for
present purposes, represents a tie to the grid system
to be used as a power source or power sink.
The power station system voltages are 11 kV, 3.3 kV
and 415 V in both examples (Figs 2.52 and 2.53). The
choice of voltages is based on engineering needs,
economic grounds and consideration of the hardware
available at the time of ordering plant.
Design operating limits
The normal voltage operating range of the 400 kV
supergrid is 0.95 per-unit (380 kV) to 1.05 per-unit
(420 kV), with a short term (15 minutes) upper limit
of 1.10 per-unit (440 kV). The normal voltage op­
erating range of the 132 kV grid is 0.90 per-unit
(119 kV) to 1.10 per-unit (145 kV). Frequency, nomi­
nally 50 Hz, is normally regulated between 49.9 Hz
and 50.1 H z . System faults may give rise to varia­
tion between 49.5 Hz and 51 Hz, with exceptional
variation between 47 Hz and 52 Hz for a period not
exceeding 15 minutes. System faults can also lead to
Power system performance analysis
GRnSP-2 TUE, 13 DEC 1988 1
step changes in vohage of 6 % at 132 kV grid supply
points.
A station electrical system is normally designed to have
an upper voltage hmit of 1.06 per-unit and a lower volt­
age hmit of 0.94 per-unit during steady state operation.
When a m o t o r starts, the transient voltage dip at
the m o t o r terminals should not fall to less than 0.80
per-unit and the remainder of the electrical system
must remain stable and recover from the transient dip
in voltage.
The station electrical systems are designed to with­
stand the effects of electrical faults, internal and exter­
nal. The worst credible disturbance normally considered
is that produced by a transient fault having a clearance
time of 0.2 second.
Except for some special applications, such as P W R
power station essential systems, the motors are speci­
fied to run at any load within rating over the voUage
range 0.94 per-unit to 1.06 per-unit, to operate for
five minutes at 0.75 per-unit voltage and be capable
of running u p to speed from a transient starting volt­
age dip as low as 0.80 per-unit.
137
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

RELIABILITY ANftLYSIS-PWR LOSP - GT ON EACH l i KV STN BO

FAILURE RñTE(F/YR)-

9
θ.75ΘΕ-Θ1

<S) ® Φ

^ Θ . 1Θ6Ε ΘΘ ^

se
θ . 142Ε ΘΘ

CRnSP-2 TUE, 13 DEC 1988 1

FIG. 2.35 Reliability analysis of failure rate (FR) for case (b)

All other A C electrical and electronic equipment • Unit post-trip.

must be capable of operating continuously under such
actual steady state and transient service conditions
without malfunctioning or suffering damage.
Design operation mode — transformer outages
The SES is designed to permit any one transformer
except the generator transformer to be out of service,
yet maintaining full station output within voltage design
operating limits.
Load flow analysis of the power station
system
Having set the voltage limits in which the SES is to
operate, the system is examined in its normal steady
state operating modes, and during the transition
between modes. These modes are:
• Unit shut down.
• Unit generating its rated output at any power factor
between maximum rated lag and maximum rated lead.
The system is also examined with designed plant out­
ages.
The effects of starting large motors are important
and strongly influence the design of the system. The
large starting current drawn by an induction motor
when it is switched on, causes a sharp reduction in
voltage at its terminals and at its supplying board. The
vohage continues to fall for a short period as other
m o t o r s , fed from the same supply, draw more current
electrical to maintain their outputs at the reduced voltage. The
switched-in m o t o r must run u p successfully; this means
the electrical torque produced must always exceed the
mechanical torque of the drive. It is particularly im­
portant in nuclear stations that some specific motors
must (also) run up within a specified time after a re­
actor trip. The other motors subject to the lowered
vohage must be able to remain stable and maintain
their outputs until the switched-in motors run u p and
the vohage rises.

138

RELIñBILITY fiNfiLYSIS-PMR LOSP - GT
fiVERñGE OUTAGE T I M E ( H )
FiG. 2.36 Reliability analysis of average outage duration (AOD) for case (c)
The magnitude of the voltage drop is a function
of the current taken at the supplying b o a r d , and the
impedance between that b o a r d and its effective supply
source. Table 2.18 shows typical impedances and other
data of transformers feeding and within a SES. C o l u m n
5 of Table 2.18 shows that the transformer closest
to any motor drive being considered, has a much higher
impedance than that of the (larger) transformers nearer
to the effective supply source. It follows that the
impedance of this transformer strongly influences the
voltage drop at the m o t o r terminals, and must be
chosen with this in mind.
Optimisation of transformer off-load tapchanger
positions
Once a transformer tap is set to a specific position, the
voltage range at the transformer LV terminals is deter-
mined by:
• The voltage at the transformer HV terminals.
• The transformer impedance.
Power system performance analysis
ON E ñ C H 11 KV STN & UNIT Β
CRASP-2 TUE, 13 DEC 1988 1
• The load on the transformer.
It follows that, where 11 k V / 3 . 3 kV transformers have
off-load tapchangers a n d 3.3 kV/415 V transformers
also have off-load tapchangers, the voltages at the 415 V
boards of the SES are operationally determined by:
• The voltages at the 11 kV b o a r d s .
• The loads on the transformers between the 11 kV,
3.3 kV and 415 V b o a r d s .
W h e n a power station is shut d o w n , the load on the
SES is usually at its m i n i m u m . This provides a con-
venient starting point in deciding which t a p positions
tap
to adopt on transformers with off-load tapchanging
arrangements. The system is modelled with its elec-
trical load at m i n i m u m value, and 11 kV b o a r d s ' volt-
ages set to nominal value (1.00 per-unit). The off-
load taps of the transformers are then set, within the
model, such that the 415 V (and 3.3 kV) b o a r d volt-
ages are close t o , but d o not exceed, the maximum
permitted voltage (usually 1.06 per-unit).
139
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

R E L I A B I L I T Y ANALYSIS-PWR LOSP - GT ON EACH 1 1 KV STN & UNIT Β

FAILURE RATE(F/YR) 7^-^ 7^

GRASP-2 TUE, 13 DEC 1988 1

FIG. 2.37 Reliability analysis of failure rate (FR) for case (c)

Using these off-load tap settings, the system is then
modelled at its predicted maximum load condition.
Any permitted outage, or combination of outages, is
also modelled and the supply system voltage must
remain within the permitted voltage range under steady
state and transient (motor start or fault) condkions.
The steady state and transient voltage conditions must
both be attainable with the voltages at the 11 kV boards
set to nominal value (1.00 per-unit).
If it is shown that the system is inadequate to sup­
ply plant within design criteria, then it is necessary to
identify the cause and correct this by changing system
and plant parameters.
Analysis of a SES will identify the relative strengths
and weaknesses of the system.
Figures 2.54 and 2.55 show vohage profiles of an
oil-fired power station electrical system at minimum
and maximum loads, without plant outages.
Loss of grid supplies
It is essential to maintain cooling supphes to nuclear
power station reactors. Supplies to motors providing
reactor cooling are normally derived from the grid
system. In the event of grid failure, gas turbines or
diesel generators provide power for these motors. Ana­
lysis is performed to demonstrate that a SES functions
correctly in this isolated m o d e . A small, isolated sys­
tem like this does not have the built in inertia of the
grid system. This is not important in load flow studies
but is a very important consideration in transient
stability analysis.
Figure 2.56 shows a network voltage profile with a
3.3 kV diesel generator supplying an isolated part of an
electrical supply system.
Reactor and turbine start sequence — voltage profile
studies
Figures 2.57 to 2.64 show a series of load flow/voltage
profile studies for an A G R nuclear power station si­
mulating a reactor and turbine start sequence.
On the network diagram, only one reactor unit is
represented. ΒI is a 400 kV busbar and B3 a 132 kV

140
 Power system performance analysis

TABLE 2.16
Summary of results for busbar indices and failure rates

Average FR Average O T 0 - 2 hour FR

(failures/year) (hours)

Basic system — no additional 11 kV standby generators

11 kV Unit board 0.101 7.94 0.095
11 kV Station board 0.101 7.94 0.095
3.3 kV Essential board 2 0.142 1.34 0.139
3.3 kV Essential board 1 0.142 1.34 0.142

System with additional standby generators on each 11 kV Station board

11 kV Unit board 0.101 6.19 0.095
11 kV Station board 0.106 5.88 0.101
3.3 kV Essential board 2 0.142 1.22 0.139
3.3 kV Essential board 1 0.147 1.18 0.144

System with additional standby generators on each 11 kV Station and Unit board
11 kV Unit board 0.106 5.88 0.101
11 kV Station 0.106 5.88 0.101
3.3 kV Essential board 2 0.147 1.18 0.144
3.3 kV Essential board 1 0.147 1.18 0.144

busbar. The main generator U is connected to B4 (23.5
kV). B5A, B5B, B5C and B5D are 11 kV b o a r d s . B6*
are 3.3 kV boards and B7* are 415 V boards (where *
represents alphanumeric symbol(s)). The 132 k V / 1 1
kV/11 kV station transformer is a three-winding
transformer. This is represented by three separate
transformers connected to a c o m m o n point, shown as
3W on the diagram.
Figure 2.57 shows the turbine and reactor off-load.
Figure 2.58 shows load flows and voltage profiles at
the next stage in the start sequence. The generator is
off-load and the gas circulators at 5 6 % of their full
load power (corresponding to 7 5 % gas flow in the
reactor). All the remaining loads, except the standby
feed pumps, are assumed to be running at the generator
continuous maximum rating (CMR) condition.
The next study, shown in Fig 2.59, illustrates the
11 kV starting/standby feed p u m p on the station b o a r d
(B5A) being started. In these load flow studies, the
standby feed p u m p is represented by a shunt. The shunt
impedance is set equal to the effective impedance of
the motor at its start. The voltage profile shown is
the lowest during the motor run-up; the increased
current drawn by other motors is taken into account
during the load flow algorithm solution. This study
also identifies any induction motor instability — the
load flow algorithm solution will not converge if the
mechanical torque required by a motor drive exceeds
the electrical torque available.
In practice, the results given by this study would be
considered satisfactory. Voltage at the board where
the motor is being started is 0.867 per-unit, the lowest
voltage at any other b o a r d is 0.876 per-unit and the
highest at any b o a r d is 1.034 per-unit.
The next study in the sequence. Fig 2.60, shows the
starting/standby feed p u m p u p to speed and running
at full load. The minimum voltage at any board is
0.975 per-unit. Physically, the next event in bringing
the generator and reactor to power is to synchronise
and load the generator, and increase the gas circulator
loads to full power. T h e next study in the start se­
quence, shown in Fig 2 . 6 1 , shows the main generator
in service delivering 264 M W (40% of its 660 M W full
load rating). The voltage profile is satisfactory. Figure
2.62 shows the 11 kV starting/standby feed p u m p on
the unit b o a r d (B5C) being started and Fig 2.63 shows
this p u m p u p to speed and running at full load.
Figure 2.64 is the last in this sequence of studies.
It shows the voltage profile and load flows with the
unit at C M R delivering m a x i m u m lagging VAr, gas
circulators at full power rating and the turbine boiler
feed p u m p running instead of the station and unit
starting/standby electric boiler feed p u m p s .
Similar sequences of studies are performed with
plant outages, e.g., a station transformer outage, to
show that the system functions correctly under outage
conditions.
Network drawing and data entry
M o d e r n analysis programs are interactive in design
and allow the user to represent power system network
diagrams on a screen. Mnemonic codes are available
to draw and modify network diagrams. Examples are:

141
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2
A
cd
O
Τ3
cd
00
en
6
142
 Power system performance analysis

NETWORK DRAWING AND MODIFYING ROUTINE

<SÜBSYSTEM NO. 1 > c . τ.7 z.a

<l9)v f <4)

Θ11

<24>v

I$5
B9

% SIB

Í21 \ B22 βζ^ B24 yé2 627 \ B2B

<26>X <27>v <28>vk9> >t29>vL <3Θ> J<ie)^l31>vL <32)X <33>v

<^ /r\ /v\ /TS

Τ 2 , 7 6W vyzs Z9
^4 \ \
Ν it?
Μ ^1

CRhSP-3B MON, Θ6 JUN 1988 10:53:37

FIG. 2.39 Network diagram for radial subsystem 1

Β draws a busbar at the cursor position. permit detailed selection of the further options existing
within that sub-menu.
G draws a generator at cursor location and connects
A n initial menu, giving the main options, may be:
it to the last drawn busbar.
• Construct a new network.
C draws a circuit from the last drawn busbar to the
cursor position. • Retrieve a network from file.
• File the present network.
Τ draws a circuit, which includes an in-hne trans­
former symbol, from the last drawn busbar t o • Modify the present network diagram.
the cursor position.
• Edit the present network data.
• L o a d flow calculation.
The diagram may be recentred or rescaled. Codes are
available to delete unwanted network items, move • Fault level calculation.
network hems to new locations, name busbars, and to • Transient stabihty calculation.
erase the screen and redraw the diagram.
• Controller design facihty.
Figure 2.65 shows an example of a SES drawn in
this way. The drawing is of an isolated system consisting • Exit from the p r o g r a m .
of an auxiliary generator supplying six gas circulators.
Programs are structured through a series of menus Options are selected by positioning the horizontal
which list the options open to the user at each stage cursor of the computer terminal screen over the option
of the analysis. The initial menu displays the b r o a d required a n d pressing any key; alternatively, a mne­
options available; sub-menus are then offered which monic code may be used.

143
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

NETWORK D R f i M I N G fiND MODIFYING ROUTINE

<SUBSYSTEM NO. 2>
Ul U4 W2

Φ Φ
*1 <26>

Bl

o
11 ^

S3
•

B4

Z3 Z6 Ζ12
\ \ Μ Μκ Μκ \
\ SM

CRnSP-3B HON, 06 JUN 1 9 8 8 10:55:45

FIG. 2.40 Network diagram for radial subsystem 2

When the program user has drawn (and filed) the the program calculates the m o t o r VAr requirement. The
electrical system to be analysed, data is then entered value calculated in this way is voltage dependent and
to define each component. This is done either by therefore may provide a more accurate solution than
copying data from an existing data bank, or by direct that obtained by using static load representation.
specifications. A n even more accurate prediction of system per­
formance can be made once plant is manufactured,
Data requirements when test or measured values of plant parameters be­
come available. Comprehensive data sets can be entered
An analyst may wish to make a preliminary assessment into programs.
of an electrical system without having full detailed T o achieve greater accuracy in calculation, additional
information about component circuits and connected data can be processed by programs. The complete hst
plant. Programs are flexible enough to allow this. Basic of data which can be used is as follows:
data requirements for load flow analysis were given
earlier in the section headed Simplified system repre­ Busbar data
sentation data requirements and outputs. These, with Busbar load, M W
transformer tapping information, are sufficient for Busbar load, MVAr
prehminary load flow calculations. Circuit data
Induction motor loads may be represented as part Positive sequence resistance
of the net active and net reactive load at busbars. An Positive sequence reactance
alternative, sometimes better, representation uses the Positive sequence shunt susceptance
equivalent circuit parameters of the induction motors Rating (used to flag overload conditions)
if these are available. For a given motor and M W load. Circuit state (in or out of service)

144
 Power system performance analysis

NETWORK D R A W I N G AND M O D I F Y I N G R O U T I N E
<SUBSYSTEM NO. 1> „ η Z2

S22
, PIO
CRASP-3B
^ ^ ^ ^
MON, 98i 10:§|¿35

FIG. 2.41 Network diagram for interconnected subsystem 1

Transformer data Induction m o t o r data

Initial tap position Mechanical power output
Minimum tap position Friction and windage losses
Maximum tap position Magnetising reactance
Tapchanger increment Stator resistance — start (cold)
Target voltage (at sending or receiving busbar) Stator reactance — start (cold)
Rating Stator resistance — run (hot)
Voltage monitoring relay bandwidth Stator reactance — run (hot)
Change of reactance with tap position Rotor resistance — start
Compensating resistance Rotor reactance — start
Compensating reactance Rotor resistance — run
Rotor reactance — run
Generator data
Rotor inner cage resistance and reactance
Machine busbar voltage magnitude
Rotor outer cage resistance and reactance
Generated power, M W
Status (indicates whether machine is included in
Generated reactive power, M V A r
studies)
Status (indicates whether machine is included in
studies) Load torque/speed characteristic
M o t o r contactor drop-off voltage
Automatic voltage regulator (AVR) data Underspeed trip setting
Not required

Governor and turbine data There are several ways of entering the above data,
Not required depending on the analysis program being used. Values

145
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

NETWORK D R A W I N G AND M O D I F Y I N G ROUTINE

<SUBSYSTEM NO. 2 >
uie
H16 WIS U17

Φ Φ φ

)
BSS

Τ: Β3

Τ. Φ Ρ . , ΊΤΊΦ
Ρ14
13 14 15

6 Β24 Β26
Ó ó ο ο
Β5

86

Ι2? \ 831 33 \ Β35

<2β>ν^ <^^^Λ^ <28>ν^ ^ ^ ' ^ Χ <3Θ>.^ <31
Η 1 $ Τ 4 H2JLT5 Wsí Τ6 Μ 4 Χ 17 H S Í T B W6

Φ..Μ Φ ρ β Φ ρ β φ

Birh

CRASP-3B Μ Ο Ν , BS JUN 1988 11:08:47

FIG. 2.42 Network diagram for interconnected subsystem 2

INTERCONNECTORS DRAWING AND M O D I F Y I N G ROUTINE

-X-
^ S U B l ^

-X-
< 3 -
SUBl

<
PRESS"?-FOR INTERCONNECTORS LIST CRASP-3B MON« 06 JUN 1988 11:02:11

FIG. 2.43 Subsystem interconnectors

146
 Power system performance analysis

TABLE 2.17 • Nominated slack busbar.

Correlation between computer generated busbar numbering
and individual system board names • Maximum number of iterations in load flow solution
algorithm.
Symbol System component • Reference machine busbar n a m e .
• Reference machine identifier.
Subsystem 1
SI 400 kV busbar • Printout option details.
S2,3 11 kV Unit boards l A l , IBl
84,7 11 kV FGD boards lA, IB Examples of data entry are given in Figs 2.66 to 2.69.
S5,6 11 kV Fan boards lA, IB
S8,ll 3.3 kV FGD auxiliaries boards lA, IB Transformer data entry
89,10 3.3 kV Mill auxiliaries boards lA, IB
Transformers in power systems usually have variable
812,23 415V FGD services boards lA, IB
tappings, with the tapchange mechanism being de­
813,22 415V Precipitator boards lA, IB
signed for on-load or off-load operation. On distribu­
814,21 415V Turbine boards lA, IB
tion transformers in station electrical systems, off-load
815,20 415V Fan services boards lA, IB tapchangers are specified where the load does not vary
816,19 415V Mill services boards lA, IB sufficiently to cause unacceptable voltage regulation.
817,18 415V Boiler auxiliaries boards lA, IB On-load tapchangers are specified when design studies
show that these are necessary to maintain system volt­
Subsystem 2
age within design Hmits. On-load tapchanging is ini­
81,2 11 kV Station boards lA, IB tiated by an automatic voltage regulator or by operator
83 3.3 kV Coal plant auxiliaries board 1 action.
84 415V Bunker board 1 Generator transformers have on-load tapchangers
85 415 V Coal plant services board 1 which are normally manually controlled. T h e generator
86 3.3 kV Ash and Dust plant auxiliary board 1 A V R is usually in service and set to keep generator
87 415 V Ash plant services board 1 terminal voltage at (or near to) 1.00 per-unit by ad­
88 415V Dust plant services board 1 justing the generator VAr o u t p u t . Supergrid or grid
89 3.3 kV Station auxiliary board 1 voltage is then regulated by varying the generator trans­
810 415 V General services board 1 former tapping manually.
811 415 V Lighting and small power board 1 In analysis programs transformer resistance and
812 415V Transmission services board 1 reactance are usually entered in the associated ^circuit
813 415V CW pump board 1 data'. In practice, transformer reactance may vary over
814 415V Administration Block board 1 the tapping range; the variation can be linear; or it
815 415V Water Treatment board 1 may fall to a minimum, then rise; or rise to a maximum,
816 415V Deaerator Heater board 1 then fall. The variation is determined by the winding
817 415V Oil Pump board 1 configuration. Linear variations of reactance with tap
position can be entered in analysis programs. Facilities
General
are not available at present for other variations, so
W Energy Source (Grid, Supergrid or Station the analyst must decide the best data to use. Where a
Train 2) transformer operates with a fixed tapping (off-load
Ρ Normally-open circuit-breaker operation or n o tapchange available), this tapping ratio
Β Normally-closed circuit-breaker is entered into the transformer data. When on-load
Q Interconnecting cable tapping facilities are used, it is necessary to enter the
τ Transformer m a x i m u m , minimum and starting t a p settings and the
ζ Isolator t a p step. The target voltage is entered, and whether it
is the voltage at the sending busbar or receiving busbar
that is to be controlled. Taps are assumed to be at the
of resistance and reactance may be entered as per-unit sending end of the transformer. Automatic voltage
values or per-cent values, based on machine rating regulator relay bandwidth may be specified, as can any
or referred to a standard base (usually 100 M V A ) . resistance and reactance compensator. Compensating
Sometimes the facility exists to enter these values as resistance and compensating reactance are not applied
ohms. Voltages are usually entered as per-cent or per- in power station networks but are often used in distri­
unit, occasionally as volts. bution networks.
In addition to the plant data listed earlier, other
information is required to control program runs. This Power station/grid system interface
includes:
A station electrical system is normally connected to the
Loadflow convergence accuracy. grid a n d / o r the supergrid. The interface, for analysis

147
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

CFSRD RAOIftL SYSTEM 2H ST - MPSP

ENCOUNTER RATE AND DURATION OF THE DERATED STATES

0. R A T E < 0 / ' Y E A R >

AV.OUR(HOURS> Τ.0.TIME<H/YEAR> POUER REOUCTION<X>

Θ.26ΘΘΘΕ ΘΘ Θ.91491Ε Θ2 0.24S09E 02

Θ.326ΘΘΕ ΘΘ Θ.454Θ5Ε Θ2 0.14828E 02

• EXPECTED LOSS OF ENERGY DUE TO THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE STATION ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT

* 28730.465 NUHR

0NTINUE?Y/'N

CRASP-3B TUE, 13 DEC 1988 14:18:28

FIG. 2.44 Radial system indices

purposes, is at the H V connections of the generator The frequency of the whole of the SES is, of course,
transformer and at the HV connections of the station the same as the grid frequency, neglecting transient
transformer. effects.
Variations of vohage and frequency on the grid It foUows from the above that the performance of
system are transmitted to the power station electrical the grid system is a major influence on the perform­
systems. ance of a station electrical system. Adverse voltage re­
Station transformer fed supplies are not protected gulation due to grid and internal causes can be additive
from step or rapid changes in vohage on the grid and influence the choice between installing transformers
system, and their voltage profile closely follows that of having on-load tapchangers and transformers having
the grid. In the longer term, the station transformer tap off-load tapchangers within the station electrical system.
setting is adjusted manually to regulate the voltage of The SESs are therefore examined with supergrid
the systems supphed from it. and grid vohages set to their extremes. This ensures
Supply systems derived from the Unit transformer that the tapping ranges on station and generator trans­
are shielded from short term grid voltage variations formers are adequate.
by the action of the generator AVR, which adjusts
the generator VAr output to maintain generator ter­
minal voltage at an almost constant value, provided 3.2 Fault level analysis
that upper and lower VAr output hmits are not ex­
ceeded. In the longer term, the generator transformer 3.2.1 Introduction
tap setting may be adjusted to match the generator
output to the supergrid/grid voltage, or to contribute In the event of a fault occurring on a power station
to regulating supergrid/grid voltage. electrical system, energy wiU be released at the point

148
 Power system performance analysis

CFSRD IMTERCONMECTED SYSTEM 2H ST -MPSP

ENCOUNTER RATE AMD DURATION OF THE DERATED STATES

O.RATE<0/YEAR) AV.DUR<HOURS) Τ.0.TIME<H/YEAR> POWER REDUCTION<X>

Θ.27ΘΘΘΕ 00 Θ.6Θ46ΘΕ Θ1 Θ.ΙβθΟβΕ 01 100

Θ.366ΘΘΕ 00 Θ.12Θ9ΘΕ 02 Θ.442Θ0Ε 01 50

• EXPECTED LOSS OF ENERGY DUE TO THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE STATION ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT ·
• Φ
• 9505.313 MWHR *

:0NTINUE7Y/N

CRASP-3B TUE, 13 DEC 19ΘΘ 14:59:37

FIG. 2.45 Interconnected system indices

I = YE

IS IS

EQUIVALENT EQUIVALENT
TO TO
I = Y (E - V)

////////// /////////
(A) (b) (c)

I = -EY L = +EY

IS
1 EQUIVALENT Η 2
1
TO I = I -EY

77777 77777^ / 7 7 7 7 7
(D) (E)

FIG. 2.46 Replacement of a voltage source by an equivalent current source

149
Electrical system analysis
GENERATOR A GENERATOR Β
Θ
LINE A-B LINE B-C
BUS A BUS Β
LOADA LOAD Β
Y1
Y4 Y5
FIG. 2.47 A simple power system and equivalent network diagram developed for use in nodal analysis
of the fauh. Currents greatly in excess of normal
may flow and considerable damage result. Synchro­
nous machines and induction machines possess kinetic
energy and magnetic field energy, and so contribute
to the fauh current. Both types of machine supply
a current which decreases with time. The induction
machine current decays to a small value comparatively
quickly, because it has no D C supplied field winding.
A synchronous machine fault current decreases to a
steady state value in roughly 0 . 5 - 1 . 5 s. The steady
state value may be about 0.6 χ full-load rating of
the machine. Precise values of decay time, initial fault
current and final fault current depend on the design
of the particular machine. Figure 2.70 shows how the
fault current of a synchronous machine varies with
time.
It is essential to detect faults and to isolate faulty
equipment, so protection schemes are designed to detect
abnormal conditions in the shortest possible time and
initiate operation of switchgear to electrically isolate
the fauky equipment. The speed of disconnection is
important since the extent of damage also depends on
the time for which fault current flows. Furthermore,
fast fault clearance makes system recovery easier.
All switchgear has specified fault current make and
break ratings. Electrical supply systems are designed
such that the prospective fault current resulting from
150
Chapter 2
GENERATOR D
LINE C-D
BUSC BUSD
LOADD
(a)
Y2 Υ3
Y6
(b)
any postulated fault does not exceed the capability of
the circuit-breaker which must clear that fault.
Power station electrical systems are so designed that
the fault levels are often well below permitted maxi­
m u m s during normal operating modes. Higher fault
levels occur when paralleling two normally separate
paths, possibly to take plant out of service or, more
often, when running up and shutting down main gen­
erating plant. Higher fault levels also occur when aux­
iliary gas turbines or diesel-driven generators are run
in parallel with the main system.
The usual way to limit three-phase fault current in
power station electrical systems at the design stage is
to modify transformer reactance. Increasing a trans­
former reactance reduces the fault levels on the boards
it feeds, but at the same time increases voltage regu­
lation (the voltage d r o p produced by load current) at
these b o a r d s . The designer must balance these con­
flicting requirements — low transformer impedance
for good system regulation, i.e., low voltage d r o p ,
against high transformer impedance to reduce fault
current — and produce a satisfactory compromise.
There are other ways of reducing fault levels, e.g.,
auxiliary generator reactances can be increased. On
the power station electrical systems considered here,
gas-turbine generators and diesel generators may have
their reactances increased to some extent, but stability
 Power system performance analysis

Read in initial voltages a* + jb' . 1

busbar data and
form nodal Y matrix

(a)

ITER =
ITER = 0 I
ITERATION NUMBER

ITER = ITER + T |

a + jb
i = NODE OR BUSBAR
i=0 IDENTIFICATION Y.k
NUMBER
(b)

i=i+ 1 FIG. 2.49 Method of accommodating off-nominal

transformer tappings by incorporating off-nominal tap
representation into the admittance matrix

BUSBAR 1? \
CALCULATE
SLACK-·γ*-Ρν NETT BUSBAR Q
PQ* /
aY.

APPLY ALGORITHM TO
GET Vi

BUSBAR RATIO Vi to.

PV? SPECIFIED VALUE
NO
FIG. 2.50 Simple ττ circuit deduced when off-nominal

>
taps are in phase
i = n? η = NUMBER
NO OF BUSBARS
YES
ΔΙ,

SOLUTION
CONVERGED? " \ ^ ^ 5 - - H Ö Ü P ^
NO

NO ITER^ \ YES
-<^A)ÖIMUM ITERATIONS^ FIG. 2.51 Alternative method of representing
off-nominal transformer taps

FIG. 2.48 Logic flow diagram for the

Gauss-Seidel method 3.2.2 Program construction

and regulation are adversely affected and must be General remarks

taken into account if this is done. Inductors can be
used to reduce system fault levels — again stability
and regulation must be taken into account. Converter/
inverter supplied motors m a k e n o fault current con­
tribution and because of this are a major advantage
in containing system fault levels. However, they also
generate harmonics, so analysis is needed to show
whether the levels produced are acceptable. They have
a higher initial cost t h a n ordinary induction m o t o r s ,
but this is offset by high efficiency at part load, so
overaU hfetime cost analysis is necessary in considering
their use.
Most of a power station electrical system is designed
on the basis of complete phase symmetry. In other
words, the loads on each phase are the same and the
voltages (and currents) are equal in magnitude and
phase, displaced by 120° and 240°.
A t lower vohages, there is some unbalance where
single phase supplies are provided but at higher volt­
ages, where supphes are almost exclusively t o induction
m o t o r s and other three-phase loads, symmetry can be
assumed during normal operation.
In analysis terms, this means that knowledge of the
voltage and current in one phase implies knowledge of

151
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

NETWORK DIAGRAM DRAWING AND MODIFYING

(?)

UBS1 SSI Β UTS1 SSI A

FIG. 2.52 Analysis diagram of a SES in an oil-fired power station

it y a.rw j a/^^^ i oir\O i D/«O

B6AX ^ T m U B6BY
B6CX f p j ^ D Y B»X

— J60X

J6DY

^ ' ^ B 7 A X " ^ B T B Y ^ B T B X H . V ^ T C Y ^^BTCX ^ B T O Y

I7DX 415MOT

7^^ Λ 7 ^ ^ 7^ r -

FIG. 2.53 Analysis diagram of a SES in an AGR nuclear power station

152
 Power system performance analysis
O g Os ^ ^ On
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I I I I I
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I
Bos
ζ
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ζ
j
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ίί Ο
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d
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<0 00 8i 8
cd 8i
Od
153
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

L O A D F L O W R E S U L T S - B U S B A R PU V O L T S &LINE M V / U ^ O A D I N G

^ 400KV

11KVUB1
1.000

1 i
UBS1 SS1B UTS1 SS1A C.A GTH WTP BHX CWPH TS 0| FOS
1.058 1 046 1.060 1.044 1.044 1.048 1.042 1.047 1.044 1.047 1.058

HVWS FPH JETTY

1.040 1.037 1.053

ΙΡ8Αβ6Κ 29 Jun 1988 08:34:34

FIG. 2.54 Voltage profile of an oil-fired power station electrical system at minimum load

L O A D F L O W R E S U L T S - B U S B A R PU V O L T S &LINE M V A L O A D I N G

7\r
400KV

1- i i i
WTP BHX 0( FOS
UBS1 SS1B UTS1 SS1A C.A GTH
1.004 1.015 1.023
1.025 1.013 1.028 1.009 1.009 1.016

HVWS FPH BHS1 JETTY

1.000 0.994 1.015 1.013

IPSA86K 29 Jun 1988 08:29:35

FIG. 2.55 Voltage profile of an oil-fired power station electrical system at maximum load

154
 Power system performance analysis

LOAD FLOW RESULTS - BUSBAR PU VOLTS & LINE M V A LOADING

J6CX
1.000

Θ Θ Θ Θ ®

FIG. 2 . 5 6 Voltage profile of a network with a 3 . 3 kV diesel generator supplying an isolated part of a S E S

LOAD F L O W RESULTS - BUSBAR PU VOLTS & LINE M V A LOADING ^

^<1^

17DX
1.050
0.2ÍB7AY 0.2

IPSASSK 29Jun1988 16:56O4

FIG. 2 . 5 7 Voltage profile with turbine and reactor off-load

155
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

LOAD F L O W RESULTS - BUSBAR PU VOLTS & LINE M V A LOADING Φ

I7D2 M^7D3
1.037 Τ 1.028 1 1.0
1.002 1.000 1 1013 J 1.010 1 009 1.009 Τ 1 005 Τ 1.005 TnCl984 I
Ιο,ΓΓ^ο.ΓΓ—0.ΓΓ—

B6CX B6DY B6DX

1.012 0.994 ^ς 0.994

o.^r^ 0 · ^ · ^

IPSA86K 29 Jun 1988 17:35:50

FIG. 2.58 Voltage profile with generator off-load and gas circulators at 56% full-load

LOAD F L O W RESULTS - BUSBAR PU VOLTS & LINE M V A LOADING

^i^^-O

I 1.009 Τ 1.005 Τ 1.005 Τ n0^984 ( |o.rr~o.rjr— o.s^r— 1 .rjr

_2i_
B6BX
0.981

0.γ 0.9^jr^ 0.9^ °-^J-

IPSA86K 29 Jun 1988 17:39:09

FIG. 2.59 Voltage profile with the first 11 kV starting/standby feedpump being started

156
 Power system performance analysis

L O A D F L O W RESULTS - BUSBAR P UVOLTS & LINE M V A LOADING

ΰΤΒΙ Cpfe7B2 r7B7B3 Ό^7Β4

I 0.998 Τ 0.995 Τ 1 008 _ Γ ΐ · 0 0 6

Β6ΑΧ Ε Β6ΒΥ ^ Β6ΒΧ

1.004 1.006

J6BY J6BX
(& 0.5 1.006
1.006 0.6

^B7AXH°%B7BV Β7ΒΧ B7CX Β70Υ B7DY1

^ Υ ΐ . 0 3 1 ο . 2 ^ ^ Υ ΐ .035 1.034
0.3J. ι.οΊΓ
0 . 6 ^ • / 0 . 3 ^ / 0 . 6 ^
IPSA86K 29Jun 1988 1 7:41:24

FIG. 2.60 Voltage profile with the first 11 kV starting/standby feedpump at speed and full load

L O A D F L O W RESULTS - BUSBAR P UVOLTS & LINE M V A LOADING

1781
. 1.019 .
0 . ^ — 0 — ^ 1.030 1.027 1.027 1.026 Τ 1.022 Τ 1.023 Τη%002
La. . 0.2

36ΑΧ ^ Β6ΒΥ ^ ΙΒ6ΒΧ B6CY ^ ΓB6CX B6DY

'024 1.025 . I 1.025 1.031 .„
1.031 1.013
0 ^
J6CY J6CX
1.031
1.031 1.2

CrB7AX \ f ^ ^ B 7 B Y
Τ ΐ . 0 5 2 0 . 2 ^ Τ 1.059
Ü^B
B7BX
J 1.056
fe Ψ ΒΧΧ
1.054
9Τ
^^B7DY

0.3
Β7

1 1.θΤ^
ΙΡβΑββΚ 01 Jul 1988 15:51:11

FIG. 2.61 Voltage profile with main generator at 40% full load and gas circulators at full load

157
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

LOAD FLOW RESULTS - BUSBAR PU VOLTS & LINE MVA LOADING (ξ)

F^B7AX \^CrB7BY C T Β }7DX

I 1 052 0 . 2 ^ Τ 1 059 Ti 1.016
¿T o J l 1.0L

IPSA86K 01 JuM9ee 15:52:10

FiG. 2.62 Voltage profile with second 11 kV starting/standby feedpump being started

LOAD FLOW RESULTS - BUSBAR PU VOLTS & LINE MVA LOADING ($)
0/

r Τ 1 030 Τ 1.027 τ 1.027 Τ 1 026 Τ 1 022 J 1.023 Tn%Q02

B6AX Ε Β6βγ Ε B6CY B6CX B6DY Β60Χ

1.015 .015 1012 i¿ 1.012
1.024 1.025 ης

0 ^ 0.2
J6CY J6CX J6DY
1.014
1.014 1.2

I7CY B7CX Ν Β70Υ Β70Υ1

1.031 1.036
o.y,
?θ7^ ° V o . 3 ^ °7θ7^ IPSA86K 01 Jul 1988 15:53:19

FIG. 2.63 Voltage profile with second 11 kV starting/standby feedpump at speed and full load

158
 Power system performance analysis

L O A D F L O W RESULTS - BUSBAR PU V O L T S & LINE M V A L O A D I N G ^

ΕβββΥ Ε Β6ΒΧ B6CY Ε

B6CX (
1.015 ης 1.015 1.031 1.031

0.5 0 ^ 1.0 Ο.β

' 0 ^ 0 ^ ^
0.6
ϋβθΥ J6BX J6CY J6CX
0.5 1.015 0.6 1.015 • 1.031 1.031
1.0 0.9

^ΒΤΒΧ
1.045
ιΤβμΫ ο·ι>Τ o i / T ο.ιΤ"ΠΓ Άΐ 0.9 1 0 . ^ 0.3 1 Ι.ΟΤ^

/ 1.057 ^ 0 . 6 ^ - ^ 0 . 3 ^ / 0 . 6 ^
IPSA86K 01 Jul 1988 16ΌΘ:50

FIG. 2.64 Voltage profile with the unit at full load

N E T W O R K DIAGRAM DRAWING AND MODIFYING

T Y P E Ή ' IF Y O U N E E D A N Y H E L P

© Θ Θ Θ Θ Θ

FIG. 2.65 Example of computer generated draughting

159
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

L I N E D A T A 1 P A G E 1 O F 3

BUS-SEND BUS-REC RESIST-PU REACT-PU SUSC-PU ZSQ-R-PU ZSQ-X-PU

4 00KV GEN32 0.00040 0 02000

T-32 GEN32 0.00010 0 00010
400KV GEN 3 1 0.00040 0 .02000
T-31 GEN31 0.00010 0 00010
GEN31 11U31 0.01389 0 .26913
4 00KV 11S31 0.01240 0 23425
4 00KV 11S32 0.01217 0 23382
GEN32 nu32 0.01389 0 26913
11U31 Jl 0.09829 0 88600
Jl 3.3E2 0.03604 0 04500
11U31 3.3U31A 0.09201 0 87958
11S31 3.3U31B 0.09475 0 88303
11S31 J3 0.09243 0 87976
J3 3.3E1 0.01839 0 02296
11S31 3.3S31 0.09475 0 88303
11U31 11S31 0.01746 0 32534
11S32 11U32 0.01746 0 32534
11S32 3.3332 0.09475 0 88303
11S32 J4 0.09871 0 88645
J4 3.3E4 0.00368 0 00459
11S32 3.3U32B 0.09516 0 88348
11U32 3.3U32A 0.09516 0 88348
11U32 J2 0.09369 0 88109
J2 3.3E3 0.03972 0 04959
3.3U31A TH31A 1.03471 4 09726
3.3U31B TH31B 1.03471 4 09726
3.3U31B CWP31 1.17079 4 25695
3.3S31 FUELl 1.44329 5 34695
3.3S31 AXBLl 0.91302 0 34175
3.3S31 RADl 1.20756 4 30011

O P T I O N S :
R E D I S P L A Y S Y S T E M B A S E MVA= 1 0 0 . 0
INEXT P A G E

H E L P
R E T U R N
IPSA86K 01 J u l 1988 16:22:24

FIG. 2.66 Example of line data entry

I N D U C T I O N MOTOR DATA 1 P A G E 1 O F 1

B U S B A R / I D PMECH-MW SLIP-PC MAG-X ST-R-PU ST-X-PU ROT-R-PU ROT-X-PU S-OUT-Tl SW-IN-Tl S-0UT-T2 SW-IN-T2

11U31 5 . 970 92 994 0 0930 1.8146 0 1558 1 3146

11U31 5.970 92 994 0 0930 1.8146 0 1558 1 3146
11U31 7.000 79 628 0 0596 1.8504 0 1095 1 0512
11U31 7.000 79 628 0 0596 1.8504 0 1095 1 0512
11U31 1.480 182 2 2 0 0 3155 7.7047 0 5014 7 7047
11S31 7.000 79 628 0 0596 1.8504 0 1095 1 0512
11S31 1.480 182 2 2 0 0 3155 7.7047 0 5014 7 7047
11U32 5.970 92 994 0 0930 1.8146 0 1558 1 3146
11U32 7.000 79 628 0 0596 1.8504 0 1095 1 0512
J5 1.480 182 2 2 0 0 3155 7.7047 0 5014 7 7047
J7 7.000 79 628 0 0596 1 .8504 0 1095 1 0512
J6 5 . 970 92 994 0 0930 1.8146 0 1558 1 3146
3.3U31A 1.750 1 3 1 214 0 3195 5.5015 0 2520 3 8280
3.3U31A 1.000 2 2 9 620 0 5592 9.6277 0 4413 10 9916
3.3U31B 0.950 2 4 1 710 0 5886 10.1344 0 4640 11 5 7 0 0
3.3U31B 1.000 2 2 9 620 0 5592 9.6277 0 4413 10 9916
3.3U32B 0.950 241 710 0 5886 10.1344 0 4640 11 5 7 0 0
3.3U32B 1.000 229 620 0 5592 9.6277 0 4413 10 9916
J8 1.750 1 3 1 214 0 3195 5.5015 0 2520 3 8280
J9 1.000 2 2 9 620 0 5592 9.6277 0 4413 10 9916
3.3E2 1.050 252 525 0 8999 12.3049 1 0836 7 8053
3.3E2 1.390 214 700 0 8258 7.9275 0 8258 6 2429
3.3E1 1.050 252 525 0 8999 12.3049 1 0836 7 8053
3.3E1 2.950 86 2 8 7 0 3486 3.4515 0 3661 3 0505
3.3E4 1.050 252 525 0 8999 12.3049 1 0836 7 8053
3.3E4 2.950 86 2 8 7 0 3486 3.4515 0 3661 3 0505
JIO 1.390 214 700 0 8258 7.9275 0 8258 6 2429
Jll 1.050 252 5 2 5 0 8999 12.3049 1 0836 7 8053
J14 7.000 79 628 0 0596 1.8504 0 1095 1 0512
J13 1.480 182.220 0 3155 7.7047 0 5014 7 7047

O P T I O N S :
R E D I S P L A Y S Y S T E M B A S E MVA= 1 0 0 . 0

H E L P
R E T U R N
IPSA86K 01 J u l 1988 16:22:44

FIG. 2.67 Example of induction motor data entry

160
 Power system performance analysis

TRANSFORMER DATA 1 PAGE 1 OF 2

BUS-SEND BUS-REC TAP-START MIN-TAP TAP-STEP MAX-TAP V-SPEC P-SHIFT

4 00KV GEN32 8.00 -6 40 1 20 15.20

4 00KV GEN31 8.00 -6 40 1 20 15.20
GEN31 11U31 -4.45 -13 77 2 33 0.21
4 00KV 11S31 - 2 . 62 -16 14 1 04 2.58
4 00KV 11S32 - 2 . 62 -16 14 1 04 2.58
GEN32 11U32 -4.45 -13 77 2 33 0.21
11U31 Jl -4.35 -4 35 0 01
11U31 3.3U31A -4.35 -4 35 0 01
11S31 3.3U31B -4 .35 -4 35 0 01
11S31 J3 -4.35 -4 35 0 01
11S31 3.3S31 -4.35 -4 35 0 01
11S32 3.3S32 -4 .35 -4 35 0 01
11S32 J4 -4.35 -4 35 0 01
11S32 3.3U32B -4.35 -4 35 0 01
11U32 3.3Ü32A -4.35 -4 35 0 01
11U32 J2 -4.35 -4 35 0 01
3.3U31A TH31A -4.16 -4 16 0 01
3.3U31B TH31B -4.16 -4 16 0 01
3.3U31B CWP31 -4.16 -4 16 0 01
3.3S31 FUELl -4.16 -4 16 0 01
3.3S31 AXBLl -4.16 -4 16 0 01
3.3S31 RADl -4.16 -4 16 0 01
3.3S32 PHEAT -4.16 -4 16 0 01
3.3S32 RAD2 -4.16 -4 16 0 01
3.3S32 AXBL2 -4.16 -4 16 0 01
3.3S32 FUEL2 -4.16 -4 16 0 01
3.3U32B CWP32 -4.16 -4 16 0 01
3.3U32B TH32B -4.16 -4 16 0 01
3.3U32A TH32A -4.16 -4 16 0 01
3.3E3 E3 -4.16 -4 16 0 01

OPTIONS:
REDISPLAY SYSTEM BASE M7A? 100.0
NEXT PAGE

HELP
RETURN
IPSA86K 01 J u l 1988 1 6 : 2 2 : 5 6

FIG. 2.68 Example of transformer data entry

ANALYSIS PARAMETERS PAGE 1 OF 1

BASE MVA 100.0 MVA

LOAD FLOW CONVERGENCE ACCURACY 0.010 MVA
MAXIMUM LOAD FLOW ITERATIONS 25
SLACK BUSBAR 400KV
FAULT T I M E 0.100
SYSTEM FREQUENCY 50.0
REFERENCE MACHINE BUSBAR NAME 400KV
REFERENCE MACHINE I D E N T I F I E R G
STUDY DURATION T I M E 1.00 SEC
S T A B I L I T Y STEP LENGTH 0.010 SEC
SWING ANGLE / POLE S L I P LIMIT 540 DEGREES OR POLE PAIRS
PLOT SYNCH. MACHINE SPEEDS? Ν
PRINTOUT SYSTEM DATA? Y
S T A B I L I T Y PRINTOUT INTERVAL 0.040
PRINTOUT BUSBAR VOLTAGES? Y
PRINTOUT AVR DATA? Y
PRINTOUT GOVERNOR DATA?

OPTIONS:
REDISPLAY SYSTEM BASE MVA= 100.0

HELP
RETURN
IPSA86K 01 J u l 1988 1 6 : 2 3 : 0 4

FIG. 2.69 Example of analysis parameters

161
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

phase sequence (a, c, b) — this is indicated by the

SUB-TRANSIENT phase rotation coefficients a and — and is called
^PERIOD the negative phase sequence component of voltage.
C o m p o n e n t Vo has no phase displacement between

V2IEI
τ SLOWLY DECAYING T R A N S I E N T
PERIOD
STEADY STATE
phases a, b and c — there are no phase rotation coeffi­
cients present — and is called the zero phase sequence
X'd PERIOD component of voltage.
DC C O M P O N E N T z . The total power in an unbalanced system is the sum
AV2|I"|
' Xd
of the symmetrical component powers.
0.5 The reason for the symmetrical component trans­
TIME, s
formation being so useful in analysis is that, for most
types of equipment used in power systems, their posi­
FIG. 2 . 7 0 Transient short-circuit of a synchronous
machine — only one phase envelope shown tive, negative and zero sequence components are inde­
pendent of each other, or ^decoupled'. This means
the associated matrices used during analysis are dia­
voltage and current in the other two phases. How­ gonal and, in consequence, are easily manipulated
ever, when a network has unbalanced loading between mathematically.
phases, or is subject to an electrical fault involving one The values of the various sequence component im­
or two phases only, then phase symmetry is destroyed. pedances for generators, overhead Hues, cables, trans­
formers, and other electrical apparatus can be obtained
Method of symmetrical components by test or from analysis. Positive and negative phase
sequence component impedances are identical for static
The method of symmetrical components [10] was de­ apparatus. Zero sequence impedance is associated with
veloped to reduce the complexity of unbalanced fault earth return paths and may be greater or less than the
analysis and is widely used in computer programs. This positive sequence impedance.
method represents an unbalanced system of voltages Driving voltage is only associated with the positive
and currents by the superposition of two symmetrical phase sequence component network. It follows that
three-phase systems of opposite phase sequence and negative and zero sequence component currents can
a zero phase sequence system, i.e., a single-phase alter­ flow only when their networks are connected to the
nating system. positive phase sequence component network. The con­
Three components are defined: nections between the various networks under fault
conditions and the associated equations are given on
Va = Vo + V, + V2 Fig 2.71.
Vb = Vo + a^Vi + aVi This assumes neghgible impedance at the point of
fault but this is not always so. In practice, fault im­
Vc = Vo + aVi + a^Y2
pedance is sometimes considered in single line to earth
or faults and this requires an impedance of 3 χ fault
impedance to be inserted in the zero sequence net­
Vo = 1/3 (Va + Vb + Vc)
work. However, design analysis is usually concentrated
Vi = 1/3 (Va + aVb + a^Yc) on worst conditions and this means setting fault imped­
V2 = 1/3 (Va + a^Vb + aVc) ances to zero. If fault impedance (Zf) is to be taken
into account, for single-line to earth faults, 3Zf is
where
inserted in the zero sequence network. For a double-
V a , V b , V c are network voltages in phases a, b , c hne to earth fault, the impedance between phases (Zp)
Vi = positive sequence component voltage is inserted in each phase network and 3Zf in the zero
sequence network. For a three-phase to earth fault Zp
V 2 = negative sequence component voltage
is inserted in each phase network, 3Zg in the zero
Vo = zero sequence component voltage sequence network (Zg is the impedance to ground) and
α is a phase rotation of 120° = exp j 27Γ/3 an additional parallel path is introduced having an
is a phase rotation of 240° = exp j 47Γ/3
impedance of (Zf - Z p ) / 3 (Fig 2.72).

(α M s a phase rotation of 360° = exp j 27Γ = 1)

or 0°
Similar equations can be written for network currents.
The component Vi is the normal value of the phase
voltage for a balanced system with normal phase se­
quence (a, b , c) and is called the positive phase sequence
component of voltage. Component V 2 has the opposite
Generator representation
Programs are written to calculate generator fault cur­
rent contribution according to the a m o u n t of machine
data entered by the analyst. For complete representa­
tion of fault current decrement with time, synchro­
nous, transient a n d subtransient data must be entered.
If only one value of machine reactance is entered, the

162
 P o w e r system performance analysis

NETWORK CONNECTIONS UNDER FAULT CONDmONS

FAULT TYPE NETWORK INTERCONNECTION ASSOCIATED EQUATIONS

POSITIVE NEGATIVE ZERO

L-G

L-L
l,^l, = 0 l, = 0

V. = V, = V„
L-L-G

V, = V,= 0
L-L-L
ln=0

L-L-L-G

FIG. 2.71 Network connections under fault conditions

L-L-L-G A suitable basis for calculating a generator fault

with Fault
Impedance current is

Zp
X
Zp '-=[χ)Λ'^
/E\ /E' E\
- - j e x p - t / T ' ^

Zf-Zp
3

3Zg account is taken of reactance between generator and

fault point by making
Ϊ
X = Xe + Xd
X' = Xe + Xd
FIG. 2.72 Three-phase to earth with fault impedance
X" = Xe + Xd

fault current calculated for the machine will not be where X g is equivalent system reactance; X d , X d , X'd
time dependent. are generator synchronous, transient and subtransient

163
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

reactances (direct axis); Τ ' , Τ" are transient and sub- Consider a network with η nodes, the i^^ node of
transient short circuit time constants; and E, E ' and which the impedance to ground reference is to be
E" are the generator voltages behind synchronous, found. If a current of 1 per-unit is injected into the
transient and subtransient reactances, respectively. network at node i, then looking at the matrix and two
vectors in general terms we have:
Also, Ydc = (1/Xn) e x p ( - t / T )
.-1 V
where Xn = 2(X'¿ Χ'^)/(Χϊ, + X ^ ) + Xe
and Τ = Xn/MRa + Re)]

Vi
X n is generator negative sequence impedance, X ^ is
generator subtransient reactance (quadrature axis) and
R a generator stator resistance.

Induction motor representation

Data for induction motor performance and analysis Vi
are frequently in terms of starting and running values
of stator and rotor equivalent resistance and reactance.
If so, a suitable method of calculating fault current
is based on:

Yac = ( 1 / X " ) exp t/T"

and Ydc = ( 1 / X " ) exp t / T a
where T" = XVωRr

Ta = X V M R s + Re)]

X" = Xe + Xs + XrstXm/(Xrst + Xm)

and it is seen that
Re + JXe = system impedance between
m o t o r and fault point Vi = Y i 7 i . 0 + Y i 2 ^ - 0 + . . . + Y i 7 i . 1 + ... + Y i ñ ^ - 0
Rr, Rs = rotor resistance, stator
resistance
X s , X m , Xrst = stator reactance, magnetising Similarly, it can be shown that, with the same unit
reactance, rotor reactance at current injected at node i, V j = Y i J ^
start. Thus the impedance to ground reference at node i
is given by element Y j Y ^ and the fault currents can
Alternatively, a method similar to that used for syn­ be determined by knowledge of the element Y i 7 ^ the
chronous machines may be used. voltage at the node prior to the fault V i , and the type
of fault.
Further, it can be seen that only one row or column,
Evaluation of fault currents and voltages
the i o f the Y " ^ matrix is required in the calculation
Once the data for the network to be analysed have been of V j . The inverses of the admittance matrices for
assembled, the nodal admittance matrix Y is formed, as positive, negative and zero sequence networks can be
described earUer, and we have: obtained and the fault current calculated.
If, for example, the fault is a Hne t o ground fault, the
YV = I three sequence impedances will be connected in series
with the value of the fault resistance (if any) inserted.
remembering that, in a system with η nodes, Let the summed network impedance be Z , having real
and imaginary parts of R and j X , and the node voltage
Y is an η χ η matrix V be Vreal + J V imag ·

V is an η χ 1 vector Then the positive sequence real current, Ireai, can be

calculated from:
and I is an η X 1 vector,
leading to Υ - ^ Ι = V Ireal = [Vreal X (R + V imag) X X ] / ( R 2
Vimag + X^)

The impedance to ground reference at any node can and the positive sequence imaginary current limag from:
be found from Y ~ ^ the inverse of the admittance
matrix. limag — [Vimag X (R - Vreal) X X]/(R^ + X^)

164
 Power system performance analysis

In this example, a single line to ground fault, the branches can be determined. The fault current in a
negative and zero sequence currents will equal the branch is the product of the branch admittance and
positive sequence values due to the series connection the voltage difference between the ends of the branch.
between the networks. In general, the fault current For branch i - j , the current flowing in phase *a' is
in each sequence network can be obtained from the given by:
solution of the symmetrical components network inter­
connected according to Table 2.19. Ifij(i) = Yij(i)[Vfi(i) - Vfj(i)]
Once the fault currents If(i), If(2) and lf(0) have been Ifij(2) = Yij(2)[Vfi(2) - Vfj(2)]
obtained, the phase *a' voltage under fauh conditions
for all busbars can be evaluated by the appHcation Ifij(O) = Yij(0)[Vfi(0) - Vfi(o)]
of the superposition theorem. For a short-circuit fault
on busbar i the *a' phase fauh voltages at busbar j where Yij(i), Yij(2), Yij(O) are the sequence admittances
are: of branch i - j .

Vjf(i) Vj(p) YiT(i) lif(i) For a transformer branch, the sending end current
is evaluated. A correction for t a p is then applied to
Vjf(2) 0 YiT(2) Iif(2) positive and negative sequence currents.
and Vjf(O) 0 YiT(0) ^m) The fault voltages for positive, negative and zero
sequence networks can then be calculated.
where Y^m^ ^ij(2)» Yij(0) are the elements in the i^^ Using Thevenin's T h e o r e m ,
row and j^^ column of the inverses of the sequence
admittance matrices. Vi(i) = Vi(P) - YH(1) li(i)
Vi(2) = 0 - Υ ΰ ά Ii(2)
Fault current in network branches
Vi(o) = 0 - Yi7¿) li(0)
Having established the voltage distribution in the
faulted network, the fault currents in the network where Vi(p) is the voUage prior to the fault.

TABLE 2.19
Fault currents for different types of fault

FAULT if(i) If(2) lf(0)

Vi(p)
L-G If(l) If(l)
Yíi(l) + Yií(2) + Yíi(0) + 3Zf

Vi(p)
L-L
-1 -if(i)
ii(2) + Zf

Vi(p) -Yii(0)i^^f(i) -Yii(2)lxlf(l)

L-L-G
-1 -1 -1
Y' αη\
ii(2) 1 Y ii(0)^
{iík\ 1 Yi7^1
' ii(2) + Y;T.Än1
ii(0)' ΥΙΤΛΐ
ii(2) + Yi7rA^l
ii(0)'
+ Yíí(l)l
-1
ii(2) ii(0)^

L-L-L-G V Í ( P ) / Y H ( 1 ) + Zf

where Y i 7 ( } ) , Y i 7 ¿ ^ ^ii(O) diagonal elements in row and column i of the inverse sequence
admittance matrices, Zf is the short-circuit fault impedance, and subscripts (1), (2), (3) denote
positive, negative and zero sequence values, respectively.

^ii(i)^ - Υΰ(1) + 0·5 Zf

r-l -1
YiT^i
' ii(2)
1
= YiTa
_
ii(2) + o-5Zf
r-l
Yü(0)l = Yr -ül ( ¿ ) + 0 . 5 Z f + 3 Z g

and Vi(p) is the voltage prior to the fault.

165
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

Generator and motor fault current contributions
These can be calculated from knowledge of the gen­
erator and motor equivalent admittances, the faulted
network voltages and the generator and motor current
contributions fed to the system prior to the fault.
Iif(l)G = Ii(p)G - Yi(l)G V f ( i )
Iif(2)G = - Yi(2)G Vf(2)
Iif(0)G = - Yi(0)G Vf(0)
where Y Í G is the value of the generator equivalent
admittance. The subject of fault current contribution
from loaded synchronous machines is discussed in
references [11] and [12].
3.2.3 Use of programs
The 'Unit at full load' condition provides a convenient
base example for fault analysis of a station electrical
system. All plant is assumed to be in service and
normal running arrangements adopted. Figure 2.73
shows such a study. The system is for an advanced
gas-cooled reactor (AGR) nuclear power station. It
provides a convenient starting point or reference for
further fault studies having different switching arrange­
ments. Switchgear ratings for this station are:
At 11 kV 900 MVA make, (47.2 kA and 39.4 kA
750 MVA break RMS sym)
At 3.3 kV 250 MVA make and break (43.7 kA RMS sym)
At 415 V 31 MVA make and break (43.1 kA RMS sym)
On the diagram, B5* are 11 kV boards, B6* are 3.3 kV
boards and B7* are 415 V boards (* = alpha­
numeric symbol(s))
Figure 2.73 shows that all fault levels are well within
switchgear ratings.
Suppose now that the 132 k V / 1 1 k V / 1 1 kV station
transformer is to be taken out of service. This trans­
former has three windings; each of the two 11 kV se­
condary windings feeds an 11 kV station b o a r d . It is
shown on Fig 2.73 as three separate transformers
bounded by B3, J5A1 and J 5 B 1 . The procedure to
take the transformer out of service is:
(a) Switch the first unit/station 11 kV interconnector
on-load. Check that it picks u p load.
(b) Open the associated station transformer 11 kV
circuit-breaker.
(c) Switch the second unit/station 11 kV interconnector
on-load. Check that it picks u p load.
(d) Open the associated station transformer 11 kV
circuit-breaker.
(e) Check that there is n o load o n the station
transformer 132 kV circuit-breaker. If so, open it.
Figure 2.74 shows fault levels after operation (a), the
first unit/station 11 kV interconnector B5A to B5D,
closed. T h e fault levels on the newly interconnected
11 kV boards are now much higher than those in
Fig 2.73. Fault levels also rise to a lesser extent at
other boards. All fault levels are within switchgear
ratings — if this were not so, the switching operation
would not be permitted. Figure 2.75 shows fault levels
at the next stage in the switching sequence, after the
first station transformer 11 kV circuit-breaker (J5A1
to B5A) is opened. Comparing this figure with the
base case (Fig 2.73), note a moderate increase in fault
level at the 11 kV unit b o a r d , B5D. This is due to
the additional induction m o t o r contribution, via the
unit/station 11 kV interconnector, from the station
boards. Figures 2.76 and 2.77 show fault levels for the
next two stages of switching. Switching the station
transformer out of service will not affect fault levels,
hence fault levels after stage (e) are the same as after
stage (d).
Because the 11 kV switchgear has different m a k e
and break ratings and the studies show m a k e fault
levels greater than 750 M V A , the above sequence is
repeated to determine break values. Break values are
always less than m a k e values because the fault current
from synchronous machines (assuming constant ex­
citation) and induction machines decreases with time.
The break value is calculated at the shortest time post-
fault that the switches can be activated to break the
fault current. This depends on the speed of the sensing
transducers, relays and the circuit-breaker operating
time. A n example of a break fault level calculation is
shown in Fig 2.78. This is a repeat of the study shown
in Fig 2.76, with current decrements from contributing
machines taken into account. A value of 0.07 s is used
here for the post-fault time interval before the circuit-
breakers start to open. Fault levels at 11 kV boards are
less than the break switchgear rating, 750 M V A .
If the SES is designed to allow 3.3 kV parallel opera­
tion, checks must be m a d e to ensure that closing the
3.3 kV interconnector does not raise fault levels to
greater than switchgear ratings. Figure 2.79 shows an
example of this; starting with the reference Fig 2.73, a
3.3 kV interconnector is added between boards B6AX
and B6BX. Because 11 kV b o a r d fault levels are all
less than 750 M V A , it is not necessary to repeat this
study to determine break values.
Figure 2.80 shows a 3.3 kV auxihary diesel genera­
tor connected to b o a r d B6AY running in parallel with
the main system. T h e associated 3.3 kV boards have
fault levels significantly higher than those in reference
Fig 2.73, but are less than the switchgear rating of 250
MVA.
So far, the examples of fault levels on station elec­
trical systems (Figs 2.73 to 2.80) have shown sym­
metrical R M S values. These are satisfactory for initial
investigations a n d yield much useful information; how­
ever, the D C component is not included a n d , of course,
the values of real interest are the actual peak current

166
 Power system performance analysis

T H R E E P H A S E F A U L T L E V E L (MVA) F O R E A C H B U S B A R A T T= lO.OmS

CrB7AY R^B7AX CTBTBY I7DX

19

FIG. 2 . 7 3 Example of a SES network used for fault analysis

T H R E E P H A S E F A U L T L E V E L (MVA) F O R E A C H B U S B A R A T T= lO.OmS ^

α —

ϋ^Β7ΑΥ F^B7AX CTBTBY M^B7t

Τ 20 Τ 20 Τ 20 Τ 20

-Γ J - 7^

FIG. 2 . 7 4 Fault levels after the first unit/station 1 1 kV interconnector is switched on-load

167
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

THREE PHASE FAULT LEVEL (MVA) FOR EACH BUSBAR AT T= lO.OmS

. 20 Τ 20 Τ 21

7^ 7^ 7 ^ 7 ^ 7 ^ 7 ^ 7^ 7^ 7^

S7 7
ΒβΑΧχΜχ^ B6BY vv^ B6CX^(m\ ΒβΡΥ^,ΒβΡΧ
Β6(

7 7
95 90

J6BY 7 J6BX J6CY J6DY

y ^@^B7AY ^@^B7AX ^O^BTBY Q^l Β7ΒΧ |§^7CY O ^ B T C X 'ÍS) (§^B7DY B7DY1

20 Y 19 Y 20 ^ Y 20 12
0 1 2

7^
0 1 2 0

7" 7"
1 2 0

Λ
Τ
7 - 7 - y ^ r -

FiG. 2.75 Fault levels after opening the first 11 kV circuit-breaker on the station transformer

THREE PHASE FAULT LEVEL (MVA) FOR EACH BUSBAR AT T= 10.0 mS ^

iFJ^B7AY Ü^B^AX CTBTBY Ü^B7t

Y 19 Y 19 Y 20 Y 20

/- 7^ 7" 7"

FIG. 2.76 Fault levels after the second unit/station 11 kV interconnector is switched on-load

168
 P o w e r system performance analysis

T H R E E P H A S E F A U L T L E V E L ( M V A ) F O R E A C H B U S B A R A TT = 10.0 m S ^

7^ 7^ 7
B6AX1®L B6BY j¡U»r B 6 C X ^ ^ B6DY « J Í^. B 6 0 X
X

7 J6AXR' J6BY 7 J6CY 7\ J6CX 7

Ü^B7AY CrB7AX CTBTBY ϋ^Β7Β) |§^7CY lR^B7CX '(S) i§^B7DY B7C
¡ 2 0 T 2 0 ¡ 2 0 Ύ 20 Τ 20 Τ 20 >|Υ 2 0 1 2

7~ r - y - r - 7

FIG. 2.77 Fault levels after opening the second 11 kV circuit-breaker on the station transformer

T H R E E P H A S E F A U L T L E V E L ( M V A ) F O R E A C H B U S B A R A TT =70.0mS ^

7
CrB7AY Ü^B7AX O^B7BY P h g^TCY (T^BTCX ® ) i§^B70Y B7C
Y 19 Y 20 19 12

7^" r-" 7^° 7-

FIG. 2 . 7 8 Example of a break fault level calculation

169
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

T H R E E PHASE F A U L T L E V E L (MVA) F O R E A C H B U S B A R A T T = 10.0 m S ^

^ ^ ^ ^ |§^7CY iR^BTCX S ^ B T O Y B7[ I7DX

Τ 19 Τ 20 > Τ 19 12 19
Ρ^87ΑΥ (3^B7AX φ^Β7ΒΥ

FIG. 2.79 Example of fault analysis for a SES designed to allow 3.3 kV parallel operation

T H R E E P H A S E F A U L T L E V E L (MVA) F O R E A C H BUSBAR A T T= lO.OmS

J6CY J6CX'

© ϋ^Β7ΑΥ ^@^B7AX Q^BTBY i§^7CY i § ^ B 7 C X ' ( S ) Ίπ^Β70Υ B 7 D Y 1

Τ 19 Y 20 19 12

FIG. 2.80 Fault analysis of a SES with a 3.3 kV diesel generator connected in parallel

170

that the circuit-breaker has to interrupt, and the maxi­
m u m prospective current, if closed onto earthed equip­
ment. Thus the symmetrical R M S value of current has
to be increased by two factors, the D C offset and the
relation between A C peak a n d R M S values which is
V2. This was illustrated in Fig 2.70. The D C offset
depends on its initial value, determined by the value of
the circuit vohage when the fauh occurs; subsequently
the rate of decay of the D C component depends on the
relative values of resistance a n d reactance between the
current sources and the fault. Figure 2.81 is similar to
reference Fig 2.73, but peak asymmetric make fault
levels are shown at each b o a r d . Figure 2.82 shows R M S
asymmetric break fauh levels at each b o a r d . In both
Figs 2.81 and 2.82, maximum initial asymmetry is
assumed.
When a switch interrupts fault current, the process
of starting and maintaining arc extinction depends on
current zeros occurring when the switch contacts start
to open. For current zeros to occur, the peak A C
component of current must exceed the D C offset at
the post-fauU time considered. T h e X : R ratio of
transformers and associated circuits in power station
electrical systems is generally low enough t o m a k e the
D C component decay rapidly; however, problems can
occur where components have high X : R ratios. T h e
most Hkely place to look for this is at the generator
circuit-breaker (used in some nuclear stations). Figure
T H R E E PHASE F A U L T L E V E L ( M V A ) F O R E A C H B U S B A R - A S Y M M E T R ^, P E A K V A L U E
N O T E : T R A N S F O R M E R PHASE SHIFTS N O T I N C L U D E D
Ρ^Β7ΑΥ Ρ^Β7ΑΧ ^ΓΒ^ΒΥ
7-^ Τ-^ Τ-^
FIG. 2.81 The SES of Fig 2.73 showing peak asymmetric make fauh levels
Power system performance analysis
2.83 shows a trace of fault current adjacent to a
generator circuit-breaker and illustrates the relationship
between D C a n d A C current components.
Values of fault current against time are also taken
at various locations in a supply system a n d are used
to confirm that equipment thermal specifications are
adequate. Here, the value of interest is the total energy
released before fauh clearance, assuming pessimistic
design fault clearance time.
Sometimes phase-to-earth fault current can exceed
three-phase fault current. This occurs where the zero
sequence impedance of a network is less than the
positive a n d negative sequence impedances. High phase-
to-earth fault currents are not expected in power sta­
tion electrical systems at voUages where earth fault
current is deliberately restricted by neutral earthing
resistors. Checks can be m a d e of prospective phase-
to-earth fault current with the neutral earthing resistor
in service, or with the neutral earthing resistor short-
circuited (which might happen through error or flash-
over). Similar checks can be m a d e at generator voltages,
where earthing arrangements use a distribution type
transformer.
System m i n i m u m fault levels are also required for
protection setting purposes. These are obtained by re­
ducing grid infeed to its minimum value, disconnecting
local generation and disconnecting the induction motors
which run only when plant is loaded.
ATT=10.0mS
^
o - • 3375β
B3
5ΘΟβ
7
Β7ΒΧ B7DY B7DY1
B7DY
56 54 25
J - 7 ~ 7
171
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

T H R E E P H A S E F A U L T L E V E L (MVA) F O R E A C H B U S B A R - A S Y M M E T R :] ^ R M S V A L U E A T T = 7 0 . 0 m S
NOTE: T R A N S F O R M E R P H A S E SHIFTS N O T I N C L U D E D

im
O
—A

© Ö^B^AY ^R^B7AX ^@^B7BY ^R^B/B) i ^ T C Y i R ^ B 7 C X TSMR^BTDY B7DY1 iM^7DX

D T 3 4 T 3 4 T 3 4 T 3 4

7^ 7- 7^ 7-
FIG. 2.82 The SES of Fig 2.73 showing RMS asymmetric break fault levels

T H R E E P H A S E F A U L T A T B4 -W I T H M A X I M U M A S Y M M E T R Y I N ' R ' P H A S E
R E D P H A S E Y E L L O W P H A S E B L U E P H A S E

[pu

Τ msec

FIG. 2.83 Trace of a generator circuit-breaker fault current illustrating the relationship of DC and AC components

172

The impedance values of system components used
in fault level studies are biased by applying a negative
tolerance during initial stages of design. This allows
for manufacturing variation and produces analysis
results which are pessimistic, i.e., higher than the
expected true values. Once plant is manufactured,
impedance values are measured and these measured
values without tolerance are entered as program data.
A Hst of data which can be processed in load flow
analysis has been given earlier. A Hst of additional
data required for fault level studies is given below:
Circuit data
Zero sequence resistance
Zero sequence reactance
Generator data
Armature resistance
Direct axis synchronous reactance
Zero sequence resistance
Zero sequence reactance
Direct axis transient reactance
Direct axis subtransient reactance
Direct axis transient open-circuit (or short-circuit)
time constant
Direct axis subtransient open-circuit (or short-circuit)
time constant
Program run control data
System base (MVA)
Fault time
System frequency
3.3 Stability analysis
3.3.1 Introduction
General
Stabihty analysis is used to prove that a power system
is able to withstand the effects of credible faults. This
means that when faulty equipment has been discon­
nected from the power system, frequency and voltage
will return to near their pre-fault values on the remain­
ing healthy part of the system within a few seconds, and
generators, motors and static plant will continue to
operate normally (i.e., as prior to the fault).
The capability of a power system to withstand the
effects of a fault depends on:
(a) The severity of the fault, i.e., its type, voltage and
duration.
(b) The configuration of the system itself.
(c) The robustness (in an electrical sense) of plant
within the system.
Items (b) and (c) can be illustrated by considering a
basic A C power system consisting of two generators.
Power system performance analysis
two transmission circuits and two b u s b a r s / d e m a n d
supply points loaded as in Fig 2.84.
2=0.01+J0.1 per unit
BUS 1 BUS 2
V=1.02 per unit V = 0.99 per unit
z=0.01+j0.1 per unit
FIG. 2 . 8 4 Basic A C power system for stability analysis
The results of a load flow calculation on the above
system are given in Fig 2.85, and a full hst of the
load flow analysis results o n Fig 2.86. T h e generator
at Bus 2 has to provide 321 M V A r to maintain Bus 2
voltage at 0.99 per-unit. At Bus 1, generator 1 provides
the remainder of the system load plus system power
losses, in total 608 M W . It also provides 161 M V A r to
maintain Bus 1 voltage at 1.02 per-unit. Each line has
a loss of 4 M W and 41 M V A r . Bus 2 voltage angle is
11.5° behind Bus 1.
Suppose one of the transmission circuits is switched
out. The system will settle to a new operating state.
This is shown in Fig 2.87 and a full hst of the load
flow analysis results on data sheet Fig 2.88. The system
demand remains the same but the results show that
the generation requirements have changed significant­
ly. The generator at Bus 2 now has to provide 397
M V A r to maintain Bus 2 voltage at 0.99 per-unit.
At Bus 1, generator 1 provides 617 M W and 176
M V A r . The hne loss is 17 M W and 173 M V A r . Bus 2
vohage angle is 23.9° behind Bus 1. A consumer taking
supplies from Bus 1 or Bus 2 would be unaware of
the location of the generators supplying his power, or
what transmission circuits are in service. H e would not
know whether he was being supplied from the system
shown in Fig 2.85 or from the system shown in Fig
2.87 because, in b o t h cases, his supply voltage and
frequency are the same. However, it has already been
shown that there are important differences between the
two networks.
In Fig 2.85, when a transmission line is switched
out, the power transfer between Bus 1 and Bus 2 is
maintained by the second transmission hne. There is
an increase in VAr generation on both generators; this
is required t o maintain the voltage levels at Bus 1 and
Bus 2 at 1.02 per-unit and 0.99 per-unit, respectively,
with the increased transmission circuit VAr loss.
173
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

FIG. 2.85 Results of a load flow calculation on the system in Fig 2.84

FAST D E C O U P L E D LOAD FLOW O U T P U T OF RESULTS

SYSTEM T I T L E : T W O BUS NETWORK

STUDY TITLE:

LINE P O W E R FLOWS

-BUSBARS SENDING END RECEIVING END LINE LOSS-

MW MVAR MVA MW MVAR MVA

BUSl BUS2 204.095 30.408 206.348 200.003 -10.518 200.279 4.093 40.926
BUSl BUS2 204.095 30.408 206.348 200.003 -10.518 200.279 4.093 40.926

8.185 81.852

OVERLOADED CIRCUIT SUMMARY

-BUSBARS- RATING LOADING

FROM
MVA MVA PER CENT

BUSBAR DETAILS

BUSBAR TYPE VOLTAGE GENERATION LOAD MISMATCH

MAG ANGLE ACTIVE REACTIVE ACTIVE REACTIVE ACTIVE REACTIVE
Ρ .U DEG MW MVAR MW MVAR MW MVAR

BUSl 1.0200 0.000 608.191 160.816 200.000 100.000

BUS 2 0.9900 -11.485 600.000 321.036 1000.000 300.000 0.005

1208.191 481.852 1200.000 400.000 0.005 0.000

MAXIMUM MISMATCH 0.005 MW 0.000 MVAR

FIG. 2.86 Full list of load flow analysis results for the system in Fig 2.84

174
 Power system performance analysis

LOAD FLOW RESULTS - BUSBAR PU VOLTS / ANGLE & LINE M W / MVAR LOADING

BUSl BUS2
1.020 0.990
417 -23.9

a .-AO

FIG. 2.87 Results of load flow calculation with one transmission circuit switched out of service

FAST DECOUPLED LOAD FLOW O U T P U T OF R E S U L T S

SYSTEM T I T L E : T W O B U S N E T W O R K

STUDY TITLE:

LINE POWER FLOWS

-BUSBARS -SENDING END RECEIVING END LINE LOSS

BUSl BUS2 417.400 75.762 424.220 400.102 -97.212 411.743 17.297 172.974
BUSl BUS2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

17.297 172.974

OVERLOADED CIRCUIT SUMMARY

RATING —LOADING
MVA MVA PER CENT

BUSBAR DETAILS

VOLTAGE —GENERATION LOAD MISMATCH

MAG ANGLE ACTIVE REACTIVE ACTIVE REACTIVE ACTIVE REACTIVE
Ρ .U DEG MW MVAR MW MVAR MW MVAR

BUSl SLK 617.400 175.762 200.000 100.000

BUS2 PV 600.000 397.212 1000.000 300.000 0.102

1217.400 572.974 1200.000 400.000 0.102

MAXIMUM MISMATCH •
• 0.102 MW 0.000 MVAR

FIG. 2.88 Full list of load flow analysis results for the modified system

175
Electrical system analysis
A small increase in watt generation is also required
to supply the increased transmission circuit real power
loss. The busbar phase angles move further apart but
the consumer sees no change.
In Fig 2.87, there is only one transmission circuit
between Bus 1 and Bus 2. If this is switched out, there
is no interconnection between the two buses. At Bus
1, prior to switching out the transmission circuit, gen­
eration exceeds demand. Provided governor and auto­
matic voltage regulator action is effective in reducing
generator 1 output to match consumer demand at Bus
1, 200 M W + 100 MVAr, and maintain voltage and
frequency at pre-switching values, consumers' suppHes
will be unaffected. At Bus 2, only if the generator
can produce 1000 M W and 300 MVAr is it possible to
continue to supply full consumer demand.
For this reason, the system shown in Fig 2.87 is
less secure than the system shown in Fig 2.85. This
weakness manifests itself in another way. If both
systems are subjected to the same disturbance or fault,
we find that the stronger system shown in Fig 2.85 has
better post-fault recovery characteristics. This is
illustrated in Fig 2.89 and Fig 2.90, which show voltage
recovery following a three phase fault at Bus 1 cleared
in 0.12 s. Figure 2.89 shows voltage recovery with two
transmission circuits in service and Fig 2.90 with one.
Note that in the period of time from 0.3 to 0.6 s, the
period following fault clearance, voltages in Fig 2.89
are significantly higher than those in Fig 2.90. Figure
2.91 shows the rotor angles of the generators with two
transmission circuits in service and Fig 2.92 with one.
The oscillations in Fig 2.91 are smaller in magnitude
than those in Fig 2.92. Both characteristics point to
the system shown in Fig 2.85 as being better able to
withstand faults and other system disturbances.
We have seen that disturbances, when they occur,
affect a power system by changing its voltage levels
and voltage angles. Power flows between the synchro­
nous generators, and this usually restores a system to
a steady operating state. In a strong stable system,
a steady operating state is restored quickly, the syn­
chronous machines initially oscillate about their new
stable positions within the power system and their
oscillations are rapidly damped out.
A weak power system, although initially stable, may
be made unstable by a large disturbance. Here, the
initial power transfers between the synchronous gen­
erators are insufficient to restore a steady operating
state. The generators are no longer cohesive in an
electrical sense, voltages vary widely and may change
rapidly from small to high values.
System transients and disturbances
The fastest significant disturbances on power systems
are caused by switching operations. Travelling voltage
waves result: these are reflected from circuit termina­
tions or circuit impedance changes, for example, where
a line is connected to a transformer. These super­
176
Chapter 2
imposed waves may lead to overvoltages. The time for
such disturbances is a few miUiseconds. Due to their
short duration, they d o not affect power system sta­
bility, except when they cause short-circuits.
Short-circuit disturbances usually last u p to about
0.15 s and are limited by protection detection and
operating time, and by circuit-breaker fault clearance
time. They result from a variety of causes, such as, the
overvoltages described above, h u m a n error (e.g., not
removing earths from equipment after maintenance),
pollution of line insulator surfaces, or mechanical
causes (e.g., accidental damage to a buried cable dur­
ing site excavation). One, two or three phases may
be affected and voltage is depressed to some degree
throughout the electrical power system. At generator
terminals, this reduction in voltage causes an imbalance
between power output and input. This is because
mechanical power input remains constant until changed
by governor action, while the electrical power output
(V3 VI cos</)) changes as V changes and approaches
zero as V nears zero. The reduction in voltage also
causes a reduction in the transmission capacity of lines
because the m a x i m u m power transmitted is propor­
tional to the voltage. Further, induction motors may
be unable to draw sufficient electrical power input to
match their mechanical power output, and slow down.
The fault current will probably be high and may cause
thermal and mechanical damage to plant.
Often related to short-circuit disturbances, but longer
in timescale, are disturbances involving mechanical os­
cillations of synchronous machine rotors. They occur as
a result of system faults, being severe when the faulted
equipment is not disconnected quickly, and also occur
when system switching causes a major redistribution of
power flows. If these disturbances are not contained,
i.e., the mechanical oscillations are allowed to increase,
a major power system breakdown will occur. The power
system is referred to as ^unstable'. Generators will pole-
slip, voltage will fluctuate from zero to high levels, and
distance protection operates to disconnect transmission
lines. Induction motors within power station electrical
systems may be unable to sustain their mechanical
loads, leading to substantial loss of generation output.
Minimising power system instability
Obviously a power system designer seeks to minimise
the possibility of power system instability. For this, he
requires primarily:
• Generators able to provide and absorb substantial
synchronising power, i.e., having low transient re­
actance.
• Generators with high inertia.
• P o w e r transmission a n d d i s t r i b u t i o n networks
matched to demand requirements.
• Fast acting protection and switching to disconnect
faulty plant.
 Power system performance analysis

TWO BUS NETWORK

, Graph 1 : BUSBAR VOLTAGE

FIG. 2.89 Voltage recovery with two transmission circuits in service

T W O BUS NETWORK

, Graph 1 . BUSBAR VOLTAGE

FIG. 2.90 Voltage recovery with one transmission circuit in service

177
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

FIG. 2.91 Rotor angles for two generators with two transmission circuits in service

T W O BUS NETWORK

Graph 1 : SM ANGLE
180-

Gl
135-

90-
/
/ /
/
/
45-
/

_......······••

1
0.5 1.0

FIG. 2.92 Rotor angles for two generators with one transmission circuit in service

178

• Fast acting generator automatic voltage regulators.
• Fast acting generator governors and valving.
• Automatic switching to restore transmission lines
after transient faults.
• Automatic load disconnection schemes to back-up
the above.
Power flows in large systems
Basic theory tells us power will only flow along a
transmission line when there is a voltage difference
between the ends of the line. On A C systems, voltage
is measured in both magnitude and phase angle.
On the British supergrid and other large power
systems the resistance of transmission lines is much
less than the reactance. Transformer resistance is also
much less than reactance. This means that the difference
in phase angle between line ends, not the difference
between voltage moduli, is dominant in determining
the watt flow on a transmission Hne. This is illustrated
in Fig 2.93.
Similarly, the difference in absolute value of voltage
between line ends, not the difference between phase
angles, is dominant in determining the VAr flow on a
transmission line.
Suppose a transmission circuit has a nominal X : R
ratio of 10:1, and the voltage at the sending end of the
circuit ( V s ) is equal in magnitude to the voltage at the
receiving end of the circuit ( V r ) , and V g leads V r by an
angle δ ° .
Then the voltage difference between the circuit ends
is V s - V r , and the circuit current I, will lag behind
the voltage difference by an angle determined by the
X:R ratio of the circuit; here, the angle is t a n " ^ 10 =
V - V
FIG. 2.93 Criteria determining power flow in large systems
Power system performance analysis
84.3°. This is shown in Fig 2.93 (a), note the relative
positions of vectors V s , I and V f .
Now let the angle δ be increased by 5 0 % , but the
magnitude of V s and V r remain unchanged. This is
shown in Fig 2.93 (b). V s - V r increases by nearly
5 0 % and, in consequence, the circuit current I increases
by nearly 5 0 % . I maintains its position between V s and
V r ; at the sending end I lags behind V s , i.e., power is
being exported at a lagging power factor, and at the
receiving end of the circuit I is leading V r , i.e., power
is being imported at a leading power factor.
Now let V s o n Fig 2.93 (a) be increased by 5 % and
δ remain unchanged (Fig 2.93 (c)). The position of
vector V s - V r is now changed and consequently I
changes its position t o o . V s and V r b o t h now lead I
and it can be seen that increasing V s has changed the
VAr flow on the circuit with only a corresponding
minor change in watt flow.
In practice, the British supergrid voltage is main­
tained close to 400 kV or 275 kV throughout the
network but, when power transfers are high, there will
be considerable differences in voltage angles between
busbars. A m a x i m u m difference of 40° between the
extremes of the network would not be unusual.
3.3.2 Analytical and programming
considerations
General
In mathematical terms, power system stability analysis
is the progressive solution of sets of non-linear dif­
ferential equations. The computation requirements are
much greater than for load flow or fauh analysis, hence
efficient solution methods and data i n p u t / o u t p u t
routines are very desirable.
1 . 0 5 X V,
V - V
(b) (c)
179
Electrical system analysis
Consider the basic operation of a turbine-generator.
In its steady state, the mechanical power input is bal­
anced by its electrical power output plus losses, and
the generator runs at constant synchronous speed. If a
difference exists (say the mechanical input exceeds the
electrical output plus losses), the surplus energy is used
to change the kinetic energy of the turbine-generator
rotor, and to overcome damping torque developed in
the damper windings of the generator. (Damper wind­
ings are fitted to absorb cychc disturbing torques.)
Unless the energy change is very slow, the equations
used in the load flow solution can no longer be used.
Let the voltage at the terminals of a generator be
reduced due t o , say, a short-circuit fault on the system.
This means the stator currents will change. This current
change is much greater than that brought about by a
gradual change in voltage. It is computed using the
generator transient and subtransient reactances, while
the slower changes are computed using the generator
synchronous reactance.
T o compute these changes, assumptions are made
that the generator can be represented by E M F s behind
synchronous, transient and subtransient reactances.
Transient and subtransient time constants are then
used to link the reactance effects.
Various methods exist to solve the coupled non-linear
differential equations. An approach often used, is to
linearise the equations over a very small range and to
compute the machine voltage angles in this way over
a small time increment. This time increment, or step
length, can be made as small as required, but obviously
an unnecessarily small step length increases the number
of calculations, increasing the cost of computation
and the time taken. It is vital to predict post-fault
rotor swings accurately. The success of this depends
on the accuracy of the model used and the accuracy
of the data entered into the program.
The speed of movement of individual generator
rotors relative to each other is usually very small
compared with their basic 50 Hz angular velocity. For
this reason, static components of the power system
(transmission Hues, cable circuits and transformers) are
modelled with constant 50 Hz characteristics. Some
programs are, however, designed to accommodate
changes in system frequency by recalculating compo­
nent parameters, where they are frequency dependent.
Machine controllers (governors and A VRs)
There are many types of controller in use. It is not
necessary to model controller actions in load flow and
most fauh level studies because controller action does
not influence the solution.
For transient stability calculations, it is essential to
model the behaviour of machine controllers accurately
and include them in the simulation because these con­
trollers have a strong influence in this case.
An IEEE committee [13] set up to standardise com­
puter representation of excitation systems, produced
180
Chapter 2
reports setting out general representations of the AVRs
then in use. T w o of these models are reproduced in
Figs 2.94 (a) and (b). These models are usually available
in transient stability programs and are used extensively.
Figure 2.95 shows a simple rate and position hmited
integrator controller used to simulate automatic voltage
regulators. It is used in several analysis programs
developed by the C E G B .
A composite s t e a m / h y d r o governor model is shown
in Fig 2.96. This simple model is adequate only if
the functions it represents are dominant in the time-
scale considered. Other more complex models are avail­
able which simulate boiler/turbine reheat cycles and
the associated valving. The data requirements for these
more complex models are given later.
The analyst will always wish to use a standard model
for his analysis if he can. However, because modern
controller design varies so much it is often difficult
to match the characteristics of a particular controller
to those of a standard model. T o overcome this,
generalised methods of modelhng controllers have been
developed, both inside and outside the C E G B . The
controller under consideration is modelled in t e r m :
of its block diagram. It is then used with synchronous
machines in transient stability studies. Facilities also
exist in some programs to test the controller by itself
in open loop simulation. The elements used to form
a controller are of two types. The first type, opera­
tional elements, contain the integral operator S, and
are phase lag, differential lag, lead-lag and quadratic
lag. The second type, non-linear elements, include
Umiters, deadbands, saturation functions, switches, ad­
ders, junctions and user defined functions. Inputs to
controllers can be taken from any point in the system
under consideration but usually are in the form of
electrical power, frequency, terminal voltage, a refer­
ence (set according to initial conditions) and a constant
value. Output from the controller can be fed to any
point in the system, but usually is set to mechanical
power for a governor and to field voltage for an
automatic voltage regulator.
Data requirements
The data which can be processed for load flow and fault
level analysis have been listed earlier. Additional data
which may be processed for transient stability analysis
are given below. Some data are essential, e.g., generator
inertia, motor inertia:
Circuit data
Any specified switching operation
Generator data
Inertia
Damping factor
Potier reactance
Saturation factor
Quadrature axis synchronous reactance
 Power system performance analysis

ν, 1
^max /
Ka 1

1+ ηρ 1+

INPUT FILTER REGULATOR AMPLIFIER SATURATING

EXCITER

(1 + Τ, ρ)

STABILISER
(a) AVR model, IEEE Type 1

V /— ^max/
1 max/
1
1+ τ ρ 1 + T^P

INPUT FILTER REGULATOR AMPLIFIER SATURATING

EXCITER

(1-^LP) (1 + T , P )

STABILISER

(b) AVR model, IEEE Type 2

: INPUT FILTER TIME CONSTANT K, : FEEDBACK GAIN

: FORWARD GAIN T, : FEEDBACK TIME CONSTANT

Ta
: FORWARD GAIN TIME CONSTANT : ADDITIONAL STABILISING FEEDBACK TIME CONSTANT

: MAXIMUM REGULATOR VOLTAGE LIMIT E.ax

: MAXIMUM EXCITER VOLTAGE LIMIT

: MINIMUM REGULATOR VOLTAGE LIMIT : MINIMUM EXCITER VOLTAGE LIMIT

: EXCITER CONSTANT V. : MACHINE TERMINAL VOLTAGE

T^ : EXCITER TIME CONSTANT V^ : REFERENCE VOLTAGE (AND OTHER VOLTAGE SIGNALS)

S3 : EXCITER SATURATION FUNCTION E, : EXCITER FIELD VOLTAGE

FIG. 2.94 AVR models

181
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

Κa
1 '

: FORWARD GAIN ^max : MAXIMUM EXCITER VOLTAGE LIMIT

: STEP FACTOR : MINIMUM EXCITER VOLTAGE LIMIT

V..a. HIGHEST RATE OF RISE OF FIELD VOLTAGE : EXCITER FIELD VOLTAGE

HIGHEST RATE OF FALL OF FIELD VOLTAGE V, : MACHINE TERMINAL VOLTAGE

COMPOSITE EXCITER/GENERATOR LOOP TIME CONSTANT : REFERENCE VOLTAGE (AND OTHER VOLTAGE SIGNALS)

FIG. 2.95 Simplified block diagram of a rate and position limited integrator

1'ωο 1/R 1 +T,p

I' 1 +T,p
1

1 +T,p 1 + T 3 P 1 +T,p

FLYBALLS CONTROL VALVE TURBINE STEAM

POWER OR
LIMITS HYDRO

MACHINE SPEED

ωο SYNCHRONOUS SPEED
R GOVERNOR REGULATION

GOVERNOR TIME CONSTANT

GOVERNOR CONTROL SYSTEM TIME CONSTANT

GOVERNOR CONTROL SYSTEM TIME CONSTANT

GOVERNOR CONTROL SYSTEM TIME CONSTANT

MAXIMUM TURBINE POWER

POWER SETTING

T. TURBINE TIME CONSTANT (HYDRO)

TURBINE TIME CONSTANT

FIG. 2.96 Composite steam/hydro speed governor model

182
 Power system performance analysis

Quadrature axis transient reactance of fault, duration of fault, and any post-fault switching
Quadrature axis subtransient reactance (e.g., removal of faulted transmission circuits, busbar,
Quadrature axis transient open-circuit time constant transformer, generator).
Quadrature axis subtransient axis open-circuit time Three-phase-to-earth faults cause more disturbance
constant than phase-to-phase-to-earth, phase-to-phase, or phase-
to-earth faults. For this reason they are the type of
Automatic voltage regulator (AVR) data fault specified most often.
Identification of model used The fault duration may be set in accordance with
Name of busbar controlled by A V R the expected fault clearance time of the faulted equip­
Forward gain ment — this depends on the operating time of the
Forward time constant equipment protection plus associated switchgear op­
Feedback gain erating time, including tolerances, or to a value derived
Feedback time constant from general design considerations. The shorter the
Maximum regulator voltage limit fault duration, the less the power system is disturbed.
Minimum regulator voltage limit In practice, fault clearance time is often a critical factor
Rate of change of regulator voltage (rising/falling) in determining whether a system remains stable in the
Input filter time constant post fault period.
Exciter gain The fault location can be at any point on the system.
Exciter time constant Usually the locations giving rise t o the most severe
Exciter ceiling voltage disturbances are chosen — this is a matter of experi­
Exciter minimum voltage ence. If deemed credible, simultaneous fauh locations
Regulator amplifier time constant can be specified, e.g., a double-circuit transmission
Exciter saturation specification line fault. A fault is simulated by specifying a shunt of
low impedance to be switched in at, or close t o , the
Governor and turbine data chosen fault location, and to remain connected for the
Speed governor loop regulation duration of the fault. The low impedance shunt is then
Interceptor loop regulation switched out.
Maximum turbine power
At the time of removing the fault (low impedance
Speed at which interceptor valve starts to close
shunt), other switching necessary to remove the fault
Constant relating output of high pressure and other
from the network is simulated, i.e., switching out the
cylinders
faulted circuit.
High pressure throttle valve time constant
The stability study is run until the power system
Interceptor valve time constant
is shown to reach a new state of equilibrium, or to
Reheater time constant
become unstable. In practice, values between one and
High pressure mains loop pipe time constant
five seconds are generally sufficient.
High pressure governor valve upper position limit,
All programs are designed to produce comprehen­
upper and lower velocity rates
sive data o u t p u t . This may be in graphical form, or
Interceptor valve upper position limit, upper and
as tabulated data. Usually the change in rotor angles
lower velocity rates
of the synchronous generators, and busbar voltage
Boiler/turbine pipework resistance coefficient levels are of prime interest but, within power station
Ratio of reheater to high pressure cylinder inlet electrical systems, the decrease in induction motor
pressure at full load speed is also vitally i m p o r t a n t . This reduction in motor
speed can lead to a situation where the voltage at some
Induction motor data
boards remains depressed and motors continue to run
Any specified switching operations
down, although the remainder of the system recovers.
Inertia
This is because induction m o t o r s , when running at
Drop-off to pick-up time delay
speeds substantially below normal rating, take a cur­
Lockout time
rent well in excess of their full load rating. If several
Data to control program runs motors fed from one transformer lose speed at the
Study duration time same time, the combined increase in current may over­
Study step length load the transformer and be enough to lower motor
Swing angle limit terminal voltage, such that the motors are unable to
draw sufficient power t o accelerate back to normal
running speed.
3.3.3 Use of programs
A n example of the graphical output of a stabihty
study following a fault is given in Figs 2.97 to 2.99.
System stability following faults
The system configuration prior to the fault has been
In preparing a stabihty study the analyst specifies sys­ shown earlier in Fig 2.64 but, for analysis purposes,
tem configuration prior to the postulated fault, type the boiler feed p u m p s are assumed running. This is

183
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

LOAD FLOW RESULTS - BUSBAR PU VOLTS & LINE MVA LOADING ©

B6CX B6DY B6DX

1.016 1.013 1^ J.013

B7BX
I 1.035 0.2 V M J 1..039
o.rj^ o.rjr o.y.

FIG. 2.97 System configuration for stability analysis following faults

shown in Fig 2.97. A three-phase-to-earth fault having
a duration of 0.2 s, applied at 11 kV board B5A, is
simulated. T o avoid repetition of the study, the fault
is assumed to be cleared without the disconnection
of any (faulted) plant. This has the effect of making
the post-fault results pessimistic, i.e., *safe'. The volt­
ages of greatest interest in the analysis of a SES are
those at the faulted board, at the busbar supplying the
faulted board and at the boards fed from the faulted
board. The speeds (or slips) of the induction motors fed
from these boards are also important. A plot of voltage
against time at these boards is shown in Fig 2.98 and
a plot of induction motor sHp against time is shown
in Fig 2.99. For ease of analysis, the fault is applied
0.1 s after the study start, and removed 0.2 s later.
The voltage reductions at the time of the fault and
subsequent recovery are typical of electrical supply
system behaviour. Induction motor speed change is
inversely proportional to drive inertia and will vary
accordingly.
The tabulated data output for a stability study
includes:
• Busbar voltages and phase angles.
• Synchronous generator electrical output
mechanical input.
• Synchronous generator rotor angle, field current and
field voltage.
• Induction m o t o r electrical input, mechanical output,
slip and losses.
• Governor parameters.
• A V R parameters.
A n example of tabulated data output for the above
study is given in Fig 2.100, which gives comprehensive
information about the system state at any specified
time; in this example, 0.18 s after fault clearance.
Single fed generator systems
In the event of a breakdown in grid supplies, power
station auxiharies are sometimes suppHed by a standby
generator, usually a gas turbine or diesel-driven alter­
nator. At some magnox type nuclear power stations, the
gas circulators are fed by an auxiliary steam turbine-
generator running isolated from the grid system.
Analysis procedures for these single generator sys­
tems are similar to the procedures for multi-generator
systems. However, load increments, relative to total
generator capacity, are often greater on single gen­
erator fed systems t h a n on multi-generator systems.
and Because of this, frequency deviations from nominal
values tend to be greater on single generator fed sys­
tems. Depending on the frequency variation, it may be
desirable to use a stability program which recalculates

184
 Power system performance analysis

Graph 1 : BUSBAR VOLTAGE

» ese

FIG. 2.98 Voltage/time relationship at affected switchboard

—Graph 4 : IMSLP

FIG. 2.99 Induction motor slip

185
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

STEP NUMBER = 43 TIME = 0.4800 MAXIMUM ITERATIONS PER STEP = 3 STEP LENGTH = 0.0100 ITS/PRINT = 8

SYNCHRONOUS MACHINES

BUSBAR M/C ROTOR POLE ROTOR MECH. POWER OUTPUT TERM. TERM. FIEL D FIELD POWER
NAME NO. ANGLE PRS SLIP POWER ACTIVE REACTIVE VOLTAGE CURRENT V O L T A GE CURRENT FACTOR
DEGREES SLPD P.U MW MW MVAR P.U. P.U. P.U, P.U.

JU4 U 61.30 0 0.0000 660.141 662.327 385.938 0.995 7.708 2.827 2.824 0.8640
Bl J* -13.43* 0 0.0000 -528.645 -527.103 -139.999 0.993 5.490 0.954 0.944 -.9665

AUTOMATIC VOLTAGE REGULATORS

BUSBAR M/C CONTROLLED I/P F I L T E R AMPLIFIER FEEDBACK

NAME NO. BÖS VOLTS SIGNAL SIGNAL SIGNAL

JU4 U 0. 995 0. 995 3,550

Bl J 0.993 0.993 1,037

THERMAL TURBINE GOVERNOR(S)

BUSBAR M/C FLYBALL CONTROL SYSTEM CO NTROL V A L V E

NAME NO. SIGNAL S I G N A L S (MW) SE TTING (MW)
(SLIP) CI C2 C3

JU4 U 0.0000 -.750 -.889 660,000

Bl J 0,0000 -4.977 -5.293 529.829

INDUCTION MOTOR LOAD

BUSBAR M/C ROTOR MECH. P O W E R INPUT TERM, TERM. T O R Q U E (MJ) POWER

NAME NO SLIP POWER ACTIVE REACTIV Ε VOLTAGE CURRENT LOAD MOTOR FACTOR
P.C. MW W MVAR P.U. P, U.

B5A G 5.0808 4 500 8 769 12 735 0.836 0.185 4.7404 8.5143 0.5671
B5A G 5.0808 4 500 8 769 12 735 0,836 0.185 4,7404 8.5143 0.5671
B5B G 0.9676 5 610 5 854 4 310 0.948 0,077 5.6644 5.8102 0.8053
B5B G 0.9676 5 610 5 854 4 310 0,948 0.077 5,6644 5.8102 0.8053
B5C
B5C
G
G
0.8448
0.8448
5
5
638
638 5
s 730
730
3
3
535
535
0.999
0,999
0,067
0.067
5.6865
5.6865
5.6962
5.6962
0.8511
0.8511
BSD G 0.8445 5 639 5 726 3 534 0,999 0.067 5.6865 5.6920 0.8510
BSD G 0.8445 5 639 5 726 3 534 0.999 0.067 5.6865 5.6920 0.8510
B6AY R 9.1860 0 089 0 161 0 34 6 0.822 0.005 0.0983 0.1453 0.4208
B5B C 1.2468 1 4 98 1 545 1 580 0.948 0.023 1.5173 1.5180 0.6993
BSD C 1.0814 1 509 1 548 1 532 0.999 0.022 1.5254 1.5238 0.7107
B5A Β S.6154 7 707 14 423 18 318 0.836 0.279 8.1656 14.0166 0.6186
BSC Β 1.1964 9 763 9 966 4 255 0.999 0.108 9.8815 9.9049 0.9197
B6AY Ε 100.0000 0 000 0 000 0 000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000
B7AX Ε 9.7885 0 342 0 686 1 128 0.790 0.017 0.3793 0.5996 0.5198
B7BY Ε 1.5367 0 240 0 256 0 127 0.990 0.003 0.2437 0.2499 0.8954

(a)

B7BX Ε 1.5246 0,507 0 541 0.270 0.987 0.006 0.5144 0. 5285 0.8951
B6B Β 1.0638 0.429 0 455 0.282 0.929 0.006 0.4334 0. 4483 0.8496
B6B R 1.3565 0.301 0 323 0.205 0.929 0.004 0.3050 0. 3166 0.8450
B6D C 0.6279 1.521 1 550 0.988 1.016 0.018 1.5311 1. 5375 0.8432
B6D A 0.9657 0.198 0 203 0.177 1.016 0.003 0.1998 0. 2001 0.7536
B6D Μ 1.1742 0.172 0 179 0.105 1.016 0.002 0.1745 0. 1748 0.8626
M4 Ε 13.5207 0.232 0 479 0.921 0.721 0.014 0.2678 0. 4042 0.4612
B7B3 Ε 1.6708 0.189 0 203 0.103 0.959 0.002 0.1920 0. 1975 0.8914
B7B4 Ε 1.6921 0,323 0 347 0.177 0.956 0.004 0.3286 0. 3381 0.8906
B7B8 Ε 1.7240 0.488 0 524 0.269 0.950 0.006 0,4961 0. 5106 0.8896
B7B9 Ε 1.8816 0.955 1 029 0.548 0.925 0.013 0.9729 1. 0006 0.8827
B7B6 Ε 1.6985 0,399 0 428 0.219 0.954 0.005 0.4059 0. 4176 0.8905
B6AX D 100.0000 0.000 0 000 0.000 0.000 0,000 0.0000 0. 0000 0,0000
M3 Ρ 1.7365 0.150 0 162 0.083 0.952 0.002 0,1527 0. 1576 0.8898

BUSBAR VOLTAGES

BUSBAR VOLTAGE ANGLE BUSBAR VOLTAGE ANGLE BUSBAR VOLTAGE ANGLE BUSBAR VOLTAGE ANGLE
B3 0 981 -2 17 3W 0 .992 -2 .52 J5B1 0.949 -5 .53 J5A1 0 839 -8 24
Bl 0 993 04 B5B 0 .948 -5 ,55 B5A 0,836 -8 .27 B4 0 994 7 55
BSD 0 999 4 56 B5C 0 .999 3 .92 J5C1 1.001 3 .98 J5D1 1 001 4 60
J5B2 0 946 - 5 58 J5D2 0 999 4 .55 B6AX 0.822 -9 .20 Β 7 AX 0 790 -11 16
B6AY 0 822 -9 19 Β 7 AY 0 .800 -10 .86 B6BX 0.962 -6 ,10 B6CX 1 009 3 26
B6DX 1 007 3 68 B6DY 1 006 3 .68 B6CY 1.009 3 .26 B6BY 0 962 -6 10
B7BY 0 990 -7 15 B7BX 0 .987 -7 .41 B7CX 1.031 1 .86 B7CY 1 026 1 81
B7DY 1 020 1 79 B7B1 0 951 -9 .44 B7B2 0.949 -9 .55 B7B3 0 959 -9 11
B7B4 0 956 -9 36 B7B5 0 958 -8 .97 B7B6 0.954 -9 .57 Jl 0 929 -8 41
J2 0 929 -8 41 J3 0 92 9 -8 ,41 J4 0.929 -8 .41 J5 0 929 -8 40
J6 0 929 -8 41 J6AE 0 823 -9 .20 J6BE 0.962 -6 .09 J6CE 1 010 3 27
J6AY 0 821 -9 19 J6AX 0 821 -9 19 J6BY 0.962 -6 .10 J6BX 0 962 -6 10
J6CY 1 009 3 26 J6CX 1 009 3 .26 J6DY 1.006 3 .68 J6DX 1 006 3 68
JU4 0 995 7 55 J5CE 0 999 3 92 J5AE 0.836 -8 .27 J5BE 0 948 -5 55
J5DE 0 999 4 56 J6DE 1 007 3 .70 B7B7 0,953 -9 .16 B7B8 0 950 -9 80
B7B9 0 925 -11 39 B7B91 0 92 5 --11 39 B7D4 1.024 0 .87 J13 1 016 2 76
B7D3 1 043 1 85 J12 1 016 2 76 B7D2 1,042 1 ,85 Jll 1 016 2 76
B7D1 1 050 2 34 JIO 1 016 2 76 B6D 1,016 2 .76 B7DY1 1 000 1 56
B7DX 1 021 2 10 J7 0 929 -8 .40 J8 0.929 -8 .41 J9 0 923 -8 50
B6B 0 929 -8 40 M4 0 721 -7 56 M3 0, 952 -7 .34

NORMAL STEP LENGTH I N C R E A S E D TO 0.02000 S , A T STEP FROM TIME 0.4800

(b)

FIG. 2.100 Example of data output for a stability study

186
 Power system performance analysis

these system component parameters which are fre­ The system modelled has been shown earher in Fig 2.65;
quency dependent. it represents a single steam generator supplying six
Examples of the output from a dynamic stability gas circulators. T h e postulated fault is a three-phase-
study of an isolated system are shown in Fig 2.101. to-earth fauU at the cable b o x (J2) of one of the

MOTOR LOADING OF 2.9MW - 0.1258 FAULT

1.4H
1.025 Η

1.2H
1.020 Η

1.0-^
1.015 Η

0.8H
i.oioH

0.6H
1.005 Η

1.000 J0.4H

0.995 0.2Jlf-2H

0.990-Ό.Ο-Ό-»0.0
^ 2 jij^E.s ^
• GENERATOR TERMINAL VOLTAGE (P.U.)
- GENERATOR TERMINAL CURRENT (P.U. ON RATING)
- GENERATOR REAL AND REACTIVE TERMINAL POWER (P.U. ON RATING)
• GENERATOR FREQUENCY (P.U.)

0.10H MOTOR LOADING OF 2.9MW - 0.1258 FAULT

6H

14i

12H
0.05-4

10H 4H

8 H
o.ooA

6i

4 H
-o.osA

H
2H

0-· -o.ioJo-i
TIME.s
-MOTOR 5 TERMINAL VOLTS (P.U.)
-MOTOR 5 TERMINAL CURRENT (P.U. ON RATING)
-MOTOR 5 REAL AND REACTIVE TERMINAL POWER (P.U. ON 100MVA)
-MOTOR 5 SLIP (%)

FIG. 2.101 Example of the output from a dynamic stability study on an isolated system

187
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

gas circulators. It is, for analysis purposes, assumed cuit between G C . B D a n d J 2 , 0.125 s after the appH-
to be of 0.125 s duration and is cleared by opening the cation of the fault.
associated circuit-breaker at the main board (GC.BD). Figure 2.102 is included here t o demonstrate the
This is simulated in the analysis by removing the cir­ unacceptable effects of slow fault clearance, in this

MOTOR LOADING OF 2.9MW - 0.125S FAULT

7H
1.4H
1.025 Η
6H
1.2H
1.020 Η
J1.0
1.0H
1.015H

0.81
1.010H

3i
0.6H
1.005 Η

2H0.4H
1.000·J 0.41

HI
0.995-^OH

0.990-^0.0-Ό-Ό.Ο
TIME,s
• GENERATOR TERMINAL VOLTAGE (P.U.)
- GENERATOR TERMINAL CURRENT (P.U. ON RATING)
• GENERATOR REAL AND REACTIVE TERMINAL POWER (P.U. ON RATING)
• GENERATOR FREOUENCY (P.U.)

0.10H MOTOR LOADING OF 2.9MW - 0.18S FAULT

6H
14H

5H
12H
0.05H

4H

O.OOH 3H

6H

2A

4H -0.05H

2H

o-" -o.io-O-J
1
^ TIME,s
- MOTOR 5 TERMINAL VOLTS (P.U.)
- MOTOR 5 TERMINAL CURRENT (P.U. ON RATING)
• MOTOR 5 REAL AND REACTIVE TERMINAL POWER (P.U. ON lOOMVA)
• MOTOR 5 SLIP (%)

FIG. 2.102 Unacceptable effects of slow fault clearance

188

example on a single generator system. The postulated
fault is similar to that shown in Fig 2.101, except that
its duration is increased from 0.125 s to 0.18 s, and
we have an example where this power system has
become unstable. Voltage remains depressed in the
post-fauU period and the remaining induction motors
are unable to accelerate to their normal speed. In
practice, the system condition simulated here would
not occur because electrical protection is provided to
disconnect the generator in the event of sustained gen­
erator overload or sustained system voltage depression.
Motor run-up
The time taken by an induction motor to run-up from
standstill to normal running speed can be calculated
using transient stabihty analysis programs. This run-up
time can be important; for example, when a boiler feed
p u m p fails and the water input to the boiler becomes
insufficient to match the boiler steam output. Gen­
erating output will need to be reduced unless a standby
p u m p can be substituted quickly for the failed p u m p
to dehver adequate water supplies to the boiler.
To simulate induction motor performance over its
whole speed range, it is necessary to provide m o t o r
resistance and reactance values, both at the normal
motor running speed and when the motor is at stand­
still. These values are not the same. It is also neces­
sary to specify how the mechanical load on the m o t o r
varies while the motor is running u p ; for example,
the mechanical load may be assumed to be constant,
or to be proportional to the motor speed. Other func­
tions relating motor speed with mechanical load can be
defined, as required.
The motor start and run-up is simulated by simply
specifying one switching operation during the tran­
sient stability study, that of switching in the m o t o r .
An example from a direct-on-line motor start and run­
up study is given in Figs 2.103 (a) to (d). Referring
to Fig 2.54, one of the boiler feed p u m p motors
connected to 11 kV SBl is assumed to be shutdown
and is redesignated as motor A . One change in t a p
position on the station transformer is necessary to
reduce the 11 kV station board voltage to 1.014 per-
unit. The resulting system condition is shown in Fig
2.103 (a).
The results of most interest to the analyst are:
Power system performance analysis
• The run-up time of the m o t o r .
• The effect of the m o t o r on the system, especially by
how much b o a r d voltages are reduced.
• The effects of these voUage reductions on other
motors.
• The recovery time of voltages at all system levels.
The results of the m o t o r run-up study are shown in
graphical form in Figs 2.103 (b) and (c). Figure 2.103
(b) shows the voltages at boards which are electrically
close to the m o t o r being started and Fig 2.103 (c)
shows the m o t o r run-up curve (slip against time) and
the slips of other motors which may be affected by
the reduced voltage. The figures show this particular
m o t o r running u p to speed in 10 s and that the other
motors are able to continue supplying their mechani­
cal loads while voltages are depressed during the motor
run-up periods. It should be remembered that motor
run-up times are strongly influenced by the voltage
at the m o t o r terminals during r u n - u p . The voltage
curves are those expected; after the initial fall in volt­
age there is a gradual slight recovery as the motor
gains speed and takes less reactive power. Finally, there
is a sharp rise in voltage as the m o t o r passes its peak
torque, and watt and VAr input reduce simuUaneously.
These results would be considered satisfactory, because
voltages remain within design hmits and the motor
run-up time is acceptable.
Detailed system performance data are available
throughout the study period. A n example is given in
Fig 2.103 (d), at 2 s after the m o t o r start. It shows
that m o t o r A at 11 kV SBl has a slip of 60.99% and
a power input of 4.33 M W and 33.55 M V A r , with a
terminal vohage of 0.843 per-unit at this instant.
3.4 Future developments of electrical
analysis programs
Further developments of the electrical analysis pro­
grams that are currently in hand include the following:
• H a r m o n i c analysis of a power system.
• Modelling of converter equipment as part of a user
defined modelling facility.
• Transient recovery voltages.
189
Electrical system analysis Chapter 2

LOAD FLOW RESULTS - BUSBAR PU VOLTS & LINE MVA LOADING

11KVUB1
1.009

JETTV
1.025

(a)

Graph 1 : BUSBAR VOLTAGE

132kV

(b)

FIG. 2 . 1 0 3 Example of motor start and run-up study

190
 Power system performance analysis

•Β· 11kVSB1
&
•S' 3.3SB1

(c)

STEP NUMBER = 122 TIME = 2.1200 MAXIMUM ITERATIONS PER STEP = 9 STEP LENGTH = 0.0200 ITS/PRINT = 23

SYNCHRONOUS MACHINES

BUSBAR M/C ROTOR POLE ROTOR MECH. POWER OUTPUT TERM. TERM. FIEL D FIELD POWER
NAME NO. ANGLE PRS SLIP POWER ACTIVE REACTIVE VOLTAGE CURRENT V O L T A GE CURRENT FACTOR
DEGREES SLPD P.U. MW MW MVAR P.U. P.U. P.U. P.U.

_
400KV -8.10* 0 . 0000 573.448 -574.530 -49.675 0.991 5.819 0.986 0.988 -.9963
23KVG S 63.17 0 - .0000 661.247 660.403 260.042 0.991 7.163 2.620 2.626 0.9305
llKVUBl G 0.00 0 0 . 0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000

INDUCTION M O T O R LOAD

BUSBAR M/C ROTOR MECH. POWER INPUT TERM. TERM. T O R Q U E (MJ) POWER
NAME NO SLIP POWER ACTIVE REACTIV Ε VOLTAGE CURRENT LOAD MOTOR FACTOR
P.C. MW MW MVAR P.U. P. U.

llKVUBl F 1.1594 2.588 2 633 1.463 0.999 0.030 2.6185 2.6116 0.8742
llKVUBl F 1.1594 2.588 2 633 1.463 0.999 0.030 2.6185 2.6116 0.8742
llKVUBl I 1.0305 2.978 3 015 1.767 0.999 0.035 3.0093 2.9941 0.8627
llKVUBl I 1.0305 2.978 3 015 1.767 0.999 0.035 3.0093 2.9941 0.8627
llKVUBl C 1.1035 2.908 2 959 1.787 0.999 0.035 2.9401 2.9400 0.8560
llKVSBl A 60.9954 -.104 4 326 33.548 0.843 0.401 -.2657 3.8581 0.1279
llKVSBl Β 1.2687 9.885 10 066 5.531 0.843 0.136 10.0119 10.0123 0.8764
3.3UB1 X 1.0429 0.999 1 032 0.830 1.006 0.013 1.0099 1.0102 0.7793
3.3UB1 X 100.0000 0.000 0 000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
3.3UB1 ζ 0.7664 2.999 3 081 3.030 1.006 0.043 3.0218 3.0237 0.7129
3.3SB1 S 1.1598 1.283 1 315 0.783 0.837 0.018 1.2976 1.2977 0.8592
3.3SB1 A 2.1981 0.195 0 205 0.111 0.837 0.003 0.1996 0.1996 0.8806
3.3F01 ζ 100.0000 0.000 0 000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
3.3F01 F 1.6974 0.531 0 527 0.282 0.844 0.007 0.5401 0.5209 0.8815
3.3F01 ζ 1.4667 1.873 1 860 0.989 0.844 0.025 1.9007 1.8402 0.8829

BUSBAR VOLTAGES

BUSBAR VOLTAGE ANGLE BUSBAR VOLTAGE ANGLE BUSBAR VOLTAGE ANGLE BUSBAR VOLTAGE ANGLE
400KV 0.991 -.58 132KV 0.958 -3.59 llKVUBl 0.999 2.71 llKVSBl 0.843 -7.42
3.3UB1 1. 006 0.53 3.3SB1 0.837 -11.38 3.3F01 0.844 -10.95 FOS 0.852 -11.57
TS 0. 846 -11.82 CWPH 0.842 -12.02 BHX 0.846 -11.74 WTP 0.837 -12.44
GTH 0. 847 -11.76 C+A 0.841 -12.17 SSIA 0.841 -12.24 UTSl 1.018 0.09
SSIB 0. 845 -11.93 UBSl 1.015 -.04 23KVG 0.991 7.18 HVWS 0.834 -12.13
FPH 0. 829 -12.63 BHSl 0.846 -11.75 HYD 0.831 -12.28 CHL 0.838 -12.07
J 0. 852 -11.57 JETTY 0.843 -11.44

(d)

FIG. 2 . 1 0 3 ^cont'd) Example of motor start and run-up study

191
Electrical system analysis
4 References
[1] Allan, R. N. and Avouris, N. M.: Users Manual for GRASP2
(Graphic/Interactive Reliability of Electrical Auxiliary Systems
of Power Stations): University of Manchester Institute of Science
and Technology: April 1983
[2] Allan, R. N. and Billington, R.: Reliability Evaluation of
Engineering Systems: Pitmans: 1987
[31 Avouris, N. M.: Interactive Reliability Analysis of Electrical
Auxiliary Systems (PhD Thesis): University of Manchester
Institute of Science and Technology: January 1983
[4] Stott, B.: Power System Load Flow (MSc Lecture notes): Uni­
versity of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology: 1973
[5] Brameller, Α.: Analysis of Linear Network Systems (MSc
Lecture notes): University of Manchester Institute of Science and
Technology: 1973
[6] Stagg and El-Abiad: Computer Methods in Power System
192
Chapter 2
Analysis: McGraw-Hill: 1971
[7] Ralston: A First Course in Numerical Analysis: McGraw-Hill:
1979
[8] Pettofrezzo: Matrices and Transformations: Prentice Hall:
1966 (out of print)
[9] Arrillaga, Arnold and Harker,: Computer Modelling of
Electrical Power Systems: John Wiley: 1983
[10] Wagner and Evans: Symmetrical Components: McGraw-Hill:
1933 (out of print)
[11] Charles Concordia: Synchronous Machines: John Wiley: (out
of print)
[12] Stevenson: Elements of Power System Analysis: McGraw-Hill:
1982 (out of print)
[13] IEEE Report on Computer Representation of Excitation
Systems Paper 31TP 67-424: IEEE Summer Power Meeting:
Portland, Oregon July 9-14, 1967
 C H A P T E R 3

Transformers

Introduction 1.7.3 Processing and dry-out

1.7.4 Final testing
1 General design and construction
1.7.5 Power frequency overvoltage tests
1.1 Types of transformer 1.7.6 Impulse tests
1.1.1 Phase relationships — phasor groups 1.7.7 Switching-surge tests
1.1.2 Star/star connected transformers 1.7.8 Load runs
1.1.3 The interconnected star connection 1.7.9 Short-circuit testing
1.2 Basic materials 1.8 Transport, installation and commissioning
1.2.1 Dielectrics 1.8.1 Transport
1.2.2 Basic materials — copper, iron and insulation 1.8.2 Installation and site erection
1.3 Transformer characteristics 1.8.3 Site commissioning
1.3.1 Basic theory
1.3.2 Leakage reactance Special design features
1.3.3 Core loss 2.1 Generator transformers
1.3.4 Load losses 2.1.1 Required characteristics
1.4 Transformer construction 2.1.2 General design features
1.4.1 Core construction 2.1.3 Single-phase generator transformers
1.4.2 Transformer windings 2.1.4 Performance and reliability
1.4.3 Winding conductors 2.1.5 Economics of operation
1.4.4 Low voltage windings 2.2 Station transformers
1.4.5 Transpositions 2.2.1 Station transformer characteristics
1.4.6 Continuously-transposed strip 2.2.2 General design features
1.4.7 High voltage windings 2.3 Unit transformers
1.4.8 Tapping windings 2.3.1 Unit transformer characteristics
1.4.9 Disposition of windings 2.3.2 General design features
1.4.10 Impulse strength 2.4 Auxiliary transformers
1.4.11 Thermal considerations 2.4.1 General design features
1.4.12 Performance under short-circuit 2.4.2 Auxiliary transformer insulation systems
1.5 Tappings and tapchangers 2.4.3 Design features of dry-type transformers
1.5.1 Uses of tapchangers 2.4.4 Special transformers
1.5.2 Impedance variation 2.4.5 Foil windings
1.5.3 Tapchanger mechanisms 2.5 Neutral earthing
1.5.4 Single compartment tapchangers 2.5.1 Generator earthing transformers — basic principles
1.5.5 In-tank tapchangers 2.5.2 Generator neutral earthing transformers — general
1.5.6 Off-circuit tapchangers design features
1.6 Tanks, connections and auxiliary plant
2.5.3 Practical arrangement
1.6.1 Transformer tanks
2.5.4 Loading resistor
1.6.2 Oil preservation equipment — conservators
2.5.5 Generator busbar system earthing
1.6.3 Bushing connections
2.5.6 Harmonic suppressors
1.6.4 SFe connections
2.6 Series reactors
1.6.5 Cable box connections 2.6.1 General design features
1.6.6 Tank-mounted coolers 2.6.2 Testing of series reactors
1.6.7 Separate cooler banks 2.7 Instrument transformers
1.6.8 Water cooling 2.7.1 Voltage transformers
1.6.9 Cooler control 2.7.2 Generator voltage transformers
1.6.10 Layout of transformer compounds 2.7.3 Current transformers
1.7 Quality assurance and testing 2.7.4 Current transformer construction
1.7.1 Quality assurance (QA)
1.7.2 Tests during manufacture 3 References

Introduction system, with power stations often located many miles

from the centres of electrical load. Before that, in the
The invention of the power transformer in the latter early days of public electricity supplies, these were D C
part of the nineteenth century m a d e possible the de­ systems with the source of generation, of necessity,
velopment of the modern constant voltage A C supply close to the point of loading.

193
Transformers Chapter 3

The power transformer, not only permitted the

development of large central power stations but, in RED

addition, made a significant contribution to the de­

velopment of the power station itself.
The amount of auxihary plant needing an electri­
cal supply in a power station is so great that it is
necessary to provide an electrical system similar in
magnitude and complexity to that of a small town. As
a result, there is a need, in a 2000 M W station, for
five or possibly six different voltage level systems,
requiring 60 or more power transformers to provide
the interconnections. These range from the largest, the BLUE C, B2 YELLOW

generator transformer, which steps u p the generator

output voltage for connection to the transmission
system, to the many very much smaller auxiliary trans­
formers which provide suppHes at several voltages down
to 415 V. In addition, there is an almost countless
number of transformers providing suppHes at 110 V
and lower, for control and instrumentation equipment.

1 General design and construction

The transformer interconnects and transfers power
between systems at different voltages. It does this with (a)
very high efficiency, usually 9 9 % or better, and even
the imperfection which results from the incomplete
magnetic coupHng of primary and secondary, i.e.,
leakage reactance, is a feature which can be used to
advantage by the system designer to reduce system fault
levels and the consequent rupturing capability of the
system switchgear.

1.1 Types of transformer

Transformers in power stations are generaUy three-
phase and almost invariably double-wound, i.e., they
have electrically separate primary and secondary wind­
ings. A u t o transformers are not used.
Since in a power station each three-phase system
requires an earth, it is convenient if one of these
windings can be star connected and thereby provide a
neutral for connecting to earth either soHdly or via a
(b)
fault current Hmiting resistor. It is also desirable that
a three-phase system should have a delta to provide a
low impedance path for third harmonic currents in
order to eliminate or reduce third harmonic voltages
in the waveform. This requirement is most easily met
by connecting the other winding in delta.

1.1.1 Phase relationships — phasor groups

If a two winding three-phase transformer has one
winding star connected and the other in delta, there
will be a phase shift produced by the transformer, as
can be seen by reference to Fig 3 . 1 . In the example
(c)
shown in the diagram, this phase shift is 30° before
twelve o'clock (assuming clockwise rotation) which FIG. 3.1 Winding connections, phasor and
is referred to as the 'eleven o'clock' position. The polarity diagram

194

secondary delta could also have been made by con­
necting ai b 2 , bi C2 and C i a2 which would produce
a phase displacement of 30° clockwise to the *one
o'clock' position. It has also been assumed that the
primary and secondary windings of the transformer
in Fig 3.1 (b) have been wound in the same sense,
so that the induced voUages appear in the same sense.
This produces a transformer with subtractive polarity,
since, if the hne terminals of a corresponding primary
and secondary phase are connected together, the volt­
ages will subtract, as can be seen in Fig 3.1 (c). If the
secondary winding is wound in the opposite sense to
the primary, additive polarhy will resuk.
The full range of phase relationships available by
varying primary and secondary connections can be
found in BS171 (lEC 76)[1].
1.1.2 Star/star connected transformers
In addition to the considerations discussed above,
when selecting the connection necessary for a three-
phase transformer, it is also necessary to consider the
phase displacement of the associated systems. That
is, in transforming to a given voltage level the re-
suUant phase displacement must be the same by
whatever route the transformation is arrived at. For
example, a generator transformer connecting the 400 kV
and 23.5 kV systems would probably be connected
star/delta, with the 23.5 kV phasor at one o'clock;
that is Y d l . The 23.5/11 kV unit transformer would
be connected delta/star, with its 11 kV phasor at the
eleven o'clock position; that is D y l l . This means that
the 11 kV system has zero phase shift compared with
the 400 kV system. This will be made clearer by
reference to Fig 3.2. If, at the same power station,
it is also required to install a station transformer
stepping down directly from 400 to 11 kV, then that
transformer must produce zero phase displacement
400kV
Θ 400 kV SYSTEM
12 O'CLOCK
)<=^GENERATOR TRANSFORMER A/AVNdl
0.3. 5kV SYSTEM
O'CLOCK
UNIT TRANSFORMER Δ IX Dyn 11
© IlkVSSYSTEM
12 0ΊCLOCK
FIG. 3 . 2 Phase shifts of power station auxiliary system
General design and construction
and the simplest way of doing this is to utihse a star/
star transformer. Such an arrangement ensures that
both 400 and 11 kV systems are provided with a neutral
for connection to earth, but fails to meet the require­
ment that the transformer should have one winding
connected in delta in order to eliminate third harmonic
voltages. It is possible, and it may indeed be neces­
sary, to provide a delta connected tertiary winding in
order to meet this requirement. However, in recent
years it has been the practice to dispense with a delta
tertiary winding and the advantages and disadvantages
of this are discussed more fully in Section 2.2.2 of
this chapter.
1.1.3 The interconnected star connection
The interconnected star connection is obtained by
subdividing the transformer windings into halves and
then interconnecting these between phases. One possi­
ble arrangement is shown in Fig 3.3 (a), producing
the phasor diagram of Fig 3.3 (b). There is a phase
displacement of 30° and, by varying the interconnec­
tions and sense of the windings, a number of alter­
natives can be produced. While the interconnected
star arrangement has little application on a power
station auxiliary system, it is used to provide a neutral
for connection to earth on a system which would not
otherwise have one, and for details of this application
reference should be m a d e to Chapter 11 of this volume
deahng with power system protection. The intercon­
nected star arrangement also has an application when
it is necessary to introduce diverse phase relationships
into the connections of equipment which can produce
high levels of harmonics. Its use can assist the reduc­
tion of the level of harmonics at the point of common
coupling to the system. This wih be discussed further
in Section 2.4 of this chapter deahng with auxihary
transformers.
STATION TRANSFORMER
Λ / Λ
YNyno
195
Transformers
COILS
(a)
(b)
FIG. 3.3 Interconnected star winding arrangement
1.2 Basic materials
1.2.1 Dielectrics
The majority of transformers installed at power station
sites are oil-filled, using a mineral oil which in the
UK comphes with BS 148. This serves the dual purpose
of providing insulation and as a cooling medium to
conduct away the losses which are produced in the
transformer in the form of heat.
Mineral oil is, of course, combustible — it has a fire
point of 170°C — and transformer fires do some­
times occur. It is usual, therefore, to locate these out
of doors where a fire is more easily dealt with and
consequentially the risks are less. It is necessary to
consider the need for segregation from other plant and
incorporate measures to restrict the spread of fire.
Because of the fire hazard associated with mineral
oil, it has been the practice to use designs for smaller
auxiliary transformers which do not contain any oil.
These may be entirely dry, air insulated; or they may
contain non-flammable or reduced flammable liquid;
they have the advantage that they may be located inside
buildings in close proximity to the associated switch-
gear. More will be said about this type of transformer
in Section 2.4 of this chapter.
1.2.2 Basic materials — copper, iron and
insulation
The other basic materials which go to make a trans­
former are iron, nowadays almost exclusively cold-rolled
grain-oriented in the form of laminations 0.28-0.30 m m
196
Chapter 3
thick, which make up the core or magnetic circuit, and
copper or, more precisely, hard-drawn high-conductivity
copper, from which the windings are formed. In most
transformers, winding turns are insulated by paper sup­
plemented in some cases by enamel, whilst the major
insulation, insulating winding from winding and wind­
ings from core, is almost entirely paper or cotton-fibre
based board or laminated board, with small amounts
of wood or wood laminates used where high mechanical
strength is demanded. The properties of these basic
materials will be dealt with in further detail in the sec­
tions dealing with core and windings.
1.3 Transfornner characteristics
For a detailed treatment of basic transformer theory,
the reader is referred to a standard text book [2].
However, it is necessary to carry out a brief review of
the basic theory in order to obtain an understanding
of how the characteristics demanded in power stations
affect the design, how these interact with each other
and what performance might reasonably be expected
from a given transformer design.
1.3.1 Basic theory
A transformer usually consists of two coils linking an
iron core. An alternating voltage applied to one of
these coils produces an alternating flux within the core.
This, in turn, induces an alternating voltage within
each turn linking the flux, which, in accordance with
Lenz's law, has such a polarity as to oppose that flux
if current is allowed to flow.
This is normally expressed in the form
Ε = - N(d</)/dt)
but, for the practical transformer, it can be shown
that the voltage induced per turn is
E / N = Κφ (3.1)
where φ is the total flux linking that turn and Κ is
a constant which depends on the supply frequency and
the units in which φ is measured.
For a 50 Hz supply, R M S voltage, and total flux
measured in Webers, Κ is equal to 4.44.
This expression is a measure of the voltage induced
per turn regardless of which winding a particular turn
might be associated with. If the transformer had only
one winding this induced voltage, or back E M F , would
balance the supply voltage and an equilibrium would
be estabhshed with the ^transformer' taking a very small
current, the magnetising current, sufficient to establish
flux within the core. Any other winding would thus
develop a voltage proportional to the number of turns
and, for a two winding transformer, the famihar re­
lationship exists that
 General design and construction

EiNi = E2N2 (3.2)

where Ei and Ni are the voltage and turns, respec­

tively, of the primary winding and E 2 and N 2 those
of the secondary winding.
If a current were then allowed to flow in a se­
condary winding, by connecting some external load,
this current would itself produce a flux, the sense of
which would be the same as that of the back E M F
and it would thus neutralise the back E M F developed
in the primary winding, thereby allowing current to
be drawn from the supply applied to the primary
winding. The flux produced by this primary current is
such as to balance the neutralising flux created by the
secondary current and equilibrium is established once
more. Primary and secondary currents are in inverse
proportion to the turns ratio, since I i N i = I 2 N 2 . (a) Single phase core-type transformer
The transformer has thus accomplished the neces­
YOKES
sary transformation of voltage levels and ^reflects' into
the primary circuit those events which occur in the
secondary.
The transformation is, however, not perfect. Not
all the flux produced by the primary winding links
with the secondary for example, so that events as seen
from the primary are not a total reflection of those
occurring on the secondary, i.e., the transformer has
leakage reactance. As already mentioned, establishing
flux in the core involves the drawing of a magnetising
current. Associated with this flux there are hysteresis
losses and eddy current losses in the core. When load
current flows there are resistive losses and eddy current
losses in the windings. There are also eddy current
losses in the tank and the core frame.
(b) 3 - phase core-type transformer

1.3.2 Leakage reactance

As explained above, the leakage reactance of a trans­
former arises from the fact that all the flux produced
by one winding does not link with the other winding.
As would be expected, therefore, the magnitude of
AXIAL mitb
this leakage flux is a function of the geometry and LENGTH mit a
construction of the transformer. Although there are
other forms of construction, the majority of trans­
mite
formers and certainly all power station transformers
produced in the UK are of the core-type construction,
as shown in Figs 3.4 (a) and 3.4 (b), consisting of a
central core surrounded by two or more concentric
windings. This central wound section is known as the (c) mit = MEAN LENGTH OF TURN
leg, or limb, and the iron circuit is completed by a
return section or yoke. Figure 3.4 (c) shows a part- FIG. 3.4 Arrangement of windings on single-phase and
section of a core-type transformer taken axially through three-phase cores
the centre of the wound limb and cutting the primary
and secondary windings. The principal dimensions are b the radial depth of the winding next to the core
marked in the figure, as follows:
c the radial depth of the outer winding

1 is axial length of windings (assumed the same for

If mit is then the mean length of turn of the winding
primary and secondary)
indicated by the appropriate subscript, mltb for the
a is the radial spacing between windings inner winding, mite for the outer winding and mita

197
Transformers
for a hypothetical winding occupying the space between
inner and outer windings, then the leakage reactance
in percent is given by the expression
% X = KF(3amha + b m h b + cmhc)/01 (3.3)
where Κ is a constant of value dependent on the
system of units used
F is equal to the ampere-turns of primary or
secondary winding, i.e., M M F per h m b
φ is the total flux in the core
Equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) determine the basic
parameters which fix the design of the transformer.
The M M F is related to the M V A rating of the trans­
former and the total flux, φ, is the product of flux
density and core cross-sectional area. Flux density is
determined by the choice of core material and the
duty of the transformer. The transformer designer can,
therefore, select a combination of φ and 1 to provide
the value of reactance required by the customer. A
larger core cross-section, usually referred to as the
frame size, and a longer 1 will reduce reactance and,
conversely, reducing frame size and winding length
will increase reactance. Unfortunately, the designer's
task is not quite as simple as that since variation of
any of the principal parameters affects the others
which will then also affect the reactance. For example,
increasing φ not only reduces reactance, because of its
appearance in the denominator of Equation (3.3), but
it also reduces the number of turns, as can be seen by
reference to Equation (3.1), which will thus reduce
reactance still further. The value of 1 can be used
to adjust the reactance since it mainly affects the
denominator of Equation (3.3). Nevertheless, if 1 is
reduced, say, to increase reactance, this shortening of
the winding length resuhs in an increase in the radial
depth (b and c) of each winding, in order that the
same number of turns can be accommodated in the
shorter axial length of winding. This tends to increase
the reactance further. Another means of fine tuning
of the reactance is by variation of the winding radial
separation, the value 'a' in Equation (3.3). This is
more sensitive than changes in b and c since it is
multiplied by the factor three, and the designer has
more scope to effect changes since the dimension *a'
is purely the dimension of a 'space'. Changes in the
value of 'a' also have less knock-on effect although
they will, of course, affect 'mhc'. For a given trans­
former 'a' will have a minimum value, determined by
the vohage class of the windings and the insulation
necessary between them. In addition, the designer will
not wish to artificially increase 'a' by more than a
small a m o u n t since this is wasteful of space within the
core window.
It should be noted that since the kVA or M V A
factor appears in the numerator of the expression
for percent reactance, the value of reactance tends to
198
Chapter 3
increase as the transformer rating increases. This is
of Httle consequence in most transformers, as almost
any required reactance can normally be obtained by
appropriate adjustment of the physical dimensions,
but it does become very significant for large generator
transformers, as permissible limits of dimensions are
reached.
1.3.3 Core loss
The purpose of a transformer core is to provide a
low reluctance path for the magnetic flux hnking pri­
mary and secondary windings.
In doing so, the core experiences iron losses due to
hysteresis and eddy currents flowing within it which, in
turn, show themselves as heating of the core material.
Hysteresis loss can be reduced by increasing silicon
content but, since this also makes the material brittle
and hard, there is a practical limit if the material
is to remain sufficiently workable to permit reason­
ably straightforward core manufacture. This limit is
about 4Y2 % silicon for steel produced by the hot rolling
process.
Orienting the grain structure by cold rolling so that
the magnetic domains are uniformly aligned rather than
r a n d o m also reduces hysteresis and, in fact, can p r o ­
duce such an improvement that the silicon content can
be reduced whilst still permitting the use of higher flux
densities than the non-oriented steel.
Reducing the silicon content (a figure of about 3 %
is used for cold rolled steel) also reduces resistivity, so
there is a tendency for eddy current loss to be increased.
This is countered by a reduction in plate thickness.
This is the basis of the development of cold-rohed
grain-oriented steel, 0.28 m m thick, which has been
current in the UK since the 1950s.
Specific loss for cold rolled steel is very dependent
on internal stress and increases sharply for any com­
pressive stress in the material. It is therefore necessary
to anneal frequently during the rolhng process. In
order to prevent fusion between adjacent layers of the
coiled strip, it is given a coating of magnesium oxide
in the rolling mill. This is usually supplemented by an
additional phosphate coating during the final anneal.
These coatings also serve as the insulation between
laminations to restrict eddy loss in the completed core.
As cores get larger, and core plates wider, higher
voltages are induced and the duty of the interlaminar
insulation becomes more onerous, so that in practice,
for cores greater than about 640 m m in diameter,
phosphate/magnesia coated plates are usually given an
additional coat of insulation, china clay or varnish, by
the core manufacturer.
This additional insulation also makes good any dam­
age to the phosphate coating brought about by the
grinding off of cutting burrs produced when the strip,
initially about one metre wide by several hundred metres
long, is cut into individual plates perhaps only 300 m m
wide by 2 - 3 m long.
 General design and construction

For a given grade of material, hysteresis loss ( W h ) Beff = flux density corresponding to the RMS
is proportional to the area of the hysteresis loop, the value of the applied voltage.
maximum flux density and the frequency:
In the UK, the supply frequency is 50 Hz and the
Wh = ki f BS,ax X weight Watts (3.4) thickness of the material is determined by the steel
manufacturer, so the only variables are B m a x and B e f f .
where η varies from about 1.6 to 2.5 depending on The steel manufacturer normally quotes the specific
the material. loss, in W / k g , at a stated working flux density, usually
Eddy current loss ( W e ) depends on square of 1.5 tesla, and provides a curve giving specific loss at
frequency and on the thickness of the steel, so that other flux densities. A typical curve is reproduced in Fig
3.5. Specific loss is obtained by cutting samples of the
We = k2 f^t^ (Beff)^ X weight Watts (3.5) material 25 m m wide by 250 m m in length along the
rolling direction and building these into a square *core'
k i , k2 = constants with overlapped corner joints, called an Epstein Square,
and measuring the loss on this.
f = frequency, Hz
The total loss of a built u p core is then theoreti­
t = thickness of material, m m cally equal to this specific loss value multipUed by
Bmax = maximum flux density, Τ the total weight. In practice, the measured loss ex-

Ü
LU
Q-

1.0 1.5 2.0

PEAK MAGNETIC FLUX DENSITY, Τ

FIG. 3.5 Typical specific loss curve for cold-rolled grain-oriented steel (28M4)

199
Transformers Chapter 3

ceeds this figure by 15-25% and this is known as manufacturer will wish to hmit the total number of
the building factor of the core. Its precise value depends strands in parallel. Also, the extra insulation resuUing
on the type of core and the form of construction. on the increased number of strands results in a poorer
More win be said on this subject in Section 1.4.1 of winding space-factor.
this chapter which deals with core construction. As explained above, eddy currents in winding con­
ductors are the resuU of leakage flux, so a reduction
in leakage flux results in smaller eddy currents. It
1.3.4 Load losses
can be seen (Fig 3.6) that a tall slim winding produces
The load loss of a transformer is that proportion of less leakage flux than a short squat winding. This
the losses generated by the flow of load current and can be proved by flux plots and is also evident from
which varies as the square of the load. This falls into Equation (3.3) in that the greater the value of 1, the
three categories: less the leakage reactance, so there is also a minimum
acceptable value of 1 if the eddy current losses are
• Resistive loss within the winding copper and leads.
to be restricted to a reasonable level. In practice,
• Eddy current loss in the winding copper. manufacturers aim to limit eddy current loss to a value
about 25% of that of the resistive loss.
• Eddy current loss in the tanks and structural In terms of the total load losses, the stray losses in
steelwork. the transformer tanks and other structural steelwork,
such as core frames only constitute a small propor­
Resistive loss can be reduced by dropping the number tion. However, they can produce significant amounts
of winding turns, by increasing the cross-sectional area of heating in areas of the tank surface a n d , particu­
of the turn conductor, or by a combination of both. larly, in heavy-section flanges which, as well as at­
Reducing the number of turns requires an increase tracting large amounts of leakage flux, tend to have
in Φ, i.e., an increase in core cross-section {frame size),
which increases iron weight and iron loss. So load loss
can be traded against iron loss and vice versa. Increased
frame size requires reduced winding length to com­
pensate in Equation (3.3) and thus retain the same
impedance, although as already explained there will
be a reduction in number of turns (which was the
object of the exercise) by way of partial compensation.
Reduction of the winding axial length means that the
core leg length is reduced, which also offsets the
increase in core weight resulting from the increased
frame size to some extent. There is thus a band of one
or two frame sizes for which the loss variation is not
too great, so that optimum frame size can be chosen
to satisfy other factors, such as ratio of fixed to load
losses or transport height.
The paths of eddy currents in winding conductors
are complex. The effect of leakage flux within the
(a) Leakage flux paths in single phase core
transformer windings results in the presence of radial
and axial flux changes at any given point in space and
any moment in time. These induce voltages which cause
currents to flow at right angles to the changing fluxes.
The magnitude of these currents can be reduced by
increasing the resistance of the path through which
they flow, and this can be effected by reducing the
total cross-sectional area of the winding conductor or
by subdividing this conductor into a large number of
strands insulated from each other. The former alter­
native increases the overall winding resistance and
thereby the resistive losses. Conversely, if the overall
conductor cross-section is increased with the object
of reducing resistive losses, one of the results is to
increase eddy current losses. This can only be offset (b) Leakage flux in squat core
by a reduction of strand cross-section and an increase
in the total number of strands. It is costly to wind
a large number of conductors in parallel and so a FIG. 3.6 Leakage flux paths in tall and squat windings

200
 General design and construction

large cross-sectional areas and hence low resistance

to the circulation of eddy currents. Local overheating
of flanges can cause rapid deterioration of gaskets
and consequent serious leakage of oil. The oil itself
suffers rapid degradation if it remains in contact with
metal at temperatures much above 130°C. Even if
the overheating is not severe enough to give rise to
either of these problems, there is still the hazard faced
by operating staff making accidental contact with the
overheated tank surface. For this reason, it is usual
to specify that the tank temperature should not exceed 1 — [
80°C u p to a height of 2.8 m above plinth level. A
temperature of up to 100°C is usually permitted above
this height. The transformer designer may comply with
these requirements by careful design of the core and FOR PROTECTION AGAINST FLUX FROM WINDINGS

by routing of heavy-current leads within the tank well

clear of the sides and of large-section flanges in par­
ticular. If these measures are insufficient, then it might
be necessary to provide packets of core steel to act as
flux shunts between the source M M F and the tank
side. A typical arrangement of flux shunts is shown
in Fig 3.7.

1.4 Transformer construction FOR PROTECTION FROM FLUX

PRODUCED BY HV LINE LEAD

1.4.1 Core construction

Laminations are built u p to form a limb or leg having
as near as possible a circular cross-section (Fig 3.8)
in order to obtain optimum use of space within the
cylindrical windings. The stepped cross-section ap­
proximates to a circular shape depending only on
how many different widths of strip a manufacturer is
prepared to cut and build. For the smaller cores of
power station auxiliary transformers, this can be as
few as seven. In the larger station and generator trans­
formers, the number is eleven or m o r e . Theoretically,
these fill from just over 9 3 % to over 9 5 % , respectively,
of the available core circle. In reality, the actual uti-
FIG. 3.7 Arrangement of shunts for leakage flux
lisation is probably slightly less t h a n this since the
manufacturer aims to standardise on a range of plate
widths to cover all sizes of cores, and will therefore
be unlikely to have available widths which would give
the ideal cross-section for every size of core. Manu­
facturers normally denote frame size by quoting the
width of the widest plate, starting at about 200 m m for
small auxiliary transformers and increasing in 25 m m
steps u p to about one metre for the largest generator
transformers.

FIG. 3.8 Cross-section of core leg

201
Transformers Chapter 3

The cyHndrical wound Hmb forms the c o m m o n fea­ shown in Fig 3.9; of these, by far the most c o m m o n
ture for all power station transformer cores. The form is the three-phase, three-Umb core. Since, at all times
of the complete core will be one of the arrangements the phasor sum of the three fluxes produced by a

3 PHASE 3 LIMB CORE SINGLE PHASE BOTH LIMBS WOUND

SINGLE PHASE CENTRE LIMB ONLY WOUND

3 PHASE 5 LIMB

SINGLE PHASE CRUCIFORM

FIG. 3.9 Typical core forms for single- and three-phase transformers

202

balanced three-phase system of voltages is zero, n o
return limb is necessary in a three-phase core and limbs
and yokes can have equal cross-sections. In order t o
limit the extent to which the flux path cuts across the
grain of the oriented material, corners of laminations
are usually cut on a 45° mitre. Plates at these mitred
corners must be overlapped so that the flux can transfer
to the adjacent face rather than cross the airgap which
is directly in its p a t h . The overlaps are formed by alter­
nating different lengths of plates in successive lays (Fig
3.10).
FIG. 3 . 1 0 Arrangement of mitred joints in core
The core is built horizontally by stacking lamina­
tions, usually two or three per lay, on a jig or stilläge.
Figure 3.11 shows a large core being built in the
manufacturer's works. Clamping frames for top and
bottom yoke will be incorporated into this stilläge
but it must also provide support and rigidity for the
limbs until the core has been lifted into the vertical
position for the fitting of the windings. Holes through
the laminations of cold-rolled grain-oriented material
cause deviations in the flux path and increase losses.
Punching of these holes also creates local stress con­
centrations which increase losses so that, although b o h s
through punched holes were the standard means of
providing clamping for cores buih of hot-rolled steel,
it is now practice to minimise bolt holes or, if possi­
ble, to ehminate them entirely. Bolts securing t o p and
bottom frames will be designed to pass a r o u n d the
yokes rather than through them, as shown in Fig 3.12.
Without clamping bolts the legs have n o rigidity at all
until the windings have been fitted. This fitting requires
the removal of the top yoke which will usually have
been placed in position during building to provide
rigidity and alignment for the core. The legs are normal­
ly clamped as tightly as possible by steel b a n d s , which
are stripped off, starting from the top of the leg, as
the windings are lowered into place. Once in place
these windings, which are built o n t o a hard synthetic
resin bonded paper (SRBP) tube, ensure that the leg
remains rigid. The top yoke can then be replaced,
suitably interlaced into the projecting ends of the leg
laminations, followed by the top core frames. Once
these have been fitted, together with any tie bars, axial
General design and construction
clamping can be applied to the windings to compress
them down to their correct length.
These principles will apply to the cores of all the
core-type transformers shown in Fig 3.9. Single-phase
cores may have windings on both limbs, in which case
Hmbs and yokes will probably have the same cross-
sectional area. Alternatively these may have one wound
central limb, with t w o , three or four return yokes. The
first arrangement tends to result in the lowest iron loss
for a given rating but, since the number of windings
is doubled, their cost is increased. The use of a number
of return yokes, as in the other arrangements, means
that the required cross-section can be achieved with
a smaller yoke depth, thus reducing the height for
transport. T h e three-phase equivalent of this is the
five-Hmb core which can be used to reduce the travel­
ling height of a three-phase unit at the expense of
iron losses. It should be noted that, provided transport
weight and height limitations permit, the yoke depth
can be increased to give a greater cross-section, and
hence reduced flux density, compared with the legs.
This results in a reduction in specific core loss in the
yokes which is greater t h a n the proportional increase
in yoke weight, hence in a net reduction in total core
loss. This is economic if the saving in the cost of the
iron loss over the Hfetime of the transformer is greater
t h a n the cost of the extra material.
Before concluding the description of core construc­
tion, mention should be m a d e of the subject of core
earthing. A n y conducting metal parts of a transformer,
unless sohdly b o n d e d to earth, will acquire a potential
in operation which depends on their location relative
to the electric field within which they He. In theory, the
designer could insulate them from earthed metal but,
in practice, it is easier and more convenient to b o n d
them to earth. However, in adopting this alternative,
there are two important requirements:
• The bonding must ensure good electrical contact and
remain secure t h r o u g h o u t the transformer Hfe.
• N o conducting loops must be formed, otherwise
circulating currents will result, creating increased
losses a n d / o r locaHsed overheating.
Metalwork which becomes inadequately bonded,
possibly due to movement from shrinkage or vibration,
creates arcing which will cause breakdown of insula­
tion oil and will produce gases which may lead to
Buchholz relay operation (see Section 1.6.2 of this
chapter), and can thus be very troublesome in service.
The core and its framework represent the largest
bulk of metalwork requiring to be bonded to earth.
O n generator transformers, connections to core and
frames are individually brought outside the tank via
3.3 kV bushings and are then connected to earth ex­
ternally. This enables the earth connection to be dis­
connected during maintenance so that core insulation
resistance checks can be carried out.
203
Transformers Chapter 3
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204
General design and construction
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205
Transformers
1.4.2 Transformer windings
In describing the basic principles of a two-winding
transformer, it has been assumed that the windings
comprise a discrete primary and secondary, each being
a cylinder concentric with the wound limb of the core
which provides the low reluctance path for the inter­
linking flux. Whether of single-phase or three-phase
construction, the core provides a return flux path and
must, therefore, enclose the winding, as shown in Fig
3.13. As well as dictating the size of the transformer
in total, the size of the windings thus dictates the size
of the window that the core must provide, and hence
the dimensions of the core and the iron losses are
determined. The designer must aim for as compact
a winding arrangement as possible. Militating against
this are the needs to provide space for cooling ducts
and insulation, and also to obtain as large a copper
cross-section as possible in order to minimise load
losses.
CORE WINDOW
FIG. 3 . 1 3 Arrangement of windings within
core window
The following sections will aim to describe how to
achieve the best compromise between these conflicting
objectives in practice.
1.4.3 Winding conductors
Before discussing the details of transformer windings
further it is necessary to look in some detail at winding
conductors.
Power station transformers use copper windings
almost exclusively and the detailed requirements for
them are set down in BS1432[3]. During the late 1960s,
there was a very sharp rise in the price of copper and
206
Chapter 3
some manufacturers attempted some experimental use
of aluminium, but its higher resistivity greatly comph-
cates the designer's problems. It necessitates a greater
cross-section of conductor and a larger number of
coohng ducts; these in turn cause a large increase in
winding size, which increases the size of the core. In
addition, the increased winding size increases imped­
ance, requiring a further increase in frame size to
counteract this (Section 1.3.2 of this chapter) so the
iron losses are increased stih further, risking a run­
away situation. Unlike other areas of power station
plant (e.g., cables) it is exceedingly unlikely that alu­
minium will ever become a serious rival to copper for
transformers.
Winding conductors are normally rectangular in
section (Figs 3.14 and 3.15). They have a far better
winding space factor compared with circular conduc­
tors and are used exclusively, except for the very small
transformers where both circular conductors and, on
occasions, foil windings are used. These wih be dis­
cussed further in Section 2.4 of this chapter which deals
with auxihary transformers.
Winding strands must be insulated from each other
within a winding conductor and, of course, each con­
ductor must be insulated from its neighbour. This is
achieved by wrapping the strands helically with paper
strip, and at least two layers are used, so that the outer
layer overlaps the butt joints in the layer below. The
edges of the copper strip are radiused in order to
assist in paper covering. This also ensures that, where
strands are required to cross each other at an angle,
there will be less 'scissor action' tending to cut into
the insulation. Where conditions demand it, many
layers of conductor insulation can be apphed and the
limit to this is determined by the need to maintain
a covered cross-section which can be built u p into a
stable winding. This demands that, particularly when
they are to have a thick covering of insulation, winding
conductors should have a fairly flat section, so that
each can be stably wound on top of the conductor
below. This usually means that the axial dimension of
the strand must be at least twice, and preferably two
and a half times, the radial dimension.
1.4.4 Low voltage windings
Although the precise details of the winding arrange­
ments vary according to the rating of the transformer,
the general principles remain the same throughout
most of the range of power station transformers and
it is therefore convenient when describing these wind­
ings to consider specific cases. It is also useful to the
reader to be able to relate the descriptions given to
practical situations.
Generally, a power station transformer is rated to
match the associated low voUage switchgear. At 11 kV,
3.3 kV and 415 V, swUchgear ratings extend up to
about 3000 A . For the low voUage (LV) winding of
most transformers, therefore, this is the order of the
 General design and construction

CORE LIMB
Φ
RADIAL DUCTS "
BETWEEN TURNS

RADIAL DUCTS
BETWEEN DISCS

LV I HV
I WINDING I WINDING
I (SINGLE KCONTINUOUS
LAYER DISC)
AXIAL DUCTS' I HELICAL)
I

LV TURN 3 y

LV TURN 2 y

LV TURN 1 y

ONE TURN OF LV HAS HV HAS 5 TURNS PER DISC

14 STRANDS IN PARALLEL 2 STRANDS IN PARALLEL PER TURN

FIG. 3.14 Section of I V and HV windings showing radial and axial cooling ducts

nitude lower t h a n this, say, u p to about 300 A . In most

oil-filled transformers, the current density is between
HV HV DISC COILS about 2 and 4 A / m m ^ , so that the conductor section
on the LV winding is of the order of, say, 50 m m χ
20 m m and that on the H V winding, say, 12 m m χ 8
LV m m . As explained in Section 1.3.1 of this chapter, the
volts per turn in the transformer is dependent on the
cross-sectional area of the core or core frame size. The
frame size used depends on the rating of the trans­
LV COIL former but, since, as the rating increases the voltage
class also tends to increase, the volts per turn usually
give an LV winding with a hundred or so turns and a
CORE H V winding with a thousand or m o r e . In practice, the
actual conductor sizes and the numbers of turns used
depend on a good m a n y factors and may therefore
differ widely from the above values. They are quoted
AXIAL CORE DUCTS WINDING TUBE PACKING
as an indication of the differing problems in designing
LV and H V windings. In the former, a small number
of turns of a large-section conductor are required; in
FIG. 3.15 Transverse section of core and windings,
showing axial cooling ducts the other, a very much larger number of turns but of
a much m o r e manageable cross-section are involved,
and it is these factors which determine the types of
current involved. (There are transformers outside this windings used.
range, of course; for a 600 M V A generator transformer, The LV winding is usually positioned nearest to
the LV current is of the order of 15 000 A.) the core, unless the transformer has a tertiary winding
The voltage ratio is usually such that the current (which are normally of lower vohage) in which case
in the high voltage (HV) winding is an order of mag­ the tertiary will occupy this position:

207
Transformers
• The LV winding has the lower test voltage and hence
is more easily insulated from the earthed core.
• Any tappings on the transformer are most hkely
to be on the HV winding (see below), so that the
LV windings will only have leads at the start and
finish and these can be easily accommodated at the
top and bottom of the leg.
The LV winding is normally wound on a tube of
insulation material and this is almost invariably of
synthetic-resin-bonded paper (SRBP). This material
has high mechanical strength and is capable of with­
standing the high loading that it experiences during
the winding of the large copper-section coils used for
LV windings. Electrically, it will probably have suf­
ficient dielectric strength to withstand the relatively
modest test vohage appHed to the LV winding without
any additional insulation.
The hundred or so turns of the LV winding are
wound in a simple helix, using the tube as a former,
so that the total turns occupy the total winding length,
although occasionally, for example, if this winding
is to be connected in interstar, the turns might be
arranged in two helical layers so that two sets of wind­
ing ends are accessible at the top and bottom of the
leg.
Between the winding base tube and the winding
conductor, axial insulation-board strips are placed so
as to form a duct for the flow of coohng oil. These
strips are usually of a dovetail cross-section (Fig 3.15)
so that spacers between winding turns can be threaded
onto them during the course of the winding. Axial
strips are usually a minimum of 8 m m thick and the
radial spacers 4 m m . The radial cooling ducts formed
by the spacers are arranged to occur between each
turn or every two turns, or even, on occasions, sub­
dividing each turn into half-turns.
1.4.5 Transpositions
It has already been explained that the winding con­
ductor of a LV winding having a large copper cross-
section, is subdivided into a number of sub-conductors,
or strands, to reduce eddy current loss. The eddy cur­
rents were said to result from the radial differences
in leakage flux between the inside and the outside of
the windings. The induced E M F s causing circulation
of these eddy currents can best be equalised and the
eddy currents reduced if each conductor occupies all
possible positions equally in its true length. It is there­
fore necessary to transpose the winding conductors
periodically throughout the length of the winding.
There are various methods of forming conductor
transpositions, but typically these might be arranged
as shown in Fig 3.16. If the winding conductor has,
say, eight sub-conductors, then eight transpositions
are needed over the winding length. These are carried
out by moving the inner conductor sideways from
208
Chapter 3
INNER STRAND MOVES TO OUTSIDE,
ALL OTHER STRANDS MOVE DOWN
ONE POSITION
INSIDE FACE OF COIL
FIG. 3.16 Developed section of an eight-strand
conductor showing transposition of strands
below the other seven, which then each move radially
inwards by an a m o u n t equal to their thickness, and
finally the displaced inner conductor would be bent
outwards to the outer radial level and then moved to
the outside of the stack.
1.4.6 Continuously-transposed strip
Even with an arrangement of transpositions of the
type described above and using many subconductors,
eddy currents in very high current windings cannot
be limited in magnitude t o , say, 2 5 % of the resistive
losses as suggested in Section 1.3.4 of this chapter.
In addition, transpositions of the type described above
take up a significant a m o u n t of space within the wind­
ing. As a result, in the early 1950s, manufacturers
introduced a type of continuously-transposed conduc­
tor. This enables a far greater number of transposi­
tions to be carried out. In fact, as the name suggests,
these occur almost continuously in the conductor itself
before it is formed into the winding. Although the
'continuous' transpositions result in some loss of space
within the conductor group, this a m o u n t s to less space
within the winding than that required for conventional
transposkions, so that there is a net improvement in
space factor as well as improved uniformity of ampere­
conductor distribution. Figure 3.17 shows how the
continuously-transposed conductor is made u p . It has
an odd number of strands flat formation insulated
from each other by enamel only and these are in two
stacks side by side axially on the erected winding.
Transpositions are effected by the top strip of one
stack moving over to the adjacent stack as the bottom
strip moves over in the opposite direction. The con­
ductor is moved sideways approximately every 50 m m
along its length. In addition to the enamel covering
on the individual strands, there is a single vertical
paper separator between the stacks and the complete
conductor is wrapped overall with at least two helical
layers of paper in the same manner as a rectangular
section conductor. Manufacture of the continuously-

FIG. 3.17 Continuously transposed conductor
transposed conductor involves considerable mechani­
cal manipulation of the strands in order to form the
transpositions and was made possible by the develop­
ment of enamels which are sufficiently tough and
resilient to withstand this.
The introduction of continuously-transposed strip
has been beneficial t o the design of large transformers,
which must be capable of carrying large currents, but
its use is not without some disadvantages of which
the following are most significant:
• A stack which might be up t o , say, twelve strands
high, wrapped overall with paper, tends to behave
something like a cart spring in that it becomes very
difficult to wind round a cylindrical former. This
problem can be limited by the use of such strip only
for large diameter windings. It is usual to restrict
its use to windings which have a minimum radius
of thirty times the radial depth of the covered
conductor.
• When the covered conductor, which will of necessity
have significant depth in the radial dimension, is
bent into a circle, the paper covering has a tendency
to wrinkle. This feature has been termed 'bagging'.
The bagging, or bulging, paper covering can restrict
coohng ducts. This problem can be controlled by
restricting the bending radius, as described above,
and also by the use of an outer layer of paper cover­
ing which has a degree of 'stretch' which will contain
the bagging. Also an allowance can be m a d e by
slightly increasing the size of the ducts.
• Because of the large number of strands, joints in
continuously-transposed strip become very cumber­
some.
• A high degree of quality control of the manufac­
ture is necessary to ensure that defects in the en­
amel insulation of the individual strands or metallic
particle inclusions d o not cause strand-to-strand
faults.
General design and construction
1.4.7 High voltage windings
Mention has already been m a d e of the fact that the
high voUage (HV) winding might have ten times as
many turns as the low voltage (LV) winding, although
the conductor size is considerably less. It is desirable
that both windings should be as nearly as possible the
same axial length and, assuming the LV winding oc­
cupied a single layer wound in a simple helix, the H V
winding might require ten such layers. A multilayer
helical winding of this type would be somewhat lacking
in mechanical strength, however, as well as tending to
have a high voltage between winding layers. (In a ten
layer winding, this would be one-tenth of the hne
voUage.) H V windings are therefore usually wound as
'disc windings'. In a disc winding, the turns are wound
radially outwards one on t o p of the other starting at the
surface of the former. If a pair of discs are wound in
this way b o t h 'finishes' appear at the outer surface of
the respective discs and the crossover between discs
takes place at the inside of the discs. A series of disc­
pairs can be wound in this way and then connected
together at their ends to form a complete winding. Such
an arrangement requires a large number of joints be­
tween sections and so has been largely superseded by
the 'continuous disc winding'. This has the same con­
figuration when completed as a sectional disc winding
but is wound in such a way as to avoid the need for
it to be m a d e in separate disc-pairs. When the 'finish'
of a disc appears at the outside radius, it is taken down
to the mandrel surface using a tapered curved former.
F r o m the surface of the mandrel, a disc is then built
u p by winding radially as previously. When the com­
plete disc has been formed, the tension is taken off
the winding conductor, the taper former removed and
the turns laid out loosely over the surface of the
mandrel. These turns are then reassembled in the re­
verse order so that the 'start' is the crossover from the
adjacent disc and the 'finish' is in the centre at the
mandrel surface. T h e next disc can then be built
upwards in the normal way. A section of continuous
disc winding is shown in Fig 3.18.
FIG. 3.18 Arrangement of continuous disc winding
209
Transformers
The HV winding requires space for coohng-oil flow
in the same way as described for the LV winding. This
is provided using dovetail strips against the inner face
of the discs and radial spacers interlocking with these.
Radial cooling ducts may be formed either between
disc pairs or between individual discs.
1.4.8 Tapping windings
U p to now, it has been assumed that power trans­
formers have simply a primary and secondary winding.
However, all power station transformers have some
form of tapping arrangement to allow both for varia­
tions of the appHed voltage and for their own internal
regulation. The range of these tappings goes from ± 5 %
variation, adjustable only off-circuit on the smallest
transformers, to ± 1 0 % , or more, on the larger trans­
formers, selectable by means of on-load tapchangers.
More will be said later about the subject of tappings
and tapchangers. However, it is convenient at this
stage to describe the tap windings themselves.
In power station transformers the tappings are
invariably connected in the HV winding. The reasons
for this are twofold. First, it is convenient to assume
that the purpose of the tappings is to compensate for
variations in the applied voltage which, for all trans­
formers except the generator transformer, will be to
the HV winding. (The generator transformer is a special
case and will be discussed more fully in Section 2 of
this chapter.) As the apphed voltage increases, more
tapping winding turns are added to the HV winding by
the tapchanger so that the volts/turn remain constant,
as does the LV winding output voltage. From the
transformer design point of view, the important aspect
of this is that, since the volts/turn remain constant,
so does the flux density. Hence the design flux density
can be set at a reasonably high economic level without
the danger of the transformer being driven into satura­
tion due to supply voltage excursions.
The second reason for locating tappings on the
HV side is that, since this winding carries the smaller
current, then the physical size of tapping leads is greatly
reduced and the tapchanger itself carries less current.
Since the tappings are part of the HV winding, fre­
quently these can be arranged simply by bringing out
the tapping leads at the appropriate point of the wind­
ing. This must, of course, coincide with the outer turn
of a disc, but this can usually be arranged without
undue difficulty.
In the largest transformers, the tappings have to be
accommodated in a separate tapping winding, but more
will be said about this in Section 2 of this chapter.
1.4.9 Disposition of windings
Mention has already been made of the fact that the
LV winding is placed next to the core because it has
the lower insulation level. It is now necessary to look
in further detail at the subject of insulation and in­
210
Chapter 3
sulation levels and to examine the effects of these on
the disposition of the windings.
Transformer windings may either be fully insulated
or they can have graded insulation. In a fully insulated
winding, the entire winding is insulated to the same
level, dictated by the voltage to which the entire wind­
ing is to be raised on test.
Graded insulation allows a more economical ap­
proach to be made to the design of the insulation struc­
ture of a very high voltage winding. With this system,
recognition is made of the fact that such windings will
be star-connected and that the star point will be so­
lidly earthed. The insulation of the earthy end of the
winding thus need only be designed for a very nominal
level.
BS171 requires that all windings up to 66 kV working
level should he fully insulated. Above this, which in
the UK means 132, 275 and 400 kV, graded insulation
is used. Since in UK power station systems there is
no voltage class between 23.5 kV (which is treated as
a 33 kV system) and 132 kV, then the former is the
highest class of power station transformer winding to
be fully insulated.
Power station transformers therefore either have
both LV and H V fully insulated or the LV fully in­
sulated and the H V insulation graded. There are no
transformers at power stations (unlike on the grid
system) for which both windings can be graded.
Figure 3 . 1 9 ( a ) shows the arrangement of a trans­
former in which both windings are fully insulated.
This might be a unit transformer, 23.5/11 kV and
perhaps around 4 0 - 5 0 M V A . The LV winding must
withstand an applied voltage test which will raise the
entire winding to 38 kV above earth. The winding
insulation must therefore withstand this voltage be­
tween all parts and earthed metalwork, including the
core. Along the length of the winding this test voltage
appears across the dovetail strips plus the thickness
of the SRBP tube. At the ends, these strips and the
tube are subjected to surface creepage stress, so that
the end-insulation distance to the top and bottom yokes
must be somewhat greater.
The 23.5 kV H V winding is tested at 70 kV above
earth. The radial separation between LV and H V must
be large enough to withstand this with, say, a single
pressboard wrap with spacing strips inside and out­
side (Fig 3.19). The end insulation will be subjected
to creepage stress and so the distance to the yoke
must be somewhat greater than the H V / L V distance.
Between the transformer limbs, the HV windings of
adjacent phases come into close proximity.
To withstand the 70 kV test voltage between phases,
it is necessary to have a clearance similar to that be­
tween H V / L V windings with, say, a single pressboard
barrier in the middle of this distance, as shown in
Fig 3 . 1 9 ( b ) .
The LV winding leads are taken out at the top and
bottom of the leg, which means that they must of ne­
cessity pass close to the core framework. Since they are
 General design and construction

1 Γ

CORE

A PHASE Β PHASE C PHASE

HV WINDING HV WINDING HV WINDING

END INSULATION
(X3 HV/LV DISTANCE)

PRESSBOARD
PHASE TO PHASE BARRIER
HV/LV INSULATION - INSULATION CLEARANCE

(a) Axial part-section through one phase of a (b) Elevation of fully insulated 3-phase
fully insulated transformer showing transformer showing interphase
disposition of major insulation barrier

CORE FRAf^E LINE CONNECTION TO

TERMINAL IN COPPER BAR

-WINDING CONDUCTORS
BRAZED TO COPPER BAR

WINDING END
CONNECTION

-HV/LV INSULATION
CORE
ί

LV HV

RISING
CONNECTION TO
NEUTRAL TERMINAL

A, (N)

CLEAT OF INSULATION
MATERIAL
NEUTRAL STAR BAR
END INSULATION

(c) Typical arrangement of LV winding ends (d) Section of transformer with HV winding
having graded insulation

FIG. 3 . 1 9 Arrangements of windings and leads for fully insulated and graded insulation

211
Transformers
at relatively low voltage, it is probable that the neces­
sary clearance can be obtained by bending these away
from the core as close to the winding end as possible
and by suitably shaping the core frame (Fig 3.19 (c)).
The HV winding leads also emerge from the top
and bottom of the leg but these are taken on the
opposite side of the coils from the LV leads. Being
at a greater radial distance from the core frame than
those of the LV winding, as well as having the relatively
modest test vohage of 70 kV, these require little more
insulation than those of the LV winding.
It is usually convenient to group the tapping sections
in the centre of the HV windings. This means that when
all the taps are not in circuit, any effective 'gap' in
the winding is at the centre, so that the winding remains
electromagnetically balanced. More will be said about
this aspect below. The tapping leads are thus taken from
the face of the HV winding, usually on the same side
of the transformer as the LV leads.
Figure 3.19 (d) shows the arrangement of a trans­
former in which the LV winding is fully insulated and
the HV winding has graded insulation. This could be a
station transformer, say, 132/11 kV, possibly 60 M V A .
If this transformer had a tertiary winding, this too
would probably be at 11 kV and would be placed nearest
to the core. The test levels would be the same as for
the 11 kV LV winding of the u n k transformer and so
the insulation arrangement would be similar to that
described above. The 11 kV LV winding would be
placed over the tertiary and the tertiary-to-LV gap
would require radial and end insulation of a design
similar to that between tertiary and core. The 132 kV
HV winding is placed outside the LV winding and it is
here that advantage is taken of the graded insulation.
For 132 kV class graded insulation, the applied volt­
age test is only 45 kV above earth, although when the
overpotential test is carried out 230 kV is induced
between the line terminal and earth. Consequently the
neutral end needs insulating only to a level similar to
that of the LV winding. However, the line end must be
insulated for a very much higher voltage. It is logical,
therefore, to locate the line end as far as possible from
the core and for this reason it is arranged to emerge
from a point halfway up the leg. The HV thus has two
half-windings in parallel, with the neutrals at the top
and bottom and the line ends brought together at the
centre. If, with such an arrangement, the H V taps are
at the starred neutral end of the winding, the neutral
point can thus be conveniently made within the tap­
changer and the voltage for which the tapchanger must
be insulated is as low as possible. Unfortunately, it is
not possible to locate these tapping coils physically in
the body of the HV winding since, being at the neutral
end, when these were not in circuit there would be a
large difference in length between the H V and LV
windings. This would greatly increase leakage flux,
stray losses and variation of impedance with t a p posi­
tion as well as creating large unbalanced forces on
short circuit. It is therefore necessary to place the taps
212
Chapter 3
in a separate winding located outside the HV winding.
This winding is shorter than the H V and LV windings
and split into upper and lower halves, with an un­
wound area in the middle through which the HV line
lead can emerge.
The centre of the HV winding must be insulated
from the LV winding by an a m o u n t capable of with­
standing the full HV overpotential test voltage. This
requires a radial distance somewhat greater than that
in the 23.5/11 kV transformer and the distance is taken
up by a series of pressboard wraps interspersed by
strips to allow oil circulation and penetration. Aher-
natively, it is possible that the innermost wrap could
be replaced by a SRBP tube which would then provide
the base on which to wind the HV winding.
The voltage appearing on test between the line end
of the HV winding and the neutral-end taps is similar
to that between H V and LV winding so it is necessary
to place a similar series of wraps between the HV and
tapping windings. These wraps must be broken to allow
the central H V line lead to emerge; an arrangement of
petalling or formed collars is normally used to allow
this to take place without reducing the insulation
strength (Fig 3.20).
1.4.10 Impulse strength
The previous section examined the disposkion of wind­
ings as determined by the need to meet the power
frequency tests which are applied to the windings.
Nowadays it is the practice to apply an impulse test to
power station transformers, as well as the dielectric
tests at 50 Hz. Impulse testing arose from the need to
simulate the effect on the transformer of steep-fronted
waves of the kind resulting from hghtning strikes on
the connecting transmission lines: these were of much
greater voltage than the power frequency tests but also
of very much shorter duration. The standard impulse
wave defined in BS171 and specified by the C E G B for
power station transformers has a wavefront time of
1.2 /IS and a time to decay to half peak of 50 μ$
(these times wih be more fully defined in Section 1.7.6
of this chapter which deals with impulse testing of
transformers). When struck by such a steep wavefront,
a transformer winding does not behave as an electro­
magnetic impedance, as it would to power frequency
voltages, but as a string of capacitors. Each turn has a
capacitance to the succeeding turn C s and a capaci­
tance to earth C g (Fig 3.21 (a)). It is a fairly simple
matter to show that when a high voltage is applied to
such a string, the distribution of this voltage is given
by a curve of the type shown in Fig 3.21 (b) and the
initial slope of the curve, which represents the voltage
gradient at the point of apphcatíon, is proportional to
the ratio C g / C s . In a winding in which no special mea­
sures had been taken to reduce this voltage gradient,
this would be many times that which would appear
under power frequency conditions. If additional in­
sulation were placed between the winding turns, this

CORE HV
FIG. 3.20 Arrangement of HV line lead with outer HV tapping winding
would increase the spacing between them and thus re­
duce the series capacitance C s . Cg would be effectively
unchanged, so that the ratio C g / C s would increase and
the voltage gradient become greater still. The most
effective method of controlHng the increased stress at
the Hne end is clearly to increase the series capacitance
of the winding, since reducing the capacitance to earth
is not very practicable*. Figure 3.22 shows several
methods by which the series capacitance can be in­
creased. The first (Fig 3.22 (a)) uses an electrostatic
shield connected to the line end and inserted between
the two HV discs nearest to the Hne end. The second
(Fig 3.22 (b)) winds in a d u m m y strand connected to
the Hne lead but terminating in the first disc. Both of
these arrangements effectively bring more of the wind­
ing turns closer physically to the Hne end. Thirdly, a
system of interleaving (Fig 3.22 (c)) can be used, where­
by the winding turns can be taken from the line end
further into the body of the winding rather than simply
winding in series. This usually involves winding two
or more strands in parallel and then reconnecting the
ends after winding to give the interleaving arrangement
required. It has the advantage over the first two meth­
ods that it does not waste any space, since every turn
remains active. However, the cost of winding is greatly
increased by the large number of joints. It is possible
by adjustment of the degree of interleaving, to achieve
a nearly linear distribution of impulse voltage through-
* Footnote: A short squat winding tends to have a lower capaci­
tance to ground than a tall slim winding, so such an arrangement
would have a better intrinsic impulse strength. There are, however,
so many other constraints tending to dictate winding geometry that
manufacturers are seldom able to use this as a practical means of
obtaining the required impulse strength.
General design and construction
HV
A,(N)
out the winding. In view of the high cost of interleaving,
the designer aims to minimise this and, where possible,
to restrict it to the end sections of the winding.
A further problem can occur at the neutral end of
the winding, since it is possible for reflections of the
impulse wave to be produced which can give rise to
oscillatory conditions which, depending on their mag­
nitude and phase relationships, can produce compara­
ble stresses to those which occur at the Hne end. In
addition, if some of the tapping winding is not in
circuit, which happens whenever the transformer is
on other than m a x i m u m t a p , the tapping winding will
then have an overhang which can experience a high
voltage at its remote end. The magnitude of the impulse
voltage appearing both across the neutral end sections
and within the tapping winding overhang will be at a
minimum when the initial distribution is linear, as can
be seen from Fig 3.21 (c), and this is usually assisted
by a further interleaved section at the neutral end.
T o some extent, the magnitude of the impulse voltage
seen by the tapping winding due to overhang effects
is dependent on the size of the tapping range, so this
must be borne in mind when deciding the tapping
range required.
1.4.11 Thermal considerations
When the resistive and other losses are generated in
the transformer windings heat is produced. This heat
must be transferred into, and taken away by, the trans­
former oil. The winding copper retains its mechanical
strength up to several hundred degrees Celsius. Trans­
former oil does not degrade below about 140°C, but
paper insulation deteriorates with greatly increasing
213
Transformers
(a)
DISTANCE FROM LINE LEAD •
(b)
MAIN HV TAPS
OSCILLATION
FOLLOWING
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION
INITIAL
DISTRIBUTION
OVERHANG
FIG. 3.21 Distribution of impulse voltage within
winding
rapidity if its temperature rises above about 90°C.
The coohng-oil flow, therefore, must ensure that in­
sulation temperature is kept below this figure as far
as possible.
The temperature at which no deterioration of paper
insulation occurs is about 80°C. It is usually not eco­
nomic or practical, however, to limit the insulation
temperature to this level at all times. Insulation hfe
would greatly exceed transformer design hfe and, since
ambient temperatures and applied loads vary, a maxi­
m u m temperature of 80°C would mean that on many
occasions the insulation would be much cooler than
this. Thus, the critical factor in determining the hfe
of a transformer is the working temperature of the
insulation or, more precisely, the temperature of the
hottest part of the insulation or hot spot. The problem
214
Chapter 3
LINE END
n
ΓΤΓΤ
(a) Electrostatic shield
LINE END
n
I I I I I I 1 11
(b) Dummy Strand
(c) Interleaving of 2 strands
over 4 discs
FIG. 3.22 Types of winding stress control
is to decide what temperature the hot spot should
be allowed to reach. Various researchers have con­
sidered this problem and all of them tend to agree
that the rate of deterioration or ageing of paper ra­
pidly increases with increasing temperature. In 1930,
Montsinger [4] suggested that the hfe of insulation
would be halved for every 8°C increase between 90
and 110°C and this rate has been generally accepted,
although some authorities now consider that a value
of 6 ° C is more appropriate for present-day insulation
materials.
It must be recognised that there is n o generally
accepted temperature at which insulation may be al­
lowed to operate, nor is there agreement between trans­
former designers as to the precise hot spot temperature
that should be accepted in normal operation. In fact,
it is now recognised that there are other factors affect­
ing insulation hfe, such as the moisture content, acidity
and oxygen content of the oil, all of which tend to be
dependent upon the system of breathing employed.
Nevertheless BS171 and other international specifica-
 General design and construction

tions set down limits for permissible temperature rise

which aim at a life of about thirty years for the
transformer. Such documents assume that a lifetime
of this magnitude would be obtained with a hot spot
temperature of about 98°C.
It must also be recognised that the specified tem­
perature rise can only be that value which can be
measured, and that there will usually be, within the
transformer, a hot spot which is hotter than the tem­
perature that can be measured and which will really
determine the Hfe of the transformer.
Study of the permitted temperature rises given in
BS171 shows that a number of different values are
permitted and that these are dependent on the method
of oil circulation. The reason for this is that the likely
difference between the value that can be measured and
the hot spot, which cannot be measured, tends to vary
according to the method of oil circulation. Those listed (a) Non-directed flow
in BS171 are:
• Natural.
• Forced, but non-directed.
• Forced and directed. to
Natural circulation utilises the thermal head produced
by the heating of the oil which rises through the wind­
ings as it is heated and falls as it is cooled in passing
through the radiators. •T

IS
With forced circulation, oil is pumped from the
radiators and admitted to the bottom of the windings
to pass through the vertical ducts formed by the strips
laid *above' and 'below' the conductors. In referring •T
to axial ducts within windings, the expressions 'below'
and 'above' mean 'nearer to the core' and 'further from
the core', than the winding turns respectively. Radial
ducts are those which connect these. In a non-directed
design, flow through the horizontal ducts which connect
the axial ducts above and below is dependent entirely
on thermal and turbulence effects and the rate of flow
through these is very much less than in the axial ducts
(b) Directed flow
(Fig 3.23 (a)).
With a forced and directed circulation, oil flow FIG. 3 . 2 3 Directed and non-directed oil flow
washers are inserted into the windings which alternately
close off the axial ducts above and below the conduc­
tors, so that the oil in passing through the winding on two faces, whilst the remainder are cooled only
must also weave its way through the horizontal ducts. on one. Further, unless the oil flow is forced and
This arrangement is illustrated in Fig 3.23 (b). directed, not only will the heat transfer via the hori­
The average temperature rise of the winding is zontal surfaces be poorer, due to the poor oil flow-rate,
measured by its change in resistance compared with but this oil could well be hotter than the general mass
that at a known ambient temperature. Since some of of oil in the vertical ducts.
the winding at the bottom of the leg is in cool oil and The temperature of the winding hot spot is thus the
some at the top is in the hottest oil, there will be a sum of the following:
difference from the average at either extreme by an
• Ambient.
amount equal to half the difference in temperature of
the inlet and outlet oil. In addition all the conductors • Measured (specified) rise by resistance.
may not be equally exposed to the oil. In the diagram
• Half difference between inlet and outlet oil.
of Fig 3.24, which represents a group of conductors
surrounded by vertical and horizontal cooling ducts, • Difference between average and maximum winding/
the four conductors at the corners are cooled directly oil temperature gradient.

215
Transformers Chapter 3

explained in BS Code of Practice C P 1010[5], which

CONDUCTOR COOLED ON ONE SURFACE deals with the subject of loading of power trans­
formers. The system works well in practice since very
few transformers are operated continuously at rated
load. Even in power stations where loads tend to be
HORIZONTAL
COOLING^ CONDUCTOR
more constant than for many other applications, loads
DUCTS<^ COOLED vary as the unit load is varied or as the unit is started
ON 2 SURFACES
up and shut down, and ambient temperatures vary
seasonally.
There is one exception to this loading pattern. This
is the generator transformer of a large base-load unit.
Ideally, this operates at near to its designed rating
continuously, apart from its periodic maintenance shut­
VERTICAL COOLING
DUCTS down. This will be discussed further in Section 2 of
this chapter deahng with the subject of generator
FIG. 3.24 Winding hot spots transformers.

1.4.12 Performance under short-circuit

Typical values are:
Type of cooling OFAF ONAN
Forced & directed Natural non-
oil flow directed oil
(a) Ambient (BS171) 30 30
(b) Rise by resistance (BS171) 70 65
(c) Half (outlet-inlet) oil 12
(d) Maximum gradient —
average gradient
110 110
It must be stressed that since items (c) and (d) cannot
be covered by specification, they are typical values
only and actual values will differ between manufac­
turers and so, therefore, will the value of hot spot
temperature. It will be noted also, that the hot spot
temperatures derived significantly exceed the figure of
98°C quoted above as being the temperature which
corresponds to normal ageing. It will also be seen that
the figure used for ambient temperature is not the
maximum recognised in BS171, which permits an am­
bient temperature of 40°C, giving a hot spot tem­
perature of 120°C. Such temperatures are permissible
because the maximum ambient temperature occurs
only occasionally and for a short time.
When a transformer is operated at a hot spot
temperature above that which produces normal ageing
due to increase either in ambient or loading, then in­
sulation Hfe is used up at an increased rate. This must
then be offset by a period with a hot spot temperature
at or below that for normal ageing, so that the total
use of Hfe over this period equates to the n o r m . This
is best illustrated by an example: if two hours are
spent at a temperature which produces twice the nor­
mal rate of ageing then four hours of Hfe are used in
this period. For the balance of those four hours (i.e.,
4 - 2 = 2) the hot spot temperature must be such as
to use up no Hfe, i.e., below 80°C, so that in total
four hours of life are used u p . This principle is fully
The effects of short-circuit currents on transformers,
as on most other items of electrical plant, fall into
two categories:
• Thermal.
• Mechanical forces.
It is a fairly simple matter to deal with the thermal
effects of a short-circuit. This is deemed to persist for
a known period of time, usually 3 or 5 s, aHowing for
clearance of the fault by back-up protection. During
this brief time, it is safe to assume that all the heat
generated remains in the copper. Therefore knowing
the mass of the copper, its initial temperature, and
the heat input, the temperature which it can reach can
be easily calculated. It simply remains to ensure that
this is below a permitted maximum which for oil-
immersed windings is taken to be 250°C, in accord­
ance with Table III of BS171: P a r t 5: 1978.
Mechanical short-circuit forces are more complex.
First, there is a radial force which is a mutual repul­
sion between LV and HV windings. This tends to crush
the LV winding inwards and burst the HV winding
outwards. Resisting the crushing of the LV winding is
relatively easy since the core lies immediately beneath
and it is only necessary to ensure that there is ample
support, in the form of the number and width of axial
strips, to transmit the force to the core. The outwards
bursting force on the H V winding is resisted by the
tension in the copper, coupled with the friction force
produced by the large number of H V turns which
resists their slackening off. This is usually known as
the 'capstan effect'. Since the tensile strength of the
copper is quite adequate in these circumstances, the
outward bursting force on the H V winding does not
normally represent a problem either. A n exception is
any outer winding having a small number of turns,
particularly if these are wound in a simple helix. This
can be the case with an outer tapping winding or
sometimes the HV winding of a unit transformer which.

216

having a voUage very httle higher than that of the
LV, might well be a helical winding (Section L 4 . 4 of
this chapter). In these situations, it is important to
ensure that adequate measures are taken to resist the
outward bursting forces under short-circuit. These
might involve fitting a tube of insulation material over
the winding or simply securing the ends by means of
taping, not forgetting the ends of tapping sections, if
included. Another alternative is to provide 'keeper
sticks' over the surface of the coil which are threaded
through the interturn spacers. Such an arrangement
is shown in Fig 3.25 in which keeper sticks are used
over the hehcal winding of a large reactor. Secondly,
there is also usually a very substantial axial force under
short-circuit; this has two components. The first results
from the fact that two conductors running in parallel
and carrying current in the same direction are drawn
together, producing a compressive force. Alternatively,
as will be seen by reference to Fig 3.26 (a), it may
be seen as an effect of the radial component of the
FIG. 3 . 2 5 Part of a winding of a saturated reactor showing detail of external bracing ( G E C Alsthom)
General design and construction
leakage flux which will be in one direction at the
top of the leg and the other direction at the b o t t o m .
Since the current is in the same direction at both top
and b o t t o m it produces a force in opposite directions
which is, in fact, compressive. The second component
of axial force is due to magnetic unbalance between
primary and secondary windings, i.e., the axial displace­
ment between their magnetic centres (Fig 3.26 (b)). In
very large transformers, the designer aims to achieve
as close a balance as possible between the windings,
but this cannot be achieved entirely for a number of
reasons. One is the problem of tappings. Putting these
in a separate layer so that there are no gaps left in
the main body of the H V winding when taps are not
in circuit, helps to some extent. However, there wih
be some unbalance unless each tap occupies the full
winding length in the separate layer. One way of doing
this would be to use a multistart helical tapping-wind­
ing but, as mentioned above, simple helical windings
placed outside the H V winding would be very difficult
217
Transformers
RADIAL COMPONENT
OF LEAKAGE FLUX
CURRENT (INTO PAPER)
PATH OF LEAKAGE FLUX
(a)
SMALL RADIAL COMPONENT
OF FLUX
F^ > F^ HENCE NET UPWARD
FORCE ON OUTER WINDING
PATH OF
LEAKAGE
FLUX
LARGE RADIAL COMPONENT
(b) OF LEAKAGE FLUX
FIG. 3.26 Forces within windings
to brace against the outward bursting forces. In
addition, spreading the tapping turns throughout the
fuh length of the layer would create problems in taking
the HV hne-lead away from the centre of the winding.
Another factor which makes it difficuh to obtain
complete magnetic balance is the dimensional accuracy
and stability of the materials used. Paper insulation
and pressboard in a large winding shrink axially by
several centimetres during dry-out and assembly of the
windings. Although the manufacturer can assess the
degree of shrinkage expected fairly accurately, and will
attempt to ensure that it is evenly distributed, it is
difficult to do this with sufficient precision to ensure
complete balance.
Furthermore, shrinkage of insulation continues to
occur in service and, although the design of the
transformer should ensure that the windings remain in
compression, it is even more difficult to ensure that
such shrinkage will be uniform. With careful design the
degree of unbalance will be small. Nevertheless it
must be remembered that short-circuit forces are pro­
portional to (current)^ and that the current in question
is the peak asymmetrical current and not the R M S
value. Consequently, for a generator transformer,
having an impedance of 1 6 % , the magnitude of the
force might be 116 times that occurring under normal
fuh-load conditions, i.e., (6 χ full load current) χ
asymmetry factor of 2.55. The effect of magnetic
unbalance is to produce an additional component
of radial leakage flux which acts in the same sense
218
Chapter 3
throughout the winding. It thus produces a force which
is upwards on one winding and downwards on the
other (Fig 3.26 (b)).
Axial forces under short-circuit are resisted by trans­
mitting them to the core. The top and bottom core
frames incorporate pads which bear on the ends of
the windings, these pads distributing the load by means
of heavy-section pressboard or compressed laminated-
wood platforms. The top and b o t t o m core frames, in
turn, are linked together by steel tie-bars which have
the dual function of resisting axial short-circuit forces
and ensuring that when the core and coils are lifted
via the top core frames on assembly, the load is
supported from the lower frames. These tie-bars can
be seen in Fig 3.12 which shows a completed core
before fitting of the windings. Since the precise mag­
nitude of these forces depends much upon leakage flux,
and the leakage flux pattern also determines the value
of reactance, manufacturers nowadays have computer
programmes for accurate determination of leakage
flux which also, therefore, enable them to assess short-
circuit forces and accurately design for them.
1.5 Tappings and tapchangers
Almost all power station transformers incorporate some
means of adjusting their voltage ratio by means of the
addition or removal of tapping turns. This adjustment
may be made on-load, as is usual in generator and
station transformers, or by means of an off-circuit
switch, or by the selection of bolted hnk positions with
the transformer totally isolated. The degree of sophis­
tication of the system of tap selection depends on the
frequency with which it is required to change taps.
1.5.1 Uses of tapchangers
It is first necessary to examine the purposes of tap­
changers and the way in which they are used. A more
complete discussion of this subject will be found in
Chapter 1 of this volume dealing with design and op­
eration of the connections to the grid system and the
auxiliary transformers forming the electrical auxiliary
system, but the transformer engineer must know what
is required of the plant and why.
Dealing first with the electrical auxilary system, the
design of a suitable supply system for auxiHary plant
must cater for ah operating conditions, for example,
unit start-up, full-load and emergency operation, and
the outage of supply equipment. It must also optimise
the various component impedances to achieve a suh-
ably economical compromise between the conflicting
requirements of fault-level limitation and acceptable
voltage regulation.
This design task is greatly assisted by the use of
off-circmt taps on the 11/3.3 kV and 3.3/0.415 kV
auxiliary transformers, especially when precise infor­
mation regarding loads and operating conditions cannot
be established during the design period.
 General design and construction

Supplies to the HV side of the station transformer and a resulting change of impedance. The auxiliary
at 132, 275 or 400 kV may be varied by ± 1 0 % to system designer would, of course, prefer to be able to
suit system loading conditions, under the direction of change the voltage ratio without affecting impedance
Grid Control and beyond the control of the power but the best the transformer designer can d o is to
station operating staff. If the 11 kV station voltage is aim to minimise the variation or possibly achieve an
to be maintained sensibly constant, therefore, an on­ impedance characteristic which is acceptable to the
load tapchanger on the station transformer must be system designer rather than one which might aggravate
available to the station operators. It should be noted his problems. Any special measures which the trans­
that if the station operator uses this tapchanger simply former designer is required to take is likely to increase
to maintain the station 11 kV system voltage constant cost and must therefore be totally justified by system
as the system voltage varies, then the station trans­ needs.
former flux density remains constant. If, however, the Figure 3.27 represents a series of sections through
operator also endeavours to compensate for regulation the windings of a two-winding transformer having
on the 11 kV station system, as he may need to d o , the tappings in the body of the H V winding. In all
then this will require an increase in the volts/turn and three cases the H V winding is slightly shorter than the
hence an increase in the flux density. The design flux LV winding in order to allow for the extra end insula­
density of the station transformer must take this op­ tion of the former. In Fig 3.27 (a) all tappings are in-
erating condition into account. circuit. Fig 3.27 (b) shows the effective disposition of
The unit transformer HV terminals are connected the windings on the principal tapping and Fig 3.27 (c)
to those of the generator whose voltage is maintained
within ± 5 % of nominal by the action of the generator
AVR. With such close control of its primary voltage,
therefore, an on-load tapchanger is not necessary on 1 X = DISPLACEMENT OF CENTRE
the unit transformer. It is a wise precaution, however, LINES OF HALF WINDINGS
to provide off-circuit taps so that some adjustment
of the voltage ratio may be made should this be found
to be necessary for the reasons outlined above with
reference to auxihary transformers.
The generator transformer is used to connect the
generator whose voltage is maintained within ± 5 % of
nominal, to a 400 kV system which normally may vary
by ± 1 0 % . This cannot be achieved without the ability (a) Maximum tap
to change taps on load. However, in addition to the
requirement of the generator to produce megawatts,
there may also be a requirement to generate or absorb
VArs, according to the system conditions, which will
vary due to several factors, for example, time of day,
system conditions and required power transfer. Gen­
eration of VArs will be effected by tapping-up on the
generator transformer, that is, increasing the number
of HV turns for a given 400 kV system voltage. Absorp­
tion of VArs will occur if the transformer is tapped
down. As with the station transformer, this mode of
operation also leads to variation in flux density which (b) Principal tap
must be taken into account when designing the trans­
former. The subject is more complex than for the
station transformer however, and will be described in
•χ X2 = DISPLACEMENT OF CENTRE
more detail in Section 2 of this chapter which deals
• ^ LINES OF HALF WINDINGS
specifically with the generator transformer.

1.5.2 Impedance variation

In discussion of the subject of leakage flux and short-
circuit forces, mention has already been made of the
unbalance effect created by the provision of tappings.
As tappings are added or removed from one of the
(c) Minimum tap
windings without any compensating change on the
other winding, there will be a change in the degree of
Out of balance', a change in the leakage flux pattern FIG. 3.27 Effects of tappings within windings

219
Transformers
when ah tappings are out-of-circuit. It can be seen
that, aUhough ah the arrangements are symmetrical
about the winding centreline and therefore have overall
axial balance, the top and bottom halves are only
balanced in the condition represented by Fig 3.27 (b).
This condition will therefore have the minimum leakage
flux and hence the minimum impedance. Addition or
removal of tappings increases the unbalance and thus
increases the impedance. It can also be seen that the
degree of unbalance is greatest in Fig 3.27 (c), so that
this is the condition corresponding to maximum im­
pedance. A plot of impedance against tap position
would thus tend to be of the form shown in Fig 3.28 (a).
It can be seen that the tap position for which the
unbalance is minimum can be varied by the insertion
of gaps in the untapped winding so that the plot is
reversed (Fig 3.28 (b)) and, by careful manipulation
of the gaps at the centre of the untapped winding and
the ends of the tapped winding, a more or less sym­
metrical curve about the mean tap position can be
LU
Ü
Ζ
<
Q
LU
Q.
2 less than for taps in the body of the HV winding. It can
10% NORMAL
TAP POSITION
(a) No gap in untapped winding
<
Q
LU
• 10% NORMAL
TAP POSITION
(b) Gap in untapped winding
FIG. 3 . 2 8 V a r i a t i o n o f impedance w i t h tap position
220
Chapter 3
obtained. This is usually the curve which gives minimum
overall variation.
From this, it will be apparent also that the varia­
tion wiU be reduced if the space which the taps occu­
py can be reduced to a minimum. While this can be
achieved by increasing the current density in the tap­
ping turns, the extent to which this can be done is
hmited by the need to ensure that the temperature rise
in this section does not greatly exceed that of the body
of the winding, since this would then create a hot spot.
If it is necessary to insert extra radial cooling ducts in
order to limit the temperature rise, then the space taken
up by these offsets some of the space savings gained
from the increased current density. The designer's
control of temperature rise in the taps tends to be less
than that which can be achieved in the body of the
winding, where the designer can vary the number of
sections by adjusting the number of turns per section,
with a radial cooling duct every one or two sections.
In the taps, the turns per section are dictated by the
need to ensure that the tapping leads appear at the
appropriate position on the outside of a section, hence
one tap must span an even number of sections, with a
minimum of t w o .
With the tappings contained in a separate layer,
external to the HV winding, the degree of impedance
variation throughout the tapping range tends to be
be seen from Fig 3.29 that the highest degree of bal-
-10%
(a) Maximum Tap - All taps in 'boost'
-10%
(b) Principal Tap (no taps in circuit)
(c) Minimum Tap condition as (a) but all taps in 'buck'
FIG. 3 . 2 9 B u c k / b o o s t tap arrangement
 General design and construction

anee will be achieved when there are no tapping turns

in circuit, provided that the LV and HV winding are O LINE TERMINAL
of the same length. But, as explained in Section 1.4.9
of this chapter, one of the occasions when it is necessary
to provide a separate tapping layer is when the H V
winding is star-connected and has graded insulation,
and with this arrangement both HV and LV windings
will have similar applied voltage test levels so that it
is logical that they should have the same a m o u n t of
end insulation and thus be of the same length. Further­
more, the physical size of the tapping winding is mini­
mised and the minimum impedance will coincide with
the mean tap position if it is arranged that the tapping
winding is connected in a *buck' and *boost' arrange­
ment. In this arrangement instead of all taps being
additive to the minimum HV turns, at one extreme of
the tapping range all taps are in circuit but of such a
polarity as to subtract from the voltage induced in the
main HV winding and at the other end of the range all
are connected in the opposite sense, i.e., additive. This
arrangement is frequently used on larger transformers,
where the saving in space occupied by the tapping
winding more than offsets the extra complexity of
the on-load tapchanger required to provide b u c k / b o o s t
switching, and the reduced impedance variation is an
added benefit.

1.5.3 Tapchanger mechanisms

The principal of on-load tapchanging was developed
in the late 1920s and requires a mechanism which will
meet the following two conditions:

• The load current must not be interrupted during a

tapchange.

• No section of the transformer winding may be short- NEUTRAL

circuited during a tapchange. TERMINAL

FIG. 3 . 3 0 Resistor transition on-load tapchanger

Early on-load tapchangers made use of reactors to
achieve these ends but in modern on-load tapchangers
these have been replaced by transition resistors which
have many advantages. (In fact, the first resistor-
transition tapchanger made its appearance in 1929,
but the system was not generally adopted in the UK
until the 1950s. In the USA, the change to resistors
is only now taking place in the 1980s.) The principle
of all resistor-transition on-load tapchangers may be
seen by reference to Fig 3.30. Alternate tapping con­
nections are brought out from the tapping winding to
two banks of selector switches SI and S2. The load
current connection, which is usually the neutral in the
case of neutral-end tapping windings of star-connected
station or generator transformer H V windings, is taken
from these selector switches via a diverter switch which
is arranged so that it connects to each bank of se­
lector switches in turn, either solidly when the required
tap has been selected, or via a transition resistor (or
resistors) at the instant of changeover. This will be
clarified by considering an actual tap change, say from
t a p 3 to t a p 4 in the diagram. With t a p 3 selected, the
diverter switch is m a d e to the right hand set of main
and transition contacts M l and T l . In order t o change
to tap 4, the selector switch of bank S2 must first move
to contact 4. The diverter switch then starts to move
to the left and, as it does so, contact M l opens first,
putting resistor R l in circuit. Further movement of the
diverter switch bridges transition contacts T l and T 2 ,
so that load current commences to flow from t a p 4,
and the section of the tapping winding between taps 3
and 4 will be circulating current through resistors R l
and R2. As the di verter switch contact T l separates,
all the load current is transferred to t a p 4, and flows via
R2 until, finally, contact M 2 is m a d e , thus taking all
current and shorting out R2. Should the tapchanger
be required to return to t a p 3, the sequence followed
would be the reverse of the above. However, if the

221
Transformers
next tapchange is to t a p 5, the selector switch
mechanism must be driven to the next contact 5 of
bank SI before changing over the diverter swhch.
This is achieved by incorporating *lost motion' into
the drive train so that the initial output from the
drive motor operates the selector switches only. For a
fuller description of operating mechanisms the reader
should consult a manufacturer's operation and main­
tenance manual.
The resistor-transition tapchangers described above
brought great advantages to on-load tapchanging. By
using a resistor to bridge the transformer taps, the
currents to be switched are made to be in phase with
the respective voltages across the diverter switch
contacts, with the result that the arc extinguishes at
current and voltage zero and the restrike vohage across
the contacts does not build up to a maximum for a
further quarter of a cycle. In addition, the diverter
switch mechanism is made of the stored energy pat­
tern, i.e., the drive motor winds up a spring which is
then released when fully charged to change over the
switch. The mechanism is thus highly reliable in that
any drive failure before the spring is fully charged
simply results in the tapchange not taking place and,
once released, the spring ensures that the di verter switch
changes over and the transformer remains in a safe
condition regardless of any subsequent failure of the
drive train.
Current transfer in these modern tapchangers takes
about 4 0 - 7 0 ms. This rapid operation, coupled with
the resistive switching, ensures that contact erosion is
minimised and reduces arc products which contaminate
the oil, with the result that maintenance intervals can
be increased and maintenance, when it is required, is
simphfied.
1.5.4 Single compartment tapchangers
Although the quantity of arc products and extent of oil
contamination produced by the diverter switches of
a high speed resistor transition tapchanger are very
much reduced as compared with reactor transhion
tapchangers, it is nevertheless practice to mount these
in a separate compartment from the banks of selector
contacts. This may be partly due to the fact that these
tapchangers were developed from reactor gear in which
the physical size of the changeover contacts and the
extent of maintenance required necessitates a separate
compartment, but it has the advantage that it reduces
the quantity of oil which may have to be processed
regularly and also makes access to diverter switches
easier. On a large transformer having a large tap­
changer, this arrangement adds little, if anything, to
the overall cost. On small auxiliary transformers how­
ever, mounting di verter swhches and their resistors
separately not only adds greatly to costs but also to
physical size, with consequent extra indirect costs.
The fact that the resistor transition diverter switch
arrangement was inherently quicker and cleaner than
222
Chapter 3
its predecessor, coupled with the objective of reduc­
ing the cost of the smaller units, led to the further
development of the resistor transhion principle to
produce small single compartment tapchangers —
both selector and diverter switch located in the same
compartment — for smaller transformers.
The following description of the operation of a
smah single compartment tapchanger is based on that
of the Ferranti DS Series shown diagrammatically in
Fig 3.31 and pictorially in Fig 3.32. Speed of operation
has been increased, compared with the separate com­
partment types, by the use of a single transition re­
sistor and by the combination of selector and diverter
switches into a single assembly which achieves the
necessary changeover with the minimum of movement.
The stored energy device consists of a faihng weight
and tensioned spring wound up by a drive motor so
that, when released, the weight faUs very rapidly aided
by the spring. The main current carrying contact (C)
is shown (Fig 3.31 (a)) connecting tap contact T l to
the neutral point of the transformer winding, with the
main auxiliary arcing contact a also in contact with T l
The switching sequence of changeover to tap contact
T2 is as foUows:
• When the stored energy mechanism operates and
the moving contact assembly commences to travel,
the main current carrying contact C opens and the
circuit is maintained via the main auxiliary arcing
contact a,
• Transitional contact / then makes contact with T2
and the bridging resistor R is then connected between
tap contacts T l and T2 (Fig 3.31 (b)).
• The main auxiliary contact a now breaks contact
with T l leaving resistor R momentarily in circuit to
carry the load current.
• Contact a then makes contact w k h T2 whilst transi­
tional contact t rolls round tap contact T 2 . (Fig
3.31 (c)). The bridging resistor R is thereby shorted
out and the circuit is made via the main auxiliary
arcing contact a.
• Transitional contact t breaks from T 2 .
• Finally, as the moving-contact assembly reaches the
end of hs travel, the main current carrying contact
C closes on tap contact T2 (Fig 3.31 (d)).
The main current carrying contact C does not make
or break current and should, therefore, last the life­
time of the transformer.
1.5.5 In-tank tapchangers
Both the separate compartment and single compart­
ment tapchangers have been contained separately from
the core and windings so that even the selector switches,
which do not break current, are not operating in the

(a) Running position tap 1
(c) Transitional position Β
FIG. 3.31 Single compartment tapchanger
same oil as that which is providing cooHng and insu­
lation for the transformer. The operating mechanism
for the selector switch contacts and the contacts
themselves suffer wear and require maintenance,
contact pressures have to be checked, minute metaUic
particles are produced and will contaminate the oil.
However, modern selector switch mechanisms have
General design and construction
(b) Transitional position A
(d) Running position tap 2
been developed since the early 1960s which need very
little maintenance and cause very little oil contamina­
tion as a proportion of total quantity of oil in the
main tank. These tapchangers have been designed for
use in the oil in the main tank, an arrangement which
the manufacturers claim is cheaper, although the eco­
nomic argument is a complex one.
223
Transformers Chapter 3

SWITCH COMPARTMENT

WINDOW FOR OBSERVATION

OF TAP POSITION INDICATOR
OPERATIONS COUNTER AND FOR
INDICATION OF OIL LEVEL
OF MOTOR DRIVE AND TIMING INSPECTION
GEAR COMPARTMENT COVERS

MAIN FRONT
COVER

MOTOR DRIVE AND TIMING

GEAR COMPARTMENT

CONTROL TERMINAL
COMPARTMENT COVERS

FIG. 3.32 Ferranti DS series tapchanger

They have the advantage that all tapping leads can
be formed and connected to the appropriate selector
switch contacts before the transformer is installed in
the tank. With the separate compartment pattern, the
usual practice is for selector switch contacts to be
mounted on a base board of insulating material which
is part of the main tank and forms the barrier be­
tween the oil in the main tank and that in the selector
switch compartment. The tapping leads thus cannot
be connected to the selector contacts until the core
and windings have been installed in the tank. This is
a difficult fitting task, requiring the tapping leads to
be made up and run to a d u m m y selector switch base
during erection of the transformer and then discon­
nected from this before tanking. Once the windings are
within the tank, access for connection of the tapping
leads is restricted and it is also difficult to ensure that
the necessary electrical clearances between leads are
maintained. With in-tank tapchangers it is still neces­
sary to keep the diverter switch oil separate from the
main-tank oil. This is usually achieved by housing the
diverter switches within a cyhnder of glass-reinforced

224

resin mounted above the selector switch assembly.
When the transformer is installed within the tank,
removal of the inspection cover which forms the top
plate of this cylinder provides access to the diverter
switches. These are usually removable via the top of
the cylinder for maintenance and contact inspection.
Such an arrangement is employed on the Reinhausen
type Μ series which is a German design, manufactured
in the UK under licence by Associated T a p Changers
Limited. It is illustrated in Fig 3.33 and has been
used on the generator transformers of the Riband
Power Station in India.
DIVERTER
, SWITCH UNIT
FIG. 3.33 Reinhausen type Μ tapchanger
General design and construction
1.5.6 Off-Circuit tapchangers
As explained in Section 1.4.1 of this chapter, the
off-circuit tapping switch enables accurate electrical
auxiliary system voltage levels to be set when the power
station comes into operation. Once selected, the trans­
former may remain at that setting for the remainder
of its operating life. Most off-circuit tapping switches
use an arrangement similar to the selector switch me­
chanism of the on-load tapchanger, employing similar
components, but if these selector contacts are not
operated occasionally a build u p of pyrolytic carbon
can occur at the contact faces. This increases contact
resistance which can lead to contact arcing and, in
turn, produces m o r e carbon. Ultimately a runaway
situation is reached and the transformer will probably
trip on Buchholz protection. T o avoid the formation of
pyrolytic carbon on off-circuit tapchangers, it is vital
that the switch has adequate contact pressure and that
it is operated through its complete range once per
year to wipe the contact faces clean. Because of these
problems, the C E G B has in recent years specified that
ratio adjustments on unit transformers and other aux­
iliary transformers, which would, hitherto, have had
off-circuit tapping switches, should be carried out by
means of links under oil within the transformer tank.
The Hnks must be located at the t o p of the tank so
that access can be obtained with the minimum removal
of oil, but provided this is specified, tapchanging is
relatively simple and reliability is greatly improved.
In fact, the greatest inconvenience from this arrange­
ment occurs during works testing, when the manufac­
turer has to plan his test sequence carefully in order
to minimise the number of occasions when it is neces­
sary to change taps. M o r e tapchanges will probably
be m a d e at this time than throughout the remainder
of the transformer lifetime.
1.6 Tanks, connections and auxiliary plant
1.6.1 Transformer tanlcs
The transformer tank provides the containment for the
core and windings and for the dielectric fluid. It must
withstand the forces imposed on it during transport.
On larger transformers, it usually also provides sup­
port for the core during transport. All but the smallest
transformers, are impregnated with oil under vacuum:
the tank acts as the vacuum vessel for this operation.
Transformer tanks are almost invariably constructed
of welded boiler plate t o BS4630. The tank must have
a removable cover so that access can be obtained for
the installation and future removal, if necessary, of
core and coils. The cover is fastened by a bolted flange
a r o u n d the tank at a high level so that it can be
removed for inspection of core and coils, if required,
without draining all the oil. The cover is normally the
simplest of fabrications, often no more than a stiffened
flat plate. It should be inclined to the horizontal at
225
Transformers
about 1°, so that it will not collect rainwater: any
stiffeners should also be arranged so that they will
not collect water, either by the provision of drain holes
or by forming them from channel sections with the
open face downwards.
The tank is provided with an adequate number of
removable covers, allowing access to bushing connec­
tions and to core earthing links, off-circuit tapping
links and the rear of tapping selector switches. Usually
the need for the manufacturer to have access to these
items in the works ensures that adequate provision is
made. All gasketed joints on the tank represent a poten­
tial source of oil leakage, so these should be kept to a
minimum. The main tank cover flange usually repre­
sents the greatest oil leakage threat, since, being of
large cross-section, it tends to provide a path for leak­
age flux, with the resultant eddy current heating leading
to degradation of gaskets. Removable covers, whilst
being large enough to provide adequate safe access
should also be small and Hght enough to enable them
to be lifted safely by maintenance personnel on site.
Occasionally the tanks of larger transformers may
be provided with deep covers, so that the headroom
necessary to lift core and coils from the tank is re­
duced. This arrangement should be avoided, if pos­
sible, since a greater quantity of oil needs to be removed
should it be necessary to lift the cover and it requires
a more complex cover fabrication.
Mention has been made of the need to avoid, or
reduce, the likelihood of oil leaks. The welding of
transformer tanks does not demand any sophisticated
processes but it is nevertheless important to ensure
that they are given an adequate test for oil tightness
during manufacture. C E G B practice is to apply a
pressure of 700 mbar, or the normal pressure plus
350 mbar, whichever is the greater, for 24 hours. This
must be contained without any leakage.
The tank must carry the means of making the elec­
trical connections. There are cable boxes for all volt­
ages ^ 11 kV. Above this voltage air bushings are
normally used, although increasing use is now being
made of S F 6 - f i l l e d connections between transformer
and switchgear at 132 kV and above.
Tanks must be provided with valves for filling and
draining. These also enable the oil to be circulated
through external filtration and drying equipment prior
to initial energisation on site, or during service when
oil has been replaced after obtaining access to the
core and windings. Lifting lugs or, on smaller units,
lifting eyes must be provided, as well as jacking pads
and haulage holes to enable the transformer to be
manoeuvred on site. A n oil sampling valve must also
be provided to enable a sample of the oil to be taken
for analysis with the minimum of disturbance or
turbulence, which might cause changes to the dissolved
gas content of the sample and thereby lead to errone­
ous diagnosis. The sampHng valve is normally located
about one metre above the tank base in order to obtain
as representative a sample as possible.
226
Chapter 3
Transformer tanks also have a device to allow the
relief of any sudden internal pressure rise, such as
that resulting from an internal fault. Until a few years
ago, this device was usually a bursting diaphragm.
This had the disadvantage that, once it had burst, it
allowed an indefinite a m o u n t of oil to be released,
which might aggravate any fire associated with the
fault, and also it left the windings open to the atmos­
phere. The bursting diaphragm has been superseded by
a spring-operated self-resealing device which only re­
leases the volume of oil necessary to relieve the excess
pressure before resealing the tank. As shown in Fig
3.34, it is essentially a spring-loaded valve providing
instantaneous ampHfication of the actuation force.
FLANGE
GASKET
FIG. 3 . 3 4 Qualitrol pressure relief device
The unit is mounted on a transformer by lugs on
the flange and sealed by a mounting gasket. A spring-
loaded valve disc is sealed against inner and outer
gasket rings by the springs. The valve operates when
the oil pressure acting on the area inside the inner
gasket ring exceeds the opening force estabhshed by
the springs. As the disc moves upwards slightly from
the inner gasket ring, the oil pressure quickly becomes
exposed to the disc area over the diameter of the outer
gasket ring, resulting in a greatly increased force, and
causing immediate full opening of the valve correspond­
ing to the closed height of the springs. The transformer
pressure is rapidly reduced to normal and the springs
then return the valve disc to the closed position. A
minute bleed-port to the outside atmosphere from the
volume entrapped between the gasket rings prevents
inadvertent valve opening if foreign particles on the
inner gasket ring prevent a perfect ring-to-disc seal.
A mechanical indicator pin in the cover, although
not fastened to the valve disc, moves with it during

operation and is held in the operated position by an
O-ring in the pin bushing. This remains clearly visible,
indicating that the valve has operated.
No pressure relief device can provide complete pro­
tection against all internal pressure transients. On the
largest tanks, two such devices at opposite ends of
the tank improve the protection. It is usual to place
the pressure relief device as high on the tank as pos­
sible. This minimises the static head apphed to the
spring, thus reducing the hkelihood of spurious o p ­
eration in the event of a 'normal' pressure transient,
for example, the starting of an oil p u m p .
However, with the pressure rehef device located at
high level, there is the risk that operation might drench
an operator with hot oil; to prevent this, an enclosure
is provided around the device to contain and direct
the oil safely down to phnth level. Such enclosure
must not, of course, create any significant back pres­
sure which would prevent the rehef device from per­
forming its function properly: a minimum cross-section
for any ducting of 300 cm^ is usually specified.
T o complete the list of fittings on the transformer
tank, it is usual to provide a pocket, or pockets, in
the cover to take a thermometer for measurement of
top oil temperature, a diagram/nameplate to provide
information of transformer details, and an earthing
terminal for the main tank earth connection.
1.6.2 Oil preservation equipment —
conservators
Although it is now c o m m o n for many of the smaller
distribution transformers to dispense with a conser­
vator (see, for example, ESI Standard 35.1), all oil-
filled transformers associated with power station aux­
iliary systems have conservators, as do the unit, station
and generator transformers.
The use of a conservator allows the main tank to
be filled to the cover, thus permitting cover-mounted
bushings, where required, and it also makes possible
the use of a Buchholz relay (see below). The conser­
vator reduces the area of the interface between air
and oil. This reduces the oxidisation of the oil and
also reduces the level of dissolved oxygen, which would
otherwise tend to shorten insulation hfe.
Recent investigation, for example that of Shroff and
Stannett (1985) [6], has highhghted the part played
by dissolved oxygen in accelerating insulation ageing.
Although, to date, no special measures have been
implemented in C E G B power stations beyond the use
of conservators, it is possible that in the near future
some arrangement might be introduced to reduce
further the degree of contact between oil and air; for
example, this could be simply achieved by the use of
a parallel-sided conservator having a 'float' covering
the surface of the oil.
It is also necessary to exclude moisture from the
air space above the conservator oil level, in order
to maintain the dryness of the transformer oil. For
General design and construction
transformers below 132 kV, this space is vented through
a device containing a drying agent (usually silica gel,
impregnated with c o b a h chloride) over which the air
entering the conservator is passed. When the moisture
content of the silica gel becomes excessive, as indicated
by the change in colour of the cobalt chloride from
blue to pink, its ability to extract further moisture is
reduced and it must be replaced by a further charge of
dry material. The saturated gel can be reactivated by
drying it in an oven.
The effectiveness of this type of breather depends
u p o n a number of factors; the dryness of the gel,
the moisture in the incoming air and the ambient
temperature being the most significant.
If optimum performance is to be obtained from a
transformer having a H V winding of 132 kV and above
or, indeed, any generator transformer operating at
high load factor, then it is desirable to maintain a
high degree of dryness of the oil, typically less than
10 parts per milUon by volume at 2 0 ° C . Although oil
treatment on initial filling can achieve these levels,
moisture levels tend to increase over and above any
moisture which is taken in through breathing, since
water is a product of normal insulation degradation,
and this is taking place all the time that the trans­
former is on load. It is desirable, therefore, to main­
tain something akin to a continuous treatment to
extract moisture from the oil. This is the principle
employed in the refrigeration type of breather,
illustrated in Fig 3.35. Incoming air is passed through
a low temperature chamber which causes any water
vapour present to be collected on the chamber walls.
The chamber is cooled by means of thermoelectric
modules in which a temperature difference is generated
by the passage of an electric current (the Peltier effect).
Periodically the current is reversed; the accumulated
ice mehs and drains away. In addition to the drying
of the incoming air, this type of breather can be ar­
ranged such that the thermosyphon action created
between the air in the cooled duct and that in the air
space of the conservator creates a continuous circula­
tion and, therefore, a continuous drying action. As
the air space in the conservator becomes increasingly
dried, the equilibrium level of moisture in the oil for
the pressure and temperature conditions prevailing will
be reduced so that water will be driven off and this,
in turn, causes moisture to migrate from the insulation
to the oil, so that a continuous drying process takes
place.
The conservator is provided with a sump by ar­
ranging that the pipe connecting with the transformer
projects into the b o t t o m by about 750 m m . This cohects
any sludge which might be formed over a period of
years by oxidation of the oil. One end is usually made
removable so that, if necessary, the internals may be
cleaned out. One end-face usually incorporates a pris­
matic oil level gauge: this should be angled downwards
by some 1 0 - 1 5 ° , so that it can be easily viewed from
plinth level.
227
Transformers Chapter 3

As mentioned above, the provision of a conser­

vator also permits the installation of a Buchholz relay
(sometimes termed a *gas and oil operated relay'). This
INLET is installed in the run of pipe connecting the conservator
• PIPE
to the main tank. In this location, the relay collects
any gas produced by a fauh inside the tank. The
presence of this gas causes a float to be depressed which
is then arranged to operate a pair of contacts which
can be set to *alarm', or *trip', or both, dependent
upon the rate of gas production. A detailed description
of this device can be found in most transformer
textbooks, for example, the J and Ρ Transformer Book
[7]. In order to ensure that any gas evolved in the
tank is vented to the conservator it is necessary to
vent every high point on the tank cover, for example,
each bushing turret, and to connect these to the con­
servator feed pipe on the tank side of the Buchholz
relay, normally using about 20 m m bore pipework.
The main connecting pipe between tank and conser­
vator is 75 or 100 m m bore, depending upon the size
of the transformer.

1.6.3 Bushing connections

A bushing is a means of bringing an electrical connec­
tion from the inside to the outside of the tank. It
provides the necessary insulation between the connec­
tion and the earth potential of the tank, and forms
a pressure-tight barrier enabling the necessary vacuum
to be drawn for the purpose of oil impregnation of the
windings. It must ensure freedom from leaks during
the operating hfetime of the transformer. The bushing
must also, of course, provide the required current carry­
\ CONNECTED TO
CONSERVATOR ing path with an acceptable temperature rise. Varying
ABOVE OIL LEVEL
degrees of sophistication are necessary to meet these
requirements, depending on the vohage a n d / o r current
TRAP ICE-SEALED rating of the bushing. Figure 3.36 shows an 11 kV
TERMINAL BOX OIL SEAL WATER DRAIN DURING FREEZING.
OPEN DURING bushing with a current rating of about 1000 A. This
SECTION A-A
DEFROST has a central current carrying stem, usually of copper,
and the insulation is provided by a combination of
COOLING AIR the porcelain shell and the transformer oil. Under oil,
DUCT
the porcelain surface creepage strength is very much
greater than in air, so that the *below oil' portion of
the bushing has a plain porcelain surface. The *air'
portion has the famihar shedded profile in order to
provide a very much longer creepage p a t h , a proportion
of which is 'protected' so that it remains dry in rainy
conditions.
At 33 kV and above, it is necessary to provide
additional stress control between the central high volt­
age lead and the external, 'earthy' flange. This can
take the form either of a synthetic-resin-bonded paper
muhifoil capachor or of an oil-impregnated paper
CONDUCTION capacitor of similar construction. Figure 3.37 shows a
LEADS 400 kV oil-impregnated paper bushing in part-section.
The radial electrical stress is graded through the in-
sulant by means of the concentric capacitor foils and
SECTION B-B
the axial stress is controlled by the graded lengths
FIG. 3.35 Refrigeration breather of these. The capachor is housed between an inner

228
 General design and construction

FLAG TYPE
CONNECTOR

RAINSHED

STEM

GASKET (TO TANK)

- PORCELAIN
SHELL

FLAG TYPE
CONNECTORS

FIG. 3.36 11 kV bushing

229
Transformers
TERMINAL PALM
OIL CONSERVATOR
-PRISMATIC OIL
GAUGE
OIL-IMPREGNATED
PAPER CORE
PORCELAIN SHELL
EARTH BAND FOR
CT ACCOMMODATION
FIG. 3.37 400 kV oil-impregnated-paper bushing
conducting tube and the outer porcelain casing. The
interspace is oil-filled and the bushing head, or 'helmet',
provides oil-expansion space and is fitted with a sight
glass to give indication of oil level. Clearly, this type
of bushing is designed for installation at, or near, the
vertical position. The bushing illustrated is of the
so-called 're-entrant' pattern in that the connection
to the line-lead is housed within the lower end of
the bushing. This has the effect of foreshortening the
under-oil end of the bushing but requires a more
complex lower porcelain section, which adds consi­
derably to the cost. In order to make the electrical
connection to the bushing, the HV lead terminates
in a flexible pigtail which is threaded through the
central tube and connected inside the head of the
bushing. The heavy insulation on the line-lead, how­
230
Chapter 3
ever, is only taken just inside the re-entrant end of
the bushing. With this arrangement, an inverted coni­
cal section gas-bubble deflector must be fitted beneath
the re-entrant end of the bushing to ensure that any
gas evolved within the transformer tank is directed
to the Buchholz relay and not allowed to collect within
the central stem of the bushing.
In this bushing, the designer's main difficulty is to
provide an insulation system capable of withstanding
the high working voltage. The low voltage bushings
of a large generator transformer present a different
problem. Here, the electrical stress is modest but the
difficulty is in providing a current rating of a r o u n d
14 000 A , the phase current of an 800 M V A unit.
Figure 3.38 shows a bushing rated at 33 kV, 14 000 A .
The current is carried by the large central copper cyl­
inder, each end of which carries a palm assembly to
provide the heavy current connections to the bushing.
The superior cooling capability provided by the trans­
former oil at the 'under-oil' end of the bushing means
that only two parallel palms are required. At the air
end of the bushing, it is necessary to provide a very
much larger palm surface area and to adopt a con­
figuration which ensures a uniform distribution of
the current. It has been found that an arrangement
approximating to a circular cross-section — here,
octagonal — achieves this better than one having
plain parallel palms. These palms may be silver-plated
to improve their electrical contact with the external
connectors, but in fact recent C E G B experience has
shown that a better connection can be made to plain
copper palms, provided that the joint is made cor­
rectly; for more information on this aspect, the reader
is referred to Chapter 4 which deals with generator
main connections.
Insulation is provided by a synthetic-resin-bonded
paper and foil condenser bushing and, as can be seen
from the diagram, this also provides the means of
mounting the flange. External weather protection for
the air end is provided by the conventional shedded
porcelain housing. A n air-release plug on the upper-end
flange allows air to be bled from the inside of the
assembly, so that it can be filled with oil under the
head of the conservator.
1.6.4 SFe connections
With the advent of 400 kV SF6-insulated metalclad
switchgear in the 1970s, the benefits of making a direct
connection between the switchgear and transformer
were quickly recognised. At Dinorwig power station,
for example, transformers and 400 kV switchgear are
all accommodated underground. The transformer hall
is immediately below the 400 kV switchgear gallery
and 400 kV metalclad connections pass directly through
the floor of this to connect t o the transformers be­
neath. Even where transformers and switchgear cannot
be quite so completely integrated, there are space
saving benefits if 400 kV connections can be m a d e to
 General design and construction

CURRENT CARRYING COMPRESSION

CYLINDRICAL 'STEM- SPRINGS
MOUNTING
FLANGE

O O O

o O O
o O O

o O O
o O O
o O
O o
\
o o 2 PARALLEL
•UNDER OIL- PALMS
o o

AIR CONNECTION PALMS SPRING PLATE

IN OCTAGON FORMATION

OUTER SHEDDED
PORCELAIN

FIG. 3.38 Simplified cross-section of a 33 kV 14 000 A bushing

the transformer, totally enclosed within S F 6 trunking.
Figure 3.39 (a) shows the arrangement employed at
Heysham 2 . The 400 kV cable which connects to the
400 kV substation is terminated with an SFe sealing-
end. SF6 trunking houses Hne isolator, earth switch
and surge di verter. By mounting the SFÓ/oil-bushing
horizontally, the overall height of the cable sealing-end
structure can be reduced.
The construction of the SF6/oil-bushing is similar
to that of the air/oil bushing described previously in
that stress control is achieved by means of an oil-
impregnated paper capacitor, oil-immersed but housed
within a cast resin rather t h a n a porcelain shell. T h e
'under oil' end is 'conventional', i.e., it is not re­
entrant and, since there is n o need for the lengthy air-
creepage path used in an oil/air bushing, the SF6
end is very much shorter than the air equivalent.
Oil expansion and contraction is accommodated by
means of a smaH pressurised conservator. Loss of oil
is detected by means of a pressure-low switch which
can be arranged to initiate an alarm. Since the SF6
trunking operates at a pressure of about 3 bar, leakage
of SF6 gas into the bushing must be regarded as a
real possibility and so this, t o o , is alarmed by means
of a pressure-high switch. Electrical connections are
m a d e to the bushing by means of plain rectangular
bolted palms at either end.
1.6.5 Cable box connections
Cable boxes are the preferred means of making con­
nections at 11 kV, 3.3 kV and 415 V, as in other power
station auxiliary electrical plant. Cabling principles are
dealt with more fully in Chapter 6 of this volume
but the following section reviews them insofar as they
affect the power transformer terminations.
M o d e r n polymeric-insulated cables can be housed
in air-insulated boxes. Such connections can be broken
with relative simplicity and it is not therefore neces­
sary to provide the separate disconnecting chamber
needed for a compound-filled cable box with a paper-
insulated cable. LV currents of u p t o 3000 A, the
switchgear limit, are used for auxiliary power trans­
formers and with cable current ratings of 6 0 0 - 8 0 0 A ,
as m a n y as five cables per phase can be necessary for
the LV connections of the largest unit and station
transformers. For the smaHest transformers of 1 M V A
or less, one cable per phase is sufficient. Since the
very rapid price rise of copper which took place in
the 1960s, power cables are m a d e almost exclusively

231
Transformers Chapter 3

LV BUSBARS
LINE
BELLOWS ISOLATOR

SF6
SEALING END

ACOUSTIC
BUND ENCLOSURE GENERATOR TRANSFORMER

FIG. 3.39 Simplified arrangement of 400 kV SFÖ connection to generator transformer

BUSHING MOUNTING PLATE

of aluminium. These tend to be bulkier and stiffer
than their copper counterparts and this has to be
taken into account in the cable box design. Each cable
has its own individual glandplate so that the jointer BUSHING ASSEMBLY &
MOUNTING TO BS 2562
can gland the cable and then manoeuvre it into posi­
tion in order to connect it to the terminal. Both cable
core and bushing will have palm-type terminations
which are connected with a single bolt. Again, in APERTURE & FLANGE ON
TANK TO BS 2562
order to give the jointer some flexibility and to pro­
vide the necessary tolerances, it is desirable that the
glandplate-to-bushing terminal separation should be
at least 320 m m .
For cable ratings of up to 400 A , non-magnetic
glandplates should be used. For ratings above 400 A , 2500A three or four gland entry enclosure

the entire box should be constructed of non-magnetic

material in order to reduce stray losses within the
shell which would otherwise increase its temperature
rise, with the possible risk of overheating the cable
insulation. To enable the box to breath and to avoid
the build-up of internal condensation, a small drain
hole, say 12 m m in diameter, is provided in one
glandplate.
Figure 3.40 shows a 3.3 kV air-insulated cable-box
having a rating of about 2400 A with 4 χ 400 mm^
aluminium cables per bushing.
At 11 kV, some stress control is required in an
air-insulated box, so bushing and cable terminations
are designed as an integrated assembly, as shown in
Fig 3.41 (a).
Figure 3.41 (b) shows a cross-section of the moulded-
rubber socket connector which is fitted to the end of
the 11 kV cable. This has internal and external semi-
FIG. 3.40 3.3 kV cable box
conductive screens: the inner screen, the cable conduc­
tor connector and the outer provides continuity for
the cable outer screen, so that this encloses the entire
termination. The external screen is bonded to earth
by connection to the external lug shown in the figure.
The joint is assembled by fitting the socket connector
over the mating bushing and then screwing the insu­
lating plug, containing a metal threaded insert, onto
the end of the bushing stem. This is tightened by
means of a spanner applied to the hexagonal-nut insert
in the outer end of this plug. This insert also serves
as a capacitative voltage test point. After making the

232
 General design and construction

restricted access. However, it is C E G B practice to

enclose the termination within a non-magnetic sheet
steel box to provide protection and phase isolation.
Should a fauh occur, this must be contained by the
box which ensures that it remains a phase-to-earth
fault, normally hmited by a resistor at the system neu­
tral point, rather than developing into an unrestricted
phase-to-phase f a u h .

1.6.6 Tank-mounted coolers

T a n k - m o u n t e d radiators represent the simplest option
for coohng smaller power station transformers. These
are suitable for all auxiliary transformers from the
smallest in c o m m o n use (about 0.8 MVA), to the
largest, which are usually 12.5 M V A , 11/3.3 kV. They
are available in various patterns but all consist basi­
cally of a number of flat 'passes' of edge-welded plates
connecting a t o p and b o t t o m header. Oil flows in
and out of the radiators via the headers and is cooled
as it flows downwards through the thin sheet-steel
SINGLE CORE
POWER SUPPLY passes. The arrangement is generally considered to be
CABLE
suitable only for transformers having natural oil and
VIEW ON FRONT WITH LID REMOVED
natural air circulation, i.e., O N A N coohng, as defined
(a) I l k V cable box in BS171.
It would be possible to suspend a fan below the
radiators to provide a forced draught, O N A F arrange­
ment. At best this might enable the transformer rating
ENTRANCE PORT
FOR MATING to be increased some 1 0 - 1 5 % , but only at the extra
11kV BUSHING
cost and complexity of control gear and cabling for,
say, two fans. Achievement of this modest uprating
would require that the radiators be grouped in such a
way as to obtain o p t i m u m coverage by the fans. With
small transformers of this class, much of the tank
RUBBER VOLTAGE INSULATING OUTER
CAP TEST
POINT
PLUG SCREEN surface is normally taken u p with cable boxes, so that
INSULATION
very little flexibihty remains for location of radiators.
In addition, to provide space below the radiator for
installation of a fan requires that the length of the
radiator must be reduced, so that the area for self-
cooling is reduced.
It is frequently a problem to accommodate tank-
m o u n t e d radiators whilst leaving adequate space for
access to cable boxes, the pressure relief vent pipe and
the like. The cooling-surface area can be increased by
increasing the number of passes on the radiators, but
(b) 11kV elastimold elbow there is a limit to the extent to which this can be done,
dictated by the weight which can be hung from the
FIG. 3 . 4 1 11 kV cable box and section of 11 kV t o p and b o t t o m headers. It is possible to make the
elastimold elbow termination
radiators slightly higher than the tank so that the top
header has a swan-necked shape: this has the added
benefit that it also improves the oil circulation by
joint, this is finahy covered by the semiconducting increasing the thermal head developed in the radiator.
moulded-rubber cap. However, this arrangement also increases the overhung
Since the external semi-conductive coating of this weight and has the disadvantage that a swan-necked
type of connector is bonded to earth, there would be header is not as rigid as a straight header, so that the
no electrical hazard resuhing from hs use without any weight-bearing hmit is probably reached sooner. The
external enclosure and, indeed, it is c o m m o n practice permissible overhang on the radiators can be increased
for a connector of this type to be used in this way in by providing a small stool at the o u t b o a r d end, so that
many European countries provided that the area has a proportion of the weight bears directly onto the

233
Transformers
transformer plinth; however, since this support is not
available during transport, one of the major benefits
from tank-mounted radiators, namely, the ability to
transport the transformer full of oil and fully-assem­
bled, is lost.
Each radiator should be provided with isolating
valves in the top and bottom headers as well as drain
and venting plugs, so that it can be isolated, drained
and removed should it leak. The valves may be of the
cam-operated butterfly pattern and, if the radiator is
not replaced immediately, should be backed u p by
fitting of blanking plates with gaskets.
Radiator leakage can arise from corrosion of the thin
sheet steel, and measures should be taken to protect
against this. Because of their construction, it is very
difficult to prepare adequately and to apply paint pro­
tection to radiators under site conditions, so that if the
original paint finish has been allowed to deteriorate,
either due to weather conditions or from damage in
transit, it can become a major problem to make this
good. This is particularly so at seaside sites. The C E G B ,
therefore, now specifies that plate-type radiators for
power station transformers must be hot-dip galvanised
in the manufacturer's works prior to receiving an etch-
prime, followed by the usual paint treatment in the
works.
1.6.7 Separate cooler banks
As already indicated, one of the problems with tank-
mounted radiators is that a stage is reached when it
becomes difficult to accommodate all the required ra­
diators on the tank surface, particularly if a significant
proportion of this is taken up with cable boxes. In ad­
dition, with the radiators mounted on the tank, the only
straightforward option for forced cooling is the use of
forced draught or induced draught fans, and, as was
indicated in Section 1.4.11 of this chapter, the greater
benefits are gained by forcing and directing the oil flow.
However, many utilities, particularly in the USA,
do make use of tank-mounted radiators for very large
transformers and it might, therefore, be worthwhile
considering the merits and disadvantages of these in
relation to the separate free-standing cooler arrange­
ment favoured by the C E G B .
Advantages
• More compact arrangement saves space on site.
• Can be transported as a single entity, which con­
siderably reduces site-erection work.
• Allegedly cheaper due to saving of pipework and
headers and frame/support structure.
Disadvantages
• Forced-cooling must usually be restricted to fans
only, due to the complication involved in providing
a pumped system.
234
Chapter 3
• Access to the transformer tank and to the radiators
themselves for maintenance/painting is extremely
difficult.
• A noise-attenuating enclosure cannot be fitted to
the tank.
If these advantages are examined more closely, it
becomes apparent that these may be less real than at
first sight. Although the transformer itself might well
be more compact, if it is to achieve any significant
increase in rating from forced cooling, a large number
of fans will be required, and a considerable space must
be left around the unit to ensure a free airflow without
the danger of recirculation. In addition, since the use
of forced and directed oil allows a very much more
efficient forced cooled design to be produced, the ap­
parent saving in pipework and cooler structure can be
easily offset. Looking at the disadvantages, the inability
to fit a noise-attenuating enclosure can be a serious
problem for larger transformers, i.e., station and gen­
erator transformers especially since, in order to allow
free access for cooling air, these must be located in an
open situation.
The protagonists of tank-mounted radiators tend to
use bushings mounted on the tank cover for both HV
and LV connections, thus leaving the tank side almost
entirely free for radiators.
Having stated the arguments in favour of free­
standing cooler b a n k s , it is appropriate to consider the
merits and disadvantages of forced as against natural
cooling for power station use.
Adopting O F A F cooling for say, a 60 M V A station
transformer, incurs the operating cost of pumps and
fans, as well as their additional first cost and that
of the necessary control gear and cabling. Also, there
is slightly-poorer reliabihty in a transformer which
relies on other auxihary equipment, compared with an
O N A N transformer having no electrically-driven aux­
iliaries. On the credit side, there is a considerable re­
duction in the plan area of the cooler bank, resulting
in significant space saving of the overall layout. Such
an OFAF-cooled station transformer is rated to dehver
full output for the start-up of a unit during an outage
on the second station transformer, so that for most
of its Ufe the loading will be n o more than its 30 M V A
O N A N rating. Under these circumstances, it is rea­
sonable to accept the theoretical reduction in reliability
and the occasional cooler equipment losses as a fair
price for the saving in space. On the other hand, a unit
transformer is required to operate at or near to full
output whenever its associated generator is on load,
so reliance on other ancillary equipment is less de­
sirable and, if at all possible, it is preferable to find
space in the layout to enable it to be totally naturally-
cooled.
If a transformer is provided with a separate free­
standing cooler b a n k , it then becomes possible to raise
the level of the radiators to a height which will create

an adequate thermal head to ensure optimum natural
circulation. The longest available radiators can be
used to minimise the plan area of the b a n k , consistent
with maintaining a sufficient area to allow the required
number of fans to be fitted. It is usual to specify that
full forced-cooled output can be obtained with one
fan out of action. Similarly, p u m p failure should be
catered for by the provision of two p u m p s , each capable
of dehvering fuh flow. If these are installed in parahel
branches of cooler pipework, then it is necessary to
ensure that the non-running p u m p branch cannot pro­
vide a return path for the oil, thus allowing this to
by-pass the transformer tank. Normally this would be
achieved by incorporating a non-return valve in each
branch. However, such a valve would create too much
head loss to allow the natural circulation necessary to
provide an O N A N rating. The solution is to use a flap-
valve of the type shown in Fig 3.42, which provides
the same function when a p u m p is running but will
take up a central position with minimal head loss for
thermaUy-induced natural circulation.
1.6.8 Water cooling
In the past, water was a c o m m o n choice of coolant
medium for many power station transformers, includ­
ing practically all generator transformers and most
station and unit transformers. This was logical, since
there is an ample source of cooling water available
in the vicinity of these transformers and oil/water
heat exchangers are compact and thermally efficient.
Such an arrangement does not provide for a self-cooled
rating, since the head loss in oil/water heat exchangers
precludes natural oil circulation, but (as explained
above) a self-cooled rating is only sensible for the sta­
tion transformer. The provision of a cooling water
FLOW DIRECTION
FIG. 3 . 4 2 Oil flap-valve
General design and construction
supply appears to be low cost compared with the cost
of running and providing fans, so that water cooling
often appears to be more economical.
The precise cost of cooling water depends on the
source, but it is often p u m p e d from river or sea and
when the cost of this is taken into consideration, the
economics of water cooling become far less certain. In
the early 1970s, after a number of major generator
transformer failures attributable to water entering the
oil through cooler leaks, the C E G B reassessed the
philosophy of water coohng. The high cost of these
failures, both in terms of increased generating costs
due to the need to operate lower-merit plant and the
repair costs, as well as pumping costs, resulted in a
decision to adopt a forced-air cooled arrangement for
the Littlebrook D generator transformers and this has
since become the standard, whenever practicable.
The risk of water entering the transformer tank
due to a cooler leak has long been recognised and is
normally avoided by ensuring that the oil pressure is
at all times greater than that of the water, so that
leakage will always be in the direction of oil into
water. It is difficult to ensure that this pressure dif­
ference is maintained under all possible conditions of
operation and malfunction. Under normal conditions,
the height of the transformer conservator tank can
be arranged such that the minimum oil-head will always
be above that of the water. However, it is difficult to
m a k e allowance for operational errors, for example,
the wrong valve being closed, so that maximum p u m p
discharge pressure is applied to an oil/water interface,
or for equipment faults, such as a pressure reducing
valve which sticks open at full pressure.
In the past, it was the practice to use devices such
as pressure reducing valves or orifice plates to reduce
the waterside pressures. However, no matter how re­
liable a pressure reducing valve might be, the time
WIN come when it will fail, and an orifice plate will
only produce a pressure reduction with water flowing
through it, so that should a fault occur which prevents
the flow, full pressure will be applied to the system.
F r o m the above arguments, it has become pohcy
to avoid water coohng as far as practicable. When it is
considered essential, special measures are taken to pro­
vide an installation of the appropriate integrity. One
recent example is the Dinorwig pumped-storage power
station where the generator transformers are located
underground, making air coohng impracticable on
grounds of space and noise. Figure 3.43 shows a dia­
grammatic arrangement of the coohng adopted for the
Dinorwig generator transformers. This uses a two-stage
arrangement having oil/towns-water heat exchangers
as the first stage, with second-stage water/water heat
exchangers having high pressure lake water cooling the
intermediate towns water. The use of the intermediate
stage with recirculating towns water enables the pres­
sure of this water to be closely controlled and, being
towns water, waterside corrosion/erosion of the oil/
water heat exchangers — the most likely cause of
235
Transformers Chapter 3
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cooler leaks — is also kept very much under control.
Pressure control is ensured by the use of a header tank
maintained at atmospheric pressure. The level in this
tank is topped up via the ball valve and a very gener­
ously-sized overflow is provided so that, if this valve
should stick open, the header tank will not become pres­
surised. The position of the water p u m p in the circuit
and the direction of flow is such that should the water
outlet valve of the oil/water heat exchanger be inad­
vertently closed, this t o o would not cause pressurisation
of the heat exchanger. A float switch in the header
tank connected to provide a high level alarm warns of
ehher failure of the ball valve or leakage of the raw lake
water into the intermediate towns water circuit.
Other situations in which water cooling might be
justified are those in which the ambient air tempera­
ture is high, so that a significantly greater temperature
rise of the transformer might be permitted if water
cooling is employed. Such an installation might use
an arrangement similar to that for Dinorwig described
above or, alternatively, a double-tube/double-tubeplate
cooler might be employed. W h h such an arrangement,
shown diagrammatically in Fig 3.44, oil and water
circuits are separated by an interspace so that any fluid
leakage will be coUected in this space and will raise
an alarm. Coolers of this type are, of course, signifi­
cantly more expensive than simple single-tube and plate
types and heat transfer is not so efficient, so it is
necessary to consider the economics carefully before
adopting a double-tube/double-tubeplate cooler in pre­
ference to an air-cooled arrangement.
Another possible option which might be considered
in a situation where water cooling appears preferable
is the use of sophisticated materials, for example, tita­
nium-tubed coolers. This is usually less economic than
a double-tubed/double-tubeplate cooler as described
above.
Passing mention has been made of the need to
avoid both corrosion and erosion of the water side of
cooler tubes. A third problem which can arise is the
formation of deposits on the water side of cooler tubes
which impair heat transfer. The avoidance of all of
these requires careful attention to the design of the
cooling system and to carefully controlled operation.
Corrosion problems can be minimised by correct se­
lection of tube and tubeplate materials to suit the
analysis of the coohng water. Deposition is avoided
by ensuring that an adequate rate of water flow is
maintained, but allowing this to become excessive will
lead to tube errosion.
If the cooling medium is seawater, corrosion pro­
blems can be aggravated and these might require the
use of measures, such as the installation of sacrificial
anodes or cathodic protection. These measures have
been used with success in C E G B stations, but it is
important to recognise that they impose a very much
greater burden on maintenance staff than does an air
cooler, and the consequences of a small a m o u n t of
neglect can be disastrous.
General design and construction
A fan and its control equipment can operate con­
tinuously or under automatic control for periods of
two years or more, and maintenance usually means
n o more than greasing bearings and inspection of
contactor contacts. By contrast, to ensure maximum
freedom from leaks, most operators of oil/water heat
exchangers within the C E G B routinely strip them down
annually to inspect tubes, tubeplates and water boxes.
Each tube is then non-destructively tested for wall
thickness and freedom from defects, using an eddy cur­
rent p r o b e . Suspect tubes can be blanked off but, since
it WIN only be permissible to blank-off a small propor­
tion of these without impairing cooling, a stage can
be reached when complete replacement tubenests are
necessary.
In view of the significant maintenance requirement
on oil/water heat exchangers, it is most advisable to
provide a spare cooler and standard practice has, there­
fore, been to install three 50%-rated coolers, one of
which will be kept in a wet standby condition, i.e., with
inlet and outlet valves closed but full of clean water,
and with the other two in service.
The subject of water cooler design and operation is
dealt w h h more fully in Volume C.
1.6.9 Cooler control
Ancillary plant to provide forced coohng must be
provided w h h power suppHes and a means of control.
At its most basic, this simply takes the form of man­
ual switching at a local marshalling panel, housing
auxiliary power supplies, fuses, overloads and contac­
tors. O n m o d e r n power stations, the philosophy has
been to reduce the a m o u n t of at-plant operator control
and so it is usual to provide remote a n d / o r automatic
operation.
The simplest form of automatic control uses the
contacts of a winding temperature indicator to initiate
the starting and stopping of p u m p s and fans. Further
sophistication can be introduced to limh the extent of
forced cooling lost should a p u m p or fan fail. One
approach is to subdivide the cooler bank into halves,
using two 50%-rated p u m p s and two sets of fans. Plant
failure would thus normally not resuh in loss of more
than half of the forced cooHng. As has been explained
in Section 1.6.7 of this chapter, many forced-cooled
station transformers and, in some cases, unit trans­
formers have a rating which is adequate for normal
system operation when totally self-cooled, so an ar­
rangement which requires slightly less pipework having
parallel 100%-rated duty and standby p u m p s , as shown
in Fig 3.45, is now favoured. This means that flow
switches must be provided to sense the failure of a
duty p u m p and to initiate start-up of the standby should
the winding temperature sense that forced cooling is
required.
A large generator transformer will have virtually no
self-cooled rating, so that p u m p s can be initiated from
a voltage sensing relay, fed from a vohage transformer
237
Transformers Chapter 3

VENT

TOP WATERBOX

DOUBLE TUBE
^ PLATE

OIL

DOUBLE TUBE

OILMATER
INTERSPACE

-OIL

LEAKAGE ALARM

FLOAT DOUBLE TUBE

PLATE

WATER -WATER

BOTTOM WATERBOX

FIG. 3.44 Double tube, double tubeplate oil/water heat-exchanger

which is energised whenever the generator transformer
is energised. 100%-duty and standby pumps are pro­
vided, with initiation of the standby p u m p should
flow-failure be detected on the duty p u m p . Fans can still
be controlled from a winding temperature indicator,
but it is usual to divide these into two groups initiated
in stages, the first group being switched on at a winding
temperature of 80°C and out at 70°C. The second
group is switched on at 95°C and out at 80°C. The
total number of fans provided is such that failure
of any one fan still enables full rating to be achieved
with an ambient temperature of 30°C. The control
scheme also allows each p u m p to serve either in the
duty or standby m o d e and the fans to be selected for
either first-stage temperature operation or second-stage
operation. In addition, a multiposition m o d e selector

238

CONSERVATOR
COOLER Ά·
FIG. 3.45 Oil circuit for ONAN/OFAF cooled unit
transformer
switch allows both pumps and fans to be selected for
'test' to check the operation of the control circuitry. T h e
scheme is also provided with 'indication' and 'alarm'
relay contacts connected to the station data processor.
For water cooled generator transformers, the fans
are replaced by water pumps which can be controlled
from voltage transformer signals in the same way as
the oil p u m p s . Again duty a n d standby p u m p s are
provided, with the standby initiated from a flow switch
detecting loss of flow from the duty p u m p .
There is a view that automatic control of generator
transformer air coolers is unnecessary and that these
should run continuously whenever the generator trans­
former is energised. Modern fans have a high reliabi­
lity, so they can be run for long periods continuously
without attention. For many large generator trans­
formers, running of fans (whether required or not)
results in a reduction of transformer load loss, due to
the reduced winding temperature, which more than
offsets the additional fan power requirement, so that
this method of operation actually reduces operating
cost. In addition, the lower winding temperature re­
duces the rate of usage of the transformer insulation
Hfe. A n example will assist in making this clear.
An 800 M V A generator transformer might typically
operate at a throughput of 660 M W and 200 M V A r ,
which is equivalent to 690 M V A . At 800 M V A , it will
have resistance rise and top-oil rise of 70° and 60° C,
respectively, if the manufacturer has designed these to
the BS Hmits. At 690 M V A , these could be reduced t o
45°C and 41 ° C , respectively, dependent on the par­
ticular design. Then, as explained in Section 1.4.11 of
this chapter, the winding hot spot temperature at an
ambient temperature of, say, 10°C will be given by:
Ambient 10
Rise by resistance 45
Half (outlet/inlet) oil 6 of doors the next important consideration is to mini­
Maximum gradient — average gradient 2 mise the lengths of connections. T h e transformer lo­
Total 63°C
General design and construction
At this ambient, the first fan group will operate under
automatic control, tripping in when the hot spot tem­
perature reaches 80°C a n d out at 70°C. It is reason­
able t o assume, therefore, that with these fans running
intermittently, an average temperature of 75°C will
be maintained. Hence, continuous running of all fans
will achieve a temperature reduction of about 12°C.
The power absorbed by twelve fans on a transformer
of this rating might typically be 36 k W . Hence, running
them continuously rather than intermittently could a b ­
sorb an additional power somewhere between 27 kW
(if half of them would otherwise have run for half the
time) and 36 k W (if they would otherwise not have
run at all). It is not unreasonable, therefore to assume
30 k W extra load.
The load loss of an 800 M V A generator transformer
at rated power could be 1600 k W . At 690 M V A this
would be about 1190 k W . If it is assumed that S5%
of this figure represents resistive loss, then this equates
to 1000 k W , approximately. A 12°C reduction in the
average winding temperature would produce a reduc­
tion of resistance at 75°C of about 3 . 8 % , hence about
38 k W of load loss would be saved. Strictly speaking,
this reduction in resistance would cause an approx­
imately 3 . 8 % increase in the other 1 5 % of the load
losses, that is about 7 k W additional stray losses would
be incurred, so that the power balance [38: (30 -f- 7)]
would approximately break even. However, the figures
used are only approximate a n d , for lower ambients, the
savings in load losses would be m o r e real. T h e impor­
tant feature, though, is that the lower hot-spot tem­
perature increases insulation Ufe. For example, referring
to Section 1.4.11 of this chapter, the 12°C reduction
obtained in the above example would, theoretically,
increase the Ufe of the insulation somewhere between
three and fourfold.
1.6.10 Layout of transfornner compounds
In planning a transformer layout there are a number
of requirements t o be considered.
All power transformers containing BS 148 oil are
considered to represent a fire hazard, so they should
be located out of doors, a h h o u g h a study of reported
statistics suggests that the likelihood of a fire resulting
from an incident involving a power station transformer
below 132 kV is very low. This is probably because
at the lower system voltages, fault levels a n d protec­
tion operating times are such that it is not possible
to input sufficient energy in a fault to raise bulk oil
temperature to the level necessary t o support combus­
tion. T h e subject of fire hazard is discussed further
in Section 2.4 of this chapter, which deals with auxihary
transformers.
Having decided to locate oil-filled transformers out
cation should be selected as close as practicable to the
load or, for the generator transformer, to the source
239
Transformers
of supply. This normally leads to transformers being
located in two groups.
The first group consists of those located immediately
outside the turbine hall. This includes the generator
transformer in order to minimise the length of the very
heavy-current generator connection and almost cer­
tainly the unit transformer also. The generator busbars
are large aluminium fabrications which, for reasons of
site installation, must be kept as straight and as simple
as possible. Those supplying the unit transformer are
teed-off the main run; although not having as large a
load current as those to the generator transformer,
the current under fault conditions is greater than that
in the main run, since both the system and the gen­
erator contribute. T o minimise the likehhood of faults,
as well as to Hmit the cost of these connections, it is
desirable that they should be kept as short as possible.
The subject of generator main connections is dealt
with more fully in Chapter 4.
The LV current of the unit transformer is of the
order of twice that on its HV side and usually involves
the use of very bulky 11 kV cables to connect to the
11 kV switchgear. T o keep these cables as short as
possible, the 11 kV unit board is normally placed close
by. The same 11 kV switchgear annexe might also house
the 11 kV station board, suitably segregated from the
unit board, hence its station transformer could also be
included in this group provided that, as an alterna­
tive source of 11 kV supplies, it too can be fully
segregated against any incident which might affect the
unit transformer.
Recent segregation requirements introduced for nu­
clear stations now require the station transformer to
be removed to a more distant location. This is so that
alternative 11 kV supphes can be preserved, even in the
event of a major incident, such as an aircraft crash on
the site.
UNIT STATION
TRANSFORMER 1 TRANSFORMER 1
GENERATOR
TRANSFORMER 1
GENERATOR
TRANSFORMER 2
UNIT
TRANSFORMER 2
FIG. 3 . 4 6 Layout of generator, unit and station transformers
240
Chapter 3
Grouping these main transformers together has the
advantage that they can share drainage facilities and,
since transformer c o m p o u n d drainage involves costly
civil works, this is a worthwhile economy. Figure 3.46
shows a typical layout of generator unit and station
transformers for two units of a four-unit station.
Oil-filled transformers represent a fire hazard. T o
ensure rapid extinguishing of any fire, each transformer
is provided with a fixed waterspray fire protection
installation. This consists of a system of spray nozzles
located around the transformer and directed towards
it which provide a total deluge when initiated, usually
by the bursting of any one of a series of glass detector
bulbs placed around and above the transformer. An­
other part of the strategy for rapid extinguishing of a
fire is the removal of any spilled oil from the phnth as
rapidly as possible. T o assist with this, its surface must
be smooth concrete. Large drainage trenches are pro­
vided and these must have an adequate fall. Clearly
large quantities of oil and water cannot be allowed to
enter the normal drainage system, so the drainage
trenches are taken to interceptor chambers which allow
settlement and separation of the oil before allowing
the water to be led away. A typical arrangement for a
four-unit station is shown in Fig 3.47. Although the
plinths are designed to drain rapidly, it is important to
ensure that any water which might be contaminated
with oil is not allowed to flood into neighbouring areas,
so each plinth must be contained within a bund wall
which will hold, as a minimum, the total contents of the
transformer tank, plus five minutes operation of the
fire protection, and this after heavy rain has fallen
onto the area.
Until quite recently, the standard method of ensur­
ing rapid removal of oil from the surface of the trans­
former pHnth was to install the transformer on dwarf
walls, perhaps one metre high, the pHnths then con-
PRECIPITATORS
BOILER
HOUSE
O
CHIMNEY

NO. 2 GENERATOR TRANSFORMER NO. 2 UNIT
TRANSFORMER
OIL CATCHMENT TRENCH
—
w
w
FROM NO. 1 COMPOUND
MANHOLE
WATER LEVEL
TYPICAL SECTION A-A
THROUGH INCERCEPTOR
FIG. 3.47 Arrangement of water and oil drains for transformer plinth
sisting of open mesh about 100 m m below the level of
the top of the wall covered with large chippings. Any
spilled oil passed through the chippings and the mesh
into the chamber below. Such an arrangement allowed
burning oil to be led from the surface very rapidly and
the fire was quickly extinguished when the chippings
were new and in a fairly clean condition. However,
it became clear that chippings which had become oily
over the years and had acquired a coating of grime,
tended to act as a wick in the event of a fire and made
it more difficuk to extinguish. Figure 3.48 shows the
layout of the main transformer plinth at Heysham 2
power station. The generator transformer is a three-
phase bank of single-phase units. Each phase has both
ends of the LV winding brought out to a pair of LV
connections side-by-side on one side of the tank. These
are connected in delta by means of a phase-isolated
air-insulated connection, similar in construction to the
main connections to the generator which are them­
selves teed-off from each corner of this delta. Because
of the difficulty in making angled welds, and of de­
signing right-angled turns in the heavy low-voltage
connections, it is desirable that these be run as straight
as possible, so ideally the generator transformer should
face squarely onto the end of the generator. Unit
transformer tee-offs can then, if physically possible,
fall vertically onto the unit transformer placed beneath
the connections and behind the generator transformer.
It is important to ensure that each phase of the
generator transformer (as well as those of the unit
transformer) can be installed and removed with the
General design and construction
TRANSFORMER
ANNEXE
MAIN ACCESS ROAD
- F R O M NOS. 3
MAIN CHAMBER
AND 4
COMPOUNDS
rill 11 11 11—1
OIL INTERCEPTOR
minimum disruption to cabhng, connections, and to its
neighbours. The routes for installation and withdrawal
are indicated on the diagram. It should be noted also
that the generator transformer cooler, with about 2
M W of losses to dissipate at full-load, is located so that
it has at least eight times its plan area of free space
a r o u n d it to ensure an adequate coohng-air supply,
with no recirculation.
The layout of generator and unit transformers, in
particular, must have regard to correct phase-relation­
ships. AUhough this is true for all transformers, it is
the bulky and less flexible arrangement of the connec­
tions which makes this so important for these two
transformers. This design task is fraught with pitfalls,
and incorrectly phased connections can be exceedingly
expensive to unscramble. The important convention
is that contained in BS 171, that the phases A, Β and C
(or Í/, V and W) run from left to right when viewed
from the H V side of the transformer, but LV terminals
are reversed when viewed from the generator. The other
conventional rule is that, within a particular winding,
the low-numbered connection goes to neutral and the
higher-numbered connection goes to the terminal. Re-
ferring to Fig 3.49 and recalling that, as indicated in
Section 1.1.2 of this chapter, the standard phasor
grouping for a 400/23.5 kV generator transformer is
Ydl, the star point of the H V winding will be ^ i ,
B\y C\ and the LV will require 0 2 to be connected c\,
Z?2 to úTi and C2 to ¿ 1 , with 0 2 becoming terminal α,
¿2 terminal b, and C2 terminal c. For the simplest
arrangement of LV connections, it can thus be seen
241
Transformers
Β Y R
MAIN GENERATOR
BUS BARS
FIG. 3.48 Main transformer plinth layout
from Fig 3.49 (b) that terminal 2 of the LV winding
will require to be on the right, when viewed from the
LV side. Figure 3.49 (b) also shows the arrangement
of generator connections required to give red, yellow,
blue to phases a, b and c, respectively.
The second group of transformers requiring to be
accommodated in the station layout are those step­
ping down 11 kV supplies to 3.3 kV and from 3,3 kV
to 415 V, Whilst it is permissible for II kV cabhng
to be used to distribute power for considerable dis­
tances around the site, supphes at lower vohages must
be placed as close as possible to their loads. Ideally,
these transformers should be in the middle of the
station. This is not practical for many reasons, not
least that oil-filled transformers represent a fire haz­
ard. Often in a coal-fired station, the best compro­
mise is to place them alongside the boiler house,
between h and the precipitators. Figure 3.50 shows
an outline plan of a two-unit coal-fired station with
242
Chapter 3
AIR/ OIL
COOl.ERS
the location of outdoor 11/3.3 kV and 3.3/0.415 kV
transformers identified. Many nuclear stations have
separate reactor and turbine buildings, so that trans­
formers can be placed alongside a roadway between
them. If the station has only one or two units, often
the best location will be to the side of the turbine
hall and steam generating plant buildings. Figure 3.51
shows where these transformers might be located in
a nuclear station.
For aU of these possible locations, consideration
must be given t o :
• Clear access for installation and for future removal
should this become necessary.
• Access for cabhng.
• The need for fire fighting provision and ensuring
that adjacent buildings and plant are not placed at
risk if a fire occurs.
 General design and construction

11/3.3kV TRANSFORMERS
Ί9
3.3kV&415V
SWITCHGEAR ROOM

I l k V SWITCHGEAR
PRECIPITATORS

UNIT1
;MlMNbY

CONTROL
ROOM
.TURBINE _
HALL
_ BOILER.
HOUSE "
Ö
(a) UNIT 2

11kV SWITCHGEAR
.3kV& 3.3/0.415 kV
TRANSFORMERS

FIG. 3.50 Location of 11/3.3 kV and 3.3/0.415 kV

transformers in a coal-fired station

REACTOR 2

CONTROL
ROOM

BLUE YELLOW RED

(C)

FIG. 3.51 Two-unit nuclear station: 11/3.3 kV and

FIG. 3.49 Connections of single-phase generator 3.3/0.415 kV transformers located between reactor and
transformer bank turbine buildings

• The need for adequate drainage.
• The provision of necessary oil interception.
As with the main transformers it is possible to m a k e
economies, particularly in respect of the last three
factors, by the grouping of auxiliary transformers
together. Any grouping, however, must have in mind
the need to segregate alternative sources of supply to
main switchboards, so that any single incident would
not make both of them unavailable.
For smaller auxihary transformers, providing sup­
plies at 415 V, the fire hazard can be removed by
eUminating oil: this can be achieved by the use of low
flammability or fire-resistant fluid, or by the elimina­
tion of fluid altogether and making them air cooled.
Whatever the method employed, and the merits of
the alternative systems available are discussed in Sec­
tion 2.4 of this chapter, the purpose is to enable
the transformers to be located indoors within switch-
r o o m s . These can thereby be placed very near t o , or
even integral with, LV switchgear, thus eliminating LV
cabling. The benefits from this are considerable and
are discussed further in Section 2.4.
1.7 Quality assurance and testing
1.7.1 Quality assurance (QA)
Unlike many items of power station electrical plant
(for example, switchgear and motors) most transformers
are virtually h a n d m a d e , little or n o mass production
is employed in manufacture and each is produced very

243
Transformers
much as a one-off. This means that the user cannot
rely on extensive type testing of pre-production
prototypes to satisfy himself that the design and manu­
facture renders the transformer fit for service, but
must have such proving as is considered necessary
carried out on the transformer itself. From a series of
works tests, which might at most be spread over a
few days, it is necessary to ascertain that the trans­
former will be suitable for thirty years or more in
service. It is therefore logical that this testing should
be complemented by a system of Q A procedures which
operate on each individual unit and throughout the
whole design and manufacturing process.
Details of operation of Q A systems are beyond
the scope of this volume and anyway these are covered
adequately elsewhere, for example, by BS5750 [8], but
it must be pointed out that testing alone will not de­
monstrate that the transformer is fully compliant with
all the requirements which must be placed upon it.
1.7.2 Tests during manufacture
As part of the manufacturer's Q A system, and also
to meet the requirements of the specification, some
testing will of necessity be carried out during manu­
facture and it will be appropriate to consider the most
important of these in some detail. These are:
Core-plate checks Incoming core plate is checked for
thickness and quahty of insulation covering. A sample
of the material is cut and built up into a small loop
(Epstein Square) on which a measurement of specific
loss can be made.
Core-frame insulation resistance This is checked by
megger and by application of a 2 kV RMS or 3 kV D C
test voltage on completion of erection of the core, and
again following replacement of top yoke after fitting
the windings.
Core-loss measurement If there are any novel features
associated with the core design or if the manufacturer
has any other reason to doubt whether the guaranteed
core loss will be achieved, then this can be measured
by the application of temporary turns to allow the
core to be excited at normal flux density before the
windings are fitted.
Winding copper checks If continuously-transposed
conductor (see Section 1.4.6 of this chapter) is to be
used for any of the windings, strand-to-strand checks
of the enamel insulation are carried out directly the
conductor is received in the works.
Tank tests The first tank of any new design is checked
for stiffness and vacuum-withstand capability. For
275 and 400 kV transformers, a vacuum equivalent to
244
Chapter 3
to 25 m b a r absolute pressure is applied. This need only
be held long enough to take the necessary readings
and verify that the vacuum is indeed being held, which
might take u p to 2 hours for a large tank. After release
of the vacuum, the permanent deflection of the tank
sides is measured and must not exceed specified limits
of up to 13 m m , depending on length. Following this
test, a further test is carried out at a pressure equi­
valent to 3 mbar absolute for 8 hours for the purpose
of checking mechanical-withstand capabiHty.
Wherever practicable, tanks are checked for leak-
tightness by filling with a fluid of lower viscosity than
transformer oil, usually white spirit, and applying a
pressure of 700 mbar, or the normal pressure plus
350 mbar, whichever is the greater, for 24 hours. All
welds are painted for this test with a flat white paint
which aids detection of any leaks.
1.7.3 Processing and dry-out
The build-up towards the final works testing of a large
power station transformer commences some time be­
fore it actually enters the test bay, at the stage at which
the final processing and dry-out begins.
Paper insulation and pressboard material, which make
up a significant proportion by volume of the trans­
former findings, absorb large amounts of moisture
from the atmosphere. The presence of this moisture
brings about a reduction in dielectric strength and also
an increase in volume. This increase in volume is
such that, until the windings have been given an initial
dry-out, it is impossible to reduce their length suffi­
ciently to fit them on to the leg of the core and to fit
the top yoke in place.
The final drying-out is commenced either when the
core and windings are placed in an autoclave or when
they are fitted into their tank, all main connections
made, and the tank placed in an oven and connected to
the drying system. The tapping switch may be fitted at
this stage, or later, depending on the ability of the tap
switch components to withstand the drying process.
Traditional methods of drying-out involve heating
the windings and insulation to between 85° and 120°C,
circulating dry air and finally applying a vacuum to
complete the removal of water vapour and air from the
interstices of the paper before admitting oil to cover
the windings. For a small transformer operating at u p
t o , say, 11 kV, this heating could be carried out by
placing the complete unit in a steam or gas-heated oven.
For a large transformer this process would take several
days, or even weeks, so that nowadays the preference
is to use a vapour-phase heating system in which a
liquid, such as white spirit, is heated and admitted to
the transformer tank under low pressure as vapour. This
condenses on the core and windings, and as it does so,
releases its latent heat of vaporisation, thus causing
the tank internals to be rapidly heated. It is neces­
sary to ensure that the insulation does not exceed a
temperature of about 130°C to prevent ageing damage:

when this temperature is reached, the white spirit and
water vapour is pumped off. FinaHy, a vacuum equi­
valent of between 0.2 and 0.5 m b a r absolute pressure
is applied to the tank to complete removal of all air
and vapours. During this phase, it is necessary to sup­
ply further heat to provide the latent heat of vapor­
isation; this is usually done by heating coils in an
autoclave, or by circulating hot air around the tank
within the dry-out oven.
The vapour phase dry-out process is similar to
systems used previously, the only difference being in
the use of the vapour to reduce the heating time. It
is not a certain method of achieving a drier trans­
former and, in fact, it is possible that the drying of
large masses of insulation might be less efficient since,
being hmited by the rate of diffusion of water through
the material, it is a process which cannot be speeded
u p . This is an area where further research might be
beneficial. The other aspect of this system of drying-
out which requires special attention is that of the
compatibility of the transformer components with the
heat transfer medium. For example, prior to the use of
the vapour phase process, some nylon materials were
used for transformer internals, notably in a type of
self-locking nut. This nylon is attacked by hot white
spirit, so it was necessary to find an alternative.
Monitoring insulation dryness during processing usu­
ally involves measurement of some parameter which
10
9 - 1 50
8 - • 1 40
7 - 1 30
6 -0 03 - 1 20
9
LU
< - 1 00
QC
AI
Ι­
4 -Ο 02 - 80
3 - 60
2 0 0 1 - 40
1 • 20
-0 - ' -ο — I— — I—
9/11 12/11 13/11
FIG. 3 . 5 2 Insulation resistance and power factor curves during dry-out
General design and construction
is directly dependent on moisture content. Insulation
resistance or power factor would meet this require­
ment. Since there are no absolute values of these which
can be applied to all transformers, it is usual to plot
readings graphically and dry-out is taken to be com­
pleted when a levelling out of power factor and a sharp
rise in insulation resistance is observed. Figure 3.52
shows typical insulation resistance and power factor
curves obtained during a dry-out. Vacuum is applied
when the initial reduction in the rate-of-change of
these parameters is noted: the ability to achieve and
maintain the required vacuum, coupled with a reduction
and levelhng-out of the quantity of water removed and
supported by the indication given by monitoring of the
above parameters, will confirm that the required dry­
ness is being reached. For a vapour phase drying system,
since it could be dangerous to monitor electrical
parameters, drying termination is identified by monitor­
ing water condensate in the vacuum pumping system.
At this point oil filling is begun with dry, filtered,
degassed oil at a temperature of about 75°C being
slowly admitted to the tank and at such a rate as to
allow the vacuum already applied to be maintained.
Drying-out of insulation is accompanied by signifi­
cant shrinkage, so it is usual practice for a large trans­
former to be de-tanked immediately following initial
oil impregnation to allow for retightening of all wind­
ings, as well as cleats and clamps on all leads and
16/11
DATE 20/11 2 11/ 1 22/11 2 31/ 1
TOTAL WATER REMOVED 125 LITRES
245
Transformers Chapter 3

insulation materials. This operation is carried out as
quickly as possible in order to reduce the time for
which windings are exposed to the atmosphere. How­
ever, once they have been impregnated with oil, their
tendency to absorb moisture is considerably reduced
so that, provided the transformer is not out of its
tank for more than about twenty-four hours, h is not
necessary to repeat the dry-out process. On returning
the core and windings to the tank, the manufacturer
will probably have a rule which says that vacuum
should be apphed for a time equal to that for which
they were uncovered, before refilling w h h hot, fihered,
degassed oil.
Before commencement of final works tests, the trans­
former is then usually left to stand for several days
to allow the oil to permeate the insulation fully and
any remaining air bubbles to become absorbed by the
oil.
1.7.4 Final testing
Standard C E G B transformer test requirements are set
out in BEBS T2 (1966). For the convenience of the
reader the information is repeated in Tables 3.1 and
3.2.
Final works tests for a transformer faU into three
categories:
• Tests to prove that the transformer has been built
correctly These include ratio, polarity, resistance,
and tapchange operation.
• Tests to prove guarantees T h e s e are losses,
impedance, temperature rise, noise level.
• Tests to prove that the transformer will be satisfac­
tory in service for at least thirty years The tests
in this category are the most important and the
most difficult to frame: they include all the dielectric
or overvoltage tests, and load current runs.
Full details of all tests in the first two categories above
can be found in BS171 and are described at length
in most standard textbooks. W h a t is more, the tests
themselves are logical and the outcome is beyond dis­
cussion. This section is concerned only with those tests
included in the third category and aims to examine
how the customer can best be satisfied that the trans­
former which he is buying has a reasonable chance of
meeting the demands placed u p o n it for a hfetime in
service.

TABLE 3.1
Summary of final works testing for generator, station and unit transformers

(a) Tests to prove correct manufacture Test defined in Routine test (R)
Type test (Τ)

Winding resistances BS 171 1970 Clause 36 R

Phasor group BS 171 1970 Clause 37 R
Voltage ratio BS 171 1970 Clause 37 R
Polarity BS 171 1970 Clause 37 R
Tapchange operation* R
Insulation resistances R

* Generator and station

transformers only

(b) Tests to prove guarantees

No load loss BS 171 1970 Clause 40 R
Magnetising current BS 171 1970 Clause 40 R
Load loss BS 171 1970 Clause 39 R
Impedances BS 171 1970 Clause 38 R
Zero sequence impedance BS 171 1970 Clause 48 Τ
Transformer noise level lEC 551 R
Cooler noise level lEC 551 Τ
Temperature rise BS 171 1970 Clause 41 Τ

(c) Tests to prove equality*

Load current run* BEBS T2 Section 1 R
Induced overvoltage including BS 171 1970 Clause 43 R
partial discharge measurement and BEBS T2
Applied voltage BS 171 1970 Clause 44 R
Additional voltage* BEBS T2 Section 1 R
Switching surge voltage* BS 171 1970 Clause 46 R
Impulse voltage including
chopped waves

246
 General design and construction

TABLE 3.2
Summary of final works testing for auxiliary transformers

(a) Tests to prove correct manufacture Test defined in Routine test (R)
Type test (T)

Winding resistances BS 171 1970 Clause 36 R

Phasor group BS 171 1970 Clause 37 R
Vohage ratio BS 171 1970 Clause 37 R
Polarity BS 171 1970 Clause 37 R
Tapchange operation (if fitted) R
Insulation resistances R

(b) Tests to prove guarantees

No-load loss BS 171 1970 Clause 40 R
Magnetising current BS 171 1970 Clause 40 R
Load loss BS 171 1970 Clause 39 R
Impedances BS 171 1970 Clause 38 R
Transformer noise level lEC 551 R
Temperature rise BS 171 1970 Clause 41 Τ
415 V busbar tests# Τ

(c) Tests to prove equality'

Induced overvoltage including
partial discharge measurements
Applied voltage
Impulse voltage including
chopped waves
BS 171 1970 Clause 43
BS 171 1970 Clause 44 R
BS 171 1970 Clause 46 Τ*

#AN transformers only •Routine on AN transformers

To do this, it is reasonable to start by consider­ 1.7.5 Power frequency overvoltage tests

ing how the transformer is likely to fail. There are,
of course, many failure mechanisms for something as
complex as a large transformer, but it is likely that
these will fall into one of three classes:
• Insulation will break down under the influence of
the appHed voltage stress.
• Insulation will be prematurely aged, due to over­
heating.
• Windings will suffer mechanical failure, due to in­
ability to withstand the apphed forces.
Since failure mechanisms are complex, any particular
failure might even be difficult to classify, being possi­
bly due to a combination of more than one of the above
causes. Overheating, for example, especially if not too
severe, often will not itself cause failure, but will re­
duce the mechanical strength of the insulation, so that
when the transformer is subjected to some mechanical
shock, such as a system fault close to its terminals, it
will then fail. It is possible, t o o , that inadequate me­
chanical strength which allows movement of conductors
could cause the reduction of electrical clearances so
that it is electrical breakdown which causes failure.
Even though failure modes are not always straight­
forward, the suggested classification allows objective
discussion of appropriate methods of testing.
The traditional approach towards demonstrating that
insulation will not be broken down by the apphed
voltage has been to apply a test voUage which is very
much greater than that likely to be seen in service.
This is the philosophy behind the overpotential test,
which involves the application of twice normal volt­
age. Traditionally this was applied for one minute, but
BS 171 (1978) now allows this to be for a period of
120 times the rated frequency divided by the test
frequency (in seconds), or 15 s, whichever is the greater.
The test frequency is increased to at least twice the
nominal frequency for the transformer to avoid over-
fluxing of the core and is often of the order of 400 Hz,
so that test times of fifteen to twenty seconds are the
n o r m . T h e test is thought by m a n y t o be a very crude
one akin to striking a test specimen with a very large
h a m m e r and observing whether or not it breaks. Con­
siderable effort has therefore been apphed in recent
times t o improving this test and this has largely been
brought about by the introduction of partial-discharge
measurements during the application of the overvoltage.
Long before the total failure of transformer insu­
lation occurs during overpotential conditions, minute
discharge currents will flow. These tend to be triggered
at the same point of successive cycles of the applied test
frequency vohage waveform and to appear as pulses
of high frequency disturbance in the b a n d . Suitable
detection equipment can be coupled to the winding

247
Transformers
under test, usually via the test tapping of the trans­
former bushing, and the disturbances can ehher be
displayed on an oscilloscope or measured directly on
a voltmeter designed for radio interference voltage
measurement. A measure of the peak value of the dis­
charge can be obtained on the oscilloscope by com­
parison with the signal obtained by injection of a
known pulse into the detector.
Very occasionally, partial-discharge measurements
made in this way can give a warning preceding total
failure and the test voltage can be removed before
complete breakdown, thus avoiding extensive damage.
More often, however, the diagnosis is less clear-cut. It
could be that measurements taken as the test vohage
is being reduced indicate a tendency towards hystere­
sis, i.e., the discharge values for faihng voltage tend to
be greater than those obtained as the voltage is being
increased. This could indicate that application of the
test vohage has caused damage. It is C E G B practice
to specify that, as the overvoltage is reduced, the
discharge should fah to a nominal level (usually 100
picocoulombs) at an adequate margin above the normal
working voltage, say, 1.2 p . u . V .
There is a viewpoint in some international circles
that, because of the extra refinement which partial-
discharge measurement has brought to overpotential
testing, it is no longer necessary to use a test vohage
as severe as twice normal volts. This view has led to the
method of overpotential testing detailed in l E C 7 6 - 3 ,
Clause 11.4, Method 2 [9]. In this test, a voltage of
1.3 or 1.5 p.u.V is applied for 5 minutes. This is
then raised to V3 p.u.V for 5 s fohowed by a return
to 1.3 or 1.5 p.u.V which is then held for thirty
minutes. Partial-discharge is recorded throughout the
test and a close watch made for signs of any tendency
for this to increase or run away during the test period.
The choice between 1.3 and 1.5 p.u.V for the major
proportion of the test time is to be agreed between
manufacturer and purchaser. If the figure of 1.3 p.u.V
is apphed, then the partial-discharge shall not exceed
300 p C ; if 1.5 p.u.V is used, then the value should
not exceed 500 p C .
Whilst it is clear that some constructive thought has
gone into the framing of this test, h is the C E G B view
that the degree of overpotential is too modest and it
is not proposed to replace the *twice normal voltage'
test in C E G B specifications.
A further point to be noted is that, whilst the in­
duced overvoltage test is usually thought of as a 'twice
normal voltage' test, for very high voltage transformers,
h can be even more severe than this. Figure 3.53
shows the arrangement for carrying out the induced
overvoltage test on a 400 kV transformer having graded
insulation on the star-connected HV winding and a
deha-connected LV winding. The test supply is taken
from a single-phase generator connected to each phase
of the LV in turn. The diagram shows the arrangement
for testing phase A. In accordance with BS171, 1978,
Clause 20 and Table 8, a vohage of 630 kV to earth
248
Chapter 3
I'-aiSkV ^ 630kV
r-315kV
+28.9kV
630 kV TO EARTH INDUCED IN A PHASE LINE TERMINAL
945kV INDUCED BETWEEN A & Β PHASE TERMINALS
FIG. 3.53 Arrangement of induced overvoltage test on
a three-phase star/deha 400/23.5 kV generator
transformer
must be induced at the line terminal. BS171 does not
specify on which tapping the transformer should be
connected and so the manufacturer usually opts for
position 1 which corresponds to maximum turns in
circuh in the HV winding. This might be the + 6 . 6 6 %
tap for a generator transformer, which could corres­
pond to 460.5 kV for a transformer having an open-
circuit voltage of 432 kV on the principal t a p . This is
the line voltage, so the phase voltage appropriate to
position 1 is 460.5/V3 = 265.8 kV: the test vohage
of 630 kV induced in this winding therefore represents
2.37 times the normal volts/turn.
It will be seen from Fig 3.53 that during the induced
overvoltage test, although all parts of the windings
experience a voltage of more than twice that which
n o r m a h y appears between them, that section of the
winding which is nearest to earth is not subjected to a
very high voltage to earth. This is so even for fully-
insulated windings which, when tested, must have some
point tied to earth. It is therefore necessary to carry
out a test of the insulation to earth (usually termed
'major insulation' to distinguish this from interturn
insulation) and, for a fully-insulated winding, this is
usuahy tested at about twice normal volts. For a
winding having graded insulation, the test is at some
nominal vohage; for example, for 400, 275 and 132 kV
transformers, it is specified as 45 kV in BEBS T2
(1966), Section 1 [10].
In addition to partial-discharge measurement, an­
other diagnostic technique to detect incipient failure

has made progress in recent years: this is the detection
and analysis of dissolved gases in transformer oil.
When partial-discharge or flashover or excessive heat­
ing takes place in transformer oil, the oil breaks down
into hydrocarbon gases. The actual gases produced
and their relative ratios are dependent on the tempera­
ture reached. This forms the basis of the dissolved-
gas analysis technique which originally found use as
a tool to assist in the diagnosis of faults in service.
When faults occur during works tests, the volumes of
the gases produced are very small and these diffuse
through very large quantities of oil. Although the
starting condition of the oil is known and its purity is
very high, very careful sampling and accurate analysis
of the oil is necessary to detect these gases. Analysis
is assisted if the time for the test can be made as long
as possible, and this was the philosophy behind the
three-hour overpotential test which was introduced
by the C E G B in the early 1970s. It must be emphasised
that this test is carried out in addition to the 'twice
normal voUs' test. 130% of normal voUs is induced for
a period of three hours. In order that the magnetic
circuit, as well as the windings, receives some degree
of over stressing, the test frequency is increased only to
60 Hz rather than the 65 Hz which would be necessary
to prevent any overfluxing of the core. Partial-discharge
levels are monitored throughout the three hours. Oil
samples for dissolved-gas analysis are taken before the
test, at the midway stage and at the conclusion.
1.7.6 Impulse tests
Mention was made in Section 1.4.10 of this chapter that
a power station transformer in service will, from time
to time, be subjected to surges caused by lightning or
by switching, and that the effect of these on the trans­
former windings is different from the effects of power
frequency voltages. The impulse test was devised as a
simulation of a lightning strike on the line near to the
connection to the transformer and to test the perfor­
mance of the transformer in response to this risk.
A standard impulse wave is defined in BS171 and is
iUustrated diagrammatically in Fig 3.54. It has a front
time of 1.2 μ$ and a time to decay to half-peak of
50 μ$, A tolerance of ± 3 0 % is allowed on the front
time and ± 2 0 % for the time to half-peak.
In addition to these standard impulses, chopped-
wave tests may be specified which simulate the con­
dition of a flashover of an external co-ordinating gap
close to the terminals of the transformer. For these,
a rod gap or some similar device is placed across the
transformer test connection and earth. The size of the
gap is such that it flashes over as the impulse wave
reaches its peak. This causes a very rapid collapse of
the voltage apphed to the transformer windings, which
results in a very rapid rate-of-change of voltage and
high electrical stress in the windings.
Impulse tests are regarded in BS171 as type tests,
i.e., they are carried out on the first transformer of
General design and construction
, DURATION OF WAVEFRONT = 1.67 TIMES THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 30%
AND 90% OF THE PEAK VALUE
T-, TIME TO HALF VALUE = THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE ORIGIN 0 AND 0,
^ AND THE 50% PEAK ^
PEAK
VALUE
(FOR LIGHTNING IMPULSES)
FIG. 3 . 5 4 Standard impulse wave
a new design as a means of demonstrating that this
has correctly incorporated the necessary features to
withstand the stresses produced under surge condi­
tions. However, in addition, they are now regarded by
the C E G B as a very searching check of quahty which
can provide further information to assist in proving
that each transformer will be suitable for its defined
service lifetime. Impulse tests, including chopped waves,
are therefore specified for all windings of all power
station transformers having operating voltages of 3.3
kV and above.
A standard C E G B transformer specification would
therefore call for an impulse test consisting of seven
shots, as follows:
1 — Reduced full-wave
1 — 100% full-wave
2 — 115% chopped-waves
2 — 100% full-waves
1 — Reduced full-wave
It is assumed that the first full-wave shot, at about
7 5 % of the nominal fuU-wave impulse test level, wih
not break down the transformer and so the voltage
and current records of that shot are taken as the
reference standard. Assessment as to whether the trans­
former has passed or failed is basically m a d e by com­
paring the records for the final 7 5 % reduced full-
wave with those for the initial one. Chopping of the
chopped-wave shots is specified to take place between
2 and 6 /xs from the start of the wave. The amplitude
is increased to 115% of the specified full-wave level
in order to ensure that the voltage is at least 100%
of the specified level at the instant of chop.
249
Transformers
Impulse tests differ from power frequency tests in
that, although very large test currents flow, they d o
so only for a very short time. The power level is
therefore quite low and the damage done in the event
of a failure is relatively slight.
If a manufacturer suspects that a transformer has
a fault, say from the measurement of high partial-
discharge during the overpotential test, he may prefer
to withdraw the transformer from this test and apply
an impulse test which will produce a less damaging
breakdown. On the other hand, the very fact that
damage tends to be slight can make the location of
an impulse test failure exceedingly difficult. Diagnosis
of impulse test failures can themselves be difficult,
since sometimes only very slight changes in the record
traces are produced. For further information on im­
pulse testing and diagnosis techniques the reader is
referred to the Electricity Councils O u i d e on Impulse
Vohage Testing Power Transformer and Reactors [11]'
or any other standard textbook on the subject.
1.7.7 Switching-surge tests
Surges generated by lightning strikes have very steep
rise-times which cause transformer windings to appear
as a string of distributed capacitance rather than the
inductance which is presented to a power frequency
voltage. Surges generated by system switching do not
have such rapid rise-times — times of 20 μ$ are typi­
cal — and at this frequency the transformer winding
behaves much as it would do at 50 H z . The voltage
is evenly distributed, flux is estabhshed in the core
and voltages are induced in other windings in pro­
portion to the turns ratio. The magnitude of switching
surges, though generally lower than hghtning surges,
is considerably greater than the normal system voltage
(perhaps 1.5 times or twice), so that the overpoten­
tial test is not an adequate test for this condition.
Switching-surge tests are therefore carried out on all
transformers which might be subjected to switching
surges in service. Three shots are carried out at a level
equivalent to 80^o of the fuh-wave impulse test level,
with a waveshape having a front time of 20 μ$ and a
tail of at least 480 /is.
1.7.8 Load runs
The second possible mode of transformer failure listed
in Section 1.7.4 of this chapter, is premature ageing of
insulation due to overheating. It is therefore important
that the opportunity is taken to investigate the thermal
performance of the transformer during works testing
as fully as possible, in an attempt to try to ensure that
no overheating will be present during the normal service
operating condition.
Conventional temperature rise tests, for example,
in accordance with BS171, are less than ideal in two
respects:
250
Chapter 3
• They only measure average temperature rises of oil
and windings.
• By reducing the cooling during the heat-up period,
manufacturers can shorten the time for the test to
as little as eight or ten h o u r s .
Such tests will have little chance of identifying localised
hot spots which might be due to a concentration of
leakage flux or an area of the winding which has
been starved of coohng oil. The C E G B approach to
searching out such possible problems is to subject the
transformer to a run during which it will carry a
modest degree of overcurrent for about thirty h o u r s .
The test is specified as a period at llO^í^o fuU-load
current, or a current equivalent to fuU-load losses sup­
plied, whichever is the greater, for twelve hours at each
extreme t a p position, with each twelve hours commenc­
ing from the time at which it reaches normal working
temperature. Also, during this load-current run, the
opportunity can be taken to monitor tank temperatures,
particularly in the vicinity of heavy flanges, cable boxes
and bushing pockets, and heavy current bushings. Both
extremes of the tapping range are specified since the
leakage flux pattern, and therefore the stray loss pat­
tern, is likely to vary with the a m o u n t of tapping
winding in circuit. Oil samples for dissolved-gas analysis
are taken before the test and at the conclusion of
each twelve-hour run. If the transformer is the first
of a new design, then gradients and t o p oil and re­
sistance rises are measured in accordance with BS171.
However, the main purpose of the test is not to check
the guarantees but to uncover evidence of any localised
overheating should this exist.
1.7.9 Short-circuit testing
It is in relation to short-circuit performance and the
demonstration that a transformer has adequate me­
chanical strength that the customer is in the weakest
position. Section 1.4.12 of this chapter described the
nature of the mechanical short-circuit forces and made
an estimate of their magnitude. However, for all but
the smallest transformers, the performance of prac­
tical tests is impossible due to the enormous rating
of test plant that would be required. l E C 7 6 - 5 [9],
deals with the subject of ability to withstand both
thermal and mechanical effects of short-circuit. This
it does under the separate headings of thermal and
dynamic ability.
For thermal ability, the method of deriving the
R M S value of the symmetrical short-circuit current
is defined, as is the time for which this is required
to be carried, and the m a x i m u m permissible value of
average winding temperature permitted after short-
circuit (dependent on the insulation class). The method
of calculating this temperature for a given transformer
is also defined. Thus this requirement is proved en­
tirely by calculation.

For the latter, it is stated that the dynamic ability
to withstand short-circuit can only be demonstrated by
testing; however, it is acknowledged that transformers
over 40 M V A cannot normally be tested. A procedure
for testing transformers below this rating involving the
actual application of a short-circuit is described. Os­
cillographic records of voltage and current are taken
for each appUcation of the short-circuit and the assess­
ment of the test results involves an examination of
these, as well as an examination of the core and wind­
ings after removal from the tank. The Buchholz relay,
if fitted, is checked for any gas collection. Final assess­
ment on whether the test has been withstood is based
on a comparison of impedance measurements taken
before and after the tests. It is suggested that a change
of more than 2 % in the measured values of impedance
are indicative of possible failure.
This leaves a large group of transformers which
cannot be tested. Although this is not very satisfac­
tory, service experience with these larger transformers
over a considerable period of time has tended to con­
firm that design calculations of the type described
in Section 1.4.12 of this chapter are producing fairly
accurate results. Careful examination of service fail­
ures of large transformers, especially where there may
be a suspicion that short-circuits have occurred close
to the transformer terminals, can yield valuable in­
formation concerning mechanical strength as well as
highlighting specific weaknesses and giving indication
where weaknesses may be expected in other similar
designs of transformer. On occasions, such an ap­
proach has enabled incipient failures to be identified
from internal inspections m a d e during a planned outage
before these have caused catastrophic failures which
would have resulted in extensive damage as well as
unscheduled loss of generation.
1.8 Transport, installation and
commissioning
1.8.1 Transport
The generator transformer is usually one of the three
largest and heaviest single loads to be delivered to a
power station site. (The other two being the generator
Stator and the stator frame.) Transport considerations
will therefore have a considerable bearing on the
generator transformer design and more will be said on
this subject in Section 2.2 of this chapter which deals
specifically with generator transformers. For the other
large transformers (station and unit transformers), it is
usually only necessary to ship these without oil to ensure
that they are comfortably within the appropriate
transport hmits, although it is necessary to check that
when mounted on the transport vehicle the height is
within the over-bridge clearances which, for trunk roads
within the United Kingdom, allows a maximum travell­
ing height of 4.87 m (sixteen feet).
General design and construction
If the tank has been drained for transport, it is
necessary for the oil to be replaced by either dry air or
nitrogen, which must then be maintained at a slight
positive pressure above the outside atmosphere to
ensure that the windings remain as dry as possible whilst
the oil is absent. This is usually arranged by fitting a
high pressure gas cyhnder with a reducing valve to one
of the tank filter valves and setting this to produce a
slow gas-flow sufficient to make good the leakage from
the t a n k flanges. A spare cylinder is usually carried t o
ensure continuity of supply should the first cylinder
become exhausted.
Transporters for the larger transformers consist of
two beams which span front and rear bogies and allow
the tank to sit between them resting on platforms which
project from the sides of the t a n k . Thus the maximum
travelHng height is the height of the tank itself plus
the necessary ground clearance (usually taken to be
75 m m but capable of reduction for low bridges). Figure
3.55 shows a 267 M V A single-phase transformer ar­
ranged for transport.
Smaller transformers, i.e., auxiliary transformers of
m a x i m u m rating 12.5 M V A , can usually be shipped
completely erected and full of oil.
1.8.2 Installation and site erection
In view of their size and weight, most transformers
present special handling problems on site. The manu­
facturer in his works will have crane capacity, possi­
bly capable of lifting u p to 260 t based on transport
weight Hmit including vehicle of 400 t, but on-site such
Ufts are out of the question except in the turbine or
reactor hall. Site h a n d h n g is difficult and must be
restricted to the absolute m i n i m u m . The transformer
plinth therefore should be completed and clear access
available, allowing the main tank to be placed directly
onto it when it arrives on site. The access road must also
be completed, as well as the surface over any space
between access road and plinth. Transformer and
vehicle can then be brought to a position adjacent to
the plinth. The load is then taken on jacks and the
transport beams removed. Then, using a system of
packers a n d j a c k s , the tank is lowered o n t o a pair of
greased rails along which it can be slid to its position
over the plinth. The required position of tank on the
plinth must be accurately marked, particularly if the
transformer is to mate u p with metalclad connections
on either the LV or H V side.
When the t a n k is correctly positioned on the plinth,
the coolers and pipework are installed. Bushings and
turrets which have been removed for transport are
fitted a n d connected, requiring the removal of blank­
ing plates giving access to the tank. Such opening of
the tank must be kept to a minimum time, to reduce
the possibility of moisture entering the tank; to assist
in this, manufacturers of large high voltage trans­
formers provide equipment to blow dry-air into the
tank and thus maintain a positive internal pressure.
251
Transformers
FIG. 3.55 Transport arrangements for a 267 MVA single-phase generator transformer
If the transformer has been transported with the tank
fuh of nitrogen, h is necessary to purge this fuhy with
dry air if anyone has to enter the tank.
When ah bushings have been fitted, access covers
replaced, and conservator and Buchholz pipework
erected, preparations can begin for filling with oil. Even
if the transformer is not required for service for some
months, it is desirable that it should be fiUed with oil
as soon as possible and certainly within three months
of the original date of draining the oil. If it is being
kept in storage for a period longer than three m o n t h s ,
it should similarly be filled with oil.
After completion of site erection, a vacuum p u m p
is applied to the tank and the air exhausted until a
vacuum equivalent to between 5 and 10 mbar can be
maintained. Heated, degassed and filtered oil is then
slowly admitted to the bottom of the tank in the same
way as was done in the works, until the tank is full.
Since, despite all the precautions taken, some mois­
ture will undoubtedly have entered the tank during site
erection, the oil must then be circulated, heated and
fihered until a moisture content of around 2 P P M by
volume is achieved for a 400 or 275 kV transformer.
For a unit transformer having a high voltage of
23.5 kV, a figure of around 10 P P M is acceptable.
If the transformer has been stored on its plinth full
of oil, it will also be necessary to erect the cooler and
pipework and fill this with oil before it can go into
service. Initially, the cooler will be filled with the main
tank isolating valves closed and oil will be circulated
via a tank by-pass pipe to dislodge any small bubbles
of air which can be vented via the cooler vent plugs.
Normally, such tank by-passes are installed by manu­
facturers as a temporary fitment but it is now C E G B
practice to retain them as permanent features on large
generator transformers. The oil necessary to bring the
level up to minimum operating level can then be added
via the conservator filling valve and, once the con­
servator is brought into operation, the refrigeration
252
Chapter 3
WEIGHT OF TRANSFORMER 170 TONNES
ON ROAD WEIGHT 258 TONNES
100mm GROUND CLEARANCE
breather may be commissioned for transformers of
132 kV and above. This needs an auxiliary power
supply which should, if necessary, be supplied from
site supplies, so that the breather can be made alive
without waiting for the marshalhng kiosk to be in­
stalled and energised.
1.8.3 Site commissioning
Transport to site could well have involved a journey
of many hundreds of miles, part possibly by sea. The
transformer will have had at least two lots of handl­
ing. There is, however, very httle testing which can be
done at site which can demonstrate that it has not
suffered damage. It is therefore vital that such testing
as can be carried out at site should be done as thor­
oughly and as carefully as possible.
The following should be carried out as a minimum:
• Ratio measurement on all taps.
• Phasor group check.
• Winding resistance measurements on all taps.
• Operation of tapchanger u p and down its range.
Check the continuity of tapped winding throughout
the operation.
• Insulation resistance between aU windings and each
winding to earth. Insulation resistance core-to-earth,
core-to-frame and core frame-to-earth.
• No-load current measurement at reduced vohage;
very likely this will be done at 415 V and compared
with the current obtained at the same voltage in the
works.
• Oil samples taken and checked for breakdown
strength and moisture content. For a generator trans­
former for which the oil is to be tested quarterly
for dissolved-gas content, this sample would also

be checked for gas content and taken as the starting
point.
• ΑΠ control, alarms, protection and cooler gear
checked for correct operation. Protection trips set
to appropriate level for initial energisation.
• Tank and cooler earth connections checked as well
as the earthing of the H V neutral, if appropriate.
2 Special design features
Whilst the foregoing sections have examined those
features which most power station transformers have
in common, the following sections take a closer look at
each class of transformer to examine those aspects
which are special for its particular duty.
2.1 Generator transformers
2.1.1 Required characteristics
The generator transformers, in most present day sta­
tions will have a voltage ratio of 23.5/400 kV. T h e
rating must be sufficient to allow the generator to
export its fuh megawatt output at 0.85 power-factor
lagging or 0.95 power-factor leading or, alternatively,
half of fuU megawatt output at 0.7 power-factor lead.
Some early 660 M W generators were designed to
deliver full output at 0.8 power-factor which, making
due allowance for the power requirements of the unit
board, led to a maximum output power of 800 M V A
so that for the sake of standardisation the generator
transformer rating has been fixed at this level.
The important criteria which influence the generator
transformer design are as follows:
• The HV voUs are high — usually 400 kV.
• The LV current is high — almost 20 000 A for an
800 M V A transformer.
• The impedance must be lower than that resulting
from the simplest design for this rating — a figure
of about 16% is specified and variation with tap
position must be kept to a minimum to simplify
system design and operation.
• An on-load tapchanger is required to allow for varia­
tion of H V system volts and generator power factor.
LV volts will remain within ± 5 % .
• The transport weight must be within the limits laid
down by the transport authorities and the available
transport vehicles.
• Reliability and availability must be as high as possi­
(b) Simple concentric winding
ble, since without the generator transformer unit
output cannot be m a d e available to the national grid
and the replacement generation cost of an outage is
high.
Special design features
There are also a number of other criteria which al­
though less important will also have a bearing on the
design. These are:
• Because of the high load-factor, both load and
no-load losses must be as low as possible.
• In view of the direct connection to the 400 kV system,
a high impulse strength is required.
• Noise level must be kept below a specified level.
• Very little overload capability is necessary. A figure
of 4 % overload for three one-hour periods per day
is normally specified.
2.1.2 General design features
The extensive list of required characteristics given
above places considerable constraints on the design of
the generator transformer. For a transformer of 800
M V A , 400 kV, the most limiting factor is that of
transport weight. The high HV voltage requires large
internal clearances which means increasing size and,
as can be seen from the expression for leakage react­
ance in Section 1.3.2. of this chapter, increased HV to
LV clearance has the effect of increasing the reactance,
and hence the impedance. This tendency to increase
reactance would normally be offset by an increase in
the axial length of the winding but, for a large gen­
erator transformer, the stage is soon reached where
further increases cannot be obtained because of the
hmit on transport height.
A significant reduction in leakage reactance for
given physical dimensions can be obtained by adopting
an arrangement of windings known as *split-concentric'.
This is shown in Fig 3.56 (a). The HV winding has
INNER lOUTER
HV HV
(a) Split concentric winding arrangement
LV INNER LV OUTER
WINDING HV WINDING HV
i 1^'
1
1
RADIAL DISTAr4CE FROM CORE
1
1
1 1
(c) Split-concentnc winding
FIG. 3 . 5 6 Split-concentric winding arrangement
253
Transformers
been split into two sections, with one placed on either
side of the LV winding. This is not too inconvenient
for a transformer with graded HV insulation, since
the inner HV winding is at lower potential and can
therefore be insulated from the earthed core without
undue difficuky. The reason why this arrangement
reduces leakage reactance can be seen from Figs 3.56 (b)
and (c), which give plots of leakage flux both for
simple concentric and split concentric arrangements
having the same total M M F . It can be shown that the
leakage reactance is proportional to the area below
the leakage flux curve, which is significantly less in
the split-concentric design. The price to be paid for
this method of reducing the leakage reactance which,
in reality, means reducing the physical size for a given
rating, is the complexity involved in the increased
number of windings, increased number of leads, and
increased sets of interwinding insulation. For simplicity,
the tapping winding has not been shown in Fig 3.56 (c).
With this split-concentric arrangement, the taps are
usuahy accommodated in a separate winding below
the inner HV winding. As taps are added or removed,
the ratio of the HV split is effectively varied and this
has the effect of producing relatively large changes
in leakage reactance. This undesirable feature is a
further disadvantage of this form of construction.
Throughout the 1960s, at the time of building most
of the 500 M W units, the spht-concentric arrangement
was the most common form adopted for 570 M V A
and 600 M V A three-phase generator transformers. It
enabled these transformers to be transported three-
phase within limits of about 240 t transport weight
and 4.87 m travelhng height, albeit most of them had
very high flux densities and losses in order to keep the
material content to the minimum. In fact, a trans­
former of 735 M V A , three-phase, aUhough its H V
winding was only 275 kV, was transported within these
hmits to Hartlepool power station. However, at the
time of the adoption of the 660 M W unit size for Drax
power station at the end of the 1960s, it was decided to
make the transition to single-phase units. These have
many advantages and will be described in greater detail
in the following section.
2.1.3 Single-phase generator transformers
With the adoption of single-phase construction, trans­
port weight for 800 M V A and probably even larger
transformers ceases to impose any significant constraint
on the transformer designer. Travelling height continues
to impose some restriction, but the designer is usuahy
able to deal with this without undue difficuky. Figure
3.57 shows various arrangements of core and windings
that can be adopted for single-phase transformers.
In Fig 3.57 (a), the core has one wound limb and
two return yokes. Alternatively, both limbs could be
wound, as shown in Fig 3.57 (b), but this increases the
cost of the windings and also the overall height, since
the yoke must be full-depth. It would be possible to
254
Chapter 3
reduce the yoke depth by providing two return yokes
as in Fig 3.57 (c) but this adds further complexky and
is therefore rarely advantageous. Some manufacturers
reduce the yoke depth still further by using four return
yokes (Fig 3.57 (d)). Figure 3.58 shows the core and
windings of a C E G B single-phase 23.5/400 kV gen­
erator transformer having one h m b wound and with
four return yokes. This has a transport weight of 185
t and a travelling height of 4.89 m . The arrangement of
Fig 3.57 (a) is also used for some C E G B single-phase
generator transformers.
A further benefit of single-phase construction is
that should a failure occur, it is very likely to affect
one phase only, so only that phase need be replaced
and, being more easily transported, spare single-phase
units can be kept at strategic central locations which
can then serve a number of power stations. This led to
the concept of interchangeable single-phase generator
transformers which were developed for the majority of
the 660 M W units. For this the electrical characteristics
of impedance and voltage ratio must be closely matched
on all tap positions and, of course, the physical sizes
and arrangements of connections for HV and LV
windings must be compatible. Each single-phase unit
must have its own on-load tapchanger, driven from
a single drive mechanism mounted at the end of the
bank. Tapchangers must thus be compatible in that
all must drive in the same sense and all must have
the same number of turns for a tap change. The tap­
changers must be located so that the drive shafts will
align. The location of inlet and outlet cooling oil pipes
must correspond on all units. Figure 3.59 shows the
arrangement of an 800 M V A bank of single-phase units
and details all the items which must align to provide
complete interchangeability.
Both ends of each winding of a single-phase unit
are brought out of the tank so that the H V neutral has
to be connected externally, as well as the LV delta. The
former is arranged by bringing the earthy end of each
H V winding to a bushing terminal mounted on the
top of the tapchangers. These can then be sohdly
connected together by means of a length of copper bar,
suitably connected to the station earth.
On the early single-phase b a n k s , the LV deka was
connected by means of an oil-filled delta box which
spanned the three t a n k s . This can be identified in
Fig 3.59. It was spht internally into three sections by
means of barrier boards so that the oil circuits of the
three tanks were kept separate. It was recognised that
phase-to-phase fauks were possible within the d e k a
box and that greater security could be obtained by the
use of an external air-insulated phase-isolated delta
which was, in fact, an extension of the generator main
connections. This is now the standard arrangement,
so that the LV connections to each single-phase unit
are made via a pair of bushings mounted on a pocket
on the side of the transformer t a n k . The use of air-
insulated phase-isolated delta connections has the added
advantage that it enables the oil circuits of the three
 Special design features

HALF - DEPTH
RETURN YOKE

(a) Single winding on centre limb (b) Increase in height due to windings on both limbs

HALF - DEPTH
RETURN YOKE

LESS THAN
HALF - DEPTH
RETURN YOKES

(c) Height reduction by using two return yokes (d) Further height reduction using
four return yokes and centre limb

FIG. 3.57 Core and windings for single-phase transformers

phases to be kept entirely separate, so that, in the event
of a fault on one phase, there will be n o contamination
of the oil in the other phases.
The HV connections may be via air bushings or
SF6-insulated metalclad trunking. The interface is
therefore the mounting flange on the tank cover, as
can be seen from Fig 3.59.
Figure 3.60 shows an 800 M V A generator trans­
former bank installed at Drax power station before
erection of the acoustic enclosure.
2.1.4 Performance and reliability
The generator transformer is the one transformer on
a power station for which no standby is provided.
It must be available for the generator output to be
connected t o the grid. For a high merit unit, high
reliabihty is required. If its output were lost, this would
necessitate running less efficient plant which is more
expensive to operate.
It is difficuh to set down design rules for high re­
liability. Design experience may identify features which
might detract from rehabihty but it is difficuh to be
sure that every potential source of trouble has been
avoided. Large generator transformers are produced
in small numbers, so there are n o large production
runs which can be used to ehminate teething troubles.
O n e factor which can aid reliabihty, therefore, is to

255
Transformers Chapter 3

FIG. 3 . 5 8 Core and windings of single-phase CEGB generator transformer (GEC Alsthom)
(see also colour photograph between pp 496 and 497)

256

B S P F L A N G E D R I L L E D T O BS.10 T A B L E Ό '
EXTERNAL LV CONNECTIONS
FOR YNd1 TRANSFORMER
c2 b2 a2
Β Y R
FIG. 3 . 5 9 Details of 8 0 0 MVA bank of single-phase transformers showing requirements for interchangeability
repeat tried and proven designs wherever possible, even
over many years, thus reducing the occasions o n which
teething troubles might occur.
Another design rule for high reliability is to *keep
it simple'. This is not easy for an item as sophisticated
as a large generator transformer but, nevertheless, as
explained in Section 2.1.2 of this chapter, a degree of
simplification was achieved by the change from three-
phase to single-phase units. This also meant that there
was no longer the same emphasis on keeping sizes
and weights to an absolute minimum and so there
was a consequent relaxation of the pressures which
threatened rehability.
In view of the importance of high reliabihty of
generator transformers, the C E G B gave special atten­
tion to the subject in the 1970s in the light of op­
Special design features
Γφη Γφη Γψ-.
LV OIL FILLED
DELTA-BOX SHOWN
—υ υ
ALTERNATIVE PLAN FOR AIR INSULATED
DELTA CONNECTIONS
erating experience on the 570 and 600 M V A units
following a series of failures. It was recognised that
the occurrence of teething troubles on new designs was
having a significant effect on the rehability of these
units. Study of the operating failures showed that
reliability was likely t o be poorer with new designs
during their early life. Furthermore, design changes
tended to be introduced frequently due to the practice
of designing for lowest total cost taking into account
the changing cost of losses (see Section 2.1.5 of this
chapter). It was decided that, although it was not
possible to have long production runs which might
ehminate the teething troubles associated with new
designs, it was possible to limit the number of new
designs which were introduced, particularly since a
single standard rating of generator of 660 M W had
257
Transformers Chapter 3
ε
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258
 Special design features

been adopted. Accordingly in 1979, the C E G B intro­ necessary replacement generating capacity and a run­
duced the concept of Registered Designs whereby manu­ ning cost which reflects the a m o u n t of energy con­
facturers agreed that they would submit detailed tech­ sumed, i.e., having the form:
nical parameters and schedules of all manufacturing
drawings, including details of revision of issue, to £P [Ap 4- k (d/100) 8760] (3.6)
describe their current design of 267 MVA 23.5/400 kV
single-phase generator transformer, which should pre­
ferably have been successfully tested and in operation where Ρ total losses, k W
at a C E G B power station. These particulars then A capacity charge, £ / k W
become that manufacturer's registered design particu­ d energy charge, p e n c e / k W h
lars and, for future stations, changes to these would
k factor which reflects the fact that the unit
only be allowed if it could be demonstrated that a
definite improvement in reliability would result, or will not generate for 365 days/year and is
were unavoidable due to the non-availability of some about 0.72
item required for manufacture. Design change in the
Ρ = an amortisation factor whose derivation is
interest of further competitiveness was not acceptable.
After more than seven years of operating the re­ given below
gistered design scheme, which has only been apphed to
this one rating of generator transformers, there are Capital charges The purchase of a transformer in­
clear indications that these transformers are achieving volves the spending of money which either has to be
a very much higher rehability than their predecessors. borrowed or which could earn income, if invested. At
It cannot, of course, be claimed that this is solely due the end of η years, the borrowed money has to be
to the registered design system, since the other factors repaid or, alternatively, enough money will have to be
mentioned in this section, as well as the more exten­ saved to replace the asset.
sive testing procedures described in Section 1.7 of The amortisation factor ρ is given by:
this chapter, are all likely to have contributed.
The C E G B is aware of the possible consequences r \"
1 +
implied in the registered design procedure that designs
100/
might become 'fossilised'. It is considered, however, Ρ = η_1 per £ of initial cost (3.7)
that by allowing changes that can be shown to improve 100

rehability, a mechanism for worthwhile development \ 100/

exists which will act as a safeguard against this.
where r % is the real rate of return on capital, i.e.,
2.1.5 Economics of operation the rate in excess of inflation. This is set as a target
'test discount rate' by the Government when economic
If the generator of a high-merit unit is unavailable
policies for nationahsed industries are appraised from
for any reason, making it necessary for less efficient
time to time.
plant to operate instead, then there will be extra costs
to the system equal to the difference in operating
costs for the failed and the replacement units. A major Loss assessment T o assess whether it is justifiable to
failure which necessitates the removal of a single-phase spend additional capital, £ A C , to reduce losses, it is
unit and the substitution of a spare would resuU in necessary t o show that:
an outage of several weeks which could incur addi­
tional operating costs equal to the first cost of the
ACp <P [Ap + k (d/100) 8760] (3.8)
transformer. This helps the subject of reliability to be
seen in context.
This can be illustrated by an example as follows:
There are, however, other costs associated with op­
eration of a transformer. These may be considered on Capacity charge £120/kW
an annual basis and consist of :
Energy charge 2.4 p e n c e / k W h
• Annual value of initial capital cost. Test discount rate 10<^o
• Cost of power absorbed as losses. Assumed plant hfe (n) 20 years
A n n u a l availability factor (k) 0.72
Cost of losses Although not strictly accurate, it is
assumed that whenever the generator transformer of a
F r o m Equation (3.7) amortisation factor ρ is given by:
high merit unit is energised, it wih operate at fuh-load.
It is therefore necessary to supply iron losses, load 1.120
losses and cooler losses in total. These have an annual 0.1 X = 0.1175
cost based on the annual capital cost of installing the (1.120-1)

259
Transformers
A balance in Equation (3.8) occurs when
A C X 0.1175 = (120 X 0.1175)
-h (0.024 X 8760 X 0.72)
i.e., A C = £1408
The losses can thus be capitalised by costing them at a
figure of £1408/kW and any expenditure greater than
this for a saving of one kilowatt of loss cannot be
justified.
It should be noted that the numbers used in the
above example have been provided for the purposes
of illustration. Whilst at the present time they reflect
with reasonable accuracy the values which would be
actually used within generation construction, in times
of high inflation they may change considerably. It
might also be recognised, however, that the value of
£1408/kW which has been derived, is considerably
less than the figure which is used by many authorities
even at the present time. The reason for this is the
value of test discount rate used; it will be seen that
if the above calculation is repeated with a value of
test discount rate set at 5 % , a figure used by some
authorities, a loss value of about £2000/kW will be
deduced. The effect of the higher test discount rate,
therefore, is to place a lower value on losses and to
sway assessments towards acceptance of lower initial
capital cost options.
Further indication of the significance of the cost
of losses can be gained by considering a specific trans­
former associated with a 600 M W unit. This might have
total losses of 2 M W and a first cost of £2.5 million.
Capitahsing the losses at the figure of £1408/kW
puts their value at £2.8 million; it can be seen that
the saving from a reduction of a few per cent in losses
is very significant.
Because this calculation can be so easily performed,
it is tempting for accountants to demand that it be
carried out whenever the purchase of a new trans­
former is contemplated. In the 1960s, when energy and
material costs as well as interest rates were changing
rapidly, and by differing amounts in relation to each
other, rapid changes in loss capitahsation values were
common. This was one of the pressures for the intro­
duction of new designs which were not warranted
on purely technological grounds. Hence the C E G B
introduced the registered design concept described in
Section 2.1.4 of this chapter, and the decision was
taken that a loss-capitalisation calculation would not
be carried out as part of the tender assessment process
for 800 M V A transformers so that manufacturers were
not encouraged to change designs in the interests of
competitiveness. Since different manufacturer's designs
did not actually have the same losses, the design having
the highest losses might appear to have an unfair ad­
vantage, since it might be expected to contain least
material. However, this was not considered to be sig­
nificant for the variation in losses which occurred in
260
Chapter 3
practice, and operation of the registered design pro­
cedure for a number of generator transformer tenders
has supported this view.
2.2 Station transformers
2.2.1 Station transformer characteristics
The station transformer supphes the power station
auxiliary system for starting-up the boiler/turbine-
generator unit and for supplying those loads which
are not specifically associated with the generating unit,
for example, lighting supphes, cranes, workshops and
other services. In addition, in order to provide a di­
versity of supplies to certain plant, the station switch­
board is used as a source of supply for certain large
drives which are provided on a multiple basis for each
unit, for example, the gas circulators of a nuclear
reactor and the circulating water pumps for the main
condensers. The station transformer is usually the first
major connection with the grid for a power station
under construction, providing supphes for the commis­
sioning of the plant.
The design criteria to be met by the station trans­
former are as follows:
• The H V connection is from the 132, 275 or 400 kV
grid system.
• On the most recent, larger units, the LV is invariably
11 kV nominal.
• Impedance must be such that it can be paralleled with
the unit transformer at 11 kV without exceeding the
permissible fault level — usually about 1 5 % .
• A n on-load tapchanger is required to maintain 11 kV
system volts constant as load is varied and as grid
voltage varies.
• Operating load-factor is low, i.e., for much of its hfe
the station transformer will run at half-load, or less.
Load losses can therefore be relatively high, but fixed
losses should be as low as possible.
2.2.2 General design features
As explained in Section 1.1.2 of this chapter, the station
transformer is almost invariably star/star connected,
since both HV and LV windings must provide a neutral
for connection to earth.
Until recently, such a transformer would automati­
cally have been provided with a delta-connected ter­
tiary for the ehmination of third harmonic. However,
as auxihary systems and the transformers feeding them
become larger, fault levels become greater, and at the
time of designing the auxihary system for Littlebrook
D power station it became clear that the use of a
132/11 kV 60 M V A station transformer with a deha-
connected tertiary would create problems in the event
of single-phase-to-earth faults on the 11 kV system.

Such a transformer has an inherently low zero-sequence
impedance and it is difficult for the designer to in­
crease this whilst maintaining the positive-sequence
impedance low enough to meet the required regulation
performance. The solution appeared to be to omit the
tertiary, but then concern arose as to whether this
would result in the zero-sequence impedance becoming
so high that single-phase-to-earth faults on the 11 kV
system would not pass sufficient current t o operate
the protection. Consultations with transformer manu­
facturers suggested that this would not be so, since
the transformer tank would behave as a very loosely-
coupled tertiary winding. This was confirmed by the
works tests on the first transformer which showed
that the zero-sequence impedance, measured on the
LV winding, was about six times the positive-sequence
value and was low enough to permit satisfactory op­
eration of the protection.
Although works testing showed that the actual value
of zero-sequence impedance obtained by omitting the
tertiary can be low enough to meet the auxiliary sys­
tem protection requirements, it is necessary to ensure
that the absence of a tertiary will not give rise to
excessive third-harmonic currents circulating in the
system neutral. Such currents flow whenever the sys­
tem has more than one neutral, as in the example shown
in Fig 3.61 where an auxiliary gas turbine generator
with its neutral earthed is operated in parallel with
the station transformer supply, thus setting u p a com­
plete loop for circulating currents. (The impedance of
this loop to third-harmonic currents can be increased
by connecting a third-harmonic suppressor in series
with the gas turbine earth connection, see Section 2.5.6
of this chapter.) Such a situation can exist at Littlebrook
D and it was shown from site tests and calculations
that the omission of the tertiary resulted in a three
to four-fold increase in the third-harmonic current
in the gas turbine neutral compared with systems which
have a normal delta-connected tertiary on the station
transformer. With an absolute value of no more than
about 1 A in the transformer neutral, however, this
was still considered to be acceptable. Without the gas
-132kV SUB-STATION
STATION GAS TURBINE
\TRANSF0RMER GENERATOR
LIQUID
θ­
EARTHING
RESISTOR
α 2.3
.11 kV STATION BOARD
FIG. 3 . 6 1 Connection of gas turbine neutral in parallel
with station transformer neutral
Special design features
turbine connected in parallel, the station transformer
neutral carried a third-harmonic current of less than
0.3 A .
In order to ensure that protection problems are
not encountered on future station transformers, it is
now C E G B practice to specify that the zero-sequence
impedance should fall within a b a n d from 0.9 to 6
times the positive-sequence value.
Reference has been m a d e in Section 1.5.1 of this
chapter to the use of an on-load tapchanger on the
station transformer as a means of compensating for grid
voltage variation and for regulation within the trans­
former itself. This has an important bearing on the
design of the station transformer.
So that the 11 kV station b o a r d voltage remains
at an adequate value under full-load conditions, the
open-circuit ratio of the station transformer is selected
to give a low voltage somewhat above nominal. A
figure of 11.8 kV is typical.
Under normal operating conditions the grid sys­
tem voltage may be permitted to rise to a level 10%
above nominal. On the 400 kV system this condition
is deemed to persist for no longer than 15 minutes.
For the 132 kV and 275 kV systems, the condition may
exist continuously.
Should the station transformer H V volts rise above
nominal, the operator may tap-up on the tapchanger,
i.e., increase the number of turns in the H V winding.
If the H V voltage were t o fall, he would operate the
tapchanger in the opposite direction, which would re­
duce the H V turns: both these operations maintain
the flux density constant.
The operator can also use the tapchanger to boost
the LV system voltage, either to compensate for re­
gulation or because a safe margin is required, say,
to start an electric boiler feed p u m p . The tapchanger
would increase the volts/turn and this would thus
increase the flux density.
The station transformer will probably have been
provided with a tapping range of ± 10% to match the
possible supply voltage variation. On the limit, it is
possible for a voltage which is 10% high to be appHed
to the - 1 0 % tapping. This is an overvoltage factor
of 2 2 % and would result in an increase in flux density
of this a m o u n t . T o avoid saturation, it is desirable
that the operating flux density should never exceed
about 1.9 T; this resuhs in a specified flux density
of 1.55 Τ at nominal volts for all station transformers,
a value considerably lower than that specified for other
transformers, e.g., the generator transformer.
Unit transformers
2.3.1 Unit transformer characteristics
The unit transformer is teed-off from the main connec­
tions of the generator to the generator transformer.
It is energised only when the generator is in service
261
Transformers
and supplies loads which are essential to the operation
of the unit.
The design criteria to be met by the unit transformer
are as fohows:
• The HV vohage is 23.5 kV.
• The LV voltage is invariably 11 kV nominal.
• Impedance must be such as to enable it to be
paralleled with the station transformer at 11 kV
without exceeding the permissible fault level —
usually about 1 5 % .
• Since the HV vohage is maintained within ± 5 % of
nominal by the action of the generator AVR, on-load
tapchanging is not needed.
• Operating load-factor is high, so that load losses
and no-load losses will both be capitalised as the
same rate. (Except in some nuclear stations, where
two fully-rated unit transformers are provided per
unit for system security purposes.)
• Parallehng of unit and station transformers during
changeover of station and unit supplies can result
in a large circulating current between station and
u n h swhchboards (Fig 3.62). This adds to the umt
transformer load current, and subtracts from that
of the station transformer. The unit transformer
must therefore be capable of withstanding the re­
sultant short-time overload.
400kV SUBSTATION
NORMAL
POWER FLOW
400/23.5 kV
\GENERAT0R TRANSFORMER
NORMAL
POWER FLOW
PHASE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
THESE BOARDS
FIG. 3 . 6 2 Paralleling of station and unit transformers
262
Chapter 3
2.3.2 General design features
The above design criteria are met by a delta/star trans­
former having an open-circuit voltage ratio of 2 3 . 5 /
11.8 kV, equivalent to 23.5/11 kV at full-load 0.8
power factor, with off-circuit taps on the HV winding
of ± 7 . 5 % in six steps of 2 . 5 % . For the reasons ex­
plained in Section 1.5.6 of this chapter, these are
varied nowadays by means of links under the oil rather
than using an off-circuit switch which was the previous
practice.
The changeover of unit and station supplies normally
only requires that these transformers be paraheled for
a few seconds. This is long enough for the operator
to be sure that one circuit-breaker has closed before
the other is opened. During this time, however, a
circulating current can flow which is dependent on
the combined phase shift through the unit, generator
and station transformers, plus any phase shift through
interbus transformers, if generator and station trans­
formers are not connected to the same section of the
grid system. This can resuh in the unit transformer
seeing a current equivalent to up to IVi x full-load.
Should the operator take longer than expected to carry
out this switching, the unit transformer windings will
rapidly overheat. Such a delay is regarded as a fault
occurrence, which will only take place fairly infre­
quently. It is considered that parallel operation for
a time of two minutes is more likely to occur than
a short-circuh of the transformer and so the limiting
400/132kV
INTERBUS TRANSFORMER
132/11 kV STATION
TRANSFORMER
I l k V STATION BOARD
NORMALLY OPEN
I l k V CIRCUIT BREAKER

temperature is set lower than the temperature per­
mitted on short-circuit. The latter is set at 250°C by
BS171 and so the C E G B has specified that a figure of
180°C should not be exceeded after a period of two
minutes parallel operation.
2.4 Auxiliary transformers
The auxiliary transformers in a power station are by
far the most numerous and varied. They range in size
from 12.5 M V A 11/3.3 kV to possibly as small as
315 kVA. They can be oil-filled to BS148[12], or dry
type, or occasionally filled with some synthetic liquid
(although it should be noted that filling with poly-
chlorobiphenyls — PCBs — once the most c o m m o n
amongst the fire-retardent fluids, has been dropped
by the C E G B since the early 1970s). Auxihary trans­
formers are very hkely to be made in a different factory
from the larger transformers. Being smaUer and lighter
they do not require the same specialised handling and
lifting equipment as the larger transformers. Vacuum
impregnation and vapour-phase drying (see Section
1.7.3 of this chapter) equipment is not required. At
the very smah end of the range, manufacturing methods
are closer to those used in mass production industries.
There are many more manufacturers who make small
transformers than those at the larger end of the scale.
The industry is very competitive, margins are smaU
and turnround times are rapid. The result is that there
is a constant tendency for manufacturers to look for
cheaper and simpler ways of making the product and
a 2 MVA transformer buiU in 1985 would appear very
different from one made twenty years earlier.
To date, changes tend to have been restricted to
methods of cutting and building cores, simphfication
of core frames and simplification of the arrangement
and method of forming internal leads, for example,
by the use of round rather than flat copper bar for
HV connections. Round bar, being stiffer, usually re­
quires fewer supporting cleats and since it can be bent
with equal ease in all planes can usually be taken from
point to point in a single formed length, whereas flat
bar might require several specially formed bends and
joints in order to follow a complex route.
These changes have generally found acceptance with
the C E G B . There have been some new materials and
processes, notably in the use of crimping rather than
sweating or brazing for the making of joints. This
has the advantage that it avoids the need to bring a
blow torch into close proximity of windings with its
associated risk of fire or, at the very least, overheating
of insulation. Crimped joints are also m a d e very much
more quickly than brazed or sweated joints, leading to
cost savings.
All this is quite acceptable provided that there is
no resulting loss of rehability or hfe expectancy. In
Section 1.7 of this chapter, the point has been m a d e
that these two factors are difficult to assess from a
Special design features
brief series of works tests. It is therefore necessary to
accept change gradually, to ensure that quality assur­
ance systems are maintained and that all the testing
that is practicable is carried out.
2.4.1 General design features
Auxiliary transformers of 11/3.3 kV are normally either
12.5, 10 or 8 M V A . These transformers are oil-filled,
which means that they are located outdoors and pro­
vided with waterspray flre protection unless positioned
remote from main buildings. Connections at 11 and
3.3 kV are in cable which means that cable boxes
must be provided for H V and LV terminations.
Cooling is invariably by natural circulation of the
oil, with natural air-cooling of the tank-mounted
radiators. A conservator is provided to allow expan­
sion space for the oil and in order to allow a Buchholz
relay to be fitted. The air space within the conser­
vator is vented to atmosphere via a silica-gel breather.
A pressure relief device is mounted on the tank cover.
Transformers for 3.3/0.415 kV normally have ratings
of 2, 1.6 or 1 M V A in order to match the standard
current ratings of 415 V switchgear, a k h o u g h smaller
ratings, for example, 800 kVA or 500 kVA, might be
used occasionahy. For these ratings a number of design
options exist and, in fact, it is becoming increasingly
c o m m o n practice to employ an alternative to class A ,
mineral oil-filled insulation. One reason for this is
that in large modern power stations it is difficult to
locate oil-filled transformers outdoors whilst keeping
them close enough to plant to obtain acceptable cable
vok d r o p s .
2.4.2 Auxiliary transformer insulation systems
In the late 1970s and early 1980s several new dielectric/
insulation systems for small auxihary transformers were
introduced. This largely arose as a result of the envi­
ronmental status of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).
For many years these were the only dielectrics in gen­
eral use where it was necessary to eliminate the fire
hazard associated with oil-filled transformers, but in
the early 1970s it was recognised that these non­
biodegradable fluids posed serious environmental haz­
ards when they were accidentally released into the
environment. Their use by the C E G B in transformers
was therefore discontinued.
Because of the number of options which are avail­
able for auxiliary transformers in this range, it is
worth examining them in some detail.
The following insulation systems will be considered:
• BS148 oil with class A insulation for comparison.
• Dry-type air-cooled with class C insulation.
• Encapsulated cast-resin.
• Synthetic liquid with class A insulation.
263
Transformers
Reasons for considering alternative dielectrics
BS 148 oil has had widespread use for auxiliary trans­
formers in power stations for so long and has proved
so reliable that it is reasonable at the outset t o question
why alternative dielectrics should be considered.
The disadvantages of oil-filled auxiliary transformers
can be summarised as fohows:
• Oil is considered a fire hazard so these transformers
must be located outdoors.
• This means relatively lengthy cable runs for both
HV and LV cables. LV cables in particular are bulky
and expensive.
• The need to locate transformers outdoors creates
layout difficulties, since it becomes exceedingly dif­
ficult to position these close to the load. At Drax,
for example, long 415 V cable runs for precipitator
electrical supphes led t o the need for on-load tap­
changers on transformers providing these supplies,
with all its attendant extra costs and complexity.
• Even when located outdoors, these transformers
must be provided with fire protection in all situa­
tions, except where they are located remote from
main buildings.
• The need to guard against pollution of drains means
that transformer compounds must be provided with
special drainage facilities, with interceptor tanks large
enough to cater for major oil spihage coupled with
the operation of water spray fire protection.
The following are the alternatives:
Dry-type air-cooled class C insulated (AN)
These have been considered by the C E G B to be the
main alternatives to oil-filled transformers since the
early 1960s.
Advantages of air-cooled transformers
ΑΠ the disadvantages of oil-fiUed transformers hsted
previously are eliminated.
• They can be regarded as almost totally fireproof.
There is very little combustible material associated
with their construction and those materials which
are present are used in such small quantities a n d are
of such low flammability as to constitute neghgible
risk.
• There are no liquids involved whatsoever, therefore
there are no risks of spillages, n o need for bunding
or protection of other equipment.
• There are no toxicity problems.
• The transformer can be made integral with 415 voU
switchgear, therefore LV cabhng can be ehminated.
264
Chapter 3
Figure 3.63 shows a typical 415 V switchboard with
an integral 3.3/0.415 kV transformer.
Disadvantages of air-cooled transformers
• The transformer and its enclosure cost about 1.8
times that of an oil-filled transformer of equivalent
rating.
• Past designs of air-cooled transformers tended t o
have poorer reliability than oil-filled.
• The weight of the transformer means that switch-
room floor loadings must be designed t o take this
into account.
• Provision must be m a d e for dissipation of trans­
former losses from switchrooms.
• T h e transformer must be provided with a reasonably
clean, dry, environment, although this need be n o
better than the environment normally provided for
switchgear and contactor gear. Care is necessary on
re-energising after any period out of service to en­
sure that the windings are moisture free.
In weighing the disadvantages of A N transformers
against the benefits, those which figure most promi­
nently are cost and reliability.
The extra cost can be very much offset by the sav­
ings on LV cabling, transformer c o m p o u n d provision
and drainage, a n d the elimination of a fire protection
requirement. It is difficult t o build u p an accurate
balance sheet since a number of factors are very dif­
ficult t o cost. For example, space saving in cable
tunnels and losses in LV cables on the credit side versus
the provision of extra space (and possibly extra struc­
tural strength) in switchrooms and extra ventilation
on the debit side. O n balance, the extra cost of the
transformer is almost totally offset by these factors.
It was certainly the C E G B experience that in the
early days of their use, A N transformers had poorer
rehability than their oil-filled counterparts. In fact,
since small oil-fihed auxiliary transformers are vir­
tually never known to fail in a power station situation
(as distinct from Area Board experience, where such
transformers are used in electrically-exposed situations),
their reliability cannot be bettered. However, the more
rigorous works testing and inspection procedures for
A N transformers instituted by the C E G B , coupled with
the appearance of polyamide-paper-based insulation
in the late 1960s, has improved their rehability con­
siderably. This conclusion is based on a fairly smah
sample of A N transformers in service, compared with
the numbers of oil-filled transformers in operation.
In terms of *large m o d e r n ' stations, at the time of
writing (1988) this means Wylfa, Dungeness, Heysham
1 and Littlebrook Z>, and there were problems at the
first two stations during their early life.
 Special design features

FIG. 3 . 6 3 4 1 5 V switchboard with an integral 3 . 3 / 0 . 4 1 5 kV transformer

Cast-resin insulated • As with A N transformers there are no liquids

Cast-resin insulation made its appearance in power
transformers in significant quantities in the 1970s.
Before that it had been used in instrument transformers
for a number of years. Its use on the continent of
Europe has been very much more widespread than
in the UK and the expansion of the market in the
UK coincided w h h moves by environmentalists to
ban PCBs. The C E G B has little experience of cast
resin for power transformers, so in assessing the ad­
vantages and disadvantages no first-hand experience
is available except in discussing those properties which
cast-resin power transformers have in c o m m o n with
instrument transformers, particularly VTs.
Advantages of cast-resin insulation
As with A N transformers, the disadvantages of oil-filled
transformers are ehminated.
• The insulation system is virtually indestructable and
dielectric failure due to neglect of environmental
conditions can be disregarded.
involved.
Cast-resin transformers designed for installation in a
415 V switchboard are illustrated in Fig 3.64.
Disadvantages of cast-resin insulation
• Because of the high cost of moulds, manufacturers
are usually only able to offer a hmited range of
ratings and impedances and insulation levels. These
generally will not coincide with the C E G B specified
requirements.
• Cost is greater t h a n A N (say, 1 0 - 2 0 % more in 1987)
with little identifiable benefit.
• Due to the problem of differential expansion between
copper and resin, the transformer has virtually no
overload capability, even for a short time. Overload
protection is required.
• There are also the weight and heat-dissipation pro­
blems, as discussed for A N transformers.

265
Transformers Chapter 3
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266

There have also been suggestions that, although a cast-
resin transformer is unlikely to initiate a fire, should
a fire occur which involved the transformer, the resin
will then burn producing heat and smoke. However,
recent testing carried out by the C E G B and by the
manufacturers of cast-resin transformers has proved
that this fear is unfounded.
The C E G B has experience in the use of two types
of cast-resin transformers:
• For use as 23.5 kV generator voltage transformers.
• For use as generator neutral earthing transformers
(see Section 2.5 of this chapter).
In both of these applications the benefits are suffi­
ciently worthwhile to outweigh some of the disad­
vantages listed. One listed disadvantage — that of
inability to purchase a transformer which meets the
CEGB specification — does not apply in that there
are specialist designs available which fully meet C E G B
requirements.
The problem of lack of overload capability is avoided
by very conservatively rating the transformers in ques­
tion. This is an approach which could not normally be
justified but which is permissible where the benefits
of resin are p a r a m o u n t . FauUs which have resuUed in
overloading cast-resin voltage transformers have, how­
ever, produced spectacular and catastrophic failures.
The excellent insulation properties of cast-resin are
demonstrated in the d a m p heat test which the C E G B
applies to cast-resin VTs. In this test, 23.5 kV voltage
transformers, which are dripping with surface con­
densation, are required to withstand 1.2 x rated voltage
for one hour, fohowed by a final five minutes at 1.9
X rated voltage. It is this abihty to survive severe
adverse conditions which justifies the use of cast-resin
where the service location or operating regime gives
rise to such exacting conditions.
It should also be noted that the use of aluminium,
usually in the form of foil windings, improves the
overload capabihty of cast-resin transformers, since
the thermal expansion of aluminium differs from that
of the resin to a lesser degree than does that of copper.
Although the use of both copper and aluminium foil
windings is tending to become widespread in small Area
Board distribution transformers, this remains the only
significant application for power station transformers.
Synthetic liquid filled
Since the banning of P C B s , many other dielectric
fluids have appeared on the market. None is as good
as PCBs in all respects but they are acceptable envi­
ronmentally. In the USA, there were very large num­
bers of PCB-filled transformers and there have also
been the strongest pressures from the environmentahsts
to ehminate them. This has given the alternatives a
commercial boost.
Special design features
At the present time, the full hst of synthetic dielec­
tric fluids is too lengthy for coverage in a volume
such as this. For full details of all such fluids available
the reader is referred t o specific works on dielectric
fluids [13], however, the following represents the salient
features of the better known fluids in the UK in 1987:
Silicone fluid This was probably the first replace­
ment for P C B to appear in any quantity. Manufac­
tured and marketed by the Dow Corning Corporation,
it has been used in fairly large quantities both as a
retrofill fluid, replacing the P C B in existing trans­
formers, and in new transformers. Its thermal proper­
ties are not as good as those of P C B or BS 148 oil so
that transformers designed for P C B and filled with
silicone fluid have to be slightly derated. There have
been n o significant adverse reports to date.
Midel 7131 Midel 7131 was developed by Micanite
and Insulators, who are currently part of the UK G E C
g r o u p . It has been widely used both in the USA and
the UK, and to date there have been n o adverse re­
ports. Midel does not require the derating demanded
by silicone fluid when used as a retrofih fluid and its
only known disadvantage at the present time is its
high cost.
Formel NF Formel N F has been jointly developed
by ISC Chemicals of A v o n m o u t h and the Electricity
Council. It is probably the only truly non-flammable
dielectric fluid which is currently available. For the
Electricity Council to come to the decision to develop
this fluid is perhaps an indication of shortcomings in the
other fluids available. It has not been used in power
station applications since, as explained above, current
policy is to dispense with liquid dielectrics for trans­
formers within buildings. T h e fluid is a mixture of
halocarbons of the type which have found widespread
use in fire-retardent cable insulation. It is hkely that
future policy will be to discontinue the use of such
halocarbon materials because of the considerable quan­
tities of damaging smoke and fumes produced from
them when engulfed in a fire. It should be noted that,
unlike most other dielectric fluids available, formel
N F is not suitable for use as a retrofilhng fluid.
RTEmp One further fluid worthy of mention is
R T E m p . This is used fairly widely in U S A and is cheaper
than either silicone or Midel. Its only known dis­
advantage is its high viscosity at low temperatures.
2.4.3 Design features of dry-type transformers
For the reasons identified in the previous section, air-
cooled dry-type transformers having class C insulation
are now the most c o m m o n means of providing 415 V
supplies. Normally these take their supply from 3.3 kV,
a h h o u g h occasionally the primary voltage is 11 kV.
267
Transformers Chapter 3

The object in ehminating the dielectric fluid is to
enable the transformers to be located close to the
load and the standard arrangement is to incorporate
them into 415 V switchboards. Such an arrangement
is iUustrated in Fig 3.63 and is shown diagrammatically
in Fig 3.65. 415 V busbars are arranged to connect
directly to the terminals of the incoming 415 V circuit-
breaker of the switchboard. Since the majority of such
415 V boards have two transformer incomers either
side of a bus-section switch (as shown in Fig 3.66),
it is necessary for the transformer section to house
the length of through busbars. The usual practice is
for the transformer manufacturer to supply the trans­
former enclosure together with this length of through
busbar. The busbar must be suitably segregated from
the interior of the transformer cubicle, since it will
probably be alive at the time that the transformer
itself has been isolated to allow access. The through
busbar must be braced against short-circuit forces to
the same standard as the busbars in the remainder of
the switchboard and it must be capable of carrying
3.3kV SUPPLY CABLE
full-load current without exceeding the specified tem­
perature rise in an ambient generated by the normal
transformer losses dissipated within its enclosure. This
requirement is particularly onerous since the trans­
former is permitted a temperature rise of 150°C which
is somewhat higher than that allowed for busbars within
switchgear.
The H V connections to indoor dry-type transformers
are invariably via cables. With modern plastic insulated
cables, it would be possible to bring these into the
transformer enclosure and terminate them directly onto
the ends of the H V winding and, indeed, this practice
is c o m m o n in some European countries. However, the
arrangement has the disadvantage that during station
construction the cabling contractor must have access
to the interior of the transformer enclosure, with the
attendant risk that the unprotected insulation of the
transformer windings might be damaged. This is not
considered a worthwhile risk to take for the com­
paratively modest benefit of eliminating a cable box
and so it is standard C E G B practice to terminate
cables in a conventional box mounted on the exterior
of the enclosure. With cast-resin insulated windings
there is much less risk of damage and elimination of
the H V cable box is acceptable.
The size and rigidity of the enclosure in relation
to that of the transformer usually requires that it

5 be dehvered to site separately from the transformer.

It is thus necessary to provide it with access doors
large enough to enable the transformer to be taken in
and out; this operation is simplified by mounting the
transformer itself on rohers. The doors also provide
access to the interior of the enclosure for the occasional
cleaning necessary during service.
TRANSFORMER 415V 415V OUTGOING Safety for access when installed is ensured by the
CUBICLE CIRCUIT CIRCUITS
BREAKER use of a key interlock arranged such that the enclosure
doors can only be opened when the transformer H V
circuit-breaker is in the circuit-earthed position.
FIG. 3.65 415 switchboard with integral 3.3/0.415 kV It is normal C E G B practice to apply a local tem­
transformer porary earth at the point of supply to a dry-type trans­
former whenever access is gained to the interior of the
transformer cubicle. A type of earth connection which
TRANSFORMER TRANSFORMER is clamped at one end o n t o a 15 m m diameter bar
'A' •B-
by means of a remote h a n d h n g pole is used. The
'earthy' end is connected via a length of flexible cable
and an earth-end clamp to the switchgear earth bar
which must be brought to a suitably accessible point
external to the transformer enclosure. With the hne-
end clamped to the H V connection inside the trans­
former enclosure and the earth-end clamped outside

ft
the enclosure, this ensures that the doors cannot be
-Ο-
closed and the H V circuit-breaker released from the
'circuit earth' position until the temporary earth has
415V BUS-SECTION 415V
CIRCUIT CIRCUIT been removed.
BREAKER BREAKER
•A' THROUGH BUS-BAR 'B' For many years, it was considered impracticable
to provide a dry-type transformer with any winding
temperature indication since, not being immersed in a
FIG. 3.66 415 switchboard with two 3.3/0.415 kV
medium such as transformer oil to which any tempera­
transformers ture rise could be referred, it was difflcuU to obtain

268
 Special design features

a reference basis. The best that could be achieved was

to place a sensor in a position which it was hoped would
THYRISTOR
expose it to the hottest coohng air. Thermal image RECTIFIERS
devices of the type used in oil-filled transformers
have recently been developed to provide indications
of reasonable accuracy. As w h h the oil-fiUed equi­
valent, these employ a heater coil having a temperature
rise equal to that of the calculated hot-spot temperature.
This surrounds a mercury-in-steel thermometer bulb
which is placed in the hottest outlet air and thus aims
to reflect the true hot-spot temperature. The main
problem with such devices is that they require that
the designer should have an accurate knowledge of
POSITIVE
what the hot-spot temperature wih be, which may not
necessarily be so.
NEGATIVE
INTERPHASE CHOKE
2.4.4 Special transformers
(a) Six-phase rectifier transformer
Because of the requirement for a neutral connection
on 415 V systems, both for earthing and to enable
240 V single-phase loads to be supplied, transformers
stepping down to this voltage level are almost invaria­
bly star connected on the LV side, w h h a delta connec­
tion on the primary (see Section 1.1.1 of this chapter).
The exception is when the low voltage side supplies
a significant a m o u n t of rectifier load, as in certain
electrolytic gas production plants. For very large recti­
fier loads, the magnitude of harmonic currents drawn
from the supply can result in considerable distortion
of the supply voltage waveform, particularly if the
loads from a number of parallel rectifiers are all
drawing harmonics in phase with each other. The
problem is unhkely to occur for smaller loads such as
battery chargers or for battery-backed inverter systems (b) 12-pulse rectifier using star/star and star/interstar
transformers and full wave bridge rectifier
for computer and instrumentation supphes.
Many rectifier transformers employ a *six-phase'
delta/star/star connection arrangement as shown in FIG. 3 . 6 7 'Six-phase' rectifier transformer and rectifier
transformer bank of delta/star and interstar/star
Fig 3.67 (a) and this of hself helps to reduce harmonic
transformers
distortion by ehmination of even harmonics. However
an improved arrangement can be obtained by doubling
the number of supply transformers and providing half harmonic currents referred t o above can produce ad­
of these whh an interconnected star (Fig 3.67 (b)). ditional heating. Also, with certain connection arrange­
This aims to displace half the rectifier load, and hs ments, polyphase transformers can be subjected to a
associated harmonic currents, by 30° so as to reduce D C component of current in their secondary windings
the resultant magnitude of any given harmonic current so that temperature rise tests should be carried out,
drawn from the supply. Although elimination of har­ if possible, in conjunction with the associated rectifier.
monics generated by thyristor loads has not yet become These transformers are almost invariably dry-type,
a major problem for power station auxiliary systems, class C, so that they can be installed indoors in a
it is an increasing one due to the growth in the use cubicle adjacent to the rectifier.
of thyristor drives and there is considerable literature Another special requirement of some smaU auxiliary
on the subject, for example. Electricity Council Engi­ transformers is that of low magnetising inrush cur­
neering Recommendation G 5 / 3 [14] and in the tech­ rent. The existence of a large magnetising inrush cur­
nical press [15]. rent is normally regarded as an inevitable feature of
The subject of avoidance of harmonic distortion a power transformer. The p h e n o m e n o n is dealt with
of power supplies caused by converter equipment is in some detail in m a n y text books [2]. For the largest
important. It is deah whh in detail in Electricity Council transformers, it must be allowed for when selecting
Report A C E 15 [16]. protection settings; for smaller transformers, supply
In most other respects rectifier transformers are fuses need to be suitably rated to avoid spurious fail­
similar to any other small auxiliary transformer. The ure. Normally this represents n o more than a minor

269
Transformers
inconvenience. However, a recent application has led
to the specification of a specially low magnetising
inrush current for certain small instrument suppHes
transformers as used in uninterruptible power (UPS)
supplies systems. Figure 3.68 shows a U P S system
which can be fed either from the battery-backed in­
verter, or from the mains should this fail. Fuses F l ,
F2 must be set low in order to protect the inverter
from damage in the event of load-side faults. However,
these fuses are subjected to the magnetising current of
the transformers (Tl and T2) on operation of the
changeover switch (S) that provides the continuity of
supply from the mains in the event of failure of the
inverter. For a system employing an 8 kVA transformer,
a fuse rating of 25 A is required to provide the neces­
sary protection for the inverter. The peak magnetising
inrush current at 415 V for a transformer of this size
would normally be over 200 A . T o avoid operation
of the fuse it is necessary to ensure that the first peak
magnetising current does not exceed about 140 A. The
other Hmiting factor which makes the transformer
specification somewhat exacting is that, because of
the nature of the loads fed from such a U P S system,
the transformer impedance must not exceed about 2%
to meet regulation requirements. Such transformers
can be designed, albeit with difficulty. Achievement
of the requirement is assisted by operation at low flux
415V SUPPLY
BATTERY
CHARGER
INVERTER
STATIC SWITCH 8^
415/11OV TRANSFORMERS
110V UPS DISTRIBUTION BOARDS
FIG. 3.68 U P S system with inverter or mains-fed
transformer
270
Chapter 3
density (about 1 T) and by the use of a primary winding
which has a large air cross-section in relation to the
iron cross-section of the core. Hence this winding is
usually made the outer winding of a double-concentric
arrangement.
The magnitude of the first peak inrush current is
dependent on the remanent flux within the core at
the instant of energisation and the precise point on the
applied voltage wave at which this takes place. The
inrush is greatest when switch-on is at voltage zero with
the remanent flux within the core at its maximum value
and in the opposite sense to that appropriate to the
applied voltage. The chances of this occurring for any
single r a n d o m switching is low, hence, in order to carry
out an effective proving test it is necessary to use a
point-on-wave switching device and to ensure that the
core is suitably magnetised.
2.4.5 Foil windings
During the latter part of the 1960s, the price of cop­
per rose steeply and threatened to rise still further,
so a number of manufacturers began to experiment
with aluminium for transformer windings, mainly in
small distribution transformers up to about 500 kVA:
the majority of these had foil windings. In addition
to avoiding the need for welded joints in wire, this
arrangement has the attraction for the manufacturer
that windings can be machine wound and, once the
machine has been set u p , can be produced very rapidly.
There is no record of these transformers so far
being used in power station applications. However,
the subject is worth mentioning in a section dealing
with power station auxiliary transformers since their
introduction remains a possibility, particularly in con­
junction with a cast-resin insulation system, as noted
in Section 2.4.2 of this chapter.
Many users of early foil-wound transformers ex­
perienced problems in service arising from the connec­
tion between the foils and the risers to the transformer
terminals. These frequently involved HV windings where
the foil is exceedingly flimsy and the situation is fur­
ther comphcated if H V taps are specified.
The interfoil insulation for foil-wound transformers
has been almost exclusively melamine sheet. This is
exceedingly thin (less than 0.1 m m ) and can be easi­
ly punctured by the inclusion of minute particles of
dirt or grit, causing failure in service. This can be
avoided by manufacturing under clean conditions. There
is an additional problem that if the edge of the foil
itself is shghtly burred or ragged, this too can cause
puncture of the melamine. There are also problems
of handling the melamine due to the very low co­
efficient of friction between this and aluminium foil.
Coils before impregnating require very careful handling
and can be very easily 'telescoped out' at this stage.
T o overcome this there have been attempts to bond
the melamine to thin paper to increase the coefficient
of friction.

Another problem with foil-wound HV windings,
particularly when deha connected, is that full line voh­
age appears across the end of the winding rather than
being distributed along its length. For this reason and
the problems associated with the use of very thin foil
previously mentioned, some manufacturers have used
foil-wound LV windings in conjunction with conven­
tional wire-wound H V windings.
Transformers with aluminium-foil windings have
been found not to be significantly cheaper than those
using copper. They have higher losses and at the end
of their useful hfe the aluminium, unhke copper, has
zero scrap value.
A recent development has been the use of copper foil
rather than aluminium. This should largely reduce the
problem of making connections to the foil, but the
benefit of low material cost is sacrificed. It would
seem that the attraction is simply that of reduced
manufacturing cost by simphfication and of something
approaching mass production being applied to the
winding process.
2.5 Neutral earthing
2.5.1 Generator earthing transformers — basic
principles
The practice of earthing the neutral of large genera­
tors via a high resistance was developed in the 1950s
with the object of restricting stator earth fault current
to a low value and thereby limiting the damage caused
by the fault. The aim with the system currently in
use is to limit the current for an earth fault on the
windings of a 23.5 kV generator to between 10 and
15 A. This requires a resistance of about 1400 Ω. If
connected directly into the generator neutral a resistor
of this value for such a low rated current would tend
to be rather flimsy as well as expensive. The solution
is to use a resistor of low ohmic value to load the
secondary of a transformer whose primary is connected
in series with the generator neutral earth connection.
When the system was first devised the intention was
to use a standard low cost single-phase distribution
transformer. Since that time, generator voltages and
ratings have increased considerably and the need for
high security means it is no longer possible to use
such a transformer.
The following section describes the special char­
acteristics of generator neutral earthing transformers
which have been developed at the present time. For
a detailed description of the protection aspects the
reader is referred to Chapter 11 of this volume.
The generator neutral connection to the primary of
an earthing transformer, or any other high resistance
neutral earthing device, must be kept as short as pos­
sible since this connection is unprotected. A n earth
fault on this connection would go undetected until a
second fault occurred on the system and then an un­
Special design features
restricted fault current would flow. It is thus necessary
to locate the neutral earthing transformer adjacent
to the generator neutral, and an oil-filled transformer
cannot be used because of fire hazard. A transformer
of high rehability with low fire risk is needed. Poly-
chlorinatedbiphenyl-fllled transformers were initially
used for this purpose but these are now excluded on
environmental grounds. In other low fire-risk appli­
cations, the C E G B uses class C insulated dry-type
transformers, but these are most prone to failure if
suddenly energised after a long period in a de-energised
condition, which is just the condition apphed to a
generator neutral earthing transformer in the event of
a system earth f a u h . In 1976, the C E G B decided that
this was an ideal application for a cast-resin transformer
and therefore drew up a specification for such a
transformer. After extensive testing of a prototype, the
system was adopted for the earthing of the Dinorwig
generators and has become the standard arrangement
for subsequent stations.
2.5.2 Generator neutral earthing transformers
— general design features
T h e detailed r e q u i r e m e n t s for g e n e r a t o r n e u t r a l
earthing transformers are set out in the C E G B Gen­
eration Design M e m o r a n d u m (Plant) N o 80. For the
neutral of a 23.5 kV, 660 M W generator a voltage ratio
of 33/0.5 kV is selected. The primary vohage insula­
tion level of 33 kV corresponds to that used for the
generator busbars (see Chapter 4 of this volume) thus
maintaining the high security against earth faults. It
also ensures an adequate margin of operating voltage
over that which could appear on the generator neutral
under A V R field-forcing conditions (assumed to be
1.4 times normal vohs) with an earth fauh on one of
the generator line terminals. With this field-forcing
condition, the nominal 10 A earth fault current be­
comes 14 A , hence the transformer should have a
rating of 14 χ 33 000 = 462 k V A . However this only
needs a five-minute rating, since an earth fault of this
magnitude would lead to instantaneous operation of
the generator protection.
The required continuously rated current is that which
is just t o o low to operate the protection, plus an
allowance for third-harmonic currents which may flow
continuously in the generator neutral. The aim is to
protect as much of the generator windings as possible
and so the minimum current for operation is made
as low as possible. This is taken to be 5 % of the
nominal setting of 10 A , i.e., 0.5 A . Tests on 660 M W
turbine-generators suggest that the level of third-har­
monic current is about 1 A . The transformer con­
tinuous rating is thus (0.5 + 1) χ 33 000 = 49.5 kVA.
In practice a typical transformer of this size has
a continuous rating of 0 . 2 - 0 . 2 5 of the five-minute
rating, hence the continuous rating is accommodated
naturally.
271
Transformers
2.5.3 Practical arrangement
The generator neutral earthing transformer should be
located as close as possible to the generator neutral.
For modern 500 and 660 M W machines the neutral
star-point is formed in aluminium busbar located
underneath the neutral end of the generator, usually
at the turbine hah basement level. It is housed in a
sheet-aluminium enclosure which provides protection
for personnel from the operating voltage as well as
electromagnetic protection to the surrounding plant
from the large flux generated by the high machine
phase currents. (This is described in greater detail in
Chapter 4.) The neutral earthing transformer in its
enclosure, which usuahy also houses the resistor, is
arranged to abut the neutral enclosure in such a way
as to enable a short ^jumper connection' to be made
from a palm on the generator star-bar to one on
the transformer line-end terminal via suitably located
openings in the neutral enclosure and transformer
enclosure. On generators 4, 5 and 6 at Drax power
station, the transformer was made with long flexible
connections to the secondary loading resistor and ar­
ranged so that it can be ^racked forward' towards the
generator star-bar once transformer and resistor have
been placed adjacent the neutral enclosure, thus en­
abling a very short connection indeed to be m a d e
between the star-bar and the transformer. A generator
neutral bar and its earthing connection is shown in
Fig 3.69.
2.5.4 Loading resistor
The value of apparent resistance required in the
generator neutral is V / I f V 3 Ω, where V is the generator
line voltage and If the specified stator fault current.
When referred to the low vohage side of the trans­
former, this becomes V / v ^ I f V 3 Ω where ν is the turns
ratio of the transformer.
Inserting the values already given for a 660 M W
23.5 kV generator gives a resistance value of about
0.3 Q. Strictly speaking this is the total secondary
resistance including that of the transformer, but since
a transformer of the rating quoted above has an
equivalent resistance of > 0 . 0 1 o h m s , this can be neg­
lected within the accuracy required.
It is also necessary that the X / R ratio for a
transformer/resistor combination does not exceed 2,
in order to ensure that the power factor of arcing
ground fauks is as high as possible and that re-striking
transients are kept as low as possible.
In fact, a practical transformer meeting the other
parameters specified above can fairly easily be designed
to have a reactance of about 4 % based on the rating
of 462 kVA for the transformer of a 2 3 . 5 kV, 660 M W
unit which equates to 0.0025 Ω. This would give an
X / R value of about 0.08, assuming the resistor to be
non-inductive, and would allow the resistor to have
considerable inductance before causing any embarrass­
ment. The C E G B Design M e m o r a n d u m states that the
272
Chapter 3
resistor should be non-inductive but this is simply
erring on the side of caution and ensuring that there
is no likehhood of the m a x i m u m X / R value being
exceeded inadvertently. Generally, a non-inductive re­
sistor would be flimsier than one which has some
inductance because of the construction needed to give
this characteristic. Economics might therefore dictate
that the resistor is allowed to have some inductance:
if so, it is important to know its magnitude and to
ensure that the permissible X / R ratio is not exceeded.
Typical forms of construction of both inductive and
non-inductive resistor elements are shown in Fig 3.70.
The resistor rating can be calculated on the basis of
I^R, where I equals 924 A , equivalent to a primary
current of 14 A , and R equals 0.3 o h m s . This works
out to about 260 kVA, which is usually rounded up
to 300 kVA and is the required five-minute rating.
This is not equal to the five-minute rating of the
transformer, since the latter has been based on a
notional vohage of 33 kV rather than the actual apphed
voltage of (1.4 χ 23.5)/V3 = 19 kV.
The resistor must also have a continuous rating.
For the example quoted, this is 1.5 A in the transformer
primary or 99 A in the secondary, giving about 3 kVA
for a 0.3 Ω resistor. As with the transformer, a resistor
which can meet the five-minute rating easily satisfies
the continuous rating.
Other parameters of the loading resistor are con­
ventional for metal resistors of this type. It must be
housed in a sheet steel enclosure which provides pro­
tection against personnel access and accidental contact.
This can be a c o m m o n enclosure with the transformer,
as indicated in Fig 3.69. However, if a c o m m o n en­
closure is used, there should be a metal barrier between
resistor and transformer so that the transformer is
protected from any directly radiated heat from the
resistor. The external temperature rise of the enclosure
after operation must not exceed about 80°C to avoid
possible injury to anyone coming into contact with it.
2.5.5 Generator busbar system earthing
In an instahation having a generator circuit-breaker,
a second earth must be provided for the 23.5 kV sys­
tem, otherwise the system on the transformer side of
the generator circuit-breaker would be unearthed when
the generator circuit-breaker was open (see Fig 3.71).
This earth must have an impedance of a similar order
to that of the generator neutral earth; if not, the
benefits from high resistance earthing of the generator
neutral would be lost. Hence, a second transformer-
connected resistor is needed. However, first it is re­
quired to provide a neutral for connection to earth. This
is obtained using an interconnected-star arrangement
(see Section 1.1.3 of this chapter) for connection to
the 23.5 kV system. The neutral point thus produced
is then connected to the primary of the neutral earthing
transformer. The most convenient location for con­
nection to the 23.5 kV system is via a tee-off from
 Special design features

FIG. 3 . 6 9 Arrangement of Dinorwig generator neutral earthing transformer (Balfour-Beatty Power Construction Ltd)

273
Transformers Chapter 3

(a)

FIG. 3 . 7 0 Typical forms of construction of metallic resistors

(a) Neutral earthing resistor having low inductive elements (GEC Industrial Controls)
(b) Neutral earthing resistor having non-inductive elements (Air Industrial Developments Ltd)

274

GENERATOR
TRANSFORMER
—•—
CIRCUIT-BREAKER
' UNIT
TRANSFORMER BUS-BAR SYSTEM
EARTHING MODULE
FIG. 3.71 Arrangement of 23.5 kV system busbars for a unit having a generator circuit-breaker
the main generator connections adjacent to the unit
transformer, so that the interstar 'transformer' can be
located outdoors alongside the generator and unit
transformers and can thus be oil-filled. The 33/0.5 kV
neutral earthing transformer can be installed in the
same tank as the interstar transformer to provide a
23.5 kV system earthing 'module' shown diagramma-
ticaUy in Fig 3.72.
The rating of the 33/0.5 kV portion of this module
must be the same as that used for connection to the
generator neutral. The interstar windings must be ca­
pable of carrying the unrestricted current that would
flow with an earth fauh on the 23.5 kV system, with
the generator circuit-breaker open and the neutral
earthing transformer shorted out (see Chapter 11). For
PROTECTION
CT
SINGLE INTERCONNECTED
PHASE STAR
TRANSFORMER TRANSFORMER'
FIG. 3.72 Arrangement of 23.5 kV system earthing
module
Special design features
MAIN
GENERATOR GENERATOR
(GENERATOR
NEUTRAL
EARTHING
TRANSFORMER
the system parameters appropriate to a 660 M W unit,
this has been calculated as 550 A . It is assumed to
persist for a time of 3 s which allows for the operation
of back-up protection to clear the fault.
2.5.6 Harmonic suppressors
Sometimes an auxiliary system is required to operate
for a long period with two earths connected to it.
For example, a diesel generator providing emergency
supplies when all other A C supphes have been lost
must have a neutral earth connection when running in
this condition. However, the same generator is required
to run in parallel with the normal auxiliary system
when normal supplies are being restored and also for
test running purposes. In this situation its neutral
earth connection will be in parallel with the auxiliary
system earth connection. A h h o u g h the return to normal
supplies operation might involve no more than a brief
period of paralleling, the test running condition might
well be for a much longer period.
A system with two earth connections provides a
path for circulation of third harmonic currents (see
also Section 2.2.2 of this chapter) and these can pro­
duce unacceptable additional heating in generators,
transformers and, in particular, earthing resistors. Where
earthing resistors are of the electrolyte-filled variety,
probably short time rated, this third-harmonic heating
can be a severe embarrassment.
One possible solution is to utilise a switched neu­
tral connection interlocked to ensure that only one
connection is m a d e at any one time. However, the
control of this can be complicated and a simpler solu­
tion is to install a third-harmonic suppressor. This
is an iron-cored inductor which is connected in series
with one of the neutral/earth connections, usually
the one which is not normally connected to the aux­
iliary system. Its design flux density is such that it is
totally saturated at 50 H z , thus having a low imped­
ance at normal supply frequency, whereas at 150 Hz
it operates below the knee point and, being unsatu-
275
Transformers Chapter 3

rated, has a high impedance, effectively equal to the

magnetising reactance. CONSERVATOR
Practical values are less than 2 Ω for an 11 kV device
with an applied voltage equal to 10% of generator SURGE
phase vohage at 50 Hz, and greater than 150 Ω with DIVERTER
this same voltage apphed at 150 Hz. It must be rated
for the continuous third-harmonic current produced 11kV BUSHING

by the expected level of third-harmonic vohage when

CABLE BOX
applied to the combined impedance of the device and
any neutral earthing resistor. In addition, it must be HARMONIC
capable of carrying the fauh current resulting from SUPPRESSOR

an earth fauh on the associated system. For an 11 kV

system, as provided for station or unit supplies asso­ ALTERNATIVE
POSITION
ciated with a 660 M W generator, this will be either FOR CABLE BOX
1000 A for 30 s, if limited by the system neutral earth­
ing resistor, or 10000 A for 3 s should this earthing
resistor have been short-circuited.
The above currents determine the thermal rating CONCRETE
of the harmonic suppressor. Should a system earth fault PLINTH

occur, coincident whh a short-circuh of the neutral

earthing resistor, the first-loop peak of the fault cur­
rent will be limited only by the fully-saturated imped­
ance of the harmonic suppressor and any impedance
of the supply. The latter, being designed to the limits
of the fault capability of the auxiliary switchgear, for
example, 750 M V A at 11 kV, wih be very low indeed.
The fully-saturated impedance of the harmonic sup­
SURGE DIVERTER
pressor is that measured with an air-core alone and, 11kV
for an 11 kV device designed to meet the requirements BUSHING
listed above, can be as low as 0.15 Ω resulting in a RESISTERI SIDE V GENERATOR SIDE
first-loop peak fault current of the order of 50000 A .
Such a fauh current imposes a very high mechanical CABLE BOX
load on the suppressor and it is normal practice to CONNECTION DIAGRAM
prove the withstand capability by carrying out a type
test on any new design at this level. FIG. 3.73 Arrangement of 11 kV harmonic suppressor
Because the suppressor has a high impedance to
high frequencies, as represented by any voltage tran­
sients which might occur on the system, it is normal 3.3 kV, the need for such current limiting reactors is
practice to connect a surge diverter across hs terminals rare. Their use on power station auxiliary systems is,
to provide a safe shunt path for these. therefore, the exception rather than the rule.
Figure 3.73 shows the typical arrangement of a There are four basic types of current limiting reactor.
harmonic suppressor as installed in the neutral earth These are:
connection of an 11 kV gas-turbine generator associated
with a 660 M W unit. • Cast-in-concrete air-cored.

• Oil-immersed gapped iron-cored.

2.6 Series reactors • Oil-immersed magnetically-shielded coreless.

• Oil-immersed electromagnetically shielded coreless.

2.6.1 General design features
Series reactors are sometimes referred to as current
limiting reactors and, as the name suggests, are used
for the purpose of hmiting fault currents or restricting
the fault levels of power station auxihary systems. The
reason for hmiting fault levels is to ensure that the
system will remain within the fault capability of the
power station switchgear and since this has been de­
veloped to achieve the comparatively high levels of
750 M V A for 11 kV switchgear and 250 M V A for
Ideally, current limiting reactors should have no iron
circuh because all iron circuhs exhibh a non-linear
saturating-type characteristic, so that, under the very
overcurrent conditions which the reactor is required
to protect against, there is a tendency for the react­
ance to be reduced. Hence, the prevalence of coreless
reactors in this hst.
The cast-in-concrete variety is therefore aimed at
ehminating iron entirely and consists of a series of

276

concrete posts supporting a helical copper conductor
arrangement. The problems with these reactors result
from the fact that they present extremely specialised
manufacturing requirements, albeit that they are tech­
nically fairly crude. They tend to be sold in such small
quantities that it is rarely worthwhile for a manufac­
turer to maintain the expertise. The major problem is
to cast the concrete posts with a sufficiently consistent
quality that they can be guaranteed crack-free, par­
ticularly since they are arranged in a circle of six,
eight, or more, all of which must be made without
defects to achieve an acceptable reactor.
As a result of the above problems it is likely that
enquiries for cast-in-concrete inductors by most elec­
trical plant manufacturers will be rejected.
Oil-filled reactors whether with or without an iron
core have a number of features in c o m m o n with trans­
formers, hence most transformer manufacturers are
able to design and build them.
Reactors with gapped iron-cores are most hke
transformers in their construction. In a three-phase
reactor, a core of superficially similar appearance to
a normal transformer core carries one winding on
each h m b , similar to a transformer winding. The core
differs from a transformer core in that *gaps' are
inserted into the axial length of the wound limbs by the
insertion of distance pieces made from non-magnetic
material — usually pressboard. These normally m a k e
up no more than about 1% of the iron path-length
but have the effect of reducing the 'normal' flux den­
sity of the device to a level such that, even at fauh
currents of ten or twelve times normal fuU load cur­
rent, the core is substantially unsaturated and the
reactance is no more than 5 - 1 0 % less than the value
at normal full-load current. Such a device is shown
diagrammatically in Fig 3.74.
FIG. 3.74 Gapped iron-core reactor
Special design features
Like transformers, reactors are subjected to large
electromagnetic forces under fault conditions. Since
each limb has only one winding, there can be no signifi­
cant axial unbalance such as can be experienced in a
transformer, so there will be n o major end forces on
winding supports. There remains an axial compressive
force and an outward bursting force on the coils. The
latter is resisted by the tensile strength of the copper
which is usually well able to meet this but the winding
must be adequately braced to prevent any tendency for
it to unwind. Since reactor windings normally have
fewer turns than transformer outer (HV) windings this
aspect often requires more careful consideration than
for a transformer (see Section 1.4.12 of this chapter).
The axial compressive force can, after repeated over-
current apphcations, resuU in a permanent compression
of the winding insulation with the result that windings
can become loose. This must be prevented by the
application of sufficient axial pressure during works
processing to ensure that all possible shrinkage is taken
u p at that time.
In a magnetically-shielded coreless reactor, the mag­
netic shield is arranged to surround the coils in much
the same way as the yokes of a conventional trans­
former core. The shield provides a return path for the
coil flux thus preventing this from entering the tank,
which would resuU in large losses and tank heating. The
larger the cross-section of the shield the greater is the
quantity of iron required, the larger is the tank and oil
quantity, and the more costly the reactor. If the shield
cross-section is reduced, the flux density under normal
rated conditions increases and the tendency to saturate
under short-circuit currents is greater, thus bringing
about a greater impedance reduction. C E G B practice
is to specify that the impedance under short-circmt
conditions shah not be less than 9 0 % of the impedance
at normal rated current.
In m a n y respects the electromagnetically-shielded
reactor appears the most attractive in that it offers
the advantage of constant impedance. In practice, this
benefit is usually reflected in the cost. The arrangement
of the shield for a single-phase reactor is shown in
Fig 3.75. The shield, which may be of copper or
FLUXES
^ ADD
\ FLUXES
CANCEL
SHIELD OF CONDUCTING MATERIAL
FIG. 3.75 Electromagnetically-shielded reactor
277
Transformers
aluminium, provides a path for currents which effec­
tively eliminate the return flux at all points outside the
shield. The flow of shield current does, of course, ab­
sorb power which appears as heating in the shield. In
addition to the balancing effect of the shield currents
on flux outside the shield, there is some reduction of
the flux within the coil, hence there is a reduction in
its reactance. It can be shown, however, that this is
independent of the current within the coil and is deter­
mined only by the inductance of the coil and the mutual
inductance between coil and shield. As in the case of
the magnetically-shielded reactor, therefore, there is a
need to strike an economic balance between physical
size, as determined by the size of the shield, and the
unwanted reduction of reactance produced by placing
the shield too close to the reactor coil. In practice the
effective reactance of the coil and shield combination
is made about 9 0 % of the coil reactance alone.
2.6.2 Testing of series reactors
Testing of all reactors can present problems to the
manufacturer which are not encountered in the testing
of transformers. To a certain extent this results from
the fact that they are made in very much smaller
quantities than transformers and so manufacturers do
not equip themselves suitably to deal with them.
Series reactors create two difficulties; one is con­
cerned with proving the performance under short-circuit,
the other with proving the adequacy of the interturn
insulation.
Proving performance under short-circuit not only
involves demonstrating that the reactor will withstand
the fault currents which are very likely to be a simi­
lar magnitude to those in transformers but, for a
magnetically-shielded or gapped-cored reactor, also es­
tablishing the reactance reduction which occurs under
short-circuit conditions.
It is rarely possible to measure the impedance at the
full short-circuit level, so that the usual approach is
to measure impedance at 5 0 % , 7 5 % and 100% of rated
current. For three-phase reactors, this is normally
obtained from voltage and current measurements taken
with the windings connected in star. A curve plotted
from these values can then be extrapolated to the
short-circuit level. Since this will involve considerable
extrapolation (although the iron part of the circuit
should operate below the knee point of the magnetising
curve — even at the short-circuit current) it is usual,
as a type test, to make an impedance measurement on
one coil fully removed from the shield. This estabhshes
an absolute minimum impedance which may be used
as an asymptote for the extrapolated impedance curve.
The normal method of proving the interturn in­
sulation of a transformer is to carry out an induced
overvoltage test during which a voltage of twice the
normal interturn voltage is developed. Such a test
would not be very effective for a series reactor since
the 'normal' voltage between turns will be very small
278
Chapter 3
and even increasing this to twice its normal value is
unlikely to give rise to any particularly searching stress.
The usual solution is to apply an impulse test to each
line terminal in turn which, as explained in Section
1.4.10 of this chapter, will generate a more significant
voltage between turns. The test level is usually the same
as would be applied to the same voltage class of trans­
former. C E G B practice is to apply two full-wave shots
preceded and followed by a reduced (between 5 0 %
and 70%) full-wave apphcation. Other tests are more
straightforward and similar to the tests which would
be carried out on a transformer, so that a full test
series might consist of:
• Winding resistance.
• Oil samples.
• Loss measurement.
• Impedance measurement.
• Zero phase-sequence impedance.
• Noise level.
• Applied voltage test, including measurement of
partial discharge.
• Impulse test.
• Oil samples (repeat).
• Insulation resistance.
• Magnetic circuit and associated insulation applied-
voltage test.
2.7 Instrument transformers
2.7.1 Voltage transformers
As stated at the opening of this chapter, a transformer
does not achieve a perfect transformation of voltage
and current. The user of a power transformer must
accept the facts of regulation and leakage reactance
and this he is normally able to d o . For instrument
transformers, however, these imperfections are less
acceptable and the design of the transformer must aim
to reduce them to the minimum. Figure 3.76 shows the
phasor diagram for a transformer carrying a lagging
power factor load I 2 . I 1 is the balancing primary
current (the diagram assumes unity turns ratio). When
added to the magnetising current I Q , this current
produces a total primary current I j . The secondary
induced E M F E 2 is modified by reactance and re­
sistance vokage drops to give a terminal voltage V 2
and, similarly, applied voltage Vi resuUs in primary
induced E M F E i . A fuller development of this dia­
gram can be found in any standard electrical engineer­
ing textbook. From the diagram, it can be seen that
primary and secondary voltages are not exactly in pro­
portion to the turns ratio, neither are they precisely
in opposition to each other. The differences are known
as the ratio error and phase angle error respectively.

FIG. 3 . 7 6 Phasor diagram for transformer with lagging
power-factor load
Voltage transformer accuracies require the designer to
restrict these errors to known small quantities. This
is possible provided that the transformer is operated
within strict hmits.
The most significant of these hmits is the load
apphed to the voltage transformer which is expressed
in VA and known as the burden, but it is also neces­
sary to ascertain that applied voltage, frequency and
power factor are within the bands prescribed by the
transformer designer.
The hmits on phase-angle and ratio error are usually
defined by specification and for voltage transformers
used within the C E G B BS3941 1975 [17] is the apph-
cable standard.
BS3941 classifies voltage transformers in accordance
with their percentage voltage ratio error and with the
use to which they are to be put.
Voltage transformers used for measurement pur­
poses may provide a signal to tariff metering equip­
ment or they may be used to control equipment
associated with a generator AVR or a transformer on­
load tapchanger. Such signals are required to have
high accuracy and five classes of measuring voltage
transformer are defined having voltage ratio errors
± 0 . 1 , ± 0 . 2 , ± 0 . 5 , ± 1 . 0 and ±3.0970, the individual
classes being identified by the use of a number equal
to the percentage voltage ratio error. Thus accuracy
class 0.1 defines a vohage transformer having ratio
error within ± 0 . 1 % of nominal.
Voltage transformers used in protection schemes
do not require such a high degree of accuracy. Usually
these are feeding equipment which simply requires to
Special design features
know whether a supply is energised or not, for example,
no-volt relays, a h h o u g h occasionally wattmetric equip­
ment might be involved such as low forward power,
or reverse power relays (see Chapter 11). Protective
voltage transformers having errors of ± 3 . 0 and ± 6 . 0 %
are defined in BS3941. These are identified in a simi­
lar manner to measuring voltage transformers but the
designation is given in addition to a suffix letter P .
Hence class 3P defines a protective vohage transformer
having voltage ratio error ± 3 . 0 % .
The voltage error limits given above for measuring
voltage transformers apply over the range 8 0 % to 120%
of rated voltage with burdens of between 2 5 % and
100% rated burden, at a power factor of 0.8 lagging
and at rated frequency.
Many forms of protection require a voltage trans­
former capable of reproducing the primary phase-to-
earth voltage. This is provided most conveniently using
single-phase units connected between line and earth.
This can, however, create problems for the voltage
transformer designer, depending on the system earthing
conditions. When there is a single-phase to earth fault
on the system to which the transformer is connected,
there is also an increase in the voltage to earth of
the sound phases which thus imposes an overvoltage
on the VTs associated with those phases. The trans­
formers experience an increase in flux density in the
core, with a resulting increase of magnetising current
flowing in the primary winding. Both of these could
produce overheating, unless the transformer is suitably
designed.
The same effect would occur in a three-phase star
connected transformer and, in addition, a residual flux
would be produced by the unbalanced voltages. This
flux cannot be contained within a normal three-phase
three-limbed core, so such transformers must have three
separate single-phase cores (making them virtually single-
phase transformers) or incorporate extra return limbs,
or employ a shell-type core construction as shown in
Fig 3.77.
The magnitude and duration of the increased vohage
depends on the method of system earthing and the
type of protection against earth faults. BS3941: 1975
therefore defines a rated voltage factor for all voltage
transformers which varies from 1.2 continuous for VTs
connected between hues in any network to 1.9 for 8 h
for VTs connected between line and earth in an isolated
neutral system without automatic earth fault tripping.
Note that the use of voltage factors even as high as
1.9 does not affect the insulation level requirement
of a V T . Insulation level is based on system highest
voltage which is related to the highest voltage that can
occur between hues: this is normally greater than that
occurring between line and earth.
2.7.2 Generator voltage transformers
The most important voltage transformers on a power
station system are those connected to the generator
279
Transformers
FIG. 3.77 Shell-type core construction for a
protection VT
busbars. These provide signals to the automatic volt­
age regulator (AVR), protection equipment, metering
and synchronising equipment. As indicated in Section
1.6.9 of this chapter, they can also be used to initiate
automatic control equipment, such as that associated
with the generator transformer coohng.
Single-phase vohage transformers are used for the
reasons discussed above, and also to make possible
a totally phase-isolated system of connections to the
generator terminals (see Chapter 4).
On a modern 660 M W generator, four sets of such
VTs are used, and connected as shown in Fig 3.78. The
generator vohage system is high-resistance earthed at
the generator neutral (see Section 2.5.1 of this chapter
and Chapter 11), so the C E G B specifies a rated vohage
factor of 1.9 for five minutes. This apparently long
duration was selected when high-resistance earthing of
the generator neutral was first introduced, the stator
earth fauh trip was made an unloading trip, i.e., the
generator circuit-breaker was not opened until after the
turbine throttle valves had been closed to reduce the
load to zero. Whilst the unloading trip is no longer
used, the timescale has been retained for the purposes
of standardisation and interchangeability.
For a generator voltage of 23.5 kV, the VTs have
a primary rated voltage of 22/V3 kV and a secondary
rated voltage of 110/V3 V. This gives a rated trans­
formation ratio of (22 000/V3)/(110/V3) resulting in
a voltage ratio of 200 to 1, which is a simple round
number. Reference to BS3941, Table 1 (Rated trans­
formation ratios) shows that standard practice is to
specify transformation ratios for single-phase VTs in
this way, using secondary voltages of 110/V3 and
primary voltages which are multiples of eleven, also
divided by V 3 .
It wih also be seen from Fig 3.78 that the trans­
formers are provided with tertiary windings, which
280
Chapter 3
can be connected in open-deha. The reason for this
is now largely historical and originated with the ob­
jective of providing protection against neutral insta-
bihty, also sometimes known as 'neutral inversion'.
This can arise on the neutral of the generator voltage
system when it is earthed only via the star point of the
generator VTs and when the VT magnetising current,
which is highly inductive, is of the same order of mag­
nitude as the capacitive current to earth in the generator
windings. A resonance is thus produced which can result
in high voltages between phases and earth, resuhing
in breakdown of the generator neutral. The problem
can be avoided by high-resistance earthing of the gen­
erator neutral, which is now standard practice for other
reasons (Chapter 11), and by ensuring that the VT
works at a sufficiently low flux density so that it is
always on the linear part of the magnetising curve
and there wih be n o chance of saturation. This is good
VT design practice anyway, and is done to ensure that
the magnetising current is low to minimise transforma­
tion errors. However, provision of a tertiary winding
costs very little and, in order to allow standard inter­
changeable VTs to be used, one is provided on each.
Provision of the connections to enable the tertiary
windings of only one set of VTs to be connected in
delta is, of course, all that is required from the external
wiring and it is C E G B practice to instah this only to
the tariff-metering VTs as indicated in the diagram.
As mentioned above, it is desirable that all generator
vohage transformers should be identical, so it is C E G B
practice to specify that these should have a dual 50/150
VA rating with high accuracy (Class 0.2) at the 50 VA
rating required for the supply of the AVR and metering
equipment, and the lower accuracy (Class 1 and Class
3P) at the 150 VA rating appropriate to the protection
duty.
The insulation system used for generator voltage
transformers is cast-resin and, since the 1970s, H V ,
LV and tertiary windings have all been encapsulated.
Solid insulation is used in preference to oil, since it
avoids any material having a fire risk being in the vici­
nity of such high integrity plant as the main turbine-
generator. The advantages of cast-resin in preference
to dry-type class C insulation are discussed in Section
2.4.2 of this chapter.
The group of four voltage transformers for each
phase is protected by a 10 A fuse fitted at the point
where the voltage transformer tee-off is made to the
generator phase-isolated busbars. Phase isolation is
maintained throughout the tee-off (see Chapter 4) and
each voltage transformer is protected by an individual
3 A fuse at the point of further sub-division from the
tee-off. These can be identified in Fig 3.76. The voltage
transformer is housed within a 'drawer' or 'drum' so
that it can be w h h d r a w n and isolated from the generator
voltage system whilst the latter remains energised. The
act of withdrawal brings about automatic earthing of
the primary line connection, on both sides of the 3 A
fuse, and also earths all secondary connections.

Fuses for secondary and tertiary windings must be
mounted as close as possible to the winding terminals,
since any wiring between winding terminal and fuse is
unprotected. The impedance of the voltage transformer
is such that the primary 3 A fuse does not provide
protection against secondary or tertiary wiring faults. In
addition to the need to ensure that the VTs themselves
have the highest possible integrity, it is important that
the hkelihood of fauhs on any equipment connected in
the vicinity of the generator busbars should be m a d e
as low as possible because of consequential damage
that can be caused by such fauhs. Normally, a vohage
transformer having resin-encapsulated windings will
have an external, non-encapsulated, core having steel
channel sections to apply clamping pressure. It is usual­
ly convenient to m o u n t secondary and tertiary fuses,
hnks and earth hnks within one of these channels. Such
an arrangement is seen in Fig 3.79, which shows the
completed installation for a 660 MV generator; the
fuses and hnks, etc., are concealed behind the cover
plate in the foreground.
2.7.3 Current transformers
For all transformers discussed thus far, it is the case
that events occurring in the secondary circuit are re­
flected in the primary, changed only by a factor de­
pendent on the transformation ratio: a short-circuit
of the secondary appears as a short-circuit to the
primary supply, open-circuiting the secondary appears
äs an open-circuit to the primary supply. A current
transformer is fundamentally different since n o event
occurring in the secondary circuit can in any way affect
the current in the primary.
The purpose of this volume is to deal with practical
aspects of power station plant and reference can be
made to any standard textbook for most areas of elec­
trical theory. It is however necessary to examine trans­
former theory as it is apphed to current transformers
in some detail in order to appreciate this fundamental
difference and the significance of the various design
features. The following few paragraphs will attempt
to do this. The reader wih find a more exhaustive
treatment in 'Current Transformers, their transient
and steady state performance' by A r t h u r Wright [18].
The phasor diagram of a current transformer is
shown in Fig 3.80. The resistance and reactance drops
in the transformer and the magnetising current play
their part in determining the dispositions of the various
phasors, as in the case of a voltage transformer, but
their relative values and the significance of the various
phasors are very much different.
Figure 3.81 represents the conventional equivalent
circmt for a transformer for which the primary winding
resistance and reactance are negligible. This is a valid
assumption for a current transformer whose inclusion
does not have any effect on the current flowing in the
primary circuit. Other circuit values as indicated in
the diagram are as follows:
Special design features
LM Magnetising inductance
R2 Secondary resistance
Rp Resistive component of core loss
L2 Secondary inductance
Io R M S value of exciting current
Iρ R M S value of resistive component of exciting
current
Im R M S value of magnetising component of exching
current
Ni N u m b e r of turns on primary winding
N2 N u m b e r of turns o n secondary winding
e\ E M F induced in primary winding
62 E M F induced in secondary winding
ΖΒ Burden
F r o m the equivalent circuit, the exciting current of
the transformer is dependent on both the impedance of
the magnetising 'branch' and the E M F required to drive
the secondary current through the total secondary
circuit impedance. Because the secondary current of a
current transformer may vary over a wide range, from
zero under no-load conditions to very large values
under primary system fauh conditions, the exching
current also varies greatly. This represents a significant
difference between current transformers and voltage
transformers since the latter operates at almost constant
excitation current under all normal conditions.
In a properly designed current transformer loaded
with its correctly rated burden, the secondary E M F
required to circulate secondary rated current will be
low enough to ensure that the core does not approach
saturation. Nevertheless, the exciting current will have
a non-sinusoidal waveform. Since at any instant the
total ampere-turns provided by primary and secondary
windings must equate t o those required t o excite the
core, then on the assumption that the primary current
is sinusoidal, the secondary current must contain any
harmonics. The degree of distortion of the secondary
current waveform will, however, be less than that of
the exciting current since the magnitude of the latter
will be small in relation to the secondary current under
all normal conditions.
Considering the phasor diagram of Fig 3.80, it can
be seen that the error in the current transformation
ratio is created by the exciting current. Once the ex­
citing ampere-turns have been determined, therefore,
the error can be obtained by comparing the exciting
ampere-turns with the primary ampere-turns. How­
ever, if the exciting current is non-sinusoidal, it is
difficult to express the error in precise terms since,
although its R M S value can be calculated, it is dif­
ficult to assign a phase angle relative to the primary
or secondary current. For this reason, it is the ac­
cepted practice to express errors in current and phase
by assuming that the exciting current is sinusoidal
281
Transformers Chapter 3

GENERATOR VTs

-E210-

-E211-

-O O- -E230-

THREE SINGLE PHASE VTs EFFICIENCY

-E231 - TEST
CONNECTIONS IDENTICAL METERING
TO THOSE BELOW

-O O- -E250-

-olp- -E251-

HANDLE OPERATED
DRAWER OR DRUM ISOLATING & SINGLE PHASE VT CUBICLE ACCESS KEY
Ei^IhLSWITCH INTERLOCK SWITCH >
6A ~| O——oHp-
•O

-O o-
I
-ojo- • E31 TARIFF METERING
INSTRUMENTS
AND FUSE FAIL
loJ OlO -E330 MONITORING

oH o 10 -E331
—

-O o -
I
-o I ο ­ • E51

ι o-H ojo 1 -E350

IoH o j o — - ! —-E351

-O o- • E20 •
- r
-O I o-
• E21 •

- O O -
- E40 •
AUTOMATIC
THREE SINGLE PHASE VTs -O I O- VOLTAGE
- E41 "
CONNECTIONS IDENTICAL REGULATOR
TO THOSE ABOVE CHANNEL A
AND PROTECTION

- O O -
- E60 •
-O I O-
- E61 -

- O O - -E120-
-r -E140-
- O I O-

-O O- -E160-
—Γ- AUTOMATIC
THREE SINGLE PHASE VTs -O I O- -E121 - VOLTAGE
CONNECTIONS IDENTICAL REGULATOR
TO THOSE ABOVE CHANNEL Β
AND PROTECTION

-E141-

"O I o- - E161-

* EARTH LINK REMOVED WHEN OPEN DELTA BURDEN IS USED

FIG. 3 . 7 8 Generator V T connection arrangement

282
 Special design features

-E210- GENERATOR VTs

-E230- DISTRIBUTION BOARD
-E250-
- E211 - - E270-
- E231 -
-E251 -

AVR CHANNEL A AVR CHANNEL Β FREQUENCY & STATOR

FUSE FAIL MONITOR FUSE FAIL MONITOR VOLTAGE TRANSDUCERS

i_L I I I I
LOW FORWARD POWER
I I I—Γ l i l i l í ! — Γ
EFFICIENCY TEST RELAYS 1 & 2 AND
METERING VOLTAGE SUPPLY
SUPERVISION RELAY

• E50 •
•
•
E11
E31
•
• Τ
• E51 '

. . . i
00 in Ν.
LU LU UJ LU LU LU CD O Ü Ü

l i l i I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
MEGAWATT & MEGAVAR MEGAWATT & MEGAVAR TARIFF TRANSFORMER OIL
INDICATIONS & INDICATIONS & SYNCHRONISING COOLER CONTROL
LOAD CONTROL 2 METERING
LOAD CONTROL 1

D E390 III
/
-E311 -<< E385

E310
-E310 -O

-E331 --0-
OPEN DELTA BURDEN
(IF REQUIRED)
-E330 __o

I
-E351 --0- '

-E350 - - 0 E385

• E20 •
• E40 •
• E60 ·
- E21 •
• E41 •
- E61 •

I I I I I I I I I I I I
AUTOMATIC VOLTAGE OVERFLUXING PROTECTION LOW FORWARD
REGULATOR CHANNEL A MOUNTED ON RELAY PANEL POWER RELAY
WITH INTEGRAL POLE SLIPPING PROTECTION AND VOLTAGE
OVERFLUXING CONTROL OVER/UNDER FREQUENCY SUPPLY
AND FUSE FAIL DEVICE PROTECTION & VOLTAGE SUPERVISION RELAY
SUPPLY SUPERVISION RELAY

-E120 -
-E140 -
-E160 -
-E121-
-E141 -
- E161 -

I I I I J I I I
OVERFLUXING
ERFLUx'lNG PROTEC"
PROTECTION
AUTOMATIC VOLTAGE MOUNTED ON RELAY PANEL LOW FORWARD
REGULATOR CHANNEL Β LOSS OF EXCITATION POWER RELAY
WITH INTEGRAL PROTECTION DIRECTIONAL SUPPLY
OVERFLUXING CONTROL lOVERCURRENT PROTECTION SUPERVISION RELAY
AND FUSE DEVICE & VOLTAGE SUPPLY
S U P E R V I S I Ó N RELAY

FIG. 3 . 7 8 {confd) Generator V T connection arrangement

283
Transformers
FIG. 3.79 Generator voltage transformer
(except in certain specific circumstances, which wih
be deah with later).
The amount by which the transformation ratio
departs from the ideal value is:
[(Ka - Kn)/Kn] 100% (3.9)
where K n is the turns ratio of the ideal transformer,
given by N 2 / N 1 and K a is the effective turns ratio
given by I 1 / I 2 .
It should be noted that this differs from the definition
of current ratio error given by BS3938: 1973 [19] which
is:
[(Knl2 - I i ) / I i ] 100% (3.10)
i.e., the current which is assumed to be flowing in
the primary on the basis of the measured current in
the secondary ( I 2 ) , minus the current actually flowing
(Ii) divided by I i . This becomes
[(Kn - Ka)/Ka] 100% (3.11)
which is not the same as Equation (3.9) but, since
the difference between K n and K a is usually smaU
compared with both K n and K a , for practical purposes
this will appear the same. The term 'current ratio error'
is often abbreviated to simply 'ratio error'.
The phase angle error is the angle between the pha-
sors representing the primary current and the second­
ary current reversed. This is conventionally taken as
284
Chapter 3
Η = Phase angle error
FIG. 3.80 Phasor diagram for current transformer
- Load
PRIMARY
SUPPLY
VOLTS
FIG. 3.81 Conventional equivalent circuit for
transformer
positive when the secondary current phasor reversed
leads the primary current phasor.
Since there is a wide band of primary currents within
which the transformer wih operate below saturation
then, provided the secondary current remains within
that determined by the rated burden, it is possible for
the current transformer designer to m a k e some cor­
rection for the ratio error. For example, if it were
required to design a C T having the ratio 1 0 0 0 : 1 , and
over the operating range the ratio error varied in mag­
nitude between 0 . 2 % and 0 . 5 % then, by using 998
turns on the secondary for a single primary turn, the
actual error over the operating range would be mini­
mised. F r o m this, h will be seen that the larger the
number of primary turns, the greater the accuracy with
which compensation can be carried out. Such compen­
sation does not, of course, affect the phase-angle error.
It will be evident from the above that reduction of
the current and phase angle errors can be obtained for
any given operating condhion by reducing the exching
 Special design features

ampere-turns in relation to the secondary winding or transient conditions is not of interest for most mea­
ampere-turns. This can be achieved by shortening the surement applications; in fact it might be advanta­
flux path and increasing the cross-sectional area of the geous if the C T saturates under these conditions, since
core. Hence, ideally, a ring construction having the this limits the overvoltage applied to the connected
smallest practical diameter and greatest practical cross- equipment.
section should be used. For protective current transformers, the performance
A significant reduction in errors can be achieved under fauh conditions is critical and for these the
by increasing the number of turns on primary and se­ concept of composite error is introduced in BS3938.
condary windings. The reason for this is that, assuming This is defined as:
no change in burden, the secondary E M F necessary
to circulate the required secondary current remains
constant. However, if this is induced into an increased 100 1 r
1_ (Knis - ip)Mt (3.12)
number of turns, the volts/turn are reduced, the flux rp J

density is reduced and hence the exciting current, which In

is the source of the error, will be reduced. It can be
shown that provided operation is within the linear part
of the magnetisation curve, the error is approximately
inversely proportional to (turns)^. This is an approxi­
mate relationship since, as with power transformers, n o
parameter can be changed in isolation from all others.
Increasing the number of turns inevitably increases the
resistance of the secondary winding, thus needing an
increased E M F to circulate the required current. This
can be offset by increasing the conductor cross-section
but since this itself increases the length of mean turn,
only partial benefit results.
The above also emphasises the benefits to be gained
by minimising secondary burdens so that, although the
impedance of relays or other equipment cannot be
changed, leads can be m a d e as large as practicable,
thereby minimising voltage drops.
At this point it is appropriate to identify and examine
the different requirements of current transformers for
measurement and protection purposes.
BS3938: 1973 defines the accuracy classes of mea­
surement current transformers in much the same way
as does BS3941 for voltage transformers. Classes 0 . 1 ,
0.2, 0.5, 1, 3 and 5 have permitted current errors of
± 0 . 1 , ± 0 . 2 , ± 0 . 5 , ± 1 , ± 3 and ± 5 % respectively at
120% of rated current. (Permitted errors are also quoted
for intermediate currents. The full range is shown in
Tables 3.3 and 3.4.) The performance during fault
where the symbols and suffixes have the same mean­
ings as defined above except that is and ip are in­
stantaneous values. Τ is the period of one cycle of the
supply.
As can be seen, this expression has the form of an
R M S quantity and takes into account the harmonic
content and phase shift of the secondary current. Com­
posite error is defined at the rated accuracy limit
primary current which may be several times the rated
primary current. The ratio of accuracy limit current to
the rated current is known as the accuracy limit factor.
Protective C T classes are defined in accordance with
their permitted composite errors and BS3938 hsts
Classes 5P and lOP having composite errors of 5 and
10% respectively. The corresponding permitted current
errors at rated current are ± 1 % and ± 3 % .
For protective C T s , a high degree of absolute ac­
curacy is not important, provided that a reasonable
degree of accuracy is obtained at the required over-
current level. For this reason, turns compensation is
not generally applied to such transformers.
The above remarks are mainly apphcable to protec­
tive CTs used for overcurrent protection. For most
other protection apphcations, the most important
feature is the m a x i m u m useful E M F which can be
obtained from the C T under system fault conditions.
In this context BS3938 defines the knee point EMF of

TABLE 3.3
Limits of error for current transformers accuracy for Classes 0.1 to 1

± percentage current (ratio) ± phase displacement at percentage of rated current

error at percentage of rated shown below
current shown below minutes centiradians
Class
10 up to 20 up to 100 up to 10 up to 20 up to 100 up to 10 up to 20 up to 100 up to
but not but not 120 but not but not 120 but not but not 120
incl. 20 incl. 100 incl 20 incl 100 incl 20 incl 100

0.1 0.25 0.2 0.1 10 8 5 0.3 0.24 0.15

0.2 0.5 0.35 0.2 20 15 10 0.6 0.45 0.3
0.5 1.0 0.75 0.5 60 45 30 1.8 1.35 0.9
1 2.0 1.5 1.0 120 90 60 3.6 2.7 1.8

285
Transformers
TABLE 3.4
Limits of error for current transformers accuracy
for Classes 3 and 5
± percentage current (ratio)
Class error at percentage of rated
current shown below
50 100
3 3 3 S. and Montsinger V. M.: Transformer Engineering: John
5 5 5
the C T as T h a t sinusoidal E M F of rated frequency
applied to the secondary terminals . . . which, when
increased by 1 0 % , causes the exciting current to in­
crease by 50W, CTs specified in terms of knee point
E M F (as well, of course, as rated primary current
and turns ratio) are designated Class X Protective
Current Transformers by BS3938 and are permitted a
turns ratio error of ± 0 . 2 5 % .
2.7.4 Current transformer construction
Current transformers for measurement and protection
purposes are required throughout a power station
auxiliary system. Most frequently it is convenient to
locate these within switchgear, for which the bar-
primary arrangement is the most suitable in terms of
strength and simphcity.
Current transformers used on generator voltage bus­
bar systems are also, in effect, bar-primary devices
with features developed specifically to meet the re­
quirements of the system. Figure 3.69 shows current
transformers at the neutral end of a 660 M W genera­
tor. It is necessary to wind the secondary turns on the
very large diameter toroidal core in order to provide
the air clearance required to meet the 70 kV power
frequency, 170 kV impulse-withstand insulation levels
of the generator busbars. For a 660 M W machine, the
rated busbar current is 20 000 A so that, if the final
secondary current is to be 5 A, a ratio of 20 0 0 0 : 5
is required. With a bar-primary, 4000 secondary turns
would thus be needed and some manufacturers consider
it more economic to carry out this transformation in
two stages. Main CTs installed at the generator bus­
bars having a ratio of, say, 20 0 0 0 : 2 0 are used in
conjunction with additional interposing transformers
of ratio 2 0 : 5 . The interposing transformers are pre­
286
Chapter 3
ferably located as close as possible to the generator
busbars to minimise the length of leads required to
carry 20 A .
3 References
[1] British Standards Institution: BS 171: Specification for power
transformers: 1970
[2] Blume L. F., Boyajian Α., Camilli G., Lennox T. C , Mineci
Wiley and Sons
[3] British Standards Institution: BS1432: Specification for copper
for electrical purposes. Strip with drawn or rolled edges: 1970
[4] Montsinger V. M.: Loading transformers by temperature:
Trans. AIEE Vol 49 pp 776: 1930
[5] BS Code of Practice CPlOlO: Loading guide for oil-immersed
transformers: 1975
[6] Shroff D. H. and Stannett A. W.: A review of paper aging in
power transformers: Proc. lEE, Vol 132, Part C, No.6:
November 1985
[7] Franklin A. C. and Franklin D. P.: The J and Ρ Transformer
Book, n t h Edition: Butterworths: 1983
[8] British Standards Institution: BS5750: Quality systems:
Part 1: Specification for design, manufacture and installa­
tion: 1979
Part 2: Specification for manufacture and installation: 1979
Part 3: Specification for final inspection and test: 1979
Part 4: Guide to the use of BS5750, Part 1: 1981
Part 5: Guide to the use of BS5750, Part 2: 1981
Part 6: Guide to the use of BS5750, Part 3: 1981
[91 International Electrotechnical Commission: Publication 76,
Power Transformers
[10] British Electricity Boards Specification: BEBS-T2: Specifica­
tion for transformers and reactors: 1966
[11] The Electricity Council: Document IT: Guide on impulse testing
power transformers and reactors
[12] British Standards Institution: BS148: Specification for un­
used mineral insulating oils for transformers and switchgear:
1984
[13] Wilson A. C. M.: Insulating liquids and their uses, manufacture
and properties: Peter Peregrinus Ltd
[14] The Electricity Council: Recommendation G.5/3: Limits for
harmonics in the UK electricity supply system: September 1976
[15] Corbyn D. B.: This business of harmonics: Electronics and
Power, Vol 18 pp 219-223: 1972
[16] The Electricity Council: Report ACE15: Harmonic distortion
caused by converter equipment
[17] British Standards Institution: BS3941: Specification for voltage
transformers: 1975 (1982)
[18] Wright Α.: Current transformers, their transient and steady
state performance: Chapman and Hall Ltd
[19] British Standards Institution: BS3938: Specification for current
transformers: 1973 (1982)
 C H A P T E R 4

Generator main connections

1 Introduction 7.9 Current transformers

1.1 Evolution 7.10 Environmental conditions
7.11 Portable earth access covers
2 Principles of isolated phase busbar operation and forces 7.12 Viewing ports
encountered 7.13 Connection of the conductor to plant
2.1 Principles 7.14 Joints in the conductor
2.2 Forces 7.15 On-load temperature measurement
2.3 Voltage rise 7.16 VT cubicles
7.17 Access platforms
3 Designing an IPB system 7.18 Structural steelwork
4 Forced cooling 7.19 Neutral earthing equipment
7.20 Site installation
4.1 Forced air cooling
7.21 Quality assurance
4.2 Liquid cooling
4.3 Water cooling 8 Testing

5 System description 8.1 Tests on component parts

8.1.1 Insulators and bushings
5.1 Line end
8.1.2 Busbar material
5.2 Neutral end
8.1.3 Transformers
5.3 Tee-offs
8.1.4 Loading resistors
5.4 Delta connections
8.1.5 Capacitors
5.5 Excitation busbars
8.1.6 Switchgear and earthing switches
5.6 Earth bar
8.1.7 Compressed air system
6 Setting out the specification 8.2 Tests on representative sections of IPB
8.3 Test levels
7 Component parts of an IPB system 8.4 Tests at site
7.1 Conductor and enclosures
9 Experience of testing
7.2 Equipment enclosures
7.3 Insulators 10 Generator voltage switchgear
7.3.1 Post insulators
7.3.2 Foot insulators (including enclosure supports) 11 Earthing
7.3.3 Disc bushings 12 Earthing for maintenance purposes
7.3.4 Wall seals
12.1 Primary earth
7.3.5 Bellows
7.4 Conductor and enclosure expansion joints 12.2 Portable drain earths
7.5 Flexible connectors
7.5.1 Flexible laminae connectors 13 Protection
7.5.2 Braided flexible connectors 14 Interlocking
7.6 Painting
7.7 Conditioned air 15 Future trends
7.8 Voltage transformers 16 References

1 Introduction busbar), which is surrounded by a concentric enclosure

The principal function of the Main Connections Busbar
System is to connect the generator to its associated
generator transformer and, incidentally, to provide a
convenient means of connecting the Unit electrical
system to the Unit transformer, via a tee-off. It is
present day practice, for reasons explained later, to use
an aluminium tube for each phase conductor (or
of the same material and similar conducting cross-
sectional area; each is effectively isolated from its
neighbour, hence the term isolated phase busbar (IPB).
British practice (1988) uses dry conditioned air at a
pressure slightly above atmospheric as the insulating
medium between the conductor and enclosure.
The conductor is supported at the centre of the en­
closure by insulators: these are equispaced and rigidly

287
Generator main connections
fixed around the circumference of the enclosure but
allow limited radial movement of the conductor. The
rating of the main connections installation is es­
tablished on the basis of temperature rise above a
specified ambient at maximum commercial load and
hs ability to withstand both three-phase short-circuit
and earth fault conditions anywhere on the generator
voltage system without damage. These requirements
introduce some complication in the system design in
order to achieve high integrity. Isolated phase busbars
have evolved over a number of years, having originally
been pioneered in the USA and further developed
in France before their introduction in the UK in the
mid-1960s. They represent 3 - 4 % of the total cost of
the connected generator and transformers. A typical
instahation is shown in Fig 4 . 1 .
1.1 Evolution
There has been extensive development of generator
connection designs since their introduction because of
larger generating sets and the consequential increase
in load and fault currents. Clearly a cable connection
to the machine is simplest, but both current and
temperature limit their use to about 120 M W (assuming
a generator terminal voltage of approximately 23 kV).
Consequently, for larger machines, three bare copper
conductors (one/phase) were introduced, supported
by single insulators at regular intervals and enclosed
within a common duct or enclosure (Fig 4.2 (a)).
Aluminium graduahy replaced copper for the conduc­
CURRENT
TRANSFORMER
NEUTRAL
CONNECTIONS
GENERATOR
i CONNECTIONS
FIG. 4.1 Generator main connections — general arrangement of a typical installation
288
Chapter 4
tor, primarily on economic grounds, once aluminium
welding techniques had improved. The duct or en­
closure only excluded gross pollution and prevented
physical contact, giving n o protection against phase-
to-phase faults or the electromagnetic forces between
conductors. Strong magnetic fields from this arrange­
ment could cause overheating of external steelwork
adjacent to the busbars, increasing system losses.
As currents increased, phase barriers made of either
a metallic or insulating material were introduced to
hmit the consequences of phase-to-phase flashover
(Fig 4.2 (b)). Further improvement was achieved by
the use of phase segregation, using a continuous me-
talhc fabricated-aluminium enclosure and barrier, the
barrier being integral with the enclosure (Fig 4.2 (c)).
Whilst phase segregation offered an improved design
compared w h h the original c o m m o n enclosure, it still
had a number of weaknesses. Phase-to-phase fauhs
were still possible because adjacent phase conductors
share a c o m m o n barrier. Comphcated circulating cur­
rents in the enclosure produced forces between conduc­
tor and enclosure because no attempt had been made
to isolate the busbars magnetically, and the assembly
generally became large and exacting to construct. Such
designs were used for generators up to 500 M W before
new designs were introduced to deal with the short­
comings of phase segregation. These are insulated by
enclosing each phase in its own conducting metal tube
separate from its neighbours; hence the name 'isolated
phase busbars'. In an installation of this type, eddy
currents are induced in the enclosure, or sheath, due
UNIT
BREAKER TRANSFORMER
UNIT
TRANSFORMER
EARTHING
TRANSFORMER
23.5kV
CONNECTION
GENERATOR ENCLOSURES
v.T. AND TRANSFORMER
CAPACITOR
CUBICLE
 Principles of isolated phase busbar operation and forces encountered
CONDUCTOR
SUPPORT
INSULATOR
(a) Non-segregated bus
INTERPHASE BARRIERS
(METALLIC OR INSULATING)
(b) Non-segregated bus with barriers
CONTINUOUS METALLIC
FABRICATED ENCLOSURE
INCLUDING BARRIERS
(c) Phase segregated bus
INSULATING FEET
FIG. 4.2 Segregated and non-segregated busbars
to the conductor current, and this to some extent shields
the forces between the conductors by modifying the
field around the conductor. There are, however, still
substantial magnetic fields outside the enclosure, which
produce forces between phases. These are reduced con­
siderably if the extreme ends of each phase enclosure
are bonded together, thereby allowing a balanced cur­
rent flow in the enclosures of all three phases. This
system is known as an ^electrically-continuous I P B with
short-circuk' (see Fig 4.3). Each phase enclosure is
made electrically continuous throughout its length and
all three are connected together at both ends of the r u n .
This distinguishes it from other systems, namely the
insulated type (where the enclosure is not continuous
but includes non-conducting sections) or the continuous
type with saturable impedance, where the continuous
phase enclosures are connected together at the ends of
the run through smah saturable reactors which limit
the induced longitudinal currents to a design value. The
last-named appears attractive because the reactor limits
the enclosure circulating currents during normal opera­
tion, thereby reducing the enclosure losses, and during
fauh conditions the reactor saturates, reducing its im­
pedance to circulating currents and allowing greater
enclosure current to flow. As will be explained later,
this enclosure current reduces the forces between con­
ductors during fault conditions. However, in practice,
the reactors tended to burn out, so now only the elec­
trically-continuous I P B with short-circmt is considered
in the UK and elsewhere. These, by virtue of the en­
closure circulating currents, limit forces between phase
conductors to approximately 10% of those that would
exist without the enclosure.
The enclosure system is earthed at one point only
and is insulated from earth along its length by sup­
porting it on insulated foot mountings, thereby giving
control over the path followed by any fauh current in
the enclosure. Clearly the main connections have now
become a system in their own right and to control the
circulating currents, as described, the enclosures must
be isolated from ah items of plant to which the conduc­
tors are connected. Enclosures are therefore connected
to auxiliary plant via rubber bellows which maintain
the physical protection of the conductor but isolate
the enclosures electrically from the plant. The bonding
or short-circuiting of the enclosures is done as close
to the end of their run as possible. The external mag­
netic fields produced by the conductor currents can link
with conducting loops in the adjacent steelwork, pro­
ducing circulating currents and heat. This is a problem
to be considered by the designer since excessive heat,
in addition to being an unnecessary system loss, can
cause unacceptable expansion and can be a hazard to
personnel if the steelwork is touched.
Machines of 660 M W are now used extensively in
the UK and an I P B installation of the type described
provides an adequate main connections design which
can be naturally cooled and is of manageable size. This
probably represents the limit of naturally cooled de­
signs and any significant increase in machine rating
will mean that forced-cooled designs will have to be
considered. The components of one phase of such a
system are shown diagrammatically in Fig 4.4.
2 Principles of isolated phase busbar
operation and forces encountered
2.1 Principles
Consider, using simple analysis, how the magnetic
fields may be reduced. When a conductor carries an
alternating current, it produces an external concentric
alternating magnetic field, the direction of which is
determined by apphcation of the ^corkscrew' rule. If
another conductor runs parallel to it, then an E M F is
induced in it, given by e = - ( d Φ / d t ) , where Φ is that
proportion of the flux linking the two conductors.
The negative sign indicates that it tries to oppose the
force which created it.
289
Generator main connections
BONDING BARS
FIG. 4.3 Phase isolated busbar — continuous sheath
For a length of isolated phase busbar, the voltage
öe induced in an elemental section of non-continuous
sheath (say, 5A and δΒ in Fig 4.5 (a)) due to the cur­
rent flowing in its associated conductor will be the
same magnitude for all elements on the circumference
of the sheath at any point along its length. It follows,
therefore, that one phase in isolation can have no
current flow in the sheath, since the voltages at all
points are equal.
If next, the condition in Fig 4.5 (b) is considered,
the voltage e induced in an elemental section of non-
continuous sheath due to the current flowing in an ad­
jacent conductor will be of different magnitude for
each position around the periphery (say, dC and 6D),
since each element cuts a different proportion of flux
from that conductor. Therefore, unequal voltages are
available to cause current to flow in the sheath as shown
in Fig 4.6 (a). This sheath current, which for the ele­
mental circuit shown in Fig 4.6 (a) can be considered as
a simple *go' and ^return' circuit, will set up an electro­
magnetic field whose direction can be determined by
application of the corkscrew rule. This will give rise to
a reduction of field within the enclosure but a reinforce­
ment of the field outside as shown in Fig 4.6 (b). Thus
there is a reduction of forces between the conductors
and an increase in forces exerted on the enclosure. The
enclosure will therefore need substantial supports.
The currents circulating in each sheath caused by
the proximity effects of adjacent conductor systems
are termed *eddy currents'. Formulae for determining
these currents and their associated losses have been
proposed by H . B. Dwight in 1923 and F. W. Carter
290
Chapter 4
in 1927. In the paper by Carter [1], the eddy current
was determined by considering the fixed distribution
of conductor currents but taking into account the
magnetic field set u p by the induced eddy current in
the sheath itself. This first order eddy current was
then determined for neighbouring sheaths and these
were used as a fixed distribution to obtain second and
further subsidiary eddy currents in the original sheath.
The process may be repeated t o any degree of approxi­
mation to obtain a total eddy current. In Dr Carter's
day, the problem did not merit meticulous calculation
and the treatment was therefore simpHfied by consider­
ing only the first order eddy current to produce results
in a convenient form for h a n d calculation. Working
independently, Dr Dwight tackled a number of proxi­
mity effect problems and in 1923 pubhshed a first
order eddy current solution [2] for sheath eddy loss
which is identical to the Carter solution. Later, in 1964,
the analysis was extended to determine the subsidiary
eddy currents for the particular case of a single-phase
circuit and also a three-phase flat grouping.
Since the non-continuous type of I P B is not used
by the C E G B , the theory is not developed here, but
the reader may deduce the necessary formulae from
papers [1 and 2].
Now consider the continuous type of I P B . If the
sheaths of all three phases are electrically connected
at each end of the IPB run, an external path is pro­
vided which allows the sheath currents t o flow in the
manner shown in Fig 4 . 3 . The phase conductors and
the enclosures are comparable to the primary and
secondary turns of a short-circuited transformer. The
 Principles of isolated phase busbar operation and forces encountered
ζQ
UJ
1
QC
UJ
Ζ
Vi
Q-l- 05
<P 2<zOi Zi Jiluj
CCLU . Z O
Ol-co<i-
o
c
'cd
ε
"o
a.
o
(Ζ
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291
 Generator main connections Chapter 4

magnetic field produced by the primary conductor

induces a current of opposite direction in the secondary
turn. The magnitude of the circulating sheath current
is almost equal to the conductor current, depending
on the resistance and reactance of the enclosure cir­
cuit, and is in antiphase to the conductor current. The
•φ sheath current usually a m o u n t s to about 9 0 % of the
conductor current.
The circulating sheath current creates its own
surrounding magnetic field which must be in antiphase
to that produced by the conductor, thus the magnetic
field still exists within the enclosure but is cancelled
outside it (see Fig 4.6 (c)). Since the enclosure has
(a) Induced voltages in an enclosure due
to its own conductor resistance, the resultant external magnetic field a r o u n d
each conductor is about 10% of that which would
occur if there was no metallic sheath.
Since the external magnetic field has been reduced,
it follows that the forces between conductors are also
reduced by a similar proportion, as will be the forces
between enclosures that exist due to the current flowing
in them.

o Θ However, end effects occur where the conductor is

connected to its associated piece of plant and is, for
practical reasons, unshielded. Therefore magnetic fields
at these points are much stronger and forces greater.
For further analysis, the reader is referred to a paper
by Skeats and Swerdlow [3].

2.2 Forces
(b) Induced voltages in an enclosure due
to an adjacent conductor The forces caused by short-circuit and earth fault
currents are very complex. Neglecting decrements, a
FIG. 4.5 Induced voltages in an enclosure totally-offset short-circuit current can be represented

ENCLOSURE
EDDY
CURRENTS

(a) Enclosure eddy currents in a phase isolated busbar -

discontinuous sheath

FIG. 4.6 Radial current flows due to current in an adjacent conductor

292
 Principles of isolated phase busbar operation and forces encountered

CONDUCTOR A' FIELD CONDUCTOR B' FIELD

CONDUCTOR Α· FIELD INCREASES LEAD CONDUCTOR Β·

TO INCREASED FORCES
BETWEEN ENCLOSURES

(b) Field distribution in insulated enclosures for a 'supply' and 'return' circuit

(c) Field cancellation in a continuous enclosure arrangement

FIG. 4.6 (cont'd) Radial current flows due to current in an adjacent conductor

by the expression I = IQ (1 - cos ωt). Consider a explanation of these shielding factors, the reader is
paraUel adjacent conductor returning the same cur­ referred to the paper by W ü s o n and Mankoff [4];
rent. The magnetic field emitted therefrom would be however, the theoretical treatment of these effects is
Β = B o (1 - cos ωt). far from conclusive.
From Ampere's Law, the electromagnetic force Taking into account current decrement, there is a
between them is reduction with time of each of the electromagnetic
force components, each component having a different
F = Bl where í i s the length of conductor, therefore, decrement rate. The forces produced differ greatly,
depending on whether the fault is three-phase or single-
F = B o l o ^ (1 - cos ωt)2. phase, the three-phase fauh being more onerous.
In principle, the short-circuit electromagnetic forces
Expansion of the expression (1 - cos ωt)^ gives arise from the combined action of the various forces
(-y - 2cos ωt + y cos 2ωt), i.e., the force is composed both between the phases and between the conductor
of steady, power frequency and second-harmonic com­ and sheath of the same phase. However, as previously
ponents. These three components of force are each explained, for a continuous I P B the external magnetic
reduced by a different shielding factor. For a detailed fields and the resulting forces between conductors are

293
Generator main connections
substantially reduced, compared with an unbonded
system. Additionally, for a continuous I P B , the forces
between phases are much smaller than those which
occur between each conductor and its own sheath.
The magnetic field which exists inside the sheath
on a continuous IPB system (as shown in Fig 4.6 (c)),
produces a force between the conductor and the en­
closure. The force on the enclosure results in the
conductor being centralised along a magnetic neutral
line. In a suitably designed IPB system, the neutral
line is coincident with the axis of the enclosure, thereby
virtually ehminating bending stresses caused by short-
circuit currents. The conductor supports are designed
to allow for this slight movement as the conductor takes
up its position on the neutral hne. The force on the
sheath is a repulsion or bursting force which can be
represented as internal pressure on the sheath.
The resultant mechanical stresses developed within
the installation also depend upon the mechanical
frequency response of the structure and wih be exacer­
bated by any resonance that may exist.
The foregoing text has attempted to show that the
presence of the sheath in fact reduces forces and to
give an awareness of the factors involved: it has not
attempted a mathematical prediction of the forces
which occur during a short-circuit. Whilst such force
calculations may be attempted for straight sections
of busbar, they are much more difficuh for bends
and tee-offs. At these positions the sheath currents vary
around the periphery and there is not the benefit
of complete mutual compensation of magnetic fields
from the conductor and enclosure. Thus, immediately
adjacent to bends, very high short-circuit forces exist
which tend to straighten out the conductor. There are
also higher stray fields which may heat up adjacent
steelwork. The I P B structural support system must
therefore be strengthened at bends and other places
where the configuration changes.
Mathematical analysis of currents, fields and forces
within an IPB system have been attempted, but a main
connections design by calculation is not deemed ac­
ceptable by the C E G B , for no mathematical method
is available that can be used with total confidence.
It should be recognised that whilst during normal
operating conditions the magnetic field outside the
enclosure is practically nil; during fault conditions the
field is the difference between the components on the
conductor and enclosure which, since there are different
time elements involved, is very difficult to determine.
Consequently, the adequacy of the design is ultimately
demonstrated by testing, as discussed further in Section
8 of this chapter.
2.3 Voltage rise
Consider the vohage rise of an electrically-discontinuous
IPB enclosure under fault conditions. Since there is
no current flow along the whole length of the sheath
294
Chapter 4
installation, large vohages build u p across the breaks.
It is, therefore, generally necessary to limit the distance
between the breaks to a less than desirable length in
order to keep these voltages to an acceptable level. With
electrically-continuous enclosures, however, the voltage
is dissipated in IR drop along the enclosure length as
it is generated. Enclosure voltages are consequently
held at completely harmless values, even during maxi­
m u m fauh conditions. A typical voltage induced per
metre length of continuous enclosure is 3 mV per 1000
A of conductor current.
3 Designing an IPB system
In designing an installation, the factors to be consi­
dered include materials, conductor and enclosure di­
mensions required for specified maximum temperature
rises, mechanical strength and structural steelwork
requirements. Up until now only naturally cooled sys­
tems have been assumed and the predominating factor
determining the cross-sectional area and configuration
of the conductor for the main connections of a nat­
urally air-cooled busbar is the permissible temperature
rise. A tubular conductor has a low skin effect ratio,
described later in this section, which helps keep down
the A C resistance and hence losses. An adequate cross-
sectional area must be provided so as to remain within
temperature confínes proven by experience and not
exceeding the temperature hmits specified in BS 159,
i.e., a maximum conductor temperature of 90°C. The
largest full-load current in the C E G B at the time of
writing is 20.1 k A , but this wih obviously increase as
larger machines are developed. The higher ambient
temperatures overseas give rise to lower temperature
margins for export designs.
Selection of the most suitable material for IPB
construction is generally straightforward, the choice
being between copper and aluminium.
At present an unusual situation exists, whereby cop­
per and aluminium are similar in price (usually copper
is much more expensive), but aluminium is still the
cheaper overall. Copper has approximately three times
the weight, but 6 0 % of the resistivity of aluminium.
Since aluminium is the poorer conductor, more ma­
terial is required but, because of skin effect, there
is a practical limit to the advantage gained by increas­
ing material thickness. Consequently it is necessary to
increase the diameter which has the advantage of
increasing the surface area and improving heat dis­
sipation. Aluminium, being much lighter in weight, is
easier to handle than copper; this, together with the
development of modern aluminium-welding techniques,
makes fabrication in aluminium much cheaper than
in copper.
The starting point for the designer is therefore
to determine the dimensions of the conductor and
enclosure appropriate to the specified operating con­
ditions. For the purpose of this exercise, assume the
 Designing an IPB system

normal cylindrical conductor and enclosure configura­
tion. From experience, an initial conductor diameter
and thickness is selected. It is then necessary to check
the resultant heat generated in the conductor, which
is given by:
Wc = l2Re
where W c = heat generated per unit length, W / m
I = rated R M S conductor current, A
Rc = A C resistance of the conductor a p p r o ­
priate to the temperature of the con­
ductor and the supply frequency, Ω/m
R c has to take account of skin effect. When A C cur­
rent is passed down a conductor, the current tends
to concentrate on the outer surface. The higher the
Where l e is the enclosure current. R e is the effective
enclosure A C resistance per metre and is calculated
from the D C resistance in a method similar to that
above for the conductor.
Development of a formula for calculating the enclo­
sure current is comphcated by several factors, includ­
(4.1)
ing the impedance of the bonding bars, the skin effect
and the proximity of structural steel or other conducting
and magnetic material, as shown by Niemoller [6].
The reader is referred t o the I E E E paper [7] for
the calculation of I P B losses.
Type testing has shown that it is not unreasonable
to assume that the ratio of enclosure current to con­
ductor current (I) t o be about 0 . 9 5 for an electrically
continuous I P B system, i.e..
We = 0.9l2Re

appHed frequency, the thinner is the effective conduc­

ting band. The A C resistance R a e is higher than the
D C resistance R d c : R a c / R d c is termed the skin effect
ratio, a full study of which was m a d e by Dwight [5].
An extract of one of the curves produced by Dwight
for a circular tube is shown in Fig 4.7. It is suitable
for aluminum or copper conductors and may be used
for all temperatures found in the operational range
of the main connections.
The D C resistance is relatively straightforward t o
calculate.
At 20°C, for a large diameter conductor with a
thin wall section, it may be closely approximated using
the expression:
Rdc = Ω/m
TrDt
where ρ = resistivity of the material at 2 0 ° C , Qm
D = conductor mean diameter, m
t = conductor wall thickness, m
In establishing the working temperature, it is assumed
that for a natural air-cooled system, almost all the
losses ( W c + W e ) have to be dissipated by radiation
and convection from the external surface of the
enclosure. Clearly the heat that must be dissipated is
that quantity which would cause the maximum per­
mitted operating temperature to be exceeded. An ap­
proximate expression for natural convection from the
outside surfaces of a busbar enclosure, indoors but
not in a c o m p a r t m e n t , at sea level and normal pres­
sure, based on Dwight et al [8] is:
Wcon = 1.36ei-2VDö-25 W/m2
(4.2)
where W c o n = loss dissipated by convection from the
enclosure, W / m ^
θ = average temperature rise of the hous­
ing, ° C
D = diameter of enclosure, m

For a conductor operating at a temperature other than

and the energy lost by radiation is given by the Stefan-
20°C, the resistance becomes:
Boltzmann expression:

Rdce = Rdc2o [1 + «20 (Θ-20)] (4.3)

5.67
ke[T^ - T^l A r W / m 2
where « 2 0 = temperature resistance coefficient at lös"
20°C
θ = temperature, ° C where W r a d = loss dissipated by radiation from
enclosure, W / m ^
Having calculated the D C resistance and knowing the e = coefficient of emissivity of the enclo­
ratio t / D , the corresponding effective A C resistance sure surface
can be determined from Fig 4.7 for the conductor Tm = average temperature of enclosure
dimension selected. F r o m this, the loss per unit length surface, Κ
is calculated, using Equation (4.1).
To = ambient temperature, Κ
Next, consider the heat generated in the enclosure
due to the enclosure circulating currents. T h e loss in Ar = effective radiation surface per metre of
each phase per metre length is: enclosure length, m^
k = factor depending on position of phase
We = ll R e watts (4.4) as described below

295
 Generator main connections Chapter 4

SKIN EFFECT R A T I O -

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200

FIG. 4.7 Skin effect ratio for rods and tubes

Since the radiation from the outer phases will differ Factors not included in the equations which will
from the centre phase, the following factors should be affect heat dissipation b o t h by convection and radia­
included [9]. tion from the enclosure are physical arrangements,
360 - 4a neighbouring structures and surface finish. It must be
For the centre phase k = Ar
borne in mind that hot spots can occur, particularly
360
at the ends of busbar runs where connections are
360 - 2a made to auxihary plant. This occurs because of poor
and for the outer phase k = Ar
360 current sharing in unsymmetrical current-carrying con­
nections, as will be discussed later, or from the con­
where a = sm - 1 (R/S) centration of circulating currents. Experience suggests
R external enclosure that the conduction of heat from associated plant,
diameter, m namely the generator itself and the transformer bush­
ings into the connections, should also be considered.
S = phasing spacing, m

Total heat loss from the busbar system in W / m run can Summarising, (a) the heat generated ( W / m run) in
then be established from ( W c o n + Wrad)'n'D. the conductor and enclosure with

296

the dimensions initiahy selected
from experience can be calculated,
i.e.. W e -f W c .
Then, (b) allowing for specified temperature
rises of conductor above enclosure
and of enclosure above ambient,
the quantity of heat dissipated per
m e t r e l e n g t h by t h e s e l e c t e d
instahation can be calculated, i.e.,
(Wcon + Wrad)7rD
The values of (a) and (b) are compared and, if they
are not close the dimensions are revised and the pro­
cess repeated.
In the C E G B , the temperatures specified at present
are:
• Conductor maximum temperature 9 0 ° C .
• Enclosure maximum temperature 65°C.
• Internal air maximum temperature 70° C.
• Ambient temperature 4 0 ° C .
Having established the dimensions of the I P B system
from load current thermal conditions, the designer
must then consider fault conditions.
Generally speaking, for a main run of I P B , the
busbars are so large for continuous current-carrying
requirements that the thermal requirements for short-
circuit conditions are more than catered for. How­
ever, for a unit transformer or other tee-off, the
continuous current rating is small but the fault current
rating is very high indeed. Here, the fauh current
specified may influence the busbar dimensions that
are required because of its thermal effects, therefore
requiring repeat calculations to determine temperature
rises during fault.
However, the major design concern arising from
fault considerations is mechanical strength. The de­
signer must provide a suitable support arrangement for
the conductor and enclosure to ensure that the final
structure is of adequate strength to withstand the forces
that are exerted on the system during fault conditions.
The forces have been briefly explained in Section 2
of this chapter. For the conductor, the designer is
looking to provide sufficient support t o :
• Prevent deflection between supports due to forces
between conductors and between conductor and
enclosures during fault.
• Prevent damage due to 'straightening out' forces
which occur at bends during fault.
• Prevent damage due to 'knife swhch' forces at the
tee-off positions, again due to the conductor at­
tempting to straighten along the line of maximum
fault current.
Forced cooling
A n adequate structural support is required for the
enclosure to withstand the resuhant static and dynamic
loadings that the system will experience during fault.
The present view of the C E G B is that there is no
mathematical approach to solving these problems that
can be used with confidence. The designer may from his
own experience use simple force calculations as a
starting point. Reference [10] is such a suitable starting
point. Uhimately, however, before a design can be
considered acceptable, a full set of short-circuit and
earth fault type-test evidence is required to substantiate
the design, as identified in Section 8 of this chapter.
Finally, the stray magnetic fields surrounding the
main connections, as already described, can give rise
to inductive heating of adjacent steelwork. For an IPB
system, there is unhkely to be any problem with systems
carrying less than 8000 A . However, above this, care
should be exercised. It is not only structural steel­
work which may cause problems, but also piping and
pipe hangers, gas and air ducts as well as stairs and
handrails. Heating of such components could ignite
adjacent flammable material, be a danger to personnel,
cause structural stresses due to restrained expansion,
and of course, incur additional running costs due to
the losses.
Analysis of this problem is most difficult and use
is m a d e of existing heat run tests. If the reader wishes
to pursue the problem, an approach is described by
Swerdlow and Buchta [11] and there are some guidehnes
regarding spacing of adjacent steelwork given in Section
7.18 of this chapter.
V a r i o u s m e t h o d s are available t o reduce the
temperature rise of structural members, the use of
shielding plates being favoured by the C E G B .
4 Forced cooling
The optimum design of an I P B instahation is deter­
mined by considering the capital cost, plus the cost
of generating the associated losses. In order to satisfy
the temperature balance requirements described in
Section 3 of this chapter, naturally-cooled connection
systems greater than 800 M V A , though practical, would
require excessive space and consequently their cost
would be high. For connections rated above 800 M V A ,
unless a much higher generator voltage is thought
worthwhile, consideration must be given to forced
cooling of the connections by some method. With
reference to Fig 4 . 1 , which shows a typical natural air-
cooled connection installation, it can be seen that the
tee-off connectors from the main busbar carry a
relatively low current, i.e., the high current flow is
from the generator to the generator transformer. In
considering the cross-sectional area of these compo­
nents, it is clear that only the main run can justify
forced cooling, the tee-off design being instead deter­
mined by the m a x i m u m fauh current which could flow
in it. T h o u g h it is unhkely that the use of forced
297
Generator main connections
cooling below 8 kA would be economic, the limit for
natural coohng, depending upon generator voltage,
is reached at currents of 2 5 - 3 0 kA and, for currents
in excess of this, the busbars are normally forced-
cooled.
Therefore, if forced cooling is to be considered,
the heat balance approach taken in Section 3 of this
chapter will have to include a calculation of the heat
removed by forced cooling. Such calculations will de­
pend very much on the design of the installation.
The obvious choice of cooling medium is either air
or water. In considering the economic case for forced
cooHng, the saving of material is offset by a possible
increase in system losses, the additional cost of cool­
ing equipment, routine inspection and maintenance of
motors, fans, p u m p s , pipework, heat exchangers, etc.
The value assigned to the losses/kW generated will
obviously influence whether to force-cool the system
if, in fact, temperature rise has not itself dictated its
use.
Once reliance is placed on forced cooling, any failure
which might occur on the coolant plant would neces­
sitate a consequential reduction in generated output,
so it is desirable to aim for a high naturally-cooled
current-carrying capacity, i.e., with the coohng plant
out of commission. It is also necessary to specify the
operating time at full-load current with the cooling
plant shut down. The more common forced cooling
systems are described below, though work is being
carried out on the use of some of the newer insulating
materials, for example, SFe gas.
4.1 Forced air cooling
A typical forced air system would comprise fans, heat
exchangers, dampers and air filters arranged such that
there is one set of equipment for each machine unit.
Cooled air is blown from the heat exchanger, usually
a finned water-cooled coil, down the busbar run
between the enclosure and the conductor and returned
to the heat exchanger, thereby forming a closed cir­
cuit. Such schemes are used extensively in the U S A
and, for a normal installation, air may enter the centre
phase of the connection system, travel along it and
return back through the outer two phases, sufficient
air volume being used to ensure that the final air
temperature does not exceed the maximum allowable
touch-temperature of the enclosure. The cooling equip­
ment may be located at any point along the con­
nections system but the most economical position is
midway between the generator and its transformer.
Since the cooling air passes through the entire system,
splitting the total cooling air volume in the centre
phase and forcing it in opposite directions results in
less overall system resistance, therefore requiring less
fan power. The air must be cleaned and dried to reduce
the risk of faults and all the associated equipment,
including the fans, must be duplicated to ensure
availability (2 χ \00% or 3 χ 5 0 % ) .
298
Chapter 4
In addition, if the coohng air leaves one phase and
enters another, then de-ionisation plant is required
to prevent ionised gases produced by a system fault
entering other phases, thereby extending its severity.
Air has the obvious advantage of being cheap and
plentiful but because it has a relatively low specific
heat and density, large quantities are required to re­
move the heat and the fan requirement is proportional
to the cube of the flow rate. This disadvantage can
be overcome if liquid coohng of the conductor is
considered.
The rating for a forced air cooled installation with
cooling plant shut down would probably be in the
region of 1 hour and the naturally cooled rating would
be approximately 60% of full load.
4.2 Liquid cooiirig
It may be considered that the obvious choice is to
extend the transformer coohng oil into the main con­
nections conductor, as oil has a low specific heat and
density compared with water. However, the fire risk
associated with oil within the power station buildings
is unacceptable. It is also considered unacceptable to
risk the integrity of the transformer insulation by
involving any other plant in the oil circuits — even
delta boxes (see Section 5.4 of this chapter). Demin-
eralised water has been used as the cooling medium
in the generator stator for many years and the tech­
niques have been well proven. It would therefore be
possible to extend this system to include the generator
main connections or, alternatively, to install a separate
water cooling system.
4.3 Water cooling
Since water has a better thermal conductivity and
specific heat than air, the temperature rise of a main
connections installation of this type can be more easily
controlled by adjustment of the coolant flow than in
an air cooled system. The material cross-sectional area
provided in these circumstances is then based on con­
sideration of the capitalised cost of the conductor
losses (see Chapter 3, Section 2.1.5) against the ca­
pital cost of the conductor itself, together with the
mechanical strength requirements for fault conditions.
Clearly the water in the conductor is at the same
potential as the conductor itself, so some form of
potential dropping device is required between the con­
ductor and remainder of the hydraulic circuit, which
should be at earth potential. This device is a resist­
ance column consisting of a long pHable connector of
non-conducting material having a small cross-sectional
area, thereby providing a high-resistance path to low
currents. The cooling water then flows within a closed-
cycle coohng system with a heat exchanger, itself in­
directly cooled by water. The cooling system may be
incorporated in the stator cooling circuit, if the heat
 System description

generated in the connections system is smaU relative
to the heat removed from the stator windings. It will
then be found most convenient to connect the hy-
drauhc coohng circuits in series. The conductor op­
erating temperature should then be only slightly above
the cooling water temperature.
Joints between sections of conductor are welded, the
welds, apart from requiring the necessary mechanical
strength, being watertight. Where conductors are con­
nected to the plant, braided flexible connectors are
used to allow for expansion and provide vibration
immunity from that plant, the terminal palms them­
selves being within the connections, bridged by the
water cooling circuit, the bridge being of non-conduct­
ing material. Heat conduction to the conductor helps
keep down the temperature of the flexible connections.
A water cooled system would have n o short-time
full-load rating and a naturally cooled rating in the
event of loss of forced coohng, of approximately 2 0 % .
The major disadvantages of a water system, there­
fore, are the substantial reduction in unit output if
coohng is lost and the danger of an earth fault develop­
ing if a water leak occurs. The reliabihty of the water
seals is therefore very important.
5 System description
A schematic drawing of a typical main connections
system is given in Fig 4.8.
The generator windings are star-connected, the star
point being formed outside the generator, so there are
two generator terminals for each phase. The output
of the generator is taken from the line end of the
phase windings, the star point being formed at the
neutral end of the windings. It is desirable, for ease
of making connections to the generator, to have these
two ends located as far apart as possible, their relative
positions being dependent on the generator manufac­
turer's frame design.
The generator transformer is wound in delta/star
configuration, the LV side being the delta winding.
This transformer may consist of one three-phase tank
or three single-phase t a n k s . The d e h a connection of
the transformer can either be formed below oil or, as
is now more c o m m o n , can be made part of the main
connections system to maintain phase isolation. An oil
delta is not nowadays favoured since it allows any
contaminated oil due to a fault in one phase to circulate
into the other phases.
Connections are taken from the main busbar to the
H V terminals of unit auxihary transformers and the
system voltage three-phase earthing transformer (if
fitted), discussed in Section 11 of this chapter. This
connection, known as a tee-off from the main busbar,
again maintains phase isolation u p to the bushings,
the transformers themselves generally being housed in
three-phase t a n k s .
There is a requirement to monitor voltage conditions
on the main connections system for various purposes.

IPB
GENERATOR DELTA
NEUTRAL LINE CIRCUIT BREAKER
END END (IF APPLICABLE)

ρη X nn
m X nn
•fñ-
STAR BAR GENERATOR 4=^ GRID

ρη X nn VOLTAGE

EARTH SWITCHES
0 / Öj o I VT VT VOLTAGE
GENERATOR
TRANSFORMER

TRANSFORMER
VT VT CUBICLE
STATOR
NEUTRAL
EARTHING
RESISTOR

! I

Etil
SYSTEM UNIT
ΡΓ| LOCATION OF PROTECTION CTs EARTHING TRANSFORMER
TRANSFORMER
(IF APPLICABLE)

FIG. 4.8 Generator main connections — simplified schematic

299
Generator main connections
including generator synchronising, tariff metering, in­
strumentation, automatic voltage regulation and protec­
tion schemes. There is also the requirement to monitor
current conditions, for example, for protection pur­
poses. The requirement to monitor voltage is met by
the connection of vohage transformers (see Section 7.8
of this chapter) onto the main connections via a fur­
ther tee-off similar to the auxihary transformer tee-
off described earher. U p to four voltage transformers
per phase may be required, mounted within cubicles
which maintain the phase isolation of the system.
Current transformers (see Section 7.9 of this chapter)
are mounted in the main connections runs, in positions
dependent upon the protection scheme adopted.
Other equipment may be included in the main
connections system, such as connections to generator
excition plant, earthing devices and to the generator
circuh-breaker. These will be discussed later.
The various features of the main connections system
are now described in greater detail.
5.1 Line end
The position on the generator of the hne terminals de­
pends on the generator manufacturer but the two
obvious locations are either above or below the ma­
chine. Both positions have advantages and disadvan­
tages for the main connections system. In ah cases,
consideration should be given to generator rotor re­
moval without the necessity to dismantle any of the
main connections installation. Any support given to the
connections should be independent of the machine to
prevent the transmission of vibration.
Where the main connections leave the generator from
above, the overall height of the machine is obviously
increased. This may increase the height of the turbine
hall crane-rails, and hence the turbine hall itself, there­
by creating a cost penalty. Also, connections above
the machine and their support structures can, if incor­
rectly designed, suffer fatigue due to vibration excited
by the generator.
If, however, the line connections are below the
generator, there are obvious obstructions which require
to be negotiated, for example, the generator founda­
tions, generator/turbine auxihary equipment, access
ways, etc. Clearance from such obstructions can dictate
whether the busbars he side-by-side or in trefoil con­
figuration. Other practical issues to be resolved at the
generator hne-end terminals are heat dissipation due to
confined space, access for stator coohng pipework,
prevention of water ingress and spacing of the hne
terminals, which may be arranged on the generator in
an in-hne or trefoil configuration. Where space is re­
stricted, it may be necessary to consider the use of
specially designed sections of busbar having reduced
conductor and sheath dimensions, a terminal box ar­
rangement with phase segregation, use of other than
circular cross-section busbars or a short water-cooled
300
Chapter 4
section (see Fig 4.9). In the case of a segregated ter­
minal box the phase barriers should be of the same
material as the box (probably aluminium) and earthed
to ensure that there is an earth plane between phases
which reduces the risk of phase to phase faults. Phase
to earth faults produce fault current which is restricted
by the neutral earthing equipment. However, there
is always the possibility of an earth fault developing
into a phase to phase fault which causes much greater
damage; it is therefore preferable to use a phase iso­
lated system if possible.
Early design co-ordination at the interface connec­
tion onto the machine is necessary to solve the pro­
blems associated with terminal spacing and ensure that
the specified impulse-withstand level can be achieved.
T o allow for possible hydrogen leakage through the
generator terminals, a complete bushing-type seal should
be provided in the main connections run to hmit the
volume into which hydrogen could possibly enter. This
volume at the generator should then be suitably ven­
tilated to ensure that approximately four air changes
per hour can take place within the enclosure to reduce
the risk of build-up of hydrogen in air, which could
form an explosive mixture.
5.2 Neutral end
The method of generator stator neutral earthing is
described in Section 11 of this chapter. A n example of
stator neutral earthing is shown in Fig 4.10.
Again, depending on the machine manufacturer, the
generator neutrals can be situated on the top or the
b o t t o m of the generator. It is obviously more straight­
forward if they are positioned below, as all the stator
neutral earthing equipment described can then be housed
within a single module supported on independent steel­
work adjacent to the neutral terminals. If the terminals
are located on the top of the machine, while the star
connection can be made easily, vibration may be ex­
cessive if the stator neutral earthing transformer is
mounted on the machine frame or support and there­
fore it should be located away from the star bar.
Vibration would certainly prevent the resistor being
mounted on the machine. Either a cable connection
would be required (which is undesirable as it is vul­
nerable to damage) or, alternatively, a short section of
I P B could be used and the transformer located away
from the star bar. Equipment installed on the top of
the machine can raise the height of the turbine hall
with a consequential cost penalty. Due consideration
should be given to preventing ingress of water into
the neutral end equipment, since ventilation must be
provided for the resistor to dissipate the heat produced
during an earth fault.
5.3 Tee-offs
Tee-off connections are used to connect auxiliary
transformers and voltage transformers to the generator

FIG. 4.9 Specially designed busbar sections for use in space-restricted areas
voltage system. The power requirements of a voltage
transformer are minimal so for these tee-offs, but
not others, a reduction in current-carrying capacity is
acceptable, provided that a suitable fuse is mounted
immediately adjacent to the tee-off connection to deal
with faults. C E G B uses a 10 A fuse at this position.
Downstream of this fuse (a distance generally of the
order of a few metres between the main and the VT
cubicle), the tee-off need only be designed to be me­
chanically sound. T o ensure that an adequately strong
design is offered, the C E G B specify a continuous rating
of 300 A for this section.
Tee-off enclosures can be bonded into the main run
or isolated and treated as a separate section of I P B ,
System description
WATER COOLED
the choice being m a d e by the designer and fault tested
as a system.
5.4 Delta connections
The connection of the delta on recent stations, e.g.,
Littlebrook D and Heysham 2, is m a d e by using air-
insulated I P B a n d , since the current flow in each delta
a r m is less than the line current by a factor 1/V3, the
dimensions can be reduced appropriately from that of
the main run, though the system highest voltage is the
same. T o ensure that the correct phasor grouping
of the transformer is achieved, correct phase sequence
301
Generator main connections
5
GENERATOR
TERMINAL PLATE
"Ί r
I I
STAR BAR
NEUTRAL
ENCLOSURE
FIG. 4 . 1 0 Stator neutral earthing
of the LV and HV phases for the instahed trans­
former winding terminals is essential (see Chapter 3,
Transformers).
5.5 Excitation busbars
Some generator designs use rotating excitation equip­
ment, whereas others use separately-located stationary
equipment. In the latter, the electrical connection be­
tween the exciter equipment and the machine is an
IPB system similar to that of the generator voltage
system, though obviously running at the much reduced
design voltage of 3.6 kV and maximum continuous
current rating of 5000 A (AC or DC) (1988), with con­
sequential reduction in size. Typically, the installation
would comprise A C and D C connections forming a
system as shown in Fig 4 . 1 1 , with a normal operating
voltage of below 650 V, connecting the main exciter,
the exciter rectifier cubicle, the field suppression swhch,
and the generator slipring and brushgear enclosure.
5.6 Earth bar
The earth bar system is quite complicated since all
associated auxiliary equipment must be earthed in a
manner such that no circulating-current paths can
occur; a typical system is shown in Fig 4.12. For the
purpose of hs design, it is assumed that the neutral
earthing equipment (see Section 11 of this chapter) has
been shorted-out due to a coincident fault and that
the earth fault current is unrestricted. The earth path
must be rated to carry the maximum earth fault cur­
rent from any part of the connections system where
an earth fault could occur back to the generator. For
302
Chapter 4
LOCATION OF PROTECTION GTs
Y.
500V
1
STATOR
NEUTRAL EARTHING
MODULE
an installation which includes generator voltage switch-
gear, an additional earth is incorporated on the system
to provide the earth when the switch is open. The
earth path must be of low resistance to prevent a rise
in potential on any part of the system (during a fauh)
above a level which could cause a danger to personnel.
With the system operating normally, the C E G B specify
this level as 55 V and, during fauh conditions, 430 V
is specified as the maximum rise of earth potential
to comply with telecommunication directives within
the UK. However, if faults can be cleared within 200 ms
a voltage rise of 650 V is acceptable.
If no earth path were provided, the return earth
fault current would follow a r a n d o m path (or paths)
of low resistance back to the machine. These routes
may be tortuous and not adequate to carry such large
currents. The provision of a designed earthing system
directs the flow of earth fault current along a pre­
determined route, thereby containing all earth fault
currents within the main connections system. The earth
path comprises an earth bar of adequate cross-sectional
area connected t o plant by flexible leads and held at
the potential of the station earth network. Since the
earth bar would provide the lowest resistance path
to earth fault currents, the earth bar redirects the fault
current away from the station earth system which, in
any case, would not normally be rated for such large
currents.
The earth bar is not screened by an enclosure; when
earth fault current flows, large external magnetic fields
are produced, so it is usual t o position the bar some
distance from the main busbar installation to pre­
vent excessive forces being produced. The earth bar
has to negotiate many obstacles on hs route, e.g.,
civil works, auxihary plant, etc., so that it includes
 System description

MAIN MAIN
GENERATOR EXCITER

LINE
CONNECTIONS

DC EXCITATION MAIN EXCITER

CONNECTIONS AC CONNECTIONS

FIELD EXCITER
SUPPRESSION RECTIFIER
SWITCH CUBICLE

FIG. 4.11 Exciter busbar arrangement

NEUTRAL GENERATOR
ENCLOSURE FRAME

GENERATOR

•
TRANSFORMER
STATION
EARTH

•
•

J J UNIT
TRANSFORMER
VT

MAIN
CONNECTIONS
EARTH
BAR

FIG. 4.12 System earthing

many bends. It is essential that sound fixing is provided When testing a main connections design, it is usual
to prevent the force produced by the fault current from to include the earth bar, thereby testing a complete
straightening out these bends. system.

303
Generator main connections
6 Setting out the specification
Having described a typical main connections installa­
tion in the previous sections, consideration is now
given to the design specification of that system, as­
suming natural air cooling. Section 7 of this chapter
will look at the component parts.
The first consideration is the particular application
— the environment, voltage and current-carrying re­
quirements. As standard a design as possible should
be specified, so that testing need not be necessarily
repeated for each apphcation. The parameters that
must be specified are:
• The maximum system voltage, frequency and power
factor.
• The output of the generator, and hence the line
current.
• The variation allowed on the above during abnormal
conditions.
• The fault contribution from the generator.
• The fauh contribution from the external grid
network.
In a tee-off busbar, there is a combined fault infeed
from the generator and the external grid. This specifies
the maximum fault level of the system for which the
installation must be designed, including the earth bar.
The maximum system voltage dictates the impulse
level for which the system must be designed and the
consequential clearances between the conductor and
the enclosure. However, it should be remembered that
the impulse and switching overvoltages entering from
the HV side of the generator transformer are not
transferred according to the winding ratio of the trans­
former but rather to the ratio of the capacitances of
the HV and LV sides. Depending on the steepness
of the incoming wave, the percentage overvoltage on
the generator side may be higher than the H V side.
This overvoltage may be reduced by the capacitance
of the generator and the generator main connections.
Economics and workability dictate the choice of ma­
terial for the conductor and the enclosure; aluminium
is the most probable, bearing in mind that the electrical
resistance should be low but the inherent mechanical
strength adequate to withstand the forces produced
during fauU. The phase configuration, i.e., flat in-hne
or trefoil, and probably the spacing, will be determined
by obstructions on the proposed route. The number of
bends should be kept to a minimum and those selected
should be of a tested design.
The enclosure insulation level from earth must be
specified. This level must be high enough to allow for
degradation caused by dust during the periods between
cleaning. At present the C E G B specifies 3.6 kV.
The temperature rises permitted during maximum
continuous current flow are then specified which, for
304
Chapter 4
C E G B installations, are as stated in Secfion 3 of this
chapter.
7 Component parts of an IPB system
7.1 Conductor and enclosures
These items have been dealt with in detail in the
preceding sections.
7.2 Equipment enclosures
At interfaces with plant, for example a transformer,
the physical enclosure of the conductor must include
access for maintenance purposes but still insulate the
enclosure system from the connected plant. Non-con­
ducting bellows, discussed later in this chapter, connect
the enclosure t o , say, the transformer, the tank of
which is earthed separately. This equipment enclo­
sure may have viewing ports (see Section 7.12 of this
chapter) in order to inspect the flexible connections
making u p the conductor interface, and an access cover
to allow the application of a portable earth if neces­
sary (see Section 12.2 of this chapter). The enclosure
may be a bolted assembly, removable for maintenance
purposes, and using bonding strips to ensure that all
parts are earthed positively and that no reliance is put
on the bolted construction for earthing. T o prevent cir­
culation currents occurring, larger access covers should
be insulated from the rest of the enclosure, except for
a single earth connection on each individual cover.
For the same reason, hinges should be bridged, using
a flexible connector. Designs should offer the facility
of taking a transformer out for maintenance, while
allowing the main connections to be re-energised safe­
ly. This latter requirement may be achieved by the
removal of links or a short section of conductor, and
the fitting of caps over the busbar ends in a manner
which maintains the insulation of the system.
7.3 Insulators
7.3.1 Post insulators
These support the conductor within the enclosure to
maintain the air clearance needed for the highest sys­
tem voltage. They are m a d e either of epoxy resin or of
porcelain; if porcelain, it must be thoroughly vitrified,
so that the glaze is not depended u p o n for insulation.
The strength of the insulators should be such that
when they are supporting the maximum short-circuit
loads, the factor of safety is not less than 2.5. The
number of supporting insulators at each point and the
spacing between them is confirmed by short-circuit
testing. Typical arrangements are shown in Fig 4.13.
Stresses due to expansion and contraction in any
part of the insulator and its fixings must not lead to

FIG. 4 . 1 3 Typical insulator support arrangements
the development of defects. The fixings, which should
be non-magnetic, should be such as to allow movement
of the conductor when centralising forces occur during
short-circuit. The post insulator is usually mounted on
plate which bolts externally o n t o a flange fitted to the
enclosure, as shown in Fig 4.14, thereby permitting easy
removal of the insulator.
7.3.2 Foot insulators (including enclosure
supports)
These are plate-type insulators which insulate the
support side of the enclosure from the structural
steelwork. An insulation level of 3.6 kV is general­
ly specified for this device, which ahows for some
dust build-up during the operation of the plant. The
support structure itself should allow relative movement
PART OF BUSBAR
CONDUCTOR - ^
CONDUCTOR
D SUPPORT FOOT
POST INSULATOR
INSULATOR BASE PLATE
FIG. 4 . 1 4 A typical insulator support assembly
Component parts of an IPB system
between it and the enclosure to accommodate thermal
expansion. Where supporting structures suffer exces­
sive vibration, installations may require anti-vibration
pads to be incorporated in the design, although the
C E G B does not generally use t h e m . The design of the
connections mountings should be such that the natural
frequency of any part of the busbar structure and its
supporting metalwork does not lie between ± 3 0 % of
the frequency of the applied electro-magnetic force,
i.e., static and dynamic loadings for the power fre­
quency specified should be taken into consideration.
7.3.3 Disc bushings
Disc bushing seals are fitted at the end of busbar runs
adjacent to plant housings to provide an airtight seal,
thereby preventing hydrogen from the generator, or
oil from the transformers, passing along the isolated
phase-runs in the event of leakage. The isolated phase-
run is then fed with conditioned air, as discussed later.
A bushing seal must also be provided in the VT tee-
off, allowing the on-load maintenance of the VTs
without affecting the conditioning air system. Careful
attention is given to the bushing profile to ensure that
moisture, which would reduce the creepage path of
the bushing, cannot be trapped in it.
7.3.4 Wall seals
Wall seals are provided where the enclosure passes
through a wah (see Fig 4.15). The individual enclo­
sures are connected to the wall seal using the bellows
arrangement described in the next section. A similar
seal is fitted where the installation passes through a
floor.
Also, to prevent transformer noise causing annoy­
ance in residential areas, the generator transformer
may be fitted with a noise enclosure. A wall seal will
then be required for the busbar to pass through that
enclosure.
7.3.5 Bellows
The bellows maintain the insulation of the main con­
nection enclosures from the connected plant (see Fig
305
Generator main connections Chapter 4

laminae. Alternatively, aluminium bellows may be used.

The bellows are usually of synthetic rubber, completely
weatherproof and airtight and must withstand at least
twice the design working pressure of the conditioning
air system within the enclosure. When bellows are
located outside buildings in direct sunlight, the material
must be chosen to ensure that degradation does not
occur.
' BELLOWS

7.4 Conductor and enclosure expansion

joints
Allowance for the expansion and contraction of the
conductor (Fig 4.17) and enclosure (Fig 4.18) is pro­
vided on the longer busbar runs. This typically com­
prises a 'cage' arrangement, where the expansion gap
is bridged by aluminium laminae. The connection must
have adequate current-carrying capacity and correct
current-sharing among the laminae is ensured by using
a symmetrical array of laminae.

FIG. 4.15 An example of a wall seal

4.16). They allow relative movement due to expansion
and vibration, and cater, to a limited extent, for any
installation misfit due to the worst combination of
allowable tolerances. When bellows are installed on a
length of busbar at, for example, a conductor expansion
point, they must be bridged using flexible aluminium
7.5 Flexible connectors
Flexible connectors can be laminae or braid, the choice
depending on the type of relative movement of the parts
being connected. When removed, they provide isolation
of plant. The significant difference between them is
that laminae only allow relative movement in two
dimensions, whereas braid gives full three-dimensional
movement.

BELLOWS ASSEMBLY ENCLOSURE

DETAIL SHOWING 2 BANDS

EACH SIDE OF BELLOWS

^GRUBSCREW
51mm GAP
STEEL BANDS TENSIONED AND FASTENED (NOMINAL)
CROSS SECTION OF BELLOWS SHOWING
GAP IN NORMAL POSITION

FIG. 4.16 A bellows assembly

306
 Component parts of an IPB system

FLEXIBLE ALUMINIUM LAMINAE

CONNECTIONS

FIG. 4.17 Main conductor expansion joint

ALUMINIUM LAMINATE

ENCLOSURE

1 ( i ι: : Γ
' u

1···

•::| ι i \:\
. η
Γ.ΙΙ)

π
U : i |-1|::Ü

NEOPRENE BELLOWS
LAMINATE ASSEMBLIES
OMITTED FOR CLARITY

FIG. 4.18 Enclosure expansion joint — typical arrangement

7.5.1 Flexible laminae connectors CTs) at expansion joints, connections to generator

voltage switchgear, and earth connections to some
These are constructed from thin strips of aluminium
items of plant.
laid one above the other, with aluminium palms welded
on each end (Fig 4.19). Suhable holes in the palm
allow the connector to be bolted to the conductor 7.5.2 Braided flexible connectors
palm. Their applications are limited to sections of These are m a d e u p of tinned-copper braid or braids
main runs (for example, to allow the insertion of (Fig 4.20) with ferrules fitted at each end which are

307
Generator main connections Chapter 4

ALUMINIUM
LAMINAE

WELD

SOLID ALUMINIUM TERMINAL PALM

FIG. 4.19 Construction of a flexible laminae connector

LAYERS
(THREE IN THIS CASE)

CRIMPED
SIDE FACE
THICKNESS
OF
COMPRESSED
FERRULE TUBE FERRULE
THICKNESS

WIDTH
OF
COMPRESSED
FERRULE

FIG. 4.20 Construction of a braided flexible connector

drilled to allow a bolted connection onto the termi­
nal palms of external plant. It is essential that the
ferrules are crimped onto the braid, since sweated
assemblies have been found to suffer from mechanical
creep problems, with failure resulting after a period
of time. Clearly, whilst the braids overcome the pro­
blem of relative movement of component parts of the
system, they introduced a dissimilar metal interface
when connected to the aluminium conductor palm.
It has been found preferable to remove tinning from
the ferrule at the joint interface surface. Methods
of overcoming problems associated with dissimilar
metals are discussed later. Careful selection of the
braids is necessary to ensure that there is adequate
current-carrying capacity and that they are capable
of operating continuously at the maximum specified
temperature.
Consideration should be given t o :

308

• The length of braid compared with the gap, to en­
sure that there is adequate flexibility (ideally there
should be 2 5 - 3 5 m m free play).
• The number, size and position of the fixing holes
on the crimped ferrule (which affects the clamping
pressure on the joint and hence its current-carrying
capability).
• The ambient air temperature within the enclosure.
7.6 Painting
The outside of the conductors and the inside of the
enclosures are normally painted with matt black heat-
resistant paint to improve heat transfer.
7.7 Conditioned air
Bolted inspection covers, portable earth access covers
and the insulator base fixing-plates are provided with
gaskets, and the ends of busbar runs incorporate a
disc bushing. These measures prevent the leakage of
moist or polluted air into the enclosure. It is usual
to pressurise the enclosure so that leakage is outwards
to atmosphere. The leakage rates are approximately
10% by volume of the busbar enclosure per h o u r .
This airflow, though quite small, purges any ionised
gases which may have accumulated inside the enclosure
and prevents condensation forming, particularly during
periods of shutdown. The cooHng effect of this air
is not taken into account in the design of the busbar
and therefore failure of the associated equipment does
not necessitate shutdown of the unit.
All the main connections within the confines of
the bushing seals are fed with dry conditioned air at
12.5 mbar(gauge). T o prevent condensation, the design
is based on a dewpoint of - 2 5 ° C . A typical system
comprises one air compressor and its associated receiver
and drying equipment per unit. Alternatively, if avail­
able, air supplies can be obtained from the Station
Instrument Air System. Either source is acceptable,
though sizing and rating problems can occur with
instrument air sources. It is usually preferable to
provide an independent compressor. Some air is fed
around the disc bushings to vent to atmosphere after
passing through the equipment housings.
7.8 Voltage transformers
Voltage transformers (VTs) are mounted within a
cubicle (see Section 7.16 of this chapter) which is de­
signed so that the transformer can be safely removed
for maintenance without requiring access to live parts,
should that be required during operation. A typical
VT weighs in the region of 100 kg. It is generally
a single-phase cast-resin transformer connected in a
star arrangement with a ratio of 22 k V / 1 1 0 V, the
Component parts of an IPB system
nearest preferred ratio to the present generator voltage
with accuracy maintained for 0 - 1 0 0 % rated output.
The primary sides of the VTs are earthed at one end
to a c o m m o n earth, which is then connected to the
generator stator earth. They are fed from the voltage
transformer tee-off busbar via fuses rated to discri­
minate against the fuse located at the tee-off from
the main busbar. In the secondary circuits, any earth
connections are m a d e to the Station earth, as that is
the earth which is used in instrumentation circuits.
Some manufacturers have traditionally provided ter­
tiary windings on their voltage transformers connected
in delta and used to prevent the occurrence of neutral
inversion and vokage transformer ferro-resonance. The
delta winding is closed solidly or through a loading
resistor, depending on the X / R ratio needed to prevent
ferro-resonance. Neutral inversion is the displacement
of the neutral due to abnormal system conditions,
such as open-circuits in one or more phases of systems
possessing inductance and capacitance. Ferro-resonance
can occur when the magnitude of the inductance of
the VT compared to the capacitance of the circuit to
which it is connected is equal and opposite. When not
required, the tertiary windings are left open-circuited
with one open-end earthed; this is usual with neutral
earthing methods now used. The reader is referred to
Chapter 3 (Transformers) and Chapter 11 (Protection),
for a more detailed discussion of these issues and the
problems they cause.
7.9 Current transformers
Current transformers (CTs) are located in various parts
of the instaUation, depending u p o n the protection
scheme employed. Typically, for the scheme shown in
Fig 4 . 1 , CTs would be installed in the following lo­
cations (shown in Fig 4.8).
At the neutral end of the stator winding, between
the terminal plate and the star-bar, for the following
purposes:
• Tariff metering.
• Efficiency testing.
• Unit instrumentation and turbine-generator
automatic control input signals.
• Low forward power protection.
• Negative phase sequence and loss of excitation
protection.
• Generator differential protection.
Within the generator neutral earthing module on the
secondary side of the neutral earthing transformer for
stator earth fault protection (see Fig 4.10).
309
Generator main connections
At the unit transformer for:
• Generator differential protection.
• Unit transformer differential protection.
On the HV bushing of the generator transformer for
generator differential protection.
The design of the CTs must be such that they do not
reduce the electrical impulse-withstand level or the
power frequency withstand level of the installation. The
CTs positioned in the main connections busbar are of
the 'slipover' type, mounted within a housing, for ease
of erection. They include an earthed screen to shield
the secondary winding from the electric field of the
conductor, thereby ahowing the secondary insulation
level to be a nominal 2 kV. This assembly is held at
earth potential by connecting the C T core-shield as­
sembly to an independent earth cable at one point only,
to prevent any circulating current paths. All secondary
cabling should be glanded on an insulated glandplate,
thereby maintaining the 3.6 kV insulation level of the
enclosure. Adequate support and bracing of the CTs
is required as a typical assembly is heavy; a neutral
CT assembly may weigh 600 kg and a line C T assembly
350 kg. Sufficient ventilation must be provided to
ensure that the heat produced in the windings does
not cause unacceptable temperature rises. Any forces
exerted on the CTs during fault conditions will be
limited to those attempting to centrahse them around
the neutral line of the enclosure. These are not signi­
ficant if the CTs are mounted concentrically. There
will be little, if any, axial force exerted on the CTs
and this is easily contained by the mountings. The
generator has an impulse-withstand level of 85 kV,
consequently a similar figure can be allowed for the
neutral-end equipment.
CTs should be clearly labelled with details of their
duty and their orientation within the system must be
identified to ensure the correct polarity of secondary
signals.
7.10 Environmental conditions
For design purposes, the relative humidity should be
taken as 10097ο and any equipment mounted out-of-
doors should be completely weatherproof and capable
of withstanding inclement weather conditions, includ­
ing wind and snow loading, and solar heating. The
entire instahation should be drip proof, dust proof
and vermin proof, whh an enclosure rating to at least
IP45 of BS5490.
7.11 Portable earth access covers
The philosophy of portable earthing is discussed in
Section 11 of this chapter. The mechanism by which
310
Chapter 4
it is applied is covered here. The design of the access
covers must allow reinstatement of the air conditioning
system when portable earths are applied to prevent
condensation and dampness forming within the main
connections system during periods of prolonged out­
ages. The access cover to the enclosure must allow
good access to the conductor and earthing device within
the enclosure, but be securely bolted and hinged when
not in use. The earthing connection onto the conductor
is made by a clamp and is applied using an insulated
pole. A flexible cable then connects this via another
clamp onto the main connections earth system. The
access cover must also allow the application of a
vohage testing device. C E G B safety rules require the
cover to be lockable.
7.12 Viewing ports
Viewing ports, comprising clear glass or Perspex view­
ing windows, are provided in the enclosure at positions
where there is a need to check the condition of flexible
connectors and other equipment regularly. These also
permit the use of infra-red heat measuring devices for
checking the temperature of the connectors.
7.13 Connection of the conductor to plant
As detailed earlier in Section 7.5.2 of this chapter,
braided flexible connectors are used to continue the
conducting path to the connected plant. At the gen­
erator, a 'candelabra' assembly (see Fig 4.21) has been
developed which forms a circular terminal arrangement
fitted to the machine terminals. Braids then bridge the
gap between the main connections conductor and the
generator terminals forming, in effect, a short cylinder
that assists equal current-sharing among the braids.
Care must be taken in the design to ensure that there
is adequate clearance from stator water cooling pipe­
work.
Connections onto the generator transformer, which
may be either a three-phase tank or three single-phase
tanks, are by braided flexible connectors onto six ter­
minal bushings. A typical arrangement in isolated phase
busbar is shown in Fig 4.22.
T o give a good current distribution, the connections
o n t o the bushings should be arranged in as near cir­
cular configuration as possible, typically eight palms
arranged in an octagonal formation (see Fig 4.23). A
single palm connection would not give good current
distribution and should be avoided. However, since the
generator transformer connections carry phase current
rather than line current, there is no need for the ela­
borate candelabra arrangement used at the generator.
Connections to auxihary transformers, e.g., the unit
transformer, are simpler than the generator transformer
since the load currents are much lower.
The temperature rise due to losses in the connec­
tions system must be reduced in areas where significant
 C o m p o n e n t parts of an IPB system

GENERATOR TERMINAL-

BRAIDED FLEXIBLE CONNECTOR

(ONLY TWO CONNECTORS
SHOWN FOR CLARITY)

CONDUCTOR 0
0 o o
0 o 0

0 o o 0

ENCLOSURE

INSULATOR SUPPORT ASSEMBLY

FIG. 4 . 2 1 Generator terminal 'candelabra' connection

heat may be conducted from plant, for example, at the
generator and the generator transformer via its bush­
ing. The specifications for these items permit higher
temperatures than are permitted for generator main
connections.
Access to terminals should be as easy as possible,
with the removal of a minimum of enclosure compo­
nents to gain access to the terminations.
tual failure of the joint, often w h h catastrophic resuhs.
A joint (which really consists of many joints in parallel)
can be so badly burnt-out that the original cause of
the fauh is impossible to determine. Consequently, ex­
tensive experimental work on joints has been performed
by the C E G B to estabhsh the most suitable joint surface
preparation assembly and fixing procedures.
There are several influencing factors to consider
when making a joint:

• T h e material of the mating surfaces to be joined.

7.14 Joints in the conductor
A h h o u g h apparently simple, joints have given serious • The preparation of the mating surfaces.
problems in the past, due to the unequal current-shar­
• The b o h size.
ing in braids and poor pointing procedures. One cause
sometimes aggravates the other and leads to the even­ • The b o h material.

311
Generator main connections Chapter 4

AIR DELTA
MAIN PHASE
CONNECTIONS

3 X SINGLE - PHASE
GENERATOR TRANSFORMER

HV BUSHING
REMOVABLE
GENERATOR TRANSFORMER
TERMINAL HOUSING
FLEXIBLE CONNECTIONS
AND LV BUSHING

I GENERATOR
^ - TRANSFORMER

UNIT T R A N S F O R M E R
TERMINAL HOUSING

FIG. 4.22 Air delta arrangement in isolated phase busbars

• The size of spreading washer to give necessary clamp­ TABLE 4.1

ing load. Recommended dimensions for bolts and washers used
in jointing
• The necessary torque.

• The method of locking the nut. Washer

Torque
Bolt size
Nm
Inside dia Outside dia Thickness
The materials making u p the joint are normally either
aluminium or copper; the joints are therefore copper mm mm mm
to copper, aluminium to aluminium or copper to alu­ M6 6.4 14 2 7
minium, in order of increasing difficuhy in making the M8 8.4 21 2.2 20
joint. It is recommended in the C E G B that where MIO 10.5 24 2.4 35
surfaces are coated or plated this should be removed M12 12.8 28 3.0 50
at the interface by linishing, so that one of these three M16 16.8 34 3.4 90
joint interfaces is created. Without going into the
science of jointing, the most satisfactory method will
be described. The jointing surfaces are first cleaned
with a wire brush, a separate wire brush being used for
7.15 On-load temperature measurement
each material. A hberal coating of petroleum jelly is As can be appreciated, temperature measurement of
then applied to prevent further oxidation. High-tensile an I P B system is not easy, but it is necessary during
steel bolts, washers and nuts are then torqued-up and commissioning to ensure that the design requirements
locked, the number of bolts depending on the size of have been met, and during operation to ensure that
the ferrule being bolted. Recommended sizes of these there has been no degradation of joints, flexible con­
components are shown in Table 4 . 1 . nectors, etc. During commissioning, there are various

312
 Component parts of an IPB system

EIGHT TRANSFORMER DISC BUSHING

TERMINAL PALMS FIXINGS

1
. 1
1 /
i / :
• 1 ι ·
1 I

. - 11-
-i- Λ"ΓΓLili 'ίΐί νΠΐ^ΙιΐΐΓ'-
• 1
\ ι ·

I
I ·

PART SECTION
CONDUCTOR
ENCLOSURE •CONDUCTOR INSULATOR

ACCESS COVER^ DISC BUSHING

ACCESS COVER- •I I-
I,. COPPER BRAIDS

4 1 1r TRANSFORMER
BONDING STRAP •i BUSHING
.1
1

SECTION SHOWING
HOUSING INTERIOR

FIG. 4 . 2 3 Generator transformer connections

'stick-on' tapes available t o record the maximum 7.16 VT cubicles

temperature attained at a spot. They have the obvious
Each phase m a y require u p t o five VTs arranged in
disadvantage that they can only be read after the sys­
isolated phase compartments. When isolating a VT, it
tem has been de-energised but they are a useful way
is usual t o break the primary side before the secondary
of doing a temperature survey. Temperature-sensitive
side, so that isolating contacts compatible with the
paints are also available which change colour at a set
secondary voltage can be used. Each VT is separately
temperature. For both these methods, it is essential
protected by a primary fuse, typically 3 A , which
to ensure that, once the sensor has been 'triggered',
discriminates with the 10 A fuse fitted at the tee-off,
it remains stable until an opportunity to check it is
already described. T h e VT secondary wiring, suhably
available. Thermocouples and contact thermometers
fused, is wired t o a combined C T a n d VT secondary
also exist, but they are generally only of use on the
marshalling cubicle and then into its associated pro­
star-bar because of the high vohages involved. A n
tection or instrumentation scheme. When the VT is
alternative method is an infra-red camera, which o b ­
isolated, before access can be gained to it, earths must
viously requires hne-of-sight vision t o the spot t o be
be applied by the VT isolating mechanism to both
measured. Painting the surface of the joint can improve
sides of the 3 A fuse, a n d the primary a n d the se­
the efficiency of emission of infra-red. Since magnetic
condary terminals of the transformer. T o ensure that
fields can influence an infra-red camera, caution must
this procedure is followed, the VT cubicle door is
be exercised when using it.
interlocked.
Because of the difficulty of temperature measure­
ment, indirect methods of monitoring can be consi­
dered. Checks of joint resistance, using a micro-ohm
meter, can be made during plant shutdown, and all
7.17 Access platforms
joints checked for obvious signs of discoloration due Since the main connections route is complicated by
to high temperature. proximity t o other plant, some access covers are un­
If viewing ports are provided, both the infra-red avoidably located at awkward places; access platforms
camera and visual checks for discoloration are possi­ are therefore necessary t o facilitate quick inspection
ble. H o t spots only occur at jointed areas; the general of joints and connection of portable earthing equip­
busbar temperature is not a problem, provided that the ment. Sufficient r o o m must be available for an operator
busbars have been correctly designed. to manoeuvre voltage sensing probes, earth application

313
Generator main connections Chapter 4

poles, etc. Care must be taken to ensure that ladders tions are transported complete, i.e., they include
and handrails do not bridge insulated joints electri­ conductor, enclosure, insulators and all fittings.
cally at plant interfaces and thus render them inef­
fective. Also, such structures in the vicinity of the
connections are designed so that they are not heated 7.21 Quality assurance
by stray magnetic fields during continuous operation
Notwithstanding the quality checks required for each
of the plant.
individual component, careful final assembly and weld­
The continuity of any current-conducting path in
ing of the busbar sections is most important. Welding
the steelwork should be interrupted by the inclusion
must be in accordance with a specified standard, e.g.,
of insulating pads, bushes and washers, etc. Attention
BS3571 Part 1 for metal arc welding or BS3019 Part 1
should be given to the need to sectionalise or insulate
for tungsten arc welding (both inert gas), and all welds
cladding or screens.
must be clearly identified in the design, including their
type, weld process, weld preparation, with samples of
each weld type m a d e available for examination. Welds
7.18 Structural steelwork can be grouped as electrical circuit welds or structural/
Structural steelwork running parallel to main con­ mechanical welds and detailed welding procedures are
nections enclosures must be spaced at least 300 m m prepared. Testing of welds by radiography and dye-
distant. Steelwork running at right angles to main penetrant techniques is carried out on a percentage of
connections enclosures must be spaced at least 150 m m all welds produced, with clear acceptance levels agreed
distant. The supporting structure for the whole of the before work starts.
main connections, including the tee-off connections,
is designed to give a rigid structure for the static and
dynamic loads imposed with a typical safety factor
8 Testing
of 1.5. Supports must be completely independent of
the equipment to which the busbars are connected This section covers tests for:
and separate from main building steelwork. They are
• Component parts of the main connections
floor-mounted and designed to prevent heating of
installation.
the structure by magnetic leakage fields.
• Manufacture of a test piece to ensure adequate
design.
7.19 Neutral earthing equipment
• Testing on site.
This equipment has developed in the manner described
in Section 11 of this chapter and, for a 660 M W gen­ • Type tests.
erator, typically comprises a solid insulation (SNAW)
• Routine tests.
462 kVA cast-resin transformer with a suitably-sized
load resistor and anticondensation heater mounted • Sample tests.
within a free-standing module, one per unit. The trans­
former is normally unenergised, so particular attention
must be given to ensuring that the complete encap­ 8.1 Tests on component parts
sulation performed under vacuum is free from voids,
cracks and other defects, and accurate location of the 8.1.1 Insulators and bushings
winding is essential. The resistor is likely to be of
At the time of writing, these components are made
the metallic type and have a value which limits the
of an epoxy material. Type tests are carried out on
earth fault current to 10-15 A in each neutral. It will
samples of complete insulators representative of each
be air cooled, non-deteriorating, non-corrodible and
type used in the installation; they will already have
fireproof, non-inductive and capable of carrying the
passed the specified Routine tests. Each insulator type
earth fault current for five minutes without mechani­
needs a different jig in order to subject it to realistic
cal damage: the total resulting temperature rise should
testing. The necessary corrections for temperature, ba­
not exceed 200°C.
rometric pressure and humidity are applied. Typical
type tests are:

7.20 Site installation • Lightning-impulse voltage withstand This is the

Clearly it is advantageous to d o as much factory
fabrication as possible, subject to transportation hmits.
Equipment housings and sections including bends re­
quire more complicated fabrication techniques and
are best done at the works, leaving the relatively easy
welding of straight joints to be done on site. The sec­
standard 1.2/50 /xs impulse test with the test con­
ditions given in BS3297 Part 1 1974 or BS223 1985
as appropriate, the test value being that for the
highest system voltage of the installation.
• Dry power frequency withstand T o BS3297 at the
appropriate test value for one minute.

314

• Wei power frequency withstand To BS3297 at the
appropriate test value for one minute.
• Partial discharge test Carried out in accordance
with BS4828, the partial discharge being measured
in terms of apparent charge; the level should not
exceed 50 picacoulombs.
• Cantilever mechanical type-test This is applied to a
complete insulator secured by its normal means of
fixing, with the load apphed at right angles to the
axis of the insulator. This test would not be applied
to a disc bushing.
The following Routine tests should be carried out on
all individual insulators and bushings:
• Visual examination,
• Electrical routine test A 1-minute withstand test at
the appropriate vohage.
• Mechanical routine test A cantilever test at 7097o of
the faihng load of the insulator in this mode.
In addition to these Type and Routine tests, the fol­
lowing Sample tests should be performed; the method
of selection is discussed in BS3297 Part 1, 1974:
• Verification of dimensions This involves checking
that the dimensions are in accordance with the re­
levant drawings, with due regard for tolerances and
other details which may affect interchangeability.
• Temperature cycle sample test Several cycles of
immersion in hot and cold water, the sample being
held at each temperature for one hour to ensure
that a uniform temperature has been attained. The
difference in hot and cold temperatures should not
be less than 70°C. This test would be followed by a
routine electrical test to ensure that no degradation
of the insulator has occurred.
• Oscillatory-load sample test This simulates mechani­
cal shocks onto the main connection installation
caused by, for example, operation of a circuit-
breaker. The number of oscillations selected is left
to the judgement of the engineer specifying the
installation (of the order of four million), but is
not applicable to disc bushings.
• Tension sample test Each sample insulator is
subjected to 7 0 % of its uhimate tensile failure load
for one minute without failure to it or its fixings.
It is not applicable to disc bushings.
• Torsional sample test A torsional load is applied
to each threaded insert or stud of an insulator or
bushing to demonstrate that no permanent distortion
or loosening of fittings occurs. For thread sizes up
to M12, a load of 50 Nm is used.
• Puncture sample test For this, the insulator is
immersed in switchgear oil and a vohage of approxi­
Testing
mately 5 0 % of the specified puncture voltage apphed
across the unit. This vohage is then increased gradually
to 1.3 times the actual dry flashover voltage of the
unit without causing puncture.
• Ultimate cantilever-load sample test Finally, a unit
should be loaded u p in the cantilever mode until
failure occurs. For this sample test, failure should
not occur below 8 0 % of the failure load obtained
from the Type testing.
8.1.2 Busbar material
Checks are made to ensure that the material is to
specification and that different material types are clear­
ly identified, so that the incorrect material or thick­
ness cannot be inadvertently used in any part of the
installation.
8.1.3 Transformers
The various VTs and CTs throughout the system require
Type and Routine tests, as described in Chapter 3.
8.1.4 Loading resistors
The neutral earthing system loading-resistor must be
tested in accordance with BS587: 1957, as fohows:
Type testing
• High voltage.
• Ohmic value of resistor.
• Temperature rise.
Routine testing
• High voltage.
• Ohmic value of resistor.
8.1.5 Capacitors
Capacitors may be installed in the main connections
for the reasons explained in Section 10 of this chapter.
They should be tested in accordance with BS 1650.
8.1.6 Switchgear and earthing switches
Testing requirements for switchgear are discussed in
Chapter 5.
Type and routine testing of earthing switches is in
accordance with BS5253, the test arrangement simu­
lating the service condition as far as practical, i.e., the
switches should be mounted in their service enclosures,
together with a section of busbar. The short-circuit
test is made on a three-phase group of switches, but all
other tests may be performed single-phase.
Control and electrical interlocking circuits, if appli­
cable, should be tested for correct operation.
315
Generator main connections
8.1.7 Compressed air system
All compressors, pipework, valves and ancillary ap­
paratus are tested to appropriate standards, i.e., the
pressure of their associated safety valves, with air
receivers being pressure tested to one and a half times
their safety valve operation pressure.
8.2 Tests on representative sections of IPB
It has been explained earlier that calculation of the
forces that exist upon a main connections installation
during short-circuit is very difficuh and at the time of
writing there is n o reliable calculation method avail­
able. Any computational method later developed will
require validation by testing. Consequently the CEGB's
normal practice is to test the capability of a main con­
nections design by subjecting h to the worst fauh
currents which might occur in service. There are limited
facilities worldwide where tests of this kind can be
carried out, and such testing is very expensive. It may
be advantageous for the manufacturer to offer a main
connections installation of higher current rating than
is necessary simply in order to use a tested design,
thereby making repeat tests unnecessary.
It is normal to offer two test pieces; a section of
main and tee-off busbar, including the tee-off itself.
et
• 7
FIG. 4 . 2 4 Test piece for generator main connections
316
Chapter 4
and the delta section. T h e former requires representa­
tion of all three phases a n d the earth bar whereas for
the latter a 'go and return' section plus earth bar suf­
fices. A n example of a test piece comprising aluminium
busbar in an aluminium enclosure representative of
a unit transformer tee-off connection is shown in
Fig 4.24.
Consideration should be given to incorporating ad­
ditional equipment into the test piece, for example C T
chambers, expansion joints, flexible connections, etc.
The following design aspects of the test piece should
be considered. In addition to the selected test piece,
it is advisable to add a short interface section where
connections are made to the incoming unscreened
section of the test station busbar. This reduces the
end effects of non-representative connections on the
test piece. The connection to the test station supply is
by flexible connections, as used in normal service.
The short-circuit is by means of a shorting bar of
construction generally similar to part of the main con­
nections installation. It is connected to the test piece
by joints similar to a normal tee-off but strengthened,
typically by welded webs, in order to whhstand the
high knife-switch forces in this area, those forces being
higher than those in practice at a right-angle bend.
In a single-phase-to-earth fault, connection to the test
piece is in a section of earth bar returning to the test

station connections by unscreened conductor, this being
representative of a normal earth bar arrangement in a
typical design. Laminated flexible sections should be
provided at each end of the screened conductor and
the conductor held down in the manner proposed in
the earth bar design. Bonding bars should be incor­
porated in the test piece at the test supply end, though
the short-circuit bar enclosure wih provide the bonding
between individual phase enclosures at the remote
end of the test piece.
It is recommended that the following measurements
are recorded:
• Input The applied current (and voltages) are re­
corded on UV oscillographs. It is advisable to take
additional current measurements using Rogowski-
coil type current transducers in various parts of the
test piece, these being particularly useful for dia­
gnostic purposes should some failure occur. (If any
CTs are fitted in the test piece, they should have
their secondary windings shorted unless some mea­
surement of their output is required.)
• Force Piezoelectric force transducers should be
positioned to measure load on the earth bar. If a
correlation is being m a d e between the test results
and predictions by calculation, as many transducers
as possible should be applied t o the earth bar to give
greater confidence in the calculation method.
• Voltage rise The voltage rise in various parts of
the test piece should be measured relative to one
point on the test piece.
• Temperature Maximum-indicating temperature de­
vices of the stick-on type should be liberally apphed
to the test piece in order to record the maximum
temperature reached. These should be examined
after the one-second test (see Section 7.15 of this
chapter) to ensure that the final conductor tempera­
ture does not exceed specification. Clearly, initial
temperature prior to short-circuit must be recorded
to determine temperature rise. The thermal short-
circuit capacity of the main busbar is far in excess
of the actual values due to the high continuous
current and large conductor and enclosure cross-
sections. For the unit transformer tee-off, the tem­
perature rise has less margin due to its relatively
smaller cross-section.
8.3 Test levels
The fauh conditions normally quoted in a specification
are synthetic insofar as the actual fault currents that
would flow on a given power station installation cannot
be predicted precisely. The test values are therefore
derived from real plant parameters, assuming that all
the variables combine at their worst. The test philo­
sophy is based on the presumption that any real fault
will be less severe than the test condition.
Testing
The values of fauh conditions are the sum of the
contributions from the generator side and the genera­
tor transformer side of the system. The design values
should be applied throughout the system, including the
associated earth bar system, to ensure a high integrity.
For a 660 M W installation, the test levels quoted
would be as follows:
(a) Equivalent R M S short-circuit three-phase 200 kA
fault current for 1 second
(b) Calculated first loop peak of (a) 630 kA
(c) R M S short-circuit single-phase equiva- 168 kA
lent to each fault current for 1 second
(i.e., this represents the heating effect
equivalent to that fauU current which
actually flows, taking into account cur­
rent decrement)
(d) Calculated first loop peak of (c) 435 k A
The earth fault values assume that the generator neu­
tral earthing transformer primary is short-circuited, (a)
and (c) are thermal tests, whereas the peak tests (b)
and (d) are mechanical.
Representative parts of the design are also tested to
demonstrate:
• Lightning impulse-voltage withstand, using the stand­
ard 1.2/50 /AS impulse, i.e., that there is adequate
air clearance between conductor and enclosure. At
present generator voltages, a test level of 170 kV peak
fuh-wave is used, apphcable to a system highest
voltage of 36 kV.
• Power frequency one-minute dry withstand corre­
sponding to the above figure, in this case 70 kV RMS
at 50 H z .
D u e to the less-onerous service conditions, the tests on
exciter systems (see Section 5.5 of this chapter) can be
confined t o :
• Power frequency dry withstand, 10 kV RMS for one
minute at 50 H z .
• Full wave lightning-impulse withstand, 5 positive
and 5 negative discharges, at 40 kV.
• A heat run of 5000 A R M S for 8 hours, including
adequate instrumentation to survey the whole system.
8.4 Tests at site
The complete installation, including compressed air
pipework if fitted, for a 660 M W Generator would
be subjected to either a dry one-minute power fre­
quency voUage-withstand test at 68 kV R M S or a dry
fifteen-minute D C voltage test at a test level of 66 kV
D C . T h e insulafion resistance is measured before and
after this H V test. The connections t o the generator
317
Generator main connections
and transformer windings are disconnected during the
test.
In addition to the above, a heat run is carried out
on the complete installation, using the generator as the
power source to ensure that the main connections
design is satisfactory for the rated overload current
and temperature condition. This test is performed by
short-circuiting the main connections on the grid side
of the generator transformer, closing the HV earthing
switches in the grid connection to form a three-phase
short-circuit and adjusting the generator voltage to
give the maximum continuous rated current of the con­
nections. A liberal number of temperatures should be
recorded and the installation run for sufficient time
to become thermally stable.
Finally, the enclosure installation should be subject
to an insulation-to-earth test appropriate to a 3.6 kV
insulation level.
Similar tests are performed on the exciter connection,
though at a reduced level.
9 Experience of testing
In the event of an unrestricted fault at or in the unit
transformer, the main connection system cannot pre­
vent damage at the point of the fauh. It is therefore
considered that a specification for the main connections
should ensure that:
• They are not the source of any faults.
• The connections will not compound a fauh occur­
ring outside the main connections terminal points.
• Their design must be such as to allow a return to
operation with the minimum possible refurbishment.
The test results of a main connections design are
therefore analysed with the above criteria in mind.
The short-circuit testing of designs undertaken by the
C E G B has not been without incident and has shown
that the designer cannot rely fuhy on calculations. This
is true both of the thermal and the mechanical short-
circuit tests. The distortion of the test sections caused
by mechanical forces has been considerable. In addi­
tion, the rise in potential of enclosures and earth bars
has been higher than predicted. Experience has shown
that as many measurements as possible, of all the
parameters, should be taken so that ah the results of
the test can be fully interpreted. An adequate supply of
measuring devices is also essential, since some can be
damaged during the test. Since test laboratory time
is expensive, detailed preparation work is essential to
ensure a trouble-free test session. This requires a com­
plete understanding of the requirements a m o n g con­
tractors, laboratory staff and customer.
It is essential to ensure that the test connections from
the test station are arranged such that no unrepresenta­
tive stress is put on the test piece due to their presence.
318
Chapter 4
The results of all short-circuit tests that have been
performed to date by the C E G B allow some general
comments to be made concerning the areas of the
design which are most critical.
Faults in the past have generally been associated
with small-section conductors, sharp changes of direc­
tion in small-section conductors, welds in small-section
conductors and end effects at bonding bars. Generally,
the main conductor cross-section required for con­
tinuous maximum rating is such that it has ample
short-circuit withstand capability. The same is true of
the main enclosure except, for example, where extra
local loading is placed upon it by poorly supported
bonding bars. Nevertheless, it is still essential to include
a section of main busbar in the test piece in order
to steady the unit transformer tee-off and other small
or complex section conductors, e.g., in hne laminae,
bolted joints, earth bar fittings, etc.
Details of some typical problems revealed in testing
are:
• Enclosure bonding bars, if not sufficiently robust,
will be distorted at the test piece ends during the
mechanical test. Bonding bar movement can pass
the stress down to the enclosure support feet, causing
them to distort.
• The additional forces that exist due to end effects
are revealed by general relative movement and dis­
tortion of the conductors at the test piece ends,
though elsewhere the conductor and enclosure must
remain straight and undistorted. The forces in this
end area can damage laminae or braided flexible
connectors.
• Inadequate earth bar cross-section and insufficient
holding down points can allow the earth bar to dis­
tort severely: this is probably one of the most
c o m m o n problems revealed by testing. This demon­
strates the effect of lack of shielding since the earth
bar is not provided with a sheath. It also illustrates
that a system of this mass, when subjected to forces
produced by the fauh current, wih suffer distortion
and possible damage whilst absorbing the energy
present. The conductor is a large, very rigid structure
supported by a strong insulator system in a braced
enclosure itself supported on strong insulated feet.
This assembly has little flexibility and a large mass
(very high inertia). The earth bar, whilst supported
at many points and of large cross-section, is rela­
tively less massive as a system and in the event of
reaction between it and the conductor system it is
the earth bar that suffers most damage.
• Because of the centralising force exerted on the
conductor by the enclosure, damage can result to the
feet supporting the conductor by spreading or crack­
ing, and the design must cater for this force.
• Testing has shown that during short-circuit con­
ditions, diametrically opposite laminaes or braids

will be attracted together when forming part of the
conductor and repelled when part of the enclosure.
This can cause movement of the conductor and
damage to the support insulator feet, or indeed the
insulator itself.
• The forces produced during the mechanical test
provide a comprehensive check of the adequacy of
the welding specification.
• During the testing it is c o m m o n for extensive arcing
and smoke to be produced, generally caused by
paint in joints of the test piece frame burning out
due to circulating current. If such arcing is to be
eliminated, sound electrical joints in the frame are
required.
Some other significant factors have arisen concerning
instrumentation of short-circuit tests.
The principal object of the tests is to short-circuit
proof-test a busbar specimen. The instrumentation pro­
vided is intended to provide supplementary information
for comparative records as well as data that might
help in the ensuing fault analysis. Taking the instru­
mentation normally applied in turn:
(a) Voltage measurement Measurement of enclosure
voltages does prove useful, but care should be taken
when interpreting the results. The intention is to
measure the voltage drop along the enclosure when
fault current flows in the conductor. T h e actual
enclosure currents are the sum of many complex
and interacting phenomena. For example, the prin­
cipal enclosure current flows on the inner surface
but currents induced by other conductors flow on
the outer surface.
The current flow in the enclosures is not
homogenous, but is subject both to concentrations
and eddies. As a result, placing a set of potential
measuring points along the outside of a relatively
short test piece of complex geometry will not yield
a smooth potential gradient along the test piece.
However, experience has demonstrated that en­
closure monitoring points can show when arcs or
conducting metal touch the enclosure. Additionally,
providing that the correct measuring method is
chosen, useful information can be derived concern­
ing the earth bar and the voltage drops along it.
(b) Strain gauges Strain gauges are very sensitive to
electrical interference and, furthermore, unless great
care is taken when positioning them, they can be
affected by thermal expansion of the test piece.
Converting the resuhs obtained into meaningful
loading figures is unrehable because of the diffi­
culty of defining exactly how the loadings are
produced.
(c) Temperature The stick-on maximum temperature
indicating devices are a perfectly adequate means
of recording temperatures during these tests.
Generator voltage switchgear
(d) Film record The basic concept of a film record
is sound and such a record should be specified.
Some shortcomings have been highhghted in recent
tests which should be dealt with.
The designer's assumption at the outset of test­
ing is that n o major problems wiU be encountered.
Thus filming is carried out in a fairly standard
fashion, using a frame speed in the region of 5000
frames/s at the instant of the fault. If a fault
occurs in which the camera sees an electrical arc,
then the film record from this point onwards is
virtually useless. On other tests where an arcing
fault has been intentionally provoked, filming has
been performed through a high sensitivity neutral
filter. The illumination of the arc is sufficient to
penetrate this filter and give a rough outline of the
surrounding equipment but, prior to the arc, the
film is totally blank and unexposed.
One possible solution, on a test where it is
not known whether arcing will occur, is to run both
normal and filtered cameras simultaneously, al­
though this is wasteful of film should a fault not
occur. It is also complicated and expensive in terms
of the initial equipment to be provided.
Another potential solution currently being in­
vestigated, centres a r o u n d a product marketed for
mihtary use. A chemically-treated plastic, trans­
parent under normal illumination, becomes almost
o p a q u e when subject to intense ultra-violet radia­
tion. T h e time taken to change from clear to opaque
is very short indeed, and a fiher of this material
apphed to the lens of the camera might offer a
cheap and ready insurance against unexpected arc­
ing faults with the possibihty of recording evidence
during the arc.
10 Generator voltage switchgear
Only a brief mention of this equipment is made here:
the actual switchgear is described in Chapter 5 and
the factors to be considered regarding its use are dis­
cussed in Chapter 1. However, if such equipment is
incorporated in the main connections installation, this
affects the layout of the busbar and calls for additional
equipment to be installed, e.g., pneumatic equipment,
cooling equipment a n d , possibly, system capacitors.
The switchgear is located in the horizontal run of bus­
bar and an area, preferably enclosed, must be provided
to house it. Due to the physical size of the switchgear,
increased centres between phases will be required in
that area. The switchgear comprises an independent
'interrupting device' per phase, thereby maintaining
complete phase isolation throughout the system. Con­
sideration must be given to the foundation requirements
for mounting the switchgear.
The switchgear itself may be either water or air
cooled, the option being selected after consideration of
the continuous current-carrying capacity and therefore
319
Generator main connections
the quantity of heat to be extracted, air coohng having
obvious hmitations.
To minimise transmission of shock to the main
busbars due to the operation of the switchgear, flexible
connections are made between the switch and busbar,
normally using aluminium laminae. Caution should be
exercised if aluminium laminae are used, as this may
reduce electrical clearances to an unacceptable degree
if the switchgear was designed to be connected by
copper laminae. Since a continuous circuit for circu­
lating current within the main connection enclosure
is required, loop connections to the body of the switch-
gear must be provided, the most suitable being alu­
minium laminae.
Another significant factor affecting the main con­
nections is whether the switchgear is fault-rated or is
lower-rated as is a switch disconnector; the imphcations
of this decision are discussed fully in Chapter 1 of this
volume. However, depending on the characteristics of
the switchgear selected, and in particular the value of
the transient recovery voltage (TRV), capacitors may
have to be added to the system, fitted between the
conductor and the earth, to cater for the satisfactory
operation of the generator switchgear under all op­
erating conditions. The most suitable position for these
capacitors is generally in a specially designed compart­
ment within a VT cubicle, a three-phase bank of single-
phase capacitors being connected between phase and
earth. These are used to decrease the steepness of the
switching or fault clearance voltage wavefront in order
not to exceed the maximum allowable voltage stress
on the insulation of the equipment. They reduce the
rate-of-rise of recovery voltage at the interruption of
short-circuits and load currents. Capacitors can also
reduce overvoltages caused by single-phase faults on
the LV side of the generator transformer. The capa­
citors themselves comply with BS 1650 or equivalent
specification, and are preferably of the steel-tank oil-
fiUed type, having insulation and impulse voltage ca­
pabilities equivalent to those specified for the remainder
of the main connections instaUation. The capacitors
should incorporate discharge resistors to ensure that
they are safely discharged to earth potential, following
the shut down and isolation of the plant. When the
capacitors are installed in the VT cubicle and the tee-
off cubicle is fed through fuses (Secdon 5.3 of this
chapter), then those fuses must be capable of h a n d h n g
the capacitor inrush current without failure.
The design of the generator stator neutral earthing
is described in Section 11 of this chapter. If generator
switchgear is installed, m a i n connections system
between the switchgear and the generator transformer
is unearthed when that switchgear is open. T o cater
for this, a system neutral earthing transformer must
be installed between the switch and the transformer
which will form a neutral point on the LV side of the
generator transformer. This neutral earthing trans­
former has an interstar primary with its neutral point
earthed via a transformer and resistor, these last two
320
Chapter 4
components being similar to those used for the gen­
erator stator neutral earthing, already described.
Consideration must be given to the additional syn­
chronising requirements when generator switchgear is
employed. The normal measuring VTs, already de­
scribed, are installed between the switchgear and the
generator (see Fig 4.8). T o monitor the 'system' side
of the switchgear either a supply can be taken from the
system neutral earthing transformer, by incorporating
a tertiary winding within it, or an additional tee-off
and VT provided instead. If system capacitors are
needed, the latter is the better solution and the VT
cubicle would then house both the additional synchro­
nising VTs and the system capacitors.
The methods of earthing for maintenance purposes
are different for installations with and without gen­
erator switchgear.
11 Earthing
The methods of earthing the main connections, namely
stator neutral earthing and systems neutral earthing,
have already been discussed, together with the earthing
requirements for the enclosure system and for con­
nected equipment, for example, transformer tanks. This
section briefly explains the philosophy of earthing the
generator and its connections.
Prior to 1950, the normally established earthing
practice for the neutral of a main generator connected
to the system by transformers, was to use a vokage
transformer, the secondary of which generally operated
an alarm in preference to tripping the generator. A
number of serious breakdowns in the early 1950s caused
this practice to be a b a n d o n e d . Instead, the neutral
was earthed via a low resistance, namely a liquid earth­
ing resistor. The resistance was typically 22 ohms for
30 M W and 60 M W generators operating at 11.8 kV,
so that the maximum line-to-earth current would be
about 300 A . The time rating of the resistor was 30 s.
This method continued until the 1960s when, instead,
earthing was effected by a low resistance connected
to the LV winding of a distribution-type matching
transformer, the H V winding of which was connected
in the neutral lead (see Fig 4.10). This has worked
satisfactorily and costs no more than earthing through
a hquid earthing resistor. The high effective resistance
to earth fault current limits the damage at the point
of fault and there is the advantage that the resistor
can be designed for low vokage w k h attendant robust­
ness and reliability. T h e surge-reflection characteristics
of this system have been found to be satisfactory. This
scheme has the additional advantage that, because the
maximum earth fault current is very low, in the order
of 10-15 A , a sensitive setting of the protection relay,
as shown in Fig 4.8, can be used in the unit protection
scheme. Clearly, the fault current flows in the trans­
former primary winding, so the current-limiting resistor
on the secondary side of the matching transformer

carries a higher current. During normal conditions with
the stator currents balanced, no current flows in the
neutral earthing transformer.
Initially, when this scheme was developed, the trans­
former and resistor were shuated some distance away
from the star point, sometimes outside the turbine
hall, since the transformer was oil filled. This neces­
sitated the use of a long length of cable, an earth fault
on which could only be detected during outage times.
Clearly such a fault on this cable would, during an
unrelated earth fauh on the system, cause unrestricted
earth fault current to flow. Consequently, a cast-resin
type transformer was developed which is located ad­
jacent to the star-bar together with its loading resistor,
thereby increasing the integrity of the system by having
as short a connection to the star-bar as possible.
See also Section 10 of this chapter for details of
system neutral earthing when a generator switch is
instahed.
12 Earthing for maintenance purposes
Before any maintenance work can be performed on a
main connections installation, the system must be ef­
fectively isolated by lockable means, and fully earthed.
The methods used and the extent to which this is
achieved depend on the Safety Rules of the operating
utility.
At the time of wrhing, the C E G B uses a National
Code of Practice for earthing high voltage apparatus
which (simply put) calls for a 'Primary earth' to be ap­
phed whhin the isolated zone on which work is to be
performed. This Primary earth must be of adequate
cross-sectional area to discharge safely any fault current
which may flow as the result of inadvertent energisa­
tion. A circuit-breaker or a specially provided earth
switch or fixed earthing device must be used to m a k e
the first Primary earth connection. After application of
this earth, the system then has a number of 'portable
drain earths' added in accordance with an agreed 'Earth­
ing schedule' in positions such that, wherever work is to
be carried out, the person performing the maintenance
work can see at all times that the portable drain earth
is in position. The C E G B requires that a visible drain
earth must be positioned within 10 m of the place of
work.
If generator switchgear is installed, the Primary earth
swhch must be located between the generator and the
generator switchgear. This earth then covers the section
in which it is fitted and also the remainder of the instal­
lation when the generator switchgear is closed. There­
fore earthing procedures and sequences are different,
depending on whether a generator switch is installed.
12.1 Priniary earth
For a 660 M W installation without generator voltage
switchgear, it is considered that inadvertent re-ener­
Earthing for maintenance purposes
gisation via the H V breaker in the substation is not
credible due to the fact that it would be open and
locked, as would the H V isolator, and the HV earth
switches would be closed and locked.
Any back-feed is then limhed t o :
Unit auxiliary system 7 kA for 2 s
Residual magnetism at barring speed 1 kA continuous
Residual magnetism at full speed 1 kA continuous
Full excitation at fuh speed 25 kA for 2 s
It is therefore deemed adequate that, for installations
without generator voltage switchgear, the primary earth
should be rated at 25 k A for 2 s.
For installations with generator voltage switchgear,
the section between the switch and the generator could
be re-energised, since the switch is the point of isolation.
Here, the Primary earth is applied by fully-rated
motorised earth swhches, complying with BS5253, on
the basis of one per phase for each generator u n h .
For a 660 M W generator installation, the following
minimum earth switch specification would be expected
for a terminal voltage of 23.5 kV, 50 H z .
• Impulse voltage withstand 170 kV peak
• Power frequency voltage withstand 75 kV R M S
to earth
• Continuous rated current 1000 A
• Rated short time current 160 k A
• Permissible duration of short-circuit 1 s
• Rated peak current 440 k A peak
• Operating time 10 s
• Rated short-circuit making current 750 A peak
at rated voltage
A typical earth switch arrangement is shown in Fig
4.25, one switch would be installed in each phase.
The switch is m o u n t e d integrally with the main
connections enclosure a n d penetrates to the conductor
via a drive housing. The actual earth connection is
m a d e by a motor-driven lead-screw system operating
a drum-type contact. A position indicator must be
provided on the outside of the swhch: a window in
the busbar enclosure allows the position of the contact
to be checked visually. It is usual to provide a handle
for m a n u a l operation of the earthing swhch, should
that be necessary.
12.2 Portable drain earths
These devices are apphed after the Primary earth, as
explained earlier in this section, and are rated to handle
the m a x i m u m fault current. For a 660 M W generator
321
Generator main connections Chapter 4

A typical method of application is the fitting of a

DRIVE MOTOR
77777^
FIG. 4.25 Single-phase earth switch
operating at 23.5 kV, the portable earthing equipment
is rated at 17.5 kA for 2 s or, alternatively, 23.5 kA
for one second.
The portable earth is applied to the conductor after
gaining access to it via a portable earth access cover.
clamping device on the portable earth connection to
a 'bair fitted permanently to the conductor, the com­
ponent parts being shown in Fig 4.26.
The earthing clamp is applied to the ball, using an
HV insulated pole of approved design. The pole is
about two metres long so that the person applying the
earth is never in any danger if, for some extremely
unlikely reason, the equipment were alive. Similar de­
vices are used to apply earths to substation equipment
but a longer pole, typically four metres long, is used
because of the higher vohages in those areas. Design
of the clamping devices must be such that it is not
possible to apply an earth with a two-metre pole, when
a four-metre pole should be used.
After application of the clamp onto the conductor,
the portable earth access cover should be closed.
At the other end of the portable earthing cable, an­
other clamp is fitted, suitable for connection to the
system main earth bar. For this purpose, secondary
earth bar loops from the main earth bar run are pro­
vided adjacent to each portable earth access point,
though the main earth bar run must be continuous and
independent of such loops. Typical points to which it
should be possible to connect portable drain earths are:
• Generator transformer LV bushings.
• U n k transformer HV bushings.

LINE CLAMP ^ \ i-
EARTH END CLAMP

^CONDUCTOR
EARTH BALL
(CHAIN DOTTED)

OPERATING POLE

OPERATING POLE DETAIL

FIG. 4.26 Portable earthing device

322

• System earthing transformer H V bushings.
• Transformer side of unit transformer tee-off CTs.
• Unit transformer tee-off.
• Both sides of generator switchgear.
• VT cubicle tee-off.
• VT cubicle side of tee-off fuse.
• Generator terminals.
• System capacitor terminals and tanks.
Portable earthing equipment must obviously be ex­
amined regularly to ensure that it is undamaged and
the results of such examinations must be recorded.
It must also be examined immediately before use by the
person responsible for the application of such earths.
Careful recording of the number of portable earths
applied and of their locations is essential to ensure
that aU are removed prior to re-energisation of the
system. This can be performed either by a mechanical
interlock method (which can become very involved
and time consuming on extensive systems), or by strict
administrative controls.
The locations of some of the portable earth access
covers may be several metres above ground. Access
platforms are provided, the design of which takes into
account the difficulty of applying the portable earth
clamp. Careful consideration must be given to avoiding
induced circulating current in this steelwork.
13 Protection
It is not intended to explain the protection systems
employed to cover the main connections; these are
fully described in Chapter 11. However, the designer
of the main connections instahation must be fully
aware of the requirements for protection devices, such
as current transformers, within the equipment and
their accommodation whhin the design. H e must also
be aware of the operation time of the protection and
design his equipment to carry fauh current safely for
that period. Present figures are quoted in Section 8.3
of this chapter.
The design of accommodation must take into ac­
count ease of assembly, access for testing and ease of
withdrawal if a device becomes faulty. During com­
missioning and reinstatement of the main connections,
primary and secondary injection tests must be per­
formed to check the protection schemes. Also, con­
sideration should be given to incorporating a primary
loop through a C T for primary injection purposes
when that C T is located in an inaccessible position,
for example, in a transformer bushing.
Marshalhng cubicles accommodating interposing cur­
rent transformers and terminals for secondary wiring
will be required.
Future trends
14 Interlocking
Operational and maintenance interlocking schemes are
discussed in detail in Chapter 1 but the designer of
the main connections should be aware of the possible
requirements for such schemes. The method of inter­
locking may be electrical on circuit-breakers and earth
switches, but may be of the mechanical key-interlock
type on other equipment. If minimal interlocking is
used, then very strict administrative controls are re­
quired to ensure that the operator cannot gain access
to live equipment and that a safe sequence of events
has to be performed before access can be achieved.
15 Future trends
660 M W generators are now the standard size used
by the C E G B , though the industry is considering an
increase from that figure for both fossil-fired and nu­
clear ( P W R ) stations. There are two possible future
steps in the short term: the choice will probably depend
on the type of steam raising plant. If the P W R con­
cept is pursued, it may be decided to drive only one
generator from each reactor, thereby requiring a tur­
bine-generator rated at about 1300 M W .
Future coal-fired plant may incorporate turbine-
generators rated at a b o u t 900 M W .
Whichever option is selected, a move to some form
of forced-cooling of generator main connections will
be required, with a probable increase in voltage and
higher line current; in this way, large dimensional in­
creases can be avoided. A forced-air cooled system is
the more likely since this would be a relatively simple
extension of current designs.
It may become possible, if adequate research work
is performed, to increase the operating temperature
of main connections. If so, it is hkely that silver plating
will be required to avoid oxidation.
Since the cost of testing main connections designs
is so high, some development work would be desirable
to reduce testing costs. This could involve either cal­
culation methods or small-scale comparisons. In the
former, a design would be completely modelled and the
forces due t o short-circuit calculated. Some physical
testing would initially be required to validate the cal­
culation m e t h o d . As an alternative, it may be possible
to model the installation or a representative part of
it and to fault-test at higher t h a n normal frequency.
This reduces the size of the test piece required and
consequently the cost. It also means that the test could
be performed in smaller test stations rather than hav­
ing to use the very limited facilities available for full-
scale testing.
Clearly I P B systems will continue to be required
and the basic technology of this subject will apply for
the foreseeable future. Only a rapid improvement in
superconductivity techniques would cause a dramatic
rethink of the materials and conditions used in the main
connections installations of t o m o r r o w .
323
Generator main connections
16 References
[1] Carter, F. W.: Note on losses in cable sheaths: Proceed­
ings of Cambridge Philosophical Society No. 24, pp 65-73:
1927
[2] Dwight, H. B.: Theory for proximity effects in wires, thin tubes
and sheaths: AIEE Trans 42: 1923
[3] Skeats, W. F. and Swerdlow, N.: Minimising the magnetic field
surrounding isolated phase bus by electrically-continuous en­
closures: AIEE Trans. No 62: 1962
[4] Wilson, W. R. and Mankoff, L. L.: Short circuit forces in
isolated phase buses: AIEE Trans: 1954
[5] Dwight, H. B.: Electrical coils and conductors: McGraw Hill:
1945
324
Chapter 4
[6] Niemoller, A. B.: Isolated phase bus enclosure currents: Trans.
IEEE: August 1968
[7] IEEE: Guide for calculating losses in isolated phase bus: IEEE
Paper 298: June 1969
[8] Dwight, H. B., Andrews, G. W. and Tileston Jnr, W.: Tem­
perature rise of busbars: General Electric Review: May 1940
[9] Albright, R. H., Conasla, Α., Bates, A. C. and Owens, J. B.:
Isolated phase metal-enclosed conductors for large electric
generators
[10] Ashdown, K. T. and Swerdlow, N.: Cantilever-loaded insula­
tors for isolated phase bus: AIEE Paper: April 1954
[11] Swerdlow, N. and Buchta, M. Α.: Practical solutions of in­
ductive heating problems resulting from high current buses:
Trans. AIEE 1960
 C H A P T E R 5

Switchgear and controlgear

1 General requirements 5 3.3 k V switchgear — fused equipment

1.1 Auxiliaries power systems — voltages and fault levels 5.1 Required performance
1.2 Switchgear performance 5.1.1 Rated voltage
1.3 Operational requirements 5.1.2 Frequency and number of phases
1.4 Control 5.1.3 Rated insulation level
1.5 Environment 5.1.4 Rated short-time current
5.1.5 Rated normal current
2 Types of switchgear
5.1.6 Rated breaking current of switching devices
2.1 Descriptions 5.1.7 First pole-to-clear factor: 1:5
2.2 Testing and certification 5.1.8 Rated short-circuit making current
2.2.1 General 5.1.9 Rated duration of short-circuit
2.2.2 Certification 5.1.10 Rated operating sequence
2.2.3 Type tests 5.1.11 Co-ordination of switching device with fuse protection
5.2 Design and construction
3 Generator voltage switchgear
5.2.1 General
3.1 Required performance 5.2.2 Duty of switching device and circuit earthing facilities
3.2 Design and construction 5.2.3 Switching devices
3.2.1 General 5.2.4 Switching device operating mechanisms
3.2.2 Control 5.2.5 Main circuit fuselinks
3.2.3 Cooling
3.2.4 Operating air plant 6 Low voltage switchgear, controlgear and fusegear
3.2.5 Phase-reversal disconnectors for pumped-storage 6.1 Required performance
schemes 6.1.1 Short-circuit withstand strength of busbar systems
3.2.6 Earthing switches 6.1.2 Capability required of main circuit making/breaking
devices
4 3.3 kV and 11 kV switchgear — circuit-breaker
6.2 Design and construction
equipment
6.2.1 General
4.1 Required performance 6.2.2 Enclosures
4.1.1 Rated voltage 6.2.3 Cabling arrangements
4.1.2 Frequency and number of phases 6.2.4 Electrical clearances and creepage distances
4.1.3 Rated insulation level 6.2.5 Busbar systems
4.1.4 Rated short-time withstand current of main and 6.2.6 Earthing of structures
earthing circuits 6.2.7 Mechanical interlocks
4.1.5 Rated peak withstand current of main and earthing 6.2.8 Coded-key devices
circuits 6.2.9 Protective systems components
4.1.6 Rated normal current 6.2.10 Current transformers
4.1.7 Rated short-circuit breaking current (of circuit- 6.2.11 Ammeters and voltmeters
breakers) 6.2.12 Control switches
4.1.8 First-pole-to-clear factor 6.2.13 Fuses
4.1.9 Rated short-circuit making current 6.2.14 Circuit-breaker equipments
4.1.10 Rated duration of short-circuit 6.2.15 Contactor controlgear
4.1.11 Rated operating sequence 6.2.16 Fusegear
4.2 Design and construction 6.2.17 Specialised switchboards/units
4.2.1 General
4.2.2 Enclosures 7 Fuses
4.2.3 Withdrawal/disconnection 7.1 Introduction
4.2.4 Electrical interlocks 7.2 Definitions
4.2.5 Coded-key devices 7.3 Required performance
4.2.6 Identification of conducting parts
4.2.7 Earthing of structures 8 DC switchgear
4.2.8 Circuit and busbar earthing 8.1 General
4.2.9 Auxiliary switches 8.2 System conditions
4.2.10 Cabling arrangements 8.2.1 Short-circuit withstand strength of busbar systems
4.2.11 Voltage transformers 8.2.2 Current making/breaking and short-circuit capability
4.2.12 Current transformers of main circuit switching devices
4.2.13 Control/selector switches
4.2.14 Switchboard/circuit identification 9 Construction site electrical supplies equipment
4.2.15 Indicating instruments 9.1 General
4.2.16 Test devices 9.2 Portable substations
4.2.17 Circuit-breakers 9.3 Portable distribution units (415/240 V)
4.2.18 Circuit-breaker operating mechanisms 9.4 Portable distribution units (110 V)

325
Switchgear and controlgear
1o Future trends in development and
application
10.1 General
10.2 Oil-break switchgear
10.3 Air-break switchgear
10.4 Air-blast switchgear
1 General requirements
1.1 Auxiliaries power systems — voltages
and fault levels
The philosophy of the design of the systems of power
supply to auxiharies plant is deah with in Chapter 1.
This chapter deals with the operational facilities pro­
vided by, and the performance required of, the switch-
gear and controlgear used in those systems, and also
with the switchgear used in schemes in which the main
generators are switched at generator voltage. The design
features necessary to meet these objectives in C E G B
power stations are described.
The presentation is intended to assist the engineer
concerned with the application and operation of switch-
gear and controlgear rather than for the information
of the speciahst designer. In consequence, technical
detail available from text books and such sources as
British and International Standards is included only
as necessary to illustrate a particular aspect properly.
The terms and definitions used in this chapter are,
in general, in accordance with the Brhish Standard
Glossary of Electrotechnical, Power, Telecommuni­
cation, Electronics, Lighting and Colour Terms —
BS4727: Part 2: Terms Particular to Power Engineering
— G r o u p 06: switchgear and controlgear terminology
(including fuse terminology).
The terms and definitions are in close agreement
with those of Pubhcation 277 of the International
Electrotechnical Commission, where there are corre­
sponding terms and definitions in that Publication.
Switchgear and controlgear are defined as follows:
Switchgear and controlgear A general term covering
switching devices and their combination with associated
control, measuring, protective and regulating equip­
ment, and also assembhes of such devices and equip­
ment with associated interconnections, accessories, en­
closures and supporting structures.
Switchgear A general term covering switching de­
vices and their combination with associated control,
measuring, protective and regulating equipment, and
also assemblies of such devices and equipment with
associated interconnections, accessories, enclosures and
supporting structures, intended in principle for use in
326
Chapter 5
10.5 Vacuum switchgear
10.6 SFe switchgear
11 Bibliography
11.1 British Standards (BS)
11.2 Electricity supply industry (ESI) Standards
11.3 Other relevant documents
connection with generation, transmission, distribution
and conversion of electric power.
Controlgear A general term covering switching de­
vices and their combination with associated control,
measuring, protective and regulating equipment, and
also assemblies of such devices and equipment with
associated interconnections, accessories, enclosures and
supporting structures, intended in principle for the
control of electric power consuming equipment.
Except where necessary to avoid ambiguity, only the
generic term switchgear, is used henceforth.
By the early to mid 1950s, the design of the aux­
iharies power systems in power stations in the United
Kingdom had become estabhshed at the dual voltages
of 415 V and 3.3 kV, with short-circmt levels of up
to 43.3 kA (31 MVA) and 26.3 k A (150 MVA) respec­
tively. However, the demand on the systems consequent
upon the rapid increase in the rating of main generating
plant and, in consequence, of its auxiharies, thereafter
necessitated the introduction of a higher vohage —
11 kV — having, initially, a short-circuh level of up
to 26.3 kA (500 M V A ) , but progressing to the present
value of 39.4 kA (750 M V A ) .
Until the introduction of a third voltage, and w h h
the aim of holding auxiliaries to two voltage levels,
switchgear having a short-circuit capacity of 43.8 kA
(250 MVA) at 3.3 kV was installed in some instances.
However this expedient was soon a b a n d o n e d in favour
of the substhution of 6.6 kV, an innovation that was
also short-lived as, yet again, auxiliaries power require­
ments were seen to be increasing beyond the capa­
bility of 6.6 kV. Thus, currently, and probably for
the foreseeable future, the major power stations in
the United Kingdom have 'three-tier' auxiliaries power
systems, i.e., systems operating at 415 V, 3.3 kV and
11 kV. Additionally, there are services operating at
lower voltages, e.g., 240 V A C , 110 V and 220 V D C .
1.2 Switchgear performance
Traditionally, the calculated prospective current likely
to flow under three-phase fault conditions in aux­
iharies power systems necessitates (for the purpose of
determining the short-circuit performance required of
circuit-breakers) equipment capable of interrupting a
current waveform featuring a transient D C c o m p o -

nent of up to 5 0 % at the instant of separation of the
circuit-breaker contacts, together with an abihty to
'make' a current of u p to 2.55 times the steady state
(symmetrical) R M S value. However, in installations
featuring gas-turbine generators connected directly into
the 11 kV vokage level, the influence of such ma­
chines together with that of the connected motor load
can, under short-circuit, produce in a phase at maxi­
m u m asymmetry, a waveform having a first major
loop peak of the order of three times the steady state
RMS value together w k h a relatively slow rate of
decay of the D C component. The hkelihood of the
occurrence of this condition is governed by the point
on the system at which the fauk occurs, and also on
the running mode of the auxiliaries at the time. In
fact, the waveform of the short-circuit output current
of a generator in a phase at maximum asymmetry
may be so displaced relative to zero that it does not
pass through zero for many cycles after fault incep­
tion. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate a typical current
waveform and circuk for a short-circuk at the bus-
BLACK PHASE
FIG. 5.1 Typical current waveform for a short-circuit
at the busbars of an 11 kV switchboard
The example illustrated shows maximum asymmetry in
the red phase.
© AUXILIARY
GENERATOR
SHORT-CIRCUIT I
jL L - IlkV BUSBARS
/ / / Safety Rules of the C E G B . It is a m a n d a t o r y require­
CONTRIBUTORY _
FAULT CURRENTS
11/3.3kV
{ Λ TRANSFORMER
FIG. 5.2 Schematic of the short-circuit represented in
Fig 5.1 showing direction of fault currents
General requirements
bars of an 11 kV switchboard. It is thus necessary to
evaluate the waveforms likely to appear on a system
to ensure that the making current and asymmetrical
breaking current capability of the switchgear is not
exceeded. It is not sufficient to assess the fault clear­
ance capability required of the swkchgear solely on the
basis of the symmetrical, i.e., steady state, value of
the system short-circuit current.
1.3 Operational requirennents
The function of the auxiliaries power system switch-
gear is the distribution and control of electrical energy
to station auxihary plant. Depending u p o n the station
operating regime and the duty of the plant controlled,
some circuits are switched frequently, whilst others may
remain on or off-load for long periods. Intermittent
operation, as opposed to base-load operation of the
generating plant, increases dramatically the switching
frequency imposed u p o n many items of switchgear —
particularly those controlling m o t o r drives. Trans­
former circuits, on the other h a n d , suffer much less in
this respect. Unless the nature of the drive calls for
variable speed control, or a form of reduced voltage
starting, all A C motors are switched direct-on-Une
regardless of size. Thus the normal operational switch­
ing duty of the switchgear may be described as:
• The making and in certain circumstances the break­
ing of m o t o r starting current, which may be u p to
six times full-load current and more in some low
voltage circuits, i.e., 415 V.
• The breaking of overload current.
• The breaking of circuit normal full-load current.
• The making and breaking of transformer magnetis­
ing current — the avoidance of the generation of
high overvokage being of particular importance in
this duty.
Of no less importance is the protective role of the
switchgear. Accordingly it must be capable of making,
carrying until the operation of protection, and interrupt­
ing the m a x i m u m prospective current which may flow
in the event of short-circuit anywhere on the system.
Besides satisfying the switching and protective roles,
the switchgear must be equipped with all facilities
necessary to permit its operation in accordance w k h
legislation in the U n k e d Kingdom (UK), and also the
ment that work on the current carrying parts of high
voltage (HV) apparatus may be carried out only when
those parts are earthed ('grounded'). Effectively, a H V
system in the UK is one in which the difference of
electrical potential between any two conductors, or
between a conductor and earth, exceeds 650 V. For
further information on the classification of systems
by voltage in the UK, see the ' M e m o r a n d u m on the
327
Switchgear and controlgear
Electricity Regulations', published by H M Stationery
Office. T o meet this earthing requirement, all instal­
lations of HV switchgear have facilities for the con­
nection to earth of ah current carrying parts, i.e., all
phase conductors.
The switchgear in the power station plays a vital
role in the procedures for work on station plant —
particularly electrical equipment. It is, therefore, per­
tinent to refer to the circumstances giving rise to the
design requirements described under the 'Design and
Construction' sections which fohow, concerning isola­
tion and earthing. A fundamental requirement of the
C E G B Safety Rules is that work on the conductors
of high voltage equipment may be carried out only
when the equipment is isolated from all sources of
supply and, except in special circumstances, earthed.
The switchgear provides the points of isolation.
The protection of persons working on such appara­
tus afforded by earthing is dependent upon the com­
bination of:
• The efficiency of the connection of primary earths
and their capability to carry the fault current until
the electrical protective devices operate.
• The speed of operation of electrical protective
devices.
• The system vohage, vohage gradient to the point
of earthing and the fauh level at the point of work.
The Safety Rules (Electrical and Mechanical) recognise
three classifications of *earth', viz: 'primary earth',
'drain earth' and 'metalclad switchgear movable earth'
Primary earth A fixed or portable earthing device
applied at a position defined in a safety document. A
primary earth must be applied within the isolated zone,
and in accordance with the terms of a 'permit for work'.
A path to earth estabhshed by closure of a circuit-
breaker has, of course, the fault current carrying ca­
pability of the circuit-breaker, i.e., an abihty to carry
a current equal to the rated breaking current of the
circuit-breaker for 3 s. Thus a circuit-breaker apphed
earth may serve as a primary earth anywhere on the
system. The principles of apphcation of a primary
earth are:
• With the exception of certain work on metalclad
switchgear feeder, busbar and voltage transformer
spouts (see below under 'metalclad switchgear mov­
able earths'), primary earths must remain in position
until the associated permit(s) for work has(ve) been
cancelled.
• Where reasonably practicable, primary earths must
be apphed between the point of work and the point(s)
of isolation. Where this is not reasonably practi­
cable, any alternative procedure adopted must have
specific approval.
328
Chapter 5
• Where primary earths are applied, all phases must
be earthed except where work is to be carried out on
phase segregated apparatus. Provided that all three
phases of phase segregated apparatus are isolated,
work may be carried out on one phase with a pri­
mary earth applied to that phase only.
• Where possible, a circuit-breaker or purpose de­
signed earth switch must be used to make the first
earth connection.
• When a non-fixed circuit-breaker, i.e., a circuit-
breaker comprising a 'removable' or a 'withdrawable'
part, is used to apply a primary earth, any auto­
matic trip feature must, unless impracticable, be
rendered inoperative before closing. After closing,
any means of opening the circuit-breaker must be
locked inoperative.
• When a fixed circmt-breaker is used to apply a
primary earth, all tripping functions must be ren­
dered inoperative after closing, and the circuit-
breaker locked in the closed poshion.
• Whenever reasonably practicable a circuit-breaker
used to establish a primary earth should be closed
from a remote control station, i.e., closure from
local (at swkchgear) controls should be avoided.
A h h o u g h the circuit-breaker has a proven full system
prospective short-circuit current making capabihty,
the avoidance of local control is considered to be
a worthwhile precaution.
Drain earth A fixed or portable earthing device ap­
plied for the purpose of protection against induced
voltages. Drain earths must be applied under the terms
of a 'permit for work' or 'sanction for test' where
induced voltages may cause danger at the point(s) of
work. They are applied and removed as necessary
during the course of the work or testing as specified in
an 'earthing schedule'.
Metalclad switchgear movable earth A portable earth
applied to metalclad switchgear spouts before a 'permk
for work' on the spouts is issued, which can be removed
and replaced one phase at a time during the process
of work being done under a 'permit for work'. The term
'spout' is used to describe the contacts in the switchgear
enclosure from which a removable or withdrawable
circuit-breaker or voltage transformer is disconnected
when the circuit-breaker or vohage transformer is dis­
connected from the busbars or circuit.
The use of the word 'must' without qualification
in the earthing procedures described, indicates a man­
datory requirement with n o discretion permitted and
n o judgement to be m a d e . Where a statement is qua­
lified by the word 'practicable', a slightly less strict
standard is imposed. It means that where it is possible
to achieve, in the light of current knowledge and in­
vention, but bearing in mind the hazards associated

with the work to be undertaken, then the requirement
must be met. Avoidance of the requirement is not
permissible on grounds of difficulty, inconvenience or
cost. Where a requirement is qualified by 'reasonably
practicable', a judgement is required as to what is
reasonable, taking into account the magnitude of the
risk on the one hand and the cost, time and trouble, or
effort necessary for averting the risk on the other.
Where, in the case of high voltage metalclad switch-
gear having spouts, i.e., metalclad switchgear incor­
porating removable or withdrawable circuit-breakers,
work is to be done on feeder or voltage transformer
spouts, or on the busbar spouts of a single panel
switchboard, and the only position where primary earths
can be apphed is at the spouts to be worked on, the
primary earths may be removed to allow the necessary
access for work. The condhions under which work on
each spout may then proceed are either:
(a) By making use of 'metalclad switchgear movable
earths', or,
(b) After proving that each spout is at or about zero
potential by use of an 'approved' voltage indicator
immediately before work is commenced; the voltage
indicator hself being tested immediately before,
and immediately after use.
Where work is to be done on the busbar spouts of
a muhi-panel switchboard, 'primary earths' must be
applied to the busbars at one of the panels. The con­
ditions under which work on each remaining spout
may then proceed are either (a) or (b) above. It will
be seen that work on the 'spouts' of the switchgear
may be carried out ehher with or w h h o u t the use
of metalclad switchgear movable earths. The follow­
ing synopsis outlines the basic steps which must be
observed when work is to be done on switchgear
spouts.
Work using metalclad switchgear movable earths When
work is to be carried out on the busbar spouts of
a multi-panel switchboard using metalclad switch-
gear movable earths, the following operations must
be carried out in strict sequence:
(a) The section of busbars on which work is to be
carried out must be isolated from ah points of
supply from which h can be m a d e live, including
any voltage transformers, the isolation arrange­
ments locked and Caution Notices affixed.
(b) Where duplicate switches in one tank or on-load
busbar selectors are installed — situations hkely to
be encountered only in the oldest stations — and
it is impossible to isolate them from ah points of
supply, then all switches that can be closed onto the
busbars on which work is to be carried out must
be 'isolated' by having their mechanisms locked
in the 'open' position.
General requirements
(c) The shutters of spouts which are, or may become,
live must be locked shut. Shutters of spouts on
which work is not to be done must also be locked
shut except for the busbar spouts at which the
primary earths are to be applied.
(d) Primary earths must be applied on the isolated
section of busbars at a panel other than that on
which work is to be carried out. If reasonably
practicable, all primary earths must be locked in
the earthed position.
(e) Metalclad switchgear movable earths must be ap­
plied to all phases on the busbar at the points
of work.
(f) Danger Notices must be attached where applicable
o n , or adjacent t o , the live apparatus at the h m h s
of the work area.
(g) A 'permit for work' must be issued.
(h) The work may be carried out by a 'competent
person'. The earths may be removed one phase at
a time t o give the necessary access. Each phase
earth so removed must be replaced by the compe­
tent person before another phase earth is removed.
Note: A 'competent person' is one who has sufficient
technical knowledge a n d / o r experience to enable h i m /
her to avoid danger, and may receive, transfer and
clear specified Safety Documents when nominated by
an appropriate officer of the C E G B .
(j) If it is necessary to carry out work on the spouts
of a panel on which the primary earths have been
applied, then after the work on the available bus­
bar spouts has been completed, the permit for
work must be cleared and cancelled. The primary
earths may then be removed and replaced on the
busbar spouts of another panel on the isolated
section of busbar. The procedure described in (e),
(f), (g) and (h) above must then be followed.
When work is to be carried out on the feeder spouts,
voltage transformer spouts and single panel spouts
using metalclad switchgear movable earths, the follow­
ing operations must be carried out in strict sequence:
(i) The spouts on which work is to be carried out
must be isolated from all points of supply from
which they can be m a d e live and, where prac­
ticable, the isolation arrangements locked and
Caution Notices affixed.
(ii) The shutters of spouts which are, or may become,
live must be locked shut. Shutters of spouts on
which work is not to be done must also be locked
shut.
(hi) Primary earths must be applied to the circuit
at each point of work and at all points of iso­
lation, except where such points of isolation are
329
Switchgear and controlgear
on the medium voltage or low voltage side of a
transformer.
Note: Under present UK legislation, the terms *low
voltage' and 'medium vohage' have the following
meaning:
Low voltage A difference of potential between any
two conductors, or between a conductor and earth,
normahy not exceeding 250 V.
Medium voltage A difference of potential between
any two conductors, or between a conductor and earth,
normally above 250 V but not exceeding 650 V.
(iv) On the feeder, voltage transformer or busbar
spouts on which work is to be carried out, the
primary earths must be replaced by metalclad
switchgear movable earths.
(v) If there are no other primary earths left on the
circuit connected to the spouts being worked on,
then while this work is in progress, no other work
must be carried out on that circuk. Where the
spouts are connected to a circuit on which there
is any likelihood of induced voltages occurring,
drain earths must, where reasonably practicable,
be connected at the nearest point to the point
of work where access to the conductors can safe­
ly be obtained.
(vi) Danger Notices must be attached where applicable
on, or adjacent t o , live apparatus at the hmits of
the work area.
(vii) A 'permit for work' must be issued.
(viii)The work may be carried out by a 'competent
person'. The earths may be removed one phase
at a time to give the necessary access. Each
phase earth so removed must be replaced by the
competent person before another phase earth is
removed.
Work without using metalclad switchgear movable earths
When work is to be carried out on the busbar spouts
of a multi-panel switchboard w k h o u t using metalclad
switchgear movable earths, the following operations
must be carried out in strict sequence:
• Operations (a), (b), (c) and (d) as for work using
metalclad switchgear movable earths, followed se­
quentially by operations (f) and (g).
• The work on the busbar spouts must then be car­
ried out under the personal supervision of an 'au­
thorised person', who must prove each spout dead
by means of an approved vohage indicator imme­
diately before the spout is worked on. The vohage
indicator itself must be tested immediately before
and immediately after use.
330
Chapter 5
• If it is necessary to carry out work on the spouts
of the panel on which the primary earths have
been applied, then after the work on the available
busbar spouts has been completed, the permit for
work must be cleared and cancelled. The primary
earths must be removed and replaced on the busbar
spouts of another panel on the isolated section of
busbar. Danger notices must be re-affixed, a permit
for work issued, and the work as described above
carried out under the personal supervision of an
'authorised person'.
Note: A n 'authorised person' is a 'competent person
who has been nominated by an appropriate officer
of the C E G B to carry out duties specified in writing'.
When work is to be carried out on feeder spouts,
voltage transformer spouts and single panel busbar
spouts without using metalclad switchgear movable
earths, the following operations must be carried out
in strict sequence:
• As in (i) for work using metalclad switchgear mov­
able earths.
• As in (ii) for work using metalclad switchgear mov­
able earths.
• Primary earths must be applied to the circuit at each
point of work and at all points of isolation, except
where such a point of isolation is on the medium
voltage or low voltage side of a transformer. If
reasonably practicable, all primary earths must be
locked in the earthed position.
• Where the work to be carried out will involve the
removal of the primary earths at the point of work,
then before a permit for work is issued alternative
primary earths must be applied as close as is rea­
sonably practicable to the point of work. However,
if this cannot be achieved, then whilst this work is
in progress no other work must be carried out on
the circuk connected to the spouts being worked
on. Where the spouts are connected to a circuit on
which there is any likelihood of induced voltages
occurring, drain earths must, where reasonably prac­
ticable, be connected at the nearest point to the
point of work where access to the conductors can
safely be obtained.
• As in (vi) for work using metalclad switchgear mov­
able earths.
• As in (vii) for work using metalclad switchgear mov­
able earths.
• Work on the spouts must then be carried out only
under the personal supervision of an authorised
person who must prove each spout dead by use of
an approved vohage indicator immediately before
the spout is worked o n . The voltage indicator itself
must be tested immediately before and immediately
after use.

When a fauh making device or a circuit-breaker has
been removed from its service position in prepara­
tion for work, it must be immediately electrically
discharged to earth. The apphcation of primary or
drain earths is then not required. After a fault making
device or a circuit-breaker has been removed from its
service position and electrically discharged to earth, a
'safety document' is unnecessary for the purpose of
working on the device or circuit-breaker unless the
work is to be done whilst it is within the confines of
a switchroom or similar place, when a 'limited work
certificate' must be issued for the work.
1.4 Control
The schemes of control provide for electrical 'close/
open' operation at the switchgear itself and, in most
cases, from remote locations. Operation at the switch-
gear is designated 'local control'. Control circuitry
internal to the switchgear operates at the following
voUages:
3.3 kV and 11 kV switchgear 110 V D C
415 V and lower vokage
switchgear:
(a) Circuit-breakers 110 V D C
(b) Contactor gear 110 V A C / 1 1 0 V D C
Generator vokage swkchgear 110 V D C
Whereas local control operates directly into the
switchgear llOV circuitry, that from remote locations
and schemes of automatic/sequence control is usually
at 48 V, via 48/100 V interposing relays m o u n t e d in
the switchgear. Plant protective interlocks/trips and
certain other control functions from external sources
are, in general, connected directly into the 110 V
circuitry.
Trip circuit supervision is provided as a matter of
course on all 3.3 kV and 11 kV switchgear, and on the
principal 415 V and lower voltage circuit-breaker and
latched contactor equipments. Supervision of 'closing'
control circuitry is provided where closure immediately
on demand is more essential than usual, i.e., in cer­
tain safety circuks. Selection of the m o d e of operation,
i.e., local or remote, is made at the switchgear. Also
provided at the switchgear are facilities for testing the
closing and opening operation of the circuit-breaker
or contactor electrically whilst the main circuit con­
trolled is disconnected (isolated) from the source of
supply.
Because of the heavy power requirement of the
closing coils of the majority of solenoid closed circuit-
breakers, particularly at 11 kV, k is impracticable
to energise the operating coils directly at the control
vokage of 110 V. Accordingly, such mechanisms are
supphed at a higher voltage, presently at 220V D C ,
General requirements
via 110 V/220 V auxihary contactor type relays mounted
in the switchgear. The adoption of 220 V D C for this
duty is intended to discourage the use of such a supply
for purposes other than switchgear operation. Prior
to the introduction of this voltage for the duty, 240 V
D C (a voltage employed generally for other power
station services) was the rule.
The D C supply voltages quoted above are derived
from 'float-charged' batteries, normally of the lead-
acid type. A C supplies are usually obtained from con­
trol transformers located in the switchgear and fed
from the 415 V main (power) circuit. However, the
range of voltage appearing across the terminals of a
battery of lead-acid cells — from fully-charged down
to the loaded condition unsupported by the charger,
at the limit of discharge compatible with the avoid­
ance of damage to the battery — can be appreciably
wider than that over which circuit-breaker mecha­
nisms of the solenoid type are guaranteed to function
satisfactorily.
As explained later in this chapter, the current British
Standards for circuit-breakers are BS4752 for voltages
u p t o , and including, 1000 V A C and 1200 V D C , and
BS5311 for A C voltages above 1000 V.
The circuit-breakers in use currently, and for many
years, in C E G B power stations are designed and tested
basically to an earher British Standard (BS3659) which
specifies that closing mechanisms of the solenoid type
shall operate satisfactorily over a voltage range, with
operating current flowing, of 8 0 % t o 100% of the
rated (nominal) value, whereas BS4752 and BS5311
require operation over the range 8 5 % to 1 0 5 % . Based
on the requirements of the latter Standards, the mini­
m u m and m a x i m u m values of voltage acceptable at
the terminals of a 220 V (rated) solenoid coil become:
Minimum 0.85 χ 220 V = 187 V
M a x i m u m 1.05 χ 220 V = 231 V
T o meet a comparable operating voltage range, the
rated vokage of a closing solenoid mechanism designed
to BS3659 becomes (100/80)187 = 234 V. This value
is also the m a x i m u m permissible at its terminals, i.e.,
the 100% value.
For shunt-trip mechanisms, i.e., opening devices
operated from a source of voltage separate from the
main circuit, the hmiting values of vokage at the
terminals are 8 0 % to 120% for devices to BS3659,
and 7 0 % to 110% for those to BS4752 and BS5311.
In recognition of these requirements, control supply
systems are designed to observe the following voltage
hmits at the incoming terminals of the switchboard
whilst operating current is flowing:
System nominal voltage (DC) 48 V 110 V 220 V
Maximum voltage 54 V 121 V 231 V
Minimum voltage 43 V 96 V 190 V
331
Switchgear and controlgear
The minimum value of 190 V for a system of nominal
voltage 220 V D C allows for a Volt d r o p ' of about
3 V within the switchgear, i.e., between the incoming
terminals of the switchboard and the terminals of the
solenoid coil — the furthermost solenoid in the case
of switchboard formations. T o allow for voltage d r o p
in circuitry external to the switchgear, e.g., in interlock
circuits, it is necessary that 48 V and 110 V control
relays be capable of functioning satisfactorily at values
of voltage down to 39 V and 88 V, respectively.
Operating supplies in switchboards are provided
by buswires, sectionahsed as shown in Fig 5.3. In
normal operation, the sections are run electrically se­
parate. However, an arrangement of links/fuses en­
ables the sections to De coupled in the event of loss
of a source, but does not ahow parallel operation.
Parallel operation is precluded to minimise the risk of
failure of one source interfering with the functioning
of another.
Where operating supphes are derived from 4 1 5 /
110 V transformers, two 100% rated units per switch­
board or per section of switchboard are provided.
They are segregated from one another, and located as
far apart in the switchboard as is practicable. One
pole of the 110 V winding is earthed.
Depending upon the duty of the switchboard, each
transformer is rated to supply a proportion of all elec­
trically-held contactors in the closed state, together with
a proportion of all contactors, both electrically-held
and latched, in the process of closing simultaneously.
T o ensure proper functioning of AC-operated me­
chanisms, it is necessary to hold the output vohage
of control transformers between 8 5 % and 110% of
the nominal value whilst operating current is flowing.
The frequency is, of course, governed by the limits
observed for the main (power) circuit, i.e., 4 7 - 5 1 H z .
Each single-circuit contactor gear unit is provided with
a discrete transformer.
Normally, each 110 V and 220 V D C system is
earthed through an earth fault relay connected to the
mid-point of a resistor across the positive and nega­
tive poles, the relay providing indication of faults to
earth. 48 V D C systems normally have the positive
pole connected directly to earth. Equipment energised
from systems having the mid-point earthed through a
relay is connected to the positive and negative poles of
the supply through a fuse and sohd link, respectively.
Equipment fed from systems having the positive pole
earthed is connected to that pole through a solid hnk,
and to the negative pole through a fuse. Similarly,
equipment fed from an A C source, is connected to the
earth pole of the supply through a sohd hnk and to
the hve pole through a fuse.
T o minimise the use of repeat relays, auxiliary con­
tacts used for control, indication and alarm circuitry
are, wherever possible, driven directly by the operating
mechanism of that element of the switchgear to the
movement of which the contacts are responsive. T h u s ,
those contacts responsive to the change of state of
332
Chapter 5
the circuit-breaker/contactor, i.e., from open to close,
and vice-versa, are activated directly by the switchgear
closing mechanism. Likewise, those contacts responsive
to the service and disconnected states of the switch-
gear are driven directly by the mechanism employed to
select the service/disconnected conditions. However,
the number of auxiliary contacts available so driven
by the operating mechanisms of present designs of
switchgear is limited. Accordingly, single-pole swkching
is generally the rule, arranged at present as follows:
• In the connection to the positive pole of systems
having the mid-point earthed.
• In the connection to the negative (i.e., live) pole
of the supply in control circuits having the positive
pole earthed.
• In the connection to the hve (i.e., unearthed) pole
of the supply in A C control circuits.
Thus is preserved, in control circuhry, the basic con­
vention of fusing and switching in the l i v e ' lead. In
the case of mid-point earthing, the choice of pole to be
fused and switched is arbitrary — both poles being at
a finite potential with respect to earth. The fusing and
switching of alarm and indication circuits is deah w h h
in Volume F .
1.5 Environment
As a general rule, the switchgear is grouped into
multi-circuit switchboard formations, accommodated
in purpose built switchrooms. Exceptions are plant-
mounted items such as the control gear built into some
designs of valve and other actuators. The switchrooms
should provide an environment in which the ambient
temperature is held between + 1 0 ° C and + 4 0 ° C —
the upper limit being subject to an average value not
exceeding 35°C over a 24-hour period — and the re­
lative humidity should not exceed 7 0 % whilst the
switchgear is energised. Except for main circuit termi­
nals, i.e., those terminals to which cabling external to
the switchgear are connected, the upper limh of 40°C
permits exploitation of the limits of temperature rise
allowed by l E C Standards for switchgear. The tem­
perature rise of main circuit terminals is held to a
maximum of 50°C out of the necessity to limit the
ultimate operating temperature to a value acceptable
for elastomeric insulated cables. It is also necessary to
ensure that the environment, particularly in the case
of air-insulated gear, is substantiahy free of pollution
by dust (especially from concrete surfaces), smoke,
corrosive or flammable gases and vapours. Should
there be circumstances necessitating the location of
switchgear in ambient temperatures higher than cited
above, the assigned fuh-load current rating is reduced
to the value necessary to limit the maximum tempera­
ture likely to be attained in service, i.e., the average
ambient temperature plus the permissible temperature
 General requirements

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SUPPLY SOURCE

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FiG. 5.3 Operating supplies in switchboards

333
Switchgear and controlgear
rise, to values not exceeding those prescribed for the
materials used in the construction of the swhchgear.
2 Types of switchgear
2.1 Descriptions
The types of switchgear used on auxiliaries power
systems in power stations in the UK comprise, broadly,
circuit-breaker equipment, fused contactor controlgear
and fusegear.
For the purpose of this chapter, the following de­
finitions have been adopted:
Circuit-breaker A mechanical switching device capa­
ble of making, carrying and breaking currents under
normal circuit conditions, and also of making, carrying
for a specified time and breaking currents under spe­
cified abnormal circuit conditions, such as those of
short-circuit.
Contactor (electrically-held) A mechanical switching
device having only one position of rest, operated other­
wise than by hand, capable of making, carrying and
breaking currents under normal conditions, including
operating overload conditions.
Contactor (latched) A mechanical switching device
operated otherwise than by hand, capable of making,
carrying and breaking currents under normal conditions,
including operating overload conditions, and fitted with
a latching device. The latching device prevents the
contactor from opening when the means of closure is
de-energised. Thus a latched contactor is deemed to
have two positions of rest. The contactor is opened
by release of the latching mechanism electrically.
Switch A mechanical switching device capable of
making, carrying and breaking currents under normal
circuit conditions, which may include specified op­
erating overload conditions, and also of carrying for a
specified time currents under specified abnormal circuit
conditions, such as those of short-circuh. It may also
be capable of making, but not breaking, short-circuit
currents.
Disconnector (isolator) A mechanical switching device
which provides, in the open position, an isolating
distance in accordance with specified requirements.
A disconnector is capable of opening and closing a
circuh when ehher negligible current is broken or
made, or when no significant change in the voltage
across the terminals of each of the poles of the dis­
connector occurs. It is also capable of carrying currents
under normal circuh conditions and of carrying for
a specified time currents under abnormal conditions.
334
Chapter 5
such as those of short-circuit. 'Neghgible currents'
imply currents such as the capacitance currents of bush­
ings, busbars, connections, very short lengths of cables
and currents of vohage transformers and dividers.
'No significant change in voltage' refers to apphcations
such as the by-passing of induction voltage regulators
or circuit-breakers.
Fuse-switch A switch in which a fuselink or fuse
carrier with fuselink forms the moving contact of the
switch. However, an essential requirement is that the
fusehnk shah be disconnected on both sides when the
switch is open. Thus arrangements in which the fuse-
link remains stationary during operation of the switch,
but in so doing are disconnected on both sides when
the switch is open, are generally accepted as qualifying
as fuse-switches. Indeed, there is merit is not subject­
ing the fuselink to the shock of rapid acceleration
and deceleration as is the case when mounted on the
moving element.
Almost without exception, the 11 kV switchgear is of
the circuit-breaker type. At 3.3 kV, the practice is a
httle different. Whilst circuit-breaker gear is the rule
generahy for switchboard incoming supplies, busbar
sectioning/interconnector and transformer feeders, the
bulk of m o t o r circuits, i.e., drives of u p to the order
of 1000 k W , have, since circa the mid-1960s, been
handled by fused controlgear — known widely as
'motor switching devices' (MSD). However, more re­
cently, such fused controlgear is, on occasion, used
for transformer circuhs up to 1000 kVA. Motors of
rating above 1000 kW are usually controlled by circuit-
breakers.
At lower voltages, i.e., 415 V and below, circuit-
breakers are normally employed for incoming and bus­
bar section/interconnection duty on switchboards deriv­
ing supply from higher voltage sources; fused contactor
gear and fusegear being the rule generally for motor
control and distribution respectively. Where the scheme
of protection ahows, switchboards further 'downstream'
may be fed via fuses — usually mounted in fuse-
switches — switches or disconnectors (isolators).
The reader wishing to research circuit-breaker theory
and design in depth is recommended to study 'Power
Circuit Breaker Theory and Design' pubhshed by Peter
Peregrinus Ltd.
2.2 Testing and certification
2.2.1 General
All switchgear and associated equipment is type a n d
routine tested basically to the appropriate British
Standard, varied a n d / o r augmented where necessary
to satisfy a particular service requirement.
Type tests are performed on one switchgear equip­
ment of each type and rating, erected for the service

specified, but without the connection of external cabl­
ing. Essentially, the type testing demonstrates achieve­
ment of the specified 'rated values' in the following
areas:
• Short-circuit withstand.
• The making and breaking of current under both
normal and short-circuit conditions.
• Temperature rise in normal operation.
• Mechanical/electrical endurance.
• Dielectric (insulation) properties.
Additionally, for swhchgear in nuclear safety related
systems, testing is carried out to determine the ability
to withstand prescribed levels of seismic event, i.e.,
earthquakes. Essentially, the switchgear must be de­
monstrated to be capable of withstanding, for a defined
period — presently of the order of 10 s — horizontal
and vertical 'floor' motion whilst performing any duty,
e.g., an opening or closing operation on c o m m a n d ,
maintaining an open or closed condition, required in
the course of a reactor safe shutdown procedure.
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show typical response spectra which
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.80.91.0 4 5
FREQUENCY. Hz
FIG. 5.4 Horizontal response spectra
Types of switchgear
the 'shaker' table, on which the equipment is mounted
for test, must simulate.
2.2.2 Certification
Wherever possible, types tests are carried out in ac­
cordance with the procedure defined in the relevant
Standard. However, the values of the test quantities
(e.g., current and voltage) may be varied from those
prescribed in the Standard to satisfy a particular per­
formance requirement. A point to be noted in this
respect concerns the issue by Testing Authorities such
as A S T A Certification Services in the UK, and the
K E M A Organisation in The Netherlands, of certifica­
tion of performance. The necessary documentation is
normally provided in the form of a Certificate (of
rating) or a Report of Performance. A n example of
the front sheet of a Certificate of Short Circuit Rating
issued by the A S T A is shown in Fig 5.6.
Certificate
A Certificate comprises a record of type tests strictly
in accordance with a recognised national or interna­
tional Standard. It certifies that the equipment tested
6 7 8 9 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 8090100
335
Switchgear and controlgear
7 8
FREQUENCY, Hz
FIG. 5.5 Vertical response spectra
has satisfied the requirements of the Standard and,
by so doing, the ratings assigned by the manufacturer
are endorsed by the Testing Authority.
Report of Performance
A Report of Performance comprises a record of tests
carried out in accordance with the instructions of the
chent — usually the equipment manufacturer. Reports
of Performance are commonly issued to cover tests
which, whilst they may have been carried out in ac­
cordance with the procedure prescribed in a recognised
Standard, featured values of test quantities differing
from those specified in the Standard.
2.2.3 Type tests
A particular departure from the requirements for type
testing specified in the relevant Standard for 3.3 kV
and 11 kV circuit-breakers (i.e., BS5311) concerns the
number of operations to be performed during the
'mechanical' test. Here, the number of operating cycles
specified presently is 2000, as opposed to the Standard
requirement for 1000. It is expected that an even higher
level of 'endurance' will be achieved by the designs
of vacuum and S F 6 circuit-breakers now under de­
336
Chapter 5
9 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
velopment. Essentially, the number of cycles of opera­
tions demonstrated for the test is taken as indication
of the frequency with which routine servicing should
be undertaken.
The type testing of circuit-breakers for electrical
performance, i.e., current making and breaking capa­
bility, centres around the 'basic short-circuit test duties'
and 'critical current tests' specified in BS5311 in the
case of high voltage equipment, and the tests for
'verification of rated short-circuit making and break­
ing capacities' specified in BS4752 for lower vokage
gear.
The object of the testing is to prove the current
making, breaking and carrying capability at any value
of current u p to and including the rated capacity at
prescribed values of power factor, apphed voltage,
transient recovery voltage (TRV) and power frequency
recovery vokage. Obviously the severity of the short-
circuit and normal conditions of the system in which
the switchgear is to be installed must fall within the
proven capability.
Short-circuit test series
For the purpose of defining the short-circuit capability,
and hence the suitability of a particular design in a
 T y p e s of switchgear

Ratir>g Certificate No.

ASTA The Association of Short-Circuit Testing Authorities

(Incorporated in the year 1938) 8 Leicester Street London WC2

Certificate of Short-Circuit Rating 7227_*.

Short- Circuit Type Tested in accordance with §?lí.Í.?ÍÍ_.?laífdard . ^ ^ ^

( w i t h amendmentß)

Rated Voltage Max. Rated Normal Currant. 1600

Tested for Switchgear L i m i t e d . Liverpool.

Designation ^^...5Z _ - Serial No

The apparatus, constructed in accordance with the description, drawings and photographs and
attached hereto, has been subjected by
Switchgear Testing Company Limited.
to a complete series of proving tests of its short-circuit rating which has been made, subject to any
observations in the record, in accordance with the appropriate clauses of the Specification(s).
The RESULTS ERE SHOWN IN the RECORD OF PROVING TESTS end by the oecillograms seeled end etteched herato. The
VALUES OBTAINED AND THE GENERAL performance ARE considered to justify the Short-Circuit Rating neigned by the manufac­
TURER, as STATED below.

Breaking-capacity at 11·.- kV. Making-capacity /13^ -kA. peak a t l l - ^ k V .

Symmetrical 52.6 KA. Short-time current capacity kA.

1000
(Equivalem to RVVVA.) for 3-0 seconds.

Asymmetrical KA.

Duty .^"3 -...^.-.3.5^in --

THIS CERTIFICATE APPLIES only TO THE SHORT CIRCUIT PERFORMARTCE OF APPARATUS made to THE same apeciftcation and having the
SARNE ESSENTIAL DETAILS AS THE APPARATUS TESTED.

The documents under seal forming part of this Certificate are:

(1) RECORD OF PROVING TESTS SHEETS NOS * ^2.

(2) OSCILLOGRAMS NOS. "^^.^^.l^^ 28 i t e m i z e d on s h e e t N o . 1.·

(3) DRAWINGSNOS L L . 5 ? C 1 . M . 10122; LL.53Cl/lOl28; LL.5312/3787; LL.S398.A.IOI25.

(4) D.AGRAMSNOS. ^^^^; D77;.D81; D98.

PHOTOGRAPHS NOS. ^ P . 5 5 3 3 1 - SP.55356; SP.55607; SP.55609 - SP.55615.

EXA D

Manager
•R T M t i n g CompM^r LIMITED

..ASTA Observer
t OF SHORT-CLNWIT TOSTINO As

Secretary

The conditions under which this ^rtificate may be repro­

Date i'^^'ÖcAvCt'.- . ^ C f 7 ^ , duced are governed by Clause 16 of ASTA Publication No.

2—Conditions for Test Work'.

F I G . 5.6 Example of the front sheet of a certificate of short-circuit rating of a busbar system, issued by the A S T A
(GEC Installation Equipment Ltd)

337
S w i t c h g e a r and controlgear
given application, circuit-breakers are assigned a 'rated
operating sequence'. BS5311 recognises t w o , viz:
(a) O-i-CO-r-CO
(b) CO-r-CO
where O represents an opening operation, CO repre­
sents a closing operation fohowed immediately (i.e.,
without any intentional time delay) by an opening
operation, /' and t" are time intervals between
successive operations.
The intervals /, t' and t" are indicative of the period
of time which should be allowed t o elapse before a
circuit-breaker is called upon t o repeat the clearance
of short-circuit current. Similarly, the assigned rated
operating sequence is indicative of the capability of
the circuit-breaker to clear successfully repeated short-
circuits without inspection/maintenance.
If, in sequence 0-/-CO-r-CO, the time intervals are
not specified, then:
• r = 3 min for circuit-breakers not intended for
rapid auto-reclosing.
• t = 0.3 s for circuit-breakers intended for rapid
auto-reclosing (dead time).
• /' = 3 min.
In sequence CO-r'-CO, t" = 15 s for circuit-breakers
not intended for rapid auto-reclosing.
The rated operating sequence deemed appropriate
for power station switchgear is O-i-CO-r-CO, with time
intervals t and /' both nominally 3 min but not less
than 2 min. In general, there is no requirement for
auto-reclosure, faults of short-circuit magnitude on
power station systems are unlikely to be of a transient
nature.
The basic short-circuit test series to BS5311 consists
of the following test duties:
Test duty I Test duty 1 consists of the rated operating
sequence confined to breaking operations only at 10%
of the rated short-circuit breaking current with a DC
component of less than 2 0 % .
Test duty 2 Test duty 2 consists of the rated operating
sequence confined to breaking operations only at 3 0 %
of the rated short-circuit breaking current with a DC
component of less than 2 0 % .
Test duty 3 Test duty 3 consists of the rated operating
sequence confined t o breaking operations only at 6 0 %
of the rated short-circuit breaking current with a DC
component of less than 2 0 % .
Test duty 4 Test duty 4 consists of the rated operating
sequence with the following characteristic quantities:
338
Chapter 5
• Breaking operations — breaking current: 100% of
the rated breaking current, i.e, the R M S value of
the symmetrical rated breaking current.
• Making operations — making current: 100% of the
rated short-circuit making current.
For this test duty the percentage D C component must
not exceed 2 0 % of the A C component.
When the characteristics of the test plant are such
that it is impossible to carry out test duty 4 within
the specified hmits of apphed vohage, making current,
breaking current, and transient and power frequency
recovery voltage, taking account also of the limits
apertaining to the time interval / between tests, the
making and breaking tests in test duty 4 may be made
separately as follows:
• Test duty 4a : making tests. C-i-C where the rated
operating sequence is 0-/-CO-r-CO, at 100% of the
rated short-circuit making current.
• Test duty 4b : breaking tests. O-t-O-t-O where the
rated operating sequence is 0 - / - C O - r - C O , at 100%
of the rated short-circuit breaking current.
When test duty 4 is performed as 4a and 4b it is
necessary, additionally, to demonstrate a 'make break'
(CO) capability at values of voltage and current as near
to the rated values as is practicable for the test plant.
Test duty 5 Test duty 5 consists of the rated operating
sequence confined to breaking operations only at 100%
of the rated short-circuit breaking current, with a spe­
cified percentage D C component (see Fig 5.24). As
stated previously, a D C component of 5 0 % is specified
for switchgear for use in C E G B power stations.
Critical current tests
The critical current of a switching device is a value
of breaking current, less than the rated short-circuit
breaking current, at which the arcing time is a maxi­
m u m , and is significantly longer than that at the rated
short-circuit breaking current. T h e manifestation of
critical current, t o a greater or lesser extent, is a feature
of switching devices in which the efficacy of the arc
extinguishing mechanism is a function of the value
of the current interrupted, i.e, the efficacy increases
as the current increases, a n d vice-versa. Circuit-breakers
of the air-break type, i.e, circuit-breakers in which
interruption of the arc takes place in air nominally
at atmospheric pressure, are particularly prone t o this
behaviour. T h e problem in air circuit-breakers stems
from the inability of arcs of relatively low current
value t o rise properly in the arc chutes, for reasons
of thermal a n d / o r magnetic effect. T h e situation is
markedly improved by the expedient of directing a
' p u f f of relatively low pressure air into the arc chute,
beneath the arc; this ' p u f f of air itself being derived

usually from the circuh-breaker moving contacts
damping mechanism.
Tests for critical current are made on circuit-breakers
likely to exhibit such characteristic at values of cur­
rent less than 10% of the rated short-circuh breaking
current. It is assumed that this is so if the average of
the arcing times in test duty 1 is significantly greater
than that in test duty 2.
Single-phase short-circuit tests
In addition to the above tests for short-circuit current
making and breaking capability, for designs of circuit-
breaker in which the contact systems of the three
poles are coupled mechanically and provided with a
common opening release, it must be demonstrated that
the circuit-breaker is capable of breaking in an outer
pole a current of not less than 100% of the rated break­
ing current. This test is necessary to show that the
operation is not affected adversely by the unbalanced
forces produced.
Short-time current test
A short-time current test is carried out to demonstrate
the capability of the switchgear to carry, for hs 'rated
duration of short-circuit', a current of not less than
its rated breaking current; the peak value of the first
major loop of the test current being not less than that
of the rated making current.
The principal type tests applied to the designs of
fused equipment covered in Section 6 of this chapter,
are described in the following paragraphs.
Switching device in combination with fuselinks —
Test duties 1, 2 and 3 in accordance with Pubhcation
N o 22 of the Association of Short-Circuit Testing
Authorities in the UK, an Organisation now incorpo­
rated under the name of A S T A Certification Services.
Test duty 1 This test duty is an 0 - / - C 0 sequence in
a three-phase circuit having prospective symmetrical
and peak currents not less than 100% of the rated
short-circuit values of the switching device in com­
bination with its fusehnks — the latter being fitted in
all three phases. This test is carried out to verify that
the complete switchgear assembly is capable of with­
standing the cut-off current of the fuselinks, and that
the striker pins incorporated in the fuselinks initiate
opening of the switching device correctly.
Test duty 2 This test duty is an 0 - / - C 0 sequence in
a three-phase circuit, with fuselinks fitted in all phases,
having a prospective current approximating to that
producing maximum arc energy within the fuselinks.
This test is carried out to demonstrate that the com­
plete switchgear assembly is capable of withstanding
the maximum energy ( P t ) let-through of the fuse-
links.
Types of switchgear
Test duty 3 This test duty comprises one O-operation
on an outer pole, and repeated on the other outer
pole, w h h fusehnks fitted in all poles, in a single-
phase circuit having a prospective current not less than
the rated short-circuit breaking current of the switch­
ing device in combination with its fusehnks. The test
is performed to further verify that the complete swhch­
gear assembly is capable of withstanding the cut-off
current of the fusehnks, and that the striker pins in­
corporated in the fuselinks initiate opening of the
switching device correctly.
For the purpose of demonstrating the rated making
and breaking current capability of the switching device
in high voltage fused equipment the switching device
itself is subjected to the series of short-circuh type
tests applied to 3.3 and 11 kV circuit-breakers. This
procedure proves:
• The adequacy of the current making and breaking
capability, having regard to the value at which the
series-connected fusehnks 'take-over' the clearance
of fault current.
• The capability of the device to function as a circuit-
breaker in a system, the fault level of which is within
the rated breaking current capacity of the device,
i.e., back-up fuse protection is not necessary.
Additionally, the switching device is subjected to the
tests for verification of rated making and breaking cur­
rents prescribed in BS775: P a r t 2: 1974: Clause 8.2.4
for Utilisation Category A C 4 . However, the value of
the test current specified in the BS to prove the mini­
m u m rated breaking current — a value equal to 2 0 %
of the m a x i m u m rated breaking current — may well
not be low enough to demonstrate satisfactorily the
behaviour if required to interrupt the load current of
the smaller motors when 'running hght'. Accordingly,
the 25 opening operations specified in the BS to prove
the rated minimum breaking current are carried out
at a value of between 5 and 10 A .
Earthing switches are type tested in accordance with
BS5253 to prove the rated short-circuh current making
and carrying capability; also the specified mechanical
endurance. There is no breaking current requirement.
Except for the circuit earthing device built into fused
equipment in 3.3 kV systems, the short-circuit current
making and carrying capability, i.e., the short-time
rating, must be not less than that of the system switch-
gear. The circuit earthing device in fused equipment in
3.3 kV systems is required to be capable of making a
current of not less than the maximum peak value of
the short-circuit current of the system, but with the
time element of the short-time current reduced from the
'standard' 3 s to 0.2 s.
Switchgear and controlgear at all operational volt­
ages is subjected to temperature rise tests to prove
the rated normal current capabihty. A d d h i o n a h y , in
the case of fused switching device equipment operating
in 3.3 kV systems, a test is performed to demonstrate
339
Switchgear and controlgear
that the switchgear is capable of carrying for two
minutes, without damage, a current equivalent to six
times the rated normal current. This test is apphed
to ensure that the switchgear has sufficient thermal
capacity to handle the starting current of direct-on-hne
started motors for the longest run-up time likely to be
encountered.
As has been indicated, type testing is carried out
on the switchgear assembled substantially as it will
appear in service, albeit without the connection of
service cabhng. Thus the individual component parts,
particularly busbar systems and main circuit elements,
e.g., the circuk switching device and circuit isolating
facility, are tested so assembled.
With few exceptions to date, all low vohage circuit-
breaker equipment, particularly in 415 V systems, is
designed, constructed and type tested basically to
BS3659: Specification for heavy duty air-break circuit-
breakers for A C systems. Consequent upon the pubh­
cation of BS4752: Specification for switchgear and
controlgear for vohages up to and including 1000 V A C
and 1200 V D C Part 1: 1977: Circuit-breakers, which
Standard is itself identical to l E C Publication 1 5 7 - 1 :
1973, BS3659 was withdrawn.
The requirements of BS3659 are, in certain respects,
more appropriate in the case of equipment for power
station applications. However, it is policy to work to
current Standards wherever possible. Thus, new de­
velopments in this field are subjected basically to
the electrical and mechanical type tests prescribed in
BS4752: Part 1, augmented by the fohowing:
• A three-phase short-circuit breaking test compris­
ing an 0 - / - 0 - Γ - 0 sequence at a value of current not
less than 100% of the rated symmetrical breaking
current, plus a D C component in one phase at the
instant of contact separation of not less than 5 0 %
of the peak value of the rated symmetrical breaking
current. The method of determination of breaking
currents is illustrated in Fig 5.24. Demonstration of
this capabihty is necessary because the waveform
of short-circuit current close to the source of genera­
tion can exhibit significant asymmetry for a number
of cycles after fauh inception.
• A single break test at a value of current not less
than 100% of the rated symmetrical breaking cur­
rent, at the appropriate phase-to-neutral voltage,
applied to an outer pole. This demonstrates that
the operation of the circuit-breaker is not affected
adversely by the unbalanced forces produced.
Main circuit contactors in contactor controlgear as-
sembhes are, in addition to the type tests prescribed in
BS5424: Part 1, subjected to the second test detailed
in Clause 8.2.7 of BS5419, i.e., a current making test,
for the specified prospective short-circuit current. For
this test, and for the through-fauh test prescribed for
the contactor in BS5486: Part 1: Clause 8.2.3.2.3,
welding of the contacts is not deemed a failure pro­
340
Chapter 5
vided that no flashover occurs. This demonstrates
the capabihty of the circuit assembly (functional unit)
to close o n t o , and carry until operation of the circuit
short-circuit protective device — usually fuselinks —
any value of fauh current consequent u p o n short-circuit
anywhere on the load side of the circuit short-circuit
protective device.
Similarly, the through-fault and making current
tests prescribed in BS5419 for the circuit (functional
unit) disconnecting (isolating) device — usually a fuse-
switch — demonstrates the capability of that device
to close o n t o , and to carry until operation of the cir­
cuit short-circuit protective device, any value of fault
current arising from short-circuit anywhere on the load
side of the circuit short-circuit protective device.
The busbar systems of swhchboard formations of
low voltage switchgear are tested for short-circuit with­
stand strength generally in accordance with the pro­
cedures prescribed in BS5486.
3 Generator voltage switchgear
3.1 Required performance
By the late 1940s, the 'unit' principle had become the
accepted pattern of the electromechanical design of
power stations in the UK, where the main generator is
connected directly to the lower voltage terminals of a
generator transformer. T h u s , for operational purposes,
the generator and generator transformer operate as an
electrically inseparable entity.
Whilst station transformers are supplied at 132 kV
from the National Grid system wherever practicable,
this voltage level is not available at all power station
sites. The high cost of switchgear and transformers
at the alternative vohages of 275 kV and 400 kV has
encouraged consideration of arrangements which, whilst
preserving the essential features of 'unit' operation,
would reduce the requirement for plant at these higher
voltages. An obvious approach is the abandonment
of conventional station transformers, together with
their attendant switchgear, and the allocation of their
duty to a combination of the Unit and Generator
Transformer associated with each main generator. This
concept, illustrated in Fig 5.7, necessitates the pro­
vision of means for disconnecting the generator at a
point between its terminals and the unit transformer(s)
tee-off connections. However, apart from issues of
cost, the provision of such a disconnection facility can
offer significant advantages operationally, particularly
in nuclear installations.
The performance required of the means of discon­
nection is governed by operational needs. The minimum
capabihty of practical usefulness is synchronising the
generator, the interruption of full-load current and
the provision of an isolating facility — a duty calling
for a switch disconnector. In essence, a switch dis-
 Generator voltage switchgear

bility of a switch disconnector as outlined above,

TRANSMISSION the ability to interrupt fault currents of short-circuit
SYSTEM
magnitude.
Wherever possible, the relevant design accords with
the principles of British Standards 5311 and 5227.
HIGH VOLTAGE
CIRCUIT BREAKER The first installations within the C E G B of generator
voltage switchgear were those at its Hartlepool and
Heysham 1 nuclear power stations, and its Dinorwig
pumped-storage project. The concept has also been
GENERATOR
\ TRANSFORMER
accepted for Heysham 2 and by the South of Scotland
Electricity Board (SSEB) for the Torness and Inverkip
power stations.
T o meet the system electrical parameters at the
C E G B stations, the switchgear is rated as follows:
GENERATOR
, CIRCUIT
f BREAKER
Hartlepool and Heysham 1 (generator MCR 660 MW)
UNIT Rated voltage (operational) 23 kV
URANSFORMERS
Rated normal current 19.5 k A

MAIN Rated short-circuit breaking current

GENERATOR
Symmetrical 120 kA

L UNIT
SWITCHBOARDS
Asymmetrical
Rated short-circuit making current
150 kA
400 kA peak
FIG. 5.7 The configuration of unit/generator Rated duration of short-circuit 3 s
transformers and generator circuit-breaker used as an
alternative to the station transformer arrangement
Dinorwig (maximum capability, when generating,
313 MW)
connector is capable of making, carrying and breaking
Rated voltage (operational) 18 kV
currents under normal circuit conditions — which may
include specified operating overload conditions — and Rated normal current 11.5 kA
also of carrying currents under specified abnormal Rated short-circuit breaking current
circuit conditions, such as those of short-circuit, for
Symmetrical 105 kA
a specified time. It may also be capable of making,
but not breaking, short-circuit currents. Additionally, Asymmetrical 158 kA
it provides (when open) an isolating distance between Rated short-circuit making current 315 kA peak
the terminals of each pole. T h u s , a switch disconnector
Rated duration of short-circuit 1 s
used to disconnect a generator at generator terminal
voltage must be capable of:
Heysham 2 (generator MCR 660 MW)
• Making, breaking and carrying continuously any Rated voltage (operational) 23.5 kV
value of current at any value of power factor u p
to the maximum load capability of the generator, Rated normal current 20.1 kA
i.e, full-load, plus a specified overload, if required. Rated short-circuit breaking current

• Carrying for a specified period of time, e.g., one Symmetrical 130 kA

second, a specified value of fault (short-circuit)
current.
• Synchronising the generator, including the making,
but not breaking, of fault current arising from clo­
sure under out-of-phase conditions.
However, present thinking within the C E G B tends
towards the use of a circuit-breaker, as this permits
the clearance of electrical faults in the generator with­
out disturbance of power supply to the unit auxiliaries.
A circuit-breaker used to switch a generator at gen­
erator terminal voltage has, in addition to the capa­
Asymmetrical 170 kA
Rated short-circuit making current 400 kA peak
Rated duration of short-circuit 1 s
In addition to the basic performance outlined above, it
is necessary to demonstrate the ability of the switchgear
to deal satisfactorily with out-of-phase current switch­
ing and generator pole-sHpping situations; also, that it
does not cause unacceptable overvoltage when switch­
ing capacitive and transformer magnetising currents.
It will be appreciated that the rated operational volt­
ages listed above are the values for which the short-

341
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

circuit performance of the switchgear is vahd. How­

ever, to meet the standard of integrhy required of the
LOWVALUE I
insulation of the switchgear/generator main connec­ RESISTOR I
ASSEMBLY
tions combination, the following levels are specified:

Rated impulse-withstand to earth 170 kV peak

Rated impulse withstand voltage across
the disconnector in the open position
(isolating distance) 195 kV peak
AUXILIARY
INTERRUPTER \>
Rated power frequency (one minute)
withstand vohage to earth 70 kV RMS I
- 1

Rated power frequency (one minute) AUXILIARY vv

Μ
NON-LINEAR
RESISTOR
INTERRUPTER X
withstand voltage across the (2)

disconnector in the open position

(isolating distances) 80 kV RMS SYSTEM

-Χ­
MAIN SERIES
INTERRUPTER DISCONNECTOR
MAIN

3.2 Design and construction GENERATOR

FIG. 5.8 Diagrammatic arrangement of a multistage

3.2.1 General
The switchgear is of indoor-type construction intended
specifically for connection directly into phase-isolated
systems of generator main connections in a manner
designed to preserve the principle of phase isolation
described in Chapter 4: Generator Main Connections.
Each pole of each three-phase assembly comprises an
interrupter system connected in series with a discon­
nector (isolator). The series disconnector is necessary
to provide the switchgear Open' condition as, in the
quiescent state, the interrupter system remains closed
— opening, and remaining so, only for so long as
is necessary to complete the process of arc extinction
when interrupting the circuit, and to ensure against
establishing current flow by the disconnector when
closing the circuit. The disconnector also provides an
isolating distance in free air, when open. The swkchgear
may, therefore, be used to isolate the generator elec­
trically, provided that precautions are taken in the
design of the scheme of control to safeguard against
closure inadvertently when so employed.
As already indicated, the interrupter in each pole
comprises, essentially, a system of current making and
breaking contacts, housed in an arcing chamber and
connected in series with a disconnector. In its most
basic form, the unit has a current breaking capabi­
lity limiting its application to that of a switch discon­
nector, i.e., capable of load switching but not fault
clearance. To increase the capability to that of a circuit
breaker (the present requirement in C E G B installa­
tions), low ohmic value resistors and auxihary inter­
rupters are connected across the main interrupter to
produce a two or three stage interruption process. The
principle is illustrated in Fig 5.8. The process of inter­
ruption takes place sequentially as follows:
interruption process
(b) Greatly reduced current flows through the low
value resistor assembly, the resistors damping the
transient recovery voltage (TRV) which appears
across the main interrupter.
(c) The current through the resistors is interrupted
by the auxiliary interrupters.
Note: Whether or not the auxiliary interrupters (1)
and (2) open together (two stage interruption), or (1)
before (2) (three stage interruption), depends upon the
magnitude of the recovery voltage across the main
interrupter. With low values of recovery voltage, the
auxiliary interrupters open simultaneously; with high
values, (1) precedes (2), the recovery vohage across the
circuit-breaker being damped by the low value resistor
assembly. A high value non-hnear resistor connected
across auxiliary interrupter (2) damps any overvoltage
arising from the interruption of low value inductive
current.
(d) The series disconnector opens, interrupting any
residual current flowing through the non-linear
resistor.
(e) The main and auxihary interrupters close.
The circuit-breaker is now open.
Closure of the circuit-breaker involves the following
sequence:
• Main and auxihary interrupters open.
• Series disconnector closes.
• Main and auxiliary interrupters close.

(a) Main interrupter opens and an axial blast of air In the matter of mechanical design, the main inter­
extinguishes the arc. rupters, which at rest take up the closed position, are

342

basically of the butt type in which the moving element
presents a hemispherical face to the hollow conical
surface of the fixed contact. When opening, the axial
air blast flows over the surface of the moving contact
and through a circular orifice in the centre of the fixed
contact, see Fig 5.9.
FIXED MOVING
CONTACT CONTACT AIR BLAST FLOW
INTERRUPTER INTERRUPTER
CLOSED OPEN
FIG. 5.9 Diagrammatic arrangement of a
main interrupter
The contact system of the series disconnector com­
prises a telescopic arrangement in which a cylindrical
drum contact moves axiahy to bridge two sets of fixed
clusters of finger type contacts arranged in a circular
formation, see Fig 5.10.
FIXED MOVING
CONTACT CLUSTERS CONTACT DRUM
DISCONNECTOR DISCONNECTOR
CLOSED OPEN
FIG. 5.10 Diagrammatic arrangement of a
series disconnector
The switchgear is operated by compressed air, the
circuit interrupters utilising the air-blast principle. The
poles of each three-phase unit are connected pneuma­
tically to operate simultaneously; there is no mecha­
nical interconnection across the poles. Each pole is
provided with a discrete unit air receiver, charged at the
switchgear operating pressure from a higher pressure
storage system. The capacity of each unit air receiver
is sufficient for one close/open cycle of operation
without replenishment from the high pressure store.
Whilst the interrupter system of the switchgear at
Dinorwig features one 'break' per pole for the elec­
trical performance required, that for Hartlepool and
Heysham 1 necessitated, at the time of placing the
order, a double-break arrangement. However, develop­
ment since has produced a single-break concept of com-
Generator voltage switchgear
parable capability. Accordingly, the design accepted for
Heysham 2 uses this arrangement.
3.2.2 Control
Control of the switchgear is electropneumatic, i.e,
operation is inhiated by electrical activation of the
pneumatic system. Each three-pole switchgear assem­
bly is provided with a 'local' control panel of the
free-standing cubicle pattern equipped with facilities
for b o t h local (at the panel) and remote control —
selection of the method of control being made at the
panel. Because of the noise of operation, personnel
must wear ear protection near the panel when the
switchgear is operational. This is an important con­
sideration in the shing of the control panels. Examples
of generator circuit-breakers are shown in Figs 5.11,
5.12 and 5.13. Figure 5.14 illustrates a circuit-breaker
control panel.
3.2.3 Cooling
The load current carrying duty of the switchgear
necessitates forced cooling. The rating involved at
Hartlepool and Heysham 1 and 2 requires a water
system, whereas a forced-air scheme suffices for the
much lower load current capability involved at Dinor­
wig. In the former arrangement, de-ionised water is cir­
culated in a closed circuh through the swhchgear phase
conductors via a raw-water cooled heat exchanger.
In the forced-air concept, the air in each pole enclo­
sure is circulated by fan through an air cooled heat
exchanger in such a manner as to leave that in the gen­
erator main connection trunkings largely uninvolved.
Whereas in forced-air cooled installations each pole is
deah with individually — the equipment is an integral
part of the enclosure structure — the plant for water
cooled switchgear is provided on the basis of one
discrete unit per three-phase assembly. P u m p capacity
in the latter is provided on the basis of two 100%
units per plant. Typical arrangements of water cooling
plant are shown in Figs 5.15 and 5.16.
3.2.4 Operating air plant
The switchgear operating air plant is reserved wholly
for that duty; it supphes n o other station services.
The capacity/rating of the high pressure storage/
compressor plant is determined by the number of op­
erations of the switchgear to be 'stored', the length
of time ahowable for the restoration of the H P system
to service pressure after a given discharge duty and the
requirement that a compressor shall, at each start, run
for a period sufficient to attain an acceptable working
temperature.
The Hartlepool and Heysham 1 projects are the
first modern C E G B stations to feature the switching
of main generators at generator terminal voltage. In
these essentially base-load stations, the switchgear is
called u p o n to switch relatively infrequently in normal
343
Switchgear and controlgear
FIG. 5 . 1 1 Two poles (of a three-phase group) of a forced-air cooled generator circuit-breaker installed at Dinorwig
pumped-storage power station (British Brown-Boveri Ltd)
(see also colour photograph between pp 496 and 497)
service. The high pressure storage/compressor plant
is, therefore, rated primarily to satisfy the needs of
switchgear commissioning initiahy, and of re-commis­
sioning after overhauls. The present practice in base-
load installations (Heysham 2 is a current example)
is provision of air plant on the basis of:
(a) A dual-pressure system in which air is stored in
duphcate groups of high pressure receivers, from
which it is fed at lower pressure to the switchgear
local (unit) receivers.
(b) One compressor plant per group of H P receivers,
connected and controlled so that:
• Each compressor can supply either or
groups of H P receivers.
• Either compressor may be selected to 'run' or
'standby' when connected to supply both groups
of H P receivers.
• Both compressors can be run in parallel to
supply either or both groups of receivers.
(c) High pressure storage of the order of 5-close/
open cycles of operation of one 3-pole switchgear
equipment without assistance from the compressor
plant.
344
Chapter 5
(d) Compressor capacity, i.e, both compressors run­
ning in parallel, capable of restoration to service
pressure of the H P system after charging of the
air receivers of one 3-pole switchgear equipment
from atmospheric to operating pressure in a peri­
od of the order of 3 hours. Such compressor ca­
pacity is also capable of replacing the air drawn
from the H P storage in IVi to 2 h running time
in a 5-close/open switchgear operating duty.
It should be explained that the ratio of 'high' pres­
sure storage to 'operating' pressure is sufficient to
ensure that expansion from one to the other results
in the supply of acceptably dry air to the switchgear.
both
The high pressure storage, and switchgear operating
pressures are:
Hartlepool High pressure storage 60 bar nominal
and Heysham /: Switchgear operating pressure 30 bar nominal
Dinorwig and High pressure storage 150 bar nominal
Heysham 2: Switchgear operating pressure 30 bar nominal
The normal operating regime at Dinorwig pumped-
storage power station entails a much heavier consump­
tion of switchgear operating air than at Hartlepool
and Heysham. These demands are supplied from three

FIG. 5.12 One pole of a forced-air cooled generator circuit-breaker, with side covers and the connection to generator
busbar removed (British Brown-Boveri Ltd)
(see also colour photograph between pp 496 and 497)
separate (though interconnectable) dual-pressure com­
pressor/storage plants, i.e, one plant per two g e n e r a t o r /
motor machines, each plant comprising high pressure
storage feeding a lower pressure switchgear operating
system. The principle of storage at *high pressure' and
switchgear operation at a lower value, is basically as
for Hartlepool and Heysham 1 and 2 .
The air storage capacity provided for Dinorwig
overall, permits switching of the circuit-breakers, as
necessary, to achieve the following station operating
conditions, unassisted by replenishment from the com­
pressor plant, commencing with the switchgear for
each generator-motor open, i.e., all six three-phase
circuit-breakers open:
• Back-to-back starting of one machine in the p u m p ­
ing mode by another in the generating m o d e , cul­
minating in a *five machines pumping' condition.
• Changeover to generation of the five machines
pumping, i.e., all machines now operating in the
generating m o d e .
• Stopping all six machines.
Generator voltage switchgear
It was assumed that operational demand could call for
the above sequence in a period as short as 45 minutes.
It is, therefore, considered representative of the hea­
viest likely consumption of air during a length of time
insufficient for make-up from the compressor plant to
be of useful significance.
The distribution of air to the switchgear receivers
in the Hartlepool, Heysham / and Dinorwig instal­
lations is by ringmain. However, the design of the
switchgear for the performance required for Heysham
2 demands air for the closing operation at a pressure
marginally above that necessary for opening. Advan­
tage is taken of the lower value required for opening
to lessen the pressure on seals when the switchgear
stands closed, that being the predominant service con­
dition. This is achieved by automatic regulation of the
pressure of the air supply to the switchgear receivers
to suit the operating m o d e . It is, of course, essential
that the circuit-breakers be capable of operating in­
dependently, i.e., allowance must be made for one
standing closed — available for opening — whilst the
other remains open — available for closure. Thus
the operating air pressure requirement of one breaker
345
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5
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346
 Generator voltage switchgear

FIG. 5 . 1 4 Generator circuit-breaker control panel (British Brown-Boveri Ltd)

(see also colour photograph between pp 4 9 6 and 4 9 7 )

347
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

FIG. 5.15 Cooling water plant (British Brown-Boveri Ltd)

(see also colour photograph between pp 496 and 497)

348
 Generator voltage switchgear

CIRCUIT BREAKER POLES

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SERVICE
COOLING
WATER
HEAT EXCHANGER/
PUMP ASSEMBLY

FIG. 5.16 Cooling water plant schematic

may, at any given time, differ from that of the other.
A simple ringmain system of supply cannot satisfy such
conditions. Each unit is, therefore, supplied separately.
Figure 5.17 illustrates a typical operating air sys­
tem. Fig 5.18 an air plant control panel, Fig 5.19 a
compressor set, and Fig 5.20 a battery of high pressure
(150 bar) air storage receivers.
3.2.5 Phase-reversal disconnectors for pumped-
storage schemes
In the special case of Dinorwig pumped-storage power
station, in addition to the use of generator circuit-
breakers, disconnectors (isolators) are necessary for
phase-reversal and machine starting purposes. As with
generator circuit-breakers, the disconnectors are of
indoor type construction, designed for connection di­
rectly into the phase-isolated system of generator main
and starting busbars. Each pole of each group is driven
separately by an electric motor in normal service, but
with provision for manual operation — the latter
being intended primarily for use during maintenance.
Mechanical and electrical interlocking prevents the
simultaneous engagement of electrical and manual
drives. Electrical operation may be from the 'local'
control panel, or from a remote station, e.g., a control
r o o m — selection of the m o d e required being made
at the local panel. The facility for remote operation is,
of course, essential where the operational requirement
necessitates a scheme of automatic control. A n Open-
to-close' operation, and vice-versa, electrically, takes
approximately 5 s. The drive mechanism housing of
each pole carries mechanical flag indication of the
operated condition of each pole, i.e., Open' or *closed'.
In essence, the mechanical construction of the con­
tact system follows closely that of the series discon­
nector employed in the generator circuit-breakers at
Dinorwig, except that natural, rather than forced, air
coohng suffices.
In addition, each pole features a glazed window on
either side through which the position of the telesco­
pic contact system can be observed. Figure 5.21 depicts

349
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5
cd
Η
350
 Generator voltage switchgear

FIG. 5 . 1 8 Air plant control panel (British Brown-Boveri Ltd)

(see also colour photograph between pp 496 and 497)

a single-pole example of a disconnector with the t o p
half of the enclosure removed.
The disconnectors, although off-load 'switching' de­
vices by definition, have a capacitive current breaking
capability. For the purpose of uniformity of design and
construction, all disconnectors, wherever positioned in
the 18 kV system, have an insulation level, normal cur­
rent carrying, and short-circuit current withstand capa­
bility matching that of the generator circuit-breakers.
3.2.6 Earthing switches
A recent introduction into C E G B practice is the use
of earthing switches for the earthing, during mainte­
nance, of generators and their main connections. These
switches comprise single-pole units designed specifi­
cally for incorporation into phase-isolated systems in
such manner as to preserve the principle of 'phase-
isolation'. Each pole of a three-phase group is driven
individually by an electric m o t o r , provision being m a d e
for operation local to the switch, or from a remote
station. It can also be operated manually, primarily
during maintenance of the switch, but only when the
electrical drive is disconnected. Each pole carries a
mechanical flag indication of the contact system
position, i.e., 'open' or 'closed'.

351
 Switchgear and controlgear
FIG. 5.19 Typical air compressor set (British Brown-Boveri Ltd)
The insulation level and short-circuit current with­
stand capabilities of the switches are, of course, matched
to the requirements of the system of generator main
connections. As throughout the power station, the
earthing of main circuit (i.e., power circuit) conductors
is attended by stringent rules governing isolation and
making *dead', supported, wherever possible and prac­
ticable, by electrical and mechanical interlocking —
the latter often featuring the use of coded keys. The
earthing switches described here are so interlocked.
Each pole being operable independently allows closure
to earth sequentially. Thus, in the event of inadvertent
activation of a switch to close — an act likely only in
consequence of gross breach of C E G B Safety Rules —
the closure of that phase alone would initiate the sys­
tem earth fault protection; the fault current flow in
such an event being limited by the neutral earthing
resistor to a value within the 'making' capabihty of the
switch. Figure 5.22 shows a single-pole switch dis­
mounted, and Fig 5.23 a three-phase group connected
into a phase-isolated system of busbars.
Essentially, the switches comprise a fixed and mov­
ing contact assembly housed in a cylindrical enclosure
of insulation material, mounted in each phase of the
phase-isolated busbar system. The fixed contact is se­
352
Chapter 5
cured to the busbar, the moving contact being driven
down into engagement with it in a vertical plane. Heavy
conductors connect the mounting flange of each switch
of a three-phase group to provide a three-phase short-
circuit connected to the power station main earthing
system.
4 3.3 kV and 11 kV switchgear — circuit-
breaker equipment
4.1 Required performance
The design parameters to meet system requirements
for this switchgear are described in the following sub­
sections.
4.1.1 Rated voltage
The rated voltage is the value of voltage used to desig­
nate the switchgear and to which is related its op­
erating performance. The rated voltage indicates the
upper limit of the highest voltage of systems for which
the switchgear is intended. For polyphase systems it is
stated as the R M S value of the vohage between phases.
 3.3 k V and 11 k V switchgear — circuit-breaker equipment

FIG. 5 . 2 0 High pressure ( 1 5 0 bar) air storage receivers (British Brown-Boveri Ltd)

353
 Switchgear and controlgear
FIG. 5 . 2 1 Single-pole example of a phase-reversal disconnector, with the top half of the phase-isolated enclosure
removed and the unit in the open position (British Brown-Boveri Ltd)
Established designs, i.e., those evolved during the
currency of BS162 and BS3659, are rated 3.3 kV or
11 kV, as appropriate to the system concerned. How­
ever, in order to align with l E C Standard values,
the presently assigned ratings are 3.6 kV and 12 kV
respectively.
4.1.2 Frequency and number of phases
This switchgear is always three-phase, 50 Hz.
4.1.3 Rated insulated level
The rated insulation level is the value of the impulse
withstand voltage and the value of the power fre­
quency withstand voltage, which together characterise
the insulation of the switchgear with regard to its
ability to withstand the electric stresses.
The 'classification' of the insulation of established
designs — again those designs evolved during the
354
Chapter 5
currency of BS 162 and BS3659 — is based upon the
achievement of clearances between phases, and clear­
ances phase-to-earth to the dimensions specified in
those Standards for 'Class B', i.e., the higher of the
two classes recognised. The 'insulation level' of such
designs is determined by a combination of the specified
clearances and the ability to withstand, for one minute,
the prescribed value of test voltage. This is accepted as
equivalent to the power frequency and impulse voltage
test philosophy. The 'insulation level' of the newer
developments, i.e, designs to BS5227 and BS5311 are,
of course, proved by test in accordance with Table 1,
List 2, of BS6581: 1985 (lEC 694: 1980).
4.1.4 Rated short-time withstand current of main
and earthing circuits
The rated short-time withstand current is the RMS
value of the current which the switchgear can carry
 3.3 k V and 11 k V switchgear
FIG. 5 . 2 2 Single-pole earthing switch, dismounted
(British Brown-Boveri Ltd)
for a specified short-time under prescribed condi­
tions of use and behaviour. The present requirements
are:
• 3,3 kVsystem equipment — 26.3 kA or 43.8 kA for
3 s; corresponding to system short-circuit levels of
150 M V A and 250 M V A for 3 s, respectively (at 3.3
kV), both levels occurring in C E G B installations.
• II kV system equipment — 39.4 kA for 3 s; cor­
responding to a short-circuit level of 750 M V A for
3 s at 11 kV.
— circuit-breaker equipment
It is probable that system requirements in the future
will be adjusted to accommodate the l E C rating of
40 kA at both 3.3 kV and 11 kV, but for 3 s — the
l E C standard value of 1 s being insufficient to permit
satisfactory time grading of protection.
4.1.5 Rated peak withstand current of main and
earthing circuits
The rated peak withstand current is the peak value of
the first major loop of the rated short-time withstand
current which the switchgear can carry under pre­
scribed conditions of use and behaviour. The present
requirements are:
• 3,3 kV system equipment A value equal to 2.55
times the rated short-time withstand current, i.e.,
2.55 times the A C component of the rated short-
time withstand current. This is the traditional value
required by the older British Standards in conse­
quence of the assumption that the maximum peak
value likely to be attained by the first major loop
of short-circuit current is 1.8 times the peak value of
the symmetrical current, i.e., (1.8V2) χ RMS value
of the A C component of the short-circuit current.
The standard l E C value, it should be noted, is 2.5
times the rated short-time withstand current.
• II kV system equipment 121 k A . This, it will
be noted, is approximately three times the RMS
value of the A C component of the rated short-
time current. Whilst the standard value recognised
by the l E C and, in consequence, by present British
Standards for high voltage switchgear, is 2.5 times
the R M S value of the A C component of the short-
circuit current, those Standards concede that higher
values may be attained in certain circumstances.
Instances of such are installations in which large
gas-turbine generators are connected directly into
the 11 kV voltage system a n d / o r featuring a heavy
motor load.
4.1.6 Rated normal current
Traditionally, the rated current of circuits and busbars
is chosen from the ratings specified in BS3659, but,
again to align with l E C ratings, they are now selected
from the values hsted in BS5311. T o date, the maxi­
m u m ratings required are 2500 A at 3.3 kV, and 3150
A at 11 kV. The rated normal current is permitted to
take full advantage of the Hmits of temperature rise
of current carrying parts accepted by the l E C . However,
these values are, in the main, appreciably higher than
those allowed by the superseded British Standards.
This being so, t o minimise the risk of damage to the
insulation of the types of cable now in use, the tem­
perature rise of the terminals to which they are con­
nected is Umited to 50°C, or such lower limit as may
be specified in an apparatus specification.
355
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

FIG. 5 . 2 3 Earthing switches installed on phase-isolated generator busbars (British Brown-Boveri Ltd)

4.1.7 Rated short-circuit breaking current A D C component of 5 0 % is the 'tradhional' value

(of circuit-breakers) used in the UK for the specification of asymmetrical
breaking current capabihty. It takes into account the
• 3.3 kV system equipment: opening time of the circuit-breaker to the extent that
the X / R ratio of the system is normally not likely to
(a) Symmetrical — 26.3 kA or 43.8 kA as be so high as to present a more onerous condition at
demanded by the system he instant of contact separation. The British Standard
fault level. currently appropriate to circuh-breakers for power
station service is BS5311: 'Specification for A C circuit-
(b) Asymmetrical — as the symmetrical value
breakers of rated voltage above 1 k V — which itself
plus 5 0 % D C component.
derives from l E C Publication 56 — specifies values
• 7 7 kV system equipment: appropriate to the actual opening time of the circuit-
breaker, based on a system X / R ratio of 14. However,
(a) Symmetrical — 39.4 kA. the BS also recognises that in certain applications, e.g.,
where the X / R ratio is higher than 14, or if a circuit-
(b) Asymmetrical — as the symmetrical value
breaker is close to a generator, the percentage D C
plus 5 0 % D C component.
component of the system short-circuit current wave­
form may be higher than the value derived from the
The value 5 0 % D C specifies the magnitude of the 'curve' shown in the Standard. A more detailed treat­
displacement from zero of the horizontal axis of the ment of the significance of 'percentage D C component'
current waveform at the instant of separation of the is given in Clause 6.2 of BS5311: P a r t 2: 1976.
circuit-breaker contacts which, added to the RMS value
of the A C component of the current at that instant,
determines the asymmetrical value. 4,1.8 First-pole-to-clear factor
Figure 5.24 ihustrates the method of determination The first-pole-to-clear factor (of a three-phase system,
of breaking currents. and at the location of the circuit-breaker) is defined

356
 3 . 3 k V a n d 11 k V switchgear — circuit-breaker equipment

D'

AA' _
ENVELOPE OF CURRENT-WAVE
BB' -
CC = DISPLACEMENT OF CURRENT-WAVE ZERO-LINE AT ANY INSTANT
DD' = INSTANT OF CONTACT SEPARATION
EE' = R M S VALUE OF SYMMETRICAL CURRENT AT ANY INSTANT, MEASURED FROM C C
X = PEAK VALUE OF AC COMPONENT OF CURRENT AT INSTANT DD'
y = D C COMPONENT OF CURRENT AT INSTANT DD'
yxioo = PERCENTAGE OF THE DC COMPONENT AT INSTANT DD'
X X
Isym = SYMMETRICAL BREAKING-CURRENT OBTAINED FROM TEST RECORD =
lasym ASYMMETRICAL BREAKING-CURRENT OBTAINED FROM TEST RECORD = ^ ii^^
X
Iprosp = PROSPECTIVE BREAKING-CURRENT OBTAINED FROM A CALIBRATION RECORD FOR = - V
TIME DD' OF TEST RECORD V 2

FIG. 5 . 2 4 Determination of breaking currents

in BS5311: Part 1: 1976 (Def. 6.25) as the ratio of
the power frequency voltage between a sound phase
and the other two phases during a two-phase short-
circuit, which may or may not involve earth, at the
location of the circuit-breaker, to the phase-to-neutral
voltage which would be obtained at the same location
with the short-circuit removed.
For the purpose of testing, the first-pole-to-clear
factor is the ratio of the value of the power frequency
recovery voltage appearing across the pole in which
current is first interrupted, to the phase-to-neutral
vohage of the test circuh. For power station service,
the highest attainable ratio, viz 1.5, is used.
4.1.10 Rated duration of short-circuit
This is the m a x i m u m length of time for which the
switchgear is guaranteed to be capable of carrying a
current equivalent to hs rated breaking current. It
follows, therefore, that such is the maximum time for
which protection may be allowed to delay tripping of
the circuit-breaker on short-circuit.
4.1.11 Rated operating sequence
This is the sequence ( 0 - / - C O - r - C O ) on which the test
duties for certification of short-circuit performance
are based (see Section 2.2.3 of this chapter).

4.1.9 Rated short-circuit making current

4.2 Design and construction
• 3.3 kVsystem equipment 2.55 times the A C compo­
nent of the rated short-circuh breaking current. 4.2.1 General
• 11 kV system equipment 121 k A . The derivation of As indicated in Section 2.1 of this chapter, the inter­
the factor 2.55 at 3.3 kV, and the value 121 k A at rupter in 11 kV switchgear is invariably, by definition,
11 kV is explained in Section 4.1.5 of this chapter. a circuit-breaker, whereas at 3.3 kV it is, depending

357
Switchgear and controlgear
upon the duty, a circuit-breaker or a fused switching
device. However, whether featuring circuit-breaker or
fused switching device, the general form of design and
construction of the switchgear as a whole, together with
the operational facilities offered, are similar at both
3.3 and 11 kV. Those features pecuhar t o , and the
service performance required of, fused switching equip­
ment are deaU with in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 of this
chapter, respectively.
The switchgear is of the metalclad type, i.e., switch-
gear assemblies in metal enclosures intended to be
earthed — complete except for external connections
— and in which components are arranged in separate
compartments with metal partitions intended to be
earthed.
Essentially, metalclad switchgear has separate com­
partments for:
• Each main circuit switching device, e.g., the circuit-
breaker.
• Those components connected to one side of the
main circuit switching device, e.g., the feeder circuit.
• Those components connected to the other side of
the main circuit switching device, e.g., the busbars.
With few exceptions, the switchgear in service in C E G B
power stations features circuit-breakers or fused switch­
ing devices of the air-break type, and was designed
during the currency of British Standards BS 162 and
BS3659. However, fused switching equipment incor­
porating vacuum interrupters is gaining favour —
particularly for frequently switched circuits. The ex­
ceptions in the circuit-breaker field are the few instal­
lations — generally to be found in the older stations
— equipped with oil circuit-breakers, and sometimes
themselves of the oil and compound insulated type.
Whilst complying basically with the above Standards,
the design overall features, of necessity, a number of
operational facilities particular to power station service.
However, it should be noted that the principal British
Standards presently current in the UK for this class
of switchgear are BS5227: Specification for A C metal-
enclosed switchgear and controlgear for rated voltages
above 1 kV and up to and including 72.5 kV, and
BS5311: A C circuit-breakers of rated voltage above
1 kV — Standards based upon l E C Publications 298
and 56, respectively. The introduction of the newer
British Standards has had no significant impact upon
the performance and operational facilities required.
Hence, designs to the superseded Standards are, for all
practical purposes, accepted by the C E G B as compliant
with the current pubhcations. Nevertheless, to regu­
larise the situation, the technical requirements of pur­
chasing specifications are now couched in terms of
the current British Standards.
The switchgear is factory assembled, i.e., built-up
into complete switchboard formations in the manu­
facturer's works, albeit dismantled into transport units
for shipment to site. Each switchgear equipment, i.e..
358
Chapter 5
each circuit in a switchboard, is provided with a con­
trol and instrument panel forming an integral part of
the switchgear cubicle. Wherever possible the relays re­
quired for the protection of the circuit are mounted on
the control panel. However, where the space available
on the control panel is insufficient to accommodate
the total requirement, separate panels are provided on
which all relays associated with the circuit concerned are
mounted. That is to say, the relays specific to a parti­
cular circuit are all mounted either on the switchgear
control panel, or on a separate panel — they are not
divided between the two. Figures 5.25 to 5.31 depict
typical 11 kV and 3.3 kV switchboard formations.
4.2.2 Enclosures
Enclosures provide, when all doors and covers are
closed, protection against the approach of persons to
live parts to 'degree of protection' IP3X (see BS5227).
Additionally, they are required to afford protection
against dripping water, e.g., from condensation on
switchroom ceilings. Thus the degree of protection
provided overall is not less than IP31 to BS5490. T o
exclude also the ingress of vermin, the protection must
be independent of the fitting of closing plates or other
sealing arrangements at the point of entry of cabling
into the switchgear. Normally the cable glanding ar­
rangement adopted satisfies this requirement.
Doors and covers, the opening of which gives direct
access to main circuit conductors which may be live,
are secured by fasteners the removal of which requires
the use of tools, e.g., spanners, screwdrivers. Fasteners
designed primarily for release by the use of a coin or
similar implement are not accepted for this purpose.
Alternatively, where for the purpose of attention to
other apparatus it is necessary to gain access to com­
partments containing main circuit conductors, doors
and covers are interlocked to prevent such access unless
the main circuit conductors are de-energised. Doors and
covers for which it is permissible to provide fasteners
requiring neither tools for their release, nor involvement
in a scheme of interlocking are, where it is desired
to prevent unauthorised opening, provided with simple
locking facilities — usually padlocking.
In recognition of the stature and physical capability
of the average male in the UK, apparatus mounted on
switchgear is, wherever practicable, positioned within
the following height hmitations — measured from the
operating floor level:
Apparatus Height
Min Max
Operational controls, indicating
instruments and indications, relay
and relay manual reset facilities. *450 mm *2000 mm
Door and panel fastenings other than
those of relay panels integral with the
switchgear cubicle structure. *300 mm *2000 mm
Protective and other relays required
to be viewed from the outside of the
switchgear, but not featuring manual
operation. 450 mm 2600 mm
•Highest and lowest positions reached by an operator's hand.
3.3 kV and 11 kV switchgear — circuit-breaker equipment
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359
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

CIRCUIT
IDENTIFICATION
PLATE

ELAPSED TIME
RECORDER

OPEN/CLOSE
REMOTE/LOCAL SWITCH
SWITCH

CUBICLE
TRIP BUTTON

SECONDARY ISOLATING
CONTACTS
CLOSING LEVER

SECONDARY
ISOLATING
CONTACTS

M A I N EARTH
FIXED-CONTACT

FIG. 5.26 Interior of cubicle fitted to the type of switchboard illustrated in Fig 5.25

360
 3.3 kV and 11 kV switchgear — circuit-breaker equipment

4.2.3 Withdrawal/disconnection The means of disconnection of the circuit-breaker

from the busbars and feeder circuhs comprise off-load
Almost without exception, the switchgear is of the
plug type contacts of the self-aligning pattern, suitable
withdrawable type, i.e., the circuit-breaker is mounted
for use whilst the busbars a n d / o r feeder circuits are
upon a wheeled carriage and hence is removable in
hve. Whilst in some designs disconnection is effected
its entirety from the switchboard. This arrangement
by withdrawal of the circuit-breaker carriage, in others
provides not only a very simple and effective means of
it is achieved by the operation of off-load selectors.
disconnection (isolation) of an individual circuit from
However, in all cases a system of mechanical interlocks
the switchboard busbars, but also, by removal totally
ensures that the switchgear is locked positively in the
of the circuit-breaker from the switchboard structure,
required condition, i.e., connected for service, discon­
permits maintenance work (on the circuit-breaker) away
nected, or arranged for circuit earthing or, where ap­
from the switchboard. This latter feature is of parti­
propriate, busbar earthing. Padlocking or coded-key
cular value in that work may be carried out on the
devices are provided to permit enforcement of the
circuit-breaker outwhh the C E G B Safety Rules aper-
required operational condition. Mechanical indication
taining to work on high voltage electrical equipment.
is provided to show when the circuit-breaker is in the
Upon removal of a circuit-breaker from its opera­
'service' or 'disconnected' poshion. The indicators are
tional location it is necessary to cover the contacts by
inscribed S E R V I C E or D I S C O N N E C T E D (or ISO­
which it connects with the busbar and its circuit in the
L A T E D ) in black lettering on a white background.
switchboard. This is achieved by shutters closing over
Arrangements for isolation of the control and aux­
the busbar and circuit contacts. The shutters, which
iliary circuitry when the circuit-breaker is disconnected
must be of metal construction, are actuated automa­
(isolated) include:
tically by the process of connection and disconnection
of the circuh-breaker. Opening is by poshive drive to • Automatic disconnection of those circuits upon
minimise the risk of short-circuh upon re-entry of the disconnection of the circuh-breaker or, alternatively;
circuit-breaker into the 'service', i.e, 'connected' posi­
tion. Closing, if not poshive, must be by two inde­ • Where such disconnection is not automatic upon
pendent means — one of which may be gravity — disconnection of the circuit-breaker, purpose de­
each capable of performing the closing operation alone. signed facilities are provided to permit such dis­
The use of withdrawable circuit-breakers facilitates connection, if desired, when the circuit-breaker is
ready access to busbars and circuhs for testing pur­ disconnected.
poses. T o this end, provision is m a d e , u p o n removal
of a circuit-breaker from the switchboard, for opening However, whichever arrangement is adopted, it must
and securing open, the shutters protecting the busbar not be possible to restore the circuit-breaker to the
contacts whilst those for the circuh remain closed, and service condition, i.e., reconnect, without reconnection
vice-versa. However, the means for securing the shutters of the control and auxiliary circuits.
in the open position are cancehed automatically and
normal operation is restored upon reconnection of the 4.2.4 Electrical interlocks
circuh-breaker. Padlocking facihties are provided for
locking the shutters closed. When closed the shutters Electrical interlocks for the prevention of closure of a
provide degree of protection I P 3 X (see BS5227) against circuit-breaker are arranged to interrupt the operating
access to the busbar and circuit contacts. T o avoid risk supply to the energising contactor of solenoid closing
of mistake, the shutters are identified in accordance mechanisms, or the release coh of stored energy, e.g.,
with the following code: spring closed mechanisms, as appropriate. Mechanical
interlocks are required to be preventative, rather than
curative, i.e., they are designed to prevent, as close
Shutter Minimum as possible to the point at which manual force may
Lettering
Shutter colour Marking height of be applied, an action of improper operation, rather
colour
to BS381C lettering, mm than 'correct' the improper action. A n example of this
philosophy is the interlock provided to prevent con­
Busbar Red 537 BUSBARS White 35
nection/disconnection of a circuh-breaker, other than
Incoming Lemon 355 DANGER Red 537 35
feeder LIVE when open. Rather than initiate tripping of a closed
CABLE circuh-breaker during the execution of the action of
Circuit Lemon 355 connection/disconnection, the interlock blocks the at­
tempt positively.

Additionally, on busbar sectioning units, the section of

busbar to which each group of disconnection contacts
is connected is indicated by a white arrow on the as­
sociated shutter, pointing toward the relevant section of
busbar.
4.2.5 Coded-key devices
T o assist the enforcement of operational and safety
procedures, the switchgear is provided, where neces­
sary, with coded key-operated devices whereby:

361
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5
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Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

FRONT INSTRUMENT
CHAMBER DOOR

FIG. 5.28 Interior of cubicle fitted to the type of switchboard illustrated in Fig 5.27 shown in the 'service* position

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3.3 kV and 11 kV switchgear — circuit-breaker equipment
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 3.3 kV and 11 kV switchgear — circuit-breaker equipment
FIG. 5.31 Interior of cubicle fitted to the type of
switchboard illustrated in Fig 5.30; circuit-breaker
withdrawn, busbar and circuit shutters propped open
(a) A key is free only when the circuit-breaker (or
earthing switch) is closed in an earthing m o d e , i.e.,
to earth busbars or a circuit. Removal of the key
locks the circuit-breaker (or earthing switch) in the
closed-to-earth condition. Each earthing condition
is dealt with by a discrete device.
(b) A key, when inserted and entrapped, permits clo­
sure of the circuit-breaker — it being free only
when the circuit-breaker is open. However, at­
tempted removal of the key when the circuit-
breaker is closed must not initiate opening of the
circuit-breaker.
(c) A key when inserted and entrapped, permits the
circuit-breaker (or earthing switch) to be closed in
an earthing mode only — it being free only when
the circuit-breaker (or earthing switch) is open. As
in (b) above, attempted removal of the key when
the circuit-breaker (or earthing switch) is closed
must not initiate opening of the circuit-breaker (or
earthing switch). Here again, as in (a) above, se­
parate devices are used for the busbar and circuit
earthing conditions.
(d) A key is free only when the circuit-breaker is
disconnected from the service condition. Whilst
removal of the key locks the circuit-breaker against
connection in the service m o d e , it must remain
possible to operate the circuit-breaker in either
an earthing or the disconnected m o d e , or to place
and operate an earthing switch in an earthing mode.
4.2.6 Identification of conducting parts
All main conductors are arranged, and identified with
their phase colours, in accordance with BS 158. The
identification is specified to be of not less than 650
mm^ in area at each location. The order of the phase
connections is Red-Yellow-Blue. Essentially, for con­
ductors arranged substantially in one plane, the posi­
tioning when viewed from the front of the switchgear,
is as follows:
• Run of conductors horizontal: Red phase t o p , left
or farthest away.
• R u n of conductors vertical: Red phase left or farthest
away.
4.2.7 Earthing of structures
Each switchboard formation is equipped with a main
earth bar — usually externally at the rear at the base
— to which 'tee-off connections are m a d e as neces­
sary. The material may be copper, aluminium or an
alloy of aluminium — specifications being BS 1432
for copper, and BS2898, material E l E or E91E, in the
case of aluminium and its alloys. A clearance of not
less than 15 m m is specified between the back face of
the main bar and the adjacent surface of the switch-
gear enclosure to permit the attachment (on Site) of
individual plant earthing cables.
Joints in earth bars are kept to the minimum prac­
ticable. Where necessary, they are secured by screw
fasteners, as are the connections thereto. Since experi­
ence has shown a need to avoid interfaces of electro-
t i n n e d / a l u m i n i u m surfaces — a combination likely to
arise from the extensive use of aluminium conductor
cable for earth bonding — copper earth bars are
specified to be of plain, i.e., uncoated, finish.
Immediately before assembly of a joint or connec­
tion, the faces of aluminium/aluminium alloy conduc­
tors have the oxide film removed by, for example,
steel wire brush, and the cleaned surface coated with
petroleum jelly or other approved c o m p o u n d . Simi­
larly, copper joint faces are cleaned and coated with
petroleum jelly.
Provision is m a d e at each end of each switchboard
main earth bar for connection to the power station
main earthing system. This must present a flat area of
not less than 50 m m x 50 m m (nominal).
T o deal with the fault levels likely to be experi­
enced, earth bars of copper have a minimum sectional
area and width — the latter being specified to en­
sure adequate area at joints, etc., — in accordance
with the information tabulated below. Earth bars of
367
Switchgear and controlgear
aluminium/aluminium alloy are specified to have a
width not less than that for copper, and electrical and
mechanical properties not inferior to that material.
Subsidiary (tee-ofO
Main earth bar
earth bars
Cross-sectional Width, mm Cross-sectional Width, mm
area, mm^ area, mm^
300 50 150 25
Unless the positioning of the main earth bar itself is
convenient for the purpose, tee-off connections are
provided to facilitate the bonding to earth of cable
glands.
The metal framework of all withdrawable parts is
connected to the earthing conductor through contacts
designed specifically for the purpose. Such contacts are
required to estabhsh the connection to earth not less
than 25 mm before establishment of the main circuit
connections.
Busbars and all conductors connected directly thereto
are insulated. The insulation may be moulded or in
the form of sleeving. It must be not less than 1 m m
thick and capable of withstanding without damage the
rated short-time current of the switchgear busbar sys­
tem. To facihtate extension, busbars are of constant
current rating throughout the switchboard. Although
traditionally of copper, conductors of a l u m i n i u m /
aluminium ahoy are not precluded. However, where of
the latter materials, the jointing procedure specified for
earth bars would be adopted.
4.2.8 Circuit and busbar earthing
Each incoming/outgoing feeder circuit in a switch­
board, and usually each single-circuit unit, is provided
with means for earthing the circuit. Likewise, provision
is made for earthing the busbars — usually at two
locations on each electrically continuous, i.e., uninter­
ruptable, section.
Traditionally, the earthing on 3.3 kV systems is
through the circuit-breaker in association with selector
devices forming an integral part of the switchgear.
However, on those units where it is necessary to pro­
vide for earthing the busbars as well as the circuit,
mechanical interlocking is provided to prevent the use
of both facilities simultaneously.
At 11 kV, whhst some designs feature earthing
through the circuit-breaker in association with selector
devices forming an integral part of the switchgear,
others use purpose designed earthing swhches. Which­
ever arrangement is adopted it must preclude, at those
locations featuring both busbar and circuh earthing,
the earthing of busbars and circuit simultaneously.
368
Chapter 5
Earthing switches have closing mechanisms of the
dependent power solenoid or the stored energy spring-
operated type (see Section 4.2.18 of this chapter), and
a rated short-circuit making current capability of not
less than that of the circuit-breaker of the associated
system switchgear. Closing mechanisms are provided
with means for padlocking the switch in the closed
position and, most importantly for safety reasons, it
is not possible operationahy to slow-close an earthing
switch when connected for earthing operation. The
basic specification for earthing switches is BS5253.
The initial connection of busbars or circuits to earth,
i.e., the connection t o earth immediately following
the making dead of the busbars or circuit, is completed
by power closing the circuit-breaker or earthing switch.
When earthing through the circuit-breaker, mecha­
nical interlocking between the circuh-breaker and the
earth path selector devices ensures that it is possible
to prepare the switchgear for an earthing duty only
when the circuit-breaker is disconnected from both
the busbars and the circuh. Similarly, where earthing is
through an earthing switch, mechanical interlocking
is employed to permit connection of the switch only
when it is open.
Where access to the busbar and circuit disconnection
(isolating) contacts may be obtained in the course of
preparation of the switchgear for an earthing operation,
provision is made whereby the automatic features of
the shutter covering the group of contacts to be earthed
remain operative, but that the shutter associated with
those contacts not involved in the earthing operation
remains closed and padlockable until the switchgear
is restored to the service condition.
Where, however, preparation of a switchgear equip­
ment for an earthing operation neither involves nor
permits access to the busbar and circuit disconnection
contacts, the shutters may remain operable, as in the
'service' condition.
T o preserve the integrity of the connection of a
busbar or circuit to earth, i.e., to reduce the possi­
bility of inadvertent disconnection, means other than
locking are provided whereby, when a switchgear equip­
ment is prepared for an earthing operation through its
circuit-breaker, the electrical tripping of the circuit-
breaker is rendered inoperative, both during closing
and when closed. Thus the circuit-breaker becomes a
fault (short-circuit) current making and carrying switch
and, as such, transfers elsewhere clearance of any fault
current consequent upon inadvertent earthing of live
conductors. However, the arrangements adopted for
rendering the electrical tripping inoperative must be
such that it is not possible to return the equipment to
the service condition and to reclose the circuit-breaker
without restoration of the electrical tripping. To pre­
vent inadvertent earthing, padlocking or coded-key
interlocking facilities are provided for locking earthing
devices against selection into the earthing condition.
Indication is provided to show when a switchgear
equipment is prepared for ' C I R C U I T E A R T H ' or,
 3.3 kV and 11 kV switchgear — circuit-breaker equipment

where appropriate, 'BUSBAR E A R T H ' . The indi­
cations are by mechanical flag or, alternatively, by
suitably positioned labels visible from the front of the
equipment, inscribed C I R C U I T E A R T H or BUSBAR
E A R T H in black letters on a white background. The
above arrangements indicate merely that the equip­
ment is prepared for an earthing operation, and that
the earthed condition will exist only when the circuit-
breaker or earthing switch is closed.
All conductors in the path to earth are required to
have a rated short-time current of not less than that
of the associated system switchgear.
In addition to the facilities for earthing busbars
and circuits through the circuit-breaker or purpose de­
signed earthing switches, portable devices are provided
for apphcation to the busbar and circuit spouts of
high voltage switchgear featuring withdrawable circuit-
breakers or fused switching devices. The devices may
serve as 'primary earths', 'drain earths' and 'metalclad
switchgear movable earths'.
Used as primary earths, the devices substitute for
an earth through the circuit-breaker, thus releasing the
circuit-breaker for servicing, etc., whilst work proceeds
in parallel on the circuit. The devices are applied to the
switchgear spouts in accordance with the procedure
outlined in Section 1.3 of this chapter. For this duty,
the devices must have a short-time current rating capa­
ble of carrying, until the operation of protection, any
value of fauk current which could materialise at the
point of apphcation in the event of energisation of the
spouts to which they are connected. Being applied man­
ually, the devices have no current making capability;
hence the need to precede their application by an earth­
ing operation through a circuit-breaker or an earthing
switch having a fault current making capability.
The use of the devices as drain earths and metalclad
switchgear movable earths is governed by the procedure
described in Section 1.3 of this chapter. Because, when
used in the latter capacity, they must be suitable for
application one phase at a time, the devices comprise
single-phase units supplied in sets of three.
4.2.9 Auxiliary switches
Auxihary switches, i.e., switches for use in control and
auxiliary circuits, are, wherever possible, driven posi­
tively in both directions. Only where the requirement
is for a greater number of auxiliary switches than can
be driven positively are interposing (i.e., repeat) relays
permitted. However, every endeavour is m a d e to al­
locate the more important circuitry to switches driven
positively. Where necessary to satisfy, for example, se­
quence and interlocking arrangements, auxiliary switches
are provided which are responsive to the fohowing
switchgear conditions:
• Service (circuit-breaker connected for service).
• Disconnected (circuit-breaker disconnected from the
service position).
• Circuit prepared for earthing.
• Busbars prepared for earthing.
All auxiliary switches are wired, in accordance with
'standard' diagrams, to terminals in the fixed (cubicle)
portion of the switchgear. Typical circuit diagrams,
together with an associated terminal schedule, are il­
lustrated in Figs 5.32 to 5.35.
4.2.10 Cabling arrangements
All cabling external to the switchgear, together with
glands and terminations, is normally supplied under a
separate cabling contract, details of which will be
found in Chapter 6 of this volume. All cable terminal
chambers are positioned at the rear of the switchgear,
the entry of cables normally being from below. With
cabhng connected, the insulation level of the terminal
arrangement must be not lower than that of the rated
insulation level of the switchgear.
The physical disposition of main circuit cabling
relative to that for auxihary circuits at the point of entry
into the switchgear enclosures is arranged to minimise
the risk of a fault or fire on the main cabhng affecting
the function of the auxiliary cabling. Similarly, where
the design of the equipment necessitates the installation
of lengths of both main and auxiliary 'external' cabling
within the enclosure, the arrangement adopted must
again minimise the possibility of a fauk or fire on the
former damaging the latter. Essentiahy, this means the
segregation within the switchgear enclosure of main
from auxiliary cabling by earthed metal or mechanically
robust fire-resistant material. Cable a r m o u r alone does
not satisfy this requirement.
Subject to minimum wire conductor sizes of 1.0 mm^
and 2.5 mm^ for individual circuits and bus-wiring
respectively; ancillary electrical equipment, e.g., control
and auxiliary wiring, control and selector swkches,
relays, etc., is specified in accordance with:
• ESI Standard 5 0 - 1 8 for circuits operating at 100 V
and above.
• Engineering Recommendation S17 for circuits op­
erating at less than 100 V.
These documents specify performance and construc­
tional requirements, together with guidance in matters
of apphcation.
4.2.11 Voltage transformers
Voltage transformers are of the metal-enclosed dry
type, complying with BS3941. They are normally in­
stalled on the 'fixed' portion, i.e., the cubicle of the
switchgear, on the circuit side of the circuit-breaker
— and thus within the protected zone. The method
of mounting permits disconnection (isolation) from the
main circuit and ready removal whilst the switchgear

369
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

ϊ" SWITCHING
DEVICE

LJCIRC
CIRCUIT BREAKER (Cß)

V ALTERNATIVE
SWITCHGEAR
AS S P E C I F I E D

PROTECTION
5 RELAY
AND
5 TEST
FACILITY

CB LOCATION
SWITCH CB P O S I T I O N SWITCH

ELAPSED
TIME
INDICATOR

^ O U T P U T FOR R E M O T E
t"! /I- ° INSTRUMENT
L_^/ I ^ ( T R A N S D U C E R W H E R E SPECIFIED)

TEST
O TERMINAL
BLOCK O
FOR
»EFFICIENCYo
METERING

INVERSE
TIME
> U N D E R VOLTAGE
R Y Β RELAYS
110VAC B U S W I R E S

F24

L24
1

P O W E R FLOW

FIG. 5 . 3 2 11 kV or 3 . 3 kV switchgear — typical motor circuit

370
 3 . 3 k V and 11 k V switchgear — circuit-breaker equipment

SPRING CHARGED' SWITCH

SPRING FREE'SWITCH

FIG. 5 . 3 2 (cont'd) 11 kV or 3 . 3 kV switchgear — typical motor circuit

371
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

SWITCHGEAR
ELEMENT OR
CABLE NUMBER SWITCHGEAR
ELEMENT OR
is
FUNCTION WIRE FUNCTION WIRE
No. APPLICATION No.
INTERPOSE RELAY W1 101 CONTROL SELECTOR 039 201
'CLOSE' W2 102 SWITCH 'LOCAL 040 202
INTERPOSE RELAY W3 103 CONTROL SELECTOR 043 203
'OPEN' W4 104 SWITCH 'REMOTE' 044 204
TRIP L101 105 CONTROL SELECTOR 045 205
RELAY CONTACT L103 106 SWITCH 'REMOTE' 046 206
TRIP CIRCUIT L109 107 CB POSITION 015 207
SUPERVISION CONTACT L113 108 SWITCH N/O 016 208
PLANT PROTECTION K15 109 CB LOCATION 09 209
INTERLOCKS K17 110 SWITCH N/O 010 210
PLANT PROTECTION K5 111 CB POSITION 017 211
TRIP K7 112 SWITCH N/O 018 212
CB POSITION 01 113 019 213
& LOCATION CONTROL/INDICATION CB POSITION
SWITCHES N/O 02 114 SWITCH N/O 020 214
CB POSITION 05 115 07 215
& LOCATION TRIPS & INTERLOCKS CB POSITION
SWITCHES N/O 06 116 SWITCH N/C 08 216
CB POSITION 021 117 L105 217
& LOCATION CONTROL/INDICATION TRIP
SWITCHES N/C 022 118 RELAY CONTACT LI 07 218
CB POSITION 023 119 TRIP CIRCUIT L115 219
& LOCATION TRIPS & INTERLOCKS SUPERVISION
SWITCHES N/C 024 120 CONTACT L119 220
CB POSITION 07 121 U/V PROTECTION 047 221
SWITCH N/O 08 122 RELAY CONTACT 048 222
Oil 123 NOT AVAILABLE WHEN 049 223
CB POSITION ELAPSED TIME U/V PROTECTION
SWITCH N/O 012 124 INDICATOR FITTED RELAY CONTACT 050 224

013 125 LOCATION SWITCH 031 225

CB POSITION CCT PREPARED
SWITCH N/O 014 126 FOR EARTHING 032 226

029 127 NOT AVAILABLE WHEN 051 227

LOCATION ELAPSED TIME CB LOCATION
SWITCH N/O 030 128 INDICATOR FITTED SWITCH N/O 052 228
CB POSITION 025 129 'SPRING CHARGED' 035 229
SWITCH N/C 026 130 SWITCH 036 230
CB LOCATION 055 131 'SPRING FREE' 037 231
SWITCH N/C 056 132 SWITCH 038 232
REMOTE C41/S41 133 CB LOCATION 053 233
AMMETER C43/S43 134 SWITCH N/O 054 234
CONTROL 041 135 235
SELECTOR SPARE
SWITCH 'TEST' 042 136 236
137 237

FIG. 5 . 3 3 11 kV or 3 . 3 kV switchgear — typical motor terminal schedule

is live. Primary windings are protected by fuselinks,
generally to BS2692 and, if necessary, current limiting
resistors. It is possible to gain access to primary fuse-
links only when the transformer is isolated.
Secondary windings are protected by fuses in ac­
cordance with the requirements for ancillary electrical
equipment and earthed at one point only. Each such
earthing connection comprises a separately-mounted
bolted link placed in an easily accessible position. The
conductors from the main circuit to the point of con­
nection to the voltage transformer primary fuseUnks
are sized to carry the rated short-time current of the
associated circuit-breaker.
4.2.12 Current transformers
Current transformers comply generally with BS3938.
Except in the case of busbar sectioning equipment,
current transformers are installed in the fixed portion
of the switchgear, on the circuit side of the circuit-
breaker. The secondary winding of each single-phase
transformer and the star point of the secondary wind­
ings of each three-phase group is connected to earth
at one point only, through a separately mounted
'captive' bolted link. E a c h secondary winding is wired
to terminals in the fixed portion of the switchgear.
Primary windings are specified to be capable of carry­
ing the rated short-time current of the associated circuit-
breaker. To this end, 'bar' type primaries are used,
wherever practicable.
Where required for test purposes, terminals in the
form of test blocks are provided on the switchgear
for the connection of external instruments and metering
equipment.

372
 3.3 k V and 11 kV switchgear
4.2.13 Control/selector switches
In the interest of uniformity, control switches are
located to the right of, or below, selector switches, and
usuahy have pistol-grip pattern handles. Padlocking
facilities are provided for locking control switches in
the 'neutral' poshion and selector switches in each
position. Control switches are spring-loaded to return
to the neutral position when released.
4.2.14 Switchboard/circuit identification
To avoid, as far as possible, the risk of injury to per­
sonnel and operational error through mistaken identi­
fication of circuits, labelhng is provided as follows:
• On each switchboard or separately-mounted relay
panel.
• On each circuit at front and rear, on the outside of
the enclosure.
Also, unless otherwise obvious, labels are provided to
identify the function of:
• Each control, selector, pushbutton and other switch,
relay, instrument, current and interposing trans­
former, transducer, indicator lamp, etc. Where relays
are mounted away from circuit-breaker panels, each
relay is labelled to show its circuit designation and
the relay duty.
• Each position of every switch.
External circuh identification labels which, for pro­
minence and clarity, are fitted on removable covers or
parts are repeated on a non-removable part in or on
the enclosure.
As an additional aid to identification, coloured sym­
bols are provided at the front and rear of each circuit
in a switchboard. These symbols are illustrated in
Fig 5.36.
4.2.15 Indicating instruments
Indicating instruments and relays are of the flush-
mounted pattern. Ammeters are scaled to indicate full-
load current at approximately 7 5 % full scale deflection.
Additionally, those in motor circuits are usually of the
suppressed scale type, i.e., suppressed at the upper end.
4.2.16 Test devices
For the purpose of primary injection testing, portable
devices are provided for the connection of test leads
to the busbar and circuit disconnecting (isolating) con­
tacts in the switchgear enclosure from which the circuit-
breaker is disconnected when withdrawn. The devices
must, when in position in the switchgear, be capable
of withstanding for 15 minutes a D C test vohage
of:
— circuit-breaker equipment
System rated DC test vohage, kV
vohage, kV Phase/phase Phase/earth
3.3 10 7.5
11 36 25
The rating of the devices is dictated to some extent
by the method of fitment to the switchgear. Generally,
those for circuits rated up to and including 800 A
are required to have a thermal capability of 400 A,
and those for duty in equipment rated above 800 A, a
thermal capability of 1000 A.
4.2.17 Circuit-breakers
Circuit-breakers of the same type, current rating and
circuit duty are required to be interchangeable; like­
wise, those of the same type and current rating, but
of different circuit duty, subject to any modification
necessary to control, indication and interlocking cir­
cuitry. Operating mechanisms are of the dependent
power solenoid or stored energy type, provided with
a shunt opening release and a mechanical opening
release. The latter device must be available for use at
all times, except when deliberately padlocked inop­
erable. In this context, 'available for use at all times'
requires that, where the release is located behind a
door, the door must not be lockable.
Indication of the closed/open state of the circuit-
breaker is provided mechanically, and driven positively
in each direction. The indication is inscribed: 'ON'
in black letters on a white background, ' O F F ' in white
letters on a green background, and is operative what­
ever the duty m o d e , i.e., the 'service', 'disconnected',
or an 'earthing' m o d e .
Shunt opening release circuitry is taken through
auxiliary switches driven by the circuit-breaker op­
erating mechanism. It is necessary to switch the pro­
tection circuitry in such manner to ensure de-energising
of such circuitry when the circuit-breaker is open.
However, to ensure reinstatement of continuity when
the circuit-breaker is closed, the swhches are arranged
to close before the main circuit is estabhshed.
Locking facihties are provided, whereby the circuit-
breaker can be prevented from being closed and also
of being opened by operation of the manual opening
device when closed in an earthing duty. Each of these
locking requirements is met by the application of a
single padlock, or a single key lock, and must not en­
tail the fitting of loose components in addition to the
padlock or key lock. Locking of the manual opening
device is provided to prevent inadvertent opening of a
circuit-breaker when used for an earthing duty. It must
not, therefore, be possible to gain access to any part of
the closing mechanism which would allow defeat of
the locking of the manual opening device when the
circuh-breaker is closed in an earthing duty.
Whilst, when a circuit-breaker is employed in an
earthing duty it is necessary to render inoperative its
373
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

AC C I R C U I T S

1 SWITCHING
AIR • DEVICE
CIRCUIT BREAKERS

ALTERNATIVE
SWITCHGEAR
AS SPECIFIED

DIFFERENTIAL
PROTECTION
RELAY
AND
TEST
FACILITY

WHERE SPECIFIED

ΐΖ OVER ^
-O CURRENT ^
AND
OEARTH FAULT
PROTECTION
•O RELAY
AND
•O TEST
FACILITY

OUTPUT FOR REMOTE

INSTRUMENT
i-/ I
(TRANSDUCER WHERE SPECIFIED)

POWER FLOW

FIG. 5.34 11 kV or 3.3 kV switchgear — typical transformer feeder circuit

374
 3.3 kV and 11 kV switchgear — circuit-breaker equipment

DC CIRCUITS

110V DC

220V DC OR 250V DC

1-
CLOSING COIL OR
SPRING CHARGE MECHANISM

CONTROL SELECTION SWITCH L ^

REMOTE
LOCAL CONTROL SWITCH CLOSING MECHANISM REMOTE
NEUTRAL LOCAL I TEST LOCAL I TEST
I I I
OPENJCLOSE I I I CB LOCATION SWITCH I I I
1—0 I I CZl o -
CLOSING CONTACTOR OR I I
SPRING RELEASE COIL
i I
PLANT PROTECTION TRIP
AND ANTI-PUMP CIRCUIT Tl
I I I I
I I . INTERLOCKS RELAY,
11=31 — O O F ÖH ~ ~ O "¿I
I I I
INTERPOSE I I CBTRIP
RELAY-CLOSE PLANT PROTECTION
TRIPS CB POSITION SWITCH INHIBIT CONTACT
0 - —Ο
-, O R -—- 0
TRIP
I COIL
I I
CB LOCATION
SWITCH
-o I I a o-
-o Icbl
I I • PLANT PROTECTION TRIPS-
INTERPOSE TRIP CIRCUIT SUPERVISION
RELAY-OPEN

TRIP CIRCUIT
SUPERVISION
PRE-CLOSE RELAY

INTERTRIP RECEIVE -o o--Or—-

TRIP RELAY

SHUNT REINFORCING
FLAG RELAYS INTERTRIP
(WHERE REQUIRED) —OSEND

DIFFERENTIAL
PROTECTION TRIP CIRCUIT
, SUPERVISION ^
kFTER-CLOSE RELAY^ TRIP CIRCUIT
SUPERVISION RELAY
L4
jy^
•^-1? PRE-CLOSE Τ
! CB LOCATION SWITCHES
I O

X
INTERPOSE RELAY - OPEN'

REMOTE INTERPOSE RELAY - CLOSE'

LOCAL I TEST

BUSBAR-PREPARED FOR EARTHING'

LOCATION SWITCH

CIRCUIT PREPARED FOR

EARTHING" LOCATION SWITCH
0 C — O O - ^ D O

'SPRING CHARGED' SWITCH

SPRING FREE' SWITCH

FIG. 5.34 {cont'd) 11 kV or 3.3 kV switchgear — typical transformer feeder circuit

375
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

[-L-L_J C I R C U I T B R E A K E R (CB)

_^ CURRENT TRANSFORMERS
" ° FOR DIFFERENTIAL A N D
- R E S T R I C T E D E A R T H FAULT
PROTECTION

£J

T. -7 L19
_P_-| /I o
OUTPUTS FOR O jV/r-azD-
II / I
-Ö--I/ I o REMOTE INSTRUMENTS <^ 1/1-ΕΞ9-
9 9 ? <? F19
! ! ' I

I I I
I I
I r^" ^_(PART)J
.|_I_J
I I I- -J

-t—h
X
α:
«ωο-
OVER ^
FREQUENCY
PROTECTION
RELAY O

110V AC
BUS
.17[]F18 F13[]

^ ) B -
I

VOLTAGE S E L E C T I O N RELAY

FIG. 5.35 11 kV or 3.3 kV switchgear — typical unit transformer circuit

376
 3.3 kV and 11 kV switchgear — circuit-breaker equipment

DC CIRCUITS

110V DC

220V DC OR 250V DC

CLOSING COIL OR •a—Π <^

SPRING CHARGE MECHANISM
L1 I.

CLOSING MECHANISM REMOTE

LOCAL I TEST
CB LOCATION SWITCH

CLOSING CONTACTOR OR
SPRING RELEASE COIL'
AND ANTI-PUMP CIRCUIT
PLANT PROTECTION
INTERLOCKS

PLANT PROTECTION CBTRIP

^ B POSITION SWITCH INHIBIT CONTACT
/•vor
o—-,ο α--·ο
r — ) > • Ri

PLANT PROTECTION TRIPS-

TRIP CIRCUIT SUPERVISION

TO REMOTE PRE-CLOSE TRIP CIRCUIT

SUPERVISION RELAY

CB LOCATION SWITCHES

INTERPOSE RELAY OPEN' CB POSITION SWITCHES

INTERPOSE RELAY-CLOSE'

BUSBAR-PREPARED FOR EARTHING'

LOCATION SWITCH

TERMINALS FOR EXTERNAL

CIRCUIT PREPARED FOR —O CABLING O
EARTHING' LOCATION SWITCH

SPRING CHARGED' SWITCH

SPRING FREE'SWITCH

HEATER SWITCH
OFF ON

VOLTAGE. CURRENT AND POWER TRANSDUCERS

SHOWN IN BROKEN LINE WHERE SPECIFIED
PTSE-POST TRIP SEQUENCE EQUIPMENT

FIG. 5.35 (cont'd) 11 kV or 3.3 kV switchgear — typical unit transformer circuit

377
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

SIZE IN MILLIMETRES.
BS 381C
COLOUR COLOUR REMARKS DIM
NUMBER
1 2

FRENCH BLUE 166 A 75 50

MIDDLE BROWN 411 Β 25 16

BRILLIANT GREEN 221 c 25 18

CANARY YELLOW 309 D 85 55

SIGNAL RED 537

WHITE W

BLACK Β

NOTES:
1. PANEL No.1 SHALL IN ALL CASES REFER TO
THE PANEL ON THE EXTREME LEFT WHEN
LOOKING AT THE FRONT OF THE BOARD.
LEFT HAND FUTURE EXTENSIONS SHOULD
USE THE SERIES IN REVERSE,
COMMENCING 42, 41 ETC.

PANEL No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

• • •
Ο
SHAPE
Λ O 0 Ο Π Λ V Ο 0 Λ Ο 0 Λ Ο 0 €3
BS 381C
COLOUR
NUMBER 5 ίο
ω 5 I m 5 m 5

Ο ν Ο
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

Π Λ Ο 0 D Π Λ Ο 0 Π Λ Ο 0 Λ Ο 0

σι
ίο
ιη m CVJ m ω cvi
(Μ I
^ REPEAT

FIG. 5 . 3 6 Coloured symbols for additional circuit identification of switchgear

378
 3.3 kV and 11 kV switchgear — circuit-breaker equipment
opening electrically, the means adopted must not lock
the opening mechanism mechanically.
T o minimise the risk of physical injury to per­
sons engaged in the maintenance of a circuit-breaker,
e.g., injury from inadvertent tripping of the operating
mechanism, provision is made for slow closing and
opening. Whilst the means of slow closing/opening is
in use, movement of the circuit-breaker contacts must
remain wholly under the control of the operator; opera­
tion of the manual opening release must not negate
this function. However, to safeguard against attempted
closure of a circuit-breaker other than by energy pro­
vided by its service operating mechanism, it must not
be possible to use the slow closing facility when the
circuit-breaker is in the service position, or employed
in an earthing duty.
Except where for economic reasons it is desired
to avoid the provision of heavy current D C battery
supphes, no distinction is made as to technical merit
between closing mechanisms of the dependent power
solenoid or stored energy types.
The interrupting systems of air circuit-breakers com­
prise fixed and moving elements of the 'butt' or 'clip
and blade' type, opening in 'arc chutes'. Both fixed
and moving elements incorporate main and arcing con­
tacts, the former for current carrying and the latter
for drawing the arc and relieving the former of the
consequential burning. The arc chutes comprise, es­
sentially, enclosures of insulation material containing
a large number of 'splitter' plates, which envelope each
phase of the contact system.
Basically, the process of interruption is as follows:
• The main contacts part, followed by parting of the
arcing contacts.
• An arc is drawn between the fixed and moving
arcing contacts.
• The arc is transferred during the motion of the
moving arcing contacts across 'arc runners' in the
arc chute.
• The arc is forced by thermal and, in some designs,
deliberate magnetic effect into a lengthening loop
in the arc chute, where it is spht into many small
series arcs, cooled and extinguished.
It is a fact that the higher the energy of the arc,
the greater its propensity from t h e r m a l / m a g n e t i c
influence to penetrate upwards into the arch chute.
Conversely, the lower the arc energy, the lower the
inducement so to d o . Thus air circuh-breakers have
a tendency towards producing arcing times at low
currents significantly longer than those of currents
nearer the 'rated' breaking capacity. The current at
which arcing time is a maximum (termed the 'critical
current') which may have a duration of many cycles,
is usually of the order of less than 5 % of the rated
capacity.
T o improve the performance at low currents, par­
ticularly at the higher voltages, an air 'puff, derived
from the device(s) used to d a m p the arrest of the
motion of the contact system at the open position, is
directed at the underside of the arc to assist its move­
ment upwards into the arc chute. The air puff is, of
course, produced at each opening of the circuit-breaker,
but is of useful effect only at low currents.
By virtue of the relatively high arc resistance gen­
erated in air circuit-breakers, the transient recovery
voltage (TRV) appearing across the breaker at inter­
ruption is weh d a m p e d , i.e., air circuit-breakers are
inherently 'soft' (see Section 10.5 of this chapter).
4.2.18 Circuit-breaker operating mechanisms
Dependent power solenoid mechanisms are of the
'trip-free' type. Dependent power operation is defined
as an operation by means of energy other than manual,
where the completion of the operation is dependent
u p o n the continuity of the power supply (to solenoids,
electric or pneumatic m o t o r s , etc.). A 'trip-free' circuh-
breaker is one in which the moving contacts return
to (and remain in) the open position when the open­
ing operation is initiated after the initiation of the
closing operation — even if the closing c o m m a n d is
maintained. However, it is recognised that, to ensure
proper breaking of the current which may have been
established, it may be necessary that the contacts
momentarily reach the fully closed poshion.
Means are provided for de-energising the solenoid
coil immediately after the circuit-breaker has closed.
The insulation materials of the solenoid coil are cho­
sen to minimise the generation of flammable gases
in the event of overheating of the coil through failure
of interruption of the supply u p o n completion of the
closing stroke. Additionally, the coil is, as far as is
practicable, so positioned in the switchgear to minimise
the risk of ignition of such gases from arcing of the
main a n d / o r auxiliary contacts during operation.
Stored-energy mechanisms are of the motor-charged
spring type. The definition of 'stored-energy operation',
being 'an operation by means of energy stored in
the mechanism itself prior to the completion of the
operation and sufficient to complete it under pre­
determined conditions'. Such mechanisms are provided
with electrical and also local (i.e., at the switchgear)
m a n u a l mechanical release of the closing energy. The
local release is usually, and preferably, by pushbutton,
shrouded or recessed to prevent inadvertent operation
and padlockable inoperative.
With the circuit-breaker in the service position,
recharging of the spring(s) is required to commence
immediately and automatically upon completion of a
closing operation. The recharging time must not ex­
ceed 30 s. It is further required that a charged spring(s)
must not be released by the shock of operation of the
circuit-breaker. Similarly, release of a charged spring(s)
whilst the circuit-breaker is in the closed position must
379
Switchgear and controlgear
neither cause opening of, nor damage t o , the circuit-
breaker.
Means are provided for charging the spring(s) man-
uahy. This permhs a service closure, i.e., a fuh energy
closure, if the spring charging motor or its electrical
supply fails. Mechanical indication is provided to show
the state of the spring(s). It is inscribed ' S P R I N G
C H A R G E D ' when the mechanism is in a condhion
to close the circuh-breaker and ' S P R I N G F R E E ' when
in any other condition. Where necessary, provision is
made for indication of the state of the spring(s) at a
remote point. Figures 5.37 to 5.44 show detailed views
of the 11 kV and 3.3 kV circuh-breakers and their
cubicles, which form part of the switchboards illus­
trated in Figs 5.25 to 5.31.
5 3.3 kV switchgear — fused equipment
The technical specification for fused equipment is
discussed in Section 5.2 of this chapter.
5.1 Required performance
Definitions and, where necessary, explanations of the
rated characteristics are given in Section 4.1 of this
chapter.
5.1.1 Rated voltage
Estabhshed designs, i.e., those evolved during the
currency of British Standards BS 162 and BS3659, are
rated 3.3 kV. However, to align w h h l E C Standard
values, the presently assigned rating is 3.6 kV.
5.1.2 Frequency and number of phases
This switchgear is always three-phase, 50 Hz.
5.1.3 Rated insulation level
The 'classification' of the insulation of established
designs — again those evolved during the currency of
BS 162 and BS3659 — is based upon the achievement
of clearances between phases and clearances phase-
to-earth to the dimensions specified in those Standards
for 'Class B'. However, here again, to align with pre­
sent thinking within the l E C , the 'rated insulation
level' is assigned in the case of the estabhshed designs,
and specified to be proved by type test for the newer
developments, in accordance with Table 1, List 2, of
BS6581: 1985 (lEC 694; 1980).
5.1.4 Rated short-time current
The present requirement is:
(a) Busbars and the conductors connected directly
thereto, u p to and including the busbar side ter­
minals of the main circuit fusehnks, have a rated
380
Chapter 5
short-time current capabihty of 26.3 kA for 3 s or
43.8 k A for 3 s, corresponding to system short-
circuh levels of 150 M V A and 250 M V A respec­
tively, both levels occurring in C E G B installations.
(b) All current carrying parts on the circuit side of
the main circuit fuselinks are rated to carry the
prospective rated short-circuit current of the bus­
bar system, i.e, 26.3 k A or 43.8 k A , as limited
in magnitude and duration by the highest rating
fusehnks permissible in the switchgear.
(c) All components forming a circuit path to earth
have a rated short-time current of not less than
that of the busbar system, except that the duration
of the short-circuit current may be reduced t o ,
but not less than, 0.2 s.
The rated peak withstand current capability of the
components in (a) and (c), and the prospective peak
value of the first major loop in (b), is 2.5 times the
A C component of the rated short-time current.
5.1.5 Rated normal current
Predominantly this class of switchgear is assembled
into switchboards in association with circuit-breaker
equipment. Accordingly, the rated normal current of
busbars is chosen as described in Section 4.1 of this
chapter for circuit-breaker equipment. The rated normal
current of circuits is as declared by the manufacturer.
T o allow for the longest likely starting time (run-up
to operating speed) of direct-on-line m o t o r drives, each
circuh must be capable of carrying for 2 minutes,
without damage, a current equivalent to six times its
rated normal current. This is in addition to the tem­
perature rise limits specified in the relevant British
Standards, and also the constraint of 50°C under 'rated
normal current' w h h respect to main circuit terminals.
5.1.6 Rated breaking current of switching
devices
Each switching device has a rated short-circuit breaking
current capability, in accordance with BS5311, having
an A C (RMS) component of not less than the 'take­
over' current of the highest rating of fusehnk per­
missible in combination with the switching device. The
'take-over' current of the fusehnks is defined as the
RMS value of the symmetrical component at which
the pre-arcing time of the fusehnks is equal to the
minimum opening time of the switching device. The
opening time of the switching device is defined as the
time elapsing between the instant of energisation of
the trip coil and the instant of separation of the con­
tacts, no allowance being m a d e for the operating time
of other protective equipment.
5.1.7 First-pole-to-clear factor: 1.5
3.3 kV switchgear — fused equipment
00
1cd
Τ3
Um
cd
O
ε
o
Cd
C
O
>
α
381
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

CUBICLE TRIP BUTTON LINKAGE

MIMIC DISPLAY. ARC CHUTE

SECONDARY
CONTACTS

AUXILIARY .
SWITCHES

, CUBICLE RELEASE
MECHANISM

. I l k V BUSHING

ANTl-PUMPING
RELAY

OPERATING
HANDLE APERTURE"

- R A C K I N G IN CAM

PIVOT WHEEL L O C K .
ASSEMBLY

• AIR CYLINDER

ISOLATING MECHANISM
ASSEMBLY

CLOSING
CONTACTORS

MAINTENANCE
HANDLE SHUTTER
TRIP MECHANISM

FIG. 5.38 Front view of 11 kV air circuit-breaker shown in Fig 5.37 with covers removed

382
 3.3 kV switchgear — fused equipment

SECONDARY ISOLATING
CONTACTS

SOLENOID
OIL DASHPOT

AIR CYLINDER

FIG. 5.39 Rear view of 11 kV air circuit-breaker shown in Fig 37

383
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

A.C.B. O P E N A.c.B.CLOSED
INDICATOR (GREEN) INDICATOR (RED)

CONTROL SWITCH CONTROL

SELECTOR SWITCH

SAFETY KEY REMOVABLE

F R O N T PANEL

ON-OFF
INDICATOR

C O M B I N E D STEERING
AND RACKING H A N D L E

ISOLATION
SELECTOR BOLT

ISOLATION
SELECTOR KEY
SERVICE-EARTH-TEST
INDICATOR

SPRING STATE
EARTH SELECTOR KEY
INDICATOR

INTERLOCK SELECTOR BOLT

SPRING-LOADED PIN

TWIN DOLLY W H E E L S SLOT FOR HAND

AND RACKING GEAR CHARGING LEVER

PULL TO CLOSE PULL TO TRIP

LANYARD LANYARD

FOR MANUAL A.C.B.OPERATION

FIG. 5.40 Front view of 11 kV air circuit-breaker fitted to the type of switchboard illustrated in Fig 5.27

5.1.8 Rated short-circuit making current system in which the switchgear wih be installed, as
In addition to the requirements of BS5311, switching limited in magnitude and duration by the highest rating
devices are capable of making and latching closed fusehnk permissible in combination with the switching
against a prospective current equivalent to that of the device.

384
 3.3 kV switchgear — fused equipment

FIG. 5.41 Rear view of 11 kV air circuit-breaker shown in Fig 5.40

385
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

ARC C H U T E S

. SECONDARY CONTACTS

-SEMAPHORE INDICATORS

OPERATIONS COUNTER

EARTHING S E L E C T O R .
HANDLE
I S O L A T I N G MECHANISM
SELECTOR HANDLE

MECHANICAL TRIP B U T T O N

- A U X I L I A R Y SWITCH S I

ANTI-PUMPING
CLOSING RELAY AUX 8
CONTACTOR"

- A U X I L I A R Y SWITCH S2

CLOSE COIL P R O T E C T I O N .
AUX 9 TRIP C O I L

- O P E R A T I N G MECHANISM

PRESS FOR SLOW

OPENING

AIR CYLINDERS

FIG. 5.42 Front view of 3.3 kV air circuit-breaker shown withdrawn from the type of switchboard illustrated
in Fig 5.29

386
 3.3 kV switchgear — fused equipment

ARC CHUTES

FIXED SECONDARY
CONTACTS

ARC CHUTE
LIFTING LUG

CABLE ISOLATING
CONTACTS

BUSBAR ISOLATING
CONTACTS

CLOSII
DASHPOT

SOLENOID
DASHPOT

FIG. 5.43 Rear view of 3.3 kV air circuit-breaker shown in Fig 5.42

387
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

FIG. 5.44 3.3 kV air circuit-breaker shown withdrawn from the type of switchboard illustrated in Fig 5.30

388

5.1.9 Rated duration of short-circuit
One second, subject to the '2 minute' rating described
under 'rated normal current'.
5.1.10 Rated operating sequence
• Equipment with fuselinks fitted, 0 - / - C 0 .
• Switching device without fusehnks, 0 - / - C O - r - C O .
5.1.11 Co-ordination of switching device with
fuse protection
An example of co-ordination of the current breaking
capability of the switching device with the short-circuit
fuse protection is given below.
Parameters assumed:
• Motor starting current, 4.8 χ full load current (see
BS4999: P t . 4 1 : 1972: Table 41.4: Col. 3).
• Two successive starts each of 20 s duration.
• Opening time of switching device, 40 ms (see defini­
tion of opening time under 'rated breaking current
of switching devices').
• Fusehnks 'derating factor' 1.8 (this is, in effect, an
'anti-deterioration factor').
N o t e : The following calculation is based on 'nominal'
values, i.e., all performance tolerances are ignored:
Motor rating 1200 kW
Full load current 244 A
Starting current (4.8 χ 244) = 1171 A
Allowing for the fuse derating factor, starting current
is assumed to become 1.8 χ 1171 = 2108 A .
To carry, without operation, for a period of 2 χ
20 s = 40 s, a current of this value, fuselinks of
UK manufacture (i.e., fusehnks to BS2692) require to
have a continuous current rating of the order of 4 0 0 -
450 A.
The 'take-over' current (see definition under 'rated
breaking current of switching devices') of fusehnks of
the order of 4 0 0 - 4 5 0 A , i.e., the pre-arcing current
they will carry for a period equal to that of the open­
ing time of the switching device, requires that the
switching device shall have a rated breaking current of
the order of 11 kA symmetrical (sym).
It follows that the lower the breaking current capa­
bility of the switching device, the lower the rating of
the back-up fuse protection and hence the smaller the
rating of motor which may be handled. Typically, in
a switching device of 5 kA sym rated breaking current,
the maximum permissible rating of the fuselinks would
be of the order of 250 A . This in turn would, on the
basis of two successive starts each of 20 s duration,
limit the size of m o t o r to approximately 600 k W .
3.3 kV switchgear — fused equipment
The above examples serve to illustrate the philo­
sophy of the relationship of motor rating to the
capability of the fuse/switching device combination.
Breaking current capability and opening times of the
order of 11 kA sym and 40 ms, respectively, are typical
of contemporary air-break switching devices in the
UK. Development is in hand in the vacuum-break
device field to at least match the capabihty of the
air-break designs.
The 'two successive starts' requirement is because
all m o t o r drives in a power station must be capable of
this without overheating. As precise details of starting
current and duration are seldom available at the time
of placing controlgear contracts, experience has shown
the 20 s per start allowance to be a 'safe' assumption.
The principle is illustrated graphically in Fig 5.45.
, FUSE LINKS PRE-ARCING
k T I M E / C U R R E N T CHARACTERISTIC
STARTING TIME X 2
SWITCHING DEVICE
M I N I M U M O P E N I N G TIME
STARTING STARTING SWITCHING DEVICE
CURRENT C U R R E N T X 1.8 M I N I M U M BREAKING
CURRENT ^^""^^^
FIG. 5.45 Principle of co-ordination of fuselink rating
with switching device current breaking capability and
motor rating
5.2 Design and construction
5.2.1 General
It was remarked at the beginning of Section 4.2 of this
chapter, that whereas the interrupter (the circuit switch­
ing device) in 11 kV switchgear is invariably a circuit-
breaker, at 3.3 kV, depending upon the duty involved,
it may be either a circuit-breaker or a fused switching
device. It was further pointed out that, whether fea­
turing a circuit-breaker or a fused switching device,
the general form of construction of the switchgear and
the operational facilities provided, are similar. Ac­
cordingly, the only features dealt with here are those
particular to the design and construction of fused
389
Switchgear and controlgear
switching equipment or those which, in the interest
of clarity, are felt to merit further discussion.
In the early 1960s, there were explosions in the
terminal boxes of 3.3 kV motors from flashover across
the surface of the filhng compound then c o m m o n . As
a consequence, in addition to improvement of the
design in this area, the concept of limitation of fault
current energy by the use of fuses was introduced.
Initially the apphcation of this philosophy took the
form of series-connected high breaking capacity (HBC)
fusehnks in boxes adjacent to the motors, followed
by incorporation of the fusehnks in the switchgear.
It should, perhaps, be stated here that the backing
of switching devices, e.g., circuit-breakers, contactors,
by fuselinks was then, and remains presently, a well
estabhshed practice — adopted primarily to deal with
currents of a magnitude beyond the making and break­
ing capability of the switching device. Whilst, as will
be explained, this is now the situation in C E G B prac­
tice, the swkchgear into which the fusehnks were fitted
initially had the full system fault level capability un­
aided by the fusehnks.
Since the mid 1960s, the switchgear used to control
3.3 kV motors up to around 1000 kW has incorporated
H B C fuse short-circuit protection — advantage being
taken of the fuse characteristic to reduce the fault
current switching capabihty required of the switching
device, and thereby produce a more compact and less
expensive design of switchgear for the duty. However,
a pre-requisite of the development was maintenance
of the operational facilities of the existing switchgear
with no reduction in rehabihty.
5.2.2 Duty of switching device and circuit
earthing facilities
The duty of interrupting the higher values of overcur­
rent (which may be many times the current manifested
during the starting of motors direct-on-line) having
been taken over by the fusehnks, such capability on the
part of the circuk switching device became superfluous.
The 'scaling down' of the switching device thus possible,
permitted appreciable reduction in the overall size of
the switchgear together with significant saving of ca­
pital cost. However, the reduction in fauh current
capability of the swkching device meant that k could
not itself serve as the circuit earthing device. {Note:
busbar earthing facihties are not required on switch-
gear controlhng motors.) Accordingly, each switchgear
equipment of this type is, in addition to the circuit
switching device, equipped with a circuit eartning switch
capable of making and carrying, until the operation of
protection elsewhere, any value of fault current which
could appear accidentally on the circuit. The circuit
earthing switch is padlockable in the closed position.
Because in an earthing operation it is essential that
the earth path must at all times be electrically con­
tinuous, the earth switch is arranged to by-pass the
circuit H B C fusehnks.
390
Chapter 5
5.2.3 Switching devices
Like circuit-breakers, fused switching devices of the
same type, current rating and circuit duty are required
to be interchangeable, as also are those of the same type
and current rating but of different duty, subject to
any modification necessary to control, indication and
interlocking circuitry.
Whilst, as for circuit-breakers, closing mechanisms
of either the dependent power solenoid or stored en­
ergy spring types are acceptable, manufacturers to date
have supplied only the former. Compared with circuit-
breakers, the power requirements of the closing sole­
noids of fused switching devices are relatively modest
— of the order of a few kilowatts.
T o meet C E G B operational and performance re­
quirements, the design phüosophy of fused swkching
device equipment follows more closely the principles
of circuit-breaker switchgear than that of contactor
controlgear. Indeed, interrupters of the air-break type
are virtually circuit-breakers, but of limited short-circuit
capability. Thus, closing mechanisms are of the 'latch
closed' type and comply generally with the require­
ments specified for those of circuit-breakers.
5.2.4 Switching device operating mechanisms
Closing mechanisms of the dependent power solenoid
type are specified to be 'trip-free'. Alternatively, if not
trip-free in the generally accepted sense, they must si­
mulate the action by being free to allow opening of the
swkching device immediately after closure, regardless
of whether the closing control circuit remains energised.
Stored energy mechanisms must comply generally with
the requirements specified for circuit-breakers.
5.2.5 Main circuit fuselinks
Operation of any fuselink initiates opening of the
swkching device. This is essential in order to preserve
the integrity of the ' o n / o f f indication and hence, as
far as possible, indication of the state of the plant
controlled.
The fuselinks for the short-circuit protection of
the main circuk are of the H B C type compliant with
BS2692. The rating of the fusehnks fitted is normally
the highest which will provide satisfactory 'take-over'
from the switching device.
Virtuahy ah 3.3 kV motors are switched at full
system voltage, i.e., direct-on-hne started. Thus the
switchgear must be capable of making and carrying,
until the drive has run-up to operational speed, a cur­
rent of several times that of the m o t o r rated full-load.
T h u s , the maximum rating of motor which may be
controlled by fused switching device equipment is deter­
mined by the overcurrent carrying capability of the
fusehnks of the highest rating permissible in the switch-
gear. The highest rating of transformer which may be
so controlled, however, is dictated more by the rated
continuous current carrying capacity of the fuselinks.

taking into account I n r u s h ' upon switching in. The
maximum rating of fusehnk is, of course, determined
by the overcurrent making and breaking capabihty
of the switching device. The principle of co-ordination
of the performance of the switching device with that
of the fuselinks is described in Section 5.1 of this
chapter.
The fusehnks are mounted on the carriage of the
switching device, on the busbar side, such that they
are disconnected automatically from both the busbars
and the circuit when the switching device is discon­
nected (isolated). It is possible to gain access to the
fuselinks only when the switching device is discon­
nected. T o ensure opening of the switching device auto­
matically upon operation of any fusehnk, each fuse-
link incorporates a striker pin arranged to actuate the
tripping mechanism directly or through energisation
of the trip circuit by an auxiliary switch. Flag indica­
tion of the operation of the fuselinks is provided at
the switchgear. Examples of switchboards featuring
fused equipment are shown in Figs 5.46, 5.47 and 5.48.
6 Low voltage switchgear, controlgear
and fusegear
6.1 Required performance
The principal low vohage auxiliaries plant supply
systems in power stations in the UK operate at 415 V,
three-phase for motor drives and three-phase and
neutral where single-phase supplies are required. The
three-phase short-circuit level of these systems, the
neutral point of which is normally solidly earthed, can
approach 43 kA. T o satisfy the system conditions, the
switchgear is rated as follows.
6.1.1 Short-circuit withstand strength of busbar
systems
(a) 36 kA (equivalent to 26 MVA) or 43.3 kA (equi­
valent to 31 MVA), as appropriate, for 3 s, when
the busbar protective device, i.e., feeder circuit, is
a circuit-breaker.
(b) Where the busbar protective device features fuses,
36 kA or 43.3 kA ^prospective', as hmited in
magnitude and duration by the 'cut-off charac­
teristic of the fuses.
The peak value of the major loop (of current) during
the first cycle of current is taken to assume a mag­
nitude of not less than 2.3 times the symmetrical
(RMS) value, i.e., 2.3 χ 36 kA or 2.3 χ 43.3 kA,
as appropriate. It will be appreciated that whilst in
(a) this peak is actually attained, it is usually a 'pro­
spective' value in (b), reduced markedly by the cut­
off characteristic of fuses at currents of short-circuit
level.
Low voltage switchgear, controlgear and fusegear
6.1.2 Capability required of main circuit
making/breaking devices
(a) Circuit-breakers
• Rated short-circuit breaking current:
Symmetrical — 36 kA or 43.3 k A , as required.
Asymmetrical — as symmetrical value plus 5 0 %
D C component.
• Rated short-circuit making current: a current
equivalent to 2.3 times the value of the rated
short-circuit (symmetrical) breaking current, i.e.,
2.3 X 36 k A , or 2.3 x 43.3 k A , as appropriate.
• Short-time current capability: a current equiva­
lent to the rated symmetrical breaking current
for a duration of 3 s.
(b) Contactors
Contactors switching main circuits, e.g., motor
circuits, are selected as follows,in accordance with
the 'duties' and 'utilisation categories' recognised
in BS5424: P a r t 1:
• Direct-to-line started motors other than actuator
drives
Rated duty — uninterrupted. A duty in which
the main contacts may remain closed whilst car­
rying a steady current without interruption for
periods of more than eight hours (weeks, months,
or even years).
Utihsation category — A C 3 , but A C 4 if
'inching' or 'plugging' is a feature of the duty.
A C 3 is appropriate where the normal duty
is the starting of a m o t o r direct-on-hne, and
its switching off under normal running load.
'Plugging' is a term used to denote stopping
or reversing a m o t o r rapidly by reversal of the
m o t o r primary connections while it is running.
'Inching' imphes energising a m o t o r once or re­
peatedly for short periods to obtain small move­
ments of the driven mechanism.
Mechanical endurance — 1 million no-load
operating cycles. This represents the number
of no-load operating cycles which can be made
before it becomes necessary to service or replace
any parts other than contacts.
• Actuator drives (excluding modulating duty).
Rated duty — intermittent duty Class 0 . 1 , on­
load factor 60%. A duty in which the main
contacts of a contactor remain closed for peri­
ods bearing a finite relationship to the no-load
periods, both periods being too short to allow
the contactor to reach thermal equilibrium. The
intermittent duty above implies a capability of
operation at a rate of 12 operating cycles per
hour, the on-load period of each cycle being
60% of the whole cycle.
391
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

SIDE VIEW OF CONTROL GEAR PANEL SIDE VIEW OF CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL
RELAY RELAY
CHAMBER CHAMBER

ACCESSTOFUSE
& TERMINAL
CHAMBER
BUSBAR
CHAMBER

TOP TIER
SWITCHING
DEVICE
COMPARTMENT ACCESS TO FUSE
CT
CHAMBER CT & TERMINAL
CIRCUIT BREAKER CHAMBER CHAMBER
COMPARTMENT
BUSBAR
CHAMBER J
BOTTOM TIER
SWITCHING r- 7
DEVICE
COMPARTMENT
CT I
CHAMBER

BUSBAR
CHAMBER

FIG. 5.46 3.3 kV switchboard featuring Whipp and Bourne Type AK fused equipments arranged in
double-tier formation

392

11; ' ' ^ ^ Ä
I I I the switchgear, controlgear and fusegear found on the
• I f 415 V and lower voltage systems. The requirements
F i g . 5.47 3.3 kV fused units of Whipp and Bourne
manufacture, generally as depicted in Fig 5.46 but
shown withdrawn and tilted for inspection/maintenance.
The left hand unit features a vacuum switching device
and that on the right an air-break interrupter.
Utihsation category — AC4.
Mechanical endurance — 1 milhon no-load
operating cycles.
• Substantially non-inductive loads switched
for long periods
Rated duty — uninterrupted. Utilisation
category — A C l Mechanical endurance — 0.3
milhon no-load operating cycles.
Additionally, contactors shall be capable of making
and carrying the specified prospective short-circuit
current of the system, as limited in magnitude and
duration by the associated circuit short-circuit
protective device, i.e., fuselinks.
The co-ordination between the contactor and the
circuit short-circuit protective device, in accordance
with BS4941: Part 1: Appendix C, is basically as
foUows:
• Type b co-ordination for equipment utilising
overload devices to BS4941: Part 1.
• Type c co-ordination for equipment
overload relays to BS 142.
Type b co-ordination accepts that the charac­
teristics of any overload relay may be altered per-
Low voltage switchgear, controlgear and fusegear
manently. Type c co-ordination requires that no
damage (including permanent alteration of the
characteristics of any overload relay) shall occur.
However, light burning of contacts, and risk of
their welding — the latter provided that no flash-
over occurs — is accepted.
6.2 Design and construction
6.2.1 General
This section describes the design and construction of
outlined are those for equipment concerned directly
with the control of operational plant. They are not
necessarily applied in non-operational plant areas, e.g.,
offices, welfare blocks, stores, etc. Henceforth in the
text, the switchgear, controlgear and fusegear will be
referred to simply as 'the switchgear'.
In A C applications, the switchgear is classified into
two duty classes commensurate with the severity of
the system conditions. These duty classes are:
Duty Class 1 For use in systems where the power
factor of short-circuit current is extremely low, e.g.,
where the switchgear is connected in relatively close
proximity to the source of generation. Duty Class 1 is
the normal requirement.
Duty Class 2 For use in 'distribution' systems in
which the power factor of short-circuit is not likely
to be lower t h a n 0 . 3 .
on
Mostly the switchgear is arranged in multi-circuit
switchboard formations accommodated in purpose
built switchrooms. However, it is expedient in certain
instances to locate items, such as small motor starters
and distribution fuseboards, local to the plant involved.
Except in the case of distribution fuseboards, al­
though there is now a tendency towards grouping
starters into small multi-motor control centre forma­
tions, the requirement 'local to plant' is largely for
single-circuit units — floor standing or wall mounted.
Main switchboards, i.e., unit and station auxiha­
ries switchboards, usually comprise a combination of
circuit-breakers, fused m o t o r starters and fused dis­
tribution gear. The incoming supply circuits of such
switchboards are almost always circuit-breakers. In
m a n y cases the supply to the switchboard is derived
from a 3.3 kV/415 V transformer housed in the switch­
board — the high vohage feed being by cable con­
utilising nected directly to the transformer H V terminals. The
switchgear includes all protective and interposing relays,
main and any necessary interposing current trans­
formers, transducers, instruments, control, selector and
test switches.
393
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

FIG. 5 . 4 8 3 . 3 kV switchboard of Reyrolle manufacture. The three left hand units are 'fused equipments Class S 1 4 A '
and the three right hand units are *air circuit-breakers Class S A ' .
(see also colour photograph between pp 4 9 6 and 4 9 7 )

The general assembly of the switchgear compHes
with BS5486: Low vohage swhchgear and controlgear
assemblies: Part 1, Specification for type-tested and
partially type-tested assemblies (general requirements):
which is identical with l E C Publication 4 3 9 - 1 : 1985.
However, for power station service it is necessary
to augment and interpret the British Standard as out-
hned below. Representative swhchboard formations are
shown in Figs 5.49 to 5.51. Typical examples of the
individual cubicle arrangements, air circuit-breakers

394
 Low voltage switchgear, controlgear and fusegear
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and starter equipment that comprise the switchboard
formations are ihustrated in Figs 5.52 to 5.54.
Basicahy, switchgear arranged in switchboards is of
Form 4 to BS5486. The ' F o r m ' of construction deter­
mines the degree of separation by barriers and parti­
tions (within the switchgear structure) of the major
components. 'Form 4' specifies the separation of bus­
bars from the functional units, and separation of all
functional umts, including their outgoing terminals, one
from the other. Essentially, the whole of the busbar
system up to the point of connection to the short-circmt
protective devices of each circuit must be capable of
withstanding a short-circuit at any point other than
in the immediate vicinity of the short-circuit. There
will, of course, be damage from arcing at the point
of short-circuit. Also, the whole switchboard assembly
must withstand any external fault. In the event of an
internal arcing fault on any functional unit, the damage
must, as far as possible, be confined to that unit, so
that the busbars and ah other functional units remain
fit for service. In addition to the basic requirements
of BS5486, speciahsed equipment and components,
e.g., circuit-breakers, contactors, fuse-switches, etc.,
must comply with the appropriate British Standard.
W h h d r a w a b l e and removable parts (see Definitions
in BS5486) of the same manufacture, type, rating and
duty must be interchangeable. Withdrawable and re­
movable parts of the same manufacture, type and
rating, but of different circuit duty must be inter­
changeable, subject to any necessary modification to
auxiliary circuits, protective devices, etc.
H a n d h n g equipment, e.g., hfting devices, is pro­
vided for withdrawable a n d removable parts exceeding
25 kg gross weight.
The use of hygroscopic or flammable materials is
avoided as far as practicable. Terminals in which a

396
L o w voltage switchgear, controlgear and fusegear
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 L o w voltage switchgear, controlgear and fusegear

AUXILIARY SWITCHES
BREAKER RACKING MECH
COVER PLATE

MANUAL TRIP BUTTON

LOCKING FLAP

LOCKING BOLT
MANUAL CLOSING MECH
COVER PLATE

V E N T I L A T I O N GRILL FRONT PLATE

FIG. 5 . 5 3 G E C type M 8 0 circuit-breaker shown withdrawn from cubicle

399
Switchgear and controlgear
VIEW INSIDE TOP
COMPARTMENT
AMMETER CT 40/1
INTERPOSING RELAYS
FIG. 5.54 Typical interior of a motor control unit fitted to the type of switchboard illustrated in Fig 5.50
screw compresses a bare wire conductor directly are
not permitted. Whilst, in general, no diversity factor is
allowed for Duty Class 1 equipment, the provisions of
BS5486: Part 1 in this respect are accepted for Duty
Class 2.
As for switchgear at the other voltages, the tem­
perature rise of terminals for external cabhng must not,
when carrying rated operational current continuously,
exceed 50°C, or the Hmits specified in the appropriate
400
Chapter 5
DROPPER
COMPARTMENT
AUXILIARY SWITCH
CONTACTOR
OVERLOAD RELAY
TEST SWITCH TRANSFORMER 415/110V
apparatus specification, whichever is the lower. All
main conductors and incoming/outgoing terminals
must be identified with their phase/polarity colours,
presently in accordance with BS 158. The colours at the
various points of identification must be of durable
material and a minimum of 300 mm^ in area. Because
in the course of time the adhesive may fail; thus allow­
ing 'unwinding' and introducing the risk of fault,
identification by taping is not accepted.

6.2.2 Enclosures
Enclosures, unless specified or approved otherwise, are
of metal, ventilated naturally, and provide a degree of
protection to BS5490 as follows:
• Equipment for indoor use — Code I P 3 1 .
• Equipment for outdoor use — Code IP44, or of
higher 'first' and 'second' numeral as necessary.
For switchgear featuring withdrawable parts, the spe­
cified degree of protection must obtain whether the
equipment is in the connected or disconnected posi­
tions, and must be independent of the fitting of closing
plates or other sealing arrangements at the point of
entry of external cabhng. Unless the specified degree
of protection provided by the enclosure is maintained
by, for example, shutters or shrouding, temporary
covers are supplied for use when withdrawable or re­
movable parts are removed. Such covers have captive
fastenings and padlocking facilities.
Additionally, all enclosures must provide:
• Adequate support of withdrawable parts during with­
drawal, and when left in the disconnected position.
• Positive restraint of a withdrawable part at the limit
of travel; the means adopted must require deh-
berate manual manipulation before it is possible to
disengage the withdrawable part from the enclosure.
• Access to main and auxihary contacts from the front
of the equipment. Access to fuses in control and
auxihary circuitry, relays, instruments, etc., is nor-
maUy from the front of the equipment in the case
of contactor controlgear, but usually from the rear
on circuit-breaker equipment.
• For work in safety on the de-energised side of any
main circuit isolating device with adjacent main
circuits live. This is a most essential requirement
as it is rarely possible, other than during planned
shutdown, in the more important switchboards to
make dead circuits other than those requiring par­
ticular attention. Also, any main circuit parts which
may remain live when access has been gained to the
interior of an enclosure, other than through doors
or covers secured by fastenings necessitating the
use of tools, must be further enclosed to prevent
accidental touching by persons. The aim in such cases
is to achieve a degree of protection of not less than
IPSO (to BS5490). Where it is physically impossible
to meet this requirement in respect of the contact
entries of the larger sizes of fuse-switch and fuse
bases, the openings must be as small as practicable
manufacturing tolerances will allow; additionally,
it may be deemed necessary to fit 'obstacles' to
obstruct access by hands/fingers.
• For access to main circuit fuselinks only when they
are dead.
L o w voltage switchgear, controlgear and fusegear
In the case of o u t d o o r equipment, any fixings which
of necessity pierce the wahs of the enclosure for
the attachment of external fittings must be gas-
ketted. Exceptions to this rule are the fixings of
labels. These may penetrate the wahs of the enclo­
sure provided that they d o not exceed 5 m m dia­
meter and are effectively sealed. Fixings for the
attachment of o u t d o o r enclosures to supporting
structures must not pierce the walls of the enclosure.
T o protect persons against electric shock, the provi­
sions of protection by barriers or enclosures, protec­
tion by insulation of live parts and protection by using
protective circuits, specified in BS5486: Part 1, are
followed.
Particular requirements with respect to doors and
covers are:
• Hinged doors shall open not less than 90° but, in so
doing, the movement must be hmited to prevent
damage to equipment mounted on the doors, and
also damage, or the application of tension, to wiring
connecting equipment on doors to that in the static
part of the enclosure.
• All indications must be clearly visible when doors
are closed, and the equipment available for service.
Additionally, to assist in the prevention of unau­
thorised interference with the intended functioning
of the equipment, provision is m a d e for padlocking
all doors closed.
• Doors and covers which give access to parts live at
main circuit vohage are secured by fastenings, e.g.,
screws and nuts, the release of which necessitates
the use of tools. Fastenings intended primarily for
operation by coins are not acceptable in this context.
As far as is practicable, bus wiring is segregated from
all other wiring and run in ducting, conduit, etc.,
preferably metallic. Largely from considerations of
mechanical security, the minimum permissible cross-
sectional area of bus wiring is 2.5 m m 2 .
T o facilitate efficient operation of the switchgear,
the following dimensional limits above operating floor
level are observed wherever possible:
Overall height 2600 mm (max)
Operating handles — (highest 2000 mm (max), 450 mm (min)
and lowest positions reached
by an operator's hand),
protective relays, instruments
and mechanical indicators
Doors and panel handles/locks 2000 mm (max), 300 mm (min)
T o p r o m o t e a movement of air through the switchgear
that is sufficient to prevent condensation when it is
out of service, heaters of the metalclad black heat
pattern are provided within the enclosures.
401
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

6.2.3 Cabling arrangements fire-resistant material. Cable a r m o u r alone is not ac­

cepted as satisfying this requirement.
Wherever practicable, external cabling is arranged to
Terminal boxes and gland plates for single-core ca­
enter equipment from below. To allow some freedom
bles rated in excess of 400 A are required to be designed
of choice as to the type of cabling used in a particular
specifically to minimise the production of induced
circumstance, main circuit terminals must be suitable
currents.
for the reception of conductors of either copper or
Gland plates are supplied on the basis of one plate
aluminium, and arranged to minimise the bending of
per cable gland, and must be detachable to fachitate
the cores.
drihing to suit by the cable contractor.
The main circuit terminals of each functional unit
Insulation must be so mounted and the method of
in a switchboard are enclosed separately in an air
attachment of connections thereto such as to minimise
insulated compartment or barriered section/subsection
the hkehhood of mechanical overstressing during nor­
of earthed metal or approved insulation material. Such
mal tightening of the mounting and connection fixings.
a compartment may also accommodate current trans­
Particular care is taken to ensure that expansion and
formers for instrument and protection purposes.
contraction of components shall have no damaging
Terminals for the connection of external control
effect, having especial regard to the temperatures hkely
and auxihary circuits are grouped and positioned rela­
to be attained under fault conditions. Additionally, the
tive to the main circuit with which they are associated.
configuration of the surfaces of insulation must be
Whilst not necessarily so in the past, it is in most cases
designed to minimise the accumulation of airborne
now pohcy to enclose each group separately, and thus
pollutants.
reduce the risk of work or a fault on one group jeo­
pardising another.
Ah terminal arrangements must, with cables con­ 6.2.4 Electrical clearances and creepage
nected, ensure achievement of the clearances and creep- distances
age distances shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.
As a general rule, the electrical clearances and creep-
age distances shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 are observed
TABLE 5.1 as minima. However, some relaxation is permitted
Indoor equipment specifically in the following areas:

Minimum clearance Minimum creepage, mm

• Contactors and associated overload protective de­
^ . in air between vices may have clearances and creepage distances
Equipment ^^^^^^ ^^^^ CTI less CTI 200 not less than those specified in BS5424: Part 1:
phase to earth, mm than 200 or greater Appendix B.
Duty Class 1 19 25 19 • Circuh disconnectors (isolating devices), fuse-swhches,
Duty Class 2 19 19 19 switched and other disconnectors may have clear­
ances not less than 12.5 m m .

The relaxed dimensions may be maintained on con­

TABLE 5.2
nections to the terminals of these components for a
Outdoor equipment
distance not exceeding 40 m m .
The clearances shown must be maintained irrespec­
Minimum creepage, mm tive of any insulation applied, unless such insulation
Equipment Minimum
Duty Classes clearance is capable of withstanding the full power frequency
CTI less CTI 200
1 and 2 in air, mm high vohage test.
than 200 or greater

Between phases 25 38
Phase to earth 25 25
The physical disposition of main circuit cabling
relative to auxihary cabling at the point of entry into
the equipment enclosure is arranged to minimise the
risk of fauh or fire on the former affecting the proper
function of the latter. For this reason, where the design
of equipment necessitates the instahation of lengths
of both main and auxihary incoming/outgoing cabhng
within the enclosure, the former is segregated from the
latter by earthed metal or other mechanically robust
25
6.2.5 Busbar systems
25
The busbar circuit of a switchboard comprises the
complete conductor system up to its points of con­
nection to the circuit disconnecting/protective devices
of the functional units. Typical busbar circuits are
illustrated in Fig 5.55.
Main and tee-off busbars are contained in separate
compartments within the switchboard. They are usual­
ly air-insulated, but may feature solid insulation at
the option of the manufacturer. Where insulation is
other than by air, it must be in the form of sleeving
with joints encased in moulded or similar covering.
Because of the possibihty of deterioration with age,

402

BUSBAR PROTECTIVE DEVICE MAIN BUSBARS
.CIRCUIT PROTECTIVE
DEVICE
TEE-OFF BUSBARS
1
(a) Multicubicle-type equipment
CIRCUIT PROTECTIVE
DEVICE
TEE-OFF BUSBARS
MAIN BUSBARS
BUSBAR PROTECTIVE DEVICE
(b) Multibox-type equipment
FIG. 5.55 Typical busbar circuits
e.g., 'unwinding' through loss of adhesion, taping of
conductors is not accepted for any purpose.
The two busbar circuits in busbar sectioning/inter-
connector equipments must be segregated from each
other by earthed metal or approved fire-resistant in­
sulation. For withdrawable equipment, the segregation
is required to extend up t o , and including, the fixed
disconnecting contacts. This segregation is necessary
to permit work anywhere on one set of bars whilst
the other remains live provided the busbar sectioning
unit is open.
To allow freedom in the positioning of circuits in
the switchboard, busbars are specified to have a con­
stant rating throughout their length; such requirement
is also of value should extension become necessary.
As a general rule, neutral conductors are required
to have a current carrying capabihty of not less than
one half that of the associated phase conductor. How­
ever, where the connected loads result in abnormal
L o w voltage switchgear, controlgear and fusegear
neutral current, for example, where the load is wholly
or predominantly fluorescent lighting, the neutral is
assigned a rating equivalent to that of the phase
conductors.
Except in the case of orifices (spouts) protected by
shutters, e.g., at disconnecting (isolating) contacts,
access to busbar circuits may be gained only by the
removal of covers secured by fastenings requiring the
use of tools, e.g., spanners, screwdrivers, to release.
Each cover must be clearly and indelibly marked
BUSBARS in red. Shutters protecting orifices are pro­
vided with facilities for padlocking closed — for use
(for example) when a withdrawable part is removed.
The short-circuit withstand strength of busbar sys­
tems is described in Section 6.1 of this chapter.
However, for the lower circuit (functional unit) cur­
rent ratings, it is often necessary to reduce the cross-
sectional area of the tee-off busbars at the point of
attachment to the terminals of the circuit short-circuit
protective device, to dimensions compatible with those
terminals. T o maintain, as far as practicable, the se­
curity of the busbar system at this point, such reduc­
tion in section must not extend for a distance exceeding
40 m m from the terminals of the protective device
unless the conductors are insulated for the rated insu­
lation voltage, and supported in a mechanically robust
manner. Where so insulated and supported, the occur­
rence of short-circuit earth faults is unhkely.
Main circuit fuselinks are to BS88 and of the gen­
eral purpose or m o t o r circuit type, as appropriate.
Similarly, fuse holders are to BS88. However, having
regard to the ih let-through of large fuse-links at high
prospective fauh currents, the maximum rating allowed
mounted in fuse holders is 100 A . Fuselinks rated above
100 A are mounted in fuse switches or similar devices.
6.2.6 Earthing of structures
Each switchboard is provided with a main earth bar
(protective conductor), usually and preferably on the
outside of the enclosure, extending throughout the
length of the switchboard. Subsidiary (tee-off) bars are
provided as necessary. The bars may be of copper,
aluminium or aluminium alloy. T o facihtate the attach­
ment on site of earth bonding cables, a clearance of
not less than 15 m m is provided between the back face
of the main earth bar and the adjacent surface of the
switchgear enclosure.
All joints are bolted. Because of problems at the
interface of aluminium cable lugs bolted directly to
tinned copper surfaces, bars are plain finish, i.e.,
untinned. Joints in aluminium bars have the oxide film
removed by steel wire brush; the surfaces so cleaned
are then coated with petroleum jelly or other approved
c o m p o u n d immediately before assembly. For outdoor
installations, the completed joint is sealed by the
application of an overall coating. Provision is m.ade at
each end of each main earth bar for connection to the
station main earthing system. T o assist achievement of
403
Switchgear and controlgear
a satisfactory connection, a flat area of not less than
50 X 50 m m must be provided.
Earth bars of copper are dimensioned as shown in
Table 5.3.
TABLE
Copper earth bar dimensions
Main earth bar
Busbar system
short-circuit
Cross-
protection
sectional
area, mm^
Fuse 150
Circuit-breaker 300
(3 s rated)
Earth bars of aluminium alloy must have a width not
less than that required for copper, and possess electrical
and mechanical properties not inferior to those of
copper.
Single main circuit equipments are provided with
an earth terminal.
Withdrawable parts are, when in the connected
position, bonded to the equipment earth bar or ter­
minal through contacts designed specifically for the
purpose. Such contacts must estabhsh the earth con­
nection before the contacts of the main circuk connect.
The neutral points of transformers are earthed at
the switchgear through removable hnks.
6.2.7 Mechanical interlocks
Mechanical interlocking is of the preventive type, i.e.,
designed to prevent as opposed to correct an improper
action, and effective as close as practicable to the point
at which force is apphed.
Essentially, such interlocks are provided:
(a) T o prevent the closure of a switching device incor­
porated in a wkhdrawable part, unless the whh­
drawable part is located correctly in the connected,
disconnected or, where appropriate, test position.
(b) To prevent the opening or closing of 'off-load'
disconnecting (isolating) devices unless the asso­
ciated switching device is open.
(c) To prevent the simultaneous closure of 'forward' and
'reverse' or 'low speed' and 'high speed' contactors.
(d) To prevent the simuhaneous closure of both contac­
tors or both switches of a changeover arrangement.
(e) To prevent access to main circuit parts through
doors unless such parts have been isolated from
all sources of supply.
404
Chapter 5
( 0 T o prevent connection to the supply of main circuit
parts to which access has been gained as in (e).
However, whilst a defeat feature is provided for
use when the door is open, it is not possible to
5.3
Subsidiary (tee-ofO
earth bar
Cross-
Minimum Minimum
sectional
width, mm width, mm
area, mm^
25 75 25
50 150 25
close the door unless the interlock is restored. P r o ­
vision is made for padlocking the interlock against
defeat.
Additionally, where for reasons of safety it is
essential to prevent the inadvertent starting of a
drive by closure of the circuit isolating device in
the presence of a welded contactor.
(g) T o prevent the closure of the disconnecting (isola­
ting) device in motor starters unless the associated
contactor is open.
6.2.8 Coded-key devices
Coded-key operated devices are provided where neces­
sary in a scheme of system interlocking whereby:
• A key, when inserted, permits a circuit-breaker (or
other switching device) to be closed, and is free
only when the circuit-breaker is open. Attempted
removal of the key when the circuit-breaker is closed
must not cause tripping of the circmt-breaker.
• A key is free only when a circuit-breaker is re­
moved from the connected position. It must not be
possible to place the circuit-breaker in the connected
position with the key removed, but it is possible
to place and operate the circuit-breaker in the dis­
connected position.
6.2.9 Protective systems components
Each component of the protective system, e.g., cur­
rent transformers, relays, etc., must be capable of
whhstanding, without damage, the passage of the short-
circuit currents available from the busbars for the
short-time rating of the equipment or, in the case of
fuse protected equipment, be capable of withstanding
 L o w voltage switchgear, controlgear and fusegear

the let-through current of the highest rated fuselink For the purpose of identification, switchboards, cir­
which may be fitted in the associated main circuit. cuhs, control equipment, etc., are provided w h h la­
belling and coloured symbols largely in line with the
requirements specified for 3.3 kV and 11 kV switchgear.
6.2.10 Current transformers
Current transformers are normally fitted on the side of
6.2.13 Fuses
the circuit switching device remote from the busbars.
The secondary windings of each single-phase current Fuselinks in both main (i.e., power) and control/
transformer, and the star-point of the secondary wind­ auxiliary circuits are of the cartridge type.
ings of each three-phase group are normally earthed Main circuit fuselinks are to BS88 and of the gen­
at one point only through a removable link. Where eral purpose or m o t o r circuit type, as appropriate.
the transformers are not readily visible, e.g., in circuh- Control/auxiliary circuit fusehnks may be to BS88 or
breaker equipment, duplicates of the rating plate are to Defence Standard D E F 5 9 - 9 6 : P a r t 1. Fuseholders
fitted in a more convenient position. are to BS88 or D E F 5 9 - 1 0 0 : P a r t 1, as appropriate.
Fuses in control/auxiliary circuits are grouped to
assist circuit identification and to provide convenient
6.2.11 Ammeters and voltmeters
points of isolation. Wherever practicable, fuses to BS88
Ammeters and voltmeters mounted on the switchgear are used in preference to the D E F type. The prefer­
are of the back-connected, flush type. Ammeter scales ence stems largely from the provision in BS88 holders
are so chosen that full-load current produces approxi­ of better shrouding of the contacts and a generally
mately 7 5 % fuh scale deflection. greater suitability for use as points of isolation.
Where there is no requirement for indication at a
remote point, those at the switchgear may be con­
6.2.14 Circuit-breaker equipments
nected directly in circuits of ratings u p to the order
of 30 A. Circuit-breakers are specified basically to BS4752: Part
All ammeters must be capable of carrying rated 1, but with the following additional capabilities:
current continuously, be suitable for use with direct-
• A rated asymmetrical breaking current equivalent
to-hne started motors where appropriate and able to
to the rated symmetrical breaking current plus, in
withstand without damage the passage of fault current
one phase at the instant of contact separation, a
until the operation of the main circuit protection.
D C component of not less than 5 0 % of the A C
component in that phase (see Fig 5.24).
6.2.12 Control switches
• Breaking a current equivalent to 100% of the sym­
Control switches for circuh-breakers are of the pistol- metrical breaking current applied to an outer pole,
grip (rotary) type; for contactor gear, pushbuttons without the unbalance forces produced under these
are the n o r m . Facilities are provided for padlocking conditions adversely affecting correct operation.
rotary selector devices in ah positions, and rotary con­
trol devices in the neutral position. Pushbuttons are
Where required for a triple-pole and neutral installa­
inscribed and coloured in accordance w h h Table 5.4.
tion, the neutral connection is established through a
bolted h n k .
TABLE 5.4 Circuit-breaker operating mechanisms are of the de­
Pushbutton inscriptions and colour coding pendent power solenoid or stored-energy motor charged-
spring type, complying basically with the requirements
Duty Inscription Colour outhned for 3.3 kV and 11 kV equipment. Whilst both
types are equally acceptable from the point of view of
Unidirectional motor Start Green performance, the latter, although of somewhat greater
Stop Red complication constructionally, does not require the
Reversing motor Forward Green provision of a relatively heavy D C closing supply. Thus,
Reverse Green
this mechanism can be of advantage in installations
Stop Red
where the provision of a heavy battery source of sup­
Valve or damper Open Black
Close Black
ply could present a problem — technically a n d / o r
Stop Red economically.
Emergency Stop Stop Red In basic concept, all low voltage switchgear assem­
blies incorporating circuit-breakers are of the metal­
clad type in accordance with the definition of the term
W t a l c l a d ' outhned for 3.3 kV and 11 kV equipment.
'Start' buttons are placed to the right of or above T h u s , disconnection (isolation) facilities for main and
*stop' buttons. Control devices are located to the right auxihary circuits, and also the provision of shutter
of or below selector switches. gear protecting busbar and circuit contacts (spouts)

405
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

in the cubicle, follow the arrangements established
for the higher voltage equipment. However, it may be
helpful to recall that the requirement described in
Section 1.3 of this chapter to the effect that work on
current carrying parts is permitted only when such parts
are earthed, is pertinent only at high vohage. Accor­
dingly, no provision is made for the deliberate earth­
ing of current carrying parts of low voltage equipment.
6.2.15 Contactor controlgear
Motor circuits account for the bulk of the contactor
type controlgear used in the power station. Essentially,
each circuit comprises a contactor in association with
high breaking capacity (HBC) fusehnks, together with
means for disconnecting the main and auxihary circuits
from their respective incoming supplies. The basic
arrangements recognised are as follows and depicted
diagrammatically in Fig 5.56:
Type A Non-withdrawable type with operational/
maintenance disconnection by fuse-switch.
Type Β Withdrawable type having off-load plug and
socket devices for maintenance disconnec­
tion and a switch within the fuse protected

R Ο­
Υ o- TYPE 'A'

B O-

R CH <• • e i -
Y O- <•
B O- <•
R O — ( •
Y O (m
Β o——(•
. ΤΥΡΕ 'Β'
> ALTERNATIVE

<•
ARRANGEMENT

<•
R Ο­

<•
Υ O-
B O-

R O- <•
Y O- <•
B O- <• •^Χ

—ΕΞ3—^—A^y^—
ΤΥΡΕ ' C

—Ε=3—[> y> »y>-

Ο —
— ΤΥΡΕ Ό '

FUSES ΤΟ BS88 'X

FOR ΤΥΡΕ C EQUIPMENT THE MAIN CIRCUIT
FUSE LINKS ARE MOUNTED ELSEWHERE
FOR TYPE D EQUIPMENT THE MAIN CIRCUIT
FUSE LINKS MUST NOT EXCEED 100A RATING

FIG. 5 . 5 6 Alternative arrangements for contactor fuses and isolating devices

406

zone for operational disconnection. The
withdrawable assembly also accommodates
the main circuit fusehnks.
Type C Non-withdrawable type with operational/
maintenance disconnection by a switch.
Type D Non-withdrawable type with a switch, within
the fuse protected zone, for operational
disconnection.
Types A, Β and C are equally acceptable. Type D is
permitted only for fuse-fed switchboards. In Type D
equipment, the fuses are mounted on the busbar side
of the circuit disconnecting device. There is therefore,
the possibihty that their replacement after operation
could be attempted before the abnormahty causing the
operation has been corrected. The act of attempted
replacement in such circumstances could initiate an
arc at the fuse carrier/holder contacts. Restriction of
the use of Type D equipment to fuse-fed switchboards,
i.e., switchboards for which the busbar system is
itself fuse-fed, is considered to reduce substantially
any risk arising from this cause.
The several devices comprising the main circuit, e.g.,
the contactor, fuse-switch, etc., are usually manufac­
tured by specialist component manufacturers and thus
may have performance ratings against specific duties.
Consequently, it is required that each 'circuit' com­
prising a combination of disconnecting device, fuses,
contactor, power terminals and associated internal con­
nections be assigned a rated operating current by the
manufacturer of the combination, i.e., the manufac­
turer of the circuit assembly.
As in circuit-breaker equipment, any neutral hnks
are of bolted type.
As a general guideline and to allow for contin­
gencies, the circuit minimum rating for direct-to-line
started motors is usually specified to be not less than
120 per cent of the nominal full load current of the
motor.
Each fuse-switch and switch has a current making
and breaking capacity not less than the value derived
from BS5424: Part 1: Clause 4.3.5 when based on
the assigned rated current of the circuit. In addition,
such switches must be capable of making a current
equivalent to the supply source prospective short-
circuit current as limited in magnitude and duration
by the highest rated fuselink which is permissible in
the circuit.
Where connection to the source of supply, e.g.,
busbars, is by plug and socket contacts, apertures
giving access to the supply side are shrouded or shut­
tered. Shutters must operate automatically on insertion
and removal of the withdrawal assembly, and are
identified as in circuit-breaker equipment, albeit the
lettering is, of necessity, usually smaller.
For the purpose of indication, if required at a
point(s) remote from the switchgear, devices for op­
L o w voltage switchgear, controlgear and fusegear
erational disconnection are provided with auxiliary
switches driven positively in each direction.
Largely to minimise the risk of operator mistake,
particularly in an emergency, the operating handles of
devices for operational disconnection are arranged uni­
formly to close the device with an upward movement.
Handles operating in a plane parallel to the front of the
equipment have a full movement not exceeding 60°
either side of the horizontal. Mechanisms are of the
independent manual type. It must not be possible to
leave an operating handle in an intermediate position.
Padlocking facilities are provided as foUows:
• For locking the handles of devices for operational
disconnection in the open position — it being pos­
sible to maintain such locking of the device against
closure when access to the interior has been gained
for maintenance purposes.
• For locking withdrawable contactor equipment as-
sembhes in the connected position.
• For locking shutters in the closed position. When
padlocked, the shutters prevent access to the fixed
isolating contacts which they shroud. Whilst the
shutters are locked closed, it must not be possible
for the isolating contacts on the withdrawable part
of the equipment to m a k e contact with the shutters
should an attempt be m a d e to place it in the con­
nected position.
• For locking disconnection (isolation) devices of
the withdrawable/removable type in the connected
position.
Each circuit is provided with a visual indicating device
to show whether the contactor is 'open' or 'closed',
which must be effective in both the 'circuit connected'
and 'circuit disconnected' positions. The device may be
either mechanically or electrically operated. The ori­
ginating action must be driven positively in the direction
of closing the main contacts and must not impede
operation of the contactor. Ahernatively, and usually
in the case of separately-mounted (i.e.. Type C) units,
the indication may be by lamps. If so, lenses are white
for O N , green for O F F , the green lens being placed
to the right of, or above, the white lens. The white
lens is identified by the legend ' O N ' .
Electrically operated devices other than indicator
hghts must adopt a non-definite indication on loss of
an operating signal.
Each contactor is provided with four normally open
and four normally closed auxihary contacts, except
that for the electrically-held type below 40 A rating, two
normally open and two normally closed contacts may
be accepted in conjunction with a repeat relay.
Auxihary contacts are driven as follows:
• Block type — positively driven in the direction of
closing the main contacts, but may be spring-
returned to the open position.
407
Switchgear and controlgear
Note: a 'block' type contactor is one in which the
contact system is carried in an enveloping case of
moulded insulation material. The moving contact
assembly operates usually with a parallel motion
in a horizontal plane.
• Clapper type — positively driven in both directions.
Note: a 'clapper', or 'bar', type contactor is one
in which moving contacts are carried on an insulated
bar and engage with stationary contacts mounted
(usually) on a flat base of insulation material.
The trip circuit auxiliary switch on latched contactors
must close before the main circuit contacts touch.
Means are provided which:
(a) On latched contactors de-energise the closing coil
when the contactor has closed and latched.
(b) On both electrically-held and latched contactors
prevent reclosure in the event of failure to close,
or automatic opening, whilst the closing signal is
maintained.
Each contactor is provided with facilities for main­
tenance testing the opening and closing operations of
the contactor by the use of the pushbuttons mounted
on the enclosure front. The arrangements are such
that the testing can be carried out only when the con­
tactor is disconnected from the busbars.
Control circuits function at the following voltages:
• Contactor closing mechanisms, 110 V A C nominal,
derived from 415/110 V control circuit transformers.
• Trip circuits (of latched contactors), 110 V D C
nominal.
Control circuit transformers are 415/110 V, non-
inherently short-circuit proof, to BS3535, Section F ,
but having an earthed metallic interwinding screen.
'Non-inherently short-circuit p r o o f transformers
will, if short-circuited at the output terminals, be dam­
aged unless disconnected by an overcurrent device.
Such transformers are well suited to the operation of
solenoid mechanisms in that, provided the overcurrent
protective device (e.g., a fuse) exhibits a suitable t i m e /
current characteristic, advantage may be taken of the
'short-time' capability (of the transformer) to satisfy
the relatively heavy transient (inrush) current taken
by the solenoid coil at energisation. Duty for duty, a
transformer 'inherently short-circuit p r o o f would need
to be of appreciably higher rating.
Fuselinks are fitted in both poles of the input con­
nections to the transformer. These may be mounted
either in a fuse-switch or in fuseholders. The output
connections are protected by a fuselink in one pole
and a solid hnk in the earthed pole. The non-fused
output terminal of the secondary winding is connected
to earth through a removable bohed link.
408
Chapter 5
6.2.16 Fusegear
Fusegear is used primarily to distribute supphes rather
than control specific items of plant directly, e.g., to
provide supplies to the smaller switchboards, separately
mounted motor starters, valve actuators, etc. A n im­
portant aspect of this role is the provision inherently
of short-circuit protection.
Fusegear may be built into and thus form an inte­
gral part of multi-motor control switchboards; these
may constitute switchboards consisting wholly of fuse-
gear, or may comprise single circuit feeding units.
Where, in addition to circuit disconnection (isolation)
a switching facility is required, fuse-switches are em­
ployed. Where there is no switching requirement, dis­
tribution fuseboards are used.
Fuse switches are basically to BS5419, double-pole,
three-pole or three-pole and neutral as necessary.
Neutral links may be either bolted or switched. Where
switched, the neutral connection must be established
before the phases 'make', and 'broken' after the phases
'break'.
T o preserve uniformity with the manner of opera­
tion of the handles of devices for the disconnection
of contactor controlgear, those for fuse-switches are
arranged to close the switch with an upward movement.
For handles operating with a rotary action in a plane
parallel to the front of the equipment, the full move­
ment of the handle shall not exceed 60° either side of
the horizontal.
Mechanisms are of the independent manual type.
It must not be possible to leave the operating handle
in an intermediate position.
Note: an independent manual mechanism is one in
which manual energy is stored and released in one
continuous operation, such that the speed and force
of the operation are independent of the action of the
operator.
Mechanical indication of the operating positions of
the switch handles is provided to show when the switch
is O N or O F F .
When necessary, fuse-switches have provision for
operating auxiliary switches.
Where fuse-switches are of the withdrawable type,
any main circuit parts which may remain live and
become exposed upon removal of the withdrawable
assembly are shrouded or shuttered. Such shutters op­
erate automatically on insertion and removal of the
withdrawable assembly.
Distribution fuseboards may be of the wall-mounted
box pattern, of the free-standing cubicle type, or may,
where expedient, be incorporated in 'main' switch­
boards.
Padlocking facilities are provided for:
• Locking fuse-switch handles in the open position.
It must be possible to keep the fuse-switch locked
against closure when access to the interior has been
gained for maintenance purposes. Only in excep-
 Fuses

tional circumstances, e.g., where continuity of supply

is an overriding consideration, is provision m a d e 1400mm APPROX

for padlocking handles in the closed position.

• Locking shutters in the closed position. Whilst

shutters are locked closed, it must not be possible
for the isolating contacts on the withdrawable part
of the equipment to make contact with the shutters
should an attempt be made to place it in the con­
nected position.

• Locking fuse-switches of the withdrawable/remov­

able type in the connected poshion.

6.2.17 Specialised switchboards/units

In addition to the traditional switchboards described
ON ON
earlier, certain specialised formations/units have been
developed. A n example of such development is the \ \
'actuator power/control distribution b o a r d ' for the OFF OFF

distribution of power and control supplies to actua­

tors, e.g., valve and damper actuators. The basic intent
of the arrangement is:

• The provision from a single location of both power

and control supplies.

• The provision of alternative/standby power supply

via changeover switches.

• To facilitate the use of 'composite' cable, i.e., cable

containing screened power cores, together with con­
trol cores, within an overall sheath.

The equipment of the switchboards — the busbar

system, contactors, fuse-switches, control switches, ca­ FIG. 5.57 Actuator power/control distribution board
bhng facihties, etc. — is generally required to comply — general arrangement
with the design and performance requirements speci­
fied for the more traditional switchboards. Figure 5.57
marily for the safety of personnel. The short-circuit
depicts a typical arrangement.
protection is provided by fusehnks in the 16, 32 and
A complementary development, but usable in its
63 A u n h s , and the earth leakage feature by residual
own right, is the 'actuator disconnection box'. This
current circuit-breaker (RCCB). Currently, a moulded-
comprises, in effect, a wah or steelwork mounted junc­
case circuit-breaker provides the switching, short-circuit
tion box serving as the interface between the station
and earth leakage functions in the 125 A rating.
'fixed' cabling and the flexible power and control leads
T o prevent the making and breaking of load cur­
from the actuator. The connection to the box is es­
rent on the plugs and sockets, a mechanical interlock
tabhshed through plugs and sockets. The plug and
is provided on all ratings whereby plant may be con­
socket concept serves the dual role of providing for
nected, i.e., a plug inserted or withdrawn, only when
ready removal of the actuator and also 'at plant'
the outlet is switched off. A test facility is provided
electrical isolation — the latter being a m a n d a t o r y
to enable the user to check the earth leakage protec­
requirement within the C E G B . A padlocking facility
tion. Figure 5.59 shows a typical u n h .
is provided to prevent engagement of the plugs to
enforce a disconnected (isolated) condition. A typical
actuator box is shown in Fig 5.58.
Power supplies for equipment primarily of a port­ 7 Fuses
able nature, e.g., welding plant, bolt heating equip­
ment, portable p u m p s , etc., are provided by wall or
steelwork mounted socket outlets. The outlets are
7.1 Introduction
triple-pole and neutral, rated 16, 32, 63 or 125 A With the possible exception of specialised control and
at 415 V. All ratings are switched, and feature short- instrumentation circuitry, for which the reader is re­
circuit and earth leakage protection — the latter pri- ferred to Volume F , the fusehnks used in the fusing

409
Switchgear and controlgear
CONTROL
PLUG-IN CABLING
FIG. 5.58 Actuator power/control local disconnection box
arrangements of main, i.e., power and auxiliary
circuits, are of the cartridge type. The design of the
modern cartridge fusehnk, particularly for very high
breaking capacities, is too complex a subject for dis­
cussion in detail here. However, the fohowing may
help towards the understanding of the philosophy of
their use in power station apphcations in the UK.
7,2 Definitions
Fuse A device that, by the fusion of one or more of
its specially designed and proportioned components.
410
Chapter 5
CABLING FROM
STATION SYSTEM
opens the circuh in which h is inserted and breaks
the current when this exceeds a given value for a suf­
ficient time. The fuse comprises all the parts that
form the complete device.
Cartridge fuselink A device comprising a fuse ele­
ment, or several fuse elements connected in parallel,
enclosed in a cartridge usually filled with an arc-
extinguishing medium and provided with terminals.
The fusehnk is the part of a fuse which requires re­
placing after the fuse has operated. Typical LV fuse­
hnks at ratings u p to 800 A to BS88:1975 are shown
in Fig 5.60.

6--
• reached by the current during the breaking operation
FIG. 5.59 415 V, 63 A socket outlet
Fuse element A part of a fuse designed to melt when
the fuse operates.
Fuselink contact A conducting part of a fuselink
designed for the purpose of connecting the fusehnk
into a circuit. The conducting parts are, essentially,
the cartridge body and end caps together with any
attached fittings — lugs, tags, necessary to provide
an adequate terminal arrangement. As a general rule.
Fuses
FIG. 5.60 Typical HBC fuse links to BS88:1975
fusehnks for use in high prospective current circuits
are provided with terminals designed for connection
into equipment by screw/stud type fastenings.
Current-limiting fuselink A fuselink which, during
and by its operation in a specified current range,
hmits the current to a substantiaUy lower value than
the peak value of the prospective current (see cut-off
current).
Prospective current of a circuit The current that
would flow in a circuit if a protective device, e.g.,
fuse or circuit-breaker, situated therein were replaced
by a hnk of negligible impedance.
Prospective breaking current The prospective current
measured at a time corresponding to the instant of
the initiation of the arc in a fuse during the breaking
operation.
Rated breaking capacity The maximum prospective
breaking current that a fuse is stated to be capable of
breaking at a stated recovery voltage under specific
conditions.
Cut-off current The maximum instantaneous value
of a fusehnk when the fusehnk operates in such man­
ner as to prevent the current from reaching the other­
wise attainable value. In other words, cut-off occurs
when the fuse operates, i.e., interrupts the circuit before
sufficient time has elapsed for the current to reach
the prospective value.
Cut-off characteristic A curve giving the cut-off
current under stated conditions of operation. In the
case of A C , the values of cut-off currents are the
maximum values reached whatever the degree of asym­
metry (of the current). In the case of D C , the values
of the cut-off currents are the maximum values reached
related to the time-constant as specified.
411
Switchgear and controlgear
Pre-arcing time The time between the commencement
of a current large enough to cause the fuse element(s)
to meh and the instant when an arc is initiated.
Arcing time The interval of time between the instant
of the initiation of the arc and the instant of final
arc extinction.
Operating time The sum of the pre-arcing time and
the arcing time.
Pt characteristic A curve giving I^t values (pre-arcing
I^t a n d / o r operating I^t) as a function of prospective
current under stated conditions of operation.
Virtual time The I^t value divided by the square of
the prospective breaking current. The virtual times
usually stated for fuselinks are pre-arcing time and
operating time.
Time/current characteristic The curve giving the
virtual time (e.g., pre-arcing time or operating time) as
a function of the prospective breaking current under
stated conditions of operation.
7.3 Required performance
Figure 5.61 illustrates 'cut-off, and Figs 5.62 and 5.63
'time/current' and 'I^t let-through' characteristics of
cartridge fuselinks to BS88:1975.
The current-hmiting capability of H B C fusehnks is
a particularly attractive feature in high fault level cir­
cuits, in that the circuit equipment need be designed
to withstand only the thermal and mechanical stresses
associated with the value attained by the current at cut­
off. In the absence of a current-limiting performance,
the whole circuit must be capable of withstanding the
very much higher stresses which would otherwise be
set up by the passage of the circuit prospective cur­
rent. Thus, where it is possible and practicable to
take advantage of the current-limiting performance of
fuses, the circuit equipment may be of appreciably
lighter construction, smaller physically and less costly
than where the short-circuit protection must, of neces­
sity, be provided by non-current-hmiting means, e.g.,
circuit-breakers.
The role of fuses in the applications described in
Sections 5 and 6 of this chapter is primarily the
provision of short-circuit protection. Where in addi­
tion it is necessary to provide protection against more
modest values of overcurrent — the protection of
motor circuits against overload being a particular
instance — the circuit switching device, e.g., the
contactor, is designed and equipped to perform that
function.
As a generality, fusehnks are 'general purpose' or
'back-up', or a derivative known as a 'motor circuit
412
Chapter 5
VALUES GIVEN APPLY AT 415V
550V VALUES ARE UP TO 10% GREATER
660V VALUES ARE UP TO 15% GREATER
MAX. INSTANT PROSPECTIVE CURRENT
VALUE OF (SHOWN HERE ASYMMETRICAL)
CUT-OFF
CURRENT
100 η
<
<
cc
tr
O
Π
1.0 10
r
PROSPECTIVE CURRENT. kA(RMS SYMMETRICAL)
FIG. 5.61 Cut-off current characteristics
fusehnk' which, as the name implies, is intended
primarily for motor duty. Essentially, a motor circuit
fuselink is a general purpose fusehnk with a dual
basis of rating; namely, a given current rating with
respect to its ability to carry current continuously and
a higher current rating with respect to its time/current
characteristic. The concept permits exploitation of the
ability of a fuselink of compact dimensions to with­
stand, for a limited duration, circuit overloads such as
occur during m o t o r starting — particularly where the
drive is switched direct-on-hne. By way of example, a
fuselink to BS88: P a r t 1: 1975 rated 63M100 has a
continuous current rating of 63 A — and hence a
body of dimensions commensurate with that rating —
but a time/current characteristic of a 100 A rated
fusehnk. Thus where, as is usually the case, the rating
of the fusehnks required by a given drive is dictated
by the magnitude and duration of the starting current,
rather than by the steady state running value, a space
saving becomes possible. The letter ' M ' appearing
between the two values of rating serves merely to
confirm the motor circuit apphcation.
Whilst it is important to note that a dual rated
fuselink should not be run continuously at a current
exceeding the lower value, e.g., 63 A in the case of a
63M100 rating, it is vital that the circuit in which it
 DC switchgear

20.000 -
4 hours - DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN FUSE LINKS IS ACHIEVED WHEN
10.000 . THE TOTAL |2t OF THE MINOR FUSE LINK DOES NO EXCEED
THE PRE-ARCING |2t OF THE MAJOR FUSE LINK.

TOTAL OPERATING |2t AT 660V

1 - ^ TOTAL OPERATING |2t AT 550V
U-«- TOTAL OPERATING |2t AT 415V
_ i - ^ PRE-ARCING |2t
1.000 -

100-

lii
Ρ
σ
ζ 10-

1.0-

0.1-

0.01-

0.005 Η 200 250 315 355 400 450 500 560 630 670 710 750 800 1000 1250
100 1.000 10.000 FUSE RATING, A
RMS SYMMETRICAL PROSPECTIVE CURRENT, A

FIG. 5.62 Time/current characteristics FIG. 5.63 I^t characteristics

is installed be capable of withstanding, at the circuit
prospective current, the values of *cut-off current
and 'energy' (I^t) let-through commensurate with the
higher rating, e.g., 100 A in the example.
Cartridge fuselinks of UK manufacture a n d com­
pliant with the appropriate British/DEF Standard are
precision devices which have proved highly rehable
in service when apphed properly, i.e., selected, in t h e
case of motor circuits, with due regard t o :
• T h e ratio of the starting/running current.
• The duration of the starting period.
• T h e number of sequential starts t o be allowed for,
i.e., successive starts without intervals between starts
long enough t o permit cooling.
The principles of the selection of fuses in schemes
of protection is described in Chapter 11.
8 DC switchgear
8.1 General
At the beginning of electricity supply, the sources of
such supply — d y n a m o charged batteries of secondary
cells — produced unidirectional current (DC). A first
essential of any system of supply is means for es-
tabhshment a n d interruption of current flow, i.e.,
switching o n a n d off. T h e most elementary means are,
of course, the coming together, and parting, in ambient
atmosphere (air) of contacts of conducting material.
The earliest devices for circuit 'making' a n d 'breaking'
were as simple as this.
All practicable forms of interruption of an electric
current involve t h e production of a n a r c , which must
be extinguished t o complete the interruption. T h e a r c ,
an intensely h o t column of conductive gas, is extin­
guished by cooling a n d lengthening t o t h e point where
the potential difference (vohage) across the contact gap,
as it widens, becomes incapable of sustaining the a r c .
At full opening of t h e contacts, t h e dielectric strength
of the g a p must withstand t h e voltage across it.
The build-up of dielectric strength across the contact
gap takes place similarly in t h e interruption of A C .
However, t h e process of interruption in an A C circuit
is assisted markedly by the occurrence of natural cur­
rent zeros at every half cycle — arc extinction taking
place at o r near a current zero. T h e absence of nat­
urally occurring current zeros in t h e case of D C thus

413
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

renders the interruption of such currents a more Short-time current capabihty — the full fauh current
difficuh process. level of the system for 3 s.
From the simplest of devices initially, switching
current in air, the switchgear evolved into open-type, Contactors
i.e., unenclosed, air-break contact systems, at first
As for A C applications, contactors are selected as
operated manually, mounted on vertical panels of in­
fohows in accordance with the 'duties' and 'utilisation
sulation material, such as slate. As systems developed,
categories' recognised in BS5424: Part 1:
arc control became necessary to achieve satisfactorily
reliable interruption. Development along these lines • Motor control
led, in due course, to the circuit-breaker concept as
Rated duty: Uninterrupted
presently understood (see Section 2.1 of this chapter
for definition of a circuit-breaker.) Utilisation category: DC2 where the duty is the
Whilst development and general acceptance of the starting and switching
metal-enclosed concept followed rapidly upon the ap­ off, of shunt-motors.
pearance, in the early part of this century, of the oil DC3 where the duty is as
circuit-breaker in the A C field, D C switchgear con­ for D C 2 , but with the
tinued firmly in the open-type tradition for several addition of 'inching'
decades. However, for many years now, the bulk of or 'plugging'.
D C swkchgear in UK power stations has been at least DC4 where the duty is the
metal-enclosed and, wherever possible, metalclad. A starting and switching
definition of 'metalclad' is given in Section 4.2 of off, of series motors.
this chapter. DC5 where the duty is as
Broadly, the several types of switchgear equipment for DC4 but with the
comprising a D C system installation, e.g., circuit- addition of 'inching'
breakers, contactor controlgear, fusegear, are two-pole or 'plugging'
versions of their three-phase A C counterparts.
Mechanical endurance: 1 million no-load operating
cycles

8.2 System conditions Accelerating contactors may be of intermittent duty.

The usual system voltages and fault levels are: • Substantially non-inductive loads switched on for
long periods
• System voltage nominal, V DC 48 110 220 250
Rated duty: Uninterrupted
• System short-circuh level
Utilisation category: DCl
Fauh current, kA 20 40 40 40
Time constant, s 0.015 0.02 0.02 0.02 Mechanical endurance: 0.3 million no-load operat­
ing cycles
To meet these system conditions, the basic capability
required of the major components of a D C switchgear Additionally, contactors must be capable of making
installation is described in the paragraphs that fohow. and carrying the prospective short-circuit current of
the system as limited in magnitude and duration by
8.2.1 S h o r t - c i r c u i t w i t h s t a n d s t r e n g t h of b u s b a r the associated circuit short-circuit protective devices,
systems i.e., fuselinks.
Starting resistors must limit motor starting currents
• The fuh fault current level of the system for 3 s, to not more than 2 5 0 % of the normal full-load cur­
where the busbar protective device is a circuh- rent, or such lower value as may be dictated by a
breaker. particular motor design. They must be capable of carry­
ing starting current for a minimum of five minutes.
• The full fault current level of the system, as limited
in magnitude and duration by the 'cut-off charac­
teristic of the fuses, where the busbar protective
9 Construction site electrical supplies
device features fuses.
equipment
8.2.2 Current mal<ing/breaking and short-circuit
c a p a b i l i t y of m a i n c i r c u i t s w i t c h i n g d e v i c e s 9.1 General
The fohowing sections outline equipment for the pro­
Circuit-breaker equipment
vision of site electrical supplies at 415, 240 and 110 volts
Rated short-circuit making and breaking current — A C 50 Hz, single or three-phase, for site construction
40 kA at a time-constant appropriate to the system. purposes.

414
 Construction site electrical supplies e q u i p m e n t

The equipment comprises: 9.2 Portable substations

• Portable substations. The substations provide supplies at 415/240 V, derived
• Portable distribution units 415/240 V. from an 11 kV source. Figure 5.65 depicts a typical
arrangement.
• Portable distribution units 110 V.
T h e transformer in the substation has a rating of
A typical site supply scheme is shown in Fig 5.64. 1000 kVA at a primary voUage of 11 kV. The high

11kV SUPPLIES FROM AREA

BOARD OR POWER STATION

I l k V B I N G MAIN HkVRING MAIN

POFffABLE PORTABLE
SUBSTATION Ε SUBSTATION A
V
NOLDINNN m [][1

No.1 X

L
No.5
* <
£
OÍKIIIII [ ][ ][] [][ ][ ]

415/240V PORTABLE
DISTRIBUTION U N I T S *
I11 ][ [][ wI
ί \
mm ][ ][] [1 ][ ]
110V PORTABLE
DISTIRBUTION Na4 {\ 110V
PORTABLE
DISTRIBUTION
UNIT ¡2
UNIT

PORTABLE PORTABLE A μ_||,

"^/^ SUBSTATION D SUBSTATION Β

[][][][][][] |][1[][][][1
I I
•ihS) ^ / Mil

PORTABLE
SUBSTATION C

FIG. 5 . 6 4 Typical site supply scheme

415
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

lOOOkVA TRANSFORMER

TRUNKING TRUNKING
415/240V
DISTRIBUTION PILLAR IlkV RING MAIN UNIT

LIFTING LUGS

HV CABLES

ELEVATION (FENCE REMOVED)

ALL ACCESS DOORS

ARRANGED FOR
PADLOCKING

PLATE STEEL FLOORING

PLAN

DISTRIBUTION PILLAR lOOOkVA

415/240V 3 PHASE & Ν " TRANSFORMER HkVRING
MAIN UNIT
HkVRING MAIN

X X

400A 630A

DIAGRAM OF CONNECTIONS

FIG. 5 . 6 5 Portable substation, 11 0 0 0 / 4 1 5 / 2 4 0 V

416

voltage switchgear comprises an oil-immersed, on-load
ring main unit with tee-off fuse switch incorporat­
ing high breaking capacity (HBC) fuses. Operating
mechanisms are of the independent manual type. The
fuse switch is tripped automatically upon operation
of any one fuse. Mechanical interlocking is provided
to protect the operator from contact with live parts
when replacing fusehnks. Integral earthing devices are
fitted to facihtate the earthing of the transformer and
one or both ring main cables. A safety device pre­
vents access to switches or bushings unless all switches
are in the 'earth' position. A maximum demand am­
meter, current operated, is fitted to the tee-off fuse-
switch portion. Cable boxes with cable glands pointing
vertically downwards are provided for the incoming
and outgoing ring main cables.
The 415/240 V distribution pihar is a weatherproof
sheet steel housing having padlockable access doors
front and rear. The base plate is constructed in two
sections which can be removed separately to aid the
process of cable installation. The base plate is sealed
against the ingress of moisture or vermin. The fuse
units are screened so that work can be carried out on
the load side of any circuit when the adjacent circuits
are 'hve'.
The pillar unit comprises:
• Three 630 A (three-phase and neutral) fuse units
with 630 A H B C fuses, neutral links and gland entries
for 4-core power cables.
• Three 400 A (three-phase and neutral) fuse units
with 400 A H B C fuses, neutral links and gland entries
for 4-core power cables.
Each circuit is fitted with a current-transformer-
operated maximum demand ammeter.
The pillar is fitted with a phase selector switch and
a voUmeter, visible from the front of the unit when the
doors are closed. Door operated bulkhead lighting is
included, together with an electric heater of adequate
capacity to prevent condensation. These items are
supplied directly from the busbars and protected by
H B C fuses.
The connecting busbars between transformer, HV
switchgear and pillar are of copper, enclosed in a
metalhc trunking.
A copper earth bar with a section of about 500 m m
X 6 m m is provided, to which is connected the neutral
earthing link of the distribution pillar, the earthing
points of equipment and all metal framework and
screens. The earth bar is connected to the site earthing
system.
The equipment is mounted on a rigid steel baseframe
suitable for handling by crane or winch onto a roughly
levehed hard-core foundation. Steel plate flooring is
positioned around the plant, fixed to the frame, to
provide safe access for operation and maintenance.
A metalhc fence, approximately 2500 m m high, sec­
tioned to facilitate easy removal and provided with
Construction site electrical supplies equipment
padlockable access gates, is affixed around the peri­
meter of the assembly. A label is attached to the fence
indicating the gross weight of the equipment.
9.3 Portable distribution units (415/240 V)
These distribution units provide supplies at 415/240 V.
The equipment is enclosed in a weatherproof housing
mounted on a rigid steel base, suitable for handling
by crane or winch o n t o a roughly levelled hard-core
foundation. Figure 5.66 depicts a typical construction.
The units are equipped with triple-pole and neutral
fuse switches complete with H B C fusehnks, entries for
power cables, one 12-way 32 A triple-pole and neutral
distribution fuseboard feeding 32 A socket outlets,
featuring earth leakage protection.
The unit is provided with a vohmeter, visible when
the doors are closed. Bulkhead type light fittings are
provided at front and rear. Electric heaters are fitted
to combat condensation. These items are supphed direct
from the busbars and are protected by H B C fuses.
The unit enclosure is provided with a substantial
earth terminal for connection to the site earthing system.
9.4 Portable distribution units (110 V)
These distribution units provide supplies at 110 V sin­
gle or three phase. Units are rated 5, 10 or 25 kVA.
Figures 5.67 and 5.68 illustrate typical constructions.
The units are of sheet steel weatherproof construc­
tion mounted on rubber-tyred wheels. All components,
such as fuse-switches and distribution boards mounted
on the transformer tank, are secured by welded attach­
ments. The units are equipped as follows:
Rating Input 415 V Output 110 V No of
kVA socket outlets
5 63 A 6-way, 20 A three-phase
triple-pole and neutral distribution
switch fuseboard 6
10 63 A 12-way, 20 A three-phase
triple-pole and neutral distribution
switch fuseboard 12
25 63 A Three-phase and neutral
triple-pole fuse-switch fitted with
switch 160 A fuselinks
The transformer is a three-phase O N type having a
voltage ratio of 415/115 V at no-load, suitable for
operation on a nominal 415 V three-phase system
having its neutral point sohdly earthed.
An earthing terminal of approximately 12 m m dia.
X 25 mm long is provided on the enclosure.
Neutral links are of the bolted type. Distribution
fuseboards are connected directly to the LV terminals
of the transformers.
417
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

VOLTMETER

CABLE
1800mm APPROX. ENTRY

FRONT ELEVATION SIDE ELEVATION

(DOORS OPEN)

DOOR OPERATED INCOMING

BULKHEAD FITTING SUPPLY

Ö/400A

BUSBAR CHAMBER 'Δ THREE PHASE

ANDNEUTRAL(TP&N)

FUSE
INCOMING SWITCHES
CABLE

•
THREE PHASE
AND NEUTRAL
FUSE BOARD

'^ufa^f Λ Λ Λ Λ Λ Λ Λ Λ Λ Λ Λ Λ

DIAGRAM OF CONNECTIONS

32A SOCKET
OUTLETS

REAR ELEVATION
(DOORS OPEN)

FIG. 5 . 6 6 Portable distribution unit, 4 1 5 / 2 4 0 V

418
 Construction site electrical supplies equipment

Ymm

LIFTING LUGS

NEUTRAL EARTH LINK

[y

η
ψ

ί1
w i
SOCKET
OUTLETS

DISTRIBUTION
FUSE BOARD

INCOMING 415V
3 PHASE, 50Hz

DISTRIB­
RATING No. OF APPROX. DIMENSIONS
UTION
kVA SOCKETS
BOARD
X Y Ζ

5 6 WAY 6 760 760 840

10 12 WAY 12 920 920 840

THREE PHASE
AND NEUTRAL
DISTRIBUTION
FUSE BOARD

DIAGRAM OF CONNECTIONS

FIG. 5 . 6 7 Portable distribution units, 1 1 0 V / 5 and 1 0 kVA

419
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5

1200rTim APPROX 1000mm APPROX

-LIFTING LUGS

O
·— OIL LEVEL GAUGE

63A TP SWITCH

EARTH TERMINAL

O O

TP AND Ν FUSE SWITCH

INCOMING 415V
3 PHASE, 50Hz

63A TP SWITCH

25kVA 415/110V
TRANSFORMER

NEUTRAL Π / TP AND Ν FUSE SWITCH

EARTHING ^ FITTED WITH 160A
LINK FUSE LINKS

DIAGRAM OF CONNECTIONS

FIG. 5 . 6 8 Portable distribution unit, 1 1 0 V / 2 5 kVA

420

Socket outlets are situated on the exterior of the sheet
steel housing, and connected to the distribution board
by cable.
The earthing terminals of fuse-switches and distri­
bution boards are connected to the earth terminal on
the transformer tank. The neutral point of the LV
winding is connected to the earth terminal on the
transformer tank through a bolted hnk located in an
accessible position.
10 Future trends in development and
application
10.1 General
With the trend towards use of plant requiring minimum
maintenance, and the ever present quest for first cost
and space optimisation, the types of switchgear on offer
to the applications engineer has changed dramatically
in recent years. That such changes have particularly
affected the vohage range from 1 kV to 36 kV can be
attributed to the fact that investment worldwide in
electrical plant is necessarily biased toward distribution
systems. Whereas the ratings required of distribution
switchgear are generally lower than those of power
station swhchgear, there is no doubt that research and
development aimed at the former has also been of
benefit to the latter.
Since switchgear exists to control and protect the
electrical system to which it is connected, it is of
paramount importance that it can perform these duties
with maximum rehabihty. The duty of short-circuit
protection has particular significance in power stations,
since the close coupling of several high energy sources
leads to very high short-circuit currents and the me­
chanical stresses resulting therefrom to system plant,
busbars and cabling.
It is a well estabhshed fact that the failure rate of
any item of engineering plant is proportional to the
number of components comprising that item. A com­
parison between the latest designs of interrupter unit
for swhchgear and long estabhshed designs shows clear­
ly that there is a distinct trend towards the reduction
of components, particularly in the interrupter. This
move has doubtless been assisted by an increasing
understanding of arc control technology and the uti­
lisation of modular construction, together with new
materials and assembly methods.
Statistics show that the majority of switchgear fail­
ures can be attributed to mechanical rather than electri­
cal breakdown. Switchgear development has therefore
concentrated much effort upon improving mechanical
rehabihty. A distinct merit of the latest interrupter
devices is that the mechanical stresses occurring within
the switchgear during short-circuit breaking and making
have been reduced and the resultant energy require­
ments of the opening and closing mechanisms have
Future trends in d e v e l o p m e n t and application
decreased proportionally. These changes not only im­
prove the mean time between failure but also achieve
a marked reduction in operating storage batteries.
The trends toward simpler and more rehable con­
struction also enable costs to be reduced, both for initial
purchase and for subsequent preventive and corrective
maintenance. However, the engineer must always be
conscious of the fact that innovation and improve­
ment do not always go hand in hand. New designs of
swhchgear still require careful evaluation and thorough
type testing. Where switchgear forms part of 'strategic'
or 'safety related' systems, in which its failure could
have serious effect, then proven service reliability may
need to be demonstrated prior to its full scale adop­
tion. Trial installations for evaluation purposes are of
long term benefit both to user and manufacturer.
10.2 Oil-break switchgear
Switchgear employing oil for both insulation and inter­
rupting purposes has not found favour for application
in UK power stations for many years, not least because
of the hazards of explosion and fire which, although
minimised by careful design, can never be eliminated.
Nevertheless, the oh circuit-breaker, whether it be of
the bulk oil or minimum oil type, sthl continues to give
reliable service in distribution systems but is steadily
being replaced by the new ranges of low maintenance,
low fire-risk switchgear now available.
10.3 Air-break switchgear
The progressive development of the early air-break
'knife switch' with plain gap into a reliable circuit-
breaker has taken a number of decades and has today
been perfected to the level where sophisticated inter­
rupting devices, employing magnetic blow-out circuits,
arc guidance systems and arc-resistant insulation, en­
able very high breaking capacities to be achieved with
air-break switchgear.
The use of such complex and bulky interrupting
devices, coupled with the more generous air clearances
required, is not without hs penahies. These are, for
power station auxiliary H V switchgear, evidenced by the
impressive size and weight of switchgear panels, their
high-initial cost and the skills required to perform major
maintenance work.
There have been some savings possible at HV with
the introduction of the m o t o r switching device, which
has been described earher in this chapter, and further
development of this device is expected albeit by em­
ploying power fuses in combination with low rated
vacuum or alternative modern arc control devices.
At LV, the application of rehable high breaking
capacity fuses of UK design means that the demand
for high capacity air-break circuit-breakers is generahy
hmited to main feeder circuits only. However, some
other industriahsed countries were less successful in
421
 Switchgear and controlgear
the development of H B C fuses and as a result a viable
alternative known as the moulded case circuit-breaker
(MCCB) was developed and subsequently introduced
to the UK.
The moulded case circuit-breaker, as its name im-
phes, uses moulded insulation materials, permitting
space and weight reduction. In some instances the filler
in the moulding material is claimed to assist in the
arc extinguishing process by producing gases favour­
able to current interruption. Current-limiting proper­
ties, similar to those of H B C fuses, can also be utihsed
to reduce fauh damage and a regime of rating steps
(as for fuses) must also be followed to ensure discri­
mination. As an alternative to 'traditional' fuse switch-
gear, the M C C B can also fulfil a role within motor
starter circuits. MCCBs now available on the UK
market have found limited favour with some users
but have yet to make their mark in UK power station
apphcations. With a specified service life for power
station plant MCCBs in 'non-maintainable' form would
not be acceptable.
The maintenance of power station switchgear at
service capability is based upon the programmed over­
haul/repair of equipment installed for the station de­
signed hfe. Whilst 'maintainable' moulded-case circuit-
breakers may have a place, the 'non-maintainable'
form is as yet unacceptable by virtue of the difficulty
of determining the performance capability after a
period of service, particularly if fault clearances have
been a feature of that service.
10.4 Air-blast switchgear
Exploitation of the improved dielectric withstand of
air subjected to pressures above atmospheric level has
resulted in present day designs of air-blast switchgear.
Designs of air-blast interrupter employing compressed
air stored at pressures of the order of 30 bar, with
sophisticated gas flow technology applied to the nozzles
and contacts in the arc region, are capable of achieving
the highest short-circuit breaking capacities demanded
today. These units therefore find ready application as
generator circuit-breakers for the largest steam turbine-
generator units available and can be forced cooled,
where necessary, to match generator load currents.
The high cost of air-blast switchgear which must
also include ancillary compressor and air storage plant,
plus the noise accompanying each switch opening, pre­
cludes the wider application of these units to power
station general auxiliary systems.
Similar air-blast switchgear was also developed for
distribution and transmission systems up to highest
E H V levels. However, with the advent of new arc-
interruption technology and more environmentally
acceptable low maintenance switchgear, the air-blast
circuit-breaker has declined rapidly in favour during
the last decade and now worldwide is being applied
only under special circumstances. This trend can be
expected to influence future application of air-blast
422
Chapter 5
technology to power station generator switchgear where
alternatives are now available for all but the very
highest short-circuit breaking capacities.
10.5 Vacuunn switchgear
Although researched in the 1920s, vacuum arc-inter­
rupting devices did not achieve commercial viability
until the 1960s. The factory sealed vacuum interrupter
has subsequently introduced to the switchgear field a
unit which is claimed by some to approach the 'ideal'
circuit-breaker of electrical theory. However, the aura
which tends to surround all 'black-box' components
has also given rise to some concern over their perfor­
mance and rehability, particularly in power station
applications, in their behaviour when switching motors
and the possibility of loss of vacuum.
Satisfactory service experience with vacuum switch-
gear during the last decade has dispelled most of the
doubts. Furthermore, research in the laboratory and
in the field has tended to confirm that some pheno­
mena are not unique to vacuum interrupters and that
for critical service conditions some special precautions
may be appropriate to both established and innovative
designs.
The success of any electric arc-interrupting device
lies in its contact geometry and, particularly with the
vacuum unit, the chemistry of the contact materials
is also of great significance. Whilst the reader wishing
to study the contact materials technology in detail can
refer to the many learned papers now published on
the subject, it is sufficient to note here that it is the
precise composition of the basic contact metal, copper,
together with controUed additives and the exclusion of
impurities, which dictate performance.
Vacuum interrupter development has produced units
for circuit-breaker application, with its demands for
high short-circuit breaking capacity and moderate num­
ber of switching operations, and for contactor appli­
cation, with moderate short-circuit breaking capacity
and high number of switching operations. A basic
advantage of the contactor interrupter, as manufac­
tured in the UK, is that it provides a 'soft' operating
characteristic particularly suited to regular switching
of load currents including high reactance transformers
and small m o t o r s , etc. C o m p a r e d with the contactor
type, the circuit-breaker interrupter has a relatively
'hard' characteristic. This is presently unavoidable, being
an inherent feature of interrupters designed specifi­
cally for very high currents, i.e., short-circuit currents.
Briefly, a 'soft' interrupter is one with a negligible
propensity to 'current chop', and thereby produce over­
voltage hkely to damage plant insulation. Conversely,
a 'hard' interrupter is one with a tendency towards
such behaviour. Current chopping is the term used
to describe the sudden reduction to zero, during the
process of interruption, of an ahernating current at a
time other than the instant of a natural zero. Theo­
retically, an interrupter 'breaks' an alternating current

when the dielectric strength across the arc gap at a
natural zero becomes sufficient t o prevent the recovery
voltage (across the gap) re-establishing the current flow.
It follows, therefore, that a dielectric strength suffi­
cient to bring about interruption of a high value of
current, e.g., a short-circuh current, wih be more severe
than necessary to deal with much lower values. Thus
it is values of current relatively low, by comparison
with the maximum capability of the interrupter, which
are susceptible to chopping, i.e., forced t o zero before
the instant of a natural zero.
Vacuum contactor interrupters in combination with
H B C fuses to form m o t o r swhching devices, are avail­
able with rated vohage from 1 kV to 7.2 kV. Such u n h s
have been successfully applied in limited quantity in
UK power stations and h is anticipated that their
usage W Ü 1 increase, particularly where they can demon­
strate a first cost advantage over air-break types. Fig­
ures 5.69 and 5.70 hlustrate examples of controlgear
featuring vacuum interrupters in association with H B C
fuse protection.
Vacuum circuit-breakers have also been successfully
applied in UK power stations but awah full recogni­
tion as an alternative to the current standard air-break
units. The trend to wider application of vacuum circuit-
breakers can be expected to fohow demonstration of
the highest short-circuit breaking and normal current
capachies appropriate for the largest power plant sys­
tems, i.e., 40 kA and 3150 A respectively. Rated volt­
ages of 3.6 kV and 12 kV will be required and although
a motor switching duty at 11 kV is specified, this wih
relate to large motors i.e., 1000 k W a n d above.
10.6 SFe switchgear
Research into the use of S F 6 (sulphur-hexafluoride)
gas for electrical insulation purposes can be traced
back to the 1930s but h was not until the 1950s that
its performance as an insulation medium was noted.
SF6 is odourless, colourless, non-toxic and non-flam­
mable. At normal temperature a n d pressure its spe­
cific denshy is five times that of air a n d hs thermal
transfer coefficient 1.6 times that of air. Its dielectric
strength at only 3 atmospheres absolute is comparable
to that of electrical insulating oil.
Initial application of S F 6 to switchgear was at trans­
mission voltage levels where it was a logical develop­
ment of the air-blast principle to employ a gas other
Future trends in d e v e l o p m e n t a n d application
than air. T h e need to seal the gas system in order
to exclude air a n d moisture, together with problem
experienced with compression a n d storage of recycled
gas, led to the derivation of the 'puffer' interrupter,
in which a minimal overpressure is held for insulation
purposes a n d where, during the interrupting cycle, a
local blast of gas is created in the region of the arcing
contacts by a direct-driven piston/cylinder unit.
At transmission vohage levels, development con­
tinues into interrupters of increasing breaking capacity,
the trend towards a simphfication of units for use
at vohages from 1 kV to 36 kV has also progressed.
T h e puffer principle is presently retained at these
vohages for short-circuhs of 1 5 - 2 0 kV and above.
Designs are also available at low fault levels and are
continuing in development by a number of manufac­
turers worldwide t o higher fault levels, using various
forms of self-extinction system, including electromag­
netic deflection a n d rotating arc techniques. The self-
extinguishing interrupter results in designs of switchgear
with minimal requirements in operating energy, whilst
the insulating and heat conductive capabilities of S F 6
enable unit sizes to be held to a minimum.
T h e specialised metalclad a n d phase-segregated
generator circuit-breaker is now available with S F 6
technology for all but the very highest normal cur­
rent a n d fauh ratings. Short-circuit breaking capacity
u p t o 100 k A has already been achieved using self-
extinguishing principles and it can be expected that
development whl continues, resulting uhimately in the
phasing out of air-blast switchgear for generator switch­
ing duties.
The explohation of the electrical insulation proper­
ties of S F 6 in isolation from its arc interrupting
characteristics occurred in the late 1960s in the UK,
when trial installations of multiple-unh vacuum inter­
rupters immersed in S F 6 gas were m a d e on the 132 kV
system. Gas insulation, also employed at E H V levels
for current a n d vohage transformers, enables internal
dimensions to be minimised. Also, because a small
overpressure is employed, the enclosure gives full en­
vironmental protection. M o r e recently, some European
manufacturers have introduced H V metalclad swhch-
gear with S F 6 gas insulation a n d oil or vacuum inter­
rupters. Whilst such equipment becomes particularly
attractive because of space saving at voltages in the
range of 24 kV to 72 kV, it is less important at power
station auxiliaries system voltages, especially if available
only w h h fixed type isolation.
423
Switchgear and controlgear Chapter 5
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424
 Future trends in d e v e l o p m e n t a n d application

FIG. 5 . 7 0 Example of control gear featuring vacuum interrupters in association with H B C fuse protection — for
3 . 3 kV service, showing the demonstration of the circuit earthing switch (GEC Industrial Controls Ltd)
(see also colour photograph between pp 4 9 6 and 4 9 7 )

425
Switchgear and controlgear
11 Bibliography
11.1 British Standards (BS)
Where an International Electrotechnical Commission (lEC) number is
given, the British Standard is identical with the lEC document.
BS4727: Part 1: Glossary of electrotechnical, power, telecommuni­
cation, electronics, lighting and colour terms: Part 2: Terms parti­
cular to power engineering Group 06. Switchgear and controlgear
terminology (including fuse terminology): 1985
BS5311: Parts 1-7: Specification for a.c. circuit-breakers of rated
voltage above 1 kV: 1976
BS5227: Specification for a.c. metal-enclosed switchgear and con­
trolgear of rated voltages above 1 kV and up to including 72.5 kV:
1984
BS4752: Part 1: Specification for switchgear and controlgear for
voltages up to and including 1000 V a.c. and 1200 V d.c. Part 1.
Circuit-breakers: 1977 (lEC 157-1975: lEC 157-1 A: 1976)
BS775: Part 2: Specification for contactors: Part 2, a.c. contactors
for voltages above 1 kV and up to including 12 kV: 1974
BS3659: Specification for air-break circuit-breakers for alternating
current systems above 1 kV and up to and including 11 kV: 1963
(withdrawn and replaced by BS5311)
BS5424: Part 1: Specification for controlgear for voltages up to and
including 1000 V a.c. and 1200 V d.c. Part 1, Contactors: 1977
(IEC158-1: 1970, IEC158-1A: 1975)
BS5419: Specification for air-break switches, air-break disconnectors,
air-break switch disconnectors and fuse-combination units for volt­
ages up to and including 1000 V a.c. and 1200 V d . c : 1977 (IEC408:
1972)
BS5486: Part 1: Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear assemblies.
Part 1, Specification for type-tested and partially type-tested
assemblies (general requirements): 1986 (IEC439-1: 1985)
BS5490: Specification for classification of degrees of protection
provided by enclosures: 1977 (IEC529: 1976)
BS1432: Specification for copper for electrical purposes. Strip with
drawn or rolled edges: 1970
BS2898: Specification for wrought aluminium and aluminium alloys
for electrical purposes. Bars, extruded round tube and sections:
1970
BS5253: Specification for a.c. disconnectors (isolators) and earthing
switches of rated voltage above 1 kV: 1975
BS2692: Part 1: Fuses for voltages exceeding 1000 V a.c. Part 1.
Specification for current-limiting fuses: 1986 (IEC282-1: 1985)
426
Chapter 5
BS3938: Specification for current transformers: 1973 (1983)
BS3941: Specification for voltage transformers: 1975 (1982)
BS162: Specification for electric power switchgear and associated
apparatus: 1961
BS6581: Specification for common requirements for high-voltage
switchgear and controlgear standards: 1985 (IEC694: 1980)
BS4941: Part 1: Specification for motor starters for voltages up to
and including 1000 V a.c. and 1200 V d . c : 1979 (IEC292-1: 1969,
IEC292-1A: 1971)
BS142: Electrical protection relays: 1982
BS158: Specification for the marking and arrangement of switchgear
busbars, main connections and small wiring: 1961 (withdrawn)
BS3535: Specification for safety isolating transformers for industrial
and domestic purposes: 1962
BS88: Parts 1 and 2: Specification for cartridge fuses for voltages up
to and including 1000 V a.c. and 1500 V d.c: 1975 (1982)
BS4343: Specification for industrial plugs, socket-outlets and cou­
plers for a.c. and d.c. supplies: 1968
BS196: Specification for protected-type non-reversible plugs, socket
outlets, cable couplers and appliance-couplers with earthing contacts
for single phase a.c. circuits up to 250 volts: 1961
11.2 Electricity supply industry (ESI)
Standards
ESI Standard 3 7 - 1 : 415 V a.c. switchgear, controlgear and fusegear
ESI Standard 3 7 - 3 : A.C. metal-enclosed switchgear and controlgear
of rated voltages 3,6 kV and 12 kV: Part 1: Circuit-breaker equipment
(air-break): Part 2: Fused switching device equipment of 3.6 kV rated
voltage
ESI Standard 5 0 - 1 8 : Design and application of ancillary electrical
equipment
11.3 Other relevant documents
Memorandum on the Electricity Regulations (SHW 928): UK Factories
Act: 1961
DEF 59-100 Part 1: Fuseholders, carriers and bases electrical fuse
(Block and extractor post types)
DEF 5 9 - 9 6 Part 1: Fuselinks electrical
Power Circuit Breaker Theory and Design: Edited by C H . Flurscheim:
Published by Peter Peregrinus Ltd
 C H A P T E R 6

Cabling

1 Introduction 5.5.6 Plant-mounted devices

2 Cable systems and layout 5.5.7 Application of short-time fireproof cables

2.1 Segregation requirements 6 Cable support systems

2.1.1 Segregation requirements for fossil-fired and hydro 6.1 Introduction
power stations 6.2 Design philosophy
2.1.2 Segregation requirements for nuclear power stations 6.3 Basic system components
2.1.3 General layout requirements 6.4 System design and application
6.5 Seismically qualified cable supports
3 Cable types
3.1 11 kV cables 7 Cable installation practices
3.2 3.3 kV cables 7.1 Introduction
3.3 415 V cables 7.2 The need for cable restraint
3.4 Cables for DC power circuits 7.3 Cable cleating design parameters
3.5 Multicore control cables 7.4 Cleating philosophy for cables installed on steel­
3.6 Multipair control cables work
3.7 Short-time fireproof cables 7.4.1 Straight horizontal runs on ladder racks
3.8 Linear heat detecting cables 7.4.2 Straight vertical runs on cantilever arms
3.9 Developments in cable design 7.4.3 Horizontal runs in a vertical plane
3.10 Thermal ageing 7.5 Installation practices for cables installed other than
3.11 Mechanical performance on support steelwork
3.12 Electrical tests 7.5.1 Direct in ground
7.5.2 Installed in ducts
4 Power cable system design
7.5.3 Routing in concrete troughs
4.1 Introduction 7.6 Cable pulling
4.2 Current rating for continuous operation
4.2,.1 Maximum conductor temperature 8 Cable performance under fire conditions
4.2,.2 Ambient temperature 8.1 Tests on a single cable or wire
4.2,,3 Conductor temperature rise 8.2 Cable installations having reduced fire propagation
4.2,,4 Permissible current ratings 8.3 Oxygen index tests
4.2,,5 Rating factors 8.4 Smoke tests
4.2.,6 Single-core cables in parallel 8.4.1 Test methods
4.3 Fault current and duration 8.4.2 Use of test information
4.3. 1 Short-circuit faults 8.5 Corrosive gas emissions
4.3.,2 Earth faults 8.6 Toxic gas emissions
4.3. 3 Overioad current
4.4 Motor starting 9 Cable accessories
4.4. 1 Motor starting current 9.1 Cable glands
4.4. 2 Motor starting times 9.1.1 Background to gland design
4.5 Cable voltage regulation 9.1.2 Gland construction
4.6 Cable system design 9.1.3 Gland sizing
4.6. 1 Feeder circuits 9.1.4 Installation
4.6. 2 Motor circuits 9.2 Power cable conductor terminations
4.7 Practical examples 9.2.1 Fittings for aluminium conductors
4.7. 1 Feeder circuits 9.2.2 Fittings for copper conductors
4.7. 2 Motor circuits 9.2.3 Formed terminations
9.2.4 Bolting terminations to equipment
Control and instrumentation cable systems
9.3 Conductor terminations for control cables
5.1 Signal levels 9.3.1 Crimped conductor terminations
5.2 Cable types 9.3.2 Wire wrapped terminations
5.3 Cable interference 9.4 11 kV terminations
5.3.1 Interference in multipair cables
5.3.2 Interference in multicore cables 10 Fire barriers
5.3.3 Circuit considerations 10.1 Introduction
5.4 Control and instrumentation cable system design 10.2 Performance requirements
5.5 Cable network system using jumpering 10.2.1 Magnitude and type of fire
5.5.1 Basic principles of cable network 10.2.2 Proximity of the fire to the barrier
5.5.2 Switchgear and interiocking equipment 10.3 Fire test requirements
5.5.3 Design of cable network systems 10.4 Additional performance criteria
5.5.4 Application of cable network systems 10.5 Fire doors
5.5.5 Testing and commissioning of a control network system 10.6 Penetrations

427
Cabling Chapter 6

11 Earthing systems 13.2.5 Appraisal

11.1 Introduction 13.3 Emergency lighting systems
11.2 Differences in earth potential 13.4 Lighting of special areas
11.2.1 Definitions 13.4.1 Battery rooms and chlorination plant rooms
11.2.2 Acceptance criteria 13.4.2 Hydrogen plant (Division 1 and Division 2 areas)
11.3 Earthing systems design 13.4.3 Central control rooms
11.3.1 Systems having remote neutrals 13.4.4 Hazard warning lights
11.3.2 Faults on internal systems 13.5 Supplementary heating and minor power systems
11.3.3 Lightning protection 13.6 Distribution system
11.3.4 Additional considerations 13.6.1 General
11.4 Earth electrodes 13.6.2 Isolation and switching of individual fittings
11.4.1 Sheet steel piles 13.6.3 AC supplies
11.4.2 Cylindrical steel piles 13.6.4 DC supplies
11.4.3 Earth rods 13.6.5 Cabling
11.4.4 Earth strip 14 Design and management techniques
11.5 Earth network construction and plant bonding
14.1 Introduction
11.5.1 Main earth network
14.2 Planning
11.5.2 Instrument earth network
14.3 Design
11.5.3 Earth bond cable sizes
14.3.1 Layout
11.5.4 Plant bonding arrangements
14.3.2 Cable support systems
11.6 Testing
14.3.3 Information from plant contractors
11.6.1 Earth resistivity measurement
14.3.4 Cable systems and electrical circuit design
11.6.2 Earth electrode resistance measurement
14.4 Installation and contract management information
11.6.3 Commissioning tests
14.4.1 Introduction
11.6.4 Routine tests
14.4.2 The aims and functions of TPI cabling
12 Lightning protection
14.4.3 Designing
12.1 General requirements
12.2 Lightning magnitudes and risks 15 References
12.3 Application of requirements to power stations Appendices
12.4 Protection system design
A Values of resistance and reactance for single-core elastomeric-
12.4.1 Main and gas turbine chimneys
insulated cables (90°C maximum conductor temperature)
12.4.2 Main buildings
Β Values of resistance and reactance for multicore PVC-insulated
12.4.3 Other buildings
12.4.4 Buildings requiring special considerations cables (70°C maximum conductor temperature)
12.4.5 Fuel oil storage tanks C Current ratings for elastomeric-insulated cables
12.4.6 Flammable gas production and storage plant
D Current ratings for PVC-insulated cables
12.5 Assessment of risks of sideflashing and interference
12.6 Inspection, testing and records Ε Rating factors for variations in thermal parameters

13 Lighting, heating and small power systems F Cross-sectional area of armour wire

13.1 Introduction G 415 V motor parameters and selected fuse sizes

13.2 Lighting system design Η Maximum cable route lengths
13.2.1 Objectives
I Main protection for feeder and motor circuits
13.2.2 Specification
13.2.3 General planning J Advantages and disadvantages of various lamps used for lighting
13.2.4 Detailed planning power station interiors

1 Introduction tions. The number of cables installed on a power

station varies with the type of plant, i.e., hydro, coal,
The cabhng system within a power station performs
oil or nuclear. Considering 660 M W units, the quan­
the essential function of connecting mechanical, elec­
trical and control equipment together to form a total tities of cables involved at the time of writing for
working entity. Cabling systems therefore form an recent projects are:
interface between a variety of plant supplied under a Cables Cables for Total
large number of electrical and mechanical contracts, per unit station services
and information has to be drawn from each of these Littlebrook D 6630 6890 26 780
to complete the cable system design. During the power (3 units, oil-fired)
station construction period cabling systems are depend­ Drax Completion 7170 8850 30 360
ent on plant having been installed so that connections (3 units, coal-fired)
can be completed. It can therefore be seen that cabling Heysham 2 16 870 17 570 51 310
is an important item in the organising and planning (2 units, nuclear AGR)

of design functions and site activities.

Furthermore, the number of cables has steadily in­ The average cable route lengths for these projects var­
creased with the size of boiler/turbine units, mainly ies from 51 m on Littlebrook D to 59 m on Heysham
due to the growth of control and instrumentation func­ 2 and 74 m on Drax Completion. This means that

428

some 3030 km of cable will be installed on the Hey­
sham 2 project. Considering Heysham 2 further, it is
worthy of note that approximately 7 0 % of the cables
are associated whh control and instrumentation.
The types of cables used in power stations range
from control and instrumentation multipair armoured
cables having 0.5 mm^ conductors, up to 11 kV power
cables having a maximum conductor size of 500 m m ^ .
In addition there are requirements for special cables
such as hnear heat detectors to sense fires and short-
time fireproof cables which are designed to keep their
integrity for a specified period under fire conditions.
The cable system also includes accessories such as
cable supporting steelwork, cable glands and conductor
terminations. Power stations tend to have requirements
which differ from normal industrial standards because
of their size, complexhy and the security needs of
such high investment plant. Therefore very often na­
tional and international standards are not appropriate
and *in house' standards have to be prepared. T o ensure
that only approved equipment of the required standard
is instahed in a power station, the C E G B operates a
type approval system.
This chapter is designed to give a comprehensive
insight into cable system requirements including hard­
ware, layout, design and installation. It also covers
items closely related to cabling such as earthing, light­
ing, heating and small power systems.
2 Cable systems and layout
2.1 Segregation requirements
Before discussing layout in general, it is necessary
to understand the segregation and separation require­
ments for various station types. The station layout,
from the very beginning, has to take into account
the disposition of ancillary plant and interconnecting
cables to ensure that segregation requirements can
be achieved. Segregation is provided to limit damage
under accident conditions such as fire.
Segregation is defined as the physical division or
isolation of one group of cables or plant from another
by an enclosure or barrier of a certain specified fire
rating. The barrier may be brick, concrete or special
fireproof partitioning as described in Section 10 of
this chapter. Separation is defined as the division of
groups of cables by distance alone.
Segregation in fossil-fired and hydro plant is pri­
marily provided to limit economic loss. However, in
nuclear power stations it is provided for nuclear safety
as well as economic reasons.
2.1.1 Segregation requirements for fossil-fired
and hydro power stations
Segregation in fossil-fired and hydro power stations
is provided to hmit economic loss in the event of fire.
Cable systems and layout
The criteria applied to conventional stations is that
the output of not more than one unit should be lost in
a single cable fire. T o segregate the equipment of one
unit from another alone is not adequate, since units
are normally dependent on c o m m o n station services
which must also be secure. It should also be reahsed that
although a fire may be contained to involve only the
equipment of one unit, the smoke and fumes of the
fire may cause further loss of generation due to the
evacuation of operations staff and as a result of dam­
age to light current equipment from corrosive fumes.
In achieving the segregation necessary to prevent
the loss of more than one unit it is also often possible
to achieve a degree of segregation within a unit without
additional cost. This can be usefully applied to dupli­
cated auxiliaries where the loss of one may cause a
reduction in output, but not necessarily a unit loss,
and can improve the security of duphcated services
and hence reduce the risk of plant damage and pro­
longed outage.
A basic summary of the requirements for segrega­
tion is given in Table 6 . 1 . It is important to note the
differences between basic requirements and optional
improvements to the security of the system that can
be m a d e at no additional cost.
In conventional stations, all barriers provided for
segregation requirements should have a minimum of
one hour fire rating. Where cables are installed direct
in the ground, a separation distance between segrega­
tion groups of one metre is considered adequate.
TABLE 6.1
Basic segregation requirements for conventional plant
Plant Segregation requirement
Unit — Unit Mandatory
Station A — Station Β Mandatory
Unit — Station None
Main plant — Standby plant Yes if no cost penalty
Main plant — Emergency DC or Mandatory
guaranteed AC
Mandatory
Alternative DC tripping supplies
It is a basic requirement that cabling of one unit
be segregated from the cabhng of all other units. This
must be achieved on all major cable routes by the
provision of suitable fireproof enclosures and barriers
to prevent spread of fire from one unit's cabling to
another, and also to contain combustion products. In
the case of turbine halls and c o m m o n boiler houses,
clearly it is not practical to enclose all minor cable
routes to achieve segregation and, because of the limited
a m o u n t of cables, there is no need to contain the
combustion products. Therefore in the case of these
minor cable routes, segregation is achieved by isolating
one from the other by distance.
429
Cabling
Segregation requirements for station cables and plant
will depend on the system design. When one station
transformer is provided for each unit, electrical station
services are provided on a unit basis. In this case,
cables for these services will be segregated by fire bar­
riers from the station services cables associated with
other units. If, however, two station transformers are
used to provide station services for the whole station,
then a different solution is required. In this case,
duplicated plant necessary for the operation of the
station may be designated 'Station A' and 'Station B',
and full segregation by fire barrier applied between
the two designations. There is no need to segregate
station cables from unit cables providing that in any
one incident the total loss is not greater than one unit
a n d / o r half the station services. Main C W pumps are
normally fed from a station system since these are
installed hydraulically on a shared station basis. For
CW pumps, cabling should be provided on a sufficient
number of segregated routes such that no more than
the output of one unit will be lost in a single incident.
Where gas turbines are installed, these are normally
on a unit basis and segregation should be provided
such that the output of only one gas turbine is lost
in a single incident. Another area where it is considered
essential to provide segregation is where an emergency
D C or guaranteed A C drive is provided for plant
safety, as for example, the turbine lubricating oil
supply. In these cases, full segregation by fire barrier
should be provided between the main drive and the
emergency drive. Where duplicate D C supplies for
switchgear tripping are provided, these should be se­
gregated from each other over their entire lengths. This
requirement stems from instances where, under fire
conditions, switchgear tripping supplies have been lost
before main circuits have been tripped. Where segre­
gation is not possible, it is permissible for one of the
D C supplies to be cabled in short-time fireproof cable
of the type described in Section 3.7 of this chapter.
We can now consider areas where segregation is
not mandatory but which will result in better avail­
ability and security and will be employed if it can be
incorporated without additional cost. The first area
to consider is the 11 kV supplies to the unit which are
derived from the unit transformer, station transformer
or via interconnectors (see Chapter 1 System design).
Often segregation can be readily achieved between the
interconnectors and the unit/station transformer feeds
over the majority of their routes up to the cable race
immediately below the switchgear. Similarly, where
auxiliary transformers and feeders are duphcated within
a unit, segregation can often be achieved for the ma­
jority of the cable routes without additional cost. Other
circumstances where segregation should be apphed if
there is no cost penalty are main and standby plant,
and also between boiler feed pumps where more than
one is provided per unit.
Separation should be provided between control
cables (containing analogue signals, digital signals or
430
Chapter 6
plant protection signals) and power cables to minimise
the effects of electrical interference. Control cables
should be separated from single-core power cables by
at least 600 m m and from multicore power cables by
at least 300 m m . This requirement does not apply to
tail ends of routes where power and control cables
are terminated in the same equipment, providing the
length of run where separation distances are not met
does not exceed 5 m. The basis for these electrical
separation distances is discussed in Section 5 of this
chapter.
2.1.2 Segregation requirements for nuclear
power Stations
The segregation requirements for conventional power
stations to protect availability of plant are equally
applicable to nuclear power stations.
However, in nuclear power stations additional segre­
gation is necessary for the safety of personnel, the
general public and plant. For these additional segrega­
tion requirements the occurrences considered are minor
fire, safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), local flooding
and a major incident within the station, i.e., turbine
disintegration, major fire or hot gas release. The safety
criterion normally applied is that any one of these
incidents and its consequential effects shall not damage
sufficient safety related cables to render the reactor
trip and post-trip functions ineffective to a degree where
an unacceptable probabihty of a district hazard would
arise. In practice, this means that:
• The reactor must retain its ability to trip.
• A specified proportion of the post-trip cooling, mo­
nitoring and control systems must remain effective.
• Consequential faults must not degrade the effec­
tiveness of the reactor trip system or post-trip cooling
systems, e.g., gas circulator run-on.
The method of applying these criteria will depend on
the type of reactor involved. However, to illustrate the
principles, an advanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR) will
be considered.
Firstly we must elaborate on the meaning of segre­
gation and for this it is convenient to define two
segregation classes. Segregation Class I is defined as
'cables, plant or equipment of different groups that
must be separated by a barrier or enclosure having a
minimum of four-hour fire rating and also be crash
proof to the required standard for the safety hazard
at the barrier/enclosure location'. Segregation Class II
is defined as 'cables, plant or equipment of different
groups that must be separated by a minimum of one-
hour fire barrier or enclosure'. For cables installed
direct-in-ground, cable groups should be separated by
at least four metres for Class I and by at least one
metre for Class II. The larger separation distance
in-ground for Class I is in order to avoid accidental

damage to both groups by mechanical excavations.
For segregation Classes I and II where cables are laid
in troughs, the routes for cable groups should be
separated by at least six metres to protect against oil
spihage or mechanical damage.
The additional segregation in an A G R is associated
with safety related cables. Safety related cables are
those which contain cores/pairs which can effect the
initiation, operation or termination of:
• Safety related fauh prevention actions (e.g., control
rod interlocks).
• Reactor trip and shutdown actions.
• Post-trip actions.
Cables associated with plant protection, indication or
alarms which in the event of a fire are essential to
an operator in the central control r o o m , emergency
indication centre or local control position are also
designated safety related. This includes fire fighting
services and essential station communications. A fur­
ther special function is heating and ventilation services
for contaminated areas.
The segregation of safety related cables is considered
in the foUowing section. However, the following rules
are only written for areas outside the confines of the
safety r o o m . Cabling, conduits and trunking within
the confines of the safety r o o m are subject to special
requirements, and these are considered too specialised
to include in this volume.
Safety related cables excluding reactor safety trip
systems
This section deals with the segregation of safety re­
lated cables with the exception of reactor safety trip
systems which are a special case. Safety related cables
will be discussed under three broad headings:
• Power cables The Heysham 2 power system ar­
rangement for one reactor is described in Chapter 1
and shown in Fig 6 . 1 . The electrical trains forming
the essential electrical system are broadly associated
with the boiler circulator quadrants (A to D) of the
reactor, and provide power supphes for two post-trip
coohng systems. These two post-trip cooling systems
are designated X and F . Essential cooling system X
is associated with forced gas circulation, e.g., gas
circulators and forced-feed decay heat boilers. Es­
sential cooling system Y is associated with natural
gas circulation and emergency feed to the main
boilers.
Segregation must be employed to limit damage
to the cables providing supplies to the plant and
auxiliaries associated with the X and Y cooling sys­
tems. Two rules have been formulated to define
the segregation to be employed, depending u p o n
the type of incident to be protected against.
Cable systems and layout
In the case of more probable incidents, such as
a small fire, segregation must be employed to ensure
that no more than the X and Y supplies of one
q u a d r a n t become unavailable. Another option is
that not more than half the total X system or, alter­
natively, half the total Y system supplies become
unavailable. T o meet this rule. Class II segregation
is required between quadrants or between halves
of systems.
In the case of less probable incidents, which are
those liable to cause most damage such as turbine
disintegration or a major fire, a different set of
segregation rules must be applied. It is required
that no single incident of this type causes damage
to such an extent that both the X and Y cooling
systems become unavailable to more than two re­
actor q u a d r a n t s . Another option for this type of
incident is that not more than all the X system
supphes or, alternatively, aU the Y system supphes
fail. T h u s , for a major incident. Class I segregation
is required between q u a d r a n t pairs A Β and C D and
their associated trains, or Class I segregation is
required between complete sections of the X and Y
systems.
In addition, separation shah be provided between
the X system and Y system power cables associated
with the same q u a d r a n t , and between power cables
associated with different quadrants routed to and
within system plant areas segregated on a half sys­
tem basis. It is not m a n d a t o r y to separate safety
related power cables from other power cables except
to ensure that the segregation principles have been
maintained.
• Control cables The segregation specified for safety
related power cables is also applied to the associated
control cables where these are required in the per­
formance of the safety related function. This applies
to post-trip sequence control signals to essential
plant.
There is n o need to segregate control cables from
associated power cables to the same equipment.
However, it is prudent to separate them to reduce
electromagnetic interference as defined for conven­
tional plant. There is n o special requirement to
separate safety related control cables from other
control cables associated with the same train. Typi­
cal post-trip cooling system and safety trip system
cabhng is shown in Fig 6.2.
• Cables for remote control and indications asso­
ciated with safety related plant and equipment In
the central control r o o m (CCR), area segregation
of control and indication cabling between t r a i n s /
quadrants is provided to Class II. This segregation
is provided to limit economic damage and is not
necessary for reactor safety for the following reasons:
(a) While the reactor is at power it is protected
against rapidly developing faults by safety cir-
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cuits and against slowly developing faults by
the CCR operator.
(b) When the reactor is tripped, post-trip cooling
is automatic. The possibihty of spurious con­
trol signals from the CCR which could prevent
effective cooling is inhibited by automatic dis­
connection at the switchgear/equipment remote
from the C C R .
Displays associated with public hazard are normal­
ly duphcated with one display in the CCR and
the other in the emergency indication centre (EIC).
Cables associated with these duplicated displays
should be segregated from each other to segregation
Class II.
As far as the cabling to the E I C is concerned,
segregation to Class II is provided between each
unit. For each unit, cables associated with quadrants
A and Β are separated from cables associated with
quadrants C and D,
Cables associated with reactor safety trip systems
Typical post-trip cooling system and safety trip cabling
is shown in Fig 6.2 and, as can be seen, the reac­
tor tripping hardware is provided on a multichannel
(guard-line) fail-safe basis. The circuits are normally
energised so that if the cabling associated with a
particular guard-line is damaged, that guard-line will
fail-safe.
Outputs from a safety group provide the inputs
to guard-line equipment where they are reviewed on
a redundant voting (e.g., 2 out of 4) basis. Outputs
from all safety groups provide signals to each of four
main guard-line (MGL) equipments which produce
the necessary signals to initiate the reactor trip coohng
systems. Outputs from particular safety trip groups
(e.g., gas temperature) also provide signals to each
of four diverse guard-hne (DGL) equipments, which
produce additional signals to initiate the reactor trip
systems.
Outputs from the M G L and D G L equipments also
provide signals to the secondary shutdown initiation
(SSI) equipment. The outputs are reviewed on a re­
dundant voting basis (e.g., 2 out of 4) in each of four
channels. If the primary shutdown rods do not insert
adequately, the SSI, M G L and D G L equipment pro­
vide signals on a guard-line basis to operate the se­
condary shutdown (SSD) nitrogen injection valves.
The SSI equipment also provides signals to separately
imtiate the reactor post-trip cooling systems and to
remove control rod clutch power supplies at the source.
Signals associated with reactor safety trip systems are
run in cables separated from all other signals. Cables
carrying safety trip systems are subject to the follow­
ing segregation, separation and special requirements:
(a) Except for special cable requirements such as flux
systems, all safety trip system cables have earthed
434
Chapter 6
metal armouring or are run in earthed metal
conduh.
(b) Class II segregation between pairs of safety chan­
nels of the same trip group.
(c) Class II segregation together with a 2 m separation
distance between safety channels of the same trip
group.
(d) Safety system cables are separated from single-
core power cables by at least 600 m m and from
multicore power cables by at least 300 m m .
This requirement does not apply on plant or
equipments at which the cable ends are termi­
nated, provided that, for any safety system cable,
the summated total of all the lengths of such cable
run in parallel with power cables at less than the
above stated separation distances, does not exceed
5 m.
(e) Safety system cabling carrying very low signal lev­
els, e.g., neutron flux measurement signals, should
be separated from single-core power cables by at
least 600 m m and by at least 300 m m from all
other cables. This requirement is applicable to
the gland-to-gland route length of the cables.
(f) Separate earthed armoured cables are provided
for incoming signals to the guard hues and output
signals to the shutdown system. Input signal ca­
bles must be separated from output signal cables,
and the routing of these cables is normally subject
to special approval.
(g) All safety system cables are marked on each core
at each termination with an orange ferrule, in
addition to other identifying symbols.
(h) Except for cables carrying very low signal levels
as (e) above, reactor safety trip system cables asso­
ciated with safety channels are not required to be
segregated or separated from other control cables.
Ah reactor safety trip system cables, however, are
routed along dedicated cable tray modules (which
are separate to cable tray modules for other con­
trol cables) and they must be clearly identified by
orange coloured bands at 1 m intervals. Groups of
reactor safety trip system cables may be identified
by a common orange coloured b a n d . Conduits
and trunking are similarly identified.
(i) All reactor safety trip system cables are:
• 2.5 mm^ multicore cables of the type described
in Section 3.5 of this chapter, or
• 0.5 mm^ (1/0.8 m m dia.) multipair cables of
the type described in Section 3.6 of this chapter,
or
• Special cables for thermocouple or neutron flux
instrument signals.

(j) Where a plant contact is being monitored for use
in a safety trip system, the cabhng to the plant
contact is designed to prevent the occurrence of
a fail-danger fault due to a short-circuit between
the go and return cable cores. Cable designs which
use cables having individually screened cores are
acceptable. Separate cables for each go and return
lead should not be used.
(k) The use of marshalling is avoided unless essential.
2.1.3 General layout requirements
From this section so far, it wih be evident that se­
gregation requirements for electrical plant and cables
have a considerable impact on station layout. Segre­
gation requirements must therefore be considered early
in the station design and one of the best ways of as­
sessing problems is by the use of an isometric drawing.
Figure 6.3 is an isometric drawing for an A G R station
and, as can be seen, a different colour is used for each
segregation class. Scale models can also be used to
assess segregation provisions. Such models are also
particularly useful later in the design of cable instal­
lations to check for fouls with other services, such as
pipework.
When considering layout, the importance of the
cable installation p r o g r a m m e must be fully recognised.
Cable accommodation must be made available in
good time and cable tunnels or basements have ad­
vantages from this point of view since they are at
the bottom of the building and must, of necessity, be
scheduled early in the civil p r o g r a m m e . If cable base­
ments cannot be economically justified due to civil
engineering considerations then, as an alternative,
dedicated overhead cable routes should be provided.
Dedicated cable routes are considered essential to avoid
disruption of the cable installation programme due to
access being restricted by other contractors. Overhead
cable routes are generally very successful in boiler
houses, but for turbine halls they are more difficult
because the plant is more compact and its erection
involves the turbine hall crane. It is difficult therefore
to obtain unrestricted access to install the cables which
leave the overhead route. However, main overhead
routes d o have the advantage that they can support
other services, but once again care must be taken that
the installation of such services does not restrict access
for cable instahation.
When designing cable routes it must be recognised
that cables are puUed-off cable drums and it is there­
fore essential that provision is m a d e for cable d r u m
access, normally at one end of the route only.
Where possible the cable d r u m position should be
at the highest route point to reduce pulhng tensions.
A further point to consider is the separation of ma­
jor cable termination facilities, such as those in the
CCR, from cable routes since this allows better ac­
cess to terminations and, in addition, allows a higher
Cable types
level of illumination to be provided economically for
terminating work.
As discussed in Section 2.1.1 of this chapter, major
cable routes should be enclosed to provide the re­
quired segregation and prevent release of smoke into
operational areas should a cable fire occur. Access
and emergency exit points must be provided for these
enclosed routes. The distance between emergency exits
is normally controlled by local regulations and pre­
mises have to be covered by a Fire Certificate which
may be issued either by Fire Officers or the HeaUh
and Safety Executive, depending on the type of pre­
mises. For power stations, the m a x i m u m distance be­
tween escape points should be 45 m and the provision
of these must be considered early in the cable system
layout. For long enclosed cable routes, it is sensible
to provide fire barriers at regular intervals across the
tunnel to restrict damage in the event of fire. If these
barriers are spaced at the distance required for emer­
gency escape points, then the door through the barrier
will form an escape point from a fire-affected compart­
ment to a safe area. Major cable routes should be
protected by a fixed waterspray fire protection system
and therefore the floor areas should be tanked, and
drainage provided.
3 Cable types
The first part of this section deals with cable construc­
tions that are currently in c o m m o n use in power
stations. These cable types all contain polyvinyl chlo­
ride (PVC) and are designed to meet the reduced pro­
pagation performance detailed in Section 8.2 of this
chapter, but there has been no deliberate attempt to
reduce smoke, acid or toxic emissions. Such emissions
are deah with using the fire protection requirements
detailed in the previous section. Recent developments
are producing limited fire hazard cables which have
the same reduced propagation performance, but in
addition have lower noxious gas emissions; a general
overview of these cable types is given at the end of
the section.
Before looking at detailed cable constructions it is
necessary to consider some of their basic components.
Firstly we should consider cable conductor material.
Ignoring special applications, the choice is basically
between copper and aluminium. Aluminium conductors
with a cross-sectional area of less than 16 mm^ have
proved from experience to be very difficult to termi­
nate, because of the tendency for aluminium to 'cold
flow' when put under pressure in, say, a standard screw
type terminal. Copper is therefore used for power cable
conductors of cross-sectional area less than 16 mm^
a n d for control cables. For cables having a conductor
size of 16 mm^ and greater, the choice of conductor
material is mainly a question of economics. Aluminium
has a higher electrical resistivity than copper and to
achieve comparative voltage d r o p and current rating
435
Cabling Chapter 6
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an aluminium conductor has to have in the order of
1.6 times the cross-sectional area of a copper conduc­
tor. However, the specific gravity of aluminium is
approximately one-third that of copper, so after taking
into account the relative resistivities, the weight of
an aluminium conductor would be approximately half
that of copper for comparative duties. The relative
costs of cables cannot be assessed on the weight of
conductor material and its cost per tonne since a larger
aluminium conductor results in additional insulation,
armouring and sheathing materials. Because aluminium
has greater ductility than copper, solid aluminium con­
ductors can be used in many applications and these
are cheaper to produce than stranded conductors, and
form a more compact cable. When assessing conductor
material it is important to take into account the rela­
tive cable weights and dimensions which wih affect
installation and cable support structure costs. The
relative costs of aluminium and copper cable installa­
tions have varied over the years, but the considerable
price advantage and improved methods of terminating
resulted in the use of aluminium cables becoming
estabhshed in power stations in the early 1960s. Since
that time, the cost of aluminium has increased steadily
with the cost of energy, which is a dominant factor
in its production. Copper, on the other h a n d , whilst
having fluctuated in cost has not seen a large overall
increase. The cost differential between aluminium and
copper cables has therefore narrowed, but aluminium
cables remain competitive for the majority of power
apphcations whhin power stations, and are not subject
to the price fluctuations associated w h h copper.
A further general topic is to consider the nature of
polymeric materials that may be used for insulation
and sheathing of cables. In the cable industry, the
term polymeric material is a general term used to
embrace plastics and rubbers. Rubbers are also fre­
quently termed elastomers. Polymeries can be further
classified into thermoplastic or thermosetting materials.
Thermoplastic materials are those that can be softened
by heating and hardened by coohng, i.e., they can be
moulded and remoulded any number of times. The
most frequently used thermoplastics are polyvinyl chlo­
ride (PVC) and polyethylene ( P E ) . Thermosetting ma­
terials, on the other hand, do not soften to any great
degree below their decomposition temperature and
therefore are not capable of being remoulded. M a n y
thermoplastic materials can be turned into thermo-
sets by 'cross-hnking'. The process of cross-linking
or vulcanisation consists of forming chemical bonds
between the long chain molecules to give a 'ladder'
effect which restricts shppage between molecules and
produces good thermal stability. The process of cross-
linking can be achieved by high energy radiation or
by chemical methods. Chemical cross-hnking is the
traditional method for the production of cables, but
radiation cross-hnking is increasing in popularity for
wires and small cables where insulation thicknesses are
not excessive.
Cable types
The most c o m m o n method of cross-linking is by
the addition of an agent such as peroxide to the
polymer which can be activated by heat. The cross-
hnking agent is introduced into the polymer prior to
it being extruded onto the cable. It must therefore be
selected such that it is inactive at the extrusion tem­
perature (typically 120-130°C). T o activate the cross-
hnking process the polymer is normally raised to a
temperature of about 200°C. During the curing pro­
cess, gaseous decomposition of the cross-hnking agent
occurs and to avoid porosity of the polymer a high
pressure is maintained a r o u n d the insulated conductor.
The curing process is carried out by passing the in­
sulated conductor immediately after extrusion into a
continuous vulcanisation line, in which the required
heat and pressure for the curing process is provided.
This vulcanisation line consists of a pipe attached di­
rectly to the extruder head, which is fiUed with high
pressure steam or inert gas. After vulcanisation has
been achieved in the heated portion of the pipe, the
insulated core is cooled by passing through water at
ambient temperature at the exit end of the pipe.
A n alternative form of chemically cross-linking ma­
terials is to use a shane c o m p o u n d to form the hnks
between the long molecular chains. This cross-hnking
method does not require heat or pressure, but is acti­
vated by moisture in the presence of a catalyst, this
normally being carried out by immersion in water at
a temperature of 8 0 - 9 0 ° C . This curing method is more
competitive since it avoids the expense of continuous
vulcanisation hues. Examples of thermosetting ma­
terials used for insulation are cross-hnked polyethelene
( X L P E ) and ethylene propylene rubber ( E P R ) .
Cables produced from thermoplastic materials such
as P V C are cheaper, size for size, than those made
from thermosetting materials because of the expensive
plant and curing time associated with the latter.
However, cables manufactured with thermosetting
insulation generally can operate at higher temperatures
(both continuous and short-circuit). This may result
in a reduction in conductor size and hence an overall
cost saving. For example, PVC-insulated cables are
normally assigned a continuous conductor operating
temperature of 70°C and a short-circuit temperature
of 160°C, compared with 90°C and 250°C respectively
for thermosetting materials such as X L P E and E P R .
Finally, it is worth noting that it is normal practice
to separate power and control cables to reduce electro­
magnetic interference and, to enable this separation
to be checked on site, power cables have black sheaths
whilst control cable sheaths are coloured grey.
3.1 11 kV cables
For 11 kV cables, the choice of insulant rests between
paper or polymeric. Paper insulated cables have lead
or alloy sheaths and in consequence are heavier and
more difficuh to install and terminate than plastic
437
Cabling
insulated cables. More importantly, plastic insulated
cables can be made considerably more fire retardent
than paper cables and therefore plastic cables are
selected for power station applications.
The design and testing of such cables w h h sohd
extruded insulation is specified in Generation Develop­
ment and Construction Division (GDCD) Standard 17
which covers single-core cables having cross-sectional
areas of 300 mm^ and 500 mm^. Single-core cables
are selected primarily because of the fault levels asso­
ciated with power station 11 kV systems. Since circuit-
breakers are used for switching, the fault current is
not restricted as it might be at lower voltages where
fuses are employed in many instances. For 11 kV,
750 M V A fault rated systems, the RMS symmetrical
value of fault current for phase faults is 39.4 kA, with
a first peak as high as 121 kA. The electromechanical
forces associated with such currents could result in
three-core cables 'bursting', i.e., the outer coverings
of the cable being torn open by the repulsive forces
between the conductors. A further item to be consi­
dered is that it is normal practice to earth the neutral
of 11 kV systems via a neutral earthing resistor, which
will restrict the earth fault current per feed to approxi­
mately 1 kA. Under these circumstances it is quite
clearly worthwhile taking steps to avoid phase faults,
which can be extremely destructive. The use of single-
core cables means that any fauhs that occur within
the cable must be between conductor and the screen
(or armour) which is earthed, hence the fault current
will be restricted by the neutral earthing resistor. Fi­
nally, the resistive heating effect in the conductor under
short-circuh condhions dictates a minimum conductor
size that would render three-core cables physically large
and heavy for instahation.
The construction of single-core cables with solid
extruded insulation is given in Fig 6.4. The preferred
WIRE ARMOUR
FIG. 6.4 11 kV single-core cable construction
438
Chapter 6
insulation is of the thermosetting type, i.e., X L P E
or E P R , which gives a conductor continuous operating
temperature of 90°C and a short-circuit temperature
of 250°C. Thermosetting materials give significant
benefits since the size of 11 kV cables is frequently
dictated by short-circuit requirements, indeed the mini­
m u m aluminium conductor size of 300 mm^ normally
prescribed in power stations is derived from this con­
sideration. For comparable duty, a paper insulated
cable having a maximum short-circuit temperature of
160°C would require a minimum aluminium conductor
size of 400 m m ^ .
The electrical stress in the insulation for these cable
designs is in excess of 2 k V / m m and this necessitates
the use of conductor and core screens for stress con­
trol. Figure 6.5 shows the stress distribution in a well
screened cable where the exponential lines are con­
centric and the flux lines are evenly distributed. Figure
6.6 shows the stress distribution for a cable without
a conductor screen, and here it can be seen that the
equipotential lines are deformed and become bunched
together at the protruding conductor strands, giving
high electrical stress in the insulation at these points.
Such high stresses may cause a local breakdown in
the insulation known as a partial discharge, which can
cause erosion of the dielectric and uhimately complete
breakdown of the cable. A similar situation can occur
on the outer surface of the insulation and Fig 6.7
shows the effect of an incomplete core screen. The
conductor core screen normally consists of an extruded
layer of semi-conducting material frequently applied
over a semi-conducting support tape, which prevents
the extruded material being l o s t ' between the conduc­
tor strands. The insulation screen may be either an
extruded layer of semi-conducting material or a semi­
conducting varnish applied direct to the insulation
surface, with a semi-conducting tape applied over it
INSULATION SCREENING
SEMI-CONDUCTING
CONDUCTOR SCREENING
CONDUCTOR
METAL SCREEN

FLUX LINES
EQUIPOTENTIAL LINES
CONDUCTOR
CONDUCTOR SCREEN
INSULATION SCREEN
FIG. 6.5 Stress distribution in cable insulation
EQUIPOTENTIAL LINES
INSULATION SCREEN
FLUX LINES
FIG. 6.6 Stress distribution in cable without a
conductor screen
as protection against mechanical damage from the
metallic screen. Where extruded screens are used, these
should be 'cold strippable' to ease the process of
terminating. A hehcally-apphed copper tape screen is
provided over the semi-conducting insulation screen
to carry both leakage and fault currents. The copper
tape is designed to carry an earth fault current of
1 kA for one second. A P V C inner sheath is provided
over the copper tape to provide a bedding for the
armour wires. This inner sheath also performs the
important function of a secondary moisture barrier
to prevent water reaching the primary insulation in
the event of the outer sheath being damaged. The
cable construction is completed by applying a layer
Cable t y p e s
EQUIPOTENTIAL
LINES
INSULATION SCREEN
FLUX LINES CONDUCTOR SCREEN
FIG. 6.7 Stress distribution with section of core
screen missing
of aluminium a r m o u r wires, these being non-ferrous
to avoid eddy current heating, and finally a P V C outer
sheath.
It is important to ensure outer sheath integrity to
prevent water entering the cable and because the cable
a r m o u r will have standing voltages due to single-point
bonding of the a r m o u r (see Section 11 of this chapter).
A semi-conducting layer is therefore applied to the
outer sheath to allow effective electrical testing be­
tween this and the cable a r m o u r to demonstrate sheath
integrity.
3.2 3.3 kV cables
3.3 kV systems in modern power stations can have
a fault level of u p to 250 M V A , which gives a phase
fault current of 43.7 k A , and neutral earthing resistors
are fitted to restrict earth fault currents to 1 kA per
feed. The situation is therefore similar to that for
11 kV described in the previous section, and single-core
cables are again prescribed for 3.3 kV circuit-breaker
fed equipment. This type of application frequently
consists of short tails of cable from transformer to
switchgear, where full advantage can be taken of the
higher continuous operating and short-circuit tempera­
tures of thermosetting materials.
Such single-core cables are purchased to the general
requirements of l E C 502, the constructional make up
being shown in Fig 6.8. A stranded aluminium con­
ductor with a minimum cross-sectional area of 400
mm^ is required to meet the short-circuit requirements
detailed above, and this size will normally be adequate
for ah apphcations. The insulation consists of X L P E
439
Cabling
WIRE ARMOUR
FIG. 6.8 3.3 kV single-core cable construction
or hard ethylene propylene rubber ( H E P R ) having a
radial thickness of 2 m m . The cable is finished in a
similar manner to that for 11 kV by applying a P V C
inner sheath, aluminium wire armour and P V C outer
sheath. Once again, a semi-conducting coating is ap­
plied to the outer sheath to facilitate electrical testing.
In the interests of switchgear economy, circuits such
as motors and smah transformers are fed from fused
switching devices (FSD) wherever possible. As described
in Chapter 5, a fused switching device consists of a
small circuit-breaker capable of interrupting u p to about
10 kA which is protected from higher fauh currents,
by fuses. Whilst these fuses are provided primarily to
protect the switching device and ensure satisfactory
short-circuit fault clearance, they also provide protec­
tion to the circuit cables attached to them. Because
EXTRUDED OVERSHEATH
FIG. 6.9 3.3 kV multicore cable construction
440
Chapter 6
CONDUCTOR
the fault current is 'cut-off, the short-circuit power and
electromagnetic forces are reduced allowing three-core
cables to be used. Under these conditions, thermosetting
insulation offers no significant cost advantage over
thermoplastic insulation.
Three-core cables suitable for this application are
detailed in BS6346 and the constructional arrangement
is shown in Fig 6.9. The conductors are solid shaped
aluminium and cross-sectional areas of 150 mm^ and
240 mm^ are normally adequate for power station ap­
plications. The minimum cable size of 150 mm^ is
related to a fuse size of approximately 400 A which
is the maximum fuse rating for a F S D . The 240 mm^
size is considered adequate to handle the largest size
of load that can be connected to a F S D . The insulation,
inner and outer sheaths consist of extruded layers of
ALUMINIUM STRIP ARMOUR
EXTRUDED INSULATION
EXTRUDED BEDDING

Ρ VC. The armour on these cables is aluminium strip
to improve conductivity, since it is used as an earth
fauh current return path, as discussed in Section 11.5
of this chapter. These three-core cables have a maxi­
mum continuous conductor temperature of 70°C and
a maximum short-circuit conductor temperature of
160°C.
3.3 415 V cables
Single-core cables are selected for use on equipment
controlled by circuit-breakers. Once again the insulant
selected for these single-core cables is X L P E or E P R
since advantage can be taken of the 90°C continuous
and 250°C short-circuit temperatures. The construction
and dimensions of these cables are identical to those
for use on 3.3 kV systems. Once again a rationahsed
conductor size of 400 mm^ stranded-aluminium will
be found suitable for short-circuit requirements and
ah normal fuh-load current applications.
Multicore cables are selected for use on fuse pro­
tected circuits. On 415 V fuse protected circuits, the
limiting criterion for cable sizing is frequently volt-
drop and therefore no advantage can be taken of the
higher operating temperature of thermosetting insula­
tions; 600/1000 V thermoplastic insulated cables com­
plying with BS6346 are therefore specified.
For cable sizes 16 mm^ and above, the conductors
are sohd aluminium, these being circular for the 16
mm^ size and shaped for larger sizes. The cables have
extruded P V C insulation, a taped P V C inner sheath,
aluminium strip armour and extruded P V C outer sheath.
For cable sizes of less than 16 m m ^ , circular stranded-
copper conductors are used covered with extruded P V C
insulation, extruded inner sheath, steel wire a r m o u r
and extruded outer sheath. T o ease bulk ordering and
stocking difficulties a rationalised range of cable sizes
is shown in Table 6.2.
Aluminium strip armour has been selected for the
larger cable sizes because it is utilised as the main
TABLE 6.2
Rationalised range of cable sizes
Conductor Number of Construction
CSA, mm2 cores
2.5 2, 3 and 4 Cu/PVC/PVC/SWA/PVC
4 2, 3 and 4 Cu/PVC/PVC/SWA/PVC
6 2, 3 and 4 Cu/PVC/PVC/SWA/PVC
16 2, 3 and 4 Al/PVC/PVC/ALS/PVC
35 2, 3 and 4 Al/PVC/PVC/ALS/PVC
70 2, 3 and 4 Al/PVC/PVC/ALS/PVC
120 3 and 4 Al/PVC/PVC/ALS/PVC
185 3 and 4 Al/PVC/PVC/ALS/PVC
300 3 and 4
Cable types
return path for earth fauh currents. Whilst the armour
of the small copper cables is also utihsed for the earth
fault return path, the smaller fuse sizes associated with
these circuits allow steel wire a r m o u r to be specified.
3.4 Cables for DC power circuits
The cables detailed in the previous section for 415 V A C
circuits are also suitable for use on D C circuits. The
largest two-core cable listed in the rationalised cable
range given in Table 6.2 is 70 m m ^ . Where cross-
sectional areas in excess of this size are required, it is
normal practice to use a four-core cable w h h hs cores
paralleled such that two cores are used for each pole.
3.5 Multicore control cables
Multicore control cables suhable for use in power sta­
tions are manufactured to ESI Standard 0 9 - 6 , Section
1. These come in a range of sizes from two-core up to
37-core and are rated at 600/1000 V. These cables
consist of a 2.5 mm^ (7/0.67 m m dia.) stranded-copper
conductor with P V C insulation. The required number
of cores is then laid-up with an overall plastic binder
tape, extruded P V C inner sheath, steel wire armour
and P V C outer sheath. The cores are numbered for
identification purposes. The steel wire a r m o u r is pro­
vided for mechanical protection and to improve the
reduced fire propagation performance.
3.6 Multipair control cables
Muhipair control cables are manufactured and tested
to the requirements of G D C D Standard 200 in a range
of sizes from two-pair u p to 200 pairs. These cables
use plain sohd annealed-copper conductors having a
cross-sectional area of 0.5 mm^ (1/0.8 m m dia. wire),
which are insulated with an extruded layer of P V C .
T w o insulated cores are twisted together to form a
pair and then pairs are laid-up to form the required
cable size. The two-pair cable does not actually consist
of two pairs, the four cores being all laid-up together
in what is known as a quad formation. For cables
having greater than 20 pairs, a unit construction is
used. This means that the cable contains a number
of 20-pair units, each 20-pair unit having the same
colour coded core sequence, and a numbered binder
tape to enable one unit to be identified from another.
The colour code is in accordance with l E C Standard
189.2. A n overall screen is applied over the laid-up
pairs and in the case of 5-pair and larger cables this
is formed from a longitudinally-applied aluminium la­
minate. A tinned-copper *drain wire' is provided under
and in contact with the aluminium screen, to enable
it to be connected to earth. An extruded inner sheath
is applied over the screen which strongly adheres to
the plastic backing of the aluminium laminate. Cables
containing 20 pairs and greater are armoured using
441
Cabling Chapter 6

double-galvanised steel tape armour. Steel wire a r m o u r
is used for 2, 5 and 10-pair cables which are too small
in diameter for steel tapes to be applied. The cables
are sheathed overall with an extruded layer of P V C .
The range of cable sizes includes 2, 5, 10, 20, 40, 60,
100 and 200 pairs. These cables are suitable for use
at voltages up to and including 110 V A C or 150 V D C .
The aluminium laminate screen provides a moisture
barrier to prevent ingress of moisture t o the cores as
The first category covers 'digital' type detectors and
a general arrangement of one of these is shown in
Fig 6.10. These generally consist of two steel wire con­
ductors that have been insulated with a suitable ther­
moplastic material and twisted to form a pair. At the
STEEL WIRE

well as being an effective screen against higher frequen­

cies. The steel tape armour provides power frequency
screening. THERMOPLASTIC

3.7 Short-time fireproof cables

A short-time fireproof (STFP) cable is one that, under
test conditions, will remain serviceable for 20 minutes
when exposed to a flame temperature of 1000°C.
These S T F P cables are available as both multicore
and multipair designs, their construction and testing
being specified in G D C D Standard 195. The muhicore
OUTER COVERING
design has 2.5 mm^ (7/0.67 m m ) stranded-copper con­
ductors laid-up in 2, 3 and 4 core cable constructions.
The multipair design has 0.5 mm^ (1/0.8 m m dia.)
sohd copper conductors laid-up into 2, 5 and 20 pair
constructions. The detailed cable construction is not
standardised as manufacturers hke to use their own
special designs. However, all cables are required to be
steel-wire armoured and sheathed for mechanical ro­
bustness. The electrical performance of these special
cables is required to be equivalent to the standard cables
detailed in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 of this chapter. The
special fire performance of these cables is achieved by FIG. 6.10 Digital-type linear heat detecting cable
appropriate primary insulation. Examples of materials
that can be used are silicone rubber or ethylene propy­
lene rubber in conjunction whh mica tapes or glass set operating temperature the thermoplastic softens,
braid. ahowing the steel conductors to move and short-circuit.
These types of cables are expensive compared with Different operating temperatures can be obtained by
conventional cables and their use has therefore to be small variations in the cable design. The short-circuit
limited. Typical applications are selected trip and pro­ that occurs at the set operating temperature can be
tection functions, audible warnings and communication used to inhiate alarms or fire protection systems.
circuits that it is essential to keep in service under fire The second category covers 'analogue' type detectors
conditions. and a typical arrangement is shown in Fig 6.11. In
this type of detector, the insulation is specially for­
mulated to have a rapid rate-of-change of resistance
3.8 Linear heat detecting cables with temperature. The resistance of the detector is
monitored and any change beyond a set point relating
With the growing concern regarding the considerable
to the required operating temperature is used to trigger
damage that can occur to power station installations
the required alarm or fire protection systems.
under fire conditions, means of rapid fire detection
have been sought. Linear heat sensors in the form of
cables which can detect relatively small increases in
temperature are one solution. These are particularly 3.9 Developments in cable design
effective for fire detection in cable routes when a The current awareness of noxious gas emission from
linear heat detecting cable ( L H D C ) is mounted over cable fires has brought about a rapid development in
each cable tray. cable compounds to replace high halogen content
Linear heat detecting cables are manufactured and materials such as P V C . Cables constructed with these
tested to the requirements of G D C D Standard 187 new compounds are generally known as limited fire
which covers two different types of sensors. hazard' designs. Suitable fire tests to assess reduced

442

SENSOR
CONDUCTOR
TEMPERATURE SENSITIVE
DIELECTRIC MATERIAL
STRANDED RAYON
INSULATOR CENTRE CORE
SENSOR CONDUCTOR
— INNER WRAP
TEMPERATURE SENSITIVE
DIELECTRIC MATERIAL
SENSOR CONDUCTOR
- O U T E R WRAP
CROSS SECTION OF
DETECTOR CABLE
FIG. 6.11 Analogue-type linear heat detecting cable
propagation performance and reduced gas emissions
are given in Section 8 of this chapter.
The basic construction of cables has remained the
same but new compounds have been substituted for
P V C . For cable beddings and sheaths, currently the
most commonly used replacement for P V C is ethy­
lene vinyl acetate copolymer (EVA). E V A is available
in both thermoplastic and thermosetting forms. For
thermosets, curing can be achieved by continuous vul­
canisation by steam or pressurised liquid, and also
by immersion in hot water if the silane c o m p o u n d
method has been used. These materials are filled with
aluminium hydroxide to give reduced fire propagation
performance.
Whereas P V C has been used in the past for primary
insulation on power cables, this is generally being
changed to ethylene propylene rubber (EPR) or cross-
hnked polythene ( X L P E ) which has hitherto only been
used on single-core power cables. Thermosetting E V A
is also being used in some cases for power cable in­
sulation. All insulation materials are suitable for use
Cable types
with a continuous conductor temperature of 90°C and
a short-circuit temperature of 250°C, smaller conduc­
tor sizes can therefore be used t h a n would be required
if P V C insulation were used for the same duty.
For multicore control cables, P V C primary insulation
is generally being replaced by a dual layer of E P R /
E V A . The layer of E P R provides the required electrical
performance whilst the outer layer of E V A gives suf­
ficient fire performance to pass the test on a single
insulated wire, which is detailed in Section 8 of this
chapter.
For multipair control cables, the P V C insulation
is being replaced by high performance thin-waU in­
sulations such as polyphenol oxide ( N O R Y L — a
General Electric (USA) trade name) and poly ether
ether ketone ( P E E K — an Imperial Chemical Indus­
tries trade n a m e ) . Both these materials are thermo­
plastic but in the case of P E E K , cables insulated with
this material are capable of operating at temperatures
in excess of 250°C under defined conditions. However,
at the time of writing, these materials are considerably
m o r e expensive t h a n P V C .
One of the difficulties with these developments
is that the material formulations are new and there
is httle service experience with them compared t o
P V C which has been used for over thirty years. There­
fore it is essential that cables employing such new
materials are adequately evaluated before putting them
into service; the remaining parts of this section define
tests that are used for this purpose.
3.10 Thermal ageing
For normal service hfe, one of the significant de­
gradation processes in cables is the ageing of their
non-metallic materials. It is therefore important to
evaluate cables to ensure that they can operate at the
required temperature for their service life. For many
non-metalhc materials the degradation process can
be defined by a single temperature-dependent reaction
that follows the Arrhenius equation:
Κ = Ae(-Ea/kBT) (6.1)
where Κ reaction rate
A frequency factor
e 2.718
Ea energy needed t o activate the degradation
reaction (electron volts)
kB Boltzmann's constant (8.617 χ I Q - ^ e V / K )
Τ = absolute temperature, Κ
This can be transferred into a form which yields an
acceleration factor, defined as the service life divided
by ageing time, as foUows:
443
Cabling
^ g[-Ea/kB(l/Ti)-(l/T2)] (6.2)
tl
where Ti = accelerated ageing temperature, Κ
T2 = normal service temperature, Κ
tl = accelerated ageing time at
temperature T i , years
t2 = accelerated ageing time at
temperature T 2 , years
To apply this formul a, the service temperature and
required life of the cable must be defined together
with the activation energies of the materials involved.
As far as service temperature is concerned, this should
be the estimated average service temperature over the
life of the cables. For example, cables are generally
sized against maximum ambient conditions which allow
for peak summer temperatures and the least effective
air conditioning. In reality this means that a cable
capable of working at a maximum continuous operating
temperature of, say, 90°C may in fact be operating at
an average annual temperature in the order of 75°C.
Typical mean service temperature conditions are:
• Power cables
75°C mean.
(90°C maximum continuous rating)
• Power cables
(70°C maximum continuous rating) 55°C mean.
• Control cables
(multicore and muhipair) 40°C mean.
It is normal practice to take the service time as the
design life of the power station. This may vary from
25 years to 40 years, or 50 years for hydro stations. It
is considered good practice to ignore reduction in
service life due to maintenance outages or two-shifting
during the later years of conventional plant, as this
allows some margin in the predicted life of the cables.
Having defined the service conditions it is now
necessary to establish the activation energy of all es­
sential non-metallic materials within the cable. The
term essential is used since, for example, some binder
tapes are included in cables purely for manufacturing
purposes and therefore if they failed mechanically they
would not affect service hfe.
The activation energy of non-metalhc materials may
be determined by carrying out ageing tests on samples
at a number of temperatures. A typical crherion for
ageing performance evaluation is to assess the time
it takes for the material's 'elongation at break' to
reduce to occur at 1.5 times its initial length (50%
absolute). Dumb-bell samples, of the type shown in
Fig 6.12, are therefore used and these are aged in
circulating air ovens. Samples are aged at a number
of temperatures (say four), these being at least 10°C
apart and with a maximum temperature of (typically)
444
Chapter 6
MARKER LINES
10mm
R7.5mm/
i ^ 1
4mm R10mm/
t
17mm 8mm
50mm
FIG. 6.12 Details of dumb-bell samples
160°C to ensure the degradation mechanism is still
representative of that occurring at the service tempera­
ture. For some high temperature materials it may be
necessary to exceed 160°C to give acceptable testing
times, but even then a typical test programme can last
up to 2 years. Samples of materials are removed from
the ovens until the time is determined at which the
material exhibits 5 0 % absolute elongation at break.
A typical graph of such results is shown in Fig 6.13.
F r o m the four test results, a graph of reciprocal tem­
perature against logarithm of time is plotted as shown
in Fig 6.14. The Arrhenius activation energy is deter­
mined from the slope E a / k B of this graph using the
method of least squares. For polymeric cable materials
the activation energies are normally in the range of
0.85 and 1.65 eV.
Having estabhshed the cable service conditions and
material activation energies formula. Equation (6.2)
can be used to calculate accelerated ageing times for
test purposes. Typical ageing times for various tem­
peratures and activation energies are shown in Tables
6.3 and 6.4.
From this information, the ageing time and tempera­
ture appropriate to the essential cable material having
the lowest activation energy can be selected. Actual
cable samples are then subjected to this ageing regime
after which they are subjected to electrical and me­
chanical tests to ensure they are still serviceable.
3.11 Mechanical performance
The mechanical properties of cables must be such
that they will withstand the rigours of being installed
along routes which could consist of horizontal and
vertical ladder racks, through ducts and conduits, or
direct in the ground. After instahation cables must
withstand the environmental conditions into which they
are placed and these could include d a m p or oil con­
taminated situations.
Materials such as P V C and P E have been freely
available since the 1950s and therefore the mechanical
performance of cables constructed from such materials
has been evaluated and proved satisfactory from long
 Cable types

350 \\
325

V
300

I\ \ \
275

\
\
250

225

% ELONGATION
\
AT BREAK 200

T, = 160°C T2 = 1 5 0 ° C ox [T^= 130

1500 1800

TIME (HOURS)

FIG. 6 . 1 3 Graph of ^elongation at break* plotted against time

TABLE 6 . 3 experience. When introducing new cables into cable

Power cable (service life 40 years at JS^'C) ageing times construction it is important to evaluate their mechani­
at various temperatures cal properties and the performance of P V C can form
a useful benchmark for such tests. Quite clearly the
Activation Ageing temperature Ageing temperature performance of the oversheath is of major importance
energy, eV 150°C 135°C and therefore the majority of testing must be concerned
with evaluating this item.
1.00 40 days 110 days
A typical range of type tests t o evaluate mechanical
1.20 12.5 days 41 days performance includes:
1.40 4 days 15 days
• Abrasion on complete cable.
1.60 1.5 days 6 days
• Sheath cut-through.
• Crush on complete cable.
• Ozone resistance of insulation a n d oversheath.
TABLE 6 . 4
• W a t e r permeation on bedding and oversheath
Control cable (service life 40 years at 40^ C) ageing times
at various temperatures materials.
• Long term water immersion test.
Activation Ageing temperature Ageing temperature
• Mineral oil resistance of oversheath.
energy, eV 135°C 115°C
• Pulling lubricant resistance of oversheath.
0.85 7.5 days 33 days
• Tear resistance of oversheath.
1.00 1 day 11 days
• Retraction of oversheath.
1.20 - 3 days
1.40 — 1 day • H o t set o n insulation, bedding a n d oversheath if
cross-hnked.

445
Cabling Chapter 6

test machine operating in its compressive m o d e to

drive a cutting edge (see Fig 6.15) through the over-
sheath of a complete cable sample. The force required
to achieve this is monitored and compared against
the acceptance criteria. The test is carried out at both

/ ambient temperature and the estimated sheath operat­

ing temperature. The crush test is similar to the cut-
through test, but the cutting edge is replaced by two
parallel flat steel blocks 50 m m wide. In this case all
10^. metallic components in the cable are monitored and
the force required to produce an electrical short is
recorded and compared with the acceptance criterion.
This test is intended to simulate a cable being crushed
by, say, being walked on. The sheath penetration test
is designed to simulate a cable being pulled over a
sharp edge such as a hexagonal bolt head. In this test
! ΙΟ**.
a weighted spike is moved along the cable sheath as
shown diagrammatically in Fig 6.16. The acceptance

TENSILE TEST MACHINE

r^PERATING IN COMPRESSIVE MODE

CUTTHROUGH TOOL

8mm MIN BEFORE

START OF RADIUS

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9

(xlO-^) l/T

FIG. 6.14 Arrhenius plot

CABLE UNDER TEST

• Tensile strength and elongation at break on insula­

tion, bedding and oversheath. FIG. 6.15 Cut-through test
• Sheath penetration.
• Hot pressure and hot deformation.

Cut-through, crush, water permeation and tensile strength

tests should be carried out on both aged and non-aged
samples, the remaining tests being carried out on non­
aged samples only.
Many of these tests are covered by British or Inter­
national Standards such as BS2782, BS6469, l E C 229
and l E C 540, and therefore further details are not in­
cluded in this volume. However, the cut-through, crush,
water immersion, oversheath retraction and penetra­
tion tests are less c o m m o n and further details of these
are included.
The cut-through test is designed to measure the TOTAL CLEAR LENGTH
capability of the oversheath to withstand being rested
on a sharp edge such as that which might occur with
a cable tray. This test is performed using a tensile FIG. 6.16 Sheath penetration test

446
 P o w e r cable system design

criterion is based upon a voltage test being applied
to the cable sheath a h h o u g h the depth of sheath
penetration is recorded for information purposes.
Because the oversheath has a considerable impact
on the cable fire performance, there is a temptation
to fill the oversheath heavily with fire-retardant fillers.
This can detract from its mechanical performance
and has been found to make materials more suscep­
tible to moisture. It is therefore important to carry
out tests to ensure that the oversheath provides ade­
quate protection against corrosion of the aluminium
or galvanised steel wire a r m o u r . It is also considered
essential to specify a long term water immersion test.
Such a test consists of immersing cable samples in
water for a period of six months during which the
insulation resistance and capacitance of the sheath are
monitored. At the end of the test period the cable
sheaths are subjected to a voltage withstand test. This
test is particularly important for single-core cables
which may be operated with armouring and, where
applicable, screens bonded to earth at one end of the
route only. Suitable test voltages are considered to be
2000 V A C for single-core cable sheaths and 500 V A C
for the sheaths of all other cable types, the voltages
being apphed for 1 minute. After the voltage tests the
samples are removed from the water and are dissected
for a visual examination for water ingress or corrosion.
Another test which experience has shown to be
valuable is one to assess retraction of the oversheath.
This is necessary to ensure that cable oversheaths do
not pull out of the gland seals after the installation
due to thermal cychng. This test is therefore only
necessary for power cables. The test procedure requires
that a cable sample 10 m long be glanded at each
end using mechanical glands of the type described in
Section 9.1 of this chapter. The cable sample is laid
straight and the position of the sheath entry into both
glands is marked. The cable is then subjected to 40
load cycles between ambient temperature and its
maximum continuous conductor temperature. After
completion of the load cycles, the movement between
the oversheath and the body of the gland, as indicated
by the reference marks, is measured at both ends. A
suitable acceptance criteria is considered to be that
the measured values should not exceed 1 m m .
3.12 Electrical tests
Electrical tests can be split into three categories, name­
ly type, routine and site. Details of such tests are
contained in the relevant International, British, ESI
or CEGB standards which are referenced in Sections
3.1 to 3.8 of this chapter. Therefore only a summary
of types of tests that may be employed is given below:
• Dimensions.
• Bend tests; ambient and cold.
• Voltage withstand; insulation and sheath.
• Power factor measurement.
• L o a d cycle (6350/11000 V and above).
• Partial discharge (6350/11000 V and above).
• Impulse test.
• Thermal ageing followed by voltage withstand,
impulse and partial discharge as appropriate.
4 Power cable system design
4.1 Introduction
As earlier described, the C E G B has a d o p t e d a
rationalised range of power cable conductor sizes for
use at each of the three system voltage levels, i.e.,
415 V, 3.3 kV and 11 kV. For each feeder or motor
circuit apphcation, a suitable conductor size, i.e., cross-
sectional area in m m ^ , has to be selected from the
applicable range. The conductor size chosen is the
smallest conductor size which meets, as applicable, cer­
tain technical requirements. The process of applying
these technical requirements to derive this conductor
size is called power cable system design. The techni­
cal requirements are primarily concerned with ensuring
that current and voltage limits are not exceeded. For
current, these are the current carrying capacity or
rating of a cable for continuous operation and the
magnitude, together with duration, of the current dur­
ing an overload and a fault. The requirements for
voltage involve the voltage regulation in the cable
during normal operation a n d , where apphcable, under
m o t o r starting conditions.
In fundamental terms, the technical requirements
are based on the need for a cable to have a reasonable
service life, the prevention of thermal damage during
an overload or a fault, and safe operation as shown
against each requirement in the following:
Reasonable service life
• Current rating for contin­
uous operation (including
current sharing for single-
core cables with more
than one cable per phase)
• Voltage regulation Safe or functional
operation
• Overload current Reasonable service hfe
and thermal damage
• Short-circuit fault Safe operation and
(phase to phase) thermal damage

• Electrical characteristics, i.e., conductor resistance, • Earth fault Safe operation and
insulation resistance, capacitance, inductance. thermal damage

447
Cabling
• Sheath vohage Safe operation
(single-core cables)
• Maximum cable route Safe operation and
length (certain types of thermal damage
415 V circuits)
Section 4.2 deals with the current rating of cables for
continuous operation which, for single-core cables,
includes the sheath armour voltage with single point
bonding and current sharing with more than one cable
per phase.
Section 4.3 covers the three types of abnormal con­
dition. These are short-circuit fault, earth fauh and
overload current, and considers their magnitude and
duration relative to cable size for the prevention of
thermal damage.
Section 4.4 is a review of motor starting require­
ments and the determination of motor starting currents
and times for different motor sizes.
Section 4.5 deals with the calculation of voltage
regulation, i.e., the percentage voltage drop in a sup­
ply system due to the impedance of the cables under
both steady state and motor starting conditions. The
appropriate cable sizes are determined for the vohage
regulation hmits within which the electrical plant and
equipment is specified to operate.
Section 4.6 examines the overall process of power
cable system design as applied to feeder and motor
circuits. This describes how the various technical
requirements are applied at each system voltage level
and includes additional requirements specific to certain
types of 415 V circuit.
In the final part, the step-by-step procedure followed
in selecting a cable size is demonstrated in a number
of worked examples.
In practice, the determination of each cable size by
calculation is a repetitive and time consuming process.
Consequently, tables have been developed for this pur­
pose which enable the correct size to be quickly deter­
mined. In the case of continuous current ratings, these
allow adjustments to be made for variations in the
installation conditions. Some tables, but not all as they
are too numerous, are included in the appendices to
this chapter.
It is necessary to have available certain design infor­
mation before the task of power cable system design
can commence. This, in turn, cahs for the design of
the power station electrical auxiliary system and plant
lay o u t / m a j o r cable routes to be reasonably well ad­
vanced. To gain an initial appreciation of what this
means, the extent of the design information needed is
as follows:
• Types of fauh current breaking device and current
rating.
• Design load currents for feeder circuits.
• Motor sizes and starting time for large motors.
448
Chapter 6
• F a u h levels.
• Protection relay operating times.
• Voltage regulation hmits.
• Cable route lengths.
• Types and details of cable routes.
• Ambient temperatures for cables laid in air.
• Soil conditions for buried cables.
• Installation configurations for single-core cables with
more than one cable per phase.
In practice, difficulty is usually experienced in obtain­
ing ah of this information when cable sizing has to
start and therefore assumptions may have to be made
in order that the task can proceed.
4.2 Current rating for continuous operation
The maximum or permissible current for continuous
(or sustained) A C operation is determined, for a given
cable conductor size, by the design of the cable and
the conditions under which it is installed.
The principal factors concerned may be summarised
as:
Design of cable
• Conductor material.
• Maximum conductor temperature for insulation.
• Operating voltage.
• Number of load-carrying conductors.
• Cable overall construction.
Conditions under which installed
• Ambient temperature.
• Type of cable route.
• Method of instaUation.
• Method of armour bonding.
The way each of these factors is taken into account
can best be described by showing how the permissible
current rating of a cable is calculated for the three
types of cable route normally employed, i.e., cables
laid in air, buried direct in the ground or laid in ducts.
As will be seen, this process is solely concerned with
ensuring that the temperature of the insulation does
not exceed a maximum limit. Each of the above factors
is involved with either the determination of the total
heat produced within the cable, or affects the way this
heat is lost to the surroundings. The current which
balances these two during continuous operation at the
maximum temperature limit is the permissible current
 P o w e r cable system design

rating of the cable. The following describes in more
detail how this current rating is derived.
4.2.1 Maximum conductor temperature
Heat is produced in a cable as the result of electrical
losses due to the flow of current in the metalhc com­
ponents, i.e., conductors, screens and a r m o u r s , and the
presence of voltage, i.e., dielectric losses in the insu­
lation. The hottest part of the cable is the conductor
and heat flows outwards to the cable surface to be
dissipated to the surrounding medium by conduction,
convection and radiation as shown in Fig 6.17.
If the cable current is steady, the cable temperature
rises above ambient until thermal equilibrium is reached
when the rate at which heat is produced is equal to
the rate at which h is lost to the surroundings, as
shown for the conductor temperature in Fig 6.18.
The time taken to reach peak temperature is much
shorter for cables laid in air than buried direct in the
ground. Typically, for a large size cable, this is 2 - 4
hours when laid in air and in excess of 24 hours when
buried direct in the ground.
In Fig 6.18, the equilibrium temperature is just
below the cable upper temperature limh, termed the
m a x i m u m conductor temperature, for continuous op­
eration. The value of this limit is normally determined
by the choice of insulation and is derived from con­
sideration of the electrical and mechanical properties
of the insulation at the maximum conductor tempera­
ture. In particular, these properties must be retained
w h h o u t significant deterioration for a reasonable serv­
ice hfe. Softening, leading to thinning of the insulation,
during a thermal overload can also be a limiting factor
with thermoplastic materials. By international agree­
ment, standard m a x i m u m conductor temperatures have

/ I SINGLE CORE CABLE LAID

HORIZONTAL IN FREE AIR

CONDUCTOR

JNSULATION

BEDDING

/ \ ARMOUR

I I I OVERSHEATH

SURROUNDING
MEDIUM

RADIAL HEAT FLOW IS REASONABLY

UNIFORM WITHIN THE CABLE BUT IS DISTANCE FROM CABLE CENTRE
NOT so EXTERNALLY

FIG. 6.17 Heat flow in cable

been assigned to all commonly-used insulation types

and grades. Examples of these are shown in Table
MAX CONDUCTOR TEMP
6.5.
- PEAK TEMPERATURE

TABLE 6.5
Maximum conductor temperature
CONDUCTOR TEMP RISE

Maximum conductor
Insulation
AMBIENT TEMP
temperature, °C

CABLE ENERGISED Polyvinyl chloride (PVC) 70

Butyl rubber 85
Ethylene propylene rubber (EPR) 90
Cross-linked polyethylene (XLPE) 90
FIG. 6.18 Conductor temperature rise

449
Cabling
4.2.2 Ambient temperature
The conductor equihbrium temperature is equal to the
sum of the ambient temperature plus the temperature
rise. It therefore fohows that before the temperature
rise (i.e., current rating) can be determined, the am­
bient temperature must be known.
The ambient temperature depends on the cable en­
vironment, which for cables laid in air is the surround­
ing air temperature and for cables buried direct in
the ground is the soil temperature. O u t d o o r s , the air
temperature varies with geographical location, season,
time of day, etc., which in turn influences the sou
temperature. Inside a power station, the air temperature
is closely controlled in certain rooms, but elsewhere
varies with location from being approximately external
air temperature in unheated areas to 50°C in parts
of a boiler house or nuclear reactor building.
In deciding the value to be adopted, it is not the
mean but the highest ambient temperatures that need
to be considered if the maximum conductor tempera­
ture is not to be exceeded. On this basis, values are
selected for each cable environment. For outdoor en­
vironments, recommended temperatures are available
and these are normally utihsed. Typical values for cable
ambient temperatures are shown in Table 6.6.
TABLE 6.6
Cable ambient temperatures
Environment Ambient temperature,
°C
Buried in ground 15
Laid in ducts 15
Outside in air 25
Inside in air 25-50
If for a cable laid in air the ambient temperature
varies over different portions of the cable route, then
clearly the highest ambient temperature involved must
be used for cable sizing. With the large number of
cables required for a power station, many of which
wih have parts of their route length at different am­
bient temperatures, the process of determining the
correct ambient temperature for each cable becomes
impractical. Therefore a high ambient temperature is
adopted which covers ah the cables within the power
station, except for a few cables in extreme ambient
temperature areas such as close to a boiler. These latter
cables are easily dealt with separately.
4.2.3 Conductor temperature rise
The steady state conductor temperature rise may be
calculated mathematically, enabling the permissible cur­
rent rating to be determined for a known ambient
450
Chapter 6
and maximum conductor temperature. Account is taken
of the heat input from each electrical loss, relative to
its position within the cable, and the heat flow through
each non-metalhc component to the surrounding me­
dium. This treatment is described in IEC287 [1] and
for A C operation is obtained from the fohowing
formula:
ΔΘ = ( P R + \ Wd)Ti + [I2R(1 + λι) + W d ] n T 2
4-[I2R(1 + λ ι + X 2 ) + Wd]n(T3 + T 4 )
where Δ θ = conductor temperature rise above the
ambient temperature, Κ
I = current flowing in one conductor, A
R = alternating current resistance per unit
length of the conductor at maximum
operating temperature, Ω/m
Wd = dielectric loss per unit length for the
insulation surrounding the conductor,
W/m
Tl = thermal resistance per unit length be­
tween one conductor and the sheath,
K.m/W
T2 = thermal resistance per unit length of the
bedding between sheath and a r m o u r ,
K.m/W
T3 = thermal resistance per unit length of the
external serving of the cable, K . m / W
T4 = thermal resistance per unit length be­
tween the cable surface and the sur­
rounding medium, K . m / W
η = number of load-carrying conductors in
the cable (conductors of equal size and
carrying the same load)
λι = ratio of losses in the metal sheath to
total losses in ah conductors in that
cable
λ2 = ratio of losses in the armouring to total
losses in all conductors in that cable
Note: The expression is written in general terms.
When apphed to polymeric insulated cables, sheath
becomes metallic screen (for 11 kV cables in power
stations) and external serving becomes oversheath.
The current rating for a four-core low voltage cable
may be taken t o be equal t o the current rating of a
three-core cable for the same voltage rating, conductor
size and construction when used in a three-phase system
with the fourth conductor as neutral.
The dielectric losses (Wd) may be neglected for ca­
bles where the voltage between conductors and earth
is less than 15 kV for E P R , 37 kV for X L P E and
6 kV for P V C , which is the case for the cables used

in power stations. Simplifying and re-arranging to
obtain permissible current rating gives:
ΔΘ
I =
RTi + nR(l + λι)Τ2 + nR(l + λ ι + XiKTs + T4)
It is appropriate only to describe briefly the method
of calculating each equation component. For further
information reference should be made to l E C 287.
Conductor resistance (R)
Conductor resistance for A C operation includes an
allowance for current distortion due to skin and proxi­
mity effects. Skin effect is the difference in current
density between the centre of the conductor and the
conductor surface due to the conductor A C magnetic
field. Proximity effect is the difference in current den­
sity due to the interaction of adjacent conductor(s)
and screen/armour A C magnetic fields.
The A C resistance at maximum operating tempera­
ture is given by:
R = R- (1 + y s + y p )
where R = A C resistance of conductor at maximum
operating temperature, Ω/m
R' = D C resistance of conductor at maximum
operating temperature, Ω/m
ys = the skin effect factor
yp = the proximity effect factor
Both the skin and proximity effect factors are small
for conductor sizes below about 150 m m ^ .
The D C resistance at maximum operating tempera­
ture is given by:
R- = Ro [1 + « 2 0 (Θ - 20)]
where Ro = D C resistance of the conductor at 20°C,
ß/m
0^20 = constant mass temperature coefficient
at 20°C per kelvin (copper = 0.00393,
aluminium = 0.00403)
θ = maximum operating temperature, ° C
(determined by the type of insulation)
Appendices A and Β list values of A C and D C re­
sistance for single-core and multicore power station
cables respectively.
Metallic screen and armour loss ratios (\¡ and \2)
Cable metallic screen and a r m o u r losses are produced
by circulating currents and to a much less extent eddy
P o w e r cable system design
currents. Circulating currents occur w h h solid bonded
cables, i.e., a r m o u r bonded to earth at both ends, the
flow a r o u n d the a r m o u r / e a r t h return loop being in-
duced by the transformer action between the conductor
and the s c r e e n / a r m o u r (the screen is bonded to the
a r m o u r at both ends). Eddy currents are the resuh of
dissymmetry in the magnetic field caused by manufac-
turing hmitations and the installation arrangement. The
use of non-ferrous metals, i.e., aluminium instead of
steel wire a r m o u r , reduces these losses.
Circulating currents in the a r m o u r of single-core
cables can be equal to an appreciable proportion of
the conductor current, the m a g n h u d e being dependent
on the load current and the method of instahation.
These circulating currents reduce the rating of these
cables. For example, w h h 11 kV single-core cables in-
stalled in air in flat formation, as described in Section
4.2.5 of this chapter, the reduction caused by circu-
lating currents is approximately 1 1 % for a 300 mm^
and 17% for a 500 mm^ size cable. This reduction may
be avoided by single-point bonding, i.e., bonding the
a r m o u r to earth at one end only, which prevents current
circulating. This, however, induces a standing voltage
in the cable a r m o u r which is at a maximum at the
unearthed end of the cable a r m o u r .
With multicore cables, two-core phase and neutral,
and three and four core cables carrying a three-phase
current, the losses are small and have little affect on
rating and are normally only taken into account for
steel wire armoured cables. Multicore cables may there-
fore he bonded to earth at both ends without any
penalty to their rating.
Thermal resistances of cable components (Tj T2 and
Ts)
T o calculate the thermal resistance of the insulation
( T l ) , bedding ( T 2 ) and oversheath ( T 3 ) the thermal
resistivity of each component must be known. Thermal
resistivity is defined as the difference in temperature
(in kelvin), between opposite faces of a metre cube
of material caused by the transference of one watt of
heat. In other words, the lower the value of thermal
resistivity the better the material is at transferring heat.
The thermal resistivity values for a number of ma-
terials are given in l E C 287, the most commonly used
are shown in Table 6.7.
Using an 11 kV single-core cable as an example,
the thermal resistance ( T i ) between conductor and
metallic screen is given by:
Tl = ( ρ τ / 2 7 Γ ) X log„ (1 + 2ti/de)
where = thermal resistivity of insulation,
K.m/W
dc = diameter of conductor, m m
tl = thickness of insulation between conduc­
tor and metallic screen, m m
451
Cabling Chapter 6

TABLE 6.7 The thermal resistance T 4 is given by:

Values of thermal resistivity for cable materials
1
T4 =
Material Thermal resistivity, K.m/W
7rDeh(Aes)4
Insulation
PVC up to 3 kV 5.0
above 3 kV 6.0 h = + Ε
EPR up to 3 kV 3.5 (De)^
above 3 kV 5.0
XLPE 3.5 where D g = external diameter of cable, m
Butyl rubber 5.0
h heat dissipation coefficient,
Sheathing W / m 2 (Κ)ΐ·25
PVC up to 35 kV 5.0
AOs = excess of cable surface temperature
above ambient temperature, Κ

Semi-conducting layers are considered part of the insu­ The heat dissipation factor constants Z , Ε and g for
lation. The thermal resistance ( T 2 ) between metalhc one, t w o or three cables either installed spaced or
screen and armour is given by: touching, supported away from or cleated direct to a
vertical wall, are detailed in l E C 287.
T2 = ( ρ τ / 2 7 Γ ) X logn (1 + 2t2/Ds) Cables installed outdoors in air are normally shielded
from the sun, but if directly exposed, separate calcula­
where qj = thermal resistivity of bedding, K . m / W tions must be performed which take account of the
heating due t o solar radiation.
t2 = thickness of bedding, m m
Ds = external diameter of metallic screen, m m
Cables buried direct in the ground T h e thermal re­
sistance for a single isolated buried cable is given by:
The thermal resistance (T3) of the oversheath is given
by:
T4 = ( ρ τ / 2 7 Γ ) X logn [U + V(u2 - 1)]
T3 = ( ρ τ / 2 7 Γ ) X logn (1 + 2t3/D,)
where = the thermal resistivity of the soil,
where qj = thermal resistivity of oversheath, K . m / W K.m/W
ts = thickness of oversheath, m m u = 2L/De

D á = external diameter of the a r m o u r , m m L = distance from the surface of the

T o calculate the thermal resistance of the insulation
for multicore cables reference should be made to l E C
287.
External thermal resistance (T4)
Cables laid in free air (protected from solar radiation)
Heat dissipation from an isolated cable laid in free
air is mainly by convection, but a proportion will be
emitted by radiation t o be absorbed by the enveloping
surface or transmitted by conduction to the cable
support system. In this respect, cables with larger dia­
meters dissipate heat better than smaller cables because
of the increased surface area. T h e close proximity of
other cables or a vertical wall reduces heat dissipation.
For example, with three single-core cables the heat
dissipation and hence current rating is lowest when they
are installed in trefoil. The heat dissipation and current
rating is improved when the cables are placed in a flat
spaced vertical formation a n d the highest rating is
achieved with a flat spaced horizontal formation.
ground to the cable axis, m m
D e = external diameter of cable, m m
The thermal resistivity of the soil depends on the
backfih material, degree of compaction, make-up of
the original ground a n d moisture content. Thorough
compaction of the backfill material is essential to o b ­
tain a satisfactory resistivity. Of the remaining factors,
the most important is moisture content which varies
the soil thermal resistivity t o such an extent that, for
most purposes, the effect of soil type can be ignored.
This variation is shown in Table 6.8.
At depths of 0.8 m a n d less, the soil moisture
content is dependent on the prevailing weather which
varies with geographical location, time of year, etc. Soil
thermal resistivity is difficult t o measure a n d for most
applications it is convenient to use a standard value
representative of the all year r o u n d maximum soil
thermal resistivity. This condition in average soil (i.e.,
clay or loam) is when the soil is d a m p b u t not quite
moist, corresponding to a value of 1.2 K . m / W .

452
 P o w e r cable system design

TABLE 6.8 has already been done and the values are readily avail-
Variation of thermal resistivity with soil moisture content able from a number of sources, notably E R A Tech-
nology. The same applies for cables manufactured to
Thermal C E G B Standards except that the values are not as
resistivity, Soil condition Weather condition widely available. The C E G B has its own computer
K.m/W program for this purpose which is used for instances
where published data is not available. The source of
0.7 Very moist Continuously moist
the current ratings for power station cables are as
1.0 Moist Regular rainfall
follows:
2.0 Dry Seldom rains
• 11 kV single core — C E G B calculated (90°C
3.0 Very dry Little or no rain
power cables ( G D C D maximum conductor
17 [2]) temperature).

In selecting this value it is assumed that drying out • 415 V and 3.3 kV — C E G B calculated (90°C
of the soil does not occur when the cable is carrying single-core cables maximum conductor
fuU-load current. This may not be the case in well temperature).
drained or loosely compacted soil, etc., for example,
• 415 V and 3.3 kV — E R A Report 69 - 30 Part
sand or made-up ground, and in these circumstances
multicore cables III [4] (70°C maximum
a higher value must be used.
(BS6346 [3]) conductor temperature).

Cables laid in ducts In this instance the external

The current ratings for these cables are tabulated in
thermal resistance consists of three parts, namely:
Appendices C and D of this chapter for the three types
• The thermal resistance of the air space between the of cable route described. As it is impractical to tabu-
cable surface and the duct internal surface T 4 . late these for every possible variation under which the
cables may be instahed, these are presented for the
• The thermal resistance of the duct T 4 . set of standard installation conditions defined in the
• The external thermal resistance of the duct T4". next section. Rating factors are then given to enable
the current rating to be corrected for any variation
from these conditions. For convenience, the A C current
Equations are available in l E C 287 for the calculation
ratings for two-core cables are also applied for D C
of each thermal resistance. The value of T 4 is given
operation.
by the sum of the individual thermal resistances, i.e.,
If a circuit involves more than one type of cable
route, e.g., a portion is laid in air and a portion buried
T4 = T; + T¡ + T¡' direct in the ground, then the lowest of the current
rating values (after apphcation of any rating factors)
Values of thermal resistivity for the two duct materials must be used for the current rating of the cable. This
used (taken from l E C 287) are given in Table 6.9. is an important point when designing an external cable
route as the decision on which type of cable route to
use can make a difference to the size and hence cost
TABLE 6.9 of the cables required. For example, it can be seen
Values of thermal resistivity for from examination of the tables in Appendix D that
duct installation
for the larger sizes of muhicore power cable the cur-
rent rating is significantly reduced if laid in ducts,
Thermal resistivity,
Material
K.m/W
whereas if buried direct in the ground the current rat-
ings are higher than in air for all except the largest
Concrete * 1.0 cable size. With single-core power cables the reduction
Earthenware 1.2 is of the same order, whether the cables are laid in
ducts or buried direct in the ground.
Typical, as value varies with mix. Short lengths of duct (normally less than half a
metre) are ignored for cable sizing purposes. The
longitudinal conduction of heat by the cable metallic
4.2.4 Permissible current ratings components is considered sufficient to maintain a
uniform temperature rise.
Tabulated ratings
Standard installation condition
In practice, there is no need to perform the calcula-
tions described to determine the current ratings for The standard installation conditions for the tabulated
cables manufactured to British Standards. This work current ratings are:

453
Cabling Chapter 6

(a) Method of armour bonding:
• Single-core power cables — single end bonded to
• Multicore power cables
(b) Cables laid in air:
• Supporting structure
• Depth of duct (measured from the ground surface
to the centre of the cable).
earth. single-core power cables — 0.8 m.
3.3 kV multicore power cables — 0.8 m .
— solid bonded for all
circuits except final 415 V multicore power cables — 0.5 m.
415 V feeder circuits • G r o u n d temperature — 15°C.
which are single-end
• Duct thermal resistivity — 1.2 K . m / W .
bonded to earth (see
Section 4.6.1 of this • Method of instahation
chapter). for single-core power — three ducts in flat
cables formation.
for multicore power — single duct.
— horizontal and ver­
cables 35 mm^ and
tical ladder rack and
above
tray spaced from
walls by at least one for multicore power — r a n d o m mix
third of cable dia­ cables 16 mm^ and touching,
meter. less

• Ambient temperature — 25 ° C . 4.2.5 Rating factors

• Method of instaUation With condhions other than the standard installation

conditions described, it is necessary to adjust the tabu­
for single core power — single-layer flat spaced
lated current rating to correct for the difference. This
cables at 80 m m centres
may be for a variation in the thermal parameters of
for multicore power — single-layer flat spaced the surrounding medium, i.e., ambient temperature,
cables 35 mm^ and 25 m m apart, depth of burial or soil thermal resistivity, or because
above the cable is grouped with others.
The correction is performed by multiplying the ta­
for multicore power — r a n d o m mix double-
bulated current rating by a rating factor. The rating
cables 16 mm^ and layer touching,
less factor to be applied is obtained from tables produced
for this purpose which cover the normal variations
(c) Cables buried direct in the ground: in installation conditions.
Where there is more than one variation to the stand­
• Depth of laying (measured from the ground surface
ard instahation conditions then the rating factor for
to the centre of the cable)
each must be multiplied together to obtain the over-
single-core power cables — 0.8 m. ah factor. Care is however required to ensure that
3.3 kV multicore cables — 0.8 m. only the relevant factors are applied to each section.
415 V multicore cables — 0.5 m. For instance, if a portion of a cable route is in air
and a portion buried in the ground, the rating factor
• Ground temperature — 15°C. for a different ambient air temperature is only applied
• Soil thermal resistivity — 1.2 K . m / W . to the laid in air current rating and that for a dif­
ferent depth of laying is only applied to the buried in
• Method of installation the ground current rating, and not, as sometimes mis­
for single-core power — single-layer flat spaced takenly happens, both apphed throughout.
cables one cable diameter
apart. Rating factors for variations in thermal parameters

for multicore power — single-layer flat spaced Tabulated rating factors are available for the fohow-
cables 35 mm^ and one cable diameter ing variations in the thermal parameters of the
above apart. surroundings:

for multicore power — random mix double- • Variation in ambient temperature (90°C and 70°C
cables 16 mm^ and layer touching, maximum conductor temperature).
less • Variation in ground temperature (90°C and 70°C
(d) Cables laid in ducts: maximum conductor temperature) for cables laid
direct in the ground.
• Type of duct
• Variation in ground temperature (90°C and 70°C
internal diameter — 100 m m . maximum conductor temperature) for cables laid in
material — earthenware. ducts.

454
 P o w e r cable system design

• Variation in depth of laying cables direct in the

ground.

• Variation in soil thermal resistivity for cables laid

direct in the ground.

• Variation in soil thermal resistivity for cables laid

in ducts. 3 x415V
CABLES LAID
HORIZONTALLY
• Variation in depth of laying ducts. IN AIR

These rating factors are given in Appendix Ε of this

chapter.

Group rating factors

1.5 2.0

It has earher been mentioned that the current rating AXIAL SPACING ( X De)
for an isolated multicore cable or set of three single-
core cables needs to be reduced if installed in close FIG. 6.20 Rating factors for three spaced cables
proximity to neighbouring cables. This is due to mutual
heating and applies irrespective of the type of cable
such an arrangement. As is shown in the following,
route. For cables laid in air the effect of being close to
the method of cable installation adopted derives bene­
a wall also has to be included. A reduction is avoided
fit from avoiding any reduction due to group rating
if cables are installed above certain minimum spacings
while at the same time efficiently utihses cable support
which, typically for cables laid in air, are shown in steelwork space.
Fig 6.19.
Unless the current rating is calculated for the method
415 V, 3.3 kV and 11 kV single-core power cables
of instahation concerned, it fohows that group rating
must be apphed to the isolated current ratings for The method of instahation is flat spaced in a single-
multicore cables or groups of three single-core cables layer at 80 m m centres as shown in Fig 6.21. Ratings
when spaced apart by less than the minimum distance are calculated using this spacing.
necessary to achieve the isolated condition. This in­
cludes single-layer and multi-layer touching cables. The
typical rating factors for three spaced cables taken
from E R A 6 9 - 3 0 P a r t III are shown in Fig 6.20.
Since the vast majority of power station cables are
laid in air it is highly desirable that adequate space is
provided between these cables to allow the isolated
current rating to be used. However this need has to be
balanced against the cost of providing the additional
* 0
room and cable supporting steelwork to accommodate

FIG. 6.21 Method of installing single-core cables

S>1.5 De

415 V and 3.3 kV multicore power cables (35 mm^

and above) are installed flat in a single-layer spaced
apart by 25 m m as shown in Fig 6.22.

25mm THERMAL
SPACER

ROW OF THREE CABLES

FIG. 6.22 Method of installing multicore power cables

FIG. 6.19 Minimum cable spacings (35 mm^ and above)

455
Cabling Chapter 6

Where the two cables are of a different size, spac-
ings are based on the larger of the two cable diameters
to err on the safe side. On the same basis, if each
cable size considered from the range of muhicore cables
is the cable with the highest number of cores, i.e., has
the largest cable diameter, then all cables of this size
with fewer cores are covered by this cable. Table 6.10
shows the axial spacings between these cables, using
the cable design maximum overall diameters and the
group rating factor. The lowest value of group rating
factor is 0.98 for the 3.3 kV 3 - c o r e 240 mm^ and 415
V 4 - c o r e 300 mm^ cables. Besides being almost negh-
gible, if the argument on loading ratio made in the
next section is apphed, it is apparent that there is no
need to apply group rating factors to these cables.
complex with heat also travelling outwards across ad­
jacent cables and air pockets to reach the exterior
surface of the cable group.
T o determine the group rating factor, it is assumed
that there is uniform heat generation throughout the
cross-section of the cable group, from which it follows
that the acceptable power loss from each cable is pro­
portional to its cross-sectional area. Since the heat
generation is uniform this also means that a cable can
be located at any position within the group. O n this
basis, the group rating factor may be calculated if
the heat dissipation coefficient and thermal resistivity
of the group is known, i.e., the cable group is treated
as behaving hke a single cable. These parameters have
been determined experimentally by the C E G B for a

TABLE 6.10
Approximate axial space between multicore power cable centres and group rating factor

Approx. axial
Maximum overall Group rating
Cable voltage/size spacing between
diameter Dg, mm factor
cable centres

3.3 kV 3-core 150 mm^ 47.9 1.5 De 0.99

3-core 240 mm^ 55.7 1.4 De 0.98

415 V 4-core 35 mm^ 26.2 2.0 De 1.0

4-core 70 mm^ 34.0 1.7 De 1.0
4-core 120 mm^ 42.7 1.6 De 0.99
4-core 185 mm^ 52.1 1.5 De 0.99
4-core 300 mm^ 64.0 1.4 De 0.98

415 V multicore power cables (16 mm^ and less) are double-layer group of cables, thus enabling the group
random laid double-layer touching as shown in Fig rating factor for each cable size to be found.
6.23. At this point it is necessary to introduce the term
loading ratio which is defined as the ratio of normal
RANDOM FILL
full-load current to permissible current rating after
DOUBLE LAYER applying any rating factor for variations in the ther­
TOUCHING
mal parameters. If a group rating factor is now applied
to the permissible current rating, h follows that:

LR = I F L / I p and GR = IQ/IF

where L R loading ratio

IFL full load current
FIG. 6.23 Method of installing multicore power cables In permissible cable current after apply­
(16 mm^ and less) ing any rating factors for variations in
thermal parameters
GR group rating factor
Cables are rarely laid straight and parallel and
may be laid loose enough to allow some air to pass IG permissible current rating after apply­
through, but this cannot be used as a basis for calcu­ ing a group rating factor
lating current ratings and the worst case must be as­
sumed which is when the cables are tightly packed. F r o m the two equations it can be seen that provided
In this situation, air flow between the cables is prac­ L R ^ G R there is no need to take account of the
tically non-existent and heat dissipation is now more cable group rating factor.

456
 P o w e r cable system design

The C E G B has also carefully examined the range
of loading ratios for cables sizes 16 mm^ and less
for feeder and motor circuits. As seen in the practical
examples later, these cables are mainly sized to meet
voltage regulation requirements and as a result are
often larger than required for continuous full-load
current operation. By comparing the loading ratio with
the group rating factor, it was found in all cases ex­
T o obtain optimum current-sharing, each cable of
any phase must 'see' the same magnetic field as the
others in that phase and this is achieved by using a
symmetrical arrangement such as that shown in Fig
6.25.
SYMMETRY WITH 2 CABLES PER PHASE

amined that the former was less for motor circuits and
also for most feeder circuits. Since cables are installed
in what in all probability will be a mixture of circuit
types, and not all wiU be in service at the same time,
a judgement has been m a d e that there is no need to
apply group rating factors to these cables. This policy
has been followed for some years and service experience
to date has supported this decision.

Cables buried direct or in ducts

The same considerations as those just discussed can
be applied to cables buried direct in the ground except
that here the minimum spacings necessary to avoid a
reduction in the current rating due to mutual heating
are much greater. The net result is that group rating
factors are apphed where necessary. These are avail­
able from E R A 6 9 - 3 0 P a r t III for cables buried in flat
formation with various axial spacings from touching
to 0.6 m between cable centres for different numbers
of cables in the group.
This situation is repeated for cables laid in ducts.
Group rating factors are available for different spac-
ings/formations of cable ducts for multicore and three
single-core power cables.
FIG. 6.25 Cable installation with two and four cables
per phase
This formation may be repeated for four cables
per phase, by arranging the cable rows in tiers on
separate steelwork levels as shown in the figure. Un­
fortunately this arrangement does not work with larger
even numbers or odd numbers of cables per phase
and the only way to achieve symmetry is by cable
transposition. Transposition involves the interchange
of cable positions so that each cable occupies the same
space relative to the others for approximately one-
third of the cable route length, as shown in Fig 6.26.

4.2.6 Single-core cables in parallel

Current sharing
Feeder circuits are frequently required to transfer high
levels of power with currents up to 3000 A . Single-core
cables are used for this purpose and from examination
of the ratings for single-core cables, it can be seen that
several cables in parallel per phase are needed.
With this arrangement, it is necessary to ensure that
the current is shared approximately equally between
each cable in parallel and that individual cables are
not overloaded by exceeding their permissible current
rating. This is particularly important for cables laid
spaced in flat formation where lack of symmetry, as FIG. 6.26 Cable transposition
shown in Fig 6.24 for two cables per phase, results
in unequal current sharing.
The C E G B has developed a computer program
C U R B 0 3 [5] to calculate the current sharing between
cables in parallel. T o determine the current in each
cable, the cable axial co-ordinates and length for each
route section are entered into the computer program,
together with the number of cables per phase, phase
current, cable conductor resistance, a r m o u r details, etc.
FIG. 6.24 Lack of cable symmetry The output from the computer contains the current in

457
Cabling Chapter 6

each cable which is checked against the cable permis- For most power cables ri — r 2 = r , from which it can
sible current rating as described earher. The computer be shown that:
also calculates the voltage drop in the cables.
[2v]/(T¡ - r?)] logn ( r 2 / r , ) - 1
Sheath voltage
Hence Vs = 4 7 r ñ 10 logn (s/r) V / m
As mentioned in Section 4.2.3 of this chapter, the
bonding of single-core power cables at one end only
produces a standing voltage on the metahic screen/ The standing sheath vohage for the outer cables is
armour. This voltage appears across the cable sheath- given by:
ing (hence is usually called the sheath voltage); its
magnitude is proportional to the conductor current Vs = j 2 7 r f l 1 0 - ^ ( 1 - [2r?/(r^ - r?)] logn (Γ2/ΓΙ)
and cable route length, the maximum value appearing -f 2 logn (V2s/r2) ± jV3 logn2) V / m
at the cable screen/armour insulated (open) end. At
again if η ^ r2 - r
full load current, the standing voltage on the screen/
armour which is connected to the cable gland must
not exceed the maximum allowable touch voltage of Vs = j 2 7 r n 1 0 - ^ [ 2 logn (V2s/r) ± jV3 logn] V / m
55 V (see Section 11.2.2 of this chapter). In the event then in magnitude
of a through fault, the induced voltage will reach a
much higher value for the short duration of the fault. Vs| = 2 7 r ñ 1 0 - ^ ( [ 2 logn (V2 s/Y)f
The cable oversheath and the gland insulation are de-
signed to withstand this voltage up to a limit of 2 kV. + (V3 logn 2 ) 2 ) T v / m
T o protect personnel from this condition, the acces- = 27ΓΠ 1 0 - 7 ( [ 2 logn (V2 s / r ) ] 2 -f 1.44)T V / m
sible metal body of the cable gland is covered with a
P V C shroud. It is necessary to calculate the sheath
The standing sheath voltages with transposed cables
voltage for these two conditions to ensure that the
are all equal and are given by:
maximum voltages do not exceed the above limits. The
two sheath voltage conditions described above are
niustrated in Fig 6.27. Vs = 2 7 r f l 1 0 - ^ ( 1 - [2V]/(TI - r?)] log« ( r 2 / r , )
+ 2 logn(3V2s/r2)) V/m

GLAND INSULATION
again if ri ^ r 2 = r

Vs = 47rfl 10-7 iQg^ (3V2s/r2) V/m

SINGLE CORE POWER CABLE

The sheath voltage can also be calculated using the

GLAND CONNECTION
TO EARTH C E G B computer p r o g r a m C U R B 0 3 . For practical
purposes, the sheath voltage under short-circuit con­
STANDING VOLTAGE UNDER
NORMAL OPERATION <55V ditions can be taken as the full load current sheath
UP TO A MAXIMUM FOR
A THROUGH FAULT <2kV vohage increased in proportion to the ratio of the
short-circuit current to the fuh load current, as shown
in the fohowing expression:
FIG. 6.27 Sheath voltage

Vsc = V F L X Isc/IpL
For cables installed in flat formation without trans-
position, the standing sheath voltage on the centre where V s c = short-circuit sheath voltage
cable differs from that on the two outer cables. The
VFL = standing sheath voltage
sheath voltage for the centre cable is given by:
I sc = short-circuit current

Vs = 27rfl 10-^(1 - [2r?/(r^ - r?)] l o g n ( r 2 / r , ) I FL = full load current

+ 2 logn(s/r2)) V/m
Design values for short circuit current are given in
where f = frequency, Hz Table 6.11.
If the standing or short-circuit sheath voltage is
I = full load current, A
found to exceed the m a x i m u m permitted, it becomes
ri = inner radius of cable a r m o u r , m necessary to sohd-bond the cable screen/armour at
r2 = outer radius of cable a r m o u r , m both ends and fh a sheath interrupter at the approxi­
s = separation between centres of adjacent mate mid-point of the cable route. A sheath interrupter
cables, m is a device which allows the removal of a short length

458

TABLE 6 . 1 1
Maximum symmetrical short-circuit currents
System Maximum symmetrical fault
voltage
kV Fault level, MVA Current, kA RMS
11 750 39.4
3.3 250 43.7
0.415 31 43.3
of the cable armour and metallic screen, and the sub­
sequent reinstatement of the cable sheath at that point.
The sheath voltages are therefore approximately halved
and transferred away from personnel touch to the cut
ends of the armour and metallic screen within the sheath
interrupter. However, k is still necessary to calculate
the sheath voltage under fault conditions and keep it
within the 2 kV limit (the design withstand voltage of
the oversheath). These techniques are normally more
than adequate for the cable route lengths found in
power stations but if the 2 kV hmit cannot be achieved
using these techniques, then more difficult and expen­
sive solutions such as cross-bonding have to be used.
4.3 Fault current and duration
The foregoing has described the process of determin­
ing the conductor size for a cable which will ensure
that the maximum conductor temperature of the insu­
lation is not exceeded during continuous operation.
During a fault, however, abnormal currents can result
in much higher temperatures which, unless the cable
is adequately protected, could cause serious damage to
the insulation or at worst start a cable fire. Insulation
damage can occur over a period of several hours due
to an overload, or within a fraction of a second due
to a short-circuit or an earth fault. It is therefore
equally important with power cable system design to
ensure that the cable is adequately protected against
aU forms of excess current. This is achieved by co­
ordinating the operating characteristics of the circuit
protection with the fault current capabihty of the cable.
4.3.1 Short-circuit faults
It is appropriate to commence with a review of the
design short-circuit current (due to a three-phase short-
circuit) used at each system voltage level, as shown in
Table 6.11, and the types of fault current breaking
device and main protection used for feeder and m o t o r
circuits, as shown in Appendix I. In this respect, feeder
circuits include interconnector and transformer circuits.
The total clearance time for a fault cleared by a
circuit-breaker may be taken as the sum of the pro­
tection relay operating time and circuit-breaker open­
ing time. With high set instantaneous overcurrent as
P o w e r cable system design
the main protection, the short-circuit fault clearance
time is in the order of 0.1 s. However, as a precaution,
it is normal cable sizing practice to assume a mini­
m u m main protection fault clearance time of 0.2 s.
Although the probability is low, there remains the
possibility that for some reason a circuit-breaker might
fail to open. In this event, a fault would have to be
cleared by the next circuit-breaker back in the supply
hne which is usually the switchboard incoming feeder
circuit-breaker. The total fault clearance time for a
short-circuh is now determined by the protection fitted
to this circuit which is either high set instantaneous
overcurrent or I D M T overcurrent. This is called the
back-up protection fault clearance time and can vary
from 0.4 s to 1.2 s.
Due to the length of time required to replace a
damaged cable, it is C E G B policy for new power sta­
tions to size cables using the back-up protection fault
clearance time on all circuits with a circuit-breaker as
the fault current breaking device. A typical oscillogram
for the current in one phase of a three-phase short-
circuit is shown in Fig 6.28.
f
INITIAL ASYMMETRICAL
CURRENT
FAULT Λ
/
RMS SYMMETRICAL
11 CURRENT
"\
«υ/ / / / \ - FAULT CLEARED
FIG. 6 . 2 8 Oscillogram of current in one phase of a
three-phase short-circuit
The same concern about failure to operate is not
held about a fuse. Therefore, the total fault clearance
time for fuse protected circuits is given by the maxi­
m u m pre-arcing time, i.e., the energy let-through time
determined from the fuse time versus current char­
acteristic, of the circuit fuse. At 415 V, the largest size
of fuse fitted is 800 A used on feeder circuits. Assuming
maximum short-circuh current, the pre-arcing time whh
this fuse is about 0.01 s. This means that circuit inter­
ruption occurs during the first half cycle of the fault
current.
The sudden rush of current causes the conductor
temperature to rise at an extreme race. Disconnection
is followed by a period of fairly rapid coohng. The
rise in conductor temperature is typically as shown in
Fig 6.29, with the cable initially carrying rated current.
The conductor is at the m a x i m u m conductor tempera­
ture and rises to a peak at the m a x i m u m short-circuit
conductor temperature. If the cable had been initially
459
Cabling Chapter 6

by the adjacent cable components and the error this

introduces provides a margin of safety.
MAXIMUM SHORT CIRCUIT CONDUCTOR TEMP The temperature rise is calculated by equating the
energy input to the energy absorbed expressed by the
SHORT CIRCUIT FAULT DURING
following formula:
NORMAL OPERATION

I^t = K2S2 logn [(Of + β)/(β', + β)]

where I short-circuit current rms, A

t duration of short-circuit, s
Κ = constant depending on the material of
SHORT CIRCUIT
FAULT ON
'V,
the current carrying component
ENERGISING
CIRCUIT s = area of conductor, mm^
AMBIENT TEMP

Of = final temperature, ° C
initial temperature, ° C
SHORT β = reciprocal of temperature coefficient of
CIRCUIT
FAULT resistance of current carrying component
at 0°C
FIG. 6 . 2 9 Short-circuit conductor temperature rise

Qc iß + 20)
Κ =
unloaded, the temperature rise from ambient would
620
be as shown dotted.
As the duration of the temperature rise is short,
the cable insulation and other components can with­ where Qc = volumetric specific heat of the current
stand considerably higher temperatures without suf­ carrying component at 20°C, J / ° C mm^
fering permanent damage. By international agreement, ^20 = resistivity of current carrying component
standard maximum short-circuit conductor tempera­ at 20°C, Ω m m
tures have been assigned to the commonly used cable
materials. Several of these are given in Table 6.12. The constants for different conductor materials are
given in Table 6.13.

TABLE 6.12
Maximum short-circuit conductor temperature TABLE 6.13
Material constants for fault calculations
Material Temperature, °C
Material Κ β ^20
Insulation
PVC up to 300 mm^ 160 Copper 226 234.5 3.45 X 1 0 - 3 17.241 X 1 0 - 6
Butyl rubber 220 Aluminium 148 228 2.5 X 10-3 28.264 X 10-6
EPR 250
XLPE 250 Steel 78 202 3.8 X 10-3 138 X 1 0 - 6

Sheathing
PVC 160
Two assumptions are made to assist with the calcu­
lation of the short-circuit temperature rise for circuh-
breaker controlled circuits. The first is that all the heat
energy produced is absorbed by the current carrying
components, i.e., the temperature rise is adiabatic. The
second is that over the duration of the short-circuit
the current remains constant.
The effects of the current initial asymmetry and
slight fall-off in current due to the increase in circuit
resistance with temperature can be regarded as negh-
gible. In practice, a certain amount of heat is absorbed
It can be seen that since the temperature rise is
adiabatic it is independent of the number of cable
conductors. It should also be noted that when used
for metalhc screens, this formula indicates much higher
temperatures than actually occur in practice and there­
fore must be used with some discretion.
For cable sizing purposes h is convenient to assume
that the cable is operating at the maximum conductor
temperature when the short-circuit occurs, and that the
peak temperature reached is the maximum short-circuit
conductor temperature. For a given cable insulation/
type, this leaves the short-circuit current, duration and
cable sizes as variables and these may be plotted gra­
phically (as shown in Fig 6.30) with initial and final

460
 P o w e r cable system design

of this chapter because in this case fuses are selected

to match m o t o r starting conditions not full-load cur­
120
110 rent requirements.
100

4.3.2 Earth faults

I
With earth fauhs, b o t h the conductor and the metalhc
screen/armour (which provide a low impedance path
so,
for earth fault current to return to the system neutral)
need to be considered. Clearly, the temperature reached
by each fault current-carrying component must not
cause thermal damage to the cable. The maximum
300mm2 short-circuit temperature of the insulation and bedding
must not be exceeded with fault current in the metalhc
_l I I I I I screen and similarly the m a x i m u m short-circuit tem­
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 perature of the bedding and oversheath must not be
exceeded with fauh current in the a r m o u r . Using the
DURATION OF SHORT-CIRCUIT
same expression for the adiabatic temperature rise
FIG. 6 . 3 0 Short-circuit ratings of X L P E / E P R insulated and the material constants given in Table 6.13, the
cables with aluminium conductors minimum cross-sectional area for the metallic screen/
a r m o u r can be calculated. In this instance:

temperatures of 90°C and 250°C respectively, i.e., I = earth fauh current, A

a 160°C temperature rise.
Using the above assumptions and the maximum
short-circuit current, the minimum size cable required
can also be calculated for a range of total fault clear­
ance times. These are shown in Table 6.14 for single-
core power cables at each system vohage.
t = duration of earth fault, s
S = area of metalhc screen/armour, mm^
Of = final metallic screen/armour temperature, ° C
θ i = initial temperature of the metalhc screen/
armour. °C

TABLE 6.14
Single-core power cable minimum cross-sectional areas

Min CSA
System main Min CSA back-up protection, mm^
voltage protection mm^
kV
0.2 s 0.4 s 0.6 s 0.8 s 1.0 s 1.2 s

11 186 264 323 373 417 457

3.3 207 293 358 414 463 507
0.415 205 290 355 410 458 502

If it can be established that the cable will always
be operating at a temperature less than the maximum
conductor temperature, then the minimum cross-sec­
tional area may be calculated for the lower temperature
concerned.
With circuits protected by fuses, the short-circuit
temperature is determined by the I^t let-through ener­
gy' of the fuse. Fuse manufacturers provide I^t values
for each fuse size from which the minimum cable cross-
sectional area can be calculated. This is not necessary
with feeder circuits, as short-circuit requirements are
automatically covered by the selection of a cable to
match the fuse rating. However, this needs to be carried
out for motor circmts as described in Section 4.6.2
The initial temperature for the metalhc screen has to
be calculated, but for the a r m o u r is taken as being
10°C below the m a x i m u m conductor temperature. The
maximum temperature for the metallic screen/armour
is normally the maximum short-circuit temperature
for the sheathing material which, from Table 6.12, is
160°C. Cable a r m o u r cross-sectional areas are given
in Appendix F of this chapter.
T o determine the earth fault current it is necessary
first to examine the method of system neutral earthing
which, for a power station, is shown in Table 6.15.
At 3.3 kV and 11 kV the neutral earthing resistor
limits the maximum earth fault current to 1000 A at
each neutral. As two system supplies and hence two

461
Cabling Chapter 6

TABLE 6 . 1 5 greater than that of the conductor, and therefore there

System neutral earthing is no need to perform the calculation.

System voltage, kV Neutral earthing

4.3.3 Overload current
11 NER ( 1 0 0 0 A) Cables must also be protected against thermal damage
3.3 NER ( 1 0 0 0 A) due to an overload. This could occur due to the in­
0.415 Solid advertent connection of too large a load, but is more
hkely to be associated with a faulty item of plant such
NER = Neutral earthing resistor as a motor or transformer. The overload does not need
to be a significant increase above the cable contin­
uous current rating to have an effect, as even a modest
neutrals can be involved, this gives a maximum fault overload results in a marked temperature rise. In par­
current of 2000 A. Sensitive earth fault protection is ticular, thermoplastic insulation is at greatest risk due
provided for feeder and motor circuits. The total fault to softening and conductor migration.
clearance time is again assumed to be 0.2 s for the The requirements for overload protection of a cable
main protection and typicahy twice this time for the laid in air are taken from the l E E Wiring Regulation
back-up protection to operate. In practice, the cross- (15th Edition) Regulation 4 3 3 - 2 [9], which states that
sectional area of the metahic screen is rated at 1000 A the characteristic of a device protecting a circuit against
for 1 s. It can also be shown that the minimum armour overload shall satisfy the following conditions:
cross-sectional area required is well within the design
of the cables. For example, the one second rating for • Its nominal current or current setting (In) is not
a 3.3 kV 240 mm^ multicore (aluminium strip ar­ less than the design current (lb) of the circuit.
moured) cable is approximately 16.8 kA.
• Its nominal current or current setting (In) does not
At 415 V, the system neutral is solidly earthed and
exceed the lowest of the current carrying capacities
therefore the fault current is determined by the earth
(Iz) of any of the conductors of the circuit.
loop impedance as shown in Fig 6.31.
• The current causing effective operation of the pro­
tective device ( I 2 ) does not exceed 1.45 times the
3 3 kV/415V TRANSFORMER 415V lowest of the current carrying capacities (Iz) of any
HV WINDING OMITTED SWITCHBOARD
of the conductors of the circuit.
TRANSFORMER DISTRIBUTION CABLE
IMPEDANCE IMPEDANCE IMPEDANCE This may be summarised as:

lb ^ In ^ Iz

I2 ^ 1.45 Iz
Ζ The circuit protection must operate w h h an overload
up to 4 5 % of rated current within a period accepted as
INTERNAL
EARTH FAULT being no more than 4 hours. While this more than
ON BLUE PHASE
doubles the conductor temperature rise, within this
EARTH CABLE ARMOUR (EARTH)
IMPEDANCE IMPEDANCE timescale, experience has shown that this does not re-
suh in unacceptable cable damage.
The overload protection of plant items such as mo­
EARTH FAULT CURRENT let =
PHASE VOLTAGE tors or transformers is provided by I D M T or ther­
PHASE + EARTH/NEUTRAL IMPEDANCE
mal overload relays. W h h the protection set correctly,
the characteristics of these devices meet this overload
crheria. As the overload capabihty of the cable is nor­
FIG. 6 . 3 1 Earth fault current path
mally greater than that of the plant item, this arrange­
ment automaticahy affords overload protection to the
It is considered that, in practice, earth fault cur­ cable. The protection of 415 V feeder circuits with
rents are unlikely to exceed 2000 A and will probably fuses to BS88: P a r t 2 [8] also meets this cable overload
be within the range 600-1000 A. For fuse protected criteria.
circuits the clearance time for a given earth fault cur­ Operation of the overload protection at not more
rent can be determined from the fuse time versus cur­ than 1.45 times the current rating of the cable also
rent characteristic, enabling the armour temperature applies to cables laid in ducts. With cables buried direct
rise to be calculated. However, with aluminium ar­ in the ground, the same rise in conductor temperature
moured muhicore cables to BS6346 it should be noted is reached with a smaller overload and therefore the
that the cross-sectional area of the armour wires is maximum current at which the protection is designed

462
 P o w e r cable system design

to operate is required to be not more than 1.3 times

the current rating of the cable.

4.4 Motor starting

With motor circuits, cable sizing has to take account
of the starting condition as well as full load running.
To obtain information on the starting requirements
of motors for power station use, reference is m a d e
to ESI Standard 4 4 - 3 [10] for 3.3 kV motors and
above and ESI Standard 4 4 - 4 [11] for 415 V m o t o r s .
Both standards cah for motors to comply with BS5000:
Part 40 [12], and for general apphcations a cage in­
duction motor suitable for direct-on-line starting is
provided. The standards also specify the frequency of
starting, stating that the motor shall be suhable for
two starts in succession under specified conditions of FIG. 6 . 3 2 Starting characteristic of a typical general
load, torque and inertia, w h h the motor at hs normal purpose induction motor
running temperature followed by a coohng period of
at least 30 minutes before attempting another starting
M o t o r starting performance is specified in kVA and
sequence.
expressed as a ratio where:
The conductor temperature rise due to two succes­
sive motor starts increases with motor size. Typically
starting (locked rotor) kVA
at 415 V, the temperature rise is approximately 15°C Ratio =
for a 5.5 kW motor (4 mm^ cable) and 50°C for a rated output kW
150 kW motor (185 mm^ cable).
It is first necessary to be able to calculate the con­ ESI Standard 4 4 - 3 and 4 4 - 4 specify that the starting
ductor temperature rise due to motor starting. For (locked rotor) kVA be in accordance with BS4999:
calculation purposes it is convenient to regard m o t o r P a r t 41 [13]. These are given in Tables 6.16 and 6.17
starting as equivalent to a low value short-circuit and for the range of m o t o r sizes/voltage level concerned.
use the formula discussed earher for this purpose. In
practice this will give a shghtly pessimistic result as
TABLE 6 . 1 6
some heat will he lost from the conductors with the
415 V motor starting (locked rotor) ratio
longer durations involved. In order to apply the formula
for short-circuit temperature rise, the starting current Rated output, kW Ratio
and duration must first be found.
1 up to 2.5 10.5

4.4.1 M o t o r starting current 2.5 up to 6.3 9.8

6.3 up to 16 9.2
The starting characteristic of a typical general purpose
16 up to 40 8.7
induction motor is shown in Fig 6.32.
The standstill starting current (100% slip) at rated 40 up to 100 8.2

voltage and frequency is termed the l o c k e d rotor cur­ 100 up to 150 7.8
rent'. As can be seen, the starting current remains
substantially equal to this value untU the motor is u p
to approximately 8 0 % of its rated speed. It is there­ TABLE 6 . 1 7
fore convenient to assume that the starting current 3.3 kV and larger motor starting
remains at the locked rotor current for the whole of (locked rotor) ratio
the starting period, and to use this value for tempera­
ture rise calculation purposes. Rated output, kW Ratio
The rated output of a motor is the mechanical power
150 up to 250 6.0
available at the shaft expressed in watts. For power
250 up to 630 5.8
station use, motor rated outputs are assigned to vohage
levels on the fohowing basis: 630 up to 1600 5.6
1 600 up to 4 000 5.4
Φ 415 V — up to 150 k W .
4 000 up to 10 0 0 0 5.2
• 3.3 kV — 150 kW to 1800 k W .
For ratings in excess of 1 0 MW the ratio
• 11 kV — 2000 kW and above. is required not to exceed 5 . 0

463
Cabling Chapter 6

The fuh load current and starting kVA for a motor TABLE 6 . 1 9
are given by: Motor starting time
kW output X 1000
FL Motor size, kW Starting time
V3 X VL X r; X COS0
If w
< 90
3 + s (empirical relationship)
Is X V3 X VL
Starting kVA = 90-450 (a) 15 s
1000 (b) large inertia motors, e.g., fan
motors — guidance sought from
where: V L = line voltage, V motor manufacturer

I FL = fuh load current, A > 450 Guidance sought from motor

manufacturer
Is = starting (locked rotor) current, A
η = motor efficiency at rated load
φ = phase angle at rated load
4.5 Cable voltage regulation
Re-arranging the second equation and substituting for In any system carrying current, there is a voltage drop
starting kVA gives: between the supply end and the receiving end due to
the impedance of the system. For A C systems, the
Ratio X kW output x 1000 supply end is the feeder transformer secondary ter­
Is = minals, and the receiving end is the incoming terminals
Vs X VL
of the item of plant or equipment concerned.
and by dividing the two equations for current The voltage drop is normally expressed as a per­
centage of the nominal system vohage called voltage
regulation, i.e..
Is/IpL = Ratio X η X COS</)

(Vs - VR) X 100

% Reg =
A starting current tolerance of +20% is permitted
Vs
in BS4999: Part 101 [14]. Hence, maximum starting
(locked rotor) current 1ST is given by:
where Vs = nominal system voltage at supply end.

1ST 1.2 IFL X Ratio χ η χ cos0 V R = voltage at receiving end.

Currents are derived using average values of efficiency
and power factor as given in Table 6.18.
TABLE 6 . 1 8
Average values for efficiency and power factor
All power station electrical plant and equipment is
designed to operate within specified voltage regulation
hmits during steady state full load and under motor
starting condhions, and consequently may not function
or operate correctly if these limits are exceeded. These
hmits are specified as:

Rated Efficiency Power factor • Steady state fuh load, + 6 % and - 1 0 % nominal
output, kW V COS0 system voltage.

1 up to 1.5 0.78 0.80 • M o t o r starting, - 20% nominal system vohage for a

2.5 up to 6.3 0.83 0.83
period u p to 90 s.
6.3 up to 16 0.87 0.86

16 up to 40 0.906 0.88
At voltage levels above 415 V, vohage regulation only
becomes a concern on the occasional circuit with a long
40 up to 100 0.927 0.90
route length. The main reason is that the denominator
100 up to 250 0.94 0.91
is now much larger, permitting a corresponding in­
250 up to 630 0.945 0.91 crease in voltage drop for the same value of voltage
630 up to 1 600 0.95 0.91 regulation. For example, for a voltage regulation of
1 600 up to 4 000 0.962 0.91 3% at 415 V, 3.3 kV and 11 kV the permitted voltage
4 000 up to 10 0 0 0 0.973 0.91 drops are 12.5 V, 99 V and 330 V respectively.
Ensuring that the voltage at the input terminals
remains within these hmits at 415 V is not just a single
cable consideration. Voltage drop occurs across each
4.4.2 Motor starting times series cable in a supply system, a n d therefore the volt­
Motor starting times are determined on the basis shown age drop across any single cable must be some lower
in Table 6.19. value in order that the total voltage d r o p remains

464
 P o w e r cable system design

within these hmits. Ahernative distribution arrange­ the 3.3 kV/0.415 kV transformer secondary voltage
ments must also be considered. being equal to the nominal system vohage at steady
T o enable the system vohage regulations t o be deter­ state full load o u t p u t , and is termed a voltage regula­
mined, the maximum aUowable steady state (this is not tion profile.
necessarily at full load as an allowance is m a d e for T o calculate the voltage regulation in a cable it is
diversity) and m o t o r starting voltage regulations for first necessary to determine the voltage d r o p . For an
the main swkchboards, m o t o r control centres and dis­ A C circuit this is as illustrated in Fig 6.34.
tribution boards are set. The permitted vohage regula­
tion for a cable between any two items is the difference
between the two assigned values of voltage regulation.
As an example, the voltage h m h s for a 415 V sup­
ply system are shown in Fig 6.33. This is based on

3.3kV SWITCHBOARD

Τ STEADY STATE FULL LOAD + 6% TO - 1°/

MOTOR STARTING + 6% TO - 6%

FIG. 6.34 Cable voltage drop

6% TO - 1 0 %
ΤΟ - 20%
' 3.3kV/415V
, TRANSFORMER

AY = [I(R cosφ + X s i n 0 ) + V s ( l - coso)]

where AV = vohage d r o p , V
I = current, I

STEADY STATE FULL LOAD + 6% TO - 1 <>/ δ = line angle

415V SWITCHBOARD MOTOR STARTING + 6% TO - 11 %

Vs = supply vohage, V
Ί R = A C resistance of conductor, Ω
cos</) = the power factor
X = conductor equivalent star reactance at
50 H z , Ω

The term V s ( l - coso) is very smaU and for simpli­

fication can be safely ignored. Therefore:

MOTOR frv.):^:í°:¿s:
AV = IR COS0 + I X s i n 0

and q/oR = 1001 (R cos</) -f- X sin0)/Vs

MOTOR CONTROL CENTRE

STEADY STATE FULL LOAD + 6o/o TO - 3.5%

MOTOR STARTING + 6% TO - 14%
The m a x i m u m cable route length for a given size of
cable and voltage regulation Hmit may be determined
by expressing R and X in per unit length values and
re-arranging the voltage regulation formula:

6% TO - 1 0 %
Three-phase circuits
6% TO - 20%

VL <í7o R

FIG. 6.33 Voltage regulation profile V3 ( 100 1 ( R L οο8φ + X L sin0)

465
Cabling Chapter 6

Single-phase circuits TABLE 6.20

415 V motor starting power factor
% R
Rated output, kW Starting cos0
2 V 100 I ( R L COS(A + XL sin</>) /
1 up to 2.5 0.26

where Lmax = maximum route length, m 2.5 up to 6.3 0.28

V = nominal phase to neutral voltage, V 6.3 up to 16 0.30

16 up to 40 0.27
VI = nominal line voltage, V
40 up to 100 0.23
%R = permissible voltage regulation
100 up to 150 0.20
RL = A C resistance per metre at conductor
operating temperature, Ω/m
XL = conductor equivalent star reactance
protection requirements and for the next two larger
per metre at 50 Hz, Ω/m
cable sizes. These are tabulated for each feeder circuit
fuse and motor circuit size for a range of voltage
Values for conductor resistance and equivalent star regulation values.
reactance for single and multicore cables are given A typical example is shown in Appendix Η of this
in Appendices A and Β of this chapter. chapter.

Feeder circuits
When applied to 415 V fused feeder circuits, an ahow-
ance of 0.8 is made for load diversity. Therefore:
I = 0.8 X fuse rating (In)
cos0 = steady state power factor
Typically cos0 = 0.85 for a mixed load and cos0 =
0.99 for a resistive load, e.g., heaters.
The conductor resistance is determined at the tem­
perature corresponding to the above current I.
Motor circuits
With motor circuits, starting and fuh load operation are
given by:
Motor starting 1ST = motor starting current, A
COS0ST = power factor on
starting
Motor full load IFL = full-load current, A
COS0FL = power factor at full load
Values for cos0 are given in Table 6.20.
For motor starting, the resistance of the conductor
is determined at the temperature attained after two
hot starts. For feeder circuits to switchboards and
motor control centres, motor starting voltage regulation
is based on the starting requirement for the largest
motor on the swhchboard or motor control centre.
As previously stated, because of the repetitive nature
of these calculations it is convenient to use tables for
cable size selection. T o achieve this, the formula is
used to calculate the maximum cable route length for
the minimum cable size to meet the full-load current/
4,6 Cable system design
Having discussed the main technical requirements it
is now time to see how these, along with certain ad­
ditional requirements associated with maximum cable
route length, are applied. T o assist, circuits are se­
parated into circuit types, i.e., feeder or motor circuits,
and these are then grouped according to the type of
fauh current breaking device employed. Under each
of the headings, the applicable requirements are given
and the basis for determining cable size is described.
First, the cable size for normal full load operation is
determined after the apphcation of any rating factors.
This cable size is then used to determine compliance
with the remaining requirements. If necessary, the cable
size is increased until a size in the range is found which
complies with all the apphcable technical requirements.
Since cables are only available in a range of con­
ductor sizes it is important to be clear about the term
motor *cable size'. This means the selection, from this range,
of the cable with the smahest conductor size which
meets the apphcable technical requirements.
There is an additional requirement for motor circuit
cable sizing so far not discussed. This is that the cable
must be able to withstand a short-circuit fault directly
fohowing the second hot start, i.e., the maximum
short-circuit conductor temperature must not be ex­
ceeded under these circumstances. It is assumed that
the time intervals between the successive starts and
between the second start and the short-circuit fault
are too short to allow conductor cooling. The tempera­
ture rise for this situation is calculated in a series of
steps.
T o a reasonable approximation, the conductor tem­
perature at normal full-load running is given by:
OFL = ΘΑ + (ΘΜ - ΘΑ) (IFL/IC)^

466

where 6FL = conductor temperature at normal full
load running, ° C
ΘΑ = ambient temperature, ° C
θΜ = maximum conductor temperature
insulation, ° C
IFL = normal full load running current, A
Ic = cable current rating after application of
any rating factors, A
To a close approximation, the conductor temperature
after two consecutive hot starts is determined from:
logn [(θ28Τ + ßVi^FL + ß)]
2tst
where I S T = starting current, A
tst = starting time, s
θ28Τ = conductor temperature after two
consecutive hot starts, ° C
The final conductor temperature following a short-
circuit fault is obtained from:
logn [(Ose + ^)/(θ28Τ +
tsc
where I sc = short-circuit current, A
= duration of short-circuh, s
Bsc = conductor temperature after short-
circuh, ° C
If the final conductor temperature exceeds the insu­
lation maximum short-circuit conductor temperature
then the next larger cable size is tried.
4.6.1 Feeder c i r c u i t s
Air break circuit-breaker (415 V, 3.3 kV and 11 kV)
(a) Continuous operation C E G B policy for large
feeder circuhs is to size the cable to the current
rating of the circuit-breaker rather than the circuh
design fuh load current. This approach affords
the maximum allowance for design uncertainty and
possible future development.
(b) Fault conditions Short-circuit minimum cross-
sectional area is determined for the back-up pro­
tection fault clearance time. This needs to be deter­
mined for each individual case.
(c) Voltage regulation The cable size for steady state
voltage regulation is checked for 415 V and 3.3 kV
circuits.
P o w e r cable system design
(d) Single core cables Sheath voltages, plus current
sharing if more than one cable per phase is used,
are checked.
for
3.3 kV fused switching device
(a) Continuous operation The circuh full load cur­
rent is used to size the cable for continuous
operation.
(b) Fault conditions A fuse to BS2692: Part 1 [6] of
a rating which provides take-over from the switch­
ing device (see Chapter 5) is fitted to all feeder
circuit switching devices. Short-circuit currents
above a take-over current are cleared by the fuse,
and below this take-over current are cleared by
the switching device on operation of the circuit
high set instantaneous overcurrent relay. If the
fuse and relay protection characteristic curves are
plotted together w h h the cable ih value adiabatic
line, in a similar manner to Fig 6.36, it can then
be seen whether the cable is adequately protected.
(c) Voltage regulation The cable size for steady state
voltage regulation is checked.
415 Vfuse
(a) Continuous operation The first of the summa­
β)] rised circuit protection requirements given in Sec­
tion 4.3.3 of this chapter may be expressed for a
single cable as: design fuh load current ^ fuse
rating ^ continuous current rating of cable. Cables
are therefore sized to the circuh fuse rating. For
design purposes, the full load current is normally
taken to be equal to the fuse rating.
(b) Fault conditions For economic reasons, local earth
bonding is not normally apphed to final 415 V
feeder circuhs at the plant equipment end (earthing
is provided via the cable a r m o u r ) . In the event of
an earth fault at the plant or equipment, there wih
be a local rise in potential with respect to any
extraneous conductive parts which are separately
earthed. This is shown in Fig 6.35.
INTERNAL FAULT
RESULTS IN LOCAL
RISE IN EARTH POTENTIAL
TRANSFERRED
POTENTIAL
DISTRIBUTION!—,
BOARD
CONNECTION
FROM CABLE
GLAND BODY
TO EARTH PLANT
ITEM
FIG. 6.35 Local rise in earth potential
467
Cabling
As this may give rise to transfer potentials in
excess of 55 volts, it is necessary to ensure that
the protection operates in a time not greater than
460 ms (see Section 11.2.2 of this chapter). The
minimum fault current to achieve this clearance
time can readily be determined from the fuse time
versus current characteristic. The earth fault cur­
rent is determined by the earth loop impedance
which, in turn, is a function of cable route length
and therefore for a given cable size there is a safe
maximum route length.
To simplify the calculation of this length, the
source impedance and cable reactance (the cable
sizes involved are normally less than 35 mm^) are
assumed to be negligible. Expressing resistance in
terms of per metre length gives:
IEF =
L(Rc + Ra)
240
therefore L n
IEF (Rc + Ra)
where Lmax = maximum route length, m
IEF = earth fault current that will inter­
rupt BS88: Part 2 [8] fuse in 460
ms, A
Rc = conductor resistance per metre at
full load operating temperature,
Ω/m
Ra = armour resistance per metre at
ambient temperature plus half the
conductor temperature rise from
ambient to full load operating
temperature, Ω/m
Vp = phase voltage, V
In this instance Rc and Ra are calculated for the
full load current concerned. The temperature rise
due to the earth fault current is assumed to be
negligible. Cable armour resistances are given in
Appendix Β of this chapter.
If the maximum route length to operate the
protection in 460 ms is found to be shorter than the
circuit route length, then the next larger size cable
is tried, until a suitable cable size is found.
If the earth fault had occurred on energising the
circuit, the cable conductor and armour would
initially be at ambient temperature. Consequently,
the resistance values would be lower than for the
full-load operating condition, shortening the fuse
operating time.
(c) Voltage regulation The cable size for steady state
and motor starting voltage regulation is determined
as described in Section 4.4 of this chapter.
468
Chapter 6
4.6.2 M o t o r circuits
Air break circuit-breaker (33 kV and 11 kV)
(a) Continuous operation The m o t o r rated full load
current is used to size the cable for continuous
operation.
(b) Fault conditions This requirement normally dic­
tates the circuit cable size, as clearance of short-
circuit current is based on the back-up protection
operating time.
Typically, back-up protection on a 3.3 kV switch­
board is provided by the incoming transformer
feeder high set instantaneous overcurrent relay on
the 11 kV switchboard which, to allow for grading
with the largest 3.3 kV outgoing circuit, would
operate in about 0.6 s.
(c) Voltage regulation M o t o r starting and steady state
vohage regulation are checked at 3.3 kV.
(d) Single-core cables Sheath voltages, plus current
sharing if more than one cable per phase is used,
are checked.
3,3 kV fused switching device
(a) Continuous operation The motor rated current
determines the cable size for continuous operation.
(b) Fault conditions A motor starting fuse to BS5907
[7] is fitted to all motor circuit fused switching
devices. Short-circuit currents above the switching
device take-over current are cleared by the fuse,
while those below this value are cleared by the
switching device as explained for 3.3 kV FSD feeder
circuits. Back-up protection in the zone covered
by the circuit high set instantaneous overcurrent
relay is provided by the fuse and the incoming
feeder circuit or interconnector high set instantan­
eous overcurrent relay also as previously described.
The cable I^t value is determined after two con­
secutive hot starts for a temperature rise up to
the maximum short-circuit conductor tempera­
ture. As before, the cable I^t value adiabatic hne
is superimposed on the fuse and protection co­
ordination curves to determine whether cable short-
circuit protection is provided. This is shown in
Fig 6.36.
(c) Voltage regulation M o t o r starting and steady state
voltage regulation are checked.
415 V fuse/contactor
(a) Continuous operation The motor rated full load
current is used to size the cable for continuous
operation.
(b) Fault conditions M o t o r circuit contactors are to
BS5424 [16] Category A C - 3 which have a break­
ing capacity of 8-times rated operational current

ADDITIONAL PROTECTION GIVEN
BY INSTANTANEOUS OVERCURRENT
RELAY
THERMAL RELAY (COLD)
THERMAL RELAY (HOT)
CABLE |2t ADIABATIC (FROM
AMBIENT)
CURRENT |2t ADIABATIC (AFTER
TWO HOT STARTS)
FUSE
CHARACTERISTIC
MAIN PROTECTION HIGH SET
INSTANTANEOUS
OVERCURRENT RELAY
CURRENT —AMPS
FIG. 6.36 3.3 kV Fuse switching device protection
characteristic for a motor
for sizes up to 100 A and 6-times rated operational
current for sizes in excess of 100 A .
Contactors therefore, are unable to interrupt
heavy fault currents and protection of the m o t o r
and cable under these conditions is provided by
fuses.
Contactor circuh fuses comply w h h BS88: P a r t
2 [8] and operate within a specified fuse time versus
current zone. This is contained by the minimum
pre-arcing time versus current characteristic and
the maximum total operating time versus current
characteristic and includes a ± 10% tolerance.
The fuse size is selected on the basis of the
maximum starting current and twice the maximum
starting time to allow for two consecutive hot starts.
This generally requires the fuse rating to be higher
than the continuous current rating of the cable
required for full-load running. Separate thermal
overload protection is provided for 1.5 k W motors
and larger. Thermal overload relays comply with
BS142 [17] which makes reference to manufac­
turer's data for the operating characteristic. For
motors up to 15 kW, relays with direct connected
elements are used and, above 18.5 k W , current
P o w e r cable system design
transformers are used. The operating characteris­
tic depends on the initial temperature of the relay.
After two hot starts the characteristic is said to
be *hot' and on initial starting said to be *cold'.
M o t o r starting requirements, fuse time versus
current characteristic and a typical thermal over­
load characteristic are shown superimposed for a
typical m o t o r in Fig 6.37 (a).
T o ensure that the maximum short-circuh con­
ductor temperature is not exceeded, the extra­
polated I^t adiabatic line after two hot starts and
for initial starting are also superimposed on the
figure for the cable conductor temperature rise
concerned.
The worst possible overload condition corre­
sponds to the point nearest the cable I^t adiabatic
line. This is either the intersection of the thermal
relay *cold' characteristic and the upper hmit of
the fuse operating line with the cable ambient I^t
adiabatic, or the intersection of the thermal relay
*hot' characteristic and the upper limh of the fuse
operating time with the cable 'two hot starts' I^t
adiabatic line. It can be seen that the adiabatic
line must cross at or above the intersection of the
thermal relay and fuse characteristic for the cable
to be protected. It can be seen in Fig 6.37 (b) that
an area is left unprotected, demonstrating that
a larger cable size is required.
Appendix G gives m o t o r parameters and the
selected fuse size for each C E G B standard motor
size.
For earth fault protection, motors larger than
50 k W are provided with sensitive earth fault pro­
tection relays. E a r t h fauh currents above a take­
over current are cleared by the fuse and below this
current by the contactor on operation of the earth
fauh protection relay.
Motors below 50 k W are not fitted with sensitive
earth fault protection and as a consequence it is
required that earth faults are cleared by the fuse.
The minimum fauh current to interrupt the fuse
without damage to the cable is obtained from the
intersection of the cable I^t adiabatic and the upper
limit of the fuse operating time. In practice if
the cable has been accurately sized for motor
starting and short-circuit phase fauhs, its adiabatic
line will cross the fuse characteristic close to its
intersection with the thermal overload relay. Since
the current and time durations for this intersection
must he known, as already described, it is con­
venient to also use these values to assess earth fault
conditions. The hmiting condition is invariably
with the thermal relay hot, as shown in Fig 6.38.
For the appropriate minimum current to flow, the
earth loop impedance must be less than a value
which corresponds to the m a x i m u m route length.
Although earth fault current may return through
other paths to the system neutral, the worst case
for the cable is when it ah returns through the
469
Cabling Chapter 6

AREA WHERE CABLE NOT

FULLY PROTECTED

FUSE CHARACTERISTIC (ZONE) FUSE CHARACTERISTIC (ZONE)

(a) CABLE PROTECTED (b) CABLE NOT FULLY PROTECTED

RELAY 'HOT-
CABLE | 2 t A D I A B A T I C (FROM AMBIENT)
CABLE | 2 t A D I A B A T I C
(AFTER TWO HOT STARTS)

CABLE l^t ADIABATIC (FROM AMBIENT)

100 1000 100 1000

CURRENT-AMPS CURRENT-AMPS

FIG. 6.37 415 V motor starting, fuse time versus current, thermal overload, short-circuit characteristic

cable a r m o u r . The maximum route length can 4,7 Practical examples

therefore be determined using the same expression T o illustrate the steps followed during power cable
as used for feeder cable maximum route length, system design, a worked example is given for a feeder
I.e., and m o t o r circuit at each system voltage.

Lmax = 240/IEF (RC + Ra) 4.7.1 Feeder circuits

where Lmax = maximum route length, m 11 kV interconnector

A n 11 kV interconnector circuit is required to carry
IEF = minimum earth fault current, A
a full-load current of 2200 A . The rating of the circuh-
Rc = conductor resistance per metre at breaker at both ends is 2400 A . The back-up protec­
full-load operating temperature, tion clearance time is 1.0 s. The cables are to be installed
Ω/m in air at an ambient temperature of 35°C with a route
length of 80 m . Access to C U R B 0 3 (see Section 4.2.6
Ra = armour resistance per metre at
of this chapter) is available. Determine a suitable cable
full-load operating temperature,
arrangement.
Ω/m
(a) Continuous operation The continuous current
ratings of 11 kV single-core cables laid in air at an
The same assumptions regarding source impedance
ambient temperature of 25 °C are given in Appen­
and cable reactance are made as before.
dix C as:
(c) Voltage regulation Voltage regulation requirements
for steady state and m o t o r starting conditions are Single-core 300 mm^ — 675 A
checked as described in Section 4.4 of this chapter. Single-core 500 mm^ — 900 A

470
 P o w e r cable system design

(b) Fault conditions The minimum cable cross-sec­

tional area required under short-circuit conditions
with a back-up protection clearance time of 1.0 s
FUSE CHARACTERISTIC (ZONE)
is given in Table 6.14 as 417 m m ^ . Short-circuh
requirements are therefore met.

(c) Voltage regulation As the cable route length is

relatively short h is most unlikely that voltage
regulation would be a concern. The vohage drop
calculated using C U R B 0 3 is 38 V corresponding to
- THERMAL
- OVERLOAD a voltage regulation of 0 . 6 % .
- CHARACTERISTIC

(d) Sheath voltage The standing sheath voltage is

given by C U R B 0 3 as 20 V which is weh within
the 55 V acceptance limit. T o determine the sheath
voltage occurring due to a through fault, the for­
mula given in Section 4.2.6 of this chapter is used,
i.e.,

Vsc = Vs X ISC/IFL

39 400
= 20 X
2400
|- MINIMUM EARTH FAULT = 328 V which is less than
CURRENT TO INTERRUPT
FUSE the 2 kV acceptance limit

In conclusion, three single-core 500 mm^ cables

per phase are required.

I I I I I I 33 kV/0,415 kV transformer
100 1000 A 2 M V A 3.3 kV/0.415 kV A N transformer is to be
CURRENT-AMPS
supplied from a 3.3 kV switchboard using a circuit-
FIG. 6.38 Minimum earth fauh current to breaker with a rating of 800 A . The back-up protec­
interrupt fuse tion clearance time is 1.2 s. The cable route length
is 500 m , part of which is in air at an ambient tem­
perature of 25°C and part buried direct in the ground
The rating factor for an ambient temperature of having a thermal resistivity of 1.5 K . m / W and a tem­
35°C is given in Appendix Ε as 0.91. Applying perature of 15°C. The ground in one section has re­
this rating factor gives: cently been made-up but is otherwise of average con­
sistency. The depth of burial is 0.8 m except in the
Single-core 300 mm^ - 614 A (675 A χ 0.91 = 614 A) made-up ground where this is increased to 1.25 m. The
Single-core 500 mm^ - 819 A (900 A χ 0.91 = 819 A) maximum duct length when passing through walls is
300 m m . Determine the cable size required:
The cables are sized to the rating of the circuit- (a) Continuous operation The continuous current
breaker (see Section 4.5.1 of this chapter) and by ratings of a 3.3 kV single core 400 mm^ cable laid
selecting the larger cable size, three cables per phase in air at 25°C and in the ground at 15°C taken
appear to be suitable, i.e., 3 χ 819 A = 2457 A, from Appendix C are:
provided current sharing is satisfactory.
Inputting cable details, co-ordinates of the route Laid in air — 785 A
sections with cable transposition, and the current
Buried direct in ground — 575 A
into C U R B 0 3 produces the following output:

Account does not need to be taken of the short

Rl = 780 A R2 = 802 A R3 = 818 A
length of cable passing through ducts (see Section
Yi = 790 A Y2 = 815 A Y3 = 795 A 4.2.4 of this chapter) but rating factors need to
B , = 789 A B2 = 795 A B3 = 816 A be applied for the ground thermal resistivity and
for the increased depth of burial.
From examination, the currents in each cable are The soil thermal resistivity is 1.5 K . m / W and
ah less than 819 A. from Appendix Ε the rating factor for this is 0.91.

471
 Cabling Chapter 6

The rating factor for a depth of burial of 1.25 m (b) Fault conditions The maximum allowable route
is given in Appendix Ε as 0.95. Applying these length under fault conditions is given by:
factors to the rating of the cable buried direct in
the ground gives: Lmax = 2 4 0 / I E F ( R C + Ra)

575 A X 0.91 X 0.95 = 497 A F r o m the 63 A fuse characteristic in BS88: P a r t 2,

to interrupt the fuse in 460 ms requires a fault
The cable rating in ground is lower than that in current Ip of 640 A .
air and is therefore the limiting factor. Since the T o obtain the conductor and a r m o u r resistances
cables are sized to the rating of the circuit-breaker, we must first calculate their operating tempera­
2 X 400 mm^ cables per phase are required. Current tures using the formula given in Section 4.6 of
sharing for the proposed installation arrangement this chapter:
is satisfactory if instahed as shown in Fig 6.25.
For the purpose of this example, it is assumed that Conductor temp OFL = ΘΑ + (ΘΜ - 6 A ) ( I F L / I C ) ^
the spacing between the two sets of cables for the
= 35 + (70 - 35)(63/92)2
route sections buried in ground is sufficient to
avoid group rating. = 35 -h 16
= 51°C
(b) Fault conditions The minimum cable cross-sec­
tional area required for a short-circuit fault with
a back-up protection clearance time of 1.2 s is The a r m o u r temperature rise is taken to be half
given in Table 6.14 as 507 m m ^ . Short-circuit the conductor temperature rise:
requirements are therefore satisfactory with 2 χ
400 mm^ cables in parallel. ÖPLA = ΘΑ + 16/2

= 35 -h 8 = 43°C
(c) Voltage regulation This is checked using C U R B 0 3
and for this example is taken to be satisfactory.
For multicore cables up to 300 m m ^ , skin and
(d) Sheath voltage The sheath voltages are checked proximity effects (see Section 4.2.3 of this chapter)
in the same way as shown in the previous example are negligible and therefore the A C resistance is
and, for the purpose of this example, are assumed taken to be the same as the D C resistance. F r o m
to be satisfactory. Appendix B:

In summary, two single-core 400 mm^ cables per phase Rc20 = 868 μΩ/m; Raio = 960 μΐΐ/m
are required. and for aluminium 0:20 = 0.00403.

415 V three-phase and neutral (TPN) distribution board Conductor resistance Rc

feeder
= R c 2 0 [1 + « 2 0 ( θ ρ ί - 20)]
A supply to a 415 V T P N distribution b o a r d is p r o ­ = 868 [1 + 0.00403(51 - 20)]
tected by a 63 A fuse. The cable is laid in air at an
ambient temperature of 35°C with a route length of = 976^ß/m
85 m. The power factor is to be taken as 0.85 and the
maximum ahowable voltage regulation is 2 % . Deter­ A r m o u r resistance Ra
mine a suitable cable size. = R a 2 0 [1 + « 2 0 ( θ ρ ί Α - 20)1

(a) Continuous operation The continuous current = 960 [1 + 0.00403(43 - 20)]

ratings for 4-core 16 mm^ and 35 mm^ cable sizes = 1049/iO/m
laid in air at an ambient temperature of 25°C are
given in Appendix D as: 240 X 10^
Now L n = 185 m
4-core 16 mm^ — 65 A 6 4 0 ( 9 7 6 -H 1 0 4 9 )

4-core 35 mm^ — 104 A

This value is greater than the actual route length
With a 35°C ambient temperature, the rating factor of 85 m .
from Appendix Ε is 0.88, giving:
(c) Voltage regulation The m a x i m u m cable route
4-core 16 mm^ — 57 A (65 A X 0.88 = 57.2 A) length for a given voltage regulation is given by:
4-core 35 mm^ — 92 A (104 A X 0.88 = 91.5 A)
VL % R
On the basis of a full load current of 63 A , the 4-
core 35 mm^ cable size is initially selected. \ 1 0 0 X 0 . 8 X I n ( R L cos</) -f- X L sin</>)

472
 P o w e r cable system design

Values for R L and X L are taken from Appendix B . The conductor temperature after two hot starts is
Correcting resistance for temperature at 0.8 given by:
gives: 2
ST - l o g n [(θ2ST + ^)/(θFL + ß)]
R L = 959 μΩ/τη at 46°C and X L = 8 2 μΩ/τη 2t.
substituting
Substituting in the equation gives:
(148)2 X (300)2
415 (1021)2 = logn [(θ25Τ + 228)/
2 X 40
V3
(40 + 228)1
2 X 10^ 0.042 = logn [(θ2sτ + 228)7268]
\ 100 X 0.8 X 63 (959 χ 0.85 + 82 χ 0.53) / 280 = θ28Τ + 228
= 111 m θ2ST = 52°C

Again, this value is greater than the actual route length Finally, to calculate the conductor temperature
of 85 m . In summary, a 4 - c o r e 35 mm^ cable is after a short-circuit fault:
required. 2Q2
K^S
l2 l o g n [(ΘSC + ^ ) / ( θ 2 S T + β)]
sc
4.7.2 Motor circuits
substituting
11 kV motor
(148)2 X (300)2
An 11 kV ID fan motor has a rating of 3 M W . The (39.4 X 10^)2 logn [(θsc + 228)/
motor manufacturer has given a ratio of locked rotor 0.7
kVA to rated output of 5.4 and a starting time of 40 (52 + 228)]
seconds. The cable route length is 100 m and is in
air at an ambient temperature of 35°C. Determine the 0.551 logn [(θsc + 228)/280]
cable size required. The back-up protection operating 486 θ s c + 228
time is 0.7 s. 258°C
θsc
From Table 6.18 ry = 0.962 and cos</> = 0.91 for
A h h o u g h the conductor temperature is 8°C t o o
a 3 M W m o t o r . The full-load current is given by
high, in reahty there would be some conductor
kW output X 1000 cooling during the sequence of events described and
IFL = therefore a judgement is taken that the 300 m m 2
V3 XVL X X cos0 size cable is satisfactory.
3000 X 1000 (c) Sheath voltage There is no transposition and
substituting = = 180 A
therefore the standing voltage on the middle cable
V 3 X 11000 X 0.962 x 0.91
is given by:
The maximum starting current
Vs = 47rfl 1 0 - 7 logn (s/r) V/m
1ST = 1.2 X IFL X ratio χ η χ οο$φ
Taking the a r m o u r radius for a 300 m m 2 cable as
= 1.2 χ 180 χ 5.4 χ 0.962 χ 0.91
18 m m and
= 1021 Α
substituting Vs = 4 X π X 50 X 180 X 10 ""^ X
(a) Continuous operation The current rating of a
logn (80/18)
single-core 300 mm^ cable laid in air is given in
Appendix C as 675 A at 2 5 ° C . = 0.017 V / m

At 35°C the current rating T h e magnitude of sheath voltage on the outer cables
= 675 X 0.91 (from Appendix E) is given by:

= 614 A Vs I = 2 7 r ñ 1 0 - 7 ^ ( 2 l o g n (V2 X s/r)2 +

(b) Fault conditions The conductor temperature

1.44
during normal fuU-load operation is given by:
= 2 X 7Γ X 50 X 180 X 10 - 7
OFL = ΘΑ + (ΘΜ - ΘΑ) Χ (IFL/IC)^
(2 logn (V2 X 80/18))^ + L44
substituting = 35 -Η (90 - 35) χ (180/614)^
= 40°C = 0.022 V / m

473
Cabling Chapter 6

As the cable length is 100 m, the standing voltage The conductor temperature after two hot starts is
on the centre cable is 1.7 V and on the two outer given by:
cables 2.2 V, and is therefore satisfactory.
During a short-circuit fault the sheath voltage (IST)^ = logn [(θ28Τ + ßVi^FL + ß)]
is given by: 2tst
substituting
Vsc = Vs X I s c / I s
(148)2 X (150)2
(365)2 = ^ l—L logn [(θ28τ + 228)/
substituting for outer cable V s c 2 X 15
= 2.2 X 39400/180 (27 + 228)]
= 482 V θ28Τ = 29°C

The short-circuit sheath voltage is less than 2 kV The ih adiabatic line for a short-circuit tempera­
and is therefore satisfactory. ture rise from 29°C to 160°C is now determined
from:
In summary, one 300 mm^ single-core cable per phase
I2t == K 2 s 2 logn m + ß)m + β)]
is required.
= (148)2 Χ (150)2 logn [(160 + 228)/
5.5 kV motor (29 + 228)]
A 3.3 kV p u m p motor has a rating of 300 k W . The = 203 χ 106
supply is taken from a 3.3 kV FSD with a 400 A fuse.
The motor manufacturer has quoted a starting time of The short-circuit l2t adiabatic line is superimposed
15 seconds. The cable is to be laid in air at an ambient on the fuse time versus current characteristic as
temperature of 25°C and a route length of 110 m . Back­ shown in Fig 6.36. For the purposes of this example
up protection is provided by the fuse in the zone it is assumed that the cable is protected.
protected by the high set instantaneous overcurrent (c) Voltage regulation The m o t o r starting voltage
relay. Determine the size of cable required. regulation is obtained first. The conductor resist­
From Table 6.18, = 0.945 and cos φ = 0.91 and ance at the end of two hot starts temperature from
from Table 6.17 the motor starting ratio = 5.8. The (b) is 29°C. F r o m Appendix B, for a 150 mm2
fuh load current is given by: cable at 20°C the conductor resistance is 206 μΩ/m
and the equivalent star reactance is 80 μΩ/m. From
k W output X 1000
the manufacturer, power factor cos</) on starting
IFL =
V3 X VL X r; X COS</) is 0.5.

300 X 1000 Conductor resistance R L

V 3 X 3300 X 0.945 x 0.91

= RC20 [1 + «2θ(θ28Τ - 20)1
= 206 [1 + 0.00403(29 - 20)]
IFL = 61 a = 213 μΩ/τη

The maximum starting current %R = 100 IL ( R L COS</) + X L smφ) V3/VL

= 1.2 X IFL X ratio χ τ; χ cos φ = 100 X 365 X 110 (213 χ 0.5 + 80 χ

= 1.2 χ 61 χ 5.8 χ 0.945 χ 0.91 0.87) 1 0 - 6 χ V3/3300

= 365 Α = 0.3707ο

(a) Continuous operation The smallest three-core This regulation is small compared with the 2 0 %
3.3 kV cable in the standard range is 150 mm^ allowed at m o t o r terminals during starting and
(because of short-circuit requirements) and it can therefore is acceptable. Because of the small value
be seen from Appendix C that this has a rating of of regulation during starting, in this case there is
265 A in air at 25°C. no need to check the regulation under full load
conditions.
(b) Fault condition The conductor temperature dur­
ing full-load operation is obtained from: In summary a three-core 150 mm2 cable is required.

OFL = ΘΑ + (ΘΜ - ΘΑ) ( I F L / I C ) ^ 415 V motor

= 25 + (70 - 25) (61/265)2 A 3 kW 415 V p u m p m o t o r fed from a 415 V contactor
starter has a cable route length of 80 m . The cable is

474
 P o w e r cable system design

to be laid in air at an ambient temperature of 35°C. K2S2

The maximum allowable voltage regulation on starting ^SCC l o g n [(ÖSCC + ^)/(ΘΑ + β)]
is 1 1 % and on full-load 3 . 5 % . Determine the cable
size. (226)2 χ (2.52)2
From Appendix G, the maximum starting current (130)2 ^ l o g n [(Osee + 234.5)/
for a 3 kW motor is 49.1 A with a full-load current 6
of 6.1 A . T h e starting time is 3.4 s and the selected
(35 + 234.5)1
fuse size is 32 A .
θsec = 136°C
(a) Continuous operation T h e current rating for a
3-core 2.5 m m ^ cable in air at 25°C is given in
Since both GSCH a n d θ s e c are lower than the ca­
Appendix C as 28 A . In an ambient temperature
ble short-circuit temperature of 160°C the size is
of 35°C a rating factor of 0.88 is applied as given
satisfactory from this aspect. Finally it is necessary
in Appendix E . Therefore the cable current rating
to check the m a x i m u m route length that will allow
is 24.6 A which is in excess of the motor full-
sufficient earth fault current t o flow t o clear the
load current of 6.1 A .
fuse using the method given in Section 4.6.2 of
(b) Fault conditions T h e conductor temperature dur­ this chapter.
ing normal fuh-load operation is given by:
F r o m Appendix B , the conductor a n d a r m o u r re­
sistance at 20°C are 7410 μΩ/m a n d 8800 μΏ/νη
OFL = ΘΑ + [(ΘΜ - OAKIFL/IC)^]
respectively. F r o m (b), the full-load conductor
= 35 + [(70 - 35X6.1/24.6)2] temperature is 37°C a n d , taking the a r m o u r tem­
= 37°C perature rise t o be half that of the conductor, gives
an a r m o u r temperature of 36°C. Correcting the
The conductor temperature after two hot starts resistances to these temperatures gives Rc = 7905
is obtained next: μΩ/m a n d Ra = 9434 μ Ω / m . Also from (b) the
intersection of the fuse a n d thermal relay (hot)
characteristics give Ip = 160 A . Therefore:
l o g n [(θ28Τ + ßViOFL + ß)]
2tst
240
(226)2 X ( 2 . 5 ) 2
(49.1)2 ^ l o g n [(θ28Τ + 234.5)/ IF (Rc + Ra)
2 χ 3.4
240 X 10^
(37 + 234.5)]
160 ( 7 9 0 5 + 9434)
θ25Τ = 51°C
87 m

The next step is to check the conductor tempera­ Since this m a x i m u m route length exceeds the act­
ture 6 s c H for a fault immediately after two hot ual route length, the cable is adequately protected
starts. The maximum fault let through is taken against earth faults.
from the intersection of the fuse a n d thermal relay
(hot) characteristics. For a 3 k W m o t o r w h h a (c) Voltage regulation T h e voltage regulation during
32 A fuse this gives ISCH = 160 A and t = 2.3 s. normal full-load operation is generally a more oner­
ous condition t h a n during starting a n d therefore
2Q2 the former is calculated first. F r o m (b), the con­
t2
l o g n [(OSCH + ßViOisr + ß)] ductor resistance at full-load conductor temperature
R L = 7 9 0 5 / i Q / m a n d from Appendix B , X L =
(226)2 χ (2.5)2 1 0 0 μ Ω / m . F r o m Table 6 . 1 8 for a 3 kW motor,
(160)2 = l o g n [(OSCH + 234.5)/ cos</) = 0 . 8 3 .
2.3
F r o m Section 4 . 5 the m a x i m u m route length:
(51 + 234.5)]

OSCH = 109°C Lmax

VL \
Then the conductor temperature for a fault with
V3 100 X 1 ( R L οο5φ + X L sin^) /
the cable at ambient must be checked. T h e maxi­
m u m fault let-through is taken from the inter­ 415 3.5 X 1 0 *
sections of the fuse and the thermal relay (cold)
V3 100 X 6.1 ( 7 9 0 5 χ 0 . 8 3 + 1 0 0 X 0 . 5 6 )
characteristics. For a 3 k W motor with a 32 A fuse
this gives I = 130 A and t = 6 s. = 208 m

475
Cabling
The motor starting vohage regulation is calculated
using the conductor temperature after two hot starts
which from (b) is 51°C. Correcting the conductor
resistance for this temperature gives R L = 8313
μΩ/m. From Table 6.20 the motor power factor
during starting, cos φ = 0.28. Now:
Lmax
415 11 X 10^
V3 \ 100 X 49.1 (8313 χ 0.28 + 100
= 222 m
These maximum lengths for voltage regulation are
both considerably in excess of the actual route
length of 80 m.
In conclusion, a 3 - c o r e , 2.5 mm^ cable is required to
supply this 3 kW motor.
In this example, the hmiting factor for route length
is the requirement to ensure sufficient current flows
during an earth fault to operate the fuse. As discussed
under 415 V fuse/contactor in Section 4.6.2 of this
chapter, the accurate but more time-consuming method
for obtaining the minimum earth fault current is to
construct the cable I^t adiabatic line (hot) on the re­
levant fuse characteristic. This will invariably give a
longer route length and may be worthwhile determin­
ing in instances where this requirement dictates the
conductor size.
5 Control and instrumentation cable
systems
This section deals with the cabling systems that are
necessary for the fohowing functions:
• Control and instrumentation.
• Protection, intertrips and interlocks.
• Metering.
• Telecommunications.
• Alarms.
• Computers and data logging equipment.
5.1 Signal levels
The types of signal being considered can be broadly
split into two classes:
(a) Analogue signals consisting of voltages that vary
relatively slowly and currents such as those pre­
sent in transmitter outputs (e.g., 4 - 2 0 m A ) , ther­
mocouple outputs (e.g., 0 - 4 0 mV) and position
indicating potentiometers (e.g., 0 - 1 0 V). They also
include current transformer (CT) and voltage trans­
former (VT) circuits for instrumentation.
476
Chapter 6
(b) Digital signals defined as voltages or current which
are normally at one voltage or another with a re­
latively rapid change between states. Examples
are plant orientated alarm signals, sequence con­
trol input and output signals (e.g., 0 - 4 8 V). They
also include switched 110 V D C and 110 V A C
circuits.
5.2 Cable types
χ 0.96) / For convenience the cable types used for these classes
of signals can be split into three categories:
(a) Muhipair control cables (as described in Section
3.6 of this chapter) which are suitable for use at
voltages up to 110 V A C or 150 V D C . How­
ever, these cables should not be used for circuhs
which contain unsuppressed 110 V A C contactor
or relay coils of such a rating that they are hkely
to give rise to switching transients that are in ex­
cess of the 2 kV test vohage. These cables have
a cross-sectional area of 0.5 mm^ and it is re­
commended that the maximum current in any con­
ductor be limited to 1 A, and that n o more than
4 0 % of the pairs be loaded with this current at
one time.
(b) Multicore control cables (as described in Section
3.5 of this chapter) which are rated at 600/1000 V
and have a conductor cross-sectional area of 2.5
m m ^ . These cables are used where the circuit volt­
age (continuous or transient) or circuit current is
in excess of the capabilities of muhipair cables.
However, these cables are more expensive and also
more prone to interference (see Section 5.3 of this
chapter) and should not be used unless essential.
(c) Special cables such as coaxial, triaxial and low loss
individually screened pair cables are necessary for
particular applications. The performance of such
special cables is normally prescribed by the plant
contractor involved and they are frequently pro­
vided by him as free issue for the cable contractor
to install. One problem with many of these special
cables is that they are normally not armoured and
are therefore unable to whhstand the rigours of
installation and service in a power station environ­
ment; so, in many cases, it is necessary to provide
mechanical protection by conduit or trunking.
5.3 Cable interference
This section is intended to give an insight into basic
interference theory which wih be found useful in under­
standing why it is important to give careful consi­
deration to signal types and the type of cable to which
they are ahocated. Table 6.21 contains the abbrevia­
tions, descriptions and units that will be used through­
out the following interference theory.
 Control and instrumentation cable systems

TABLE 6.21
Descriptions and abbreviations used in interference theory

Abbreviation Description Unit

Β Magnetic flux density Webers per square (Wb/m^)

metre

/A Permeability of free Henries per metre (H/m)

space 47Γ X 10"^
I Current through Amperes (A)
conductor
Ε Electric field strength Volts per metre (V/m)

q Charge per unit length Coulombs per (C/m)

metre

e Permittivity of free Farads per metre (F/m)

space
f Frequency Hertz (Hz) FIG. 6.39 Magnetic field around an isolated
single conductor
V Voltage Volts (V)

(a) Magnetic flux density at a point P , r metres from

the centre of the conductor is
5.3.1 Interference in multipair cables
Every current carrying conductor produces a magnetic Β = Webers/m2
field and an electric field. If we consider the hypo­ 27rr
thetical case of an isolated single conductor, see Fig
6.39, it will be surrounded by a magnetic field indi­ (b) Electric field intensity
cated by the dotted hues and an electric field indicated
by the solid lines. T h e spacing of the hues gives an Ε = V/m
indication of the relative strength of the field, where €2'7ΓΓ

they are close it is high and where they are far apart
it is low.
It can be shown that the magnetic flux density and
electric field intensity at any point are inversely propor­
tional to the distance away from the conductor:
These two expressions show how Β and Ε decrease
as r increases.
If we now consider a balanced pair of conductors,
i.e., carrying equal a n d opposite currents (see Fig 6.40),

FIG. 6.40 Magnetic field for a balanced pair of conductors

477
Cabling
in the same way expressions can be stated which give
the magnetic flux density and electric field strength.
It can be shown that the magnetic flux density and
the electric field strength at any point Ρ vary as the
inverse of the square of the distance between Ρ and
the cable system centre. In fact the field strengths at
P i and P 2 wih not be identical when ri and χ2 are
equal because of the geometry of the arrangement, but
providing that r is considerably larger than d (conductor
diameter), then this approximation may be made. In
our calculations we will be able to assume, generally,
that r is greater than d and so the simplification wih
be invoked:
(a) Magnetic flux density at a point P , r metres from
the centre of the twin system.
μ\ά
Β = (6.3)
ΤΓΓ^
(b) Electric field intensity at point Ρ
qd
Ε = (6.4)
€7ΓΓ"
Note the two implications of these formulae; firstly
the flux density and field intensity vary inversely with
the square of the distance from the system (and not
directly as the inverse of the distance as in the isolated
conductor case), and secondly that the smaher d is
made the smaller the flux density/field intensity at a
given point becomes.
Before we turn from looking at the magnedc/electric
field produced by current carrying conductors to the
interference induced in other conductors by those fields,
there is one further point to consider.
The last example considered long, straight, parallel
conductors. If we twist those conductors to form a
twisted-pair then there is a cancellation of the
magnetic/electric fields which is most easily explained
by the diagram shown in Fig 6.41.
Field at Ρ due to A is cancelled by that due to Β
C is cancelled by that due to D
Ε is cancelled by that due to F ,
etc.
Assuming the twisted cable to be made up of very
short, straight lengths joined by transpositions it can
be shown that (for short enough parallel lengths) the
magnetic and electric fields, at a point Ρ outside the
cable will each be cancelled.
FIG. 6.41 Effect of twisted pair
478
Chapter 6
Since we are deahng with a twisted pair, there are
many small geometrical considerations which wih affect
the a m o u n t of cancehation and thus there wih be
residual fields. These considerations include conductor
geometry, twinning lay and spacing variation. It is
usual to apply a reduction factor of about 10 for the
case of a normal twisted-pair cable compared with a
straight parallel-pair.
We shall now consider the way in which the mag­
netic field produced by (a) a single conductor and (b)
a pair of conductors, affects another pair of conduc­
tors in their vicinity. In both cases straight parallel
conductors are considered initially, the reduction factor
above being applied at the end of the calculation.
In this situation we are primarily concerned with the
magnetic coupling between the two circuits since we
are working at normal power frequencies. Electrostatic
coupling becomes more important as frequency rises
(10"^ k H z and above), but at mains frequency magnetic
couphng dominates.
Referring to Fig 6.42, the induced voltage on a pair
is a function of the magnetic field cutting them which
in turn depends on the separation of the pair, their
mutual separation from the current carrying conduc­
tor and other geometric considerations. Mathematically
the a m o u n t of flux linking the cables may be found
in several ways. T o d o this exactly is a relatively
complicated procedure, but an approximation may be
made by finding the average flux at the centre of the
pair and assuming this to be constant over the area
between them (safe assumption if d is small). To find
the total flux cutting the pair per metre, we must then
multiply this average by (2d χ 1) square metres which
is the area enclosed by a 1 metre length of the pair.
The voltage induced on the pair is then proportional
to this flux and its rate of change, i.e., frequency.
The induced voltage per metre is given by:
^1
V = 27rf X X (2d X 1) (6.5)
27rR
rate of change x mean flux x area
which simplifies to
ΙμάίΙ
V = (6.6)
The basic implications of this are that as we make
d smaher a n d / o r R larger the induced vohage drops.
0 Q O
FIG. 6.42 Paired cable relative to single power cable
 Control and instrumentation cable systems

If the pair cable is a twisted pair then a reduction Ιμάη

factor of about 10 may be applied to this induced Using: V = — — V/m
voltage as mentioned previously.
Following through a similar logic for a pair cable where d = 7 χ lO""^ m
inducing voltage on another pair cable of the same
R = 6 X 10-1 m
geometry (as in Fig 6.43), we find a result which may
f = 50 Hz
be stated mathematically as:
I = 840 A

2 X 47Γ X 1 0 " ' ^ X 7 X 1 0 - 4 X 50 X 840

V = (6.7) Thus V =
(R2 - d2) 6 X 10-1

= 1.23 X 10-4 V/m

Óó 6 ó
AUowing a reduction factor of 10 since the pair
is twisted.

Induced voltage = 12.3 /xV/m

Note: d is calculated on the basis of a 1/0.8 m m

diameter c o n d u c t o r with an insulation radial
FIG. 6.43 One pair relative to another pair
thickness of 0.3 m m

(b) A twisted pair suffering interference from (i) a

What this means is that the induced voltage now single core, 25 m m away in the same cable and
drops off much more quickly as d is reduced and (ii), a twisted pair carrying balanced current also
also as R is increased. Note that in both Equations 25 m m away. In both cases the interfering con­
(6.6) and ( 6 . 7 ) a frequency term appears on the t o p ductor (s) is (are) carrying 1 A .
line indicating that induced voltage is directly propor­
tional to frequency. This is why transient phenomena 2/idn
(i) Using: V =
(basically high frequency harmonics) may give rise to R
interference.
If both the pair cables are twisted-pairs then a where d = 7 χ 1 0 - ^ m
reduction factor of (10 χ 10) may be applied. R = 2.5 X 10-2 m
The type of interference that we have calculated f = 50 Hz
here is manifested as a potential difference between
I = 1 A
the cores, i.e., a voltage source connected in series
with the cable. Thus this type of interference is known 2 X 47r X 1 0 - ' ^ X 7 X 1 0 - 4 χ 50 χ i
as series mode voltage (or transverse mode voltage). It Thus V =
can be shown from the previous equations that b o t h 2.5 X 10 - 2

cores will suffer a rise in potential above the local earth

V = 3.5 X 10-6 V / m
potential, again dependent upon the strength of the
interfering field in which the cores are situated and this
Allowing a reduction factor of 10 since one
is known as c o m m o n m o d e vohage (or longitudinal
pair is twisted
vohage).
In general, the equipment at the end of the cable V = 0.35 /iV/m
will be examining the potential difference/current/
resistance seen between the two cores and thus will Αμά^η
be most sensitive to series mode interference. C o m m o n (ii) Using V = —
mode interference does not pose such a problem unless r2 -

it is of very large magnitude, when special isolation ^ 4 X 4 T X 1 0 - 7 X (7 X 1 0 - 4 ) 2 χ 5 0 χ 1

methods must be employed. In this examination we are
concerned mainly with series m o d e voltages. (2.5 χ 1 0 - 2 ) 2 _ (7 χ 10-4)2

Two examples of interference calculations for paired

cables wih now be given: V = 1.9 Χ 10-7 V / m

(a) A twisted pair suffering interference from a single AHowing a reduction factor of 100 since both
power cable carrying 840 A , situated 600 m m away pairs are twisted:
(effects of armour, other cables and supporting
steel work are ignored). V = 0.0019/iV/m

479
Cabling Chapter 6

(ii) represents an improvement of about 45 dB to interference than muhipair cables under the con­
over (i), illustrating the importance of main­ ditions considered. The actual level of interference
taining balanced pair working. within multicore cables is dependent on the physical
location of the cores which are used to complete the
5.3.2 Interference in multicore cables electrical circuit. If the cores used are widely spaced
whhin the cable, then the level of interference whl be
The basic theory given in the previous section for
greater than if adjacent cores were used. In general,
multipair cables is equally relevant to multicore cables
little control is used over the selection of cores used
with the obvious exception that no factors have to be
and, in practice, cores forming an electrical circuit may
taken into account for twisting.
even be in different cables in which case the levels of
Two examples of interference calculation will now be
interference can be significantly greater.
given:
F r o m Section 5.3.1 of this chapter, it can be seen
(a) Two adjacent cores suffering interferences from that in order to reduce interference between circuits
a single power cable carrying 840 A, situated (cross-talk) and from external sources to a m i n i m u m ,
600 m m away (effects of armour, other cables and h is essential that balanced pair working is used. This
cable supporting steelwork are ignored). means that the current in one core of a pair must be
equal and opposite in direction of flow to that in the
2μάη
Using: V = V/m other core of the same pair. This is a m a n d a t o r y re­
R quirement for analogue signals and should be adopted
whenever possible for digital signals.
where d = 1.7 X 10-3 m Also from Section 5.3.1 it can be seen that inter­
r = 6 X 10-1 m ference within a control cable is inversely proportional
f = 50 Hz to its distance from the source. Control cables are
I = 840 A therefore separated from single-core power cables by at
least 600 m m and from muhicore power cables by at
2 X 4π X 10-"^ X 1.7 χ I Q - ^ X 50 X 840 least 300 m m . Interference is directly proportional to
Thus V the distance over which the control cable and power
6 X 10 - 1
cables are parallel. It is therefore possible to waive
V = 2.99 X 10-^ these separation requirements over short distances and
the requirement is not applied to cable ends where they
Induced voltage = 299 μΥ/τη are terminated into equipment. A general rule used is
that power and control cables can be run at less than
Note: d is calculated on the basis of 7/0.67 m m the foregoing stated separation distances provided that
stranded conductor with an insulation radial thick­ the summated total length does not exceed five metres.
ness of 0.7 m m . Analogue and digital signals are n o r m a h y segregated
(b) Two widely spread cores within a 37-core cable into separate cables, but separation is not required
suffering interference from a single power cable between such cables.
situated 600 m m away (effects of a r m o u r , other A further consideration when designing control cable
cables and cable supporting steelwork are ignored). systems should be the effects of cable capacitance.
One particular aspect that needs attention is to ensure
2^DFL that the capacitance due to cable length or type is not
Using: V = V/m
such that the leakage current is sufficient to cause
*seahng in' of relay coils. Further information on the
where d = 10.2 x 1 0 m effects of capacitance is given in Volume F .
R = 6 10 - 1 m
X

f = 50 Hz
I = 840 A
5.4 Control and instrumentation cable
system design
Induced voltage = 1795 μ V / m This section deals with the design of cable systems to
handle circuhs used for control, protection, instru­
Note: d is calculated for diametrically opposite
mentation and communications within a power station.
cores in the outer layer of a 37-core cable, w h h
This design work is now generally carried out by the
conductor and insulation parameters as in the
C E G B who also issue the detailed working instructions
previous example.
and drawings to the cable installer.
The work involved on a major project such as Hey­
5.3.3 Circuit considerations sham 2 covers 36 000 control cables and weh over 1
F r o m the previous sections h can be seen that m u h i ­ million wire terminations. Each 'cable' and each V i r e '
core cables can be up to 150 times more susceptible has to be uniquely designed and identified to ensure

480

that the plant functions correctly. Because of the vast
quantity of information involved, computer systems
are now extensively used to aid design and to store
data.
To understand the philosophy behind modern con­
trol system cable networks it is useful to consider first
how the extent of such systems has grown over the
years with increasing generator unit size. This evolution
can be considered to have four phases.
In phase one, prior to about 1950, auxihary control
functions within power stations were largely restricted
to the remote control of switchgear using voltages in
the order of 110 V and currents that could be as high
as 5 A. For these functions, multicore cables were used
which had an imperial sized conductor equivalent to
the modern metric 2.5 m m ^ . ΑΠ connections would be
*point to point', i.e., direct between equipment without
marshalling of cores. A typical arrangement is shown
in Fig 6.44.
CENTRAL CONTROL PANEL
SWITCHGEAR
I and delivery dates, the design information tended to
Θ ΘΘ MOTOR CIRCUITS
LOCAL CONTROL
PANEL
IIZI
LOCAL
CONTROL
SWITCH
PRESSURE
SWITCH
CD Í
PRESSURE
SWITCH
TEMPERATURE
SENSOR
FIG. 6.44 Toint to point' control cable system
During the second phase, in the 1950s, the increasing
number of plant auxiliaries and level of instrumen­
tation made h desirable to reduce the size of control
panels for switchgear. The same period also saw the
introduction of mimic diagrams for control panels and
desks. The equipment developed by the G P O for tele­
communications was an obvious choice to reduce size
and facilitate an increase in the complexity of power
station control functions. The use of 50 V D C inter­
posing relays, and key and discrepancy switches there­
fore became c o m m o n in power stations. The intro­
duction of such equipment allowed the development
Control and instrumentation cable systems
of sequence controHers and simUar devices. The ex­
pression 'light current control' came into being and
this was generally taken to mean devices operated via
a 50 V system of relays and swhches. It was reahsed
that light current devices would operate satisfactorily
through cables having a reduced cross-sectional area
and that the introduction of 'telephone type' cables
could result in considerable financial savings. Unfor­
tunately, the importance of balanced paired working
when using these types of cables was not always appre­
ciated in early installations, and interference problems
were sometimes encountered. T o reduce termination
space requirements, the traditional O ΒΑ terminals
were replaced by screw clamp terminals, broadly in
two sizes, one for multicore cables and a smaller version
for muhipair cables.
The third phase was initiated by a further upsurge
in quantity and complexity of control and instrumen­
tation equipment in the 1960s with the introduction
of 500 M W units, which put a heavy demand on cable
systems. T o achieve economy of cable cost consistent
with the required rehability, operation and maintenance
requirements a higher degree of marshalling was intro­
duced. A typical arrangement is shown in Fig 6.45.
With these marshalling systems, as w h h point to point
cabling, ah terminal points have to be individually
designed and scheduled prior to site installation. Clear­
ly the considerable a m o u n t of work involved cannot
be completed until the necessary circuit and terminal
information has been received from the various plant
contractors. Because manufacturers programme plant
contracts in relation t o the equipment manufacture
be m a d e available later t h a n the cable system design
task required. Consequently the cable design activity
could not match the site cable installation demand
for information. The resulting concentration of cable
design and installation activhy towards the end of the
project was a threat to the construction programme.
Although supporting steelwork could be erected and
power cables installed, control and instrumentation
cabhng invariably was delayed due ehher to late in­
formation from contractors (and hence from the cable
designers) or due to lack of terminal release points
from the equipment contractors. A further difficulty
with this type of marshalling system is that all wires
had to be identified by a unique number at their
terminal points to allow identification and for fault
finding during commissioning and maintenance. This
identification usually consisted of a nine-digit alpha­
numeric code formed using beads (ferrules) placed over
the wire insulation. The termination was then com­
pleted by applying a crimped pin (see Section 9.3.1
of this chapter) to the conductor which would in turn
be fastened into a screw clamp terminal. The larger
sizes of paired cables (50, 75 and 100 pairs) used for
trunk cables during this phase had a more complex
colour coding than those currently used since all pairs
were identified without repetition. The net resuh of
481
Cabling
CONTROL BLOCK TRUNK CONTROL
CABLES
FIG. 6.45 Typical arrangement of cable marshalling
these factors was that approximately 2 % of wires were
wrongly identified or terminated.
The fourth and final phase of the evolution of the
cable network system began with the introduction of
660 M W units in the early 1970s, which had associated
with them more sophisticated control and data logging
systems. There was clearly a need to review and if
possible simphfy the design and installation of control
cables and terminations. It was also considered de­
sirable to try and spread the load factor on the design
and site labour forces. Such considerations brought
about the adoption of cable networks which utilised
jumpering facilities to complete the circuitry. This type
of network has been used at stations such as Little­
brook D, Dinorwig and Heysham 2; a description of
the principles and equipment used is given in the next
section.
5.5 Cable network system using jumpering
5.5.1 Basic principles of cable network
The cable network is a hierarchical system formed to
route circuits from the 'field' (plant areas, switchrooms,
etc.) to the control room area. A simplified arrange­
ment to demonstrate the basic principles is shown in
Fig 6.46. As can be seen, the network is buih up using
20-pair modules to match the type of multipair cables
used. These muhipair cables, which are fully described
482
Chapter 6
PLANT
I MARSHALLING FIRST ITEMS
MARSHALLING
BOXES BOXES
(MAY BE DISPENSED
WITH IF PLANT ITEM IS
NOT TO BE CONNECTED
TO MORE THAN ONE
TRUNK CABLE)
in Section 3.6 of this chapter, are constructed on a
unit basis. This means that each cable consists of a
number of 20-pair units, the pairs of each u n h having
the same colour code identification sequence, the u n h s
themselves being identified by numbers.
The network is built u p in 20-pair modules from
field marshalling boxes or local panels a r o u n d the
plant, via network marshalling boxes and trunk cables
into a marshalhng centre.
Similarly, central equipment such as control desks
or alarm equipment is connected in 20-pair modules
via trunk cables into the marshalhng centre. Therefore
each 20-pair module will start in a field marshalling
box or in an item of control and instrumentation equip­
ment. All pairs of the field end of the module wül be
made-off onto terminals and the whole module will be
extended back to the marshalling centre.
Each 20-pair module is given a unique number that
will appear above every block of 40 terminals that are
used to terminate the module. Each wire in every
module is terminated in the same terminal position in
a block as shown in Fig 6.47. This means that a signal
onto terminal l A of, say, a field network box will end
u p on terminal l A of the same module in the mar­
shalhng centre. Since each module is uniquely identified
by a number and each pair within a module is uniquely
identified by colour code, a system of attaching ferrule
numbers to core terminations is not considered neces­
sary. Since the terminations within 20-pair modules
should never need to be disturbed for correction or

ALL CABLE PAIRS
TERMINATED IN
THE SAME COLOUR
CODE SEQUENCE
THROUGHOUT
FIG. 6.46 Basic principles of pair networking arrangements
modification, wire wrap techniques as described in
Section 9.3.2 of this chapter are used.
The marshalhng centre itself consists of a termina­
tion cubicle or frame which is provided with jumpering
facilities. The function of the marshalhng facility is to
form into a circuit a number of loops that are brought
in by pairs within the network. The circuits are formed
by means of jumpers installed between the ends of
the muhipair cables. Jumpers are terminated using tab
connectors, as described in Section 9.2 of this chapter,
which provide the facihty for breaking a circuit into
its fundamental pairs for testing. Each jumper has
numbered ferrules apphed at each end to enable it to
be identified.
Control and instrumentation cable systems
ALARM CUBICLE
By way of an example of the use of this system, the
signal from an oil pressure switch could be connected
into a field marshalling box on terminals 4A and 4B.
The signal would then appear on terminals 4A and 4B
of the same module in the marshalhng centre, which
could then be jumpered to the appropriate terminals
of the module routed to the alarm cubicle to initiate
a 'lubricating oil pressure low' alarm. In a similar
manner, j u m p e r connections can he used to complete
the circuit between the alarm cubicle and the alarm
facia on the desk. This is shown in the form of a loop
diagram in Fig 6.48.
Connections into field marshalhng boxes from plant-
m o u n t e d devices use screw/clamp terminations and
483
Cabling Chapter 6

I 1A I 1B I 2A I 2B I 3A I 3B |4A I 4B I 5A I 5B I 6A I 6B I 7A I 7B I 8A I 8B I 9A I 9B 110A 110B |l 1A 111Β 112A112B 113A 113B 114A 114B 115A 115B 116A 116B 117A 117B118A 118B119^
Arrangement (b)

W
1A

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w ,
2A

2B

3A

3B
°\ V
w

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1Β
2Α

2Β
3Α

3Β
4Α

4Β
5Α

5Β
6Α

6Β
7Α

7Β
8Α 9Α 10Α

9Β MOB
IIA

11Β
12Α 13Α

12Β
14Α

136
15Α

14Β
16Α

15Β
17Α

16Β
ISA

17Β
19Α

18Β
20Α

19Β 20Β
4A
BN \ , Arrangement (c)
4B
w
5A

5B

6A
Β ' \ ,
6B

7A

7B ° \
8A " 1

8B
9A 1A IB

9B 2A 2B

3A 3B
10A
BN'V
- ' \ , 4A 4B
EQUIPMENT 10B
20 PAIR CABLE NOTES:
SIDE BK 5A 5B
11A KEY TO COLOUR CODE FOR PAIRED CABLE:-
« \ ' 6A 6B
11B WHITE
BK 7A 7B B BLUE
12A 0 ORANGE
0 ' \ , 8A 8B G GREEN
12B BN BROWN
BK 98 GY GREY
9A
13A R RED

°V
BK BLACK
10A 10B
13B Y YELLOW
BK 11A 118
14A Arrangements (b), (c) AND (d) WILL HAVE THE
BN \ 128 SAME COLOUR PAIR CODING AS SHOWN IN
12A

X
14B Arrangement (a).
BK 13A 138
15A
REPRESENTS A PAIR
14A 148
15B
ALL MODULES TO HAVE WRAPPED CONNECTIONS
15A 158 ON OUTGOING SIDE.
16A

«V
16A 168
16B
17A 178
17A

°V
18A 188
17B
ISA 198
18A

°V
20A 208
18B
19A Arrangement (d)

19B

20A

20B
Υ
ν
BN
.

Arrangement (a)

FIG. 6.47 Cable module terminations

ferrule numbers are applied to cable cores for identi­
fication. Indeed this policy is used for all terminations
having less than 20-pairs to enable plant changes or
disconnection for test purposes.
This type of cable network system was developed
to try and overcome some of the programme and
technical difficulties, discussed in Section 5.4 of this
chapter, that had been encountered with marshalling
schemes that did not include jumpering.
Let us consider how a network which includes j u m ­
pering can improve programme performance. It is ex­
pected that the backbone of the network system which
includes field and pair network marshalhng boxes,
marshalling centres and associated trunk cables will be
designed early. This is carried out before detailed cir­
cuit knowledge is available by using experience of
previous station requirements and taking into account
any particular control function requirements. Control
and instrumentation contractors are encouraged to
forward at an early date their requirements for the
number of outgoing pairs for their major panels,
cubicles and desks to enable trunk cables to these items
to be scheduled. When circuit diagrams are obtained
from manufacturers for sequence, control and instru­
mentation, interlock and intertrip equipment, etc., the
system loop diagrams can be prepared and the cable
system completed. At this stage it is only required that
the tail end cables from the field network boxes to the
plant devices and the necessary jumpers be scheduled.
It should therefore be appreciated that the design work
has been spread over a greater period by being effec­
tively started much earlier. Furthermore, the process
is better able to cope with late receipt of information
as well as design changes. Providing steps are taken

484

FIELD MARSHALLING
BOX 2207
1 WB 4A
2 Β 4B
3 R 5A
— 0 — — c
4 O
0 5B
— O
PRESSURE
SWITCH
2100 = MODULE NUMBER
FIG. 6.48 Simplified loop diagram
to ensure timely civil access for trunk cables and mar­
shalling centres, the site workload can also be started
earher and spread to give a more controlled, levelled
and (hence) economical installation task. Because the
large majority of terminations are completed in a re­
petitive colour code order they are less prone to error
by the installer, thus reducing the problems that can
occur at the commissioning stage. This repetitive type
of termination encourages the widespread use of wire
wrap terminations which are fast, reliable and more
economic than the use of ferruled wires in screw clamp
terminals.
From a technical point of view, this type of network
system encourages paired working and hence improved
signal-to-noise ratio, as discussed in Section 5.3 of
this chapter. Individual networks can be provided to
meet segregation and separation requirements and this,
together with computerised cable design methods, can
give the necessary quality assurance.
5.5.2 Switchgear and interlocking equipment
No mention has so far been made of the involvement
of switchgear and hence the use of muhicore cables in
the network system.
Switchgear at all voltage levels provides a large
number of the inputs into a control and instrumen­
tation scheme in the form of operations, indications
and alarms. In the past, equipment for interlocking
and sequence control, and interposing relays for remote
control have all been built into individual switchgear
units, a unique specification being required for each
panel. This obviously necessitated early finalisation of
control and instrumentation design in order that these
devices could be built into switchgear in the factory.
This proved to be too inflexible from a p r o g r a m m e
point of view. Late information from control and
Control and instrunnentation cable systems
CONTROL ROOM
MARSHALLING CUBICLE ALARM CUBICLE CONTROL DESK
4A 1A 1 1A
4J f / 1B 1 1B
r ° , ° ALARM
2A 1 2A MODULE
2B
- O -
10A
—O— T O FACIA
{LUBRICATING
10B OIL PRESSURE
—O— LOW)
instrumentation contractors, who were naturally de­
pendent on mechanical plant designs, conflicted with
the necessity to clear switchgear designs in time for
dehvery to site to meet commissioning dates.
A ready solution to this problem is the use of stand­
ard switchgear control circuitry, so that n o special
equipment has to be housed in the switchgear enclosure
other than the interposing relays. Having removed
Individual' control and instrumentation components
from switchgear, it has to be located somewhere else
and for this purpose an 'interlock cubicle' is provided.
The cost, complexity and p r o g r a m m e requirements
discourages the purchase of a completely designed and
factory-built Interlock cubicle'. The solution is there­
fore to purchase a cubicle containing nothing initially
other than terminal blocks, wiring and plug-in bases.
This enables relays, timers, etc., to be plugged in as
requirements become known.
When designing the cabling from switchgear, certain
circuits such as electrical protection (including VT and
C T secondaries) are excluded from the cable network
system. C T secondary circuits are excluded from the
network because special measures, in the way of ter­
minals with shorting h n k s , are required to prevent
the C T being left open-circuited when energised with
resultant high potentials which may be a danger to
personnel and equipment. However, circuits from inter­
posing CTs may be routed via the cable network. These
circuks therefore have their terminals grouped into
discrete blocks to enable them to be cabled direct to
their destinations using multicore cables.
All remaining switchgear functions are wired to ter­
minals in groups to match standard multicore cable
sizes, i.e., 12, 19, 27 and 37 cores. F r o m these terminal
blocks, cables are run to identical terminal blocks in
the marshalling cubicle and in this manner all the
auxiliary functions of the switchgear are extended to
485
Cabling
the jumper field. By means of jumper connections,
functions can be extended to other equipment. Where
extension is not required for a particular function,
but circuit continuity is required (i.e., plant interlock
in closing coh circuit), then a jumper is used as a
shorting link.
The 'module' approach, described in Section 5.5.1
of this chapter for paired cables, is also apphed to
multicore cables. This means that core 1 is always
connected to terminal 1, core 2 to terminal 2, etc., and
this can form a standard instruction to the electrician.
This technique can apply both to the switchgear and
the marshalling centre, hence no wiring diagrams or
connection schedules are necessary. A h that is required
is for the group of terminals to be identified by a
module number and that this is then related to a cable
number.
Interlock cubicles are cabled direct to the marshal­
ling centre, using multicore or multipair cables as
appropriate, also employing 'module' techniques.
5.5.3 D e s i g n of c a b l e n e t w o r k s y s t e m s
Section 5.5.1 of this chapter used a simphfied model to
demonstrate the principles of a cable network system.
In practice, the structure of the network will be de­
pendent upon the segregation and separation require­
ments for a given project. These requirements are
discussed in Section 2 of this chapter. This means that
a separate segregated network will always be required
for each unit.
Segregation requirements will allow station services
to be mixed with unit services provided that, in the
event of any incident, not more than one unit and half
of the station's services are affected. For example,
one network could be provided for u n h 1 and station
A functions with a separate segregated network for
unit 2 and station Β functions. Whhst segregation is
not required between station and unit services it is
recommended that consideration be given to separa­
tion between marshalhng facilities to reduce their size.
This is because experience has shown that large mar­
shalhng centres can form an 'installation bottleneck'
because access space limits the number of electricians
that can work in a given area. For the same reason
it is recommended that, on a conventional station, at
least three marshalling centres are provided per unit.
The location of marshalling centres is discussed later.
However, a typical arrangement would be to provide
such facihties at the control r o o m , boiler electrical and
turbine electrical annexes. A typical unit arrangement
for a conventional power station is shown in Fig 6.49.
For nuclear projects the unit electrical system may
be provided on a 'train basis' (i.e., a separate electrical
system associated with each reactor quadrant) and in
this case it is necessary to have separate segregated
control cable networks for each train. In addition
each 'train' may comprise a number of 'sub-trains'
(usually two), each requiring separation between cables
486
Chapter 6
and marshalhng centres. In this respect a sub-train is
the plant, equipment and cables associated with the
essential cooling system. A typical arrangement for
an advanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR) is given in
Fig 6.50.
Regardless of the type of station, separate cables
are used for analogue and digital signals although
c o m m o n marshalling centres may be used. A diagram
of a marshalhng centre for an A G R showing typical
jumpering is given in Fig 6.51.
The location of marshalhng centres is important.
The initial reaction had been to set u p a marshalling
centre only adjacent to the control r o o m , an evolution
of the earher idea of using smah trunk cables as shown
in Fig 6.45. However, as the control cable network has
developed to accommodate all C and I circuitry, the
physical location of marshalhng facilities has had to
be closely re-examined. The actual position will depend
on the specific station layout and therefore no hard
and fast rules can be applied, but when considering
this subject the following points should be taken into
account:
• In order to reduce the length of multicore cables
between switchgear and the marshalling centre, which
are relatively expensive as compared with multipair
cables, a marshalling centre should be located as
close as practicable to the switchgear.
• For the same reasons as given above, the interlock
cubicles should be positioned near to a marshalling
centre.
• A marshalling centre should be provided in the
control block. This should he located as close as
possible to the underside of the desk to ahow the
flexible cables from individual desk modules to be
terminated directly into the marshalling centre.
• Where switchboards are located in outbuildings a
smah marshalhng centre should be provided, i.e.,
wall-mounted jumpering boxes.
5.5.4 A p p l i c a t i o n of c a b l e n e t w o r k s y s t e m s
As soon as the locations of the major hems of plant
(mechanical, electrical, and control and instrumenta­
tion) are known, the trunk cabling of the cable network
system should be laid out. This requires that the mar­
shalling centres are located and that an estimate is
m a d e of the number of analogue and digital pairs that
are required between major plant areas. This is achieved
by using experience of previous station requirements
and a knowledge of any particular control and data
requirements for the station.
When estimates for the trunk routes have been
prepared, the number of pairs should be increased by
2 0 % to allow spare pairs for modifications and ad­
ditions during construction and to achieve 10% spare
pairs for future modifications and extensions. It is
considered preferable to provide adequate spare ca-
Control a n d instrumentation cable systems
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Cabling Chapter 6
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489
 Cabling
pacity at this stage since the cost of pairs in large
trunk cables is only 10% of that of smah individual
cables that might otherwise have to be added at a
later stage.
Having established the trunk cabling, the remainder
of the network has to be designed on an individual
circuit basis. This can only be done when the location
of individual plant hems becomes known. To this end,
plant manufacturers are encouraged to forward their
requirements at an early date so that the location of
control panels and the requirements for field mar-
shahing boxes can be assessed. The number of pairs
assessed in this manner should then be rounded up
to the nearest multiple of 20-pair modules to assess
termination and cabling requirements.
The next stage is to obtain circuit diagrams from
manufacturers for sequence, control and instrumen­
tation, interlock equipment and the like. This infor­
mation, together with standard switchgear diagrams,
allows system circuit diagrams in the form of loops to
be prepared. These are produced on a system basis to
enable the information to be alhed directly to design,
erection and commissioning.
At this stage it is expedient and efficient to use
a computer management program (e.g., the C E G B
C A D M E C program) to allocate cores in cables and to
produce termination schedules. The C A D M E C pro­
gram may be used t o :
• Allocate the cores/pairs of cables required to route
each circuit element of the system circuit, and to
produce printouts displaying all routing details. The
circuit elements will be routed as balanced pairs
and displayed as such where the circuit element re­
ferences (CER) are assigned to pairs of terminals at
equipment.
Note: A circuit element comprises the electrical
connections identified by the same unique circuit
element reference (CER) between circuit components
(contacts, relays, etc.).
• Produce marshalling centre jumper schedules.
• Produce a schedule of connections for the field
multipair and multicore marshalhng boxes.
• Produce the circuit loop information in schedule
form.
The 2, 5 and 10-pair, or multicore cables to plant-
mounted devices at the extremities of the network also
have to be scheduled during this stage.
It should be appreciated that the amount of infor­
mation necessary to install and terminate cables is
minimal, as the only unique connections required are
for the jumpers in the marshalhng centres and for the
field cables connected into the field network marshall­
ing boxes. The information provided by the computer
system is in a form that can be issued direct to the
installation contractor's labour. It is standard practice
490
Chapter 6
to provide a computer terminal on she to enable cable
and termination information to be requested as
required.
5.5.5 Testing and commissioning of a control
network system
After installation of the network cable system and
prior to jumpering, the paired section of the network
should be tested to ensure:
• All cores are clear of each other and earth.
• Continuity of conductors and termination through
the network.
• Correct allocation of terminals, i.e., terminal l A at
one end of the cable is connected to terminal l A at
the remote end.
Automatic test equipment is available to carry out
these tests. The tests are normally carried out using the
master test equipment at marshalling centres and a
slave unit at the extremity of the network, e.g., field
marshalling box or panel. In this way intermediate
terminations such as those at pair network marshalling
boxes are also verified.
The correctness of connections from field equipment
into field marshalling boxes, and of j u m p e r connections
as well as multicore sections of the network, is verified
by pre-commissioning checks.
5.5.6 Plant-mounted devices
It is considered good practice to connect plant-mounted
devices such as pressure switches, transmitters and
resistance thermometers via a flexible cable into an
adaptable box. This adaptable box then forms an inter­
face between the device and the permanent armoured
cable. The flexible cables for general use are P V C
insulated with a copper braid screen and P V C outer
sheath complying with D E F Standard 6 1 - 1 2 Part 5.
For special high temperature applications, in the range
of 70°C u p to 250°C, P T F E insulated and sheathed
cables may be used. These types of plant-mounted
devices are normally supplied under plant contracts
and it is preferable that they be supphed complete with
at least 1 m of flexible cable. The adaptable box should
be supplied and erected, and the flexible cable should
be cleated and terminated by the cabling contractor.
The advantages of this method of connections are:
• Devices can be removed for recalibration without
disturbing the armoured cables.
• Many devices are mounted on pipes and the un­
desirable effects of vibration and movement on
conventional cabhng are avoided.
• High temperature flexible cables may be used to
devices located in conditions which would not be
suitable for the permanent armoured cables.

• The cable contractor is free to install and termi­
nate the permanent armoured cable prior to the
device being installed and released to him. It should
be borne in mind that it is not unusual for plant
contractors to install devices at the last possible
moment, to avoid damage.
• The problem that many devices do not have suitable
entries for armoured cables is overcome.
To avoid the production of individual wiring diagrams
for each device, standard connections are used as shown
in Fig 6.52. This diagram forms part of the standard
information issued to electricians for use on site.
There are a few areas where plant devices need to
be treated in a different manner and these are detailed
as follows:
• Thermocouples are cabled using compensating cable
direct to their associated cold junction cubicle or
transmitter cubicle. Frequently the supply, installa­
tion and termination of compensating cables is
placed in plant contracts.
• Where short-time fireproof cables are used (see
Section 5.5.7 of this chapter), a higher degree of
security is achieved by terminating the cable direct
into equipment and devices.
• Plant devices mounted on the turbine and boiler feed
p u m p turbine blocks are grouped and cabled into
marshahing boxes. The location of the marshalhng
boxes must be such that they need not be disturbed
during dismantling of the turbine and that they are
accessible with the unit on load. It is recommended
that flexible cables and adapter boxes still be used
for plant devices, but in this case aU cabling and
equipment up to and including the turbine mar­
shalhng boxes should be supphed by the plant con­
tractor. Connections from these marshalling boxes
to network marshalling boxes or marshalling centres
should be the responsibility of the cable contractor.
5.5.7 Application of short-time fireproof cables
The separation and segregation requirements given
in Section 2 of this chapter are intended to minimise
fire risk, limit consequential damage and eliminate
multi-unit outage without extensive use of fire survival
cables. However, there are situations where if cables
failed due to fire it might be impossible to shut down
a unit safely and isolate it from the Grid System.
Likewise, there is certain equipment whose integrity
must be maintained to enable evacuation and fire-
fighting to be effective. Such equipment must be cabled
using short-time fireproof cables (STFP) of the type
described in Section 3.7 of this chapter. Because of the
considerable cost of S T F P cables, their blanket use
on every alarm and protection circuit is not considered
acceptable. It is considered appropriate to use S T F P
cables for the following apphcations.
Control and instrumentation cable systems
Main plant protection (see Fig 6.53)
(a) The cable from the unit overall protection panel
to the boiler burner panel a n d / o r to the individual
burners dependent on the boiler control scheme
containing the boiler firing trip circuit.
(b) The cables from the unit overall protection panel
to the individual stop valves containing the valve
trip circuits.
(c) One of the two cables from the unit overall protec­
tion panel for the duplicated intertripping scheme
to the 400 kV switchgear protection panel in the
400 kV substation. If it is possible to route the two
cables by segregated routes it will not be necessary
to use S T F P cables.
(d) The cable from the unit overall protection panel
to the unit transformer circuit-breaker containing
the trip circuk.
(e) The cable from the unit overall protection panel to
the field circuit-breaker (when provided) containing
the trip circuk.
(f) The cable between the u n k control desk and the
unit overall protection panel containing the emer­
gency stop p u s h b u t t o n circuitry.
(g) T o overcome the possibility that the fire could
involve the generator stator circuitry, it is neces­
sary to ensure that some form of electrical pro­
tection should survive.
The form of protection involving the minimum of
cable is the back-up earth fault protection on the
stator, consequently it is a requirement that the current
transformer secondaries of this protection scheme be
cabled to the unit overall protection panel in S T F P
cable.
Station public address system
The complete cabhng system from microphones to
loudspeakers via amplifiers and switching should be
in S T F P cable.
Audible alarms
Power feeds for alarm behs and sirens are usually
provided from several local sources on the basis that
the loss of one device through lack of supply will not
silence the alarms. Where it is considered that the loss
of any one device is not acceptable (and considering
the need to cater for maintenance outage this is un­
likely), then the power supply to the device should
be in S T F P cable. There is, however, a c o m m o n signal
cable from the control r o o m to initiate the local beU/
siren contactors and the loss of this cable would pro­
duce a complete failure. It is essential, therefore, that
this cable be instahed in S T F P cable.
491
 Cabling Chapter 6

1 PRESSURE SWITCHES ETC 2 RESISTANCE THERMOMETERS

κ
ADAPTABLE BOX ADAPTABLE BOX
DEVICE
(a)

X
(a)
1
N/O

FLEXIBLE CABLE
ORANGE

PAIRED CABLE MULTICORE FLEXIBLE CABLE

Χ
PAIRED CABLE
CORE IDENTIFICATION CABLE
MARKERS

CORE NUMBER CODE

PAIR COLOUR CODE CORE NUMBER CODE
ADAPTABLE BOX ADAPTABLE BOX
DEVICE \ ^ /

X
(b)
WHITE ,
N/O
BLUE

FLEXIBLE CABLE \
X
PAIRED CABLE MULTICORE FLEXIBLE CABLE ^
~3~|- 3
ORANGE
X
^PAIRED CABLE
TERMINALS CABLE

ADAPTABLE BOX
(c)
1
N/O
Η ' h
CT 3 TRANSMITTERS
2
CABLE CONNECTIONS
AS 1(b) ADAPTABLE BOX
3 TRANSMITTER
(a)

Η ^ h 4 Κ
FLEXIBLE CABLE

r TERMINALS 2 AND 3
LINKED

ADAPTABLE BOX
FLEXIBLE CABLE

(d)
* h:
PAIRED CABLE
N/O

X
ADAPTABLE BOX 2.5mm2
TRANSMITTER /SUPPLY CABLE

X
> X X
X
N/O CT

X
N/C OUTPUT

FLEXIBLE CABLE

X
DEVICE 2
/
FLEXIBLE CABLES ^PAIRED CABLE
, 0 ^

TERMINALS 6 AND 7
LINKED

ADAPTABLE BOX

X
(e)

N/O
Ι Ή 3

4 X
"6~f- 6 X
X
X
y
FLEXIBLE CABLE

ADAPTABLE BOX
(f)

N/O

X
y X
FLEXIBLE CABLE MULTICORE
CABLE
ORANGE

PAIRED CABLE

FIG. 6 . 5 2 Standard connections to plant-mounted devices

492
 Control and instrumentation cable systems

^ ELEC SOLENOID
i ON TURBINE TO
< RELEASE FLUID
AND TRIP TS VS

LOCAL TURBINE TRIP LEVER

TURBINE

X
STEAM
OVERSPEED TRIP VALVES

RELAY
FLUID
PRESSURE
SWITCH
LOSS OF LUBRICATING OIL

LOW STEAM INLET PRESSURE

LOSS OF SPEED GOVERNOR TRIP

BOILER
FIRING
TRIP
LOSS OF BOILER WATER

EMERGENCY PUSHBUTTON REMOTE & LOCAL

OVERALL PROTECTION

BUCHHOLZ SURGE

HV OVERCURRENT

LV BALANCE EARTH FAULT

LV STANDBY EARTH FAULT

LOSS OF GENERATOR EXCITATION

LOSS OF STATOR WATER FLOW

GEN STATOR E/F (INSTANTANEOUS HIGH RESIST)

GEN STATOR STANDBY E/F (INVERSE HIGH RESIST)

NEGATIVE PHASE SEQUENCE

GEN STATOR E/F (INSTANTANEOUS LOW RESIST)

GEN STATOR STANDBY E/F (INVERSE LOW RESIST)

WINDING TEMPERATURE

OVERALL PROTECTION ELECTRICAL SIGNAL

BUCHHOLZ SURGE
MECHANICALyHYDRAULIC SIGNAL
HV OVERCURRENT

GENERATOR TRANSFORMER PERMISSIVE INTERLOCK DEVICE

AND HV CONNECTIONS HV BALANCE EARTH FAULT -CONTACT WHICH CLOSES ON
OPERATION OF SENSITIVE POWER
RELAY FOR DETECTING CUT-OFF
FIRST MAIN FEEDER PROTECTION OF STEAM SUPPLY TO TURBINE

SECOND MAIN FEEDER PROTECTION

INTERLOCKED OVERCURRENT
-NOT REQUIRED IF HV BUSBAR
INTERLOCKED OVERCURRENT ^ PROTECTION TRIPS UNIT

HV BUSBAR PROTECTION

SHORT TIME FIRE PROOF CIRCUIT

FIG. 6.53 Application of short-time fireproof cables for main plant protection

493
Cabling
Station VHF and UHF links
All cables from the microphones at the unit control
desks out to the transmitters covering the various
areas of the station should be in S T F P cable. The
aerial cable from the transmitter is co-axial and is
not available in a fireproof construction — it must
therefore be routed in a low risk area.
Direct wire telephones
Direct wire telephone circuits are routed point-to-point
using STFP cables.
Fire fighting equipment
In order that diesel pumps and other mechanical plant
necessary for the continuous operation of the fire
fighting equipment shall remain in service when in­
volved in a fire, any cabhng on that plant or required
to start it in case of fire should be in S T F P cable.
Likewise, circuits carrying essential alarms from the
fire fighting equipment to the control r o o m should be
in STFP cable.
Fire detectors
Fire alarm initiating devices, e.g., 'break glass' devices,
smoke detectors and heat detecting cables should be
cabled in STFP cable only in the areas that they are
protecting. Outside these areas, the circuits should be
routed in the multipair cable network. This is on the
basis that the alarm circuits are all self-monitoring.
Nuclear alarms
All detector and audible circuits associated with nuclear
alarms should be cabled using S T F P cables only.
6 Cable support systems
6.1 Introduction
In modern power stations, large quantities of steel
framework type structures are used to support the
cables on their paths, both horizontally and vertically,
across the power station. In the horizontal case, these
cables may be routed in purpose built cable tunnels,
in cable 'flats' or in general plant areas. In the ver­
tical case, the cables may be running in purpose built
'risers' (sometimes referred to as cable 'flumes'), or
simply through slots in floors/ceihngs, again in plant
areas. Virtually all of the cables used in a power sta­
tion, both power and control, wih be installed on these
steel support structures for at least part of their length.
In addition, the following installation methods are
also used for some cables:
• Buried direct in the ground.
• Installed in ducts.
494
Chapter 6
• Routed in concrete troughs.
These three methods, by their very nature, tend to be
used outside the main station buildings; they are dealt
with in more detail in Section 7.5 of this chapter.
Additionally, a very small number of cables will be
installed either in proprietary electrical trunking or con­
duit. This apphes chiefly to lighting and small power
circuits such as socket outlet ring mains. Cables for
such circuits will be installed in accordance with the
edition of the l E E Wiring Regulations [18] vahd at
the time of installation. The resuh will therefore be
similar to any other industrial electrical installation.
Further consideration to such circuits is not, therefore,
given here.
6.2 Design philosophy
A generic design of cable support steelwork has been
employed by the C E G B in all of its most recent power
stations. The main considerations in arriving at this
design were as follows:
• The diversity of locations across a power station
where cables, and hence their support steelwork, are
installed. At one extreme, these may be purpose
built cabling areas such as cable flats, at the other
they may be plant areas such as the boiler house
or turbine hall.
• The huge differences in quantities of cables which
need to be installed in these differing physical
locations. Main cable routes like cable tunnels may
carry as many as 1500 cables, whereas 'tail end'
routes may simply consist of two cables (one power
and one control) being routed t o , for example, a
limit switch.
• The considerable variation in cable sizes and weights
which need to be accommodated. At one extreme,
a 4-core 300 mm^ power cable has an overall dia­
meter of around 70 m m and weighs 7 k g / m . At the
other, a 2-pair multipair control cable has an over-
ah diameter of 12 m m and weighs only 0.3 k g / m .
• The need for the support steelwork to accommo­
date the installation requirements of different cable
types. Power cables, for example, require a free flow
of air for coohng purposes and single-core power
cables need additionally to be firmly anchored to
restrain the large bursting forces generated under
fault conditions. (These requirements are addressed
later in this section.)
Clearly h was considered an uneconomic proposition,
both in terms of design and manufacture, to use cable
support assemblies unique to each different application
and therefore the idea of using a large 'construction
kit' evolved as the means of providing the most flexible
solution.
 Cable support systems

The basic components of this construction kit were

developed by the C E G B throughout the 1970s in
cohaboration with the leading UK manufacturers. The
design which resuhed from this work drew on both the
CEGB's installation experience and also the suppliers'
practical manufacturing experience. The culmination
of this development exercise was the production of V TWO LENGTHS OF
< C1 CHANNEL WELDED
an internal C E G B specification known as G D C D BACK TO BACK

Standard 197, [19]. This document has, in the absence

of specifications from national sources, become the
accepted standard for this type of cable support system
throughout the UK. This design of steelwork has been
used with considerable success on all of the CEGB's
recently constructed power stations including Drax
Completion, Heysham 2 , Dinorwig and Littlebrook £).
FIG. 6.55 Cross-section through a C2 channel

6.3 Basic system components

The cable support system employed by the C E G B is
based upon a proprietary design of *open channel'
steel section, manufactured in a c o m m o n format by
a number of UK companies. Indeed, the same basic
format of channel is readily available worldwide. This
basic channel section, referred to in C E G B documenta­
tion as a C I channel, is in the form of a square, open
on one side, 41 m m wide χ 41 m m deep, rolled from
2.5 m m thick steel. A cross-section through this chan­
nel is shown in Fig 6.54. There are three other basic FIG. 6.56 Cross-section through a C3 channel
channel sections employed by the C E G B which are
variations on this theme, these are:
^IN/

35mm MIN

íñi íñl

FIG. 6.54 Cross-section through a Cl channel

• A C2 channel, formed from two C l channels placed PLASTIC FOAM

back-to-back and spot welded at 150 m m intervals

NOTE:
(see Fig 6.55). THE MAIN CHANNEL SECTION
UTILISES THE Cl CHANNEL SECTION.
THE INSERT TANGS SHOWN ON THIS
• A C3 channel, which has a depth of only 21 m m , i.e., DRAWING ARE TYPICAL ONLY

half that of the basic C l channel (see Fig 6.56).

• A C4 channel, which is similar to a C l channel except

that tangs are pressed out from the rear face of
the channel at 300 m m intervals (see Fig 6.57). This
type of channel is called a ^concrete insert channel'
and is used to provide a convenient means of fixing
cable support steelwork to the power station civil
structure. The channel is temporarily fastened to
FIG. 6.57 Isometric view of a C4 channel
the inside surface of the shuttering prior to concrete
p o u r , special polystyrene inserts being used to pre-
vent ingress of concrete into the channel itself. The
result is an open channel fixing point, flush with

495
Cabling
the concrete wah or ceihng. The tangs in the rear
of the channel will be embedded firmly in the
concrete. This type of concrete insert channel
provides a very cheap method of providing fixings
to the civil structure but it does have its drawbacks.
These are discussed in greater detah later in this
chapter.
These basic channel sections are used in conjunction
with a range of standard bracket formations and fix­
ings to form a support framework on which the cable
carriers are located. The brackets and channels are con­
nected together using special fixings known as sprung
channel nuts (sometimes referred to as 'zebedees'), and
standard hexagonal head set screws (usually Μ12) of
grade 8.8 steel (as defined in BS3692 [20]). The design
of the sprung channel nut is illustrated in Fig 6.58
and the basic composite assembly is shown in Fig 6.59.
FIG, 6.58 Isometric view of sprung channel nut
FIG. 6.59 Channel nut/screw assembly in a CI channel
The main advantage which this type of connection
has, is that the support frameworks can be erected
at she without the need for drilhng, giving major
savings in assembly time and manpower requirements.
The channel nuts are simply inserted sideways into
the channel between the lips on the open face, de­
pressed, and twisted into place. The spring holds the
channel nut in place whilst the assembly is being ef­
fected, hence freeing the operative's hands for other
assembly jobs. This means that a rehable connection
can be made very quickly and that a great degree of
496
Chapter 6
installation flexibihty is obtained, since a connection
can be made at any point on a channel.
These reductions in assembly time and the man­
power needed, produce considerable consequential in­
stahation cost savings.
It is worth noting that a version of the basic channel
nut is also available without the spring. It is necessary
to use this type of nut in conjunction with the C3
channel as the limhed depth prevents the use of the
spring.
Because no drihing is required to form this type of
connection, h fohows that for loads parahel to the
major axis of the support channel, the basic load-
carrying capacity of the connection is being derived
from a friction grip. T o ensure adequate performance
of this frictional grip, the top surface of the channel
nuts have specially serrated grooves milled into them.
These grooves, which can be seen in Fig 6.58, are auto­
matically aligned with the inturned lips on the support
channel and consequently, when the fixing screw is
tightened, these bite into the underside of the channel
lip. This creates a very high-strength friction grip.
The actual load-carrying capacity of the connection
parallel to the channel major axis wih therefore be
directly dependent upon the tightening torque applied
to the fixing screws. For grade 8.8 M12 fixings, the
C E G B specifies that a torque of 65 N m be apphed
and this gives a slip resistance capability of typicahy
2700 kgf. For cable steelwork design purposes, how­
ever, the maximum permissible static load on a fixing
is taken to be 1200 kgf allowing for a factor of safety.
One design of channel section which is widely avail­
able in the UK, actuahy takes this type of connection
further by having a sawtooth formation on the under­
side of the lips. This mates with a similar formation
on the top surface of the channel. In this type of
connection, a high tightening torque is not so critical
in obtaining the required load-bearing performance,
as the interlocking teeth provide the resistance to
movement. This design of steelwork is, of course, more
expensive than the plain type. Since the required level
of performance can be obtained without the need for
a channel lip sawtooth formation, the C E G B does not
feel h necessary to require this feature in hs specifi­
cation document.
The standard types of brackets which are used in
the construction of the support frames have been
chosen to be simple and hence cheap. The bulk of the
bracket designs are simply bent from 6 m m thick plate
with holes punched in them to accept the fixing screws.
Typical examples of these brackets are illustrated in
Fig 6.60. They are all manufacturers-' standard catalogue
items. Welding wih only be employed in the construc­
tion of the bracket if it is:
• Essential to form the required shape of bracket.
• If it is necessary to add strength to the bracket, for
example the addition of a gusset to add strength, as
illustrated in Fig 6.61.
FIG. 3.11 Large core being built (GEC Alsthom)
FIG. 3.12 Completed core, showing frame bolts (GEC Alsthom)
FIG. 3 . 5 8 Core and windings of single-phiase CEGB generator transformer (GEC Alsthom)
FIG. 3.60 800 MVA generator transformer bank at Drax power station (GEC Alsthom)
FIG. 3.64 Cast-resin transformers for installation in 415 V switchgear (GEC Alsthom)
FIG. 5.11 Two poles (of a three-phase group) of a forced-air cooled generator circuit-breaker installed at Dinorwig pumped-storage power station
(British Brown-Boveri Ltd)

FIG. 5.12 One pole of a forced-air cooled generator circuit-breaker, with side covers and the connection to generator busbar removed
(British Brown-Boveri Ltd)
FIG. 5.13 Three-phase water cooled generator circuit-breaker showing connection into the generator phase-isolated busbar system
(British Brown-Boveri Ltd)
FIG. 5 . 1 4 Generator circuit-breaker control panel (British Brown-Boveri Ltd)
FIG. 5 . 1 5 Cooling water plant (British Brown-Boveri Ltd)
FIG. 5 . 1 8 Air plant control panel (British Brown-Boveri Ltd)
FIG. 5.29 Typical 3.3 kV switchboard of ReyroUe manufacture
FIG. 5 . 4 8 3 . 3 kV switchboard of Reyolle manufacture. The three left hand units are 'fused equipment Class S 1 4 A '
and the three right hand units are 'air circuit-breakers Class S A ' .
FIG. 5.49 Typical 415 V switchboard of GEC manufacture
FIG. 5.51 Typical 415 V switchboard of Electro-Mechanical Manufacturing Co manufacture
FIG. 5.69 Switchboard formation of control gear featuring vacuum interrupters in association with HBC fuse protection for 3.3 kV service
(GEC Industrial Controls Ltd)
FIG. 5 . 7 0 Example of control gear featuring vacuum interrupters in association with HBC fuse protection — for 3 . 3 kV service, showing the
demonstration of the circuit earthing switch (GEC Industrial Controls Ltd)

ϋ required in those areas. Such detail design information
ΰ is not, however, available for the many smaller cable
FIG. 6.60 Typical examples of brackets without
welded components
FIG. 6.61 Typical example of bracket with
welded gusset
All brackets are hot-dip galvanised after fabrication
to provide environmental protection. Post-fabrication
hot-dip galvanising is specified for two reasons:
• The inclusion of zinc in a weld (from galvanising)
will significantly weaken that weld.
• Bending and forming after galvanising can cause
flaking of the galvanising to occur.
The CEGB's standard component range also includes
a number of brackets and fixings which are used for
attaching the steel frameworks to the civil structure.
(In this context, the civil structure will include not
only load-bearing walls, floors and ceilings but also
structural steelwork such as columns and rolled steel
joists (RSJs).)
The basic type of civil structure fixing method, the
C4 concrete insert channel, has already been intro­
duced and described. Whilst this is a very simple and
inexpensive method of obtaining a fixing point from a
structural wall or ceihng, its use relies u p o n quite de­
tailed cable instahation design information being avail­
able at an early stage in the power station construction
Cable support systems
(i.e., prior to mass concrete pour). This information is
generally available for major dedicated cabling areas
such as tunnels and flumes where it is possible to predict
the quantities of cabhng, and hence support steelwork,
runs, particularly in plant areas where plant layout,
and its associated fixings, will sdll be subject to change.
T h e use of concrete insert channels does, therefore,
have its limitations. It is also worth noting that the
C E G B has experienced practical problems where con­
crete insert channels have become misaligned during
concrete pouring. This is attributed to insufficient care
being taken when fixing these channels to the shutter­
ing. It is therefore a quality control problem which
can be addressed by more rigorous on-site inspection.
The most straightforward alternative to using con­
crete insert channels is to 'surface m o u n t ' lengths of
C I channel using wrap-around brackets and proprietary
concrete fixing anchors (expansion or cast resin types)
as shown in Fig 6.62. In this arrangement, a fixing
anchor spacing of 1 m is usually deemed to provide
equivalent load-carrying capabilities to concrete insert
channels although this will, of course, depend u p o n
the performance characteristics of the concrete anchors
used, the strength of the concrete hself (which also
affects the performance of the concrete inserts) and
also the proximity of those fixing anchors to discon­
tinuities in the wah or floor. These aspects are addressed
by the manufacturer's instructions provided with the
concrete anchors themselves, and these instructions
must always be fohowed imphcitly.
14mm DIA HOLE
M12 CONCRETE ANCHOR .' v;oJ
••«ί.ν^·^·
CHANNEL BRACKET
F I G . 6.62 Surface-mounted CI channel using a single
fixing anchor per fixing point
The surface mounting of CI channels is more ex­
pensive than using concrete inserts for the following
reasons:
• It requires additional components, most notably
the concrete anchors themselves, which are quite
expensive.
497
Cabling Chapter 6

• The increased instahation time and effort resuhing

from the need to drih both the channel and also
the concrete itself. (The need to drill the mounting
channel can be avoided by using brackets which
wrap around that channel, see Fig 6.63. This will
of course, require two concrete anchors per fixing
point rather than one.)

FKI. 6.64 Baseplate for a Cl channel

M12 CONCRETE
ANCHORS

FIG. 6.65 Baseplate for a C2 channel

Many physical situations on a power station dictate

the need for cables to be routed to plant which is
FIG. 6.63 Surface-mounted Cl channel using two remote from concrete walls or ceilings. In these cases,
anchors per fixing point the structural steelwork is often used to provide fixing
points for the cable steelwork. A specially designed
beam clamp, known as a B15 clamp (see Fig 6.66),
Care should always be taken when drilling structural
is used for this application which provides a con­
concrete walls or ceilings to ensure that reinforcing
venient method of fixing from the flange of a R S J .
bars are not damaged.
The beam clamps are used in pairs in conjunction with
In addition to using lengths of channel to provide
fixing points on the civil structure, the CEGB's stand­
ard also includes a number of floor/ceiling baseplate
brackets. The two basic designs of these baseplates
are shown in Figs 6.64 and 6.65 which are intended
for use with C l and C2 channels respectively. These
baseplates are fixed to the floor or ceiling using pro­
prietary concrete anchors and the upstands provide the
take-offs for the channels. Again, they are designed to
be very simple and hence inexpensive, with environ­
mental protection being provided by hot-dip galvanis­
ing. For the more elaborate cable steelwork assembhes,
which are described in the next subsection, special
designs of floorplate are provided in the standard range
of components. These have a wide variety of upstand
configurations which combine installational flexibility
with stable load bearing capacity. They remain, how­
ever, more specialised forms of the basic brackets
shown in Figs 6.64 and 6.65. FIG. 6.66 A B15 heavy duty beam clamp

498

short lengths of CI or C2 channel. The completed
assembly, shown in Fig 6.67, has a load-bearing ca­
pabihty of 1200 kg which makes it suitable for the
support of complete cable steelwork assemblies. It
is, however, also used to provide upper bracing points
for cable steelwork structures fixed to the floor.
FIG. 6.67 Application of a B15 beam clamp
Two other standard components are also used to
provide fixings from structural steelwork where smaller
load-carrying capacities are required or simply if a
bracing point is being provided. The first of these is a
light duty beam clamp which again provides a fixing
from the flange of a RS J. This type of bracket, shown
in Fig 6.68, is usually used to provide a bracing point
for the box section bridges described in the next sub­
section. The second is a h o o k bolt fixing which is
used to gain a cable steelwork fixing point from
cladding rails. The application of this type of fixing is
shown in Fig 6.69.
FIG. 6.68 A light duty beam clamp
Cable support systems
FIG. 6.69 Application of cladding rail hook bolts
When fixing cable steelwork to the structural steel­
work, it is obviously very important to check that the
structural steelwork itself is capable of supporting the
intended cabling loads safely (bearing in mind that
it may also be carrying other equipment loads such
as pipework). It is therefore essential to ensure that
co-operation and co-ordination exists between the civil
and electrical design disciplines when determining cable
supporting steelwork routes. The same civil structure
loading considerations must also be observed when
providing fixings from concrete wahs and floors, al­
though the civil design often includes an allowance
for loads such as these.
The other large group of components which make
u p the complete system are the cable carriers.
Since the bulk of cable routes in a power station
are horizontal, the most commonly used cable carriers
are those which support the cables along these hori­
zontal routes. T h e cables are supported on so-called
'ladder racks' which are formed by welding sections
of standard C3 channel together. Essentially, the ladder
rack consists of two C3 side rails joined by C3 channel
'rungs' at 300 m m intervals as illustrated in Fig 6.70.
Three standard widths of ladder rack are available,
600 m m , 450 m m and 300 m m , their use depending on
the quantity of cables to be carried. This basic format
of cable carrier was selected because it was seen to
offer the fohowing advantages:
• The ladders offer a flat surface on which to lay
the cables. This permits them to leave and join the
ladder without having to negotiate obstacles such
as upturned lips.
• The open channel ladder rungs and side rails provide
convenient points at which to cleat the cables.
• When compared with other cable carrier types, such
as perforated trays, ladder racks offer high strength
with low self-weight. A given design of support frame
can therefore carry a higher cable weight.
499
Cabling Chapter 6

CONSTRUCTED FROM
C3 CHANNEL SECTION.
LADDER ASSEMBLED
WITH ALTERNATE RUNGS
WEB UPPERMOST

REF WIDTH Wmm

LI 300
L2 450
L3 600

FIG. 6 . 7 0 Ladder rack

• The ladder type format allows free access of air to mining cable weight-carrying capacity. The modular
the cable hence providing cooling by natural cir­ concept stems from the computer-aided cable routing
culation. Cable ratings will therefore be higher when program which the C E G B employs in managing cable
using this type of carrier. installation contracts (see Section 14 of this chapter).
A module consists of a 75 m m χ 75 m m area
• The ladder racks are completely compatible w h h
of available ladder space (75 m m of support width
the support steelwork and, since they are made
X 75 m m of support depth). The G D C D Standard
from standard channel, can be supplied by the same
197 steelwork is designed to be capable of supporting
manufacturer as the 'construction kit'.
a cable loading of 7 k g / m o d u l e / m e t r e run of support.
Therefore, a 600 m m wide ladder rack, the largest of
A small cost is paid for the above advantages in that
the standard rack widths, when allowing for the non-
the ladder type carriers are slightly more expensive
usable space at the side rails, is capable of accommo­
than their perforated tray counterparts. This is chiefly
dating seven modules worth of cables, or, 50 k g / m
due to the welded content of the ladders which, for
rounding u p . For a 450 m m wide ladder rack, the
the majority of manufacturers, is still done manually.
corresponding figure is 35 k g / m and for a 300 m m
Attempts have been made to introduce automatic
rack, it is 20 k g / m .
welding processes with varying degrees of success but
These loading figures give the maximum permissible
automation will, in the long run, reduce costs.
cable loading for the given ladder size on a module
The ladders are fabricated in standard six metre
by module basis. In practice, the cable cleating philo­
lengths, protection being provided by hot-dip galvanis­
sophy used by the C E G B (see next section for details)
ing after fabrication. The ladders are constructed such
may mean that the ladder rack is physically full before
that alternate rungs face upwards. The upward facing
the maximum permissible total cable load has been
rungs provide cleating points for the cables, whilst the
reached. Another factor which plays a big part in
downward facing rungs provide the facilities for the
determining the total cable load on a rack is the total
installation of linear heat detecting cable (see Section
combustible mass, comprising the cable insulation and
8 of this chapter for more detail). Great care is ex­
sheathing materials. This is important from a fire pro­
ercised during fabrication to ensure that the tops of
pagation point of view.
the rungs are level whh the tops of the side rails. This
The maximum permissible combustible mass load­
is important since any mismatch could leave burrs
ing on a cable ladder is again expressed as a weight
or weld-bead protrusions which could damage cable
per metre run of carrier and the limiting value will
sheaths.
vary dependent upon cable type, cable size, insulation
Similarly, care is taken to ensure that any galvanising
material and installation method. When the automatic
'spikes' are removed by fetthng immediately after the
cable routing program has allocated cables to carriers
racks are removed from the galvanising baths.
it therefore checks three h e m s :
The standard sizes of ladder rack which have been
chosen are derived from a 'modular' basis for deter­ • Combustible mass loading.

500

• Total weight loading.
• Physical space available to suit prescribed cleating
methods.
The checks are hierarchical, being performed in the
above order.
It is important to note that the construction of all
three sizes of ladder rack is the same, save for the rung
length. Therefore, the actual load carrying capacity of
the three sizes will be the same. Indeed, it could be
argued from a theoretical point of view, that the smaller
the ladder width, the stiffer it wih be and hence the
stronger h will be. It is a fact that the cable steelwork
which the C E G B employs has considerable reserve
strength over design loadings.
Because the ladder racks are manufactured in stand­
ard 6 metre lengths, splice joints are required. A ladder
splice consists of a 200 m m long piece of 8 m m thick
mild steel bar with four Μ12 tapped holes equally
spaced along it. The bar is sized such that it wih shde
into the end of the C3 channel which forms the rail
of the ladder. With this bar positioned centrally be­
tween the two ladders to be joined, the M12 screws
are tightened down into the splice bar and on through
it until they contact the b o t t o m of the ladder rail.
As they are tightened still further, they begin to de­
form the b o t t o m of the side rah; ah four screws are
tightened to produce the same degree of deformation.
The deformation of the channel in this way forms a
mechanical key which prevents relative slip.
The ladder racks themselves are supported at 2
metre intervals using specially designed cantilever a r m s .
These arms are in turn mounted on upright supports
which constitute part of the main support structure.
A typical cantilever arm is shown in Fig 6.71, from
o
ft ft
FIG. 6.71 Cantilever arm for a horizontal cable route
Cable support systems
which it will be seen that h consists of a length of
CI channel welded to a backplate, the whole being
hot-dip galvanised for protection. The backplate is
formed from 10 m m thick mild steel plate w h h fixing
holes punched through it. The ends of the backplate
are specially cut and bent to fit in between the channel
hps when the arm is correctly b o h e d into place, as
shown on the inset detail. This provides a positive
location to the connection and also provides some
additional lateral stiffness for the joint. It should also
be noted that two holes are punched into the back­
plate, one above the a r m and one below it. For nor­
mal horizontal ladder rack installation, only the upper
fixing hole is used as this provides sufficient shp whh­
stand capabihty. The lower hole provides additional
flexibility for the application of the cantilever arm.
The ladder racks do not simply rest in the cantilever
arms, they are firmly fixed to them. This is done using
Z-brackets as illustrated in Fig 6.72, which shows a
ladder assembled on a cantilever a r m which is in turn
fixed to an upright channel. It is important to note
that when the Z-bracket is correctly installed, the head
of the fixing screw is below the level of the ladder rungs,
hence removing a potential source of damage to cable
sheaths during installation.
A similar cantilever support arrangement is also
used for vertical cable routes. The cantilever arm is of
the same design as that shown in Fig 6.71 except that
the open face is turned through 9 0 ° . The presence of
two fixing holes removes the need to have left hand'
and 'right h a n d ' support cantilevers. Ladder racks are
not used on vertical runs because the orientation of the
cable removes the need to prevent sagging. Cantilever
arms are simply installed at 1 metre vertical intervals
and the cables cleated to them. This type of arrange­
ment is shown in Fig 6.73.
6.4 System design and application
The basic and most frequently used cable support
arrangement is that of the horizontal ladder rack sup­
ported at 2 metre intervals on cantilever arms. This
Θ .
FIG. 6.72 Cantilever arm/ladder rack assembly
501
Cabling
C2 CHANNEL OR
C4 CONCRETE INSERT
FIG. 6.73 Cantilever arm arrangement for a vertical
cable route
is used in dedicated cable areas such as tunnels and
flats and it will also be found in plant areas, suspended
from concrete ceihngs, fixed to structural steelwork
and anchored to concrete walls using concrete insert
channels. The type of fixing arrangement used wih
essentially be determined by the quantity of cables to
be installed.
For major cable routes such as cable flats, the can­
tilever arms will normally be fixed to C2 channels
spanning from floor to ceiling, being fixed at both
using the standard baseplate bracket shown in Fig 6.65.
Such an upright may be loaded with stacked arrays
of cantilever arms on both sides and the resulting
assembly, shown in Fig 6.74, is known colloquially as
the 'double-sided Christmas tree' assembly. The support
uprights could equally be a C l channel or a C4 con­
crete insert channel. In the former case, the C l channel
must be fixed firmly to a concrete wall or some other
rigid bracing point. The latter type of upright is par­
ticularly useful for cable tunnels where cantilever arms
can be fixed to both sides of the tunnel, leaving a
central walkway for installation and access purposes.
The fact that by using concrete insert channels the
cantilever arms can be mounted flush to the wall saves
valuable space. Cable tunnels are particularly appro­
priate areas for using concrete insert channels since
the required positions of the upright may be accurately
determined at a very early stage in the design work.
Where such stacked arrays of ladder racks are used,
a standard minimum vertical spacing of 305 m m is
502
Chapter 6
FIG. 6.74 Oouble-sided Christmas tree' ladder
rack assembly
maintained between ladders. This is sufficient space
to gain access to install the cables and also to cleat
them. The resulting gap also provides enough separa­
tion to assist in preventing the propagation of a cable
fire from one tray to another.
Where cables are required to leave routes, the lad­
der racks are always installed on the 'next size u p '
cantilever a r m . Thus, a 450 m m ladder rack would
normally be installed on a 600 m m cantilever arm while
a 600 m m wide ladder is placed on a 750 m m canti­
lever arm (there is no 750 m m wide ladder). The lad­
ders are always placed to the o u t b o a r d ends of the
cantilever arms leaving a 150 m m gap which permits
cables to leave the ladder at the rear in order to change
direction a n d / o r level. The alternative, which would
be to allow cables to change levels at the front of the
ladders, would produce a n unsightly installation and
would also dictate that future cables installed on the
route would have to be threaded behind the cables
leaving the racks, which would be inconvenient. The use
of oversize cantilever arms is in fact mandatory for
the 'double-sided Christmas tree' support as, without
them, the horizontal clearance between the racks on
either side of the upright could not be made large
enough to reduce the risk of a fire propagating horizon­
tally from one tray to the other.
In practice, the only areas where oversize cantilever
arms are unlikely to be found are cable tunnels. Here,

there wih be very httle requirement for cables to change
tray level or direction and hence the clearance to the
rear of the ladder is not essential and a valuable space
saving can be m a d e .
It is worth noting that in reality a nominal 600 m m
long cantilever arm is in fact 615 m m long. The ad­
ditional length is required to achieve sufficient clearance
at the inboard end of the cantilever arm to apply the
correct tightening torque to the ladder fixing screws.
This is shown in Fig 6.72.
Where it is necessary for the vertical level of the
ladder route to be changed in, for example, a cable flat
to create the headroom necessary for an emergency
escape route, the ladders are angled to maintain the
same vertical clearance (see Fig 6.75). Straight forward
2-hole angle brackets are used to join the angled ladder
to the horizontal ladder. If the angled portion of the
run is long enough, special swivel fixing cantilever arms
are available to provide support for the ladders over
the angled portion of the run (see Fig 6.76).
In addition to being used on the main arterial cable
routes across the station, these basic cable support
arrangements are also found in plant areas where much
fewer cables are required. Figure 6.77 shows an example
where upward-pointing C2 channels fixed to the t o p
surface of a structural beam using B15 beam clamps,
provide the supports from which horizontal ladders
may be mounted. The same arrangement may equally
FIG. 6.75 Method of jointing ladder racks of different planes
Cable support systems
be inverted and suspended from the underside of a
beam as illustrated in Fig 6.78. A variation on the
same theme is created by using lengths of C I channel
clamped to the underside of structural beams at 2
metre intervals to form the cantilevers on which the
ladder is directly m o u n t e d (see Fig 6.79). It is also
possible to m o u n t the type of assembly shown in Fig
6.78 directly under a concrete ceihng using suitable
concrete fixing anchors or lengths of C4 concrete insert
channel cast into the ceiling. Here, the fact that the
central upright is supported at one end only, means
that the total load carrying capacity must be restricted.
In the same way, the vertical channels described
above can be used to provide fixings for cantilever arms
for vertical cable routes. In dedicated cable risers, these
uprights are hkely to be concrete insert channels since
their required location will be known at an early stage
in the design. Closer to plant items, vertical cable
runs are quite hmited and in these cases the upright
would typically be a length of CI channel surface-
mounted on to a concrete wall or braced to a structural
steel column.
In addition to using ladder racks laid flat in a hori­
zontal plane, they are also sometimes turned edge-on
into a vertical plane for horizontal routes. Ladder racks
which are orientated in this way may then be bolted
flat to wahs, o n t o surface-mounted CI channels or C4
concrete insert channels. In these cases, the cables are
LADDER RACK TO BE CUT
TO SUIT RAKE ANGLE
503
Cabling
FIG. 6.76 Swivel cantilever arm
not simply fixed flat against the ladder, as this would
require a positive fixing to be made. Instead, specially
designed J-brackets installed at 600 m m spacing are
used to carry the cables. These J-brackets (shown in
Fig 6.80), are fabricated from a short length of C3
channel with two 6 mm thick plates welded to it at
either end, one larger than the other whh a fixing hole
punched in it. The length of the C3 channel used is
either 150 mm or 75 mm (corresponding to two and
FIG. 6.77 Method of fixing cable racking to top of steelwork
504
Chapter 6
one modules-worth of cables respectively). With the
J-brackets in place, there is sufficient clearance simply
to lift the cables into them in much the same way as
they are placed on the cantilever arms.
The longer of the two end plates of the J-bracket
is in fact 150 m m long. This means that h is possible
to stack four of these brackets and fix them to a 600
m m wide ladder rack, the top J-bracket being anchored
into the ladder rail whilst the other three are fixed
to the ladder rung as illustrated in Fig 6.81. If large
J-brackets are used, this gives a theoretical total cable
carrying capacity for this arrangement of eight modules
(or 56 k g / m ) , hence ihustrating that edge-mounted
ladder rails can provide significant cable carrying
capacity without protruding great distances from the
wall.
Where cables pass through plant areas such as the
turbine hall basement, it is often the case that there
are many obstructions present at ground level, such as
pipework and equipment mounting phnths, which pose
considerable problems for the cable steelwork layout
designer. The problem has two facets; firstly, there is
the difficulty of finding a clear route for the cables
to follow without the need for excessive bends in the
steelwork runs, and secondly, there are the physical
problems encountered when instalhng cable steelwork
in congested areas, often requiring complex scaffold
arrangements to provide access.
C2 CHANNEL SUPPORT
AT INTERVALS OF 2m
C1 CHANNEL LENGTH
TO SUIT BEAM SIZE.
CHANNEL TO OVERHANG
B15 CLAMPS 25mm EACH END
U-BOLT TO BUTT
AGAINST BEAM
FLANGE
MIN BEAM
WIDTH 260mm
 Cable support systems

U-BOLTS TO BUTT
AGAINST BEAM FLANGE

-iL U-BOLT TO BUTT AGAINST BEAM FLANGE.

LADDER RACK TO BUTT AGAINST B15 CLAMP

• χ

LENGTH TO SUIT BEAM AND LADDER RACK WIDTHS

CHANNEL TO OVERHANG 815 CLAMP BY 25mm

FIG. 6.78 M e t h o d o f f i x i n g cable racking to underside FIG. 6.79 A l t e r n a t i v e methods o f f i x i n g cable racking
o f beams to underside o f beams

In order to get round this problem, the C E G B has

developed a number of cable support bridge and tower
assembhes. The use of these bridge/tower combina­
tions addresses both of the difficulties identified above.
Firstly, h is possible to design clear, uninterrupted cable
runs free from the obstructions at ground level, the
towers themselves providing a convenient method of
dropping the cables down to the items of plant which
they serve. Secondly, it is often possible to carry out
a certain amount of 'pre-assembly' of these bridges
and towers in site workshops. This reduces the time
required for construction in the congested plant areas,
leaving access free for other contractors.
The box section bridges are formed by bolting to­
gether lengths of standard ladder rack. T w o basic
designs of bridge are used, termed light duty and heavy
duty, both of which are capable of carrying the same
weight of cable. The distinguishing feature between
them is that the maximum allowable span for the heavy
FIG. 6.80 J-bracket
duty bridge is 9 m whereas it is only 7.5 m for the light
duty bridge.
From Fig 6.82, it can be seen that the sides of the at 600 m m intervals, the b o t t o m strap being staggered
light duty cable bridge are formed from ladder rack with the top for additional rigidity. Standard J-brackets
300 m m , 450 m m or 600 m m wide, depending u p o n are m o u n t e d on the side ladder racks to provide sup­
the number of cables to be carried. These ladders are ports for the cables in the normal way. For the heavy
joined at the top and bottom by steel bracing straps duty cable bridge, the bracing straps are replaced by

505
Cabling Chapter 6

Once assembled, these bridges are supported on

'J- BRACKETS
FIG. 6.81 J-bracket assembly fitted to ladder rack
300 m m ladder racks as shown by Fig 6.83. These 300
m m ladders are joined to the side ladders using right
angle brackets at 1 m intervals. It is important to
note that the 300 m m ladders are provided to make
the structure more rigid. They are not there to provide
extra cable carrying capacity.
box-section towers. These towers are themselves formed
by bolting together sections of ladder rack at site
but away from the j o b face. The towers are in fact
identical to the heavy duty bridges, 300 m m ladder
rack being used for ah four sides. Tower heights of
up to 6 m (the standard length of ladder rack), are
permissible.
The standard selection of steelwork components in­
cludes a range of specially designed gusset and cruci­
form brackets to facilitate the connection of the bridges
to the towers. Some examples of these are shown in
Fig 6.84, which ihustrates a right angle connection of
two bridges to a tower. There are also more elaborate
designs of bracket which facilitate angled take-offs
of bridges from their support towers.
In the main applications for these large cable bridges,
the support towers will generally be found fixed to
concrete floors using welded baseplate brackets and
proprietary concrete anchors. It is however possible to
m o u n t the towers on support stools, which are in turn
welded to structural RSJs. This welded fixing is not
a preferred solution since it removes some of the flexi­
bility from the steelwork system. It is also considered
good engineering practice to reduce on-site welding of
structural steel to an absolute minimum.
In areas such as boiler houses, there are often many
cases where the use of welded mountings is unavoid-

STRAPS ARE TO BE STAGGERED

ON TOP AND BOTTOM SIDES AS SHOWN

MAY BE DECREASED WHEN NECESSARY TO

ACCOMMODATE SPLICE OR TO AVOID FOULING
J-BRACKETS

6 0 0 m m NORMAL

FIG. 6.82 Light duty cable bridge assembly

506
 Cable support systems

1 METRE BETWEEN BRACKETS.

MAY BE DECREASED WHEN NECESSARY
TO ACCOMMODATE SPLICE OR TO AVOID
J-BRACKETS

WHEN USED AS A TOWER

THE LOWEST BRACKETS
SHALL BE WITHIN 600mm
OF THE FLOOR PLATE

SIDE MAY BE 300/450/600mm

LADDER RACK TOP AND BOTTOM
RACKS ARE 300mm

m Da

FIG. 6 . 8 3 Heavy duty cable bridge assembly

FIG. 6 . 8 4 Cable bridge/tower arrangement

507
Cabling Chapter 6

able. Another variation on the same theme is to m o u n t

the towers from the underside of a RSJ using a
combination of CI channels and B15 beam clamps.
It is also permissible to fix cable bridges directly to
the underside of structural steelwork using the clips
described in the previous section. The variety of accept­
able fixing arrangements for these box-section bridges
all serve to illustrate the overall flexibility provided
by the steelwork system as a whole.
Because it is possible to instah four 150 m m J-
brackets on either side of these bridge sections (for
600 mm wide ladders), it follows that these bridges
are capable of carrying significant quantities of cables
(up to 112 k g / m ) . The large quantity of components
which need to be assembled to form these cable bridges
means that they are a relatively expensive method of
supporting cables. It is therefore important to ensure
that these bridge/tower arrangements are only specified
if they are to be well loaded.
There is, however, a significantly cheaper bridge/
tower combination which may be used for routes with
few cables. This is known as the 'tee tower' assembly
and it provides a method for supporting a single TEE TOWERS CONSTRUCTED
300 m m ladder rack laid horizontally over spans of FROM 300mm LADDER RACK

up to 6 m at up to 6 m above the floor. In this arrange­

ment, the towers are formed by bolting together two
300 m m ladders to form a tee-section upright. These
ladders are in turn fixed at top and bottom to a spe­ FIG. 6.85 Typical tee tower arrangement
cial 'baseplate' assembly. The 300 m m bridging ladder
is then fixed to the top surface of the upper 'base­
plate', the cables being cleated to the top of this ladder
in the conventional way. Two reinforcing channels are
usuahy fixed to the underside of the horizontal ladder
to provide additional rigidity. Where spans of up to
4 m are required, these reinforcing channels are of
the CI pattern. If 6 m spans are required, C2 section
channels are used to provide the necessary strength.
Despite the relatively long spans and simple tower con­
struction, these tee tower assemblies still have a very
high steelwork-to-cable carrying capacity ratio and they
are not, therefore, considered to be very cost effec­
tive. Alternative cantilever arm based cable support
arrangements will therefore be used in preference if
fixing positions are available. If the use of a tee tower
is unavoidable, then an attempt is always made to
open out the support tower pitch to the maximum
FIG. 6.86 U-bracket arrangement
permissible by using C2 reinforcing channels. A typical
tee tower assembly is shown in Fig 6.85.
The tee tower assembly described provides a means is provided by a 75 m m wide bracket. Overhead cable
for carrying three modules-worth of cables (21 k g / m ) . bridges are formed simply by bolting these U-brackets
Where support for even smaller quantities of cables to lengths of either CI or C2 channel at 0.6 m inter­
over elevated routes is required, the cable steelwork vals. If a CI channel is used, the maximum permissible
system provides small U-brackets which can be bolted span is 4 m, a C2 channel increases this to 6 m. By
directly to CI and C2 type channel. These U-brackets, virtue of the very small cable carrying capacity, this
illustrated in Fig 6.86, are similar in design to the type of cable support arrangement is generally referred
J-brackets described earlier, consisting essentially of a to as being 'tail end steelwork' and is used to support
short length of C3 channel with plates welded to it at cables over the tail ends of their routes as they approach
either end. A 150 m m wide U-bracket provides the the equipment to which they connect. The important
capachy for 14 k g / m of cable whilst 7 k g / m capacity features of tah end steelwork are that:

508

• It carries very small quantities of cables.
• The arrangements used are designed at site, usually
by the cable installation contractor, to suit the phy­
sical conditions which prevail where the cable is to
be routed.
• Tail end steelwork does not form part of the com­
puter matrix used to provide the automatic routing
facility. For this reason, tail end steelwork is some­
times referred to as 'off matrix steelwork'.
The flexibility provided by the construction kit based
steelwork employed by the C E G B means that there is
a very large number of tail end steelwork configura­
tions to be found in modern C E G B power stations.
The basic cable carriers which are used for tail end
steelwork are:
• J-brackets.
• U-brackets.
• 300 m m ladder racks.
• Perforated cable trays.
Of these, the perforated cable tray is the only one
which has not been mentioned before. The perforated
tray is a proprietary cable support product and is
generally of the form ihustrated in Fig 6.87. This type
of cable support is inexpensive because it has no welds
EDGING STRIP WHEN REQUIRED
FIG. 6 . 8 7 Perforated cable tray
in its construction. It is also very easy to work with
at the very small capacity sizes required for tail end
steelwork. Perforated tray steelwork is available in
the same sizes as the standard ladder rack, but it is
not used in preference t o ladder racks where that is
justified because h is inferior to ladder rack on the
fohowing counts:
• It has a higher self-weight to cable carrying weight
ratio (and is therefore less cost-effective).
• It does not provide convenient cable
facilities.
Cable support systems
• The solid base prevents cables from being routed
out through the b o t t o m of the cable carrier.
• The sohd base restricts the flow of air round the
cables, hence losing a high proportion of the avail­
able convective coohng.
• The upturned lip provides an obstruction to cables
leaving the ladder rack.
This subsection has described the various cable
steelwork assemblies which are commonly constructed
from the basic range of steelwork components. It has
illustrated that cable carrying capacity is based around
a 7 k g / m 'module' and that standard arrangements
are avahable to support from one to 16 modules of
cables. Table 6.22 draws all these standard assemblies
together into a single ready-reference chart. A chart
such as this would he used by the cable steelwork
layout designer when selecting the best type of cable
support steelwork for a particular application.
By providing standard support assembly designs, h
is possible to draw u p a coding system which greatly
simphfies cable steelwork layout drawings. The C E G B
uses a coding system based u p o n the standard assembly
figure numbers appearing in G D C D Standard 197 for
the preparation of its cable steelwork layout drawings.
6.5 Seismically qualified cable supports
Before leaving the subject of cable support steelwork,
it is worth covering briefly the topic of seismic quah-
fication and its impact on cable support steelwork
design.
Essentially, seismically quahfying a cable installation
requires justification that the cable support steelwork
stays intact and in place during the defined seismic
incident and also that the cables remain on their support
steelwork.
Because of the huge variety of cable steelwork
assemblies which will be required for a typical power
station cable installation, seismic qualification by full
scale test is impractical. By virtue of their frame-hke
modular construction, cables support steelwork assem­
blies are most suitable for seismic qualification by
mathematical analysis. Complex finite element mathe­
matical computer models are prepared for represen­
tative or worst-case assembhes in order to predict the
behaviour of the real assemblies during the earthquake.
The lengths of channels and the ladder racks are mod­
elled as beam or strut elements whilst the fixings and
connections are modelled as translational a n d / o r
rotational springs. In many cases, static load testing
is used to determine the spring stiffness values for the
various connection types.
It is important to realise that the term seismically
qualified can only he applied to the cable steelwork
cleating assemblies and not the components which go to make
u p those assembhes. Also, as with the seismic quali-
509
Cabling Chapter 6

TABLE 6.22
Guide to selection of steelwork structures for various modules

Horizontal Vertical
No. of
modules Maximum Max Type of
Type of structure
span span structure

Up to 1 4m Cl channel — cables laid in channel or 4m Cl channel

in 75 mm U-bracket
6m C2 channel — cables laid in channel or 6m C2 channel
in 75 mm U-bracket

Up to 2 4m Cl channel — cables laid in 150 mm 4m Cl channel

U-bracket
6m C2 channel — cables laid in 150 mm 6m C2 channel
U-bracket

Up to 3 2m 300 mm ladder rack (laid flat)

4m 300 mm ladder rack (laid flat)
— reinforced with Cl channel
6m 300 mm ladder rack (laid flat)
— reinforced with C2 channel

Up to 4 2m 300 mm ladder rack — on edge with 1 m 300 mm

2 X 150 mm J-brackets cantilever

Up to 5 2m 450 mm ladder rack — laid flat

Up to 6 2m 450 mm ladder rack — on edge with 1m 450 mm

3 X 150 mm J-brackets cantilever

Up to 7 2m 600 mm ladder rack — laid flat

Up to 8 2m 600 mm ladder rack — on edge with 1 m 600 mm

4 X 150 mm J-brackets cantilever

7.5 m 300 mm light duty bridge with

2 X 150 mm J-brackets on each side face
9m 300 mm heavy duty bridge with
2 X 150 mm J-brackets on each side face

Up to 12 7.5 m 450 mm light duty bridge with

3 X 150 mm J-brackets on each side face

9m 450 mm heavy duty bridge with

3 X 150 mm J-brackets on each side face

Up to 16 7.5m 600 mm light duty bridge with

4 X 150 mm J-brackets on each side face

9m 600 mm heavy duty bridge with

4 X 150 mm J-brackets on each side face

Note: For module requirements greater than those stated in the table, use multiples of the
system. With 40 modules of cabling use six levels of 600 mm ladder rack on cantilever
arms.

fication of other equipment, the seismic quahfication
wih relate to the particular design e a r t h q u a k e conditions
being assumed.
F o r normal non-seismic apphcations, cable steelwork
structures and their fixings have only to be designed
t o withstand the n o r m a l loads imposed by gravity act­
ing on the cables and the self-weight of the structures
themselves. T h e major difference which needs t o be
catered for in order t o survive a seismic disturbance is
resistance to horizontal accelerations. A t Heysham 2 ,
which was the first C E G B power station where cer­
tain plant items were specifically designed t o withstand
the effects of a n e a r t h q u a k e of prescribed m a g n i t u d e ,
the most significant effect on the design of the cable

510

steelwork was the increase in the cross-sectional
areas of most of the main upright members which, in
turn, increased their stiffness. This effect is seen most
dramatically by the comparison of the floor to ceiling
upright members for non-seismic apphcations with
those for seismic applications (shown in Fig 6.88). The
two uprights are shown drawn to the same scale.
NON-SEISMIC
SEISMIC
FIG. 6 . 8 8 Comparison of floor to ceiling upright
supports for non-seismic and seismic applications
Another area of impact on the steelwork was that
of the civil connection design. The high moments
generated by the horizontal loadings in the steelwork
assemblies led, w k h conventional fixings, to very high
pull-out loads in some of the concrete anchors. In a
'conventional fixing', it is assumed that the objective
is to clamp the steelwork baseplate as rigidly as possible
to the floor/ceihng and hence make the connection as
'stiff as possible. However, in an assembly where the
connections at the floor and ceiling are stiff (buih-in
connections), much higher stresses in the upright, and
hence greater moments at the fixings, are generated.
Cable support systems
The solution, therefore, was to design the floor and
ceiling fixings with pinned connections since a true
pin connection can t r a n s m k n o m o m e n t . Using these
fixings led to much lower loadings on the concrete
anchors and lower stresses in the uprights. The pay-off
from using this fixing method is that it permits greater
movement in the cable supports.
The requirement for special civil connections and for
large upright sections essentially stemmed from the
approach used for seismic qualification at Heysham 2 ,
which was to start with the established format of
steelwork and determine what needed to be done to
obtain the ability to withstand the seismic disturbance.
This approach was adopted for a number of reasons:
• The design permitted retention of the cantilever
type support arrangements. This in turn enabled the
same cable installation practices to be used for the
seismically qualified areas of the power station as
those used for the non-seismic areas and, as for pre­
vious stations, to run the cables out adjacent to the
route and then hft them into place.
• Adopting the same basic steelwork format permitted
the existing computer-aided cable routing programs
to be used with very httle modification.
• The same cleating methods could be used for both
seismic and non-seismic areas.
• Interface compatibihty between non-seismic and seis­
mic cable steelwork was assured.
The decision to employ cantilever type steelwork also
had penalties, chiefly resuhing from the required in­
crease in structure stiffness. The upright members in
the support frames became very heavy, expensive, and
time consuming and labour intensive to install. The
fixings to the civil structure were also very heavy and
expensive due to the high load capacities required from
them.
The main difficuhy arises in accommodating the
flexibility brought about by the use of the cantilever
type cable ladder supports. A n alternative approach
which is being used at Sizeweh Β is to use closing
struts to form trapezoidal supports for the cable lad­
ders. The effect of adding the closure strut is to pro­
duce a much stiffer framework as far as horizontal
loadings are concerned. The increased stiffness means
that standard cross-section members can be used, these
trapezes usually being assembled using C2 channel.
Simply adding the closing strut is generally not suffi­
cient in its own right to achieve seismic withstand
capability, and in m a n y cases additional bracing struts
are needed to achieve the required rigidity.
The main advantage in going to this system is that
the frameworks are much easier to handle since they
are hghter. Because, in general, they make use of stand­
ard components they are also cheaper than their canti­
lever counterparts. The major drawback is of course
that cable instaUation is no longer straightforward
511
Cabling
since cables now need to be threaded through the
trapezes. The use of trapeze type supports will also
mean that for a given cable carrying capacity, the
support structure will also occupy a greater volume.
This may have implications for civil structure costs
for areas such as cable tunnels.
Finally, it is important to appreciate that a seismic
withstand requirement wih also have an impact on the
design and installation of tail end steelwork. The need
to demonstrate by mathematical analysis that a cable
support will stay intact during an earthquake and the
inherent design work and time which this requires, will
mean that it is not possible to leave the design of tail
end cable steelwork as a site activity. Every tail end
steelwork cable support assembly which is required to
survive the earthquake must therefore be designed in
advance. In order to reduce the costs of this seismic
qualification activity, it also becomes necessary to
impose hmits on the number of designs of tail end
steelwork which may be used.
Imposing these hmits means that some adaptations
of designs may be necessary to suit particular apphca­
tions at she. This often leads to provision of tail end
steelwork with a greater load carrying capacity than
required for the application, incurring a hardware cost
penahy. This is, of course, offset by the savings which
result from not carrying out further qualification
analysis. Because of the relative simplicity of the tail
end support structures it is, however, possible to use
simplified methods of analysis and thereby produce
qualified steelwork designs more cheaply.
7 Cable installation practices
7.1 Introduction
This section primarily describes the CEGB's 'cable
cleating phüosophy' and hs origins, i.e., the manner in
which cables are permanently located on their support
arrangements. As described in the previous section, the
bulk of cables in a power station are installed in air on
cable supporting steelwork and this is the method on
which the most emphasis is placed. The other installa­
tion options are:
• Installed direct-in-ground.
• Installed in ducts.
• Laid in concrete troughs.
Before the cables can be permanently cleated to their
support steelwork, however, they must first of all be
transferred from the drums on which they are delivered
to site. This process is known as cable pulling and it
is dealt with in Section 7.6 of this chapter.
7.2 The need for cable restraint
The fundamental reason for restraining cables is simply
512
Chapter 6
to provide a means for their location. In the horizontal
direction this basically means leading the cables along
the correct paths, while vertically it is also necessary to
support their weight. This is true irrespective of the
type and size of cable. There are, however, two further
factors which need to be considered when designing
cable cleating arrangements for power cables.
Under normal load conditions, conductor power
losses dictate that there will be some thermal expan­
sion of the cables and, to allow for this, cables are
never anchored to structures as they pass round bends.
However, since many power station electrical loads
are intermittent there is, in many cases, also an element
of thermal cycling which needs to be ahowed for by
the cleating system used. Over and above these ther­
mal requirements however, there is for the single-core
power cables used for large energy transfers across
the power station, the need for restraint against the
large electromagnetic forces generated under short-
circuh conditions. These large forces do not necessitate
cleating of multicore power cables for two reasons:
• Circuits fed using muhicore power cables are fuse-
protected and the magnitude of the fauh current, and
hence the bursting forces generated, are limited by
the presence of the fuse.
• Any forces which are generated between the phase
conductors are restrained by the construction of the
cable itself.
The forces which are exerted on a single-core power
cable are negligible under normal full-load conditions
(typically 1 kgf per metre, dependent u p o n the installa­
tion configuration used). Under through-fault condi­
tions, however, forces measured in many thousands
of kgf can be generated for periods of the order of
1 second. The cable restraint system used for single-core
power cables must therefore be capable of controlhng
these forces in order to minimise the risk to h u m a n life
and damage to adjacent plant and the cables themselves.
For single-core cleat design purposes, a current of
121 kA asymmetric first peak, decaying to 39.4 kA
RMS symmetrical in not less than 150 ms is assumed.
This is based on a 750 M V A fauh on the 11 kV system,
reinforced by contributions from rotating plant. As­
suming that the main protection functions correctly,
then the clearance of that fault will take place within
0.5 seconds. Should main protection fail to operate,
the fault will be cleared by the back-up protection
but with considerably extended clearance times. H o w ­
ever, neither main nor back-up protection operation
time is used as the design parameter for single-core
power cable cleats; instead, the performance capability
of the cables themselves is chosen as the hmiting factor.
The elastomeric cable insulations employed in the
C E G B approved range of single-core cables (at all three
auxiliary system voltages), are capable of withstand­
ing a short-circuit maximum conductor temperature of
250°C. T o ensure compatibility with the design per-

formance of these cables, therefore, the cable cleating
arrangements are designed to restrain the cables under
fauh conditions for the period of time necessary for
the conductor to reach this limiting temperature. This
covers ah practical conditions since the cable size will
have been selected to match the system protection
requirements. Putting numbers to this, certain types
of cable restraints must be capable of whhstanding an
imtial shock approaching 9000 kgf on one conductor
(cushioned somewhat by the cable itself), and then an
oscillatory load of around 3000 kgf. (Implicit in the
load figures is an assumption about the formation of
the cables within the clamps and this point is addressed
later.)
These short-circuit loading figures are, however, used
as design guidehnes only. Full scale short-circuit testing
is used to demonstrate conclusively the adequacy of a
particular design of cable cleat.
In summary, therefore, there are three possible rea­
sons for providing restraint for cables. Which of these
apply depends upon the cable type being considered.
However, for all cable types, the cleating system used
must provide the most economic method of fulfilhng
the design functions reliably during the life of the power
station. The methods which are used by the C E G B in
practice are discussed as fohows.
7.3 Cable cleating design parameters
Single-core power cables may be installed in either a
'trefoil group' or a 'flat spaced' arrangement. In the
trefoil formation, the three individual phase cables are
cleated together in the form of a triangle, sheath to
sheath. In flat formation, as the name imphes, the
cables are laid side-by-side. In cases where there is a
neutral cable, this is either laid alongside the trefoil
group or forms a fourth cable in the flat formation.
Each installation formation has its own advantages
and disadvantages. The trefoU group, because of the
close proximity of the conductors, is subject to very
high bursting forces under condhions of through fault
currents. In addhion to this, under normal load con­
ditions, the trefoil arrangement reduces the current
carrying capacity of the individual cables due to the
reduced heat radiating surface area. A further dis­
advantage is that handling problems make it difficult
to lay up the trefoil arrangement for larger single-core
cables. In contrast to this, the flat spaced formation
reduces bursting forces considerably, allows full use of
the prospective current rating of the cable and is very
simple to lay. Furthermore, the cleats for the flat spaced
formation are of a much simpler pattern than those
required for the trefoil configuration and are therefore
less expensive.
The flat spaced arrangement, however, suffers from
the disadvantage of generating a stronger, less h o m o ­
geneous, magnetic field, hence leading to current im­
balance difficulties in multiconductor per phase circuits
and also higher sheath voltages. This effect also in­
Cable installation practices
creases the cable impedance. Installing the cables in
this way will, of course, also take u p a greater space on
the support arrangement.
At the m o m e n t , C E G B policy accepts that the ad­
vantages of the flat spaced formation outweigh its
disadvantages and this is the instahation method which
is therefore used. The issue is continually reviewed
in the hght of experience and technological develop­
ments in cleat design and it is possible that, in the
future, the trefoil group may he favoured for some
installations.
7.4 Cleating philosophy for cables installed
on steelwork
Both cable type and run orientation will have major
influences on cable cleating philosophy and the C E G B
therefore lays down rules governing cleating arrange­
ments for all of the main cable types in the three major
run orientations. These run orientations are:
• Straight horizontal runs with the cables supported
on ladder racks.
• Straight vertical runs with the cables fixed directly
to cantilever a r m s .
• Horizontal runs in a vertical plane (i.e., with the
ladder rack m o u n t e d edge-on).
Guidelines are also given for cleating at bends, cleat­
ing below equipment and for cleating at single-core
cable transposition points. These are, however, rather
beyond the scope of this text which wih therefore only
concentrate o n the three major groups above. Readers
requiring further information on these arrangements
should refer to G D C D Standard 216 [21].
7.4.1 Straight horizontal runs on ladder racks
Single-core power cables are rigidly clamped to the
support ladders using plastic coated, steel zig-zag cleats,
of the type shown in Fig 6.89, spaced at 1.2 metre
intervals (i.e, alternate, upward-facing ladder rungs).
A single size of cleat is used for all sizes of cable and
the design ensures a centreline spacing of 80 m m . To
reduce chafing of the cables due to thermal cycling, a
plastic insert is placed into the open face of the ladder
rung underneath the cables. Further protection is also
provided by the plastic coating of the cleat.
Multicore power cables are installed on ladder rack­
ing without clamping hence permitting the required
thermal movement to take place. A n additional bonus
arising from the lack of clamping is that installation
costs are also reduced.
In these cases, location is achieved by means of a
device known as a thermal spacer. This spacer, shown
in Fig 6.90, is a polypropelene peg of 25 m m diameter,
with a specially designed foot profile which enables
it to be locked firmly into place on a length of cable
513
Cabling Chapter 6

• They provide an easily installed method of restrain­

ing the lateral movement of cables.

• They provide a simple method of obtaining a 25 m m

spacing between adjacent cables to allow air circula­
tion, hence avoiding cable derating.

• They provide a simple means of instahing the hnear

heat detecting cables used for fire detection pur­
poses in C E G B cable installations. T h e thermal
spacers are locked into place on the underside of
the ladder such that the detector cable protects the
cables on the ladder immediately below h . The de­
tector cables are simply laid into the slot in the barrel
of the spacer, some local protection being given to
the detector cable by using a short length of split
silicon rubber tubing. A longer design of thermal
spacer to that shown in Fig 6.90 also exists to support
a detector cable above the topmost ladder rack of
a stacked arrangement. Further information about
the operating principles of linear heat detecting
cables can be found in Section 3.8 of this chapter.
CHANNEL OR LADDER
RACK
Multicore power cables, u p to and including 16 mm^
conductor size, are installed touching in a double-layer
located by these thermal spacers along the rails of
FIG. 6.89 Multiple zig-zag cleats for single-core cables the ladder work at 1.2 m intervals. Larger cables are
installed in a single-layer with a thermal spacer between
each cable, hence providing the required air gap (see
Fig 6.91).
Control and instrumentation cables require n o cool­
ing and hence can be installed touching, irrespective
of size (see also Fig 6.91). Again they are retained on
their support ladders by thermal spacers located in
the rails. Cables u p to and including 12-core multicore
and 60-pair muhipair, are installed in a double-layer.
Cable sizes larger than this are installed in a single-
layer due to their physical size and weight. These
installation rules also serve to limit the a m o u n t of
combustible mass carried by the ladder rack which is
important from the fire propagation point of view.
It is worth noting that where the cable installation
is to have a seismic withstand capability, the short,
polypropelene thermal spacers are not adequate. Two
problems exist:

• The weight and movement of the cables during an

earthquake can be such that they can snap the spacers
at the narrow part of their foot profile.

• The movement of the cables can be so great that

they can j u m p over the short spacers.

T o overcome these problems, the C E G B has developed

a special high strength thermal spacer, m a d e from
FIG. 6.90 Thermal spacer super-tough nylon, which is also twice the height of
the standard thermal spacer.
When installing control and instrumentation cables
support channel, simply by twisting it. These thermal it is also necessary to consider the possibility of ad­
spacers fulfil three functions: jacent power cables inducing interference currents in

514
 Cable installation practices

ARRANGEMENT 1 :
SINGLE CORE POWER CABLES

ARRANGEMENT2:
MULTICORE POWER CABLES

LADDER RACK

ARRANGEMENTS:
MULTICORE AND
MULTIPAIR CONTROL
CABLES

FIG. 6 . 9 1 Horizontal cable cleating arrangements for multicore power and control cables

the control cores, particularly under fault conditions.
To avoid this, the C E G B dictates that, for all major
horizontal or vertical cable routes, where power cabl­
ing or C and I cabhng is run in parahel, a minimum
physical separation of 600 m m is maintained between
the power and control cables. This requirement is
relaxed to 300 m m if n o single-core power cables fol­
low the route. For ease of installation and cost re­
duction, this separation ruhng is furthermore relaxed
at the tail-end of the cable routes for multicore power

515
Cabling Chapter 6

cables, provided that the parallel length does not ex­
ceed 5 m.
Having separated C and I cables from power cables,
it is always considered good practice to install the
power cables on the uppermost racks of a stacked ar­
ray to reduce unnecessary heating, and hence thermal
ageing, of the control cables.
7.4.2 S t r a i g h t v e r t i c a l runs o n c a n t i l e v e r a r m s
Cantilever arms are installed at 1 m intervals on ver­
tical cable routes and the cables are therefore cleated
to every arm.
Zig-zag cleats are not used to anchor single-core
cables on vertical runs for two reasons. First, it is not
possible to guarantee that the dead weight of the mid­
dle cable (or cables if a neutral is present) will be
adequately restrained if, for example, the two outside
cables in the cleat had shghtly larger outside diameters.
Secondly, it creates unacceptable installation difficul­
ties in simuhaneously lining up three large power cables
side-by-side on a vertical run. Instead, individual cast
aluminium, two-part claw cleats of the type shown in
Fig 6.92 are used in conjunction with a steel bracing
NON-MAGNETIC
SPACING STRAP
CLEATS USED IN PAIRS.
NOTE DISPOSITION OF CLEATS
SPACING STRAP
FITTED BETWEEN
CLEATS AND ARM
Strap to provide rigidity under short-circuit condhions.
The cleats are aluminium and not steel in order to
avoid the large currents which would circulate in the
cleat due to the creation of a magnetic circuh around
the cable. The effects are very much smaller where the
magnetic circuit loops all three phases of a circuit since
a magnetic balance wih virtually exist. This is there­
fore not a problem in the case of the zig-zag cleats
used on the horizontal runs. It is for this reason that
the bracing strap used w h h claw cleats must always
be placed between the cleats and the cantilever arms
rather than above, bridging between the top of the
cleats, since the fixing b o h s would then create magnetic
circuits around the individual cables. These individual
claw cleats are, of course, more expensive than the
zig-zag cleats and they are also more time consuming
to install. They are therefore not used on horizontal
cable runs.
Vertical runs of multicore power cables with conduc­
tor sizes of above 16 mm^ are clamped singly, using
a single pressed steel cleat of the type shown in Fig
6.93. This type of cleat has the advantage of a specially
shaped foot which fixes a r o u n d the lip profile of the
cable support channel. The act of tightening-up the cleat
onto the cable serves to lock the cleat in place. This
leads to much faster cable installation than using the
claw type cleat. A range of cable sizes is covered by
one cleat size which is also a major advantage. Such
a cleat would not, however, be capable of withstanding
the forces associated with a short-circuit and they must
not therefore be used for cleating single-core power
cables.
Cables of 16 mm^ conductor size and below are
strapped at 1 m intervals in bundles using a specially
designed, two part, polypropelene cable tie (similar
to conventional cables ties). These ties have specially

SEPARATE SHAPED PLASTIC

COUNTERBED HELD IN POSITION
MIO CHANNEL^ I BETWEEN CABLE AND CHANNEL
NUT ^ > SHAPED METAL PLATE ^"'^
TO CLAMP CABLE
CHANNEL ARM ADJUSTED BY SET SCREW

M10x95mm FIXING STUD

SECURES EACH PAIR OF
CLEATS AND SPACING
STRAP TO ARM WITH
CHANNEL NUT

EXAMPLE OF USE OF CLEATS FOR 3 SINGLE CORE

POWER CABLES SPACED AT 80mm CENTRES

HOLES FOR M10

FIXING STUD CLEAT HOOKED ON TO
INSIDE OF CHANNEL ARM

FIG, 6.92 Claw cleats for single-core cables FIG. 6.93 Pressed steel cleat

516

shaped hammerhead ends which locate under the lips
of the cable support channel. Again, tightening the
cleat fixes the strap in place.
For vertical cable routes which exceed 10 m , every
third strap is replaced by a pressed steel cleat of the
type described above. This provides more positive sup­
port for the cables.
W k h the exception of the very largest control and
instrumentation cables, the same installation method
is used as for the smaU multicore power cables above
(i.e., straps and pressed steel cleats). The large con­
trol cables are cleated singly at 1 m intervals using the
pressed steel cleats. These cleating arrangements are
illustrated in Fig 6.94.
7.4.3 Horizontal runs in a vertical plane
In this situation the support ladder rack is mounted
edge-on, flat against a waU for example, or forming
the side member of a support bridge.
In general, cables will be supported on J-brackets
bolted onto the ladder rack at 0.6 m intervals. The
cables are then laid in the J-brackets and cleated as
they would be for straight horizontal runs.
The exception to this is single-core power cables
which are cleated directly to the outward facing ladder
rungs at 1.2 m intervals, using the claw type cleats
shown in Fig 6.92 in conjunction with the steel backing
straps. This arrangement is ihustrated in Fig 6.95.
7.5 Installation practices for cables installed
other than on support steelwork
The three alternatives to instalhng cables on support
steelwork mentioned in Section 7.1 which are used by
the C E G B are:
• Burying them directly in the ground.
• Installation in ducts.
• Routing in concrete troughs.
Each is covered briefly as follows.
7.5.1 Direct in ground
This installation method is obviously only applicable
for cables routed externally t o the main power station
building. Only a very smaU proportion of cables on a
modern power station are buried directly in the ground.
When routing cables in this way, the main consi­
deration wih be to reduce the risk of damage to the
buried cables from subsequent excavations. This is
done by first of all selecting the route for the cable
such that it will be subject to the minimum possible
future disturbance. It is recognised, however, that ex­
cavations are often carried out on power stations sites
during their operational life and that other measures
are also necessary.
Cable installation practices
The main protection is provided by ensuring an ade­
quate depth of burial. For cabling u p to and including
415 V, the excavated trench for the cable is cut deep
enough to ensure that the highest point on the cable
is not less than 500 m m from the surface. For cabhng
at 3.3 kV and 11 kV, the corresponding figure is 800
m m . Where muhi-layering of cables is necessary, the
depth of trench is simply increased to ensure that the
above hmits are maintained for the uppermost layer.
Before the cables are laid, a 75 m m thick layer of sand
is tamped down into the bed of the trench. This sand
layer is used primarily to provide a cushioned surface
against the cable sheath, free from stones or other
protrusions which could cause damage.
After the cables are laid, a further 75 m m layer of
sand is used to cover them on top of which protective
concrete trench covers, clearly marked to identify the
presence of the cables below, are placed prior to back-
filhng. Marker posts are then placed at strategic points
along the cable route to provide an additional degree
of protection.
Finally, drawings of all external cable routes are
prepared on completion of installation for reference
when future excavations are required.
7.5.2 Installed in ducts
Routing through ducts is sometimes used as an alter­
native to direct burial for outdoor routes, particularly
at road crossings and similar locations. They are also
used in hmited instances within the main building where
cables pass through wahs. The ducts which are used
by the C E G B are either of the unglazed fine earthen­
ware type or, alternatively, plastic. The formerly-used
glazed earthenware type ducts are no longer readily
available.
When designing ducted cable routes it is important
to m a k e the runs as short and as straight as possi­
ble as this will greatly ease cable installation. Any
unavoidable bends in the route must be of a larger
radius than the minimum bend radius of the cables
to be pulled through them and, ideally, should be of
as large a radius as practicable. During installation,
care must be taken to ensure correct ahgnment at duct
section joints, as this could cause damage to cable
sheaths during cable pulling.
Having installed the duct, it is also important to
ensure that any debris is removed from it before at­
tempting to pull cables t h r o u g h . This is done by pulhng
an appropriately sized bobbin through the duct.
7.5.3 Routing in concrete troughs
The major disadvantage with burying externally routed
cables directly in the ground or in routing them through
ducts, is the difficulty involved when installing addi­
tional cables later along the same route. For the bulk
of o u t d o o r routes a r o u n d a power station site, particu­
larly in areas such as substations, cables are therefore
517
Cabling Chapter 6

A R R A N G E M E N T 1:
SINGLE CORE POWER CABLES

CANTILEVER ARM

A R R A N G E M E N T 2:
MULTICORE POWER
AND CONTROL CABLES

SINGLE CLEAT

FLEXIBLE, TWO-PART,
CABLE STRAP

CANTILEVER ARM

3-SINGLE CLAW CLEATS

WITH SPACING STRAP

LARGE MULTICORE
POWER OR LARGE
C AND I CABLES
(NOT MIXED ON
THE SAME CANTILEVER WHERE A VERTICAL
ARMS) CABLE RUN EXCEEDS
10m, A PRESSED STEEL
CLEAT IS USED ON EVERY
THIRD CANTILEVER ARM

SMALL MULTICORE
POWER OR
C AND I CABLES
(NOT MIXED ON
THE SAME CANTILEVER
ARMS)
1000mm

FIG. 6.94 Vertical cleating arrangements for single-core and multicore cables

installed in preformed sectionalised concrete troughs.
These troughs also provide protection for cables in­
stalled in areas liable to settlement where directly buried
cables might be damaged.
The trough types used by the C E G B have a U-
section and they are provided with close fitting concrete
lids of the reinforced pathway type. Three basic sizes
are used:
• 685 m m wide x 345 m m deep.
• 360 m m wide χ 205 m m deep.
• 175 m m wide χ 215 m m deep.
Cable cleating within these troughs depends u p o n the
cable type. For both straight runs and bends, control
cables are laid direct into the base of the trough, being
neither cleated to the trough nor to one another. For
power cables in the two large sizes of trough, lengths
of cable support channel are installed in the base of
the trough at 1 metre intervals although they are not
anchored down to allow for some settlement. Single-
core power cables are cleated to these channels using
the zig-zag cleats at 2 metre intervals. Where multicore
power cables are installed in troughs, they are laid on
the channels spaced using thermal spacers at 1 metre
pitch for cables of 35 mm^ size and above.
Where the number of power cables is sufficient to
warrant their use, J-brackets are mounted on the walls
of the trough down each side. The cables are instahed
on the brackets in the same manner as for normal

518

LADDER RACK
3 SINGLE CLAW CLEATS. WITH
NON-MAGNETIC SPACING STRAP
FIG. 6 . 9 5 Cleating arrangement for horizontal runs of
single-core cables in a vertical plane
Steelwork runs. In the smallest size of trough, the
power cables are simply laid direct into the trough base
and, if used for cables of 35 m m ^ or above, only one
can be instahed since there is n o means of providing
spacing.
Whilst the use of concrete troughs might appear
particularly appropriate in a n d around transformer
compounds, experience has shown that they can become
traps for transformer oil which will, in the long term,
cause damage to cable sheaths. In such areas, cables are
installed either in ducts or, alternatively, if concrete
troughs or trenches are used, after the cables have
been laid they are filled with sand a n d covered with a
concrete screed.
7.6 Cable pulling
Cable puhing is the term used to describe the way
in which the cables are transferred from the drums
on which they are delivered from the manufacturer
to their permanent support arrangements. Again, this
subsection concentrates on cables installed on support
steelwork as these constitute the bulk of cables in
modern power stations.
The term pulling derives from the fact that the cable
is physically puhed from its d r u m during installation.
Whilst this may sound a very straightforward pro­
cedure, it must be appreciated that a cable is more
likely to sustain damage during installation than at
any other time in its working life. There are therefore
certain basic rules which must be adhered t o during
cable installation in order t o minimise the risk of cable
damage.
A cable can sustain damage during installation in
a number of ways, the most obvious of which is by
Cable installation practices
having an excessive tensile load applied t o it during
pulling. This type of loading can cause relative slip
between the concentric layers of the cable, possibly
causing waisting in t h e insulation materials which could
lead t o premature breakdown during operation. This
is particularly crhical for 11 kV cables. F o r smaher
cables, notably C a n d I types, excessive tensile load
can break individual conductors.
If a cable has been subjected t o excessive pulhng
tension during installation, stretching of its polymeric
components m a y well have occurred, particularly the
sheath. This stretching may subsequently relax during
service a n d expose the armours at the glands, a phe­
n o m e n o n referred t o as sheath retraction. This may
then affect the integrity of the cable gland.
T o avoid t h e problems caused by the apphcation of
excessive tension, m a x i m u m allowable pulhng tensions
are quoted by cable manufacturers for each cable type
and size. These figures depend u p o n conductor ma­
terial a n d cross-sectional area, although cable con­
struction is also significant. In a multicore cable, for
example, the tensile load is unlikely t o be distributed
evenly between the conductors. T h e maximum ahow-
able pulling tension figures must take factors such as
this into consideration.
It is also important t o take care when pulhng cables
a r o u n d bends as the cable is being successively bent
and straightened as h passes over the bend. This apphes
a tensile load t o t h e outer part of t h e cable a n d a
compressive load on the inside. T h e smaller the bend
radius, the greater will be the tension on the outer
portion of the cable a n d hence the greater will be the
tension required t o puH t h e cable round that bend.
Similarly, for a given bend radius, t h e larger the cable
diameter the greater wih be the tensile load generated.
Furthermore, as t h e cable passes r o u n d t h e bend, a
reactionary force will be set u p at right angles t o the
cable major axis, the so-called sidewall pressure (see
Fig 6.96). This reactionary force wih have a crushing
effect on the cable a n d in the extreme m a y cause damage
such as, for example, rucking of tape screens in multi-
pair cables.
This type of damage is avoided by specifying mini­
m u m ahowable bending radii for each cable type a n d
size. These minimum bending radii are usually ex­
pressed in terms of the overall cable diameter.
SIDEWALL PRESSURE
FIG. 6 . 9 6 Diagram showing sidewall pressure
519
Cabling
Furthermore, the sheath of a cable could sustain
damage if it were to be dragged across any sharp edges
or rough surfaces during instahation. In these cases,
rollers and skid plates such as those shown in Fig 6.97
may be used to lift the cable away from the hazard
and hence prevent scuffing. As an additional precau­
tion, the C E G B has devised mechanical tests (see
Section 3.11 of this chapter) to demonstrate that the
cables which are used in modern power stations have
some degree of resistance to this type of damage.
LEADING ROLLER
HOOP ROLLER
SKID PLATE ROLLER
FIG. 6.97 Typical rollers and skid plates
Pulling cables into ducted runs brings with it its
own unique problems, mainly due to the restricted
space within the duct and the inaccessibility of the
cable once the pull has commenced. These problems
become worse as the length of duct run increases.
In addition to the number of, and radius of, the
bends in a ducted run, the force required to pull a
cable through a duct will depend upon the coefficient
520
Chapter 6
of friction between the cable sheath and the inner
surface of the duct. This coefficient of friction can be
reduced by the use of proprietary cable pulling lubri­
cants. Care must be taken when selecting such pulling
lubricants to make sure that they have no long term
detrimental effect on the cable sheathing materials.
Another problem which needs to be considered is
that of j a m m i n g . Jamming is the wedging of cables
within the duct where three or more cables are laying
side by side in a flat plane. This situation can easily
lead to excessive tension being applied to the cable,
hence damaging it. This condition is most likely to
occur when pulhng cables a r o u n d bends and can be
avoided by the careful selection of cable fill for a
particular size of conduit.
There is another potential source of installation
damage to cables which is specific to ducted runs. If
more than one cable is to be routed in a given duct,
then they should ah be installed at the same time.
Additional cables are never installed over existing ones
because the winch wire used to pull the cable can
easily cause cut-through damage to the sheaths of the
original cables.
It has been pointed out in the previous section on
cable support steelwork, that the C E G B favours the
use of cantilever type cable support arrangements.
When cables are being installed, it allows them to be
pulled from the d r u m , laid alongside their support
steelwork and then hfted into place. This will in turn
reduce the loads to which the cables are subjected
during installation. Where the use of trapeze type cable
support structures is unavoidable (usuahy only for
certain seismic applications where additional rigidity
is required), installation is greatly comphcated by the
need to thread cables through the supports.
When the cable is being pulled from the d r u m , it
is important to ensure that the drum itself is con­
veniently placed, so that the cable does not have to
negotiate any unnecessary bends. The drum itself should
be supported on a freely turning axle with the cable
being removed over the top of the d r u m . The cables
must never be removed from the d r u m by rolling the
drum along on its flanges, since the arc length at the
drum flange will be greater than that of the cable on
the d r u m . Attempting to d o this will lead to the cable
being used to skid the d r u m round on its flanges.
The C E G B normally uses two basic pulhng tech­
niques, hand pulhng and winch (or nose) pulhng.
The former is self-explanatory. Its advantage is that
cables are unlikely to be subjected to excessive pulling
tensions. The drawback is of course, that the tech­
nique is highly labour intensive and hence expensive.
Good access is also essential for the whole of the route
length, requiring complicated and expensive scaffold­
ing. Obviously, the larger the cable, the more difficult
it will be to hand pull it.
In the alternative method, the pulhng force is pro­
vided by a motorised winch. Here, a winch rope (usually
of the plastic coated steel type) is connected to the

end of the cable using a flexible stocking, of the type
shown in Fig 6.98, and the winch wire wound-in by
the motor. This pulling method obviously requires
less direct labour during the pull, a h h o u g h it may be
necessary to set up a number of sheaves and rollers
along the route prior to pulling. For this reason, most
advantage would be gained from using this method
where a number of cables are to be pulled along the
same route. If a winch rope is pulled across a cable
sheath h can cause considerable damage due to friction
burn-through, even if that winch rope is plastic coated
and, therefore, the utmost care must be taken when
pulling cables onto steelwork where other cables have
already been installed.
WIRE BINDERS CONSISTING OF TWO
TURNS OF WIRE WITH ENDS TWISTED
TOGETHER TO SECURE THE BOND IN
POSITION UNTIL IT TIGHTENS UNDER
THE PULLING STRAIN
APPLICATION OF BOND
TO END OF CABLE
FIG. 6 . 9 8 Method of attaching pulling bond to
multipair cables
It is also important to ensure that a non-stretch
winch rope is used, as this will remove the tendency
for a succession of impulse loads to be applied to the
cable during pulling.
Since a motor is providing the pulling power, there
is also more potential for applying excessive load to
the cable using this pulhng technique. It is essential
therefore that the winch operator is in close com­
munication with other members of the pulhng gang
stationed along the run, who can warn him if the cable
becomes snagged or caught. When using this installa­
tion method, it is also necessary to monitor the load
being placed on the cable during the puH for comparison
with the maximum allowable pull tension for the cable.
This is usually achieved by means of a dynamometer
attached to the winch rope.
Another method of ensuring that excessive loads
are not applied to the cable, is by placing a shear device
in the pulling wire which will fail at a predetermined
tension. The C E G B does not favour the use of such
devices as they can cause a safety hazard, due to whip­
lash, if they fail suddenly.
Finally, as an additional precaution against damaged
cable being used in service, a 1.5 metre length is always
cut from the nose of the cable following the pull.
More sophisticated cable pulling methods also exist,
such as motorised rollers and running bond techniques.
These are discussed briefly as fohows.
Cable installation practices
Motorised rollers
The motorised roller basically consists of an electrical­
ly-driven rubber-tyred roller with a spring-loaded bearer
roller to create a friction grip. The degree of spring
loading is variable and this determines how much tensile
load can be apphed to the cable before slip occurs.
On a typical cable route, a number of these m o ­
torised rollers would be installed prior to cable instal­
lation, mainly o n ehher side of bends, and these would
be used in conjunction with standard non-driven rollers
and sheaves. These motorised rollers are all controHed
from a central panel, all being simuhaneously switched.
During the cable pull, personnel are required at all
bends (as a minimum), to guide the cable through the
rollers. It is important that such personnel are in con­
tact with the operator at the central control panel to
advise him of any problems occurring with the pull,
so that the driven rollers can be turned off to prevent
damage to cable sheaths by continual shppage.
The motorised roller technique has the following
advantages:
• It significantly reduces the tensile loads placed on
the cable during installation and hence damage
potential.
• It offers the potential for pulling cables through very
comphcated routes without the risk of applying too
much load to the cable. The tensile load applied
to the cable only a m o u n t s to that required to pull
the cable from the previous motorised roller.
• There is, in theory, n o hmit to the length of an
individual cable pull.
The disadvantages with this technique are:
• T h e setting u p of the roUers, including a complex
alignment process, is time consuming and expensive.
• Generally individual cables (or at best, two or three
cables of the same diameter), only can be pulled
through motorised rollers in one pass. After each
pull, individual cables would therefore have to be
removed from the rollers before another cable can
be pulled through the same roher set-up.
• The space available between individual cable carriers
is limited a n d m a y physicaUy prevent the use of
these motorised rollers.
• The pulhng equipment is much more sophisticated
t h a n that required for nose pulling and is therefore
more expensive.
Running bond techniques
The principle of the running b o n d cable pulling tech­
nique is shown in Fig 6.99. The technique is widely
used and has been developed by the distribution side
of the electricity supply industry for the installation
of large, delicate, high voltage cables in trenches.
521
Cabling
STEEL WIRE BOND
CABLE DRUM \ CABLE TIED
WIRE BOND TENSIONING
UNIT AND CABLE RAMP
CABLE UNTIED -
BOND
^'f^^ — COMPLETING TIE
ONTO BOND
SNATCH
BLOCK
METHOD OF TYING TO CABLE
FIG. 6.99 Running bond technique
A steel bondwire, of at least twice the length of
the cable section length over which pulhng is to be
carried out, is run-out through the whole section length
over cable rohers positioned along the hne which the
cable is to follow. As with nose pulhng techniques,
those rollers should be installed at sufficient frequency
to prevent the cable from dragging along the support
steelwork.
The cable is then tied to the bond wire at 2 metre
intervals along its entire length, increasing the fre­
quency of ties if the cable is to be installed on a steep
incline or through vertical run sections. At each change
of direction during the puh, the bond ties are released
and the cable is taken round the bend using separate
skid plates and rollers with the bond wire passing
through a separate snatch block. After each bend, the
bond ties are replaced. Whilst traversing each bend,
the nose of the cable is guided over the corner rollers
to ensure that a positive tension is maintained to pre­
vent build up of slack at the bend. The advantages of
this pulhng technique are similar to those of the
motorised roher technique, namely:
• The reduction of tensile load applied to the cable.
• The potential to pull through complex routes.
• The potential to pull through very long routes.
522
Chapter 6
-CABLE RE-TIED
DEEP WALL LADDER RACK
The disadvantages again revolve a r o u n d the time and
effort required to set u p the rollers and snatch blocks
prior to pulhng. The tying and untying of the bond
wires at each bend is also very time consuming and
labour intensive.
In general, the cable support steelwork design and
layout philosophy used by the C E G B , in particular the
use of cantilever supports, means that the motorised
roller and running b o n d cable pulling techniques are
not necessary. They d o , however, have a potential for
application to the problem of pulling cables through
successive trapeze type supports.
8 Cable performance under fire
conditions
This section deals with cable performance under fire
conditions with respect to flame spread and fume emis­
sions, and with the tests used to evaluate these factors.
Whilst the burning characteristics with respect to
flame spread and fume emissions are controhed, such
cables may not necessarily be designed to continue
functioning under fire conditions. Where circuit inte­
grity is required, then short-time fireproof (STFP)
cables as described in Section 3.7 of this chapter must
be used.

Fires started by faults within cables are rare, al­
though theoretically possible if incorrect electrical pro­
tection is apphed. However, because of their service
function, cables become involved in fires caused and
fuelled by other sources, e.g., oU and rubbish. There
were a number of serious cable fires in the 1960s and
early 1970s which demonstrated a need for a close
examination of fire protection policies. The majority
of these fires involved P V C cables, although some also
involved synthetic rubbers such as ethylene propylene
rubber (EPR) and chlorosulphonated polyethelene r u b ­
ber (CSP). A n examination of these serious cable fires
revealed the fohowing major conclusions:
• Where large quantities of cables were involved, the
fire could propagate along both horizontal and ver­
tical cable routes at an alarming speed (10 m e t r e s /
minute).
• Large quantities of dense smoke might be evolved
which would hamper fire fighting operations.
• Large quantities of corrosive fumes could be pro­
duced which might damage building materials, swhch­
gear and electronic equipment.
With the cable insulation and sheathing materials avail­
able in the early 1970s, it was not possible to produce
new designs of cables that would reduce all three of
these risks. As far as power stations are concerned,
because of the large numbers of cables involved, it
was decided to concentrate on reduced fire propagation
characteristics.
Until these serious fires occurred during the late
1960s, P V C had been considered to be a fire retardant
material. This belief was founded on the ability of a
single cable to pass the type of flame test detailed in the
following subsection. This test method was originally
devised to assess cables having fibrous coatings impreg­
nated with so cahed flame retardant paints. When it was
subsequently found that P V C sheathed cables passed
such a test this earned P V C the description of flame
retardant. Research after these major fires showed that,
whilst a single P V C cable would not b u r n when the
source of ignition was removed, if sufficient of these
cables were grouped together then there was a critical
mass above which propagation could occur. However,
no precise figure of P V C critical mass is possible
because this varies with the formulation of the P V C
compound and the cable installation arrangement, but
it is generally accepted to be in the order of 2 - 3 kg per
metre. It was therefore clear that the earlier practice of
assessing fire performance by testing a single cable was
inadequate and a new test had to be devised in which
cables were fire tested in a density and formation re­
presentative of the actual installation. Details of these
reduced fire propagation tests are given in Section 8.2
of this chapter. Cables to meet this new standard were
constructed mainly from speqiahy formulated P V C
compounds which still liberated considerable quantities
Cable p e r f o r m a n c e under fire conditions
of hydrochloric acid gas (HCl) and smoke under fire
condhions. However by restricting propagation, the
quantity of cable insulating material involved in the fire
is reduced and thus the volume of combustion pro­
ducts. The quantity of smoke and acid that could be
liberated is still sufficient to cause considerable damage
and therefore all major cable routes need to be enclosed
and protected as discussed in Section 2 of this chapter.
C o m p o u n d developments during the early 1980s has
offered the prospect of cables which, not only have
reduced fire propagation characteristics, but also re­
duced coloured smoke and corrosive gas emissions. Such
cables are generally classified as limited fire hazard.
Test methods have been recently developed (1988) to
assess smoke, corrosive and toxic emissions; the general
principles and background to these have been included
in this section for completeness.
8.1 Tests on a single cable or wire
Fire tests on single cables or wires are specified to
BS4066: P a r t 1 ( l E C 332: P a r t 1). In this test, the wire
or cable is clamped vertically and a bunsen or similar
burner is arranged at 45° to the axis of the wire as
shown in Fig 6.100. For large cables, two burners are
used. The flame is apphed to the test sample for a set
time and after its removal the sample is left to burn
until it self-extinguishes. The a m o u n t of uncharred
material remaining at the t o p of the sample is then
measured and compared with the acceptance criteria.
BS4066: P a r t 1 is not suitable for wires having a
cross-sectional area of 0.5 mm^ or smaller because the
flame is sufficiently harsh to burn through the con­
ductor. A new specification has therefore been prepared
for these small wires which employs a smaher burner
and this is expected to be published in due course as
l E C 332: P a r t 2.
The fire propagation performance of cables is now
assessed as described in the following Section 8.2. The
type of tests on single samples described here are
therefore of greatest value in assessing the fire perfor­
mance of cores of cables, particularly control cables,
and for panel wiring.
8.2 Cable installations having reduced fire
propagation
During the early 1970s, test methods were developed
to assess the fire performance of bunched cables and
this culminated in the issue of C E G B Standard 099905
( G D C D Standard 21) — 'Cable instaUations having
reduced fire propagation'. Since it was reahsed that
propagation was dependent o n b o t h the mass of cables
and also their configuration, the first step in producing
this standard was to define standard installation con­
figurations. For type approval purposes, four categories
of cable together with their installation conditions were
defined as follows:
523
Cabling
600mm ±25mm
NON-METALLIC BASE
FIG. 6.100 Test on a single cable or wire
• Category 1 — single core cables tested in spaced
formation.
• Category 2 — multicore power cables 16 mm^ and
above tested in spaced formation.
• Category 3 — multicore control cables and small
power cables up to and including 16 mm^ tested
in touching formation.
• Category 4 — multipair control and instrumenta­
tion cables tested in touching formation.
All categories were tested with a non-metallic mass
of 10 k g / m .
The test rig specified in the first issue of G D C D
Standard 21 was based on the Italian CESI laboratory
test rig in Milan, the general arrangement being shown
in Fig 6.101. The test method consists of mounting
cables in a vertical arrangement within a chimney to
produce an onerous condition. The cables are heated at
the base, using electrical hot plates, w h h a minimum
temperature of 600°C and pilot flames are provided
to ignite flammable gases that are driven off. Once
the cables have ignited they are left to burn and, after
one hour, if they have not self-extinguished they are
manually extinguished. The test is considered satisfac­
tory if the traces of charred damage on the cables do
not extend more than 1.5 m above the hotplates. AH
524
Chapter 6
300mm ±25mm
450mm ±25mm
SECTIONAL VIEW OF A-A
test rigs used must be proved by testing untreated
P V C cables to ensure that propagation occurs.
In 1982, l E C Pubhcation 332: Part 3 — T e s t s
on bunched wires or cables' was issued. This speci­
fies a test similar to the first issue of G D C D Standard
2 1 , the major differences being that the l E C specifies
a gas burner instead of electric hot plates and in addi­
tion the acceptance crheria is increased from 1.5 m
to 2.5 m. The general arrangement of this test rig
is shown in Fig 6.102. The l E C burner is of the rib­
bon propane-gas type with a fuel input rate of 73.7
X 10^ J / h (70000 B t U / h ) . The l E C allows tests at
1.5 L / m , 3.5 L / m and 7 L / m which equate to ap­
proximately 2.5 k g / m , 5 k g / m and 10 k g / m using a
typical density for the cable combustible materials. A
test rig complying w h h l E C 332: Part 3 had been buih
in the UK at Queen Mary College Industrial Research
Limited and the C E G B evaluated this against the
existing G D C D Standard 21 protocol during 1982. Tests
were carried out at 10 k g / m on at least one cable in
each of the four G D C D Standard 21 Categories. In
a d d h i o n , an untreated P V C cable was tested to ensure
that the rig was capable of producing propagating fires.
These tests demonstrated that the l E C test rig could
be used as an acceptable substitute for tests to G D C D
Standard 2 1 ; the test rig was therefore adopted for cable
constructions containing P V C materials. Because of
the size and complexity of power station installations.
 Cable p e r f o r m a n c e under fire conditions

SMOKE OUTLET

(a) GENERAL ARRANGEMENT

GAS BURNERS REMOVABLE ELECTRIC FURNACE

CONSISTING OF RADIANT PANELS
IN FRONT OF AND BEHIND THE
TEST CABLES

FIG. 6.101 Reduced propagation test rig

(electric hotplates)

additional requirements beyond the l E C test method

are specified t o reduce the risk of fires propagating.
The maximum density of cables that the l E C specifies
is 10 k g / m which is the same as G D C D Standard 2 1 ,
Issue 1. This generally results in an economic arrange­
ment for Category 1 a n d 2 cables which are installed
spaced t o maintain their current rating. However, for
Categories 3 a n d 4, the cables are installed touching
and a restriction t o 10 k g / m of non-metalhc material
results in the cable tray being under-loaded as far as
space a n d weight considerations are concerned. F o r
Categories 3 and 4, tests may therefore now b e specified (b) TYPICAL TEST RESULT
at 20 k g / m or higher. A further requirement is that
during the test, penetration t o the conductor should be
FIG. 6.102 Reduced propagation test rig (gas burner)
achieved (i.e., the conductor insulation should be con­
sumed or degraded t o ash). If this is not achieved then
the cables are retested with a burner having a larger t o design a cable with suitable heat barrier tapes t o
heat output. T h e reason for this is that it is possible pass the test with a 70 000 B t u / h burner. However,

525
Cabling
when this cable is subjected to a greater heat source,
as may be the case in a real fire shuation, then the
barrier tapes may break down allowing the more flam­
mable insulation within to be exposed and propagation
can occur. By trying to obtain penetration to the con­
ductor during the test this risk is reduced.
During the 1970s special P V C compounds were for­
mulated to enable cables to be constructed to pass these
propagation tests. This was achieved by the use of
various additives which did not generally affect the
mechanical performance of the P V C . The most com­
monly used addhive today is antimony trioxide which
acts together with the chlorine in P V C to suppress the
flames.
The use of P V C produces cables that have high
smoke and acid emissions due to the halogens in the
material. A requirement for low smoke and acid emis­
sion requires the use of non-halogenated materials,
but means that the halogen gases are not available to
interrupt the combustion process. One of the polymers
that is becoming popular for hmited fire hazard (LFH)
cables is ethylene/vinyl acetate (EVA) and, to give this
reduced propagation performance, h can be heavily
filled with aluminium hydroxide (alumina trihydrate).
This fiher contains about 3 5 w a t e r which is released
at temperatures above 200°C with the absorption of
heat. The steam produced also dilutes the flammable
gases given-off from the polymer.
Whilst Category 1 and 2 L F H cables were found to
behave in a similar manner to P V C cables, when testing
non-PVC Category 3 and 4 cable designs (which are
required to be mounted in a close touching formation)
it was found that they behaved in a manner different
to P V C cables. With P V C cables there is a greater
tendency for propagation with increasing mass. This
was not apparent with new limited fire hazard designs.
It was noted that cables nearest the burner became
involved in the fire but any cables in the second or
subsequent further-removed rows were substantially
unaffected. With P V C cable designs h had been normal
for all cables at burner level to become involved in
the fire. In service installations however, cables are
not normally tightly held in regimented rows as speci­
fied for this fire test. In a cable riser, the cables are
cleated in small bundles having a maximum diameter
of 75 m m , whhst on horizontal runs the mix of dif­
ferent sizes of cables gives a natural break-up from the
close array that may be attained with cables of one
size. Tests were therefore conducted with cables fixed
to the ladder in bundles approximately 60 m m wide
with 20 m m between bundles. When tested in this
manner, it was found that cables tended to propagate
fire more readily and this tendency increased w h h the
mass being tested. Indeed, tests were carried out w h h
cables mounted in blocks over the range from 2.5 k g / m
up to 30 k g / m of non-metallic material and consistent
resuhs were obtained throughout.
In summary, for Categories 3 and 4, a close regi­
mented touching array as specified by l E C 332, P a r t 3,
526
Chapter 6
is considered acceptable for P V C , since normally all
non-metallic material is involved during test at burner
level. However, this method of mounting is not typi­
cal of an actual service condhion and for new cable
designs it may give inconsistent results. The C E G B
Standard for limited fire hazard cables therefore re­
quires Category 3 and 4 cables to be tested in discrete
bundles.
In practice, the number of cables that can be placed
on a cable tray is limited by the space available on the
cable supporting steelwork or the maximum weight it
can carry. For Categories 1 and 2, where the cables
are installed in spaced formation to achieve adequate
current rating, space is the limiting factor and the
maximum non-metallic mass that can he usefuhy used
is 10 k g / m . For Categories 3 and 4, where the cables
are bunched, the maximum non-metahic mass is con­
trolled by the maximum cable dead-load that the steel­
work can support. As discussed in Section 7 of this
chapter, G D C D Standard 197 600 m m wide ladder
racks are designed to carry a dead-load of 50 k g / m .
This means that a test with a non-metallic mass of
20 k g / m is adequate for Categories 3 and 4 to match
the steelwork design.
8.3 Oxygen index tests
The oxygen index (OI) of a material is defined as the
minimum concentration of oxygen, expressed as a per­
centage by volume, in a mixture of oxygen and nitrogen
that will just support combustion of material under
defined conditions. A suitable test method is given in
Appendix A of BS4066: Part 3: 1986. In this test a
sample of material is mounted vertically in a glass
chimney through which a known mixture of oxygen
and nitrogen is passed. The top of the sample is ignited
and its behaviour noted to see if it burns beyond a set
distance or if it self-extinguishes within a prescribed
time. The oxygen/nitrogen ratio is adjusted until the
material under test just supports combustion, the con­
centration of oxygen as a percentage by volume is then
recorded as the OI of the material.
The OI of a typical untreated P V C will be of the
order of 25%, whilst a treated P V C used in reduced
propagation cables may have an oxygen index in the
range 30 to 4 0 % . However, it must not be assumed
that a c o m p o u n d with a higher OI will automatically
produce a cable with greater resistance to fire propaga­
tion. Two materials having the same OI may behave
completely differently depending on the polymer type
and the additives used to give flame retardence. It
must also be borne in mind that the test is carried out
at ambient temperature and also that the flame is re­
quired to burn downwards like a candle; the test con­
ditions are therefore not representative of a typical real
fire shuation. For these reasons an oxygen index test
must not be considered as a substitute for the propa­
gation tests described in the previous Section 8.2.

However, this oxygen index test is very reproducible
and forms an excehent method for quality control of
compounds used in reduced propagation cable systems.
As stated previously, a high OI does not necessari-
ly mean better flame propagation performance a n d ,
therefore, for routine Q A tests, h is necessary to con-
trol both the minimum and maximum OI levels. This
can be achieved by measuring the OI of materials of
cables subjected to reduced propagation type tests de-
scribed in the previous section. A poshive and negative
tolerance (in the order of ± 1 . 5 % ) is then agreed with
the manufacturer for routine tests. It should be noted
that to apply this principle the absolute OI must be
measured. Therefore, when using Appendbc A of BS4066
for routine testing of power station cables, it is im-
portant that the complete test in Section A8 is specified
rather than the abbreviated test in Section AlO which
only checks for a minimum. In summary, OI tests are
used to check whether a material has changed rather
than to see if it meets a minimum OI requirement.
A variation of this type of test which is gaining
popularity is to measure the temperature index of the
material. The apparatus used for this test is similar to
that used for oxygen index with the addition of heaters
around the glass chimney. Both the oxygen/nitrogen
ratio and test temperatures are varied to enable a plot
of the type shown in Fig 6.103 t o be prepared. The
temperature index of the materials is taken to be the
temperature at which the sample just supports com-
bustion with an oxygen concentration in nitrogen of
2 1 % . Whhst this type of test arguably gives greater
information on the material than a plain oxygen index
test, it must be remembered that it is still only a test
on materials. Like the OI test it cannot be considered
a substitute for fuh scale propagation tests, since h is
known that both the q u a n t h y of cable and the cable
configuration affect flame spread. With present tech-
OXYGEN
INDEX {%)
1 \
100 200 250
°C
FIG. 6 . 1 0 3 Graph showing temperature index
Cable p e r f o r m a n c e under fire conditions
ñiques, the temperature index test is time consuming
and is less reproducible t h a n an OI test because of
sample deformation at higher temperatures. It is not
therefore considered practical as a routine test. It is
however considered by many manufacturers to be a
useful aid to material assessment.
8.4 Smoke tests
8.4.1 Test methods
There are two c o m m o n methods of quantifying smoke
emissions:
• Measurement of hght obscuration through smoke.
• Weighing of smoke particles after trapping them in
a filter.
Considering these methods, the weighing of smoke
particles ignores the effect that particle size has on
visibihty, i.e., a lot of small particles will reduce visi-
bihty more than a fewer number of large particles for
the same total weight. Measurement of light obscura-
tion is therefore considered more meaningful where
h is desired t o obtain a degree of correlation between
tests and the visibility of, say, exit signs in a real fire
situation.
Early investigations into smoke emission were carried
out using small samples of cable materials in bench
top equipment such as the U S A National Bureau of
Standards (NBS) or the A r a p a h o e smoke chambers.
The NBS is an optical method in which a sample is
burnt (either in a flaming or non-flaming mode) in a
chamber having a volume of approximately 0.5 m^.
Light transmission is measured using a photometric
system with a vertical p a t h . The A r a p a h o e is a gravi-
metric system in which a sample is burnt using a small
propane-gas burner and the smoke particles are trapped
in a filter and weighed. M o r e recent work has shown
that smoke emission is highly dependent on the number
of cables involved and their configuration, i.e., spaced
or touching formation. The situation is similar to
testing for reduced propagation characteristics where
tests on materials or single cables are inadequate as
type tests. These bench-top tests are now therefore only
recommended for routine tests such as quality control
and for the prehminary evaluation of materials.
For type tests it is considered essential to carry
out large scale tests o n a typical cable arrangement.
One such large scale test method which was developed
by the L o n d o n Transport Executive (LTE) in the early
1970s is the 3-metre cube and this has now gained
international popularity. The test equipment which is
shown in Fig 6.104 consists of a cube of 3-metre
3Ó0 side and normally constructed from metal sheet. A
door containing an inspection window is provided in
one side for access purposes. Smah windows are pro-
vided in opposite sides of the cube to enable a light
527
Cabling Chapter 6

tests because of limitations of the 3-metre cube test

ACCESS DOOR WITH^
OBSERVATION WINDOW
FIG. 6.104 3-metre smoke cube
source and photoelectric cell assembly to be mounted
externally, so that the attenuation of light with in­
creasing smoke density can be measured. The photo­
cell is designed to have a response close to that of
the h u m a n eye. A fan is provided to mix the smoke
and give reproducible resuhs. Since a large number
of manufacturers and test authorities have constructed
this test equipment, there is clearly a need to en­
sure they all have similar characteristics. This can be
achieved by burning known ratios of toluene/alcohol
in the cube and checking the light attenuation against
reference values. The 3-metre cube is now a well
estabhshed test equipment that is relatively simple and
very practical.
Having established suitable test equipment to mea­
sure smoke from a representative section of cable
installation, we must now consider the fire model. The
fire model used by L T E consists of burning a number
of cables by placing them in horizontal formation over
a fire source consisting of a tray containing 1 litre of
equipment, e.g., the cable quantity subjected to the
test has to be hmited to avoid smoke saturation in
the cube. Although h is not possible to carry out smoke
tests in the 3-metre cube on the largest array of cab­
hng used in a power station, it is possible to use a
representative sample which is adequate to correlate
smoke emission with the effects of propagation.
The fire model selected for type tests is s h o w n , i n
Fig 6.105 and consists of cable samples 2 metres long,
wired to a vertical ladder. The number of cable samples
is selected to give a loading of 5 k g / m of non-metalhc
material and the cables are mounted in the same for­
mation as detailed for reduced propagation in Section
8.2 of this chapter, i.e., power cables spaced and control
cables bunched. It is important to note that cable for­
mation is a dominant factor in smoke production and
that variations in cable spacing can significantly affect
results. The fire source itself consists of the same
propane-gas ribbon burner and flow rates as used for
the propagation test. The test regime consists of apply­
ing the fire source for a period of 25 minutes, after
which it is extinguished and the samples are left to
burn or smoulder until maximum smoke production
has been achieved. By this method both flaming and
non-flaming modes can be assessed.
CABLE SAMPLES 2m LONG-
^ LADDER
GAS BURNER

alcohol. The number of cable samples is selected such

that the test configuration contains 2 - 3 k g / m of
combustible material which is considered typical of an
underground railway instahation. However, within a
power station, higher densities of cables are involved
and a number of routes are vertical; the L T E fire model
is therefore not suitable for power stations. Considering
power station applications, quite clearly for smoke tests
it is desirable to use a vertical array of cable samples FIG. 6.105 Cable sample arrangement for smoke test
known to be the more onerous case. This follows the
same principle as for reduced propagation tests. Taking
this one step further to be consistent, the same type During the test, the intensity of the light received
of fire model should be used for both the reduced by the photocell is monitored on a chart recorder as
propagation and smoke tests (i.e., a vertical ladder with a measure of transmittance. The recorded light trans-
a propane-gas burner fire source). In practice it is not mittance can be converted to absorbance using the
possible to use the identical arrangement for smoke formula:

528
 Cable p e r f o r m a n c e under fire conditions

At = logio l o / I t where D = visibihty distance

Κ = parameter dependent on light level and
where I o = initial luminous intensity
type of exit sign
It = intensity of light beam through smoke
F r o m Equations (6.8) and (6.9):
It is normal to present the results as standard absor-
bance Ao by the formula KV
D = (6.10)
ΑοΠ
Ao = At X V/f

Now the factor *n' must relate the quantity of cable

w h e r e V = volume of test chamber, m^
i = optical path length, m
Ao is then defined as the absorbance produced across
the faces of a 1-metre cube when the test installation
is burnt under the given condkions.
The calculation for A Q ignores the effect of any
smoke deposited on the windows of the optical system.
This is because experience has shown that the absorb­
ance associated with this deposition on the windows
is small compared to the absorbance associated with
the smoke in the cube, and negligible error is caused
by ignoring this factor. Where it is wished to take
this factor into account, the absorbance associated with
deposition on the windows can be measured after clear­
ing smoke from the cube and the appropriate correc­
tions made.
material tested to that contained in the power station
installation. It is suggested that the smoke test be car­
ried out on an array containing 5 k g / m of non-metalhc
combustible material. Therefore, assuming a hnear
relationship:
installed mass installed mass
η =
test mass
Typical values for the parameter Κ are given in Table
6.23. These parameters are based on experiments
carried out in a 3-metre cube, using a r a n d o m sample
of observers to assess the visability of typical signs
over a range of distances through a known density of
smoke.
TABLE 6.23

Clearly A Q can be calculated at any time during Typical values for the parameter Κ
the test but the most significant measurements are
Lighting Value of Κ
considered to be at the end of the test flame appli­
cation period, Ao (ON), and the maximum after the
Self-illuminated signs 3.0 - 3.5
flame is extinguished, A Q (OFF). Quite clearly the
Reflecting signs in well lit areas 1.5
most crkical factor is the total smoke generation
and since this is achieved during the Ao (OFF) period, Reflecting signs in poorly lit areas 1.0
it should be used for the acceptance criteria. A typical
test requirement would be that Ao (OFF) should not
exceed 10. As an example, consider a cable flat 2 m wide by
2 m high and 50 m long. Using a test acceptance cri­
terion of Ao(OFF) = 10 and assuming one cable tray
8.4.2 Use of t e s t i n f o r m a t i o n
carrying a non-metahic combustible cable mass of
Having defined a test method we can now try to re­ 10 k g / m , for self-illuminated signs the visibility would
late the information gained to what would happen be:
in power station locations under fire conditions. One kV 3 X 2 X 2 X 50
method of achieving this is as follows: D = = 30 m
The 'expected absorbance' in a particular location Aon 10 X 10/5
is given by:
The results obtained by this process should only be
Ae = AoU/V (6.8) used for guidance since the process assumes an even
dispersion of smoke particles and ignores any irritant
where Ao = absorbance across the faces of a 1 m affect that smoke may have on the eyes.
cube found from test

V = dispersal volume, m^
8.5 Corrosive gas emissions
η = factor depending on quantity of cable
A t present, bench-top tests on samples of materials
involved
taken from cables are considered the most practical
method of assessing corrosive gas emissions.
Κ
Also Ae = - (6.9) The most commonly used of these bench-top tests
D is that specified in l E C 754. This test method requires

529
Cabling
that approximately one gram of material is pyrolysed
in a combustion tube using an electric furnace. R a m p
heating is used with a maximum temperature of 800°C
and the resultant gases are analysed by titration meth­
ods. Hydrogen chloride and hydrogen bromide are
assessed as hydrogen chloride and the limit of sen­
sitivity of this method is 0 . 5 % . The difficulty with
this test method is that it only assesses two of the
halogen gases and, whilst hydrogen chloride may be
potentially the most aggressive, other corrosive gases
cannot be ignored. Another drawback with this method
is that the hmit of detection is 0 . 5 % and may not
be adequate for recent developments in low fire risk
cables.
The C E G B has therefore developed a test method
which m o n h o r s p H and conductivhy which can detect
all acid species. A diagrammatic arrangement of the
test apparatus is given in Fig 6.106. The combustion
arrangement is similar to l E C 754 in that the sample
is pyrolysed in a combustion tube using an electric
furnace and r a m p heating up to 800°C. A sample size
of one gram is used and the combustion products are
drawn through distilled water of which the p H and
conductivity is measured. Since hydrogen chloride is
COMBUSTION
TUBE
X pH/ION
METER
CELL WITH UP TO
FIVE PROBES
DE-IONISED
H2O
0
MAGNETIC
STIRRER
FIG. 6 . 1 0 6 Corrosive gas emission test equipment
530
Chapter 6
of particular concern, a sensitive chloride ion electrode
is included which can monitor to a level of 0 . 0 5 % .
Experimental work has been carried out for the CEGB
to assess the corrosive effects of the more c o m m o n
acid gas species on items such as printed circuit boards
and relay contacts. F r o m this work it is possible to judge
the maximum concentration of gas in parts per million
( P P M ) that is tolerable from a corrosion aspect. Using
this information, together with a knowledge of the
quantity of cable material likely to be consumed in a
fire and the station volume in which it may be released,
it is possible to predict p H acceptance levels for the
test method discussed.
8.6 Toxic gas emissions
At present, bench-top tests on samples of material
taken from cables are considered to be the most prac­
tical way of assessing toxic gas emissions. There are
several such tests available but the most established in
this country is that defined in the Ministry of Defence
specification NES 713. This test procedure has there­
fore been used as a basis for C E G B assessment of
toxic gas emissions.
DRIED
AIR
THERMO­
COUPLES
 Cable accessories

The C E G B test method consists of burning a four

gram sample in a sealed chamber having a volume of PLASTIC WASHER

one cubic metre. The chamber is constructed from a METAL

ARMOUR CLAMP

plastic material (typically polypropylene or polycar­ EXTENSION TUBE

CABLE ARMOUR
bonate) having a transparent access door in one side.
The sample is burnt using a gas burner in which the
fuel is premixed with air. A fan is used to ensure rapid
mixing of products of combustion with the air in the
chamber. Samples of the combustion products are drawn OUTER
NEOPRENE SEAL
out of the test enclosure through gas detection tubes.
These gas detection tubes consist of a glass tube filled
with crystals which change colour when they react with OUTER SEAL NUT
the selected gas type. A selection of gas detection tubes ASSOCIATED ENCLOSURE
OR GLAND PLATE
is used to assess the toxic gas emissions that are likely
to be obtained from cable insulating materials.
A toxicity index can be calculated from the measured
gas concentrations using I D L H values. The immediate
INSULATED SECTION
danger to hfe and health (IDLH) value, as defined
in the N I O S H / O S H A 'Guide to chemical hazards',
represents a maximum level from which one could
escape within 30 minutes without any escape-impairing
symptoms or any irreversible effects on health.

9 Cable accessories

9.1 Cable glands

9.1.1 Background to gland design FIG. 6.107 Typical arrangements of insulated

Cable glands are used to terminate the outer finishes
of cables (i.e., inner sheath, armour and outer sheath)
and to take the insulated conductors through into the
equipment. The gland therefore locates the cable at the
equipment and is required to form a moisture seal to
both the cable and the equipment. Glands also provide
a means of making connections to the armour for
earthing when required. Where connections to earth are
required, it is important that the gland is fitted with an
integral earth lug so that a bond can be installed to
take the fault current direct to the earth bar. Without
this provision the fault current would have to flow to
earth via the less secure route of gland threads, gland
plate securing b o h s and equipment casing.
The requirements for cable glands are specified
in G D C D Standard 190: 'Insulated mechanical cable
glands'. These have been developed as replacements
for the traditional all-metal gland designs which are
specified in BS6121: 'Specification for mechanical
glands Part 1 — metahic glands'. Insulated glands
allow the cable armour to be isolated from the gland
plate and hence earth. Typical arrangements of insu­
lated glands are shown in Fig 6.107. Insulated glands
complying with G D C D Standard 190 must incorporate
the following features and offer certain advantages
over metallic glands to BS6121, Part 1:
• Insulated glands allow single-point bonding of sin­
gle-core cables to prevent a r m o u r circulating currents
and hence permh current rating to be maximised.
cable glands
• Insulated glands allow single-point bonding of
control cables t o prevent circulating or fault currents
flowing in the a r m o u r and hence reduce the risk of
interference in control and instrumentation circuits.
• Insulated glands allow cable a r m o u r to be isolated
from earth to enable cable outer sheath integrity to
be tested.
• A n integral earth lug is specified to provide an
adequately tested means of connecting the cable
a r m o u r to earth.
• G D C D Standard 190 requires that all glands for use
on power cables are subjected to short-circuit tests.
• A screen terminator can be provided, as shown in
Fig 6.108, to allow the copper tape screen of 11 kV
cables t o be electrically connected to the cable
armour.
• G D C D Standard 190 requires glands to accept a
wider range of cable sizes.
9.1.2 Gland construction
G D C D Standard 190 covers a range of glands which are
identified by 'Class N u m b e r ' according to a r m o u r type
and gland configuration, i.e., whether bonding connec­
tors or screen terminators are required. The armour

531
Cabling
OUTER SEAL METAL EXTENSION TUBE
ASSEMBLY WITH INTEGRAL SCREEN
TERMINATOR
ARMOUR LOCK
FIG. 6.108 Insulated gland with copper tape screen terminator for use on 11 kV cables
types covered are aluminium wire, aluminium strip,
steel wire and double steel tape. T o avoid corrosion
problems, for aluminium armour the gland body is
constructed from aluminium and for steel armour the
gland body is made from brass. The glands include an
outer seal, to seal between the gland and the cable outer
sheath. A gland plate seal is also provided to seal
between the gland and the gland plate. Inner seals, to
seal between the cable inner sheath and the gland to
prevent moisture entering the cable armour area are
not considered necessary, as cable boxes are normally
kept in a dry condition. In addition it is essential that
compression-type inner seals are not used on cables
insulated with materials such as low-density polythene,
since this is likely to flow from under the seal during
load cycling and reduce the dielectric strength of the
cable.
Multipair cables, as described in Section 3.6 of this
chapter, have a drain wire provided to enable connec­
tions to be made to the screen. Whilst insulated ter­
minators can be provided on the gland for this drain
wire to be terminated, it is normally more convenient
to provide an insulated block of terminals in the equip­
ment to terminate the drain wires for connection to
each other, or to earth, as appropriate.
The insulated portion of the gland is designed and
tested to withstand 2 kV for 1 minute. The figure of
2 kV matches the design criteria for rise of potential
on single-point bonded cable armours under fault con­
ditions, this figure also being the minimum voltage
withstand for cable sheaths. Quite clearly, if gland
bodies can rise to voltages of u p to 2 kV at the 'floating
end' then insulated shrouds must be fitted for personnel
safety. Where control cable glands are not bonded to
earth these must also be shrouded to protect personnel
532
Chapter 6
INSULATED BUSH PLASTIC WASHER
CABLE COPPER NEOPRENE FACE SEAL LOCKNUT
TAPE SCREEN
from transferred potentials. There is n o requirement
to shroud glands that are bonded to earth and indeed
this would he physically difficult because of the bond­
ing connections.
With respect to short-circuit tests, it is judged that
all power cables that could be fitted into gland sizes
of 40 m m and smaller would be fuse protected and
therefore these sizes of glands are tested at a level of
13.1 kA for 0.1 s. Gland sizes of 50 m m and above
may accept cables that are circuit-breaker controlled
and these are tested at a short-circuit level of 43 kA
for u p to 1 s depending on the capabihty of the cable
armour.
Insulated glands for use with wire braid, such as
on flexible cables, are not required since such cables
are normally short and there is no risk of circulating
currents. Standard C X glands to BS6121 are therefore
used for braided cables.
9.1.3 Gland sizing
When sizing cable glands the fohowing factors must
be taken into account:
• The dimension over the cable inner sheath (under
armour) must be smaller than the gland bore.
• The dimension over the cable outer sheath must be
smaller than the fully-opened outer seal but greater
than the test mandrel size to ensure an adequate seal.
• The gland must be selected for the armour type,
material and size.
There is not a large overlap in cable accommodation
between gland sizes and therefore gland sizing should
be carried out on the cable manufacturers' dimensional

information rather than that obtained from cable stand­
ards. For this reason it is normally the responsibility
of the cable installation contractor to ensure that the
gland manufacturer is supplied with all relevant cable
data prior to manufacture of glands.
9.1.4 Installation
It is normal practice to have equipment supplied with
detachable gland plates that are undrilled. This is
because at the time of ordering equipment, the cable
size and hence gland size are u n k n o w n . It is n o r m a h y
the responsibility of the cable contractor to drill the
gland plate and fit the gland to the cable and equipment.
Gland plates should be non-ferrous for cable circuit
ratings of 400 A or greater.
Cables should be set as far as practicable in their
final position before glanding commences. This is to
avoid differential movement, e.g., between a r m o u r and
outer sheath, which could result in an ineffective seal
should the cable be moved excessively after glanding.
It is good practice to cleat all cables at a distance of
not more than 1 m below the gland to reheve glands
and gland plates of the cable weight and of the stresses
set u p by thermal cycling of the cables. Even after
these precautions, it is not considered good practice
to use top-entry glands on equipment located out of
doors.
Finahy after installation of the glands has been
completed ah nuts should be checked for tightness. It
should also be checked that a gap exists between the
gland body and armour clamp as this gives assurance
that the armour wires are locked in the clamp.
9.2 Power cable conductor terminations
This section details methods that are used to terminate
the conductors of power cables and connect them to
equipment. The conductor connection clearly must be
capable of carrying the cable fuh-load current without
overheating and must be mechanically robust to with­
stand any short-circuit forces.
The traditional method of using soldered lugs t o ter­
minate conductors has now been completely replaced in
power stations by compression or mechanical fittings.
One reason for this is that it is a highly skilled j o b to
use soldered lugs, particularly on aluminium conduc­
tors, and if full penetration of solder between strands
is not achieved overheating in use can occur. Secondly,
soldered lugs are not recommended for use on poly­
meric cables having a designed limiting short-circuit
conductor temperature of 250°C since solder softens
at this temperature.
9.2.1 Fittings for aluminium conductors
Compression-lugs typically consist of an aluminium
tube, of a suitable size to fit over the conductor, which
has been squashed at one end to form a palm that can
Cable accessories
be bolted to equipment. Ahernatively, some manufac­
turers prefer to produce lugs by forging sohd bars.
A compression-lug fitted to a single-core cable can be
seen in Fig 6.116.
The lug is apphed to the conductor using dies to
compress the fitting down onto the conductor. The
large mechanical forces required to complete this op­
eration are provided by a hydraulic tool into which
the dies are fitted. A h h o u g h these large mechanical
forces tend to break u p the tenacious high electrical
resistance aluminium oxide film on the conductor and
fittings, to produce a good connection it is stih im­
perative that surfaces are adequately prepared. It is
therefore required that fittings are factory cleaned by
shot blasting with aluminium oxide grit and are then
immediately dipped in petroleum jelly, or an equi­
valent covering, to prevent further oxidation. Cable
conductors are cleaned with a stainless steel wire brush
and immediately coated with petroleum jelly prior to
compression. Lugs are available for use on circular
stranded, circular sohd and shaped sohd aluminium
conductors.
Properly designed compression fittings provide good
reproducible results without the skih necessary to pro­
duce a soldered connection. T o assist in quality control
the following facilities are expected:
• Fittings to be marked with manufacturer's name,
identification number and appropriate conductor
size.
• The fitting to be marked to show the position at
which the compression die is to be apphed unless
controhed by other means as the tool is apphed.
• A crimping code is to be marked during the for­
mation of the crimp so that the crimping die used
can be identified.
• The compression operation must not be interrupted
until complete and the tool must be designed to pre­
vent this happening other than by deliberate action
by the operator.
• Hydraulic tools are to be fitted with a pressure relief
valve that will operate at the end of the compression
operation to show that this is complete.
The test requirements for aluminium compression fit­
tings are given in Engineering Recommendation C79
(1972) — *Type approval tests for connectors and
terminations for aluminium conductors of insulated
power cables'. A British Standard, BS4579: Part 3: 1979
— 'Mechanical and compression joints in aluminium
conductors', is based on Engineering Recommendation
C79 and gives similar requirements. The test regime
consists of preparing 6 samples and subjecting them
to:
• Initial resistance measurements.
• Short-circuit tests (optional).
533
Cabling
• Electrical load cycling test — 2000 cycles with re­
sistances and temperatures measured every 100 cycles.
• Tensile test.
The test results are analysed to check whether the
compression fittings have remained stable throughout
the test.
Engineering Recommendation C79 was published
before the large scale introduction of elastomeric ca­
bles; hence the load cycle test temperature of 80°C
above ambient and the short-circuit test temperature
of 160°C are appropriate to the cables commonly in
use at that time, i.e., paper or P V C insulation. When
dealing with fittings for elastomeric cables (e.g., X L P E
or E P R ) , h is considered appropriate to increase the
load cycle test temperature to 90°C above ambient
and the short-circuh test temperature to 250°C.
As already stated, the short-circuit tests are optional
and the choice depends on whether the fittings are going
to be used on circuits protected by H B C fuses. As
discussed in Section 4.2.1 of this chapter, multicore
power cables are always fuse protected and there is no
requirement to carry out short-circuit tests on fittings
for shaped aluminium conductors. Single-core cables
with stranded aluminium conductors are normally asso­
ciated whh circuh-breaker controhed circuits. Fittings
for these must therefore be short-circuit tested. Fittings
for circular sohd aluminium conductors are associated
with earth cables. Earth cables of 150 mm^ and larger
are used to bond plant that is associated w h h circuh-
breakers, so the conductor fittings must be short-circuh
tested. Earth cables smaller than 150 mm^ are used to
bond plant protected by H B C fuses and there is no
requirement to have short-circuit tests carried out on
these sizes of conductor fitting.
At the time of writing there is no pubhshed British
or l E C Standard to control dimensions of conduc­
tor fittings. It is therefore left to the user to specify
dimensional constraints, which is essential to ensure
that clearances and creepage distances are maintained
within standard terminal arrangements. British Standard
BS5372: 1976 gives requirements for cable terminations
for electrical equipment.
9.2.2 Fittings for copper conductors
The construction method for compression fittings for
copper conductors is similar to that for aluminium
which was discussed in the previous section. Although
not mandatory it is normal practice to tin copper
fittings. The requirements for tools and dies, and for
marking (given in Section 9.2.1 for aluminium fittings)
are considered to be equally relevant to copper fittings.
Test requirements for copper fittings are given in
BS4579: Part 1: 1980 — 'Performance specification for
compression joints in electric cable and wire connec­
tors'. This specification requires six specimens to be
prepared and subjected t o :
534
Chapter 6
• Initial resistance measurement.
• 500 load cycles with resistance measurements every
50 cycles.
• Final resistance measurement.
• Tensile test.
It should be noted that, unlike aluminium, the test
regime for copper fittings does not include an option
of short-circuit tests. Experience from short-circuit
tests on equipment in which conductor fittings have
necessarily been included have demonstrated a need
to design fittings to meet these condhions adequately.
For fittings to be used on circuit-breaker controlled
circuits, it is therefore recommended that short-circuit
tests are carried out in a similar manner to that already
prescribed for aluminium conductor fittings. A further
point to bear in mind is that BS4579: Part 1 limits the
fittings to use on conductors having a maximum con­
ductor temperature of 85°C. Therefore, where fittings
are required for use on elastomeric cables (e.g., X L P E
or E P R ) which operate at a continuous conductor
temperature of 90°C, a more onerous test regime is
required. In these cases it is recommended that the
load cycling be carried out at 90°C above ambient as
previously proposed for aluminium fittings in Section
9.2.1 of this chapter.
In practice, the vast majority of copper power ca­
bles used in power stations are small multicore types
insulated with P V C and protected by fuses for which
the test requirements given in BS4579: P a r t 1 for con­
ductor fittings are more than adequate.
The comments given in the previous Section 9.2.1
regarding conductor lug dimensions and termination ac­
commodation are equally applicable to copper fittings.
9.2.3 Fornned terminations
Formed terminations are a means of terminating solid
aluminium conductors by squashing the conductor flat
and punching a hole through h for the terminal equip­
ment fixing bolt. The operation is carried out using a
hydrauhc tool and special dies. A n arrangement of
formed terminations is shown in Fig 6.109.
This idea was proposed in the early 1960s (Burki
and Sabine, 1963 [22]), but h did not gain any imme­
diate popularity possibly because of concerns about the
mechanical and electrical integrity of the flattened palm.
Formed terminations were reassessed by the Central
Electricity Research Laboratories during the early 1970s
and considerable effort was devoted to obtaining op­
timum palm dimensions for mechanical and electrical
performance. The advantages of this system are:
• The sensitive interface between conductor and com­
pression fitting is eliminated.
• The termination length is considerably reduced, re-
heving space problems in terminal boxes.

ALTERNATIVE CONDUCTOR
POSITIONS GIVING
REVERSE ANGLE TO PALM
FIG. 6.109 Formed terminations
• The cost of purchasing and stocking the fittings is
eliminated.
• The work content and hence the time required to
terminate cables is reduced.
• One set of dies can cope w h h different-shaped
conductors.
Formed terminations are currently suitable for circular
or shaped solid aluminium conductors from 35 mm^
up to 300 mm^. It is not possible to use this tech­
nique on conductor sizes smaller than 35 m m ^ , because
there is insufficient conductor material to form a
palm of adequate mechanical integrity.
Multicore cables having shaped solid aluminium
conductors are normally only used for fuse-protected
circuits. Therefore, since there is not an onerous short-
circuit requirement, the palm area and bolt sizes are
maximised to give optimum performance at the highest
continuous conductor operating temperature. Since
earth cables having circular solid aluminium of less
than 150 mm^ are associated with the bonding of fuse-
protected equipment, the same palm configuration and
(hence) dies can be used.
Earth cables having circular solid aluminium con­
ductors of 150 mm^ and larger may be used to b o n d
equipment controlled by circuit-breakers and therefore
these are required to have an adequate short-circuit
performance. Since earth cables do not have to carry
any appreciable continuous current, the palm area of
the formed termination may be reduced in favour of a
more robust (thicker) palm to meet short-circuit re­
quirements. The radius between the palm and the un­
formed conductor is also larger on earth cable formed
terminations, at the expense of palm length, to give
optimum short-circuit performance. Figure 6.109 shows
Cable accessories
the different forms of terminations for use on fuse
protected cables and for earth cables of 150 mm^ and
larger. Figure 6.110 shows the type of hydraulic tool
head and dies used to produce formed terminations.
Formed terminations for use on fuse-protected cir­
cuits have been tested to BS4579: Part 3, the require­
ments of which were discussed in Section 9.2.1 of this
chapter. These tests were carried out with the formed
terminations bolted to both aluminium and plain cop­
per connection bars. A h h o u g h there is no requirement
to carry out short-circuit tests on terminations protected
by H B C fuses, such tests were carried out (to a final
conductor temperature of 160°C) to give confidence
in the system. A large number of the samples that
underwent the 2000 load cycles were simultaneously
subjected to 100 Hz vibration of approximately 0.5 m m
amplitude w h h o u t ill effect.
Earth cable formed terminations which are designed
to have good short-circuit performance have been tested
successfully to demonstrate their performance at short-
circuh conductor temperatures in excess of 325°C.
9.2.4 Bolting terminations to equipment
Care is required in the selection and preparation of
joint surfaces, particularly when dealing with alumi­
nium. W h h aluminium, an oxide immediately forms
on its surface and this is both tenacious and insulating
by nature, thus requiring special measures to be taken.
After suitable preparation, an aluminium surface can
be bolted direct to another aluminium surface or to a
plain copper surface. Aluminium can also be bolted
direct to hot-dipped tinned copper but not to copper
that has been electroplated with tin or silver. This re­
striction is attributed to the inabilhy of soft platings
to crack the aluminium oxide. Since h is difficult on-
site to ascertain what type of plating has been used,
it is recommended that a brass transition washer of
appropriate diameter is always used between aluminium
and plated copper. The grade of brass used should have
a temperature expansion coefficient that is approxi­
mately midway between those of copper and alumi­
nium. This helps to reduce differential movement at
the interfaces and hence the shearing of contact points.
The brass washer surfaces must of course be suitably
prepared on site, or prepared and protected at the
manufacturer's works. T o avoid this complication, h
is recommended that aluminium or plain copper ter­
mination interfaces are provided in equipment.
The preparation of aluminium bar or formed ter­
mination palm contact areas, should consist of abrading
the surface with a stainless steel wire brush until all
visible traces of oxide are removed and the surface
presents a matt finish. The surface must then be coated
immediately w h h petroleum jelly to protect it and pro­
duce a low resistance joint. Aluminium compression
fittings are normally supplied factory cleaned and these
only need to be hghtly smeared with petroleum jelly on
the mating surface.
535
Cabling
FRONT LOCATOR
CABLE
INSULATION
CABLE
CONDUCTOR
FIG. 6.110 Formed termination tool
Plain copper or brass should also be cleaned with a
stainless steel wire brush and immediately coated with
petroleum jehy. Tinned surfaces need only be cleaned
with a degreasing agent before a light coat of petroleum
jelly is applied. Copper compression fittings should be
supplied and packaged in a clean condition and only
need a light coat of petroleum jelly on the mating palm
surface.
It is important that the wire brush is made from
stainless steel and that a separate brush is kept for each
type of metal. If a joint is slackened for any reason it
is essential that it is completely undone and remade
using the appropriate surface preparations.
If aluminium is not involved, after suitable surface
preparation the joint can be completed using normal
diameter washers (to BS4320) between the joint
materials and the fastener. With copper joints, the thin
copper oxide film on the joint surfaces ruptures rela­
tively easily to give metal-to-metal contact, therefore,
the clamping pressure and hence the fastener torque is
not critical.
536
Chapter 6
PUNCH HOLDER
POCKET IN RAM
. TO COLLECT
TERMINAL HOLE
SLUGS
Where aluminium is involved, because of the tena­
cious nature of the surface oxide, h is essential that
the clamping pressure is sufficient to rupture the oxide
film at contact spots so that metal-to-metal contact
is formed. These contact points are actually crests or
peaks that are formed on the contact surface by the
preparation using a stainless steel wire brush. This
contact pressure is clearly dependent on the surface area
under the clamping washer and on the torque applied
to the fastener. Because aluminium creeps under ap­
plied pressure and the dimensional change causes a
relaxation in clamping load, it is important that the
load is applied over as large an area as practicable.
For this purpose, large diameter washers having an
area complying w h h BS4320, Table 2, form C are used.
These large-diameter washers are of sufficient area to
restrict the aluminium creep whilst being small enough
to generate sufficient clamping pressure to rupture sur­
face oxides using acceptable fastener torques. Washers
complying w h h BS4320 have insufficient thickness to
avoid deformation and this results in a reduction of
 Cable accessories

clamping pressure towards their circumference. It is These torques are applicable to nuts and bolts that
therefore necessary to use either two washers together have been kept free from grease. If grease is acci­
or preferably washers made to the dimensions given dentally applied to nuts or bolts a higher clamping
in Table 6.24. The washers should be cadmium plated pressure will be applied which is unhkely to be dele­
to BS1706, Class C d . 2 . terious to the joint interface. However, there could be
a risk of the fastener breaking. Steel b o h s should be
TABLE 6 . 2 4 grade 8.8 manufactured in accordance with BS3692:
Dimensions for washers clamping aluminium 1967. Brass bolts should be manufactured from high
tensile materials complying with BS2874: 1969, material
Nominal Inside Outside Thickness designations C 2114 (hard) or C Z 115 (cold worked). It
size of bolt diameter diameter is essential that torque wrenches are used at site when
mm mm mm
tightening joints involving aluminium to ensure that
M6 6.4 14 2.0 the correct clamping pressure is applied.
M8 8.4 21 2.2
Where joints are formed between dissimilar metals,
and these are exposed to d a m p environmental condi­
MIO 10.5 24 2.4
tions such as in cable tunnels or basements, k is es­
M12 12.8 28 3.0
sential that they are protected. This can be achieved by
M16 16.8 34 3.4 coating the completed joint with bitumen paint or by
M20 21.0 39 3.4 the use of a heavy anticorrosive grease. On no account
should such greases be used instead of petroleum jelly
for the preparation of joint surfaces.
The bolt torque is calculated from the area of the
washer to ensure that the initial interface pressure is
sufficient to break down the oxide film and produce 9.3 Conductor terminations for control
an adequate number of contact spots to pass the re­ cables
quired current without excessive heating. During service
there will be a reduction in the clamping load because 9.3.1 Crimped conductor terminations
aluminium creeps under pressure. Secondly, where the
bolt material is different from that of the conductors The dimensional and tooling requirements for crimped
being clamped, there will be differential thermal ex­ conductor terminations for copper conductors in the
pansion which wih lower the interface pressure with range of 0.28 to 10 mm^ are currently given in ESI
thermal cychng. This will be more prevalent w k h steel Standard 1 2 - 2 , Issue 1. This information wih be trans­
bolts than brass bolts because there is a greater dif­ ferred to ESI Standard 5 0 - 1 8 when it is raised to Issue
ference in the coefficient of thermal expansion of steel 2, and type test requirements wih be added. These
relative to aluminium than between brass and alumi­ crimped conductor fittings are required to be provided
nium. These load relaxations tend to occur early in in uninsulated and pre-insulated forms. For the pre-
service life, leaving a steady residual load. This residual insulated form, insulation is applied over the conductor
load must be sufficient to avoid excessive destruction barrel during manufacture and this is frequently colour
of contact points due to tensile and shear forces from coded to indicate the conductor size range for which
the dimensional changes associated with the load re­ the crimp is suitable. Terminations are required to pro­
laxation. T o achieve an acceptable residual load, it vide insulation support for flexible/stranded conductors
is necessary to apply a higher pre-load to steel bolts of 0.5 mm^ a n d below, and for single-strand conduc­
than to brass bolts. Suitable bolt torques are given in tors of 1 mm^ and below.
Table 6.25. The forms of termination used are h o o k , pin, blade,
ring and snap-on receptacle, these all being shown in
TABLE 6 . 2 5 Fig 6.111. H o o k type terminations are for use with
Recommended bolt torques screw clamp/spring-loaded insertion terminal blocks
and may be used 'back to back' where two terminations
are required in one terminal. Pin and blade type ter­
minations are for use with insertion type terminals and
the blade type only may be used 'back to back' where
two terminations are required in one terminal. Ring
type terminations are for general use with screw or stud
type terminals. Snap-on connectors are for use with
tab type terminals having tabs 6.3 m m wide of the
form detailed in BS5057: 1973.
Type test requirements for these crimped fittings are
based on BS4579: P a r t 1: 1970, with additional re­
quirements for sah and sulphur corrosion tests. Hook

537
Cabling Chapter 6

FIG. 6.111 Control cable crimped terminations

type terminations are also subjected to tensile tests

to ensure that they can be retained in a spring-loaded
insertion terminal block with the terminal clamping FIG. 6.112 Wire wrap termination
screw fuhy released. The mechanical rehabihty of snap-
on terminations is assessed in accordance with Clause
10 of BS5057: 1973. a 'cut, strip and w r a p ' bit which severs the conductor,
The ring type terminals may also be used to terminate strips the insulation and wraps the termination in one
small power cables but consideration must be given to operation. The 'cut, strip and w r a p ' technique is faster
the maximum operating temperature, particularly with and hence cheaper than using separate operations to
the pre-insulated type. strip and w r a p . A typical cut, strip and wrap operation
is shown in Fig 6.113. The bit is used in conjunction
with a high torque hand-held electrically-operated gun
9.3.2 Wire wrapped terminations
of the type shown.
A wire wrap termination is formed by wrapping the The principle of the method is that the wire is
stripped conductor tightly around a sharp cornered wrapped under a high level of tensile stress. Notches
terminal to form a sound electrical and mechanical joint are formed in the wire by the edges of the terminal
without soldering. Such an arrangement is shown in
Fig 6.112. General requirements for wire wrap termina­
tions are given in l E C Pubhcation 352. The method is
INSULATION REMOVED WIRE WRAPPING BIT WIRE WRAPPING TOOL
suitable for use with solid single-strand conductors
of the type used in muhipair cables described in Section
3.6 of this chapter. The conductor size of 1/0.8 m m is
relatively large by conventional wire-wrapping standards
but is well within the capability of the method. The wire
wrap method offers the advantages of a compact, con­
sistent, rehable and fast termination.
The type of termination used should be the modified
wire wrap connection which wraps a minimum of one
half turn of insulation around the post as well as the
turns of uninsulated wire that form the electrical con­
nection. This half turn of insulation gives improved
vibration characteristics. Wire wrap joints can be pro­
duced by stripping the insulated wire for the set dis­
tance to give the required number of turns and then
using a pre-strip bit. A n alternative method is to use FIG. 6.113 Wire wrapping tool operation

538
 Cable accessories

post during wrapping and these lock the wire in posi­
tion causing the wire to remain in tensile stress with
the terminal in compressive stress. The forces set u p
in the notch area at the terminal corner are such as
to produce a gas-tight corrosive-resistant joint. Indeed
h has been reported [23] that the stresses involved
in the notch areas are sufficiently large to penetrate
oxide and tarnish films and promote cold welding. In
this respect, h is considered beneficial to have one of
the surfaces tinned and the most economical way is
to tin the terminal post rather than the wire. For the
size of wire being considered (1/0.8 mm) a minimum
of four turns of bare wire is specified. This means
that if a four-cornered post is used there will be in
the order of 16 terminal/wire notches w h h intimate
metal contact, which explains why a high degree of
consistency and reliability is achieved with this type of
joint.
Considering the parameters of the wire being wrapped,
quite clearly if it is required that tensile stresses are
locked in between terminal/wire notches then the wire
must not he stretched beyond its yield point. T o meet
this requirement it is recommended that wires of the
size being considered have a minimum of 2 0 % elonga­
tion at break. When using cut, strip and wrap tech­
niques the force required to strip the insulation affects
the wrapping tension and hence the integrity of the
joint. For P V C insulated wires this is not generally a
problem, but some low fire risk insulations are harder
or show an affinity for copper and, with these, this
point must be considered. In extreme cases it may only
be possible to use separate stripping and wrapping
operations.
The terminal post itself can take a number of forms
such as square, oblong, triangular or V-shaped. For
joint performance it is advantageous to have the largest
number of contact points (notches) per wrap and from
this point of view square or oblong terminal posts are
desirable. The maximum radius for post corners needs
to be controlled as this affects the notch depth and
hence joint performance. T o demonstrate the signifi­
• The edges shall be parahel within 0.05 m m per 10 m m
over the entire wrapping length.
• The posts shall have 18 m m of wrappable length.
The wrappable length is defined as the length of
terminal post that has a full cross-section available
for wrapping.
• The tip of the post is to be bevelled to facihtate
insertion into the wrapping tool.
• The spacing of the posts shall be such as to ahow
access for the wrapping tool when all adjacent posts
have been wrapped (minimum 6 m m centres).
• T h e terminal block shall withstand voltages of 2 kV
between posts (when wrapped) and 5 kV between
post and earth.
The wire w r a p joint should not be considered per­
manent as it can be removed by unwinding the wire in
the opposite direction to the original w r a p . Since the
terminal is harder than the wire, a number of wraps
(at least 10) can be m a d e on the same post before h s
edges become sufficiently rounded to reduce joint in­
tegrity. However, the wire can only be wrapped once
and therefore a previously wrapped section must be
cut off prior t o re-terminating.
9.4 11 kV terminations
As stated in Section 3.1 of this chapter, with 11 kV
cables it is necessary to provide semi-conducting screens
to control the electric stress within the primary insula­
tion. The core insulation screen cannot simply be cut
back and left at the cable end as very high electric stress
would occur at that point (see Fig 6.114). Such areas
INSULATION EQUIPOTENTIAL LINES

cance of this requirement consider the extreme of a

square post with large r a d h , i.e., a circular post, in
which case there will be no notches, no locked-in
tensile stress in the wire and hence no significant elec­ CONDUCTOR

trical or mechanical performance. The terminal post

must be harder t h a n the wire so that the notch is
formed in the latter. Considering these and other factors
it is recommended that terminals meet the following
requirements:

• The post size to be 0.79 m m χ 1.57 m m .

• The post material to be phosphor bronze to BS2870,

designation PB102, condition half-hard, electro-
tinned 0.0127 m m minimum average thickness to
BS1872.

• The maximum radius of post edge shah be 0.075 m m .

FIG. 6.114 11 kV cable screen termination without
• The maximum edge burr shall be 0.05 m m . stress control

539
Cabling
of high stress can cause partial discharges whhin the
insulation, which result in erosion and eventually fail­
ure of the cable at that point. It can be seen from Fig
6.114 that there is also a very high stress in the air
where the screen terminates, and this may be sufficient
to cause discharges in the air at working voltage. It
is therefore necessary to incorporate a stress control
system into the termination of 11 kV cables.
Stress control can be provided by a number of
methods such as the use of high permittivity materials,
non-linear materials or resistive coatings applied over
the insulation from the screen end for a defined dis­
tance. These materials may be obtained in heat shrink
or tape forms. Heat shrink components are manufac­
tured from cross-hnked materials that have been ex­
panded at high temperature and then cooled in this
expanded condition. Since the material is cross-linked,
it retains a 'memory' of its original shape and size.
When it is subsequently heated during installation
(using a blow-lamp or hot-air gun), it tries to recover
its original size and hence shrinks down tight onto
the cable.
A further method of stress control is the use of a
stress cone. This works by controlhng the capacitance
in the area of the screen termination to reduce the
stress, as shown in Fig 6.115. Stress cones were ori­
ginally formed by applying layers of insulating tape
to build u p the cone shape, then applying layers of
semi-conducting tape. This process was very skilled
and time consuming, and has now been replaced by
the use of moulded rubber terminations. Moulded
rubber stress cones are manufactured for use on cables
having extruded screens, so an adapter has to be in­
cluded when they are used on cables having varnish
and tape screens. This adapter fits over the varnish
EQUIPOTENTIAL
LINES
REINFORCING
INSULATING
PORTION
FLUX LINES
FIG. 6.115 11 kV cable screen termination with
stress control
540
Chapter 6
and tape screen to present an interface to the stress
cone simhar to that of an extruded screen. A com­
plete termination is shown in Fig 6.116. F r o m this
figure, the cable copper tape screen can be seen ter­
minated on the gland and, above this, the screen adapter
and stress cone. Stress cones of this type are used within
cable boxes having air clearances which are located
indoors in controlled environmental conditions, such
as switchrooms, where condensation whl not occur.
In locations where terminal boxes are liable to con­
densation (such as on motors and transformers) or
where air clearances cannot be achieved, it is necessary
to use a fully insulated termination. A fully insulated
termination is shown in Fig 6.117 and these are known
as elbow terminations because of their shape.
Elbow terminations are fully screened by an outer
layer of semi-conducting material which is earthed.
An inner semi-conducting screen is provided which is
held at phase potential by contact with the conductor
fitting. This arrangement prevents high stresses and
hence discharges in the air surrounding the conductor
fitting. A stress rehef adapter is provided to control
the stress, in a similar manner to the stress cone, where
the cable insulation screen is terminated. Quite clearly
these elbow terminations are more expensive to pur­
chase and install than stress cones and should only be
used where essential.
Moulded rubber terminations have been used ex­
tensively in power stations since the introduction of
elastomeric cables. Their selection was based on the
results of a series of tests carried out by the Central
Electricity Research Laboratories. These tests showed
that moulded rubber terminations were relatively easy
to install and provided excellent stress control as in­
dicated by a lack of partial discharge activity at up
to three times working voltage. Moulded rubber ter­
minations also provide a ready means of disconnecting
cables for testing.
Suitable test criteria for terminations are given in
Engineering Recommendation C89, May 1986 —
'Performance specification for terminations on poly­
meric insulated cables'. It is important to ensure that
the partial discharge performance of terminations is
matched by that of the cable to enable the completed
installation to undergo a partial discharge test. It is
recommended that all 11 kV polymeric cables (complete
with terminations) be subjected to a partial discharge
test as part of the commissioning procedure.
10 Fire barriers
10.1 Introduction
A fire barrier is, as the name suggests, a physical
barrier which inhibits the progress of a fire and hence
limits its damaging effects. In this context, the term
'damaging effects' includes not only the flames and
their associated heat of combustion, but also any
Fire barriers
o
o
>
541
Cabling
RUBBER CAP VOLTAGE TEST POINT ^ MOULDED CONDUCTIVE SCREEN
DEAD END PLUG INSULATION
CONDUCTOR CONNECTOR
INTERNAL SCREEN
FIG. 6.117 11 kV elbow termination (diagrammatic)
smoke and corrosive and toxic gases generated by that
combustion.
Fire barriers form an integral part of the CEGB's
design philosophy for cable installations since they are
used to provide 'segregation' between groups of cables
a n d / o r electrical plant. The concept of segregation is
described in detail in Section 2.1 of this chapter.
A fire barrier may be part of the power station civil
structure hself, i.e., concrete or blockwork walls, ceil­
ings or floors, or it may be a purpose designed pre­
fabricated partition. Requirements for segregation are
therefore taken into account when the civil structure of
the power station is being designed. However, there are
many cases where it is impracticable or prohibitively
expensive to provide civil structure fire barriers for
segregation and, in situations hke these, pre-fabricated
fire barriers are used; it is these pre-formed parthions,
colloquially known as fire barriers, with which this
section is chiefly concerned.
Pre-fabricated fire barriers (Fig 6.118) are formed
from non-combustible flbreboard panels which are
mounted onto a framework, usually of C-section steel
channels. The panels are generally mounted on either
side of the steel framework leaving a gap of typically
100 m m . This 'double-skin' format is required to
provide the necessary level of fire withstand perfor­
mance. In some cases, the air gap between the two
panels is filled with mineral fibre to further increase
the degree of thermal insulation provided by the bar­
rier which, in turn, reduces the temperatures on the
unexposed face during a fire.
542
Chapter 6
EARTHING EYES EQUIPMENT BUSHING EQUIPMENT
BUSHING PLATE
CABLE REDUCER
The panels themselves are proprietary items and
may typically be composed of an asbestos-free fibre/
cement reinforced by galvanised steel sheet, mechani­
cally-bonded to the fibre during manufacture by press­
ing tangs into the fibre surface. This is the type of
panel ihustrated in Fig 6.118. A n alternative panel type
is formed from glass fibre reinforced cement. The steel
sheet and the glass fibre reinforcement are provided
to improve the mechanical properties of the panel.
The steel framework onto which the panels are fixed
will itself be rigidly fixed to the civil structure at the
barrier location.
10.2 Perfornnance requirements
The level of fire performance required from fire bar­
riers varies dependent u p o n the type of power station
in which they are installed. In fossil-fired and hydro
power stations, segregation is provided primarily to
limit economic loss resulting from a 'smah' fire. (A
small fire is defined as one which can be extinguished
within one hour.) Consequently, fire barriers used for
this type of segregation must be capable of containing
the effects of that fire for a minimum period of one
hour.
In the case of nuclear power stations, irrespective
of the type of reactor employed, additional segregation
is required to ensure that the reactor can be safely
shutdown in the event of a fire. As explained in Section
2.1.2 of this chapter, the segregation phhosophy used
for nuclear power stations dictates that two different

0.5mm GALVANISED
STEEL SHEET
FIBRE CEMENT
FIG. 6,118 Pre-fabricated fire barrier
levels of segregation, ox segregation classes, are defined.
There are, therefore, two different levels of fire barrier
performance needed to provide these two classes of
segregation.
Fire barriers for segregation Class I need t o be able
to contain the effects of a 'major' fire, defined as one
which can be extinguished within four hours. They
may also be required to withstand the effects of other
hazards which may occur locally to that barrier, such
as missiles from a turbine disintegration or a hot gas
release (the latter being specific to gas-cooled reactor
types). Because of these more onerous requirements,
fire barriers for segregation Class I are generally part
of the civil structure.
Segregation Class II fire barriers must he capable
of containing the effects of a 'smah' fire (as defined
previously). The same designs of barrier are therefore
used to provide Class II segregation as are used for
fossU-fired and hydro stations.
At the time of writing, pre-formed fire barriers have
not formally been demonstrated as being capable of
providing Class I segregation. However, development
Fire barriers
0.5mm GALVANISED
STEEL SHEET
work aimed at the formal approval of partition fire
barriers (and their associated fixings and penetration
seals) is in progress, which will provide this perfor­
mance. In addition to this, the UK design for P W R
power stations also calls for a 3-hour rated fire barrier.
Development work in this area is also in progress.
It is important to note that the basic performance
requirements and hence test methods for such barriers,
wih be of the same form as those set out for Class II
fire barriers except that they must be maintained for
the appropriate longer period.
Class II fire barriers are further divided into two
categories dependent u p o n the function which they
fulfil. Category 1 fire barriers are used to provide the
required segregation defined above. Category 2 fire
barriers are employed within a given segregation 'zone',
acting as smoke and fire stops, thus restricting the
extent of fire damage and also assisting fire detection
and fire fighting. This categorisation is merely one of
functional definition as the performance requirements
for b o t h Category 1 and Category 2 fire barriers are
the same.
543
Cabling Chapter 6

This distinction can be seen more clearly by examin­
ing typical cable installation fire barrier configurations,
examples of which are shown in Fig 6.119.
Configuration 1 shows a simple plain wall, partition
type fire barrier. This type of arrangement is most
likely to be used to provide a Class II, Category 1
fire barrier. The second configuration shows an ex­
ample of a Category 2 fire harrier used to provide
zoning within a particular segregation area. Here, the
most important features are the so-called 'penetrations'.
Since Category 2 barriers provide fire protection whhin
a segregation area they will, by definition, have cables

r CABLES SUPPORTED
ON STEELWORK

Q--

0 ~ ' _:. ..-Q . . FIRE BARRIER

Q- • — Ω
CONFIGURATION 1
TYPICAL CATEGORY 1
- Ω PLAIN WALL TYPE
FIRE BARRIER

-Q .
BARRIER
FIXING
-Q . ^ FRAMEWORK

BARRIER PIPEWORK PENETRATION

FIXING (FIRE PROTECTION PIPEWORK)
FRAMEWORK.

FIRE BARRIER
CONFIGURATION 2
TYPICAL CATEGORY 2
CROSS-BARRIER
CABLE PENETRATIONS INCORPORATING CABLE
D D (SINGLE AND MULTI OPENING)
' MAY OR MAY NOT
INCLUDE CABLE
AND PIPE PENETRATIONS
AND FIRE DOOR

SUPPORT STEEL

GLAZED FIRE DOOR

INCLUDING OPERATING
MECHANISMS AND SEALS

CANTILEVER ARMS

CABLE RISER WALLS

CONFIGURATION 3
TYPICAL CATEGORY 2
FIRE BARRIER HORIZONTAL CROSS
INCORPORATING BARRIER IN A CABLE
SUPPORT ARRANGEMENT RISER

PENETRATIONS

ELEVATION

FIG. 6.119 Typical fire barrier configurations

544

and other services (e.g., pipework and personnel access
doors) passing through them. It is obviously necessary
to ensure that these penetrations do not jeopardise
the integrity and fire performance of the barrier as a
whole. This point is addressed in more detail below.
In a similar way. Category 2 fire barriers may also
be instahed in a horizontal alignment to sectionalise
cable flumes (or risers). Such a barrier is shown in the
third configuration.
The effectiveness of a fire barrier in containing a fire
wih be chiefly determined by two factors:
• Magnitude and type of fire.
• Proximity of the fire to the barrier.
These are explained in more detail in the following
subsections.
10.2.1 M a g n i t u d e a n d t y p e o f fire
This wih depend on the type and quantity of combus­
tible material which is fuehing the Are. When pro­
viding fire barriers for cable installations, the main
source of combustible material is, of course, the cables
themselves in the form of their insulation, bedding and
sheathing materials, all of which are combustible.
The performance of cables under fire conditions
has, throughout the 1970s and early-to-mid 1980s, been
chiefly governed by the use of P V C as the major cable
insulation, bedding and sheathing material. Whilst P V C
possesses excellent electrical and mechanical properties,
it also has a number of undesirable fire performance
characteristics which must be allowed for when selecting
flre barriers.
Fire performance properties are discussed in detail
in Section 8 of this chapter, but the most important
aspects which must be considered are summarised as
follows:
• The abihty of these materials to propagate a flre,
both verticahy and horizontally.
• When P V C and to some extent the other common­
ly used materials burn, they generate considerable
quantities of dense smoke and toxic, acidic fumes
and gases which may rapidly reduce visibility and
render the atmosphere hostile to humans in con­
fined spaces. This is aggravated by the presence of
the Category 2 fire barriers. The main consthuent
of these combustion products is hydrogen chloride
which readily combines with available moisture to
form hydrochloric acid. (Water is produced during
combustion as well as being present in the atmos­
phere.) Even after a fire has been extinguished, the
corrosive deposits which result may cause long term
damage to senshive equipment such as relay contacts.
• The gases driven off by the combustion of P V C
are also highly flammable. Indeed, it is beheved that
it is the burning of these gases, with recorded flame
Fire barriers
temperatures in excess of 1000°C, which contributes
most to the propagation mechanism.
During the next few years, completely new cable in­
sulation, bedding and sheathing materials wih begin
to supersede P V C . These new materials have been
specifically developed with their fire performance in
mind and have the advantage that when they burn,
they give off significantly reduced quantities of smoke
and toxic, acidic gases, whilst still maintaining low fire
propagation characteristics. It is unhkely, however, that
the total heat of combustion generated by cables using
these new materials will be significantly lower. The
performance requirements for cable instahation fire
barriers are therefore unlikely to change significantly
as a resuh of these developments in cable technology.
Despite the fact that cable components are the major
source of combustible material in a cable instahation,
it must be pointed out that fires started by internal
faults in the cables themselves are very rare. Indeed,
with correct design of the cable instahation, especial­
ly particular care in power cable sizing and protec­
tion, cable fauhs can be virtually eliminated. However,
cables, by the very nature of their service function,
easily become involved in fires caused and fuelled by
other sources. Cable tunnels and flats are areas of
an operating power station in which rubbish may ac­
cumulate, even with the most rigorously applied 'good
housekeeping' policies. Their physical location can mean
that liquid spillages may also find their way into them.
Such spillages could include flammable lubricating and
coohng oils.
These are important additional factors which must
be allowed for in the design of cable installation fire
barriers. Sources of ignition and fuel will of course be
the same, irrespective of whether P V C or the new range
of materials is used in the cable construction.
10.2.2 P r o x i m i t y o f t h e f i r e t o t h e barrier
Having identified the nature of the fuel source and its
combustion characteristics, it is necessary to consider
how near a potential hazard may be to the protective
barriers.
A n ideal cable instahation layout would ensure that
the fire barriers were installed some distance away
from the major source of combustible material, hence
reducing the level of performance required from the
barriers and consequently their cost. This invariably
proves impractical, for two reasons.
Firstly, the space available for cable routes is limhed
by civil structure costs and, secondly, as has already
been mentioned, that cables need to pass through Cate­
gory 2 barriers (i.e, those used to provide zoning within
a given segregation area). This type of fire barrier will,
therefore, have the principal source of combustible
material in intimate contact with the barrier.
These two factors dictate that all Class II fire bar­
riers must be designed to provide the required level
545
Cabling Chapter 6

of performance assuming the fire to be immediately

adjacent to the barrier. In this way, the most onerous
practical conditions are catered for at the design stage.
It is clear from the above, that the nature of the fire
hazard present in power station cable installations is
unique. The C E G B has therefore produced its own
internal technical specification which sets out perfor­
mance requirements. This specification is becoming
increasingly well known throughout the fire barrier
manufacturing industry. These technical requirements
are discussed in more detail in the following section.

10.3 Fire test requirements

It is considered that the only representative method of
assessing the performance of a fire barrier is to conduct
a fuh scale fire test, i.e., to place a sample of the fire
barrier in front of a 'test fire' and examine how it
performs. T o make this test fuhy representative of
'as-installed' conditions, the specimen barrier must in­
clude ah fixings, accessories, penetrations, doors, etc.,
which would be included in use.
This is the philosophy set out in Brhish Standard
Specification BS476: Part 8: [24], the document which
forms the basis of the CEGB's fire test requirements.
This specification primarily addresses test methods
and performance criteria for materials used in build­
ing construction. Whilst this standard was conceived
for more conventional apphcations, such as factories 20 30 40
and other public buildings, its philosophies are ob­ TIME INTO TEST (MINUTES)

viously equally applicable to the power station cable

installation.
In order to make a fire test repeatable and hence
provide a means of comparing the performance of one
barrier construction with another, it is necessary to
define a standard set of fire conditions. The severity of
this test fire is specified in terms of a time/temperature
curve. BS476: Part 8: 1972 specifies such a t i m e /
temperature relationship, to which the test furnace
should be closely controlled within laid down h m h s
for the duration of the test. This is the so-called 'BS476
fire test curve' and it has been derived from the burn­
ing characteristics of typical materials found in normal
building environments (such as wood, fabrics, etc.).
General construction fire barriers such as blockwork
walls have been designed and tested to these require­
ments. This fire test curve is shown in Fig 6.120.
Other time/temperature test curves exist for special
applications however. A typical example is the hydro­
carbon fire curve developed by the Mobil Oil Company
which is used extensively throughout the petrochemi­
cal industry. This fire test curve recognises that when
hydrocarbons burn, they do so initiahy at much higher
temperatures than do the materials considered by the
Brhish Standard. The Mobil curve therefore features a
higher initial rate of temperature rise than does the
Brhish Standard curve. In the longer term, if there is
sufficient fuel available, a building material fire will
FIG. 6.120 Fire test curves (BS476 and Appendix A)
attain higher temperatures than the hydrocarbon fire.
Again, this is reflected in the profile of the two
time/temperature curves.
Similarly, cable insulation, bedding and sheathing
materials have different burning characteristics from
conventional fire hazard materials as a result of the
combustion of the gases driven off. The C E G B fire
barrier specification therefore contains a fire test curve,
known as the 'Appendix A ' curve, which acknowledges
this fact. This test profile has the high initial rate of
temperature rise of the hydrocarbon curve, flattening
out at a temperature of 1050°C and is also shown in
Fig 6.120 for comparison with the British Standard
curve.
Since Class II fire barriers must be capable of con­
taining the effects of a cable installation fire for a
minimum of one hour, a one hour long fire test is con­
ducted on representative barrier specimens.
BS476: Part 8: 1972 identifies three major properties
of the barrier which are indicative of hs level of pro­
tection and these are:
• Stability The ability of the fire barrier to remain
intact and in a stable condition without excessive
deformation for the complete duration of the test.

546

This property is assessed by examination of the
barrier both during and immediately following the
test. It is essentially a measure of the strength of the
barrier assembly under the extreme temperatures of
the fire.
• Integrity In addition to remaining 'stable', no cracks
or other openings must develop in the barrier during
the test which could affect its abihty to prevent
the spread of fire from one side of the barrier to
the other. In cable installations, this aspect is par­
ticularly important since such openings could permit
passage of the gases and fumes from one side of the
barrier to the other. A test is passed, therefore, only
if there is virtually n o leakage of hot gases or smoke
through the barrier; particular attention being paid
to joints, penetration seals and doors. It is difficuh,
however, to quantify exactly what constitutes 'ac­
ceptable' leakage in this context as it will depend very
much on the size and complexity of the barrier
assembly being tested. The Brhish Standard cahs for
integrity to be measured by holding cotton wool
pads immediately over any cracks or fissures, a test
pass being recorded if the pads do not catch fire.
This is not considered to achieve adequate demon­
stration that smoke and fumes will not pass through
the openings; the performance of the barrier is
therefore checked by a careful visual examination
throughout the test.
• Insulation The insulation performance of a fire
barrier is determined by measurement of tempera­
tures on the unexposed face during the fire test.
When assessing the thermal resistance of the barrier,
it is important to consider the nature of the cable
materials local to the barrier. Because P V C can start to
emit combustible gases from upwards of 200°C, it is
important to limit the temperatures on the unexposed
face by barrier design. Temperatures at various points
on the unexposed barrier face are therefore monitored
throughout the test using thermocouples. A test pass
is recorded if the mean temperature of the unexposed
face rises by no more than 140°C and if the temperature
at any critical hot spots (for example, bolt heads) rises
by no more than 180°C. These temperatures ahow for
the fact that the cables will not actually be in contact
whh the barrier surface but wih be protected to some
degree by their penetration seals.
As illustrated by Fig 6.119, many different fire
barrier configurations will be used in protecting a cable
installation. It may therefore be necessary to conduct
separate fire tests on a number of different barrier
configurations in order to have complete confidence
in the barrier installation as a whole. Since this would
be expensive, care is taken to ensure that a fuh scale
test assembly covers as many of the practical barrier
arrangements as possible. For example, a successful
test on an arrangement such as configuration 2 in
Fig 6.119 would normally be considered as demon­
Fire barriers
strating the performance of the plain barrier arrange­
ment of configuration 1. The case is not so clear cut
when configuration 3 is examined and a separate test
on such an arrangement would most likely have to be
carried out.
F r o m the above, it is clear that care must be taken
in assessing whether fire test performance data may
be applied to a particular practical configuration.
As a closing note on full scale fire testing, it is
important to remember that a fire barrier which has
successfully maintained stabihty, integrity and insula­
tion during a fire test has performed in that manner
under test fire conditions only. Fire barriers passing
such tests are often referred to as having a 1-hour
(say) rating. It should be appreciated, however, that
the 1-hour rating relates to the specific characteristics of
the test. Since all real fires have differing and unique
characteristics, the fire test cannot ever be an absolute
guarantee of performance. O n the positive side, h
must be remembered that the test fire is immediately
adjacent to the fire barrier whereas in practice this is
unlikely to be the case. It should also be noted that
test fire conditions m a k e n o allowance for the fast-
acting fire fighting systems which the C E G B usually
employs to protect its cable installations for economic
reasons.
As well as the main full-scale fire performance tests
described above, the CEGB's specification also calls
for non-combustibility and surface spread-of-flame
tests to be carried out on fire barrier materials.
The non-combustibility test is carried out in ac­
cordance with BS476: P a r t 4 [25], which cahs for
specimens of a predetermined size to be heated in a
small, closely temperature controlled, electrically-heated
oven. During the test period, the current in the heating
coils is held at a fixed value which, after a period of
stabilisation, produces an approximately constant oven
temperature. The test specimen is then introduced into
the oven and held there for 20 minutes during which
time the oven temperature is closely monitored. Any
increase in the oven temperature (above a certain
tolerance value) is then deemed to be attributable to
the combustion of the test specimen. A sample giving
such a temperature rise would therefore fail the test.
In addition to this temperature measurement, any
sustained flaming of the specimen is also noted. If
flaming occurs continuously for more than 10 seconds,
this is also deemed to be a test failure.
It is clear therefore, that the term 'non-combustible'
as determined by this test procedure, is not absolute.
The British Standard defines non-combustible materials
as those which 'make little or n o thermal contribu­
tion to the heat of the furnace and d o not produce a
flame', which is consistent with C E G B philosophy for
fire barrier material combustibility.
The surface spread of flame test is carried out in
accordance w h h BS476: P a r t 7 [26].
This test provides a method for measuring the lateral
spread of flame along the surface of the fire barrier
547
Cabling
panels when vertically orientated, and a classification
system based on the rate and extent of flame spread.
The test method has been designed to take account
of the combined effect of factors such as ignhion
characteristics and the extent to which the surface of
the test specimen spreads the flame. The influence on
these factors of any underlying materials, in relation
to their ability to influence the rate of fire growth, is
also taken into account.
In this method, specimens of the flre barrier panels
are subjected to a specified radiative heating regime
with a small gas ignition flame at one end. The hori­
zontal spread of flame from this ignition source is
measured at 1.5 minutes and 10 minutes into the test,
and the progress of the flame-front determines the sur­
face spread-of-flame classification given to the material.
The most onerous classification, which is that required
by the CEGB for hs flre barrier panels, is Class I. T o
meet Class I requirements, the flame front must not
progress beyond 165 mm from the ignition source after
the 10-minute test period.
10.4 Additional performance criteria
In addition to the basic fire test performance criteria,
the CEGB also dictates that its fire barriers provide
the following features:
• Design performance over a lifetime of 40 years in a
power station environment without the need for
maintenance.
• Suhability for use in d a m p and wet conditions.
• Freedom from asbestos in their construction.
• Freedom from materials which emit any corrosive
or toxic fumes or smoke on the unexposed face of
the barrier under fire conditions.
• Defined minimum mechanical strength.
• Capability of withstanding the pressure rise asso­
ciated with fires in sealed cable tunnels.
• Capability of withstanding in-service levels of vibra­
tion whhout reduction in fire performance.
• Barriers must not fail in such a way as to damage
other plant (including cables) during a seismic dis­
turbance of a specified magnitude (requirement for
nuclear power stations only).
A wide range of tests are carried out on barrier samples
which are designed to demonstrate the above qualities.
These tests include:
• A hose stream test to verify that the thermal and
mechanical shock of a hose stream being suddenly
played on a hot fire barrier does not cause catas­
trophic failure.
• The following mechanical strength tests:
548
Chapter 6
(a) Impact withstand.
(b) Modulus of elasticity and bending strength.
(c) Mechanical strength after wet cycling.
(d) Pressure rise due to combustion (simulated
statically or by analysis).
• Water absorption.
• Seismic qualification, usually by analysis based u p o n
dynamic tests on representative fire barrier samples.
It is more difficult to demonstrate that the materials
used will not age significantly over their 40-year design
hfe. The type of testing which is carried out very much
depends upon the materials used, but a c o m m o n feature
is the apphcation of heat, ehher a continually-apphed
elevated temperature or some form of thermal cycling.
In some cases, the materials used to construct the fire
barrier are standard building materials for which ageing
data is already well established. In these cases further
testing is not necessary.
10.5 Fire doors
It is not possible to specify requirements for fire bar­
riers without giving careful consideration to the design
of fire doors.
Fire doors may effectively be considered as person­
nel penetrations, and they bring with them their own
problems in ensuring adequate fire performance. O b ­
viously, the presence of the door must not detract
from the fire performance of the barrier in which h
is located. This means that special care must be taken
at the j a m b assembly to ensure that integrity and in­
sulation requirements are met. It may be particularly
difficult to achieve the required fire performance whilst
still providing doors which provide satisfactory emer­
gency egress for personnel.
Another problem which arises with doors is that
for ventilation purposes they often need to be latched
open during normal operation. This means that a fast-
acting fire detection system must be provided to trigger
door release in the event of a fire. The closing me­
chanism must obviously ensure that the required seal is
made on closing.
10.6 Penetrations
Penetration seals are required in order to seal around
openings where cables (and other services such as pipe­
work) pass through fire barriers. It is a fundamental
requirement, therefore, that the presence of these pene­
tration seals does not degrade the fire performance of
the barrier in which they are located.
Configurations 2 and 3 in Fig 6.119 show typical
examples of the apphcation of these seals, here shown
specifically installed in pre-formed type fire barriers.
They could, however, equally be installed in wahs.

floors, roof soffits, etc., since all of these may be
considered as fire barriers.
There are three basic types of penetration seal; rigid,
flexible and pre-formed, each of which is described
briefly as follows:
• Rigid seals These are usually modified plasters
made up of inert materials such as vermiculite or
pearlite, which are mixed at site to form a paste.
Being water based, they are placed around the pene­
trants by trowelling and then form a rigid seal by
evaporation at room temperature. When set, they
effectively form an extension of the fire barrier in
which they are located, containing the fire in much
the same way as the barrier hself. They have the
additional advantage of acting as a heat sink which
retards the conduction of heat along the conductors
of the cable during a fire.
This type of seal, whilst being inexpensive, suffers
from two main problems. Firstly, h requires the d m e -
consuming, labour intensive process of damming at
each penetration prior to forming. This is usually
carried out using plywood or a similar material.
Secondly, once a seal has been formed, it is then
difficuh to add further cables. It is undesirable to
leave the sealing of penetrations to the very end of
cable installation as the construction period hself
is the time of greatest fire hazard due to high person­
nel presence. Despite these two disadvantages, these
are the traditional type of seals which have been
used in a wide variety of industrial apphcations for
many years.
There is, however, a new form of rigid penetration
seal which is now generally available in the form
of a two-part sihcone elastomer which, when mixed,
wih cross-hnk at r o o m temperature to become rigid.
This mixing takes place at the head of special p u m p ­
ing equipment which is used to install this type of
seal. Because the seal material is a liquid when first
applied, it is able to mould itself to the contours
of the penetrations.
During a fire, the seal material burns to form a
surface layer of char. It is this char layer which
prevents further combustion of the seal and hence
restricts the fire.
Again, prior to forming the seal, damming ma­
terials need to be installed at each penetration. In this
case, the damming is formed from ceramic fibre
board which is not removed after curing and forms
part of the finished penetration seal assembly. This
type of seal suffers from the same disadvantages
as the modified plasters described above and is also
more expensive. Furthermore, it is also necessary
to use speciahsed installation equipment and requires
trained applicadons staff in order to ensure a con­
sistent standard of seal. It is, however, much faster
to install than the plaster type seals and it also has
a pressure withstand capacity, which the plaster type
seals do not have. This can be an advantage where
Fire barriers
it is identified that a pressure rise due to combustion
in a sealed area may exist.
• Flexible seals A variation of the silicone elastomer
rigid seal described above is formed by the addition
of a foaming agent to one of the components in
the mix. Once mixed, the two components begin to
cross-link at r o o m temperature but, whilst doing so,
hydrogen gas is generated which causes foaming to
occur. This foaming leads to expansion of the seal
material which in turn provides a good mould to
the contours of the penetrants. Again, ceramic fibre
b o a r d damming is required at each penetration prior
to sealing and this forms part of the completed
penetration seal assembly.
The main advantage with this type of seal is
the relative ease with which additional cables may
be added at a later date. The fully cross-hnked foam
may easily be cut with a craft type knife, as can
the ceramic fibre board by means of a special tool.
If the hole in the foam is cut slightly undersize
to the penetrant, its natural springiness will ensure
a good smoke-seal without the need to re-apply
sealant.
As with the rigid elastomer seal, expense may
restrict the use of these seals which require trained
staff and special equipment to install.
• Pre-formed These types of seal, sometimes known
as 'cable transits', are in the form of 2-part, semi-
flexible, pre-formed blocks which are placed around
individual cables. These blocks, along with 'blanks'
where necessary, are shd into a special frame formed
around the inside of the penetration. Clamping screws
are used to achieve a tight seal around the penetrant.
During a fire, the block material is consumed very
slowly, hence the thickness determines the level of
fire performance.
The design intent of these cable transhs was the
easy addition and removal of cables after formation.
However, it is necessary to keep a complete range
of block and blank sizes to cover for all cable sizes
and penetration configurations. Use of these transhs
means that cable support ladders must be stopped
on either side of the fire barrier, hence giving rise
to the need for additional cable steelwork supports.
Also, the fact that blocks are placed a r o u n d in­
dividual cables makes this a very time-consuming
and expensive sealing method and consequently they
are rarely used by the C E G B .
As mentioned, it is essential that penetration seals
provide the same level of fire performance as the bar­
riers in which they are located. It is therefore necessary
to incorporate examples of typical sealing arrangements
in the full scale fire test assembly. Particular attention
is paid to the unexposed face temperatures around the
seals which are a potential weak point in the barrier
assembly.
549
Cabling
As with fire barriers, in addition to the basic fire
test performance criteria, the C E G B also dictates that
its penetration seals provide the following features:
• Design performance over a lifetime of 40 years in
a power station environment.
• Suitability for use in d a m p and wet conditions.
• Freedom from asbestos in their construction.
• Capability of withstanding the pressure rise asso­
ciated with combustion in sealed cable tunnels.
• Compatibihty wkh cable sheathing materials.
• Capability of wkhstanding in-service vibration and
cable movement due to short-circuit and thermal
cycling without reduction in fire performance.
• They must not damage cables during a seismic dis­
turbance of specified magnitude (requirement for
nuclear power stations only).
A further design criterion which must be considered
when selecting penetration seal materials, is the effect
which the seals may have on the current carrying ca­
pacity of power cables which pass through them. Here,
two conflicting interests exist. In order to achieve good
insulation properties to restrict unexposed face tem­
peratures during a fire, it is desirable for the seal to
be a good thermal insulant. This does, however, restrict
the conduction away of heat generated in the power
cables due to copper losses under normal operating
conditions. Thus it may become necessary to derate
the power cable to accommodate the seals. This in turn
may lead to the use of larger cables sizes to supply
particular loads. The rigid plaster type seals wül be
less of a problem in this respect than the other seal
types, since they are more thermally conductive.
11 Earthing systems
11.1 Introduction
The purpose of an earthing system is to provide an
adequate path for earth fault currents to return to the
system neutral. This has to be performed in a manner
which ensures 'safety to personnel', i.e., without giving
rise to dangerous touch, step or transferred potentials.
In addition, to prevent damage to plant, the rise of
earth potential under fault conditions must not result
in breakdown of insulation. In all cases, the system
design must be such that enough fauh current will flow
to operate the protection devices and disconnect the
fauh. To meet these needs, an earth system must in­
clude earth electrodes to allow current to flow into
the ground to remote system neutrals, and also a
network of conductors to allow fault current to flow
between plant within the station site. In this context,
in accordance with British Standard Code of Practice
550
Chapter 6
1013: 1965, Clause 215, k is a requirement that if
two or more stations are adjacent on what may be
considered to be one she, then the earthing systems are
to be interconnected to form a single earthing system.
This applies to a number of generating stations on
one site, and also to power stations and transmission
substations on a c o m m o n site.
When reading this section it should be borne in
mind that earthing is closely associated with lightning
protection, power cable ratings and gland bonding, and
therefore reference will also need to be made to the
sections covering these topics.
11.2 Differences in earth potential
11.2.1 Definitions
When earth fault currents flow to ground, a potential
gradient is formed a r o u n d the earth electrode due to
the resistance of the ground. This potential gradient is
greatest adjacent to the earth electrode and reduces
to zero or true earth at some distance from the earth
electrode. Three methods of contact with these poten­
tials are considered and defined as step, touch and
transferred potentials. These are shown diagramma-
tically in Fig 6.121 which is discussed as follows:
• Step potentials Person *a' on Fig 6.121 illustrates
'step potential'. Here the potential difference Vi
seen by the body is limited to the value between two
points on the ground separated by the distance of
one pace. Since the potential gradient in the ground
is greatest immediately adjacent to the electrode
area, it follows that the maximum step potential
under earth fault conditions will be experienced by
a person who has one foot on the area of maximum
rise and the other foot one step towards true earth.
• Touch potential Person ' b ' on Fig 6.121 illustrates
'touch potential'. Here the potential difference V 2
seen by the body is the resuh of hand-to-both-feet
contact. Again the highest potential wih occur if
there were a metal structure on the edge of the
high potential area, and the person stood one pace
away and touched this metal. The risk from this type
of contact is higher than for step potential because
the voltage is applied across the body and could
affect the heart muscles.
• Transferred potential The distance between the
high potential area at the electrode and that of true
earth may be sufficient to form a physical separa­
tion rendering a person in the high potential area
immune from the possibihty of simuhaneous contact
with zero potential. However, a metal object having
sufficient length, such as a fence, cable sheath or
cable core may be located in a manner that would
bridge this physical separation. By such means, zero
earth potential may be transferred into a high p o ­
tential area or vice-versa. Person 'c' in Fig 6.121

FIGURE CURRENT FLOW PATH
a leg-leg
b arm-body-legs
c arm-body-arm
d arm-body-leg
FIG. 6.121 Differences in earth potential
illustrates the case of a high potential being trans­
ferred into a zero potential area via the a r m o u r of
a cable. Since the a r m o u r is bonded to the main earth
grid at the power station, the voltage V3 wül be
the full 'rise of earth potential of the power station'.
In the illustrated case, the person is making simul­
taneous contact hand-to-hand w h h the cable sheath
and true earth. However, if the person is standing
on true earth then the voltage V3 seen by the body
could be the result of a hand-to-both-feet contact.
P e r s o n ' d ' in Fig 6.121 represents the case of zero
potential being transferred to a high potential area
via a cable core which is earthed at the remote
point. In this case, the voltage V4 is lower than V3
which represents the station rise of earth potential,
because p e r s o n ' d ' is located some distance from the
main earth electrode and therefore is subject to the
ground potential gradient. Quite clearly if p e r s o n ' d '
had been on or touching the main electrode he would
have experienced the full rise of earth potential V3.
Transferred potentials are therefore considered to
carry the greatest risk since the shock voltage may
be equal to the full rise of earth potential and not
a fraction of it, as is the case with step or touch
potentials.
11.2.2 A c c e p t a n c e criteria
Acceptance criteria are related to the rise of earth
potential and its duration in the following manner:
Earthing systems
REMOTE
Φ POINT
^ TRUE
PILOT CABLE HAVING CONTINUOUS EARTH
METALLIC SHEATH INSULATED
THROUGHOUT BUT WITH BOTH ENDS
EXPOSED. SHEATH BONDED TO MAIN
EARTH GRID AT SUBSTATION END ONLY
EQUIPOTENTIAL LINES DURING
FLOW OF EARTH FAULT CURRENT
POTENTIAL
DIFFERENCE TYPE
V^ STEP POTENTIAL
^2 TOUCH POTENTIAL
^3 TRANSFERRED POTENTIAL
V4 TRANSFERRED POTENTIAL
(a) For high rehability systems, i.e., systems having
high speed protection, the m a x i m u m permissible
rise of earth potential without special precautions
is 650 V. This requirement, given in Engineering
Recommendation S 5 / 1 , is based o n limits set by
the International Telegraph and Telephone Con­
sultative C o m m h t e e for installing telephone equip­
ment without special protection for personnel or
equipment. A duration is not given for the clear­
ance time associated with high reliability systems,
but this is generally accepted as 0.2 seconds.
Although this value of 650 V originates from re­
quirements for telephone equipment, it is now also
used as a crherion for safety generally. Therefore,
providing this limit is not exceeded, experience
has shown that n o special measures are necessary
in respect of potential rise, step, touch or trans­
ferred potentials.
(b) For systems protected by overcurrent protection,
the m a x i m u m permissible rise of earth potential
w h h o u t special precautions is 430 V.
This requirement, also taken from Engineering
Recommendation S 5 / 1 , is again based on C C I T T
recommendations for telephone equipment. Once
again, n o fault duration is given for this condition
but using the criterion given in (a) a n d extrapolating
on an I^t basis, for the 430 V hmit a maximum
duration of 0.46 seconds is obtained. As for (a),
providing the criterion is not exceeded, no special
551
Cabling
measures are required in respect of step, touch or
transferred potentials.
(c) British Standard code of practice CP1013: 1965
(Clause 213) requires that the potential difference
between two normally earthed items to which per­
sonnel may have simultaneous contact should not
exceed 55 V. Bearing in mind the criterion given
in (b), this hmit of 55 V is apphed to ah rises of
earth potential that exist for durations in excess
of 0.46 seconds.
(d) If the criterion given in (a), (b) and (c) cannot be
complied w h h , then special precautions must be
taken to protect personnel and plant. An example
of precautions to protect against transferred po­
tentials is the use of isolation transformers on
incoming telephone lines. A further example is the
provision of local bonding to give immunity by
ensuring that all metalwork to which simuhaneous
contact can be made is at the same potential. Guard
rings buried at increasing depths around an elec­
trode can be used to modify the ground surface
potential to protect against step potentials.
11.3 Earthing systems design
When considering the design of earthing systems it
is useful to bear in mind that earth fault currents have
to return to their own system neutrals. This means that
whilst a common earth system for all equipment is
employed, it can be analysed in two parts depending
on whether the neutral of the system feeding the fault
is within the power station or is remote. The following
Section 11.3.1 deals with 400 kV, 275 kV and 132 kV
systems where a significant proportion of the earth
fauh current will flow via the earth electrode to a
remote supply source. Section 11.3.2 deals with system
voltages up to and including generator voltage, where
the system neutral is within the power station and
therefore the vast majority of earth fault current will
flow in the metahic bonding system.
11.3.1 Systems having remote neutrals
400 kV, 275 kV and 132 kV systems have neutrals that
are outside the confines of the power station and
therefore the earth fault current flows back to the
source via the ground and any E H V cable sheaths or
aerial earth conductors. The proportion of fault current
returning down each path will be dependent on the
path impedance. Under such fault conditions the whole
power station earth network whl be raised in potential
with respect to remote earth. The rise of earth potential
will be the product of the current returning through
the ground and resistance of the station earth. Since
these E H V systems are classed as high rehability, the
maximum allowable rise of earth potential under fauh
conditions without additional precautions is 650 V as
discussed in Section 11.2.2 (a) of this chapter.
552
Chapter 6
Since the earth fault current that flows into the
ground is associated with the E H V systems, the main
earth electrodes should be adjacent to plant connected
to the E H V system (e.g., generator and station trans­
formers). This is to enable earth currents to flow to
ground close to the fauh location, thus restricting the
fault current flowing through the station earth system
interconnections and minimising the potential gradients
across the station. In addition to these main earth
electrodes, it is normal practice to install a number of
secondary electrodes to reduce the overall station re­
sistance and limit potential gradients across the site.
A typical station earth system arrangement is shown
in Fig 6.122.
The earth electrode system is designed by calculating
in sequence the following parameters:
• Maximum earth fault current that has to return to
remote sources.
• Minimum size of electrode required to transfer fault
current into the ground.
• Resistance of these minimum size individual
electrodes.
• Consequent overall station earth resistance.
• Proportion of current that returns to source via the
ground.
• Resultant rise of earth potential.
• If the rise of earth potential is unacceptable, the size
of individual earth electrodes is increased and the
calculations repeated.
• If the rise of earth potential cannot economically be
reduced to an acceptable level, other measures to
protect personnel and plant must be considered.
This process is explained in greater detail in the
remainder of this section and a worked example is given
in Section 11.4 of this chapter.
For earth electrode sizing it is only that proportion
of E H V system earth fault current that has to return
to remote neutrals that is of interest. Therefore, due
account should be taken of *on site' contributions to
fauh currents. For example, where generator trans­
formers are connected to the 400 kV system, any con­
tribution to the 400 kV earth fault level from On site'
generation can be ignored when sizing the earth elec­
trodes since the current will flow through metallic
connections and not into the ground.
Before electrode sizing can be started, the soil re­
sistivity at each proposed location must be established
using the Wenner four-electrode test described in Sec­
tion 11.6.1 of this chapter. The first step in sizing
an electrode is to calculate the minimum surface area
that is required to dissipate the current into the ground
without undue heating and drying out of the soil local
to the electrode. For these calculations h is considered
prudent to ignore all E H V cable sheaths and overhead
 Earthing systems

ESDB(NW) ESDB (NE)

ESSE (NW) ESSB(NW)

"mm

FIG. 6.122 Typical station earth system

553
Cabling
line earth conductors, and to assume that all earth
fauh current returns to the remote neutrals via the
electrode adjacent to the faulted plant. Whilst this
may appear conservative, in reality the electrode size
is normally dictated by its resistance (since this governs
the rise of earth potential) and not by its current carry­
ing capabihty. At this stage the cross-sectional area
of the electrode itself should be checked to ensure that
it is capable of carrying the anticipated fault current.
Such calculations should take into account the esti­
mated loss of metal due to corrosion during the station
hfe.
Having estabhshed the minimum size of electrode
required to carry the fault current, the next step is to
calculate the resistance of the station earth system and
assess whether the rise of earth potential is acceptable.
The first step in this process is to calculate the resist­
ance of each individual electrode as shown in Section
11.4 of this chapter. The overall station resistance is
then calculated for all electrodes in parallel ignoring
the impedance of interconnecting cables. This greatly
simplifies the calculations and experience has shown
that this also compensates for ignoring fortuitous earth
paths such as pipes and base slab concrete which cannot
be readily identified or calculated.
This rise of earth potential will be the product of
the station earth electrode resistance and the current
flowing through it. As already stated, the earth fault
current wih return to remote neutrals via the ground
and any overhead line aerial earths or cable sheaths
that may exist. The current division will be dependent
on the relative impedances of each route. Since the
electrode design is dictated by the allowable rise of earth
potential, it would be grossly uneconomic to base these
calculations on the assumption that all current flows
in the ground. Therefore, the division of current be­
tween the various paths must be assessed. The amph-
tude of the earth current returning to neutrals via
overhead line earth wires and towers can be 3 0 - 7 0 %
depending on the number of lines and their length
[27]. Therefore, quite clearly, the value of current
flowing into the ground will be dependent on the phy­
sical location of E H V substations relative to the power
station.
Where the power station and E H V substation share
a common site, at least one metallic connection per
generating unit will be provided between the two earth­
ing systems. Earth fauh currents can therefore flow
via these connections to the earth wires and towers
associated with the E H V substation. The magnitude
of these currents will depend on the number of overhead
lines or cables entering the substation and their lengths.
Since power station earth electrodes normally consist
of steel piles they have, of necessity, to be designed
and installed at an early stage of power station con­
struction. This frequently means that accurate pre­
dictions of current division cannot be made at the design
stage. It is therefore normal practice to calculate the
rise of earth potential assuming the worst case of 7 0 %
554
Chapter 6
of the fauh current returning through the ground. The
combined resistance of the power station and E H V
substation earth systems is used for this calculation.
Another arrangement that may be encountered is a
power station located a few miles from its associated
E H V substation. In such cases it can be assumed that
for an earth fauh at the power station only 3 0 % of the
current would flow in the ground. The rise of earth
potential would therefore be the product of this p r o ­
portion of current and the power station earth system
resistance.
If the calculated rise of earth potential exceeds the
650 V hmit, the size of the electrodes should be in­
creased and their resistances and the potential rises
recalculated.
In some cases it may not be economically or tech­
nically possible to provide an electrode system that wih
hmit earth potential to 650 V. In such cases the po­
tential rise should be reduced to an economic minimum
and addhional precautions taken to safeguard against
transferred, step and touch potentials. Such measures
against transferred potentials would include isolation
transformers on incoming telephone and pilot cables,
and possibly isolated sections in pipelines or railway
tracks entering the she. In a d d h i o n , step and touch
potentials would have to be assessed using the type
of techniques given in I E E E Standard 80 [28]. If step
or touch potentials are found to be excessive then
addhional provisions such as guard rings wih be ne­
cessary. G u a r d rings consist of a number of ground
conductors, connected to the main electrode, and buried
at increasing depths a r o u n d it so that the ground sur­
face potential is modified. A typical arrangement is
shown in Fig 6.123.
11.3.2 Faults o n I n t e r n a l s y s t e m s
For system voltages up to and including generator volt­
age, the system neutrals are earthed whhin the boundary
of the power station and therefore the vast majority of
the earth fauh current will flow via metahic bonds and
not into the ground itself. Equipment operating at
generator voltage is considered a special case since it
is all bonded to a special earth bar run with the main
connections. Consequently, any earth fault current wih
preferentially flow in this special earth bar rather than
in the station earth network. Detahs of generator main
connections are given in Chapter 4.
Earth fauh currents associated w h h 11 kV, 3.3 kV
and 415 V systems will however return to their neutrals
via the station earth network. The station earth net­
work is a mesh of metalhc bonds interconnecting the
earth electrodes and forming a ring a r o u n d plant areas.
We must now consider the magnitude of earth fault
currents associated with these systems. If the zero phase
sequence impedance of the system were the same as
the positive phase sequence impedence, then the earth
fault current would have the same magnitude as that
for a three-phase symmetrical fault. In practice for

POTENTIAL AT GROUND SURFACE
WITH RESPECT TO REMOTE EARTH
STEP POTENTIAL ~
WITHOUT GUARD RING -
πΓ 11,
• · · • · *
EAF
WITHOUT GUARD RING
GUARD RINGS BURIED
AT INCREASING DEPTHS
TO CONTROL GROUND
POTENTIAL GRADIENT
FIG. 6 . 1 2 3 Typical guard ring arrangement
transformers it is not possible t o obtain identical
values for positive and negative phase sequence im­
pedances. Transformers are therefore specified to have
a zero phase sequence reactance as close as possible
to 100% of the positive phase sequence reactance, with
an allowable minimum of 9 0 % . With this minimum
value the earth fault current could be 3 . 5 % higher than
the three-phase symmetrical fault current. Since every
effort is made to keep the negative phase sequence
impedance as near as possible to the positive value,
and since in practice earth fauh currents rarely achieve
their full prospective value, it is normal within power
station design to assume that the unrestricted earth
fault current is the same as the three-phase symmetrical
level. The fault levels associated with internal systems
are as follows:
• 11 kV — 750 M V A (break) = 39.4 k A
• 3.3 kV — 250 M V A = 43.7 k A
• 415 V — 31 M V A = 43.1 k A
Neutral earthing resistors (NER) are provided on the
11 kV and 3.3 kV systems which limit the fault current
to approximately 1000 A per infeed. However, the
415 V system is solidly bonded to earth to make avail­
able the full prospective fault current to allow proper
Earthing systems
I* r LOWER STEP POTENTIAL
; ^ f WITH GUARD RING
J
*1
ITH
GUARD RINGS BONDED
TO EARTH ELECTRODE
WITH GUARD RING
clearance of fuses. T h e m a x i m u m current returning to
an internal system neutral under a single earth fault
condition is therefore that associated with the 415 V
system, and this fixes the size of the station earth net­
work for internal faults. There is a very low probabhity
of the N E R flashing over, allowing unrestricted earth
fault current to flow for 11 kV and 3.3 kV system faults.
If this were to occur on the 3.3 kV system, the fault
current flowing through the station earth network
would be greater than the design value associated w k h
the 415 V system. The increase in fauh current would
however be so marginal that the integrity of the sta­
tion earth system would not be threatened. For out­
buildings which d o not directly form part of the main
station earth network, the size of its earth ring will be
dependent on the system voltage and fault levels for
equipment wkhin that building.
For faults on internal systems, the allowable rise of
earth potential should be that appropriate to over-
current protection as defined in Section 11.2.2 of this
chapter. This means that the rise of earth potential
should be hmited to 430 V for faults cleared in less
than 0.46 seconds and 55 V for longer clearance times.
Where these limits cannot he economically achieved,
special measures (such as local bonding to give im­
munity from transferred potentials) can be used as
discussed later in this section. For these internal faults.
555
Cabling
the rise of earth potential at the faulted equipment
is taken to be the product of the impedance of the
metallic bonding system path and the total earth fauh
current.
To keep the potential gradient across the station to
a minimum, the impedance of the fault current return
path must also be kept to a minimum. Furthermore,
to reduce the risk of electrical interference in control
and instrumentation circuits, it is desirable to keep
the fault current supply and return paths as close as
possible. For multicore power cables these aims are
achieved by using the a r m o u r as the main earth return
path. For single-core cables which have their armours
single-point bonded, these requirements can best be
achieved by running an earth cable in close proximity
with the power cables.
In the case of large transformer feeds and inter­
connectors, the single-core cable circuhs will be short or
will follow a major cable route where an earth cable
forming part of the station earth network will already
exist in close proximity. However, for motors fed by
single-core cables, there is not hkely to be an existing
earth cable in close proximity to the power cables for
the entire length of the route and, in these cases, h is
necessary to provide an earth cable between the supply
switchgear and the motor terminal. This earth cable is
run in close proximity to its associated motor single-core
cables.
For 11 kV and 3.3 kV plant, the 430 V and 55 V rise
of earth potential crheria may not both be met. The
possibility of transferred zero earth potential, via struc­
tural steelwork or adjacent electrical plant with its own
earth return connection, cannot be ignored. Therefore,
where paths exist for such transferred potentials,
immunity must be given. This immunity is provided in
these specific cases by installing local bonding between
all adjacent plant and between plant and steelwork to
which personnel may make simuhaneous contact. Aher-
natively if there is a station earth bar connection point
locally, the plant may be bonded to this.
For 415 V fuse-protected circuits the rise of earth
potential under earth fault conditions will be in excess
of 55 V and therefore local bonding may be neces­
sary dependent on the protection clearance time. As
shown in Section 4 of this chapter for motor circuits,
the fuse size is selected for starting conditions rather
than full-load current and is therefore relatively large.
This means that to keep the c o n d u c t o r / a r m o u r loop
resistance to a sufficiently low value to clear an earth
fault in less than 0.46 seconds, the cable route length
would have to be severely restricted or the cable size
would have to be substantially increased. In this situ­
ation the economic solution is to provide local bond­
ing on 415 V motors in a manner similar to that for
11 kV and 3.3 kV circuits, to give immunity from
transferred potentials. However, for feeder circuits
other than those for motors, the fuse size will be
more closely matched to the cable and therefore it
is considered more economic to ensure that the pro­
556
Chapter 6
tection operates in less than 0.46 seconds than to
provide local bonding. In making this judgement, ac­
count has been taken of the cost and difficulty of
providing local bonding on all small plant such as
switches and light fittings. T o ensure that the protection
operates within the required time limit, the c o n d u c t o r /
a r m o u r loop resistance is controlled as detailed in
Section 4 of this chapter.
For remote outbuildings which are well outside the
area covered by the main earth electrode system, such
as might be the case for a C W p u m p h o u s e , there is
some advantage in installing local earth electrodes.
Normally a pair of electrodes should be provided to
enable one to be disconnected for testing with the
station operational. These electrodes will assist in re­
ducing the rise of earth potential and hence trans­
ferred, touch and step potentials.
11.3.3 Lightning protection
As discussed in Section 12 of this chapter, it is neces­
sary to connect the lightning protection system to the
station earth network. The detahs of the required
connections are also given in Section 12.
11.3.4 Additional considerations
The requirements of British Standard code of practice
C P 1013: 1965 should be complied with by earthing
each of the fohowing:
• The neutral points of each separate voltage system.
• A p p a r a t u s frameworks and other non-current car­
rying metalwork associated with each system, e.g.,
transformer tanks and the armours of power cables.
• Extraneous metalwork not associated with power
systems, e.g., boundary and transformer fences.
11.4 Earth electrodes
The purpose of this section is to give a worked ex­
ample for sizing an earth electrode system using the
principles already given in Section 11.3.1 of this chap­
ter. During this process, alternative types of electrodes
are assessed for their suitability for power station ap­
plications. The types of electrode investigated are as
follows:
• Sheet steel piles.
• Cylindrical steel piles.
• Vertical earth rods.
• Buried horizontal strip.
The calculations show that a considerable length of
buried strip or a large number of earth rods would be
required to dissipate the fault currents associated with
 Earthing systems

E H V systems. Therefore, these types of electrodes

require considerable space and are difficult to accom­
modate at the locations where E H V system faults are
hkely to occur, i.e., generator or station transformers.
It is therefore more convenient to use sheet or cylin­
drical steel piles which form a more compact electrode.
The actual type of steel pile used for the earth elec­
trode on a new station will usually be selected from
those that the civil contractor has on site for his own i ii 1000mm SQ

needs.
u uu u
Full calculations to obtain the overall station re­
sistance and rise of earth potential are only com­
pleted for steel phes to demonstrate the principles. The
design parameters selected for all examples are as
fohows: 100mm X 12mm
ALUMINIUM EARTH BAR
• Maximum earth fault current to return to remote
neutrals is 28 k A . It should be noted that this is
the current which has to return to the remote neu­ 100mm X 12mm ALUMINIUM
BRACKET REMOVABLE
trals via the earth electrode and therefore 'on site' FOR TEST PURPOSES

generation is ignored. For earth electrode design 100mm X 12mm STEEL BARS <C I
purposes, this earth fault current is assumed to have WELDED

a maximum duration of 1 second.

• Average soil resistivity to a depth of 10 m at any ELECT CONTINUITY

STRAPS AT EACH
proposed electrode location is 19.9 Qm. PILE JOINT
650mm MIN
LENGTH OF WELD

For simphcity, all calculations are carried out assum­

ing the top of the electrode is flush with the ground
surface. In practice, for steel piles, the top of the 100mm X 12mm
STEEL STRAPS
electrode is approximately 1 m below the surface as WELDED TO PILES
WITH CONTINUOUS
shown in Figs 6.124 and 6.125. The errors from this FILLET WELD

approximation are considered negligible, bearing in

mind the limitations in the accuracy of soil resistivity
measurements.

11.4.1 Sheet steel piles

SECTION B-B
This example is based on Larson N o 3 piles as shown
in Fig 6.124. This type of pUe is trough-shaped, the
FIG. 6 . 1 2 4 Arrangement of sheet steel pile electrode
sides being 145 m m long and the b o t t o m 248 m m wide;
the thickness of the pile is 14 m m .
Consider the station electrode arrangement shown

V
in Fig 6.122, where site measurements have shown the
57.66 X 10^
highest average soil resistivity for any proposed main A/m2
electrode location to be 19.9 Qm. This figure can be
used to determine the smallest electrode area capable
of dissipating the assumed 28 kA earth fault current
associated with the 400 kV system. where: ρ = soil resisitivity, Qm
As discussed in C P 1013: 1965, the little experimen­ t = duration of fault, s
tal work which has been carried out on current loading
has been confined to model tests with spherical elec­
trodes in clay or loam of low resistivity. One of the For the given conditions:
tentative conclusions from this work is that the time
to failure on short-term overload is inversely pro­
portional to the specific loading, which is given by / 57.66 X 10^
i^Q where i is the current density at the electrode i = \/ A/m2
surface and ρ the resistivity of the soil. For soils in­ 19.9 X 1
vestigated the maximum permissible current density is
given by: i = 0.17 X 10^ A/m2

557
Cabling Chapter 6

90mm CABLE DUCTS

(AS REQUIRED)

100mm X 12mm
ALUMINIUM
EARTH BAR

100mm X 12mm ALUMINIUM

BRACKET. REMOVABLE FOR
TEST PURPOSES

STEEL BARS WELDED

100mm X 12mm STEEL

EXTENSIONS WELDED
TO PILE LINER

TOP OF CYLINDRICAL
STEEL ELECTRODE

650mm MIN
LENGTH OF WELD

SECTION A-A

FIG. 6 . 1 2 5 Arrangement of cylindrical steel pile electrode

Minimum length of single pile required: w = width of base of pile, m

L =
I
s = length of side of pile, m
i X (2w + 4s)
28 000
where I = earth fault current, A L =
0.17 X 10"^ X ((2 X 0.248) + (4 χ 0.145))
i = maximum permissible current density,
A/m2 L = 15.3 m

558
 Earthing systems

As discussed in Section 11.6.1 of this chapter, the csa = 4 (9 X 97) = 3492 mm^
depth to which a pile may economicahy be driven is
dependent on the ground conditions. For this example, This ahows a significant factor of safety on the mini­
the maximum economic length of pile is assumed to m u m requirement of 372 m m ^ .
be 10 m. Therefore two interlocked steel piles wih be Now the electrode resistance can be determined
required to dissipate the current. using the formula given in C P 1013: 1965 for plate
The next stage is to assess the current carrying ca­ electrodes:
pability of the electrode material itself and the con­
nections to it. Using the short-circuit formula given ρ TT

in Section 4.3.1 of this chapter, the minimum cross-

sectional area of steel to carry the earth fault current is
calculated as fohows: where ρ = soil resistivity, Qm
A = surface area of electrode, m^

S = — 19.9
logn R =
\ei+ßj 4 [(2 X 0.248) + (4 X 0.145)1 x 10 x 2

= 1.9 Ω
For steel: Κ = 78 and jS = 202
Now for I = 28 000 A , t = 1 s, 6f = 375°C and
θί = 25°C: T o avoid an excessive rise of earth potential, an over­
all station resistance typically of less than 0.1 Ω is
required. Therefore, even with the eight proposed
electrodes in parallel, an individual electrode resistance
28 000
S = 375 + 202 of 1.9 Ω is not acceptable and the number of pile
78 logn sections must be increased. Increasing the number of
25 + 202 pile sections to 25 would result in an electrode 10 m
long having a resistance of:
S = 372 mm2

19.9
Now considering the electrode itself, the total cross- R =
sectional area for two steel piles is: [(2 X 0.248) + (4 X 0.145)1 x 10 x 25

csa = 2 Χ 14 X [248 + (2 χ 145)] = 15 064 mm^ = 0.54 Ω

However, ahowance has to be made for surface cor­
rosion of the electrode over the hfe of the station.
This will depend on a number of factors of which the
most significant is the soil p H which should be es­
tabhshed from soil surveys. For this example, it is as­
sumed that the corrosion reduces the electrode thickness
by 3 m m (1.5 m m per surface) over the station hfe.
Therefore after corrosion the cross-sectional area of
two piles is:
The resistance of the remaining electrodes is then
calculated assuming the same number of pile sections
but using the soil resistivhy appropriate to the location.
For the purpose of this example let us assume that
the remaining primary electrodes have resistances of
0.41, 0.51 and 0.49 Ω, and the secondary electrodes
have resistances of 0.50, 0.58, 0.45 and 0.62 Ω. The
overall station resistance is given by:

1 1 1
csa = 2 X 11 X [248 + (2 χ 145)] = 11 836 mm^ R = — + -I- ...
Rl R2 Rn/
It can be seen that this is considerably in excess of
the required 372 mm^. 1 1 1 1 1
R = + -h + + -I-
With respect to the connections from the earth cable
0.54 0.41 0.51 0.49 0.50
connection bar down to the earth electrode, h is nor­
mal practice to use four 100 χ 12 m m steel bars (as -1
1
shown in Fig 6.124) to provide adequate mechanical
strength. Again assuming 1.5 m m of surface corrosion 0.45 0.62 /
0.58
over the station life, the final cross-sectional area will
be: R =
0.063 Ω
559
Cabling
Now assuming that the power station under consi­
deration is some 3 km from the 400 kV substation, as
mentioned in Section 11.3.1 of this chapter, it should
be assumed that 3 0 % of the earth fault current returns
via the ground. T h e rise of earth potential ( R E P ) at
the power station will therefore be:
R E P = 28 000 X 0.3 X 0.063 = 529 V
This figure of 529 V is lower than the acceptance
criteria of 650 V a n d gives a reasonable factor of
safety.
11.4.2 Cylindrical steel piles
This example is based on a typical cylindrical pile
having an external diameter of 1.05 m a n d a radial
thickness of 6 m m . A typical arrangement is shown
in Fig 6.125.
Reference should be made to Section 11.4.1 of this
chapter for explanation of formulae a n d definitions
where they are not given in this section.
Maximum allowable current density:
57.66 X 10^
1 =
\ Qt V 19.9
= 0.17 X 10^ A / m 2
Minimum length of pile required:
I r = L/[logn ( 8 L / d ) -
L =
i X TT X d
where d = external diameter of pile
28 000
L =
0.17 X 10^ X 7Γ X 1.05
Although the minimum length required for current
dissipation is 5 m , it is proposed that a 10 m length
be used t o obtain a lower value of resistance.
Now considering the current carrying capability of
the electrode material itself and the connections t o
it:
Maximum csa of pile = 7r(R^ - r^)
= 7Γ(5252 -
= 19 679 m m 2
After corrosion csa of pile = ^(523.5^ -
= 9839 m m 2
This can be seen to be considerably in excess of the
minimum requirement of 372 m m ^ that was derived
560
Chapter 6
previously in Section 11.4.1. With respect to the con­
nections t o the pile, four 100 χ 12 m m steel bars are
used as shown in Fig 6.125, these being shown to be
of adequate size in Section 11.4.1.
The resistance of a vertical r o d type electrode can
be obtained using the following formula given by Tagg
[29]:
R = [ρ/27ΓΕ] X [logn ( 8 L / d ) - 1]
where ρ = soil resistivity, Qm
L = length of r o d , m
d = diameter of r o d , m
19.9
R = χ [logn (8 Χ 10/1.05) - 1]
2 X π X 10
= 1 06 Ω
As discussed previously in Section 11.4.1, a value of
resistance of 1.06 Ω is considered t o o large for a main
electrode. It will therefore be necessary t o increase
the electrode length or put a number of electrodes in
parallel.
57.66 X 10^
The following method of dealing with electrodes in
parallel is given by Tagg [29]. T h e method uses the
X 1
'equivalent hemisphere' principle where the rod elec­
trode is replaced by a hemisphere having the same
resistance. T h e radius of this equivalent hemisphere
is given by:
1]
where L = length of r o d , m
d = diameter of r o d , m
For t w o rods in parahel:
= 5.0 m
Resistance of rods in parallel 1+ a
Resistance of one rod 2
where a = r / S a n d S = spacing of electrodes, m
A n d for three rods in parallel, arranged in a triangle:
Resistance of rods in parallel 1 + 2a
Resistance of one rod 3
5192)
F r o m the above formulae it can be seen that as the
spacing S increases, a wih tend t o zero a n d the ideal
value of 0.5 for the ratio wih be approached. However,
520.5^)
whilst initial increases in the spacing give a good
improvement in the ratio, very large spacings would
be required t o approach the ideal value. F o r practical
purposes, setting the spacing equal t o the r o d length
normally gives a n acceptable design.
 Earthing systems

Now for the pile electrode under consideration, the For an earth fault duration of 1 second and a soil
radius of the equivalent hemisphere is: resistivity of 19.9 Ω m, the maximum permissible rod
loading is:
10
r = = 3.0 m 380
/ 8 X 10 -1 = 85 A / m
logn V(19.9 X 1)
\ 1.05
The total length of earth rod required for a fault current
For S = L = 10 m of 28 k A is:

r 3.0 28 000
a = — = =0.3 L = = 329 m
S 10 85

Therefore, for two pile electrodes in parahel: Assuming that the m a x i m u m depth to which an earth
rod can be driven is 5 m , the total number of rods
/ 1+ required is 66. In order to obtain reasonable current
R2 = X (resistance of a single pile)
dissipation and overall resistance from the electrode
V 2 /
array, the rods should be spaced on 3 m centres. Using
this spacing, an area of some 600 m^ is required for
1 + 0.3
X 1.06 the electrode array.
In view of the need to place the electrode close to
the location where an E H V earth fauh may occur,
R2 = 0.69 Ω e.g., generator transformer, h is hkely t o be difficuh
to find such an area of free space available. A further
complication with this type of electrode is the diffi­
For three pile electrodes, arranged in a triangle:
cuhy of interconnecting the large number of rods with
buried cable or strip. This type of electrode is not
/ 1 + 2a \ therefore recommended for power station applications.
Rs = X (resistance of a single pile)
\ 3 /
11.4.4 Earth strip
1 + 0.6 \ This section is based on the use of 50 χ 6 m m copper
X 1.06
strip. For an earth fault duration of 1 second and a soil
resistivity of 19.9 Ωm, the permissible current rating is
once again:
Rs = 0.56 Ω

From this h can be seen that only a relatively small

improvement in resistance is obtained by adding the
third electrode. Therefore, if ground conditions permit,
V 57.66 X 10^
19.9 X 1
= 0.17 X 10^ A / m 2

Total length of strip required is:

it may be more beneficial t o drive two electrodes t o
a greater depth than to add further electrodes.
The overall station earth resistance and rise of earth
potential are then determined in the same manner as
in Section 11.4.1 of this chapter.
11.4.3 Earth rods
This section is based on the use of 16 m m diameter
extensible steel-cored copper earth rods complying with
ESI Standard 4 3 - 9 4 .
The general formula for permissible current loading
can be transformed by using the surface area of a
16 m m earth rod to yield the following:
380
1 = A / m of earth rod
V(Qt)
fault current
L =
current density χ circumference
28 000
0.17 X 10^ X [(2 X 0.05) + (2 χ 0.006)]
= 147 m
In order to obtain reasonable current dissipation and
obtain the required order of resistance, this tape would
need to be buried over an area in excess of 300 m^.
As discussed for earth rods, this a m o u n t of free space
is not normally available at the required location. An
ahernative would be to install the electrode in contact
with the earth under the foundation slab concrete.

561
Cabling
However, this would require accurate planning so as
not to delay the civil contractor and if any damage
occurred during concrete pouring this could not be
detected. An added complication is the time involved
in making an electrical connection between the strips
at each mesh intersection.
11.5 Earth network construction and plant
bonding
Earth networks are formed and bonding of plant is
carried out using P V C insulated cables. Earth cables run
on the power cable supporting steelwork are considered
to give a more economic installation than copper or
aluminium bar clipped to the building surface. The use
of earth cables allows the same installation and ter­
mination techniques as for power cables, giving a
unified approach to labour requirements and the use
of standard tools and equipment.
All cables used for earthing and bonding comply with
the insulation, construction and testing requirements
given in BS6004: 1975. The cables may have ehher
green or green/yellow insulation and the following
rationalised range of sizes is used:
Size, mm^ Type of construction
2.5 Stranded c o p p e r / P V C
4 Stranded c o p p e r / P V C
6 Stranded c o p p e r / P V C
10 Stranded c o p p e r / P V C
16 Solid a l u m i n i u m / P V C
35 Sohd a l u m i n i u m / P V C
95 Solid a l u m i n i u m / P V C
150 Solid a l u m i n i u m / P V C
300 Solid a l u m i n i u m / P V C
500 Stranded a l u m i n i u m / P V C
All earth cables are terminated, bohed to equipment
and where necessary protected from corrosion using
the techniques given in Section 9.2 of this chapter.
11.5.1 M a i n earth network
The main earth network is formed by interconnecting
the earth electrodes and forming rings around main
plant areas as shown in Fig 6.122. These rings are
extended into all levels of the building where major
plant is located. Interconnections are made using 'tee-
o f f bars of the type shown in Fig 6.126. These 'tee-off
bars are also inserted in the ring at strategic locations
to enable connections to be made to electrical plant.
As discussed in Section 11.3 of this chapter, the
largest current that the station earth network will
normally have to carry is the 43.1 kA associated with
the 415 V system. Major plant such as switchgear is
562
Chapter 6
NOMINAL INSULATION TO PREVENT
ELECTRICAL CONTACT AND CORROSION
t\ Ό) !Ί Q Q O Q ΓΊ 0* t-
^ 1 L J L J 1 ^
FIG. 6 . 1 2 6 Arrangement of tee-off connections
given a 3 - s e c o n d rating and it is considered a p p r o ­
priate to give this rating to the main earth network.
However, this fault duration is considerably in excess
of that associated with back-up protection and such
faults must be considered extremely rare. Under these
circumstances it is considered acceptable to allow the
earth cable to reach a final temperature of 325°C,
as allowed by Engineering Recommendation S5/1 for
aluminium bar. Whilst this ensures mechanical integrity
of the earth system, it will be appreciated that the
P V C cable sheathing will disintegrate and any affected
cables would have to be replaced. However, for fault
durations appropriate to back-up protection, the earth
network should not be damaged and therefore the final
conductor temperature of earth cables is limited to
160°C.
The required cable size is calculated using the formula
given in Section 4.3.1 of this chapter:
logn [(of + « / ( O i + β)]
43 100
148 V logn [(325 + 228)/(25 + 228)]
= 570 mm^
The use of 500 mm^ cable is accepted as being
adequate for forming the station earth network because
of the extremely low probability of a 3-second fault and
also, since the network is a ring, there wih be a degree
of current sharing between cables. For a cable
temperature limit of 160°C the maximum allowable
fauh duration is 1.26 seconds which is adequate to cater
for back-up protection.
11.5.2 Instrument earth network
T o reduce the risk of interference on control and
instrumentation equipment, a 'clean' earth termed the
station instrument earth is provided. This instrument

earth network is normahy instahed in the main control
block area where the bulk of C and I equipment is
located. The instrument earth network is connected,
at a single point, to a relatively noise-free part of
the station earth system. The reason for using a single
connection is to avoid circulating earth currents or
large earth fault currents flowing in the system which
could resuh in interference.
This instrument earth is distributed to all C and I
control equipment, marshalhng cubicles, local adapter
boxes, etc., using a combination of earth cables and the
screens of muhipair cables. A general arrangement of
this system is shown in Fig 6.127. It can be seen from
this figure that the screens of muhipair cables are
connected to the instrument earth at a single point. T o
keep interference to a minimum, it is preferred that
the 0 volt rail(s) of internally-generated power supplies
are connected to the instrument earth. The P A X and
D W (direct wire) telephone systems should also be
connected to the instrument earth network.
It should be noted that the armours of multipair and
muhicore cables are not connected to the instrument
earth network, but single-point bonded to the station
earth network. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly,
there is a risk of cable armours becoming accidentally
shorted to equipment cases and if the a r m o u r were
connected to the instrument earth this would defeat
the single earth point connection pohcy for that system.
Secondly, many multicore cables emanate from switch-
gear or local panels where an instrument earth will not
be readily available and therefore it is more convenient
and cheaper to use station earth.
11.5.3 Earth b o n d c a b l e sizes
On the same basis as that already discussed for the
main network earth cables, the bonds to switchgear
UNIT INSTRUMENT EARTH
FIG. 6 . 1 2 7 Single-point earthing system for C and I cables
Earthing systems
and other major plant are sized for a 3-second rating
with a final conductor temperature of 325°C.
The bonds for all other power plant are sized for
back-up protection which is typically up to 1-second
rating. For 11 kV and 3.3 kV systems, the earth fault
current is normally restricted to 1000 A per infeed which
would result in a relatively small bond size. However,
it is considered prudent to ensure mechanical integrity
in the event of a neutral earthing resistor itself having
a short-circuh. Under these circumstances of a double-
fault, i.e., both main protection and neutral earthing
resistor faihng, some damage to the P V C cable sheath
is accepted and the cables are sized for 1-second rating
with a final temperature of 325°C. On the 415 V
system, the earth fault current is not restricted and
therefore the earth cables are sized for 1-second rating
w h h a final conductor temperature of 160°C, to ensure
they are not damaged for faults cleared by back-up
protection.
For fuse-protected circuits it is traditional to use
an earth b o n d size of not less than half the phase
conductor size. In ah cases the minimum bond size
ahowed is 4 mm^ to ensure mechanical integrity.
The b o n d sizes for these conditions are calculated
as follows, using the formula given in Section 4.3.1 of
this chapter. It should be noted that, for economic
reasons, the calculated value has been reduced down to
the nearest cable size. This is particularly the case for
3-second ratings because in practice this fault duration
is unhkely ever to be reached.
(a) 11 kK 750 MVA system
For aluminium cables, constant Κ = 148 and β
= 228
Therefore, for a short-circuit duration of 3
seconds:
563
Cabling Chapter 6

For m o t o r s , other plant a n d cable gland bonds

I where a 1-second rating is required, a 300 mm^
s = - cable is used. Alternatively, for cable gland b o n d s ,
κ \ lognKOf + β)/(θΐ + β)]
aluminium bar having the same cross-sectional area
may be used.

39 400 (c) 415 V, 31 MVA system

s =
148 \ logn [(325 + 228)/(25 + 228)] For aluminium cables, constant Κ = 148 a n d β
= 228
= 521 mm2
Therefore, for a short-circuk duration of 3 seconds
and a final conductor temperature of 325°C:
For a short-circuit duration of 1-second:

43 100
39 400 1 S =
S =
148 V logn [(325 + 228)/(25 + 228)]
148 \ l o g n [(325 + 228)/(25 + 228)]

= 301 mm^ = 570 m m ^

For a short-circuit duration of 1-second a n d a final

For the 3-second rating, the nearest rationahsed
conductor temperature of 160°C:
cable size of 500 mm^ is selected t o b o n d plant.
For switchgear the 3-second rating is met by using
two 300 mm^ cables, one connected t o each end of
43 100 1
the switchgear earth bar. S =
For motors, other plant and cable gland bonds 148 \ l o g n [(160 + 228)/(25 + 228)]
where a 1-second rating is required, a 300 mm^
earth cable is used. Alternatively, for cable gland = 445 mm^
bonds, aluminium bar having the same cross-
sectional area may be used.
For a short-circuit duration of 1-second a n d a final
(b) 3.3 kV 250 MVA system conductor temperature of 325°C:

For aluminium cables, constant Κ = 148 and β =

228 43 100 1
S =
Therefore, for a short-circuit duration of 3 l o g n [(325 + 228)/(25 + 228)]
seconds:

43 700
S =
For the 3-second rating, the nearest rationalised cable
148 V l o g n [(325 + 228)/(25 + 228)] size of 500 m m ^ is selected t o b o n d plant. F o r
switchgear the 3-second rating is met by using two 300
= 578 mm^ mm^ earth cables, one connected t o each end of the
switchgear earth b a r .
For a short-circuit duration of 1-second: For motors a n d other plant where a 1-second rating
is required, a 500 m m ^ earth cable is used. For cable
gland bonds, aluminium b a r should be used and since
43 700 1 this can be operated at 325°C without h a r m , the cross-
S =
sectional area required is 300 m m 2 .
148 \ l o g n [(325 + 228)/(25 -f- 228)]

= 334 mm2 11.5.4 Plant bonding arrangements

This section gives specific plant bonding arrangements

For the 3-second rating, the nearest rationahsed
cable size of 500 mm^ is selected t o b o n d plant.
For swkchgear, the 3-second rating is met by using
two 300 mm^ cables, one connected to each end of
the switchgear earth bar.
which are based, where appropriate, on the fault levels
and calculated cable sizes given in the previous sub­
section.
Plant bonding arrangements for electrical system
neutral earthing are as follows:

564

• Generator transformer neutral earthing The gen­
erator transformer H V neutral connection should
consist of an earth cable connected from the earthy
end of the neutral C T direct to the adjacent generator
transformer earth electrode. The cable size is to be
calculated using the full 400 kV earth fault current
(including on-site generation) for a fault duration
of 1 second.
• Station and unit transformer neutral earthing The
station and unit transformer LV neutral earthing
connections shall be a 500 mm^ earth cable, con­
nected from the transformer neutral earthing re­
sistors onto the local earth network.
• 3,3 kV transformer neutral earthing The 3.3 kV
transformer neutral earth connections should be by
means of a 500 mm^ earth cable connected from the
transformer neutral earthing resistors, either direct
to an adjacent earth electrode or to the station earth
network, whichever is the nearer.
• 415 V transformer neutral earthing The 415 V
transformer neutrals should be connected to earth
at the 415 V switchgear, a connection being m a d e
between the switchgear neutral and earth bars via a
link.
Plant bonding arrangements for earth connections to
electrical plant are as follows:
• Generator earth bond network The generator earth
bond network consists of an earth bar mounted
in parallel with the main generator connections to
which all items of plant operating at generator
voltage are bonded. This earth bar is connected to
earth at the generator transformer earth electrode
using two 500 mm^ earth cables.
• Station transformers The earth terminals of these
transformers are connected to the station earth net­
work by means of a 500 mm^ earth cable.
• 11/3,3 kV ancillary transformers The earth ter­
minals of the ancillary transformers are connected to
the station earth network by means of a 500 mm^
earth cable.
• Gas turbine generator stator, VT cubicle and liquid
neutral earthing resistor These items of plant are
connected direct to the station earth network by
means of a 500 mm^ earth cable.
• 11 kV switchgear The earth bar of 11 kV swhch-
gear is connected to the main station earth network
by means of two 300 mm^ earth cables, one cable
being connected to each end of the bar.
• 11 kVmotors The earth terminals of 11 kV motors
are connected to the 11 kV switchgear earth bar by
means of 300 mm^ cable, the cable being routed
with the 11 kV power cables.
Earthing systems
In addition, a 150 mm^ b o n d is to be provided
between the m o t o r and adjacent plant and struc­
tural (or other) steelwork to which personnel may
m a k e simuhaneous contact.
• 77 kV/415 V gas turbine unit transformers The
earth terminals of these transformers are connected
to the station earth network by means of a 500 mm^
earth cable.
• 3,3 kV switchgear For switchgear connected to a
transformer and not fuse-protected, the switchgear
earth bar is connected to the main station earth
network by two 300 mm^ earth cables, one con­
nected to each end of the bar.
For switchgear fed by fuse protected cables, the
power cable armours will be utilised to provide
the earth return p a t h . A cable gland bond, of cross-
section not less t h a n half that of the power cable
core, being provided between the gland and the
switchgear earth bar with the exception of single-core
power cables which utilise a 300 mm^ b o n d .
• 3,3 kV motors For 3.3 kV motors fed by three
single-core power cables, an earth return cable of 300
mm^ cross-section is provided from the motor earth
terminal to the supply switchgear earth bar. The
earth cable should be laid in proximity to the power
cables.
When the m o t o r is fed by a multicore cable, the
cable a r m o u r is utilised to provide the earth return
path, connection being made to the cable armour
from the m o t o r earth terminal by a bond of cross-
section not less than half that of the power cable
core.
In addition, local bonding is provided between the
m o t o r earth terminal and adjacent plant, and struc­
tural or other steelwork to which personnel may
m a k e simultaneous contact. The size of bond shah be
half that of the power cable core cross-sectional area.
• 3,3 kV diesel generators The 3.3 kV diesel gen­
erator stator frame is connected to the station earth
network by means of a 500 mm^ earth cable.
• 3,3 kV diesel generator harmonic suppressors If
harmonic suppressors are provided on the 3.3 kV
diesel generators, their tanks are to be connected to
the station earth network by means of a 500 mm^
earth cable.
• 3,3 kV diesel generator neutral earthing resistors
The 3.3 kV diesel generator hquid earthing resistor
tanks are to be bonded to the station earth network
by means of a 500 mm^ earth cable.
• 415 V switchgear For switchgear fed by single-core
cables, the switchgear earth bar is connected to the
main earth network by means of two 300 mm^
cables, one connected to each end of the bar.
For swhchgear fed by fuse-protected multicore
cables, the power cable armouring is utihsed to pro-
565
Cabling
vide the earth return path. A cable gland bond of
cross-section not less than half that of the power
cable core is provided between the gland and
switchgear earth bar.
• Transformers having 415 V low voltage windings
Transformers of 1 M V A rating and larger have a
500 mm^ cable connection between the transformer
earth terminal and the 415 V switchgear earth bar.
Transformers of rating in the range 0.5 to 0.8
M V A have a similar connection of 300 mm^ cross-
section.
Transformers of rating less than 0.5 M V A have a
similar connection of cross-section not less than one
half that of the power cable core.
• 415 Vplant other than switchgear and transformers
For plant within this range fed by a multicore cable
the cable armour shall be utilised as the earth return.
The gland bond size between the plant and the gland
shall be of cross-section not less than half that of
the power cable core, with a minimum cross-section
of 4 mm^.
When the plant is fed by single-core cables, an
earth return cable of 300 mm^ cross-section shall
be provided from the equipment earth terminal to
the supply switchgear earth bar. The earth cable
shall be laid in close proximity to the single core
power cables.
Any plant which is fed by a conduit or trunking
system shall also have an earth cable included in
the conduit of the same cross-section as that given
by the above criteria.
For motor circuits of 1.5 kW and above, addi­
tional local bonding is provided between the motor
and adjacent plant and structural or other steelwork
to which personnel may make simultaneous contact.
The bond size should not be less than half that of
the power cable core, whh a minimum size of 4
mm^.
• Control and instrumentation marshalling boxes and
cubicles The steelwork of all panels, marshalling
boxes and the like should be bonded to the station
earth network using 4 mm^ earth cable. Where
equipment is mounted directly onto earthed metal­
work, no bond is necessary.
Where a power cable is taken into a panel, the
cable armour is bonded to the panel and a separate
bond to the station earth network is not required.
Plant bonding arrangements for insulated cable glands
of the type described in Section 9.1 of this chapter are
normally used for both power and control cables. This
means that where a connection is required to the cable
armour, a bond has to be connected from the gland
integral earth tag to the equipment earth b a r / s t u d or
other glands as appropriate. In order to pass this in­
formation to site, a series of bond codes is used. The
gland bond codes are recorded on the block cable dia­
566
Chapter 6
grams and also on cable schedules and work cards used
on she. A list of typical bonding codes is as follows:
• 11 kV, 3.3 kV, 415 V power cables and multicore
control cables
Earthed: A The armour is connected to the
station earth or, where apphcable,
the equipment earth stud.
Floating: Β The a r m o u r is insulated from earth.
If the cable has a screen then this
also is insulated. An insulating shroud
is fitted over the gland body.
• Multipair cables
Earthed: Η The a r m o u r is connected to the sta­
tion earth system and the cable screen
is connected to the instrument earth
system.
F In situations such as outbuhding con­
trol panels where a separate instru­
ment earth system is not available,
both a r m o u r and screen are con­
nected to station earth.
Floating: Β The a r m o u r is insulated from earth.
If the cable has a screen then this
also is insulated. A n insulated shroud
is fitted over the gland body.
Ρ The a r m o u r of 'digital control cables'
is connected to the armours of other
cables of the same disciphne in the
same b o x . T h e cable screen is
connected to the screens of other
cables of the same discipline in the
same box.
R The a r m o u r of 'analogue control
cables' is connected to the armours
of other cables of the same disciphne
in the same box. The cable screen
is connected to the screens of other
cables of the same discipline in the
same box.
S Special requirement. T o obtain the
correct bonding information refer to
the block cable diagram.
Actuator cables:
The armours of the actuator cables
(composite p o w e r / c o n t r o l design)
in the load centre are connected to­
gether and to the a r m o u r of the in­
coming multipair cable. The actuator
cable outer screen and the incoming
multipair cable screen are connected
to the insulated screen bar in the
load centre. The actuator cable inner
screen is connected to station earth.

/ The actuator cable a r m o u r is insu­
lated from earth. The screen of the
flexible power and control cables is
earthed at the actuator earth stud.
• Unarmoured cable and cables requiring no connec­
tion to armour
O Stuffing gland.
Ζ N o gland.
Table 6.26 shows gland bonding codes that may be
associated with equipment. A block cable diagram
showing a typical application of bonding codes for
control and instrumentation cabling is included as Fig
6.128. A similar block cable diagram for power cabling
is shown in Fig 6.129.
The sizes of cable gland bond connections should
be as foHows:
• Insulated cable glands for 11 kV cables Where re­
quired, the bond for an insulated cable gland should
consist of an aluminium bar arranged to provide
the shorting strap across all glands of the circuit
and the connection to the switchgear earth bar.
This aluminium bar should have a minimum cross-
sectional area of 300 m m ^ .
• Insulated cable glands for 3J kV and 415 cables
For single core cable circuits, when required, the
bond should consist of aluminium bar arranged to
provide a shorting strap across ah glands of the
circuit and also connect to the switchgear earth bar.
This aluminium bar should have a minimum cross-
sectional area of 300 m m ^ .
For multicore cable circmts, where the cable ar­
mouring is utilised as the earth return circuit for
the plant, the earth bonds at both ends of the cable
shall use an earth cable of cross-section not less
than half that of the power cable core, w k h a mini­
m u m cross-section of 4 m m ^ .
• Control and instrumentation insulated cable glands
Where cable gland earth bonds are required they
shah be 4 mm^ stranded copper earth cables.
Plant bonding arrangements for extraneous metalwork:
• Bonding of structural steelwork All major vertical
steel columns of the structural steelwork shall be
bonded together and to the main earth network
with a 300 mm^ cable. The connection to each steel
column is made via a suitable connecting lug which
should be welded to the appropriate steel columns
under the main steelwork contract. The intercon­
nections between columns is carried on the cladding
support steelwork or other adjacent steelwork. Con­
nections to the earth electrodes should be m a d e
at ah locations where the steelwork bonds pass an
earth electrode position.
Earthing systems
• Bonding of cable supporting steelwork In locations
where cable support steelwork is directly connected
to the station structural steelwork no additional
bonding is required. Where, however, cable support
steelwork is insulated from the station steelwork
(e.g., concrete cable tunnels) the steelwork should
be bonded direct to the main station earth network.
This connection is m a d e onto every section of in­
sulated steelwork using any convenient station earth
network cable being carried on that section of steel­
work. In cases where there is no earth cable on the
section of steelwork, a separate earth cable of 35
mm^ cross-section shall be used, this cable being
connected into the nearest adjacent section of earth
network.
• Bonding of station perimeter fences Perimeter fences
are connected to earth by means of separate earth
rods driven at ah corners and at intervals not
exceeding 100 m a r o u n d the fence. The connection to
the fence is made with a 10 mm^ stranded-copper
earth cable.
• Bonding of electrical plant compound fences Elec­
trical plant c o m p o u n d fences shall be connected to
earth as for station perimeter fences and, in ad­
dition, a separate connection shah be made from
the fence to the main earth network associated whh
the plant in the c o m p o u n d . This connection shall
be a 10 mm^ earth cable.
11.6 Testing
11.6.1 E a r t h resistivity m e a s u r e m e n t
The method of soil resistivity measurement most com­
monly used is that derived by Dr. F . Wenner [30].
In practice the method uses four electrodes driven
into the ground in a straight hne with equidistant spac­
ing 'a' as illustrated in Fig 6.130. T o obtain accurate
results it is important that the electrode depth does
not exceed one twentieth of the electrode spacing 'a'.
The outer two electrodes are used to circulate current
and the inner two measure the ground potential dif­
ference. This is carried out using an earth tester which
has the appropriate four terminals for connection to
the electrodes and gives a direct reading in o h m s . As­
suming the soil to he homogeneous the value of soil
resistivity is given by:
ρ = 27raR ßm
where R is the resistance measured by the instrument
If the distance 'a' is increased, the current will pene­
trate deeper into the ground and the measured value
of resistivity will be related to this greater depth. To
access the resistivity at various depths, a series of mea­
surements are taken with increased electrode spacings
567
Cabling Chapter 6

TABLE 6 . 2 6
Gland bonding codes relative to equipment

Equipment Cables Bonding code

Switchgear 11 kV A
3.3 kV A
415 V A
Multicore A

Interconnections between switchboards A at Unit 1

11 kV
Β at Unit 2

A at Unit 1
3.3 kV
Β at Unit 2

(e.g., Unit 1 and Unit 2 ) A at Unit 1

415 V
Β at Unit 2

A at Unit 1
Multicore
Β at Unit 2

Motors 11 kV Β
3.3 kV A/B *
415 V A/B *

Transformers 11 kV Β
Multicore Β
3.3 kV A/B *
415 V A/B *

Distribution boards 415 V A

Equipment fed from distribution boards 415 V A

Plant-mounted transmitters Multipair Β

(pressure switches, limit switches, transducers, etc.) Multicore Β

Network marshalling boxes Multipair R, Ρ or S

Network marshaUing cubicles,

Multipair R, Ρ or S
(except control room unit and
Multicore Β
transmission marshalling cubicles)

Control room unit and transmission marshalling

cubicles, (except transmission end of inter­ Multipair Η
connections between them)

Transmission marshalling cubicle ends of inter­

connections to control room unit marshalling Multipair Β
cubicles

Control room panels and desks Multipair Β

Interlock cubicles Multicore A

* See Fig 6 . 1 2 9

568
 Earthing systems
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Cabling Chapter 6
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 Earthing systems

TABLE 6.27
CURRENT Soil resistivity measurements
SOURCE

Electrode Test Point

separation (a)
R Apparent
aR resistivity,
metres Ω Qm

1 5.8 5.8 36.4

2 1.58 3.16 20.0
FIG. 6.130 Measurement of earth resistivity 3 0.92 2.76 17.3
4 0.68 2.72 17.1
5 0.49 2.45 15.4
about the central point. A typical set of measurements
6 0.46 2.76 17.3
is given in Table 6.27 and these are shown graphically
in Fig 6.131. 7 0.43 3.01 18.9
The next step is to decide the best way to apply these 8 0.36 2.88 18.1
resuhs. The first step must be to relate the electrode 9 0.36 3.24 20.4
spacing to the effective depth to which the resistivity 10 0.29 2.9 18.2
is measured. C P 1013 states that the average resistivity
12.5 0.26 3.25 20.4
measured is for a depth equal to the electrode spacing.
15 0.19 2.85 17.9
Some references will be found quoting the effective
depth to be in the range 0.6 to 0.75 times the electrode 17.5 0.17 2.98 18.7
spacing. If the soU is reasonably homogeneous, it will 20 0.19 3.80 23.9
be found that the resistivity becomes substantially
constant with depth as shown in Fig 6.131. The inter­
pretation of effective depth is not critical under these was varied. In practice it will be found that the soil
conditions and to assume the effective depth is equal to is non-homogeneous. T o consider this in a simphfied
electrode spacing should give acceptable results in way, the value of resistivity for small values of electrode
practice. The formula used is derived on the assumption spacing can be said to represent the soil resistivity near
that the soil through which the current circulates is the surface. Also, where the soil resistivity becomes
homogeneous, and this would be borne out if the soU sensibly constant w h h electrode spacing, this can be
resistivity remained constant as the electrode spacing said to represent the underlying strata. The formulae

10 12
ELECTRODE SEPARATION (a) - METRES

FIG. 6.131 Graph of soil resistivity measurements as a function of electrode spacing

571
Cabling
used in Section 11.4 of this chapter assume h o m o ­
geneous soil condhions and therefore, where they are
applied to non-homogeneous soil conditions, it is the
^effective' value of soil resistivity that should be used.
The deduction of this effective value is complex, but
it must lie between the values deduced for the sur­
face and underlying strata soils. As a practical way
of dealing with these difficulties, it is suggested that
acceptable results will be obtained by taking the mean
value of the measured values down to the maximum
depth the proposed electrode will be driven.
For example, if it is required to drive an electrode
to a depth of 10 metres, using the resuhs given in
Table 6.27 the effective resistivity is taken as:
36.4 + 20.0 + 17.3 + 17.1 +
15.4 + 17.3 + 18.9 + 18.1 + 20.4 + 18.2
Q =
10
ρ = 19.9 Qm
Where the apparent resistivity starts increasing as the
electrode spacing *a' is increased, the underlying soil
strata will be of higher resistivity and there will be less
benefit in driving an electrode to this depth.
Soil resistivities will vary over a site and it is im­
portant to make measurements at each proposed elec­
trode position. Where possible, these measurements
should be made before site work commences since any
buried earth conductors, cables or pipes can change the
pattern of current flowing between the test electrodes,
thus reducing the accuracy of the measurements.
11.6.2 Earth electrode resistance m e a s u r e m e n t
The resistance to earth of an electrode is measured
using the same principle as for earth resistivity mea­
surements, i.e., by passing current through the ground
and measuring the potential difference across it. In
this case the current is made to flow between the
electrode under test and an auxiliary earth electrode
driven into the ground. This auxiliary electrode may
be specially driven for the test or could be any con­
veniently placed existing electrode. This auxiliary elec­
trode should be placed at a sufficient distance away,
such that it does not interfere with the natural dis­
tribution of current from the electrode under test. This
distance will depend on the size and efficiency of
the electrode under test and this will also affect the
test method selected. For relatively small electrodes,
such as individual pile electrodes recommended for
power stations, a proprietary earth resistance mea­
surement instrument can be used as described in (a)
below. However, for large low-resistance electrodes
such as the combined system on a power station or
E H V system, the required distance is so large that a
power frequency current injection system as outlined
in (b) is necessary:
572
Chapter 6
(a) Measurement of resistance by composite instrument
Measurements are made using the same instrument
as that discussed in the previous Section 11.6.1
which is fitted with terminals for current injec­
tion and potential measurements, and provides a
direct reading of resistance in o h m s . A diagram­
matic arrangement of the test is shown in Fig 6.132
where X is the electrode under test, Y is the current
electrode and Ζ the potential p r o b e . T o use the
instrument in this m o d e , one of the potential ter­
minals is connected to a current terminal and the
electrode under test, the remaining terminals being
connected to the potential and auxiliary current
electrodes as appropriate.
The electrodes themselves are driven in a straight
line. With the current electrode Y fixed, resistance
measurements should be taken with the poten­
tial electrode Ζ at various distances from X . These
measurements should be most frequent at the loca­
tion where X Z = 0.6 XY since this is where the
neutral zone or true resistance should be found.
The results should be plotted as shown in Fig
6.133 and the flat portion which forms the neutral
zone gives the resistance of the electrode under
test. If a neutral zone is not found, the auxiliary
electrode should be moved further away at, say,
twice the previous distance from the electrode under
test, and the test procedure repeated. If the neutral
zone cannot be found with a practical distance
between the electrode under test and the auxiliary
current electrode, then the 6 1 . 8 % distance rule as
described by Tagg [29] should be invoked. This
work by Tagg indicates that the true resistance
should be indicated at a potential electrode posi­
tion of 6 1 . 8 % from the electrode under test to the
auxiliary electrode position. Under these circum­
stances, h is suggested that a family of four graphs
is constructed for various current electrode posi­
tions and the electrode resistance taken as the mean
of the four resistance measurements at the 6 1 . 8 %
potential electrode distance position. A typical set
of results is shown in Fig 6.134.
(b) Measurement of impedance by power frequency
current injection
For a large earth system it may be difficult to
estimate its centre to apply the 6 1 . 8 % rule dis-
CURRENT
SOURCE
^
FIG. 6 . 1 3 2 Measurement of earth electrode resistance

ELECTRO DE POTENTIAL
UNDER T{EST PROBE
·χ·
innm ^
^ .1
-m *i
ELECTRODE 4
RESISTANCE Ω
/
/ 30 40 50
DISTANCE FROM ELECTRODE UNDER TEST XZ
FIG. 6.133 Graph of electrode earth resistance showing neutral zone
cussed in (a) and to compensate for this the dis­
tance to the auxihary current electrode may become
prohibitively long. Furthermore, since the current
injection and potential measurement leads are run
in parallel (because the electrodes are in a straight
line), an appreciable error can be produced due
to the induction introduced into long measuring
leads.
Under these circumstances, to improve accuracy,
it is preferable to increase the current circulating
through the ground. T o provide a sufficient current
requires the use of a fairly substantial source,
such as a substation auxiliary supply or a diesel
generator set. Where a diesel generator set is used,
the frequency should be set at say 60 Hz to allow
normal frequency (50 Hz) stray currents to be
identified. When conducting such tests, the p o ­
tential measurement leads should be laid at 90°
to the current injection leads to avoid induction.
Further information on current injection tech­
niques is given in Engineering Recommendation
S34 [31].
11.6.3 Commissioning tests
On completion of the installation of the earthing system
or after any major modifications, the following tests
should be carried out:
Earthing systems
CURRENT
ELECTRODE
Ύ·
NEUTRAL ZONE
60
70
• Each individual electrode should have its resistance
to earth measured using a composite instrument in
the manner described in the previous Section 11.6.2.
It is important that the test links are disconnected
to ensure that only the electrode being considered is
tested.
• Where individual electrode measurements are found
to be higher than calculated, or where the calculated
rise of earth potential is near the accepted hmits, a
current injection test should be carried out in the
manner described in Section 11.6.2.
• Earth cable continuity tests should be completed as
detailed in CP1013.
11.6.4 Routine tests
Routine testing consists of the following tests and time-
scales:
• Visual inspections of the station earth network
system including earth electrode connections should
be carried out at three-yearly intervals.
• The earth resistance of individual earth electrodes
should be checked using the test methods detailed
in Section 11.6.2 of this chapter at six-yearly
intervals.
573
Cabling Chapter 6

ELECTRODE o 5
RESISTANCE Ω

40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 160 METRES

DISTANCE OF POTENTIAL ELECTRODE FROM ELECTRODE UNDER TEST

FIG. 6.134 Graph of electrode earth resistance where the neutral zone is not apparent

12 Lightning protection
12.1 General requirements
The function of a lightning protection system is to
divert to itself a lightning discharge that might other­
wise strike a vulnerable part of the protected structure,
and to carry the current safely to earth. The require­
ments for the protection of structures against lightning
are given in British Standard Code of Practice BS6651:
1985. It is necessary to interpret these requirements
for power station applications and this is carried out
within G D C D Standard 83.
It should be recognised that the requirements of
BS6651: 1985 are primarily for the protection of the
building structure and special ahowances are not made
for electrical equipment contained within them. It is
therefore necessary to consider whether additional
measures are required to protect electrical equipment,
particularly light current devices, from interference or
transferred potentials.
As a general requirement it is considered essential
that the lightning protection system is bonded to the

574

station earth system. This is to reduce the risk of large
potential differences between the systems, under light­
ning strike conditions, which could result in flashovers
and hence damage to the structure or plant within.
This aspect wih be discussed more fully later.
12.2 Lightning magnitudes and risks
This section is based on information drawn from
BS6651: 1985.
In the UK there are about one million flashes that
strike the ground each decade. Lightning activity varies
over the UK and the distribution of lightning flashes
to the ground is given in Fig 6.135.
The important part of the lightning flash, with regard
to damage, is the return stroke. This is that part of
the flash in which a charged cell in a thunder-cloud is
discharged to earth.
The current in the return stroke ranges from about
2000 A t o about 200000 A and these follow a log
normal distribution, as fohows:
1% of strokes exceed 200 000 A
10% of strokes exceed 80 000 A
5 0 % of strokes exceed 28 000 A
9 0 % of strokes exceed 8 000 A
9 9 % of strokes exceed 3 000 A
The lightning current rise time is also an important
factor, since this is used to calculate the inductive
voltages that will occur within the protection system.
The majority (approximately 90%) of ground flashes
are negative, i.e., the flash current is a negative flow
from the negatively charged cells in the thunder-cloud
to ground. For a negative flash, the rise time is less
than 10 ^s this being m o r e onerous t h a n for a positive
flash where the rise time is considerably longer.
As recommended in BS6651: 1985, for the purposes
of design of lightning protection systems the fohowing
parameters are considered to be the most severe:
I = 200 k A (max)
/DL\
= 200 k A / ^ s
VDT/
The probability of a structure being struck by lightning
in a year is the product of the lightning flash density
and the effective collection area. The lightning flash
density (Ng) is the number of flashes t o ground per
km^ per year. The estimated average annual densities
are shown in Fig 6.135.
The effective cohection area of the structure is the
area of the plan extended in all directions t o take
account of its height. For the simple rectangular struc­
ture shown in Fig 6.136, the cohection area is calculated
as follows:
Lightning protection
Ac = L W + 2 L H + 2 W H + ττΗ^
where L, W and Η are length, width and height of the
building
Another simple case is t h a t of a chimney which is shown
in Fig 6.137 and the collection area is calculated as
follows:
Ac = 7ΓΗ2
In practice many buildings have a complex shape, for
instance they may be L-shaped or contain a number
of different roof heights. Also chimneys or other tah
structures may only give partial cover to lower buUd-
ings, for example in Fig 6.137, if H i increases
significantly it will modify the collection area so that
it is n o longer a complete circle. Each building there­
fore has to be treated individually.
T h e probable n u m b e r of strikes to the structure
per year (P) is as follows:
Ρ = Ac X Ng X 10 - 6
where Ac has units of m^
Having estabhshed the value of P , h is now necessary
to apply weighting factors t o take into account the type
a n d use of the structure under consideration. There are
five weighting factors designated A , B, C, D and Ε by
which Ρ has t o be m u h i p h e d . T h e overall risk factor
( P o ) is therefore given by:
P o = P x A x B x C x D x E
The weighting factors A , B, C, D and Ε are presented
in Tables 6.28 t o 6.32.
Having obtained the overall risk factor P Q , it is
now necessary t o use this to assess the requirements
for providing a lightning protection system. BS6651:
1985 recommends that for risks less than 1 0 " ^ , light­
ning protection is not necessary, for risks greater than
say 10 ""^, sound reasons would be needed to support
a decision not to provide protection. Between these
figures, the need for protection must be considered
marginal and factors such as consequential effects and
the cost of providing a system should be taken into
account.
12.3 Application of requirements to power
stations
This section is intended t o give guidance in the apph­
cation of weighting a n d risk factors t o power stations.
The first step in assessing the requirements for in­
dividual structures must be t o consider the zone of
protection afforded by a particular hghtning protection
system. For structures u p t o 20 m high h is reasonable
575
Cabling
NATIONAL GRID IDENTIFICATION
FIG. 6 . 1 3 5 Number of lightning flashes to the ground per km^ per year for the U K
to accept that the zone of protection is the volume
contained within a 45° cone or wedge as shown in Fig
6.138.
This 45° cone of protection principle is not con­
sidered adequate for structures in excess of 20 m high,
since there are many recorded instances of the sides
576
Chapter 6
of tall buildings being struck by lightning. This phe­
n o m e n o n is best explained by considering the process
that precedes a negative downward flash to ground,
which is the most c o m m o n type. The lightning flash
starts w h h a step-by-step descent of a downward leader
in r a n d o m steps and with multiple branching. As this
 Lightning protection

TABLE 6.28
Use of structure weighting factor A

Weighting factor A (use o f structure)

I Value o f
Use to which structure is put
factor A

Η Houses and other buildings o f comparable size. 0.3

Houses and other buildings o f comparable size

with outside aerial. 0.7

Factories, workshops and laboratories. 1.0

FIG. 6.136 The effective collection area f o r a simple Office blocks, hotels, blocks o f flats and other
rectangular structure residential buildings other than those included
below. 1.2

Places o f assembly, e.g., churches, halls, theatres,

museums, exhibitions, department stores, post
offices, stations, airports and stadium structures. 1.3

Schools, hospitals, children's and other homes. 1.7

TABLE 6.29
Type of structure weighting factor Β

Weighting factor Β (type o f structure)

Value of
Type o f construction
factor Β

Steel framed encased with any roof other than metal. * 0.2
FIG. 6.137 Collection area f o r a tall chimney
Reinforced concrete with any roof other than metal. 0.4

Steel framed encased or reinforced concrete with

metal roof. 0.8

Brick, plain concrete or masonry with any roof other

than metal or thatch. 1.0

Timber framed or clad with any roof other than metal

or thatch. 1.4

Brick, plain concrete, masonry, timber framed but

with metal roofing. 1.7

A n y building with a thatched roof. 2.0

* A structure o f exposed metal which is continuous down to ground

level is excluded f r o m the table as it requires no lightning protection
beyond adequate earthing arrangements.

complete the path for the return stroke. Upward

FIG. 6.138 Zone o f protection f o r structures up to
20 m high
charged leader progresses, the electric field between
itself and earth intensifies until the field at the earth
surface is sufficiently high for an upward streamer
to be launched to meet the downward leader, and so
streamers are launched from the earth's surface at
points of greatest electric field intensity, and they
can travel in any direction towards the downward
leader. Tall structures give a high degree of field
enhancement and therefore upward streamers can start
preferentially from these. This is particularly true for
high current density flashes where higher charges are
involved and hence longer upward streamers. How­
ever, downward leaders do not have to travel direct­
ly downwards, it is therefore possible for them to
approach a tall structure in such a manner as to
allow a strike part way down, as shown in Fig 6.139.

577
Cabling
TABLE 6 . 3 0
Contents or consequential effect weighting factor C
Weighting factor C (contents or consequential effects)
Value of
Contents or consequential effects
factor C
Ordinary domestic or office buildings, factories and
workshops not containing valuable or specially
susceptible contents.
Industrial and agricultural buildings with specially
susceptible* contents.
Power stations, gas installations, telephone exchanges,
radio stations.
Key industrial plants, ancient monuments and historic
buildings, museums, art galleries or other buildings
with specially valuable contents.
Schools, hospitals, children's and other homes, places
of assembly.
* This means specially valuable plant or materials vulnerable to fire
or the results of fire.
TABLE 6 . 3 1
Degree of isolation weighting factor D
Weighting factor D (degree of isolation)
Value of
Degree of isolation
factor D
Structure located in a large area of structures or trees
of the same or greater height, e.g., in a large town
or forest.
Structure located in an area with few other structures
or trees of similar height.
Structure completely isolated or exceeding at least
twice the height of surrounding structures or trees.
TABLE 6 . 3 2
Type of country weighting factor Ε
Weighting factor Ε (type of country)
Value of
Type of country
factor Ε
Flat country at any level
Hill country
Mountain country between 3 0 0 m and 9 0 0 m
Mountain country above 900 m
However, such strikes are likely to be low current
density since these have shorter upward streamers. The
length of the last leader to complete the strike is called
the striking distance. Since the last leader is not con­
fined by direction, ah points equidistant from the end
578
Chapter 6
fARD LEADER
0.3
0.8
1.0
1.3
1.7
FIG. 6 . 1 3 9 Lightning strikes on tall structures
of the leader prior to the last j u m p , can be considered
equally likely to receive a lightning strike. Therefore
the surface of a sphere having a radius equal to the
striking distance can be used to define the zone of
protection as shown in Fig 6.140. The practice of using
an imaginary sphere in this manner to predict the zone
of protection is known as the rolling sphere method.
This name is derived from the need, w h h complex-
shaped buildings, to roll the imaginary sphere around
and over it to determine the zones of protection. As
already stated, the radius of the sphere is equal to the
0.4
striking distance which is related to the charge and
hence current density of the strike. Since the current
1.0
density varies from one strike to the next a statistical
approach has to be used. BS6651: 1985 originahy re­
2.0
commended a sphere radius of 20 metres but this is
being amended to 60 metres for general use, as this
is considered to be much more practical. For buildings
with explosives or highly flammable contents, however,
the 20 metre radius sphere is still recommended.
We must now consider how to apply the method of
risk analysis to power station structures. Firstly we
must estabhsh an acceptable overall risk factor. As
stated above, BS6651: 1985 recommends that for risks
less than 1 0 l i g h t n i n g protection is not necessary
0.3 while for risks greater than 1 0 s a y 10sound
1.0
reasons would be required for not providing protec­
tion. Between these figures the need to fit protection
1.3
is considered marginal, especially towards the lower
1.7
figure, and other factors such as consequential effects
and economics need to be taken into account. It will
be demonstrated later in this section that the collec­
tion area of power station main buildings is such that
a lightning protection system will be required even if
the lower risk value of 1 0 " ^ is used. However, for
other smaller structures this lower value of 10 ~^ is
considered to be financially unjustified for the risk
 Lightning protection

liiiii? ZONE 0 - PROTECTION PROVIDED BY LIGHTNING

. PROTECTION SYSTEMS OF BUILDING AND CHIMNEY

FIG. 6.140 Zone of protection defined by rolling sphere method

involved, bearing in mind that any high density current t o be struck by lightning. It is of course possible for
strikes are likely to be to the chimney or main buildings. main buildings to be whhin the 45° cone volume of
Therefore, for these smaher structures, the risk is as­ the chimney (as shown in Fig 6.141) and in this case
sessed against a probability of 5 χ 1 0 t h i s being it is possible t o claim that the main buildings are less
the mid-point between the values of 1 0 " ^ and 10""^. hkely to be struck by lightning, particularly by high
As far as the weighting factors outlined in the pre­ density strikes, than if the chimney were not there. This
vious Section 12.2 are concerned, a number of these can degree of protection can be taken into account by
be treated as standard for all power station buildings. selecting a value of 0.4 for weighting factor D from
W h h respect to weighting factor A for the use of the Table 6.31. Main power station buhdings are typically
structure for power station buildings, a value of 1.0 is steel framed or reinforced concrete w h h a steel roof,
considered appropriate. Weighting factor C for the for which a value of 0.8 is appropriate for weighting
structure contents is set at 1.0 for power stations. The factor B. Therefore, for main buhdings:
vast majority of power stations are sited in flat country
and therefore a value of 0.3 is selected for weighting Overall weighting = A x B x C x D x E
factor E. Weighting factors Β and D , which relate to factor = 1 X 0.8 X 1 X 0.4 X 0.3
type of construction and degree of isolation respective­ = 0.096
ly, have to be considered individually for each structure.
Having defined zones of protection and the method From Section 12.2: Ρ = Ας x Ng χ 1 0 " ^
of risk analysis, we can now consider the requirements and P o = P x A x B x C x D x E
for individual structures, starting with the tallest. For Po
A. =
a fossil-fired power station the tallest structure will be 0.096 X Ng X 10 - 6
the main chimney and, as already discussed, since this
is likely to receive any high current density strikes it Taking a median value of Ng = 0.5 from Fig 6.135 and
is essential that it is fitted with an efficient protection a value of 5 χ 10 ~^ for the maximum acceptable risk,
system. Gas turbine and auxiliary boiler house chim­ the maximum ahowable effective collection areas, as
neys are also of sufficient height that lightning protec­ defined in Section 12.1, is:
tion systems must be fitted.
Considering main buildings such as turbine halls or 5 X 10 - 5
boiler houses, these are t o o large t o be within the zone Ac =
0.096 X 0.5 X 1 0 - ^
of protection of the chimney as defined by the rolling
sphere method and therefore it is possible for them = 1042 m^

579
Cabling Chapter 6

ZONE 1 - SOME PROTECTION PROVIDED BY OTHER BUILDINGS OR STRUCTURES

WITHIN 4 5 ° CONE OR WEDGE VOLUME

FIG. 6.141 45° cone of protection from chimney

This equates to a building size of some 20 m square (b) Structures which are within the 45° cone or wedge
by 10 m high which is considerably smaller than any volume of chimneys or main buildings, but not
main buildings. Even if the risk is increased to 10 ""^ covered by (a) need to be assessed with respect
thus doubling the collection area, the ahowable build­ to their collection area. As before, constants A , C
ing size still does not approach that of power station and Ε are fixed and, since in this case a consider­
main bmldings. Therefore it is required that ah main able degree of protection will be given by the taller
buildings such as turbine halls and boiler houses be structures, a value of 0.4 is chosen for weighting
fitted with a lightning protection system. factor D . As previously discussed, the maximum
Whilst dealing with main buildings it is useful to allowable overah risk factor P Q is taken as 5 χ
consider nuclear power stations where there is ob­ 10-^
viously no main chimney. Such stations tend to be
isolated and are taller than the few buildings that may Now the overall risk = A x B x C x D x E
be in the local area. For this degree of isolation, a factor
= 1 X Β X 1 X 0.4 X 0.3
value of 2 for weighting factor D is considered ap­ = 0.12B
propriate. This wih have the effect of reducing the
collection areas, given above for buhdings within the 5 X 10"^
cone of chimneys, by a factor of five. Therefore quite Maximum allowable
clearly because of their size, the reactor and other collection area Ας Ng X 1 0 - 6 X 0.12 X Β

main buildings will need to have a lightning protection

416
system fitted.
We now need to consider the remaining smaller struc­ Ng X Β
tures that will be present on a power station site. The
requirement for lightning protection will be dependent For any particular power station, Ng is selected
on the degree of protection afforded by taller structures according to its location from Fig 6.135. Weighting
and it is convenient to use three classes according to factor Β is selected according to type of structure
location: from Table 6.29.

(a) Structures that are within the zone of protection (c) Structures which are outside any zone of protection
of chimneys or main buildings as defined by the are again assessed on their collection area. As be­
rolling sphere method are not required to be fitted fore, constants A , C and Ε are fixed. In this case
with a lightning protection system. a value of 1 for weighting factor D is considered

580
 Lightning protection

appropriate since there wih be a number of struc­ addhional connection is required. The continuity of
tures of similar height and taller in the area. this connection should however be checked and not
merely assumed.
Now the overall risk = A x B x C x D x E
factor
= 1 X Β X 1 X 1 X 0.3 12.4.1 Main and gas turbine chimneys
= 0.3B
It is now standard practice to construct single and
multi-flue chimneys from reinforced concrete, there­
5 X 10 - 5
Maximum allowable fore the lightning protection system details herein are
collection area Ας Ng X 1 0 - 6 X 0.3 X Β appropriate to that type of construction.
The air termination is formed using the metalhc
166 cappings (or metallic flues if provided), ensuring that
Ng X Β capping segments are adequately bonded together to
be electrically continuous. Where metallic cappings
For any particular power station, Ng is selected are not provided, a metal strip coronal band must be
according to hs location from Fig 6.135. Weighting fitted to each flue. The connection from the air ter­
factor Β is selected according to type of structure mination on each flue is brought down to a test clamp
from Table 6.29. as shown in Fig 6.142. In addition, the concrete wind­
shields of multi-flue chimneys are also provided with
In summary, lightning protection systems shall be fitted a strip coronal b a n d which is bonded direct to the
to structures as follows: windshield reinforcement. This windshield coronal band
can be omitted if handrails are fitted since these can
• Main, gas turbine and auxihary boiler chimneys. form the air termination, but in this case handrail
• Main buildings including boiler, turbine and reactor sections must be bonded together and direct to the
buhdings, irrespective of height. windshield reinforcement rods. Finally an external bond
should be provided between reinforcement of flue and
• Buildings or structures that are within the 45° cone windshield where reinforcement is not continuous, as
or wedge zone of chimneys or main buildings but shown in Fig 6.142. Coronal bands and all connections
outside the protection zone as defined by the rolling
sphere method, that have a collection area in excess
of Ac = 416/(Ng X B). CORONAL BAND BONDED
TO DOWN CONDUCTOR

• Buildings or structures which are outside the 45°

cone or wedge zone of chimneys or main buildings
that have a collection area greater than Ac = DOWN CONDUCTOR
166/(Ng X B).

• All structures containing explosive or flammable DOWN CONDUCTOR

HOLDFASTS
materials shall be protected in accordance with
BS6651: 1985.
REINFORCEMENT

12.4 Protection systenn design

This section is intended to give the principles of system
design and therefore constructional details of indi­
vidual components are not included. Reference should
be made to G D C D Standard 83 for constructional
details of components. HANDRAIL BONDED
A lightning protection scheme has three essential TO REINFORCEMENT

elements which are the air termination, the downcon-

ductors and the earth termination. The power station
structures are discussed in the following sections with
respect to these elements.
As a general requirement, the combined resistance
to earth of each hghtning protection system should EXTERNAL BOND BETWEEN
REINFORCEMENT OF FLUE
AND WINDSHIELD WHERE
not exceed 10 ohms. In addition, each individual light­ REINFORCEMENT IS NOT
CONTINUOUS
ning protection system must be connected to the main
station earth network to reduce the risk of dangerous
potentials occurring between earth systems. In cases
FIG. 6 . 1 4 2 Typical arrangement of air terminations and
where a connection exists via structural steelwork n o down conductors for multi-flue chimneys

581
Cabling
within 12 m of the flue top are to be formed using
copper strip which has been seamless lead covered to
protect it from the flue gases.
The reinforcement of the windshield should be uti­
hsed as the downconductor subject to the following
conditions:
• The reinforcement should be secured by tie wires
at all laps and intersections, the laps being bonded
by at least two tie wires.
• External connections should only be made to re­
inforcement that is part of a continuous mesh.
Ah metalwork including aircraft warning light access
doors and handrails shah be bonded to the reinforce­
ment. Bonding of small isolated metalwork such as
steeplejack access fittings is not necessary. At intervals
of approximately 45 m throughout the height of the
chimney, all continuous vertical runs of metal including
stairways, lift structures, cable armouring and rein­
forcement of windshield and flues should be bonded
together. It is normally convenient to carry out such
bonding at the levels at which aircraft warning lights
are fitted. The downconductor system shall be brought
out near ground level to a total of four test clamps
spaced equally around the perimeter of the chimney.
To ensure adequate current carrying capability, each
test clamp should be bonded directly to a minimum of
four reinforcement rods. In addition, where flues ex­
tend to the chimney base, the windshield and flue
reinforcement should be bonded through to the base
reinforcement.
An earth termination formed from earth rods should
be provided adjacent to each test clamp position. C o p ­
per strip is used to connect the earth termination to
the test clamp.
12.4.2 Main buildings
Where roofs are constructed from metal decking, com­
plying with the minimum thicknesses given in Table
6.33, the roofing may be regarded as the air termina­
tion and externally applied tapes are not considered
necessary.
This apphes even if the decking is covered in insula­
tion, such as bitumen felt, since these materials offer
negligible resistance to lightning. When metal decking
TABLE 6.33
Roof thickness
Material Minimum thickness, mm
Galvanised steel 0.5
Stainless steel 0.4
Copper 0.3
Aluminium and zinc 0.7
Lead 2.0
582
Chapter 6
is used as the air termination it is important to en­
sure that there is adequate electrical continuity between
sheets, and between sheets and the steel framework.
Where roofing is formed from non-conducting ma­
terials, e.g., in-situ or precast reinforced concrete,
air terminations in the form of metal strip must be
provided a r o u n d the perimeter and over the roof to
form a mesh not exceeding 10 m χ 20 m . Any projec­
tions above the general roof level, e.g., parapet wahs,
vent pipes, heating and ventilating exhausts, should be
bonded to the roof steelwork or the air termination
network. If such projections are non-conducting, they
need to be provided with metal strip air terminations
bonded to the roof t e r m i n a d o n .
Where possible, steel or reinforced concrete columns
should be utihsed as downconductors. Columns for
use as downconductors need to be nominated early
in the civil programme to enable provisions to be
made for the connection of air and earth terminations.
The nominated columns should be spaced at intervals
not exceeding 10 m a r o u n d the perimeter of the
building. For steel columns a welded boss should be
provided for bonding connections. W h h reinforced
concrete columns for bonding connections, a tag should
be provided which is welded or clamped to at least
four reinforcement bars to allow adequate current
distribution. Sufficient bonding connections should
be provided between metal decking or air termina­
tion networks at each column nominated as a down-
conductor.
At each concrete column used as a downconductor,
the reinforcement should be tied to the floor reinforce­
ment to form an earth electrode. In addition, the tag
connection to the reinforcement at the b o t t o m of the
column should be bonded to the station earth network.
Where steel columns arc used as downconductors, a
tag should be provided at the column base which is
connected either to the supporting pile (if present) or
to at least four reinforcement bars in the base concrete.
This tag is to be bonded to the boss at the base of
the steel column and to the station earth network.
12.4.3 Other buildings
All other buildings which are deemed to require light­
ning protection, when assessed in accordance with Sec­
tion 12.3 of this chapter, should be protected in the
fohowing manner.
Air terminations should be formed using the same
techniques as described for main buildings in the
previous Section 12.4.2.
Again where possible, as with main buildings, struc­
tural steel or reinforced concrete columns should be
utihsed as downconductors. Facihties should be pro­
vided to allow a connection to be made from the base
of the column to an external earth electrode. This can
be achieved by providing a lug or boss on the outside
of the column, if exposed, or by the provision of a
duct from the column base to an external earth pit.
 Lightning protection

Where h is not possible to utihse the fabric of the

building as downconductors, then separate metal strip
conductors have to be provided down the outside of
the bmlding. The spacing of downconductors a r o u n d
the building should not exceed 20 m for buhdings u p
to 20 m high. For buildings over 20 m high, down-
conductors need to be provided at intervals not ex­
ceeding 10 m a r o u n d its perimeter.
An earth termination consisting of copper-clad steel
earth rods complying with ESI Standard 4 3 - 9 4 should
be provided at the base of each downconductor. The
connection to earth is completed using copper strip
via a test h n k . These test links should be located in a
position w h h suhable access for testing.
COLUMNS
NOMINATED
AS DOWN
12.4.4 Buildings requiring special considerations CONDUCTORS

When designing a lightning protection system it must

be recognised that lightning currents will seek out the
lowest impedance and hence the most direct path to
earth. It should be the design intent to provide low
impedance paths a r o u n d the perimeter of buildings,
thus reducing the magnitude of currents flowing through
the building which might result in interference or
sideflashing. For simple rectangular buildings, such as
that shown in Fig 6.143, this can be achieved by no­
minating columns a r o u n d the perimeter of the building
for special treatment as downconductors or by using
separate external downconductors. Where there are
annexes attached to the building these can be readily
incorporated by running tapes over the roofs.
However, for complex buildings such as that shown
in Fig 6.144, special provisions are necessary if it is
required to prevent substantial currents flowing through
the building where sensitive equipment may be housed.
In Fig 6.144 the building length is such as to demand
a number of downconductors along its length. In this
case h is not considered permissible t o run conductors
down from the highest roof, across the lowest roof
and back u p to the other roof to connect to the down-
FIG. 6 . 1 4 4 Protection scheme for a complex
building design
conductors along the perimeter of the building. If
downconductors were installed in this manner the
lightning current from a strike at location A (Fig 6.144)
would be unhkely to fohow such a tortuous route and
would seek a more direct route through the buhding
structure, by sideflashing where necessary. The solution
to this type of problem is to provide catenaries across
the void to interconnect the air terminations on the
two roofs. This provides a low impedance path to
the peripheral downconductors and achieves a higher
degree of current sharing between them.
12.4.5 Fuel oil storage tanks
This section relates to heavy oil and gas turbine fuel oil
tanks. In these cases the tank structure itself forms
the air termination and the downconductors. T o faci­
litate connection t o the earth termination, bosses should
be provided near the base of the tank at intervals not
exceeding 35 m a r o u n d the perimeter of each tank.
A n earth termination formed from earth rods comply­
ing with ESI Standard 4 3 - 9 4 is provided at each boss
location. The earth termination is connected to the
boss, via a test hnk, using copper strip.

12.4.6 Flammable gas production and storage

plant

Hydrogen generation plant

FIG. 6 . 1 4 3 Protection system for a simple
rectangular building
In order to provide adequate protection against hght­
ning, the complete hydrogen plant and storage area
should be covered by a suspended horizontal air ter­
mination network. This applies even when the plant
is in the protective zone of the chimney or main
buildings. The network shall enclose ah the buhdings
and storage areas of the plant and should be con-

583
Cabling
structed in accordance with the requirements of British
Standard Code of Practice BS6651: 1985, Clause 2 1 .
The number of horizontal conductors is determined
from the plant layout using a protective angle of u p
to 45° between conductors and a maximum of 30°
outside the outer conductors, as shown in Fig 6.145.
The height of the horizontal conductors needs to be
sufficient to avoid any risk of flashover to the protected
structure and due account must be taken of items
such as vents that may be higher than the main struc­
tures. The minimum clearance of these conductors and
their supports from the structure should be 2 m.
A n earth electrode should be provided at the base
of each conductor support and these are interconnected
by a ring conductor. This ring conductor should pre­
ferably be buried to a depth of 0.6 m, but may be
run above ground where this is more convenient for
bonding other objects or for testing. A h major metal
forming parts of the protected structure, including con­
tinuous metal reinforcement, should be bonded together
and connected to the lightning protection system. T o
achieve this, at least two connections should be made
to the ring conductor and, if possible, connections
should be equally spaced around the perimeter of the
structure at intervals not exceeding 10 m. In addition,
the ring conductor should be connected to the station
earth system.
SUSPENDED AIR TERMINATION
PROTECTED BUILDING
- EARTH ELECTRODE
(a) Elevation
SUSPENDED AIR TERMINATION
PROTECTED BUILDING
SUSPENDED AIR TERMINATION
(b) Plan
KEY
\ / 4 5 ^ 30·^
PROTECTED
BUILDING
(c) End elevation showing zones of protection
FIG. 6.145 Typical catenary air termination system for
flammable gas production and storage plant
584
Chapter 6
The materials and bonding should be in accordance
with BS 6651: 1985, Clause 2 1 , and particular atten­
tion is drawn to clauses 21.2.6 and 21.2.7 which detah
bonding of pipes, cables, etc., entering the area. In­
sulated flange points of the type shown in Fig 6.146
are to be fitted to the delivery main immediately outside
the c o m p o u n d fence.
Propane storage cylinders
The propane cylinder storage c o m p o u n d is to be treated
in a similar manner to the hydrogen generation plant.
12.5 Assessment of risks of sideflashing and
interference
When a lightning protection system is struck by hght-
ning, large potential differences are produced across
it. The overah potential produced has two compo­
nents. The first is the product of the current and the
resistance to earth; the second is the product of the
rate of change of current and the inductance of the
downconductor system. Whilst there wih be a phase
difference between these components the worst case,
which is given by the simple addition of the two pro­
ducts, is normally used in any assessment.
T o illustrate this point, consider a building 20 m high
fitted with an air termination and a single downcon­
ductor.
In Section 12.2 of this chapter we defined the maxi­
m u m design current as 200 k A and, in Section 12.4,
we require a maximum earth termination resistance
COPPER ALLOY FLANGES
V
INSULATING WASHER | INSULATING DISC
CABLE EARTH
,RING AT BASE
OF MASTS
M10BOLT AND NUT
TO STATION
- EARTH NETWORK
ZONES OF PROTECTION
AT MAST
ZONES OF PROTECTION
AT MAXIMUM SAG OF
SERIAL CONDUCTOR
NEOPRENE JOINT RINGS
INSULATING SLEEVE MS WASHER
MINIMUM INSULATION RESISTANCE 2M Ω AT 500 VOLTS
FIG. 6.146 Insulated flange point for a gas pipeline
 Lightning protection

of 10 Qm. Therefore the potential difference across For strip conductors, effective radius has to be used
the earth termination is: and this can be calculated using the formula:

VR = IR = 200 X 10^ X 10 = 2 MV W + t

3.5
Hence the base of the downconductor wih be raised
by 2 M V above remote earth. where W = strip width, m
Now consider the second component which is the t = strip thickness, m
potential difference across the downconductor. A down-
conductor tape has a self-inductance of the order of Having calculated the transfer inductance Μ χ , the
1.5 μΗ/τη and from Section 12.2 we take the maxi­ inductive vohage V L generated in the loop shown in
mum rate of change of current to be 200 k A / / i S (2 χ Fig 6.147 is given by the equation:
10^^ A / s ) . Therefore the potential difference across
the height of the building is: / di \ mj
VL = — X (kV)
\ dt / max η
/di\
VL = - X f X Ls
Where £ = loop length, m
dt / max
η = number of downconductors that simul­
where i = downconductor length, m taneously share the lightning current
Ls = self-inductance
Now taking the example shown in Fig 6.148, we have
VL = 2 X 10^1 X 20 X 1.5 χ 1 0 - ^ an earth cable bonding a cubicle down to the main
= 6 MV station earth network. T h e earth cable is run parallel
with a downconductor at a distance of 4 m for a length
Therefore, the total rise of potential of the air ter­ of 20 m . For a 25 m m χ 3 m m strip conductor:
mination above remote earth is:
re = (0.025 + 0.003)73.5 = 0.008
V ^ V R + V L = 2 + 6 = 8 MV Now M T = 0.46 logio (4/0.0008) = 1.24 μΗ/m

This simple example is pessimistic since the most For a design value of rate of change of current of 200
onerous hghtning parameters and earth electrode re­ k A / ^ s (2 X 10^1 A / s ) :
sistance have been used. Also, a single downconductor
has been considered where in practice on a tall building V L = 2 X lOii X 20 X 1.24 χ l O ' ^ = 5 x 10^ V
there would be many, which would reduce the induc­
tance between the air and earth terminations consi­
derably. Nevertheless it does demonstrate the order
of magnitude of potential gradients that can occur in
structures when subjected to a lightning strike. These
voltages do not constitute a danger to the structure
itself, but they can have an effect on equipment such as
pipes or cables in the vicinity of the downconductors.
From this point of view it is necessary t o determine
DOWN CONDUCTOR
inductively-generated voltages to assess the risk of side-
flashes between equipment and downconductors.
For the calculation of vohages between a lightning
conductor and other metalwork we cannot use self-
inductance as in the previous example. In this case
we need to use the transfer inductance, which is the
coupling generated by the self-inductance minus the
mutual inductance to the metalwork. F r o m BS6651:
1985 the transfer inductance M j may be calculated
from the formula:

S
MT = 0.47 log 1 0 — μΗ/τη
r METAL PIPE, CONDUIT,
TRUNKING OR OTHER
where S = distance between downconductor and other METALWORK

metalwork, m
r = radius of downconductor, m FIG. 6.147 Transfer inductance of a simple loop

585
Cabling Chapter 6

, di
And VL = —
dt / max η

2 0 0 X 10^1 X 2 0 X 0 . 4 1 χ lO'^

VT = 1.64 X 106 V

Again taking the dielectric strength of air as 500 k V / m ,

the flashover distance is:
mm
1.64 X 106
D = = 3.28 m
500 X 10^

EARTH '
CABLE
STATION
EARTH RING
FIG. 6.148 Inductive voltage generated in a loop
Taking the dielectric strength of air to be 500 k V / m
it is clear that sideflashing could occur between the
cubicle and the downconductor.
Now it is interesting to compare the difference when
a reinforced column is used as the downconductor
instead of metal strip. Consider a concrete column
1 m square w h h reinforcement to within 0.05 m of
the surface, so that all reinforcement is contained
in a square having 0.9 m sides. A reasonable approxi­
mation of the inductance for such a group of reinforce­
ment may be obtained by treating it as a box-section
of the same dimensions. T o calculate the inductance
it is first necessary to calculate the effective radius
thus:
W + t 0.9 + 0.9
re = =
3.5 3.5
The air space between the column and the panel is
the spacing, less half the column width which is 3.5 m,
therefore sideflashing should not occur. This demon­
strates one of the many advantages in using the build­
ing structure as a downconductor since the larger
size of the column has had the effect of reducing the
inductively-generated voltage by a factor of 3 com­
pared w h h that obtained using a metal strip down-
conductor.
All the examples so far have only considered a
single downconductor, whereas in practice any large
buhding wih have a number of downconductors which
will share the current to some degree. The formula for
induced voltage (Υχ) has a factor η which represents
the number of downconductors. The basic formula
therefore assumes that the value of d i / d t is equally
shared by the downconductors. However, BS6651: 1985
recognises that in rectangular or square buildings w h h
more than four downconductors, the corner down-
conductors take a disproportionately large share of the
total current. It is therefore recommended that a factor
of 3 0 ^ 0 be added to the inductive voltage generated
by corner downconductors. Conversely, in the central
area of structures having many downconductors, the
value of d i / d t is lower by approximately 3 0 % .
As an example, consider a building which utilises
twelve reinforced concrete columns (having the same
dimensions as the previous example) as downconduc­
tors. N o w for metalwork bonded at the b o t t o m to the
downconductor and run parallel for 20 m at a distance
of 2 m:
M T = 0 . 4 6 logio = 0.27 μΗ/τη
0.51
0.51 m
and

'di\
Using the same physical arrangement and lightning VL = ( -
parameters as in the previous example we have: d t / max η

MT = 0 . 4 6 log 10 (S/r)
20 X 0.27 X 1 0 - *
= 2 X 10" X
= 0 . 4 6 logio ( 4 / 0 . 5 1 ) 12

= 0.41 μΗ/m VL = 9 0 kV

586

Now for a corner conductor add 3 0 % , therefore V L
= 117 kV and for a central conductor subtract 3 0 % ,
therefore V L = 63 kV.
Taking the dielectric strength of air as 500 k V / m ,
sideflashing wih not occur unless the panel is with­
in 234 m m of a corner downconductor or within
126 m m of a central downconductor. In fact the di­
electric strength of concrete is similar to air, so these
clearances can be assumed to apply to air, concrete
or a mixture of these mediums.
This method of calculating inductive voltages, by
assuming all central or ah corner downconductors carry
equal current, is not considered rigorous when apphed
to large steel or reinforced concrete framed buildings.
This is because the downconductors are connected
by horizontal conductors which themselves have im­
pedance and therefore the downconductors nearest the
strike point wih carry a higher proportion of current.
Where the building structure itself is used as a down-
conductor, there wih be a number of vertical paths
formed by the columns interconnected at each floor
level as a resuh of the horizontal paths formed by
beams. Figure 6.149 shows the most significant current
paths in a steel or reinforced concrete framed building
for a strike on one corner. As can be seen, the current
divides at each building node so that better current
sharing is achieved at lower building levels. It should
also be noted that currents are generally greater in
peripheral than in interior conductors.
The method given in BS6651 for dealing with mul­
tiple downconductors is regarded as adequate for
general use. However, for special cases, such as when
sensitive equipment is located at high level in a build­
ing, a more rigorous calculation should be carried
out.
POINT OF STRIKE
FIG. 6.149 Distribution of most significant current
paths in a steel or reinforced concrete framed building
Lightning protection
Having explored the methods of calculating induc­
tively-generated vohages and typical values, it is now
necessary to consider what precautions are necessary
against the risk of sideflashing. In general there are
two solutions, either to ensure there is sufficient
distance between plant a n d downconductors to prevent
sideflashing or to b o n d the plant to the downcon­
ductor. In practice, power station buildings tend to be
large in size and as a consequence they require many
downconductors. The calculated inductive vohages are
therefore relatively small as demonstrated in the last
calculated example for a building w h h twelve down-
conductors. In that example, the clearances required
to prevent sideflashing were less t h a n 250 m m for a
corner downconductor and less than 150 m m for a
central downconductor. This indicates that as a general
policy, bonding of plant to downconductors should
not be necessary if the following rules are observed:
• Bond reinforcement or steelwork across expansion
joints and the like at all floor levels to achieve
o p t i m u m current sharing.
• W h e r e practical, sensitive electronic equipment
should be located at low level in the building.
• N o equipment should be m o u n t e d o n or very close
to outside columns or steel reinforced wahs.
Quite clearly it is not practical t o calculate sideflash
distances for ah the vast a m o u n t of plant within a
power station, and it is suggested that if the above
rules are followed this is not necessary other than in
special cases. A n example of a special case is nuclear
safety equipment.
12.6 Inspection, testing and records
A log b o o k should be employed t o record the resuhs
of ah visual inspections a n d resistance measurements.
All lightning protection systems should be visually
inspected during installation and after completion to
check compliance with BS6651: 1985. A h accessible
components of the system should be visually inspected
at intervals not exceeding 12 m o n t h s .
U p o n completion of the instahation, each hghtning
protection earth electrode should have its resistance
measured to demonstrate t h a t it does not exceed 10 Ω,
as required by BS6651: 1985. The method of testing
should be as given in CP1013: 1965. Tests to mea­
sure earth resistance need to be repeated at regular
intervals. Because the lightning protection system is
bonded to the station earth network which is a high
integrity system, h is not considered necessary to carry
out these tests at 12 m o n t h intervals as suggested
in BS6651: 1985. It is therefore recommended that
lightning protection earth electrodes be tested at the
same frequency as the station earth electrodes which
is every 6 years.
587
Cabling
13 Lighting, heating and small power
systems
13.1 Introduction
Lighting is both an art and a science. It can be both
decorative and functional a h h o u g h the balance between
decoration and function will vary with application. The
applications considered in a power station are essen­
tially functional. The function of the lighting system
in a power station is to provide adequate illumination
for safe plant operation and personnel movement. The
lighting system should also contribute to achieving an
acceptable overall environment of the work area.
One of the most fundamental decisions to be made
when designing the lighting of any interior is the rela­
tionship between dayhght and artificial (electric) light.
This can take three forms:
• Rely on dayhght during the daytime and design elec­
tric lighting only for night-time conditions.
• Use daylight as available but supplement h as re­
quired by electric lighting.
• T o ignore dayhght and operate by using electric
hghting only.
Artificial light is necessary in a power station for two
main reasons. The first, quite simply, is that the op­
eration of a power station is a continuous 24-hour
per day process and the after dark activities must be
catered for; the second reason is that the architecture
of the plant and buildings of a power station make
h uneconomic and invariably impossible to illuminate
adequately with natural daylight.
13.2 Lighting system design
Lighting design is a complex process and no hard and
fast rules can be devised which will suit all applications
or every designer. The Chartered Institute of Buhding
Services (CIBS) Code for Interior Lighting (1984) offers
a design approach that represents reasonable practice
and is used by the C E G B as a guide to plan and cal­
culate the lighting requirements for power stations.
The recommendations given in this code, and previous
issues, reflect and are written confirmation of the good
design practice that has been adopted by the C E G B
for a considerable number of years in the design of
power station lighting systems.
The overah design process proposed by the CIBS
code consists of five stages:
• Objectives Determine the objectives of the design
in terms of the safety requirements, task require­
ments and the appearance required.
• Specification Specify the design objectives as a set
of compatible design criteria, acknowledging those
objectives which cannot be quantified.
588
Chapter 6
• General planning T o resolve the type of lighting
system which will achieve the desired objectives.
• Detailed planning Planning of the final scheme
using accurate data to ensure the most economical
and efficient final design.
• Appraisal The installation is reviewed after com­
pletion in order to assess its success in terms of the
design objectives and its acceptabhity to the users
(in the case of the C E G B , the power station operating
stafO.
The following sections consider the apphcation of the
above design process to the design of power station
main A C lighting systems. The procedure is equally
vahd for the design of emergency lighting systems,
which are discussed in Section 13.3 of this chapter.
13.2.1 Objectives
The design of the lighting system for a power station
must meet the specified standard service illuminance
and the essential requirement of high reliability, whilst
simultaneously satisfying economic requirements in
terms of low capital, energy and maintenance costs
over the design life of the installation. Due regard
must also be paid to the desirability of minimising the
number of different light sources stored as spares by
the power station.
Some, if not all, of the above objectives are com­
m o n to all installations whether in power stations,
industrial or commercial premises. One area unique to
power stations is the design hfe of the installation.
All installations in power stations are designed for a
minimum life of 25 years. The tendency now with
modern nuclear stations (e.g., Sizewell Β (PWR) power
station) is to design for an extended life of 40 years.
T h e lighting equipment manufacturers must present
data in support of their claims for the life of their
equipment. This must be borne in mind when consider­
ing, in addition to the energy and maintenance costs,
the ease of replacement and refurbishment of equip­
ment over the design life of the station.
A n additional requirement placed on the lighting
instahations of modern nuclear power stations is the
support of the safety-related equipment which has nu­
clear safety duties. Although the lighting installation
is not directly safety-related h is designed to aid the
satisfactory supervision of this essential safety-related
equipment. Particular attention is therefore given to
the main and emergency operation lighting systems in
areas of the station containing such equipment, or
equipment required to be operated following a trip
of the nuclear reactor.
It is also important when considering objectives to
establish the design constraints. There are many con­
straints which affect the design objectives, such as en­
vironmental considerations (which may limit the range
of acceptable luminaires) and the physical problems
of access.

13.2.2 Specification
Having defined the objectives for the main A C in­
stahation, these must be expressed in the form of a
suitable specification giving, wherever possible, mea­
surable quantities (e.g., the standard service illumi­
nance is given in C E G B , G D C D Standard 31). Where
objectives cannot be expressed as measurable quanti­
ties, the lighting designer must exercise experience and
judgement to replace calculation. It is important that
the objectives which cannot be quantified are not over­
looked.
13.2.3 General planning
When the design specification has been established,
the purpose of the remaining stages of design is to
translate these physical requirements into the best pos­
sible solutions. There are no hard and fast rules about
how to plan a lighting installation. Experience and
judgement will usually dominate the planning process.
The planning stages can be divided into general and
detailed planning.
The first stage in the general planning of a lighting
installation is to consider the interior to be lit, its
proportions, hs contents, and most importantly the
type of hghting to be adopted.
Electric lighting systems fall into three basic
categories:
• General lighting.
• Localised lighting.
• Local lighting.
Lighting systems which provide an approximately
uniform distribution of light over the entire working
plane are called general hghting systems. The lumi-
naires are normally arranged in a regular layout. The
appearance of this type of installation is usually tidy
but may be regarded as being rather bland. General
hghting is simple to plan and requires n o co-ordination
with task locations. The greatest advantage of such
systems is that they permit complete flexibility of task
location. For this reason, general lighting systems are
predominantly used for hghting the major plant areas
in power stations. The disadvantages of bland appear­
ance and increased energy requirement to illuminate
the whole area to the same illumination level are
outweighed by the functional requirement for a flexible
lighting system throughout the hfe of the power station.
Localised lighting systems employ an arrangement
of luminaires designed to provide the required service
illuminance on the work areas together with a lower
ihuminance for the other areas provided by 'light spiir.
The layout of locahsed lighting must be co-ordinated
whh the equipment and task positions. The system can
be inflexible and it is essential that correct information
on equipment and task locations is available at the
design stage. The m a g n h u d e and complexity of the
Lighting, heating and small p o w e r systems
design process for a power station means that this
information is often not available at the required
time. The inflexibility of this system of lighting, where
changes to the equipment layout can seriously impair
the efficiency of the lighting, make it unsuitable for
use in the major plant areas of power stations but
it is employed in certain other areas. Power station
control rooms over the last decade, for example, have
utilised contoured lighting schemes to illuminate the
control surfaces of the control desks and the fronts of
control panels, allowing 'light spill' to illuminate other
areas of the control r o o m floor for access purposes.
Local lighting provides illumination only over the
small area occupied by the task and its immediate
surroundings. It is normally associated with a general
hghting system which provides sufficient ambient hlu-
mination for staff movement and the performance of
other minor and incidental tasks in the area. This
lighting system is also employed in power stations for
workshops, crane lighting and other areas where high
illuminances are necessary for the task to be under­
taken. Local lighting is frequently provided by lumi­
naires mounted on the work station. A n example is
the crane lighting which, by means of tungsten halogen
lamps in flood lantern luminaires mounted on the
crane, provides instantaneous lighting of the working
surface.
The designer will consider all three lighting systems
(general, localised and local) when planning the hghting
of a power station, and will to some extent utilise all
three systems to provide the most efficient hghting
arrangement for the diversity of tasks and buildings.
One objective that must be considered at the gen­
eral planning stage is the desirability of minimising
the number of different light sources that need to be
stored. The choice of lamp will affect the range of
luminaires available and vice-versa. There is a consi­
derable variety of lamps available to the designer, from
tungsten to gas discharge lamps (including the very
versatile and efficient tubular fluorescent). The require­
ments for lamps are specified in G D C D Standard 32.
The advantages and disadvantages of lamps used for
lighting power station interiors are summarised in
Appendix J.
W h e n selecting a range of suitable lamps, the de­
signer must consider the types of luminaires which are
available and the degree of light control and light
output required.
In the choice of luminaire the designer can exer­
cise a combination of professional judgement, personal
preference and economic analysis. Luminaires in a
power station have to withstand a variety of physical
conditions, such as vibration, moisture, dust, ambient
temperature, general ih-treatment (including theft),
etc. The onus is on the designer to specify safe equip­
ment. C E G B Standards have been produced to as­
sist the designer in specifying the required standard
of equipment. These are G D C D Standards 35, 36
and 37.
589
Cabling Chapter 6

Specialised luminaires are also required for power

stations to warn aircraft or shipping, or to light hostUe
and hazardous environments. These luminaires are
discussed in Section 13.4 of this chapter.
Luminaires may be classified in a number of ways,
the most important being on the basis of their light
distribution since this influences the distribution of
illuminance and the directional effects that will be
achieved. The luminous intensity distribution (or light
distribution) from a source is usually shown graphically
in a polar curve, see Fig 6.150. The curve is produced
by plotting the luminous intensity in a series of direc­
tions within one vertical plane through the source, and
defines the way in which the luminaire controls the
light from the lamp.
The first way to classify the luminaire from hs light
distribution is in terms of the proportion of the total
light output of the luminaire in the upper and lower
hemispheres of the polar curve. A luminaire giving all
or very nearly all of its light downwards is cahed direct, FIG. 6.150 Example of polar curve
and one giving all light upwards indirect. Between these
two extremes the intermediate types are called semi-
direct and semi-indirect. classification. This is a procedure whereby the curve
The fractions of upwards and downwards light ex­ of direct ratio (the proportion of downward light from
pressed as percentages of the total light from the lumi­ the fitting that is directly incident on the working
naire are termed the ßux fractions. The ßux fraction plane) against r o o m index for an actual luminaire is
compared w h h a family of ten hypothetical curves
ratio may also be quoted, although this may be cal­
which cover the whole range of possible downward
culated from the flux fractions, i.e..
concentrations, ranging from the most concentrated to
Upper flux fraction the most widely dispersed (see Fig 6.151). The r o o m
Flux fraction ratio = index is a measure of the proportions of the room;
Lower flux fraction the area, perimeter and height of the fittings. The area
The ratio of the luminous flux from the luminaire between the curves is termed a zone. F r o m the
to that from the lamp is cahed the light output ratio hypothetical curves a family of ten standard zones
(LOR). results, identified by the numbers 1 to 10. The curve
of the actual luminaire will lie within one of these zones
Light from luminaire and the luminaire will then be classified and assigned a
Light output ratio, L O R = BZ number, e.g., BZ5 means the curve lies within zone
Light from lamp
number 5.
The light from the luminaire is the sum of the upwards Manufacturers of luminaires will provide the follow­
and downwards light from the luminaire. It is also ing information on their luminaires:
possible to express the light output ratio in terms of its • British Zonal (BZ) classification.
upwards and downwards components:
• Upward light output ratio.

Upward light output ratio, U L O R • Downward hght output ratio.

Upward hght from luminaire • Luminous area.

Light from lamp

Downward hght output ratio, D L O R
Downward hght from luminaire
Light from lamp
The hght output ratios and flux fractions are important
to the designer because they are involved in assessing the
level of glare associated w h h a luminaire.
The second way of classifying luminaires according
to their light distribution is the Brhish Zonal (BZ)
The luminous area is the area of the luminous part of
the luminaire as seen from vertically beneath it.
The manufacturers may also quote the upper and
lower flux fractions or flux fraction ratio, though these
may be calculated from the output ratios. These
characteristics of the luminaire enable the designer to
determine at the general planning stage the glare indices,
the acceptable luminaires and surface reflectances, and
the utilisation factor.
Glare occurs whenever one part of an interior is much
brighter than the general brightness in the interior.

590

0.6 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
0.8 1.25
ROOM INDEX
FIG. 6 . 1 5 1 Graph of direct ratio against room index
Glare can have two effects; h can impair vision, in
which case it is called disability glare and h can cause
discomfort in carrying out the visual task, this is called
discomfort glare. A n important distinction is that
between direct glare caused by the primary sources,
the lamps and luminaries, and indirect glare due t o
secondary sources, surfaces which are t o o bright or
the reflections of the primary source from the glossy
materials.
Indirect glare usually depends o n elements in the
interior, wall and ceihng finishes, equipment surfaces
and the general decoration, which are normally outside
the control of the hghting designer.
A practical system adopted by the C E G B for the
numerical evaluation of direct glare is the l E S glare
index system. This system for artificial hghting in­
stallations sets out a procedure for the evaluation of
glare discomfort based on the four factors which most
Lighting, heating a n d small p o w e r systems
affect it, the brightness of the source (Bs), the bright­
ness of the background (Bb), the apparent size of
the source (a solid angle ω) and the position of the
source in relation to the direction in which the eyes
are looking (represented by an index, p).
The relationship between the direct glare index and
these factors is:
Glare index =
0.8
ω
10 log 10 0.5 X constant Σ B J ' ^ ,1.6
Bb
T h e implementation of the l E S glare index system is
fully discussed in speciahst design manuals such as the
Electricity Council's Interior Lighting Design Manual
and the CIBS C o d e for Interior Lighting,
The utihsation factor (UF) for a luminaire is a
measure of the efficiency with which light from the
lamp is used for illuminating the working plane, i.e.,
the luminous flux which reaches the working plane
expressed as a ratio of the luminous flux emitted by
the l a m p .
Although utilisation factors can be calculated by the
designer (refer to CIBS Technical M e m o r a n d u m N o 5),
most manufacturers pubhsh UFs for standard condi­
tions for their luminaires. It should be noted that a
range of UFs are normally quoted for each luminaire
type. The range of factors is dependent on the effi­
ciency, distribution and spacing of the luminaires, as
well as the r o o m proportions and reflectances of the
r o o m surfaces.
F r o m the U F s , luminaires can be ranked in order of
the installed efficacy they provide so t h a t the most ef­
ficient luminaire, capable of meeting the other require­
ments, may be selected. However, the designer must
remember that the luminaire with the highest installed
efficacy may not offer the highest operating efficacy.
A n aspect that should be considered at the general
planning stage is the maintenance of the installation.
Lighting systems must be serviced regularly and this
must be ahowed for at the design stage. The ease with
which luminaires can be installed a n d maintained wih
affect the overall economics and convenience of the
scheme.
The most powerful constraints on any design are
financial. T h e designer must consider the instahation
and operating costs and be satisfied that the proposed
scheme is a sound economic proposition. Scheme
economics are difficuh t o judge in absolute terms and
for this reason comparisons are normally used. The cost
of owning and operating an installation is conveniently
divided into 'capital' and 'operating' costs as foHows:
• Capital costs: lamps, luminaires and associated
equipment, instahation and cabling.
« Operating costs: energy costs, lamp replacement costs
(including labour) and maintenance costs.
591
Cabling
The capital cost and operating cost must be scrutinised
and controhed at all stages of the design process.
It is common practice in the design of power station
lighting schemes to carry out a simple economic com­
parison, at the general planning stage, to assess the
most economical selection of lamps and luminaires.
To make this comparison, the fittings are assumed
to illuminate a large unobstructed area. In calculating
the overah cost per lumen of various light fittings cer­
tain other assumptions are made:
• Calculations of lamp costs are not based on the
*rated average life' of the lamps as given by the
lamp manufacturers, but on the time taken for 20^o
of the installed lamps to fail, or the time taken for
lumen output to fah to 7 0 % of the inhial output,
whichever is the shorter. This corresponds to the
usual maintenance programme.
• Longer hfe figures result from the above assumption
but the output figures used in the hghting design
are lowered. For the purposes of the design cal­
culation, the figures for lighting design lumens are
taken to be 8 0 % of initial lumen output, with the
exception of high pressure sodium (SON) lamps
where a figure of 8 5 % is used.
• The figures for initial lumen output are the mean
values of manufacturers' published figures. The rea­
son for this is that at the general planning stage the
suppher is u n k n o w n .
The cost comparison is as fohows:
X + Y + Ζ
Total cost per lumen =
A X Β
where X = the capital cost
Y = the energy cost
Ζ = the lamp replacement cost
A = the basic downward light output ratio
of luminaire
Β = lighting design lumens of lamp
Total capital cost (X) =
(Cost per lamp) -f- (Cost per luminaire)
+ (Overall erection cost of each luminaire)
The overall erection cost for each luminaire is the
sum of the cabling cost (including material, installa­
tion and cleating), the cable glanding and terminating
cost, and cost of erecting the luminaire.
Energy cost (Y) =
(Total circuh power) χ (Caphahsed cost)
The capitahsed cost is expressed in £ / k W .
592
Chapter 6
L a m p replacement cost (Z)
Design life of installation (lamp cost + labour)
Ζ =
Lamp life
This simple calculation allows the designer to place
the various lamp/luminaire combinations in order of
their economic cost per lumen.
Before leaving the general planning stage it may
be helpful to list, together with the reasons for their
choice, some examples of the typical fittings used on
recent conventional and nuclear power stations. The
following hst is by no means comprehensive, nor is it
intended as a mandatory list of equipment for power
station hghting systems.
High bay applications Gas discharge lamps (mercury
and sodium) in high bay reflectors are preferred to
fluorescent tubes and tungsten lamps for high bay
apphcations. The 1000 W SON lamp is the most suitable
because of its low cost per lumen, and because large
a m o u n t s of hght can be provided from a relatively
small number of sources. This resuhs in a saving in
the capital and running costs, and also a reduction in
the maintenance costs. Wherever possible, particularly
in the turbine hall, the fittings are suspended from
chains at a height that facilitates maintenance from
the crane platform, thereby removing the necessity to
use scaffolding.
Plant areas The problems in the lighting of plant areas
are caused by the fact that there can be a multiplicity
of different size areas, mounting heights, obstructions,
operating conditions and access difficulties. It is ad­
vantageous in plant areas to use the minimum number
of fittings, i.e., to use high hght-output sources (whh
due regard to glare), and to punch the light from
distant positions to those areas where it is required.
The positions of these fittings is chosen for ease of
access. The use of directional luminaires introduces
flexibihty and permits alteration of the lighting scheme
with the minimum of alteration to the source-t)Ositions
should there be significant changes in plant size or
layout.
Although h is difficult to make a general rule to
use one particular lamp and luminaire, it is sensible
to provide as much light as possible with one type of
fitting. The fittings selected for this task are 400 W
(preferably) or 250 W SON discharge lamps in direc­
tional projector luminaires. In areas where it is not
possible to provide illumination from distant positions,
1800 m m fluorescent fittings are used because they
may be positioned at low mounting heights.
Low headroom applications (switchrooms, meter rooms,
relay rooms, telecommunication rooms, compressor
rooms, etc.) In switchrooms and rooms whh low equip­
ment mounting heights (except cable tunnels and cable
 Lighting, heating and small p o w e r systems

flats) fluorescent fittings are used. T o reduce stores U F = utilisation factor of the luminaire in the
requirements, the 1800 m m fitting has been selected room
to be comparable with the fittings used in the plant M F = maintenance factor
areas.

The formula can be rearranged to permit the calculation

Access ways, stairways, cable tunnels, cable flats, etc.
These areas by their very nature are small and subject
to rough treatment. The fittings are required to be
suitable for low mounting heights and must be of a
robust construction. Low power bulkhead fittings meet
both these requirements and, additionally, experience
has proved that they are less likely to be misappro­
priated. For these reasons bulkhead fittings are pre­
ferred to 1800 m m fluorescent fittings.
In summary the four types of fitting described here,
high bay reflectors, directional projectors, 1800 m m
fluorescent fittings and bulkhead fittings form the
mainstay of fittings for power station lighting systems.
13.2.4 Detailed planning
When the general planning has been completed, de­
tailed calculations are required to determine such things
as the number of luminaires, the glare index, the
final costs, etc. The designer may find at the detailed
planning stage, due to the large number of variables
associated with the design of lighting systems, that the
proposals resulting from the general planning are
unsatisfactory in some regard. The design has to be
refined by an iterative procedure as part of the detailed
design process.
The starting point for the detailed interior light­
ing design of a power station is to determine the
number of luminaires required to achieve a specified
illuminance, i.e., the levels of illumination given in
C E G B , G D C D Standard 3 1 . The calculation of average
illuminance is performed using the 'lumen method'
formula. Until recently, the procedure adopted was to
ahow for deterioration of the installadon throughout
its operating hfe. This was done by introducing a
maintenance factor (MF) to represent the effect of
dirt depreciation and by using the lighting design lumen
(LDL) figures, rather than initial lumen figures, to
represent lamp depreciation. The L D L figure is a no­
minal value which is representative of the average light
output of each type or size of lamp throughout its
hfe. Using this approach the equation for calculating
the average illuminance is:
F x n x N x U F x M F
Ε =
of the number of luminaires required to achieve the
specified illuminance:
EA
Ν =
F X η X UF X MF
As stated previously, the room proportions influence
the utilisation factors (UF). The absolute values of
r o o m dimensions are not important, it is the relation­
ship between area, perimeter and height of the light
source that matters. The r o o m index is a measure of
the proportions of the r o o m :
LW
R o o m index =
(L + W) Hm
where L = the length of the r o o m
W = the width of the room
H m = the mounting height of luminaires
above the working plane
Let us now consider a typical example using the pre­
ceding lumen method of calculation to determine the
number of high bay SON fittings required to ihumi-
nate the main turbine hall of a power station. The
required illumination level from G D C D Standard 31
is 200 lux. The turbine hall dimensions are 130 m χ
62 m with the light fittings m o u n t e d 28 m above the
operating floor level. The lamps selected are 1000 W
SON in high bay luminaires.
Lighting design lumens of lamp = 102 000
Downward light output ratio, D L O R = 7 2 %
130 X 62
R o o m index =
(130 + 62) 28
= 1.5
The ceiling and wall reflectances in the turbine hall are
0.3 and 0.1 respectively. F r o m the tables of utihsation
factors calculated using the BZ method described in
CIBS Technical M e m o r a n d u m 5, the U F is 0.55. A
maintenance factor of 0.8 is used.

200 X (130 X 62)

where Ε = illuminance, lux N u m b e r of fittings, Ν =
102 000 X 0.55 X 0.8
F = lighting design lumens of the light source
η = number of lamps per luminaire = 36

Ν = number of luminaires T o achieve an acceptable uniformity of illuminance,

A = area to be ht, m^ the spacing between centres of luminaires (in either

593
Cabling
direction) divided by the mounting height must not
exceed the maximum spacing/height RATIO quoted by
the manufacturers for their luminaires (i.e., fitting
spacing/height ratio < maximum spacing/height ratio).
If this ratio is exceeded in either direction the illumi­
nance will be unacceptably patchy.
The maximum spacing/height ratio for the high
bay luminaires is 1:1. W h h the luminaires arranged
as shown in Fig 6.152 the spacing/height ratio =
15.5/28 = 0.5:1 < maximum spacing/height ratio.
The procedure of adopting a maintenance factor of
0.8, or whatever other figure seemed appropriate for
the situation, is increasingly being abandoned because
it gives only a single estimate of the illuminance that
wih be provided by the installation. The C E G B is
considering the adoption of the light loss factor used
by the CIBS, which represents the total light depre­
ciation at a given time compared to the figure when
the installation was brand new and in pristine con-
dhion. The hght loss factor is the product of three
other factors, namely:
• The lamp lumen maintenance factor (LLMF) esti­
mates the decline in light output of the light source
over a specified time.
• Luminaire maintenance factor (LMF) estimates the
effect of dirt deposited on or in the luminaire over
a set time on the light output of the luminaire.
• R o o m surface maintenance factor (RSMF) estimates
the effect of dirt deposited on the r o o m surfaces
over a set time on the illuminance produced by the
instahation, so:
light loss factor = L L M F χ L M F χ
A detailed consideration of this data enables a realis­
tic maintenance factor to be established. By calculat­
ing the hght loss factor for different times and taking
into account the proposed maintenance schedule, it
is possible to predict the pattern of illuminance that
will be produced by the installation over time (see
Fig 6.153). This pattern can be used to estimate the
7.75m
T"
15.5m
-^-^—ψ—^"Η^'
ι ι ι ι
/
/ through an angle of θ from this position, the general
< ^
\/ \/ \U \ί/ \/_ \/ NJ/
'7^ τρ^ 7^ 7^
FIG. 6.152 Arrangement of luminaires in turbine hall
594
Chapter 6
average illuminance provided by the instahation over
time, and hence to determine whether the installation
is hkely to meet the appropriate design service illu­
mination recommended in G D C D Standard 3 1 .
Substituting L L F for M F in the lumen method for­
mula, the average illuminance on the working plane
(x) is given by:
F X η X Ν X LLF χ UF(x)
E(x) =
A(x)
where E(x) = average illuminance on working plane,
lux
F = the initial illuminous flux of the l a m p ,
lumen
η = number of lamps per luminaire
Ν = the number of luminaires
LLF = the light loss factor
UF(x) = the utilisation factor of the working
plane
A(x) = the area of the working plane, m^
The lumen method applies only to regular arrays of
luminaires. In the case of directional projector lumi­
naires used in power station plant areas and other ir­
regular layouts the calculation of average illuminance
can be inadequate or meaningless. For these arrange­
ments it is necessary to calculate the illuminance at
all points of interest due to the individual luminaires.
Various means of calculating the direct ihuminance
are available, ranging from laborious h a n d calculations
RSMF to more sophisticated computer m e t h o d s . The illumi­
nance at a point due to direct light (i.e., ignoring any
reflected light) can be calculated by the inverse square
law (see Fig 6.154 (a)):
I
Ε =
"¡2"
where Ε illuminance on a plane perpendicular t o
incident light, lux
I the luminous intensity of the source in the
relevant direction, cd
d distance
Referring to Fig 6.154(b), if the surface is turned
ι
> relationship becomes:
Ε = (I/d2)cos θ
\U NU
It is often more convenient in practice to measure
the height of the source (H) and the horizontal distance
away (D). The general formula m a y be expressed in
these terms as foHows:
 Lighting, heating and small p o w e r systems

YEARS ON ASSUMED 3000 HOURS USE PER YEAR

1 2

70 CLEANED TWICE A YEAR

AND LAMP RENEWED
62 CLEANED ONCE A YEAR
AND LAMP RENEWED
55 CLEANED TWICE A YEAR
AND ORIGINAL LAMP
50 Η 5"l CLEANED ONCE A YEAR
PERCENT OF AND ORIGINAL LAMP
INITIAL ILLUMINANCE

HOURS OF USE

FIG. 6.153 Changes in illuminance with time for different maintenance schedules

The above formulae assume that the luminaire can

be considered as a 'point' source, i.e., the source is
small compared with the distance between it and the
point of illumination. A luminaire can be considered
(a)
as a point source if its largest dimension is less than
a fifth of the distance from it to the point being illu­
minated. W h e n this is not the case, the calculation
must be modified. Similar formulae exist for 'line' and
'area' sources, and are fully described in speciahst design
manuals such as the CIBS Code for Interior Lighting.
C o m p u t e r s , with suitable software, are ideal for per­
forming the considerable number of calculations in­
volved in determining the illuminance at all points of
interest. However, h a n d calculations when used with
discretion, yield sufficient information to allow the
design of the hghting installation to proceed.
Having designed the installation to provide the cor­
rect levels of illumination with an acceptable level of
glare, the designer will perform a detailed cost com­
parison of the final installation to confirm the conclu­
sion of the economic assessment carried out at the
general planning stage.

13.2.5 Appraisal
FIG. 6.154 The calculation of illuminance due to
direct light The final step in the design of a lighting installation
is t o undertake an appraisal of the system following
its completion. In addition to the subjective assess­
Eh = I/(D2 + H 2 ) cos θ or (I cos^ β)/Η^ ment m a d e by the designer, a photometric survey of
the lighting conditions achieved by the installation
should be performed and the results compared with
similarly
the quanthative elements of the design specification
(e.g., levels of illumination). If h is found that the
En = I/(D2 + H 2 ) or (I cos2 Θ ) / Η 2
final installation does not meet the specified levels
of illumination the installation can be modified to
Εν = I/(D2 + H 2 ) sin θ or (I cos^ θ sin Θ)/Η^ provide additional light fittings. The importance of

595
Cabling
undertaking such an appraisal is that not only does
it provide reassurance that any deficiencies wih be
discovered and rectified, but it also completes the de­
sign function by providing feedback on the installation
for the benefit of future designs.
13.3 Emergency lighting systems
The Fire Precautions Act, 1971 and the Health and
Safety at Work Act of 1974 make it obligatory to pro­
vide adequate means of escape in all places of work
and pubhc resort. Emergency lighting is an essential
part of this requirement. The C E G B has always re­
cognised the need to provide personnel escape lighting
to ensure safe and effective evacuation of buildings
in the event of failure of the main A C lighting for
whatever reason. All power station lighting systems
incorporate personnel escape lighting systems that are
either continuously energised or energised immediately
on loss of the main A C lighting, so that some form
of exit lighting is always available.
Certain areas of nuclear power stations cannot be
evacuated immediately in the event of an emergency
or loss of A C grid supphes. The nuclear reactors of
these stations must be shut down safely and monitored
to prevent risk to life. To assist in the operation of
the essential safety-related equipment on nuclear power
stations two additional emergency lighting systems are
provided.
The first is called the emergency operational lighting.
This system, in common with the personnel escape
lighting, is a battery-supported system that is contin­
uously energised, or energised immediately on loss of
the main A C lighting. It is required to maintain the
effectiveness of the control room and other selected
operational areas.
The second system is called the essential opera­
tional lighting. With this system a selected number
of the normal A C light fittings are supplied from a
diesel-generator supported power supply. The essential
operational hghting takes over from the emergency
operational lighting to provide the long term lighting
in the control room and other areas containing safety-
related equipment. The essential operational lighting
system is more efficient than the emergency opera­
tional lighting system, and provides an enhanced level
of illumination to enable the operators to carry out
the long term safety duties on loss of the main A C
lighting. These two diverse hghting systems ensure that
some operational hghting is always available following
loss of the main A C lighting supplies. The diesel-
generators used to supply this hghting are the same
diesel-generators that supply the essential safety equip­
ment. On loss of the normal grid supplies these dieseis
are started automaticahy, and supplies are restored to
the essential loads and the essential operational hghting.
Although the essential operational hghting is not di­
rectly safety-related it is designed and qualified to the
596
Chapter 6
same standard as the essential plant it is required
to illuminate. T o achieve this, segregated seismically-
qualified lighting systems are provided to guarantee
some functional lighting following a seismic disturb­
ance. The segregation requirements for electrical equip­
ment are given in Section 2.1 of this chapter.
The five-stage design process adopted for the de­
sign of the main A C hghting (objectives, specification,
general planning, detailed planning and appraisal) is
equally valid for the design of the emergency hghting
system.
The personnel escape lighting is designed to provide
a normal illuminance of 5 lux along the centre line of
a clearly defined escape route for a minimum period
of 30 minutes. This enables all areas of the station to
be evacuated if necessary. The luminaires are located
near each exit and at points where it is necessary to
emphasise the position of potential hazards, such as
changes of direction, staircases, changes of floor level,
etc.
The alternative lighting arrangements considered by
the C E G B for the battery-supported emergency lighting
systems range from the traditional independent D C
system with a centrahsed battery to the self-contained
A C fitting where the individual luminaire incorporates
the battery, charger and inverter. The self-contained
luminaires are self-powered and operate independently
from their own batteries in an emergency. T h u s , al­
though individual luminaries may be destroyed in a
fire, the remaining luminaires will be unaffected.
Self-contained luminaires are the easiest and most
flexible to install but their effective hfe (i.e., replace­
ment of integral battery, a n d / o r fitting) is less than
that of a centralised battery scheme. Also, maintenance
and testing of self-contained luminaires is more in­
volved and must be thorough if operation in the event
of emergency is to be guaranteed. The initial attrac­
tions of this system of ease and flexibility of installa­
tion are outweighed by the cost and maintenance
difficulties involved in implementing such a system on
a power station. In almost all cases, with the exception
of the control r o o m , the independent D C system with
centralised batteries has been adopted for the person­
nel escape lighting. It has also been used for the
emergency operational lighting on recent A G R nuclear
stations. In this system, D C lamps (tungsten or tungsten
halogen) are fed from D C distribution boards which,
in turn, are supphed via D C contactors from a central
battery (see Fig 6.155).
Because tungsten and tungsten halogen lamps have
a relatively poor operating life, the independent D C
system is de-energised under normal operating condi­
tions. It is therefore necessary to arrange for the D C
emergency lights to be switched on automatically when
the main A C lighting is lost. A low vohage relay
monitors the three-phase supply to the A C distribution.
When the relay detects that the A C supply has been
lost or fallen to an unacceptable value for half a cycle,
the D C contactor closes automatically energising the

415V STATION BOARD
FUSED
SWITCH
0
O vided with 5 0 % of the emergency fluorescent tubes
LOW VOLTAGE
RELAY
AC DISTRIBUTION
BOARD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
FIG. 6 . 1 5 5 Independent D C emergency lighting system
D C lights within half a second. A timer is provided
on the low voltage relay to cater for the re-strike time
associated with discharge lamps. The timer delays the
opening of the D C contactor on restoration of the
A C supply until the A C lighting has returned. Dupli­
cate batteries and chargers are provided to prevent a
single fault, including a fire, causing the loss of all
the escape lighting.
Centralised batteries are used for other D C systems
(control, switchgear closing and tripping) and the main­
tenance procedures for such batteries also apply t o the
emergency lighting batteries and chargers (see Chapter
9 'Emergency supply equipment').
Although the independent D C system has always
been regarded as uncomplicated and economic, it does
have the disadvantage of requiring D C contactors and
low voltage relays at each distribution centre. Also
D C hght fittings, which are inefficient, are required
in addition to the normal A C light fittings. A future
development that is being considered for power station
D C lighting systems is a hybrid of the independent
D C system and the self-contained luminaire system.
In this system, continuously-energised A C fittings with
integral inverters are supplied from centralised battery
systems, thus combining the efficiency of A C fluores­
cent fittings with the advantages of a centralised
battery. The system is continuously energised and
therefore contributes to the illumination level provided
by the main A C system. However, before this system
can be adopted for use as the emergency lighting on
power stations, a detailed study of the reliability of
the integral inverters must be performed to ensure
that the reliability of the new system is equal to that
of the existing systems.
Lighting, heating a n d small p o w e r systems
In order to achieve an efficient, aesthetically-con­
toured (i.e., light fittings arranged t o follow the hne
DC SOURCE of desks and panels) lighting scheme in the control
r o o m , emergency operational lighting is provided by
supplying the centre A C fluorescent tubes of the special
FUSED
SWITCH recessed fittings via dedicated inverters from a battery-
backed source. A duphcate feeder arrangement is pro­
connected to each feeder. T h e lamps are interlaced and
supplied from alternate emergency A C distribution
DC CONTACTOR centres to guard against a single fault, such as failure
of an inverter or charger, rendering sections of the
control r o o m inoperative. The personnel escape lighting
DC DISTRIBUTION
in the control r o o m is provided by 'light spih' from
BOARD
the emergency operational lighting.
13.4 Lighting of special areas
The lighting of some areas within a power station
requires special consideration, either because these
INDEPENDENT
LAMP areas are hostile and hazardous, or the luminaires used
11 are unique to a particular apphcation.
13.4.1 Battery rooms and chlorination plant
rooms
The luminaires used in these areas are corrosion proof
to Section 8.1 of C E G B Standard 127304. T o prevent
the possibihty of hydrogen being trapped adjacent to
ceiling-mounted luminaires, luminaires in battery rooms
are suspended on chains from the cehing. The fittings
are arranged so that they are above clear floor areas
and not suspended directly above the battery cells. The
switches and sockets are mounted outside the r o o m .
13.4.2 Hydrogen plant (Division 1 and Division 2
areas)
The choice of lamps a n d luminaires for these areas
is either SON lamps in directional reflectors for the
main A C lighting with tungsten lamps in bulkhead
luminaires for the emergency lighting, or fluorescent
tubes in Division 1 or Division 2 luminaires for the
main A C lighting and tungsten lamps in wellglass
luminaires (Division 1 or Division 2) for emergency
hghdng.
The choice of fittings is twofold because there are
two alternative methods of ihuminating a Division 1
or Division 2 area:
• By locating n o fittings inside the area itself, but pro­
viding the light from conventional lamps and lumi­
naires through sealed and toughened glass windows.
• By using special fittings located at low level inside the
area itself. These fittings must comply with BS4683:
'Electrical apparatus for explosive atmospheres'.
In selecting a suitable lighting system for these explo­
sive areas, the design must comply with the require-
597
Cabling
ments of CIBS lighting guide for ^Hostile and hazard­
ous environments'.
13.4.3 Central control rooms
The lighting scheme in power station central control
rooms (CCR) incorporates recessed air handling fittings
using 1800 m m warm white fluorescent tubes. The fit­
tings are recessed to eliminate glare (either direct or
reflected) from control surfaces including indicator
glasses.
The fittings are positioned to enable the lamps to be
changed and the fittings maintained while the plant is
running.
Maintenance of the control room lighting is effected
from below without the use of staging or elaborate
access facilities. N o light fitting is positioned over a
control desk.
The recommended configurations for various areas
are:
• Panel vertical surfaces (front) A continuous row of
luminaires following the contour of the panels and
positioned so that there is no specular glare reflected
by the pohshed surfaces of the panels from the
luminaire controlling the light directly onto the panel
vertical surfaces.
• Control desks The recessed luminaires are placed
in a continuous line parallel to the main axes of
the desks (normally square horseshoe-shaped). They
are positioned so that there is no specular glare to
affect a seated or standing operator at the desks.
• Behind the panels A continuous row of luminaires
is provided which fohows the contour of the panels.
Variable illuminance by means of thyristor or switched
controlled dimmers is provided to meet the varying
needs of the personnel working in the control r o o m ,
particularly the unit control areas. Care is taken to
ensure that the minimum levels of illumination speci­
fied for the control room are always maintained.
13.4.4 H a z a r d w a r n i n g lights
To meet the requirements of the Department of Trade
and Industry and the Ministry of Defence, aircraft
obstruction hghting is provided on all obstructions
(e.g., chimneys and cooling towers) having a height
of 153 m or more above ground level at the site
of the obstruction. The warning lights are occulting
lights with a special light distribution and a particu­
lar mounting arrangement. The requirements of the
Department of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of
Defence and the construction and mounting arrange­
ment of the warning lights are all fully specified in
G D C D Standard 34.
In a similar manner, warning hghts are required
to identify hazards to shipping, such as C W outfah
598
Chapter 6
structures. The present requirement for shipping haz­
ard lights is a white flashing light that flashes once
every five seconds. However, the C E G B closely consults
with the relevant P o r t and Docks Authority on the
latest requirements for shipping hazard lights.
13.5 Supplennentary heating and minor
power systems
The minor power supphes (e.g., small ventilation fans,
electrically operated doors, etc., and similar loads up
to 30 A) and ah heating supphes, are taken from the
minor power fuseboard on each distribution centre.
Also, the supply to the 110 V A C power socket fuse-
board is taken from the minor power fuseboard, via a
centre-tapped 415/110 V transformer.
110 V A C socket outlets are provided in plant areas
to supply hand tools, etc., which are used for main­
tenance. By earthing the centre t a p of the 415/110 V
transformer output winding and connecting it also to
the earth terminal of the a p p a r a t u s , the line to earth
voltages are reduced to 55 V while the fuh 110 V supply
is available to power the a p p a r a t u s . As most electric
shocks occur between a live part of an equipment and
earth, this is a major step in the reduction of the
shock risk. The adoption of this system in the con­
struction and mining industries has resuhed in a dra­
matic fah in the number of electrical portable tool
accidents, and it is now being increasingly adopted in
other industries. G D C D Standard 25: T l u g s , socket
outlets and fuse spur units' specifies the requirements
for 110 V sockets for power stations.
In addition to the 110 V A C socket ouflet system, a
system of three-phase 415 V socket outlets is provided
to supply the mobile plant utilised in power stations.
The type of plant envisaged is welding equipment, bolt
heating equipment, etc.
The use of mobile electrical equipment, irrespective
of its size, always introduces additional hazards to a
permanent installation.
These risks can largely be identified with:
• Electric shock from the mobile equipment in the
event of a fault within that equipment.
• Damage to the trailing cable used to connect the
mobile plant to the permanent cabling installation.
Both these risks can be minimised if the correct equip­
ment is chosen both for the remote electrical apparatus
and for the traihng cable, and its connections.
Providing that the conductors utilised are enclosed
within an earthed metallic screen and this screen is
of adequate capacity to carry any fault currents that
could arise from insulation failure of those conduc­
tors, then there is no risk of electrocution from con­
tact w h h the conductors of the installation. Special
consideration must be given, however, to the rise of
 Lighting, heating a n d small p o w e r systems

earth potential of the metalhc screening of the re­ 13.6 Distribution system
mote equipment during the instant that the metal
screening is carrying earth fault current. Protection 13.6.1 General
against rise of earth potential on the casing of the
T o illuminate a volume of space, that space can be
portable apphance can be afforded by overcurrent
divided into overlapping spheres, with a fuseboard at
devices such as fuses, or residual current devices in
the centre of each sphere. The cables radiate from the
the form of current operated earth leakage circuh-
fuseboard, and the radius of each sphere is the maxi­
breaker s. Following investigations by the C E G B into
m u m economic length of the cables. The centre of each
the possible fault clearance times associated with H B C
sphere is k n o w n as the 'load centre'.
fuses, the 415 V socket outlets now incorporate re­
W h h the large size of hghting and minor power
sidual current protection devices. The device is spe­
systems in power stations, the aim of this principle
cified to have a tripping current of not greater t h a n
is to achieve an economic design of the distribution
30 m A with an operating time not exceeding 30 m s .
system and reduction in maintenance by reducing the
The fuh specification for the *415 V A C fused and
number of spheres, and therefore fuseboards, to a
swhched socket outlets (incorporating residual current
m i n i m u m by fully utilising the capacity of fuseboards
protection)' is given in G D C D Standard 238.
and cables.
The heating of the main areas within a power station
In general, areas requiring hghting, minor power
is provided for by the main heating, ventilating and air-
supplies and 110 V power socket outlets are supplied
conditioning (HVAC) system. Supplementary electric
from 'distribution centres'. Areas that d o not warrant
heating is provided in areas where h is uneconomic or
distribution centres, i.e., areas containing lighting only,
impractical to provide a comprehensive H V A C system.
are supplied from distribution fuseboards. However,
The supplementary heating is designed in accordance
when considering the case for distribution fuseboard
with design m e m o r a n d u m 0 7 4 / 4 . This design m e m o ­
versus distribution centre, account must be taken of
r a n d u m gives details of various heating methods avah­
the number of main feeders that wih be required and
able, and the temperature and humidity levels to be
whether main supplies wih be derived from a swhch-
achieved.
b o a r d or distribution b o a r d . Lighting circuitry should
The three types of heaters previously specified for be utilised to the m a x i m u m and therefore all hghting
use on power stations are: circuhs should be fused wherever possible at 30 A .
However, there may be certain lighting and minor
• In switchrooms and other areas with low rates of
power circuits requiring fuses rated at less than 30 A .
change of air, where the air is to prevent conden­
The m a x i m u m economical cable lengths from fuse-
sation, tubular heaters of the type that limit their
b o a r d to fitting are dependent u p o n the v o h d r o p in
surface temperature should be used. Control is by
the cable under starting and running conditions, and
means of thermostat a n d / o r humidistat devices, de­
the fuse size protecting the cables.
pending on the situation and building construction.

• In rooms with very large volumes, it may be im­ 13.6.2 Isolation and switching of individual
practical to use the above tubular heaters because
fittings
of the large quantities involved. T o achieve the heat­
ing levels specified in design m e m o r a n d u m 0 7 4 / 4 , Lighting in plant areas is utilised for three basic
fan heaters may be considered for the purpose. purposes, namely:
Again, control is by means of thermostat a n d / o r • Access.
humidistat devices, depending on the shuation and
building construction. • Inspection.

• In areas where comfort of personnel is required,
but where space heating is impractical (e.g., semi-
open work areas such as garages), radiant heaters
of the infra-red type may be used. It is essential
that the manufacturer's installation instructions for
these heaters are strictly adhered t o , particularly
concerning mounting height and coverage. T h e r m o ­
static control is difficult with this form of heating
and care must be taken regarding the positioning
of the thermostats.
Supphes for supplementary heating systems are taken
from the minor power fuseboards on each distribution
centre.
• Maintenance.
Traditionally, where it is necessary t o provide a high
level of lighting for maintenance, temporary lighting
is used. In the past, access and inspection have not
been differentiated but have b o t h been covered in the
normal permanent lighting scheme. However, bearing
in mind the current high cost of energy it has been
decided on recent projects, where possible, t o split
these two requirements and to provide separate hghting
sub-circuits for 'access' and 'inspection' lighting.
Therefore, in those areas where this scheme can
be practically and economically used, two A C hghting
distribution fuseboards are provided at each load cen­
tre, one designated 'access' and one 'inspection'. The

599
Cabling
'access' lighting is left permanently switched on, and
the 'inspection' lighting switched when required by
means of a contactor controlled by a switch adjacent
to the plant covered by that load centre.
'Access' lighting basically covers walkways and exits
to allow free and safe movement around items of plant,
and utilises approximately 5 0 % of the total comple­
ment of fittings. 'Inspection' lighting uses the remaining
fittings and provides supplementary illumination cover­
ing plant items.
Because of the nature of the rooms in which fluo­
rescent tubes are used, it is not necessary in some cases
(e.g., switchrooms, relay rooms, offices, etc.) to pro­
vide illumination at all times. Therefore switches are
provided in the sub-circuits to give a simple and flexi­
ble arrangment. Switches are 15 A, single-pole, to
BS3676: 'Switches for domestic and similar purposes'.
Switches are positioned at each entrance to each area
with 2-way and intermediate switching as required.
In 'industrial' areas, switches are of galvanised steel
and surface-mounted. In areas where a 'fair finish'
is required, switches are of satin chrome plate and
flush-mounted.
Current switching capacity is the maximum steady
current which may be interrupted, or prospective cur­
rent which may be made, with a purely resistive (non-
reactive) load. Loads, other than of a purely resistive
nature, invariably require derating if working life and,
in some cases, safe working are to be maintained. An
inductive load may cause high voltage and current
surges as the magnetic flux collapses. Such voltage
surges may cause flashover and damage to insulation.
Therefore, for inductive (fluorescent) loads, suitable
switches are always specified.
13.6.3 AC supplies
An area of plant (e.g., turbine hall) wih be divided for
the purposes of lighting, heating and minor power
system into zones.
Situated as near as possible to the 'load centre' of
each zone will be a group of distribution fuseboards
known as the 'distribution centre'. Each A C distribution
centre is designed to be either floor or wall/column
mounted and includes the following:
• One distribution fuseboard for the continuously
energised lighting. In the areas where switched light­
ing is to be provided, one distribution fuseboard
for 'access' lights and one distribution fuseboard
for 'inspection' hghts is required. The inspection
fuseboard should be fed via a contactor controHed
by a switch located adjacent to the plant covered by
the corresponding lamps.
• One distribution fuseboard for minor power supphes.
• One sphtter box, to splh the incoming cable to feed
the lighting fuseboard(s) and the minor power fuse-
board.
600
Chapter 6
• One distribution fuseboard for power sockets.
• One 415 V / 1 1 0 V A C transformer fed from the
minor power fuseboard, supplying the 110 V A C
power socket fuseboard.
A lamp characteristic which should be considered when
planning the main A C lighting distribution system is
the stroboscopic effect. The stroboscopic effect is an
illusion which makes a moving object appear stationary,
or moving in a different manner from that which it
is in fact moving. Ah lamps operating on alternating
current exhibit some degree of cyclic variation of light
output. It is most significant with discharge lamps
which do not employ a phosphor coating. The problem
can normally be reduced, or eliminated, by having
alternate rows of luminaires fed by different phases
of the supply, ensuring that critical areas containing
unguarded moving machinery receive illumination in
roughly equal proportion from each phase.
13.6.4 DC supplies
Each area covered by the D C battery-backed emergency
lighting scheme is divided into the same zones as the
corresponding A C supplies. A D C distribution centre
provides the emergency lighting in that zone. The D C
distribution centre is separated from the A C distribu­
tion centre to avoid loss of D C supplies in the event
of a fire at the A C distribution centre. The D C dis­
tribution centres comprise the following:
• One distribution fuseboard for personnel escape and
emergency operational lighting.
• An automatic low voltage relay with a manual over­
ride, accommodating a three-phase feed from the
associated A C lighting distribution fuseboard. Where
'access' and 'inspection' fuseboards are instahed, the
three-phase feed shall be from the 'access' distribu­
tion b o a r d .
• One timer hnked to the low voltage relay. One D C
contactor operated by the low vohage relay in the
D C distribution centre.
13.6.5 Cabling
The majority of the cables used for the lighting, heating
and minor power systems of modern power stations
are of the armoured type described in Section 5.4 of
this chapter. This method of cabling is compatible with
the main station cabling and is less labour intensive
to install than conduit and trunking. However there
are exceptions to this, for example, where circuits have
to be run buried in plaster to give a 'fair finish', or
in areas where a muhiplicity of terminations is re­
quired. In these cases trunking and c o n d u h may be
more economical than armoured cables.
The A C supply cable to any one A C distribution
centre from its switchboard is designed to be segre-
 Design a n d m a n a g e m e n t techniques

gated from the D C supply cable to the D C distribution 14.2 Planning

centre associated with that one zone. The segregation
An essential element in the planning process is a sys­
is Class II in a c c o r d a n c e with the segregation
tem index, a document which lists every activity whhin
requirements discussed in Section 2.1 of this chapter.
the scope of the contract and which is formulated over
This is required to prevent a single fault (fire, missile
the design period of the station. As items of plant
damage, etc.) causing the loss of both the A C and
are added to the station design and areas of work
D C hghting in any zone.
become apparent, these items are added to the system
index.
Complex systems are broken down into subsystems
14 Design and management techniques and groups and it is essential that a suitable number­
ing system be adopted. Computers are used for moni­
14.1 Introduction toring and control of information and it is therefore
important that the system numbering be compatible
The total design and installation process for a cable with the chosen data-handling computer programs.
system is illustrated on the flow chart shown in Fig Installation and commissioning dates are established
6.156. It comprises essentially three phases of work, a
for each individual system. These dates must be flexi­
design phase, an information issue phase and an
ble and capable of change in order to evolve the final
instahation phase. The quantity of work is very large
p r o g r a m m e of the station. The dates should primarily
for each phase, involving many m a n years of effort.
be derived from the commissioning programme and,
The three phases are continuous over periods of several
whilst it may not be possible initially to give dates
years for a large power station project and overlap
to the smaller items, a reasonable estimate should be
for most of the time.
given using the commissioning p r o g r a m m e of previous
There is an obvious need for a great deal of detailed
stations as a guide. Alternatively, 'envelope dates' may
planning of all phases of the work and the success
be given t o specific subsystems leaving the appropriate
of the project depends very much on how well this is
groups to be dated as the p r o g r a m m e evolves.
done.
Whilst it will be appreciated that the commissioning
The C E G B undertakes a greater proportion of the
p r o g r a m m e requirements will take priority over all
total cabling task for a new power station than it does
other aspects, before a system is dated consideration
for any other system or equipment. It initiates and
must be given to the question of load resourcing on
undertakes virtually the whole of the design and en­
design and drawing office staff, the cabling contractors
gineering work and issues the detailed working face
management and she labour, the commissioning team
instructions and drawings to the cable installer. It also
and ancillary departments such as quantity surveyors.
plays a large part in organising site installation which
The dated system index is then used t o :
is dependent on other contractors in respect of both
access and programme. • Feed electrical access dates into the civil programme.
The work involved on a major project covers be­
• Feed access dates for cabling into the mechanical
tween 25 000 and 50 000 cables and more than 1 000 000
erection programmes.
wire terminations. Each 'cable' and each 'wire' has
to be uniquely designed and identified to ensure that • Feed termination release dates into the mechanical
electrical plant and control and instrumentation equip­ erection p r o g r a m m e s .
ment functions satisfactorily. The extent of control
• Inform plant manufacturers of the final dates for
and instrumentation has increased considerably on
design information for circuitry on a system basis.
modern power station projects, with a consequent in­
crease in the number of cables and wire connections • Inform the drawing office engaged on the design of
to be made. the cable supporting steelwork grid and the control
To manage the design and execution of the cable pair network.
contract effectively it is essential to have all the or­
ganisations involved working on a c o m m o n basis. T o It will be appreciated that it is usually necessary to
determine the basis it is necessary to consider the inform the CEGB's civil and mechanical contractors
object of the contract and this can be best defined as: of the date by which access a n d / o r termination releases
Completing the works in the contract strictly in ac­ are required, rather t h a n to ask them the date by which
cordance with the commissioning programme of the they expect to have access available.
station and within the approved budget price.
This objective can be made easier to achieve if
the works are allocated strictly to specific items of 14.3 Design
plant, these ahocated packages of works being known
as 'systems'. A system may therefore be defined as: The total design task includes the fohowing elements:
The works necessary to bring any one piece of plant • Provision within the station layout of adequate
to a stage whereby it can be commissioned. accommodation for electrical equipment and cables.

601
Cabling Chapter 6

STATION PLANT AS KNOWN AT TIME

DESIGN
PRODUCE SYSTEM COMMISSIONING
INDEX PROGRAMME

EXAMINE LOADING ON DRAWING OFFICE, ENGINEERS, SITE

DATE SYSTEM INDEX STAFF, CONTRACTOR. ETC AGAINST AVAILABLE RESOURCES
AND RÉDATE SYSTEMS IF NECESSARY

MECHANICAL PLANT ERECTION MECHANICAL PLANT DESIGN

CIVIL PROGRAMME CONTRACTS FOR RELEASE OF DESIGN OF STEELWORK
PROGRAMME FOR ACCESS AND
FOR ACCESS DESIGN INFORMATION GRID AND PAIR NETWORK
TERMINATION RELEASE

1
CIVIL CONTRACTS MECHANICAL CONTRACTS

ENGINEER TO DESIGN SYSTEM

DRAWING OFFICE TO CONVERT SYSTEM

DESIGN INTO CABLES AND ACCESSORIES

QUANTITY SURVEYOR FOR

PREMEASUREMENT

CONTRACTO R TO ORDER
MATE RIALS JOINT CEGB/CONTRACTOR
MANAGEMENT TEAM CALL UP
RESOURCES AND RELEASE SYSTEMS
FOR INSTALLATION

MANUFACTURE AND
DELIVER MATERIALS

ACCESS FOR STEEL AND

CABLE

TERMINATION RELEASE

PRECOMMISSIONING CLEAR DEFECTS

CHECKS

QUANTITY SURVEYOR
POST MEASUREMENT

FIG. 6 . 1 5 6 Design and installation process flow chart

602

• The design of the cable support steelwork.
• T h e a c c u m u l a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n from p l a n t
contractors to establish types, sizes and quantities
of cables.
• Cable system design.
• Electrical circuit design.
• Scheduhng of cables.
• Routing of cables.
• Design clearance of cables, i.e., circuit design com­
pleted and terminations specified for each cable and
core.
14.3.1 Layout
During the initial development of station layout, ca­
ble routes are planned. These are based on estimated
quantities and known major plant locations, i.e.,
switchhouse, control rooms and plant areas. Although
the first consideration in station layout is the econo­
mical disposhion of plant and minimum civil works'
costs, cabling space provision must be adequate and
cabling needs catered for.
The most important of these needs is that the routes
must be available with unobstructed access as early
as possible. This imphes being able to include them
in the early phase of civil construction, with minimum
dependence on steelwork and plant erection. One way
to achieve this is to locate them in basement areas
or tunnels. The ahernative of locating them below
operating floor level, provides an acceptable technical
alternative especially at estuarine stations where tunnels
are costly. It is also important t o provide cable routes
which are as short and simple as possible. T o this
end, basement cable routes, with electrical plant at
ground level, should be designed into the layout.
14.3.2 Cable support systems
Cables are carried on steelwork and trays installed
within major cable routes. T o facilitate design and
manufacture, proprietary systems have been developed,
tested and approved. Provided access is available, the
use of these systems should avoid delays in this area.
14.3.3 Information from plant contractors
The information concerned is of several types, including:
• Details of numbers and ratings of plant h e m s .
• Circuit and wiring diagrams of equipment.
• Termination details.
These various types of information are required at
different times a n d are associated with different phases
of the cabhng design task.
Design and management techniques
A rigid a p p r o a c h is necessary to ensure that design
clearance freeze dates are met by the various con­
tractors so that cable design information flows at the
required time.
14.3.4 Cable systems and electrical circuit design
Cable systems a n d electrical circuit design involves a
tremendous volume of detailed engineering work t o
ensure that each circuh and wire is cabled and con­
nected correctly.
A large n u m b e r of staff is involved. The co­
ordination h a s , therefore, to be very close and re­
sponsibilities have t o be defined clearly t o ensure that
efficient working is maintained and design clearance
achieved to p r o g r a m m e . The introduction of computer-
aided design techniques into drawing offices for the
preparation of all types of electrical diagrams (cover­
ing cable block diagrams, schematic diagrams and loop
diagrams) has assisted greatly in solving resource pro­
blems. Provided that the correct engineering resource
has been allocated at the right time, the rate of design
clearance of cables and systems is dependent on the
progress of t h e engineering in plant contractors' works
and will reflect any plant delays that are occurring.
The development of the CEGB's current design p r o ­
cedures has addressed various difficulties which are
described as fohows:
Electrical circuit design
T h e process of circuit design consists of the working
out of schematics which have then to be converted
into detailed connection diagrams. Sometimes in the
past, n o permanent record of the overall schematic
(or loop diagram) was provided; this led to difficulties
at site during installation a n d commissioning and em­
barrassed station staffs when maintenance, repair or
modification was required. T h e present process for
clearing circuit design and producing final information
for cable connections involves the preparation and
issue of the following information:
(a) System flow diagrams These are logic diagrams
a n d are prepared for ah complex systems, e.g.,
sequence controls, automatic boiler controls, oil
burner control systems, etc.
(b) Schematic diagrams These are drawn for individ­
ual plant items or circuhs o n a disconnected contact
logic basis so that the circuits can be understood
and specified correctly. Some are drawn by the
C E G B to give guidance to the contractors, e.g.,
switchgear protection and control, but the majority
are prepared by manufacturers for the equipment
they are supplying.
(c) Equipment wiring diagrams These are detailed
point t o point wiring diagrams prepared for ah
electrical equipment cubicles, panels, control desks,
local equipment cubicles, etc., by the equipment
603
Cabling
manufacturer. They wih be marked u p with basic
cabhng and core information requirements.
(d) Cable block diagrams These are normahy drawn
on a subsystem basis and wih show ah marshahing
cubicles, junction boxes and connections to plant
items for the circuits involved. They do not gen­
erally detail the wire numbers.
(e) System circuit diagrams These are prepared on
a system or subsystem basis to co-ordinate all
the connections between the various plant items,
initiating devices and equipment, and detail all wire
numbers and circuit connection requirements. They
are drawn to ensure the circuit schematic design is
correctly translated into control system wiring and
to provide the permanent record of C and I wiring
connections.
(f) Wire and jumper schedules Provide simplified
work face information for the cable contractor on
she, scheduling the wire connections for each cable
and the jumper connections for each system.
The aim is to provide accurate information for fast
installation and provide a complete permanent record
for the station staff. It meets the stringent require­
ments for nuclear projects, particularly in the safety
consideration of circuit security and segregation.
Cable system design
The design of cable systems has become more con­
strained by segregation rules, especially in nuclear
power stations. These rules are determined by both
plant operational availabihty and by safety considera­
tions (especially in the nuclear case). They have been
clearly defined and are handled by the computerised
cable design methods now used. In fact the necessary
quality assurance can only be guaranteed in this area
by the use of computerised techniques and their use
is a material factor in establishing the safety case for
a nuclear power station.
The design of control and instrumentation system
cables must both achieve technically suitable schemes
and also make h as easy as possible to achieve instal­
lation programmes. The major technical objective is
to improve signal-to-noise ratios, while the p r o g r a m m e
aim is to permit early installation and termination of
as much cable as possible. There is also the aim of
reducing cost by the use of large multicore and multi-
pair cables.
These aims led to the development of C and I
cable system networks using the large trunk multipair
cables and marshalling cubicles incorporating jumper­
ing facilities described in Section 5 of this chapter.
Scheduling of cables
This work consists of ahocating a cable number to
a particular cable, deciding its type and listing it on
604
Chapter 6
the computerised cabling schedules. Cable block dia­
grams are prepared for power and control cables for
the various subsystems and groups using estimated
quantities for cable cores in the case of control cables.
The cables can then be scheduled.
Routing of cables
T o enable a cable to be sized and routed, it is es­
sential that the location of each end is identified on
layout drawings. This work is dependent on the final
layout of electrical equipment and manufacturers' plant
items.
Power cable routing can normally proceed at a rea­
sonable rate, but C and I cable routing is frequently
delayed by a lack of plant and C and I information
with subsequent heavy peaks of work.
The use of a computer speeds up the process and
accurately routes cables in conformity with routing rules
including segregation. It produces a precise route card
for the cable listing all node points, which is of con­
siderable assistance to the she installation work.
Design clearance of cables
The 'design cleared' marker can only be allocated to
a cable when it is scheduled, sized, routed and full
termination details are specified for each core. This will
then allow the cable to be fully installed, connected and
tested, but when delays occur cables are released for
installation where the cable is scheduled and routed, but
termination details are not complete. This procedure,
however, creates extra recording and work.
14.4 Installation and contract management
information
14.4.1 Introduction
The cabling instahation process on a power station
project can be divided into five parts:
• Electrical equipment that is part of the cable in­
stallation, e.g., junction boxes, distribution boards.
• Cable steelwork.
• Cable instahation.
• Cable glanding, terminations.
• Cable marshahing and j u m p e r s .
The magnitude and complexity of electrical cabling
contracts combined with the segregation and quality
assurance requirements of power station design, give
rise to the need for a sophisticated system of design
and management control.
Total project information (TPI) is a comprehensive
c o m p u t e r - b a s e d design a n d m a n a g e m e n t c o n t r o l
system, covering the activities both in the design office
 Design a n d m a n a g e m e n t techniques

and at site, including contract planning aids, work face • Equipment scheduling All equipment items that are
instruction and evaluation. It includes a cable manage­ to be either separately erected or cabled are sche­
ment section. duled as separate items within the equipment of the
T P I cabling comprises a number of programs which switchboard. For each item of equipment to be sche­
form a single project interface with a c o m m o n data duled, the g r o u p whhin which each equipment item
base. Each program maintains specific areas of the fahs must also be given at the time of scheduhng.
data. The programs involved in this section of T P I
• Cable scheduling All numbered cables must be
are as fohows:
scheduled in their appropriate g r o u p as going from
• TÓPICO Basic project parameters. one equipment h e m to another. The latter infor­
mation may be either specified as an equipment item
• TOPIC 1 Equipment scheduhng.
or by an Enghsh description. The appropriate gland
• TOPIC2 Cable steelwork/route matrix. and termination data must also be given before the
cable can be design cleared.
• TOPIC2 Cable scheduhng and routing.

• TOPIC5 Cable marshalling and j u m p e r s .
• TOPIC? Measurement and stores control.
Data will be prepared using the C E G B K E Y / M A S T E R
data entry system as well as the automatic stripping
of data from the C A D system, and engineering detail
from contractors.
Outputs are produced partly by the T O P I C programs
and partly using the S O C R A T E S report generator, and
in addition there are management graphics facilities.
Outputs can be requested by the users.
On-line interrogation of the data can be achieved us­
ing the M A N T I S screen displays which run under C I C S .
14.4.2 T h e a i m s a n d f u n c t i o n s of T P I c a b l i n g
The aims and functions are as follows:
• Scheduhng.
• Designing.
• Planning.
• Organising.
• Commanding.
• Co-ordinating.
• Monhoring.
• Valuation.
• Reporting.
Scheduling
The fohowing basic design data is recorded whhin the
system and forms the nucleus of the cabling area of
the database:
• Plant scheduling The areas of plant may be split
into separately erectable/commissionable areas based
on a hierarchical breakdown of systems, subsystems
and groups; the concept being that a subsystem com­
prises a major commissionable entity. For example,
systems are boiler, turbine-generator, etc., subsystems
are a F D fan, turbine barring gear, etc., and groups
are single drives such as jacking oil pumps, etc.
• Steelwork T h e cable carriers (trays, conduits, etc.)
that form the cable route matrix must be scheduled
for each segment. In addition, tailend steelwork can
be designed a n d scheduled.
14.4.3 Designing
A n automatic cable routing and sizing process is an
integral part of the overah T P I system.
Planning
T h e key target dates are assigned t o commissioning
systems based on the project master commissioning p r o ­
g r a m m e . This d a t a may either be generated automati­
cally from critical path network programs or explicitly
input. Dates can be assigned to the fohowing events:
• Design completion.
• Access for erection.
• Termination release/cable early start.
• Cable start.
• Cable finish.
• Cable latest finish — j u m p e r start.
• Commissioning complete — j u m p e r finish.
The estimated number of cables and jumpers in each
system or subsystem m a y also be input as a basis for
the initial plans.
Subsequently the site joint planning team takes into
account improved information, obtained from ques­
tionnaires as the project proceeds, to review and pro­
gressively refine the dates. This is normally done by
assigning dates at g r o u p level. This is a continuous
process from the long term (16 weeks plus) to the short
term and immediate work p r o g r a m m e s .
Organising
The organisation depends u p o n the control of resources,
both material and labour, to match the current work
programme and access. This is done by arranging the
cables, terminations and equipment into work packages.

605
Cabling
Details of all material orders and deliveries are
entered into T P I . In conjunction with the figures de­
rived from progress data, these form the basis of a
stock control system which compares quantities with
requirements computed from the scheduled quantities.
The labour resources required for the current work
programme are computed from the estimated labour
content of each task to be performed by the contractor.
This allows the joint planning team to ensure that
a consistent level of work is released to the contractor
and that the material required is available.
Commanding
The instructions to the contractor (which are not in­
tended to overcast contractual responsibilities) are the
working instructions and are issued as foHows, all out­
standing work released to the contractor is the subject
of a work release and is listed on the current schedules.
Work face instructions for ah of these tasks are
computer produced in the form of work cards bearing
all the necessary information to carry out the task. For
example, cabhng work cards state fuh details of the
cable type, route, glands and methods of instahation.
Completed work can be recorded on the work cards
which can then be used as computer input documents.
Work cards are produced for the fohowing tasks:
• Steelwork supports.
• Steelwork instahation trays/trunking.
• Cable installation.
• Equipment installation.
• Termination instructions.
• Jumper instructions.
The site joint planning team monitors progress on work
packages and work cards.
Monitoring
Report generators are used to summarise and display
data in a manner enabling the management team to
monitor and analyse design and site activities. During
the design phase, the cable route matrix segment usage
and control cable core usage can be monitored allow­
ing advantageous design changes to be made prior to
instahation. During the site phase progress, costs and
productivity can all be kept under review.
Valuation
The system will accept measurement information for
the fohowing:
• Steelwork quantities and supports installed.
• Route matrix segment lengths.
• On-matrix cable tail lengths.
• Off-matrix cables.
606
Chapter 6
• Cable terminations.
• Jumpers installed.
• Equipment erections.
• Material delivery.
This information will normally be input by the quantity
surveyors. Valuations of material delivered, material
used and labour content value for either a specific
valuation period or for the whole of the contract to
date may be produced. The latter is known as cumu­
lative valuation.
Cable measurement cards are used to assist in the
task of cable measurement. They show any outstanding
measurement task, i.e., installed and not measured,
together w h h any measurements previously recorded.
Reporting
An important aspect of the aid to management af­
forded by T P I is the quality of reporting that is possible.
In addition to special ad-hoc enquiries, there are routine
reports that can be produced showing the progress and
status of the contract works against p r o g r a m m e .
Management summaries can be produced showing
the total work done on each section of the contract.
These may also be produced in graphical form so that
current trends can be analysed.
15 References
[ 1 ] IEC287: Calculation of the continuous current rating of cables:
1982
[2] GDCD Standard 17: 6350/1 lOOOV extruded solid insulation
cables: May 1978
[3] BS6346: Specification for PVC-insulated cables for electricity
supply: 1969 (1977)
[4] ERA Report 69-30: Current rating standards for distribution
cables: Part 3: Sustained current ratings for PVC insulated
cables to BS6346: 1969 (AC 50Hz and DC)
[5] CERL Report RD/LN197/75: CURB03 computer program:
Three-phase power frequency impedance characteristics of
single-core power cables with special reference to current
sharing between cables in parallel: 1976
[6] BS2692: Part 1: Specification for current-limiting fuses: 1986
[7] BS5907: Specification for high voltage fuse-ünks for motor
circuit applications: 1986
[8] BS88: Part 2: Supplementary requirements for fuses of stand­
ardised dimensions and performance for industrial purposes:
1975(1982)
[9] lEE Wiring Regulations: 15th Edition 1981: Regulation 433-2
Protection against both overload and short circuit currents
[10] ESI Standard 44-3: Electric motors — specification (3300V
and above), 1980
[11] ESI Standard 44-4: Electric motors — specification (415V and
below, 0.75 kW and above), 1980
[12] BS5000: Part 40: Motors for driving power station auxiliaries:
1973 (1984)
[13] BS4999: Part 41: Specification for general requirements for
rotating electrical machines — General characteristics: 1977
[14] BS4999: Part 101: Specification for general requirements for
rotating electrical machines — Tolerances: 1972

[15] BS5311: Part 2: Specification for AC circuit-breakers of rated
voltage above 1 kW — Rating: 1976
[16] BS5424: Specification for controlgear for voltages up to and
including 1000 V AC and 1200 V DC: 1977
[17] BS142: Section 2.3: Specification for thermal electrical relays:
1984
[18] lEE Wiring Regulations: currently 15th Edition 1981; 16th
Edition to be issued
[19] GDCD Standard 197: Cable supporting steelwork: April 1979
[20] BS3692: Specification for ISO metric precision hexagon bolts,
screws and nuts. Metric units: 1967
[21] GDCD Standard 216: Cable cleating arrangements
[22] Burki A. N. and Sabine A. M.; Connecting solid-conductor
aluminium cables in terminal boxes: The Engineer: December
1963
[23] Solars P. M. Α.: Wire wrapped joints — a review: Electro-
component science and technology: Volume 1, pp 17-25: 1974
References
[24] BS476: Part 8: Fire tests on building materials and structures
- test methods and criteria for the fire resistance of elements
of building construction: 1972
[25] BS476: Part 4: Fire tests on building materials and structures
- non-combustibility test for materials: 1970 (1984)
[26] BS476: Part 7: Fire tests on building materials and structures
- surface spread of flame tests for materials
[27] Alderton J. R., Anderson P. C , and Cakebread R. J.: Cal­
culation and measurement of the earth impedance of an e.h.v.
substation: Proc lEE, Vol 125, No. 12: December 1978
IEEE Standard 80: IEEE guide for safety in substation ground­
[28]
ing: 1986
Tagg G. F.: 'Earth resistances': George Newnes, London: 1964
^^^^
[30] Wenner Dr. F.: Scientific Paper 258: Bureau of Standards:
1915
[31] Engineering Recommendation S34: A guide for assessing the
rise of earth potential at substation sites: May 1986
607
Cabling Chapter 6

Appendix A

Values of resistance and reactance for single-core

elastomeric-insulated cables OO^C maximum conductor temperature)

Conductor Armour

DC AC Equivalent DC
Cable type resistance resistance star reactance resistance
at at at at
20°C, μΩ/m 90°C, /ifi/m 50 Hz, μΩ/m 20°C, μΩ/m

// kV Cables
Single-core 100 129 158 200
300 mm^

Single-core 60.5 79 142 170

500 mm^

3.3 kV Cables
Single-core 77.8 100.5 150 110
400 mm^

415 V Cables
Single-core 77.8 100.5 150 110
400 mm^

Note: Equivalent star reactance values are for a single cable per phase
laid in flat formation

608
 Appendix Β

Appendix Β

Values of resistance and reactance for multicore

PVC-lnsulated cables (70°C maximum conductor temperature)

Conductor Armour

DC AC Equivalent DC
Cable type resistance resistance star reactance resistance
at at at at
20°C, μΩ/m 70°C, μΩ/m 50 Hz, /ifi/m 20°C, / i ß / m

3.3 kV Cables
3-core 150 206 248 80.0 240
3-core 240 125 151 76.5 150

415 V Cables
2 9100
2-core 2.5 7410 8866 100.0
mm
3-core 2.5 mm^ 7410 8866 100.0 8800
4-core 2.5 mm^ 7410 8866 100.0 7900
2-core 4 mm^ 4610 5516 98.5 7500
3-core 4 mm^ 4610 5516 98.5 7000
4-core 4 mm^ 4610 5516 98.5 4600
2-core 6 mm^ 3080 3685 93.5 6800
2
3-core 6 3080 3685 93.5 4600
mm"^
4-core 6 mm^ 3080 3685 93.5 4100
2-core 16 mm^ 1910 2295 86.0 140
2
3-core 16 1910 2295 86.0 130
mm''
4-core 16 mm^ 1910 2295 86.0 1200
2-core 35 mm^ 868 1043 82.0 1400
3-core 35 mm^ 868 1043 82.0 1100
2
4-core 35 868 1043 82.0 960
mm''
2 570
2-core 70 443 532 79.0
mm
3-core 70 mm^ 443 532 79.0 480
4-core 70 mm^ 443 532 79.0 420
3-core 120 mm^ 253 304 77.0 280
4-core 120 mm^ 253 304 77.0 240
2 230
3-core 185 164 197 77.0
mm''
4-core 185 mm^ 164 197 77.0 150
3-core 300 mm^ 100 120 76.0 140
4-core 300 mm^ 100 120 76.0 120

The constant mass temperature coefficient at 20°C per kelvin are:

Copper = 0.00393

Aluminium = 0.00403

Galvanised = 0.0045
steel wire

Note: Cables up to and including 6 mm^ have copper conductors and steel
wire armour.
Cables 60 mm^ and larger have aluminium conductors and armour.

609
Cabling Chapter 6

Appendix C

Current ratings for elastomeric-insulated cables

The current ratings are based on a maximum conductor temperature

of 90°C with ambient temperature of 25°C, with single-point bonding
and no core transposition.

Current rating, A

Cable type
Direct in In single-
In air
the ground way ducts

// ky Cables
Single-core 300 mm^ 500 480 675
Single-core 500 mm^ 645 610 900

3.3 kV Cables
Single-core 400 mm^ 575 550 785

415 V Cables
Single-core 400 mm^ 575 550 785

Note: All cables have stranded aluminium conductors

610
 Appendix D

Appendix D

Current ratings for PVC-insulated cables

The current ratings are based on a maximum conductor temperature of 70°C

and an ambient temperature of 25°C.

Current rating, A

Cable type
Direct in In single-
In air
the ground way ducts

3.3 kV Cables
3-core 150 mm^ 257 217 265
3-core 240 mm^ 338 285 361

415 V Cables
2-core 2.5 mm^ 41 34 33
3-core 2.5 mm^ 35 29 28
4-core 2.5 mm^ 35 29 28
2-core 4 mm^ 55 45 44
3-core 4 mm^ 47 38 38
2
4-core 4 47 38 38
2-core 6 69 57 56
3-core 6 mm^ 59 48 48
4-core 6 mm^ 59 48 48
2
2-core 16 91 75 77
mm*^
2
3-core 16 77 62 65
mm
4-core 16 mm^ 77 62 65
2-core 35 mm^ 142 115 120
3-core 35 mm^ 120 97 104
2
4-core 35 120 97 104
2-core 70 mm^ 209 170 185
3-core 70 mm^ 176 144 161
4-core 70 mm^ 176 144 161
2
3-core 120 243 199 232
mm
4-core 120 mm^ 243 199 232
3-core 185 mm^ 309 254 306
4-core 185 mm^ 309 254 306
3-core 300 mm^ 407 338 421
2
4-core 300 407 338 421
mm''

A/ores: 3.3 kV cables have solid aluminium conductors.

415 V cables with nominal conductor areas of 2.5 mm^,

4 mm^ and 6 mm^ have stranded-copper conductors.

All other 415V cables have solid aluminium conductors.

611
Cabling Chapter 6

Appendix Ε

Rating factors for variations in thermal parameters

Rating factors for variation in ambient air temperature

(a) Maximum conductor temperature 70°C

Air temperature, °C 25 30 35 40 45 50 55

Rating factor (maximum 1.00 0.94 0.88 0.82 0.75 0.67 0.58
conductor temperature
70°C)

(b) Maximum conductor temperature 90°C

Air temperature, °C 25 30 35 40 45 50 55

Rating factor {maximum 1.00 0.95 0.91 0.86 0.80 0.75 0.69
conductor temperature
90°C)

Rating factors for variation in ground temperature for cables buried direct in the ground.
(a) Maximum conductor temperature 70°C

Ground temperature, °C 20 25 30 35 40

Rating factor (maximum 0.95 0.90 0.85 — —

conductor temperature
70°C)

(b) Maximum conductor temperature 90°C

Ground temperature, °C 20 25 30 35 40

Rating factor (maximum 0.97 0.93 0.89 0.86 0.82

conductor temperature
90°C)

612
 Appendix Ε

Appendix Ε (cont'd)
Rating factors for variations in thermal parameters

Rating factors for variation in ground temperature for cables laid in ducts
(a) Maximum conductor temperature 70°C

Ground temperature, °C 20 25 30

Rating factor (maximum 0.95 0.90 0.85

conductor temperature
70°C)

(b) Maximum conductor temperature 90°C

Ground temperature, °C 20 25 30

Rating factor (maximum 0.97 0.93 0.89

conductor temperature
90°C)

Note'. The rating factors in the following tables may be

taken to be the same for maximum conductor temperatures
of 70°C and 90°C respectively.

Rating factors for variation in depth of laying direct in the ground

3.3 kV and 11 kV
415 Volt cables
cables
Depth of
laying, m
Up to Above Up to Above
70-300 mm^ 300 mm^
50 mm^ 300 mm^ 300 mm^

0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 — —

0.60 0.99 0.98 0.97 — —

0.80 0.97 0.96 0.94 1.00 1.00

1.00 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.98 0.97

1.25 0.94 0.92 0.89 0.96 0.95

1.50 0.93 0.90 0.87 0.95 0.93

613
Cabling Chapter 6

Appendix Ε (confd)
Rating factors for variations in thermal parameters

Rating factors for variation in soil thermal resistivity

(a) Cables laid direct in the ground

Ground thermal resistivity, K.m/W

Nominal area of
conductor
0.8 0.9 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5

Multicore cables

2.5 mm^ 1.09 1.07 1.04 0.94 0.86 0.80

4.0 mm^ 1.10 1.07 1.05 0.94 0.85 0.79
6.0 mm^ 1.10 1.07 1.05 0.93 0.85 0.79
16 mm^ 1.12 1.08 1.05 0.93 0.84 0.77
35 mm^ 1.13 1.09 1.06 0.92 0.83 0.76
70 mm^ 1.14 1.09 1.06 0.92 0.83 0.75
120 mm^ 1.14 1.10 1.06 0.92 0.82 0.75
150 mm^ 1.14 1.10 1.06 0.92 0.82 0.75
185 mm^ 1.14 1.10 1.06 0.92 0.82 0.74
240 mm^ 1.15 1.10 1.07 0.92 0.81 0.74
300 mm^ 1.15 1.10 1.07 0.92 0.81 0.74

Single-core cables
300 mm^ 1.17 1.12 1.07 0.91 0.80 0.73
400 mm^ 1.17 1.12 1.07 0.91 0.80 0.73
500 mm^ 1.17 1.12 1.07 0.91 0.80 0.73

614
 Appendix Ε

Appendix Ε (cont'd)
Rating factors for variations in thermal parameters

Rating factors for variation in soil thermal resistivity

(b) Cables laid in ducts

Ground thermal resistivity, K.m/W

Nominal area of
conductor
0.8 0.9 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5

Multicore cables

2.5 mm^ 1.03 1.02 1.02 0.98 0.94 0.91

4.0 mm^ 1.04 1.03 1.02 0.97 0.94 0.90
6.0 mm^ 1.04 1.03 1.02 0.97 0.93 0.90
16 mm^ 1.04 1.03 1.02 0.97 0.92 0.88
35 mm^ 1.05 1.03 1.02 0.96 0.92 0.87
70 mm^ 1.05 1.04 1.02 0.96 0.91 0.86
120 mm^ 1.06 1.04 1.03 0.95 0.90 0.85
150 mm2 1.06 1.04 1.03 0.95 0.90 0.85
185 mm^ 1.07 1.05 1.03 0.95 0.89 0.84
240 mm^ 1.07 1.05 1.03 0.95 0.89 0.84
300 mm^ 1.07 1.05 1.03 0.95 0.88 0.83

Single-core cables
300 mm2 1.11 1.08 1.05 0.93 0.85 0.79
400 mm^ 1.11 1.08 1.05 0.93 0.85 0.78
500 mm^ 1.11 1.08 1.05 0.93 0.85 0.78

Rating factors for variation in depth of cables laid in ducts

415 Volt cables 3.3 kV and 11 kV cables

Depth of
laying, m
Single-core Multicore Single-core Multicore

0.50 1.00 1.00 — —

0.60 0.98 0.99 — —

0.80 0.95 0.98 1.00 1.00

1.00 0.93 0.96 0.98 0.99
1.25 0.91 0.95 0.95 0.97
1.50 0.89 0.94 0.94 0.96

615
Cabling Chapter 6

Appendix F

Cross-sectional area of armour wire

415 V 3.3 kV and 11 kV single-core power cables

Nominal cross-sectional Cross-sectional area of

area of conductor armour wire, mm^

// kV Cables
Single-core 300 mm^ 103
Single-core 500 mm^ 169

3.3 kV Cables
Single-core 400 mm^ 153

415 V Cables
Single-core 400 mm^ 153

All cable sizes have round aluminium armour wire

415 V and 3.3 kV multicore power cables to BS6346

Cross-sectional area of
Nominal cross-sectional armour wire/strip mm^
area of conductor
mm^ 2-core 3-core 4-core
mm^ mm^ mm^

2.5 17 19 20
4 21 23 35
6 24 36 40
16 23 26 29
35 24 30 34
70 56 67 78
120 N/A 117 136
185 N/A 143 214
300 N/A 237 271

2.4 mm^, 4 mm^ and 6 mm^ cable sizes have steel

wire armour

16 mm^ and above cable sizes have aluminium strip

616
 Appendix G

Appendix G

415 V motor parameters and selected fuse sizes

Rated Nominal Maximum Starting 2 X Full

output starting starting time Starting load Fuse size
kW current current time current
A A s s A

0.75 11.0 13.1 3.1 6.2 1.7 10 A

1.1 16.1 19.3 3.2 6.4 2.5 12 A
1.5 21.9 26.3 3.2 6.4 3.3 16 A
2.2 32.1 38.6 3.3 6.6 4.4 20 A
3.0 40.9 49.1 3.4 6.8 6.1 32 A
4.0 54.5 65.4 3.5 7.0 8.1 40 A
5.5 75.0 90.0 3.7 7.4 11.1 50 A
7.5 96.0 115 4.0 8.0 13.9 63 A
11 141 169 4.5 9.0 20.5 80 A
15 192 230 5.0 10.0 27.9 100 A
18.5 224 267 5.5 11.0 32.3 125 A
22 266 320 6.0 12.0 38.4 160 A
30 363 436 7.0 14.0 52.4 500 A
37 448 537 8.0 16.0 64.6 250 A
45 513 616 9.0 18.0 75.0 315 A
55 627 753 10.4 20.8 91.7 315 A
75 856 1027 13.0 26.0 125.1 500 A
90 1027 1232 15.0 30.0 150.1 630 A
110 1194 1432 15.0 30.0 178.9 630 A
132 1432 1719 15.0 30.0 214.7 800 A
150 1628 1953 15.0 30.0 244.0 800 A

617
Cabling Chapter 6

Appendix Η

Maximum cable route lengths

Steady state voltage regulation — 1 %

Motor starting voltage regulation — 1 5 %
Ambient air temperature 25°C

Motor Fuse 415 V AC motor circuits

rated rating
output Cable size 1 Cable size 2 Cable size 3

Route Route Route

length length length
kW A mm"^ m mm^ m mm^ m

0.75 10 2.5 231 — —

1.1 12 2.5 157 — —

1.5 16 2.5 115 4 185

2.2 20 2.5 78 4 125
3.0 32 2.5 61 4 99
4.0 40 2.5 46 4 74
5.5 50 4 53 6 80
7.5 63 6 61 16 99
11 80 16 67 35 144
15 100 16 48 35 105
18.5 125 35 88 70 168
22 160 35 74 70 141
30 200 35 53 70 102
37 250 70 82 120 138
45 250 70 69 120 117
55 315 70 55 120 95
75 400 120 68 185 100

618
 Appendix Η

Appendix Η (cont'd)
Maximum cable route lengths

Fuse Three-phase and neutral

rating distribution feeder circuits

Cable size 1 Cable size 2 Cable size 3

Route Route Route

length length length
2 2
A m m m
mm''

10 2.5 45
12 2.5 37 4 61
16 2.5 27 4 45 6 68
20 2.5 21 4 36 6 54
25 2.5 16 4 28 6 42
32 4 21 6 32 16 54
40 6 25 16 42 35 92
50 16 33 35 73 70 139
63 16 25 35 57 70 109
80 35 44 70 85 120 142
100 35 34 70 67 120 112
125 70 52 120 89 185 128
160 120 68 185 99 300 144
200 120 53 185 78 300 114
250 185 61 300 90 2-185 128
315 300 70 2-185 101 2-300 146
400 300 54 2-185 78 2-300 114

619
Cabling Chapter 6

Appendix I

Main protection for feeder and motor circuits

System
Fault current
voltage Application Main protection
breaking device
kV

11 Feeder circuits
(a) Outgoing Air circuit- High set instantaneous over-
transformer breaker current and restricted earth
fault, IDMT overcurrent.

(b) Interconnector Air circuit- Circulating current, IDMT

breaker overcurrent and earth fault.

Motor circuit High set overcurrent and

instantaneous earth fault,
thermal overcurrent with
single-phasing.

3.3 Feeder circuits

above 1 MVA
(a) Outgoing Air circuit- High set instantaneous over-
transformer breaker current and restricted earth
fault, extremely inverse over-
current.

(b) Interconnector Air circuit- Circulating current, IDMT

breaker overcurrent and earth fault.

Motor circuits Air circuit- High set instantaneous over-

above 1 MW breaker current and earth fault,
thermal overload with single-
phasing.

Feeder circuits
1 MVA and below
Outgoing Fused switching Fuse to BS2692: Pt 1, [6]
transformer device high set instantaneous over-
current and restricted earth
fault, extremely inverse over-
current.

Motor circuits Fused switching Fuse to BS5907, [7] high set

1 MW and below device instantaneous overcurrent
and earth fault, thermal
overload with single-phasing.

0.415 Feeder circuits Air Circulating current differential

above 0.33 MVA circuit-breaker earth fault.
(interconnector)

Feeder circuits Fuse Fuse to Β888: Pt 2 [8]

0.33 MVA and
below

Motor circuits Fuse/contactor Fuse to BS88: Pt 2

above 50 kW thermal overload with single-
phasing, definite time high
set earth fault.

Motor circuits Fuse/contactor Fuses to BS88: Pt 2,

50 kW down thermal overload with single-
to 1.5 kW phasing.

620
 Appendix J

Appendix J

Advantages and disadvantages of various lamps

used for lighting power station interiors

Type of lamp Advantages Disadvantages

Tubular fluorescent (a) Immediate light output and
restrike.
(b) Low surface brightness per­
mitting low mounting height.
(c) Good colour rendering.
(a) Rating of lamp low, typically
85 W . Therefore lumen output
per fitting low. More fluorescent
tubes needed than discharge
lamps in any one area. This
increases maintenance problems.

(d) Long life (5000-10 000 hours)

depending on type, switching
cycle, etc.

High pressure mercury discharge (a) Long life (5000-10 000 hours)
(fluorescent) depending on type, rating,
switching etc.
MBF — Arc tube and fluorescent
coating on the inside of outer (b) Discharge lamp rating higher
envelope than fluorescent, therefore high
lumen output per lamp.
MBFR — An MBF lamp in which
part of the outer envelope has an (c) Light may be provided from
inner reflecting coating distant positions using direc­
tional projectors.
(d) Acceptable colour rendering.
(a) Higher rated lamps require high
mounting height to avoid glare.
(b) Run-up period to full light out­
put of about 4 minutes.
(c) Loss of output occurs when
supply voltage falls below 8 0 %
of nominal voltage.
(d) Re-ignition after about 10 minutes
on loss of output.

(e) Operation in any position,

position.

(f) Can withstand prolonged

vibration.

High pressure mercury discharge
(Metal halide)
MBI — High pressure mercury
discharge lamp with metal halide
additives in arc tube and clear
outer envelope.
MBIF — An MBI lamp with a
fluorescent coating on inside of
of outer envelope
(a) Long life (5000-10 000 hours)
depending on type, rating,
switching cycle, etc.
(b) High lumen output per lamp.
(c) Light may be provided from
accessible distant positions
using directional projector.
(d) Good colour rendering.
(e) Can withstand prolonged
vibration.
(a) High mounting height required
to avoid glare.
(b) Run-up period to 9 0 % of full
light output in about 5 minutes.
(c) Loss of output occurs when
supply voltage falls below 8 0 %
of nominal voltage.
(d) Re-ignition after about 10 minutes
on loss of output.
(e) Restrictions on operating position.

621
Cabling
Appendix J (cont'd)
Advantages and disadvantages of various lamps
used for lighting power station interiors
Type of lamp Advantages
High pressure sodium (a) Long life (6000-12000 hours)
according to rating, etc.
SON — A high pressure sodium
discharge lamp with an arc tube in (b) High lumen output per lamp.
an outer envelope.
(c) Light may be provided from
SON-R, A SON lamp with an accessible distant positions
internal reflecting coating. using directional projector.
(d) Operates in any position.
(e) Can withstand prolonged
vibration.
Tungsten filament (a) Does not require any control
gear and operates from either
an AC or DC supply.
(b) Immediate light output.
(c) Good colour rendering.
(d) Operates in all positions.
Tungsten halogen (a) Does not require any control
gear and operates from either
an AC or DC supply.
(b) Immediate light output.
(c) Good colour rendering.
(d) Longer life and higher lumen
output than tungsten filament
but still relatively poor (2000-
4000 hours).
622
Chapter 6
Disadvantages
(a) High mounting height required
to avoid glare.
(b) Run-up period to 90% of light
output in about 5 minutes.
(c) Loss of output occurs when
supply voltage falls below 80%
of nominal voltage.
(d) Re-ignition within 1 minute
following loss of output.
(e) Colour has high yellow and
red colours but all colours
distinguishable.
(a) Larger ratings require high
mounting height to avoid glare.
(b) Limited life only 1000-2000
hours.
(c) Poor light output. Light output
and life sensitive to small voltage
variations.
(d) Adversely affected by vibration.
(a) Larger ratings require high
mounting height to avoid glare.
(b) Light output and life sensitive to
small voltage variations.
(c) Adversely affected by vibration.
(d) Some restriction on operating
position.
 C H A P T E R 7

Motors

1 Introduction 5 Power station auxiliary drives

2 Types and performance of motors 5.1 Boiler feed pumps
2.1 Cage induction motors 5.2 Coal- and oil-fired boiler units
2.2 Slipring induction motors 5.2.1 Draught plant
2.3 AC commutator motors 5.2.2 Milling plant
2.4 Variable-speed AC converter drives 5.3 Nuclear reactors — AGR
2.4.1 Cycloconverter 5.3.1 Gas circulators
2.4.2 Slip-energy recovery systems 5.4 Nuclear reactors — PWR
2.4.3 Voltage source converter 5.4.1 Reactor coolant pumps
2.4.4 Current source converter 5.4.2 Safety-related drives
2.4.5 Pulse-width-modulated converter 5.5 Circulating water pumps
2.5 DC motors 6 Testing
3 Design and construction 7 Future trends
3.1 Mechanical construction
3.2 Types of enclosure 8 References
3.3 Methods of cooling 9 Additional references
3.4 Windings
9.1 ESI Standards
3.5 Insulation systems
9.2 CEGB Standards
3.6 Bearings
9.3 British Standards
3.7 Terminal boxes
9.4 IEEE Standards
4 Technical requirements 9.5 lEC Recommendations

1 Introduction performance. M a n y textbooks and technical papers

The modern power station requires a wide range of
electric motors ranging from small power motors u p
to motors as large as 15 M W . There are about 2000
motors in a typical power station. Their total installed
capacity is between 5% and 10% of the station M W
output, depending on the type of station, e.g., nu­
clear, coal- or oil-fired, and on the type and number
of motor-driven auxiharies. Whilst most motors in
a modern power station are of the cage induction
type, others are also used when there is a technical
or economic need. Examples include variable-speed
shpring induction motors for boiler feedpump drives,
D C motors for turbine-generator standby lubricating
oil pumps, two-speed cage induction and converter-fed
variable-speed A C motors for drives such as boiler
draught fans, barring and the low speed facility for
gas circulators on advanced gas cooled (AGR) nuclear
reactors.
This chapter examines typical auxiliary drive require­
ments and the selection of the motors used. It considers
the functional requirements and the effect of these on
the motor design, constructional features and technical
are available to the reader on detailed m o t o r design,
theory, insulation, etc., a n d such theory is not repeated
in this chapter. Some of these aspects are, however,
dealt with insofar as they are necessary to describe
particular features of the m o t o r s , to explain the func­
tional needs and to portray modern practice.
2 Types and performance of motors
There are large numbers of small power (formerly
known as fractional horsepower) motors used, e.g.,
sootblowers, servo motors, instrument drives, etc. These
types are not described here. Their technical require­
ments are specified in C E G B Standard 44011 Electric
motors — small power and in BS5000, Part 11, Small
power electric motors and generators.
Five types of m o t o r are considered:
• Cage induction m o t o r s .
• Shpring induction m o t o r s .
• A C commutator motors.

623
Motors Chapter 7

• D C motors. motors because of limitations on starting current im­

• Variable-speed A C converter drives.
Other types of motor not deah with in detail include
linear motors which have, for example, been used on
cranes and shding doors, synchronous motors and m o ­
tors for glandless pumps of the wet-stator winding or
of the canned types. Technical requirements of motors
for glandless pumps are given in C E G B Standard
620106, Glandless p u m p / m o t o r units.
2.1 Cage induction motors
Cage induction motors are very reliable, since the ro­
tors are of robust construction and have no sliprings,
commutators or brushes. They are relatively low in
cost and have high operating efficiency; their simph-
city and reliability has led to their extensive use for
power station auxiliary drives.
A disadvantage of the cage induction motor is the
large starting current, which is about 5 to 7 times
normal full-load current. This presents vohage drop
problems to the electrical supply system to which it is
connected and can create some difficulties in providing
adequate electrical protection, e.g., overcurrent and
short-circuit protection. Whereas many industrial users
have to restrict the power rating of cage induction
posed by their electrical power supply system, power
stations have auxiliary power systems backed by high
M V A infeeds and even the largest cage induction
motors used in these stations can usually be started
direct-on-line. High values of starting current also
present problems in that the stator windings must be
designed to withstand the electromechanical forces
produced by the starting current. The windings must
also be designed to meet the temperature rise during
starting, which may be considerable, particularly for
the rotor cage windings if a high number of starts
per hour is required or the driven load has high inertia.
Table 7.1 gives maximum values of starting current
permitted with C E G B practice. These values comply
with BS4999, Part 4 1 .
The motor torque-speed characteristics must be de­
signed to meet the requirements of the driven load
under the most arduous conditions of service. The
torque requirements may in some cases present diffi­
culties to the motor designer since the maximum per­
mitted value of starting current (see Table 7.1) affects
the starting and maximum torque values obtainable
from a given design. F r o m a study of the equivalent
circuh theory of induction motors (see Alger 1951 [1],
1970 [2], and Say 1983 [3]) it will be apparent that
the starting torque and current characteristics can be
controlled by varying the values of rotor resistance and

TABLE 7.1
Ratio of starting (locked rotor) kVA to rated output kW

Rated output Rated voltage Ratio of starting

(kW) (locked rotor) kVA to
rated output kW

Over 1 up to 2.5 415 V 10.5

Over 2.5 up to 6.3 415 V 9.8
Over 6,3 up to 16 415 V 9.2
Over 16 up to 40 415 V 8.7
Over 40 up to 100 415 V 8.2
Over 100 up to 150 415 V 7.8
Over 150 up to 250 3.3 kV and above 6.0
Over 250 up to 630 3.3 kV and above 5.8
Over 630 up to 1 600 3.3 kV and above 5.6
Over 1 600 up to 4 000 3.3 kV and above 5.4
Over 4 000 up to 10 000 3.3 kV and above 5.2
Above 10 000 3.3 kV and above 5.0

Notes: (1) To obtain the ratio of starting (locked rotor) current to full load current,
multiply the above ratio by per unit efficiency and power factor at rated
load.
(2) Depending on the efficiencies and power factors involved, the above values
correspond to:
6 to 7 times full load current for 415 V motors
5 to 6 times full load current for 3.3 kV and above.
(3) The above values are selected from BS4999, Part 41.

624

reactance. A variety of designs may be used to obtain
the required characteristics in this way. These include
the following types of cage rotors:
• Normal types — rectangular or round section rotor
bars.
• Current displacement types — deep rectangular
bars, T-section bars, L-section bars.
• Double-cage rotors.
• Trislot rotors.
• High resistance rotors.
Figure 7.1 ihustrates all five types of rotor and gives
typical torque-speed curves.
With the current displacement type, the rotor current
is forced towards the top of the bars at starting, due
to the relatively high value of reactance at the b o t t o m
of the slots. This results in an effective A C resistance
considerably higher than that experienced when the
motor is running at fuh speed, with the rotor bars
operating at very low slip frequency. There is thus an
increased ratio of starting torque to starting current,
compared with the normal type of cage winding.
The action of the double-cage rotor is similar, in
that the rotor current is forced into the high resistance
outer-cage winding at start due to the higher reactance
of the inner cage. The major component of starting
torque is thereby produced in the higher resistance
winding. When the motor is up to speed, the reactance
of the inner cage winding is relatively low due to the
low value of slip frequency and the bulk of the current
(and hence torque) is produced in the low resistance
inner-cage winding. The trislot rotor is another varia­
tion in which a high resistance outer-cage produces
the bulk of the starting torque. The running winding
consists of two rows of inner slots containing the in­
sulated inner winding, which consists of short-circuited
turns forming closed loops spanning approximately
a pole pitch. This type has an even better ratio of
starting torque to starting current than the double-
cage rotor, but both double-cage and trislot rotor
machines have a high starting torque (see Fig 7.1). All
the above types of cage winding have been used for
power station applications, the choice depending on
the power output and speed of the m o t o r , the apph­
cation and performance characteristics required. For
most drives, such as boiler feed pumps and draught
plant, the performance available from normal cage or
current displacement cage designs is perfectly suitable.
Double-cage and trislot type rotors are generally not
as mechanically robust as the other types and may
therefore be restricted in power output or speed (e.g.,
> 5 M W at 1500 r / m i n and below and > 2 M W at
3000 r / m i n or above). Double-cage and trislot rotors
tend to be restricted to drives requiring a high starting
torque, e.g., pulveriser mihs. The high resistance type
rotor is constructed of high resistance rotor bar ma­
terial, such as bronze or other high resistance alloy.
T y p e s a n d performance of motors
A = NORMAL CAGE
Β ^ = DEEP BAR, B2 = L BAR, B3 = Τ BAR
C = DOUBLE CAGE
D = TRISLOT ROTOR
Ε = HIGH RESISTANCE CAGE
3
d
LU
0.5
SPEED, p.u.
FIG. 7.1 Torque-speed curves of cage induction motors
The high value of resistance gives a high value of
starting torque but also results in a low operating ef­
ficiency due t o increased rotor I^R losses. This type is
therefore mainly used for applications where a high
starting torque is required but operating efficiency is
not important. Because this type of motor has a high
slip at fuh load, its speed can be varied by adjusting
the value of supply voltage. Since the high resistance
type rotor is an inefficient variable-speed drive it is
limited to drives with intermittent use, such as cranes
and actuators, where efficiency is not very important
and the higher cost of alternative variable-speed mo­
tors is not justified.
Figure 7.2 shows the effect of reduced voltage on the
torque-speed curve of a typical current-displacement
cage-induction m o t o r . It is necessary t o ensure that
sufficient margin of accelerating torque is available
in order to meet the worst conditions, e.g., reduced
supply voltage due to rotor starting and high loads
such as opening control valves on p u m p s .
2.2 Slipring induction motors
This m o t o r differs from the cage induction motor
described in the previous section in that both the sta­
tor and rotor are wound with insulated windings, the
rotor winding being brought out t o sliprings which are
connected to external resistances during starting and
for speed control.
625
Motors Chapter 7

A typical diagram of connections for a stator-fed

2.0 MOTOR TORQUE α
ο.
UJ
σΐ.ο
oc
o regulator is then used to inject a voltage into the ar­
ACCELERATING
TORQUE
^ ^ ^ ^ LOAD TORQUE α (SPEED)'
0.5
41.0
SPEED p.u.
FIG. 7 . 2 Torque-speed curves of cage induction motor
at reduced voltage
The main application on modern power stations has
been for variable-speed drives for starting and standby
boiler feed p u m p s , where its low operating efficiency
has not been a disadvantage, due to the relatively low
running hours per a n n u m , and the capital cost has been
relatively low compared to other variable-speed drives.
However, the tendency is now to use direct-on-line cage
induction m o t o r s driving t h r o u g h variable-speed
hydraulic couplings (see Section 5.1 of this chapter).
The starting current is much lower than for cage
induction motors, a typical value being 120% fuh-
load current with 100% starting torque. The combined
starter and speed controher for these large feed p u m p
motors is of the hquid type. The shp energy to be
dissipated in the controller at reduced speed is con­
siderable and the hquid controller is therefore invaria­
bly water-cooled in order to dissipate this energy.
Methods for recovering this slip energy are available,
such as the Kramer scheme where the low frequency
slip power from the rotor is converted by an inverter
shunt-connected motor (which is more often used than
the series connection), is shown in Fig 7.3.
The action of the c o m m u t a t o r is to convert the slip
frequency generated in the armature windings back
to supply frequency (i.e., normally 50 Hz) across the
brushes. The brushes are connected to the main power
supply through an induction regulator which provides
the link between the variable voltage at the commu­
tator brushes and the constant voltage supply. This
mature winding via the brushes and causes the speed
to be varied in relation to the injected voltage. At
speeds below synchronous, power is drawn from the
armature and returned to the supply; at super-synchro­
nous speeds power is drawn from the supply and fed
into the armature. Further infomation on c o m m u t a t o r
motors and induction regulators is given by Adkins and
Gibbs, 1951 [4].
One of the main apphcations has in the past been
on exhauster fans associated with pulveriser mihs on
boiler plant, where the variable-speed feature has been
used to control the boiler fuel/air flow. The commu­
tator and brushes associated w h h this type are an
obvious disadvantage representing a considerable main­
tenance task.
2.4 Variable-speed AC converter drives
With an increased emphasis now being placed on en­
ergy saving methods, coupled with the need to reduce
overall costs, increasing attention has been given to
A.c. SUPPLY
TRANSFORMER

to 50 Hz and recovered by feeding it back to the

power supply. However, this scheme is generally only
economic for drives with high load factors because it
has the disadvantage of a high wear rate on brushes
and sliprings which results in a heavy maintenance bur­
den. This scheme has not been used much by the C E G B ,
although it has found favour with several Western
European supply companies. One or two examples
do however exist in C E G B , including the boiler feed
pumps at West Thurrock power station.

2.3 AC commutator motors INDUCTION

REGULATOR
The most commonly used variable-speed A C commuta­
tor motor has been the stator-fed type, in which both
the stator and armature are insulated windings, the FIG. 7 . 3 Stator-fed AC variable-speed
armature winding being brought out to a c o m m u t a t o r . commutator motor

626

improved means of providing variable-speed for power
station auxiliary drives as a means of saving power.
The recent rapid development of A C variable-speed
drives has now reached a stage where the improved
overall performance and reliability should result in
an increasing application of such drives for controlhng
and varying flow or speed. Variable-speed using D C
motors was much used in the old days, but fell out
of favour with the increased power requirements (see
Section 2.5 of this chapter). However, with the im­
proved techniques and increase in power ratings of
thyristors over recent years, the use of A C variable-
speed converter drives is increasing and is competing
with other methods of controlling speed or flow, such
as vane or damper control of fans or control valves for
feed flow.
The fohowing types of drive are discussed as follows:
• Cycloconverter.
• Shpring motor, with shp energy recovery.
• Voltage source converter.
• Current source converter.
• Pulse-width-modulated ( P W M ) converter.
The vohage source inverter, the current source inverter
and the pulse-width-modulated converter can all be
classified as DC-hnk converters because the A C supply
is rectified to D C before it is filtered and fed into the
inverter, in which thyristors or transistors are switched
sequentially to generate a variable-frequency supply to
the motor.
2.4.1 Cycloconverter
A cycloconverter converts the mains frequency into
a variable frequency directly through a one-step con­
version process. This is the essential difference from
other types of converter described later, where the line
power is first converted to D C and then to variable-
frequency through an inverter. A cycloconverter can be
programmed to generate variable-frequency variable-
voltage to drive an induction m o t o r . It can also be used
in the rotor circuit of a slipring motor for slip-energy
recovery, as described below. The output frequency is
limited to approximately 40% of its input frequency to
maintain an acceptable waveform. The cost and com­
plexity of power and control circuits make them un­
competitive whh other types of converter drives for
general apphcations. However, they have been used for
cement mill and steel mill applications, where the mills
are directly coupled to the motor which is supplied by
a low frequency cycloconverter. The cycloconverter has
not so far been used in C E G B power stations.
2.4.2 Slip-energy recovery systems
Slip-energy recovery systems, in conjunction with a
cycloconverter or one of the DC-link type converters
T y p e s and performance of motors
and a slipring induction m o t o r have been used, parti­
cularly in Western E u r o p e , for boiler feed p u m p drives.
However, a major disadvantage is the current collec­
tion associated with the slipring m o t o r which adversely
affects reliabihty and increases maintenance. The use
of cage induction motors u p to the h m h of forced
commutation (about 1.5 M W ) in conjunction with one
of the DC-link type converters, and brushless syn­
chronous motors above this level (up to about 20 M W ) ,
avoids these problems.
All static converters inject harmonics into the power
supply system, the a m o u n t of which is significantly
affected by the type of arrangement used for the recti­
fier. This arrangement also significantly affects the
power factor. The harmonic levels must be acceptable
to the power supply system and other connected plant.
All types of converter also inject harmonics into the
m o t o r , the extent of which depends on the type and
design of converter and also the m o t o r leakage re­
actance. One effect of this is to increase the motor
losses.
2.4.3 Voltage source converter
A voltage source converter feeding an induction motor
is shown schematically in Fig 7.4. The required output
voltage is achieved by controlling the rectifier and the
required frequency by controlhng the switching of the
inverter thyristors. Auxiliary forced-commutation cir­
cuits are required to turn off each inverter thyristor
at the end of its conduction period, but these circuits
are not described in detail here. Vohage source con­
verters can be used with standard induction m o t o r s ,
a h h o u g h some derating may be necessary due to the
effects of harmonics, as mentioned above. A n exam­
ple of the application of a vohage source converter
is to be found on the gas circulator drives for A G R
nuclear reactors, to provide low speed barring and
also a variable-speed facility for reactor depressurised
conditions.
2.4.4 Current source converter
A current source converter feeding an induction motor
is shown schematically in Fig 7.5. The D C current is
controlled by employing a current regulation loop,
which in turn controls the vohage from the phase-
controlled rectifier. The thyristors or transistors of the
VARIABLE VOLTAGE
D.C. LINK
A.c.
CONTROLLED INVERTER
RECTIFIER
FIG. 7.4 Vohage source converter
627
Motors
VARIABLE
VOLTAGE
D.C. LINK
AC
INVERTER
CONTROLLED
RECTIFIER
FIG. 7.5 Current source converter
inverter steer the current source into the three phases
of the motor winding to generate a variable-frequency
six-stepped current wave. Because of the large D C link
reactor and the controlled-current mode of operation,
the converter is inherently rugged and has an ability
to recover from malfunction. Since the motor is part of
the commutating circuit and commutation depends on
the motor subtransient reactance, the converter needs
to be matched electrically to the motor. The sudden
changes in current which are inherent in the output
current waveform result in large transient voltage spikes
at the motor terminals.
2.4.5 Pulse-width-modulated converter
A pulse-width-modulated converter feeding an induc­
tion motor is shown in Fig 7.6. A diode rectifier with
a smah fiher capachor generates a constant D C link
voltage: both the magnitude and frequency of the
output voltage are controlled within the inverter. The
inverter typically has a similar circuit configuration to
that of a six-step voltage source inverter, but has a
much more complex switching sequence: in addition,
there is usually an auxihary commutating thyristor
associated with each main thyristor. Microprocessors
are now being introduced into the control circuits.
Rapid thyristor or transistor switching is required, so
that each half of the output voltage waveform consists
of a number of pulses of equal amplitude. The mag­
nitude of the fundamental output vohage is controlled
by variation of the total voltage-time area for a half
cycle. By suitably modulating the pulse width, the
harmonic content of the output voltage can be reduced
to a low level.
For synchronous motors, the inverter is commutated
by the motor voltage, which is known as 'machine
CONSTANT VOLTAGE
D.C. LINK
A.c.
DIODE INVERTER
RECTIFIER
FIG. 7.6 Pulse-width-modulated converter
628
Chapter 7
commutated', and the relatively expensive forced-com­
mutation equipment necessary for induction motors
can be ehminated. However, forced commutation has
to be provided during the inhial starting period, up to
approximately 10% speed, because the vohage obtained
from the motor during this period is too low to com-
mutate the inverter. Machine-commutated converters
for synchronous machine drives are well established
and their previous uses include starting schemes for
large hydro-generators, e.g., Dinorwig power station,
gas-turbine sets and synchronous compensators at some
transmission sub-stations. They have additional merits
when used with brushless excitation arrangements on
the m o t o r and have been used by some Western E u r o ­
pean supply companies for variable-speed boiler feed
p u m p and fan drives. The advantages of variable-speed
A C converter drives can be summarised as fohows:
• High efficiency, which is maintained at reduced
powers and speeds.
• Wide speed range (10:1 readily achievable), with
accurate speed control ( 1 % ) .
• Low starting current (i.e., 1 to 1.5 χ full-load cur­
rent (FLC), compared with 5 to 7 χ F L C on cage
induction motors) with possible cost savings on the
power system due to lower starting current and also
to less arduous starting conditions for the m o t o r .
• Regenerative braking can be provided, if necessary.
• Converter equipment can be continuously monitored
thus facilitating identification of any faulty equip­
ment or components.
• Reduce space required local to driven equipment,
compared with cage induction motors driving through
hydrauhc couphngs.
• Maximum speed is not limited by power system
supply frequency, for example, speeds greater than
3000 r / m i n on 50 H z supply are possible.
• Relatively easy to convert existing fixed-speed drives
or to replace obsolete variable-speed drives. Exam­
ples have occurred during refit programmes of fossil-
fuel power stations.
2.5 DC motors
T h e main application of D C m o t o r s in modern power
stations is for standby auxiharies associated with vital
services, such as the lubricating oil system of the
turbine-generator u n h . T h u s , if the A C supply to the
station auxiliary system fails completely, the turbine-
generator bearings can be fed by the D C motor-driven
lubricating oil p u m p powered from the station bat­
tery. On older power stations, D C motors were often
used for variable-speed drives, such as boiler fans, etc.
However, with increasing power requirements, which
tended to exceed the capacity of commercially available
motors, together with the need to improve reliability

and reduce maintenance, this type is now seldom used
for such applications and has been largely superseded
by variable-speed A C motors, where such speed control
is required (see Section 2.4 of this chapter).
3 Design and construction
3.1 Mechanical construction
The construction of motors depends on many factors
such as the manufacturer, type, motor rating and, of
course, the apphcation. For smah m o t o r s , the use of
aluminium is increasing for stator frames, cage rotor
windings and even stator winding conductors. For
medium and large motors, the stator frames are mostly
of fabricated-steel box construction, although cast iron
is still sometimes used for medium sizes.
Figure 7.7 illustrates the sectional arrangement of a
typical medium-size horizontal cage-induction m o t o r .
The base is the main constructional member and pro­
FIG. 7.7 Sectional arrangement of cage induction motor
Design and construction
vides the location for the stator and rotor assemblies,
cooler and bearings. The base has to withstand tor­
sional loads, bending forces in both axes and the weight
of the m o t o r .
The principal C E G B requirements are:
• M o t o r frames, end shields, external end covers, ex­
ternal fan cowls to be constructed of metal and be
robust enough to withstand conditions experienced
within the power station such as vibration, impact
and environmental.
• Glass fibre and plastic components must be of ade­
quate design and robustness to whhstand the long
term effects of the environmental and operating
conditions.
• Duplicate motors and their major components to
be interchangeable.
• M o t o r s , including those with pedestal-type bearings,
to be designed so they can be moved as an integral
unit.
629
Motors
The construction of stator and rotor cores varies from
one manufacturer to another and is also a function
of type, size and speed. A c o m m o n method of con­
struction of stator cores of medium and large motors
is to build the laminations on mandrels. The lamina­
tions are then welded to a framework to form a stator
pack. For rotors running at high speed and for those
of large diameter, it may be necessary to shrink the
laminations onto the shaft or shaft spider.
The radial airgap between stator and rotor cores
must be of sufficient length to prevent the possibi­
lity of rubbing between stator and rotor cores during
all conditions of service. This must take into consi­
deration the effects of any shaft deflection due to
unbalanced magnetic pull. This conflicts with the need
to keep the radial airgap small in order to minimise
the magnetising current to obtain an improved elec­
trical performance, particularly power factor, of low
speed motors.
3.2 Types of enclosure
The motor enclosure is chosen to give adequate pro­
tection to persons against contact with live or moving
parts inside the enclosure and to the machine against
the ingress of sohd foreign bodies. Adequate protection
is also required against the harmful ingress of water
and other liquids. The most vulnerable part of an elec­
tric motor to contamination is the electrical insulation
of the windings and electrical terminations and it is
important that the correct choice of enclosure is made
in order to ensure good reliabihty. The ingress of coal
dust, cement dust, water, steam, oil or other contami­
nants could cause premature electrical or mechanical
failure, or overheating of the motor due to restriction
of ventilation circuits.
TABLE
Typical motor protective enclosures and methods of cooling
Description
Drip-proof, screen protected
Totally-enclosed, fan-ventilated
Totally-enclosed, closed-air-circuit, air cooled,
integral heat exchanger
Totally-enclosed, closed-air-circuit, air cooled,
machine-mounted heat exchanger
Totally-enclosed, closed-air-circuit, water cooled,
machine-mounted heat exchanger
Totally-enclosed, closed-air-circuit, water cooled,
separately-mounted heat exchanger
* Motors which are situated outdoors or exposed to the weather are required to have
a weather-protected enclosure, IPW 55.
630
Chapter 7
A primary consideration when choosing an enclosure
is to examine the environment and decide whether it
is suitably clean and dry for direct coohng, using a
ventilated type of machine, or whether there is any
risk from airborne dust, water, steam, oil or sahne at­
mosphere, which wih require total enclosure of the
motor. A significant factor in this choice is capital
cost, which is usually higher with totally-enclosed types.
Other factors which can influence the choice of en­
closure are whether the motor is situated indoors, or
is outdoors and exposed to the weather. Saline environ­
ments, such as those encountered with coastal power
stations, are particularly arduous. Site conditions dur­
ing the construction and commissioning of the power
station have also to be taken into account, since the
risk is greater, often for long periods of time.
A hst of standard machine enclosure types used in
C E G B power stations is given in Table 7.2.
The general trend is for the greater use of totally-
enclosed type motors and they are invariably used for
boiler auxiliaries, due to higher levels of contamina­
tion. There is also an increasing tendency to use them
on turbine-generator auxiliaries, in view of the risk
of contamination from steam, water or oil, or from
activation of fire protection equipment. With small
power motors up to approximately 10 k W , the techni­
cal and economic advantages of ventilated-type motors
are so marginal that totally enclosed motors are invaria­
bly used. For outdoor apphcations, totally-enclosed
weatherproof motors are used with special features
provided, such as bearing seals, gaskets between flanged
joints and protective finish to bare metal surfaces, such
as shaft extensions, etc. Pipe- or duct-ventilated motors
have occasionally been used in special applications, such
as circulating water p u m p s . These have advantages,
particularly for larger machines, where a source of
clean air is readily available (inlet duct), or where the
7.2
Protective Method of
enclosure cooling
BS4999, BS4999,
Part 20. Part 21.
(IEC34-5) (IEC34-6)
IP 22 IC 01
* IP 54 IC 01 41
* IP 54 IC 01 51
* IP 54 IC 01 61
* IP 54 IC W37 A81
* IP 54 IC W37 A91

discharge of relatively large quantities of hot air could
affect the ambient temperature to the detriment of
operating staff or other plant (outlet duct). However,
the more usual types of enclosure for circulating water
p u m p motors are drip-proof screen-protected or totally-
enclosed, closed-air-circuit, air cooled with an increas­
ing tendency towards the latter, particularly for coastal
stations due to the risk of saline contamination.
The type of enclosure is defined in BS4999, Part 20
(lEC 3 4 - 5 ) and contains an international code, con­
sisting of the letters I P fohowed by two numerals. The
first digit (0 to 5) signifies the degree of protection
against contact by persons with live or moving parts
inside the enclosure and of machines against ingress of
sohd foreign bodies. The second digit (0 to 8) signifies
the degree of protection against harmful ingress of
water. In general, the higher the number, the higher is
the degree of protection. Table 7.3 hsts some typical
motor auxiliary drives for a C E G B power station and
gives the types of enclosure used.
3.3 Methods of cooling
With the ventilated types of enclosure, the smaller
sizes of motor are normally provided with axial-type
ventilation, which comprises a single radial fan drawing
air through axial ducts in the stator and rotor cores
(iron laminations), and over the endwindings: it is
then discharged to atmosphere. For larger machines,
the coohng surface is increased by using a combination
of axial and radial ducts in the core. The largest
machines usually have radial-type ventilation with two
FIG. 7.8 Section of radial ventilated induction motor
Design and construction
parallel air circuits: shaft-mounted fans at each end of
the rotor circulate cooling air towards the centre of the
rotor and radially outwards through ducts in the rotor
and stator cores. Figure 7.8 shows a section through a
typical radially-ventilated drip-proof m o t o r .
With totally-enclosed machines, the variations in
overall designs are greater but the arrangements of
cooling air flow within the machine are basically simi­
lar, except that they are arranged for a closed circuh.
At the small power end of the range, the totally-
enclosed m o t o r depends on free convection at its outer
surfaces w h h or without an internal fan. For larger
m o t o r s , both internal and external fans are provided,
with heat transfer taking place through fins provided
on the stator frame. This is the well known totally-
enclosed fan-ventilated m o t o r . Bigger motors have heat
exchangers built into the stator frame, or more often
are provided with an integral air-to-air heat exchanger
unit m o u n t e d either on the machine or, for the largest
machines, separately m o u n t e d . Figure 7.9 shows a
section through a typical closed-air-circuit air cooled
m o t o r with radial ventilation.
A n alternative to the air-to-air heat exchanger is the
air-to-water type, where water passes through parallel
rows of cooling tubes and the m o t o r primary cooling
air flows over the tubes. The outsides of the tubes are
usually finned to increase the surface area. Figure 7.10
shows a section through a typical closed-air-circuh
water cooled m o t o r with radial-type ventilation.
For enclosed type motors rated u p to approximately
1500 kW the use of water coohng is generally not
technically or economically preferred and air cooling
631
Motors Chapter 7

TABLE 7.3
Some typical motor auxiliary drives (660 MW turbine-generators)

Power, Speed, Voltage, Number

Auxiliary Type motor Enclosure Mounting
kW r/min V per unit

1 Turbine-generator
AC Lub-oil pumps Sq. cage 53 1450 415 TEFC V 1
Standby lub-oil DC 19 1450 250 DC DPSP V 1
Jacking oil pumps Sq. cage 36 940 415 TEFC Η 1
Turning gear Sq. cage 50 1450 415 TEFC Η 1
Oil purifier Sq. cage 11 1450 415 TEFC Η 1
Hydrogen seal oil Sq. cage 15 1450 415 TEFC Η 1
Standby seal oil DC 15 1450 250 DC TEFC Η 1
Stator winding liquid
pump: — main Sq. cage 37 2930 415 TEFC Η 1
— standby DC 37 2930 250 DC TEFC Η

2 Feed pumps and feed

heating plant
Starting/standby Sq. cage 9000 1480 11 000 CACW Η 2 χ 50<ί/ο
Feed pumps or slipring
Feed suction pump Sq. cage 920 990 3300 CACA Η 3 χ 5007ο
Condenser extraction pump Sq. cage 920 990 3300 CACA V 3 χ 50%

3 Coal-fired boiler
ID fans Sq. cage 3200 590 11 000 CACA Η 2 χ 50<ί7ο
FD fans Sq. cage 2200 590 11 000 CACA Η 2 χ 50^70
Pulveriser mills Sq. cage 330 980 3300 CACA Η 10
PA fans Sq. cage 500 1480 3300 CACA Η 10
Sootblower compressor Sq. cage 2630 1480 11 000 CACA Η 4/station

4 Circulating water pumps

CW pumps Sq. cage 3500 980 11 000 DPSP V 4/station

5 Reactor — AGR
Gas circulators Sq. cage 5000 2980 or 11 000 Submerged Η or 8
1470 C02 V

6 Reactor - PWR
Reactor coolant pumps Sq. cage 6000 1475 11 000 Special * V 4

Abbreviations TEFC — totally-enclosed fan-cooled CACA — closed-air-circuit air cooled

DPSP — drip-proof screen protected PA — primary air
Η — horizontal CW — circulating water
V — vertical Sq.cage — squirrel cage induction
ID — induced draught AGR — advanced gas cooled reactor
FD — forced draught PWR — pressurised water reactor
CACW — closed-air-circuit water cooled * — located inside reactor containment

is S t a n d a r d p r a c t i c e . For l a r g e r motors up to a p p r o x i ­ sible in order to minimise the possibihty of water

mately 5000 k W , both air a n d water c o o h n g are usu­
ally available, but air cooling is preferred unless there
is substantial justification for selecting the water cooled
type, e.g., o ver ah cost, ambient temperature, etc., since
air cooled motors are self-contained and not reliant
on an external supply of c o o l i n g water. For motors
above approximately 5000 k W , the physical size of
air-to-air heat exchangers becomes large compared to
water cooling, due to the poorer heat transfer pro­
perties of air, and for machines of this size water
cooling is usuahy preferred for cost and physical size
considerations.
Where water cooling is employed, the coolers are
mounted at the side or underneath the motor if pos­
contaminating the windings in the event of a leakage.
If the cooler is mounted above the m o t o r , spray baffles
should be fitted to deflect any leaking water spray
away from the windings and towards the b o t t o m of the
machine where an alarm should be provided. Catch­
ment trays should also be provided under the cooler
stack to contain any leaked water. At coastal power
stations, the use of sea water for direct cooling of
motors is avoided to ehminate the risk of corrosion
and fouhng of cooler tubes, towns main water being
always used.
The method of cooling is defined in BS4999, Part
21 ( l E C 3 4 - 6 ) which contains an international code
consisting of the letters I C , a group of one letter and

632
 Design and construction

FIG. 7.9 Section of closed-air-circuit air cooled motor

FIG. 7.10 Section of closed-air-circuit water cooled motor

two numerals for each coolant circuit. The letter
signifies the nature of the coolant (e.g., A — air, W
— water), the first numeral ( 0 - 9 ) the means of cir­
culating the coolant and the second numeral ( 0 - 9 ) the
method of supplying the power necessary to circulate
the coolant. Where there is a primary and secondary
coolant circuh, the secondary is stated first, e.g., IC
W 3 7 A91 (closed-air-circuit w a t e r c o o l e d , with
machine-mounted cooler). Examples of types common­
ly used by the C E G B are given in Table 7.2.

633
Motors
Separate motor-driven cooling fans are occasionally
used for very low-speed motors or for variable-speed
motors having a wide speed range. Examples are varia­
ble-speed A C commutator motors on older power
stations for boiler fan drives.
3.4 Windings
Stator windings normally used by the C E G B are:
Random wound (Mush) Single- or two-layer lap
415 V winding, with circular
conductors. Considered
unsuitable for use on
voltages ^ 3 . 3 kV.
• Diamond windings — Two-layer lap winding,
3.3 kV and above with coils pre-formed
and insulated prior to
winding. Open-type
slots. Used on vohages
^ 3 . 3 kV.
Note: for the largest
motors, half coils may
be used, with turn-to-
t u m joints made during
the winding process.
• Hairpin (concentric) — Single-layer winding.
windings — Slot portion and closed
end of winding pre­
formed 3.3 kV and
above and insulated.
Open end of winding
has to be formed and
individual turn-to-turn
conductor joints made
during the winding
process. Semi-closed
slots are normally used.
Note: This has now
been largely superseded
by the diamond wind­
ing, due to cost, ease
of r e p a i r a n d high
load-losses.
The stator winding and its insulation system is one
of the most critical areas of the design. This needs to
be of high reliability, of established and proven design,
and able to meet the combined effects of:
• Electrical/dielectric stresses.
• Thermal endurance.
• Thermo-cychng.
• Mechanical and thermal stresses.
• Contamination.
634
Chapter 7
• Environmental conditions.
Power station motors are required to have a hfe en­
durance of at least 18 000 starts.
Stator windings must be adequately supported, braced
and blocked to provide sufficient rigidity during all
conditions of service. Special attention needs to be
given to the support and bracing system of the stator
endwindings of cage induction motors which are to
be direct-on-line started, to cope with the mechani­
cal and thermal stresses produced by the high starting
current. The support system for windings of vertical
motors must prevent any downward displacement oc­
curring in service. Magnetic slot wedges are generally
not so reliable as the non-magnetic type, in that they
are liable to delaminate and loosen, so their use is
therefore avoided where possible. The electrical joints
and connections must withstand the mechanical and
thermal stresses involved and should be of brazed or
welded construction. W o u n d rotors for slipring, A C
commutator and D C motors are normahy wound two-
layer lap or wave, depending on the voltage and current
involved. Similar considerations apply as for stator
windings, but additionally the windings must be de­
signed to withstand the rotational stresses. The windings
are connected to sliprings or commutators.
Cage windings must also be designed to withstand
the thermal and mechanical stresses during starting,
which can be high, particularly on high inertia drives
such as boiler induced- and forced-draught fan drives.
Rotor bars must fit tightly in their slots to minimise
bar vibration in a radial direction, which could cause
premature bar failure. The cage short-circuiting end-
rings should be of jointless construction in order to
avoid the risk of joint failure.
3.5 Insulation systems
The classification of insulation systems is given in
BS2757. Insulated windings are Class Β or F . Class Η
is generally only used for applications involving high
ambient temperatures such as sootblower motors. In­
sulation systems must be of proven design and relia­
bility: for voltages of ^ 3 . 3 kV, they are required by
the C E G B to be type-tested.
Further discussion on the performance and test
methods of high vohage A C m o t o r insulation is dis­
cussed by Schwarz 1969 [5]. The C E G B testing require­
ments for insulation systems of motors of ^ 3 . 3 kV are
given in ESI 4 4 - 5 . A summary of these tests follows.
Type tests Intended to evaluate the basic design,
materials and manufacturing process of the insulation
system. They involve testing at least two sample cohs.
The tests include:
• Dielectric loss tangent/voltage characteristic of slot
cell insulation and its stability during one thermal
cycle of 140°C ^ 5 kV.
 Design and construction

• Inter-turn insulation 1 min, 50 Hz withstand vohage,

also instantaneous 50 H z whhstand vohage.

• Slot cell and end winding insulation 1 min, 50 H z

withstand voltage, also instantaneous 50 Hz with­
stand voltage.

Routine quality control tests during manufacture in­

clude: COIL WOUND FIRST
AS FLAT LOOP

• Dielectric loss tangent/voltage characteristics at

room temperature ^ 5 kV. Test requirements depend
on the type of insulation system, i.e., resin-rich ENDWINDING
or vacuum/pressure impregnated (VPI), and also SLOT PORTION

on voltage, polarity and kW output of m o t o r .

• Inter-turn insulation — a high frequency impulse

voltage is injected to the leads of each coil, the Λ CONNECTION LEADS
NOSE
peak voltage being Upeak = 3 Un V 2 / V 3 , where Un
is the rated line-to-hne vohage.

• Complete winding — 1 min, 50 Hz overvoltage test

to BS4999, Part 60. •PICTORIAL VIEW OF
•PULLED DIAMOND- COILS

The insulation systems of stator windings are specified

to be of the epoxy type, with thermosetting materials,
and with the main slot cell insulation based essentially
on mica. The conductor and endwinding insulation of
windings ^ 6 . 6 kV should also be based on mica. The
coils adjacent to the ends of the slots on such windings
are treated to provide electric stress control, usually
by a semi-conductive tape or semi-conductive varnish.
The slot portions of the coils are treated to prevent
corona discharge, usually by means of an outer layer
of conducting tape.
The windings must be impregnated and suitably pro­
cessed to seal them effectively to prevent deterioration
from adverse environmental conditions at site. T w o
insulation systems are in general use for windings at
^ 3 . 3 kV:
SECTION SHOWING
TYPICAL SLOT
• The resin-rich system Coils are insulated with tapes CONFIGURATION

heavily loaded with uncured resin, usually referred 2 TURN COIL.

to as B-stage resin. The coils are then cured by heat­
ing and pressing individually in moulds, or some­
times (for smaller machines) after winding into the
stator core. Figure 7.11 shows detahs of an 11 kV
diamond-type coil, including slot configuration.
• Vacuum/pressure impregnation (VPI) The stator is
wound with coils, which are insulated with dry semi-
porous tapes: the winding is then vacuum dried,
impregnated under pressure and cured by heating.
The resin-rich system has been used in the UK for
many years, but is tending to be superseded by the
VPI system which has been extensively used in the
USA and other countries for several years, with much
success. This is mainly due to the better quality control
possible during manufacture and the achievement of
void-free windings.
12C0ND/TURN
FIG. 7.11 11 kV diamond-type coil
3.6 Bearings
Bearings can broadly be divided into two main types:
rolling element bearings (sometimes referred to as
frictionless bearings) a n d plain bearings. These can
take various forms, depending on the rated power and
speed, whether the shaft is vertical or horizontal, and
also on the radial and axial loadings.
Rolling bearings take the form of balls, cyhndrical
rollers, tapered or spherical rollers. They depend for
their satisfactory operation on the clearance between
the rolling elements and their races, sometimes referred
to as the diametral bearing clearance. Grease is gen-

635
Motors Chapter 7

erally used as a lubricant, but for certain designs or

applications oil is occasionally used. Lithium-based
greases have replaced soda-based greases for power
station motors, due to their stability at higher tem­
peratures and improved lubricating properties. The
construction of the bearing assembly should be such
that the bearings can be dismantled without risk of
damage. Split-type roller bearings have been used to
fachitate maintenance on some large motors, e.g., cir­
culating water pumps. Precautions need to be taken
against the effects of any vibration which could be
transmitted when the motor is not running, for ex­
ample, standby motors. Pre-loaded bah bearings are
often used for these applications. Alternatively, plain
bearings are used, since these are inherently less prone
to damage from such effects. Figure 7.12 shows a typi­
cal arrangement of a grease lubricated rolling bearing.
Within the size range in which they are used (see
Table 7.4), r o l h n g bearings have the following
advantages:
• Low cost.
• Replacement bearings usually readily available.
• Grease lubricant gives good protection against in­
gress of moisture and dirt into motor.
• Easier to seal against leakage of grease into motor,
as compared with oil.
• Low friction torque at starting.

The larger power motors use plain bearings, which

may be of the sleeve or tilting-pad type. Oil lubricated
bearings may be self-lubricated by means of oil rings,
or by a disc running in an oil reservoir. Where forced-
oil lubrication is required (for example, in the case
of high speeds of 3000 r / m i n or high bearing loads),
the oil p u m p is driven from the main shaft system and
is self-priming. Where possible, such a lubricating
system is made common to the motor and its driven
auxiliary.
Tilting-pad bearings are used where appreciable axial
thrusts are present, for example, in vertical motors for
circulating water p u m p s . Lubrication must be adequate
during starting, particularly of standby equipment with
automatic start, and also during running-down if this

TABLE 7.4
Type of motor bearing FIG. 7 . 1 2 Typical arrangement of a grease lubricated
rolling-type bearing
Type of
Synchronous speed — r/min Rating
bearing
is of long duration, such as can occur on high-inertia
1000 and below Up to 750 kW Rolling loads. A motor-driven oil p u m p may additionally be
1000 and below Above 750 kW Plain fitted in such cases. A motor-driven jacking oil p u m p
Above 1000, up to 1500 Up to 530 kW Rolling may be needed for starting drives with heavy shaft
Plain
loads. Figure 7.13 shows a typical arrangement of an oil
Above 1000, up to 1500 Above 530 kW
lubricated sleeve-type bearing.
Above 1500 Up to 375 kW Rolling
For motors above 750 k W , it is the practice for
Above 1500 Above 375 kW Plain
bearings of the motor and its driven auxiliary to be

636

FIG. 7 . 1 3 Typical arrangement of an oil lubricated
sleeve-type bearing
of the same type in order t o ensure that incorrect
distribution of bearing loads does not occur due to
differences in shaft hft during run-up, or of different
rates of bearing wear.
Provision must be made for the prevention of
damage to bearings by any shaft currents which may
be produced by uneven fluxes in the magnetic circuit
of the motor. This is achieved by insulating the
bearings, if shaft currents are hkely to occur.
Table 7.4 gives details of the C E G B practice for
bearing applications.
3.7 Terminal boxes
Particular attention has t o be given t o the design of the
terminal arrangements a n d of terminal boxes in order
to achieve a high degree of reliability a n d also to faci­
litate installation of the power supply cables. Within
Technical requirements
power stations, the electrical auxiliary system to which
the motors are connected is subject to high fauh levels,
so the effects of an electrical fault must be taken into
account in the design of the terminal arrangement
and terminal box to prevent a possible explosion due
to the rapid heating of gas in a confined space with
risk of injury to personnel or damage t o plant (see
Schwarz 1962 [6]).
The C E G B requirements are summarised as follows:
• M i n i m u m electrical clearance a n d creepage distances
are specified.
• Terminal boxes must be suitable for the type and
size of cable to be used.
• Terminal boxes for 415 V motors u p t o 75 k W shah
be totally enclosed (IP 54) but may be open to the
interior of the m o t o r . Above 75 k W , the terminal
boxes must be constructed of steel, be totally enclos­
ed (IP 57) a n d sealed from the m o t o r interior.
• For 3.3 kV m o t o r s , a standard terminal box has
been developed in conjunction with manufacturers.
This is totally-enclosed (IP 57), phase-insulated,
and of the pressure-rehef type, with fully-insulated
terminals. M a x i m u m fault capacity 250 M V A . Maxi­
m u m current rating 290 A . For use w h h three-
core, plastic-insulated cables u p t o 300 m m ^ , solid
aluminium or copper conductor. Figure 7.14 shows
details of this terminal b o x .
• For 11 kV m o t o r s , a standard terminal box has
been developed in conjunction with manufacturers.
This is totally-enclosed (IP57), phase-segregated,
and of the pressure-rehef type, with fuHy-insulated
terminals. Maximum fault capacity 750 M V A . Maxi­
m u m current rating 650 A . For use with three single-
core, polymeric-insulated cables u p t o 500 m m ^ ,
with moulded elbow-type connector. Figure 7.15
shows details of this terminal b o x .
• Terminal boxes for ^ 3 . 3 kV to be type-tested to
withstand internal short-circuit a n d through-fault
current capability.
4 Technical requirements
Some of the principal requirements of C E G B power
station motors are given below. l E C documents equi­
valent to BS are also given.
Relevant standards: BS5000, P a r t 40
BS4999, Parts 10, 20, 2 1 , 30, 32,
3 3 , 4 1 , 5 0 , 5 1 , 6 0 ( l E C 34, Parts
1, 2 a n d 4 t o 10).
ESI Standards 4 4 - 3 , 4 4 - 4 , 4 4 - 5 .
Service conditions: Ambient air 40°C (max)
(normal) Cooling water 30°C (max)
637
Motors Chapter 7
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Motors
Temperature rises: To BS4999, Part 32 (lEC 34 —
1), except that temperature
rise of Class F insulation to
be to hmits of Class B.
Rating: Maximum continuous rating.
Minimum voltage 8 0 % rated vohage
during starting
period:
Variation of 94^0 to 106% voltage and 9 6 %
vohage and to 102% Hz.
frequency: Capable of continued operation
at 7 5 % voltage for 5 minutes
without injurious heating.
Transient recovery: To recover after a power supply
system disturbance causing loss
of voltage for 0.2 seconds, fol­
lowed by sudden restoration
to 6 0 % voltage for 3 seconds,
followed by restoration to 8 0 %
vohage, and then ultimate re­
covery to normal.
Starting (locked- Selected from BS4999, Part 41
rotor) kVA for (see Table 7.1)
cage induction
motors:
Locked-rotor Must be adequate to meet re­
torque for cage quirements of driven load, but
induction motors: in any event C E G B practice
requires the values to be not
less than those given in BS4999,
Part 4 1 .
Starting (run-up) The accelerating torque at any
torque of cage speed and 8 0 % voltage must
induction motors: be not less than 10% of motor
rated load. The motor starting
(run-up) torque at 100% volt­
age must also be not less than
1.7 times the torque obtained
from a load torque which var­
ies as the square of the speed
and is equal to 100% torque
at fuh speed.
Maximum (pull-out) 200% full-load torque
torque:
Noise levels: Γο BS4999, Part 5 1 , except that
in no case shall the mean sound
pressure level exceed 87dB(A) at
1 metre from the surface of the
machine.
640
Chapter 7
Harmonics: Vohage distortion less than 7 % ,
(AC converter with individual harmonic com-
drives) ponents to l E C 1 4 6 - 2 .
Nuclear Qualification of Class IE safety-
qualification: related motors to IEEE 334.
5 Power station auxiliary drives
Details of some of the more important motor auxiliary
drives required on a modern C E G B power station with
660 M W turbine-generator (TG) units are given below,
and also in Table 7.4.
5.1 Boiler feed pumps
The normal arrangement adopted currently by C E G B
is for 1 X 100% steam turbine-driven feed p u m p , with
2 X 5 0 % starting and standby motor-driven variable-
speed feed p u m p s . Motor-driven suction stage pumps
are also required for the feed p u m p s .
Since the motor-driven feed pumps are required for
starting and standby duty only, the choice of motor is
largely dictated by first cost. Variable-speed slipring
motors with variable rotor resistance liquid type con­
trollers have been used. Squirrel-cage induction motors
with speed control by hydrauhc couplings have also
been used, particularly for nuclear power stations,
where starting is required infrequently.
The variable-speed shpring induction motors are ty­
pically 1480 r / m i n (maximum), 9 M W , 11 kV, starting
current 100% fuh load, 50 Hz, with speed variation
100% to 7 0 % by rotor-resistance control, with liquid-
type speed controhers. The feed p u m p is driven through
speed-increasing gears at 8000 r / m i n (maximum). Three
X 5 0 % duty suction stage pumps are provided, driven
by 1000 kW, 1480 r / m i n cage induction motors. Figure
7.16 shows a typical slipring induction motor feed
p u m p drive.
With the cage induction m o t o r drive, the motors are
typically 1480 r / m i n , 10 M W , 11 kV, 50 M V A at start,
50 Hz, driving through hydraulic couphngs with speed
variation 1 0 0 - 7 0 % . These are mechanically coupled to
the feed pumps via speed-increasing gearboxes at 8000
r / m i n (maximum) p u m p speed. The suction stage p u m p
is rated at 1000 kW, 1480 r / m i n and is coupled to a
shaft extension of the main drive motor.
5.2 Coal- and oil-fired boiler units
5.2.1 Draught plant
T h e practice is to install two induced-draught and two
forced-draught fans per boher u n h , each working at
full-load when the boiler is at continuous maximum
rating (CMR). It is possible to run the boiler unit at
reduced load in the event of failure of one of the fans,
a h h o u g h it is expected that this condition would not
be allowed to continue for any length of time. The
 P o w e r station auxiliary drives

STATOR WINDINGS

/
COOLING FAN

FIBREGLASS SLIP RING COVER

ROTOR WINDINGS
DRIVE END
FOR H.P. STAGE

REMOVABLE
PERSPEX COVER PEDESTAL EARTHED
THROUGH REMOVABLE
COPPER STRIP
DRIVE END FOR OTHERWISE
SUCTION STAGE FULLY INSULATED

DIRECTION OF
FLOW

BEARING ,,
OIL INLET \ I

BEARING
OIL OUTLET HEAT EXCHANGER
TUBES
PEDESTAL FULLY/
INSULATED

SLIPRINGS HEAT EXCHANGER

COOLING WATER
INLET
BRUSHES

INSPECTION WINDOWS

FIG. 7 . 1 6 Typical slipring induction-motor feed pump drive

trend is for the motors to be single-speed cage induction
type, although two-speed cage induction and variable-
speed stator-fed A C commutator motors have been
used. The moments of inertia of the fans are high, being
several times those of their respective motors, which re­
suhs in relatively long run-up times, typically 50 to 80 s.
5.2.2 Milling plant
The milhng plant comprises the coal pulveriser mill,
primary air fan (or exhauster fan), coal feeder and
separator. Standby capacity is provided. The pulveriser
mills usuahy need more maintenance than any other
auxihary in the station: for this reason, the running
and standby units are frequently interchanged. Coal
pulveriser mills require a high starting torque (typically
200<7o) and a relatively high number of starts per hour
(typicahy six). The vibration level of the plant is also
relatively high and a robust motor is therefore required.
Totahy-enclosed air cooled squirrel-cage motors are
usually provided.
5.3 Nuclear reactors — AGR
5.3.1 Gas c i r c u l a t o r s
A typical arrangement is for eight gas circulators to
be installed in each reactor to circulate the primary
coolant C O 2 through the reactor core and boilers.
Two basic configurations are in c o m m o n use in the
C E G B , horizontal and vertical; this description con­
centrates on the vertical configuration, but many of the
principles apply to b o t h . Figure 7.17 shows the location
of a vertically-opposed gas circulator in a nuclear re­
actor at Heysham 7 power station.
Each gas circulator is a single-stage centrifugal type,
delivering 461 k g / s of C O 2 at 41 bar and a temperature
of 287°C. The inlet gas temperature to the circulator
is 278°C and the pressure rise across the circulator is
2.83 bar.
The circulator is driven at 3000 r / m i n by an 11 kV
m o t o r mounted below the impeller on the circulator
shaft (see Fig 7.18). A 415 V pony m o t o r , mounted on
the circulator shaft below the main motor, drives the
circulator at barring speeds below 350 r / m i n . The motor
unit for each circulator is encapsulated and comprises
the composite assembly of main motor, pony motor,
rotor shaft, bearings, impeller, inlet guide vanes and
isolating d o m e operating mechanism. This assembly is
contained completely within the reactor pressure bound­
ary. The circulator unit can be withdrawn and replaced
for maintenance w h h the reactor depressurised.
The impeller shaft passes through a barrier plate
which is provided with a labyrinth seal to minimise

641
Motors
LOCATION OF GAS CIRCULATOR
FIG. 7 . 1 7 Position of gas circulator unit within
AGR reactor
hot gas flow between the motor compartment and
the reactor. The impeller operates in reactor gas at
nearly 300°C, whereas the motor is isolated thermally
to operate at temperatures of about 60°C. Although
normal operation is in C O 2 at 41 bar, the circulator
must be capable of operation in air at atmospheric
pressure (or reduced C O 2 pressure) for commissioning,
maintenance or during fault conditions.
Main motor
The circulator main drive motor is an 11 kV, two-pole
squirrel-cage induction machine contained completely
within the reactor pressure boundary. The motor,
mounted on the circulator rotor shaft with the 415 V
pony motor, rotates at a nominal speed of 3000 r / m i n
and maximum continuous rating of 5.59 M W .
The motor is designed to BS2613 Class F insula­
tion, but operates normally within Class Β temperature
h m h s . The motor is capable of operating continuously,
at rated torque, at any frequency between 48 and 51 Hz
and at any vohage between ± 5 % of the nominal value.
The motors are designated for 'essential duty' and
are capable of continuous operation at 7 5 % nominal
volts at 50 Hz for a period of 5 minutes without in­
jurious heating. They are also capable of recovering
normal operation in the event of a system disturbance
642
Chapter 7
causing temporary loss of supply voltage for periods of
up to three seconds, followed by a sudden restoration
initially to 8 0 % nominal voltage.
The motor stator windings and laminations are con­
tained within the main motor outer frame which is a
mild steel cyhndrical ribbed fabrication with top and
bottom flanges (see Fig 7.19). The top flange ahgns with
the lower face of the top bearing bath and the bottom
flange aligns with the b o t t o m bearing batch assembly
and incorporates holes for the twelve motor securing
bolts. The stator and outer frame complete weighs
approximately 14.5 tonnes.
The rotor is fitted on the forged carbon steel shaft
together with the impeller, drive-end bearing sleeve,
motor cooling fan, pony motor rotor, non-reverse
clutch, pulsing disc and non-drive end thrust collar (see
Fig 7.20).
Intensive research, development and full-scale testing
were required to estabhsh the design of these motors,
which have to operate under arduous conditions. The
motor has also to withstand specified radiation levels
and also operate whh contamination from lubricating
oil mist. All these presented problems; in particular,
the design of bearings under high rates of change of
pressure of the ambient gas, the insulation system, the
electrical design and thermal design. These are discussed
in more detah (see Schwarz 1973 [7]).
A very high rehabihty is required, particularly since
the units are inside the reactor pressure containment
and even apart from safety aspects, any unplanned
outage can be very costly.
5.4 Nuclear reactors — PWR
5.4.1 Reactor coolant pumps
A typical arrangement is four reactor coolant pumps
per reactor which are located within the reactor con­
tainment. The p u m p unit consists of a vertical single-
stage centrifugal-type p u m p , with vertical drive motor
mounted above the p u m p and directly coupled to it.
The motor has a drip-proof enclosure, but the cooling
air outlet is water cooled. A flywheel is located at
the top of the motor to provide the required coast-
down capability in the event of loss of electrical power
supply to the motor. This hmits the transient tem­
peratures within the reactor under such conditions. The
motor must withstand specified radiation levels within
the containment.
Figure 7.21 is a cutaway view of a typical reactor
coolant p u m p and m o t o r unit.
5.4.2 Safety-related drives
There are a number of drives, classified as safety-related
category Class IE to IEEE Standard 334, which are
essential for the safety of the reactor during normal
periods of shutdown or emergency periods fohowing
loss-of-coolant accidents which could involve severe
 P o w e r station auxiliary drives

INLET DUCT

ISOLATING DOME

FLOW
STRAIGHTENER
CONE

IMPELLER

SECONDARY
CONTAINMENT
BARRIER PLATE

LABYRINTH
BLOCK

MAIN MOTOR
OUTER FRAME

DOME OPERATING
RODS

MOTOR
SECURING BOLTS

J A C K I N G O I L PUMPS

I.G V . O P E R A T I N G
GAS COOLER FOR SHAFT
MOTOR VENTILATION

I.G.V. I N T E R L O C K END ENCLOSURE

UNIT PLATE

I.G.V. D R I V E M O T O R S I.G.V. G E A R B O X

FIG. 7 . 1 8 Sectional arrangement of a gas circulator

643
 Motors Chapter 7

TERMINALS
LOCATION OF
MAIN MOTOR

STATOR WITHDRAWN
FROM FRAME

OUTER
FRAME CLAMPS TERMINALS

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

NON-DRIVE
END
COILS STATOR LOCKING
PLATE

FIG. 7.19 Gas circulator — main motor stator and outer frame

644
 Testing

PONY
MOTOR ROTOR

CLUTCH AND PULSING

IMPELLER MAIN DISC ASSEMBLY
MOTOR ROTOR

FIG. 7 . 2 0 Gas circulator — main motor rotor

radiation, thermal and environmental stresses. The test
requirements to be met in order to quahfy or prove
the design and reliabihty of such motors are given
in IEEE 334. Examples are motors for centrifugal
charging pumps, high head safety injection pumps and
residual heat-removal containment spray p u m p s .
5.5 Circulating water punnps
The usual arrangement of the cooling water system is
a bus system, in which the coohng water is taken to a
common chamber whence a number of pumps dis­
charge into a c o m m o n bus-main supplying all the con­
densers in the station. In view of the vhal importance
of the cooling water to the station output and in pre­
venting plant damage due to loss of cooling water, spare
plant capacity is installed.
The motors are usually of the cage induction type.
Some installations use vertically-mounted m o t o r s ,
where-as others are horizontal. Figure 7.22 shows a
typical vertical-shaft circulating water p u m p m o t o r . The
pumps are usuahy of low speed (typically 500 down to
150 r / m i n ) . With p u m p speeds lower than about 500
r / m i n , it is usual to provide a motor driving through a
speed-reducing gearbox, this being the most economic
arrangement.
The more usual arrangement is to provide a p u m p -
house, sometimes with removable or shding roof for
maintenance purposes. Both drip-proof and totally-
enclosed motors have been used. The tendency is
towards the totally-enclosed type, which gives greater
protection against contamination of the windings. At
coastal power stations, the stator windings are some­
times additionally of the sealed type to protect against
the sahne conditions.
6 Testing
Testing can be categorised into two groups: develop­
ment testing and works testing.
The development of new designs and techniques,
new materials and component parts is a research and
development activity. Verification of the properties,
performance, etc., must be obtained and is usuahy
achieved by a testing process. Simulation methods may
have to be used in some cases where direct testing is not
possible or practical, e.g., accelerated ageing tests on
insulation systems, where, for example, a relationship
between voltage, temperature and time to breakdown
can be established and the tests made at elevated tem­
peratures and voltages. Fatigue testing of bars of cage
induction motors is another example, where such tests
are m a d e to establish the total number of starts that
can safely be m a d e during the hfe of the m o t o r .
Works testing on the completed motor needs to
be m a d e to verify that the motor is electrically and
mechanically sound and that the stated performance
characteristics are achieved. Such tests are categorised
into basic and routine tests. Basic tests are in general
m a d e on the first m o t o r of each type and routine tests
on all other m o t o r s . Table 7.5 hsts the individual test
requirements for induction m o t o r s .
TABLE 7.5
Works tests on induction motors
Test Basic Routine
Resistance of windings (cold)
No load losses and current
Locked rotor — current
— torque
Starting (run-up) torque characteristics
for cage motors over 3 7 5 kW
Direct-on start at full voltage
(cage motors) ( ^ 3 . 3 kV)
Rotor open-circuit induced
voltage (slipring)
Temperature rise test
Power factor and efficiency
Speed control (variable-speed slipring)
Maximum (pull-out) torque
Vibration measurement
Noise level <^

645
Motors Chapter 7

UPPER RADIAL BEARING

THRUST BEARING THRUST BEARING

OIL LIFT PUMP
& MOTOR

MOTOR SHAFT

MOTOR STATOR

MAIN LEAD CONDUIT BOX

MOTOR UNIT
ASSEMBLY

LOWER RADIAL BEARING

No.3 SEAL LEAK OFF

No.2 SEAL LEAK OFF

PUMP SHAFT

COOLING WATER INLET

CASING

DISCHARGE NOZZLE

IMPELLER
SUCTION NOZZLE

FIG. 7 . 2 1 Reactor coolant pump and motor unit

7 Future trends sought. Improved materials wih continue to be de­

Motors for power station auxiliary drives are likely to
continue to grow, both in power requirement and
complexity. More emphasis is likely to be placed on
the achievement of high reliability, due to increasing
costs of unplanned outages, and on safety to person­
nel. This implies extension of a n d / o r improvements
to existing testing techniques and could include tests
to determine the permissible number of direct-on-line
starts in the life of cage induction motors. With in­
creasing attention being given to the conservation of
energy, improvement in operating efficiencies will be
veloped. These could include lubricating grease whh a
higher withstand-temperature and improved capability
of insulation systems.
The use of motors having brushes, sliprings and
commutators is likely to continue to be avoided. An
increasing use of A C variable-speed converter drives
is forecast, particularly with improvements in tech­
niques and reduction in cost of converter equipment.
Linear motors are hkely to find an increasing number
of applications where linear motion is required, such as
cranes and sliding doors.

646
 Additional references

THRUST AND GUIDE CENTRIFUGAL

BEARING SWITCH INSULATED PLATE OIL INLET

OIL DRAIN

OIL OUTLET
AIR
INLET

OIL OVERFLOW

, HkVMAIN
TERMINAL BOX

NEUTRAL TERMINAL
ACCESS COVER

THERMOCOUPLE
TERMINAL BOX
ANTI-CONDENSATION
HEATER TERMINAL BOX

OIL FLOW INDICATOR

AIR INLET
OIL INLET

OIL OUTLET

AIR VENT EARTHING VERTICAL INSULATED OIL OVERFLOW OIL DRAIN

BRUSHGEAR GUIDE PLATE
BEARING

FIG. 7.22 Circulating water pump motor

8 References 9 Additional references

[1] Alger, P.L.: The nature of polyphase induction machines:
Wiley: 1951
[2] Alger, P.L.: Induction machines, 2nd Edition: Gordon & 9.1 ESI Standards
Breach: 1970
ESI 4 4 - 3 Electric motors specification (3.3 kV and above)
[3] Say, M.G.: Alternating current machines, London.: Pitman:
1983 ESI 4 4 - 4 Electric motors specification (415 V and below)

[4] Adkins, B. and Gibbs, W.J.: Polyphase commutator machines: ESI 4 4 - 5 Testing the insulation systems for stator coils for rotating
Cambridge University Press: 1951 electrical machines (3.3 kV and above).
[5] Schwarz, K.K.: Performance requirements and test methods for
high voltage a.c. motor insulation: Proc. lEE, Vol 116, No. 10:
1969 9.2 CEGB Standards
[6] Schwarz, K.K.: Design and performance of high and low voltage
terminal boxes: Proc. lEE, Vol 109A ρ 151: 1962 CEGB 44011 (GDCD 85) — Electric motors — small power
[7] Schwarz, K.K.: Submerged gas circulator motors for advanced CEGB 620106 (GDCD 192) — Glandless pump/motor units electrical
gas-cooled reactors: Proc. lEE, Vol 120, No 7: July 1973 and mechanical design requirements

647
Motors Chapter 7

9.3 British Standards Part 51 Noise levels

Β82757 Classification of insulating materials for electrical ma­ Part 60 Tests

chinery on the basis of thermal stability in service BS 5000 Rotating electrical machines of particular types
BS4999 General requirements for rotating electrical machines Part 40 Motors for driving power station auxiliaries
Part 10 Standard dimensions
Part 20 Classification of types of enclosure
9.4 IEEE Standards
Part 21 Classification of methods of cooling
IEEE 334 Type test of continuous duty class IE motors for nuclear
Part 30 Duty and rating
power generating stations
Part 32 Limits of temperature rise and methods of measurement
Part 33 Methods of determining losses and efficiency
Part 41 General characteristics
9.5 lEC Recommendations
Part 50 Mechanical performance — vibration lEC 34 Rotating electrical machines Parts 1, 2 and 4 to 10.

648
 C H A P T E R 8

Telecommunications

Requirements and policy 7.3.5 Direct speech

1.1 Access to off-site services 7.3.6 Use of paging systems
1.2 Requirements on the power station site 8 Radio systems
1.2.1 General telephone requirements
8.1 Introduction
1.2.2 Radio systems
8.2 Radiotelephony systems
1.2.3 Radio paging system
8.2.1 Radio frequency bands used by PMR systems
1.2.4 Operational telephone systems
8.2.2 Comparison of VHP and UHF systems
1.2.5 Maintenance and commissioning communication
8.2.3 Allocation of radio channels
system
8.2.4 VHP systems used in power stations
1.2.6 Audible warning system
8.2.5 UHF systems used in power stations
1.3 Special requirements for nuclear and pumped-storage
8.3 Crane radio systems used in power stations
power stations
8.3.1 Crane control systems
1.3.1 Nuclear power stations
8.3.2 Anticollision systems
1.3.2 Pumped-storage power stations
8.4 RF modulation systems
1.4 Accommodation and power supplies
8.4.1 Amplitude modulation (AM)
1.4.1 Main telecommunications room (MTR)
8.4.2 Frequency modulation (FM)
1.4.2 Auxiliary telecommunications room (ATR)
8.4.3 Signalling systems
1.4.3 PABX room
8.5 RF propagation
1.4.4 48 V DC power supplies
8.5.1 RF received power
Access to British Telecom national cable network 8.6 Antenna systems
2.1 On-site British Telecom cable requirements 8.6.1 Antennas
2.2 On-site duct routes for British Telecom cables 8.6.2 Typical antenna arrangements
2.3 Segregation of British Telecom cables within the power 8.6.3 Radiating cable (leaky feeder)
station building 8.7 RF fixed stations
2.4 British Telecom cables 8.7.1 Fixed station transmitters
2.5 Electrical isolation of British Telecom circuits 8.7.2 Fixed station receivers
8.7.3 Antenna coupling equipment
British Telecom telephone services 8.8 Lightning protection
3.1 Public switched telephone network (PSTN) 8.8.1 Antenna systems
3.2 Telex 8.8.2 Fixed station cubicle
3.3 Data 8.9 Remote control systems
8.9.1 Operational description of the M87 control system
3.4 Private circuit network
8.9.2 Operational description of the Motorola-Storno CAF2200
On-site telecommunication cabling system
4.1 General 8.10 Handportable radiotelephone transceivers
4.2 PAX telephone cabling 8.11 Vehicle-mounted radiotelephones
4.2.1 Main distribution frame and station PAX telephone 8.11.1 Vehicle antennas
cabling 8.11.2 Noise suppression
4.2.2 User distribution frame in the station administration 8.12 Interference problems
building for the PAX/PABX telephone cabling 8.12.1 Intermodulation products
4.3 Short-time fireproof cabling 8.12.2 Half IF interference
4.4 Low smoke cabling
9 Direct wire telephone systems
Private automatic exchange (PAX)
9.1 General details
5.1 Types of telephone exchange 9.2 Common equipment and common equipment
5.1.1 Strowger systems accommodation
5.1.2 Crossbar systems 9.3 Plant telephones
5.1.3 Stored programme control (SPC) systems 9.4 Audible and visual calling units
9.5 Common equipment location and battery supply
Private automatic branch exchange (PABX)
10 Maintenance and commissioning telephone jack
6.1 General facilities
system
6.2 Night service facilities
Paging systems 11 Siren system
7.1 Lights and sounders 11.1 Station emergency zones
7.2 Inductive loop paging systems 11.2 Emergency alarm signals
7.3 Radio paging systems 11.3 Control panels
7.3.1 Component parts of a non-speech radio paging system 11.3.1 Operation of system from power station central
7.3.2 Central control equipment control room controller
7.3.3 Manual controllers 11.3.2 Operation of system from gatehouse controller
7.3.4 Transmitters and antennas 11.4 Equipment cubicle

649
Telecommunications
11.5 Power supplies
11.6 Cabling
12 Central control room supervisor's desk
13 Nuclear power station requirements
13.1 Specific requirements for nuclear stations
13.2 Public address systems
13.2.1 Power station zones
13.2.2 Controllers
13.2.3 Common equipment
13.2.4 Loudspeakers
13.3 Siren systems
13.3.1 Siren signals
13.3.2 Controllers
13.3.3 Common equipment
13.3.4 Cabling and power supplies
13.4 Emergency telecommunications
13.4.1 Nuclear incident
13.4.2 Emergency control centre (ECC)
13.4.3 District survey laboratory (DSL)
13.4.4 Operations support centre (OSC)
13.4.5 Radio services for a nuclear emergency
14 Pumped-storage power station requirements
14.1 Private automatic branch exchange
14.2 Private automatic exchange
14.3 Radio paging system
14.4 Personal radio system
14.4.1 Antenna system
14.4.2 Radio channels
14.4.3 Handportable radiotelephones
1 Requirements and policy
Reliable telecommunication services are essential for
the efficient operation of a power station during nor­
mal and emergency conditions. T o ensure the required
availability of telecommunication services at all times,
it is C E G B pohcy to provide separate, dispersed, in­
dependent and, where necessary, duphcated telecom­
munication systems.
The term telecommunications in respect of a C E G B
power station covers the following:
• Telephonic communication on site.
• Telephonic communication to locations outside the
power station.
• Radio paging of staff on site.
• Radio communication both on-site and off-site.
• Audible and visual broadcast of information and
emergency instructions.
1.1 Access to off-site services
Good communication links are required from power
stations to the following locations and services:
• To the national grid system operations control and
telephone network; and in particular, to the area
grid control centre from which the power station
receives generation and operational instructions,
details of which are found in Volume K, Chapter 12.
650
Chapter 8
14.4.4 Controllers
14.4.5 Fixed stations
14.5 Sound-powered telephone systems
14.5.1 System 1 — 400 kV cable tunnel system
14.5.2 System 2 — Power station emergency telephone
system
14.6 Maintenance and commissioning telephone jack
system
14.7 Siren system
15 Construction site telecommunications
15.1 Initial requirements for British Telecom services to site
15.2 On-site telephone cable duct network
15.2.1 General requirements
15.3 Telecommunications systems and services
15.3.1 Private automatic branch exchange (PABX)
15.3.2 Emergency telephone system
15.3.3 Site emergency warning system
15.3.4 Pay telephones
15.3.5 Radio paging system
15.3.6 Site radio system
15.3.7 Radio telephone handportables
15.3.8 Data, telex and facsimile services
16 Future trends and developments
16.1 Connections to off-site telecommunication networks
16.2 On-site cabling
16.3 Telephone exchanges
16.4 Radio systems
16.4.1 Trunked radio system
17 Additional references
• T o the associated 400 kV or 275 kV switching station
(which may be on-site or off-site), through which
the bulk of the power station electrical output is
fed into the 400/275 kV national grid tranmission
system.
• T o the pubhc switched telephone network (PSTN)
operated by British Telecommunications pic (BT)
(the main British national telephone company) and
also to the BT national cable network.
• T o the emergency services, i.e., Pohce, Fire and
Ambulance.
• T o the C E G B corporate telephone network (CTN).
1.2 Requirements on the power station site
A number of telecommunication systems are provided
on site to ensure diversity and reliability of operation.
1.2.1 General telephone requirements
Telephonic communication is required to power sta­
tion on-site locations and to remote locations. It is
present C E G B policy to satisfy these requirements by
providing two separate automatic telephone exchanges:
a private automatic exchange (PAX) and a private
automatic branch exchange ( P A B X ) , which have inter­
connecting circuits. A small number of direct telephone
lines to the P S T N are also provided which are inde­
pendent of the station exchanges.

The P A X system has telephones at all parts of the
station and provides telephonic communication faci­
lities for the general administration of the station. The
P A X system also has an operational function which
supplements the power station discrete direct wire op­
erational telephone systems referred to later in this
chapter. The P A X has access to the national C E G B
telephone networks, i.e., system operation telephone
network, the C E G B C T N , and also direct circuits to
other off-site C E G B P A X s and telephones.
The P A B X system provides access to the BT P S T N .
The allocation of P A B X telephones is generally re­
stricted to those locations needing such access, main­
ly in the Station Administration Building. The lines
connecting the P A B X and P A X p e r m h intercom­
munication between all P A B X and P A X telephone
extensions.
Access of individual P A X telephones to off-site
locations is allocated on a 'need to use' basis, as is
the access of individual P A B X telephones to the BT
P S T N . Nominated locations and personnel have both
a P A B X and P A X telephone which provides direct
communication with both telephone exchanges.
Two separate telephone exchanges are provided be­
cause present Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
regulations prohibit the C E G B from maintaining a
telephone exchange which has access to the BT P S T N .
The telephone exchange must be maintained by an
'approved maintainer' which can be BT or, alternative­
ly, the supplier of the telephone exchange. However,
the C E G B requires the option of carrying out emer­
gency repair work immediately, using its own staff.
This is achieved by providing a P A X completely under
CEGB control for telephone communication to all
station locations and a separate P A B X for those lo­
cations and personnel authorised for access to the
BT P S T N which is maintained by BT or another ap­
proved maintainer. A failure of the P A B X cannot
receive attention until the off-site maintainer attends
the fauh.
The use of two telephone exchanges located in
different areas of the power station, e.g., P A X in the
control building and the P A B X in the station ad­
ministration building, also improves the rehability of
telephone communications by providing spatial and
equipment diversity.
1.2.2 Radio systems
Radio communications are provided by fixed base sta­
tion receivers and transmitters remotely controlled from
desk or table top mounted controllers and handport-
able radiotelephones (handportables) carried by roving
personnel. Roving personnel carrying handportables are
also able to speak to each other via a fixed station,
using the 'talkthrough' facility.
U p to five separate radio frequency channels are
available for use at a power station site. The term
'power station site' is understood by the licensing au-
Requirements and policy
thorities to mean one or more contiguous power sta­
tions and therefore the five channels, where authorised,
would be shared between ah the power stations.
1.2.3 Radio paging system
A radio paging system (RPS) enables users of P A X
telephones, the telephone operator and the station
control engineer to access the paging system and page
individual roving personnel carrying pocket pagers.
The paged person wih estabhsh speech communi­
cation with the caller by using a convenient P A X
telephone and dialling the c o m m o n answering code
for the paging system. O n present systems, the pocket
pagers have an alphanumeric display which is pro­
grammed by the caller to show the telephone number
which the paged person should call.
The operating procedure adopted by the caher would
be t o :
• Key/dial the R P S access number on the P A X . If
this is successful, an acknowledge tone wih be re­
ceived from the R P S .
• Key/dial the desired pager number. A supervisory
tone will indicate acceptance of the pager code by
the R P S .
• Key/dial the callers telephone number which is to
be displayed on the pager.
• A supervisory tone will indicate that the paging call
has been accepted.
• Replace the telephone handset and await the call
back from the paged person.
The radio paging system is also used to alert groups
of personnel, i.e., the first-aid team, the fire fighting
team and, in nuclear power stations, the damage assess­
ment teams.
1.2.4 Operational telephone systems
Discrete, direct wire operational telephone systems are
provided for each unique plant system, e.g., boiler/
turbine unit and associated plant, electrical plant and
coal plant (where appropriate).
1.2.5 Maintenance and commissioning
communication system
A network of direct telephone circuits terminated on
telephone jack sockets are provided on (or near) power
station plant, control desks, etc., where direct tele­
phone communication is required during maintenance
and commissioning of station plant. Station personnel
use portable telephones or amplified headsets plugged
into the telephone jack sockets. The network is referred
to as the maintenance and commissioning telephone
jack system ( M C T J S ) .
651
Telecommunications
1.2.6 Audible warning system
An audible warning, to inform all power station per­
sonnel of an emergency, is provided by operating sirens
in either the discrete area(s) of the power station
affected or in all areas of the power station. The opera­
tion of the sirens is controlled from the power station
control room a n d / o r the security gatehouse.
1.3 Special requirements for nuclear and
punriped-storage power stations
Nuclear and pumped-storage power stations need spe­
cial telecommunication facihties not found in conven­
tional fossü-fuelled stations.
1.3.1 Nuclear p o w e r stations
Safety and emergency conditions in the reactor area
require consideration of:
• Safety of personnel and plant.
• Control of emergency operations.
• Immediate dissemination of information to person­
nel during emergency condhions.
• Communication with off-site nuclear incident emer­
gency services.
• Dissemination of information to the general public
during a nuclear incident.
• Radio communication whhin and into the reactor
areas of the power station.
1.3.2 Pumped-storage p o w e r stations
Safety and emergency conditions in the underground
areas of the power station require consideration of:
• Safety of personnel and plant.
• Communication with roving personnel in all areas
of the underground labyrinth.
1.4 Accomnnodation and power supplies
In fossil-fuel power stations, three telecommunica­
tions rooms are provided for diversity and security of
alternative operational communication system equip­
ment: two in the Main Station Building, i.e., the Main
Telecommunications Room (MTR) and the Auxiliary
Telecommunications R o o m (ATR), and one in the
Station Administration Building (PABX room). In
nuclear power stations an A T R is provided for each
react o r / t u r bine-generator unit.
The telecommunications requirements change during
the life of a power station and adequate space is spe­
cified at the design stage to ensure that future changes
and additions to equipment can be accommodated.
652
Chapter 8
In accordance with present telecommunications prac­
tice, computer type flooring, i.e., removable floor
squares, is provided in all three rooms for convenience
of cabhng and future changes of equipment. A h h o u g h ,
generally, telecommunications equipment is becoming
smaller, the quantity of equipment is increasing.
1.4.1 Main telecommunications room (MTR)
The M T R has a floor area sufficient to accommodate
the known and future equipment. Over-provision of
space is desirable because of the inability to m a k e accu­
rate forecasts of future requirements which in the tele­
communication field are subject to continuous change.
The M T R has an adjacent battery r o o m . A typical
layout of the two rooms is shown on Fig 8.1.
The M T R has cable routes to the main cable risers
and cable tunnels for access t o :
• The power station digital pair network.
• Telecommunications cable routes to the associated
400/275 kV swhching station.
• Each of the two physically separated incoming BT
cable routes.
Access for equipment and personnel into the M T R
is provided by a double door. A second door is used
for access of personnel and as an emergency exit. Con­
sideration is required of the access and equipment
handling facilities available on the route to the M T R
double door within the station.
The environmental conditions of dust and humidity
must not at the present time be less than those apph­
cable to the Central Control R o o m (CCR), as specified
in Specification CEGB-EES (1980), Clause 2.2, Table 1,
Class B3.
The temperature of the r o o m should be maintained
within the hmits of + 5 ° C to + 4 0 ° C , ahowing for a
maximum heat dissipation of 10 k W from the equip­
ment in the M T R .
With modern S P C exchanges, air conditioning is
provided for the M T R to give Class A conditions, i.e.:
• Temperature limits of + 1 8 to -h27°C.
• Relative humidity h m h s of 35 to 7 5 % .
S P C exchanges which have been approved to the re­
quirements of the C E G B General Specification for
Electronic Equipment (CEGB-EES 1980), will continue
to operate within Class Β temperature and humidity
hmits but with the possible reduction in equipment
timing and other minor variations in the manufacturer's
specified equipment operational limits.
T o supply the M T R and the associated telecommuni­
cation battery charging requirements, two alternative
7.5 k W , three-phase, 415 V A C supphes are required
to feed two 6-way, three-phase and neutral distribu­
tion boards complying with C E G B Category 2 safety
 Requirements and policy

7.5m

"T" SINK
500 BATTERY 1
500
L
2540
SUSPENDED
' LIGHT FITTING ± -800

2.5m

BATTERY 2

—!_! LJ 1_Ι
48V FUSE/LINK BOX
WALL MOUNTED B.T. LINKS 5A

-1380- •690- •700

MAIN
DISTRIBUTION 48V 48V 48V
FRAME 700 DISTRI - CHARGER CHARGER
LINE SIDE BUTION No.2 No.1
1065 BOARD

EXCHANGE
SIDE

TELETYPEWRITER

700- -«-550-*-

f
700 800 LINE PAX 550
7.3m
1

GENERAL
-*-550-»-l

τ
INDICATIONS 240V AC. SWITCHED
SOCKET OUTLETS
UHF UHF VHF
550 RADIO RADIO PAGING INTERFACE FOR
1 CORPORATE
TELEPHONE
NETWORK

BENCH

I 1

FIG. 8.1 Main telecommunications room — typical floor plan

requirements. Each of the two battery chargers is MTR equipment

supphed from different A C supply distribution b o a r d s .
A 110 V 50 W A C uninterruptable power supply
(UPS) is required for the radio paging central control
equipment.
The minimum lighting standard is 300 Lux. Emer­
gency hghting is also provided.
The equipment includes cable distribution frames,
PA(B)X, U H F radio equipment, radio paging equip­
ment, 48 V D C power supply equipment, isolation
equipment for BT incoming cables, C T N equipment
and grid control telecommunications equipment (for

653
Telecommunications
grid system control and telephony) when the latter is
not located in the associated 275 kV or 400 kV switching
station.
MTR 48 V DC power supplies
If Planté batteries are used, the 48 V power supply
equipment comprises: two chargers, two batteries and
a single distribution board. The power supply system
has sufficient electrical capacity to supply the known
and predicted 48 V D C requirements of the M T R . For
a modern power station this would include two batteries
of approximately 400 Ah each. The arrangement com-
phes with CEGB Transmission Plant Standards. A sim­
plified block diagram of the system is shown in Fig 8.2.
The two batteries and chargers are operated in parallel.
Failure of one battery or one charger will not cause
a complete failure of the system. Each charger has
sufficient output to meet the total battery load. The
two paralleled batteries are capable of supporting the
load for approximately 12 hours.
The arrangement enables one battery and charger
to be disconnected from the load for off-load boost
charging. During boost charging the standby capacity
of the system is halved, e.g., h is approximately 6
hours.
The 48 V positive poles of the batteries are earthed
at one point, usually at the distribution board via
an isolating link. An earth cable is run between the
distribution board and the power station's control and
instrumentation (C and I) earth. The C and I earth
is also used for the cable screen earths associated with
the power station multipair cable distribution system.
A.c. A.c.
SUPPLY SUPPLY
48V DISTRIBUTION
BOARD
48VDC SUPPLIES
FOR MCR EQUIPMENT
FIG. 8.2 Main telecommunications room — 48 V DC
power supplies block diagram
654
Chapter 8
The Planté batteries are located in a battery r o o m
adjacent to the M T R . The r o o m comphes with the
C E G B standards for battery rooms described in Chapter
9.
If recombination cell batteries are used, the 48 V D C
power supply equipment is provided for each indi­
vidual telecommunications equipment. A power equip­
ment rack (PER) comprising modular rectifiers and
48 V battery units is provided ensuite with its associated
telecommunications system. Each modular battery has
a capacity of approximately 100 A h . A number of
rectifier/battery modules are connected in parallel to
provide the required standby capacity, e.g., 12 hours
for a P A X , D W T S or A W S and 7 hours for a P A B X .
The advantages/disadvantages of recombination cells
are described in Section 1.4.4 of this chapter.
1.4.2 Auxiliary telecommunications room (ATR)
The A T R is remote from the M T R and provides ac­
c o m m o d a t i o n for t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s e q u i p m e n t
associated with each turbine-generator unit, whereas
the M T R provides accommodation for non-unitised
telecommunications equipment. In the event of a fire
in the M T R , the telecommunications in the A T R will
be unaffected and vice versa. Nuclear stations have
one A T R per turbine-generator unit to provide further
separation and the enhanced security which arises from
dispersed and diversified systems. With the exception
of the u n h M C T J S which uses the station multipair
cable system, the A T R equipment uses dedicated cable
systems.
The A T R is dimensioned to accommodate the fol­
lowing telecommunications equipment:
• A public address system (for one of the duphcated
systems).
• An audible warning (siren) system (AWS).
• A maintenance and commissioning telephone jack
system (MCTJS).
• A direct wire telephone system (DWTS). One of the
A T R s will also accommodate the D W T S for the
C C R supervisor's desk in addition to one of the
turbine-generator unit systems.
Where there is a requirement at a nuclear power station
for seismically quahfied D W T S s , then the central
D W T S equipment must be seismically qualified and
located in a seismicahy quahfied r o o m . The A T R bat­
tery which provides power for the D W T S and the other
telecommunication equipment in the A T R must also
be seismicahy qualified.
Figure 8.3 shows the floor plan of one of the two
ATRs for a two-unit nuclear power station, where
seismic quahfication of the D W T S is required. Where
seismic quahfication is not required, the D W T S equip­
ment is located in the same r o o m as the other telecom­
munication equipment.
 R e q u i r e m e n t s a n d policy

4m

[Γ BATTERY ROOM
υ SUSPENDED
LIGHT FITTING

2.5m

48V BATTERY SINK

(SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED)

l±^6 WAY SINGLE PHASE

48V DISTRIBUTION UNIT
BATTERY I
FUSE AND
LINK
BOARD CHARGER DIRECT WIRE
AND TELEPHONE
3m DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
BOARD

SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED EQUIPMENT

I

P.A.

,240VA.C. SWITCHED
SOCKET OUTLETS

PUBLIC
7m ^ADDRESS
(P.A.)

MAINTENANCE &
COMMISSIONING
TELEPHONE JACK
SYSTEM PATCHING
BOARD

30 WAY CHARGING RACK FOR

RADIO HAND PORTABLES

FIG. 8.3 Auxiliary telecommunications room — typical floor plan of a unit ATR for a nuclear power station having
a seismically qualified direct wire telephone system

655
Telecommunications
A TR 48 V DC power supplies
If Planté batteries are used, the 48 V power supply
equipment comprises: a single charger, a battery and
a single distribution board. The power supply system
has sufficient electrical capachy to supply the known
and predicted 48 V D C requirements of the A T R .
For a modern power station the battery would be of
the order of 100 Ah. The arrangement comphes with
CEGB Transmission Plant Standards. A simplified
block diagram of the system is shown in Fig 8.4.
The earthing arrangement is similar to that described
for the M T R 48 V power supphes.
If recombination ceh batteries are used, the rectifiers
and batteries are provided and sized to suit the asso­
ciated telecommunications system as explained for the
MTR.
1.4.3 PABX room
The P A B X room and the associated battery room (when
required) are located in the power station administra­
tion building. The rooms should have sufficient floor
area to accommodate the known present and future
equipment requirements.
The P A B X room accommodates the P A B X , battery
charger, 48 V distribution rack or power equipment
racks (PERs), cable distribution and isolation frames,
maintenance terminal and miscellaneous furniture.
When the battery comprises lead acid Planté cells,
a battery room is provided to accommodate the 48 V
D C battery and battery maintenance equipment.
The cable distribution frames located in the P A B X
room include the Network Operator's Distribution
Frame (NODE), the User Distribution Frame (UDF)
and the Test Jack Frame (TJF).
The N O D E is the termination point for the network
operator's off-site cable connections.
The U D F is the termination point for the on-she
P A B X telephone cable system.
The T J F is the termination point for the P A B X
cables and interconnections between the P A B X , the
N O D E and the U D F .
All three distribution frames have a jumper wire
system to enable the flexible interconnections to be
made.
The cables terminating on the U D F include cables t o :
the floor distribution points (FDPs) in the station
administration building; the local distribution boxes;
the locally sited line jack units (LJUs) for telephones;
the P A B X switchboard(s) in the reception area of the
station administration building; the M T R in the station
control building and the supervisor's desk in the C C R .
In the case of 'hot' sites, i.e., sites which have poor
earthing systems ahowing the earth point potential to
rise during high voltage (HV) to earth fauhs, an iso­
lation frame is inserted between the N O D E and the
cables connected to the off-site network operator's cable
distribution system. This is unnecessary for sites served
solely by fibre-optic cables. The isolation frame can
656
Chapter 8
AC
SUPPLY
SINGLE
BATTERY
CHARGER
48V DISTRIBUTION
BOARD
48V DC SUPPLIES
TO ATCR EQUIPMENT
FIG. 8 . 4 Auxiliary telecommunications room — 4 8 V
DC power supplies block diagram
be free-standing or wallmounted and accommodates
cable pair isolating links and isolation transformers.
Alternatively, the links and transformers can be pro­
vided as separate wall-mounted units.
The definition of a 'hot' site is given in Engineering
Recommendation S5/1 Section 6 . 1 . From the Recom­
mendation it can be seen that isolation equipment
is necessary if the earth potential rise is greater than
430 V RMS for systems protected by overcurrent pro­
tection and 650 V on 'high reliabihty systems', i.e.,
systems having high speed protection.
Typical wall-mounted isolation units are described
in Section 2.5 of this chapter.
The P A B X r o o m is also used as the marshalling
and terminating point for cables connected to station
telecommunication services, access to which is required
within the station administration building, e.g., the
station public address system, the station radio paging
system and the P A X telephone system.
The environmental condhions in the P A B X room
should be similar to those of the M T R to provide the
correct environment for the P A B X .
A rehable A C power supply is required into the
P A B X room to provide power for the P A B X battery
charger and other telecommunication equipment. An
A C power supply is also required for wall-mounted
sockets in the P A B X r o o m for portable test equipment,
the P A B X interrogating and programming terminal and
portable cleaning equipment.
A low resistance connection is provided to the A C
power supply earth located as near as possible to the
power supply cable entry to the Administration Build­
ing. This earth connection is extended to the P A B X
positive connection of the 48 V D C battery or to the

P E R s . All 48 V D C positive connections in the P A B X
are taken to this single earth point and are isolated
from the P A B X cabinet earth to avoid multiple earths
on the 48 V D C positive, which can resuh in noise
and cross-talk interference.
1.4.4 48 V DC power supplies
Planté cell batteries
48 V D C power supplies have traditionally used Planté
cell batteries. The power supply system has comprised
one or two 48 V batteries, one or two chargers and a
fused distribution b o a r d .
The 48 V power supply system positive has been
earthed at one point only, i.e., at the 48 V distribution
board. Here, an earth cable has been taken to the
power station C and I earth system.
The 48 V batteries for the M T R and the A T R have
sufficient electrical capacity to provide a minimum of
12 hours' standby for the total 48 V D C installed load,
and for the anticipated growth In the load over the
foreseeable future.
Recombination cell batteries
48 V D C power supphes which use recombination ceh
batteries are provided as an integral part of the in­
stalled equipment with each telecommunications sys­
tem. The batteries are provided with sufficient capacity
to supply the associated telecommunications system.
Gas recombination in lead acid cells
The negative plate in a lead acid cell consists of a lead
alloy lattice or grid in which the spaces of the grid
are filled with chemically-active lead sponge. If a fully
charged negative plate is removed from the acid and
exposed to the air it will heat up rapidly, produce
steam from the water on the surface and quickly form
a deposit on the surface. During this chemical reaction,
oxygen from the air reacts with the lead to produce
lead oxide (PbO) and heat.
The significance of this is that a fully charged ne­
gative plate is highly reactive with oxygen. This is the
basis of lead acid gas recombination cells. W h e n a
charge current flows through a fully charged lead acid
cell, electrolysis of water occurs to produce hydrogen
from the negative electrode and oxygen from the posi­
tive electrode. The evolution of the oxygen and hydro­
gen gases does not occur simultaneously because the
efficiency of the recharge of the positive electrode is
not as good as that of the negative. This causes oxygen
to evolve from the positive plate before hydrogen is
evolved from the negative plate.
As the oxygen is evolved from the positive electrode,
there is a substantial a m o u n t of highly active lead
sponge existing on the negative electrode before hydro­
gen commences to evolve. Therefore, provided oxygen
can be transported to the negative electrode, conditions
Requirements a n d policy
are ideal for a rapid reaction between the spongy lead
and the oxygen to form lead oxide:
2 P b + Ol = 2PbO (8.1)
The lead oxide in the acidic conditions easily goes to
lead sulphate:
2 P b O + 2H2SO4 = 2 P b S 0 4 + 2H2O (8.2)
Since the lead sulphate is deposited on the surface of
the electrode which evolves hydrogen it will be reduced
to lead and sulphuric acid:
2 P b S 0 4 + 2H2 = 2 P b + 2H2SO4 (8.3)
Adding Equations (8.1), (8.2) and (8.3), and cancelling
similar terms on b o t h sides of the resulting equation
produces:
2H2 + 0 2 = 2H2O (8.4)
This reaction is gas recombination. Provided the pro­
cess is 100<7o efficient, a method is available to re-
combine the gases produced by overcharging within
the lead acid battery.
For production batteries, recombination efficiencies
of better t h a n 9 6 % have been quoted.
T h e recombination efficiency is based on the a m o u n t
of hydrogen lost to the system and can be expressed
by the m e t h o d proposed by Harrison and Whhley in
the fohowing equation
I-IH
R = X 100%
I
where R is the gas recombination efficiency
I is the average charging current which passes
through the battery during test
I H is the average current equivalent, under
Faraday's law, of hydrogen emhted during
the test period
Since the hydrogen arises from the electrolysis of water
an equivalent quantity of water is lost t o the battery,
giving rise t o an equivalent loss of oxygen.
There are a n u m b e r of theories of how the oxygen
is removed from the battery. The most popular are
corrosion of the positive electrode or sulphation of the
negative electrode. The former would reduce conduc­
tivity of the positive electrode and the latter would
reduce the capacity of the negative electrode. Loss of
water would also affect the capacity of the cell. Each
has a direct effect on the operational life of the battery.
Although referred t o as sealed cells, a vent is pro­
vided t o allow hydrogen to escape a n d prevent a dan­
gerous build u p of pressure inside the battery.
The recombination efficiencies obtained from the
Harrison and Whitley technique have indicated that
657
Telecommunications Chapter 8

the operational life of the batteries is of the order of

10 years.
The electrolyte is absorbed by a fibre-glass separa­
tion material between the plates. This allows free
movement of gases between electrodes and with the 50.4H
vent removed would result in little or n o electrolyte
escaping because it would be held by the absorbent
separation material.
48i

Advantages of recombination cell batteries

• A specially designed battery room is not necessary.

>45.6
• Size, suitable for locating in equipment r o o m s . UJ

• Ease of handhng during installation.

• Lower level of maintenance. 43.2H

• Low level of hydrogen liberated during charge.

Disadvantages of recombination cell batteries 40.8H

• Lower operational hfe, 10 years compared to 2 5 - 3 0

years for Planté ceh batteries.
38.4- —I 1 1 1 —
• Difficuh to determine the state of the battery, i.e., 20 40 60 80 100 110
DISCHARGE AMPERE-HOURS
capachy available for an emergency. (5H CAPACITY=100)

• Lower level of maintenance required can lead to

FIG. 8.5 Battery terminal voltage plotted against depth
abuse of the battery by personnel assuming that the of discharge
batteries are maintenance-free.

These facilities will enable the recombination cell bat­

CEGB requirements for recombination cell batteries
Until the C E G B has accumulated a similar amount of
operational experience to that for Planté cells the fol­
lowing requirements are specified. The power equip­
ment racks (PERs) shah be provided with:
• Low volts alarm relay or equivalent across 48 V
busbars (set at 43 V).
• High volts alarm relay or equivalent across 48 V
busbars (set at 60 V).
• Low vohs disconnect load relay or equivalent (set at
41 V).
• Isolation facilities to enable disconnection of the rec­
tifier output and load to each 48 V battery module.
• Facilities to enable open-circuit volts to be mea­
sured on each 48 V battery module in turn, allowing
the remaining paralleled 48 V battery modules and
rectifiers to supply load.
• Facilities to enable current flowing into each 48 V
battery module to be measured.
• Facilities to enable current flowing out of each 48 V
rectifier to be measured.
• A calibration graph for each 48 V battery module
showing open-circuit volts against discharged ampere
hour capacity, see Fig 8.5.
tery to be monitored and the available capacity to be
determined.
For further details on batteries see Chapter 9.
2 Access to British Telecom national
cable network
As British Telecommunications pic (BT) is the main
telecommunication carrier in the United Kingdom, ac­
cess to the BT national telephone cable network allows
the use of the wide range of BT telecommunication
services.
The main service is the public switched telephone
network (PSTN), which provides telephone services to
all United Kingdom a n d international telephone users
and access to the sophisticated telecommunication
services now available on the BT P S T N .
The C E G B also makes use of the BT national cable
network for telecommunication circuits to locations
external to the power station for telephony, data, grid
system control, telecommunications and grid system
protection.
BT provides telephone cables from the power sta­
tion telecommunication rooms to two segregated points
outside the boundary of the power station site and
arranges for segregated routing of cables from the two
off-site segregated points to the BT cable network.
This is to reduce the probability of a c o m m o n mode

658

cable failure affecting all circuits and services provided
by BT, i.e., the power station wih not be subject to
total failure should damage occur to one of the cable
routes. Access from these points is required to BT high
grade circuhs, routed sometimes over long distances,
for grid system control, telecommunications and H V
transmission line protection equipment. It is usual to
provide two alternatively routed circuits to locations
with which it is essential to maintain telecommunica­
tion services at all times, such as to the system opera­
tions grid control centre and the distant ends of the
HV transmission lines connected to the power station
for grid line protection. If two circuits are required
to a remote location, then BT are instructed to segre­
gate one circuit from the other through the entire
BT telephone cable network to minimise the risk of
simuhaneous loss of both circuhs.
2.1 On-site British Telecom cable
requirements
Two segregated routes are provided on-site to the
foHowing locations:
• Station M T R .
• Station administration building ( P A B X r o o m ) .
• 400/275 kV swhching station telecommunications
room (if on site).
BT cables are also routed on she between the above
locations for interconnection of BT circuits. Typical
arrangements are shown on Fig 8.6.
POWER
STATION
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ROOM
BT OFF SITE CABLE ROUTE NO 1
TO BT CABLE NETWORK
MAIN ROAD
BT OFF SITE ROUTE NO 3 USED IF APPLICABLE
FIG. 8.6 Diagram showing the diversity and separation of two cable routes on a power station to the off-site
BT cable networks
Access to British T e l e c o m national cable network
2.2 On-site duct routes for British Telecom
cables
T o provide segregation and protection for the BT
cables on-site, two segregated duct routes are provided
from the BT off-site points to the various on-site tele­
communication r o o m s . The provision for each route
is a minimum of two 100 m m P V C type ducts, with
carriageway boxes spaced along the route to facilitate
the drawing-in of cable during installation and the
replacement of cables. The carriageway box is specified
because of its strong construction to ensure that it
is not easily damaged by the weight of heavy vehi­
cles, particularly during the construction period of the
power station.
2.3 Segregation of British Telecom cables
within the power station building
The segregation of the two BT cable routes is continued
between the segregated access points into the power
station building and to the M T R .
At the design stage, two BT cable routes are planned
to provide the required segregation and the cables are
routed in unplasticised P V C cable trunking. This pro­
vides a degree of mechanical protection of the cables
and reduces the fire risk to the BT external-type tele­
phone cables, which often have a polythene sheath.
2.4 British Telecom cables
During the design stage of the station, the quantity and
sizes, i.e., number of pairs, of the on-site BT cables
STATION
ADMINISTRATION
BUILDING
BT OFF SITE CABLE ROUTE NO 2
TO BT CABLE NET WORK
659
Telecommunications
are specified by the C E G B , based on the known and
estimated future telecommunication needs of the sta­
tion, thus minimising the need for additional or re­
placement BT cables during the hfe of the station.
BT regulations do not permit the jointing of on-site
BT telephone cables directly connected to the off-site
BT telephone cable network. This is to ensure that
BT personnel are not put at risk if the jointing of one
of the cables coincides w h h a rise of earth potential
at the power station site, during an electrical system
fault in the power station, or the on-site 400/275 kV
switching station.
2.5 Electrical isolation of British Telecom
circuits
Ah of the above BT cable pairs are terminated by
BT on isolation links (BT reference. Links Isolation
Type 5A) in the locations detailed in Section 2.1 of
this chapter, to permit easy electrical disconnection
of the cable pairs from equipment installed in the
station.
If the calculated rise of earth potential during elec­
trical fault conditions exceeds 650 V A C R M S , then
isolation equipment is provided on every working cir­
cuh to isolate the off-site BT circuhs electrically from
the power station telecommunication equipment. This
prevents the transfer of the rise of earth potential but
permits through-transfer of speech and signalhng infor­
mation, thus preventing damage to BT plant external
DISCONNECTION/TEST
LINKS SCREEN
^
SEND<
TO
POWER
STATION y
TELECOMS ^
EQUIP.
RECEIVED
FIG. 8.7 Transformer isolation unit for connecting power station telecommunications equipment to
BT 4-wire audio circuits
660
Chapter 8
to the power station and also the transfer of electrical
potential to BT personnel working on external BT
plant.
Figure 8.7 shows a circuit diagram of an exchange
hne isolating equipment and Fig 8.8 shows a circuit
diagram for isolating equipment typicahy used for grid
system control, telephony and protection of telecom­
munication circuits.
3 British Telecom telephone services
A power station requires access to many BT services
including the P S T N , telex, data and point to point
circuhs.
3.1 Public switched telephone network
(PSTN)
The majority of the direct exchange lines (DEL) for
the station will be routed to the nearest BT telephone
exchange. However, if the station is in a rural area it
is often prudent, in the interests of reliabihty of service
and security of access to associated BT services, for the
DELs to by-pass the local BT telephone exchange and
to be directly connected into a BT telephone exchange
serving an u r b a n area.
For additional securhy, a BT telephone on the super­
visor's desk in the C C R has a D E L connected to an
alternative BT telephone exchange to that serving the
power station P A B X . This ensures that access to the
HIOH VOLTAGE
SSEND
Γ
CIRCUIT TO
> REMOTE SITE
VIA BT
CABLE NETWORK
\ RECEIVE

SCREEN
BT
TELEPHONE
OR <
PABX
3
ilh
• RELAYS CA&AAHAVE
HIGH INSULATION BETWEEN
RELAY COILS AND CONTACTS
FIG. 8.8 Transformer isolation unit for direct BT
telephone lines or PABX exchange lines
BT P S T N is available to the supervisor should the BT
telephone exchange serving the station fail. The tele­
phone number of this D E L is not listed in the BT
telephone directory and it is referred to as the *ex-
directory out-of-area' telephone. This D E L is routed in
the BT cable network both on and off-site, to provide
diversity with the direct telecommunications circuit
to the remote grid control centre. This gives an aher-
native means of speech communication between the
supervisor's desk and the grid control if the grid control
communication hnk is faulty.
3.2 Telex
One telex machine is provided in the station connected
to the BT telex network, its primary purpose being
the transmission and reception of telexed information
from locations not having access to the C E G B Cor­
porate Data Network (CDN).
3.3 Data
Access to BT data circuits is required, such as the
BT packet-switched service, for locations not having
access to the C E G B C D N .
3.4 Private circuit network
Access is required to the BT private circuit network
for:
• Grid system operation circuits.
• P A X and P A B X exchange interconnection tie circuits.
On-site t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n cabling
• Emergency speech circuits for fire and pohce services.
Nuclear stations also require access to off-site nuclear
emergency services.
• C E G B C T N circuhs.
• Remote control of circuits for radio fixed stations
located outside the power station.
Access to the private circuit network of Mercury Com­
munication Limited (MCL), the second largest British
pubhc telecommunications carrier, is also used (where
available) to provide an alternative to the BT private
circuit network.
4 On-site telecommunication cabling
4.1 General
Special factors related to the importance of a particu­
lar telecommunications system determine the type of
cable used and hs routing.
The cables for P A X main cable routes, either de­
dicated or via the station digital pair network, have
fire-retardant sheathed cables as detailed in Chapter
6 of this volume, and are as used for control and
instrumentation cabhng within the power station. The
cable for the personal ultra high frequency (UHF) radio
systems, the grid control emergency and nuclear emer­
gency very high frequency (VHF) radio systems, the
direct wire telephone systems (DWTS) and the siren
system is short-time fireproof cable, which will remain
serviceable in a fire area for a minimum period of
20 minutes.
4.2 PAX telephone cabling
The power station digital pair network, which is de­
tailed in Chapter 6, has multipair cable marshalling
boxes in power station areas for the marshahing of
dighal circuits required by equipment located near to
the boxes.
The marshalling boxes are cabled to central mar­
shalling cubicles which are interconnected with muhi­
pair cables to enable digital circuits to be routed be­
tween many areas of the power station.
The P A X telephone circuhs are routed by the di­
gital pair network from station locations to the station
M T R , where they terminate on the M D F .
The P A X telephone circuits use dedicated 20-pair
modules in the digital pair network. All pairs of each
dedicated module are through-connected from a 20-
pair terminal strip on the M T R M D F to 20-pair tele­
phone cable marshalling boxes in the station areas.
Figure 8.9 shows a typical telephone cable marshalling
box, dedicated for telephone circuit use only.
For new power stations, at least 2 0 % spare circuits
(which are all through-connected to the M D F ) are
provided to each telephone cable marshahing box.
661
Telecommunications Chapter 8

TO SCREW/SCREW
CLAMP TERMINALS
(FOR 8 PAIR CABLES TO
TELEPHONE
INSTRUMENTS)

40 WIRE WRAP/SCREW
CLAMP TERMINALS
FOR 20 PAIR INCOMING
CABLE

SCREEN CONNECTION
TO TELEPHONE CABLES
10 SCREW/SCREW
CLAMP TERMINALS
WITH COMMONING
BAR FOR CABLE
SCREEN CONNECTIONS
JUMPER
RING

SECTION A-A
GLAND PLATE
TELEPHONE
CABLES TO
20 PAIR TELEPHONES
CABLE TO TMB
STATION DIGITAL TYPICAL LABEL FOR
MULTIPAIR NETWORK TELEPHONE MARSHALLING BOX

FIG. 8.9 Typical telephone cable marshalling box

These may be used subsequent to the initial installa­
tion of the cable system to provide direct connections
to the M T R M D F without having to interfere w h h
the digital pair network interconnecting arrangements.
4.2.1 Main distribution frame and station PAX
telephone cabling
The M D F in the M T R is the marshahing and terminat-
ing point for the majority of telecommunication cables
entering the M T R .
The M D F is floor standing and has a hne side (for
termination of cables to the M T R ) , and an equipment
side (for termination of cables to equipment in the
M T R ) . The line and equipment sides are interconnected
by single-pair jumpers as required. The line side is fitted
with discrete 20-pair terminal strips having terminals
for wire wrapping. Each block of terminal trips will

662

accommodate one 20-pair module from the digital
pair network, i.e., one through-route to a 20-pair
telephone cable marshalling box in the power station
plant area. Other cables on the line side of the M D F are
as follows:
• 100-pair cable to supervisor's desk in the C C R .
• Three 100-pair cables to the user distribution frame
(UDF) in the P A B X r o o m of the station adminis­
tration buhding (for P A X telephones in the station
administration building area, for P A B X telephones
in the power station and for power station plant
buildings outside the control building).
• Multipair cables to the BT incoming cable isolation
rack.
4.2.2 User distribution frame in the station
administration building for the P A X / P A B X
telephone cabling
The user distribution frame (UDF) is located in the
P A B X room of the station administration building
(described in Section 1.4.3 of this chapter) and is a
single-sided wall-mounted frame fitted with 20-pair
terminal strips, having insulation displacement termi­
nals (IDTs) for cable and j u m p e r wire terminations.
These terminal strips are used for terminating all multi-
pair cables to the floor distribution points (FDPs) in
the station administration building, the cables being
used for both P A X and P A B X telephone circuits.
The cables used for BT circuits such as D E L s and
data circuits, are terminated on the network operators
distribution frame (NODE). These are BT network
services required to individual locations in the station
administration building or the main station buildings,
which are directly connected (by isolation equipment
where necessary) to the BT national cable network.
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) regulations
require that BT network services are routed in cabl­
ing separate from that carrying P A B X / P A X extension
circuhs.
This separate cabling requirement for BT network
services is designated as Overlay cabling' and is aimed
at the separation of BT network services from sepa­
rately provided and owned P A B X cabling. The P A B X
extension cabling must now comply with Brhish
Standard BS6701, which details the requirements for
cabling of P A B X telephone extension cabling. It also
specifies a separate isolated earth connection, referred
to as a functional earth (FE), to each P A B X telephone
F D P or cable marshalling box for use by P A B X tele­
phones where the P A B X requires an earth connection
for certain P A B X telephone functions, i.e., recall
operator, transfer call, etc. This isolated F E connection
is earthed at the P A B X r o o m only.
4.3 Short-tinne fireproof cabling
The CEGB has developed, with the cable manufac­
Private a u t o m a t i c e x c h a n g e ( P A X )
turers, a cable which provides a 20-minute withstand
of temperatures u p to 1000°C.
The mechanical and electrical properties of the cable
are given in G D C D Specification 195 and are described
in Chapter 6.
Short-time fireproof (STFP) muhipair cables are
used for the fohowing telecommunication systems:
• Direct wired telephone systems.
• U H F handportable radio telephone systems.
• Siren control systems.
• Public address systems.
4.4 Low smoke cabling
The C E G B and the cable manufacturers have jointly
developed a cable which has low smoke and halogen
emission properties when b u r n t .
This type of cable reduces the risk to personnel
during a fire and reduces the damage caused to electrical
and mechanical equipment due to the production of
hydrochloric acid from the halogens.
The cable is used extensively in the C E G B P W R
nuclear power stations for telecommunication on-site
cabhng in place of P V C multipair cables.
Details of the mechanical and electrical properties
of these cables are given in G D C D Technical Speci­
fication and are described in Chapter 6.
5 Private automatic exchange (PAX)
5.1 Types of telephone exchange
As stated in Section 1.2 of this chapter, the P A X pro­
vides telephone facilities in all areas of the power sta­
tion site. This site coverage was achieved in the past,
prior to the introduction of P A X systems, by the use
of office type intercom systems, supplemented by
operational direct wire telephone systems.
For about 40 years, until recently, all new C E G B
power stations were equipped with an electromecha­
nical P A X to provide automatic dialhng of all site
telephones. Most were of the Strowger type, Strowger
being the n a m e of the inventor of the first automatic
telephone exchange which used a *step by step' method
of connecting telephone lines under the control of a
telephone dial. Strowger systems were used almost
exclusively, until recently, throughout the British pubhc
swhched telephone network (PSTN). In later years, a
small number of P A X s used in power stations were of
the electromechanical crossbar type which used a form
of c o m m o n control switching. Both types are being
replaced in power stations by stored p r o g r a m m e control
(SPC) telephone exchanges for both P A X and P A B X
requirements. The Strowger, crossbar and S P C type
telephone exchanges are briefly described in the follow­
ing subsections.
663
Telecommunications
5.1.1 Strowger systems
The basic elements of a Strowger telephone exchange
are the telephone extension line circuit, uniselector and
selector. The arrangement of the elements used for a
telephone call between two telephone extensions on a
100-hne telephone exchange is shown on Fig 8.10 and
is briefly described as follows:
• Handset of calling telephone is lifted and operates its
discrete line circuit in the P A X which then operates
its discrete uniselector.
• The wipers of the uniselector rotate to find the first
unused selector circuit. Dialhng tone is then returned
to the calhng telephone.
• The first digit is dialled and the wipers of the se­
lector step vertically to a position determined by the
digit dialled.
• The second digit is dialled and the selector wipers
rotate into a horizontal bank of contacts coming to
rest on contacts determined by the digit dialled. The
contacts are associated whh the called telephone.
• The selector then transmhs ringing current to ring
the beh of the called telephone via the wipers of
the selector and also returns a ringing tone to the
calling telephone.
• When the called telephone answers, the lines of the
called telephone and calling telephone are connected
via wipers of the uniselector and the selector, speech
is then possible between the two telephones.
STROWGER TELEPHONE EXCHANGE
UNISELECTOR
LINE
CIRCUIT
CALLING
PAX
TELEPHONE
FIG. 8.10 Elements of a basic Strowger telephone exchange
664
Chapter 8
The Strowger system relies on the operation of complex
electromechanical equipment which requires regular
maintenance by skihed maintenance staff.
5.1.2 Crossbar systems
The crossbar system is more complex than the Strowger
system. The uniselector and selector functions of the
Strowger system are performed by crossbars. Each
crossbar u n h comprises a matrix of contacts which are
operated by levers (or fingers) to route circuits for
speech and control through the telephone exchange.
The mechanical movement of the equipment parts
is small compared with that of the Strowger system
and there is a reduction in the a m o u n t of wear and
readjustment, so the maintenance requirement of a
crossbar system is much less than that of an equivalent
Strowger system. However, the complexity of the cross­
bar system requires skihed staff to diagnose and repair
faults.
5.1.3 Stored p r o g r a m m e control (SRC) systems
The S P C telephone exchange is now specified for P A X
and P A B X requirements at new power stations, and
is also specified when replacement of Strowger and
crossbar P A X s and P A B X s at existing power stations
is necessary.
The S P C telephone exchange has few moving parts
and a low maintenance requirement. Most faults can
be rectified by relatively unskilled staff. Indeed, many
problems are rectified by integral self-diagnostic equip-
SELECTOR
OTHER CALLED
• SELECTORS PAX
TELEPHONE
SELECTOR

ment which checks the operation of the telephone
exchange to identify the particular part which is faulty
and then reconfigures the exchange to replace or by-pass
the faulty area.
It is also possible for diagnostic and reconfiguration
operations to be carried out from manually-operated
interrogation equipment at a remote location. The inter­
rogation and corrective action is carried out after
making a telephone call to the test number of the
telephone exchange which connects the remote inter­
rogation equipment to the telephone exchange inter­
rogation circuh.
The basic elements of the S P C telephone exchange
are the telephone extension line circuit, electronic switch
and the computer (central processor unit ( C P U ) a n d
processor memory). The arrangement of equipment
elements used for a cah between two telephone exten­
sions is shown on Fig 8.11 and is briefly described
below:
• Handset of calling telephone is lifted. The extension
line circuit detects this and alerts the C P U which
sends a dialhng tone to the calhng telephone.
• The cahing telephone dials dighs, which the line
circuh decoder passes to the C P U . The C P U discon­
nects the dialhng tone after the first digit.
• As the digits are received by the C P U it checks
that the number is valid. If the dighs are valid, the
C P U sends ringing current to the bell of the cahed
telephone and also a ringing tone to the calhng
telephone.
• When the called telephone answers, the line circuh
associated with the called telephone alerts the C P U ,
which then disconnects the ringing current and ring­
ing tone and routes the telephone circuhs through
the electronic swhch: the telephone conversation
may then commence.
The common equipment elements, e.g., C P U and pro­
cessor memory, of the telephone exchange are dupli­
cated and have facilities for automatic changeover in
SPC TELEPHONE EXCHANGE
LINE
CIRCUIT
CALLING
PAX ELECTRONIC
TELEPHONE SWITCH
LINE
CIRCUIT
CALLED
PAX
TELEPHONE
FIG. 8 . 1 1 Elements of a basic stored programme
control telephone exchange
Private a u t o m a t i c branch e x c h a n g e ( P A B X )
the event of failure, to minimise complete failure of
the exchange.
M a n y sophisticated faculties are avaUable on the SPC
exchange, only some of which are of use on a power
station P A X . The more useful facilities are as follows:
• *Ring back when free' (automatic ring back of a
calling telephone when a previously-called engaged
telephone becomes free).
• Three party conference (three telephones in speech
contact).
• Transfer of calls to another telephone.
• T i c k - u p groups' which enables a single telephone to
answer incoming calls to telephones in the same pick­
u p group by dialling an abbreviated code.
6 Private automatic branch exchange
(PABX)
The P A B X provides automatic telephone facilities
between locations within the power station and from
nominated power station locations to the BT pubhc
swhched telephone network (PSTN). Prior to the adop­
tion of P A B X s for power station use, the service was
provided by a private manual branch exchange (PMBX)
based on a manually-operated telephone switchboard.
The telephone operator provided the required connec­
tion by using two flexible circuit cords (connected to
a c o m m o n bridging circuit) which were plugged into
sockets wired to the lines of the P A B X telephones or
BT exchange hues for telephone conversations between
P M B X telephones, or between a P M B X telephone and
an exchange h n e . The P A B X s currently specified for
new power stations are S P C telephone exchanges, simi­
lar to that described in Section 5.1.3 of this chapter.
The P A B X is located in the station administration
building, which is the area of the power station where
the majority of P A B X telephone users are located.
The P A B X is housed in h s own equipment r o o m , whilst
the telephone operator's console associated with the
P A B X is located in the reception area of the station
administration building. The receptionist provides tele­
phone operator services in addition to reception duties.
For a typical 2000 M W power station, the P A B X
normally has facilities for approximately 20 exchange
lines and 250 telephone extensions. T o provide a degree
of diversity to enable a service to be maintained during
possible failures of the P A B X a n d / o r BT exchange
lines, the exchange lines will normally be arranged as
follows:
13 Directory listed exchange lines
6 Ex-directory exchange lines
1 Ex-directory, out-of-area exchange hne
The directory listed exchange hues have one common
number listed In the BT local telephone directory, the
665
Telecommunications
number normally dialled for the power station. O n
dialling the number, the BT exchange hunts for any
one of the thirteen exchange lines to the station P A B X
which is not in use.
The ex-directory exchange hues enable priority
incoming calls to be received by the P A B X at all times
from C E G B personnel requiring access to the station
P A B X from the BT P S T N , including occasions when
the directory listed exchange hnes are all in use or
faulty.
Should the local BT telephone exchange fail, then
a restricted service is available via the ex-directory
out-of-area exchange line, which is connected t o an­
other BT telephone exchange, preferably in another
town.
Outgoing cahs, originated from P A B X extensions
having direct access to the BT P S T N , will first have
access to the ex-directory lines and then to the directory
listed exchange lines, the directory listed exchange lines
being kept available for incoming calls from tne BT
PSTN.
During normal conditions, the ex-directory out-of-
area hne is only available for cahs made via the station
telephone operator.
The P A B X will be powered from a battery-backed
48 V D C supply giving a minimum of seven hours
standby should the mains supply fail t o the associated
48 V D C charger.
The P A B X will have a dual processor to ensure
operation should one processor fah. Should the P A B X
fail completely, then the exchange lines are automa­
tically, or manually, connected directly to nominated
telephones to provide a minimum service for incoming
and outgoing telephone cahs via the BT P S T N .
A limited number of power station locations in­
cluding the central control room (CCR), the station
gatehouse (used by security personnel), the power sta­
tion manager's office and the charge engineer's office
are provided with telephones having direct access to
the P S T N independent of the P A B X , These telephones
are designated direct exchange line (DEL) telephones.
6.1 General facilities
The P A B X will include present S P C telephone facilities
as follows:
• Extension transfer of telephone calls.
• Conference facilities.
• Ring back when free.
• Operator recall.
• G r o u p pick-up.
• Abbreviated dialling.
The P A B X is chosen from a C E G B approved hst which
includes PABXs approved by the Department or Trade
and Industry (DTI) for connection to the BT P S T N ,
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Chapter 8
which have also satisfied the C E G B tests and criteria
for use in power stations.
6.2 Night service facilities
Outside normal working h o u r s , night service facilities
for transferring incoming BT P S T N calls to the re­
quired P A B X telephone extensions are provided from
a P A B X telephone extension on the C C R supervisor's
desk. The night service facility is automatically trans­
ferred to a P A B X telephone in the Gatehouse if the
incoming call is unanswered at the supervisor's desk.
7 Paging systems
7.1 Lights and sounders
The paging of power station roving staff from the
P A B X , P A X and fixed locations has for a long time
been recognised as a useful faculty. Before the 1950s
various methods of staff location were used, one meth­
od was the use of combinations of flashing a n d / o r
coloured lights, another method being the operation
of sounders to a repeated morse code signal. These
systems required high levels of maintenance and were
ineffective in noisy areas.
7.2 Inductive loop paging systems
During the 1950s, an inductive loop paging system
controhed from manual controllers was developed which
operated by magnetic induction from a wire loop an­
tenna. This antenna comprised a single-wire looped
a r o u n d a building or buildings with both ends of the
loop being connected to the paging transmitter. For
a large building or complex, the antenna sometimes
comprised a number of loops to obtain the required
cover. At a power station a number of antenna loops
were necessary and a series/parallel arrangement of
the individual loops was used to optimise the area of
cover.
The signals transmitted by the system antenna were
in the frequency range 2 0 0 - 4 0 0 0 H z . The pocket pagers
carried by mobile staff received the signals and emitted
an audible tone if the pager received its unique identity
signal.
During 1961, a commercial inductive loop paging
system manually-operated from a controller was in­
stalled at U s k m o u t h Power Station. The controller,
which incorporated pager coding p u s h b u t t o n s , was con­
nected by cable to the main coding and transmitting
equipment. A n equipment was developed for the C E G B
by one of the authors (F. Ashurst) to enable this paging
system to be operated from any power station P A X
telephone. A t the time, this was a unique method of
operation.
The method of operation from any P A X telephone
required the dialling of a single-digit paging system

access code, followed by a two-digit code for the
required pager. The paged person dialled the c o m m o n
paging answering code from any P A X telephone to
speak to the caller.
Operation of the paging signal from the m a n u a l con-
troher produced a different sound from the pocket pager
to indicate to the paged person the need to call the tele­
phone number of the manual controher instead of the
common paging system answering code on the P A X .
The First Aid Team or Fire Team could also be called
from a special paging telephone in the power station
CCR and multi-access to the special paging telephone
was available to the Teams when they called the Team
paging answering code from any power station P A X
telephone.
One major problem associated with the inductive
loop paging system was the occasional severing of the
antenna loops which were routed via many of the
buildings of the power station, resuhing in a partial loss
of cover.
7.3 Radio paging systems
Radio paging systems have replaced all other types of
paging system in C E G B power stations.
Most radio paging systems can be operated from
manual controllers and from the power station P A X
and P A B X telephone systems, in a way similar to that
of the inductive loop paging system. Present day radio
paging systems provide an alerting signal and a simple
numeric or alphanumeric information display.
The radio paging systems currently use a group of
channels in the 26, 27 and 49 M H z b a n d of V H F radio
channels which are available at present for the specific
use of radio paging. These channels are not exclusive
to C E G B but are also available for other commercial
users.
The hcensing and allocation of the paging channels
is controhed by the D T I who specify the conditions
under which the system will operate. Each system
supplier is allocated a group of frequencies for use
throughout the UK. The channel ahocated by the sup­
pher is selected so that mutual interference w h h other
radio paging systems in the area of cover is minimised.
The permitted maximum transmitted output and height
of the antenna(s) are also specified to minimise mutual
interference. However, the multi-use of the same paging
channel in the area of cover will not necessarily cause
interference as the coding of the signals transmitted
on a common paging channel provides an additional
safeguard to minimise the receipt of incorrect infor­
mation by a paged person.
7.3.1 Component parts of a non-speech radio
paging system
It is C E G B policy to use non-speech radio paging
systems in power stations, for reasons which will be
explained later.
Paging systems
The component parts are:
• Central control equipment.
• M a n u a l controllers.
• Transmitters and antennas.
• Pocket paging receivers (pagers).
7.3.2 Central control equipment
The central control equipment in new power stations
is usually m o u n t e d in a cubicle located in the M T R .
This provides good access to the P A X which is also
located in the M T R .
Also m o u n t e d in the cubicle is a test manual con­
troher used for operating, testing and programming the
radio paging system. The cubicle is the focal point of
the system and cables radiate from the cubicle to a
secure A C power supply, the P A X , the other manual
controllers and the dispersed fixed station transmitters.
7.3.3 Manual controllers
Three m a n u a l controllers are usually provided for each
radio paging system, as follows:
• Test and programming controller fitted in the central
control equipment cubicle ( M T R ) .
• Supervisor's desk, central control r o o m (CCR).
• Power station telephone operator and receptionist
desk.
The supervisor's desk and power station telephone op­
erator's m a n u a l controllers have the following facihties,
which are not available to the caller initiating a paging
cah via the P A X or P A B X :
• Individual call of ah power station pagers with dis­
tinctive bleeping or vibrating of the pager to indicate
a call from the C C R or the telephone operator.
• G r o u p call of members of operations or emergency
teams, i.e.. Fire, First Aid or Security. The pagers of
the team members will also receive individual paging
calls when their discrete number is called.
If a pager is faulty, the user will be provided with a
replacement pager. The replacement pager, however,
operates on a different calling code to the user's nor­
mal pager. T o enable the user to be called when his
published number is dialled on the P A X , or called from
a manual controher, it is necessary to programme the
central control equipment with this information so
that calls can be automatically sent to to the replace­
ment pager. This may be accomphshed from any of
the m a n u a l controllers, if not barred, or from the test
and programming controller.
7.3.4 Transmitters and antennas
A single transmitter with one or more antennas may
be sufficient to provide paging signals in all areas of
667
Telecommunications
a small power station, but large power stations, and
particularly nuclear power stations, require a number
of synchronised transmitters having multiple antennas
with associated radiating cables. The transmitters are
synchronised to prevent interaction of signals from two
transmitters having radio cover which overlap in some
power station areas. The synchronising is accomplished
by frequency-dividing the main transmitter radio signal
and transmitting the low frequency derivative via tele­
phone cable pairs to each of the associated slave radio
paging transmitters where the signal is muhiplied back
to the original frequency, thus producing a synchro­
nised transmitter output.
The siting of the transmitters and associated an­
tennas requires a detailed study of the power station
main building and outbuildings including the cooling
water (CW) pumphouse (much of which may be under­
ground), coal plant (if a coal-fired power station) and
the reactor area (if a nuclear power station). Particular
attention is needed for the power station basement area.
A close examination of the power station working
areas or, if a new power station, a detailed examination
of its layout, is necessary to determine the location
of antennas to provide maximum radio paging cover.
In underground locations and corridors, it may be
necessary to supplement the antennas with 'radiating
cable' (sometimes cahed l e a k y feeder') which provides
a low power leakage of transmitted signal along its
length to enhance the signal in areas of poor reception.
Judicious routing through areas of poor reception of
the radiating cables connecting remote antennas to
the associated transmitters, will enhance the cover along
their routes. Alternatively, radiating cable provided for
radiating purposes only but having an electrical con­
nection to the transmitter output signal, will also en­
hance the paging signal in difficult areas of the power
station.
Modern pagers are small compact devices which fit
in a breast pocket. The cahing signal operates any
or ah of the following alerting modes; audible tone,
lamp or vibrator and also the numeric or alphanumeric
displays. The power supply is provided by dry or re­
chargeable batteries.
Calling the pager from one of the manual controhers
or from a P A X telephone will operate the alerting
devices of the pager, giving a distinctive alert to indicate
the type of cah, i.e., group cah or individual cah. The
visual display wih instruct the paged person t o , for
example, ring the manual controller, his emergency
control (if the paged person is a member of an emer­
gency team), or to cah back a P A X telephone number.
If it is not convenient to ring back the originator of the
page, it may be delayed at the discretion of the paged
person. The pager will also store a number of paged
messages which may be displayed retrospectively.
To call a pager from a P A X telephone, the caller dials
the paging system access code, followed by the unique
code of the paged person, a n d then the P A X extension
number for the paged person to call back.
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Chapter 8
7.3.5 Direct speech
A 'paged person receive speech' channel is available
as an optional extra on contemporary radio paging
systems to enable the caller to transmit a verbal message
to a paged person or group of persons. There is also a
further optional enhancement to provide return speech
from the paged person to the caller. These options
are rarely specified for C E G B power stations, the use
of alphanumeric displayed information on the paged
receiver being preferred. The display gives the paged
person unambiguous instructions of the action required
and also the option of calling the initiator of the page
or delaying this until a more convenient time.
The provision of the received speech facility to a
paged person would require a higher standard of re­
ception throughout the power station areas, necessi­
tating a larger number of fixed station transmitters. The
provision of transmitted speech from the paged person
would also require a large number of fixed station
receivers to be positioned in strategic locations through­
out the site.
It is C E G B policy to provide roving station person­
nel who need direct speech communication w h h a
handportable radiotelephone operating on the power
station radio system.
7.3.6 Use of paging systems
It is the policy of some power station managers to
issue most of the staff with a pocket pager which, for
a large station, could be 400 or more. This enables all
staff to be contacted wherever they are on site. Other
power station managers restrict the issue of pagers to
roving personnel; operations, maintenance, security and
emergency team staff.
8 Radio systems
8.1 Introduction
Radio systems form part of the telecommunication
infrastructure at a power station. They are provided
both to supplement a n d as an alternative to the
telephone systems, i.e., radiotelephone systems and also
for non-speech communication purposes, viz, crane
radio control and anticohision systems.
The increasing use of automatic control for power
station plant has resulted in greater centralisation of
the operational control a n d monitoring of the plant,
and in a significant reduction in permanently manned,
distributed control centres. This has reduced operations
staff numbers and permitted greater flexibihty and
mobility in work patterns. The use of radio enables
speech communication to be established with the mobile
staff.
As has already been mentioned, modern power sta­
tions have a central control r o o m (CCR) from which
the operation of the power station is m o n h o r e d and

controlled. Work carried out by staff involved in the
day-to-day operation of the power station is controlled
from the C C R .
Emergencies are dealt with by the C C R staff, w h o
may require communication between the C C R and fire,
first aid or damage assessment teams and the off-site
pubhc emergency services.
One of the most useful means of communication
between the C C R and roving operations staff is by
radio. Roving staff are provided with a handportable
radiotelephone (handportable) and each control desk in
the CCR is fitted with a radio system controller. Staff
whh handportables are also able to communicate with
each other using the radio system. Additionally, radio
systems are used for other duties which involve com­
munication between other control centres and mobile
staff, e.g., between the maintenance works-control
office and maintenance staff. Radio in nuclear power
stations is extensively used for similar applications as
well as for the special requirements of health physics
monitoring and use during nuclear emergency activities.
8.2 Radiotelephony systems
The radiotelephone systems used in power stations are
based on commercially available private mobile radio
(PMR) equipment. P M R equipment is primarüy de­
signed for use with wide area mobile radio schemes.
These comprise a central fixed station housing a high-
powered transmitter and a sensitive receiver, a fixed
station antenna mounted on a mast located at a high
point central to the required reception area and vehicle-
mounted mobile radios (vehicle mobiles). The fixed
station is usually connected by land lines to a remote
control unit (controller).
This arrangement is suitable for off-site communi­
cations, e.g., emergency communications between the
power station and the associated grid control centre
when other telecommunication links have failed.
However, the standard type of P M R system must
be adapted to provide on-site radio cover inside power
station buildings, which contain thick, reinforced con­
crete walls, floors and ceilings, large fabricated steel
plant items, underground plant rooms and labyrinths
of cable ways and pipework gaheries. None of these
are ideal places for radio signal propagation.
The design constraints on the use of P M R systems
in power stations can be summarised as follows:
• A restriction of the field strength transmitted by
handportables to reduce the effect of radio frequency
interference (RFI) on sensitive electronic control a n d
instrumentation (C and I) equipment.
• The hot, humid and dirty environment.
• The harsh electromagnetic environment.
• The need for simple control units (controllers) in
control rooms for operation by staff not employed
as professional radio operators, but using radio as
Radio systems
a tool to improve speech communications.
• T h e need for a reliable a n d clear speech communi­
cation medium to enable staff to be instructed
accurately to carry out operations on power station
plant and machinery.
In order to achieve a suitable radio system, accepting
these constraints, it is therefore necessary to adapt the
standard P M R equipment for use in power stations.
The radio systems used for power stations have
developed from the use of a single remote control unit
(controller) located in the C C R a n d cabled to a fixed
station (transceiver) located in the plant area close to
the antenna. T h e antenna has usually been mounted
on the roof of the highest bmlding, e.g., turbine hall/
boiler house or the mechanical annexe situated between
the turbine hall a n d boiler house. This arrangement
had to be supplemented by relatively high-powered
handportables in order t o provide adequate radio cover
in all but the smaller power stations.
As power station buildings have become larger and
more complex, a n d the constraint on the power output
of handportables has increased (in order to avoid RFI
to control a n d instrumentation equipment), so the radio
system has h a d to become more sophisticated.
The handportable R F power output has been reduced
to 0.5 W into the antenna instead of an effective
radiated power (ERP) of 0.5 W . T h e definition of an
E R P of 0.5 W is the power radiated from a half-wave
dipole antenna when 0.5 W is connected to it. As
handportable antenna gains vary from - 3 dB to - 1 0
dB when compared with a dipole antenna, the radiated
power has been reduced t o between 0.25 W and 0.05 W
ERP.
In order t o compensate for these reductions, the an­
tenna arrangements of the fixed stations have become
more complex. The antenna systems comprise internal
and external antennas supplemented by radiating cable
(leaky feeder) in confined areas, e.g., basements, tun­
nels, corridors a n d C W pumphouses.
In addition, distributed fixed station arrangements
are used in medium a n d large power stations. The
arrangements comprise fixed transmitters and receivers
located at different plant areas adjacent to the antenna
systems required to provide radio cover of the area.
Prior to the availability of synchronising systems for
transmitters a n d voting systems for receivers (which
allowed automatic selection of the best received signal),
the use of distributed fixed stations required each to
operate on a different frequency. This was necessary to
prevent interference at the receiving mobile. The inter­
ference was most acute when the two received signals
were of the same frequency a n d field strength, and was
due to the rapid cancellations taking place in the com­
bined received signal as the two varied in phase with
each other.
As more radio frequency channels were required to
carry the communications traffic, it became necessary
669
Telecommunications Chapter 8

to adopt new techniques to improve the efficient use LOW BAND 71.50-72.80 Mobile transmit
of the channels available. (12.5 kHz spacing) 76.95-78.00 Two-frequency simplex
One technique was to use quasi-synchronous op­ 85.00-86.30 Fixed station transmit
eration of the fixed station transmitters to allow the 86.95-88.00 Two-frequency simplex
same channel to be used simultaneously at all fixed 86.30-86.70 Single-frequency simplex
stations. This provided fuh cover of the station by each
channel and enabled two handportables operating via MID BAND 105.00-108.00 Mobile transmit
(12.5 kHz spacing) Two-frequency simplex
two different fixed stations to use one channel instead
of two, as was previously the case. This technique also 138.00-141.00 Fixed station transmit
Two-frequency simplex
dispensed with the need for handportable users to re­
member which channel had to be used in different areas 165.05-168.25 Fixed transmit
Two-frequency simplex
of the power station. Channels were allocated to the
main functional groups, e.g., operations and main­
HIGH BAND 169.85-173.05 Mobile transmit
tenance, for use throughout the power station. (12.5 kHz spacing) Two-frequency simplex
Details of quasi-synchronous operation and the as­
168.95-169.85 Single-frequency simplex
sociated receiver voting system are given later in this
section.
Band 9 contains the fohowing P M R frequency bands:
The latest development being evaluated by the C E G B
is the use of radio channel trunking techniques. A UHF BAND 453.00-454.00 Fixed station transmit
trunked radio system uses the frequency agility of the 456.00-457.00 Two-frequency simplex
modern synthesised transmitters and receivers available 459.50-460.50 Mobile transmit
for handportable and mobile radios to enable them to 461.50-462.50 Two-frequency simplex
be remotely switched to a channel.
One of a group of radio channels is used as a control Section 8.7.1 of this chapter gives an explanation of
channel in conjunction w h h a microprocesser-based single-frequency and two-frequency simplex operation.
control equipment (CEQ). The C E Q sets up calls be­
tween mobiles, controllers or telephones connected to
8.2.2 Comparison of V H F a n d U H F systems
the system and allocates each call to a traffic channel
(the name given to the remainder of the channels in The antennas used for P M R systems operating in the
the group). Each call is allocated a traffic channel V H F and U H F frequency bands are simhar. These are
sequentially on a first come first served basis. Once a derivatives of the standard half-wave dipole. The ac­
call has been allocated a traffic channel the C E Q and tual antennas used will be dealt with in more detail
control channel are free to deal with the next call. This later. However, it is worth noting at this point that
type of system makes more efficient use of the radio the receiving area of an antenna determines the power
channels and enables sufficient channels to be provided received from a radiating signal, which is measured
to allow a large number of low traffic users to be given in watts per square metre (see Section 8.5.1 of this
radio facilities without the need for them to be skilled chapter).
at radio procedures to make efficient use of a c o m m o n The area of a receiving antenna is proportional to
channel. the square of the wavelength of the radiating signal.
The trunked radio system also provides a number Therefore a half-wave dipole is more effective at V H F
of additional improvements and facilities which are than at U H F . This also applies to those antennas that
described in detail in Section 8.2.5 of this chapter on are derived from the half-wave dipole. This is one
U H F systems. reason for using V H F off-site and U H F for on-site
telecommunications in a power station, where there is
a requirement to confine the radio cover to the site
8.2.1 R a d i o f r e q u e n c y b a n d s used by PIVIR
and immediate area around the site, thus allowing the
systems re-use of the U H F frequency channel elsewhere in the
P M R equipment is manufactured to operate in the country.
V H F and U H F bands of the radio frequency spectrum. V H F P M R equipment is therefore used for tele­
The two bands cover the fohowing frequencies: communications between the power station and mobile
or fixed stations up to approximately 30 km away,
Band Frequency Metric Designation depending on the height of the transmitting antenna
subdivision and the type of surrounding terrain, whhe U H F P M R
30-300 MHz Metric VHF equipment is used for on-site radio systems, i.e., up
300-3000 MHz Decimetric UHF
to approximately 8 km from the power station.
waves With careful design, it has proved possible to repeat
U H F frequency channels at minimum distances of Π ­
Band 8 contains the fohowing three P M R frequency Ι 6 km and thus make economic use of the U H F radio
bands: spectrum. Detailed design requirements to achieve this

670

minimum distance are given in the antenna system
design Section 8.6 of this chapter.
8.2.3 A l l o c a t i o n of radio c h a n n e l s
The ahocation of radio frequency channels for use by
the CEGB is not carried out directly by the Radio
Communications Division of the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI). The DTI has ahocated a group of
frequencies for the exclusive use of the fuel and power
industries. This group of frequencies is administered
on behalf of the member industries by a Joint Radio
Committee (JRC). The J R C considers all apphcations
for radio licences received from the member organisa­
tions and allocates radio channels with the prime objec­
tive of avoiding mutual interference between systems.
The main method adopted by the J R C to achieve
this is to ahocate channels to each member organisa­
tion, using spatial diversity to reduce the possibility of
interference between locations allocated the use of the
same frequencies. This is particularly the case for local
area radio schemes using the U H F b a n d .
Sections 8.2.4 and 8.2.5 of this chapter show the
present groups of frequencies used in power stations
and the proposed changes in the U H F group of fre­
quencies. These changes have become necessary follow­
ing the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference
(WARC) of the International Telecommunications
Union where it was agreed to adopt 12.5 k H z channel
spacing instead of 25 k H z , by taking advantage of
modern developments in radio manufacture. This will
result in the more efficient use of the radio frequency
spectrum.
8.2.4 V H F s y s t e m s used in p o w e r s t a t i o n s
The frequencies used for power station V H F systems
are:
LOW BAND
86.575 MHz Grid emergency system channel
Single-frequency simplex
86.675 MHz Nuclear emergency system channel 1
Single-frequency simplex
86.700 MHz Nuclear emergency system channel 2
Single-frequency simplex
MID BAND
105.7687 MHz Handportable to handportable
Maintenance/commissioning system
Single-frequency simplex
107.13125 MHz Handportable to handportable
Maintenance/commissioning system
Single-frequency simplex
HIGH BAND
169.050 MHz Handportable to handportable
Maintenance/commissioning system
Single-frequency simplex
Changes to the Low and Mid band channels are under
consideration at present.
Radio systems
The Low b a n d V H F systems are all single-frequency
simplex and are used for off-site radio communications
between fixed desk-mounted or table-top controllers
connected by multipair cable to fixed stations housing
radio transmitters and receivers. The fixed stations are
connected by coaxial cable to external antennas, usually
mounted at a conveniently high position on the roof
of one of the power station buildings.
The V H F Grid Emergency System provides com­
munications between the power station and remote
radio fixed stations located at other power stations, the
Grid Control Centre, manned substations or swhching
stations situated within a radius of 35 km of the power
station.
The V H F nuclear emergency systems provide radio
communications within a radius of 35 km of a nuclear
power station. During a nuclear emergency, they pro­
vide communications between the power station inci­
dent control r o o m , h e a h h physics m o n h o r i n g teams,
off-site support centres (OSCs) and nuclear emergency
organisations.
The V H F nuclear emergency systems are also used
for routine communications between the power station
and health physics monitoring teams and in-transit
nuclear fuel flask vehicles.
The Low b a n d V H F channels are also used for an
emergency handportable to handportable communica­
tions system for on-site emergency purposes at nuclear
power stations.
The Mid and High b a n d single-frequency channels
are used for handportable to handportable communi­
cation systems for commissioning, maintenance and
emergency purposes. The handportable systems sup­
plement the U H F systems and also provide hmited
communications in the event of the failure of the U H F
systems.
8.2.5 U H F s y s t e m s u s e d in p o w e r s t a t i o n s
The frequencies used for power station U H F systems
are in the process of change (1988). The existing twelve
25 k H z spaced channels are being replaced by twenty-
four 12.5 k H z spaced channels.
The existing group of twelve 25 k H z spaced channels
is:
Channel No Transmitted frequencies
Fixed station (MHz) Mobile (MHz)
21A 456.050 461.550
22 456.075 461.575
22A 456.100 461.600
In similar 0.025 456.325 461.825
steps to 27
The proposed new group of twenty-four 12.5 kHz
spaced channels is:
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Telecommunications
Channel No Transmitted frequencies
Fixed station (MHz) Mobile (MHz)
1283 456.0375 461.5375
to in 0.0125 steps to in 0.0125 steps to
1306 456.3250 461.8250
U H F systems used for on-site radiotelephone com­
munications are based on conventional P M R systems
which use manual selection of the radio channel by a
mobile or handportable for speech communications.
Automatic allocation of one of a group of radio chan­
nels, as used in trunked radio systems, is at present
being evaluated by the C E G B .
The conventional U H F systems used for on-site radio
communications comprise desk-mounted or table-top
controllers, fixed stations containing the base station
radio transmitters and receivers (for each of the radio
channels used by the power station) and mobile radios.
The mobile radios include handportable radiotele­
phones and radiotelephones mounted in vehicles.
The complexity of the controllers will depend on the
overall complexity of the radio system and the ability
of the radio contractor to supply customised simplified
controllers instead of his standard model.
The controllers are connected to the fixed stations by
multipair cables. In modern power stations the cables
have short-time fireproof insulation material to improve
the security of the radio systems.
Single and multichannel controllers are provided as
necessary. A single-channel controher has access to one
radio channel only, whereas a multichannel controller
has access to a number or all of the channels. The latest
controllers have a programming facihty, which enables
the number of channels accessible to the controller to
be pre-programmed, as required by the customer.
The fixed stations are located within the plant areas
of the power station, close to the associated antenna
systems.
The number of fixed station locations is dependent
on the number of antenna systems required to provide
good radio cover of the power station. The number of
fixed station transmitter/receivers is dependent on the
number of radio frequency channels allocated to the
power station. This is based on the predicted speech
traffic requirements for operation, maintenance and
emergency purposes.
To avoid interference between the signals transmitted
simuhaneously from a number of distributed fixed
stations, it is necessary to use one or a combination of
the following:
(a) The allocation of different radio frequency chan­
nels to each fixed station.
(b) To repeat the use of the same radio frequency
channel(s) only if there is no possibility of an
overlap of the radio cover between any two of the
fixed stations.
672
Chapter 8
(c) The use of quasi-synchronous or synchronous
operation of the transmitters which use the same
radio frequency.
(d) The use of a best signal received voting arrange­
ment for receivers operating on the same radio
frequency.
(e) The use of dynamic sharing of the radio channels
between fixed station locations so that each has
access to all channels, but only those channels not
in use at other locations being used at any one time.
Alternatives (c) to (e) require a c o m m o n control equip­
ment (CEQ) to which each fixed station and controller
is connected. The C E Q carries out the receiver voting
and dynamic sharing operations for the whole system.
The present practice is to provide a single fixed
station location for small power stations and distributed
fixed stations for medium and large power stations.
Each fixed station is connected to a dedicated an­
tenna system.
The antenna systems comprise a combination of in­
ternal and external antennas, supplemented on larger
power stations by radiating coaxial cables (leaky feed­
ers). The complexity of the antenna system depends on
the level of difficulty experienced in providing good
radio cover throughout the station. The design objective
is to obtain a level of radio cover better than a minimum
sensitivity signal to noise ratio of 15 dB SIN A D . SIN A D
is the acronym for Signal Noise A n d Distortion.
Signal to noise ratio in dB S I N A D =
S + Ν + D
10 log
Ν + D
where S = signal power Ν = noise power and D =
distortion power.
For a modern receiver, a sensitivity of 15 dB S I N A D
would be equivalent to a signal of approximately 1 μΥ
pd at the receiver input.
The mobile radios include up to four radiotelephone
units mounted in vehicles, e.g., ambulance, fire tender
and four-wheel drive vehicles, and u p to sixty hand-
portable radiotelephone u n h s carried by staff working
in the power station.
The mobiles can be single or multichannel radios.
The multi-channel mobiles, which can be switched to
the channel on which the user wishes to operate, are
usually provided for those power stations which are
allocated multiple radio channels, e.g., u p to five.
The number of channels allocated to a power station
is dependent on the size of the station and the predicted
r a d i o c o m m u n i c a t i o n s speech traffic. T h e r a d i o
requirements for the operations function of a station
having two turbine-generator units could be satisfied by
one channel but a six-unit station could need at least
three channels for operational purposes.

The present J R C agreement ahows large stations to
have a maximum of five radio channels. It is expected
that this could increase to eight following the change
to 12.5 kHz channel spacing to be completed by the
early 1990s. The actual number of channels allocated
to a power station will depend on the predicted traffic
requirements for normal operations, maintenance, com­
mon services and emergency purposes.
A two turbine-generator u n h station, in addition to
its operations channel, would have a channel allocated
to maintenance.
A large six turbine-generator unit station would have
five radio channels typically ahocated to five radio
systems as follows:
• Operations system for Units 1 and 2.
• Operations system for Units 3 and 4.
• Operations system for Units 5 and 6.
• Maintenance/emergency system.
• C o m m o n services system.
The common services system would include the follow­
ing systems sharing the same radio channel:
• Securhy system.
• Ambulance, fire and first aid system.
• Site transport system.
The operations systems would include the following
systems sharing the same radio channels:
• Fuel handling system.
• Waste disposal system, e.g., ash or spent nuclear
fuel.
• Crane speech communication system.
Plant or site emergencies are initially dealt with by
the operations staff in the C C R using the operations
system(s). For a prolonged emergency, e.g., in a nuclear
station, control of the incident would be assumed by
the emergency control centre and the mobhe staff in­
volved in dealing with the emergency would take over
use of the maintenance or common services system.
The operations system would then be released for its
prime purpose, i.e., to be used by staff engaged in the
operation of the plant unaffected by the incident.
The method of informing the relevant staff to switch
to the emergency channel will depend on the emergency
procedures of a particular power station. The method
would be based on the use of one or other of the two
power station 'global' communication systems, i.e.,
the siren and public address systems.
The design bandwidth may limit the handportable to
a maximum of three channels. When this is so, two
groups of handportables have to be provided if, as is
the case for a large power station, five channels are
available for use. The two groups of handportables
Radio systems
would be provided with three channels each, one of
which would be the c o m m o n channel, to which all
handportables could be switched in an emergency.
The radio systems can also be provided with audio
or sub-audio signalling systems for use with selective
calhng systems (SELCALL) and continuous tone cahing
signalhng systems (CTCSS), respectively, see Section
8.4.3 of this chapter.
The S E L C A L L system enables an operator of a radio
controller to use the keypad on the controller to call
any individual mobile which has a S E L C A L L decoder
fitted. On receiving the appropriate S E L C A L L code,
the mobile receiver unmutes the audio output to the
loudspeaker and allows a calhng signal to be heard by
the user. If the appropriate code is not received, the user
is unaware that a call is in progress on the radio channel
unless he deliberately unmutes the mobile by manually
operating a S E L C A L L defeat switch.
The S E L C A L L facility is usually provided on the
operations systems in order to provide the C C R staff
with a means of ensuring that the operator who is to be
given an instruction is the correct operator for the work
in progress.
The CTCSS system consists of a sub-audible tone
which is transmitted simultaneously with the radio fre­
quency signal. All fixed station and m o b h e transmitters
allocated to the radio channel carry the same CTCSS
tone encoder and all the receivers the appropriate
CTCSS decoder. Unless the radio frequency signal also
includes the appropriate CTCSS tone, the receiver wih
not unmute the receiver audio circuit. Therefore, any
calls on a radio channel shared with other organisations
will only be heard if the correct CTCSS tone is present
or the mobile is manually unmuted using a CTCSS
defeat switch.
The CTCSS system is used on the non-operational
channels instead of S E L C A L L because these channels
are used more frequently on talk-through, which re­
quires the handportable to be u n m u t e d . CTCSS wih
automatically u n m u t e the handportable, whereas re­
ceipt of a S E L C A L L code initially unmutes the hand-
portable which only stays unmuted for a preset time
after receipt of the code or subsequent operation of the
handportable transmitter (i.e., the press-to-talk T T T '
switch).
The CTCSS system reduces the irritation that often
occurs when the radio channels are shared with other
organisations.
Both the S E L C A L L and CTCSS systems are useful
where a power station has to share radio channels with
an associated power station construction site or another
separately-managed power station.
Distributed fixed station systems
Distributed fixed station systems are used in modern
power stations to provide good radio cover. As has been
explained previously, distributed fixed station operation
has become necessary for two main reasons:
673
Telecommunications
• The increased size and complexity of the civij design
of a modern power station.
• The necessity to limit the R F output power of
handportables to 0.5 W into the antenna to reduce
the RFI to electronic control and instrumentation
equipment.
Each fixed station is located close to the associated
antenna system which comprises a combination of inter­
nal and external antennas and radiating cable (leaky
feeder). The external antennas are mounted as low as
possible commensurate with good radio cover of the
site, which includes outlying buildings having no an­
tenna system of their own. The internal antennas are
mounted in the large open areas within the power
station, e.g., turbine hah/boiler house and C W p u m p -
house. Radiating cable is used in confined areas, e.g.,
basements, tunnels and enclosed corridors.
In order to prevent mutual interference between
fixed stations, it is necessary to allocate different fre­
quencies to each. This is not necessary for those fixed
stations which serve a totally confined area. However,
in modern power stations the radio cover from each
fixed station is so complex that it is difficult to confine
the area of cover.
The disadvantages of using different frequencies at
each fixed station are:
• Mobile users need to remember which channel has
to be selected for use in different areas of the power
station.
• Calls to mobiles require a polling facility to enable
calls to be made from each fixed station transmhter
in turn. This increases the call set-up time.
• Cahs between mobiles operating via different fixed
stations require the use of two or more channels for
a single conversation or conference between three
or more mobiles.
• A single emergency channel, to which all mobiles
can be switched in order to monitor the emergency
situation as it progresses, cannot be provided.
In order to overcome these short-comings in the sys­
tem, quasi-synchronous operation of the fixed station
transmitters and voting of the associated receivers has
been adopted.
Quasi-synchronous operation of the transmitters al­
lows the same channel frequency to be used at each
fixed station. This provides full radio cover of the
power station on all channels.
The system uses high stability oscillators, permitting
the channel frequency at each fixed station to be off-
tuned by one or two Hertz from each of the adjacent
fixed stations. The effect of this arrangement is that
a mobile which receives signals of similar field strength
from two fixed stations will detect a beat frequency
of one or two Hertz, but will not experience rapid
674
Chapter 8
fluctuations in signal due to phase cancellations. Theo­
retically the one or two Hertz beat frequency, being
sub-audio, wih not be heard by the users and there­
fore speech quality will not be impaired. In practice,
in those areas having pronounced quasi-synchronous
effects, a background noise is detected which rises and
fahs in amplitude at a low frequency of one or two
Hertz. This noise is produced by multipath signals ar­
riving at the receiving antenna which vary in phase.
However, the effect does not normally detract from
the intelligibility of the speech. On the rare occasions
when intelligibility is affected, a small spatial movement
by a handportable user of one or two paces will result
in a marked improvement in reception. This is because
the points of poor and good reception tend to be located
on a small-meshed matrix covering the affected area.
Signals received at two or more fixed stations from
the same mobile are compared in the C E Q , the best
quahty signal is then selected by a receiver voting system
and connected to the receive bus of the C E Q . The C E Q
bus is then connected to the cable from a controller
or to a transmitter if the call is between mobiles. Where
an area is adequately covered by the fixed station
transmitter but not by the associated receiver due to the
lower power output of the handportables, one or more
distributed fixed station receivers can be provided to
improve cover.
An alternative to the use of quasi-synchronous trans­
mitters is to use the frequency agility of synthesised
transmitters and receivers in the mobile. The C E G B
is evaluating trunked radio systems which make use
of the synthesised mobiles and fixed stations now
available.
Trunked radio systems
Trunked radio systems use automatic allocation of
one of a c o m m o n group of radio channels to a mobile
radiotelephone, directly wired controller or telephone
each time a radio call is m a d e .
The system dispenses with the need to allocate each
radio channel to a specific function, e.g., operations,
maintenance or c o m m o n services, and makes more
efficient use of the radio channels available for a power
station. Channels can be shared by adjacent power sta­
tions, or power station construction sites, which results
in more efficient use of channels and makes more
channels available to each management unit in times
of emergency or abnormal operational activity. In order
to share channels between adjacent power stations, or
between a power station and an adjacent construction
site, a data signalhng hnk has to be provided between
the CEQs of each of the radio systems. The hnk is
used to indicate to each C E Q the channels in use at
any one time.
Automatic channel selection requires a change to
the method of operating the m o b h e . In a conventional
radio system the mobile user switches to the channel
and uses a verbal call-sign or the name of the called

party. The user of a directly wired controller connected
to the C E Q adopts a similar procedure, or uses a keypad
to send a selective calling code to initiate an alerting
signal in the called mobile.
In a trunked system the calling mobile has to request
a free radio channel. This is usually achieved by press­
ing a cah request or send button on the keypad of
the mobile.
Two systems are being evaluated by the C E G B for
use in power stations and power station construction
sites:
• A system which has been used on the Continent for
a number of years which uses the Comité Consultatif
International de Radio (CCIR) sequential single fre­
quency code (SSFC) signalling from fixed station to
mobile and the Comité Consultatif International de
Telegraphique et Telephonique (CCITT) dual tone
multi-frequency (DTMF) signahing from mobile to
fixed station.
• A system which is based on the digital signalling
system specified in the Ministry of Posts and Tele­
communications specification MPT1327, *A sig­
nalling Standard for Trunked Private Land Mobile
Radio Systems' issued by the Radiocommunications
Agency (RA) of the Department of Industry (DTI).
The same signahing system is used in both directions
of transmission between the fixed station and the
mobile.
In the CCIR/CCITT system, pressing the call request
button results in the mobile seizing one of the group
of trunked channels which is not transmitting a 'chan­
nel busy' signal. The microprocessor-controlled com­
mon equipment (CEQ) of the system then carries out
a 'handshake' procedure over this selected channel to
identify the mobile before returning a dial tone to
the mobile. The handshake procedure consists of an
identity (ID) code being sent to the mobile and an
acknowledgement being returned to the C E Q . On re­
ceiving dial tone the caher then keys the code of the
called party on the keypad of the mobile. D T M F signals
associated with each key pressed are sent over the
channel. This procedure is referred to as 'on-air call
set-up'. The called party can be a mobile, telephone or
controller directly wired to the C E Q , or a P A X / P A B X
telephone connected via interconnecting tie-circuits
between the C E Q and the P A X or P A B X .
Calls from a directly wired telephone or controller,
P A X or P A B X telephone are carried out in a similar
manner. On receipt of a call for a mobile, the C E Q
transmits a calling signal via one of the free channels
which is being monitored by the quiescent mobiles.
The calling signal contains a preamble signal to allow
all quiescent mobiles to swhch to the channel followed
by an ID of the called mobile. On receiving the correct
ID, the mobile sends an acknowledgement signal back
to the fixed station. At the same time the receiver of
the handportable is unmuted and the acknowledgement
Radio systems
signal is heard at full volume in the handportable
loudspeaker. When the acknowledgement signal is
received by the C E Q , a ringing tone is sent to both
the called and the calling party. The press-to-talk (PTT)
b u t t o n has to be depressed on the called mobile to
answer the call. On receipt of the P T T signal, the C E Q
removes the ringing tone. Normal speech communi­
cations can then take place.
Should the called mobile not answer or be engaged
on another call, the C E Q would send a 'number un­
obtainable' or a 'busy' tone to the calling party.
In the MPT1327 system, a fast frequency shift keying
(FFSK) digital signalling system is used in both direc­
tions between the fixed station and the mobile.
T w o operational systems are available:
• For large systems, e.g., a group of five or more
channels, one of the channels is designated the con­
trol channel and all mobhes continually monitor
this channel when in the quiescent state. The remain­
ing channels are used as traffic channels to which
mobiles are switched automatically by the C E Q (via
the control channel) once a communications link
has been established between a calling and called
party.
• For smaher systems, any one of the channels assumes
the role of control channel until there are no other
channels available for use as traffic channels. The
control channel then assumes the function of a traffic
channel after first acting as a control channel to
set-up the communications link between the calhng
and called parties. The next channel which becomes
free then assumes the role of control channel.
During the period when all channels are busy, addi­
tional calls cannot be made with the exception of
'override' cahs which are initiated by callers having a
congestion override class of service facility.
In the MPT1327 system the cahed party's ID is first
entered into the memory of the mobile and the send
b u t t o n is pressed. The mobile then t r a n s m h s a cah
request (RQS) message on the control channel. When
the C E Q is free to handle another call the RQS is
accepted and an acknowledge call request (AKQ) mes­
sage is sent to the mobile. The mobile will next send
the called party's ID which is stored in its memory.
This process of storing the called party's ID before
it is transmitted is referred to as Off-air call set-up'.
The C E Q stores the ID and uses a look-up table held
in memory to determine whether the called ID is a
mobile, directly wired controller or telephone, P A X or
P A B X telephone.
If the called ID belongs to a mobile the C E Q sends
an 'Ahoy' (AHY) message via the control channel
to all mobiles. If the mobile is busy or not available
the C E Q wih send a busy or number unobtainable
tone to the calling party. If the cahed mobile receives
the A H Y message an A K Q message is returned via
the control channel to the C E Q . The C E Q sends a
675
Telecommunications
calling message to the mobile and a ringing tone to
the calling party.
On receipt of the cahing message the mobile will
emh an audible cahing tone. The call is answered by
pressing the P T T button on the mobile. On receiving
the P T T signal, the C E Q removes the calling message
and ringing tone and connects both parties to a c o m m o n
traffic channel. Speech communications can then pro­
ceed over the traffic channel while the control channel
is free to handle subsequent calls.
If the called ID belongs to a directly wired controller
or telephone or to a P A X / P A B X tie-circuh, the C E Q
sets up a hard-wired path to the called party and rings
the controller or telephone, or transmits the necessary
dial p u l s e s / D T M F signals over a P A X / P A B X tie-
circuit. On receipt of an answering signal from a di­
rectly wired controller or telephone, the C E Q would
connect the parties to a c o m m o n traffic channel. Alter­
natively, on completion of the dial pulses or D T M F
signals over the P A X / P A B X tie-circuit, the C E Q would
connect the cahing party and the tie-circuit to a c o m m o n
traffic channel.
The MPT1327 system has the advantage of off-air
call set-up and faster signalling speeds which make more
efficient use of the radio channels.
Both the CCIR/CCITT and the MPT1327 systems
use timers to control the occupancy time of the traffic
channels. Fixed timers are used to limit the occupancy
to a customer-determined period, e.g., 2 min. When
dynamic timing is provided, the fixed timers are over­
ridden only when there is not a free traffic channel
left on the system. This is another method of improv­
ing the efficient use of the radio channels.
The timers that are normally incorporated in a system
are as follows:
• The dynamic timer which provides a warning signal
approximately 10 s before clearing-down a com­
munications channel. The dynamic timer is only
activated when there is only one channel free on the
system. This ensures a channel is avahable, or is
made available, at worst after a period equivalent
to the setting of the minimum fixed timer for emer­
gency or priority calls made from a mobile or hand-
portable.
• A minimum fixed timer which is set to provide a
minimum period for conversation, e.g., 60 seconds,
before the dynamic timer is able to clear-down a
channel.
• A maximum fixed timer which is set to provide a
maximum period for conversation to take place,
e.g., 5 minutes, before a forced clear-down sequence
is initiated. This timer would be over-ridden by the
dynamic timer during periods of heavy traffic.
• A channel activity timer is also provided which is
initiated each time a P T T is operated on the channel.
If a P T T operation is not detected in a preset time,
e.g., 30 seconds, a warning signal is transmitted.
676
Chapter 8
If a P T T is operated then the timer is reset. If a P T T
is not operated within approximately 10 seconds of
hearing the warning signal a clear-down sequence
is initiated.
The use of microprocessor control in the C E Q of both
systems enables sophisticated facilities to be provided.
Examples of these are as follows:
• Abbreviated keying — this enables the mobile to use
more easily-remembered one or two digh codes in
place of frequently used or lengthy codes, e.g., calls
to the C C R telephone or to telephones on the C E G B
CTN.
• Ring-back when free — this enables a calling party
to request to be called when a busy party becomes
available after a call is completed.
• Group calls — this enables the C C R to call a group
of mobiles, e.g., a fire team, by keying a c o m m o n
group code.
• Emergency override — this enables mobiles or
directly wired controllers/telephones with the ne­
cessary class-of-service to 'knockdown' an existing
call of a lower class-of-service if all channels are
engaged.
Some of the facilities, e.g., abbreviated keying, can be
used to simphfy the operation of the mobile for those
users not requiring the more sophisticated facihties.
Both trunked systems have the following important
features:
• Efficient use of the radio frequency channels which
enables more traffic to be handled.
• Confidentiality of radio conversations as controllers
and mobiles are unable to select busy channels and
monitor them.
• Remote control units (controllers) can be replaced
by directly wired telephones which simphfy the
procedures for accessing and using the system. This
is more acceptable to control engineers who, in gen­
eral, do not wish to be trained radio operators.
• The users have the equivalent of a dedicated channel
for each call on the system. This enables a large
number of low-level traffic user groups to make
use of radio whereas previously, because they were
unable to have a dedicated channel, they opted out
of using the system. The resulting integrated traffic
requirements can be used to justify the allocation
of more channels to the power station.
• The use of datalinks between radio systems serving
two or more adjacent power stations or between
a partly commissioned power station and hs ad­
jacent construction she, enables a group of c o m m o n
channel frequencies to be shared. This provides a
larger pool of channels which are available to any
 Radio systems

one of the shes during unusually busy periods, e.g., Low frequency (LF) crane control systems
annual overhauls and site emergencies. L F crane control systems use frequencies in the 2 8 7 - 3 1 3
• Direct dialling/keying between the radio and P A X / k H z b a n d , which is shared with maritime radio navi­
P A B X . This creates an integrated telecommunica­ gation beacons. This system has been used for remote
tions system for telephone and radio users. This control of power station cranes since the 1960s.
facihty enables station staff to speak to remotely The use of L F provides a limited range facility to
located specialist support engineers directly from ensure that the transportable remote control transmitter
plant locations. unit cannot operate the crane from a distance greater
than 100 m , so that the crane is always operated from
a safe distance. Ideally the operator would be close to
8.3 Crane radio s y s t e m s used in p o w e r
the load while operating the crane by radio control.
Stations This limited operating range is achieved because
In addition to the PMR-derived radiotelephone systems, the radio field strength (electric field strength Ε (V/m)
there are a number of other radio systems used in a for a high impedance source, e.g., a dipole, or mag­
power station. These include L F systems and S H F netic field strength Η ( A / m ) for a low impedance
(microwave) systems used for crane control and anti- source, e.g., a current loop) of an L F signal varies
colhsion systems. The two systems use the following inversely as the cube of the distance for distances with­
frequency bands: in a sixth of a wavelength of the transmitter, i.e.,
Band Frequency Metric Designation within the 'near-field region', which extends to a dis­
subdivision tance approximately equal to λ / 2 7 Γ metres from the
5 30-300 kHz Kilometric LF transmitting antenna where λ is the wavelength of
waves
(low frequency)
the R F signal. Figure 8.12 shows the graph of wave
10 3-30 GHz Centimetric impedance against distance from source for both high
SHF
waves and low impedance sources.
(super high freqency)
For a typical system using a ferrite dipole having a
8.3.1 Crane control systems gain of one with respect to a half-wavelength dipole
There are three types of crane control system available, antenna and for an R F signal of 300 k H z , the near
low frequency (LF) analogue systems, V H F or U H F field would extend to approximately 160 m from the
digital systems, and combined L F and V H F or U H F . antenna of the transportable transmitter.

ELECTRIC FIELD PREDOMINANT

ExI/r^.HíDcl/r^

PLANE WAVE
Eccl/r^,Hocl/r^v

0.5 1.0
DISTANCE FROM SOURCE NORMALISED TO X / 2 7 r m

FIG. 8.12 Radio wave impedance as a function of distance from the transmitting antenna

677
Telecommunications
The LF crane control system used by the C E G B
uses a multichannel, transportable transmitter and a
crane-borne multichannel receiver. One channel, the
safety channel, is allocated to providing the restricted
range and all other signals received by the receiver
have to lie inside a narrow amplitude window centred
on the safety channel. Control signals comprise un­
modulated L F radio channels; in the simplest system
one per control function.
In order to reduce the size and weight of the battery
required for the transportable transmitter, the R F
output power is kept to a minimum, i.e., of the order
of 60 m W . To compensate for the low R F output a
sensitive receiver is mounted on the crane. The maxi­
m u m sensitivity of the receiver is approximately 0.02
μ\. The sensitivity is adjustable to provide the required
operating range up to a maximum of 100 m.
The amplitude window is approximately ± 6 dB either
side of the safety channel received level and the frequen­
cy window is approximately ±25 l / 4 z of the nominal
frequency of the channel.
It was thought for many years that this narrow
frequency/amplitude window and the use of the near-
field region of the radio frequency signal gave a high
level of securhy from malfunction due to external
interfering signals.
Fohowing two malfunctions, which were eventually
discovered to be not wholly the fault of the radio sys­
tem design, a detailed analysis identified weaknesses in
the security of the system. The restricted range of the
system depended on the receiver operating in the near-
field region of the transportable transmitter. However,
this did not restrict the receiver to operating whhin the
near-field region of interfering signals. Due to the high
senshivity of the receiver, it was found that it could
respond to signals from high-powered transmitters
located a number of kilometres away from the receiver,
the signal having been attenuated to a level which was
within the security frequency amplitude window.
Initially, this was thought to happen at only one
particular level of signal. Analysis showed that this was
not so. As the transportable transmitter moves beyond
the minimum operating distance from the receiving
antenna to the maximum operating distance, the re­
ceived level of the safety channel signal varies in pro­
portion to the inverse of the cube of the distance. This
resuhs in a much wider amplitude window than was
originally thought.
It was also found that high levels of interfering signal
having a frequency just outside the pass band could be
attenuated by the narrow band crystal filters in the
receiver to levels matching that of the safety channel
signal. This would occur when the transportable trans­
mitter was at some particular operating distance from
the receiver.
This could effectively increase the frequency window
to a value approaching the full receiver bandwidth of
approximately 3 kHz for single frequency interfering
sources.
678
Chapter 8
The good safety record of the system had been mainly
due to the limited number of users in the L F band
and the monitoring of the frequency band usage by
the supplier of the crane control system. The other
main user of the band is the Trinhy House, which uses
the band for shore-based radio beacons. Unfortunately,
many power stations are also built on coastal sites.
The other limitation of L F systems is the increased
L F pollution generated by modern industrial plant,
viz., R F heating, welding and inverters.
In locations with high L F pollution, an L F system
can be rendered inoperable by LF noise causing the
receiver automatic gain control to desensitise the re­
ceiver. This reduces the controlled range of the system
below the minimum operating distance.
For these reasons, the use of crane control relying
solely on an LF system was discontinued for high
category cranes, e.g., turbine hah, coohng water p u m p -
house and nuclear pile-cap cranes.
However, there are a number of well tried, success­
ful features of the LF system which are the result of
good engineering design such as:
• Limited operating range.
• D C outputs from the receiver being derived directly
from the R F received signals.
• Emergency stop facility based on the loss of the
R F signal.
These features have been retained where possible by
the C E G B as necessary requirements for any crane
control system.
VHF or UHF crane control systems
There are a number of V H F / U H F crane control systems
available. These systems include the use of digital sig­
nalling, which gives a higher level of security than that
obtained from the use of frequency-division multiplex­
ing of unmodulated signals in the analogue L F system.
One way of specifying the security of a digital code
is to quote the ' H a m m i n g distance' of the code. The
term ' H a m m i n g distance' is a concept used in assessing
the checking ability of codes. It is the measure of the
number of sequential positions by which the correct
and incorrect code combinations differ.
A code with a H a m m i n g distance of d is capable of
detecting ah combinations of ( d - 1 ) or fewer errors.
Thus a code that only required one bit to change, for
example, a 1 to a 0 to make h an acceptable but in­
correct code, has a H a m m i n g distance of 1 and is not
capable of detecting any errors, i.e., d - 1 = 0.
The systems available at the present time have H a m ­
ming distances in excess of 4, and more sophisticated
systems are bound to follow the trends in data systems,
which include error correction as well as error detection
faculties.
The present crane control systems comprise one way
systems similar to the L F system, i.e., a crane-borne

receiver and a transportable control transmitter. There­
fore, there is no communication path from the crane
in the direction of the transportable controller to allow
confirmatory checks to be carried out between the
crane receiver and the controller.
The systems are microprocessor-based which has
resulted in the development of sophisticated self-testing
procedures in both the transportable remote control
unit and the crane-borne receiver. Monitoring of the
microprocessor is provided in the form of a watch-dog
circuh, which detects the loss of the microprocessor
clock pulses. The loss of the clock pulses should result
in the watch-dog circuit switching off the receiver out­
puts to the crane electrical control circuits.
However, it is essential that a rehable emergency stop
facility is incorporated in the design of the system to
cover failure of the crane-borne microprocessor a n d / o r
receiver output circuits.
Should the microprocessor fail during a crane opera­
tion, it must be possible to release any receiver output
circuit or trip the main supply contactor to prevent
further uncontrolled operation of the crane.
The present range of systems does not incorporate
the CEGB-preferred L F design feature of deriving the
receiver output D C signals directly from the received
R F signal.
The usual method of providing an emergency stop
control in V H F / U H F systems is to transmit an emer­
gency stop digital signal to the crane-borne receiver.
An emergency stop would rely on the successful re­
ceipt of the emergency signal, which would be depend­
ent on the faultless operation of the receiver. Since
the need for an emergency stop could be due to a
faulty receiver, it is not acceptable to have to rely on
the correct operation of the receiver to release the
output circuits.
Unfortunately, other essential requirements adopted
by the C E G B from experience with L F crane con­
trol systems also have not been satisfactorily provided
in the U H F / V H F systems. In addition, the systems
do not incorporate a hmited range facility which is
as reliable as the L F system. As a consequence, the
C E G B has not (as yet) approved a U H F / V H F system
for use on high category cranes in a power station
environment.
Combined LF and VHF/UHF crane control systems
These systems are a development of the L F system. The
LF system has been retained for providing a limited
range facility and supplementing the emergency stop
requirement. The V H F / U H F system is used to provide
more secure digitally-coded control signals.
There are stih, however, the unacceptable design
features which have been described for both L F and
V H F / U H F systems and, due to these limitations, com­
bined systems have not been approved for use in power
stations. However, the combined L F and U H F / V H F
approach has a great deal of merit and it is expected
Radio systems
to lead to an approved system in due course for loca­
tions which do not suffer from L F pollution.
8.3.2 Anticollision systems
The most reliable anticolhsion device used for power
station crane systems is a probe and limit switch ar­
rangement. A 4 m probe is attached to each crane and
a strike plate mounted adjacent to the probe attached
to the other crane. If the probe strikes the plate, h
operates limit switches which disconnect the electrical
supply to the long travel m o t o r .
This arrangement is suitable for use with two cranes
which share the same long travel rails. Where two cranes
operate on long travel rails mounted in parallel, with
one set of rails directly above the other, a different
approach must be adopted. An ahernative or supple­
mentary method t o the probe arrangement is a radio
system which uses either the radar principle of com­
paring a reflected signal with the transmitted signal
or the L F controlled range facility.
A typical anticolhsion radar equipment gives ad­
vanced warning of possible collision by detecting the
change in frequency between the transmitted signal and
its reflected signal. The equipment relies on the Doppler
effect which arises when the reflected signal frequency
is modified by the relative movement between the trans­
mitting source and the reflecting surface. The faster the
closing velocity, the higher will be the difference
frequency between source signal and reflected signal.
When the source and reflecting surface are stationary,
no difference frequency will exist. The equipment can
thus detect movement and relative velocity between the
crane and another crane or stationary object.
The equipment comprises a transmitter/receiver unit
enclosed in a housing which also holds a circular,
paraboloidal, dish antenna. This unit is mounted on one
crane and a suitable reflector is mounted on the other
crane. A narrow 5° beam is emitted from the 300 m m
diameter dish antenna. The transmitter is based on a
O u n n ' diode and the receiver on a 'Schottsky' diode. A
self-check system is normally provided to detect failure
of either transmitter or receiver.
The equipment can be provided for systems operat­
ing over a number of distance ranges between the trans­
mitter and reflector, e.g., up to 10 m, 50 m or 100 m.
For cranes operating on long travel rails mounted above
each other, the radar system requires a number of
transmitter receivers angled to detect the other crane
over different sections of the rails.
The system can suffer from the effects of spurious
reflections from surfaces other than the reflector
mounted on the other crane. This weakness can be over­
come to a large extent by the use of a narrow beam
and paying particular attention to the method of in­
stallation used for the transmitter/receiver and reflector
units. A particular problem is the movement or loosen­
ing of the mounting arrangement over a period of time
by the vibrations set u p by the crane when in operation.
679
Telecommunications Chapter 8

8.4 RF nnodulation systems

MODULATING WAVEFORM
The information to be carried by the radio frequency
carrier wave can be audible speech in the form of voice (a)
frequencies (VF), coded VF signals or VF data signals. AMPLITURE MODULATION
The VF band of frequencies used for radio systems
is nominally 30-3000 Hz. This band is subdivided as
fohows:
(b)
3 0 - 3 0 0 Hz sub-audible band
300-2000 Hz audible band
2000-3000 Hz above audible band

The three sub-bands are isolated from each other by

use of a combination of low pass, band pass and high
pass filtering techniques.
(c)
Speech signals are confined to the audible band
and non-speech data or coded signals can use in-band
or out-of-band signals. Examples of sub-audible and
in-band signahing are given in Section 8.4.3 of this
chapter under continuous tone control signalling sys­
tems (CTCSS) and selective calling systems (SELCALL)
ENVELOPE
respectively. UNMODULATED
SIGNAL
Examples of in-band and above audio band signahing
are also given in Section 8.9 of this chapter, which
deals with remote control signahing between operator (d)
control units (controllers), the radio frequency channel
common equipment and fixed stations. In these ex­
amples, the control signals not required to be trans­
mitted with the RF signals are removed by suitable
band stop or low pass filters. AMPLITUDE
CAR RIER

8.4.1 Amplitude modulation (AM)

An amplitude modulated wave is formed when the (e) • FREQUENCY
(T-FS) f (F+TS)
information signal is used to vary the amplitude of
the RF carrier wave, whhe the frequency of the carrier
remains constant. FIG. 8 . 1 3 Waveforms for A M and F M systems of
Figure 8.13 shows a sine wave (a) which is used to modulation
amplitude modulate a carrier wave (b).
A carrier wave can be represented by:
The first term is the unmodulated carrier wave: the
= Vc sin ω t. (8.5) second and third terms are called the lower (LSB) and
upper sidebands (USB), respectively, see Fig 8.13 (e).
where Vc is the amplitude and ω/27Γ is the frequency T h e a m o u n t of modulation applied t o the R F carrier
of the carrier wave. wave is measured by the depth of modulation (m).
The amplitude modulated carrier wave can be re­ T o avoid distortion, the amplitude of the modulation
presented by: signal has to be limhed t o ensure that a depth of
modulation of 100% (i.e., m = 1) is not exceeded.
Vam = Vc (1 + m sin ωst) sin ω t, (8.6) The depth of modulation is generally set to between
60 and 6 5 % using a fixed a m p h t u d e , 1000 Hz test
where m varies with the magnitude of the audio signal signal. This allows for an additional 4 0 % modulation
and ω 5 / 2 7 Γ is the frequency of the audio signal (Fig to occur during peak excursions in the speech signal
8.13 (d)). The factor m is referred to as the depth of before over-modulation distortion can occur.
modulation or modulation factor.
Equation (8.6) can be expanded:
8.4.2 Frequency modulation (FM)
mVc
^am = Vc sin ω t + cos(ω - ωs)t — A frequency modulated wave is formed when the in­
formation signal is used t o vary the frequency of the
mVc
COS(ω + ωs)t (8.7) radio frequency carrier wave, while the a m p h t u d e of
the carrier wave remains constant.

680
 Radio systems

Figure 8.13 (c) shows a carrier wave which has been
frequency modulated by a sine wave.
It has already been shown that a carrier wave can be
represented by Equation (8.5) Vc = Vc sin ωst.
A carrier wave, frequency modulated by a sine wave
information signal, is represented by:
Vfm = Vc sin 27Γ (fc + 6f sin
where fc is the carrier frequency
ω 5 is the angular velocity of the sine wave infor­
mation signal
of is the frequency deviation corresponding to
the frequency shift of the carrier
Continuous tone controlled signalling system (CTCSS)
This system uses a sub-audible modulating signal which
is continuously transmitted with the associated R F car­
rier wave. The signal is always present with the R F
carrier and is a modulating signal addhional to the
information signal.
The CTCSS code frequency (or tone) is the assigned
ωst)U (8 8) audio frequency quoted by the Radiocommunications
Agency (RA) of the D T I when a radio licence is issued
for the radio system. These standard frequencies are
hsted in Table 8.1, which is taken from the DTI perfor­
mance specification M P T 1306 — CTCSS for use in the
Land Mobile Services. The CTCSS modulation limhs
quoted in MPT1306 are given in Table 8.2.

TABLE 8.1
For the peak amphtude of the sine wave information
CTCSS standard frequencies, Hz
signal:
7Γ
= η — 67.0 110.9 146.2 192.8
2 71.9 114.8 151.4 203.5
77.0 118.8 156.7 210.7
where η represents the odd integers 1,3,5, etc. 82.5 123.0 162.2 218.1
88.5 127.3 167.9 225.7
π
94.8 131.8 173.8 233.6
sin = sin η — = ±1
2 103.5 136.5 179.9 241.8
107.2 141.3 186.2 250.3
Therefore, when the amplitude of the sine wave infor­
mation signal is at m a x i m u m . Equation (8.8) becomes:

TABLE 8.2
Vfm = Vc sin 27Γ (fc ± 5f)t (8.9)
CTCSS modulation limits

From this equation, h can be seen that of represents
the maximum deviation.
The amplitude of the modulating information signal
producing an FM radio frequency carrier wave has to
be limhed to ensure that a maximum deviation (of) of
± 5 M H z for a 25 kHz R F channel spacing, or ± 2 M H z
for a 12.5 kHz channel spacing, is not exceeded. This
is a requirement of the M P T Performance Specification
issued by the Radiocommunications Agency (RA) of
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) to restrict
the bandwidth of each radio frequency channel, thus
preventing interference between channels and making
economic use of the radio spectrum.
8.4.3 Signalling systems
There are five main signalling systems used with power
station radio systems, these are:
• Continuous tone controlled
(CTCSS).
• Selective call signalhng (SELCALL).
• Fast frequency shift keying (FFSK).
System channel Amplitude modulation Angle peak
spacing, kHz depth, «7o deviation ±Hz
25 10 to 20 400 to 800
12.5 10 to 20 200 to 400
A radio system which uses CTCSS incorporates a
CTCSS codec (coder/decoder) in both the fixed stations
and the mobiles. The output of the CTCSS decoder
Unmutes the output of the receiver audio stages, allow­
ing audio to reach the loudspeaker when the R F carrier
contains the correct CTCSS code frequency. The coder
audio frequency output modulates the transmitted R F
carrier with the assigned CTCSS code frequency.
CTCSS systems are used to reduce the irritation
experienced by users sharing an R F channel, which is
often the case for power stations when the channel
signalling system is shared with an associated second power station or
construction site, or with other members of the fuel
and power industries using the c o m m o n group of radio
channels ahocated to them by the Joint Radio C o m m h -
tee ( J R C ) .

• CCITT dual tone muhi-frequency (DTMF) signalhng. Selective call signalling system (SELCALL)
• CCIR sequential single frequency code (SSFC) sig­ This signalhng system uses in-band and above audio
nalhng. band frequencies. There are three main code systems

681
Telecommunications Chapter 8

which come under the generic name S E L C A L L . These

are known as:
ALARM
• E E A — recommended by the Electronic Engineer­ ADDRESS TONES RESET
ing Association — UK preferred.
• CCIR — recommended by the Comité Consultatif 1 II III IV V VI
International de Radio.
• ZVEI — recommended by the Zentralverband de LINK EACH TONE
ESTABLISHMENT 40 ms (EEA)
Electrotechnichen Industries, or DZVEI (depressed TIME 70 ms (ZVE1/DZVE1)
100ms (CC1R)
ZVEI) an alternative to ZVEI with lower signalling
frequencies.

NOTE: TONES I - VI REPEATED AT APPROX 30 SECOND

Table 8.3 contains a schedule of the frequencies asso­ INTERVALS FOR ALARM
ciated with each code system.
FIG. 8 . 1 4 Code format for the 5 and 6 tone
SELCALL
TABLE 8.3
SELCALL code systems
sequential tones are transmitted as a VF modulation on
the R F carrier wave. The associated mobile S E L C A L L
EEA and
Digit ZVEI DZVEI decoder will detect the code and unmute the audio
CCIR
stages of the receiver, allowing a calling signal to be
*Group 1055 970 825 heard. The receiver remains unmuted under control
1 1124 1060 970 of a timing circuit which is reset each time the mobile
transmitter is operated within the time-out period. If
2 1197 1160 1060
no transmission is made during the time-out period,
3 1275 1270 1160
the receiver will revert to a muted condition. A manual
4 1358 1400 1270 unmuting switch is provided to enable the mobile user
5 1446 1530 1400 to hsten to the radio channel, thus ensuring that it is
6 1540 1670 1530 not busy before he transmhs a call to a controller or
7 1640 1830 1670 to another mobile.
Where S E L C A L L is used for operations mobiles
8 1747 2000 1830
and CTCSS is used for other mobiles associated with
9 1860 2200 2000
maintenance and common services, the operations mo­
0 1981 2400 2200 biles will also include CTCSS transmit facilities.
Repeat 2110 2600 2400 S E L C A L L can also be provided in the mobile to
fixed station direction, enabhng mobiles to call indi­
Alarm/ 2400 2800 2600
reset vidual controllers and mobiles.

*for ME5 ZVEI, compatible group tone is 2800
Tone frequencies in Hz
The system preferred for power station radio is
5-tone E E A , which is also UK users preferred. Figure
8.14 shows the code format for 5 and 6 tone sequential
codes. A call to mobile number 99 would result in a
5 tone S E L C A L L address, where address tones I, II,
III, IV and V would be O R R 9 R . The frequencies re­
presenting digits 0 to 9 and repeat (R) are given in Table
8.3 under E E A . The sixth element of the address is used
for remote alarm reset, which is not normally used in
power station systems.
The S E L C A L L system can be used as an alternative
t o , or in addition t o , CTCSS.
Each mobile which has an individual S E L C A L L code
can be called from a desk or table-top controher by
depressing the relevant buttons on a S E L C A L L digital
keypad followed by depressing a 'send' button. The 5
Fast frequency shift keying (FFSK)
This system uses two in-band VF signals to represent
the two digital bits 0 and 1. FFSK is similar to the
frequency shift keying (FSK) system used for the control
signalhng between controllers, c o m m o n equipment and
fixed stations, as described in Section 8.9 of this chapter
for the Phhips Telecom M87 control system. FSK used
in the M87 is at present limhed to 300 Bauds (bits/s)
signalhng rate. FFSK specified for trunked radio sys­
tems in the Radiocommunications Agency of the DTI
performance specification M P T 1327, operates at 1200
Bauds.
The name frequency shift keying is derived from
the fact that the frequency shifts from that used to
represent bit 0 to the other used to represent bit 1 in a
digital word.
Figure 8.15 shows the basic signalling format spe­
cified in M P T 1327 for the FFSK signalling system.
The Link Estabhshment Time (LET) section com­
prises one of the FFSK frequencies transmitted for at

682
 Radio systems

DTMF

LET PREAMBLE MESSAGE Η

FREO. Hz 1209 1336 1477 1633
1 J
697 1 2 3 A
1 2
770 4 5 6 Β
852 7 8 9 C
4 5 6 voU
7 8 9
FIG. 8 . 1 5 Basic format for M P T 1 3 2 7 FFSK 941 * 0 Η D αΊ
signalling system DIGIT OR LETTER * 0 Η Β I

least 6 bit periods, which for 1200 bits/s is 5 m s . Sig­

nalling transmissions are preceded by the L E T .
SSFC
The Preamble comprises the first a n d second FFSK
FREO. Hz 1124 1197 1275 1358 1446 1540 1640 1747 1860 1981 2110
frequencies transmitted alternately. Each frequency is DIGIT 1 2 4
3 5 6 7 8 9 0 R
transmitted for one b h period, i.e., 0.8 m s . T h e pream­
ble comprises a minimum of 16 bits a n d ends with a
FIG. 8 . 1 6 D T M F signalling format and keypad
binary 0 bit.
The Message is a contiguous transmission compris­
ing a codeword synchronisation sequence, an address Usually Comité Consultatif International de Radio
codeword a n d , where appropriate, o n e or m o r e d a t a (CCIR) sequential single-frequency code (SSFC) is used
codewords. in t h e fixed station t o mobile direction.
The Hangover Bit (H) terminates signalling trans­
missions by appending either a binary zero or binary CCIR sequential single frequency code (SSFC)
one t o the last transmitted message t o provide even signalling
parity of the total binary ones transmitted.
SSFC signalling comprises eleven frequencies ranging
The message can be a control code from a controller
from 1124 t o 2110 H z as shown in Fig 8.16. Each
to the c o m m o n equipment a n d / o r fixed station, or t h e
frequency represents t h e digits *Γ t o Ό ' a n d a repeat
number for calling an individual mobile transceiver.
digit 'R'. T h e duration of each frequency/tone is 100 ms
Simharly, from the mobile, the message can be a calling
in accordance with t h e C C I R recommendation. T h e
code for a controller or another mobile.
system is used for selective calls between t h e fixed
In a trunked radio system, the R F channels allocated
station a n d mobiles.
for use by a power station are divided into one control
This signalling system is used in trunk radio schemes
channel and the remainder traffic channels. T h e calling
such as t h e Motorolla-Storno CAF2200 system.
message from the mobile will be received by the control
channel receiver. T h e control equipment checks that a
traffic channel is available a n d returns a n audible sig­
8.5 RF propagation
nal t o the mobile t o confirm that the cah can proceed.
The mobile user then keys t h e number of t h e re­ In order t o design a n adequate radio system for use
quired mobile or controller. O n receipt of the message in a power station it is necessary t o determine the pro­
signal, t h e c o m m o n equipment checks that t h e called pagation of radio signals that can be achieved from the
mobile is available a n d , o n receipt of confirmation of antenna systems located in the station. T h e equations
this, automatically switches the mobiles t o the synthe- used t o determine the R F propagation from a n antenna
sised frequency of the available traffic channel a n d are based o n the theoretical point source antenna called
sends a calling message t o the called mobile t o initiate an isotropic radiator.
a calhng audible signal in that m o b h e . Once t h e t w o The power density Ρ ( W / m 2 ) at a point R metres
mobiles are swhched t o the traffic channel t h e control away from a n isotropic radiator d u e t o power Pt
equipment wih deal with the next call. transmitted by t h e radiator is given by:
All signahing between control equipment a n d mobiles
wih use t h e FFSK signalling format. Ρ = Pt/4xR2 W/m2 (8.10)

The equivalent electric field strength Ε in volts/metre

CCITT dual tone multi-frequency (DTMF) signalling
( V / m ) for a power density Ρ is determined from:
D T M F signalling comprises two in-band audio signals
transmitted simultaneously from each o n e of twelve Ρ = EVl207r W / m 2 (8.11)
keys of a standard telephone keypad, i.e., figures o n e
to zero a n d t h e gate a n d star keys. where 1 2 0 7 Γ (377) is known as the resistance of free
The frequencies specified by the Comité Consultatif space (see Fig 8.12). F r o m Equations (8.10) a n d (8.11)
International de Telegraphique et Telephonique (CCITT) we get:
are shown in Fig 8.16. T h e D T M F code is normally
used from the mobile t o the fixed station o r from (30 Pt)2
Ε = V/m (8.12)
mobile t o mobile in a simhar manner t o S E L C A L L .

683
Telecommunications Chapter 8

For an antenna having a gain Gt with respect to an increase of 6 dB each time the distance from the an­
isotropic radiator, Equation (8.10) becomes: tenna is doubled.
When considering on-site U H F systems and off-site
Ρ = PtGt/47rR2 (8.13) V H F systems, the effect of free space loss is more
pronounced in the U H F systems because the increase
and Equation (8.12) becomes in attenuation is greater at short distances from the
antenna, e.g., at 30 m from the antenna the free space
Ε = (30PtGt)^/R V/m (8.14) loss is 55 dB and, at 300 m, it is 75 d B . As the distance
from the antenna increases, so a 6 dB change in free
For a half-wave dipole in the direction of maximum space attenuation represents a much larger change in
radiation distance from the antenna, e.g., at 15 km from the
antenna the free space loss is 109 dB and, at 30 km, it
Ρ = 1.64 Pt/(47rR)2 W / m 2 (8.15) is 115 d B .
Equation (8.19) can also provide interesting data
Ε = (49.2 Pt) 2 /R V/m (8.16) when an internal dipole antenna is compared to a ra­
diating coaxial cable (leaky feeder) for use inside power
Note that the gain Gt of a half-wave dipole is 1.64 station buildings. Section 8.6.3 of this chapter gives
(2.15 dBi) with respect to an isotropic radiator in the details of radiating coaxial cable systems.
direction of maximum radiation, i.e., normal to the Two radiating cables (leaky feeders) used for power
axis of the dipole. station radio systems have the following couphng losses
between the radiating cable and a dipole located 6 m
and 3 m away respectively:
8.5.1 RF received power
• Andrew Antennas radiax slotted cable R X 4 - 2 R has
To determine the power intercepted by a receiving
a coupling loss of 75 dB for a 450 M H z U H F signal
antenna, it is necessary to determine the effective area
and a distance of 6 m to the receiving dipole.
of the antenna when intercepting a given radiated power
density. • BICC radiating cable T3537 with apertured tape has
Let the radiated power density be Ρ W / m ^ , then a couphng loss of 74 dB for a 450 M H z U H F signal
the effective area of an antenna is given by: and a distance of 3 m to the receiving dipole.

Area = {0^\^ϊη^)/4π (8.17) F r o m Equation (8.19), the loss between an internally

where Gr is the gain of the receiving area w h h respect
to an isotropic radiator and λ is the wavelength of the
RF propagated wave. The power Pr (watts) intercepted
by an antenna having an effective area of A is Ρ x A
in the direction of maximum radiation.
Using Equations (8.13) and (8.17), this becomes:
Pr = PtGtGrXV(47rR)2 W (8.18)
T o determine the loss of free space. Equation (8.18)
has to be rearranged to obtain:
Pr/Pt = GtGrXV(47rR)2 (8.19)
To find the loss of the free space between two iso­
tropic radiator antennas, i.e., allowing the gain of each
antenna to be unity, then Equation (8.19) becomes:
Pr/Pt = (X/47rR)2 (8.20)
Loss = 10 log Pr/Pt
= 20 log X/47rR (8.21)
Using Equation (8.21), the graph in Fig 8.17 of loss for
free space propagation between two isotropic radiators
can be obtained.
The graph shows the effect of the inverse square
law on the attenuation through free space, i.e., an
mounted dipole transmitting antenna and a receiving
dipole can be calculated from:
Loss = 10 log P r / P t
= 20 log (1.64)2 (0.67)V47rR
which gives a loss of 30 dB at 3 m and 36 dB at
6 m.
F r o m the results, it can be seen that an internal an­
tenna would have a theoretical gain of 39 dB over the
Andrews radiating cable (leaky feeder) and a 44 dB gain
over the BICC radiating cable (leaky feeder). For this
reason, antenna systems used in power stations com­
prise a combination of internal antennas and radiating
cable.
The antennas are used in the larger open areas such
as turbine halls, boiler houses, etc., and radiating cable
for confined areas such as cable tunnels, corridors sur­
rounded by thick reinforced concrete walls, floors and
ceihngs.
8.6 Antenna systems
8.6.1 Antennas
A n t e n n a systems used in power stations have to be
designed within the following Joint Radio Committee

684
 Radio systems

LOSS FOR FREE SPACE PROPAGATION

f = 450 MHz \ = '%λ^ = % LetG^ = G p = P ^ = 1

65-

60-

55 -

50-

45-

40 -

S35i 3m FREE SPACE LOSS TO ISOTROPIC = 35dB

(ή TO DIPOLE = 33dB

O 30 Η COUPLING LOSS BICC CABLE = 74dB

6m FREE SPACE TO ISOTROPIC = 42dB
25- TO DIPOLE = 40dB
COUPLING LOSS ANDREWS = 80dB
20-

15-

10-

5-

—Γ­
ΙΟ 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
DISTANCE FROM TRANSMITTER ANTENNA, m

FIG. 8 . 1 7 Graph of loss for free space propagation

(JRC) limits on R F transmitted power from an anten­
na. External antennas must be limited to a maximum
effective radiated power (ERP) of 2 W and indoor
antennas to 5 W (ERP).
E R P is defined as the average power supplied to the
antenna by the transmitter during one R F cycle under
conditions of n o modulation multiphed by the gain,
relative to a half-wave dipole, of the antenna system in
the direction of maximum radiation.
The antenna(s) used for a particular antenna system
are selected on the basis of the following:
• Operating frequency.
• Polarity of the radiated field.
• Direction of radiation.
• Bandwidth.
• Power handling capabihty.
• Input impedance.
• Mounting arrangement.
• Wind loading.
The operating frequency will depend on the radio
system, i.e., a V H F lowband, midband or high band
system, or a U H F system.
The p o l a r i t y used for power station radio systems
is usually vertical polarity, i.e., the radiating element
is mounted perpendicular to the ground. This also
means the electric field, the E-plane of the radiated
signal, is also perpendicular to the ground and the
magnetic field, the H-plane, is parahel to the ground.
The direction o f r a d i a t i o n for maximum transmission
or reception wih be either omnidirectional or unidirec­
tional. The direction of the radiation from an antenna
is shown on H-plane and E-plane polar diagrams. The
two polar diagrams are required because the radiation
is three dimensional. Usually for omnidirectional anten­
nas, where the H-plane polar diagram is represented
by a concentric circle w h h the antenna at the centre,
only the E-plane polar diagram is given in the manu­
facturer's technical data sheets. Figure 8.18 shows a
Phihps Telecom Type C A T omnidirectional colinear
antenna. Figures 8.19 and 8.20 are E-plane diagrams
for the V H F low b a n d and U H F versions, respectively,
of this antenna. The polar diagrams are drawn on a
graph of concentric circles. The convention used is
to call the largest circle reached by the largest lobe
of the polar diagram the 'reference circle'. Circles are
then drawn through - 3 dB points from this reference
circle, i.e., circles representing 0, - 3 dB, - 6 dB, etc.,
are drawn, w h h the outer reference circle representing
0 dB.
Figure 8.19 is the E-plane diagram for a Type C A T
80 antenna, which is the V H F low band version hav­
ing a m a x i m u m gain of 3 dB with reference to a half-
wave dipole. The graph circles therefore represent
gains of 3 d B , 0 d B , - 3 dB and - 6 d B , starting at

685
Telecommunications
GAIN 3 d b ( V H F ) , 5 d b i U H F )
SLIM, T A P E R E D DESIGN
R U G G E D , GLASS-FIBRE P R O T E C T I O N ;
FOAM ENCAPSULATION
EASY M O U N T I N G
FIG. 8 . 1 8 Philips Telecom V H F / U H F coUnear anten­
nas type C A T
the largest reference circle and moving towards the
centre.
Figure 8.20 is the E-plane diagram for a Type C A T
460 antenna, which is the U H F version having a
maximum gain of 5 dB with reference to a half-wave
dipole. The graph circles therefore represent gains of 5
dB, 2 dB, - 1 dB and - 4 d B , starting at the largest
reference circle.
The polar diagram shows a number of secondary
lobes, the largest of which have gains of approximately
686
Chapter 8
225° 240° 255° 270° 285° 300° 315°
FIG. 8.19 E-plane polar diagram for a Philips V H F
C A T 80 antenna
225° 240° 255° 270° 285° 300° 315°
FIG. 8.20 E-plane polar diagram f o r a Philips U H F
C A T 460 antenna
- 2 dB with respect to a half-wave dipole in directions
of 70° and 110° from the horizontal. The required
bandwidth of the antenna will depend on the number
of fixed station frequency channels which are to be
transmitted or received and whether the antenna is to
be used for transmit and receive functions. The
bandwidth is conventionally taken as the frequency
b a n d b e t w e e n t h e 1.5 V S W R p o i n t s o n t h e
VSWR/frequency graph for the antenna, where VSWR
stands for the Voltage standing wave ratio':
VSWR =
where Emax = voltage at crest of standing wave
Emin = voltage at trough of standing wave
The VSWR is a measure of the impedance match
between the characteristic impedance of the antenna
coaxial cable and the impedance of the antenna.
The characteristic impedance of a cable is the input
impedance of an infinitely long length of the cable. In
 Radio systems

practice, this is the value of impedance v^hich, when F r o m which Ρ = 4SPm/(S + 1)^
terminating any length of the cable, will produce an
input impedance of the game value. For VSWR = S = 1.5, Ρ = 0.96 P ^ , i.e., for a
For a perfect match between the coaxial cable and VSWR = 1.5, 960^0 of the power that would be
the antenna impedances, there is no reflected signal dehvered to a matched load is delivered to the un­
from the antenna/coaxial cable connection and there­ matched antenna; this is equivalent to a loss of 10 log
fore no standing wave, i.e., | E m a x I = | E m i n | and the 0.96 = - 0 . 2 d B .
VSWR = 1. F r o m Fig 8.21, it can be seen that the bandwidth
For a value of antenna impedance which is less or between the 1.5 VSWR points for a V H F version
greater than the characteristic impedance of the coaxial of the C A T 80 antenna is approximately 2.5 M H z .
cable the VSWR will be greater than 1. F r o m Fig 8.22, the bandwidth of a C A T 460 U H F an­
tenna is approximately 22 M H z . The VSWR/frequency
d iFfl + lErl graphs for the C A T 80 and the C A T 460 antennas
VSWR = (8.22)
show that, at the design frequency for the antennas,
Efl - | E r |
the VSWR is approximately 1.15 and that the VSWR
changes with frequency.
where Ef = voltage of the forward travelling wave
The power handling capability of the antenna will
Er = voltage of the reflected wave depend on the m a x i m u m R F output of the transmitter.
when Er = 0, VSWR = 1 For a C A T type antenna, the maximum input power
For VSWR = 1.5, | E^ax I = 1 . 2 | E f | is 150 W , which is well above any transmitter output
used for a power station radio system.
and I Emin I = 0.8 I Ef I
The input impedance of an antenna is specified for
To appreciate the meaning of VSWR = 1.5, h is useful the design frequency and will vary between the VSWR
to calculate the impedance of the load of the antenna 1.5 points of the antenna bandwidth. For power station
compared with a coaxial cable characteristic of 50 Ω. systems, the design impedance is usually 50 Ω: this
To do this, the following equations can be used: varies between 50 and 75 Ω over the design bandwidth
of the antenna.
Ζ - Zo The mounting arrangement will depend on the type
Q = (8.23)
of antenna chosen. The mounting arrangements for a
Ζ + Zo
C A T type colinear antenna suitable for masthead
where ρ voltage reflection coefficient mounting are shown in Fig 8.23.
Ζ antenna impedance, Ω
Zo characteristic impedance of the coaxial
cable, Ω 3.o^
CD

The modulus of the voltage reflection coefficient | ρ ^- 2.0H

is determined from the VSWR: δ 10-1

| s - i | |z -zo|
(8.24)
Is + i| I ζ + Zo I 2.0 π

where S = VSWR = 1.5 and if Z o = 50 Ω

I Ζ - 50 I 0.5
then giving | Z | = 75 Ω

i
DC
I ζ + 50 I 2.5
1.5H
The power delivered to the antenna at a VSWR = 1.5
can be calculated using:

Mismatch loss = P m / P

where Pm = power dehvered to a matched load 1.0-

78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85
Ρ = power delivered to the antenna
FREQUENCY, MHz

1 (S + 1)2
48 FIG. 8 . 2 1 Gain and V S W R curves for a Philips V H F
CAT 8 0 antenna

687
Telecommunications Chapter 8

1.5-
:AT 3 9 CAT 4 2 0 A C A T 4 4 0 Λ CAT 4 6 0 ,

1.0-
380 400 420 440 460 480

FREQUENCY MHz

FREQUENCY BAND, MHz

TYPE NO. (FOR 1.5 : 1 MAX. VSWR)

CAT 390 380 - 396

CAT 400 396-412
CAT 420 412-430
CAT 440 430 - 450
CAT 460 450 - 470

FIG. 8.22 VSWR curves for Philips U H F CAT

antennas In-line/Off-set Masthead Clamp

Folded dipole antennas which can be used for both

V H F and V H F systems are supplied with a mounting
b o o m . Figure 8.24 shows a typical folded dipole an­
tenna, the Philips Telecom Type A N S D H , which has a
38 m m diameter mounting b o o m . Figure 8.25 shows the
typical mounting crossover clamps used to attach the
boom to a mast. The mast fixing arrangement must
be capable of withstanding a wind loading of 160 k m / h .
For power station external antennas the mast is usually
clamped to a suitable wall or to metal girder sections
at two points along its length.
The Type A N S D H 460, or similar, is used as an inter­
nal antenna for U H F on-site systems. When used in this
way, the mounting boom can be supphed with a wall
bracket and enough boom length to allow the wall to
antenna spacing to be adjusted between 3/16 and 1/4 Parallel Clamp
of a wavelength. The spacing should be adjusted for
maximum radiation.
Figure 8.26 shows the effect of the proximity of a
mast on the polar diagram of the antenna. In this case,
a b o o m length of 1 wavelength or more will give the
best omnidirectional pattern.
When designing/installing antenna systems, it is
necessary to reduce the coupling between transmitter
and receiver antennas used for a common two-frequency
simplex channel and between antennas of different
channels. This is necessary to prevent unwanted signal
levels appearing at the output of transmitters and the
input of receivers, which could result in intermodulation
interference.
Figure 8.27 shows the relationship between isola­
tion in decibels and the vertical separation between the
antennas, while Fig 8.28 shows the relationship between
isolation in decibels and horizontal separation between
the antennas.
Comparison of the two figures shows that the vertical Parallel Clamps
separation is more effective than the horizontal, e.g., at
450 M H z , 35 dB isolation can be obtained by vertical
separation of 0.6 m or by a horizontal separation of
4.2 m. FIG. 8.23 Clamping arrangements for CAT antennas

688

FIG. 8.24 Folded dipole antenna, Philips type ANSDH
8.6.2 Typical antenna arrangements
In the past a typical external antenna arrangement for
power stations comprised a mast with folded dipoles for
the transmitter and a c o m m o n omnidirectional high
gain antenna for the receivers. The high gain receive
antenna was mounted at the top of the mast and the
folded dipoles 3 m below.
Figures 8.24 and 8.29 show a typical folded dipole
and the dipole characteristics: Figs 8.30 and 8.31 il­
lustrate a typical high gain omnidirectional antenna
(Philips Type ANSA) and its associated characteristics.
The high gain antenna consists of four vertical dipoles
mounted on a 38 m m support tube. The dipoles are
Radio systems
FIG. 8.25 Typical crossover/parallel clamps for boom-
mounted folded dipoles
fed in a suitable phase relationship by a matching
harness which is attached to the support tube. Gain
in the direction of m a x i m u m radiation is approximately
5 dB relative to a half-wave dipole.
Figure 8.31 shows the H-plane radiation patterns
which can be obtained by re-arranging the dipoles, e.g.,
all four dipoles can be m o u n t e d o n the same side of the
support tube to provide extra gain in one direction,
resulting in a gain of 8.5 d B .
Figure 8.32 shows the E-plane polar diagram for the
high gain antenna. T h e lobes showing that the direction
of m a x i m u m gain radiate horizontally. This would
resuh in poor on-site cover from an antenna mounted
on a high building. For a high gain antenna mounted
on the roof of a turbine hall or boiler house, some
E-plane tih is required to obtain on-site cover. E-plane
689
Telecommunications Chapter 8

CO
I
o

LU
>

Q
LU
OC

Ü
D
CC

CC
o
CL
Q.
Z)

NOTE: 2ND CONCENTRIC CIRCLE REPRESENTS

ANTENNA SPACING TO NEAREST SUPPORT STRUCTURE RADIATOR PATTERN OF ANTENNA IN FREE SPACE

FIG. 8 . 2 6 Effect of spacing on the radiation pattern

10n

20 Η

30 Η

CO
40
z
o

50 Η

60 Η

SEPARATION BETWEEN ANTENNAS, m

70- 1 1
FIG. 8 . 2 7 Isolation by vertical separation of antennas 10 100
SEPARATION BETWEEN ANTENNAS, m

tilts of 5° and 10° can be obtained electrically by fitting

special matching harnesses which comprise tuned co­ FIG. 8 . 2 8 Isolation by horizontal separation
axial cable elements. of antennas

690
 Radio systems

WIND MINIMUM DISTANCE

FREQUENCY LOADING SPACING BETWEEN
BAND AT 193 km/h FROM CENTRESOF
(FOR 1.5:1 WEIGHT (120 mph) 50mm STACKED
ANTENNA VSWR) LENGTH (LESS BOOMt) ANTENNA ONLY MAST DIPOLES
MHz mm kg kg mm m
AN SDH 65 58-71 2160 2.7 15.8 864 3.4
AN SDH80 68-88 1780 2.5 12.4 710 2.7
AN SDH 85 73-93 1651 2.4 12 660 2.6
AN SDH100 88-110 1420 2.2 10.8 558 2.4
AN SDH460 445-475 305 0.3 3.1 127 0.46
t BOOM; 0.45 kg PER m LENGTH

1-5H
CC
U N SDH65 AN SDH80
I
1.0 —I 1 1 Γ-
55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90
MHz

FIG. 8.29 Folded dipole characteristics

Tests have shown that the circular E-plane polar
diagram of a half-wave dipole can give superior on-site
cover to a high gain antenna. Ahernatively, an antenna
arrangement consisting of two folded dipoles mounted
one above the other in a cruciform arrangement with
E-planes parallel and horizontal, will produce a field
having a circular polarity (i.e., both vertical and hori­
zontal) directed downward. This paging system type
antenna gives localised site cover more suitable for
power stations. A n antenna of this type is shown in
Fig 8.33 which also illustrates the depressed E-plane
polar diagram sometimes referred to as an 'umbrella'
characteristic. This is far more suhable for on-site
U H F radio systems where the antenna is mounted at
high level on one of the power station buildings.
In designing the antenna system for a power sta­
tion, it is necessary to consider the cover required, the
buildings on which the antennas are to be mounted and
the E-plane polar diagrams of the proposed antennas.
A number of folded dipole antennas located at different
positions around the site and mounted at low level
give better on-site cover than one high gain antenna.
The adoption of multiple fixed station operation, to
enable handportable R F outputs to be reduced, also
makes the use of muhiple antennas mounted at lower
levels more acceptable.
The arrangement that is eventually adopted will be
determined by the size and complexhy of the layout
of power station buildings, the R F output from the
handportables that can be permitted without causing
unacceptable levels of RFI to control and instrumen­
tation equipment and the cost advantages which will
accrue from use of a radio communications system.
8.6.3 Radiating cable (leaky feeder)
Radiating cable is specially designed coaxial cable which
has a loosely braided or slotted sohd copper outer con­
ductor. The hole in the braid or sohd copper outer
conductor creates three mutually perpendicular ele­
ments of R F field; one element parallel with the cable,
one tangential with the cable and the other perpen­
dicular to the cable. For R F transmitted from the cable,
the latter element is perpendicular in the direction
leaving the cable. For R F received from a handportable
transmitter, a similar field arrangement is created by
the holes but in this case the perpendicular element is
directed into the cable.
T h e effectiveness of the radiating cable is measured
as a couphng loss. The couphng loss is measured by
mounting a dipole 3 m or 6 m away from the cable
such that the dipole elements are parallel with the
radiating cable. The dipole is connected to a matched,
cahbrated, measuring R F receiver. One end of the
radiating cable is connected to a calibrated R F trans­
mitter and the other end to a matched resistive load.
The transmitter is set to a suitable R F input power
to the radiating cable which produces a readable signal
on the calibrated receiver connected to the dipole.
The overall loss comprises the attenuation due to
the radiating cable (cable loss CD) between the input
connections and the cable opposite the receiving dipole,
and the coupling loss (CL) between the radiating cable
and the dipole.
Table 8.4 shows typical cable attenuation and cou­
pling losses for a B I C C radiating cable Type T3537
and an Andrew A n t e n n a radiating cable Type Radiax
R4-2R.
Figure 8.34 shows a fixed station transceiver con­
nected to a length of radiating cable through a coupling
interface (CI).
The m a x i m u m attenuation (MAF) between a fixed
station transmitter and a handportable receiver is deter­
mined by subtracting the minimum operational power
required at the input to the receiver from the output
power of the fixed station transmitter. These powers

691
Telecommunications Cliapter 8

135° 120° 105° 90° 75° 60° 45°

225° 240° 255° 270° 285° 300° 315°

OFF-SET PATTERN

135° 120° 105° 90° 75° 60° 45°

/Tí

210°

225° 240° 255° 270° 285° 300° 315°

ELLIPTICAL PATTERN

FIG. 8 . 3 1 H-plane polar diagrams for high gain anten­

na Philips type ANSA

135° 120° 105° 90° 75° 60° 45°

150°

210'
225° 240° 255° 270° 285° 300° 315°

FIG. 8.30 Philips type ANSA high gain antenna

FIG. 8.32 E-plane polar diagram for high gain anten­
na Philips type ANSA
are usually quoted in decibels with respect to 1 W
Measured power
(dBW), i.e., dBW = 10 log (or 10 log The maximum attenuation ( Μ Α Η ) between a hand-
One watt portable transmitter and a fixed station receiver is found
measured power, in watts) in a similar manner.

692
 Radio systems

In order to calculate M A F and Μ Α Η it is necessary

to determine the losses involved at the handportable.
In both receive directions, although the minimum
receiver sensitivity is of the order of 0.5 μΝ pd (1 μΝ
E M F , see Fig 8.36), a minimum operational sensitivity
of between 2 and 5 μΝ E M F would normally be used
to design the system.
The body proximity loss (BP) for the handportable
is not necessarily the same for transmit and receive. This
is because during transmit the handportable is held at
head level and during the receipt of a call it could be
attached to a beh or in a pocket. This could resuh in
a B P of u p to 3 dB for transmit and u p to 6 dB for
receive.
For a receiver w h h an operational sensitivity of 2.5
pd ( - 1 2 9 d B W ) , a fixed station transmit power of
25 W (14 dBW) and a handportable transmit power of
0.5 W ( - 3 dBW) into the antenna, M A F and Μ Α Η can
be calculated as foHows:

MAF = 14 - ( - 1 2 9 ) = 143 dB
ΜΑΗ = -3 - ( - 1 2 9 ) = 126 dB

Using these values for M A F and Μ Α Η the cable

distribution loss can be calculated from the fohowing
equations, see also Fig 8.34.

M A F = CI + C D + CL + R D + BPL + A L (8.25)
Μ Α Η = A L + B P L + C L + R D + CI (8.26)
where A L = antenna loss
B P L = body proximity loss
CD = cable distribution loss
CI = cable interface loss
RD = Rayleigh distribution loss

FIG. 8.33 Paging type antenna — Jaybeam type 7395

693
Telecommunications Chapter 8

TABLE 8.4

Typical cable attenuation and coupling losses

Radiating cable Nominal Frequency Attenuation Coupling

diameter dB/100 m loss

BICC T3537 13 mm 85 MHz 2.8 64 dB at 3 m

50 Ω cable 67 dB at 6 m
(Apertured tape) 450 MHz 6.8 74 dB at 3 m
77 dB at 6 m

Andrews R4-2R 13 mm 85 MHz 3.6 69 dB at 6 m

(Slotted screen)
450 MHz 10.5 75 dB at 6 m

FIXED STATION

RADIATING CABLE
RADIO
TRANSMITTER

OdBW- CD 50Ω TERMINATING

Cl RESISTOR

RADIO
RECEIVER

CL + RD

BPL
AL = ANTENNA LOSS
BPL = BODY PROXIMITY LOSS AL
CD = CABLE DISTRIBUTION LOSS
Cl = CABLE INTERFACE LOSS TX/RX
CL = COUPLING LOSS HANDPORTABLE
RD = RAYLEIGH DISTRUBITON LOSS

FIG. 8.34 Calculation of maximum cable distribution loss

Since Μ Α Η is smaller than M A P the former would
normally be taken as the value to carry out the calcula­
tion of C D . However, in practice, since the cable inter­
face loss (CI) and BP loss differ for the t r a n s m h and
receive directions it is prudent to calculate C D for both
directions.
The cable interface loss (CI) could be 3 dB in
the transmit direction for a single-transmitter/receiver
arrangement or up to 6 dB for a 5-transmitter arrange­
wave created in space with the signal strength following
a Rayleigh probabihty distribution. A typical standing
wave is shown in Fig 8.35. It can be seen that the signal
strength varies between the minimum of 10 dB to
the maximum of 20 d B , i.e., a total variation loss of
10 d B .

fxmrm
ment. In the receive direction, because an amplifier
could be used before the receiver, the CI would be
dependent on the gain of the amplifier used. A typical
value for CI would be - 1 0 dB (i.e., a gain of 10 dB). § O H

The Rayleigh Distribution loss (RD) covers the losses

experienced by a handportable while on the move. The o
ω -20 Η
loss is due to muhiple path reflections causing varia­
tion in the received signal due to the complex sum­
ming of signals received from the radiating cable direct, LINEAR DISTANCE, λ/2
and signals reflected from the walls, ceihng, floors and
plant.
As the receiver moves through the field, the signal FIG. 8.35 Signal intensity plotted against distance in a
strength plotted against distance will reveal a standing muUipath environment (Rayleigh Distribution)

694
 Radio systems

Referring to Fig 8.36 (a), it can be seen that in order

to obtain a receiver input of 2.5 μΝ pd the E M F ex­
ORTHOGONAL
tracted by the antenna from the radiating field must CONDUCTING
be 5 μΥ, i.e., 126 dBW. PLANE
In the transmit direction. Fig 8.36 (b) shows that
a transmitter output of 1 W is necessary in order to
deliver 0.5 W into the antenna.
Since the radiating cable coupling loss is specified as
the loss between the cable and a two-element half-wave
dipole, the handportable antenna loss (AL) must be (a)
calculated with respect to a dipole. The antenna is ehher
a quarter wavelength monopole or helical antenna.
Figure 8.37 shows the relationship between a m o n o -
pole having a practical ground plane and a dipole. The
gain parallel to the ground plane is shown to be - 3 dB CONDUCTING
whh respect to a dipole. PLANE
For a handportable the ground plane is likely to be
complex and difficult to determine. The value of body
proximity loss (BP) includes any loss due to a poor
ground plane.
Tables 8.5 and 8.6 identify typical handportable
antenna losses obtained in practice.
(b)
Typical values for each of the losses required in
order to determine the maximum cable distribution
loss are as fohows:

Al = 3 dB
BPL = 3 dB for transmitter and 6 dB for receiver lOXDIAMETER
CD = to be calculated GROUND-PLANE
INFINITE
CI = 3 dB for a single transmitter and up to GROUND-PLANE
6 dB for 5 transmitters

50
RECEIVER INPUT POWER = ("I)^ X ^W

RECEIVING
ANTENNA
50 ÍÍ
Vp.d. = £ pV (c)
50 η RECEIVER
INPUT IMPEDANCE

emf EpV
Θ FIG. 8.37 Effects of ground plane on a monopole
antenna

(a) Dipole element into which a thin conducting sheet has

(a) been inserted.
(b) Showing how a voltage generator can be split so that
connection can be made to the conducting plate to form two
identical and separate monopoles, each having a feed point
impedance half that of a dipole.
(c) Free space radiation patterns of λ / 4 monopoles over perfectly
0.5W DELIVERED conducting ground planes of various diameters. The infinite
TO THE ANTENNA
ground plane shows a 3 dB gain over a dipole a 0° elevation angle,
but any finite ground plane will exhibit a 3dB loss.
TRANSMIT
POWER 1W

CI = - 10 dB (gain) for receiver

(b)
CL = 80 dB
MAE = 143 dB
FIG. 8.36 Calculation of receiver input powers ΜΑΗ = 126 dB

695
Telecommunications Chapter 8

F r o m Equation (8.25) 0.105 = 295 m. Thus the total a m o u n t of radiating

cable that can be used is increased to 10 + 2 χ 295
CD = M A F - CI - CL - R D - B P L - A L = 600 m .
= 143 - 6 - 80 - 10 - 6 - 3 This procedure can be repeated to produce a complex
radiating cable and internal antenna system (see Fig
= 38 dB
8.39).
From Equation (8.26)
8.7 RF fixed stations
CD = Μ Α Η - A L - B P L - CL - R D - CI
The R F fixed stations are distributed throughout the
= 126 - 3 - 3 - 80 - 10 - (-10)
power station to ensure good radio cover. Each fixed
= 40 dB station consists of a transmitter, receiver and an an­
tenna system coupling equipment. The complexity of
For Andrews ( R 4 - 2 R ) type radiating cable and an the coupling equipment will depend on the number of
operating frequency of 450 M H z , 38 dB is equivalent transmitters and receivers which have to be coupled
to a length of 362 m of cable which is not sufficient to the antenna system and the number of R F chan­
for use in a complex antenna system required for a nels that have been allocated for use by the radio
power station. system. Each R F channel will require a fixed station
However, if the transmitter is connected to the transmitter/receiver.
centre of the radiating cable, as shown in Fig 8.38, The coupling equipment could comprise: duplexers
the radiating cable either side of the power splitter can for coupling a receiver and transmitter to a c o m m o n
have a maximum loss of: antenna system; diplexers for coupling two transmitters
to a c o m m o n antenna system; a receive amplifier for
38 - (3.5 + 3.5) = 31.0 dB connecting a number of receivers to a c o m m o n receive
port of the coupling equipment; circulators and iso­
Since at 450 M H z Andrews ( R 4 - 2 R ) radiating cable lators for connecting transmitters to a c o m m o n anten­
has an attenuation of 10.5 dB/100 m , the length of na system, thus reducing the effects of reflected or
cable on either side of the power splitter can be 3 1 . 0 / unwanted signals returning to the transmitter. A com-

TERMINATING
RESISTOR
son
ANTENNA GAIN=-8dB

RECEIVED SIGNAL TO BE
5μν MINIMUM =-26dBW

HAND PORTABLE
ANDREWS RADIATING
CABLE R4-2R
10.5dB/100m AT 450 MHz
OdBW

UHF 3.1dB (POWER SPLITTER)

TRANSMITTER

RECEIVER

24.4dB = 232m

TOTAL LENGTH OF
RADIATING CABLE = 474 m

50Ω
TERMINATING
RESISTOR

FIG. 8 . 3 8 Centre-fed radiating cable arrangement

696
 Radio systems
QQ moo
Slag
I
03
§
Vi
•s
α
Η
c O X II
697
Telecommunications
bination of all or some of these items of equipment
could be assembled to make up an antenna coupling
system suitable for a particular location.
8.7.1 Fixed s t a t i o n t r a n s m i t t e r s
The fixed station transmitters used for power station
radio systems are standard P M R transmitters designed
to operate at the particular band of frequencies
allocated to P M R use. The fixed stations for V H F low
band systems use single-frequency simplex, amplitude
modulation (AM) base stations. For the U H F band
systems, the fixed stations use two-frequency simplex,
frequency modulation (FM):
• Single-frequency simplex operation means that both
the fixed station and mobiles use the same R F fre­
quency for both transmit and receive functions. Since
the same frequency is used, the fixed station and
mobile are unable to operate at the same time (duplex
operation). It is necessary, therefore, for the fixed
station and mobile to transmit in turn, i.e., single-
frequency simplex operation.
• Two-frequency simplex operation means that the
fixed station and mobile use different R F frequencies
for the transmit functions. The fixed station uses one
frequency for transmit which is received by the
mobile receiver and the mobile uses a second fre­
quency for transmit which is received by the fixed
station receiver. Although two frequencies would
allow duplex operation, simplex operation is used
for speech because a user of the radio system cannot
speak and listen at the same instant. Two-frequency
simplex operation also provides improved mobile to
mobile communications by the use of a fixed station
talkthrough facility. During talkthrough, any signal
received at the fixed station receiver, e.g., from a
mobile, is re-transmitted by the fixed station trans­
mitter to other mobiles switched to the same R F
channel.
The transmitter equipment has to comply with the
following performance specifications issued by the
Radiocommunications Agency (RA) of the Department
of Trade and Industry (DTI):
• For frequency modulated (FM), U H F and V H F
equipment — M P T 1326 — Performance Speci­
fication for Angle modulated V H F and U H F radio
equipment for use at fixed and mobile stations in
the Private Mobile Radio Service.
• For amplitude modulated A M , V H F equipment —
M P T 1302 — Performance Specification for
Amplitude modulated V H F radio equipment for use
at fixed and mobile stations in the Private M o b h e
Radio Service.
Figure 8.40 shows a block diagram of a typical R F
fixed station transmitter. The speech, plus any tone
698
Chapter 8
signalling, is transmitted from the remote controher
over a cable connection to the line interface and audio
frequency (AF) amplifier section of the transmitter.
A crystal-controlled R F oscillator generates the R F
carrier wave which is connected via a frequency multi­
plier to the amplitude modulation (AM) modulator
or frequency modulation (FM) modulator in series
with the output of the A F amphfier section.
In an A M transmitter, the amplitude of the R F
carrier wave is varied in sympathy w h h the complex
A F output from the A F amplifier section and the ra­
dio frequency remains constant. In an F M transmitter,
the frequency of the R F carrier wave is varied in
sympathy with the A F output from the A F amphfer
section and the amplitude of the R F carrier wave re­
mains constant.
The modulator in an A M transmitter is a non-linear
device which has the R F carrier and signal voltages
applied to it in series.
The modulator in an F M transmitter varies the
frequency of the carrier wave to produce a FM signal
which, as shown in Section 8.4.2 of this chapter, can
be represented by:
Vfm = VcSin 27Γ ( f c + of)t
where f c is the carrier frequency and
6f is the frequency deviation corresponding t o
the frequency shift of the carrier for the peak
amplitude of the information signal
Thus for a carrier of 10.7 M H z and frequency devia­
tion of 5 k H z (0.005 M H z ) , the instantaneous carrier
frequency would be 10.705 M H z at the positive peak
of the signal and 10.695 M H z at the negative peak.
The output of the modulator is connected to a
power amplifier driver section which provides the
driving signal to operate the power output stage of the
transmitter. Since this stage is operating at relatively
high R F powers, e.g., 0.5 W for handportables and
25 W for fixed stations, use of a linear Class A amphfier
stage would result in significant power losses in the
internal impedance of the stage. Figure 8.41 (a) shows
a typical transfer characteristic for a Class A amplifier
stage. A constant bias centres the signal on the linear
portion of the characteristic between the cut-off point
for current through the stage and the upper point where
current would be drawn by the control circuit. This
causes a constant current to flow through the stage
which is varied as shown when a R F signal is present
at the input. This resuhs in a stage efficiency of between
40 and 65%. For fixed station transmitters the heat
generated in the stage would have to be dissipated
adequately. For a handportable, this would result in an
unacceptable drain on the battery as well as requiring
adequate stage coohng.
Figure 8.41 (b) shows a typical transfer characteristic
of two Class Β amphfier stages operating in push-pull.

LOCAL
MICROPHONE LINE
INTERFACE & MODULATOR
CABLE TO FM OR AM
AF AMPLIFIER
REMOTE
CONTROLLER
CRYSTAL
CONTROLLED RF
RF OSCILLATOR MULTIPLIER
FIG. 8.40 Radio communications transmitter — block diagram
where one amphfier carries the positive half-cycles of
the R F signal and the other the negative. The outputs
of each of the two amplifier stages are connected to a
common load which combines the two half-cycles to
give the R F signal output shown. N o current flows in
the stage unless a signal is present in addition to the
constant cut-off bias. This improves the stage efficiency
to between 70 and 8 5 % .
Figure 8.41 (c) shows a typical transfer characteristic
for a Class C amphfier stage. In this case, the stage is
biased by a multiple of the cut-off bias voltage value.
A large signal is applied to the input of the stage
from the driver stage of the transmitter which resuhs
in the flow of R F signal pulses through the load of
the Class C output stage. As shown in the figure, the
pulses occur at alternate half-cycles of the input signal
and are present for a period less than the time of a
half-cycle. The output load of the Class C stage is a
parallel tuned circuit, tuned to the R F carrier wave. The
transmitter is designed so that the size of the R F pulses
is large enough to contain sufficient energy to ensure
the tuned circuit continues to oscillate between pulses,
and contains sufficient harmonic information to carry
the modulating information signal. Class C operation
improves the stage efficiency to between 95 and 9 8 % .
As can be seen from the transfer characteristic, a
Class C stage operates on the non-linear portion of
the characteristic. Therefore it requires only a small
interfering signal fed back from the antenna to produce
unwanted intermodulation products between the trans­
mitted carrier frequency and the interfering signal.
Figure 8.42 shows typical intermodulation char­
acteristics due to the non-hnearity of the Class C o u t p u t
stage of a transmitter at 150 M H z .
The graph shows the level of third order inter­
modulation relative to the interfering signal level. As
would be expected, the level of the third order inter­
modulation decreases with an increase in frequency
separation between the source of intermodulation, i.e.,
the transmitted frequency and the interfering signal.
The highest level of third order intermodulation
is for adjacent transmit channels, i.e., 12.5 k H z or
Radio systems
\ /
TO RECEIVER.
POWER ANTENNA TRANSMITTER
POWER
AMPLIFIER COUPLING
DRIVER AMPLIFIER "OR COMBINATION
EQUIPMENT
OF BOTH
25 k H z channel spacing. This level of between - 7 and
- 8 dB is sometimes referred to as the 'conversion
figure' of 7 or 8 d B .
Except where p o o r engineering practices have been
adopted in the assembly of transmitters in the fixed
station cubicle/cabinet, most intermodulation genera­
tion will be caused by coupling between antennas, either
directly or via the feeder runs, or due to a combination
of both — see Section 8.6 of this chapter on antennas.
Care must be taken in the design of the couphng
equipment (which interfaces the power amplifier and
the antenna system) to reduce the signal levels which
are received by the output stage from the antenna.
Modern nuclear and large fossh-fuel power stations
require a number of fixed stations to provide fuh radio
cover of the power station. In order to use the same
radio channel at a number of fixed stations, the trans­
mitters are operated in a quasi-synchronous mode.
This is necessary because it is usually not possible
completely to confine the transmitted R F signal to one
particular zone of the power station.
A handportable user receiving similar signal strength
R F carrier waves from two transmitters operating on
the same frequency, would experience erratic reception
of the radio message as he moved in the vicinity of
overlap. This would be due to the addition, carried out
in the handportable receiver, of all signals being re­
ceived. The received signals would include direct and
reflected signals from each of the transmitters. In some
locations, the prominent signals from each transmitter
would be out-of-phase causing a cancellation of signal,
while elsewhere they would be in-phase.
By off-tuning one of the signals by a very smah
a m o u n t , e.g., 2 or 3 Hz in 460 M H z , a quasi-synchro­
nous m o d e of operation is achieved.
The signals now add but result in a 2 or 3 H z beat
signal being produced which is sub-audible to the
handportable user. In practice, a hissing beat is heard
but it does not detract from the intelligibihty of the
message.
In order to provide quasi-synchronous operation, it
is necessary to have a very stable R F oscillator in the
699
Telecommunications Chapter 8

STAGE CURRENT, I
(TYPICAL INTERMODULATION CHARACTERISTICS AT 150 MHz)

+1

NEGATIVE BIAS, V 9^
LOAD
-oí

I
INPUT I
10kHz 100kHz 1MHz 10MHz
FREQUENCY SEPARATION - SOURCE OF INTERMODULATION & INTERFERING SIGNAL
(a) Class A Amplification

FIG. 8.42 Effects of Class C non-linearity in the

output stage of a transmitter

transmitter. A crystal-controlled oscillator is therefore

STAGE 2 CURRENT STAGE 1 CURRENT

t
provided with a frequency stability ageing rate of the
-1 + 1 order of 5 parts in 10^^ per day. The crystal used is
contained in a temperature-controlled oven. The quasi-
synchronous systems marketed by Philips Telecom­
munications Ltd use a high stability drive unit Type
HS400, a simple block diagram of which is shown in
NEGATIVE

"A"7
BIAS, V Á Fig 8.43.
^ 1|Vco The latest transmitters being introduced for P M R

\ .__\y_. systems use synthesising techniques. The crystal-con-

troHed oscillator is used to provide the stabilised R F
/ 1 LOAD generator but individual channel frequencies are derived
1 digitally by means of multipher and divider circuits.
-I
This approach has the advantage that one transmitter
+1
INPUT ^
can be programmed to produce any one of 256
channels.

(b) Class Β Amplification

8.7.2 Fixed s t a t i o n r e c e i v e r s

The fixed station receivers used for power station ra­

dio systems are standard P M R receivers designed to
STAGE CURRENT,!
operate at the particular band of frequencies allocated
t to P M R use.
As explained in Section 8.7.1 of this chapter for fixed
station transmitters, the V H F low band systems used
in power stations employ single-frequency simplex A M
operation and the U H F systems two-frequency simplex
NEGATIVE BIAS.V
F M operation. The receiver equipment has to comply
with the performance specifications issued by the
Radiocommunications Agency of the DTI as described
in the section on transmitters, i.e., M P T 1302 and 1326.
Figure 8.44 shows block diagrams of typical A M and
F M R F fixed station receivers.
A M and FM systems both use similar antenna coupl­
INPUT
ing equipment and R F amphfier sections.
The A M oscillator and mixer stage connects the R F
(c) Class C Amplification output of a local oscillator and the received R F signal
in series to a non-linear device which produces three
signals, f c , f c - f o and f c + f o , e.g., for a received
FIG. 8.41 Amplifier classifications frequency ( f c ) of 461.5 M H z and a local oscillator

700
 Radio systems

|~DIVIDER A N D C O M P A R A T O R A S S E M B L Y

Η
781.25 Hz
5MHz FREQUENCY MONOSTABLE OR
-TL DIVIDERS ¿2a83H¿
STANDARD MULTI - PHASE DC. LOW P A S S LOCK INDICATOR
LIMITER ^6400 O R AMPLIFIER
OSCILLATOR 5MHz 5MH2 VIBRATOR COMPARATOR FILTER DETECTOR GATE
^9600

CORRECTION VOLTAGE
LOCK
INDICATOR
NO LOCK INHIBIT
VOLTAGE REGULATOR

V O L T A G E C O N T R O L L E D C R Y S T A L O S C I L L A T O R ANDIKEYING A S S E M B L Y INCREMENTAL STEPS

R F OUTPUT OF RF OUTPUT

fx = 21.6 MHz - 32MHz 1562.5Hz OR 1041.6666Hz

ICRYSTAL ose LIMITER PROGRAMMED
1 21.6-32 MHz
BUFFER
AND FREQUENCY ^ = 10.8 MHz - 16 MHz 781.25 Hz OR 520.8333 Hz
12V AMPLIFIER
GATING
1 DIVIDERS

1 J = 3.6 MHz - 5.33 MHz 260.4166 HZ OR 173.6111 Hz

OPTIONAL
^ICAD. CELL
1 = 2.7 MHz - 4 MHz 195.3125 Hz OR 130. 2083 Hz
1 - J

KD RF OUTPUT
- O f x ORjxORfxORjx
T R A N S M I T KEY o . 2 6 8
OV ^

FIG. 8.43 Block diagram of a high stabiUty oscillator

AM RECEIVER

TO RECEIVER,
X
ANTENNA
LOCAL
^LOUDSPEAKER
TRANSMITTER COUPLING RF RF OSCILLATOR IF AF
OR COMBINATION AMPLIFIER AND MIXER AMPLIFIER DETECTOR
EQUIPMENT AMPLIFIER CABLE TO
OF BOTH "•REMOTE
CONTROLLER

FM RECEIVER

TO RECEIVER.
1
ANTENNA
RF RF OSCILLATOR LIMITER
^ LOCAL
TRANSMITTER COUPLING AND IF AF LOUDSPEAKER
OR COMBINATION AMPLIFIER AMPLIFIER AND AMPLIFIER
EQUIPMENT CONVERTER CABLE TO
OF BOTH DISCRIMINATOR
" REMOTE
CONTROLLER

FIG. 8.44 Radio communications receivers — typical block diagrams

frequency ( f o ) of 472 M H z , two sidebands at 10.7 of 465 k H z . The second I F is taken via another I F
M H z and 933.5 M H z will be produced. The IF amphfier amplification stage t o the detector, comprising a diode
stage, which is tuned to 10.7 M H z , would select the and R F filter which selects the A F signal for connection
lower sideband and amplify it. to the A F amphfier.
A similar result would be achieved if the local os- When a S E L C A L L or CTCSS signalhng system is
cillator frequency fo were (fc - 10.7) M H z , i.e., 450.8 used, these coded audio or sub-audio modulating sig-
M H z . The two sidebands would then be 10.7 M H z and nals are connected via bandpass filters t o a tone detector
912.3 M H z . circuit which will, on receipt of the correct signal code,
This technique of converting the received R F sig- u n m u t e the A F output stage and connect the A F signal
nal to a lower intermediate frequency (IF) is called to the line interface or local loudspeaker.
superheterodyning. The lower IF is more easily con- For quasi-synchronous working, the local oscihator
trolled within the receiver because stray capacitance o u t p u t for each of the two oscillator/mixer stages will
has 40 times less effect on IF than on the equivalent be derived from the same high stability drive unit de-
RF. The cost of the electronic circuitry and screening is scribed for the fixed station transmitter in Section 8.7.1
therefore considerably reduced. of this chapter.
In modern R F fixed station receivers, a second stage In addition t o quasi-synchronous transmitter opera-
of super-heterodyning is used to produce a second IF tion a n d multiple fixed station operation, a receiver

701
Telecommunications Chapter 8

voting system is also used to determine which fixed
station receiver is receiving the best signal from the
mobile. The output from each receiver is taken to a
common equipment which determines which receiver
has the best signal to noise ratio. The best signal is
selected and is connected to the remote controller. The
latest receivers being introduced for P M R systems,
like the transmitters, use synthesising techniques. The
crystal-controlled oscihator is used to provide the sta­
bilised R F generator but the individual channel fre­
quencies are derived digitally by means of multiplier
and divider circuhs. The advantage with this approach
is that one receiver can be programmed to produce
any one of 256 channels, for example.
8.7.3 Antenna coupling equipment
A n t e n n a coupling equipment is used to connect
transmitters and receivers operating on different radio
channels to a common antenna or antenna system. It is
a very important part of modern power station U H F
radio systems, where up to five radio channels can be
in use at up to three fixed station locations.
Figure 8.45 shows a simple resistive circuit that can
be used to connect a transmitter and receiver to a com­
mon antenna. The resistor value of 16.7 Ω is chosen to
make each port of the three port system match the
terminating equipment having nominal impedances of
50 Ω. As can be seen from the figure, the disadvantages
of this network are that only a quarter of the power
from the transmitter is transmitted to the antenna
and that a similar level of signal is connected to the
receiver.
If the resistive circuh were used to couple two
transmitters to a common antenna, a similar situation
would occur. Since the receiver in a simplex operation
could be disconnected during transmission, this may
not seem much of a problem. However, a switching
solution would become very complex if five channels
were involved. The problem is exacerbated by the need
to ensure that each port is always correctly terminated
to prevent reflections. Terminating loads would also
be required, so that a disconnection/termination of
each receiver connection can be provided.
Several years of research by supphers like Sinclair
Radio Laboratories have resulted in the development of
sophisticated duplexers which are an improvement on
resistive circuits. These are based on the use of compact
25 m m cavities, using either hehcal or coaxial hne
resonators.
Figure 8.46 gives specification information and the
frequency/attenuation characteristics for the MR356
duplexer suitable for operation in the 406/512 M H z
U H F band.
It can be seen that the maximum insertion loss from
the transmitter to antenna is 1.5 dB and that the mini­
m u m receiver isolation at the transmit frequency is 75
dB, which are marked improvements on the 6 dB ob­
tained when using a simple resistive circuh.
Where the unwanted R F signal is separated from
the wanted signal by a number of megahertz, as in
two-frequency simplex systems, with the transmit and
receive bands of frequencies separated by 5 M H z ,
coaxial fihers or lumped circuit filters using discrete
inductors and capacitors can be used.
As the unwanted R F signal approaches within tens of
kilohertz of the wanted signal, the rejection efficiency
of these fihers falls. Therefore, for couphng equipment
which has to connect two transmitters to a c o m m o n
antenna, circulators have to be considered.
A terminated circulator, also referred to as an iso­
lator, is usually required when transmitters on adjacent

R = 16.7n

R = 16.7n R= 16.70

TRANSMITTER ^IN A ^ RECEIVER ANTENNA

son

Ϊ
OUTPUT - \ ^IN 50Ω ^0-5V|isj INPUT 0.5V
IN IMPEDANCE
CONNECTIONS IMPEDANCE IMPEDANCE
OF 50 Ω

LOSS FROM TRANSMITTER TO ANTENNA = 6dB (INSERTION LOSS)

LOSS FROM TRANSMITTER TO RECEIVER = 6dB

FOR A RESISTIVE COUPLING - NETWORK THE FOLLOWING

GENERAL EQUATION CAN BE USED TO DETERMINE R

"=^'
WHERE Ζ = NOMINAL IMPEDANCE OF EACH EQUIPMENT AND THE INPUT
IMPEDANCE TO EACH PORT OF THE NETWORK WITH THE
OTHER PORTS TERMINATED IN Ζ
η = NUMBER OF PORTS ON THE NETWORK

FIG. 8.45 Resistive coupling circuit

702
 Radio systems

PORT 2 ANTENNA FEED

SPECIFICATIONS
NUMBER OF CAVITIES 6
FREQUENCY SEPARATION, MHz 5 MIN.
POWER INPUT, W 50
INSERTION LOSS:
TX TO ANTENNA 1.5db MAX. WANTED I UNWANTED
RX TO ANTENNA 1.5db MAX. OUTPUT I POWER
Tx NOISE SUPPRESSION AT Rx FREQUENCY 75db MIN. FED TO I RETURNING
Rx ISOLATION AT Tx FREQUENCY 75db MIN. ANTENNA
TEMPERATURE RANGE -- 40° C TO 60° C
MAXIMUM V.S.W.R. 1.5 POOR VSWR OF TERMINATION
CONNECTOR B.N.C. OR TYPE Ν LOAD ALLOWS REFLECTED
MAXIMUM DIMENSIONS: POWER TO RE-ENTER PORT 3
HEIGHT 32mm AND CONTINUE ON TO PORT 1
WIDTH 156mm THUS REDUCING ISOLATION
LENGTH 229mm POSSIBLE WITH DEVICE
WEIGHT 1588 GRAMS

MODEL MR36 PORTI

TRANSMITTER PORT 3
TERMINATION LOAD
DISSIPATES UNWANTED
POWER

FIG. 8.48 Isolator configuration

arrow on the circulator symbol, an ideal circulator

would have no losses but, in practice, a loss of the order
of 0.5 dB wih occur. In the opposite direction of
rotation, an ideal circulator would pass n o R F signal:
FREQUENCY, MHz
in practice, a reverse loss in the order of 30 dB will be
FIG. 8.46 Duplexer characteristics present.
This unidirectional behaviour of a circulator is due
to gyromagnetic effects in the ferrite core created by
channels, i.e., separated by as little as 12.5 k H z , are a high frequency magnetic field. For this reason,
to be coupled to the same antenna. A circulator is a since moderately strong internal fields which have been
passive unidirectional device with three or more input adjusted for o p t i m u m performance are present in the
or output ports. It usually contains a ferrite core circulators, the circulator should not be subjected to
through which the R F signal injected into one port is strong external magnetic fields or placed in close prox-
transferred to an adjacent port, while the other port imhy t o large masses of iron or steel.
(or ports) are effectively isolated. Figures 8.47 and 8.48
Isolators are three port circulators with one port
show examples of three and four port circulators and
terminated by its characteristic impedance. Thus, in
an isolator.
the direction of rotation indicated by the arrow on
. As shown in Fig 8.47, an R F signal entering port 1 the circulator symbol (Fig 8.48), an R F signal entering
would emerge at port 2 only, an R F signal entering port port 1 will emerge from port 2 while an unwanted or
2 would emerge at port 3 only and an R F signal entering reflected signal entering port 2 will emerge at port 3
port 3 would emerge at port 1 only, i.e., in a cychc and be absorbed in the terminating load and no signal
order. In the direction of rotation indicated by the wih pass on to emerge at port 1.
Figure 8.49 shows an arrangement using isolators
3 P O R T CIRCULATOR 4 P O R T CIRCULATOR to reduce the effects of interfering signals between
adjacently located transmitters. The rating of the load
PORT 2 PORT 2
resistor connected to the third port has to be chosen on
a worst case basis.
Under normal conditions, spatial separation of the
antennas and good installation of the antenna coaxial
P0RT1 PORT 3
cables should result in an approximate isolation level of
30 d B , so the power in the load resistors wih be about
PORTI PORT 3
30 dB down on each of the transmitter outputs.
PORT 4 Under fault conditions, where one antenna may have
F O R W A R D L O S S A ¿ 0 . 5 dB
R E V E R S E L O S S ;^i30 dB
fallen onto the other and become enmeshed with it,
the power in the load resistor could be a combination
of the transmhter output of the adjacent transmitter
FIG. 8.47 Three and four port circulator plus the reflected transmitted power due to an im-
configurations pedance discontinuity in the damaged antenna circuh.

703
Telecommunications Chapter 8

this chapter which deals with antenna systems. The 7 dB

figure, sometimes referred to as the ^conversion figure'
or ^conversion loss', is the level of third order inter-
30 dB ISOLATION modulation given in Fig 8.42. This represents the level
of intermodulation, with respect to the interfering
signal, for a frequency separation of 25 k H z which
would be the case for two adjacent transmitter sig­
nals. The intermodulation level for adjacent channel
transmitters, assuming a transmitter output of 25 W
(14 dBW), is given by:

Intermodulation level =
(Transmitter output) - (antenna/feeder coupling loss)
- (conversion loss)
= 1 4 - 3 0 - 7
= - 2 3 dBW
= 5 mW

1 POWER IN R1 (OR R2) UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS
-30 dB RELATIVE TO Tx2 (OR Tx1) OUTPUT
2 POWER IN R1 (OR R2) IF ANTENNAS MESH
> 0 dB RELATIVE TO Tx2 (OR Tx1) OUTPUT
3 POWER IN R1 (OR R2) IF OWN ANTENNA FAILS OR
BECOMES A MISMATCH BY SNOW/ICE LOADING ETC
0 dB RELATIVE TO Tx1 (OR Tx2) OUTPUT
NOTE: IN THE EVENT OF 2 OCCURING BOTH LOADS
COULD BE AFFECTED
FIG. 8.49 Effects on termination power rating of
isolator port
Figure 8.50 shows the improvement in isolation be­
tween two transmitters that can be achieved by using
isolators.
Figure 8.50 (a) shows the isolation that can be
achieved by 0.6 m vertical spacing of U H F antennas
operating at 450 M H z , as explained in Section 8.6 of
This level of intermodulation signal can produce a
0.5 pd signal in a handportable, operating on the
same frequency as the intermodulation, at a distance
of approximately 75 m from the source of the inter­
modulation signal.
Figure 8.50 (b) shows that an additional improve­
ment can be made by using multiple isolators, with
each additional isolator adding approximately 30 dB of
isolation.
Figure 8.51 shows an arrangement where three cir­
culators are used. It should be noted that the rating
of the load resistors connected to the terminated ports
need not be the same. The isolator nearest the antenna
would require a load resistor capable of h a n d h n g ap­
proximately 25 W . The next load resistor handles - 3 0
dB and the nearest load resistor to the transmitter - 60
dB, both relative to 25 W , i.e., 25 m W and 25 μΨ
respectively.

(a) (b)

ANTENNA/FEEDER ANTENNA/FEEDER
COUPLING LOSS COUPLING LOSS
= 30 dB ¿SOdB

/ \
INTERMODULATION LEVEL = INTERMODULATION LEVELS
-30 dB + (-7dB ) RELATIVE TO 25 W -30 dB + (-30dB) + (-7dB) RELATIVE TO 25W
=5mW = 5MW

RANGE OF INTERFERENCE 5km RANGE OF INTERFERENCE 75 m

ADDITIONAL ISOLATION 30 dB

TRANSMITTERS 25W TRANSMITTERS 25W

NOTE: TRANSMITTERS ON NEARBY

CHANNELS - WITHIN ± 1%

FIG. 8.50 Improvements achieved by the addition of isolators

704
 Radio systems

30 dB ISOLATION
BETWEEN ANTENNAS

WORST CONDmONS NORMAL CONDmONS

TERMINATION TO HANDLE 25 W -30 dBb RELATIVE TO 25 W

TERMINATION TO HANDLE -60 dB RELATIVE TO 25 W

-30 dB RELATIVE TO 25 W

TERMINATION TO HANDLE
-30 dB +(-30dB) RELATIVE TO 25 W -90 dB RELATIVE TO 25 W

25 W

FIG. 8 . 5 1 Use of multiple isolators

8.8 Lightning protection
Lightning protection is provided on ah high, roof-
mounted, external antennas. The main protection is
provided by a bulkhead-mounted protector (high gain
Type L A - 1 or equivalent), located at the point where
the antenna coaxial cable enters the power station
building.
The general precautions to be taken to reduce the
effects of a hghtning strike are hsted in the following
subsections.
8.8.1 Antenna systems
• Provide a good earth directly below the mast and
connect to the earth system of the building.
• Solidly b o n d the outer conductor sheath of coaxial
cable and the base of the mast using a proprietary
grounding kit, ensuring that the b o n d is made
watertight.
• Ensure that the coaxial cable leaves the base of the
mast using the sharpest bend permitted by the cable
construction. Include as m a n y sharp bends as prac­
tical between the base of the mast and the cable entry
to the building.

• Use antennas having grounded elements and ensure • Where possible, include a length of galvanised steel
that elements are bonded to antenna mast. duct through which the coaxial cables can be taken.

705
Telecommunications
• Insert a lightning arrester in the coaxial cable where
it enters the building (e.g., 'Hygain' coaxial arrester
Model L A - 1 by Antenna Products Corporation, or
equivalent).
8.8.2 Fixed s t a t i o n c u b i c l e
• Ensure that the antenna cable enters the fixed station
cubicle at ground level and bond the outer conductor
sheath to the single-point earthing of the cubicle, as
near to the bottom of the cubicle as possible.
• Connect a gas discharge tube between the coaxial
centre conductor and the cubicle earth at the entry to
the cubicle.
• Connect a gas discharge tube between the A C supply
neutral and the cubicle earth as near to the bottom
of the cubicle as possible.
8.9 Remote control systems
The radio system controhers mounted on the control
desks, or the table-top versions used at other control
locations, can be supplied with a number of different
facilities.
The controllers used for power stations normally
have the following controls and indications:
Controls
• Channel monitor
• Channel select
• Talkthrough select (per channel)
• Loudspeaker volume
• Telephone handset volume
• Loudspeaker or audible call select
• Receiver voting by-pass
Indications
• Transmitter Operated' lamp
• Modulation lamp
• Received call/busy lamp
• Power on lamp
• 'Channel on talkthrough' lamp
It is generally feh that a simplified controller, similar to
a telephone, would be more appropriate for power
station use. Unfortunately, in recent years, the C E G B
has not been able to make it financially attractive for
supphers to purpose-build simphfied controllers for
power station use. With the proposed adoption of
trunked radio techniques h is now more hkely that, in
future, the controllers wih be replaced by telephones
directly cabled to a radio telephone exchange connected
in turn with the radio system through a c o m m o n control
equipment.
706
Chapter 8
The controllers can use a number of types of sig­
nalling between the controller and the fixed station,
either directly or via a c o m m o n equipment cubicle,
depending on the complexhy of the radio system. D C
or A C signalling can be used, depending on the dis­
tances involved. For power station systems, A C sig­
nalling is now used so that isolating transformers can
be interposed between each terminating equipment and
the interconnecting multipair cable. The transformers
and line protection units protect the equipment from
the power surges, rise-of-earth potentials or circulating
earth currents that can be experienced at a power station
during faults on the high voltage system.
Modern control systems, like the Philips Telecom
M87, use toneburst digital signalling, supplemented by
frequency division multiplex signals for keying trans-
mhters or transmitting CTCSS or S E L C A L L tone
signals.
A simphfied control schematic diagram based on
the M87 control system is shown in Fig 8.52.
8.9.1 O p e r a t i o n a l d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e M 8 7 c o n t r o l
system
The local operator's controller is connected to the local
operator's termination card in the M87 c o m m o n equip­
ment (CEQ) via a cable highway. The highway contains
two pairs for send and receive audio speech signals, a
pair for serial data out (SDO), a pair for serial data
in (SDI), a core for the press-to-talk (PTT) transmitter
keying control and a pair for power supplies derived
from the C E Q , one core of which is used as an earth
return for the P T T control. The in and out serial data
is transmitted at 4800 Baud (bits/s), hmhing the length
of the cable highway to approximately 300 m.
For distances greater than 300 m , the controller is
converted to a remote operator controller by the ad­
dition of a M O d u l a t o r - D E M o d u l a t o r ( M O D E M ) b o a r d
and is connected to a remote operator termination card
in the C E Q which contains a similar M O D E M . The
serial data is converted to frequency shift keying (FSK)
signalling between the two modems operating at 300
Bauds. The P T T D C control signal is converted to 2970
Hz in the remote operator controller and mixed with
the FSK and speech audio, which is connected to the
'send' pair of a two-pair cable between the controller
and C E Q . The FSK and speech audio from the C E Q
are mixed and connected to the controller 'receive' pair
of the two-pair cable. By this method of converting all
control and indication signals into voice frequencies
and mixing them with the audio speech signals, it is
possible to use amphfied cable pairs for long cable runs
in excess of 5 km.
The serial data signals in both the 'in' and 'out'
directions of local operator controller are taken via the
local operator termination card to the SDI and S D O
connections of a universal asynchronous receiver trans­
mitter (UART), which is allocated to the controller
in the operator's serial interface unit. Simharly the

serial data signals SDI and SDO of the m o d e m lo­
cated in the remote operator's termination card are
connected to the U A R T allocated to the remote op­
erator controller.
The U A R T converts the serial data to parallel data
suitable for use on the control processor u n h (CPU)
data bus and vice versa.
All controls and channel selections from the con­
trohers are taken to the relevant U A R T as 'serial data
in' and all indications from the C E Q and fixed radio
stations are taken from the parallel data bus via the
same U A R T as 'serial data out'.
The serial data in and out signals (SDI and SDO)
use an eleven-bit data word as shown in Fig 8.53 (a).
The eleven-bit word comprises a start zero Ό ' bit,
eight data bits, a parity bit which can be either Ό ' or
*1' to give odd 'I's parity, and a stop ' 1 ' b h . The odd
'I's parity is achieved by choosing a Ό ' or Ί ' for the
parity bit to give an odd number of Ί ' bits when the
parity and eight data bits are added together. This
enables a simple form of error detection check to be
carried out at the receiving end. The serial data is
converted to the FSK signalling format shown in Fig
8.53 (b) for remote operator controllers. The FSK
signals comprise a 2295 H z tone for logic zero and a
2505 Hz tone for logic one. The eleven-bit tone-burst
is preceded by a synchronising preamble of 40 ms at
2505 Hz. For a control, selection or indication message
requiring only one eleven-bit data word, the word is
repeated once and checked for correct reception. For a
message which requires more than one eleven-bit word,
the first is repeated once followed by the remaining
eleven-bit words of the message. The last two eleven-bit
words of the message form a checksum byte, which is
used for error detection.
In order to u n d e r s t a n d the general signalling
principles adopted for the M87 control system, a typical
selection of channel 1 by a controher followed by the
transmission of a S E L C A L L to a mobile will be
described.
The 'select' button for channel 1 is first pressed on
the controller. The eleven-bit code is then transmitted
from the controller to the operator's serial interface
U A R T . A second U A R T in the serial interface will
detect the operation of the interface U A R T and pre­
pares the relevant parallel data address. On the next
scan by the C P U , the data and address will be loaded
on the data and address bus. The C P U will decode the
address data, identify the associated operator termina­
tion card and decode the data bus message, which will
confirm that the selection of channel 1 has been m a d e .
The C P U , via the C M O S highway, will swhch the
multiplexer (MUX) on the addressed operator termina­
tion card to channel 1 and the M U X on channel 1
termination card to the operator input, i.e., O P l for
the local operator controller shown in Fig 8.52. On
completion of this operation, the 'send audio' high­
way is connected from the local operator's controller
through the operator termination card, channel 1 ter­
Radio systems
mination card, channel 1 remote control u n h (RCU) to
the two fixed station transmitters ( I T X l and ITX2)
which use the same channel 1 frequency. Following
selection of channel 1, the C P U wih load the data
messages onto the data bus and the operator's serial
interface addresses sequentially onto the address bus;
the 'channel 1 selected' indication wih then be displayed
on operator controller 1 and a 'channel 1 busy' indica­
tion on all other controllers. On receipt of the channel
selected indication, operator 1 whl press the S E L C A L L
buttons to call the required mobile and press the
send/key-transmitter b u t t o n . The S E L C A L L code for
the required mobile will be sent as an eleven-bit data
word to the operator's serial interface where h will
be loaded onto the address and data bus, under the
control of the C P U , and transferred to the S E L C A L L
serial interface. The interface will convert the parallel
data to serial data using a U A R T associated with chan­
nel 1 and the serial data will pass to the S E L C A L L
encoder in the channel 1 termination card. The encoder
will convert the serial data to the necessary S E L C A L L
V F sequential tones which will be passed, together
with the transmitter keying frequency of 2970 Hz
(originating from the local operator's termination card)
and the CTCSS tone from the channel 1 R C U , to the
two fixed station transmitters.
A 2970 H z detector in each transmitter will switch
on the R F transmitters and the S E L C A L L sequential
tones and the CTCSS sub-audible tone wih modulate
the R F carrier signal. W h e n the relevant mobile receiver
detects the correct S E L C A L L code, the audio output
of that receiver will be unmuted and a call tone heard
by the mobile user. The mobile user wih press the
mobile press-to-talk (PTT) swhch and reply verbally
with his n a m e or callsign: a sub-audible CTCSS tone
will also be transmitted.
O n receipt of the correct R F carrier and CTCSS
tone, either one or both channel 1 fixed station receivers
wih receive the cah. If both receive the cah, the CTCSS
detector in each will lift the mute on the receiver audio
stage and pass the audible speech signals to the voting
equipment. The better signal wih be selected and the
output of the voted receiver will be connected by the
receive audio pair into the channel 1 termination card
via the receive amphfier in the R C U . At the same time,
an eleven-bh serial data word indicating the voted
receiver will be passed from the U A R T to the FSK
m o d e m in the R C U . T h e FSK tone-burst, eleven-bh
word will be decoded by the m o d e m in the channel 1
terminating card and an eleven-bit serial data word
passed to the channel serial interface, where channel 1
U A R T will convert it to a parallel data word. Under
control of the C P U , the parallel data word will be
passed, via the data bus, to the U A R T associated with
operator 1 ( O P l ) in the operator's serial interface.
The U A R T will convert the parallel data to serial
data and this will pass via the cable highway to the
local operator controller ( O P l ) , where the voted re­
ceiver will be indicated on an L C D display. At the
707
Telecommunications Chapter 8

M87 COMMON EQUIPMENT

CHANNEL 1 TERMINAL CARD

TELERADIO CONNECT (TC)
TERMINAL CARD
Tc

TELEPHONE
DECADIC/DTMF
SIGNALLING ,CH2
I MODEM
FSK
)DEM I Η I
SELCALL L
ENCODER Γ

0P1 TERMINAL CARD

LOCAL CABLE HIGHWAY

OPERATOR
CONTROLLER AUDIO
SO IN/OUT
PTT

CHANNEL 2 TERMINAL CARD

A U D I O TX

0P2 TERMINAL CARD TMUXCONTROL

A U D I O Rx
REMOTE
OPERATOR CH2
CONTROLLER SD IN/OUT
2 PAIR CABLE
AUDIO
FSK IN/OUT
2970 Hz PTT
PTT 0P2
CHANNEL 3 TERMINAL CARD
Η MODEM k Tc
AUDIO Tx

AUDIO Rx

SD IN/OUT

CENTRAL
PROCESSOR CHANNEL SERIAL INTERFACE
UNIT

OPERATOR SERIAL INTERFACE

CONTROL

UART h
-Π CH2
UART

CH3
UART

SELCALL
SERIAL
INTERFACE

FIG. 8.52 Radio communications M87 control system — block diagram

same time, the audio reply wih be heard on the loud­
speaker.
A similar procedure wih take place for ah controls,
i.e., by-pass voting selection, talkthrough selection and
calls to non-selective call mobiles, where the CTCSS
tone will unmute the mobile receivers.
8.9.2 Operational description of the Motorola-
Storno CAF2200 system
The control system is based on the TE2200 terminal
unit. The terminal unit comprises interface circuits for
fixed stations, telephones directly wired to the radio
system (DWTS) and PA(B)X tie circuhs. The terminal
u n h is connected t o the fixed stations, D W T S and the
PA(B)X by multipair cables.
The fixed stations can be located in one or more
locations as necessary t o provide good radio cover of
the power station. Each fixed station comprises radio
transmitters and receivers, one of each per radio
channel in use.
The fixed stations operate in duplex m o d e , i.e.,
they can receive and t r a n s m h simuhaneously. This
means that a continuous R F carrier is transmitted for
as long as the channel is in use, even when n o speech
is modulating the R F carrier. T h e continuous R F carrier
enables handportables a n d mobiles to identify busy
channels when scanning for a free channel, fohowing a

708
 Radio systems

associated with the terminal u n h . The D W T S use

CHANNEL EQUIPMENT D T M F signalling to operate the terminal unit equipment
and receive standard telephone ringing when called by
the terminal unit.
The D W T S are located at local control points, e.g.,
C C R , works control office and the power station re­
ception desk.
T h e star b u t t o n (*) o n the keyboard is depressed to
obtain a dial tone. The handportable automatically
searches for the first free channel and transmits the
relevant D T M F code (see Fig 8.16 and Fig 8.54).
On receipt of the D T M F code, the TE2200 stores
the dial tone request until the C P U is free to deal
with the call and simultaneously transmits a continuous
carrier to busy the channel. When the C P U is free to
CHANNEL 2 deal with the call request, the TE2200 transmits an idle
FIXED STATION 1
(R) tone.
On receiving the idle tone the handportable transmits
CHANNEL 2 its 3-digit D T M F ID to the C P U . The C P U then
FIXED STATION 2
repeats the ID back to the handportable in the form of
CHANNEL 2
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT & RECEIVER VOTING
a SSFC comprising a pulse of idle tone followed by
each of three tones representing the handportable I D .
CHANNEL 3
O n receiving the correct I D , the handportable trans­
FIXED STATION 1
mits a pulse of acknowledgement (R) tone and simul­
taneously Unmutes the loudspeaker.
CHANNEL 3
FIXED STATION 2 Receipt of the acknowledge tone by the TE2200
CHANNEL 3 results in a dial tone being sent to the handportable.
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT & RECEIVER VOTING
The handportable user then keys, on air, the re­
KEY quired mobile or handportable ID or the access code
ACU ANTENNA COUPLING UNIT
CTCSS CONTINUOUS TONE CONTROLLED SIGNALLING SYSTEM for the P A B X fohowed by the telephone number in
DTMF DUAL TONE MULTI-FREQUENCY
FSK FREQUENCY SHIFT KEYING D T M F signalhng.
MUX MULTIPLEXER
PTT
RX
2970HZ PRESS TO TALK SIGNAL
RECEIVER
On receiving the first D T M F tones, the C P U removes
SD SERIAL DATA
SELCALL SELECTIVE CALL SIGNALLING SYSTEM the dial tone and stores the received code.
Tx TRANSMITTER
UART UNIVERSAL ASYNCHRONOUS If the D T M F ID code is for a handportable or
RECEIVER/TRANSMITTER
mobile, the C P U checks that the handportable is not
already engaged on a call. If it is engaged then a busy
FIG. 8.52 (cont'd) Radio communications M87 control
system — block diagram tone is returned to the caller. If not, the C P U sends a
preamble idle (R) tone to alert ah quiescent hand-
portables which are continually scanning the channels
PREAMBLE START 11 BITS
that a n I D is a b o u t t o be transmitted. All handport­
ables lock-on to the channel and receive the subse­
(a)
mOOOQOCMJ
quently transmitted I D . The calling handportable user
also hears the I D which acts as a confidence tone fol­
lowing the keying process.
8 BITS DATA
If the called handportable is switched on and re­
ceives the I D correctly, it acknowledges the cah by
automatically returning an acknowledgement (R) tone.
(b) At the same time the A F section of the handportable
is u n m u t e d and the acknowledgement (R) tone is heard
in the handportable at full volume, i.e., h by-passes
the volume control. This acts as an alerting signal to
FIG. 8.53 M87 control system — serial data format
the user of the called handportable indicating that an
incoming call has been received.
dial tone request being initiated by the user of the O n receipt of the acknowledgement (R) tone, the
mobile or handportable. TE2200 sends a ringing tone which is heard by both
The D W T S have numeric keypads with star (*) and handportables at the volume control setting level which
gate (#) buttons as found on modern p u s h b u t t o n exists at each handportable.
telephones. Four alpha buttons (A to D) are also p r o ­ The called party answers the call by depressing the
vided for use with the special programming fachhies P T T switch.

709
Telecommunications Chapter 8

CALL INITIATED CALL CLEARED

MOBILE Ά' CALL MOBILE IDENTIFICATION KEYBOARD DIGITS

CALLING
No. XYZ
SIGNALLING -{ϊ(]-\ X I D I Y I D I Ζ |~D]iiHCMIHIHI}-
J: 1 60 60 60 60 60

η ΓΊ ΓΊ ΓΊ ΓΊ
; ^ ^ ^ B I L E CALL Ζ
BLOCKED

MOBILE 'Β'
CALLING
No. XYZ
SIGNALLING
•Θ-

CHANNEL ENGAGED
DUPLEX
FIXED
STATION

DIAL DIAL
TONE TONE RINGING TONE
SELECTIVE CALL SELECTIVE CALL 1216Hz

•Θ- R X Y Ζ

TERMINAL
EQUIPMENT

CONNECTION CLEAR DOWN

PERIOD PERIOD

FIG. 8.54 Mobile-to-mobile signalling on the Motorola-Storno CAF2200 system

The TE2200 removes the ringing tone, connects the If a handportable user tries to key without waiting for
channel fixed station receiver A F output to the trans­ a dial tone or tries to d o something on the system which
mitter A F input and leaves the channel under the is an incorrect operation, a 'don't do that' cadence of
control of the system timers. tones is transmitted from the TE2200.
If a cah is completed before it is timed-out by the At first the operation of the handportable can be
system timers, each party has to press the gate (#) rather intimidating and people become a little over­
button, which is equivalent to replacing the handset of awed. However, after using the unit for a while most
a telephone, to release the call. people regard it as being similar to a modern telephone.
The system incorporates four system timers:
Group calls
• The channel activity timer circuh monitors the op­
eration of P T T activity on the channel fixed station Two types of group calls are available on the system:
receiver. If no activity is detected for a preset peri­ (a) Hierarchical group calls — these are based on the
od, a warning tone is transmhted which is heard three-digh IDs given to the handportables and
on both handportables. If a P T T is not operated mobiles. T o enter the group call m o d e , the gate (#)
within 10 s then the channel time-out sequence is key is pressed instead of the star (*) key to obtain
initiated, which transmits a time-out sequence of a dial tone.
tones after another 10 s and immediately mutes the
t w o h a n d p o r t a b l e receivers a n d releases t h e • If a single digit is pressed fohowed by another
gate (#), a hundred group is called, i.e., ah
connection.
handportables with the same first digit of their
• The system dynamic timer circuit is activated when IDs as the group digh transmitted. For example,
all but one channel are engaged. The timer times- a #4# would call the 400 to 499 group of hand-
out the longest estabhshed call 10 s after first trans­ portables.
mitting a warning tone.
• If two digits are pressed a tens group is called.
• The minimum call timer prevents clear-down by the For example, a #40# would call the 400 to 409
dynamic timer until after a preset minimum period group of handportables.
selected by the customer in the range 1 0 - 6 0 s.
(b) Serial group calls use system number-pools in
• The maximum call timer clears down a call when the which a series of non-related three-digit numbers
dynamic timer is not in operation, after a preselected can be stored. T o send a serial group call the user
period in the range 20 s to 5 minutes. of a D W T , handportable or mobile merely keys-

710

in the number of the system number-pool followed
by the star (*) b u t t o n .
Abbreviated dialling
The system number-pools can also be used to store
long C T N numbers or short but frequently-used
numbers. Any number in the system number-pool can
be used for either serial group calls or abbreviated
numbers.
Manual port select
To manually select a channel port, the second display
mode of the handportable has to be selected by pressing
the o n / o f f button a second time. This is followed by
pressing the Β button.
The display changes to a C fohowed by four dashes.
A four-digh security access code has to be keyed-in to
occupy the dashed positions on the display.
The display then changes to C O I indicating that
channel 1 has been selected.
If another channel is required, this can be selected by
keying the required channel number and pressing B.
Once in manual select m o d e , the group call or *all
cair facihty can be used and the group of h a n d p o r t ­
ables locked-on to the selected channel. This provides
the equivalent of an open channel and by-passes the
system timers.
It is envisaged that this facihty will be very useful
during emergencies or during commissioning when an
intricate test sequence is being carried out involving a
number of dispersed commissioning engineers.
Fixed station fall-back mode
This facility is software-driven in the fixed station.
It enables a fixed station to be switched to act as a
quasi-open channel on talkthrough.
Any handportable or mobile user knowing the ne­
cessary security access code is able to switch a fixed
station to this m o d e of operation.
Firstly, the handportable has to be switched to the
manual mode of operation to enable the user to m a n ­
ually select the channel to be switched to fall-back
mode. In the manual m o d e a telegram can be trans­
mitted on the selected channel which switches the chan­
nel to talkthrough.
Once the fixed station is switched to the fall-back
mode, it transmits a preamble idle (R) tone to capture
all quiescent handportables and mobiles. This is fol­
lowed by a telegram to switch all the handportables
and mobiles to the fah-back channel. The handport-
ables/mobiles then operate in the same manner as a
group call where everybody hears and can speak t o
everyone else, i.e., equivalent to open channel operation
on talkthrough.
The fixed station software repeats the handport-
able/mobile capturing process at regular intervals to
include newly switched-on radios or those that were
out of range during the previous polling transmissions.
Radio systems
The fixed station can be switched back to normal by
sending the relevant telegram from a h a n d p o r t a b l e /
mobile in a similar manner to that used for swhching
to the fall-back m o d e .
Other advanced features
The system has a number of advanced software-driven
features, some of which could be useful in emergencies.
These features include:
• Busy number break-in.
• Channel congestion override.
• Call enquiry and transfer.
• Emergency calls to system manager or other desig­
nated D W T by keying 00 (without dial tone).
• Cah-back when free.
• Abbreviated diahing.
• Change of h a n d p o r t a b l e I D using the keypad.
8.10 Handportable radiotelephone
transceivers
T h e handportable radiotelephone transceivers (hand-
portables) used for power station radio systems have
to comply with the following performance specifica­
tions of the Radiocommunications Agency of the De­
partment of T r a d e and Industry (DTI):
• For frequency modulated (FM), U H F and V H F
equipment — MPT1303 — Performance Speci­
fication for Angle modulated V H F and U H F radio
equipment, incorporating integral antennas, for use
in the Private Mobile Radio Service.
• For amplitude modulated (AM) V H F equipment —
M P T 1304 — Performance Specification for Am­
plitude modulated V H F radio equipment, incor­
porating integral antennas, for use in the Private
Mobile Radio Service.
• For frequency modulated (FM) V H F and U H F
equipment manufactured to the mobile specification
— M P T 1326 — Performance Specification for
Angle modulated V H F and U H F equipment for use
at fixed and mobile stations in the Private Mobile
Radio Service.
In addition to these requirements, the Joint Radio
Committee (JRC) recommends that the maximum E R P
from the handportable be hmited to 0.5 W .
For power station radio systems, this recommended
value of R F power has been found to be too high.
Control and Instrumentation equipment used in power
stations is specified to withstand a radio field strength
of 10 V / m for radio signals in the frequency bands
between 20 M H z and 500 M H z (CEGB General
Specification for Electronic Equipment — E E S 1980).
711
Telecommunications Chapter 8

Tests, supported by calculations, show that if a
handportable having an E R P of 0.5 W is held within
a distance of 0.5 m of sensitive C and I equipment, a
field strength in excess of 10 V / m is produced (Fig
8.55).
The variation in field strength given in Fig 8.55 is
due to different antenna gains associated with the dif­
ferent manufacturers. The calculated values are based
on equations, which are only relevant for the far field
region (see Fig 8.12). The far field fohows a short
transitional region at the end of the near field, which
extends up to one-sixth of the wavelength from the
antenna. As can be seen from Fig 8.12, inside the near
field region the impedance of the wave changes rapidly
from a constant value of 377 Ω to a high or low wave
impedance, dependent on the source impedance.
The value of one-sixth of a wavelength for a U H F
radio signal of 460 M H z whl be of the order of 0.1 m
which represents the origin of the graphs in Fig 8.55.
These graphs cannot therefore be extrapolated into
the area between the antenna and a distance of 0.1 m
from the antenna, because of the rapidly changing wave
impedance.
Tables 8.5 and 8.6 provide a schedule of antennas of
different manufacture with the approximate gains as
specified by the manufacturers. Using these antenna
gains, the Κ factor shown in the table for each an­
tenna has been calculated for both 0.5 W and 1.0 W R F
powers into the antenna. The Κ factor is calculated
using Equation (8.10) from Section 8.5 of this chapter,
where Κ = ( 3 0 G t ) T .
The electric field strength (E) from an isotropic
radiator is given by:
Ε = (30Pt)T/R V/m
where Pt = transmitted power, W
R = distance from radiator, m
For an antenna of gain (Gt) with respect to an isotropic
radiator, the equation becomes:
Ε = (30GtPt)T/R = Κ (Pt)T/R V/m
where Κ = (30Gt)T is a constant for a particular an­
tenna arrangement.

For new power station radio systems, the practice is

therefore to restrict the R F power to the handportable
antenna t o 0.5 W . Even with this limhation, some
MOTOROLA HT220 5W
handportables will exceed the 10 V / m field strength
when operated within 0.3 m . For this reason, even lower
output powers (of the order of 0.05 W) into the an­
tenna are expected to be specified in future t o eliminate
any possibhity of Radio Frequency Interference (RFI)
t o C and I equipment. This lower handportable trans­
mitted output will have to be compensated by use of
CALCULATED FIELD
distributed fixed station receivers a r o u n d the power
FOR 1 WATT INTO AN
OMNI-DIRECTIONAL station. With distributed fixed stations, power stations
AERIAL
can be almost completely covered by these low R F
MOTOROLA KT220 1W
signals without risk of interference to C and I equip­
ment. This means that radio cover is not the problem
it once was whhin a large modern power station.
However, the presence of high audible noise in some
areas of the power station is still a problem. Most
STORNO AN865
AND MOTOROLA WHIP handportables can be used with headsets and noise
STORNO AN864 cancelhng microphones or throat microphones. Unfor­
PHILIPS TELESCOPIC
PHILIPS COIL WHIP tunately, unless staff have t o work continuously in the
MOTOROLA SHORT
HELIFLEX - 25mm noisy environment, they are not prepared to be cluttered
with headsets, microphones, voice-operated switching
boxes and the associated cable leads.
In an attempt to find an alternative, handportables
have been modified for use in power stations by drilling
0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 1
a small aperture in the lower face of the handportable
DISTANCE, m
which also contains the loudspeaker. A n acoustic tube
-MEASURED RESULTS connects this aperture to a desenshised 'electret'
-CALCULATED RESULTS
microphone in the handportable. This enables the
handportable to be held to the ear and operated like
a telephone. A n acoustic transducer fitted t o the hand-
FIG. 8.55 Field strengths from typical handportable
transmitters at short distances, with 0.5 W into
portable produces a 110 dB sound pressure level alerting
the antenna tone on receipt of the correct S E L C A L L code. These

712
 Radio systems

TABLE 8.5

Antenna schedule for transmitter output of 0.5 W

Field strength Distance from antenna

Gain with Effective
Manufacture
respect to radiated At At At
and type of antenna
dipole, dB power, W 0.1 m, 1 m, V/m 10 V/m,mm K = (30Gt)2
V/m

Motorola-Storno
Spring heliflex AN 864 - 8 0.079 19 1.9 190 2.79
length 46 mm
Flexible whip AN 865 - 6 0.126 24.5 2.5 260 3.52
length 155 mm

Motorola-Storno
Short heliflex (25 mm) -12 0.03 12 1.2 123 1.76
λ/4 Whip (pencil length) - 6 0.126 24.5 2.5 260 3.52

Philips
Coil whip antenna -10 0.05 15.5 1.55 150 2.2
Telescopic antenna (P5000) - 9 0.06 17 1.7 170 2.49

Theoretical 0.5 W ERF

from a 0.5 W handportable 0 0.5 50 5 500 4.97

Philips HP 1AM used in

ERA tests -14 0.02 10 1.4

TABLE 8.6

Antenna schedule for transmitter output of 1 W

Gain with
Manufacture ERP Field strength Distance from antenna
respect to Κ = (30Gt) 2
and antenna type at 1 m For FS = 10 V/m
dipole

Motorola-Storno
Spring heliflex AN 864 - 8 dB 0.16 W 2.7 V/m 270 mm 2.79
length 46 mm
Flexible whip AN 865 - 6 dB 0.25 W 3.46 V/m 350 mm 3.52
length 155 mm

Motorola-Storno
Short heliflex (25 mm) - 1 2 dB 0.06 W 1.73 V/m 173 mm 1.76
λ/4 Whip (pencil length) - 6 dB 0.25 W 3.46 V/m 350 mm 3.52

Philips
Coil whip antenna - 1 0 dB 0.1 w 2.2 V/m 220 mm 2.2
Telescopic antenna (P5000) - 9 dB 0.125 W 2.4 V/m 240 mm 2.49

Theoretical 0.5 W ERP from - 3 dB 0.5 W 5 V/m 500 mm 4.97

a 1 W handportable

modifications greatly improved the performance of station radio systems have t o comply with the same
the h a n d p o r t a b l e in acoustically noisy areas. performance specifications issued by the Radiocom­
munications Agency of the D T I referred to in the
sections on fixed station transmitters a n d receivers, i.e.,
8.11 Vehicle-mounted radiotelephones M P T 1302 a n d M P T 1326.
The vehicle-mounted radiotelephones used for power A vehicle-mounted radiotelephone comprises:

713
Telecommunications
• Vehicle boot-mounted transceiver.
• Vehicle dashboard-mounted controller.
• Vehicle-mounted antenna.
The transceiver is a robust unit consisting of a re­
ceiver, transmitter and control interface. The trans­
ceiver is connected to the dashboard-mounted controller
by a multicore cable which uses a plug and socket
arrangement to interconnect the controller and trans­
ceiver. The plug and socket are held together using a
retaining chp. The transceiver is connected to a roof
or boot-mounted antenna by a coaxial cable. The
coaxial cable is connected to the transceiver by a screw-
clamped coaxial connector.
The vehicle dashboard-mounted controller comprises
a loudspeaker and microphone, with controls for loud­
speaker volume, squelch setting of the receiver (this
is the muting arrangement which sets the level of R F
signal required to hft the A F mute), channel selection
and indicator.
The vehicle antenna is either wing-mounted or roof-
mounted. The antennas used for power station radio
systems are usually three-quarter wave for U H F and
five-eighths wave for V H F and the Philips Telecomm
G X Series of antennas in this range are shown in Figs
8.56 and 8.57.
8.11.1 Vehicle antennas
The efficiency of the quarter wave antenna is dependent
on the mounting position, the better position being
the centre of the vehicle roof, which acts as a good
electromagnetic reflecting surface when it is a grounded
metal roof acting as the c o m m o n earth for the vehicle
electrical systems. The metal reflecting surface has the
effect of adding an electrical image of the antenna
which, for a quarter wave antenna, would produce a
transmit/receive characteristic equivalent to a half-wave
antenna (Fig 8.37). The grounded metal roof is referred
to as the 'ground plane' of the antenna.
If the antenna is mounted on a non-metalhc roof, a
ground plane should be formed by sticking metal foil
to the inside of the roof. The metal foh must be bonded
to the earthed chassis of the vehicle and to the earth
contact of the antenna coaxial cable. Mounting the
antenna on the vehicle wing is a less efficient arrange­
ment but may have to be accepted for vehicles with
non-metallic roofs.
Figure 8.37 (a) shows the effect of placing a conduc­
ting plane between the elements of a dipole antenna
and Fig 8.37 (b) shows the equivalent circuh using a
conducting plane. This plane is referred to as the
ground plane for a monopole antenna. Each monopole
has a feed point impedance of half that of the dipole
because the voltage injected is divided between the two
elements of the original dipole.
Figure 8.37 (c) shows the free space radiation pat­
terns of quarter wave monopoles over perfectly con­
714
Chapter 8
ducting ground planes of various diameters. The in­
finite ground plane shows a 3 dB gain over a dipole at
zero degrees elevation angle, but any finite ground plane
will exhibit a 3 dB loss. The 3 dB gain for an infinite
ground plane is due to the fact that the same field
is produced by an input voltage of half that required
by a dipole across an impedance of half that of the
original dipole.
It should be noted that the diameter of the ground
plane for the 0.5 wavelength case shown in Fig 8.37 (c)
must be 3.5 m for an operating frequency of 86 M H z
and 0.6 m for 460 M H z . Thus, to obtain the advantages
of the ground plane reflection effect, the mounting
position of the antenna should be chosen with care.
8.11.2 Noise suppression
In order to improve the signal to noise ratio of the
receiver, it is necessary to suppress any electrical noise
from the engine and ancillary electrical equipment.
The levels of interference laid down by various coun­
tries are determined by the effect upon receiving equip­
ment external to the vehicle, with the receiver located
at a predetermined distance from the source. This
can resuh in fields within the vehicle being t o o high
for interference-free reception by sensitive equipment.
Therefore, although the vehicle may be adequately sup­
pressed for a conventional car r a d i o / t a p e player, opera­
tion of communication type equipment in the V H F
and U H F bands may require additional suppression.
Assuming that the vehicle has been fitted with the
basic suppression measures, the problem is to find the
optimum location of the proposed receiving equipment
and ascertaining the area of likely interference. The
following precautions should be taken:
• Antenna position is one of the most important points
to observe during installation. The antenna and coa­
xial cable should be as far from the sources of
interference as possible. The ground plane of the
antenna must not be affected by interference cur­
rents. Any currents containing noise pulses, either
conducted or induced, flowing in the ground plane
will cause interference to be fed to the input of the
receiver.
• Cables for the radio equipment should not be run
parallel with the electrical cable looms of the vehicle.
• Particular attention should be paid to the battery
supply for the radio equipment. Additional suppres­
sion may be necessary.
• Offending electrical ancillary equipment on the ve­
hicle will have to be individually suppressed follow­
ing installation of the radio equipment.
For detailed solutions to the various problem areas that
can be experienced, refer to a speciahsed document,
such as Phihps Telecom Ltd Engineering Note T S P
427/1 Electrical Noise in M o t o r Vehicles.
 Radio systems

ELECTRICAL
FREQUENCY
RANGE 390-470 MHz

GAIN 5dB MINIMUM RELATIVE TO QUARTER-WAVE

ANTENNA WITH GROUND PLANE
IMPEDANCE 50 ohms
BANDWIDTH 2% for 1.5:1 VSWR
FEEDER 4.5m URM76 ÍRG58 C/U),
URM43 OR FSJ1-50 LOW-LOSS

MECHANICAL
ANTENNA ROD 2.5mm AND
1.6mm DIAMETER
STAINLESS STEEL WIRE

TYPICAL VSWR CURVE TYPE GX450

1
1

-1.5

1A
448 450 452 454 456 458 460 462 464 466 468
FREQUENCY MHz
GX450H GX450S

FIG. 8 . 5 6 U H F three-quarter wave vehicle antennas

8.12 Interference problems modulation products which can be produced in any

There are a number of sources of interference which
have to be taken into account when designing radio
systems which use muhiple R F channel operation.
8.12.1 Intermodulation products
The most prevalent source of interference is inter­
non-hnear impedance, given the right conditions.
One of the possible sources of intermodulation has
been referred to in Section 8.7.1 of this chapter. This
is the output stage of the transmitter. Another can be
the R F input stages or mixer stage of the receiver.
As an example of the production of intermodulation,
consider four frequencies a, b , c and d.

715
Telecommunications Chapter 8

ELECTRICAL
FREQUENCY
RANGE 140-174 MHz

GAIN 3db MINIMUM RELATIVE TO QUARTER-WAVE ANTENNA

WITH GROUND PLANE
IMPEDANCE 50 ohms
BANDWIDTH ± 2% FOR 1.5:1 VSWR

FEEDER 4.5m URM76 (RG58/C/U) OR URM43

MECHANICAL
ANTENNA ROD 2.5mm DIAMETER STAINLESS STEEL

160 162 164 166 168 170

GX150CH GX15ÖTFH GX15ÖTSFH FREQUENCY (MHz)

FIG. 8.57 V M F five-eighth wave vehicle antennas

Third order intermodulation products can be pro­ Let a = 456.100 M H z

duced when the frequencies bear the fohowing par­ (Channel 22A fixed station transmh frequency)
ticular relationships to each other:
b = 456.325 M H z
(Channel 27 fixed station transmit frequency)
2 a - b = c or a + b - c = d
c = 456.250 M H z
e.g., Let a = 456.25 M H z (Channel 25A fixed station transmit frequency)
(Channel 25A fixed station transmitter)
b = 456.325 M H z Then a -I- b - c = 456.175 M H z , which is again the
(Channel 27 fixed station transmitter) Channel 24 fixed station transmit frequency.
T o be able to select five channels without any third
Then 2a - b = 456.175 M H z , which is the Channel order intermodulation products being produced, it is
24 fixed station transmit frequency necessary to have 12 regularly spaced (e.g., 25 k H z

716
 Direct w i r e telephone systems

spaced) channels available. Channels 1, 2, 5, 10 and Channel 25A = 456.25 M H z

12 will not give rise to the production of third order
intermodulation products. For the power station U H F
band of frequencies, the third order intermodulation
free channels would be Channels 21A, 22, 23A, 26
and 27.
The following Table 8.7 shows in greater detail the
operating channels having no third order intermodula­
tion interference. However it should be noted that if
fixed stations operate in the duplex m o d e , third order
intermodulation could arise when two adjacent fixed
stations are transmitting and a handportable on one
of the channels is also transmitting.
Mixer output will produce a difference frequency
= 16.050 M H z or 5.35 M H z
Note that 5.35 M H z has a second harmonic of 10.7
M H z which could also be produced, albeit at a lower
level, in the mixer and passed on to the IF stage.
Should the allocation of frequency channels to a
power station m a k e this form of interference possible,
then the frequency for the local oscillator would be
specified as 472.3 M H z .

TABLE 8.7
9 Direct wire telephone systems
Operating channels having no third order
intermodulation interference 9.1 General details
Required Available Operating channels having no third Discrete direct wire telephone systems (DWTS) are pro­
channels channels order intermodulation interference vided in power stations where direct and reliable means
of speech communication is required between manned
3 4 1, 2, 4 control points and the associated plant locations.
4 7 1, 2, 5, 7 The design of each D W T S takes cognisance of the
5 12 1, 2, 5, 10, 12 following considerations:
6 18 1, 2, 5, 11, 13, 18 • Absolute rehability to ensure continuance of op­
7 26 1, 2, 5, 11, 19, 24, 26 eration when all station supplies are lost.
8 35 1, 2, 5, 10, 16, 23, 33, 35
• Ahernative to the P A X system and other DWTSs
9 46 1, 2, 5, 14, 25, 31, 39, 41, 46 were practicable.
10 62 1, 2, 8, 12, 27, 40, 48, 57, 60, 62
• Cabling between equipment elements to be in short-
time fireproof cable to prolong operation during fire
conditions in locations through which the cables are
Let a = 456.075 M H z routed.
b = 461.575 M H z
• Operation t o be possible when control point or plant
c = 456.100 M H z location equipment has been mis-operated, i.e., tele­
phone handsets not replaced.
Then a -h b - c = 461.550 M H z , which is Channel
• D W T S c o m m o n equipment to be suitable for cubicle
21A mobile transmitter frequency.
or control desk mounting.

8.12.2 H a l f IF i n t e r f e r e n c e
As described in Section 8.7.2 of this chapter on
receivers, the first IF of the receiver is 10.7 M H z .
A fixed station operating on Channel 22A will re­
ceive the mobile transmit frequency of 461.600 M H z .
For the fixed station there is a choice of local oscil­
lator frequency ( f o ) to mix w h h the received signal to
produce a difference frequency of 10.7 M H z :
• The D W T S desk-mounted telephone concentrator
panels to have the minimum of equipment mounted
on them (Fig 8.58).
• The equipment and control desk panels are based on
modules of 10 D W T S extensions, expandable from
10 t o 30 extensions. For m o r e t h a n 30 extensions a
second control desk panel would be provided, ex­
tending the system to 60 extensions m a x i m u m .

= 461.6 + 10.7 = 472.3 M H z For non-nuclear power stations it is the practice of

the C E G B to provide a discrete D W T S radiating from
or = 461.6 - 10.7 = 450.9 M H z
each of the following control points:
Assume that Channel 22A fixed station receives a • Supervisor's desk — CCR.
signal from Channel 25A fixed station transmitter at
• Each u n h control desk — CCR.
456.250 M H z .
• Coal handling control desk — coal transport and
fo = 472.3 M H z or 450.9 M H z stocking area (applicable to coal-fired stations only).

717
Telecommunications Chapter 8

DIRECT WIRE TELEPHONE PANEL

• • [• • • • • • Q • •

DW1 DW2JDW3 DW4 DW5 DW6 DW7 DW8 DW9 DW SUPPLY

10 FAIL

OFF N.S.
SPEAK
RECALL

LAMP

DW DW DW DW DW DW DW DW DW DW FUSE DIRECT
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ALARM WIRE
KEY
OFF LAMP
SPEAK TEST
RECALL

DW DW DW DW DW DW DW DW DW DW
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

OFF
SPEAK
RECALL

FIG. 8 . 5 8 D W T S concentrator panel and telephone handset

The additional DWTSs for nuclear stations are de­ Block diagrams of the two types of D W T S , i.e., with
scribed in Section 14 of this chapter. desk-mounted and cubicle-mounted c o m m o n equip­
The elements of the D W T S are: ment are shown on Figs 8.60 and 8.61.

• C o m m o n equipment for cubicle or desk interior

mounting.
• C o m m o n equipment cubicle (if c o m m o n equipment
is to be cubicle-mounted) (Fig 8.59).
• D W T S telephone concentrator with associated op­
erator's handset at the manned control point (Fig
8.58).
• Telephones in office locations.
• Telephones whh associated audible and visual calling
units at plant locations.
9.2 Connnnon equipment and common
equipment accommodation
The discrete c o m m o n equipment for each D W T S is
accommodated, where possible, in a single crate which
houses the plug-in modules containing the D W T S
equipment printed circuit boards (PCBs).
There are three types of equipment module:
• Module for four D W T S telephone extensions.
• Module for switchboard telephone handset.

• Module for crate alarms and crate power supphes.

• Battery and charger.

• Cabling. A typical D W T S having twenty telephone extensions

• Cable marshalhng cubicle. would require one equipment crate housing:

718
 Direct wire telephone systems

FIG. 8.59 DWTS common equipment cubicle

719
Telecommunications Chapter 8

CONTROL DESK

20 WAY KEY &

LAMP PANEL

CONNECTOR

UNIVERSAL
CONTROL
UNIT

CONNECTOR

48V DC FLEXIBLE
SUPPLIES CABLE

CONTROL DESK
TERMINATIONS

L.
STATION 2 PAIR
ALARM -
PANEL 2,5 OR 20 PAIR
-SHORTTIME FIRE PROOF
CABLES
2 PAIR
DESK
TELEPHONE 110V AC OR. AUDIBLE AND
TO OTHER 240V AC SUPPLY VISUAL
20 PAIR CALLING UNIT
CONTROL-
DESKS
TOA 5 5
SEPARATE , PAIR PAIR
DIRECT WIRE^
TELEPHONE 2 PAIR
SYSTEM
WALL
TELEPHONE

DUAL
TELEPHONE AUDIBLE AND
VISUAL i — ' ^ - ^ PAX TELEPHONE
110V AC OR — CALLING UNIT
240V AC SUPPLY
2 PAIR
2 PAIR
WEATHERPROOF
TO OTHER TELEPHONES
{ TELEPHONE

110V AC OR _ AUDIBLE AND

240V AC SUPPLY VISUAL
CALLING UNIT

KEY

• TELEPHONE HANDSET JACK - SOCKET

ο Ί TERMINAL BLOCK WITH TEST BUTTON

FIG. 8 . 6 0 D W T S with desk-mounted common equipment

• Five, 4-DWTS telephone extension modules. 9.3 Plant telephones

• O n e switchboard telephone handset module.
• O n e alarm a n d power supphes module.
A D W T S having more than thirty telephone exten­
sions would require an additional crate containing the
additional telephone extension modules.
D W T S telephones in plant areas are robust, heavy duty,
weatherproof telephones w h h a n associated audible
and visual calling unit. Each D W T S telephone point is
electrically connected t o the D W T S c o m m o n equipment
by t w o cable pairs: o n e pair is used for speech a n d
the second pair for signalling. T h e use of t w o pairs
permhs:

720
 Direct w i r e telephone systems

CONTROL DESK

• 20 WAY KEY &

LAMP PANEL

^CONNECTORS

[> FLEXIBLE CABLE

(5 METRE APPROX.)

2X20 PAIR CONTROL DESK

TERMINATIONS

DIRECT WIRE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ROOM Ί

48V DC
SUPPLIES

[UNIVERSAL C0NTR0L|
UNITS CUBICLE

CABLE TERMINATION
CUBICLE

STATION _ 2 PAIR 2 PAIR TO MAINTENANCE AND COMMISSIONING

ALARM PANEL TELEPHONE JACK SYSTEM

• TO OTHER CONTROL DESKS

V 2.5 OR 20 PAIR SHORT ^p.'
-^TIME FIRE PROOF CABLES J : A
2 PAIR 110V AC OR — AUDIBLE AND
DESK 240V AC SUPPLY VISUAL
TELEPHONE CALLING UNIT

TOA 5
SEPARATE .PAIR PAIR
DIRECT WIRE-
TELEPHONE 2 PAIR
SYSTEM WALL
TELEPHONE

DUAL
TELEPHONE AUDIBLE AND 2 PAIR
VISUAL
110V AC OR — CALLING UNIT I I · • PAX
240V AC SUPPLY
2 PAIR 2 PAIR
2 PAIR
WEATHERPROOF
TO OTHER TELEPHONES TELEPHONE
2 PAIR

110V AC OR AUDIBLE AND

240V AC SUPPLY'H o VISUAL
CALLING UNIT

KEY

• TELEPHONE HANDSET JACK - SOCKET

TERMINAL BLOCK WITH TEST BUTTON

FIG. 8 . 6 1 D W T S with cubicle-mounted common equipment

Operation of the audible a n d visual calling unit from
the D W T S swhchboard when the D W T S telephone
extension handset has not been replaced.
Audible confirmation at the D W T S switchboard that
the audible a n d visual cahing unit is operating.
9,4 Audible and visual calling units
The audible a n d visual calling units are multi-purpose
for use with one or t w o of the following telephones;
P A X , P A B X or D W T S , in any combination. The units
are powered by 110 V or 230 V secure A C supply.

721
Telecommunications
The audible device is an electronic sound transducer
and the visual device is a rotating beacon.
The A C supply voltage is wired to an internal trans­
former which provides an isolated 12 V A C supply for
the beacon lamp and a D C supply (via an internal rec­
tifier) for the beacon motor and the relay or solid state
circuit. The D C supply is also used to operate the
audible device when the unit is used with a P A X tele­
phone extension. When used with a D W T S telephone
extension, the audible device operates from the D W T S
common 48 V battery supply via one pair of the tele­
phone extension two-pair cable, when called from the
D W T S telephone switchboard. This ensures that the
audible device will also operate in the event of failure
of the A C supply to the audible and visual calling unit.
The outline of the audible and visual calling unit is
shown on Fig 8.62 and the schematic diagram on Fig
8.63.
9.5 Connnnon equipment location and battery
supply
The D W T S is entirely separate from the P A X system
and provides an alternative means of speech communi­
cation to operational locations. To maximise diversity
and security, the two systems are separately located and
separately powered; the P A X in the power station M T R
is powered by the M T R battery supply, and the D W T S
common equipment in the power station A T R is pow­
ered by the ATR battery supply or the associated D W T S
power equipment rack (PER) using a recombination
cell 48 V battery.
10 Maintenance and commissioning
telephone jack system
The maintenance and commissioning telephone jack
system (MCTJS) permits point-to-point speech com­
munication between power station plant and also be­
tween power station plant and the associated control
room.
The M C T J S provides conveniently situated speech
facilities direct from power station plant. It is parti­
cularly useful during commissioning of the power sta­
tion before other speech communication services have
been provided.
Two-pair circuits radiate from a central patching
panel. Each two-pair circuit provides two speech chan­
nels paralleled to a number of four-pole telephone
jack sockets mounted on, or near t o , related station
plant which requires occasional point-to-point com­
munication, for commissioning, testing or operational
purposes. Each pair of the two-pair circuit terminates
at the central patching panel on a separate two-pole
jack socket (Fig 8.64).
Portable telephones a n d / o r amplified headsets are
used with the M C T J S for speech communication be­
tween locations. The amplified headsets are provided
722
Chapter 8
for use in noisy areas and for hands-free operation.
Each telephone and headset is fitted with a connecting
cord terminated on a four-pole telephone jack plug,
having facilities to select either of the one-pair circuits
when plugged into a four-pole telephone jack socket.
When point-to-point speech communication is re­
quired between station locations not on the same com­
m o n speech circuit, then patching cords are used on
the central patching panel (Fig 8.65) to connect the
unrelated speech circuits together.
The M C T J S is extensively used during commission­
ing and is also used for operational and maintenance
purposes when the convenience of speech communica­
tion to provide on-the-spot monitoring and perfor­
mance of equipment is desirable.
The M C T J S also provides useful direct speech links
when long-time speech communication is required be­
tween two or more locations without using other power
station communication systems intended for short-time
speech communication, e.g., the U H F radio system.
11 Siren system
A single siren system is provided at non-nuclear power
stations controlled in the station C C R from a manually
operated siren control panel mounted on the super­
visor's desk. The siren system is used to alert station
staff regarding emergency conditions which may require
the total evacuation of either all or part of the power
station.
A second siren control panel is provided in the gate­
house for alternative operation of the system.
In addition to the siren system, other local emergency
warnings are initiated by 'break glass' or equipment
alarms in localised areas of the stations. Initiation and
operation of local alarms is indicated at the C C R to
make the control engineer aware of the situation.
The C C R control engineer usually receives verbal
information of power station emergencies via the P A X
emergency telephone on his communications desk or is
otherwise alerted by the station plant alarms.
Sufficient sirens are provided to give total coverage
of all zones of the station, both internal and external,
with due consideration to ambient noise within the
power station and the minimising of disturbance to
nearby residents.
11.1 Station emergency zones
For the purpose of the siren system the station is divided
into eight zones. Any combination of zones may be
selected for operation of their sirens or, alternatively,
all station sirens may be operated by the *ALL Z O N E S '
control switch.
11.2 Emergency alarm signals
Typical emergency alarm signals would be:
 Siren system

ROTATING BEACON

SOUND
TRANSDUCER

FRONT P A N E L .

TELEPHONE
CALLING UNIT

'SUPPLY UN­
LABEL

EARTH BOLT

DANGER
LIVE TERMINALS

UJJ ^ ^ ^ ^ = \uj ~[QR^

• GLAND PLATE

FIG. 8 . 6 2 D W T S audible and visual calling unit

• Continuous signal mode — (in selected zones or all
station zones); used for 'Station or Zones Evacuate'
when personnel are mustered in the open, e.g., fire,
flooding or a b o m b alert when the suspect b o m b is
inside a building.
• Wailing signal mode — (in all station zones); used
for a 'Station Incident' when personnel are mustered
indoors, e.g., for nuclear or chemical gas release or
b o m b incident when the suspect b o m b is outside a
building.
• Intermittent short signal mode — is used as the
'Emergency over', or other instruction determined
by the Station Manager.
11.3 Control panels
The C C R supervisor's desk siren system control panel
is shown on Fig 8.66 and the system block diagram
is shown on Fig 8.67.
In addition to the 'siren operate' switches, there is
a loudspeaker monitor switchable to microphones in
each zone which enables the audible operation of sirens
in the selected zone to be checked when a signal has
been inhiated at the control panel.
An alarm display indicates when the power supply to
the sirens a n d / o r siren control equipment has failed. A
pushbutton switch is provided on the panel to cancel the
audible panel alarm after an alarm condition is received
on the display. Another p u s h b u t t o n permits visual test­
ing of the alarm display light emitting diodes (LED).
11.3.1 Operation of system f r o m p o w e r station
central control r o o m controller
Operation of the system from the central control room
(CCR) is carried out using the pushbuttons and rotary
switch shown on Fig 8.66. The siren operation wih be

723
Telecommunications Chapter 8

EXTN A.V.C.U.
(IF REQUIRED)

REMOTE TEST
BUTTON
(IF REQUIRED)

PAX LINE 1
EXTENSION BELL CCT
OF PAX TELEPHONE

PAX LINE 2
EXTENSION BELL CCT
OF PAX TELEPHONE

DWTS LINE 1
EXTN BELL CCT

DWTS LINE 2
EXTN BELL CCT

DWTS LINE 1 SPEECH

CCT (CONFIRMATION OR
OPERATION
OF SOUNDER)
SOUND
TRANSDUCER
MONITOR DWTS LINE 2 SPEECH
ICCT (CONFIRMATION OR
OPERATION
OF SOUNDER)

FIG. 8 . 6 3 DWTS audible and visual calling unit — circuit diagram

automatically cancelled after three minutes, but reoperat-
ing the zone switch or turning the *A11 Zones' rotary
switch to the 'off position will also cancel the operation.
11.3.2 O p e r a t i o n of s y s t e m f r o m g a t e h o u s e
controller
Reduced facilities are provided on the gatehouse con­
troller. Only 'All Zones' operation of the sirens is
possible for 'Station Evacuate', 'Station Incident' and
'Emergency Over' signals.
11.4 Equipnnent cubicle
The system equipment cubicle, connected to the con­
trol panel by multicore cables, is mounted remote from
the desk in the auxiliary telecommunications room
(ATR). The cubicle is the connection point for the
system cables to the siren controller in the station
CCR, to the siren control panel in the gatehouse, to
the siren contactors and to the A T R 48 V D C supply
distribution board.
11.5 Power supplies
• Equipment cubicle and CCR control panel
equipment cubicle is located in the A T R . The power
supply for the equipment cubicle and the power
station C C R siren control panel is provided from
the A T R 48 V battery.
• Contactors and sirens The contactor relay coils are
operated from the A T R 48 V battery and the si­
rens are operated via the contactor contacts from
a secure 110 V D C , 250 V D C , 110 V A C or 240 V
A C power supply. The power supply at each con­
tactor is monitored and loss of supply is alarmed
on the power station C C R supervisor's desk siren
control panel.
• Gatehouse controller The power supply for the
gatehouse controller is 48 V D C from a discrete bat­
tery in the gatehouse.
11.6 Cabling
As stated in Section 4.3 of this chapter, the cabling for
the siren system is in short-time fireproof cable to
maintain the availability of the cable if fire occurs in
the areas through which the cable passes. The cables
radiate from a cable terminating cubicle mounted ad­
The jacent to the equipment cubicle in the A T R .

724
Siren system
o
-o
I.
T3
C
1
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725
Telecommunications Chapter 8

The C C R supervisor's desk will have panel space for

TELEPHONE JACK SYSTEM PATCHING PANEL the following equipment:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 • Two telephone concentrator panels (for concentrat-

ing telephone circuits o n t o one panel) with plug-
GROUP 1 in pendant telephone handsets.
CIRCUITS
• One BT ex-directory, out-of-area exchange line
telephone.
G" 'G
Ho >Η • Two P A B X telephone extensions, one having night
GROUP 2 Io >I
CIRCUITS J o 3J
service transfer facilities.
K° »K
Lo »L
• One pendant telephone to off-site emergency services.
Mo oM
No oN
• One non-busy emergency P A X telephone circuh hav-
GROUP 3 Oo »0 ing digital display of the telephone number of each
CIRCUITS po »P cahing P A X telephone.
Qo »Q
Ro • One station siren control panel with loudspeaker for
S° °S
To °T
monitoring the operation of sirens in each zone of
GROUP 4 Uo "U the power station.
CIRCUITS Vo o V
Wo oW
• One radio system controller, having access to all
Xo oX channels of the station U H F personal radio systems.
Í Í ι ιI ι ι
icOMMONING Ζ • One radio paging controller.
Ϊ Iί
ΐ ΐ
JACK AA 1 ΑΑ
SOCKETS BB 0 o ΒΒ • One grid control emergency V H F radio controller.
I
ι ί¿ce
CC 1
DO 1! DD
• One D W T S switchboard.
1 ¡
• One grid control telegraph for receiving visual in-
PATCHING PANEL structions from the grid system control.
T W O WAY PATCHING CORD JACK SOCKETS
• One actual load display and grid control instructed
HIGHWAY 1 load display for each generator.
• One civil defence warning receiver (where specified).
HIGHWAY 2

• Visual display units (VDUs) for station services trans-

HIGHWAY 1
HIGHWAY 2
FIG. 8.65 Layout of M C T J S central patching panel
12 Central control room supervisor's
desk
The power station central control room (CCR) super-
visor's desk is the main location in the power station
from which station operation is controlled.
Reliable and ahernative means of speech communi-
cation are required from the supervisor's desk to all
power station locations, to station roving staff, to the
grid system control centre, to the public emergency
services and to the P S T N . Reliable means of alerting
all station staff are required from the supervisor's desk
when station emergencies occur. Control and instru-
mentation equipment to provide visual information of
power station performance and visual information/
instruction of system operation requirements is also
installed on the supervisor's desk.
mission, etc.
The two telephone concentrators provide duplicated ac-
cess to P A X telephone extension circuits, P A B X tele-
phone extension circuits (when the concentrator is Bri-
tish Approvals Board for Telecommunications (BABT)
approved), grid control telephone extension circuits
and also M C T J S circuits. A waiting amplifier with loud-
speaker is provided on each concentrator to permit
incoming telephone calls to be heard without using the
telephone handset. Each telephone concentrator is pow-
ered by a separate 48 V battery supply to reduce the
probability of simultaneous loss of both concentrators.
Secure and ahernative A C supplies are provided for
desk equipment operating on A C to reduce the pro-
bability of simultaneous loss of equipment.
13 Nuclear power station requirements
13.1 Specific r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r n u c l e a r
Stations
Nuclear power stations require telecommunication
equipment and services additional to that required for

726
 Nuclear p o w e r station requirements

O ZONE 1 POWER SUPPLY FAIL

O ZONE 2 POWER SUPPLY FAIL
O ZONE 3 POWER SUPPLY FAIL
O ZONE 4 POWER SUPPLY FAIL

O ZONE 5 POWER SUPPLY FAIL

O ZONE 6 POWER SUPPLY FAIL
O ZONE 7 POWER SUPPLY FAIL
O ZONE 8 POWER SUPPLY FAIL

O EXTERNAL AREA POWER SUPPLY FAIL

O CONTROL OFF - TIMED OUT
O UNIT 7 EQUIPMENT SUPPLY FAIL
O UNIT 8 EQUIPMENT SUPPLY FAIL

ZONE 1 -
ZONE MONITOR ZONE 2 -
ZONE 3 -
ZONE 4 -
ZONE 5 -
ZONE 6 -
ZONE 2 ZONE 3 ZONE 4 ZONE 7 -
ZONE 8 -

ZONES ZONE 6 ZONE 7 ZONE 8

FIRE ZONE EVACUATE STATION OFF

STATION

OPTIONAL I I
SIGNAL I !
ALL ZONES I 1 OPERATE — -OPERATE
IF REQUIRED' I

ALL ZONES

FIG. 8.66 Siren system — central control room controller

fossil-fuel power stations. Telecommunication systems
must be adequate to cater for postulated non-nuclear
and nuclear emergencies which may arise during the
working hfe of the power station.
Provision of telecommunications facilities and serv­
ices in the nuclear areas is often difficult because of
their physical isolation from the conventional plant
areas of the power station. Radio communication,
which is required in all areas of the station, presents
particular problems because of the civil construction
of the nuclear areas including steel-reinforced concrete,
steel containment of equipment and the tunnels.
Nuclear power stations have emergency centres which
are brought into operation during nuclear emergencies
on the site and require access to telecommunication sys­
tems. These are detailed in Section 13.4 of this chapter.
13.2 Public address systems
It is current C E G B policy to provide a pubhc address
system in new nuclear power stations but not in new
non-nuclear power stations. A duplicated pubhc ad­
dress system is provided for nuclear power stations
because it is essential to acquaint all on-site personnel

727
Telecommunications Chapter 8

ICENTRALCONTROL ROOM

fÄuXILIARYTELECOMMS ROOM ' ["ZONE 1

I I
I I OTHER

SIREN CONTACTOR
SYSTEM UNIT
_Ί OTHER
> FIRE
IJ ZONES

D-
SOUND
SIREN MONITOR
CONTROL MIC.
-®
BEACONS

FIG. 8 . 6 7 Siren system — block diagram

immediately of action to be taken should a nuclear
emergency occur. A duphcated pubhc address system,
having parallel operation of both separate systems,
ensures maximum availability of equipment and should
provide good overall intelhgibility of verbal instruction
and alarm tones in all areas of the power station. The
loudspeakers of each separate system are interspaced,
each system providing total cover of all locations,
thereby ensuring total station cover if either system
fails. There are two auxihary telecommunication rooms
(ATRs) for a two-reactor nuclear power station. The
equipment cubicles for each pubhc address system are
located in separate ATRs to minimise the possibihty
of loss of both systems in the event of a local fire.
In locations where the ambient noise level can vary
from high to low, such as the turbine hah where noise
level depends on whether or not the turbine-generators
are running, noise volume sensors monitor the ambient
noise level and remotely adjust the volume of the pubhc
address amphfiers serving the location to the appro­
priate level.
Fachhies are provided to check the individual opera­
tion of the large number of loudspeakers. This is done
by selecting the loudspeaker omnibus circuits to be
tested and transmitting a 'click' sound on the circuit.
The audible operation of each loudspeaker on the cir­
cuit may then he checked.
When the station siren system is operated, the public
address system whl enhance the siren sound by a si­
mulated siren sound generated in the public address
system control equipment, which is triggered and syn­
chronised by signals from the associated station siren
system. Figure 8.68 shows the block diagram of a
nuclear power station duplicated public address system.
13.2.1 Power station zones
For the purpose of public address broadcasting (and
also for operation of the sirens via the siren system
described elsewhere), the power station is divided into
eight internal zones and one external zone. This faci­
lity may be used to minimise interference by public
address messages in zones of the power station not
affected.
13.2.2 Controllers
The public address system at a typical A G R power
station is controlled from:
• The C C R supervisor's desk.
• The Emergency Control Centre (ECC).
• The Emergency Indications Centre (EIC).
• The power station telephone operator/receptionist.
The E C C is staffed during a nuclear emergency to take
over executive control of the emergency, leaving the
C C R to carry on controhing the operation of the power
station a n d / o r shutdown of the reactor(s). The E I C is
staffed to supervise the shutdown of the reactor(s) in the
event of the transfer of control, during an emergency,
from the C C R .
The E I C has indications of the reactor status but
no direct reactor controls.
Each controller has a hands-free microphone and
may broadcast to any or all zones by the operation of
appropriate zone switch, or to all locations by opera­
tion of the 'Ah Zones' switch (Fig 8.69). A m o n h o r
loudspeaker on each controller, relays messages ori­
ginating from any of the other controhers and the in­
dication lamps also light to show the zone of the power
station to which the broadcast is being transmitted.
Each zone switch has three positions, i.e., off/speak
n o r m a l / s p e a k emergency, the last named position gen­
erates an 'emergency' signal to precede the message.

728
 Nuclear p o w e r station requirements

MAIN CONTROL ROOM I AUXILIARY TELECOMMS ROOM 1 I ZONE 1 (PA & SIREN)

cH
SIREN
SYSTEM A
110Vac
LOUDSPEAKERS

.J
ROUTE 1

PA
SYSTEM
EMERGENCY OTHER .
OTHER
CONTROL ROLLERS <
ZONES
CENTRE ROUTE 1 -

EMERGENCY
SHUTDOWN ROOM I AUXILIARY TELECOMMS ROOM 2
DESK1
I

OTHER L OTHER
CONTROLLERS <^ ZONES
EMERGENCY ROUTE 2 -
SHUTDOWN ROOM
DESK 2

RECEPTION
DESK - ADMIN
BUILDING

FIG. 8.68 Public address system duplicated for a nuclear power station — block diagram

Each controher operates on 110 V A C uninterrupted
power supplies.
13.2.3 Common equipment
The equipment of each public address system is lo­
cated in a different A T R from hs associated duphcated
system to minimise the risk of loss of both systems.
Each system is connected to a different 240 V A C diesel-
backed supply.
Each c o m m o n equipment comprises a control cubicle
containing equipment to interface with the controllers,
level and tone controls, pre-amplifiers, etc. Other cu­
bicles contain the 100 W amphfier modules (or other
u n h power size) to power the 50 V or 75 V hues of the
loudspeaker distribution network. A cubicle is also used
to terminate ah the loudspeaker distribution cabhng.
Each amphfier module has a volume control, tone
control and output indicating device or meter for
individual adjustment. Figure 8.70 shows a typical lay­
out of the control cubicle and amphfier cubicles.
13.2.4 Loudspeakers
Loudspeakers are re-entrant, unidirectional or bidirec­
tional, cabinet or ceihng type to suit the local conditions.
13.3 Siren systems
As with the station public address system, it is C E G B
pohcy to provide a duphcated siren system for nu­
clear power stations because it is essential to acquaint
all on-site personnel immediately of action to be taken
should a nuclear emergency occur at the station. A
duplicated siren system, having paraheled operation of
both separate systems ensures maximum availability of
equipment to provide good overall coverage of all areas
of the power station. The sirens of each separate system
are interspaced, each system providing total coverage
of all locations thereby ensuring total cover of the
power station in the event of the failure of either system.
The equipment cubicles of each siren system are located
in separate A T R s in a similar way to the public address
system to minimise the loss of both siren systems in
the event of a local fire. Figure 8.71 shows the block
diagram of the system.
13.3.1 S i r e n signals
In areas of very high ambient noise, the siren sound
is supplemented by discrete beacons to indicate the
particular siren signal.
Three siren signals are generated by the system:
• Continuous signal m o d e (with operation of asso­
ciated red beacons)
'Station or Zone Evacuate'
This signal is used for fire, flood or b o m b alert when
the suspected b o m b is located indoors. Personnel
muster at o u t d o o r muster stations.

729
Telecommunications Chapter 8

CARDIOD
MICROPHONE

SPEAKERS

No.1 No.1 No.2 MONITOR LAMP

SIREN SYSTEM SYSTEM ZONES TEST
SYSTEM FAULT FAULT

No.2
SIREN ZONE ZONE ZONE ZONE
SYSTEM 1 2 3 4

ZONE ZONE ZONE ZONE

5 6 7

SYSTEM 1 SYSTEM 2

ALL )l
)t ZONES
POWER POWER
ON ON

SPEAK SPEAK
NORMAL EMERG

* PUSH ON/PUSH OFF ILLUMINATED PUSH BUTTONS 0 NON-LOCKING ILLUMINATED PUSH BUTTONS

Δ ILLUMINATED LAMPS ONLY ? LEDS-LIGHT EMITTING DIODES

FIG. 8 . 6 9 Public address system controller panel layout — duplicated for a nuclear power station

Wailing signal mode (with operation of associated This signal is an option available for use as deter­
yellow beacons) mined by the Station Manager.
'Station Incident'
This signal is used for radiation gas release, chlorine 13.3.2 Controllers
gas release or b o m b alert when the b o m b is located
outdoors, e.g., in a car parking area. Personnel The siren system at the most recent nuclear power
muster at indoor muster stations. station is controlled from:
• The supervisor's desk in the C C R .
Intermittent short period on signal mode
'All Clear or Stand-down' • The E I C communication desks.

730
 Nuclear p o w e r station requirements

FIG. 8 . 7 0 Public address system — layout of equipment cubicles — duplicated for a nuclear power station

731
Telecommunications
FIG. 8 . 7 1 Siren system — duplicated for a nuclear power station
The CCR supervisor's desk controher has facihties
for sounding the continuous signal (for *Zone Evacuate'
at nuclear stations) in any or all of the eight zones of
the power station, with audible monitoring of the siren
operation.
The CCR supervisor's desk controller also has faci­
lities for operating all power station sirens by operating
the 'All zones' switch to 'Station Evacuate' (continuous
signal) and 'Station Incident' (warbling signal). The
controller panel layout is shown on Fig 8.72.
The controller in the E I C can divert the control of
the power station sirens to the E I C by operating a
switch on the E I C controller. An indication that the
control has been transferred is given on the supervi­
sor's desk controller. Only the 'Ah zones' 'Station
Evacuate' and 'Station Incident' signals can he initiated
from the E I C controller.
13.3.3 Common equipment
The common equipment of each system, in a d d h i o n to
being located in a different A T R , is also connected to
a different 48 V battery supply from that of hs asso­
ciated duplicated system to minimise the simultaneous
loss of both systems due to a common m o d e failure.
13.3.4 Cabling and p o w e r supplies
The cabling of each siren system is segregated and
732
Chapter 8
(REPEATS FOR OTHER ZONES)
the power supplies to the siren contactors and sirens
in the same area are from different sources to minimise
the risk of simultaneous loss of both systems.
13.4 Emergency telecommunications
13.4.1 Nuclear incident
A nuclear incident at a nuclear power station would
be reported to the C C R . The supervisor's desk in
the C C R becomes the focal point in deahng whh the
initial stages of the emergency. Action would be taken
from the supervisor's desk to initiate the emergency
procedures and to inform ah on-site personnel of
the incident. The external emergency services are also
informed.
The C C R fohows the nuclear incident procedures
until the on-she E C C is staffed and operational to take
over control of the situation, thereby releasing the C C R
to concentrate on the operational aspects of the plant
unaffected by the incident.
Telecommunication services are diverted from the
power station to each emergency centre as it is activated.
13.4.2 E m e r g e n c y control centre (ECC)
All C E G B nuclear stations have an E C C which is usu­
ally located in the administration building. The E C C
is equipped with telecommunication equipment which
 Nuclear p o w e r station requirennents

ZONE 1 TURBINE HSE - UNIT 7 & 8

ZONE 2 REACTOR BLDG 7 & 8
ZONE 3 ESB 8A, 8B, DIESEL HSE A
ZONE 4 ESB 7A, 7B, DIESEL HSE Β O ZONE 1 POWER SUPPLY FAIL
ZONE 5 ESB 7C, 7D, DIESEL HSE C O ZONE 2 POWER SUPPLY FAIL
ZONE 6 ESB 8C. 8D, DIESEL HSE D O ZONE 3 POWER SUPPLY FAIL
ZONE 7 ADMIN. BUILDING O ZONE 4 POWER SUPPLY FAIL
ZONE 8 CWPH, ABH. MISC BLDS.
O ZONE 5 POWER SUPPLY FAIL
Θ O ZONE 6 POWER SUPPLY FAIL
O ZONE 7 POWER SUPPLY FAIL
O ZONE 8 POWER SUPPLY FAIL
O EX. AREA POWER SUPPLY FAIL
O CONTROL OFF-TIMED OUT
O
O
VOL

AUDIBLE MONITOR OF
SELECTED ZONE
ZONE MONITOR

7— - 2

ZONE 1 ZONE 2 ZONE 3 ZONE 4

SY1 SY2 SY1 SY2 SY1 SY2 SY1 SY2

5 4
ZONE 5 ZONE 6 ZONE 7 ZONE 8

SY1 SY2 SY1 SY2 SY1 SY2 SY1 SY2

ALARM LAMP
lACCEPTl TEST

OFF
REMOTE
CONTROL CONTROL
ON ON
\ SYSTEM \SYSTEM
UNIT STATION STATION UNIT 1 1
INCIDENT EVACUATE

ALL ZONES \ SYSTEM ^ SYSTEM

2 2

FIG. 8 . 7 2 Siren system — C C R controller panel layout — duplicated for a nuclear power station

is activated when the E C C is staffed during a nuclear
incident and the telecommunication services serving
the power station are diverted to the E C C when it is
operational. The E C C provides co-ordination with the
emergency services and takes over this responsibility
during the incident to enable power station staff to
concentrate on deahng with the incident itself.
13.4.3 District survey laboratory (DSL)
A h C E G B nuclear power stations have a district survey
laboratory (DSL), which is a separate building either
within the site b o u n d a r y or within a radius of 1.6 km
of the power station. The main function of the DSL
is to house the nuclear health physics laboratory of
the power station. It controls routine health physics

733
Telecommunications
sampling checks of the surrounding area and analyses
the samples brought in during routine checks.
The DSL also serves as a secondary emergency
control centre (SECC) should it not be possible to use
the E C C in the event of fire or nuclear heahh hazard:
facilities exist to divert emergency telecommunication
facilities to the DSL from the E C C .
During a nuclear incident when the E C C is opera­
tional, nuclear heahh physics staff would occupy the
DSL and provide assistance to the E C C as required.
If there are two nuclear power stations on the same
site, each station would have its own E C C but would
use a common DSL for both normal health physics
work and for nuclear emergency services.
13.4.4 Operations support centre (OSC)
In a nuclear emergency, an off-site operations support
centre (OSC) is activated. The purpose of the O S C is
to provide a focal point for the dissemination of in­
formation in respect of the nuclear incident to the
general pubhc and the media at a location remote from
the power station, thus minimising the nuisance and
disruption in the area surrounding the power station
due to the public and media seeking information and
interfering with the mobihty of the emergency services.
The police and other nominated services would also be
in attendance at the OSC.
Telecommunication services, including an on-site
P A B X are brought into service at the O S C . Designated
telecommunications circuits serving the power station
and the station emergency telecommunication centres
(ECC, DSL, etc.) are diverted to the O S C to provide
direct telecommunication circuits to the BT P S T N ,
the emergency services, to C E G B national emergency
centres and also to the power station.
A block diagram of the circuits for providing tele­
communications services during a nuclear incident at a
power station site is shown on Fig 8.73.
13.4.5 Radio services f o r a n u c l e a r e m e r g e n c y
On-site UHF radio During a nuclear emergency, good
speech radio communication is required to and between
roving emergency staff on the power station site. T o
enable this to be provided by the U H F radio system, the
control of one or more of the power station operations
or maintenance radio channels is taken over for such
emergency use.
Off-site VHF radio The two V H F channels allocated
for nuclear purposes will be actively used during an
emergency. One channel is used to communicate with
handportables carried by nuclear emergency staff who
may be operating on the power station site or off-site.
V H F mobile radios fitted into power station vehicles
will also use this frequency.
The second of the two V H F channels is a nuclear
'general channel' which is used by other nuclear organ­
isations, such as the Unhed Kingdom Atomic Energy
734
Chapter 8
Authority (UKAEA), who would be involved during
an emergency. The V H F channel would enable com­
munication with the U K A E A vehicles. Control of the
nuclear channels would be available from the CCR,
E C C , and the DSL. Additionahy the C C R and E C C
would have access to the C E G B Grid Control emer­
gency V H F channel.
The arrangement of the V H F fixed stations and
V H F fixed station controllers is shown on Fig 8.74.
14 Pumped-storage power station
requirements
A pumped-storage power station having electricity
generating plant and E H V transforming plant under­
ground presents problems in providing good communi­
cation throughout the power station. The telecommuni­
cation speech systems provided for a pumped-storage
station are influenced by the constraints of the station
location and design. The systems outlined in this sec­
tion are based on those provided to meet the needs
of a C E G B 1800 M W pumped-storage power station
at Dinorwig, North Wales, where the main plant is
located in a cavern created inside a mountain, the com­
position of which is largely slate.
Telecommunications cover, particularly for speech
communication, is required in the internal and external
areas of the power station which basicahy are:
• Underground plant areas (including access and inter­
connecting tunnels, 400 kV switching station and
400 kV cable tunnel).
• External upper water reservoir area and tunnels.
• External lower water reservoir area and external
administration building.
• External roads to reservoirs and gauging stations.
Sufficient diversity of telecommunications systems and
equipment is provided to enable telecommunications
facilities to be available during any credible failure of
plant, including loss of all electricity supplies within the
underground areas of the power station.
Possible rises of earth potential between discrete
areas of the power station, during faults on the 400 kV
electrical system at Dinorwig, were likely to be high
because of the slate enclosure of the power station:
therefore the telecommunication circuits connecting the
discrete areas of the station were fitted with isolation
barriers. In a d d h i o n , the postulated rise of earth p o ­
tential during the above condition between the power
station and the local village (within the boundary of
which was the BT telephone exchange serving the power
station) was high as a resuh of the slate composition
of the locality. All telecommunication circuits were
therefore fitted with isolation barriers (see Fig 8.7) to
minimise the transfer of the rise of earth potential to
the off-site BT telephone cables serving the power
station.
 P u m p e d - s t o r a g e p o w e r station requirements

EX DIRECTORY
EXCHANGE
LINE

TO POLICE

FIG. 8.73 Nuclear power station on-site emergency telecommunication circuits to off-site locations

The various telecommunications systems provided • Siren system.

at Dinorwig are hsted below:
• Grid system operations telecommunications system.
• Private automatic branch exchange (PABX).
• Private automatic exchange ( P A X ) . 14.1 Private autonnatic branch exchange
• Radio paging system. The P A B X in the above-ground station administra­
• Radio system. tion building provides telephone communication fa­
cihties and access to the BT P S T N and also access
• Sound-powered telephone systems.
to the BT P S T N for a hmited number of locations
• Maintenance and commissioning telephone jack in the underground areas of the power station. The
system. P A B X provides the same fachities as for a conven-

735
Telecommunications Chapter 8

EXTERNAL EXTERNAL

GRID NUCLEAR
CONTROL EMERGENCY
FIXED STATION SYSTEM
(1 CHANNEL) FIXED STATION
240V 240V (3 CHANNEL)
• A.C. A.C.

THREE SINGLE
1 1 SINGLE THREE
1 1 THREE THREE
CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL 1 1 CHANNEL CHANNEL
CONTROLLER CONTROLLER CONTROLLER CONTROLLER CONTROLLER CONTROLLER
1 1

SUPERVISORS
DESK EMERGENCY HEALTH DISTRICT SURVEY
CENTRAL CONTROL ROOM CONTROL ROOM PHYSICIST I LABORATORY

FIG. 8.74 V H F radio fixed stations and controllers for a nuclear power station

tional power station, as detailed in Section 6 of this
chapter.
14.2 Private automatic exchange
The P A X provides general telephone communication
to ah areas of the underground locations and the
above-ground external areas of the power station not
requiring access to the BT P S T N . The P A X provides
the same facihties as for a conventional power station,
as detahed in Section 5 of this chapter.
Ten nominated P A X telephones located at impor­
tant operational locations, in addition to having nor­
mal P A X facihties, have the option of directly calling
a 10-way direct wired telephone switchboard on the
communications desk in the CCR by the operation of
a pushbutton on the telephone. The communications
desk may also directly call any, or all, of the nominated
P A X telephones from the 10-way direct wired tele­
phone swhchboard. The facility operates independently
of P A X and is available for use when the P A X is out
of service. This facihty provides a dual-purpose limited
direct wire telephone system.
14.3 Radio paging system
The radio paging system generally provides the same
facilities as for conventional power stations, as detailed
in Section 7.3 of this chapter.
Radio paging coverage of all power station areas,
and the roads to the external power station locations,
is provided by overlaying the radio paging signals on
two channels of the power station three-channel radio
system and taking advantage of the extensive antenna
system of the power station radio system detailed below.
14.4 Personal radio system
The personal radio system uses seven fixed stations.
Each fixed station has one or two radio channels to
provide speech communication, between the controllers
in the C C R and the station administration building,
to roving station staff in all external/internal areas of
the power station and along roads to external station
locations where handportable radiotelephones a n d / o r
vehicle-mounted radiotelephones are used. The 400 kV
switching station and 400 kV tunnel radio system use
one fixed station controlled from a controller in the
400 kV switching station and from the C C R . The system
operates on V H F midband and is amplitude modulated.
14.4.1 Antenna system
The antenna system for the multichannel radio system
comprises approximately 9 km of radiating cable (leaky
feeder) supplemented by conventional antennas, which
provides cover for the labyrinth of tunnels and rooms
in the underground areas of the power station. Con-

736

ventional antennas are used for the large volume areas
of the station such as the machine hall, the under­
ground 400 kV switching station and the external
areas. The radiating cable is routed to provide op­
timum coverage with minimum attenuation in the con­
fined areas of the power station. Heated antennas are
used at the power station reservoir at the top of the
mountain to minimise icing problems during winter.
10 kV, 50 Hz isolating filters are inserted in the
coaxial cable connections to the radiating cable/antenna
network at each fixed station to protect the radio equip­
ment from damage by a rise of earth potential or
induced 50 Hz voltage, which could result during a
fault on the power station electrical system.
The radiating cable has a flame-retardant sheath to
reduce fire propagation if fire affects the areas through
which the cable is routed.
FIG. 8.75 Dinorwig power station radio system — radiating cable combining point
P u m p e d - s t o r a g e p o w e r station requirements
Combining points (points at which lengths of ra­
diating cables are connected together in a *tee' or
'through' arrangement), have tee units (power sphtters)
or through-connectors provided to facilitate the loca­
tion of cable fauhs. Loops in the cable at these points
provide the spare cable necessary for repair and re-
termination of the cable. The radiating cable combining
point for the machine hall base station is shown on
Fig 8.75.
The radiating cable in the underground areas (ex­
cluding the 400 kV switching station and 400 kV cable
tunnel) is used both for the operations channel and
the maintenance channel.
At each fixed station location, the radiating cable
terminates on a duplexer to separate the transmitted
and received signals: the transmitted signals are routed
to the duplexer via a combiner (which combines the
737
Telecommunications Chapter 8

fixed station two-channel transmitter outputs) and the of channel 2 sited at the high altitude upper water
received signals are connected via a combining amplifier reservoir.
to the two fixed station receivers (Fig 8.76).
• Radio channel 3 Transmission channel, covering
the underground 400 kV switching station and 400
ANTENNA ANTENNA kV cable tunnel.

RADIATING CABLE I J The fixed equipment operates from 110 V A C guaran­

teed supplies (battery backed).
DUPLEXER A block diagram of the radio system is shown on
Fig 8.77.

14.4.3 Handportable radiotelephones

TRANSMITTER COMBINING
COMBINER AMPLIFIER
Two-channel handportable radiotelephones (handport­
ables) are provided for use on the operations and main­
tenance channels and single-channel handportables for
use on the transmission channel only. In accordance
TRANSMITTER RECEIVER TRANSMITTER RECEIVER
with C E G B regulations, the maximum output of the
FIXED STATION 1 FIXED STATION 2
handportable is 0.5 W effective radiated power ( E R P ) .

FIG. 8 . 7 6 Dinorwig power station, connection of fixed 14.4.4 Controllers

stations to radiating cables — block diagram
14.4.2 Radio channels
Three radio channels are used at Dinorwig power
station. These are hsted below, together with their func­
tion and area of cover.
• Radio channel 1 Operations channel (covers under­
ground, external administration building, external
lower reservoir area).
• Radio channel 2 Maintenance channel (cover as
channel 1), but with facilities to extend to the upper
water reservoir when mobile staff are working or
travelling t o / f r o m the upper water reservoir. This
is to minimise the broadcasting of station radio
traffic over a wide external area from the antenna
The system has four controllers, w h h channel alloca­
tion in accordance with their function, as shown in
Table 8.8.
Each controher has facihties t o :
• Monitor the status and alarms of the fixed stations.
• M o m t o r the use of the system by other controllers.
• Select and monitor each radio channel.
• Control the use of talkthrough for each radio chan­
nel monitored (to enable handportables on the same
radio channels to speak to one another).
• Interconnect radio channels.
• Broadcast on all radio channels.
• By-pass receiver voting control on each radio channel.

TABLE 8.8

Personal radio system controllers — channel allocation

Controlled
Location channel Areas covered

Reception desk 1 and 2 Underground areas

(Station administration
building) 2 Upper water reservoir

400 kV switching station

3
station and cable tunnel

Supervisor's desk 1 and 2 Underground areas

(Central control room)
2 Upper water reservoir

Unit desk 400 kV switching station

3
and cable tunnel

(Central control room) 400 kV switching station

3
and 400 kV cable tunnel

400 kV switching station

738
 Pumped-storage p o w e r station requirements

ANTENNA SYSTEM
VI/ ANTENNA SYSTEM (INCLUDING RADIATING CABLE) ψ
ψ (INCLUDING RADIATING CABLE)

LOWER UPPER
RESERVOIR RESERVOIR

ADMINISTRATION SURFACE
BUILDING WORKS
ELECTRICAL
BUILDING

CONTROLLER FIXED
FIXED
CHANNELS STATION
STATION
1/3/2/2* CHANNELS
1 AND 2 CHANNEL 2 *

•"MAIN
CAVERN
ALTERNATIVE MACHINE HALL TRANSFORMER
ACCESS AREA HALL AREA
TUNNEL AREA

FIXED FIXED FIXED

STATION STATION STATION
CHANNELS CHANNELS CHANNELS
1 AND 2 1 AND 2 1 AND 2

CEGB PILOT

COMMON
EQUIPMENT RESERVE CCT VIA BT

400kV SUBSTATION INLET VALVE AREA

CONTROLLER
CHANNEL 3

FIXED
STATION
CHANNELS
1 AND 2
FIXED
STATION
CHANNEL 3
RADIO PAGING
CONTROL FROM
PAX

CONTROLLER CONTROLLER
CHANNELS CHANNELS
1/3/2/2* 1/3/2/2*

COMMS DESK

CONTROL
400kV TUNNEL ROOM

ISOLATION * CONTROLLER FACILITY

EQUIPMENT TO SWITCH ON AND USE
CHANNEL 2 FIXED STATION
AT UPPER RESERVOIR

FIG, 8.77 Dinorwig power station radio system — block diagram

• Provide loudspeaker, microphone or, alternatively, Fixed station transmitters 1-6 operate in the quasi-
handset operation. synchronous m o d e (synchronising of transmitter fre­
• Provide indications that the fixed station is trans­ quencies t o prevent generation of audible interference
mitting and modulating. by two signals of the same frequency but different
phase) to minimise mutual interference in areas of
transmitter overlap.
14.4.5 Fixed stations
Receiver voting techniques are included in the scheme
Fixed station details are hsted in Table 8.9. which routes the best received signal from a trans-

739
Telecommunications
TABLE
Details of fixed station
Fixed station
No Channels
location
1
Underground
transformer hall
2
1 and 2
Underground starting
3 areas and tunnels
equipment house
Underground machine
4
hall
5 Administration building 1 and 2
Upper water reservoir
6 2
equipment room
Underground 400 kV
7 3
switching station
mitting handportable to the controller monitoring the
channel. The fixed station receiver voting facility will
switch from one fixed station receiver to another on
receipt of a stronger signal when a transmitting handpor­
table moves from one fixed station receiving area to
another.
The c o m m o n equipment cubicle, used by all systems,
is located in the underground machine hall and is the
focal point of the system. A h fixed stations and control
units have direct circuits, albeit via 50 Hz isolation
equipment if necessary, to the c o m m o n equipment.
Most circuits between the c o m m o n equipment
cubicle, the fixed stations and the controllers, are routed
via dedicated short-time fireproof multipair cables
which provide a minimum of 20 minutes security of
operation at 1000°C in the event of a fire along the cable
route. The circuits to the remote fixed station at the
location of the upper reservoir, however, are routed via
pairs in a C E G B pilot cable between the telecommuni­
cations r o o m and the upper water reservoir equipment
room.
14.5 Sound-powered telephone systems
Two separate sound-powered telephone systems are
provided at Dinorwig, which wih operate if all electri­
city supphes in the underground plant areas and tunnels
are lost.
One system is provided for use in the 400 kV cable
tunnel and the other primarily for use between the
above-ground station gatehouse and the underground
areas, should other communication systems fail. T h e
telephones, being dual purpose, are able t o work with
or without a power supply. Use of a power supply.
740
Chapter 8
8.9
Antenna system Cover
Radiating cable only
Underground plant
Radiating cable and
antennas
Administration building,
External roof-mounted
lower reservoir and off-
antennas
site roads
External roof-mounted
Upper water reservoir
antennas and radiating
and off-site roads
cable
Radiating cable and 400 kV switching station
antennas and 400 kV cable tunnels
however, improves the quality of received speech. The
calling signal from a telephone is generated by a hand-
cranked generator mounted in the telephone. The
received calhng signal operates a hooter mounted in the
telephone.
14.5.1 System 1 - 400 k V c a b l e t u n n e l s y s t e m
This system is provided for operational and main­
tenance use. A telephone is fitted at each of the 400 kV
cable joint bays, the locations at which repair work may
be carried out.
All of the telephones in the cable tunnel are con­
nected via discrete 25 kV isolation transformers to a
c o m m o n four-pair cable for parallel operation. The
four-pair cable is extended to the sound-powered
telephone equipment in the 400 kV switching station
but electrically isolated from the tunnel by 25 kV iso­
lation transformers.
T h e system equipment in the 400 kV switching station
is powered from a 48 V battery supply for security of
operation, which is converted to 110 V A C for trans­
mission via the tunnel isolation transformers to all the
telephones in the 400 kV cable tunnel, where it is then
converted t o 24 V A C . However, should the power fah,
the system will function in the sound-powered m o d e .
A selector switch o n each telephone enables the tele­
phone user to ring either all tunnel telephones and the
telephone in the transmission district engineer's office
in the 400 kV switching station or the power station
C C R . A call initiated from the power station C C R
supervisor's desk wih call all tunnel telephones and the
transmission district engineer's office in the 400 kV
switching station.

14.5.2 System 2 — power station emergency
telephone system
This emergency system is provided so that in the event
of a total or partial loss of communication between
the above-ground areas and the lower works, com­
munication may be maintained with the above-ground
gatehouse from sound-powered telephones in the under­
ground areas of the power station.
The system comprises a master station at the gate­
house with separate circuits to a maximum of 17
telephones (one at the supervisor's desk in the C C R and
the remainder in the underground works). A cable
termination box is provided at the gatehouse, where all
circuits to the underground telephones may be diverted
to a local emergency control point should a serious
underground emergency occur.
This system is simhar to that provided for the 400 kV
cable tunnel except that three pairs only are required
to each telephone as only one location, i.e., the
gatehouse, is to be called.
14.6 Maintenance and commissioning
telephone jack system
This system is provided for point to point speech com­
munication from portable telephones and portable
headsets as detailed in Section 10 of this chapter, and
has similar circuit patching facilities in a central
patching cubicle located in the underground plant areas.
14.7 Siren system
This system is simhar to the siren system detailed in
Section 11 of this chapter, except that the areas of the
power station are not zoned for discrete operation of
sirens in a particular zone. The siren operation is heard
in all areas of the station. For this siren system, three
unambiguous signals are provided:
• Station evacuate — continuous sound.
• Station alert — wailing sound.
• Stand down — short continuous sound fol­
lowed by a preset silence, then
repeated until swhched off.
The system is controhed from the underground C C R
and also above ground from the gatehouse. The
gatehouse siren controher has a facihty to monitor the
audible operation of the sirens from a microphone in
the underground transformer hall.
15 Construction site telecommunications
15.1 Initial requirements for British
Telecom services to site
A construction site could be active for a number of
Construction site telecommunications
years and must provide adequate telecommunication
services during this period. The telecommunications
must satisfy the requirements for C E G B staff, con­
sultants, and contractors.
For a 2000 M W station, the number of personnel on
site during the peak of the construction period rises
to over 3500. The provision of telecommunications
services for a construction site requires adequate con­
sideration well in advance of the arrival on she of the
C E G B construction staff and contractors carrying out
the prehminary site works.
Discussions take place at an early stage with British
Telecom (BT) to advise them of the estimated total
public service telephone network (PSTN) requirements
and other BT-provided telecommunications services
to satisfy the:
• Construction site requirements.
• Power station requirements.
• Grid switching station requirements.
These requirements all overlap during the construction
period.
As m a n y of the new power station sites are in rural
areas, BT often have to reinforce their existing networks
to provide adequate and rehable access to carry the
combined telecommunications traffic generated by the
construction site, power station and grid switching
station. BT is requested to provide to the construction
site a 200-pair of fibre optic cable for initial require­
ments, plus access to another cable for a small number
of circuits, to provide an alternative for emergency
circuhs should the main 200-pair cable fail.
BT is also advised of the segregation requirements
for the power station telecommunication circuits in its
off-site cable routes.
15.2 On-site telephone cable duct network
15.2.1 General requirements
A network of on-site telephone cable ducts is needed to
satisfy the constantly changing requirements of the site
during the construction period and also the final needs
of the power station and grid swhching station (if
on-site).
The on-site cable duct network must be connected to
the access points of the off-site segregated BT telephone
cable routes serving the site. The on-site network must
be designed to continue the physical segregation of duct
routes to all permanent power station locations which
require segregated routes to the BT off-site telephone
network.
G o o d access from the cable duct network is required
into the main Construction Site Office, which is the
focal point of all telecommunication services for the
construction site. The incoming off-site BT telephone
cables terminate in the construction she office and
telephone cables radiate to distribution points through-
741
Telecommunications
out the she for connection to the dispersed contractors
offices and working areas.
The on-site requirements for telecommunications
services to the contractor's premises is high and to
some extent unpredictable. Provision must be made for
adequate access to the site telecommunication serv­
ices, as required, during the construction period. Flexi­
bility to respond to all foreseeable requests during
the construction period is important. The provision of
ducts throughout the site enables additional multipair
a n d / o r fibre optic cables to be routed where required.
Some contractor's working areas are re-occupied during
the construction period and their needs may be com­
pletely different from the previous occupiers. Further­
more, legislation affecting telecommunication services
is evolving which sometimes requires alterations to
existing telephone cabhng. It is not easy to reinforce, or
change, telephone cable routes on a construction site
which could involve unplanned excavation or (as in the
past) the temporary provision of poles and overhead
lines, which are subject to damage by mobile cranes.
Underground duct routes of one, two and four 100
m m P V C ducts connecting into heavy duty carriageway
boxes are provided. Carriageway boxes with robust
removable covers ensure immunity from damage by
contractor's loaded vehicles. The provision of strate­
gically placed carriageway boxes and adequate spare
duct space ensures flexibility of response to requests for
changes to the telephone cable network.
15.3 Teleconnmunications systems and
services
The following telecommunications systems and services
are required for construction sites:
• P A B X operated by the C E G B to provide on-site and
off-site telephone services for ah construction site
personnel, i.e., C E G B , consultants and contractors.
• Emergency telephone system for reporting accidents,
fires, plant emergencies, etc., to the gatehouse a n d /
or medical centre.
• Site emergency warning system.
• Pay telephones.
• Radio paging system.
• Site radio system.
• Handportable radiotelephone communications.
• Data, telex and facsimile services.
15.3.1 Private a u t o m a t i c branch exchange
(PABX)
It is present C E G B policy to provide a single P A B X
for ah telephone services for a main construction she.
The P A B X provides all on-she and off-she telephone
services for C E G B she staff, contractors and other
site organisations. The P A B X is located in the Main
742
Chapter 8
Construction Site Office which, as previously stated, is
the focal point for the site telephone cables to con­
tractor's offices and working areas.
The P A B X belongs to the C E G B and the use of the
P A B X and the cabling to the contractor's premises is
provided by the C E G B as a free site service. O n - s i t e
only' telephone calls are also provided as a free site
service. The contractors pay for the telephone equip­
ment on their premises and also pay for ah their outgo­
ing telephone calls to off-site locations, via the P S T N .
The extent of use of the P A B X telephone services by
the contractor and the costs for which the contractor is
responsible in respect of their use are detailed in his
contract document.
The P A B X wih nowadays be a modern S P C tele­
phone exchange, as described in Section 5 of this chap­
ter, having connections to the BT P S T N and the C E G B
C T N , and with facilities for connection to the remote
main offices of the she major contractors. Route-
barring arrangements on the P A B X will restrict P A B X
telephone extensions from gaining access to direct lines
to C E G B or contractor's remote locations, if a particu­
lar P A B X telephone extension user is not permitted by
current telecommunications legisladon to use them.
P A B X telephone extensions restricted to on-site tele­
phone calls only wih be barred from access to the PSTN,
C T N and other off-site telecommunication circuhs.
15.3.2 Emergency telephone system
The emergency telephone system (ETS) is entirely se­
parate from the P A B X . The ETS telephone exchange is
usually located in the construction site main 11 kV
substation from which radiates all the 11 kV site supply
cables to the dispersed on-site temporary 11 kV sub­
stations.
The telephone cables associated with the ETS also
radiate from the 11 kV substation: they are installed
and laid in the same trench when the 11 kV site supply
cables are provided to the distributed 11 kV substations.
The ETS telephone cables to each distributed 11 kV
substation are terminated on a distribution box on
the fence of the substation and an ETS telephone is
installed on the substation fence wired into the dis­
tribution box. ETS telephones required in the working
areas of the site are cabled to the nearest ETS dis­
tribution box.
The ETS c o m m o n equipment in the main 11 kV
substation is powered from a battery supply having a
minimum standby capacity of 24 hours.
It is C E G B practice to use a P A X for the E T S .
ETS telephone extensions located at internal and exter­
nal working areas are able to dial the security officers
in the site gatehouse, or the medical centre, in the
event of an emergency.
15.3.3 Site emergency warning system
A purpose built site emergency warning system (EWS)
is provided, controlled from the site gatehouse and

utilising telephone pairs in the ETS telephone cable
network. The E W S is required to alert construction site
staff of site emergencies which may require action and
is also a means of informing on-site personnel of other
events.
Most recent C E G B nuclear power stations have been
buih adjacent to an existing nuclear station whose
emergency warning system uses sirens. T o provide an
EWS for the construction site with unambiguous sig­
nals which d o not conflict with the siren signals of the
existing nuclear station, a system of u b i q u h o u s elec­
tronic transducers controlled from a control panel in
the construction site gatehouse is provided.
The control equipment is powered from a dedicated
48 V battery having a 24-hour standby capacity. The
control panel mounted in the gatehouse can initiate
three distinct signals from the electronic sound trans­
ducers on the construction site, these are:
• Site evacuate — continuous audio signals of 0.5 s
on and 0.5 s off.
• Fire/first aid team — three signals of 0.5 s on
and 0.5 s off, fohowed by a pause of 4 s before
repeating.
• Spare signals (use determined by Site Manager) —
three signals of 2 s on, 0.5 s off, 0.5 s on, 0.5 s
off, 0.5 s on, fohowed by a pause of 4 s before
repeating.
The transducers use pairs in the E T S telephone cabling
network.
Each transducer may be tested for correct operation
from a nearby test pushbutton. The test b u t t o n is
activated for use during the test at the gatehouse control
panel.
15.3.4 Pay telephones
Pay telephones provide direct access to the P S T N for
telephone calls to off-site locations but they require ad­
vance confirmation that the caller will pay for the call.
Two types of pay telephones are provided on C E G B
construction sites and associated worker hostel sites,
i.e., coin-operated and pre-paid card-operated. Inser­
tion of the coin or card enables the call to be initiated
and the cost of the call to be recovered from the a p p r o ­
priate number of inserted coins or by magnetic deletion
on the inserted 'phone card' of the appropriate number
of pre-paid call units. Telephone cahs to the off-site BT
P S T N telephone operator service and the off-site public
emergency services are available without the need to
insert coins or a 'phone card', but on-site emergencies
would normally be reported to the on-site emergency
services using the E T S , P A X or P A B X telephones.
Coin and card operated pay telephones are usually
provided and instahed by BT, and the C E G B provides
ah necessary on-site facilities.
The C E G B is required to provide kiosks, or a p p r o ­
priate accommodation, for pay telephones which are
Construction site telecommunications
required in external locations: most pay telephones
are located in she buildings such as the site office re­
ception, gatehouse, site canteen and in the site hostel
recreation and sleeping areas. It is essential that a suffi­
cient number of pay telephones are provided in the
site hostel to enable contractor's staff to cah their
famihes during their meal and leisure time.
T o minimise possible theft and fraudulent use of
the pay telephones the following precautions are taken
where possible:
• P a y telephones are installed in supervised areas.
• Pre-paid card-operated telephones are provided in
preference to coin-operated telephones.
• Heavy duty cash boxes are provided for coin-
operated telephones.
• Access to P S T N is restricted to outgoing calls only,
to prevent the fraudulent use of transfer charges on
incoming cahs routed via the P S T N operator.
It is necessary for the pay telephones to receive cah
charge pulses from the off-site BT P S T N telephone
network to operate the coin payment and card payment
equipment of the pay telephones. At shes having a
rise of earth potential problem, the transfer of pulses
through the isolation equipment fitted on all working
pairs of the incoming BT telephone cable presents
problems and special isolation equipment is necessary.
Isolation equipment is not necessary on sites being
served by incoming fibre optic cable.
15.3.5 Radio paging system
A radio paging system is provided for each construc­
tion she using techniques and equipment detailed in
Section 7.3 of this chapter. The direct speech facility
is not used.
The system is completely separate from the power
station system. The two systems operate on different
frequencies so that there is n o mutual interference
during the period when both systems are in use.
Paging is a particularly useful facility for the she
staff, m a n y of w h o m could be anywhere on the site.
The facihty provided by the pager alphanumeric dis­
play enables the paged person to respond to the call
when convenient and allows the paging person to carry
on w h h other work in the meantime.
The system should be capable of providing for the
needs of all nominated site staff including C E G B ,
consultants, contractors, etc., who wih benefit from its
use.
Access to the system from the she P A B X will enable
the paging system to be used from most locations on
site and the provision of good coverage of the site by
one system only will justify the cost of additional slave
transmitters and antennas.
In addition to access to the system from the P A B X ,
separate direct access will be available by the site
P A B X operator who will also have facilities for pro-
743
Telecommunications
viding limited changes to the system, e.g., to enable
spare pagers to replace faulty pagers and respond to
the same P A B X pager code.
15.3.6 Site radio system
A radio system is provided for construction site use
and is completely separate from the systems provided
for the power station.
The system is provided for use by the site security
and medical teams and operates on U H F channels
selected from the group of frequencies allocated to the
Joint Radio Committee of the National Fuel Industries.
Fixed stations are provided at the construction site
gatehouse or main site office, and are operated by the
security and medical staff, and the telephone operator.
The fixed stations provide communication to all exter­
nal areas of the construction site during the initial site
preparation and, if necessary, are extended to indoor
areas of the she by the use of one or more fixed sta­
tions also controlled from the gatehouse, site office or
ambulance room.
The fixed stations operate to handportable radio
telephones (handportables) carried by the securhy staff,
the medical teams and other nominated staff.
Some site ambulance(s) have been equipped with
handportable holders into which the handportables
may be inserted when the medical staff are using the
ambulance. This enhances the performance of the
handportables and the signal received by the hand-
portable is relayed through a loudspeaker unit in the
holder. However, this arrangement has been found to
be unreliable due to intermittent failure of the p l u g /
socket and is no longer recommended. A standard
vehicle-mounted radio is nowadays preferred.
The radio system uses open channel working so that
all handportables are able t o monitor the transmissions
from the fixed station and consequently be aware of
all emergencies.
More recent systems use radio trunking techniques
and handportable or mobile radios having pushbutton
keypads.
The equipment and techniques used are detailed in
Section 8 of this chapter.
15.3.7 Radio telephone handportables
Handportables for operation on the single-frequency
simplex channel of 169.050 M H z , as detahed in Section
8.2.4 of this chapter, are provided for local point-to-
point communication on the site and for other commis­
sioning purposes.
This V H F channel supplements the U H F hand-
portable system for construction site security and com­
missioning purposes.
15.3.8 Data, telex and facsimile services
Ah major C E G B construction shes have an on-site
computer for site management. Data circuits are pro­
744
Chapter 8
vided to link the on-site computer t o one or more of
the major C E G B computing centres. T h e data circuits
are either routed via the C E G B corporate data network
(CDN) or via direct circuhs rented from BT or M C L .
Data terminals at the construction site have access to
the local computer and some have direct access to the
major C E G B computing centres.
Proprietary equipment is used for the data appli­
cations. T h e equipment is usually updated a n d / o r
replaced during the construction period to keep pace
with current developments.
Access to the BT Telex Network and proprietary
equipment is provided for sending and receiving telexes.
Proprietary facsimile equipment to operate via the
C E G B Corporate Telephone Network and the BT
P S T N is also used to transmit and receive visual in­
formation and documents at remote locations.
16 Future trends and developments
16.1 Connections to off-site
telecommunication networks
Currently, the majority of C E G B power stations rely,
for off-site telecommunications, on access to the British
Telecom telecommunication network, the connections
being made via BT multipair telephone cables t o the
power station, as described in Section 2 of this chap­
ter. However, the requirements for telecommunication
circuits t o power stations are increasing dramatically
and alternatives to existing practices are being con­
sidered, as hsted below:
• T h e use of fibre-optic cables t o replace or co-exist
with telephone cables.
• T h e use of microwave links to replace or co-exist with
telephone cables.
• Access to telecommunication networks other than
the BT network, e.g., M C L networks.
The use of fibre-optic cables has the following ad­
vantages:
• Wide frequency bandwidth a n d high data transmis­
sion speeds.
• Using digital signalhng techniques many circuits for
data, telephony, telemetry, etc., may be carried on
each fibre core.
• N o conduction of the rise of earth potential during
faults on the electrical system from the power station
to the off-she telecommunication networks.
• Reduced space taken in cable ducts.
The use of microwave links also enables many circuits
to be provided for data, telephony, telemetry, etc.
Access to other telecommunications networks from
the power station could include the Mercury C o m -

munications Limited (MCL) network, the access to
which could be via microwave or fibre-optic cable.
Access would be dependent o n whether or not M C L
were operating in the area of the power station and, if
not, whether there was an economic case for extending
their network into the area. The other network to which
access could be made available would be the C E G B
fibre-optic network, the cables for which are being
incorporated in the earth wire, or ahernatively wrapped
around the earth wire, of the C E G B 400 kV and 275 kV
transmission lines. This will eventually provide access
points to the network at most of the 400 kV and 275
kV substations many of which are co-sited at, or near,
CEGB power stations.
16.2 On-site cabling
A new range of cables for telecommunications is being
developed which is suitable for use at future nuclear
power stations. These are cables having a sheath which
produces only a small a m o u n t of toxic fumes when it
burns: they also incorporate an insulated single-core
earth wire for remote earthing of telecommunications
equipment connected to the P A B X system, for P A B X
telephones which use an earth recall facility for transfer­
ring telephone calls to other P A B X extensions.
16.3 Telephone exchanges
As detailed in Section 1 of this chapter, two telephone
exchanges, a P A X and a P A B X are at present provided
to serve the needs of C E G B power stations. In a d d h i o n ,
there is a separate automatic Private Control Exchange
(PCX) which is provided for Grid System Operations
telephony purposes, details of which are included in
Chapter 12 of this volume.
Consideration is being given within the C E G B to
reducing the number of telephone exchanges in a power
station from the three mentioned above to either:
• Two telephone exchanges, i.e., a P A B X and P C X .
The P A B X would combine the presently-provided
P A X and P A B X , with the P C X providing automatic
telephone facihties for system operation telephony
needs.
• One telephone exchange to serve all automatic tele­
phone needs of a power station and providing P A X ,
PABX and System Operation telephone requirements.
Both the above options may only be viable when the
CEGB becomes an 'approved maintainer' by the 'De­
partment of Trade and Industry', so that full main­
tenance of the telephone exchanges may be carried o u t .
This would enable C E G B staff to exercise control of
the maintenance and to carry out repair work should
the equipment fah, thus minimising the outage time
of the equipment. Approved maintainer status would
also enable work to be carried out by C E G B staff if
industrial action is being taken by the existing licensed
Future trends and developments
'approved maintainers' (pubhc network contractors
a n d P A B X manufacturers). The C E G B as an 'approved
maintainer' would thereby be able to provide the service
which at present is only permitted on the P A X .
16.4 Radio systenns
The radio systems used in power stations, which are
described in Section 8 of this chapter, have been de­
veloped since radio speech communication for roving
power station staff was first introduced in the 1960s.
However, much of the equipment is now obsolescent
and ready for replacement. Also, in 1986, the Depart­
ment of Trade and Industry advised the Joint Radio
Committee of the nationalised fuel and power industries
that the 12 U H F channels, which have 25 k H z spacing
between adjacent channels allocated for the exclusive
use of the industries, were to be changed by 1991 to
24 U H F channels having 12.5 k H z spacing, using the
same U H F frequency spectrum. The channels had pre­
viously been used almost exclusively by the C E G B but
other bodies of the fuel and power industries made
known their intention to make use of these additional
channels.
The C E G B set u p a working party to consider their
requirements and to report on what action should be
taken. They reviewed the existing radio systems op­
erated by the C E G B which generahy use dedicated
R F channels for particular functions, i.e., operations,
maintenance, security, emergency, etc., and also the
use of trunked radio, the technology for which has
recently become available. Of the systems considered
by the working party, the trunked system offered the
most effective way of providing the presently perceived
needs of the power station user for medium and large
stations. It was also considered that small stations
would use the same basic radio equipment without the
trunking operation, which is not suitable for less than
five radio channels.
16.4.1 Trunked radio system
The working party agreed that a multichannel trunked
system, using one dedicated channel for signalling/
control and the remaining channels for speech traffic,
would be most suitable for large and medium power
station use. All user groups would have access to all
speech channels, thus optimising total system use.
The system would comprise three sub-systems, i.e.,
antenna system, fixed station/control equipment and
radiotelephones, each of which is to be discrete to
facilitate alternative provision of supply. Figure 8.78
shows a block diagram of the system.
T o originate a call, a roving user would switch on
his handportable radio telephone and seize the con­
trol channel. The control channel would allocate a free
speech channel to the mobile user and transmit a code
back to the roving user's radiotelephone to swhch it to
the free speech channel. The roving user would then
receive a dial tone. The roving user is then able to
745
Telecommunications Chapter 8

TO ANTENNA SYSTEM
(ANTENNAS AND RADIATING CABLE)

TRANSMITTER/RECEIVER TRANSMITTER/RECEIVER TRANSMITTER / RECEIVER TRANSMITTER / RECEIVER TRANSMITTER / RECEIVER

SIGNALLING SPEECH SPEECH SPEECH SPEECH

AND CONTROL CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL
CHANNEL

CENTRAL CONTROL UNIT STATION PAX

AND PROCESSOR ' AND/OR PABX
MANUAL CONTROLLER
AND/OR OPTIONAL DIRECT
TELEPHONES

, OPTIONAL
I EXPANSION

RADIO
PAX UNIT

TRANSMITTER / RECEIVER

HANDPORTABLE
SYNTHESISED
TRANCEIVER

FIG. 8.78 Trunked radio system — block diagram

key the required control point or direct telephone • Station services/safety.

(connected to the central control unit or radio P A X • Security.
u n h ) , or key a telephone extension on the power station
P A X or P A B X . • Fire.
A call for a roving user would be routed via the • First aid.
central processor u n h , which will allocate a free speech
• Visiting personnel/contractors.
channel and transmh a code on the control channel to
alert the roving user and also to swhch the handport­
In addition, for nuclear stations, there would be a
able to the ahocated traffic channel. The traffic channel
health physics apphcation. The various user require­
would be held until the originating caller releases the
ments are hsted below.
call or, alternatively, the call may be released after a
pre-programmed time-out period.
Radiotelephones
It was also agreed that the following applications
would apply to all stations: • Keypad.
• Pre-programmed single-button call to user's control
• Plant operation.
point.
• Plant maintenance.
• Abbreviated keying of users contacts simulated de­
• Fuel and waste h a n d h n g . dicated channel.

746
 Additional references

• Priority override. • Fixed station Transmitter output w h h use of ferrhe

• Ordinary keyed digits call (direct extensions or via
station P A X or P A B X ) .
• Conference calls/station emergency group calls.
• Special requirements:
(a) Loud bleep/visual indication/vibrator
(b) Bleep loudness independent of volume control
— preferably from separate audible call
transducer
isolators to minimise intermodulation products and
to facihtate multiple fixed s t a t i o n / c o m p o s h e antenna
systems.
Transmitter and receiver combining networks to
enable a c o m m o n antenna/radiating cable system to
be used.
Transmitter, receiver and control equipment to
be approved by British Approvals Board for Tele­
communications (BABT) to permit connection to the
PABX.

(c) Drop-test withstand capability • A n t e n n a system Antennas and radiating cable t o

provide m a x i m u m coverage of station and site areas.
(d) Single-channel/multichannel working/automatic
control of R F channel The basic operational requirements of the preferred
system
(e) Noise cancelling/desensitised microphone
• Station coverage by ah channels.
(f) Headset with pushbutton or voice-operated
transmitter • Simplicity of operation (single digit operation for
group control desk).
(g) Methods of carrying handportable u n h : t o p
pocket overall/shoulder harness/belt harness. • Non-blocking for priority/emergency users.
• Extension of station P A X .
Direct telephone control points

• Ordinary keyed digits cah to handportable.
• Priority override keyed digits call to handportable.
• Conference/station emergency group(s) calls (open
channel).
A pilot scheme of the above system is being engineered
for use at Ironbridge power station (1988), t o deter­
mine the performance and acceptability of the system
for power station use.

17 Additional references
Station PAX and/or PABX access
Phihps Telecommunications Ltd Engineering Notes:
• Direct dialhng between P A X / P A B X telephones
TSP 1267 Minimising Intermodulation and Blocking Effects in
and handportable radiotelephones/vehicle-mounted
VHF/UHF Radiotelephone Systems.
radios. TSP 377 The Location of Antennas on Motor Vehicles
TSP 427 Electrical Noise in Motor Vehicles
System and equipment detail TSP 480/1 Intermodulation in VHF and UHF Radio Systems —
locating and minimising the effects
• Frequencies used The channels t o be used by a TSP 588/1 The use of Circulators/Isolators to Minimise Transmit­
system wih be ahocated by the J R C from the b a n d ter Intermodulation
of 24 U H F channels available to them. This is ITT Reference Data for Radio Engineers (Sixth Edition)
done after consideration of the need (a) to minimise MPT Performance Specifications issued by the Radiocom­
munications Agency of the Department of Trade and
interference to other users of the channels whhin
Industry
the mutual reception range of the power station
Morton, A. H.: Advanced Electrical Engineering: Pitman: 1966
radio system and (b) to minimise the on-site inter­ Electronic Engineers Reference Handbook (fifth edition): Edited
modulation products. by Mazda, F.: Butterworths

747
 C H A P T E R 9

Emergency supply equipment

1 Introduction 3.3 Duplication of battery/charger systems

1.1 Introductory statement on batteries 3.4 DC system voltage limits
1.2 Introductory statement on systems 4 Chargers
2 Batteries 4.1 Introduction
2.1 Explanation of terms 4.2 Required characteristics
2.2 Possible types 4.2.1 Initial charge
2.2 1 Heavy duty lead-acid Planté positive plate cells 4.2.2 Maintaining charge
2.2 ,2 Tubular plate lead-acid cells 4.2.3 Charger ratings
2.2 3 Pasted flat plate lead-acid cells 4.2.4 Boost charging
2.2 ,4 Nickel-cadmium cells 4.2.5 General additional requirements
2.2 5 Sealed lead-acid (SLA) or recombination cells 4.2.6 Earthing
2.2 6 Summary 4.2.7 Protection and monitoring
2.3 Heavy duty lead-acid Planté cell — description and 4.2.8 Alarms
chemistry 4.2.9 Nuclear safety
2.3 ,1 General 4.3 Description of equipment
2.3 2 Positive plates 4.3.1 Introduction
2.3 ,3 Negative plates 4.3.2 Basic principles
2.3 ,4 Separators 4.3.3 Main transformer
2.3 5 Plate interconnections or group bars 4.3.4 Thyristor rectifier
2.3 ,6 Plastic containers 4.3.5 Control board
2.3 7 Cell lids 4.3.6 Reference transformer
2.3 ,8 Vent plugs 4.3.7 DC transformers
2.3 9 Terminal pillars 4.3.8 Display
2.3 ,10 Terminal pillar seals 4.3.9 Battery float/boost control circuitry
2.3 11 Intercell connectors 4.4 Testing
2.3 12 Polarity identification 4.4.1 Introduction
2.3 13 Electrolyte 4.4.2 Type testing in manufacturer's works
2.3 14 Battery stands 4.4.3 Routine tests in manufacturer's works
2.3 15 Chemistry 4.4.4 Tests at site
2.4 Battery accommodation
5 Diesel generators
2.4 1 General requirements
2.4 2 Ambient temperature 5.1 System requirements
2.4 3 Ventilation 5.1.1 Purpose of diesel generator installation
2.4 ,4 Lighting 5.1.2 Starting and loading
2.4 5 Battery main connections in battery rooms 5.1.3 Rating and number of diesel generators
2.4 ,6 Access to battery rooms 5.1.4 Protection against external hazards
2.5 Initial tests, charging, maintenance and site testing 5.2 Engine and auxiliaries
2.5 ,1 Tests in manufacturer's works 5.2.1 Engine types and characteristics
2.5 ,2 Tests at site 5.2.2 Engine design and construction
2.5 ,3 Charging 5.2.3 Starting equipment
2.5 ,4 Factors affecting cell life and precautions to be taken 5.2.4 Cooling system
2.5 ,5 Inspection 5.2.5 Fuel oil systems
2.5 .6 CEGB experience 5.2.6 Inlet and exhaust air pipework, turbochargers and
2.5 .7 The case for testing silencers
2.5 .8 End of life 5.2.7 Governors
2.5 .9 Uncharacteristic behaviour of odd cells 5.3 Generator and electrical equipment
2.5 .10 System tests of essential battery-backed DC systems 5.3.1 Generator design and construction
5.3.2 Excitation equipment and automatic voltage regulator
Battery systems (AVR)
3.1 Introduction 5.3.3 Diesel generator control and protection equipment
3.2 Provision of DC systems 5.3.4 Control of auxiliary systems
3.2.1 220 V DC systems for switchgear closing 5.4 Testing
3.2.2 110 V DC systems for switchgear control, protection 5.4.1 Tests in manufacturer's works
and interiocks 5.4.2 Tests at site
3.2.3 48 V DC systems for telecommunications, plant control 5.4.3 In-service operational testing
and alarms
6 Additional references
3.2.4 250 V DC systems for emergency lighting and
emergency drives 6.1 British Standards (BS)

748

1 Introduction
As the electrical industry developed rapidly at the start
of the twentieth century, the advantages of high voltage
A C supply and distribution meant that the original D C
stations were gradually replaced. This change from D C
to A C supply introduced many new problems associated
whh the high voltages used.
Remote control of swhches and equipment was in­
troduced and, because of their reliability and flexibility,
batteries were considered to be the best source of sup­
ply for operating circuit-breakers and the many safety
and protective devices which are part of the complexity
of A C generation and distribution.
In the 1940s central control r o o m s replaced local
boiler and turbine gauge boards in power stations.
There was then a need for electrical transmission of
measured quantities, e.g., temperature, pressure, etc.,
from plant to the central control r o o m . Electrical
remote control began to replace the older pneumatic
and hydraulic systems. These requirements demanded
ever larger batteries and their associated chargers to
provide standby supplies for the control and operation
of plant, varying from three hours to six hours dura­
tion, in the event of a complete loss of Grid supphes.
Shortly afterwards, studies suggested that depend­
ence on batteries could be reduced to half-hour dura­
tion, after which time diesel generators or gas-turbine
generators could take over the emergency load until
Grid supplies were restored. This reduced battery sizes
and proved to be an economic solution; it is now
generally adopted by the C E G B , with a preference for
diesel generators because of their superior starting re­
liability and capabihty of picking u p load very rapidly.
This arrangement ensures safe shutdown of plant,
particularly nuclear reactors, and facilitates a rapid
restart on restoration of Grid supphes, as the diesel
generators are able to recharge the batteries in readiness
for this event.
Modern power stations and substations employ a
number of batteries and chargers of different sizes
and voltages for a variety of duties. Nuclear power
stations require larger batteries and chargers than con­
ventional stations for essential duties, due to nuclear
safety requirements.
In earher years, batteries and chargers were provided
on a station basis. However, because of the ever increas­
ing demands on batteries and the physical growth of
the power stations, h was found to be more economic
to provide batteries for each boiler/turbine unit. Al­
though this increased the number of batteries in a
power station, the extra cost was compensated by the
reduction in cable sizes which, because of the long
distances involved in the station battery arrangement,
were sized on voh-drop rather than carrying capacity.
For nuclear reactors operating on a quadrant (i.e.,
four train basis) for safety reasons, batteries, chargers
and diesel generators are sub-divided further to m a k e
each quadrant of the reactor completely independent.
This ensures that a fault on one quadrant does not
Batteries
jeopardise the satisfactory operation of the remaining
quadrants.
1.1 Introductory statement on batteries
T h e batteries instahed in modern C E G B power stations
are almost exclusively of the lead-acid high perform­
ance Planté positive-plate type, individually enclosed
in transparent cell boxes, with positive and negative
plates immersed in dilute sulphuric acid (see Section 2.3
of this chapter for details). They have given satisfactory
service, with a hfe of a r o u n d 25 years, depending on
usage and maintenance.
In the past, other types of batteries have been in­
vestigated, such as tubular positive-plate lead-acid cells,
pasted flat plate lead-acid cells and nickel-cadmium
cehs, but have been rejected on a basis of hfetime costs.
Maintenance-free (sealed) batteries have come on the
market in recent years, but are not at present considered
suitable to replace the heavy duty lead-acid battery in
power stations because of their low life expectancy and
lack of service experience.
A short description of the above alternatives to high
performance Planté cehs is given in Section 2.2 of
this chapter.
1.2 Introductory statement on systems
M o d e r n power stations require a number of different
D C supphes for telecommunications (48 V), control and
instrumentation (48 V and 110 V), switchgear closing
(220 V) and tripping (110 V), emergency lighting and
emergency m o t o r drives (250 V); for details see Chapter
1. These supplies are derived from combinations of
batteries, chargers and D C switchboards. In a large
nuclear power station with two advanced gas-cooled
reactors and two 660 M W turbine-generators, there
are between 70 and 80 batteries and their associated
chargers. M o r e details of these systems are given in
Section 3 of this chapter.
Under normal (mains healthy) conditions, each bat­
tery and set of load circuits floats across its associated
mains fed charger. The charger provides a constant
output voltage and at this controlled voltage supplies
the whole of the continuous load and automaticahy
maintains the battery in a fully charged condition.
Under emergency (mains or charger failure) condi­
tions, each battery supplies the whole of hs system load
for a specified m a x i m u m period, thus each battery
provides an automatic no-break, back-up supply for hs
charger at all times.
T h e normal open-circuh vohage of a fully charged
ceh, with a specific gravity of 1.207 at 2 0 ° C , is 2.05 V.
2 Batteries
2.1 Explanation of terms
Capacity The quantity of electricity, usually expressed
in ampere-hours (Ah), that may be taken from a ceh
749
E m e r g e n c y supply e q u i p m e n t
at a particular discharge rate under specified conditions
of voltage and temperature.
Discharge rate The capacity of lead-acid Planté cells
is greatest at low discharge rates and lowest at high
rates of discharge. The discharge rate is defined as
the steady current in amperes (A) that can be taken
from a battery of defined capacity (Ah) over a de­
fined period (h). Batteries for C E G B power stations
are normally specified for a 10-hour rate.
Voltage The capacity can be related to any practi­
cal limit of cell voltage and the higher the final voltage
at minimum discharge, the lower will be the capacity
of the battery. The final voltage to which the battery
wih supply the duty is defined in terms of volts per
ceh.
Temperature Low battery temperatures temporarily
reduce the available ampere-hour capacity and dis­
charge voltage. Capacity and voltage are restored to
nominal with a return to normal temperature, even
whhout a charge. An increase in battery temperature
results in an increase in capacity, particularly at high
rates of discharge. The capacity of lead-acid Planté
cehs is specified at 20°C.
Rating The ampere-hour capacity of a positive plate
or cell assigned to it by the manufacturer, under spe­
cified conditions of discharge.
Charging The passing of an electric current through
a cell to bring it to a chemical condition where it is
capable of supplying electrichy to an external circuh.
The quantity of electricity put in is known as the
'charge' and is usually measured in ampere-hours.
Fully charged The condition of a battery when the
voltage and the electrolyte specific gravity of every cell
have not varied appreciably during three consecutive
hours at the end of the charging period, account being
taken of temperature variations.
Discharge The quantity of electricity in A h taken out
of a cell connected to an external circuh when the
current flows through the cell in the reverse direction
to that of charge.
Plate The unit that, singly or in groups, is sub­
merged in electrolyte of dilute sulphuric acid, or po­
tassium hydroxide in the case of nickel cadmium cehs
(see Section 2.2.4 of this chapter), so that h forms
the whole or part of one of the electrodes of the
ceh.
Positive plate The plate that forms the anode or
part of the anode during the charge. For lead-acid
batteries, it can be of three main types: Planté, tubu­
750
Chapter 9
lar or flat plate.
Negative plate The plate that forms the cathode or
part of the cathode during the charge.
Plate group A complete electrode consisting of either
positive or negative plates, together with a group bar
and a terminal pillar.
Separator A n insulating structure used to separate
plates of opposite polarity.
Container A box of suitable material, usually plastic
in C E G B power stations, in which the plate groups
and separators are assembled.
2.2 Possible types
2.2.1 H e a v y duty lead-acid Planté positive plate
cells
This cell is derived from the conventional long-life
lead-acid battery and is designed to provide low to
medium currents for, say, 1-3 h o u r s . It has a high cell
voltage and is tolerant of temperature changes, al­
though these affect hs output capacity. W h h good
maintenance, a life of 25 years is not u n c o m m o n in
C E G B experience.
Planté poshive plates are m a d e of pure lead instead
of the pasted-plate of a flat plate battery (Fig 9.1
(a)). A n electrochemical formation process produces
a thin layer of lead dioxide on the total active surface
area.
The enclosures are generally transparent styrene
acrylonitrile (SAN), stress-reheved to give clarity and
mechanical stability through hfe, together with *at a
glance' inspection of electrolyte levels. The SAN en­
closures replace the moulded-glass containers and lead-
hned wood containers used previously. The latter were
employed for very large capacity cehs. One major
advantage of this type of cell is that maintenance
personnel can assess hfe by visual inspection (see
Section 2.3 of this chapter for a detailed description
of the high performance Planté cell).
2.2.2 T u b u l a r p l a t e l e a d - a c i d cells
They are physically some 66% of the volume and
8 0 % of the price of the corresponding ampere-hour
capacity Planté poshive plate battery, but the life ex­
pectancy of tubular positive plate batteries is only 10
to 15 years. This was confirmed by experience at
Heysham 1 and Hartlepool nuclear power stations,
where tubular plate lead-acid cehs needed replacement
after about ten years. They have higher open-circuit
losses and need more frequent inspection.
Tubular plates (Fig 9.1 (b)) are constructed from
tubing manufactured from Terylene or a combina­
tion of perforated P V C and woven glass fibre, fitted

(a) Planté plate construction (lead-acid)
(c) Flat pasted-plate construction (lead-acid)
F I G . 9.1 T y p i c a l construction o f battery positive plates
over cast antimonial-lead spines. The tubes are filled
with lead oxide and then undergo a formation process.
Their construction does not permit a visual inspec­
tion of the plates: their condition is therefore not easily
ascertainable and any slow deterioration is not readily
detected.
Again, the enclosures are generally S A N , stress-re­
lieved to give clarity and mechanical stability through­
out hfe, together w h h *at a glance' inspection of elec­
trolyte levels.
2.2.3 Pasted flat plate lead-acid cells
These suffer from the same disadvantages of hfe ex­
Batteries
(b) Tubular plate construction (lead-acid)
(d) Pocket plate construction (nickel cadmium)
pectancy and open-circuh losses as tubular positive
plate lead-acid cehs. Their life expectancy is even
lower, about 5 - 6 years.
They are designed for low performance apphcations
only and are unsuhable for even moderate discharges
lasting m o r e t h a n a few minutes.
The flat plates consist of a paste m a d e from lead
oxide, sulphuric acid, water, and other additives, ap­
plied to a lattice grid m a d e of lead or lead ahoy. The
plates are dried under controHed conditions and then
undergo a formation process (Fig 9.1 (c)).
Again, the enclosures are generally stress-relieved
SAN.
751
Emergency supply equipment
2.2.4 Nickel-cadmium cells
When correctly maintained, nickel-cadmium cells can
have a life of more than 30 years, during which ap­
proximately 10-20^0 capacity is lost. They employ
perforated steel pocket plate construction, using nickel
hydroxide as the basis of the active material for the
positive electrode and cadmium hydroxide for the
negative electrode (Fig 9.1 (d)).
The electrolyte is an aqueous solution of potassium
hydroxide, with the addition of hthium hydroxide. The
purpose of the electrolyte is solely to support the
reactions between the electrodes and there is no sig­
nificant change in specific gravity from a fully charged
to a discharged condition.
The containers can be of nickel-plated steel, thus
affording maximum strength and durability for use in
rugged environments, also where shock and vibration
are present. Alternatively, the containers can be of
translucent high-impact polystyrene plastic for ease
of maintainance and mechanical strength and stability
throughout an extended hfe. These also enable the
electrolyte level to be checked at a glance.
An advantage of the nickel-cadmium battery is its
ability to be left idle for long periods in any state of
charge and its rapid recovery after neglect by topping-
up and recharging.
The following disadvantages outweigh the advantages:
• It is not possible to check the state of charge whhout
carrying out a discharge test.
• The electrolyte in the cells requires replacement,
initially after two years and subsequently between five
and eight years. Failure to replace reduces the high
rate discharge capacity significantly.
• The internal resistance is higher than for a lead-acid
cell, hence there is a greater propensity to higher
electrical noise levels generated by currents such as
charger harmonics, signals, telephone speech, etc.
These currents generate volt-drops across the bat­
tery internal resistance and are transferred to other
circuits connected to the battery.
• The cost of a nickel-cadmium battery is higher than
the corresponding lead-acid Planté battery as a larger
number of cells is needed for the same ampere-hour
capacity because of their lower cell voltage.
Maintenance costs of a nickel-cadmium battery are
higher than for a lead-acid Planté battery because of
the larger number of cehs and the greater need for
cleanliness to prevent tracking between poles due to
close spacing.
Its high rate performance is lower than that of a
lead-acid Planté cell.
Any attempt to boost charge may resuh in the 'self
destruct syndrome'. These cells have been known to
disintegrate somewhat forcefully and resoundingly after
such a treatment, due to the release of large volumes
of hydrogen and oxygen.
752
Chapter 9
2.2.5 Sealed lead-acid (SLA) or recombination
cells
When a traditional lead-acid battery is charged nor­
mally, the electrochemical reaction evolves unpleasant
and potentially explosive hydrogen and loss of water
occurs (for detahs see Section 2.3.15 of this chapter).
Hence the need for ventilation and topping-up. By the
use of 'gas recombination' both these problems have
been solved, whilst retaining the inherent advantages
of low cost and long hfe of the lead-acid battery. The
gases usually liberated into the atmosphere during
float/recharge operation in conventional lead-acid cells,
recombine to form water in a recombination cell. As
a consequence, these cehs do not lose water during
normal operation and therefore topping-up and ven­
tilation are not required.
The recombination principle works when oxygen
evolved from the positive plates diffuses through the
highly porous glass-microfibre separator to the re­
active negative plate and is electrochemically reduced
to water. The separator acts hke a sponge and holds
captive a closely controlled quantity of acid in a stable
condition, whüst providing the medium by which gas
recombination can take place.
Even if the cell container is accidentally damaged, it
wül not leak acid, unlike a conventional lead-acid cell
with hs copious quantities of dilute sulphuric acid
electrolyte.
Although the ceh is virtually sealed, a safety valve
together with a flame retardant device is provided to
stop damage by inadvertent overcharging. Hence the
term 'sealed' battery is really a misnomer.
These cehs suffer rapidly from anything other than
very carefully controhed vohages. Even under these
conditions, their hfe is claimed to be only ten years
and can be as low as three to four years if charging
voltage or ambient temperature is increased.
Sealed lead-acid cells use a flat pasted construction
for both positive and negative plates. A grid alloy with
a high hydrogen overpotential is essential to long term
operation and lead-tin-calcium ahoys are used.
The separator is crucial in achieving efficient oxygen
recombination in SLA cells. Glass microfibre paper
is used for the separator because of hs inertness and
large uniformly porous volume, so that when the
separator is not fully saturated there is an electrolyte-
free path between positive and negative plates along
which oxygen diffuses from positive to negative and
there reduced to water.
The cells are formed by compressing together the
plates and separator into the container with a carefully
measured quanthy of electrolyte, the lid then being
sealed.
The containers are of flame-retardant ABS plastic
which is mechanically robust and abuse-resistant. It
withstands stress, thermal shock and vibration.
Like nickel-cadmium cehs, the maintenance of re­
combination cells is essentially hmited to momtoring
battery and cell voltages and charging current, in

addition to normal good housekeeping such as clean-
hness and tight joints.
In addhion to being maintenence-free, SLA recom­
bination cells do not require separate ventilated accom­
modation. Their low internal resistance gives them high
short-term current capability for duties such as engine
starting. They are also inherently more robust, smaller
and lighter than Planté cells for a given duty.
The main advantage they offer is one of civil cost
savings, which balance their shorter hfe and conse­
quently increased lifetime replacement costs.
The condition of a SLA cannot be assessed visually
and neither can the electrolyte specific gravity be check­
ed. In view of present C E G B maintenance practice,
these are serious disadvantages. Alternative condition
monitoring techniques are being developed by users of
SLA cells; one of these is the comparison of current
in parallel strings of cells, a configuration c o m m o n
in SLA batteries. Variations in the string currents
indicate problems in one string. Routine discharge
testing is also available and special test load sets have
been developed. Monitors using ripple or pulsed load
techniques are other options that are also becoming
available. Finally of course, the C E G B practice of
periodic cell dismantling can be used to assess the
residual hfe of a battery.
2.2.6 Summary
The evidence over many decades of satisfactory per­
formance and long life of heavy duty lead-acid Planté
cells has led the C E G B to continue their use to the
present time. Although the recombination version of the
lead-acid cell now appears to offer an ahernative which
may well be explored in future power station schemes.
Initially, lack of operating experience discouraged de­
tailed consideration of its use but there is now a growing
volume of such experience. Within the C E G B , Trans­
mission Division have some four years' experience of
these batteries for telecommunications systems.
The use of batteries as emergency power supphes
means that condition monitoring is an important issue.
Whhe this is a problem with a sealed ceh, techniques
are being developed and generally experience of failure
rates with SLA batteries has been good.
It seems likely, therefore, that in the future, lead-
acid batteries of the recombination type will offer a
serious alternative to the Planté cell.
Using heavy duty Planté cells and by careful main­
tenance, only one complete battery replacement may
be necessary in the hfe of a power station, whereas
other types necessitate more than one. This considerably
increases the hfetime costs for the station, and there
are therefore no overall economic advantages in using
types other than Planté.
2.3 Heavy duty lead-acid Planté cell — 2.3.5
description and chemistry
In view of the almost exclusive use in C E G B power
Batteries
stations of the lead-acid high performance Planté posi­
tive plate battery, further details of the cell construction
and operation are given in this section (Fig 9.2).
2.3.1 General
High performance Planté cehs designed to BS440, now
superseded by BS6290, provide the highest integrity
source of standby power with a long and predictable
hfe. They are designed for operation under constant-
potential float or trickle charge conditions, not in­
volving regular deep cycles of charge and discharge.
In addition, their high rate performance makes them
particularly suitable for circuit-breaker tripping and
closing duties together with diesel and gas turbine start­
ing operations. By virtue of the high power/weight
ratio and sealed construction, high performance Planté
cells are ideal for installations where space is limited.
As mentioned already, they have a typical life of
2 0 - 2 5 years.
2.3.2 Positive plates
The positive plates are cast from pure lead and consist
of numerous thin vertical laminations, strengthened by
a series of horizontal cross-ribs to increase the surface
area by as much as 12 times that of a plain lead plate
of similar width and length. This ensures that there
is n o fall-off in capacity t h r o u g h o u t their long life.
The positive plates are hung from ledges moulded in
the container.
2.3.3 Negative plates
The negative plates are of interlocking design to ensure
active material retention and provide balance with the
positive plate to give m a x i m u m performance and hfe.
The negative group always has one more plate than
its matching positive g r o u p , so that when the groups are
interleaved, each positive plate is located between two
negative plates to ensure that both surfaces are worked
equally and thus prevent distortion or buckhng.
The negative plates are supported on ribs in the
b o t t o m of the container.
2.3.4 Separators
Separators are m a d e of microporous P V C , providing
a complete diaphragm between the plates and giving
m a x i m u m electrolyte utilisation, together with high me­
chanical and electrical strength. Separators are chemi­
cally inert and their high porosity ensures minimum
internal resistance. This permits more efficient circu­
lation of electrolyte and, combined with maximum
physical strength, prevents internal short-circuits by
active material deposition.
P l a t e i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s or g r o u p bars
T o obtain the desired ampere-hour capacity, each re­
spective group of positive and negative plates are joined
753
Emergency supply equipment Chapter 9

VENT PLUGS

CELL LID

FIG. 9.2 General arrangement of a typical heavy duty lead-acid Plante cell

754

together by group bars made of lead which, dependent
on the manufacturer, may contain a small percentage
of antimony. Cehs utihse fully-welded group bars on
the positive and negative groups, ensuring that plate
lugs are firmly burned into the group bar.
2.3.6 Plastic containers
Plastic containers are injection moulded from trans­
parent styrene acrylonhrile (SAN) and stress-reheved,
giving improved transparency and mechanical stability
throughout hfe. The very high insulating qualities
ehminate the need for separate cell insulators. The
improved transparency enables the electrolyte level and
cell condition to be seen at a glance. The maximum and
minimum levels are marked on the sides of the ceh
as necessary to facilitate maintenance.
Ah containers are much deeper than the length of
the plate they accommodate, to allow ample gassing
space above the plates and space below them for the
downward expansion of the positive plates and the
build-up of sediment (*mud space').
Springs or buffers are provided to hold the plate
groups in position throughout the life of the cell.
2.3.7 Cell lids
Cell lids are moulded in an easily-cleaned form from
opaque SAN material and are bonded to the container
to prevent leakage of gas or electrolyte. They are
arranged to carry vent plugs and terminal pillars.
During the mid-1970s, because of unsightly ap­
pearance, two major manufacturers decided to depart
from the, until then, otherwise satisfactory method of
bonding the lid to the cell. The new method, using
solvent-based cement, appeared to be satisfactory in
the short term; in the long term, the joint seal failed
and electrolyte started to leak from the cells.
After some considerable development work, a new
method of lid-to-case seahng evolved, using a hot-meh
adhesive. This can be used either on the factory
assembly line or on site to avoid having to return cells
to the factory. At present (1988), one manufacturer is
still experiencing difficulties and is carrying out further
research.
2.3.8 Vent plugs
Vent plugs are of special design which effectively
returns ah acid spray to the cell, but allows free exit of
the oxygen and hydrogen which are generated towards
the end of boost charging. Two polystyrene filling plugs
are also fitted to each lid.
2.3.9 Terminal pillars
For normal usage, terminal pillars are of antimonial
lead, giving high conductivity, corrosion-free proper­
ties. For extra high current duties, these pillars are
provided with tinned copper inserts. Dependent on the
manufacturer, cells up to approximately 600 Ah have
Batteries
a single pillar per pole. Above that capacity, up to
about 1400 A h , twin pillars per pole are used. For the
largest sizes, three (and sometimes even four) pillars
per pole are provided.
Over a period in the late 1970s, one manufacturer
reduced the a m o u n t of antimony in the pillars. After
some years in operation, corrosion appeared on the
positive pillar which burst the pillar seals and in some
instances even cracked the hds, leading to acid leak­
age. When this was discovered, a programme of re­
placing faulty cells was insthuted, using pillars with
their former proportion of antimony in the composition
of the ahoy. This meant having replacement cehs
available to substitute for faulty cells, which could
only be recondhioned in the factory. All new batteries
supphed since that date have, of course, reverted to
the original proportions of antimony and lead in the
pillars.
2.3.10 Terminal pillar seals
Terminal pillar seals effectively prevent the escape of
electrolyte or gas at all times during the working hfe of
the cell under normal usage to prevent corrosion of
the pillar above the hd. All cells are pressure tested
prior to despatch, to check the integrity of the seals.
2.3.11 Intercell connectors
Similar to the terminal pillars, single, twin and triple
intercell connectors are provided depending on the cell
capacity. These are usually of lead-plated high con­
ductivity copper, combining corrosion resistance and
minimum resistance/maximum current flow. For cor­
rosion reasons, bolt sets provided with each cell are
heavily cadmium plated.
Intercell connectors for the seismically-quahfied bat­
teries used in nuclear power stations are made in flexi­
ble insulated braid, instead of solid connections.
2.3.12 Polarity identification
A + (plus) sign is moulded into the lid in a minimum
of two positions adjacent to the positive pillar, which
is also identified by a red terminal ring (dependent
on the manufacturer); negative pillars are similarly
identified with a blue ring and at the option of the
manufacturer with a - (minus) sign moulded into the
lid.
2.3.13 Electrolyte
The cells are provided with pure sulphuric acid having
a specific gravity of 1.207 at 20°C when fully charged
and with the electrolyte at m a x i m u m level. For des­
patch from works, they can be filled with acid and fuhy
charged ready for immediate service after a short
refresher charge or, as sometimes used for overseas
destinations and the larger cehs for UK service, they
are shipped assembled but unfilled and uncharged.
755
Emergency supply equipment
2.3.14 Battery stands
Battery stands can be constructed of high quality knot-
free timber and finished with three coats of acid-
resisting paint. Ahernatively, steel stands w h h an acid-
resistant epoxy coating can be provided. Each stand
module is fitted with adjustable nylon feet to allow
for any variation in floor finish and for insulation.
Batteries can be arranged in single tier or double tier,
with single rows for positioning against walls or twin
rows where access can be provided from both sides.
Where seismically-qualified batteries are provided
for nuclear power stations, they are accommodated on
special seismic stands using mild steel. They are
constructed in a similar manner to the normal stand
but use larger cross-section material and additional tie
bars. Each module is bolted to the floor.
2.3.15 Chemistry
The fundamental parts of the lead-acid Planté cell are
two dissimilar plates or electrodes immersed in an
electrolyte, i.e., positive plate (lead dioxide), negative
plate (spongy lead) and dilute sulphuric acid electrolyte.
Cell on discharge
Assuming the cell is fully charged, the sulphate ions
from the electrolyte move to the negative plate and
give up their negative charge when an external load is
connected across the cell terminals. This produces an
excess of negative charge at the plate, which is relieved
by a flow of electrons via the load to the positive
terminal, i.e., from low potential to higher potential,
which is opposite to the conventional direction of
electric current. This passage of surplus electrons allows
more sulphate ions to combine whh the lead in the
negative plate to form lead sulphate.
At the positive plate, the highly oxidised lead di­
oxide is short of negative charge, so it readily accepts
the electrons from the negative plate via the load.
Hydrogen ions from the electrolyte now combine with
oxygen ions from the plate to form water. This leaves
some lead-free to combine with the sulphuric acid to
form lead sulphate and more water.
As the discharge proceeds and current continues to
flow, more lead sulphate is formed in both plates by
combination of the acid from the electrolyte. Water
is also produced, which helps to dilute the electrolyte,
and it is this progressive weakening of the electrolyte
by formation of water which provides a convenient
way of measuring the amount of discharge taking
place. The ceh is discharged when hs vohage falls ra­
pidly: at this stage, most of the active material has been
converted to lead sulphate and the plates are almost
identical in chemical composition.
Cell on charge
To reverse the chemical changes which take place in
the ceh during discharge, it is necessary to pass a D C
756
Chapter 9
current into the cell in the opposite direction to that
of discharge.
The charging source must therefore have a voltage
greater than that of the cell or battery to be charged.
The charging source connected across the cell supplies
an excess of negatively charged electrons to the negative
plate and creates a shortage at the positive plate. The
resuh is that poshively charged hydrogen ions are
attracted to the negative plate, where the hydrogen
combines with lead sulphate to form lead and acid.
The shortage of charge produced at the positive plate
resuhs in sulphate ions being attracted and combining
with the hydrogen of the water to form sulphuric acid.
This releases the oxygen ions in the water, some of
which combine with the lead of the positive plate to
form lead oxide. At the negative plate, the process of
recombination of the hydrogen and sulphate continues
as long as there is sulphate present. When the process
of conversion of lead sulphate to lead is almost com­
plete, hydrogen bubbles form at the negative plate and
rise through the electrolyte. This is known as 'gassing'.
Similarly, sulphate ions react with water at the posi­
tive plate, forming sulphuric acid and leaving oxygen
to react w h h lead to form lead dioxide. When most of
the lead is converted, the oxygen appears as gas at the
positive plate. The formation of hydrogen and oxygen
gas at the plates is a sign that the cell is reaching the
fully charged condition.
As the charge proceeds, acid which is released from
the plates passes into the electrolyte and the specific
gravity slowly increases. Measurement of the specific
gravity of the electrolyte during the course of a charge
does not give a true indication of the charged condition
of the ceh or battery. It is not until gassing commences
that the stronger acid, hberated from the plates, is
mixed w h h the weaker acid at the top of the ceh. Spe­
cific gravity readings can therefore be of value only
towards the end of the charge, when constancy of
readings indicates that all strong acid has been liberated
from the plates and the ceh is fully charged.
Although some gassing is necessary to bring into
circulation the strong acid released during the charge,
excessive and prolonged gassing can in time shorten
the life of a battery by scouring the active materials
at the surface of the plates.
Hydrolysis of the electrolyte resuhs in loss of water
which must be replaced by adding more pure water
from time to time. The demands of a battery as re­
gards the a m o u n t of topping-up water required, when
working at known duty are a good guide to correct
charging. Excessive water consumption usually means
overcharging, whilst too little means undercharging.
The chemical reaction can be expressed as follows:
Discharged Charged
PbS04 + PbS04 + 2H2O Pb02 + Pb + 2H2SO4
Lead Lead Diluted Lead Lead Sulphuric
sulphate sulphate electrolyte dioxide acid
Positive Negative Positive Negative

The arrows are used instead of an ^equals' sign to
indicate that the reaction is reversible.
It will be appreciated that the normal working of
a battery produces lead sulphate at both positive and
negative plates, which are reconverted to their original
condition by charging. 'Sulphated' is the term usually
applied to a battery which has been abused by under­
charging or left in a discharged condition for long
periods, when the plates become excessively sulphated,
lose porosity and develop a high resistance. In this
abnormal condition, the sulphated plates will not usu­
ally accept a charge.
The important feature of the lead-acid Plante cell
is the pure lead of the positive plate. The use of this
plate ensures that any active material shed during the
working routine is reformed on the plate surface by
the regeneration of the base lead. During the life of
the cell, lead dioxide is gradually lost from the plate
laminations forming sediment in the container and is
made good by conversion of the underlying surface to
lead dioxide during the normal charging and discharg­
ing of the ceh. This ensures that full cell capacity is
always available through h s hfe.
2.4 Battery accommodation
Batteries mounted on stands as described in Section
2.3.14 of this chapter, are normally accommodated
in rooms specifically designed for this purpose and
for their exclusive use. Figure 9.3 shows a typical
arrangement.
2.4.1 General requirements
Battery rooms are well ventilated and dry, with wall and
ceihng finishes durable and free from flaking and corro­
sion. They are generally treated with an acid-resistant
paint. This also applies to any metalwork within the
room.
Floor finishes are generally antistatic. They are laid
level beneath batteries and access areas. Elsewhere they
slope to a drain constructed of acid-resistant materials
a n d / o r have a retaining sill across internal door sills.
The battery r o o m can conveniently house all the
maintenance equipment, protective clothing and serv­
ices. A water tap and porcelain sink is provided in each
battery r o o m .
2.4.2 Ambient temperature
Since battery capacity and performance is reduced by
low temperature, a minimum electrolyte temperature
of 5°C is maintained as a general rule. However, in
nuclear power stations, where reduced capacity could
affect the safe shutdown of a reactor, a minimum
temperature of 15°C is maintained by thermostatically
controlled heaters of the totally-enclosed tubular type.
Whilst batteries are capable of operating in an am­
bient temperature of 35°C, w h h occasional excursions
to 40°C, these high temperatures are avoided, as they
Batteries
lead to greater evaporation of water from the electrolyte
and a significant reduction in service hfe.
2.4.3 Ventilation
Adequate ventilation is provided in all battery rooms to
keep the concentration of hydrogen gas in the room
within safe limits. It must be remembered that hydrogen
is lighter than air and diffuses upwards very rapidly.
Because of the potential unreliability of forced ven-
thation, battery accommodation is designed, wherever
possible, for natural ventilation.
Although hydrogen and oxygen will diffuse into the
air within the battery r o o m , it should be borne in
mind that the hydrogen forms an explosive mixture with
air when the hydrogen concentration by volume exceeds
about 4 % . The aim of the ventilation system is there­
fore to maintain the average concentration below l^o,
but concentrations above this level will occur in the
immediate vicinity of the ceh t o p s . BS6133 Appendix A
gives a typical calculation to arrive at the required
number of air changes.
The number of air changes is arranged to dilute
the average concentration of hydrogen to less than 1%.
The ventilation outlets venting to the open air are at
the highest level in the battery r o o m . Ceilings are sloped
towards them, to aid the escape of hydrogen. False
ceilings and unvented structural pockets in ceilings are
avoided. Air inlets are usually provided at the bottom
of the r o o m on the opposite side from the outlets to
ensure that air recycling cannot take place and that the
venthation flow is through the r o o m and across the
cells themselves.
Where mechanical ventilation is unavoidable, fans
must be acid-resistant, with totahy-enclosed motors,
and installed at the outlet of any ducting which itself
is made of materials resistant to acid corrosion. It is
essential that the ventilation system on the outside of
such a r o o m is exclusive to the battery r o o m .
2.4.4 Lighting
It is normal practice to provide corrosion-resistant
luminaires in battery r o o m s . Mounting directly over
cells is avoided, to prevent accumulation of hydrogen
in the luminaire with consequent risk of explosion.
2.4.5 B a t t e r y m a i n c o n n e c t i o n s in b a t t e r y r o o m s
Connections within the battery rooms and to the outside
are made of suhably-sized sohd copper rod identified
at intervals with acid-resistant red/black paint (or tape)
for positive/negative connections, respectively. They
are supported on suitable stand-off insulators mounted
on battery r o o m walls or on extensions of battery
stands. The supports are designed to withstand the
electromagnetic forces experienced in the event of an
inadvertent short-circuit.
The main connections to the D C switchgear are taken
from the battery via through wah bushings to a top-
757
Emergency supply e q u i p m e n t Chapter 9

ROOF SLOPED TO AID VENTILATION

VENTILATION AIR
TO ATMOSPHERE

PVC COVERED COPPER ROD

CLAMPED TO WALL /
/
/ HI*] //
/ /
/ /
/ /
/ +ve
/
/ /
/ /

/
1456 MAX
1363 MAX
π /
/
/
610 954
H Ν
joo_
H RI n n
A 100 MIN
MIN MAX MIN MAX MIN MAX M'N MAX
ELEVATION A - A'

^-1

BATTERY
SINGLE ROW
DOUBLE TIER

BATTERY 2 ROWS BATTERY DOUBLE

OF DOUBLE ROW DOUBLE TIER STANDS ROW DOUBLE TIER STAND

1800 MIN

SINK/BENCH

BATTERY ROOM PLAN

FIG. 9.3 Typical layout and environmental requirements of a battery room

758
 Batteries

WALL B U S H I N G

BATTERY SWITCHGEAR

100 M I N
ELEVATION Β - B*

B A T T E R Y C A P A C I T Y (Ah)
80 120 160 200 240 320 480 720 880 1120 1360 1600
AT 3 H O U R R A T E A T 2 0 ° C

B A T T E R Y C A P A C I T Y (Ah) 100 150 200 250 300 400 600 900 1100 1400 1700 2000
AT 10 H O U R R A T E A T 1 5 ° C
LENGTH 134 172 210 248 286 362 257 307 357 433 509 585
WIDTH 203 203 203 203 203 203 368 368 368 368 368 368
CELL HEIGHT 423 423 423 423 423 423 682 682 682 682 682 682
DIMENSIONS
H E I G H T kg 186 249 306 369 434 584 106 156 190 240 290 340
PITCH FACE T O FACE 140 178 216 256 292 368 267 317 367 443 519 595
PITCH EDGE TO EDGE 228 228 228 393 393 393
FACE T O LENGTH 1680 2136 2592 3072 3504 4416

24 C E L L S FACE WIDTH 400 400 400 400 400 400

SINGLE ROW EDGE TO LENGTH 2736 2736 2736
D O U B L E TIER
EDGE WIDTH 407 445 521
W E I G H T kg 447 598 735 886 1042 1402
FACE T O LENGTH 1860 2492 3024 3584 4088 5152
54 C E L L S FACE WIDTH 680 680 680 680 680 680
DOUBLE ROW EDGE TO LENGTH 3192 3192 3192
D O U B L E TIER
EDGE WIDTH 724 832 954
W E I G H T kg 1005 1345 1653 1993 2344 3154
FACE T O LENGTH 1960 2492 3024 3584 4088 5152

105 C E L L S FACE WIDTH 1970 1970 1970 1970 1970 1970

2 X DOUBLE ROW EDGE TO LENGTH 3192 3192 3192
DOUBLE TIER
EDGE WIDTH 2058 2274 2518
W E I G H T kg 1953 2615 3213 3875 4557 6132
FACE T O LENGTH 2240 2648 3456 4096 4672 5888
125 CELLS FACE WIDTH 1970 1970 1970 1970 1970 1970
2 X DOUBLE ROW EDGE TO LENGTH 3648 3648 3648
D O U B L E TIER
EDGE WIDTH 2058 2274 2518
W E I G H T kg 2325 3113 3825 4613 5425 7300
SINGLE ROW FACE TO FACE 370 370 370 370 370 370
STILLAGE W I D T H EDGE TO EDGE 435 510 585
FACE TO LENGTH 7210 8560 9910 11960 14015 16055
105 C E L L S FACE WIDTH 2390 2390 2390 2390 2390 2390
2 X DOUBLE ROW EDGE TO LENGTH 10610 10610 10610
SINGLE TIER
EDGE WIDTH 2650 2650 3250
W E I G H T kg 11130 16380 19950 25200 30450 35700
FACE T O LENGTH 8550 10150 11750 14180 16610 19040
125 CELLS FACE WIDTH 2390 2390 2390 2390 2390 2390
2 X DOUBLE ROW EDGE TO LENGTH 12580 12580 12580
SINGLE TIER
EDGE WIDTH 2650 2950 3250
W E I G H T kq 13250 19500 23750 30000 36250 42500

ALL D I M E N S I O N S IN mm

FIG. 9.3 {cont'd) Typical layout and environmental requirements of a battery room

759
Emergency supply equipment
entry fuse switch unit mounted immediately outside
the battery r o o m . Cable connections to the respective
chargers or distribution boards are all made at the
bottom of these fuse swhch u n h s .
2.4.6 Access to battery rooms
Access doors to battery rooms should be locked from
the outside of the room at all times, except when work
is carried out within the r o o m . Emergency exit doors
must be provided with a quick release device on the
inside, operative at ah times, even when locked from
the outside.
To prevent damage to cells, battery rooms must not
be used as access routes to other areas.
2.5 Initial tests, charging, maintenance and
site testing
The capability of a battery system to meet emergency
demands throughout its life depends on the condition
and state-of-charge of the battery installation. C E G B
guidelines ensure that operators can have confidence
in the capabihty of a battery to meet an emergency
demand.
Planté cehs basically dehver 100% capacity after
initial preparation and charging. Their end of life is
not predictable by relating capacity to years of service.
They would normally deliver 100% capacity through­
out their life which, if they are on charge/discharge
cycling operation, can be in the order of 500/600 full
cycles. On float charge service, the life is usually de­
pendent on the manner in which the cells are managed.
It can be judged from the physical state of the battery,
coupled with knowledge of cell electrolyte specific
gravities, vohages and related data. Such data can best
be assessed by a speciahst from the C E G B or by a
manufacturer.
2.5.1 T e s t s in m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s w o r k s
Tests on batteries in manufacturer's works can be di­
vided into two categories:
• Type tests.
• Routine tests.
Type tests are usually carried out on a representative
sample of cehs of a new design and provide a means
of proving the design characteristics. Routine tests are
less searching in character and are usually confined to
estabhsh that a ceh has been assembled correctly.
Type tests
Dependent on the total number of cehs, one or more
cells of each type and size are fully charged. After a
period of not less than 12 h and not more than 18 h
during which the cells are disconnected from the sup­
ply, they are subjected to a discharge appropriate to
760
Chapter 9
the emergency loads specified for the particular battery.
During the discharge, records of voltage, temperature
and specific gravity are taken and plotted against time.
At the end of the discharge, the cell voltage must
be such that, for a complete battery of such cehs, the
total vohage must not be less than that specified.
The cells used above are then charged at the specified
starting rate to a cell voltage of 2.3 V and from this
voltage at the specified finishing rate to a cell voltage
of 2.7 V. Vohage, temperature and specific gravity are
recorded and plotted against time. The time required
to charge the battery must not be longer than that spe­
cified. Starting and finishing rates are given in Section
2.5.3 of this chapter.
During the foregoing tests the specific gravity must
be maintained within specified upper and lower limits.
Electrolyte must not be added during discharge. After
charging the specific gravity may be adjusted to the
specified normal figure.
In order to ensure that the cell lid is correctly bonded
to its container, an air leakage test at an appropriate
pressure is carried out. N o loss of pressure must take
place over a specified period.
Routine tests
Apart from a visual examination, the only routine test
carried out on each cell in the manufacturer's works
is the air leakage test described above.
2.5.2 T e s t s a t site
After erection and initial filling with electrolyte and
charging, a discharge test to demonstrate the 3 h rated
capacity is carried out on each battery. For this, the
manufacturer provides a resistive load frame, as it is
unlikely that load is available in the power station at
that stage. A discharge characteristic of voltage against
time is plotted. On completion, the battery is fuhy
recharged.
Further tests are carried out in conjunction with the
associated chargers and are described in Section 4.4.4.
of this chapter.
2.5.3 Charging
Float charging
The method of operation for all the battery systems
is known as afloat charging' which means that the
charger, the battery and the D C standing (i.e., con­
tinuous) load are all connected in parallel. The charger
output vohage is such that the battery vohage is held
constant at a voltage of 2.25 V per cell. This is the
optimum floating voltage, resulting in the longest pos­
sible life alhed to the minimum maintenance require­
ments. Assuming the battery is fully charged to begin
with, h wih take sufficient 'trickle' charge from the
charger at the above voltage to ensure it is maintained
in a fully charged condition.

The charger is sufficiently rated to supply the D C
system standing load and recharge the battery. The
sole purpose of the battery, w h h the charger in service,
is to supply any peak loads such as circuit-breaker
closing solenoids which are in excess of the charger
capacity. The capacity removed from the battery by
these short duration loads is normally replaced by the
charger automatically. However, emergency or acci­
dental discharge in excess of 5 - 1 0 % of the 10-hour
rated capachy of the battery may over-discharge it;
boost charging would then be required.
Boost charging
The quickest and best way of recharging a battery after
a discharge amounting to more than 5 - 1 0 % of the
10-hour rated capacity of the battery is to raise the
battery ceh vohage from hs floating value of 2.25 V t o
a maximum of 2.7 V. This is commonly known as 'boost
charging'. It involves isolation of the battery and its
associated charger from the load, because the voltage
imposed on the load may exceed the upper limit of its
design vohage.
At the commencement of recharge, the charger input
current to the battery is hmited t o 14% of hs 10-hour
capacity, called the starting rate, u p to a cell voltage of
2.3 V, i.e., the gassing point. The current is then man­
ually reduced to 7 % of the 10-hour capacity, called the
finishing rate, for the remainder of the recharge in order
to hmit the a m o u n t of gassing from the cell and to pre­
vent damage to the plates. Charging is continued, taking
specific gravity and voltage readings, until they become
sensibly constant over a period of three hours and all
cehs are liberating gas bubbles in similar a m o u n t s . T h e
system is then returned to normal float charge.
Boost charging enables a fully discharged battery to
be recharged in 10.5 h, whilst a battery discharged at the
15-minute rate would be completely recharged in ap­
proximately four h o u r s . The length of time taken to
recharge a particular battery obviously depends on the
ampere-hour capacity taken out of the battery during
the emergency discharge, i.e., the load, the duration and
the final battery vohage at the end of the discharge.
A n important point to note is that a battery can
be over-discharged and permanently damaged. The D C
loads must be disconnected at the end of the design
duty to prevent any possibihty of this occurring. Bat­
teries must not be discharged past a specific gravity
specified by the manufacturer, typically 1.170.
Limited voltage recharging
Instead of boost charging after an emergency or
accidental discharge amounting t o m o r e than 5 - 1 0 %
of the 10-hour rated capacity of the battery, it is
possible to recharge a battery fully at a limhing volt­
age of 2.25 V per ceh, but this is not ideal and is not
recommended.
Recharging under these conditions may produce
stratification of the electrolyte, as the battery cell volt­
Batteries
age is always less than the gassing point of the cell
at 2.30 V per ceh. Stratification produces a higher
specific gravhy at the b o t t o m of the cells than at the
t o p because the water in the electrolyte has a lower
density than the acid. This stratification will eventually
disappear after about one to two months w h h con­
tinual float charge at 2.25 V per cell and the electrolyte
will become fully mixed, providing further discharges
have not taken place.
A further objection to this method of charging is
the increase in time t o achieve a fully charged battery.
The following approximate recharge times could be
expected:
Previous discharge, as a
percentage of normal Recharge time
battery capacity at (hours)
10-hour rate, %
25 10
50 24
75 42
100 72
As the charger automatically maintains the float charge
rate at a nominal 2.25 V per ceh (see Section 4.2.2
of this chapter), the battery would be approximately
7 6 % recharged in 12.5 h o u r s , but h would take a
considerable time to put back the remaining percentage
capacity to restore its full capacity for emergency use.
2.5.4 F a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g cell life a n d precautions
to be t a k e n
Loss of active material from the plates due to cyclic
service
Lead-acid cells shed active material in service: when the
m u d spaces below the plates are fuh of debris, creating
short-circuit paths between plates, the whole battery
should be replaced. A correctly designed battery, when
on float charge, should be time expired before the
m u d spaces are fihed.
With clear transparent cell boxes, it is possible to
examine the state of the plates and separators at the
edges of the cells and to check the rate of sludge build­
u p in the m u d space. The end of life would usually
occur when either the sludge has built u p to the plates
in at least one cell or there are other indications of
failure. It is usual for cehs t o be instahed in the edge-
to-edge orientation, i.e., the plates are at right angles
to the lines of cells to facilitate inspection.
Separator failure could cause partial internal short-
circuits: examination of cell electrolyte specific gravity
should indicate this.
Corrosion at the acid/air interface
Corrosion of pihars, group bars and risers at the
acid/air interface is an indication of age. Great care
761
E m e r g e n c y supply e q u i p m e n t
is required when carrying out such examinations, since
it is not unknown for the riser to appear normal on
visual inspection, but for it to collapse and fail when
disturbed.
Corrosion of terminals and connectors
Corrosion of terminals and connectors can occur, but
is avoidable since they are accessible for cleaning,
inspection, preservation and continuity testing.
Failure of the cell container
Safeguards against such failures are:
• Regular inspection of p i l l a r seals and lid/case seal.
• Administrative control of door locks to reduce the
risk of accidental damage, e.g., by battery rooms
being used as access routes.
Contamination of electrolyte
Electrolyte consumables, hydrometers, etc., must be
subject to quality assurance control. Procedures are
specified and care must be taken to adhere to them.
Progressively increasing need for make-up water
A change in the make-up water rate is indicative of
a change in cell chemistry and serves as an indicator
for detailed examination.
Degree of undercharging or overcharging
Correct battery voltage is necessary to obtain maxi­
m u m life from an installation. Chargers are checked
regularly to ensure that the correct float voltage is
maintained.
Boost charging
The condhion at any time and the ultimate life of an
emergency supply battery is influenced by hs state of
maintenance. A boost charge every 2 - 3 years is usual.
The rate and duration of a boost charge follows the
particular manufacturer's recommendations. Details of
the boost charge schedule are included in the operating
instructions.
Duty cycles
The number of charge/discharge cycles in service as
well as the type of duty can determine the ultimate life
of a battery installation, which has otherwise been
maintained correctly.
2.5.5 Inspection
The state of the battery is a good indicator of general
conditions of the D C system and its associated chargers.
Regular visual inspections are a reliable guide to battery
condition and its ability to perform correctly when
called upon in an emergency.
762
Chapter 9
A n inspection routine is usually based on the
following:
• Daily Check overall battery voltage.
• Weekly Check voltage and specific gravity on se­
lected pilot cells per battery, always using the same
cells. Electrolyte levels are noted and recorded and
topped-up, if necessary. A minimum of two pilot
cehs per battery are used dependent on the size of
the battery and are evenly spaced throughout the
total number of cells, e.g., 1, 30, 60 and so on.
• Quarterly Check voltage and specific gravity, and
visually inspect every cell.
• Annually Employ the services of a speciahst to
assess battery and experience over the year.
• Six yearly See Section 2.5.7 of this chapter.
2.5.6 CEGB experience
It is C E G B policy to follow a pattern of routine in­
spection, but the exact routine varies from station to
station. Some stations employ manufacturers to assist
in the assessment of battery conditions.
Generally, the C E G B has followed the recommenda­
tions of the specialists regarding battery replacement
and overall experience has shown this to be a conser­
vative policy in that there is no record of a battery
fahing to fulfil its required duty. Equally, the record
of battery life of up to 30 years has been satisfactory.
2.5.7 T h e case for testing
Experience with Planté cell batteries has been sound
and it is known that cell capacity does not drop until
end of hfe. Nevertheless, it can be argued that dis­
charge testing to establish the capacity of a battery is
a more certain demonstration of hs ability to perform
satisfactorily. However, testing only demonstrates this
at the time of test and at all other times reliance has
to be placed on the inspection routines. In view of this,
the C E G B does not consider h worthwhile to conduct
routine discharge tests, for the sake of the battery
alone (see Section 2.5.10 of this chapter for D C system
tests).
It is important, therefore, to ensure that the in­
spection routines previously outlined, are sufficiently
rigorous and are capable of accurately determining the
state of the battery. This can be attained more posi­
tively by removing one or two cells for dismantling,
followed by closer inspection of all the parts by a
speciahst. The C E G B recommends that two sample
cells are removed from a battery at six-yearly intervals
(or at more frequent intervals, e.g., annually, if the
normal inspection shows that unusual deterioradon has
taken place and that such a check would be prudent).
These removed cells will be unserviceable after the
inspection and therefore new replacement cells will be
required to complete the battery.

After removal from the battery, but prior to dis­
mantling, the removed cells are subjected to a capacity
check at the half-hour rate from a fully charged state.
The half-hour rate is used, since it generally approaches
the duty cycle for which the battery has been installed.
The above policy has been agreed with the Nuclear
Installations Inspectorate for ah C E G B nuclear power
stations.
The points to be examined and the acceptable con­
dhions are given in Table 9 . 1 . The condhions in this
table are applicable to any plate in either of the removed
cehs.
If an adverse condition is identified on one plate
of one ceh only, then a further examination of the
battery wih be conducted. Only if this additional ex­
amination shows the adverse condition to be present
on other plates, should the action indicated for the
condition in Table 9.1 be followed.
2.5.8 End of life
As previously described in Section 2.5.6, the C E G B has
followed a conservative policy on replacement of bat­
teries and has also achieved acceptable battery life. This
policy is continuing. In addition, the requirement to re­
move cells ensures that a closer inspection can be given.
When the cehs reach the conditions indicating that the
battery capacity is likely to fah before the next full
inspection is due, steps are taken to replace the battery.
In general, the practice is to replace the battery when
the need for a one-yearly inspection is identified (see
Table 9.1) as a resuh of the procedure outlined in
Section 2.5.7 above. If conditions prevent this practice
being followed when an annual inspection is required,
then a discharge test at the load duty cycle may be
performed on the complete battery at not greater than
yearly intervals, to help to decide whether replace­
ment may be deferred for the time being. During the
period between discharge tests, the items checked during
an annual inspection are rechecked every six m o n t h s ,
since any deterioration in battery condition could affect
battery capacity.
2.5.9 Uncharacteristic behaviour of odd cells
Occasionally, it may be discovered that one or two cells
exhibit symptoms that are not typical of all the other
cells in a battery. This uncharacteristic behaviour of
odd cehs should not necessarily be taken as an indica­
tion of the unacceptable condition of the whole battery.
These odd cehs wih be discovered by the inspection
routines. The cehs exhibiting non-typical behaviour
should be replaced by new cells. The reason for the
behaviour should be determined to ensure that the
whole battery is not affected.
2.5.10 System tests of essential battery-backed
DC systems
Chapter 1 sets out a test procedure for periodic system
Battery systems
tests of essential battery-backed D C systems. These
tests, which provide a demonstration that the whole
D C system operates within design hmits and can meet
its performance specification, can also be used to give
back-up information on the condition of the battery.
The case for testing Planté cells has already been
discussed in Section 2.5.7 of this chapter, and the point
was m a d e that a test is only a demonstration at the
time of test. Nevertheless, if a system test is to be carried
out, it can be used to give support information on the
Planté cells. It must be emphasised that this is not
an essential test to determine the state of the battery.
The test procedure outlined in Chapter 1, incorporates
three phases:
• Phase 1 — initial setting u p .
• Phase 2 — application of emergency load to battery.
• Phase 3 — recharge of battery.
During the test, the battery parameters shown in Table
9.2 are recorded.
3 Battery systems
3.1 Introduction
D C systems are provided for the following three cate­
gories of equipment:
• Essential equipment needing a D C supply during
normal conditions and also required to operate when
A C supphes have been lost, these two categories
include:
Essential instruments
Control
Switchgear closing and tripping
Telecommunications
Protection
Interlocks
Alarms.
• Standby equipment which only operates when A C
supphes to n o r m a l equipment have been lost, this
category includes:
Emergency lighting
Emergency oil pumps on main plant including tur­
bine-generators and reactor gas circulators, etc.
Other miscehaneous emergency drives.
3.2 Provision of DC systenns
In order to satisfy the categories of equipment hsted
in the previous subsection, the following D C systems
are provided.
3.2.1 220 V DC systems for switchgear closing
It is generally not economical to supply closing sole­
noids from a battery shared with other loads, such as
763
Emergency supply e q u i p m e n t Chapter 9
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764
 Battery systems

TABLE 9.2

DC system test procedure

Period Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3

Battery voltage \ Every γ hour Every γ hour

Battery current Every γ hour Every γ hour

Ambient temperature At start of Phase 2 At start of Phase 3

Immediately prior
Pilot cells to commencement
(a) Specific gravity of Phase 2 Every γ hour Every γ hour
(b) Electrolyte temperature Every γ hour Every γ hour
(c) Voltage Every γ hour Every γ hour

Specific gravity, all cells At or near the end of

Voltage, all cells / Phase 2 , if duration At end of Phase 3
of the phase permits

emergency lighting, emergency D C drives, etc., because
the solenoid operating range is between + 5 % and
- 1 5 % of the rated voltage, whereas the voltage range
of emergency lighting is ± 2 0 % and of motors ± 1 0 %
continuous; - 2 0 % for 30 minutes. If the whole D C
system were designed around the closing solenoids,
then the battery capacity would need to be considerably
higher, typically twice the capacity without the closing
solenoids since the designed voltage range would be
much less. It is therefore generally more economical
to provide dedicated batteries for switchgear closing
solenoids.
Since BS5311 gives 220 V and 250 V as preferred
voltage ratings of solenoids, the C E G B chose the
lower, permitting 105 cells to be used for the 220 V
solenoids instead of 120 cells at 250 V.
A dedicated battery for switchgear solenoids also
offers a distinct advantage with respect to 'blackstart'
capabhity, i.e., complete loss of A C supplies to the
chargers as the result of a Grid failure.
Under these conditions, switchgear could be operated
for many hours, or even several days as n o stand­
ing loads are connected to the battery. A shared bat­
tery would usually only be designed for a 30-minute
capacity.
The system is designed to meet the following criteria:
(a) With the battery on 'float charge', it must be possi­
ble to close any two circuit-breakers simultaneously.
(b) With the battery on 'float charge', h must be possi­
ble to close up to 100 circuh-breakers each day.
There must be sufficient spare capacity in the bat­
tery rating to avoid having to boost-charge it to
meet this duty.
(c) Fohowing a loss of A C supply to the charger, the
battery must be capable of supplying the solenoid
of the highest current-rated single 11 kV circuit-
breaker continuously for 30 s or two 3.3 kV circuh-
breakers simultaneously at the commencement of
battery discharge.
Additionally, it must be capable of closing all other
designated circuit-breakers, such as interconnectors
and emergency p u m p s , to shut down the station in a
safe manner and to restore the supplies following Grid
reconnection. The minimum discharge voltage at the
end of this duty must not fall below 199 V at the bat­
tery fuse swhch terminals.
Following this duty and after restoration of the
charger supply, it is assumed that no loads will be
connected for 10 hours in order to achieve full readi­
ness to meet duties (a) and (b) above.
It should be noted that this system is not necessary
if switchgear closing solenoid mechanisms are replaced
by m o t o r - w o u n d spring-charged closing mechanisms.
The advantages and disadvantages of this choice are
discussed in Chapter 5.
3.2.2 110 V DC systems for switchgear control,
protection and interlocks
These systems provide a secure D C supply for essential
loads, such as:
• Swhchgear and controlgear tripping.
• Switchgear closing, where spring-charged closing
mechanisms are used.
• Interlocks and protection.
• Local control equipment and essential instruments.
Each battery is designed to be capable of supplying its
designated standing and emergency loads for a dis­
charge period of 30 minutes following complete failure
of all incoming A C supplies.
Additionally, each battery is also capable of sup­
plying one-half of its designated standing load for a

765
Emergency supply e q u i p m e n t Chapter 9

discharge period of one hour fohowing loss
charger. This permhs a standby charger to be
nected manually.
The minimum discharge voltage at the end of
duties must not fall below 102 V at the battery
switch terminals.
3.2.3 48 V D C s y s t e m s f o r t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,
plant control and alarms
These systems provide secure supplies for two distinct
categories of equipment:
(a) Telecommunications equipment such as:
• Private automatic exchange (PAX)
• Private automatic branch exchange (PABX)
• Direct wire telephone system (DWTS)
• Radio system controllers
• Control desk telephone equipment
• System operation telecommunications equipment.
(b) D C supplies for essential loads, such as:
• Automatic sequence control equipment
• Alarms and indications at central control room
• Manual control from central control r o o m .
Each battery is designed to be capable of supplying its
designated standing and emergency loads for a dis­
charge period of 30 minutes following complete failure
of all incoming A C supplies.
Additionally, each battery is also capable of sup­
plying one-half of its designated standing load for
a discharge period of one hour fohowing loss of a
charger. This permits a standby charger to be connected
of a The minimum discharge vohage at the end of these
con­ duties must not fall below approximately 211 V at
the battery fuse switch terminals.
these In the unlikely event that A C supplies are not re­
fuse stored by means of diesel generators, it is necessary
to disconnect loads no longer required to permit the
hydrogen-cooled generator emergency seal-oil pumps
to continue to operate for a further 1.5 hours.
Sufficient spare capacity is allowed in the rating of
the battery to avoid having to boost charge it after
a 30-minute discharge period with loads as described
above.
3.3 Duplication of battery/charger systems
T o allow boost charging and maintenance to be carried
out, which requires isolation of the battery/charger
combination from the D C load, they are provided in
duplicate with suitable switching facilities at the D C
switchboard. These permit the two battery/charger
systems to be paralleled before taking one off-load.
3.4 DC system voltage limits
Power station D C systems must be designed to take
account of limits of the load voltage. For good battery
operation it is necessary to charge at the float voltage,
but it is also necessary to discharge the battery down
to a sufficiently low voltage, if the full capacity is to
be released from the cehs.
In order to ensure that the conditions at the termi­
nals of any D C loads are consistent with the require­
ments of Chapter 1, the battery parameters as shown
in Table 9.3 are used.
TABLE 9.3

manually. DC system voltage limits

The minimum discharge voltage at the end of these
System nominal voltage, V 48 110 220 250
duties must not fall below 46 V at the battery fuse
switch terminals. No. of lead-acid cells 24 54 105 125

Float charge voltage, V 54 121.5 237 281.3

3.2.4 250 V D C s y s t e m s f o r e m e r g e n c y lighting (2.25 V/cell)
a n d e m e r g e n c y drives
Minimum discharge voltage
These systems provide secure D C supplies for loads, at battery equipment
termination, V 46 102 199 210.5
such as:
• Emergency lighting (DC luminaires). Off-load boost charge 65 146 283 337
voltage, V (2.7 V/cell)
• Emergency auxiliary drives, such as lubricating oil
pumps for turbine-generators, gas circulators, etc.
• Emergency valve operation.
4 Chargers
• Fire sirens.

Each battery is capable of supplying the designated

total load of all emergency auxiliary drives and the
designated total emergency lighting load, excluding
plant buildings remote from the main station buhding,
for a discharge period of 30 minutes following com­
plete failure of all incoming supplies.
4.1 Introduction
F r o m the remarks made in Section 2.5 of this chapter,
it will be evident that a correct charging procedure is
most important to ensure satisfactory battery hfe and
performance. Modern charging equipment, using A C
supplies, provides safe and flexible control of battery

766

charging ehher automaticahy (float charging) or with
the minimum of manual attention (boost charging).
As well as maintaining the battery at a sufficient state
of charge, the charger must also be capable of sup­
plying the continuous electrical system load (standing
load), leaving peaks and emergency loads t o be supphed
by the battery.
The performance targets of a battery charging system
for heavy duty lead-acid Planté cells in a power station
can be summarised as follows:
• To ensure that the battery is maintained at a suffi­
cient state of charge, without reducing its life or
necessitating undue maintenance.
• To ensure that the output voltage and current of the
complete system are compatible with the connected
electrical load.
• To ensure that adequate system monitoring is avail­
able to the appropriate interface standards.
• To ensure that the battery is recharged after a dis­
charge, sufficiently to perform the specified dis­
charge duty within the specified recharge time.
4.2 Required characteristics
4.2.1 Initial charge
In the manufacture of the lead-acid battery, the plates
are converted to the active state of lead dioxide (posi­
tive plate) and spongy lead (negative plate) in the pre­
sence of dilute sulphuric acid during a process known
as the formation charge.
Fohowing formation, the plates are washed and dried
and assembled into cehs or batteries. After adding
dilute sulphuric acid, and before putting into service,
it is essential to give the battery an initial charge. This
consists of passing a current into the battery for a
number of hours, as recommended by the battery
maker. This charge completes the electrochemical con­
version of any lead sulphate remaining in the plates.
It ensures that the battery starts its hfe in the best
possible condition, so that it is capable of giving rated
capacity and satisfactory performance from the m o ­
ment it goes into service. It also ensures maximum life.
The inhial charge is given to the battery either in the
manufacturer's works or on site (see Section 2.3.13
of this chapter).
4.2.2 Maintaining charge
If the initially charged battery is left disconnected from
load or charging equipment, it wih slowly discharge.
In order to maintain the charge without excessive cur­
rent flow, the charger output voltage must be held
constant at 2.25 V per cell, to replace the small open
circuit losses.
The current/voltage characteristic is non-hnear, i.e.,
a small increase in charging voltage causes a relatively
Chargers
large increase in current. Once the open-circuit losses
have been overcome any more current is unnecessary
for charging and is undesirable (see Section 2.3.15 of
this chapter). Equally, if the vohage is allowed to fall
t o o low, the open-circuit losses will not be replaced and
the battery will slowly discharge.
Thus the charging voltage needs to be carefully
controhed for proper battery maintenance. The hmits
used by the C E G B are ± 1 % about the float voltage
for a charger load between 0 % and 100% of hs rated
current.
The float voltage has a small negative temperature
coefficient which must be allowed for when batteries
are to be used in exceptionally hot environments.
C E G B power station chargers are provided with a
stepless float voltage adjustment from 1.69 V to 2.4 V
per cell m o u n t e d inside the charger cubicle to prevent
unauthorised access and possible maloperation leading
to over or undercharging of the battery.
4.2.3 Charger ratings
In the simplest D C standby power system, the battery
is permanently floated across the system or load in
parallel with a rectifier charger. The float charge rating
must therefore be capable of supplying the sum of:
• The float charge rate of the battery.
• The continuous (standing) load of the system.
In practice, the chargers for C E G B power stations
have to fulfil further duties to provide continuity of
supply, and the systems described in Chapter 1 have
been developed to ensure this.
Summarising these duties, the float charge rating
must be selected from the sums of one of the following
two systems.
Interconnected unit system
• T h e float charge rate of the batteries of two unit
systems.
• The standing load of two unit systems.
• One half of the station system standing load.
Interconnected station system
• The float charge rate of two associated batteries.
• T h e standing load of the whole of the station system.
In addition to the above requirements, chargers must
be designed to operate satisfactorily in parahel, to
ensure changeover on-load before a charger is taken
out of service.
4.2.4 Boost charging
There are circumstances when the float voltage can
and should be exceeded. New batteries, those which
767
Emergency supply e q u i p m e n t
have suffered abuse, or those discharged by 5 - 1 0 %
of their 10 h rated capacity will benefit from vigorous
gassing at u p to a boost vohage of 2.7 V per ceh.
For this purpose, a separate constant voltage, variable-
current charger can be provided in addition to the
float charger; or the facilities can be incorporated in
the float charger.
Whichever method is used, boost charging must only
be carried out with the battery disconnected from the
system to avoid applying excessive voltages to equip­
ment on the load side of the charger. T o ensure this,
a float charge/boost charge selector switch must be
provided and interlocked so that the system load must
be disconnected before boost charging.
Since boost charging is always carried out under
supervision the charging current is regulated manually.
The control potentiometer for this purpose is mounted
inside the charger to prevent unauthorised access.
4.2.5 General additional requirements
Output voltage ripple
It must be possible to operate chargers without bat­
teries. Under this condition, the D C voltage ripple must
not exceed 10% peak-to-peak of the battery float volt­
age under loading condhions over the range 0 to 100%
rated output.
Power supplies
The fohowing power supphes for the input to the
chargers are normally provided in a power station:
• 415 V, three-phase, 50 Hz, sohdly earthed neutral.
• 240 V, single-phase, 50 Hz, solidly earthed neutral.
In general, the 415 V three-phase supply is preferred to
ahow distribution of the load evenly across the phases,
but the 240 V single-phase supply can be used to an
upper hmit of 16 kVA.
The supply is normally maintained within + 6 % and
- 1 0 % of the nominal voltages and whhin the fre­
quency range of 49.5 to 51 Hz.
Chargers must be capable of continuous operation
at their rated output with any combination of the
above voltage and frequency limits.
In addition, chargers must be capable of contin­
uous operation over the above voltage range at an
output which decreases pro rata with frequency below
49.5 Hz down to 47 Hz. Operation below 48 Hz wih
not be for periods longer than 15 minutes at any one
time.
Supply voltage transients
Chargers must be capable of operating from a sup­
ply vohage which is 2 0 % low for up to 90 s to cover
the starting of large motors, the frequency being whhin
the limhs of 47 to 51 H z . Under these conditions.
768
Chapter 9
the charger must not be damaged, nor must it mal­
function.
During extreme transient conditions caused by ex­
ternal system faults, the voltage at the supply terminals
to the charger may be lost for up to 0.2 s, followed
by initial recovery to 6 0 % for 3 s and then 8 0 % for a
period not exceeding 3 min. Under these conditions,
the charger must not be damaged, but its probable
performance, whilst not critical, must be assessed by
the manufacturer.
Rectifiers
Rectifiers used in C E G B power stations are of the
fuh wave bridge type, employing ehher sihcon junction
diodes or thyristors.
In order to ensure a long hfe for the rectifier it is
vhal that the junction temperature of the diode/thyristor
is limhed. In order to achieve this, the diode/thyristor
and heat sinks must be rated by the manufacturer to
carry 200% of the load current continuously when
operating in an ambient air temperature within the
cubicle of 55°C, without exceeding the maximum junc­
tion temperature of the diode/thyristor as quoted by hs
manufacturer. In other words, under normal operating
conditions the diode/thyristor is only half-loaded, with
a considerably reduced junction temperature.
Internally to each charger, individual diode/thyristor
fuses are fitted to provide protection in the event of
diode/thyristor failure. They are special high speed
fuses, specifically designed for use with semi-conductor
rectifiers because of the latter's low \H capability.
These fuses are provided with striker pins which, when
the fuse ruptures, operate a microswitch to illuminate
a warning lamp to locate the rectifier arm in which
fahure has occurred and give an alarm (see Section 4.2.8
of this chapter).
T o protect the rectifier against vohage surges, inverse
or otherwise, from the input or the load that may occur
in service, surge suppression circuits are incorporated
and fitted with alarm type fuses as described above.
Transformers and chokes
These are usually of the naturally air-cooled type
with class F non-hygroscopic insulation to BS2757. In
order to ensure a long hfe, the temperature rises are
limited to those appropriate to class Β insulation.
T o allow for input voltage adjustment, bohed hnks
are fitted to p e r m h vohage variation of ± 5 % in 2 τ %
steps.
Electronic equipment
Ah electronic equipment is designed to comply with
the C E G B General Specification for Electronic Equip­
ment, EES 1980, suitable for Class B3 conditions w h h
an ambient temperature range of 0 ° C to 40°C outside
the cubicle. The electrical environmental class is taken
as X which is 'mild' and generally applicable to plant
rooms.

4.2.6 Earthing
All D C standby power systems at 110 V and above
have positive and negative poles insulated from earth.
An earth leakage detection system is provided incor­
porating a resistor connected across the battery and
with a centre tap to which a detection relay is connected
to earth. This ensures that an earth fault occurring on
one pole of the system does not blow a fuse, but can
be readily detected for remedial action before another
earth fault occurs. Fuses for outgoing circuits are
provided in the positive pole and withdrawable links
in the negative pole.
48 V D C standby power systems have their positive
pole sohdly earthed. Fuses for outgoing circuits are
provided in the negative pole only.
4.2.7 Protection and monitoring
Overvoltage protection
Chargers are provided with an integral voltage sens­
ing device, measuring vohage at the charger output
terminals. Should this vohage rise significantly above
the normal float voltage of the battery, the circuit is
arranged to shut down the charger and provide an
alarm. This device must be disabled during boost
charging.
Low voltage detection
To warn of load failure due to insufficient vohage, a
low voltage detection device is provided to give an
alarm. This enables batteries to be disconnected to
avoid damage due to excessive discharging.
Battery circuit monitoring
Corrosion of the group bars joining groups of positive
or negative plates could eventually lead to an open-
circuited battery if not detected in time by »egular
inspection. Modern C E G B power stations are fitted
with battery continuity monitoring devices to provide
an alarm if an open-circuit occurs, which could serious­
ly jeopardise important D C supplies, e.g., switchgear
tripping.
4.2.8 Alarms
Each charger is provided with the following alarms
which can be displayed by indicating hghts or alarm
facias on the charger cubicle:
• Charger failure (loss of A C supply).
• Charger shutdown on D C system overvoltage.
• Rectifier fuse failure.
• Surge circuit fuse failure.
• Over-temperature and cooling fan failure (when
forced coohng is provided).
• Battery open-circuit.
Chargers
• Battery earth fault.
• Battery vohage low.
• Battery on boost.
Since charger cubicles are generally located in un­
attended r o o m s , it is important that the central con­
trol r o o m is m a d e aware when any of the above faults
occur. Usually, the control r o o m engineer cannot take
direct action to rectify the fault and can only direct
an auxiliary plant attendant t o investigate locally. The
above alarms, with the exception of 'battery on boost'
and 'battery open-circuit', are therefore grouped on
a c o m m o n facia in the central control r o o m titled
'battery/charger fault'. This keeps the number of facias
whhin bounds and reduces the workload of the con­
trol r o o m engineer. The 'battery on boost' and 'battery
open-circuit' alarms are considered sufficiently vital
for the control r o o m engineer to be informed sepa­
rately, to indicate that the battery is not available
for load or to enable him to take more urgent action.
4.2.9 Nuclear safety
In the event of a seismic disturbance, whilst it may not
be feasible t o continue t o operate a nuclear reactor on
load, h must be possible to shut h down safely and
avoid a nuclear hazard. In such an event, batteries and
chargers play an important role, since there may be a
complete failure of Grid supplies.
All equipment involved must therefore be designed
and tested to withstand a seismic disturbance of spe­
cified severity.
4.3 Description of equipment
4.3.1 Introduction
In order to fulfil the requirements outhned above,
chargers of varying ratings are provided for the many
diverse loads and battery capacities. The equipment
for an individual charger is usually contained in a
venthated steel cubicle with a hinged front door; it
can be divided into the following groups:
• Magnetic components and filters, e.g., main trans­
former, D C filter choke and fiher capacitors.
• Thyristor and diode stacks.
• Control b o a r d . This printed circuit board comprises
all circuits for the control of the rectifier and alarm
systems.
• Display. This is normally fitted to the door and
gives visual indications of various conditions and
alarms, together with facilities for switching.
Since most of the components of chargers are similar
and vary mainly in size, the details of a typical charger
are given in the following sections.
769
E m e r g e n c y supply e q u i p m e n t
4.3.2 Basic principles
Figure 9.4 shows a simphfied block diagram of a
typical charger. Single or three phase versions are
available, but the basic principles are similar. More
detailed descriptions of some of the items are given
in subsequent subsections.
Mains transformer
This provides the power for the basic rectifier and
isolates the mains from the rectifier. It is designed
to give a voltage and current output compatible with
the requirements of the battery and standing load.
Thyristor rectifier
This is similar to a conventional bridge-type full wave
rectifier, with thyristors replacing the diodes. Using the
control board, the output is controlled by regulating
the proportion of time during which the thyristors
conduct in each half-cycle period.
Control board
This printed circuit board monitors various parameters
associated with the operation of the rectifier by com­
paring them with preset standards. The results are used
to regulate the conducting time of the thyristors so
that the rectifier output voltage is maintained at the
correct level.
Reference transformer
This has two functions:
• To provide power for the power supply section of
the control board.
• To provide a reference voltage for use as a datum in
the thyristor control circuits of the control board.
DC voltage and current transformers
These provide isolated D C outputs from D C sources
suhable for use with integrated circuhs.
The basic D C current transformer consists of two
identical saturable reactors connected in series-opposi­
tion with a common primary winding. The reactors are
toroidally wound on high permeability (square loop)
magnetic alloy. Figure 9.5 shows the usual practical
circuit.
The D C ampere-turns due to the primary current
wih cause both reactors to saturate. In this condition
their A C impedance wih be low. The application of the
A C excitation current will alter the level of saturation
in each reactor. In a given half cycle, the ahernat­
ing current will drive one reactor further into satura­
tion keeping its impedance low. On the other reactor,
the magnetising forces wih oppose, tending to remove
saturation and current will flow to bring the reactor
just out of saturation. The A C impedance of the reactor
will then go high and wih support the remainder of
770
Chapter 9
the excitation vohage. During the other half cycle, the
roles of the two reactors are reversed.
The resultant output current is an A C near-square
wave, proportional in amplitude to the D C primary
current. This, after rectification, gives the typical
notched D C waveform.
DC filter
This is of the normal choke/capacitor type and reduces
the ripple on the output of the charger to an acceptable
level. A charger operates permanently into a source
of E M F , so current can only flow when the charger
E M F exceeds the battery E M F . This could lead to
very short periods of rectifier conduction, hence very
high peak values of current being fed to the load.
The D C filter extends the periods of conduction and
so reduces these pulse currents, resulting in a con­
siderable reduction in the output current ripple. In
addition, semi-conductor components need not be rated
to carry these excessive peaks.
4.3.3 Main transformer
This is usually of the naturally air-cooled type with three
secondary windings for the three arms of the rectifier.
Allowance must be made in the design to allow for
possible distortion of the voltage waveform due to the
presence of the rectifier, which would increase losses
and therefore produce a higher temperature rise.
4.3.4 Thyristor rectifier
Thyristors are usually of the silicon type mounted
on heat sinks. The larger output thyristors are some­
times provided with forced air coohng to augment the
natural coohng and thus keep temperature rises to
the manufacturer's specification, while keeping heat
sink dimension (and thus cubicle dimensions) within
reasonable limits.
4.3.5 Control board
The control circuits can be sub-divided as fohows.
Voltage feedback This circuit compares the D C out­
put voltage produced by the D C voltage transformer
with a preset value and produces a signal to keep the
output at this level. With normal load conditions, the
voltage feedback circuit fully controls and holds the
charger output voltage to the float voltage setting.
When the total current limit or the battery current
limit is reached, the voltage feedback circuit is over­
ridden and the charger output voltage is reduced by
the current limit circuits, thus limiting the output cur­
rent to the set limit.
On switching power to the rectifier, and until steady
operating conditions are reached, the voltage output
is depressed and steadily ramped u p to float vohage by
the action of a 'soft start' circuit.
 Chargers

MAINS MAIN THYRISTER D.C. VOLTS .LOAD

INPUT TRANSFORMER RECTIFIER D.C. FILTER TRANSFORMER SHUNT •

CONTROL BOARD 1

FIRING PULSE CURRENT

REFERENCE
TRANSFORMER FIRING CONTROL VOLTAGE FEEDBACK

I
I
D.C.
(TOTAL CURRENT FEEDBACKf JATTERY CURRENT FEEDBACiK U l CURRENT
TRANSFORMER
I

ALARM SECTION
1
HV ( g > - " ~ VOLTAGE &
CURRENT
COMPARATOR
LV

BATTERY
POWER DISCHARGE
SUPPLY

FIG. 9.4 Simplified block diagram of a typical charger

DC Total current feedback This circuit measures the

PRIMARY
I CURRENT total current fed into the rectifier bridge. Any con­
dition which causes this current to exceed a preset
IDCCURRENT value will reduce the output voltage until the input
. JTRANSFORMER current is within its hmit.

AC Thyristor firing control In this section, the sum of the

EXCITATION signals from the three feedback circuits above are
VOLTAGE
related to a reference voltage supplied by the reference
BURDEN transformer. This ensures synchronisation with the
AND/OR
SILICON AMMETER mains input voltage. A n output signal is produced,
RECTIFIER ETC.
which controls the firing point of the thyristors in
each half cycle period. This output drives the firing
pulse amplifiers. After firing, the thyristors will con­
tinue to conduct until the voltage across them fahs
to zero. Each thyristor therefore requires two firing
FIG. 9.5 DC current transformer — circuit diagram
control circuits, i.e., one for each half cycle, making a
total of six for a three-phase g r o u p .

Battery current feedback In this circuit, the battery
charging current signal produced by the D C current
transformer is compared w h h a preset value. Current
exceeding this level will reduce the output voltage until
this level is reached.
Firing pulse amplifiers These are simple oscillators
which are switched by the output signals from the
firing control circuhs. Their electrically isolated out­
puts are rectified, producing the D C signals required
to turn on the thyristors. Similar to the firing control

771
Emergency supply equipment
circuits, there are six firing pulse amplifiers for a
three-phase group.
Power supply section This is fed from two secondary
windings of the reference transformer. Each winding
is connected to a rectifier which provides outputs
which vary in magnitude from manufacturer to manu­
facturer, dependent on the design requirements of the
control board. Typical values are + 1 8 V and ±15 V.
These output voltages are fed to the control board
via stabilised voltage regulators. They are also available
for other purposes as required, e.g., alarm circuits.
Alarm section The power supply to this section is
fed via a thyristor with a capacitor/resistor delay to
allow other power supplies to become stabilised, thus
avoiding spurious alarms.
The various alarm signals such as high vohage cou­
pled with high battery charging current and low volt­
age coupled with low battery charging current are
generally obtained by a feedback signal fed into an
amplifier where it is compared with a preset value.
Under normal circumstances, for 'high' alarms, the
amplifer output is negative and the output is blocked.
If the feedback voltage exceeds the preset value an
output signal is produced to energise the alarm on
the front panel display. For 'low' alarms the reverse
applies, i.e., the amphfier output is normally positive
and so on.
4.3.6 Reference transformer
This mains-fed transformer has three secondary wind­
ings, two of which provide the power supplies for the
control board and the third the reference voltage for
the firing control circuits. This transformer is usually
specifically designed with specific ratings and connec­
tions of the secondary windings to suit a particular
rating of charger. It is therefore not interchangeable.
It is particularly important that the phase relationship
to the main transformer is not interfered with, to
ensure the correct order of firing pulses.
4.3.7 DC transformers
The D C voltage transformer obtains the supply for
its power section direct from the mains, and a signal
from the D C output of the charger. It gives an out­
put proportional to the output voltage of the rectifier
to feed the voltage feedback circuit of the control
board.
The D C current transformer requires an input from
the power section of the control board and a signal
of the output current of the charger obtained from a
shunt. It gives an output proportional to the output
current of the charger and feeds the current feedback
circuit of the control board. It also provides an indi­
cation of the battery discharging in the event of a
charger failure.
772
Chapter 9
4.3.8 Display
It is usual for the front door of the charger to carry
the necessary switches, instruments, indication and
alarm displays to enable the operator to ensure that
the constant (standing) load is supplied correctly and
that a fully charged battery is available for emergency
use.
The facilities provided fall into three categories.
Although they can vary in detail from charger to
charger, they generally comprise the fohowing:
Instruments
• Voltmeters to register 'input' and Output' volts.
• Ammeters to register 'input' and 'output' current.
Control devices
• Input isolator — this switch is interlocked w h h the
front door to ensure that the incoming A C supply
is off before the door is opened.
• Output isolator.
Note: Both the input and output isolator can be pad­
locked in the ' o f f position. Dependent on the current
rating of the charger, they can either switch direct or
energise contactors or circuh-breakers.
• F l o a t / b o o s t changeover switch.
• Alarm reset and lamp test pushbuttons.
Alarm devices
The manner of displaying alarms varies from manu­
facturer to manufacturer. The three types most com­
monly employed are:
• Indicating lamps.
• Light emitting diodes.
• Proprietary alarm facias.
The number of alarms displayed varies according to
the complexity of the charger and the requirements of
the C E G B specification for a particular location. A
typical hst was given in Section 4.2.8 of this chapter.
Facilities are also provided by means of clean relay
contacts (i.e., contacts not connected to other circuhs)
to energise alarms in the central control r o o m , as
required.
4.3.9 Battery f l o a t / b o o s t control circuitry
The float/boost swhch on the front door of the charger
can only be operated by means of an interlock key
which becomes available for use when the load is
isolated. This enables the battery alone to be boost
charged. During this operation, the interlock key is
trapped in the float/boost switch to prevent the load
being switched on.

When boost is selected, the vohage reference feed­
back is automatically increased by the float/boost
switch and the current feedback similarly reduced. This
effectively raises the current hmit to the boost charge
starting rate. During this operation, the charger high
voltage alarm is also automatically inhibited. When
the battery reaches the gassing voltage, the current
h m h is changed to the finishing rate.
4.4 Testing
4.4.1 Introduction
Tests on chargers can be divided into two categories:
• Tests in manufacturer's works.
• Tests at site.
The former can be further divided into type tests and
routine tests. Type tests are usually carried out on the
first unit of a new design and provide a means of
proving the design characteristics as well as the correct
functioning of the unit. Routine tests are less searching
in character and are usually confined to establish the
correct functioning only.
4.4.2 T y p e t e s t i n g in m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s w o r k s
It is usual for the manufacturer to submit to the
C E G B , for agreement in good time before the tests
take place, a test schedule including the parameters
to be recorded so that the tests can progress smoothly
and without any delays. This is important with some
of the special tests for which the use of an outside
test organisation may have to be used who usually
charge on a time basis. In-house testing is clearly pre­
ferred, but the extremely high cost of special equipment
coupled with its infrequent use sometimes prohibits
this.
The fohowing is a basis for such a test schedule:
• Visual checks.
• Performance tests and settings.
• Alarm checks and settings.
• Instrumentation checks.
• Electrical stress.
• Output voltage and waveform analysis.
• Smoothing checks.
• Output checks during supply transients and inter­
ruptions.
• Temperature rise test.
• Insulation resistance.
• Soak test.
• Seismic tests (where specified for a nuclear power
station).
Chargers
• Testing of electronic circuit boards and components.
• Final visual inspection and performance test.
Some of the above hems are self-evident, others require
further elaboration.
Output voltage and waveform analysis, and smoothing
checks
The D C output voltage is measured over the load range,
including the most onerous specified load range, and
a harmonic waveform analysis is produced.
Before the tests take place, the manufacturer sub-
m h s fuh details of his calculations of the harmonics
produced by his equipment. H e is required to demon­
strate that due allowance has been made in the trans­
former design for these harmonics and their effect on
the transformer losses.
Visual checks
A complete physical check is carried out to ensure
that the equipment has been provided in accordance
with previously approved drawings, that the appro­
priate clearances to earth and between phases have
been achieved, that components are to the normally
approved C E G B standards, that the necessary shroud­
ing against accidental contact has been provided and
that the equipment is clean, free of dust and swarf.
Performance tests
The voltage and current regulation is demonstrated
throughout the specified load range within the speci­
fied input vohage and frequency variations, and also
transients.
Temperature rise test
The charger, as mounted in service w h h all cubicle
doors and covers in position, is subjected to a tem­
perature rise test by either connecting it to a simulated
load or, for larger equipments, by short-circuiting the
output terminals. When the latter method is employed,
full-load current is applied at reduced voltage to si­
mulate load losses. The equivalent of the open-circuit
losses obtained from an open-circuit test are incor­
porated by increasing the current by a proportionate
amount.
Thermocouples are positioned at hotspots known
from experience, such as the top of the inner trans­
former winding, busbars (particularly joints), thyristor
heat sinks, etc. T h r o u g h o u t the test, readings are taken
at half-hourly intervals and the test is terminated when
two or three sets of readings have been substantially
constant, indicating that maximum temperature rise
has been reached.
During the test, ambient air temperature readings
in three poshions a r o u n d the cubicle are taken and
averaged, as also is the ambient air temperature inside
773
Emergency supply e q u i p m e n t
the cubicle. From these and the thermocouple read­
ings, the appropriate temperature rises are calculated
and compared with specification requirements.
After the temperature rise test, a test is performed
to show that the transformer temperature is satisfac­
tory when producing full output in accordance with
the most onerous specified duty cycle.
Testing of electronic circuit boards and components
Electronic circuit boards (control boards, alarm and
indication monitoring boards, etc.) are tested in ac­
cordance with the type tests listed in the C E G B General
Specification for Electronic Equipment, EES 1980. If
the same design of a board is used in chargers of dif­
ferent ratings, only one series of type tests is necessary
on the printed circuit board. The tests specified ensure
that electronic components will satisfactorily operate
in the temperature and humidity environments stipu­
lated in this specification. By means of ovens, refri­
gerators and climatic chambers, they are subjected to
high and low extremes of temperature and high humi­
dity as may at times occur in service. They are also
subjected to specified vibration levels and drop tests,
simulating the dropping of a printed circuit board onto
a bench, as may occur during maintenance.
Both before and after the tests, detailed performance
tests and a thorough visual examination are carried
out. Throughout the tests, the printed circuit boards
are energised and regular performance checks are car­
ried out to ensure failures are detected at the earliest
possible moment to estabhsh any particular weaknesses
of the design.
Although the above tests can be performed with
the electronic components in situ in the charger, it is
usually more convenient to carry them out separately.
Soak test
During this test, the charger, is energised at normal
vohage for a continuous period of 100 h, as in service,
to detect any 'rogue' electronic components which have
passed all the other tests.
The final performance test, which is identical to
the performance test at the beginning of the type test
series, will indicate any deterioration or failure when
comparing results.
Routine tests as part of type tests
In order to ensure that the routine tests specified for
subsequent units are satisfactory and can be performed
without serious problems arising, they are carried out
on the type-tested u n h . Any difficulties arising can
then be resolved before the further production u n h s
become available, resulting in a saving of time and space
in a test bay.
4.4.3 R o u t i n e t e s t s in m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s worl<s
O n completion of erection, each charger is subjected
774
Chapter 9
to a series of tests designed to ensure that it has been
correctly assembled, that the correct components have
been used and that the equipment functions correctly.
These tests comprise:
• Testing of electronic equipment in accordance whh
routine tests hsted in C E G B General Specification
for Electronic Equipment, E E S 1980.
• Visual examination for similar reasons to that car­
ried out during the type tests.
• Heat run with a limited number of thermocouples
attached to hot spots determined during the type
tests.
• Check on smoothing, insulation, accuracy of in­
struments, correct functioning of swhches, indica­
tions and alarm contacts.
• Insulation resistance of the completed equipment.
• Apphed high voltage test, followed by a further
insulation resistance test to detect any breakdowns
that may have occurred.
4.4.4 T e s t s a t site
These are carried out on each charger in accordance
with C E G B document 099/500 — Site Testing and
Commissioning by Switchgear, Transformer and Re­
actor Manufacturers. Their main purpose is to es­
tablish that the equipment has not been damaged during
transit from the factory to site or during erection. They
also ensure that the charger operates satisfactorily w h h
its associated battery and external load.
The tests can be summarised as follows:
• Visual checks for damage, loose connections, missing
components, etc.
• Presence and values of fuses.
• Insulation resistance to earth.
• Check that A C supply, connections and fuses are
available.
• Check that charger operates n o r m a h y in both 'float'
and 'boost' outputs.
• Fully charge battery and top up electrolyte if ne­
cessary. Connect load equivalent to approximately
5 0 % of charger rating. Swhch off charger. Check
that battery discharges correctly into load (instru­
ment polarities correct, etc.).
• Check that low voltage alarm operates.
• Switch on charger to 'float' and check that it attains
its full rated output and that current limit feature
operates.
• Recheck with charger switched to maximum 'boost'
and check that maximum charger output persists only
for a short time before tapering down.
• Switch charger to 'float' and check that D C output
voltage is within the limits of ± 1 % .

• Check operation of high vohage and earth fauh
alarms.
• Recharge battery fully, record specific gravity and
voltage of each cell and leave charger on 'float' to
keep battery charged ready for use.
5 Diesel generators
5.1 System requirements
5.1.1 Purpose of diesel generator installation
Diesel generators are required in all types of C E G B
power stations to provide back-up electrical supplies to
enable essential auxihary plant to perform its role to
safely shut down, and to maintain in a shutdown con-
dhion, conventional boiler or nuclear reactor and main
generator plant in the absence of Grid supplies.
For instance, at the Dinorwig pumped-storage power
station, on loss of Grid supphes, diesel generators pro­
vide supphes for normal drainage p u m p s , emergency
lighting, battery charging, essential instrumentation,
etc. In addition they enable a main generator to be
restarted and to re-energise the Grid system, known as
'black' station start.
Diesel generators are also specified for the new
generation of 900 M W coal-fired power stations to
maintain essential electrical auxihary supplies during
shutdown conditions in the absence of Grid supplies.
Their most important use, however, is in nuclear
power stations, where they are associated primarily with
reactor cooling water and emergency boiler feed systems
in the event of failure to maintain or re-establish Grid
electrical supphes during reactor post-trip operation.
As batteries are half-hour rated, diesel generators
are, in addition, required to supply battery chargers to
maintain the standing load and to recharge batteries
in readiness for a restart of the reactor/turbine-gen­
erator u n h .
Since the installation of diesel generators in nuclear
power stations is their largest and most important
use by the C E G B , this section gives details of such
installations.
5.1.2 Starting and loading
Under reactor trip conditions (either one or both re­
actors of a two-reactor nuclear power station), all
diesel generators in the station are signalled to start
automatically from the reactor post-trip sequence sys­
tems to run at preset AVR and governor settings, i.e.,
full voltage and speed. Such an emergency start over­
rides any AVR and governor settings selected manually
at the control desks.
In the event that the reactor trip is accompanied
by loss of Grid supplies or should these supplies be
lost while diesel generators are running on open cir­
cuit, they wih be connected to their respective 3.3 kV
Diesel generators
Essential Services Boards, having first estabhshed that
the normal feeds via 11/3.3 kV transformers are open,
together w h h any interconnectors between 3.3 kV
Essential Services Boards which might have been closed
when Grid supplies were lost (see Fig 9.6). Each diesel
generator is associated with its own 3.3 kV Essential
Services Board, thus diesel generators wih not nor­
mally be required to run in parallel with one another.
This avoids synchronising delays in bringing diesel
generators into action.
They must, however, operate satisfactorily in parallel
with the station auxiliary system, as described below.
Should a reactor trip occur when a diesel generator
is running on test under manual control, but otherwise
available for emergency duty, the appropriate circuh-
breakers will be tripped and the emergency start relays
will reset the diesel generator AVR and governor to
the preset emergency running conditions. The diesel
generator is therefore available for loading with others,
as described above.
W h e n a diesel generator has been connected to its
3.3 kV Essential Services Board under reactor trip and
loss of Grid conditions, it will be loaded automatically
in accordance with a preset sequence.
After emergency running, when Grid supplies have
become available, each diesel generator will be con­
trolled manually from its control desk. Under this con­
dition, the diesel generator will be selected to parallel
running to introduce speed and voltage d r o o p char­
acteristics followed by synchronising with the station
auxiliary system energised from Grid supplies. When
running in parallel with the Grid has been achieved,
the diesel generator is then unloaded and shut down.
It will then be available again for emergency duty.
This form of parallel running is also a requirement
for periodic fuh load testing of the diesel generator
in an operational nuclear power station (see Section
5.4.3 of this chapter).
It should be noted that diesel generator auxiliary
supplies are generally obtained from the station 415 V
Essential System which is subject to interruption of
supply for up to 30 s on loss of Grid. Should the
diesel generator be running on test at the instant of
loss of Grid, it should be capable of withstanding the
resultant loss of load, which may be full rated load,
and of running through without auxiliary supplies at
no load for a period of at least 30 s.
Attention is drawn to the need to test the diesel
generators easily and also their initiation devices, to
ensure their availabihty as standby plant.
5.1.3 Rating and number of diesel generators
It is normal C E G B practice for a two-reactor station,
each reactor having four independent quadrants, to
install eight diesel generators to allow for sufficient
redundancy in the event of machines not being avah­
able due to a maintenance outage, failure, or failure to
start.
775
Emergency supply equipment Chapter 9
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The continuous maximum ratings (CMR) are based
on the auxihary system loadings as described in Chapter
1. Typical of the A G R type figures for the Heysham 2
nuclear power station are 5.2 M W for four of the
machines and 6.8 M W for the other four. They also
have 10% overload capabihties of 5.8 M W and 7.5 M W
respectively for 60 min.
In addition to hs continuous rating, each diesel
generator is capable of meeting the transient voltage
and power requirements during direct-on-line start­
ing of individual drives with squirrel-cage induction
motors. These requirements include the starting of
the largest individual drive, such as an emergency boiler
feed p u m p motor, at the end of the loading sequence
initiated under the emergency conditions described
above. Additionally, the tripping of a block load equi­
valent to 3 3 % of the generator C M R rating must not
cause a frequency excursion outside the range of 48
to 51 H z .
The diesel generator systems are engineered to pro­
vide a high degree of reliability and to avoid depend­
ence upon single items of auxiliary equipment. Subject
to deterioration or wear or liability to accidental
damage, adequate auxihary equipment redundancy is
incorporated.
The diesel generators are suitable in all respects for
rapid starting and loading, including 'dead starts', after
being stationary for long periods. They are also capable
of running a significant number of hours at no-load
between periods of routine testing or operation. These
requirements are met without impairing its function
of providing reliable essential electrical supplies.
Engines, generators and auxiliary equipment are, as
far as possible, of standard design of proven rehabihty
over a period of 20 000 running hours and preferably
in service on similar duties.
Diesel generators and their auxiliary equipment are
designed for the following ambient conditions:
Outside
Maximum ambient temperature 40°C
Minimum ambient temperature -25°C
Relative humidity 100%
Inside the diesel house
Maximum ambient temperature 55°C
Minimum ambient temperature
-10°C
Relative humidity
100%
Inside the local control room
Maximum ambient temperature 40°C
Minimum ambient temperature -10°C
Relative humidity 85%
Where diesel generator systems are installed in close
proximity to the sea, due regard is given to corrosion
problems arising from the sah-laden atmosphere.
Diesel generators
Because of its installation in a nuclear power station,
the equipment is suhable for a radiation dose of 0.1
mrad/h.
T h e plant is normally designed for an operating hfe
of 30 years under the conditions of operation described.
Certain items of plant such as seals, gaskets and joints,
cannot be obtained to achieve this hfe. It is therefore
important that the manufacturer declares the presence
of such components and their difficulties. In such in­
stances facilities for easy access and rapid replacement
are usually provided.
Because of the generally high noise levels originating
from diesel generators, stringent requirements are ob­
served with respect to sound reduction by appropriate
design of the diesel house, to ensure that noise levels
in the neighbourhood are kept whhin reasonable h m h s
so as not to cause annoyance to the public. These are
set out in C E G B Standard 989907 — Noise Limits for
New Power Stations.
In addition, air intakes, exhausts and other secondary
sources of noise external to the diesel house, e.g., fans,
require special treatment to comply with the specified
m a x i m u m permissible noise levels.
5.1.4 Protection against external hazards
High winds
The diesel generator system is designed to withstand
the effects of high winds. Adequate supports and re­
straints are provided for those items subject to high
winds. The diesel house is designed to whhstand the
effects and therefore only plant items external to the
buhding are considered, e.g., exhaust stacks, outdoor
m o u n t e d cooler, etc.
Three external hazards are guarded against:
(a) High wind damage — maximum gust of 69 m / s
for 3 s.
(b) W i n d b o r n e missiles, generally considered as a sec­
tion of corrugated aluminium cladding from an
adjacent building, measuring 6 m χ 1 m χ 1.6 m m
travelhng at 50 m / s .
(c) Windborne combinations of seaspray, rain and
snow.
The design provides that the engines will run despite
the effects of these hazards, in particular:
• The starting system must remain functional.
• The fuel supply system must remain functional.
• The air intake must allow full-load running of the
engines at all times.
• The atmospheric coolers must remain intact and
functional.
• The exhaust must remain functional, i.e., unblocked,
although not necessarily intact.
777
Emergency supply e q u i p m e n t
The starting and fuel supply systems are totally pro­
tected against damage from windborne cladding.
The air intake system allows the air flow required
for full power running desphe damage by the wind-
borne cladding a n d possible blockage by windborne
debris. It is capable of removing excessive windborne
seaspray, rain a n d / o r snow such that operation of
the engine itself is protected. It is also capable of
withstanding the strongest wind gust without signifi­
cant loss of efficacy.
Atmospheric coolers can withstand the greatest wind
gust whhout damage and are protected against signi­
ficant damage caused by windborne cladding. They are
also protected against loss of efficiency due to blockage
by windborne debris or snow.
The exhaust system and silencer are not required to
survive the hazards intact but are designed always t o
provide a free passage for exhaust gases, bearing in
mind possible damage caused by high wind or wind­
borne cladding.
These design criteria ensure that the plant remains
running without significant loss of efficiency.
Seismic requirements
Diesel generators are designed to operate after an earth­
quake in order to provide supplies to safely shut down
nuclear reactors within the station.
The magnitude of seismic vibrations can vary from
station to station and also from one floor level to
another within a building. T o enable the manufacturer
to design equipment to withstand seismic vibrations
in combination with normal operational forces, the
necessary details to calculate acceleration forces are
given in the appropriate specification for a station.
Diesel generator systems are designed t o withstand twice
the response accelerations which are calculated from
the acceleration forces in combination with horizontal
and vertical floor response spectra for the particular
building.
The ability of the equipment to withstand seismic
vibration is established preferably by analytical meth­
ods, or by a combination of analysis and low level
induced vibration tests. Where these methods cannot
be used with confidence, items comprising the first
production u n h are subjected to shaker table tests.
The equipment is energised during these tests a n d ,
where practical, it is at normal operating temperature.
Monitoring equipment is used to evaluate the perfor­
mance of the equipment before, during and after these
tests. Fuh particulars of seismic qualification procedure
are contained in the C E G B Technical Specification
and Schedules for Seismic Qualification of Electrical
Plant (E/TSS/EX32000).
Avoidance of common mode failure
In order to avoid common mode failure, the C E G B
always reserves the right to obtain some of the ma­
chines for a particular station from each of two dif­
778
Chapter 9
ferent diesel engine manufacturers. This subject is given
careful consideration during the tender stage, with
particular respect t o the tenderers' information on
proven standard design and reliability and service ex­
perience on similar duties.
Location of diesel generators
Diesel generators are usually located in engine rooms
in pairs, with careful attention to ensuring that failure
of a component or system does not render both diesel
generators inoperable (see Fig 9.7). In particular, where
c o m m o n systems are employed, standby plant and suf­
ficient pipework and valving is provided t o ensure that
alternative supply routes are available for each diesel
generator. Individual services t o each diesel generator
are separated b u t , where it is necessary to run systems
in close proximity, then adequate protection is provided
to each system to prevent c o m m o n failure.
Fire protection
The whole installation is designed to minimise both
the risk and the effects of fire. Nevertheless, accidents
can occur and the diesel generator installation, with
the exception of the bulk fuel storage tanks (see below),
is therefore protected against fire by an automatic
system of high velocity watersprays. It is a design re­
quirement that the operation of the fire protection
system does not adversely affect the operation of a
diesel generator running at the time of operation of
the watersprays. Careful attention to waterproofing
of equipment is therefore essential. Whilst individual
certification of equipment for this condition is not
required, a site test on the completed installation will
subject the running diesel generator to high velocity
watersprays, when any waterproofing deficiencies are
made good.
Any ancillary plant or electrical equipment likely
to be affected by smoke, excessive heat or by the o p ­
eration of the fire protection equipment is located
outside the engine room in a separate plant r o o m .
The fuel oil bulk storage tanks are equipped to
inject low-expansion foam as a fire extinguishing
medium.
5.2 Engine and auxiliaries
5.2.1 Engine types a n d characteristics
The engines specified by the C E G B are of the cold
starting, compression ignition (diesel) type, pressure
charged, operating on a four stroke cycle. The cylinder
configuration is usually a Vee' arrangement a n d , to
obtain long life, the running speed does not usually
exceed 750 r / m i n . In general, they comply with BS5514
and are suitable for use w h h BS 2869 Class A fuel ohs
over the full range of engine operating conditions and
ambient temperatures. A block diagram of a typical
diesel generator system is shown in Fig 9.8.

SNOW COWL
LUB OIL
PRIMING PUMPS
MOTOR DRIVEN
LUB OIL PRIMING
PUMP AIR RECEIVER
DUMP TANK MODULE
AUTO DRAIN PUMP
FIG. 9.7 Side elevation of a diesel house, showing the location of diesel generator and its auxiharies
5.2.2 Engine design and construction
Engine assembly
The engine crankcase and frame are designed to be
extremely robust and rigid constructions, with a pre­
ference for high grade castings rather than a fabricated
construction. Where the latter is employed, careful
attention is paid to the manufacturer's construction,
fabrication and inspection procedures, with particular
reference to quality of welding (see Figs 9.7 and 9.9).
As the engines spend long periods in the station­
ary condition, the manufacturer is required to give
particular attention to the tensile stresses induced in
cast iron components to reduce the risk of long term
creep damage to the engine structure. The C E G B
requires such tensile stresses not to exceed approxi­
mately 2 5 % of the material yield strength w h h the
engine stationary. Allowance is made for the effects
of waterside c o r r o s i o n , which reduces m a t e r i a l
thickness during the life of the plant.
The crankshaft bearing housings can form part of
the bedplate or crankcase. Sheh type, lined, high fatigue
strength main bearings are used. They are split and
arranged so that both halves may be removed without
Diesel generators
SECONDARY JACKET
WATERCOOLING RADIATORS
Η
. FUEL OIL
DAY TANK
NEUTRAL
LOCAL CONTROL 1^ EARTHING
PANEL RESISTOR
FUEL DUMP AIR
RESERVOIR
disturbing the crankshaft. Any thrust bearings that
require periodical adjustment are arranged to facilitate
this operation.
The crankshaft is a one-piece alloy steel forging,
fully machined incorporating oil ways and an integral
driving flange at one end. The whole of the rotating
and reciprocating masses is balanced.
All bearings, pistons, connecting rods, cam shafts,
crankshaft, etc., are accurately machined to standard
sizes. The aim is to ensure complete interchangeability
of components throughout the engines of a particular
size for a particular station a n d , whenever possible,
on a national basis, thus reducing the cost of spares
holdings.
Cylinder blocks are provided with renewable cyl­
inder liners which are separately cooled to minimise
thermal stresses induced by the rapid start require­
ments. Liners are fitted with seals to prevent the
interleakage of oil, water or gases whhin the engine.
Means of detecting failure of the liner lower seals are
provided.
Each cylinder is provided with its own individual
cast iron cylinder head, complete with starting air inlet
valve, aspiration air inlet valves, exhaust valves, pres-
779
Emergency supply equipment Chapter 9

ENGINE CHARGE AIR NEUTRAL 3.3kV 3.3kV ESSENTIAL

HAND SPEED INDUCTION AND AIUlYII
CONTROL tAhi 1 n I N o A A I L IlAAnD Y
V AUX. BOARDS
CONTROL EXHAUST SYSTEM RESISTOR BOARD

EXCITER &
BARRING DIESEL ENGINE GENERATOR
PERMANENT
GEAR MAGNET
GENERATOR

STAFITING PNEUMATIC FUEL LUB. OIL COOLING

AR CONTROL SYSTEM WATER AVR
SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM
SYSTEM

[ELECTRONIC LOCAL PRESSURE & RADIATOR

CONTROL TEMPERATURE DIESEL CONTROL DESK
GOVERNOR FANS
PANEL MONITORING

CENTRAL POST TRIP

CONTROL SEQUENCE
ROOM EQUIPMENT

FIG. 9.8 Block diagram of a typical diesel generator system

sure relief valve, indicator cock and centrally located
fuel injector. The heads have a high resistance to
thermal stresses and are separately cooled to meet the
fast response requirements. Heads are totally enclosed
by individual covers except for the injector, which is
located o u t s i d e to avoid c o n t a m i n a t i o n of t h e
lubricating oil by the fuel oil.
T o facilitate maintenance access, the crankcase is
provided with inspection doors on both sides of the
engine and is vented to atmosphere. Ahogether, the
whole engine is arranged to allow easy and rapid
maintenance with a minimum of special tools.
T o satisfy statutory and personnel safety require­
ments, pressure relief valves and flame traps are fitted.
The engine is cooled by a water cooling system, as
detailed in Section 5.2.4 of this chapter.
Lubrication
The C E G B gives preference to engines operating on a
wet sump system and incorporating a forced lubricat­
ing oil system to provide correct lubrication under all
operating conditions to all surfaces requiring an oil
supply. The exceptions are the generator and exciter
bearings which are separately lubricated (see Section
5.3.1 of this chapter).
The lubricating oil capacity of the engine s u m p /
tank is sufficient for at least 24 h continuous operation
of the engine at rated load w h h o u t make-up.
Occasionally a manufacturer may put forward a
dry sump design, but this must be demonstrated to
be able to maintain a positive suction head on the
lubricating oil pumps at all times.
The main lubricating oil p u m p is of the positive
displacement type directly driven off the engine. The
p u m p takes oil from the wet sump via upstream coarse
strainers.
A standby electrically-driven p u m p , complete with
automatic changeover controls and alarm initiating
devices, is usually provided. The inhiation of the
electrically-driven standby p u m p is at a higher oil
pressure than the *low oil pressure' engine trip setting
to permit continued engine running in the event of
failure of the engine-driven p u m p .
Oil coolers, using water as a cooling medium, are
provided and are designed to avoid contamination of
the lubricating oil by water due to leakage across the
separate oil/water circuits. Interconnecting pipework
is arranged for easy removal of the cooler end boxes
for cleaning the cooler tubes.
Thermostatic control is provided to regulate the
system, safely maintaining the optimum oil temperature
under all conditions of operation.
Because the engine is stationary for long periods, it
is essential to maintain the oil at the optimum tem­
perature for starting. This is achieved by fitting thermo­
statically controhed oil heaters (see Section 5.3.4 of
this chapter).

780
 Diesel generators
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781
Emergency supply equipment
Duplicate full-flow fine filters, with replaceable ele­
ments and onload changeover facilities, are provided.
Drip trays are fitted in this area and in all other
positions of possible oil spillage.
A dirty lubrication oil collection system is provided
in each diesel house to cover each pair of engines.
The tank is sized to contain the sump oil of two en­
gines. Drainage of the sump to the tank is by means
of a portable p u m p and flexible hoses. The tank is
arranged for discharge to a road tanker.
In addition, drainage points are provided at the
lowest points of oh fihers, heaters, coolers, etc. I hese
are arranged to keep oil spillage to a minimum and all
pipework is self-draining. Magnetic drain plugs are
fitted to trap any metallic particles in the lubricating
oh.
A portable lubricating oil centrifuge is provided to
service any of the diesel generators in a station and
is sized to give a minimum of three changes per 24 h
per engine. To facihtate this arrangement, using hoses,
the necessary connections and valves are provided on
each engine.
It will be noted from the above that any draining
or centrifuging of the oil involves the use of hoses. This
requires a deliberate action on the part of maintenance
personnel connecting the two ends of a hose and avoids
the accidental opening of a valve on a fixed pipework
drainage system which could cause an inadvertent
loss of oil endangering the engine and jeopardising hs
availability.
Compression fittings for pipe joints have given trou­
ble in the past because of possible poor workmanship
during assembly. They are reduced to a minimum
nowadays and preferably not used at all in positions
1 m or less from the engine, to avoid the fire risk
caused by oil spraying onto a hot engine.
Lubricating oil priming
When the engine is stationary, oil will drain from
bearings and cylinder liners. This is avoided by supply­
ing these items with oil during stationary periods, either
on a continuous basis or intermittently, controlled by
a timer; this operation is known as priming.
T o safeguard the engine, duplicate (duty and stand­
by) electrically-driven pumps are fitted for each en­
gine, arranged so that in the event of p u m p failure
the standby p u m p will take over the duty. A n air-driven
priming p u m p is also provided, which comes into op­
eration if the electric pumps are unavailable.
The priming system is designed to avoid lubricating
oil entering the cyhnder combustion chamber or exhaust
system but, at the same time, cyhnder hners receive
adequate lubricating oil to prevent pistons shding on
dry wahs on start-up.
The priming pumps are capable of supplying suffi­
cient oil to the bearings to enable the machine to be
barred and also to allow the machine to be safely
brought to rest should the main oil pumps fail when
starting or running.
782
Chapter 9
Fuel injection
Fuel injectors, fuel injection pumps (one per cylinder)
and fuel filtration equipment are usually of the manu­
facturer's standard type, thoroughly proven in service
elsewhere under similar operating conditions. Adequate
redundancy is provided in the operating drive and
metering control to ensure the engine is not made un­
serviceable by individual component failure.
Fuel injectors, incorporating fihers, atomise the fuel
sufficient for complete combustion. The injectors are
easily removable for maintenance purposes, for which
a maintenance jig (including a test p u m p ) , are provided.
The fuel injector p u m p s are individually cam-op­
erated, of the spring-return plunger type and are driven
off a c o m m o n camshaft. They have means of ensur­
ing equal distribution and metering of the fuel to all
cyhnders under all conditions of loading. Each p u m p
is capable of being m a n u a h y primed.
The fuel system is self-venting and any fuel spill from
the injectors is returned directly to the fuel oil bulk
storage tank.
Fuel pipes from the p u m p s to the injectors are
sheathed such that any leakage is piped to a tank fitted
with a level alarm.
Dual full-flow fine fihers are provided upstream of
the fuel injector p u m p s .
Flywheel
Dependent on the inertia of the total diesel engine/
generator assembly, a flywheel is sometimes provided
to overcome the cyclic variation in torque of a diesel
engine. It is manufactured from a material free from
significant defects and is subjected to an o ver speed
test at 150% normal engine running speed.
The dynamic system, comprising engine and driven
machinery, is so designed that cridcal speed vibration
stresses do not exceed the recommended values given
in the latest edition of Guidance Notes of Lloyd's
Register of Shipping.
Barring gear
M o t o r operated barring is provided to turn over the
engine at slow speed at regular intervals in conjunc­
tion with the priming equipment described above,
during long periods of idleness and for maintenance
purposes. Interlocks are fitted to prevent engine opera-
d o n with the barring gear engaged. Provision is also
made for manual operation. The electrically-driven
gear is made inoperative when hand operation is in
use and stardng of the engine is prevented with hand
barring gear engaged. Barring gear 'engaged' indication
is provided at the control panels.
Facilides are available for 'inching' the diesel gen­
erator rotors to enable them to be positioned angularly
w h h precision for purposes of erecdon and maintenance
(see also Section 5.3.4 of this chapter).
The drive motor of the electrically-powered barring
gear is designed to turn the diesel generator from rest.
 Diesel generators

An automatic decompression device is sometimes used
to reduce the standstih torque required from the m o t o r .
Foundations
It is usual for engine and generator to be mounted
on a c o m m o n bedplate to provide a rigid assembly.
Although the foundations are provided by the civil
contractor employed by the C E G B , the diesel generator
manufacturer provides the basic design of foundations
suitable for his equipment. This should withstand the
seismic hazards previously referred to in Section 5.1.4
of this chapter. It should also ensure, as far as pos­
sible, maximum isolation of the building structure from
transmitted vibrations when the plant is operational.
5.2.3 Starting equipment
Diesel generators are started by supplying compressed
air to the cyhnders (Fig 9.10). For this purpose, a com­
pressed air starting system with automatic and manual
control systems is provided for each engine, together
with a common charging section feeding the separate
engine systems. This c o m m o n section comprises two
electrically-driven compressors on a d u t y / s t a n d b y sys­
tem, each capable of being selected to duty. They sup­
ply a pipework ring main from which the individual
engine systems are fed. In order to regulate the rate
of pressure change and to act as an accumulator, a
receiver is fitted to the c o m m o n system.
Each engine system consists of two air receivers
for automatic starting and one air receiver for manual
starting, all being fed individually from the common
system ring main. The automatic systems operate si­
multaneously on separate banks of cylinders of the
engine. Each system is capable of starting the engine
in the event of failure of the other system.
Independent pipework is provided from each starting
receiver to the starting valves of the engine.
For each automatic starting system, duplicate sole­
noid-operated start valves, each rated for 100<7o air
flow requirements for the whole engine, are provided
for each cylinder b a n k . The start valves are arranged
for parallel operation both electrically and pneuma­
tically. M a n u a l isolating valves are fitted on either side
of each of the solenoid valves. These permit each one
to be taken out of service for maintenance without
affecting the others and without reducing the starting
ability of the engine.
A manually operated valve is provided for the man­
ual start system.
Each engine system also incorporates a separate air
receiver for the air-driven lubrication priming p u m p
described in the previous subsection. This receiver is
separately supplied with its own pipework and valves
from the c o m m o n charging ring main.
The capacity of each of the individual engine starting
system air receivers is designed to achieve six starts
w h h o u t recharging from the c o m m o n air system. This
ensures ample capachy in the event of failure to start
the engine on the first or subsequent attempts.
Similarly, the capacity of the air-driven lubrication
priming p u m p air receiver is sized to provide sufficient

SET FUEL
CONTROLS
" FOR START

I Γ
ELECTRICAL SIGNALS
FROM P.T.S.E. CCR
OR CONTROL DESK
SOLENOID - OPERATED
AIR START VALVES -
A BANK

TO
ENGINE
CYLINDERS

PNEUMATICALLY - OPERATED
AIR START VALVES -
CONTROL Β BANK
AIR
^ LOCAL PANEL
ST
PUSHBUTTON
ELECTRICAL
SIGNALS
FROM POST TRIP
J5U
SEQUENCE . r 1 SOLENOID
EQUIPMENT ^^"•l J VALVES
CENTRAL '
CONTROL ROOM
OR CONTROL ^SET FUEL CONTROLS
DESK FOR START

FIG. 9.10 Engine start system

783
Emergency supply equipment
air for about 2.5 minutes of running which is consi­
dered sufficient to provide adequate lubrication prior
to the first start attempt.
Air compressors and drives
Each compressor is of the air cooled type, mounted
on a common bedplate with its electric motor and
associated equipment to make a complete packaged
u n h for floor mounting (Fig 9.11). It is aligned in
the manufacturer's works for easy erection on pre­
pared foundations designed to the requirements of the
manufacturer. Emphasis is again placed on a standard
design and construction of proven reliability.
Equipment associated with each compressor com­
prises air suction filter, silencer, intercooler, relief valves,
automatic start and stop features in the form of pres­
sure swhches, automatic unloading gear and automatic
drain valves. Means are also provided for separating
oil and moisture from the compressed air.
Each compressor is capable of charging the two
largest receivers from atmospheric pressure to normal
working pressure in the minimum time commensurate
with the requirement that the compressor is kept run­
ning for a period of about 20 minutes under normal
charging conditions. This period is chosen to enable
the compressor to reach its normal working tempera­
ture and reduce wear and tear due to frequent stops
and starts. Whilst it is generahy left to the manu­
facturer to specify the above times, in no circumstances
is the recharging time allowed to exceed one hour.
Air receivers
Each receiver is fitted with a relief valve, non-return
valve, drain connection and valve, moisture t r a p , pres­
NON RETURN VALVE
AUTO DRAIN PNEUMATIC RELAY
DRAIN BOTTLE
VALVES VALVE
DISCHARGE
FIG. 9.11 General arrangement of air compressors
784
Chapter 9
sure gauge, a pressure operated alarm swhch (receiver
low pressure) and facilities for regular statutory in­
spections. The receivers and fittings are manufac­
tured and tested in accordance with BS 1123 and
BS5169.
The relief valves are piped to a safe discharge point
to avoid danger to personnel. For maintenance pur­
poses, the air supply pipework to the receiver incor­
porates an isolating valve.
T o prevent corrosion, the internal surfaces of air
receivers are either galvanised or coated with a flame-
resistant coating approved by the C E G B .
Air pipework and valves
Pipelines are sized to allow the required air quantities
to flow without prejudicial pressure d r o p and they in­
corporate drainage slopes. Pipework and valves are
designed to withstand a hydrauhc pressure of twice
the working pressure (Fig 9.12).
Manually operated isolating valves are provided in
the diesel generator r o o m to isolate the starting air sys­
tem from the diesel engine whilst work is being carried
out on the engine. The valves have padlocking facilities
to enable them to be locked off in compliance with
the C E G B Safety Rules. Similar isolating valves are
provided for all other pneumatically operated aux­
iliaries associated with each diesel generator.
The manual isolating valves are also interlocked whh
the barring gear to prevent h from being engaged until
the isolating valve is in the closed position.
Internal surfaces of pipework are coated, similar to
the interior surfaces of air receivers. For small bore
pipework coating is not possible, and this is usually
supplied in stainless steel to BS3605.
DISCHARGE FILTER/MOISTURE SEPARATION
DISCHARGE STOP VALVE DRAIN BOTTLE
FLANGE DISCHARGE
 Diesel generators

AX1 AX2
BUFFER
AIR
AY1
<5> AY2

'Χ" RECEIVER .γ.

COMPRESSORS COMPRESSORS

-tx-
i
•{XF -tXF - M -

t
AIR • AX1 AX AX2 LO AX LO AY AY2 AY AY1
RECEIVERS
X ENGINE X ENGINE X ENGINE X ENGINE Y ENGINE Y ENGINE Y ENGINE Y ENGINE
A BANK MANUAL Β BANK LUB. OIL LUB. OIL A BANK MANUAL Β BANK
AUTO START AUTO PUMP PUMP AUTO START AUTO
START START START START

FIG. 9 . 1 2 Compressed air ring main system

Where vibration can become a problem, e.g., in
the vicinity of compressors, flexible pipework is pro­
vided to avoid fatigue fracture and noise transmission.
5.2.4 Cooling system
Each diesel generator is provided with a radiator system
(Fig 9.13) with separate circuits for cooling of:
• The engine jacket water.
• The secondary water system, supplying coolers for
engine lubricating oil, charge air system, generator
coolers, etc.
Each radiator system is complete with its own water
make-up tank, radiator, electrically-driven fans, filters,
pipework and valves. Pipework is arranged to con­
nect separate sections of the radiator to the jacket a n d
secondary coohng circuits and valved to enable one
circuit to be taken out of commission without affecting
the others. There is n o interconnection between cooling
circuhs, with the exception of the c o m m o n make-up
supply.
T o maintain the optimum engine working tempera­
ture under ah conditions of operation, the engine jacket
cooling water circuit is thermostatically controlled. This
includes keeping the engines in a suitable pre-start
condition, which may need the use of off-load heaters
(see Section 5.3.4 of this chapter).
T o prevent air locks, continuous or automatic
venting from the high parts of the water system is
provided.
The engine jacket cooling system is arranged to feed
water direct from the engine to the radiator, with cir­
culation maintained by an engine-driven water p u m p .
It is also usual to provide a standby electrically-driven
p u m p with automatic start facilities in the event of
failure of the engine-driven p u m p .
The separate secondary water system, for the other
coolers mentioned above, feeds water direct to a se­
parate section of the radiator with circulation main­
tained by a separate engine-driven water p u m p and a

785
Emergency supply equipment Chapter 9

MAKE-UP
TANK

RADIATORS

TURBOCHARGERS
STANDBY
PUMP

HEATER
PUMP

HEATER
ENGINE
WATER
JACKET PRESSURISING
CI IDICIKiri

VALVE
ENGINE
DRIVEN
PUMP JACKET WATER

STAND-BY
PUMP

ALTERNATOR O O
AIR COOLER

HEATER
'^HARGP LUB
AIR OIL
COOLER
I COOLERS I
ENGINE
DRIVEN
PUMP SECONDARY WATER
^

COOLER

HEADER
TANK

PUMP 1 VALVE
CAGES

PUMP 2
VALVE CAGE WATER

FIG. 9 . 1 3 Block diagram of a cooling water system

STANDBY electrically-driven p u m p , similar to the one
already described.
A flow indicator is provided on all engine circulating
water discharges.
Comprehensive precautions are taken against freez­
ing of any part of the coohng system by including
off-load heaters, antifreeze solution and trace heating.
Also, where necessary, lagging is provided.
and out to prevent corrosion. They are of the closed
(fully covered) design, vented to atmosphere and sized
to ensure that no overflow occurs due to expansion
of the coolant at any operating temperature. They
are fitted with a calibrated level indicator visible from
ground level. Tanks are erected on steelwork at a height
which provides a gravity feed to the radiator systems.
Personnel access platforms are fitted for cleaning.

Water make-up tank Radiator and cooling fans

Tanks are constructed generally I N accordance with A radiator with fan assembhes is provided for each
BS417 Part 2 from mild steel and galvanised inside diesel generator unit (Fig 9.14). The assembly forms

786

SNOW COWL-
FIG. 9.14 Cooling water radiator and fan
an integral, self-contained, free-standing unit and is
normally mounted on the roof of the diesel generator
building, with maximum efficiency of heat transfer to
atmosphere. Radiators are constructed from a number
of separate cooler elements, any one of which is capable
of being removed without disturbing the others, in­
cluding the provision of isolating and drain valves for
each element. The elements are constructed from non-
ferrous materials in separate sections to accommodate
the separate coohng circuhs. A number of elements can
be used on any cooling circuit, but the use of one
element on two separate cooling circuits by division of
the header is avoided.
Two nominal 100% duty, thermostatically controlled
radiator cooling fan groups are provided, so that each
fan group on its own can provide 100% diesel gen­
erator cooling at an ambient temperature of 15°C.
The fan groups are arranged on a d u t y / s t a n d b y basis,
with either group being capable of selection as the duty
fan group. The second fan group is arranged to act
automatically as standby in case of failure of the duty
group and to supplement the supply of cooling air dur­
Diesel generators
MANIFOLD
ELEMENT
JACKET/WATER
INLET/OUTLET
SECONDARY
WATER
INLET/OUTLET
ing periods of ambient temperature in excess of 15°C.
The fans are electrically-driven with a preference
for direct drive. Multi Vee' belt drives are acceptable,
so long as twice the number of belts required for the
duty is provided, together with belt adjustment and
m o t o r / f a n alignment facilities.
Water pipework and valves
All interconnecting pipework and valves are designed
and installed in accordance with C E G B Standard 239903
— T i p i n g Systems — Low Pressure Water Services'.
Compression type pipe couplings are not used where
failure could result in a safety hazard to personnel
or plant. Where necessary, expansion joints are fitted,
e.g., on long runs. Provision for drainage and collection
of the water is also provided.
5.2.5 Fuel oil s y s t e m s
Each diesel generator fuel oil system basicahy com­
prises bulk storage tanks, transfer p u m p s , daily service
tanks, line filters, recovery tanks, etc.
787
E m e r g e n c y supply e q u i p m e n t
The capacity of the bulk storage tanks is calculated
to provide a minimum of 80 hours fuh-load running
of the associated diesel generator.
The daily service tanks are sized for 8 hours full-
load running.
A gravity fuel supply to the engine from the daily
service tank is preferred for all states of diesel gen­
erator loading, to avoid the use of additional aux­
iliary equipment which could jeopardise the fuel supply
to the engine under emergency conditions. At some
installations this cannot be achieved and, in these
instances, duplicate pressurising pumps (engine-driven
and electrically-driven standby) are provided. In any
circumstances, the diesel generator must be capable
of a black start with at least 10% of rated output by
gravity fuel feed, with the pressurising pumps by-passed
if necessary.
To enable each daily service tank to be replenished
automatically from the bulk storage tanks, duplicate
fuel oil transfer pumps are provided and operate on
a duty/standby basis. These are of sufficient capacity
to make up the fuel used from the daily service tank
by running for not more than half of the engine run­
ning time.
A deadweight type fire valve with fusible link is
provided to drain the daily service tank to the bulk
storage tank automatically in the event of a fire. Opera­
tion of the fire protection system will inhibit operation
of the transfer p u m p to the tank concerned.
The fuel oil is arranged to reach the engine at the
correct temperature for atomisation, irrespective of am­
bient temperature. Where necessary, thermostatically
controlled fuel oil heaters are installed to achieve this.
Daily service tank and associated equipment
Tanks are constructed in accordance with BS799 Part
5, using mild steel coated with an oil resistant treat­
ment, approved by C E G B .
They are vented to atmosphere via a flame t r a p .
An overflow is provided with pipework back to the
recovery tank. An easily cleanable sludge trap is fitted.
Because of the height at which these tanks are likely
to be mounted, ready access for cleaning in the form
of gaheries and ladders is provided.
A calibrated level indicator, visible from ground
level, is provided.
Bulk storage tanks
The tanks are constructed in accordance with C E G B
Standard 20752 — T u e l Oil Storage T a n k s ' and
BS2594. They are located in pits in the diesel house.
After manufacture, they are given an oil resistant treat­
ment approved by the C E G B .
Additional capacity is provided in the bulk storage
tank above the normal high level control which stops
the transfer p u m p , to accommodate the contents of the
recovery tank and the daily service tank when emptied
by the operation of the fire protection.
788
Chapter 9
A tank level indicator and local high level visual and
audible alarms are provided. A temperature monitor
in the gas space above the fuel oil level provides a
high temperature alarm for fire prevention.
Because the tank is located in a pit, permanent
galleries and ladders are provided for cleaning and
for access to valves and the sludge trap (see Section
5.1.4 of this chapter for fire protection).
Recovery system
In order to collect fuel oil leakage, blowdown, etc.,
from the engines and overflow from the daily service
tank, a recovery system is provided including a recovery
tank. From the latter, oil is automatically returned to
the bulk storage tank.
Dependent on the relative heights of recovery tank
and bulk storage tank, automatic d u t y / s t a n d b y elec­
trically-driven pumps are sometimes fitted to return the
oil to the bulk storage tank. A visual level indicator
is fitted.
The construction of the recovery tank is generally
similar to that of the daily service tank.
Oil pipework and valves
All interconnecting pipework and valves are designed
and installed in accordance whh C E G B Standard 23992
— 'Piping Systems — Oil Services'.
Pipework is not routed over the engine exhaust mani­
folds or in any position where it is at risk from fire in
the event of leakage from pipe joints, etc. Provision
for drainage by suitable trays and pipework is pro­
vided. Compression type couphngs are not used where
their failure constitutes a fire risk or a hazard to per­
sonnel or plant.
Adequate supports and flexible pipework are used to
minimise the dangers of pipeline fatigue fractures due
to vibration.
Immediately after testing, the fuel oil system is
treated with an inhibitor to ensure that the fuel lines
are protected from rust, corrosion, seahng or any form
of deterioration.
5.2.6 I n l e t a n d e x h a u s t air p i p e w o r k ,
t u r b o c h a r g e r s a n d silencers
Aspiration
The aspiration system draws air from outside the en­
gine room via duplicate filters with an air inlet designed
such that 100% air flow to the engine at the design
pressure drop can be achieved whh one filter panel
blocked or removed for cleaning. The design of the
intake and the air approach velocity are arranged to
avoid the ingress of moisture from any source as weh
as the draw-in of snow.
The C E G B usually prefers engines with exhaust-
driven turbochargers to supply air for complete fuel
combustion at maximum loading to achieve the full

load rating of the engine. The turbochargers are readily
accessible and easily dismantled for maintenance and
cleaning. They have a separate lubricating oil system
complete with means of checking oil level.
Charge air is usually intercooled. Air-to-water charge
air coolers are provided with the intercooler forming
an integral part of the engine coohng circuit.
To avoid premature failures due to fatigue, duct­
ing is fully supported and free of vibration while the
engine is running by the fitting of flexible joints.
Facilities for engine inlet air temperature measure­
ment are provided.
Exhaust manifold
The engine has a smooth flow gas exhaust manifold
coupled via the turbocharger to the exhaust system.
In order to avoid injury to personnel, the exhaust
manifold is shielded t o give a maximum surface tem­
perature of 65°C under all operating conditions.
Silencers and exhaust pipework
The design of the exhaust system ensures that the back
pressure on the engine and the noise level are kept as
low as practical. Provision is made for spark arresting
to reduce the fire danger.
Silencers are manufactured from heavy gauge sheet
steel and all internals are secured by continuous weld­
ing. T o release any condensed moisture, drain plugs are
provided. The outlet of the silencer is terminated at a
level which allows adequate dispersal of exhaust gases.
The exhaust pipework is usually flanged heavy gauge
steel tubing to BS806 Class B, with expansion joints
to ensure that no stresses are imposed by expansion
of the building structure from which the pipework is
supported.
Weather and heat shielding is provided for silencers
and exhaust pipework external to the building. All
exhaust pipework internal to the building is lagged
and clad with aluminium sheet to prevent excessive
temperature in the building. Lagging and cladding is
always arranged for easy removal for maintenance,
where this is required.
As for the exhaust manifold, heat shielding is ap­
plied to all parts of the system within 3 m of ground
level or which are accessible from personnel access
points.
Due to the exposed nature of certain seaside power
stations, care is taken to ensure that cladding external
to the building will shed water and withstand high
winds, as defined in Section 5.1.4 of this chapter. For
this reason, to give additional protection, all items
exposed to the open air are sprayed with metallic
aluminium and immediately sealed by two wet coats
of silicon aluminium sealer capable of withstanding
operating temperatures up to 450°C,
5.2.7 Governors
Each engine is provided w h h a main governor of the
Diesel generators
electronic type and a standby mechanical governor.
The engine governing limhs specified are to BS5514
Class A l .
The governor system provided, permits the engine
speed to be varied from 8 0 % normal speed at no-load
to 2 % overspeed at full-load. Means are provided for
this speed adjustment to be made by hand from the
station central control r o o m , at the local engine control
panel and at the engine itself.
The governors regulate the quantity of fuel oil sup­
plied by positioning the fuel p u m p control racks to
suit the load d e m a n d .
O n failure of the electronic governor, facilities are
provided to ensure changeover to the mechanical
governor.
Electronic governor
This governor operates from either the 110 V, single
phase 50 H z , guaranteed essential instrument supply
available in a power station (uninterruptable power
supply) or a 110 V D C supply obtained from batteries.
It is capable of maintaining the generated frequency
between 48 Hz and 51 Hz under normal operating
conditions.
Remote control of speed is provided, when running
in parahel with the system, as described in Section 5.1.2
of this chapter. This control permits operation of the
engine at any load at frequencies between 4 8 - 5 1 Hz.
For parallel running w h h the system, speed droop is
switched in. T o p e r m h running when isolated from the
system (if required for emergency duty), speed droop is
switched out.
The governor reponse rates are designed to enable
it to cope with block load applications and rejections
of 2 5 % , 5 0 % and m a x i m u m load, together with the
worst loading sequence specified for the particular
station under emergency duty conditions.
In the event of failure of the electronic governor, an
alarm is given with the engine either running or
stationary.
Mechanical governor
This governor is of the centrifugal type. It has a
speed setting of about 5 % above that of the electro­
nic governor to avoid interference. When the speed
reaches the level of the mechanical governor, it will
assume and maintain control of the engine. It is pro­
vided with a fixed speed d r o o p such that, at full-load,
the engine on mechanical governor would run at its
rated speed.
Overspeed trip device
A separate overspeed trip device is provided to operate
in addition to (and independently of) both electronic
and mechanical governors, to protect against runaway
or damage to the engine with possible risk to personnel
should both governors and their associated fuel controls
fail.
789
Emergency supply e q u i p m e n t
The overspeed trip device is separately driven off
the camshaft gear train. It operates independently of
the fuel p u m p control rack, by actuating the fuel p u m p
blowdown system, which clears the fuel and air locks
the pumps.
The setting of the overspeed trip is arranged so that
a temporary rise in speed due to instantaneous loss of
full load, when operating with either governor setting,
will not cause a trip condition.
5.3 Generator and electrical equipment
5.3.1 Generator design and construction
Reliability being a prime requirement, manufacturer's
standard units are preferred which can be demonstrated
to have a proven record of reliability. At times, it is
preferable to install a standard unit, even if it does not
fully comply with every detail of the specification, so
long as these departures are identified at the tender
stage.
The generator unit is designed to comply with BS5000
Part 99 and BS4999 Parts 3 and 5 1 . The type of
environmental protection provided, i.e., to BS4999
Part 20, I P W 5 5 , enables the machine to operate satis­
factorily under fire protection deluge condhions (see
Section 5.1.4 of this chapter).
The method of cooling preferred by the C E G B is
that covered by BS4999, Part 2 1 , I C 3 1 , utihsing a fan
mounted on the generator shaft. This avoids rehance
on separately driven auxiharies such as fans and p u m p s .
Cooling air is taken from and returned to the outside
of the diesel generator house via inlet air filters and
outlet air protective louvres.
For very large machines the above method of cool­
ing may be inadequate. Under these conditions, a
forced air, water cooled design to IC81 may have to
be accepted, so long as the constructional requirements
comply with ESI Standard 4 4 - 3 — ^Electric Motors
Specification (3300 V and above)'.
Insulation is specified to comply with BS2757 Class
F. However, to achieve a long insulation life, tempera­
ture rises are hmited to the lower Class Β temperature.
Since the generator unit is required to operate sud­
denly after long periods at standstill, off-load heaters
for anti-condensation protection, anti-corrosion pro­
tection, and the protection of bearings against trans­
mitted vibration are provided.
The generator unit is capable of continuously with­
standing levels of imposed vibration from the engine of
0.25 m m peak-to-peak amphtude between 5 and 10 Hz
and levels of imposed vibration velocity from the gen­
erator core in accordance with BS4675, Classification
11.2, between 10 and 200 H z . These levels can be mea­
sured at any point of the frames or bearing pedestal.
Generator mechanical design
Generators are sahent pole machines, with a revolving
790
Chapter 9
field of the brushless variety, i.e., with shaft-mounted
diodes as rectifiers for the provision of D C excitation
current. The machines are suitable for direct coupling
to the diesel engine and have their own self-lubricated
bearings in accordance with ESI Standard 4 4 - 3 , Sec­
tion 5.4.1. The generators may share one bearing whh
the diesel engine. The bearings are split horizontally
for ease of maintenance.
The rotor shaft is a single forging machined all over
with an integral coupling flange. Because of the cyclic
variation in the torque of a diesel engine, the rotor
is capable of withstanding continuously a vibratory
torque of ±2.5 times the rated fuh-load torque over
the range of 95 to \ \0% rated speed. It is also capable
of withstanding ± 6 times rated full load torque when
passing through critical speeds.
Means are provided to prevent the circulation of
shaft currents through the rotor and bearings by the
use of an insulated bearing pedestal.
On-site balancing facilities are provided.
Generator electrical design
The generator is capable of supplying, for one hour
during any period of twelve consecutive hours' running,
a load 10% greater than the nominal continuous rating.
As stated previously in Section 5.1.2, the generators
are not normally required to operate in parallel with
each other, but must be capable of operating satis­
factorily in parallel with the station electrical auxiliary
system for the purpose of full-load testing. Reactive
kVA sharing equipment is therefore provided (see next
Section 5.3.2). When operating in this m o d e , har­
monic currents produced by the generator are circulated
through the machine and other equipment. Such cur­
rents must be within the temperature rise capabihties
of such equipment.
The 3.3 kV stator windings are star-connected, with
the neutral bar connected to earth via a resistance to
limh the phase to earth fauh current to 1000 A, to
minimise damage under fault conditions.
Separate line and neutral terminal boxes mounted
on opposite sides of the stator casing are usually pro­
vided, designed to limit damage to other plant and
injury to personnel in the event of a through or inter­
nal fauh.
The length of the stator may at times prohibit the
fitting of such boxes direct to the stator casing because
of their size. In these circumstances, separate free­
standing hne and neutral terminal boxes are used. These
are located adjacent to the stator and linked to h by
means of connections in ducts.
If the stator is not solidly bolted to its foundations,
i.e., it is located on anti-vibration mountings, care is
taken to incorporate the necessary flexibility into the
cable connections to the terminal boxes, or to the ducted
connections when separate free-standing terminal boxes
are provided.
Current transformers necessary for control and pro­
tection of the diesel generator are accommodated in

the neutral terminal box. For robustness, ring type
current transformers are preferred to wound types.
Vohage transformers are accommodated in the asso­
ciated circuit-breaker equipment.
5.3.2 Excitation equipment and automatic
voltage regulator (AVR)
The remarks made in the first seven paragraphs of
Section 5.3.1 of this chapter, also apply here.
Exciter
This is of the brushless variety, directly coupled to
and pipe-ventilated from the generator. The machine
produces three-phase A C power which is fed via con­
nections running along the shaft direct to the diodes
referred to in the previous section.
The exciter is capable of whhstanding, for a specified
period of time, a short-circuit across the D C output
connections to the generator rotating field and the loss
of one or more diodes.
Means, in the form of a resistance switched across
the field, are provided for rapidly suppressing the field
current during fault and shutdown conditions.
The exciter, diodes and excitation control equipment
are capable of operating at maximum (ceiling) voltage
for at least 5 s, to cater for field forcing conditions, to
preserve system stability and to ensure rapid protection
operation during system faults.
Provision is made for diode bridge arm failure
detection.
Excitation control and A VR
The generator voltage is controlled within the limits of
BS4999 P a r t 40 for voltage regulation grade V R 2 . 3 . 1 .
To achieve this, the A V R is of the continuously-
acting solid state thyristor type. One automatic channel
and a manual control device, with suitable m a n u a l
changeover circuits and controls, are provided. Each
channel is capable of operating independently of the
other. A nuh balance indicator is provided to allow
'bumpless' manual transfer between automatic and man­
ual control.
In view of the very high reliabihty of modern AVRs,
the diesel generator is tripped in the rare event of an
AVR failure. This is considered preferable to the
comphcation of automatic follow-up by the manual
control device and automatic changeover to manual if
the auto channel becomes faulty.
As briefly mentioned in the previous section, re­
active kVA sharing equipment is provided. This is only
in operation when running in parallel with the station
auxiliary system and is removed from service auto­
maticahy when the diesel generator receives an emer­
gency start signal. It is controlled by a selector switch
in the station central control r o o m , which also switches
the governor droop in and out of service.
The AVR with its ancillary equipment is normally
located in the diesel generator local electrical cubicle.
Diesel generators
5.3.3 Diesel generator control and protection
equipment
Control system
Under normal standby conditions, the diesel generators
are not running but are left in a state of readiness for
starting on d e m a n d .
The control system for each diesel generator is de­
signed on the following principles:
• The control scheme for each machine is separately
supphed and fused.
• Loss of a single fuse, supply, or component or a
single contact failure does not render inoperative the
starting, running or control of a diesel generator.
• The operating voltage of each control system is
110 V D C .
Initiation of the automatically controlled starting se­
quence for each diesel generator is either automatic, by
means of a signal derived from the reactor post-trip
sequence equipment, or m a n u a l , by means of push­
buttons from either the station central control room or
the diesel generator local control panel housed in the
diesel generator building. The latter location is normally
used only for testing purposes after maintenance work
has been carried o u t .
A two-position selector switch is provided in the
station central control r o o m of a nuclear power station,
having the following functions:
Position 1 The diesel generator is available for auto­
matic operation or for manually-initiated
testing and loading from ehher the station
central control r o o m or the diesel genera­
tor local control panel.
Position 2 The automatic override from the reactor
post-trip sequence equipment is inhibited,
leaving all other local and remote controls
operational.
For in-service operational testing and loading of a diesel
generator, with the selector switch in position 1, the
sequence is as fohows:
• The operator initiates starting by using the appro­
priate p u s h b u t t o n .
• The diesel generator will run-up automatically and
excite to 3.3 kV.
• Synchronising to the 3.3 kV system is initiated,
fohowed by loading.
• After completion of the routine test, the diesel gen­
erator is manually taken off-load and shut down.
For testing after maintenance work has been completed,
with the selector switch in position 2, the sequence is
as follows:
791
Emergency supply equipment
• The operator manuahy initiates starting, run-up and
exchation to 3.3 kV, using the appropriate facihties
at the diesel generator local control panel.
• When the above sequence is complete, the speed
and voltage controls available at the local panel or
in the station central control room can be used prior
to synchronising with the 3.3 kV system.
• After the operator has satisfied himself that the
diesel generator is ready for returning to emergency
service, it is shut down manually and the selector
switch is returned to position 1.
Manual and automatic synchronising facilities are avail­
able in the station central control room and at the
local diesel generator control panel.
Protection
The provision of initiating devices for automatically
shutting down the diesel engine and tripping the diesel
generator 3.3 kV circuit-breaker are restricted to those
considered to be essential, bearing in mind the duty
of the equipment and the requirement for high reha-
bhity. Wherever possible, the operator is given prior
warning of an impending trip to enable him to rectify
the fault before a trip occurs. A typical example is the
lubricating oil temperature. Two temperature sensors
are provided; the first and lower-set device provides
an alarm only for high temperature and the second
device operates on extremely-high temperature only to
trip the diesel generator.
The following is a typical list of protection trips:
• Circulating current (generator stator phase fauhs
and earth faults).
• Extremely inverse overcurrent (back-up protection).
• Excitation diode short-circuit.
• Excitation overcurrent (time delayed trip).
• Undervoltage (time delayed trip).
• Overvohage (time delayed trip).
• Jacket water temperature high.
• Lubricating oh temperature high.
• Lubricating oil temperature low.
To shut down the engine, all protective devices act
directly to shut-off the fuel supply to the engine by
means of a solenoid valve. This is energised to shut-off
the fuel and requires local manual resetting following
operation.
Interlocks
Interlocks are provided on each diesel generator to
protect plant and personnel. They are grouped in two
categories as follows:
• Operational interlocks — those which operate in
the automatic control equipment to maintain a cor­
792
Chapter 9
rect relationship between various automatically con­
trolled functions. They are sometimes known as
'sequence' interlocks.
• Essential interlocks — these are permanently in
service to protect individual items of plant. They
generally trip the 415 V or 3.3 kV switchgear supply­
ing the devices they protect. They are sometimes
known as 'safety' interlocks.
Alarm system
Each diesel generator local control panel is equipped
with alarm annunciator equipment to draw the op­
erator's attention to fault or abnormal operation of the
diesel generator unit and its auxihary systems. This
provides local visual and audible alarms for the safe
and efficient operation of the plant.
This alarm system is independent of the station
service alarm system in the station central control room
and self-contained in hs operation. However, a limited
number of important alarms are repeated to the con­
trol r o o m . The remainder, i.e., alarms that require the
control room staff to despatch an auxiliary plant at­
tendant to the normally u n m a n n e d diesel generator
r o o m to take the necessary remedial action, are grouped
as repeat alarms to the control r o o m .
The alarm system obtains its electrical supply from
the 110 V A C guaranteed essential instrument and
control supply (uninterruptable supply).
Emergency stop
Each diesel generator is provided w h h an emergency
pushbutton switch mounted on the local electrical panel.
The pushbutton switch operates into the engine shut­
down system described above, including tripping of
the 3.3 kV circuit-breaker. The pushbutton switch is
of the 'stay put' type, i.e., after depressing, the con­
tacts stay closed until the swhch is reset by means of
a key normally held by senior authorised personnel.
This ensures that operation of the pushbutton switch
is fully investigated by management before the diesel
generator is returned to service.
5.3.4 C o n t r o l of a u x i l i a r y s y s t e m s
Lubricating oil priming system
The priming p u m p automatic control system incor­
porates adjustable timing equipment to start and stop
the duty priming p u m p , to achieve the engine manu­
facturer's recommended priming cycle. In some cases,
priming is continuous and, if the duty p u m p fails, the
timing equipment signals are automatically transferred
to the standby p u m p .
Total failure of the lubricating oil priming system
is detected by a pressure switch, which initiates a local
audible and visual alarm. This alarm is interrupted by
the timing equipment when priming is not in operation.
Where intermhtent lubricating oil priming is p r o ­
vided, it is interlocked with the diesel generator a u t o -

matic starting system such that, in the event of a
requirement for the diesel generator to run during
priming, the engine start-up overrides the priming cycle.
The lubricating oil priming system is also started
automatically when the associated diesel engine is
tripped due to loss of oil pressure. The lubricating oil
priming pumps can also be started manually local to
the diesel generator.
Barring gear
Motorised barring, as described in Section 5.2.2 of
this chapter, is controhed from a local control station
adjacent to the diesel generator. It is sometimes in­
corporated w h h the diesel generator local control panel.
The fohowing control equipment is provided:
• Start/stop control swhch for continuous barring in
the forward direction only.
• Forward/reverse 'inching' pushbuttons for main­
tenance purposes.
Electrical interlocks are provided to ensure that m o ­
torised barring cannot commence until the drive is
fully engaged and an adequate supply of lubricating oil
is present. Failure of this oil supply during barring
renders the barring gear inoperative by tripping the
415 V supply to the m o t o r .
Compressed air starting system
Compressor control equipment is provided for auto­
matic control of the two air compressors described
in Section 5.2.3 of this chapter. This maintains the
receivers and ring main charging system at the required
pressure by means of pressure switches, as follows:
(a) T o start the duty electric m o t o r driven compressor
on falhng pressure.
(b) If the duty compressor fails, to start the standby
electrically-driven compresser on falling pressure
and to initiate a local audible and visual alarm
'duty air compressor fail'. This pressure switch is
set to operate at a pressure significantly lower than
the pressure switch in (a) above.
(c) If both duty and standby compressors fail, to ini­
tiate a local and visual alarm 'starting air pressure
low'. This pressure swhch is set to operate at the
higher of the two pressures detailed below, and signi­
ficantly lower than the pressure switch in (b) above:
• The pressure corresponding to the minimum required
for the pneumatic devices associated whh the diesel
generator.
• The minimum pressure required to provide the full
starting duty described in Section 5.2.3 of this chapter.
The pressure switches are located so that one com­
pressor can be taken out of service, leaving the control
and alarm system operative.
Diesel generators
The compressor control equipment, including the
d u t y / s t a n d b y selector swhch, is housed in a cubicle
located in the engine r o o m . This is constructed to with­
stand a deluge from the diesel generator fire protection
system.
Radiator cooling fans
T h e duty group of radiator cooling fans, described in
Section 5.2.4 of this chapter, is started at the same
time as the diesel generator, whereas the starting of
the standby group is initiated thermostatically on high
cooling water temperature due either to failure of
the duty group or high ambient temperature. A local
audible and visual alarm is initiated whenever the stand­
by group is running.
Alarm thermostats are provided in each section of
the cooling system. They are set to operate at a tem­
perature below the setting of any high water tempera­
ture trip of the diesel generator unit.
D u t y / s t a n d b y selection of the fan groups is provided
on the diesel generator local control panel.
Auxiliary cooling water pumps
Cooling water is normally circulated by the engine-
driven coohng water p u m p . If h fails, the auxihary
electrically-driven cooling water p u m p is started ther­
mostatically or on flow failure and, at the same time,
a local audible and visual alarm is given.
Fuel oil transfer pumps
T h e d u t y / s t a n d b y fuel oil transfer p u m p s are arranged
to replenish the daily service tank automatically by
drawing fuel oU from the bulk storage tank. The auto­
matic control of the duty fuel oü transfer p u m p is
initiated from a pair of magnetic level switches located
within the associated daily service tank. One is designed
to start the duty fuel oil transfer p u m p . Should this
fail to start or fail whilst operating, the standby p u m p
is automatically started from the same level switch.
The second level switch gives a stop signal to both
p u m p s when the tank has reached hs full level.
Separate level switches are provided in each tank for
alarm purposes as follows:
• One located at a higher fuel oil level in the tank
t h a n the p u m p stop control level. It is arranged to
give a local audible and visual alarm when the tank
is fuh and either of the p u m p s has failed to stop.
Sufficient time is allowed for the operator to take the
necessary action before fuel oil overflows back to
the recovery tank.
• One located at a level below the p u m p start control
level and arranged to initiate a local audible and
visual alarm when the quantity of fuel oil remaining
in the tank is sufficient only for one hour running
time of the associated diesel generator at full-load.
D u t y / s t a n d b y selection of the p u m p s is provided on the
diesel generator local panel.
793
E m e r g e n c y supply e q u i p m e n t
Lubricating oil and diesel engine water jacket
Where such heaters are provided for use during stand­
stih periods of the diesel generator (see Sections 5.2.2
and 5.2.4 of this chapter), they are controlled by
thermostats. Usually three thermostats are provided
for each heater or group of heaters, i.e., control, safety
(if the control thermostat fails to switch off the heater)
and low temperature alarm (if the heater or its asso­
ciated control thermostat fails).
5.4 Testing
T h r o u g h o u t w o r k s , she and operational testing,
emphasis is placed on tests that show that the plant
comphes with the specification and is capable of per­
forming hs emergency role under all conditions of
operation.
5.4.1 T e s t s in m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s worlcs
In general, the object of the works tests is to show
that the plant complies with the specification, schedules
and previously approved drawings.
Prior to tests taking place, detailed test schedules
are agreed between the manufacturer and C E G B staff.
The latter usually witness the principal tests, whilst
other tests can be carried out by the manufacturer, so
long as the resuhs are submitted to the C E G B for
scrutiny.
Auxiliary plant
As far as is practical, all items of auxiliary plant are
fuhy tested in the respective manufacturer's works
before assembling them with the diesel generator. Such
tests include hydraulic pressure tests on oh coolers,
valves and piping, water coolers and tanks, air com­
pressors and their auxiliaries. All rotating plant, such as
air compressors, and all types of pumps are subjected
to running tests over the full specified range of duty.
Tests on motors prior to assembly with their driven
items are covered in Chapter 7.
Generators and exciters
The fohowing tests are carried out on each generator
assembled for running with its exciter and driven by a
temporary motor, in the manufacturer's works, before
coupling to the diesel engine:
• Demonstration of compliance with vibration
quirements.
• Determination of generator magnetisation and loss
curves, using exciter field current as a variable para­
meter.
• Resistance and insulation resistance of all windings.
• High vohage test on all windings.
• Insulation and high vohage tests on all wiring and
equipment.
794
Chapter 9
heaters • Heat runs on open-circuit, short-circuit and full
kVAr loading to determine temperature rises of gen­
erator and exciter.
T o prove the design fully, the first generator of each
size in a particular contract is subjected to the fol­
lowing additional tests:
• Using test slip rings, determination of generator
and exciter open-circuit and short-circuit and loss
curves.
• Oscillograph and analyser measurement of the gen­
erator phase and line voltage at no-load, normal
voltage.
• Sudden three-phase short-circuit applied to generator
terminals with generator running at no-load, normal
speed and lOO^Í^o voltage. F r o m this test reactances
are calculated from the current envelopes.
• Check of radio interference suppression.
Combined tests on complete diesel generators
After checking such details as cylinder head nut torques,
tappet clearances, p u m p drive chain tensions, crank­
shaft deflections, correct charging with oil and cor­
rect functioning, charging and priming of all auxiliary
systems; each diesel engine, fully assembled with its
generator, exciter, governor, AVR and auxiliary equip­
ment, is then subjected to the following combined tests:
• Ahgnment check of complete units.
• Cold, standby and hot starting tests. At least five
starts are performed for each condition, defined as
follows:
Cold Engine at ambient temperature with no
auxiliary oil and water heaters in operation
Standby Engine at temperature attained by opera­
tion of oil and jacket water heaters at normal
thermostat settings and normal ambient conditions
Hot Engine at a temperature as attained not more
than five minutes after shutdown from a full-load
run with stabilised temperature rises
• Run at normal speed and highest overspeed per­
mitted by the manufacturer for five minutes to check
the balance of rotating parts and compliance with
vibration requirements. A typical figure for highest
permissible overspeed for 5 minutes is 1%.
re­
• Run at full rated output by use of artificial electrical
loading facilities for a sufficient length of time to
ensure that steady working conditions have been
reached, fohowed by a one hour run at 10% over­
load. Records of temperature attained on the unit
are taken.
• Fuel consumption tests.
• Governor tests, including load acceptance and re­
jection tests.

• Tests to show the time taken from start-up to ac­
ceptance of fuh-load with the u n h initially in the
standby condhion (as defined above).
• Operational tests of control panels set u p tempor­
arily as in service, including automatic starting and
shutdown equipment, alarms and protection devices.
• Repeat of waveform and sudden short-circuit tests
already carried out on generator (see generator tests
above).
• No-load operation endurance test, to demonstrate the
abihty of the unit to accept load and run satisfac­
torily after a continuous period of 48 h at synchro­
nous speed, normal voltage and zero load. During
this run, checks of fuel consumption, vibration,
exhaust discoloration, etc., are made at regular
intervals.
After the 48 h run, the diesel generator is sub­
jected to the load acceptance test determined most
onerous from the governor tests above.
• Voltage regulation measurement from no-load to
full-load and vice versa.
• Insulation and high voltage tests on all engine-
mounted wiring and equipment.
It should be noted that the full output, fuel consump­
tion, waveform and no load endurance tests are carried
out on the first unit of each type and size only.
Dependent on the environmental condhions specified
for a particular station, the diesel generator tests are
also sometimes carried out to ensure compliance in
the fohowing areas:
• Seismic withstand.
• High wind withstand.
• Proof against fire protection sprays.
5.4.2 T e s t s a t site
Site testing is normally a repeat of certain works tests
selected to reveal any damage in transit to site, to
ensure that the diesel generator and its auxiliaries have
been correctly assembled and that the performance on
dynamic loads complies with manufacturer's guaran­
tees. Test results are compared with those obtained
during works tests and any significant deviations are
investigated and rectified.
Prior to the site testing phase, the manufacturer
agrees the format of the detailed test schedules with
the C E G B . All testing is carried out in accordance with
these schedules, which are completed and witnessed
by the manufacturer and the C E G B site construction
representatives at the time of the test. These schedules
are subsequently made available for scrutiny by the
CEGB operating staff, the Nuclear Installations In­
spectorate or other bodies, as appropriate.
Site testing is subdivided into three stages:
Diesel generators
Stage 1 — Preliminary tests Preparation and testing
of individual items of equipment or smah subsystems
prior to functioning as a system.
Stage 2 — Isolated system tests Testing of systems to
the maximum extent possible without connecting the
diesel generator to the operational system.
Stage 3 — Operational system tests Proving of the
diesel generator unit as part of the essential supplies
system of the power station.
Stage 1 — Preliminary tests
The fohowing is a summary of a detailed check hst
agreed between the C E G B and the manufacturer.
Complete unit and hs auxiharies:
• A physical inspection to ensure correct installation,
to installation drawings, and absence of damage.
• Check for correct labelling of all plant items.
Electrical equipment:
• Operational checks on switchgear, including the set­
ting of overcurrent relays.
• Test the insulation resistance of power supply cables,
motors and small wiring, together with associated
control and alarm devices.
• Check the direction of m o t o r rotation.
Earthing:
• Physical inspection of all earthing connections to
electrical equipment metalwork.
• Ensure that the diesel generator unit earthing system
is correct to drawings and connected to the main
station earthing system.
Pipework:
• Operation of valves.
• Pressure testing.
• Comprehensive purging to remove dirt and debris
that may have entered during transport to site and
erection.
P u m p s , compressors, fans, etc.:
• Check the duration and magnitude of the starting
current.
• Check for correct operation and setting of control
safety and alarm devices.
• Raise system to normal pressure and check for leak­
ages.
• Recheck operation of control, safety and alarm de­
vices.
Tanks and air receivers:
• Carry out an internal inspection for cleanliness and
absence of damage to internal hnings.
795
Emergency supply e q u i p m e n t
• Check the overflow/blowdown arrangements.
• Check for the correct operation of control, safety
and alarm devices, in conjunction with associated
pumps/compressors.
• Check level/pressure gauges, both local and remote.
Engine speed controls:
• Check the operation of speed setting motor.
• Set operation of electrical and mechanical governor
for service.
• Check the operation and setting of the overspeed trip
switch.
Engine mechanical checks:
• Recheck cylinder head nut torques, tappet clear­
ances, p u m p drive chain tensions, crankshaft deflec­
tions, engine and generator shaft alignment, correct
charging with oil, etc.
• Charging, priming and venting of auxihary systems.
• Check engine pressure/temperature sensors.
Generator:
• High voltage tests.
• Retest insulation resistance and check polarisation
index of stator winding.
• Check anti-condensation heaters and control circuits.
• Set and adjust AVR for service.
Local control and alarm panels:
• Check A C and D C auxiliary supply voltages and
polarities.
• Check the pick-up and drop-off values of relays.
• Check sequence functions of relays.
• Check functioning of alarm annunciator equipment,
including accept, reset, lamp test facilities and the
audible alarm device.
Stage 2 — Isolated system tests
Again, this is only a brief summary of a detailed check
list agreed between the C E G B and a manufacturer.
Local alarms:
• Check operation of all alarm initiating devices
around the plant in conjunction w h h local alarm
annunciator equipment and separate or grouped
alarm outputs (as appropriate) to the station central
control room alarm system.
Protection:
• Primary inject current transformer circuits to check
balanced current and earth fault protection, includ­
ing setting of associated relays and AVR current
transformer circuit for reactive kVA sharing.
796
Chapter 9
• Check correct operation of generator circuit-breaker,
field suppression switch and fuel shut-off valve from
all trip devices on the diesel generator.
Controls:
• Check diesel engine remote start and stop controls,
including automatic starting circuit.
• Check governor and AVR remote 'raise' and 'lower',
'manual' and 'automatic' controls.
• Carry out secondary voltage injection on AVR.
Engine first run:
• This generally fohows the manufacturer's standard
commissioning and setting-up procedures for no-load
running.
• Record a series of measurements during engine starts
to estabhsh the cranking speed at which firing occurs.
• Monitor and record various air, water and oil tem­
peratures a r o u n d the unit until all parameters have
stabihsed.
Governor tests:
• Check engine run-up and shutdown on both the
electronic and mechanical governors.
• Check engine behaviour on simulated failure of the
electronic governor.
• Record the rate of rise of speed and governor action
during the above tests.
• Carry out tests to establish the time taken to vary
the engine speed over the range of ± 5 % of syn­
chronous speed with increasing and decreasing speed.
• Take engine to overspeed and check the overspeed
trip setting.
• Check range of speed control from the control desk.
AVR tests:
• Run-up and shutdown the unit to record cut-in and
cut-out points for excitation, and check rate of rise
of generator output voltage.
• Run-up the unit with excitation diode short-circuited
to prove protection.
• Run-up the unit with excitation diode open-circuited
to prove alarm.
• Check excitation failure trips.
• Check range of AVR settings.
Loading tests:
During commissioning of diesel generators in a new
power station, it is unlikely that sufficient load will be
available to fully load the u n h . It is therefore usual
to bring to site the artificial electrical loading facilities
used during works testing. This also provides greater

flexibility in the control of load variations, without
interfering with the work of other contractors. The tests
generally follow the manufacturer's standard commis­
sioning and setting procedures:
• Monitor and record various air, water and oil tem­
peratures around the plant when stable conditions
have been obtained at 5 0 % , 100% and 110% k W
load, 0.8 p.f. and normal vohage. The time to reach
stable conditions should also be recorded.
• Regular records of the above parameters, including
also exhaust temperatures, are taken during a 10 h
run which follows the above runs. Temporary tem­
perature detectors are attached to busbars, bolted
connections and cable tails in the line and neutral
terminal chambers, t o detect any hot spots.
Load apphcation and throw-off tests:
• In order to check the performance of the governors
and the AVR, various block loads are applied and
thrown-off, recording voltage, current, p.f. and
speed. The tests are commenced when the machine
is at full speed and voltage and normal running
temperatures. Block loads of 2 5 % , 5 0 % , 7 5 % and
100% 0.8 p.f. are apphed, thrown off and reapplied
after 10 s.
• In addition to the normal log sheet information,
oscillograms of voltage, current, engine speed, turbo-
charger speed and fuel rack position are also taken.
Diesel starting tests:
• All starts on each engine are recorded, timed and
dated w h h the reason for start and reason for any
failure to start.
• Single bank starting — after establishing normal
working air pressure in the appropriate receiver,
its inlet valve is shut. A series of engine starts is
carried out to determine the number of starts avail­
able from the receiver, and the minimum pressure
needed in the receiver to carry out a successful start.
The tests are carried out on each bank in turn.
• Twin bank starting — with both air receivers at
normal working pressure and their inlet valves shut,
a series of starts is carried out to determine the
number of starts avahable.
• Repeat start tests — start tests are carried out to
achieve a total of 300 successful starts on all engines
comprising one type.
The tests need not be carried out immediately follow­
ing each other. 8 0 % are carried out with the engine
in its standby (kept warm) condition and 2 0 % are
carried out at the hot equilibrium condition.
• The reasons for any failures to start are noted and
the C E G B requires additional start tests if 50
consecutive successful starts without failure are not
achieved.
Diesel generators
• A standard test log sheet is completed for each run
at the end of a 5-minute load run. This includes a
record of any leaks, discrepancies between tests and
any other a n o m a h e s , together with any corrective
action taken.
Stage 3 — Operational system tests
For this series of tests, the diesel generator is tested in
conjunction with the power station auxiliary supply sys­
tem which, in turn, is connected to the Grid system.
They demonstrate as far as possible that the diesel
generators can carry out the duties for which they are
designed.
Synchronising Phase rotation and synchronising tests
are performed prior to synchronising the diesel gen­
erator to hs associated Essential Services Board for
the first time.
Governor and A VR performance tests under various
system load conditions The extent of these tests can
vary from station to station and depend u p o n the aux­
ihary system design. Two examples of typical tests are
given:
• With the diesel generator at full speed and voltage,
two emergency boiler feed pumps are started simul­
taneously. Oscillograms of vohage, current, p.f. and
engine speed are taken.
• With the diesel generator carrying a m o t o r load of u p
to 5 0 % , one emergency boiler feed p u m p is started.
Oscillograms of voltage, current, p.f. and engine
speed are taken.
Auto starting and auto loading tests Control systems
are adjusted to suit loading expected in service:
• A h diesel generators are started automatically from
a simulated reactor trip signal and are observed to
run at their preset speed and voltage conditions with
all their auxiliaries in the appropriate condition.
• A l o s s of Grid' condition is then simulated by open­
ing the connection between the Grid-fed station
auxiliary system and the Essential Services Boards
to permit automatic connection and loading of the
diesel generators on to their associated switchboards.
• A further test consists of simulating 'loss of Grid'
conditions as the initiating event with the diesel gen­
erators available for service but at standstill. Ob­
servations of run-ups and loading are made as above.
5.4.3 In-service operational testing
In order to ensure that diesel generators are at all
times available for their emergency role and able to
carry their rated load, periodic testing at intervals not
greater than one m o n t h is carried out.
Each diesel generator in turn is started manually
and synchronised as described in Section 5.3.3 of this
797
Emergency supply equipment
chapter, and loaded u p to its full rating. Any surplus
generation over and above that required by the station
auxiliary system is exported to the Grid system. T h e unit
is left running until all conditions have stabihsed and
to allow the operators to check that ah auxiliaries are
running correctly. Where a p p r o p r i a t e , failures of duty
auxiliaries are simulated to ensure that changeover to
standby auxiliaries takes place correctly, after which
service is either restored to the duty auxiliary or the
standby unit is changed over to the duty auxiliary.
Such tests at nuclear power stations are fully re­
corded for inspection by the Nuclear Installations
Inspectorate.
It should be noted that t h r o u g h o u t the test, the diesel
generator can take u p its emergency role immediately,
the test being terminated by automatic means (see
Section 5.1.1 of this chapter).
6 Additional references
E/TSS/EX. 32000: Technical Specification and Schedules for Seismic
Qualification of Electrical Plant
CEGB Standard 239903: Piping systems — Low pressure water
services
CEGB Standard 23992: Piping systems — Oil services
CEGB Standard 20752: Fuel oil storage tanks
CEGB Standard 989907: Noise limits for new power stations
ESI 44-3: Electric Motors Specification 3300 V and above
EES 1980: CEGB General Specification for electronic equipment
Smith, G.: Storage Batteries: Pitman: 1971
6.1 British Standards (BS)
BS417: Specification for galvanised mild steel cisterns and covers,
tanks and cylinders; Part 2, Metric units: 1973
798
Chapter 9
BS440: Specification for stationary batteries (lead-acid Plante positive
type) for general electrical purposes: 1964 (withdrawn and replaced
by BS6290)
BS799: Specification for oil burning equipment; Part 5, Oil storage
tanks: 1975
BS806: Specification for design and construction of ferrous piping
installations for and in connection with land boilers: 1986
BS1123: Specification for safety valves, gauges and other safety
fittings for air receivers and compressed air installations: 1976
BS2594: Specification for carbon steel welded horizontal cyHndrical
storage tanks: 1975
BS2757: Method for determining the thermal classification of
electrical insulation: 1986
BS2869: Specification for fuel oils for oil engines and burners for
non-marine use: 1983
BS3605: Specification for seamless and welded austenitic stainless
steel pipes and tubes for pressure purposes: 1973
BS4675: Mechanical vibration in rotating machinery: 1978
BS4999: Specification for general requirements for rotating electrical
machines:
Part 3: Terminal markings and direction of rotation: 1981
Part 20: Classification of types of enclosure: 1972
Part 21: Classification of methods of coohng: 1972
Part 40: Characteristics of synchronous generators: 1972
Part 51: Noise levels: 1973
BS5000: Specification for rotating electrical machines of particular
types or for particular appHcations; Part 99, Machines for miscel­
laneous applications: 1973 (1981)
BS5169: Specification for fusion welded steel air receivers: 1985
BS5311: Specification for a.c. circuit-breakers of rated voltage above
1 kV: 1976
BS5514: Reciprocating internal combustion engines: performance
BS6290: Lead-acid stationary cells and batteries: 1983/84
 C H A P T E R 10

Mechanical plant electrical services

1 Introduction 4.4.3 Motor protection

4.4.4 Brakes
2 General requirements
4.5 Lift car and landing equipment
2.1 Sources of supply 4.5.1 Landing control facilities
2.1.1 Choice of supply 4.5.2 Car control facilities
2.1.2 Supply variations 4.5.3 Car lighting
2.1.3 Applications 4.5.4 Telephone
2.2 Motors 4.5.5 Maintenance facilities
2.2.1 Motor ratings and supply voltages 4.6 Safety devices and systems
2.2.2 Design standards 4.6.1 Fireman's control system
2.2.3 AC motors 4.6.2 Flood control system
2.2.4 DC motors 4.6.3 Travel interlocks
2.3 Safety considerations 4.6.4 Lift car emergency hatch
2.3.1 General requirements 4.6.5 Audible alarm
2.3.2 Equipment enclosures 4.7 Lift shaft lighting
2.3.3 Control and trip circuits 4.8 Earthing
2.3.4 Interlocking
2.3.5 Emergency trip controls 5 Gas producing and storage plant
2.4 Environmental conditions 5.1 Introduction
2.4.1 Ambient conditions 5.2 General requirements
2.4.2 Hazardous atmospheres 5.2.1 Safety assurance and standards
2.4.3 Nuclear environments 5.2.2 Lightning protection
2.5 Electronic equipment 5.2.3 Motors in hazardous areas
2.6 Switchgear and contactor gear 5.2.4 Switchgear and contactor controlgear
2.7 Radio and television interference 5.2.5 Control and instrumentation equipment
2.8 Noise levels 5.2.6 Transformer/rectifier equipment
5.2.7 Frost protection
3 Cranes
5.2.8 Earthing and static protection
3.1 General 5.3 Hydrogen producing plant — electrolytic cell process
3.2 Power supply and distribution 5.3.1 General description of plant
3.3 Crane motor drives 5.3.2 Classification of plant areas
3.3.1 Motors 5.3.3 Electrical, control and instrumentation equipment
3.3.2 Motor protection 5.4 Hydrogen producing plant — methanol chemical reaction
3.3.3 Motion control — direction 5.4.1 General description of plant
3.3.4 Motion control — speed 5.4.2 Classification of plant areas
3.3.5 Braking systems 5.4.3 Electrical, control and instrumentation equipment
3.4 Control station systems 5.5 Methane production plant
3.4.1 Cab control 5.5.1 General description of plant
3.4.2 Radio control 5.5.2 Classification of plant areas
3.4.3 Pendant control 5.5.3 Electrical, control and instrumentation equipment
3.5 Crane controls, interlocks and limit switches 5.6 Nitrogen storage plant
3.5.1 Control equipment cubicles 5.6.1 General description of plant
3.5.2 Protective panel 5.6.2 Electrical requirements
3.5.3 Limit switches 5.7 Carbon dioxide storage plant
3.6 Anti-collision system 5.7.1 General description of plant
3.7 Travel motion supply systems 5.7.2 Electrical requirements
3.7.1 Long travel
3.7.2 Cross-traverse 6 C W electrochlorination plant (sodium hypochlorite
3.7.3 Alternative supplies for long travel production and storage)
3.8 Crane earthing 6.1 General description of plant
3.9 Crane services 6.2 Classification of plant areas
3.10 Special features required for nuclear plant cranes 6.3 Electrical, control and instrumentation equipment
3.10.1 Duty categories 6.3.1 General
3.10.2 Design requirements 6.3.2 Production control panel
4 Lifts 6.3.3 Sea water feed pumps and strainers control
6.3.4 Transformer/rectifier controls
4.1 Types and general requirements 6.3.5 Sodium hypochlorite storage
4.2 Supplies and distribution
6.3.6 Dosing pump controls
4.3 Motor room equipment
6.3.7 Electrical distribution
4.4 Lift drive systems
4.4.1 Electrical 7 Water treatment plant
4.4.2 Hydraulic 7.1 Description of plant

799
Mechanical plant electrical services C h a p t e r 10

7.2 Electrical distribution system 10.3.2 Tank heating — steam

7.3 Electrical control 10.3.3 Pipe heating — electrical
7.4 Motor drives 10.4 Storage tank instrumentation
7.5 Frost protection 10.5 Valve actuators
7.6 Electrically-operated valve actuators 10.6 Lightning protection

8 C o a l ash and dust plant 11 Air compressors

8.1 Coal handling plant 11.1 General description of plant
8.1.1 General description of plant 11.2 Air compressor drive motors
8.1.2 Electrical supplies 11.3 Heaters
8.1.3 Electrical control 11.4 Automatic and safety controls
8.1.4 Conveyors
12 Heating and ventilating plant
8.1.5 Stacker/reclaimer machine
8.2 Ash and dust handling plant 12.1 General description of plant
8.2.1 General description of dust handling plant 12.2 Control gear
8.2.2 General description of ash handling plant 12.3 Classification of electrical equipment
8.2.3 Electrical supplies 12.4 Drive motors
8.2.4 Electrical control 12.5 Air conditioning units
8.2.5 Mobile ash hoppers 12.5.1 Chiller unit
8.2.6 Ash-grabbing crane 12.5.2 Humidifier
8.2.7 Trace heating 12.5.3 Airheater
8.2.8 Local control panels 12.5.4 Fan
8.2.9 Conveyors 12.6 Water heating plant
8.2.10 Sump pump, grit pump and dust pump controls 12.6.1 Heating elements
12.7 Cabling and terminations
9 Electrostatic precipitators
12.8 Water circulating pumps
9.1 General description of plant
9.2 Electrical supplies 13 Fire fighting equipment
9.2.1 415 V switchboards 13.1 General description of system
9.2.2 High voltage control cubicles 13.2 Controls and alarms
9.2.3 Transformer/rectifier equipment 13.3 Diesel-driven fire pumps
9.2.4 High voltage chamber enclosures 13.4 Air compressors
9.2.5 High voltage insulators 13.5 Trace heating
9.3 Maintenance interlocking and locking 13.6 Detectors and distributors
9.4 Earthing 13.6.1 Quartzoid bulbs
9.5 Interference suppression 13.6.2 Heat-detecting cable systems
13.6.3 Smoke detection
10 Fuel oil plant
13.7 Fire dampers and smoke extraction
10.1 General description of plant 13.8 Control cabling
10.2 Pumps 13.9 Batteries and chargers
10.3 Oil heating
10.3.1 Tank heating — electrical 14 References

1 Introduction supply voltage and local distribution requirements. The

supplies may be A C , taken directly from main switch­
This chapter describes the main electrical requirements
boards or distribution boards (which may be located
of ancillary mechanical plant in a modern power sta­
ehher remote from or local to the plant), or D C from
tion. Such plant, whilst not directly associated with
the D C distribution system. The D C distribution sys­
the main generating units, is essential for the op­
tem is supplied by battery systems incorporating charg­
eration of the power station. It includes cranes, hfts,
ing equipment supplied from the electrical auxiharies
gas production and storage, electrochlorination, water
system.
treatment, coal ash and dust plant, precipitators, fuel
The following supphes are available in most modern
oil, air compressors, heating and ventilation, and fire
power stations:
protection.
• 11 kV, three-phase, 50 H z , resistance earthed, w h h
a maximum symmetrical short-circuit fauh level of
2 General requirements 750 M V A (39.4 kA).
• 3.3 kV, three-phase, 50 H z , resistance earthed, with
a maximum symmetrical short-circuit fault level of
2.1 Sources of supply
250 M V A (43.8 kA).

2.1.1 C h o i c e of s u p p l y • 415 V, three-phase and 240 V, single-phase, sohd

The electrical systems of ancillary mechanical plant
are fed from the power station electrical auxiliaries
system to suit the specific requirements of the plant
in terms of load, security of supply, limitations on
earthed, 50 Hz with a maximum symmetrical short-
circuh fauh level of 31 M V A (43.8 kA).
• 110 V, single-phase, 50 H z , one pole sohdly earthed,
from one or two sources, for instrumentation supphes.

800
 General requirements

• 110 V, single-phase, 50 Hz , centre-point earthed, for Nominal battery voltage 48 V 110 V 240 V
supphes to smah tools through socket outlets. Nominal working (float) vohage 54 V 121 V 270 V
• 240 V D C from a battery system, earthed through a Maximum vohage at equipment 54 V 121 V 270 V
sensitive earth fault relay connected from the mid­
Minimum vohage at equipment 43 V 93 V 216 V
point of a resistor connected between the negative and
positive poles.
2.1.3 Applications
• 110 V DC from a battery system, earthed in the same
• 11 kV, three-phase supplies are used for a few large
manner as the 240 V D C system.
m o t o r drives, such as air compressors.
• 48 V DC from a battery system, the positive pole sohd­
• 3.3 kV and 415 V, three-phase supplies are used for
ly earthed.
m o t o r s , actuators and the power requirements of
major equipment.
2.1.2 Supply variations
• 240 V, single-phase supplies are used for miscel­
Since A C supphes are derived from the electrical aux­ laneous small power requirements, including light­
iliaries system, they are subject to vohage and fre­ ing, heating and m o t o r drives u p to 0.75 k W .
quency variations and occasional momentary breaks,
due to system disturbances created by the switching of • 110 V, single-phase instrument supplies are used for
control and instrumentation needing high availabi­
large loads. The permitted supply variations stipulated
lity but which can tolerate short breaks of u p to
for design purposes are outhned below and all elec­
10 ms in the event of supply changeover or system
trical equipment is required to accommodate these
disturbances.
variations, with the exception of motors which are
discussed in Section 2.2 of this chapter: • 110 V, single-phase centre-tapped supplies are used
to supply portable tools through socket outlets,
(a) 11 kV, 3.3 kV, 415 V, 240 V, 50 Hz supplies
where personnel safety considerations require a maxi­
Voltage range: nominal - I - 6 % / - 1 0 % con­ m u m voltage to earth of 55 V.
tinuously; nominal - 2 % for
• D C supplies are used when supply interruptions are
brief periods; loss of supply
unacceptable, control supplies being at ehher 110 V
for up to 200 ms fohowed by
or 48 V and m o t o r supphes at 240 V D C .
a slow recovery to normal
system voltage taking up to
180 s, this condition occurring 2.2 Motors
in the event of a major fault
on the distribution system be­
2.2.1 IVIotor ratings and supply voltages
ing cleared by protection.
M o t o r ratings comply with the relevant British Stand­
Frequency range: 48 H z to 51 Hz continuously; ard. F o r power station requirements, m o t o r ratings and
47 Hz to 51 Hz for brief supply vohages are categorised as fohows:
periods.
U p to 0.75 k W — 415 V, three-phase, 50 H z
Transient conditions: u p to 5 X nominal vohage occasionally
for u p to 2 m s .
240 V, single-phase, 50 Hz
(b) 110 V, 50 H z instrument supplies
110 V, single-phase, 50Hz
Voltage and frequency variation range as (a), but
250 V D C and 110 V D C ,
a high availabihty supply, usually obtained by a
battery or rectifier derived.
supply changeover system; m a x i m u m break in sup­
ply 10 m s . 0.75 t o 150 k W — 415 V, three-phase, 50 H z
(c) 110 V, 50 H z supplies, centre-tapped to earth 250 V D C a n d 110 V D C ,
Voltage and frequency range as (a). battery or rectifier derived.

(d) 240 V, 110 V and 48 V D C supphes. Above 150 k W — 11 kV, three-phase, 50 Hz

3.3 kV, three-phase, 50 Hz
When fed from battery systems incorporating charger
D C supphes derived from
equipment, electrical equipment is designed t o operate
rectifier equipment.
with a D C supply voltage which is normally at, or near,
the battery float voltage but which may fall to a value
considerably lower t h a n the rated battery voltage in 2.2.2 Design standards
the event of charger failure, as the battery discharges. The basic requirements for motors associated with an­
These voltage ranges and variations are as follows: cillary mechanical plant are the same as those apphed

801
Mechanical plant electrical services
for main plant auxiliaries and are based upon the
appropriate British Standards, as qualified by C E G B
standards. Typical main plant auxiliary-drive require­
ments and the selection of motors are discussed in detail
in Chapter 7. An outline of the requirements applicable
to the majority of motors is given below.
Rating up to 0.75 kW
General design is in accordance with BS5000 P a r t
11 [1].
Motors are continuously rated in accordance with
BS5000 and suitable for continuous operation in 40°C
ambient. Winding temperature rises are in accordance
with BS5000 [1], except that Class Β temperature limhs
(130°C) are apphcable, even though Class F insulation
may be used.
Motors are capable of three consecutive starts, fifteen
starts per hour and of operating under varying supply
conditions, as follows.
A C motors and D C motors fed from rectifier equip­
ment must operate continuously at rated load with
supply frequencies of 48 to 51 Hz and voltage varia­
tions of ± 6 % of nominal, and must also be capable
of short term operation under emergency conditions
with supply frequencies down to 47 H z . In addition,
when specified for essential duties, motors must operate
continuously at 7 5 % rated vohage and 50 Hz fre­
quency for periods up to 5 minutes and be capable
of recovery to normal operation following a supply
interruption lasting u p to 0.2 s.
D C battery-fed motors are required to operate con­
tinuously with supply voltage variations of ± 1 0 % of
nominal and for up to 30 minutes at 8 0 % of nominal.
Motor enclosures are built to one of the following
standards, as classified in BS4999 [2]:
• Drip proof to IP22 — protected against sohd ob­
jects greater than 12 m m and dripping water when
tilted up to 15°.
• Totally-enclosed to IP54 — protected against dust
and splashing water.
• Totally-enclosed fan-cooled to IP54 for indoor use
and IP55 — protected against dust and water jets
— weatherproof for outdoor use.
Ratings above 0.75 kW and up to 150 kW
General design is in accordance with BS5000 Part
40 [1].
Motors are suitable for continuous operation in
40°C ambient. Winding temperature rises are in ac­
cordance with BS5000 [1], except that Class Β tem­
perature hmits (130°C) are apphcable, even though
Class F insulation may be used.
Motors are capable of two starts in succession,
fohowed by a 30-minute coohng period before another
attempt at starting is made, and of three equally-
spaced starts per hour under normal running condi­
802
C h a p t e r 10
tions. Also, they must be capable of starting when the
supply voltage is 8 0 % of the nominal.
Windings and insulation are designed to have a
minimum life of 18 000 starts and bearings are de­
signed for 4 0 0 0 0 hours' running.
The A C and D C supply variations which the motors
are required to operate under are the same as those
described above for motors rated u p to 0.75 k W .
A C squirrel-cage induction motors are started direct-
on-line at rated vohage. Puh-out torque is specified as
not less than twice full-load torque for ah induction
and c o m m u t a t o r motors.
Most motors have a maximum continuous rating
(MCR). When appropriate, motors may have a duty
type rating (DTR) or short term rating (STR).
M o t o r enclosures are built to one of the following
standards as classified in BS4999 [2]:
• Drip proof to IP22.
• Totally-enclosed to IP54.
• Totally-enclosed fan-cooled to IP54.
• Totally-enclosed air-cooled with an integral heat
exchanger to IP54.
• Totally-enclosed air-cooled, with a machine-mounted
heat exchanger to IP54 for indoor use and IP55
weatherproof for outdoor use.
The maximum rating of 415 V, three-phase 50 Hz
motors is generally 150 k W . These motors are con­
trolled by contactors incorporating overload protection
and protected against short-circuit by fuses.
Ratings of 150 kW and above
General design is in accordance with BS5000 Part
40 [1].
The operational requirements for this range of
motors are generally as described above for ratings
above 0.75 k W and u p to 150 k W , except that ma­
chines of 1500 kW and above are totally-enclosed,
closed air circuit, with water-cooled heat exchangers,
ehher machine or separately m o u n t e d . The maximum
cooling water temperature is specified as 30°C.
All 11 kV motors are protected by circuh-breakers.
3.3 kV motors are protected either by motor switch­
ing devices incorporating fuse protection or by circuit-
breakers. Circuh-breaker-fed motors are equipped w h h
terminal boxes capable of withstanding the full system
three-phase symmetrical fauh level.
2.2.3 A C motors
Cage induction motors
Three-phase cage induction motors are the most widely
used for ancillary mechanical plant demanding con­
stant-speed drives because of their low cost and high
reliabihty. They are discussed in detail in Chapter 7.
 General requirements

With the development of electronic control techni­ 2.3.2 Equipment enclosures

ques and equipment, the use of cage induction motors Equipment enclosures are designed to provide ade­
as variable-speed drives can provide an economic alter­ quate and appropriate protection against the ingress
native to tradhional A C types, such as shpring induc­ of water, dust and solid objects likely to jeopardise the
tion and commutator m o t o r s . The various techniques safety of plant and personnel, to prevent unauthorised
for speed and t o r a u e control are discussed in Chapter 7. access by personnel and to allow authorised access by
personnel for routine maintenance and commissioning
Slipring induction motors purposes.
Slipring induction motors in conjunction with rotor The degree of protection against the ingress of water
resistance-switching contactors are widely used for an­ and solids is categorised in hne with British Standard
cillary mechanical plant, such as cranes, demanding BS5490 [3]; the I P rating most appropriate to the duty
variable-speed drives. Details of this system are included must be specified.
in Chapter 7. A brief description, as given in BS5490 [3], of IP
ratings appropriate to power station electrical equip­
ment and typical applications is given below:
2.2.4 DC motors
Because of their higher capital and running costs and IP30 Protected against solid objects Indoor equipment in control
greater maintenance requirements, D C motors are used — greater than 2.5 mm. rooms, equipment rooms.
only when the operational role precludes the use of IP31 Protected against solid objects Indoor equipment for which
A C induction motors. This includes essential drives greater than 2.5 mm and protection against dripping
which must be independent of A C supply system dripping water. water is essential, e.g.,
switchgear.
failures and specialist apphcations, such as hfts.
IP44 Protected against solid objects Outdoor equipment, such as
greater than 1 mm and switchgear, which requires to
splashing water. be ventilated and protected
2.3 Safety considerations against the environment.
IP54 Protected against dust and Indoor equipment in which
2.3.1 General requirements splashing water. the accumulation of dust
The basic requirement is to ensure the safety of person­ would be detrimental and
protection against dripping
nel who are either directly or indirectly associated with water is essential, e.g., elec­
the operation or maintenance of the plant, or who may tric motors.
be in the vicinity of the plant when it is operational. IP55 Protected against dust and Outdoor equipment and spe­
In order to meet this requirement, the following ob­ water jets in any direction. cial situations, such as boil­
jectives have to be considered as part of the design er houses and coal plants,
where the environment is
process:
particularly harsh, e.g.,
• The plant must be capable of operating safely over motors.
the full range of environmental conditions to which IP65 Dust tight and protected Equipment in exposed wet
it may be subjected for its design life. Hazardous against water jets in any and dusty situations neces­
direction. sitating maximum protection
atmospheres must be recognised and taken into against the ingress of dust,
account in the overall design. e.g., valve actuators.

• In the event of failure of the plant, or part thereof,

the safety of personnel must not be jeopardised. Enclosures for equipment t o be used in hazardous areas
are designed to satisfy the requirements of BS4683 [4]
• The design should recognise that h u m a n error can
appropriate for the area classification, as defined in
result in the plant being operated incorrectly and
BS5345 [5].
so should include electrical interlocks, mechanical
interlocks and protective devices necessary to ensure
safe operation. 2.3.3 Control and trip circuits

• A readily accessible means of shutting the plant
down quickly and easily in an emergency should
be provided.
• When plant control is dependent to a large extent
on manual operation, as in cranes, the possibility
of an operator collapsing must be considered and
the plant designed to fail-safe.
• The design must include all reasonable measures
to ensure the safety of operating and maintenance
personnel.
Control circuit supplies, with the exception of those to
switchgear closing coils, are h m h e d to 110 V maximum
in the interests of safety. These supplies are normally
obtained from the 110 V A C instrument supply system,
from the 110 V D C or 50 V D C supply system or from
an integral transformer in the equipment, which steps
the supply voltage down to 110 V A C .
Equipment requiring a secure supply but which is
not likely to suffer from the momentary loss of sup­
ply or the variations in supply voltage and frequency
described in Section 2.1.2 of this chapter, such as a

803
Mechanical plant electrical services
control and instrumentation cubicle, is supplied from
the 110 V A C instrument supplies system.
Equipment requiring guaranteed supplies for control
purposes, such as switchgear and contactor gear, is
connected to the station 110 V D C or 48 V D C dis­
tribution systems.
Equipment which can accommodate the occasional
supply interruptions and variations in supply vohage
and frequency detailed in Section 2,1.2 of this chapter,
such as crane control equipment, is normally supphed
from integral 110 V transformers.
Control circuits incorporate a 'test' selector switch
to enable functional checks to be made in the control
circuits without operating the plant. This is important,
since it not only permits routine checks to ensure
the correct operation of the equipment but also veri­
fication that protection and safety interlock circuits are
functioning correctly.
Switchgear closing circuits are connected through
'plant protection interlock contacts' which ensure that
the plant can only be started when in a safe condition.
Switchgear trip circuits are connected through 'plant
protection trip contacts' which complete the trip circuit
in the event of plant malfunction, or of a plant con­
dition arising which could jeopardise the safety of op­
eration. Also connected into the trip circuh are contacts
on plant protection devices, which operate to complete
the trip circuit in the event of a fault developing on
the equipment. The 'plant protection trips' and 'plant
protection devices' are fundamental to the safety of
the plant and are either connected in such a manner
that their failure wih cause the plant to trip, or, as in
switchgear circuits, the protection contacts are wired
in a manner which enables the integrity of the wiring,
connections and supply to them to be continuously
monitored by a supervision relay.
2.3.4 Interlocking
Interlocking takes two forms; mechanical and electrical:
Electrical interlocks include limit switches, pressure
switches, position switches and transducer contacts
which continuously monitor the state of the plant, and
are connected into the control circuit to ensure that
the plant can only be operated in a correct sequence,
and in safety. These circuits also include circuit-breaker,
contactor and relay poshion contacts, which are cross-
connected into other circuits in the control system to
ensure that the correct electrical control sequence is
followed, subject to the plant state being proved correct
by the interlock contacts.
Mechanical interlocks take the form of linkages, cams
or other mechanisms which prohibh the operation of
a device when h is unsafe to do so; for example, by
preventing a cubicle door being opened if the supply
disconnector is 'on', or by preventing a non-load-
breaking disconnector from being switched ' o f f when
the associated contactor is On'. When h is required
804
C h a p t e r 10
to interlock between different items of plant or devices
to ensure that they are operated in the correct sequence
or combination, coded-key interlocks are widely used.
Used either singly, or in conjunction with key-exchange
boxes, they ensure safe operation and also 'authorise'
plant operation and access for maintenance.
2.3.5 E m e r g e n c y trip controls
Since the majority of power station plant is unattended,
it is not general practice to locate emergency trip con­
trols adjacent to drive motors or plant but rather
to incorporate such devices in the control station, which
may be either local or remote. Interlocks and strict op­
erational safety procedures ensure that safety is main­
tained during both normal operation and maintenance.
A n emergency trip device normally consists of a red
mushroom-headed push-to-trip b u t t o n , with an integral
shrouded or key-operated trip release device to ensure
that a deliberate action is necessary for the operator
to reset the trip circuit.
2.4 Environmental conditions
2.4.1 A m b i e n t conditions
The design of the equipment has to include adequate
protection against the ingress of water and solids, and
be suitable for continuous operation over the full range
of ambient temperatures or, if the equipment is sub­
jected to radiant or conducted heat, at the maximum
operating temperature likely to occur in service.
In the interests of standardisation, equipment is
generahy specified in three classes, as fohows:
Ambient Class 1 Applies to equipment located in­
doors in a non-corrosive atmosphere, in which the
ambient temperature range is 0 ° C to + 4 0 ° C . Enclo­
sures are protected against fahing dust to IP30 of
BS5490 [3].
Ambient Class 2 Apphes to o u t d o o r equipment in a
corrosive atmosphere, in which the ambient tempera­
ture range is - 2 5 ° C to + 5 5 ° C . Enclosures are pro­
tected against airborne dust to IP44 of BS5490.
Ambient Class 3 Apphes to equipment in special
situations where the atmosphere is corrosive and the
ambient temperature range is - 10°C to -l-70°C. En­
closures are protected to IP55 of BS5490.
For most power station equipment. Ambient Class 1
is provided for indoor use and Ambient Class 2 for
outdoor use, where it may be subjected to sunhght,
wind, rain, snow or freezing conditions. For harsh en­
vironments, such as boiler houses, equipment is speci­
fied to Ambient Class 3, in view of the greater risk
of water and dust ingress and the wider operating
temperature range. Exceptionally high conditions of

humidity, such as may be found underground, are
considered individuahy and treated as special cases.
2.4.2 Hazardous atmospheres
Whilst most power station environments do not con­
stitute hazards, certain areas, such as hydrogen plants,
do. Equipment for use in hazardous areas comphes
with the requirements of BS5345 [5], which classifies
areas as Zone 0, Zone 1 or Zone 2.
Zone 0 An area in which an explosive gas/air mixture
is continuously present or present for long
periods.
Zone 1 An area in which an explosive gas/air mixture
is hkely to occur in normal operation.
Zone 2 An area in which an explosive gas/air mixture
is not likely to occur in normal operation and,
if it occurs, will exist for only a short time.
All areas not classified as Zone 0, 1 or 2 are deemed
to be non-hazardous.
2.4.3 Nuclear environments
Reactor buildings at nuclear power stations present
unique environmental conditions which have to be
taken into account in the design of electrical equipment
for ancillary mechanical plant.
The equipment is designed to operate in the envi­
ronmental conditions which occur when the reactor is
being commissioned, on-load or shut down for main­
tenance. In addition, the possibility of reactor system
faults or seismic disturbances is considered and the
equipment designed accordingly, having regard for the
operational role of the equipment during and fohowing
the event.
Environmental conditions to which equipment may
be exposed during its operating life are dependent u p o n
the design of the reactor system and the location of
the equipment. In addition to the temperature varia­
tions, radiation levels and humidity range occurring
during normal station operation; short-term large varia­
tions in temperature, pressure and radiation levels may
occur during maintenance or reactor system fauhs.
2.5 Electronic equipment
To ensure that electronic equipment is of consistent
standard and suhable for operation in a power station
environment, the C E G B has its own specification, E E S
(1980) [6] which lays down basic design parameters
and stringent type tests. Electronic equipment is classi­
fied according to its environment — Class B 3 / X for
indoor equipment and Class C l / X for o u t d o o r equip­
ment. Requirements appropriate t o these classifications
are stipulated in the specification. Because of the
sensitivity of electronic equipment to its environment.
General requirements
these classifications cover environmental temperature,
humidity and levels of electrical interference to which
the equipment may be subjected during operation.
Equipment may be subjected to radio frequency and
cable-borne interference. C o m m o n causes of radio fre­
quency interference are portable radio transmitters,
fluorescent lamps, D C relay operation and the switch­
ing of A C supplies. Cable-borne interference reaches
equipment in both power and signal lines as a result
of coupling at the source and between cables, the main
cause being the rapid change of current due to switching
and fuse operation. E E S (1980) [6] specifies tests de­
signed to demonstrate that equipment is unaffected
by levels of interference appropriate to the environ­
mental classification.
Environment Class B 3 / X covers a temperature range
of - 5 ° C to -h40°C, a humidity range of 5 % to 9 5 % ,
and mild levels of radio frequency and cable-borne
interference appropriate to control/equipment rooms
and other areas associated with power generation plant.
Class C l / X caters for a temperature range of - 25°C
to + 55°C, humidity u p to 100% and interference levels
simhar to Class B 3 / X .
2.6 Switchgear and contactor gear
Swhchgear and contactor gear for use w h h mechanical
ancillary plant is provided to the same standards and
specifications as that used elsewhere in the power sta­
tion, and is described in Chapter 5.
2.7 Radio and television interference
All electrical equipment is designed to restrict radio
interference t o the h m h s specified in British Standard
BS800 [7].
2.8 Noise levels
M a x i m u m levels of noise are specified which (a) satisfy
the recommendations laid out in the Department of
Employment 'Code of Practice for Reducing the Ex­
posure of Employed Persons t o Noise', (b) are con­
sistent w h h the established limits of person-to-person
and telephone communication, and mental concentra­
tion, and (c) are consistent with the hmits of noise
transmission which can be achieved at reasonable cost,
to areas beyond the power station boundary.
T h e specified limits in noise level are outlined below:
Local-to-plant Surface noise level local-to-plant
measured at a distance of 1 m from the plant surface
is 93 dBA m a x i m u m for plant generally and, for plant
provided with a noise enclosure, 90 dBA maximum at
the enclosure surface and 110 dBA inside the enclosure
(if access is necessary when the plant is operational).
Control rooms Background noise level must not ex­
ceed 67 dBA at 62 H z , ranging to 33 dBA at 8 kHz.
805
Mechanical plant electrical services C h a p t e r 10

Control areas Background noise level must not exceed The diversity of locations and operational require­
83 dBA at 63 Hz, ranging to 54 dBA at 8 k H z . ments of these cranes necesshate specialist requirements
t o o numerous to describe here. The principal design
Off-site The noise level at the nearest residence or requirements which apply to the majority of cranes on
community must not exceed 67 dBA at 63 Hz, ranging a power station site are described in this section. These
to 33 dBA at 8 kHz. relate specifically to overhead travelling cranes and
goliath cranes but many of them form the basis for the
design of the more specialist cranes, such as reactor
3 Cranes charging machines. Specific design features for nuclear
power station cranes are discussed in Section 3.10 of
3.1 General this chapter.
A typical cab-controhed crane, as used in turbine
Power station cranes include:
hahs, is illustrated in Fig 10.1.
• Overhead travelling cranes in areas such as the Cranes vary in rating between 5 t and 3 5 0 1 , and may
machine hall. be equipped with u p to two auxiliary hoists. In some
• Goliath cranes in outdoor areas such as the C W instances, two cranes are required to work in tandem
pumphouse. for large hfts, such as turbine rotors.
Operational requirements, together with the heavy
• Grabbing cranes, in coal and ash plants.
and frequent usage during the power station construc­
• Travelhng stacker/reclaimer machines in the coal tion period, are carefully considered when estabhshing
stockyard. basic design requirements. Since the cranes may be in
• Maintenance hoists. service from early in the power station construction
period, their design must be adequate for the environ­
• Reactor pile cap cranes.
mental conditions and power supply variations which
• Reactor charging machines. occur during that period: these conditions may be more
• Nuclear fuel flask-handling cranes. onerous than later, when the power station is operating.
The design requirements described in this section
Cranes provided for power station construction pur­ supplement or supersede those of British Standard
poses only are not deah with in this section. BS466 [8].

CROSS TRAVERSE
CONDUCTOR SYSTEM AUXILIARY HOIST
MOTOR

CROSS TRAVERSE
MOTOR

LOCKABLE GATE

SHROUDED
SHROUDED LONG TRAVEL
MAINTENANCE CONDUCTORS
CAGE WITH
LOCKABLE DOOR

GRAB RAILS

FIG. 10.1 Cab-controlled crane — typical arrangement

806

3.2 Power supply and distribution
A 415 V three-phase three-wire 50 Hz supply is p r o ­
vided for each crane, direct from a fuse switch in the
main 415 V swhchboard serving that area. Prior to
the station swhchgear being commissioned, the site
construction supply is used, with variations and hmits
as detailed in Section 2.1.2 of this chapter.
The 415 V supply is connected by cable to a main
isolating switch which is readily accessible from the
plant operating floor. F r o m there, it is extended by
cable to the downshop conductor system and thence to
the crane. On the crane is located a further isolating
switch which supplies the crane drive motors through
line contactors. Fuse protection is provided on indi­
vidual drive supplies. Particular attention is paid to
the rating of fuses fitted to the 415 V main supply
switchboard and those on the crane to ensure adequate
fault discrimination.
Figures 10.2 and 10.3 show a typical crane supply
and distribution system.
3.3 Crane motor drives
3.3.1 Motors
Variable-speed motors are normally provided for the
principal crane motions, i.e., main hoist, auxihary hoist
(if fitted), long-travel and cross-traverse. For the ma­
jority of apphcations, 415 V, three-phase 50 Hz induc­
tion motors are used; either slipring (with swhched
rotor-resistances) or squirrel-cage types (whh thyristor
speed control systems). For constant-speed drives,
squirrel-cage induction motors are normally used, these
being started direct-on-line.
For certain applications in nuclear power stations,
240 V D C motors are used, these requirements being
discussed in Section 3.10 of this chapter. Motors are
in accordance with British Standards BS5000 [1] and
BS4999 [2], as appropriate. They are totally-enclosed,
with protection to IP54 for indoor cranes and to IP55
weatherproof for outdoors.
For main hoist, auxiliary hoist, long-travel and cross-
traverse applications involving cyclic operation, motors
are suitable for 150 starts per hour and are of duty
type S4 or S5 to BS4999 Part 30 [2], with a minimum
cychc duration factor of 25%, T o cater for long slow
lifts, main and auxiliary hoist motors are capable of
continuous operation on the first notch speed.
3.3.2 Motor protection
Short-circuh protection on the motor supplies is pro­
vided by high breaking capacity (HBC) cartridge fuses
to BS88 [9]. Motor protection is afforded by magnetic
overcurrent relays, fitted with adjustable inverse time
delay elements connected into each of the three phases.
Hoist motions are, in addition, fitted with current-
operated single-phasing protection.
Cranes
These protective devices are arranged to trip the
main supply contactor rather t h a n the motion con­
tactor, since the main supply contactor is subjected
to a less arduous duty and is therefore less suscep­
tible to failure. A n undervoltage protection system
is fitted to the main crane supply and connected to
trip the main supply contactor when the voltage drops
below the operating capabihty of the motor, i.e.,
8 0 % of the nominal value (see Section 2.2 of this
chapter).
The main isolating switch, main supply contactor,
m o t i o n contactors a n d all protection equipment are
housed in sheet-steel cubicles mounted on the bridge
of the crane.
3.3.3 Motion control — direction
Motion directional control is provided by a three-phase,
triple-pole reversing-type contactor connected to reverse
t w o of the three phases of the drive m o t o r supply. This
contactor is manufactured to BS5424 [10] and ESI
Standard 3 7 - 1 [11] and is electrically and mechanically
interlocked to ensure that only one direction can be
selected at any time.
3.3.4 Motion control — speed
Speed control of shpring induction m o t o r drives is
achieved by a n u m b e r of m o t o r accelerating contactors
controlled by timer devices, which progressively short-
circuit resistances connected in the rotor circuit to give
the required acceleration and final speed. This is the
most c o m m o n system in use on power station cranes
and is shown on Fig 10.2.
Ahernative systems for the speed control of squirrel-
cage induction motors include solid state variable-
frequency or voltage control equipment.
High integrity, high availability cranes, or cranes
utilised for close tolerance fitting operations, are pro­
vided with a creep speed control system, in addition to
the normal speed control system. A typical creep speed
control system consists of a closed-loop in which an
eddy-current brake with variable-torque-speed char­
acteristics is coupled to the shaft of the shpring induc­
tion m o t o r and used to control its speed within close
tolerances (in the order of ± 1 % ) . The motor is ac­
celerated u p to the rated speed under rotor-resistance
control. By comparing the m o t o r slipring voltage with
a reference voltage, the difference between the desired
and actual m o t o r speeds is determined, the error signal
then being amplified and fed to a thyristor firing cir­
cuit to vary the a m o u n t of braking. By continuous
monitoring of the speed difference signal, the output
speed variation is restricted to close limits. In the event
of failure of the creep speed system, the drive reverts
to the basic rotor-resistance system. The operational
integrity and safety of the motion drive is therefore
assured, a h h o u g h the accuracy of speed control is
impaired.
807
Mechanical plant electrical services Chapter 10

MAIN HOIST -

- TO OTHER
415V CREEPSPEED
3PH
50H2 - CONTROL
LOOPS

UNDERVOLTAGE SUPPLY
PROTECTION INPUT FUSES
(315A)

SINGLE PHASING
PROTECTION
CLOSED LOOP CREEP SPEED CONTROLS

CURRENT
^ TRANSFORMERS

9 9 9 9 0 0 9—0 9 9 9 9 O Ó Ó-O O
OVERCURRENT
RELAYS

MAINS SUPPLY
CONTACTOR
SWITCHING
CIRCUIT
REVERSING
CONTACTOR

EDDY CURRENT
BRAKE

SELECTION
CONTACTS

MAIN HOIST MOTOR

ROTOR RESISTANCE
SWITCHING NETWORK

FIG. 10.2 Typical main and auxiliary hoist supply and distribution system

808
 Cranes

AUXILIARY HOIST Ά

415V
3PH ^
50Hz

SUPPLY SUPPLY
INPUT FUSES INPUT FUSES

SINGLE SINGLE
PHASING PHASING
PROTECTION PROTECTION

OVERCURRENTJ OVERCURRENT ; i
RELAYS J RELAYS J

E A R T H BAR

I, io io I. I. Ζ ν - / / / REVERSING
/ / / / / / REVERSING
/ CONTACTOR
Q Q 0 9 <? </ CONTACTOR
FAST
'CREEP'
LIMIT SWITCH
LIMIT SWITCH I

(Q)
FAST' MOTOR CREEP- MOTOR

AUXILIARY HOIST B'

SUPPLY
INPUT FUSES

OVERCURRENT
RELAYS

FAST
LIMIT SWITCH t?

FAST MOTOR CREEP' MOTOR

FIG. 10.2 (cont'd) Typical main and auxiliary hoist supply and distribution system

809
Mechanical plant electrical services C h a p t e r 10

M A I N TRAVERSE - • MAIN TRAVEL-

415V
3PH <
50Hz

SUPPLY
INPUT
FUSES A IA Φ Ii Φ Ó ó

3 CLOSED LOOP CREEPSPEED CONTROLS

OVERCURRENT
RELAYS 3^

o o o o o o c ^ o o o o o ó c ^ ^ o

EARTH
BAR
MAINS SUPPLY
CONTACTOR
SWITCHING
CIRCUIT

EDDY CURRENT
BRAKE

MAIN TRAVERSE MOTOR

ROTOR RESISTANCE
SWITCHING NETWORK

Ϊ Ϊ
MAIN TRAVEL MOTOR
ROTOR RESISTANCE
SWITCHING NETWORK

FIG. 10.3 T y p i c a l travel and traverse supply and d i s t r i b u t i o n system

810
 Cranes

3.3.5 Braking systems Creep South/slow S o u t h /

All motions are equipped with electrically-operated fast South.
'thrustor' or 'electromagnetic solenoid' brakes which (6) Cross-traverse control Creep West/slow W e s t /
have a duty and rating defined by BS3579 [12]. The fast West
brake system design ensures that the brake is auto­ Creep East/slow East/fast
matically applied if the supply to the associated drive East.
motor fails. Figures 10.2 and 10.3 show typical ar­
rangements of 'thrustor' brakes on a crane, one being (7) Long travel limit Key-operated.
provided for each travel motion and two, emergency override
and service, being provided on the main and auxiliary (8) Cross-traverse limit Key-operated.
hoist motions. The brakes are supplied from the m o t o r override
side of the motion contactor and provide a fail-safe
system. On the hoist motions, the emergency brake (9) Anti-collision system Key-operated.
acts as a back-up to the service brake, if the latter override
fails. (10) Warning hooter
o n / o f f switch.

3.4 Control station systems (11) Crane floodlights To floodlight operating

3.4.1 Cab control
Cab control consists of a driver's cab slung under
one end of the crane bridge, equipped with ah devices
necessary for the manual control of the crane. The
arrangement suffers from a number of disadvantages
and has been superseded by radio control in certain
power stations, when the operational advantages justify
the additional cost.
The disadvantages of cab control are as follows:
• The size and disposition of the cab imposes a re­
striction on hoist and traverse movements.
• The driver is positioned high above the operating
floor and so cannot perform operations without
the aid of an assistant on the operating floor.
• Parking and driver access is normally restricted and
can necessitate the crane being manned for long
periods during a prolonged handhng sequence.
o n / o f f switch floor.
(12) Crane bridge lights T o control access lighting.
o n / o f f switch
The above controls operate directly into the contactor
control circuhs, through a control station selection
device located adjacent to the 'local' controls on the
crane bridge-mounted protection panel.
3.4.2 Radio control
Radio control overcomes the shortcomings of cab con­
trol and offers the foHowing advantages:
• T h e crane operator is at operating floor level and
unrestricted, thereby enhancing crane operating ef­
ficiency.
• Parking of the crane is not governed by personnel ac­
cess requirements, except for maintenance purposes.

• The full span of the bridge can he utihsed for travers­

A typical cab control layout is shown in Fig 10.4.
Crane operator controls are provided as follows:
the motion control devices are levers, which return to
the 'off position when released.
(1) Key-operated o n / o f f The key has a code unique
switch to the crane and is trapped
in the 'on' position, to pre­
vent unauthorised opera­
tion of the crane.
(2) Emergency-stop Described in Section 2.3.5
pushbutton of this chapter.
(3) Main hoist control Creep raise/slow raise/
fast raise.
Creep lower/slow lower/
fast lower.
(4) Auxihary hoist control As for main hoist.
(5) Long travel control Creep N o r t h / s l o w N o r t h /
fast N o r t h .
ing and hoisting operations.
The system is not without disadvantages, however,
and these are summarised below:
• Radio control is susceptible to interference and
elaborate safeguards must be included in the system
to prevent malfunction.
• The control system is m o r e complex, since it requires
a transmitter, receiver and interface relay equipment.
• The portable transmitter/control units are suscepti­
ble to accidental damage and abuse if their usage
a n d storage is not strictly controlled.
A n outline of the radio-control system is given below.
The control functions provided by a body-worn
transmitter/control unit are the same as those described
in the previous section. A typical layout is shown in
Fig 10.5.

811
Mechanical plant electrical services C h a p t e r 10

CROSS TRAVERSE CONTROL (6) MAIN HOIST CONTROL (3)

CROSS TRAVERSE
OVERRIDE (8)*
ON-OFF SWITCH (1)*

EMERGENCY STOP (2) LONG

BRIDGE LIGHTS (12)
TRAVEL LIMIT
OVERRIDE (7)*
WARNING
HOOTER (10)

LONG TRAVEL CONTROL (5) AUXILIARY HOIST CONTROL (4)

• KEY OPERATED

FIG. 10.4 Cab control layout

)
LOWER LOWER LOWER NORTH EAST

RAISE RAISE RAISE LIMIT SOUTH WEST

START MAIN AUX LIGHTS AUX OVER-
HOIST ALARM HOIST A H O I S T B' RIDE TRAVEL TRAVERSE

FIG. 10.5 Radio transmitter control layout

Radio control systems are V H F , U H F or, more
usually, L F , and comprise a transmitter/control unit,
which is carried by the crane operator on a waist/
shoulder harness, plus a receiver and interface relay
equipment, the last two hems being located on the
crane bridge. Contacts on the interface relays are con­
nected through sequence relay equipment to operate
the crane control contactors.
A typical L F radio control system uses coded, con­
tinuously-transmitted multi-frequency signals to safe­
guard against malfunction of the crane due to external
interference. For each crane control to function, a
minimum of three radio frequency signals and a master
security-frequency signal must be transmitted simul­
taneously. Unique control frequencies are ahocated to
each crane to safeguard against the incorrect matching
of transmitter and crane. As a further safeguard, the
transmitter range is limited to approximately 60 m.
3.4.3 Pendant control
The simplest and most economic means of crane con­
trol is by pendant control station. Applications are
necessarily limhed to lower-capacity cranes, such as

812
 Cranes

those used in diesel generator houses and ancillary

plant houses, where hfting needs are relatively small
and hmited.
The control station is either of the double-insulated
pattern, w h h a metal insert to give mechanical strength,
or a metal case shrouded in rubber. Pushbuttons are
shrouded to prevent accidental operation and are self-
resetting when released. A typical pendant control sta­
tion is shown in Fig 10.6.
A n earth continuity conductor is incorporated in the
pendant supply cable and is connected to the control
station metal insert or box.

3.5 Crane controls, interlocks and limit CONTROL OPERATIONAL

SWITCH °
switches
|oON o

3.5.1 Control e q u i p m e n t cubicles [o OFF o]

The control equipment is housed in a suite of cubicles

mounted o n the crane bridge: h comprises protec­
tion equipment, stator contactor controlgear, rotor
controlgear, timing relays, sequence relays, speed con­
trol equipment and related electrical control equipment.
These cubicles have protection to IP54 of BS5490 [3]
for indoor use and to IP55 weatherproof in outdoor
TRAVEL & TRAVERSE
situations. ^ L/S OVERRIDE ^
One of the cubicles houses the 415 V main supply
isolating switch. A system of coded-key interlocks is
provided to prevent any of the control cubicle doors
from being opened when the main supply isolating
switch is *on', a n d to prevent the isolating switch being
closed when any door is unlocked. t o WARNING HOOTER o \

Figures 10.7 and 10.8 show the disposition of equip­

ment on the bridge and crab unit of an overhead travel­
ling crane.

3.5.2 Protective panel

[ o RESET <n
One of the suite of control cubicles, the protective
panel, accommodates the 415 V main supply isolat­
ing switch, the main supply contactor, motor overload
protection devices, fuses, transformers, rectifiers a n d
other components necessary for the control of the [ o EMERGENCY STOP o ]
crane, a complete set of motion control pushbutton
swhches for maintenance and testing purposes and a
control selector switch. T h e last item has four positions:

Remote Allows the crane to be operated from

the normal control panel only.

Local Allows the crane to be operated from

the protective panel only.

Remote test Allows the crane remote control cir­

cuits to be checked, with the main
supply isolating switch *off.

Local test Allows the crane local control circuits

to be checked, with the main supply
isolating switch O f f . FIG. 10.6 Pendant control station

813
Mechanical plant electrical services C h a p t e r 10

MAIN HOIST RESISTOR PANEL

MAIN HOIST CROSS TRAVERSE AND
MAIN HOIST RESISTOR PANEL AUXILIARY HOIST PANEL
CONTACTOR PANEL
CROSS TRAVERSE AND
CRANE PROTECTIVE PANEL
LONG TRAVEL RESISTOR PANEL

MAIN HOIST
RESISTOR PANEL / LONG TRAVEL
/ CONTACTOR PANEL
LONG TRAVEL / /
GEARBOX
INTERMEDIATE
DOWNSHOP RELAY PANEL
COLLECTORS
\

END CARRIAGE

EASTSIDE

AUXILIARY HOIST A

LONG TRAVEL CREEPSPEED

CONTROL UNIT

MAIN HOIST MAIN HOIST TOP MAIN HOIST

CREEP SPEED CONTROL UNIT SUSPENSION SERVICE BRAKE
MAIN HOIST
CROSS LEAD TOWING BRACKET DRUM

AUXILIARY HOIST
MAINTENANCE PLATFORM

FIG. 10.7 Typical crane bridge layout

814
 Cranes

M AN
I HOIS
T RESISTANC
E P A NL
E L O NG T R A VLE P A NLE
M AN
I HOIS
T P A NL
E

MAINTENAN
EC
SOCKET
OUTLET
- R A DOI RECEIVE
R

CROSS TRAVERS E
DRIVE R U N NRE
- L O NG T R A VLE
L I MTI SWITCH

HOIST SERVIC
E
BRAKE
A U X I L I AYR HOIS
T .
ACCES S DOOR S
>LON G T R A VLE
L I MTI SWITC H

_ HOIS
T EMERGEN
YC
BRAK
E

HOIST CREEPSPEE D
" C O N T RLO U NTI

>LON G T R A VLE
L I MTI SWITC H
CROS S TRAVERSE
L I MTI SWITC
H

CROS S TRAVERSE
L I MTI SWITC
H

LONG T R A VLE D R I V-E

R U N NRE

L O NG T R A VLE M O T R
O CROS S T R A V E RES
L O NG T R A VLE L O NG T R A VLE RESISTANC E
CREEPSPEE D C O N T RLO PANE L
U NT
I M AN
I HOIS
T
RESISTANC
E P A NL
E

FIG. 1 0 . 8 Typical crane crab layout

Figures 10.2 and 10.3 show typical distribution and
switching arrangements.
415/110 V transformers are provided to supply
control circuits and crane auxiliary circuits, such as
walkway lighting and anti-condensation heaters.
3.5.3 Limit switches
Limit switches are provided in hoist, long travel and
cross-traverse motion circuits. They are metalclad and
mechanically operated, normally having a self-resetting
action in b o t h directions, and are positioned so that
they are accessible from the crane bridge walkways for
maintenance purposes.
On hoist motions, limit switches are connected into
the motion contactor control circuit to prevent over-
lowering and over-hoisting. Over-hoisting is more dan­
gerous, and to safeguard against contactor or limit
swhch malfunction, a back-up system is provided
consisting of two limh switches connected directly into
two phases of the 415 V, three-phase supply to the
hoist m o t o r . These limit switches are manually reset
and n o override facility is provided.
O n long travel and cross-traverse motions, four limit
switches are installed in each direction of motion to
prevent overtravel and safeguard against hmit switch
or contactor fahure. The first limit switch trips the
motion contactor, the second limit switch trips the main
supply contactor and the third and fourth hmit switches,
which share the same position, trip motion and main
supply contactors, respectively. Limit switches are posi­
tioned as follows:
T h e first limit switch stops the crane when travelling
at fast speed before it reaches the second limit switch.

815
Mechanical plant electrical services
The second limit switch stops the crane when travehing
at fast speed before it reaches the third and fourth hmit
switches.
The third/fourth limit switches both stop the crane
when travehing at slow speed before it reaches the rail
buffer stops.
Travel limit switches do not reset until the crane
operating arm reverses past them.
The travel limit override control, referred to in
Section 3.4.1 of this chapter, allows the crane to be
driven over the first and second limit switches at slow
speed and up to the third/fourth hmit switches. A
second override control allows the crane to be driven
over the third/fourth hmit switches at slow speed u p
to the rail buffer stops.
When travel motions have single-speed m o t o r s , three
limit switches only are installed, the first to trip the
motion contactor and the second and third, which share
the same position, trip the motion and main supply
contactors, respectively. The limit switches are posi­
tioned as follows:
The first limit switch stops the crane when travelling
at fast speed before it reaches the second and third
limit switches.
The second/third limit switches stop the crane when
travelhng at fast speed before it reaches the rail buffer
stops.
A travel limit override enables the crane to be driven
at slow speed past the first and second/third limit
swhches up to the rail buffer stops.
Travel limit override controls spring-return to O f f
to prevent pre-selection and to ensure that overriding
requires a dehberate action.
3.6 Anti-collision system
Sometimes two cranes share the same rails and are,
therefore, provided with an anti-collision system to
prevent them being driven into each other. When the
cranes are required to be used in tandem for large
hfts, a key-operated anti-colhsion override switch is
provided at the control station (see Section 3.4.1 of
this chapter) to enable them to be driven up to each
other for coupling purposes.
Anti-colhsion systems are of the optical, radar or
potentiometer-wire type. The last system has been used
in a number of C E G B power stations and is briefly
outhned below.
A potentiometer wire system consists basically of a
low resistance register wire and a potentiometer wire
running parallel with each other and with the down-
shop conductor systems of the two cranes. The poten­
816
C h a p t e r 10
tiometer wire is connected across the secondary winding
of a supply transformer which causes a vohage drop
along the wire of the order of 24 V. Electronic units
on each crane are connected to the potentiometer wire
by collectors and interconnected via collectors and the
register wire. The potential difference along the length
of potentiometer wire between the collectors of the two
cranes is m o n h o r e d by the electronic u n h s , the control
loop being completed through the register wire. As the
cranes approach each other, the potential difference
between the pick-up points on the potentiometer wire
decreases until the minimum approach distance of the
two cranes is reached. At this point, the electronic units
trip the crane motion contactors and stop the cranes.
3.7 Travel motion supply systems
A h systems are rated for a 31 M V A 415 V fault level.
3.7.1 Long t r a v e l
The 415 V three-phase 50 H z supply and earth con­
tinuity connections to the crane comprise four fuhy-
shrouded downshop conductors located immediately
below the crane rahs. These conductors are made of
hard-drawn copper, copper/steel laminate or phosphor
bronze, as dictated by current rating and voh-drop
requirements. Protection against accidental contact
with metal objects is provided by insulating shrouds.
Connections between the downshop conductors and
the crane are made by short-boom type collectors,
which are accessible from the crane bridge for main­
tenance.
The 415 V three-phase 50 Hz supply from the Station
Switchboard is connected into a quick-break, three-
position (service, isolated and off/earth) supply iso­
lating switch positioned at operating floor level and,
ideally, half way along the length of the downshop
conductors to minimise volt-drop on the system. The
415 V supply connections from the isolating switch
to the downshop conductors are made in armoured
cable.
At each end of and, in some instances, at regular
intervals along the downshop conductors, warning
lamps are fitted to indicate to personnel in the crane
operating area that the conductors are energised. At
each location, three red-coloured indicating lamps are
connected in star formation to the three phases of the
downshop conductors through H B C fuses.
Fully-shrouded downshop conductors are used for
the majority of overhead travelling cranes in a power
station. For gohath cranes, travelling cable systems or
totally-enclosed rigid conductor/collector systems,
mounted just above floor level, are used to satisfy
personnel safety and weatherproof ing requirements.
For overhead cranes with limited long-travel require­
ments, a travelling cable chain system may be con­
sidered instead of a fully-shrouded rigid conductor
system.

3.7.2 Cross-traverse
Power supply and control connections between the
crane bridge and the crab unit, which traverses the
crane bridge and accommodates the hoist equipment,
are made by a circular or flat-form travelling cable
system in which the cables are looped between trolleys.
Cables are terminated in junction boxes on the bridge
and crab. Power supphes are run in separate cables
from the control connections to protect control func­
tions and operating personnel from the effects of supply
cable fauhs. Control cables have an overall screen to
protect against interference from the supply cables.
3.7.3 Alternative supplies for long travel
Where two cranes share the same rails, they are de­
signed so that each crane can be supplied from ehher
set of downshop conductors. This necessitates two
sets of cohectors and a changeover disconnector on each
crane. A coded-key interlock exchange-box system is
provided to ensure that both downshop conductor
supply isolating switches are in the *off position before
either crane changeover disconnector can be operated.
This system safeguards against unauthorised operation
of the changeover disconnectors and ahows non-load
making/breaking disconnectors to be used.
3.8 Crane earthing
A n earthing system is provided on the crane which
ensures that the crane structure and metal cases of
all electrical equipment, including metal conduit and
trunking, are all effectively earthed. This is connected
to the Station earth through the earth continuity con­
ductor forming part of the downshop conductor system
(see Section 3.7.1 of this chapter), an earth continuity
conductor down to the supply isolating swhch and
thence to the earth mat.
Crane rails are bonded with earthing tape across
joints and connected to the station earth.
3.9 Crane services
The following services are provided on cranes, as ap­
propriate:
Floodlights 110 V tungsten or discharge-type flood­
lights are provided on the side of, or below, the bridge
to illuminate the crane handling area. A 415/110 V
transformer is provided on the crane for all lighting
and heating services. The floodhghts are controlled
from the control station by a contactor, each luminair
being separately fused.
Access lighting Crane access ways and driver's cab
(if fitted) are ihuminated by 110 V tungsten bulkhead
luminaires controlled by a switch fuse.
Warning hooter Each crane is provided with an audi­
ble warning device to warn any person situated within
Cranes
the crane operating area. It is supplied at 110 V from
the 415/110 V control circuh transformer and con­
trolled from the control station by a contactor.
Maintenance socket outlets A system of 110 V A C
socket outlets is provided on the crane bridge to
facihtate the use of h a n d lamps and portable tools. To
enable maintenance work to be carried out whh the
crane disconnected from the 415 V supply, 110 V socket
outlets are provided on the building structure adjacent
to the crane rails and a flying lead is used to connect
between them a n d the crane bridge. This allows work
to be carried out on the crane in the event of a break­
down in any position.
3.10 Special features required for nuclear
plant cranes
3.10.1 Duty categories
Cranes for the handling of plant or maintenance of
equipment within the reactor building and associated
areas in a nuclear power station are categorised accor­
ding to their duties as fohows:
Category A — Safety-related cranes This category
comprises high availability, high integrity cranes which
are required t o handle critical loads in areas where a
breakdown or malfunction during the handling of a
load could give rise to a radiological hazard or be the
cause of damage to the reactor structure, safety-related
systems, or essential ancihary equipment.
Category Β — Availability-related cranes Cranes in
this category are needed to handle loads related to
unit availabilhy, such as unit auxihary plant and plant
items with long delivery lead times, lack of availability
of which would jeopardise unit availability.
Category C — Auxiliary cranes These cranes are for
general maintenance purposes on non-essential auxUiary
plant and for use in areas where u n h availabilhy will
not be prejudiced by their breakdown or malfunction.
3.10.2 Design requirements
The design requirements for Category Β cranes are
detailed in the preceding paragraphs of this section,
whüst those for Category C are less onerous.
In view of the essential nature of Category A cranes
and the stringent operational safety requirements ne­
cessitated by their location, the requirements applicable
to Category Β are supplemented by those briefly out-
hned below:
(a) Seismic quahfication. The cranes, together with
their control gear, are designed to ensure that a
load is held and control retained in a safe manner
during a seismic event.
817
Mechanical plant electrical services
(b) Control system security. All crane components and
systems which are essential for the security of a
load are designed to ensure that a single failure will
not result in an incident. This is achieved either
by built-in redundancy or by conservative design.
(c) Hoist motions. Preference is given to the provision
of two independent systems, either of which is
capable of handhng the rated load in the event
of fahure of the other. If only one system is prac­
ticable, then a higher safety factor is applied for
design purposes. When separate drive motors are
employed, particular attention is paid to the need
for them to be synchronised and equally loaded
in operation.
Hoist overload systems are provided to ensure
that the hoist rating is not exceeded. Such a system
may consist of load cells operating into the crane
control circuit.
In addition to the service and standby brakes
described in Section 3.3.5 of this chapter, each hoist
is equipped with an emergency brake capable of
retarding and holding the rated load. The emer­
gency brake is not deployed in normal operation,
operating only in the event of a hoist malfunction,
e.g., overspeed, incorrect rotation, load hang-up,
or when the main supply contactor trips.
(d) Travel motions. Independent drive units are pro­
vided on each end carriage for long travel. Each
unit is equipped with automatically operated service
and standby brakes, those on either drive unit being
capable of stopping a fully-loaded crane from fuh
speed in the event of the other u n h faihng.
(e) Motors. 240 V D C drive motors may be used in
preference to A C u n h s when security of supply and
crane operation are of p a r a m o u n t importance.
(f) Cables and wiring. When cranes are exposed to
nuclear radiation, the use of P V C insulated cable
and wiring, which is prone to degradation in such
environments, is avoided. Polymeric cables are used
in preference.
4 Lifts
4.1 Types and general requirements
There are three categories of power station lift: pas­
senger, goods and construction hfts. Lift design and
construction, in general, is in accordance with the
following British Standards: BS 2655 [13], BS5655 [14]
and BSCP407 [15].
Construction hfts are installed early in the power
station construction programme for use as passenger
or goods hfts during the construction period. Control
gear is provided suitable for the harsher environment
existing during this period, with protection to IP55
weatherproof of BS5490 [3] being specified.
818
C h a p t e r 10
Goods and passenger hfts are provided for use during
the power station commissioning and operational peri­
ods, by which time the environment is controhed.
Control gear is therefore provided with less protection
— IP31 in control buildings, offices and workshops
and IP54 in boiler houses and reactor buildings.
Some passenger hfts are designed to accept stretcher-
borne personnel.
4.2 Supplies and distribution
Three supphes are provided to each hft motor r o o m :
• 415 V three-phase 50 Hz three-wire.
• 240 V single-phase 50 H z .
• 240 V D C .
The 415 V three-phase 50 H z supply is connected into
a triple-pole (TP) isolating switch which feeds the hft
drive power circuits, and individually fuse-protected
circuits for the lift car door drive-motor and control
circuh transformer(s). A typical control circuit trans­
former has three secondary windings; 20 V for hft car
and landing indicator lamps; 110 V centre-tapped to
earth for miscellaneous requirements (such as trapdoor
indicating lamps) and 130 V A C , rectified to 110 V D C ,
for control and interlock circuhs.
The 240 V single-phase 50 H z supply is connected
into a single-pole and neutral (SP and N) isolating
switch feeding an SP and Ν distribution fuseboard from
which separate fused supplies are taken for lift car
hghting, control cubicle heating, car-top transformers
and hft shaft hghting.
The 240 V D C supply is connected into a double-
pole (DP) isolating switch, feeding a D P distribution
board from which supplies are taken for the audible
alarm, hft shaft hghting, fire alarm and flood alarm (if
appropriate).
4.3 Motor room equipment
Lift motor rooms are located at the top of the shaft
for electrically-driven hfts and at the bottom for hy­
drauhc types. They house the supply isolating switches
and distribution boards; winding motor/generator;
control, interlock and contactor equipment cubicles;
hft car and shaft lighting switches; junction boxes for
the trailing cables to the hft car, and cable junction
boxes for telephone and station alarm circuits.
4.4 Lift drive systems
4.4.1 Electrical
Lift drives are either two-speed or variable-speed. The
former uses m o t o r s , as detailed in BSCP 407 [15],
supplied at 415 V three-phase 50 Hz through a reversing
contactor (raise/lower), a main contactor and a speed-
change contactor.

The variable-speed drive frequently uses a varia­
ble voltage (Ward-Leonard) system, in which a 415 V
three-phase 50 Hz squirrel-cage induction m o t o r is
mechanically coupled to a D C generator which sup­
phes a D C hft-winding m o t o r electrically. Direct-on­
line, star-delta or auto-transformer starting is em­
ployed for the A C drive motor, as appropriate to the
lift requirements, although the first system is preferred
because of its simphcity and rehability. Typicahy, the
D C motor and generator control system is supphed
at 210 V D C from a transformer/rectifier combina­
tion, fed from the main 415 V three-phase 50 H z
supply.
4.4.2 Hydraulic
A typical hydraulic control system comprises a
hydrauhc r a m / c y h n d e r coupled to the lift car, which
is supphed with hydrauhc fluid through a two-position
control valve (fast and slow speed) by an electrically-
driven p u m p submerged in an oil tank. The p u m p
motor is a constant-speed squirrel-cage induction m o t o r
supphed at 415 V three-phase 50 Hz and is started
direct-on-hne, delta-star or by auto-transformer, as
the duty demands. The p u m p is started when *hft raise'
is selected; downward movement of the hft is con­
trohed by pressure rehef valves.
4.4.3 M o t o r protection
Motor circuits are provided with overcurrent, under­
voltage, single-phasing, phase failure and phase reversal
protection.
4.4.4 Brakes
Lift car travel brakes are of fah-safe design, being
applied mechanically immediately upon disconnection
or failure of the supply to the release solenoid. T o
cater for a hft car stopped between floors, the brake
is fitted with a manual operating mechanism, which
allows the car to be moved t o a convenient floor level
by hand. H a n d release of the brake causes ah lift con­
trol circuits to be de-energised, allowing the lift to be
moved by use of the manual brake release and winding
gear only.
4.5 Lift car and landing equipment
4.5.1 Landing control facilities
A complete set of pushbutton controls and indications
is provided at each landing.
For goods hfts, this comprises a 'cah' p u s h b u t t o n , a
'call accepted' lamp and a series of 'lift position' lamps.
Control is arranged so that personnel entering the lift
car have complete control until they have disembarked
and the doors have closed.
For passenger lifts, each landing is equipped with
directional call buttons ('up' and 'down'), a 'call ac-
Lifts
cepted' lamp and a series of lift position' lamps. Col­
lective control is provided, allowing personnel to board
the lift at intermediate floor levels when h is travehing
in the selected direction.
In addition to the above controls and indications,
each landing is equipped with an illuminated panel
indicating when the 'fire' or 'flood' control systems are
in operation. Flood control systems are only provided
when lift shafts could be flooded, as in an underground
power station.
4.5.2 Car control facilities
Lift cars are provided with the following controls and
indications: 'destination selection' pushbuttons; a series
of lamps showing the position and direction of travel;
a door opening b u t t o n ; a pushbutton to initiate an
audible alarm outside the lift-well and an illuminated
panel to indicate when the 'fire' or 'flood' control system
is in operation.
In addition, cars are equipped with a key-operated
selector switch to enable them to be operated by an
Attendant.
O n passenger lifts which have been designed to ac­
c o m m o d a t e stretchers, operation of the 'door opening'
b u t t o n keeps the door open for a preset length of time,
to facihtate the removal or loading of the stretcher.
4.5.3 Car lighting
T w o 600 m m fluorescent fittings are installed in each
lift car to provide a general illumination level of 100
lux. The hghting is supplied at 240 V single-phase 50 Hz
from the distribution b o a r d detailed in Section 4.2 of
this chapter, and is controlled by an isolating switch
located in the m o t o r r o o m .
T o safeguard against A C supply failure, each hft
car is equipped with self-contained emergency hghting
fittings capable of operating for a minimum of one
hour following supply failure, in a d d h i o n to the normal
lighdng.
4.5.4 Telephone
A wall-mounted telephone is provided in each lift car
for emergency use.
4.5.5 M a i n t e n a n c e facilities
The T P isolating switch, connected in the main 415 V
three-phase 50 Hz supply to the lift, has three positions;
t e s t / o f f / o n . The test position ahows control circuits to
be tested and adjusted with the 415 V hft-drive power
supply isolated. Control cubicle doors are interlocked
to prevent access by personnel unless the isolating
switch is in the ' o f f or 'test' positions.
T o facihtate maintenance of the hft car, a control
selector switch is provided on the car top with three
positions; t e s t / n o r m a l / o f f . T h e test position inhibits
control of the hft from any location other than the
819
Mechanical plant electrical services
roof t o p , where up and down control pushbuttons
are provided.
Operation of the lift is inhibhed from all control
stations when the ' o f f position is selected. Neither the
'fire switch' nor 'flood switch' (if apphcable) overrides
the car-top control swhch, this being necessary to
safeguard maintenance staff when the hft is being
controlled from the car-top.
Provided on the car roof are a 25 V A C socket outlet
supplied from a 240/25 V transformer, for use with
an inspection lamp, and a 110 V A C socket outlet fed
from a 240/110 V transformer to facilitate the use
of portable tools.
4.6 Safety devices and systems
4.6.1 Fireman's control system
Each lift is provided with a fire switch adjacent to the
landing gate designated for fire control purposes, as
specified in BS2655 [13]. When the switch is operated,
all registered calls are cancelled and the lift car proceeds
directly to the designated fire control floor level, where
it stops with doors open. Thereafter, the hft can only
be operated using the car controls. Indicating panels
warning that the fire control system is in operation
are provided inside the lift car and on the car-top,
adjacent to the maintenance controls detailed in Sec­
tion 4.5.5 of this chapter.
4.6.2 Flood control system
If there is a danger of a hft shaft flooding, a flood
control system is provided. A flood control swhch is
provided adjacent to the designated landing gate located
above the maximum flood level, and a flood detection
system is installed in the lift shaft.
In the event of flooding or the flood control switch
being operated, the control system is overridden and
the car returned to the designated flood control level
where it is parked with doors open. The hft then re­
mains inoperative until the flooded shaft has been
drained. When the flood control system is initiated,
warning panels are illuminated inside the hft car and
on the car-top adjacent to the maintenance controls.
However, in the interests of safety, if the hft is under
car-top control, downward movement of the hft below
the 'flood control' level is inhibited.
4.6.3 Travel interlocks
To safeguard personnel, ultimate-hmit switches are
fitted to prevent overlowering and overwinding. These
devices are in addition to the operational limit switches
and form a back-up system in the event of failure of
the normal control hmits. Ultimate-hmit switches are
hand-reset devices and are connected in at least two
of the three phases of the hft drive 415 V supply
and in the control circuit supply to ensure that the
820
C h a p t e r 10
lift is stopped and that all control functions are
inhibited.
To safeguard maintenance personnel driving the hft
from the car-top control station, upward travel is
limited to within two metres of the shaft top by ad­
ditional limit switches, functional in that control mode
only, if the normal top-limit switch ahows the car to
travel higher.
4.6.4 Lift car e m e r g e n c y h a t c h
Each lift car is provided with an emergency hatch as
required in BS2655 [13].
For a lift provided with a flood control system,
the hatch is secured with an electromagnefic lock which
is released automaticahy in the event of lift supply
failure, when the 'flood control' system is operating or
by manual operation of a switch on the car-top. This
allows passengers to escape from the lift car by using
the escape ladder and doors provided in the hft shaft.
4.6.5 Audible alarm
An audible alarm (Klaxon) is provided outside the lift-
well at a suitable location where it can be readhy heard
when initiated in an emergency by personnel inside the
hft car.
4.7 Lift shaft lighting
Lighting is provided in the lift shaft which can be
switched on manually from the fire control landing and
automatically in the event of the fire control system
being inhiated. T o provide adequate hghting for main­
tenance purposes, selection of the 'test' position on the
roof-top selector switch also initiates the lighting. The
hghting system comprises tungsten bulkhead fittings
fed from an automatic changeover contactor supphed
from the 240 V A C and 240 V D C distribution boards,
the D C supply being connected in the event of failure
of the A C supply.
4.8 Earthing
The metal cases of ah electrical equipment and metal
structures are bonded together and connected to the
station earth, an earth continuity conductor being
included in the trailing cable system between the hft
car and motor r o o m for this purpose.
5 Gas producing and storage plant
5.1 Introduction
This section covers the electrical aspects of gas produc­
ing and storage plant which form an essential part of
modern power stations. The types of plant described are
as follows:
• Hydrogen production by the electrolytic cell process.

• Hydrogen production by methanol chemical
reaction.
• Methane production.
• Nitrogen storage.
• Carbon dioxide storage.
Because of the potential hazard to personnel and plant,
gas production and storage plants are located away
from the main building complex.
The principal uses of the various gases are given
below:
Hydrogen main generator cooling
Methane mixed with carbon dioxide coolant
gas to minimise graphite corrosion
in gas-cooled reactors
Nitrogen used for sealing feedheaters, con­
densers a n d similar p l a n t , also
reactor circuits during shutdown.
Carbon dioxide reactor coolant gas and generator
purging.
Design considerations which are c o m m o n to ah gas
production and storage plants are described in the
fohowing sub-sections.
The choice of hydrogen generation plant is dictated
by economic considerations. Costs associated with the
electrolytic ceh process are generally higher than those
of an equivalent methanol chemical reaction system
in terms of capital and running costs.
Electrical energy consumption of the electrolytic cell
process is in the order of 4 k W h to generate 1 m^ of
hydrogen per hour compared with 1 kWh of the
methanol-based system. Plant costs of the two systems
are compatible but civil costs associated with the elec­
trolytic cell process are generahy higher. The cost of
purchasing and storing methanol is also taken into
account.
Advanced gas cooled reactors (AGRs) require large
quantities of oxygen for coolant gas regeneration pur­
poses. Since the electrolytic cell process produces large
quantities of oxygen as a by-product, this process is
favoured for hydrogen generation at A G R power
stations. At other types of power stations, by-products
are of no significance.
5.2 General requirements
5.2.1 Safety assurance and standards
In the interests of personnel safety, ease of mainte­
nance and minimisation of equipment costs, as much
electrical equipment as possible is housed in electrical
equipment r o o m s , designated as 'safe areas'. Equipment
rooms house transformer/rectifier units, switchgear,
motor control gear, air compressors, air receivers and
Gas producing and storage plant
driers, control cubicles and instrumentation. Oil-filled
transformers are located outdoors to minimise the fire
risk. When an electrical equipment r o o m adjoins a
hazardous area, extreme care is taken to ensure that
all penetrations through the dividing wall are adequately
sealed.
Hazardous areas are classified as Zones 0, 1 or 2,
as defined in BS5345 [5] (see Section 2.4.2 of this
chapter), and all electrical equipment for use therein
is certified by British Approvals Service for Electrical
Equipment in Flammable Atmospheres (BASEEFA)
in accordance with that standard. Installations comply
with B A S E E F A certification standards SFA3012 —
Intrinsic safety; SFA3004 — Shunt diode safety bar­
riers and SFA3008 — Increased safety.
Electrical connections between a non-hazardous area
and a Zone 1 area (in which an explosive gas/air
mixture is likely to occur in normal operation) are
m a d e through a barrier cubicle. The barrier cubicle
accommodates equipment which constitutes an electri­
cal interface between the 'safe' signals necessary for
equipment in the hazardous area and the signals ne­
cessary for plant in the non-hazardous area, thereby
allowing the use of non-specialist equipment in the
latter environment.
A back-up safety protection system is provided to
ensure that in the event of plant, control or protection
malfunction, the plant is tripped before an unsafe
condition can arise in a hazardous area designated
Zone 1.
In explosive or hazardous gas environments, the
use of aluminium is avoided since it has been demon­
strated that, under certain abnormal conditions, the
impact of rusty iron and aluminium can create an igni­
tion source. Whilst the risk is low, the use of aluminium
cables and aluminium paint is avoided since suitable
alternatives are readily available.
5.2.2 Lightning protection
When the plant does not fall within the hghtning pro­
tection zone of another building, a horizontal hght­
ning protection system is provided in accordance with
BSCP326 [16]. Lightning protection is discussed in
Chapter 6, Cabling.
5.2.3 M o t o r s in h a z a r d o u s a r e a s
In addition to the requirements for motors previously
referred to in Section 2.2 of this chapter, those in
hazardous areas comply with the following British
Standards.
Motors for use in areas designated Zone 1 (see Sec­
tion 2.4.2 of this chapter) comply with the require­
ments of BS4683 [4], P a r t 4, appropriate to protection
type 'e'. Maximum surface temperature is limited in
accordance with Class T 3 .
Motors for use in areas designated Zone 2 are pro­
vided either to the same standard as for Zone 1, or
to BS5000 [1], P a r t 16, Type N .
821
Mechanical plant electrical services
5.2.4 Switchgear and contactor controlgear
Switchgear and contactor controlgear is located in
non-hazardous areas and is provided to the same
standards and specifications as that elsewhere in the
power station (see Section 2.6 of this chapter).
5.2.5 Control and instrumentation equipment
Control and instrumentation equipment is located in
non-hazardous areas and is provided to the same
standards and specifications as that elsewhere in the
power station, in accordance with C E G B specification
U S / 7 6 / 1 0 [17].
5.2.6 Transformer/rectifier equipment
Transformer/rectifier equipment are located in non-
hazardous areas and are provided to the same stand­
ards and specification as that elsewhere in the power
station in accordance with BS417 [18], BS171 [19] and
British Electricity Board Standard BEBST2 P a r t 5
[20].
An outline of the design requirements is given be­
low. Figure 10.9 shows a typical transformer/rectifier
equipment schematic diagram.
Transformers and chokes
Rectifier transformers and chokes are naturally air-
cooled: Class F to BS2757 [21] insulation is used but
winding temperatures are limited to Class Β BS2757
[21], in the interests of long hfe and rehability.
T o allow compensation for distribution voltage varia­
tions, transformer primary windings are provided with
off-load, bolted-hnk taps, giving ± 5 % on the nominal
voltage.
An earthed screen is provided between primary and
secondary windings to protect rectifier equipment in the
event of a winding fauh developing in the transformer.
Delta-connected transformer primary windings and
double-star secondary rectifier connections are used
to minimise ripple in the D C output and heating of
electrolytic cells.
Rectifiers
Full-wave bridge rectifiers are used, employing either
sihcon junction diodes or thyristors. Because of the
arduous operating conditions in a power station and
the need for maximum rehabihty and hfe, individual
diodes or thyristors are rated at twice the load current
and the equipment designed for a cubicle ambient air
temperature of 55°C. Spare diode capacity is buih
into each rectifier bridge a r m .
Individual diode/thyristor fuses are fitted for pro­
tection in the event of diode/thyristor failure. T o assist
maintenance, indicating hghts are provided to identify
the rectifier arm in which failure has occurred.
Rectifiers are protected against vohage spikes by
surge-suppression circuits. High speed semiconductor
rectifier fuses are fitted to protect against overload
822
Chapter 10
and short-circuh conditions. Rectifier equipment is
classified as electronic equipment and must meet the
requirements of EES (1980) [6], referred to in Section
2.5 of this chapter.
D C smoothing is provided to h m h ripple content to
5 % of the mean value under any of the supply varia­
tions detailed in Section 2.1.2 of this chapter.
Protection
The basic protection requirements of transformer/
rectifier units are hsted below and shown on Fig 10.9:
• A rectifier A C overload relay arranged to trip the
HV supply.
• A rectifier D C overload relay arranged to trip the
H V supply.
• Rectifier diode/thyristor fuses, with a monitoring
system designed to trip the H V supply.
• Surge-suppression equipment fuses, with a monitor­
ing system arranged to trip the HV supply.
5.2.7 Frost p r o t e c t i o n
All pipes and storage vessels which may be subjected
to frost and may consequently jeopardise the safe and
efficient operation of the plant are equipped with trace
heating or immersion heaters, as appropriate.
Anti-frost equipment is controlled automatically by
temperature sensors, either pocket thermostats or ther­
mocouples, to maintain the temperature of the equip­
ment a r o u n d 5 ° C . Control circuits operate at 110 V A C .
Thermostats located in hazardous Zone 1 areas are
BASEEFA-certified and form part of an intrinsically-
safe circuh.
Trace heating in the form of tape is wrapped around
pipework, each section or circuit being separately pro­
tected by fuses and supphed at 110 V A C from a
415/110 V transformer. The 110 V secondary winding
is centre-tapped to earth to limit the vohage to earth
to 55 V in the interest of personnel safety, and an earth­
ed screen is provided between the two windings to
prevent the transfer of excessive voltages from primary
to secondary. Trace heating tapes are of two basic
types, resistance and self-regulating, and have a uni­
form thermal rating per unit length.
Resistance-type trace heating tape comprises two
insulated resistance elements running parallel to each
other for the length of the tape and interconnected at
one end to form a loop. A thermostatically controlled
electrical supply to the loop regulates the heat output.
The maximum length of a tape section is limited by
its loop resistance and by the capacity of the supply.
Self-regulating trace heating tape comprises two con­
ductors running parallel to each other for the length
of the tape and separated by a conductive *core' ma­
terial, the conductance of which varies in response to
changes in temperature. The heat output is there­
fore self-regulating and thermostats are not necessary.
 Gas producing and storage plant

COOLING
FAN FAIL
RELAY

THYRISTOR
COOLING { Μ
FAN MOTOR

rv-f
MAIN
CIRCUIT BREAKER
OVERCURRENT
TRIP CIRCUIT
PROTECTION

AC OVERLOAD
RELAY

DELTA-STAR/STAR
TRANSFORMER

m :
AC SUPPRESSION
VARISTOR
L_--S-0^0--- FUSE FAIL
RELAY

THYRISTOR
FUSE FAIL
RELAY

THYRISTOR

rfi TÍ
OVERTEMPERATURE
RELAY

L A

DC SUPPRESSION
PULSE
VARISTOR
AMPLIFIER
FUSE FAIL
RELAY

rft DC SUPPRESSION
VARISTOR

DC CIRCUIT BREAKER y y DISCONNECTOR

ó 0
DC+VE DC-VE

FIG. 10.9 Typical transformer/rectifier equipment — simplified circuit diagram

823
Mechanical plant electrical services
Immersion heaters are provided in storage vessels
and are supplied at 240 V A C when their rating is
low enough to be controhed directly by thermostats.
For higher ratings, a 415 V three-phase 50 Hz sup­
ply is used and controlled through a contactor by a
temperature-sensing device. Each storage tank is fitted
with a thermostat to control the temperature over the
desired b a n d . When overheating, such as might occur
in the event of failure of a thermostat, could prove
dangerous, an extra 'safety' thermostat set to operate at
a higher temperature than the control thermostat is
connected in series with the control thermostat. The
safety thermostat is manually reset. Temperature sen­
sors and immersion heaters are both designed to be
removable for maintenance purposes, without the stor­
age tank being drained.
Alarm thermostats are provided to warn the op­
erator if the heating system fails to maintain the fluid
above the minimum temperature.
5.2.8 Earthing and static protection
In hazardous areas, it is imperative that all equipment
is bonded together and earthed in order to prevent
the build-up of static or potential differences between
items of plant or equipment, both of which create
risk of a spark and hence ignition.
The 415 V switchgear earth-bar is connected to the
station earth. Ah metal vessels, pipework and non­
conducting metalwork, with the exception of electro­
lytic cells, are bonded together and connected to the
switchgear earth-bar with 70 mm^ copper PVC-insu-
lated and sheathed cable. The metal enclosures of all
electrical equipment are treated similarly. Continuity-
bonding conductors are connected across ah uninsu­
lated pipework joints of bolted or screwed construction.
Precautions are taken to prevent the transfer of
potentials along pipework into hazardous areas and
to ensure that circulating currents cannot occur in
pipework and supporting structures due to the high
current levels in gas generating electrolytic cells. T o
this end, electrolytic cehs are mounted on insulated
supports and all metallic pipework connected to the
cells has insulated flanged joints in the vicimty of the
cell. Each low pressure delivery main into gas storage
vessels is mounted on insulated supports and equipped
with an insulated joint outside the storage area. The
insulated joints and supports must have a minimum
insulation resistance of 2 ΜΩ at 500 V D C .
5.3 Hydrogen producing plant —
electrolytic cell process
5.3.1 General description of plant
The electrolytic cell process for the production of
hydrogen comprises banks of cells, using a solution
of caustic soda and water, or potash and water, as
an electrolyte. A low voltage D C supply from a trans­
824
C h a p t e r 10
former/rectifier unit to the cehs causes hydrogen to
be produced at the cathode and oxygen at the anode.
Since the rate of production is directly proportional to
the D C current, hydrogen production is regulated by
rectifier control. Electrolyte level is maintained by a
deminerahsed water make-up system.
Hydrogen from the cehs passes via a gasholder, at a
m a x i m u m pressure of 12 m b a r , to compressors
operating at high discharge pressure (25 to 30 bar) and
through driers and filters to the H P storage vessel.
F o r distribution, hydrogen pressure is reduced to 10
bar. Oxygen is vented to atmosphere. A typical system
diagram is shown in Fig 10.10.
The disposition of equipment within the hydrogen
plant c o m p o u n d is illustrated in Fig 10.11. In general
terms, the plant layout consists of an outdoor storage
area, in which the H P and L P storage vessels are
situated and a building containing the compressor,
electrolytic cell and electrical equipment r o o m s . Hy­
drogen compressors, filters and driers are housed in
the compressor r o o m ; switchgear, transformer/rectifier
equipment and the gas production control panel are
housed in the electrical equipment r o o m and the
hydrogen producing cells in the ceh r o o m .
5.3.2 Classification of plant areas
The classification of the various areas, as defined in
BS5345 [5], is as fohows and electrical equipment is
provided accordingly (see Section 5.2.1 of this chapter):
• Electrolytic ceh r o o m — Zone 1.
• Hydrogen compressor r o o m — Zone 1.
• Storage area:
(a) Within 1 m of storage vessels or directly above
them — Zone 1.
(b) Within 3 m of storage vessels excluding (a) —
Zone 2.
(c) Remainder — non-hazardous.
• Electrical equipment r o o m — non-hazardous.
5.3.3 Electrical, control and instrumentation
equipment
DC connections and busbars Connections between
the electrolytic cehs and the rectifier equipment consist
of hard-drawn, high conductivhy copper busbars com­
plying with BS159 [22] and BS158 [23] or P V C in­
sulated and sheathed copper cables to BS6346 [24].
Busbars within the hazardous environment of the ceh
r o o m are insulated with anti-static P V C . F r o m the cell
r o o m , the connections pass through wall bushings into
the electrical equipment r o o m where, if they are bus­
bars, they are protected by a wire-mesh screen to
prevent accidental contact. The wall bushings are gas-
tight to ensure that hydrogen is prevented from entering
the electrical equipment r o o m under all circumstances.
 Gas producing a n d storage plant

OXYGEN HYDROGEN
VENT VENT

TRANSFORMER
Ίτπ WATER
HYDROGEN
HYDRAULIC
RELIEF VALVE

& RECTIFIER
SEAL

HYDROGEN
ELECTROLYSER i PURITY
CELLS ' CONTROL
VALVE

COOLING
LOW PRESSURE
GAS HOLDER

ητ -w-

Vτ HIGH PRESSURE
STORAGE
VESSELS

ι JJL-
RECIRCULATION

HYDROGEN
COMPRESSORS
ττ
DRIERS FILTERS
DEOXYGENATOR
(IF REQUIRED)

J EXCESS FLOW

HYDROGEN TO
CONTROL PANEL

FIG. 10.10 Hydrogen generation plant — electrolytic cell process — system diagram

Cabling installation and testing Cabling practice is the
same as that adopted elsewhere in the power station,
apart from that associated with electrical equipment
situated in the hazardous areas referred to in Section
5.3.2 of this chapter, where it is required to be com­
patible with the appropriate safety requirements. Par­
ticular attention is paid to the earthing of screens and
armours and the glanding and termination of cables
at equipment. Installation and testing comphes w h h
the recommendations of BSCP1003 [25] and BS5345
[5].
Barrier-unit cubicle A barrier-unit cubicle is located
in the electrical equipment r o o m and accommodates
all intrinsically-safe relays and shunt-diode safety bar­
riers necessary for the interconnection of electrical
equipment in the hazardous areas with power sources
and equipment in the electrical equipment r o o m .
Warning notices and gas detection Warning notices
prohibiting smoking and naked hghts are provided at
all entrances to hazardous areas and are permanently
illuminated from a 110 V A C / D C supply.
Gas detectors, operated from the same 110 V A C /
D C supply as the warning notices, are installed in ah
r o o m s , including the non-hazardous electrical equip­
ment r o o m , and initiate audible and visual alarms at
the entrance to the specific area where gas has been
detected.
Back-up protection As mentioned in Section 5.2.1 of
this chapter, the overah protection of the plant is
assured by the provision of a back-up protection
scheme. T h e scheme is arranged to trip the circuit-
breaker of the incoming supply to the 415 V switch­
board in the event of a contactor faihng to open after
initiation of a trip. Devices provided to initiate trip­
ping of a contactor are either fitted with duphcate
contacts or are duplicated t o operate into the back-up
protection scheme.
T h e plant control a n d back-up safety protection
systems function independently to ensure that plant

825
Mechanical plant electrical services Chapter 10

ELECTRICAL

•
ROOM
CELL
ROOM
TRANSFORMER/
RECTIFIER
CELLS

COMPRESSED
AIR PLANT

COMPRESSOR
ROOM

COMPRESSORS
\

Η. P. VESSELS

EMERGENCY
GATE

SECURITY FENCE

FIG. 10.11 Hydrogen generation plant — layout of compound and buildings

safety is not jeopardised by control system faults. The
back-up safety system is arranged so that, in the event
of any plant parameter exceeding the normal con­
trol range such that it could give rise to a potential
hazard, the circuh-breaker is tripped, rendering the
plant safe.
Gas production control panel The gas production
control panel is located in the electrical equipment r o o m
and forms the control centre of the plant. Control of
the hydrogen plant is normally automatic, but manual
control and test facilities are provided. Incorporated
in the control panel are the following facilities:
(a) A mimic diagram indicating the state of plant.
(b) Indicating and recording instruments for hydrogen
pressure, temperature, purity, dryness and other
data necessary for the operation and monitoring
of the plant.
(c) Rectifier controls and indicators.

826

(d) Hydrogen compressor controls and instruments, for
each compressor, including duty selection switches
( d u t y / a u t o s t a n d b y / m a n u a l standby).
(e) Control and instrumentation (C and I) air com­
pressor controls and instruments, simhar to (d)
above.
(f) Alarm annunciator panel incorporating *alarm ac­
cept', 'reset' and 'test' buttons, an audible alarm,
and repeat alarm contacts to bring u p alarms in
the Central Control R o o m of the power station.
The general control philosophy is 'failure-to-safety'.
Electropneumatic converter equipment Due to the
flammable nature of hydrogen, all automatic valves
in the gas system are pneumaticahy controlled through
electropneumatic converter equipment located in a
non-hazardous area, normally the electrical equipment
room. The equipment operates from the C and I air
system, which has a nominal working pressure of 7
bar.
Hydrogen compressor control Three compressors are
provided, each capable of handling the total ceh p r o ­
duction, to ensure that adequate standby capacity is
available when one u n h is off-stream for maintenance.
The compressor system automatically maintains hy­
drogen pressure in the H P receivers at a maximum
pressure of 31 bar and incorporates safeguards against
the compressors running when the L P reservoir is less
than 10% fuh.
Normally two compressors are selected to 'duty'
and one to 'standby'. The number of compressors run­
ning is selected automaticahy according to the level
of hydrogen in the L P storage vessel.
An emergency stop-switch controlling all three com­
pressors, of a type appropriate t o the Zone 2 classi­
fication of the area, is provided in the compressor
room.
A manual control facility is provided at the 415 V
switchboard.
C and I air compressor control Two compressors
are provided, each 100%-rated, one being selected to
'duty' and one to 'standby'. Their operation is normally
automatic, being governed by pressure switches on
the storage vessel.
A manual control facihty is provided at the 415 V
switchboard.
Rectifier control The quantity of hydrogen produced
by the cehs is controlled by varying the rectifier output
current. This is normahy automatic, but a m a n u a l
control facihty is provided. The rectifier output is
varied by switching the A C rectifier supply. Under
automatic control, pressure swhches in the H P hydro­
gen network are used t o vary hydrogen production
and so to maintain pressure in the pipework and stor­
Gas producing a n d storage plant
age vessel between 25 and 30 bar. They shut down
production in event of H P storage vessel pressure
exceeding 31 bar. In the event of the L P storage vessel
becoming more t h a n 9 5 % fuh, the rectifier A C supply
is isolated.
Automatic voltage control is incorporated to main­
tain a constant D C current output under any of the
supply system variations detailed in Section 2.1.2 of
this chapter.
5.4 Hydrogen producing plant — methanol
chemical reaction
5.4.1 General description of plant
A n alternative process t o that described in Section 5.3
of this chapter, uses a mixture of methanol and water
(typically 6 4 % methanol and 3 6 % water by weight)
for the production of hydrogen. A typical system dia­
gram is shown in Fig 10.12. The methanol/water
mixture is p u m p e d from a storage t a n k , through a
heat exchanger, to a preheater which vaporises it. The
rate of hydrogen production is controlled by swhching
the A C supply to the preheater, thereby controlling
the rate of fuel vaporisation. The vapour then passes
over a catalyst which breaks it down t o a gas, the
main constituents of which are hydrogen and carbon
dioxide. This hydrogen-rich gas then passes into a
diffusion chamber, where the hydrogen is separated
and fed to a gas holder. Waste carbon dioxide is vented
to atmosphere from the diffuser.
Hydrogen from the gas holder is passed to com­
pressors operating at high discharge pressure (25 to 30
bar) and then through driers and filters to the H P
storage vessel. For distribution, hydrogen pressure is
reduced to 10 bar.
The disposition of equipment within the hydrogen
plant is similar t o that shown for the electrolytic ceh
process in Fig 10.11, and consists of an outdoor stor­
age area and a buhding incorporating compressor,
methanol generator and electrical equipment r o o m s .
5.4.2 Classification of plant areas
The classification of the various areas, as defined in
BS5345 [5], is as fohows a n d the electrical equipment
is provided to suit (see Section 5.2.1 of this chapter):
• Methanol gas producer r o o m — Zone 1.
• Hydrogen compressor r o o m — Zone 1.
• Storage area:
(a) Within 1 m of methanol and hydrogen storage
vessels or directly above them — Zone 1.
(b) Within 3 m of above storage vessels — Zone 2.
(c) Remainder — non-hazardous.
• Electrical equipment r o o m — non-hazardous.
827
Mechanical plant electrical services C h a p t e r 10

DRIERS FILTERS PUMPS

TO DISTRIBUTION
(25-30 bar)

FIG. 10.12 Hydrogen generation plant — methanol chemical reaction system

828

5.4.3 Electrical, control and instrumentation
equipment
General Many similarities exist between this plant
and that described in Section 5.3 of this chapter. In
Section 5.3.3, cabling, barrier cubicle, warning notices
and gas detection, back-up protection, electropneuma-
tic converter equipment, hydrogen compressor control
and C and I air compressor control, all fall into this
category.
Cable connections and busbars Connections between
415 V switchgear in the electrical equipment r o o m
and the generation plant in the methanol gas producer
room comprise either non-static P V C insulated, hard
drawn, high conductivity copper busbars complying
whh BS158 [23] and BS159 [22] or PVC-insulated and
sheathed copper cables to BS6346 [24]. Busbars in
the hazardous environment are insulated with anti­
static P V C . These connections pass through bushings
in the separating wall into the electrical equipment
room where, if they are busbars, they are enclosed by
a wire mesh screen to prevent accidental contact. The
bushings are gas-tight to ensure that hydrogen is
prevented from entering the electrical equipment r o o m
under ah circumstances.
Gas production control panel The gas production
control panel is located in the electrical equipment
room and is the focal point for control of the hydrogen
plant. Accommodated in the control panel are the
fohowing facihties for automatic and manual control:
• A mimic diagram indicating the state of the plant.
• Indicating and recording instruments for hydrogen
pressure; methanol supply purity; hydrogen tempera­
ture, dryness and purity; and other data necessary
for the operation and monitoring of the plant.
• Hydrogen generation controls.
• Hydrogen compressor controls and instruments.
• C and I air compressor controls and instruments.
• Alarm annunciator panel, incorporating 'alarm ac­
cept', 'reset' and 'lamp test' pushbuttons, an audible
alarm and alarm contacts used to bring up alarms
in the Central Control R o o m of the power station.
The general control philosophy is 'failure-to-safety'.
Hydrogen generation control Automatic and m a n u a l
control of the methanol generator is provided, the
former being designed to maintain the selected hydro­
gen production rate, irrespective of variations in system
and ambient condhions. The rate of gas production
is controlled by switching or varying the voltage of
the preheater A C supply to maintain gas pressure in
the H P pipeline and storage vessel between 25 and
30 bar. Production is stopped if the gas pressure rises
Gas producing a n d storage plant
to 31 bar or if the L P gas holder is greater than 9 5 %
fuh.
M a n u a l control facilities comprise ' a u t o / m a n u a l '
control selection, production ' o n / o f f and 'raise/lower'
controls.
Preheater supply A contactor-controlled 415 V three-
phase four-wire supply is provided to the preheater,
the individual elements of which are connected for
240 V single-phase operation. Overload protection is
provided on the 415 V supply and arranged to trip
the supply contactor and raise an alarm.
Protection devices trip the heater supply when the
heater temperature exceeds approximately 570°C and
restore it automatically when the temperature fahs to
a safe level. This prevents the gas generator from over-
pressurising.
5.5 Methane production plant
5.5.1 General description of plant
Methane (CH4) is produced by the catalysed reaction
of carbon dioxide ( C O 2 ) and hydrogen ( H 2 ) . Carbon
dioxide is drawn from the C O 2 storage tanks and
hydrogen from the L P gasholder.
Hydrogen is supphed to the methanation plant via
an L P compressor and mixer, the hydrogen and car­
b o n dioxide mixing at sufficient pressure to drive h
through the methanation process plant. Methanation
takes place within a catalyst vessel, the methane pro­
duced being fed via compressors and separators to an
H P storage vessel.
Methanation occurs in two stages within the tubes
of the reaction vessel over a bed of catalyst packed
inside the tubes. F r o m the first stage reaction vessel,
the gas produced passes via the tube side of a recu­
perative heat exchanger into the first stage condenser
which removes water produced in the reaction.
The gas is then passed through the shell side of the
recuperative heat exchanger t o raise its temperature
prior to entry into the second stage reaction vessel. Gas
temperature is controlled by adjusting the volume of
gas returned through the heat exchanger, using the
inlet regulating and by-pass valves.
The heated gas then passes through the second stage
reaction vessel and through the second-stage condenser,
where the water produced by the reaction is again
removed. F r o m there, the methane gas is compressed
and fed to the H P storage vessel at a pressure in the
order of 44 bar.
The rate of methane production is controlled either
automatically or manually by varying the supply of
hydrogen and carbon dioxide from their respective
storage vessels.
Once started, the process within the reaction vessels
generates sufficient heat for it to be self-sustaining.
However, t o start the reaction, the first stage vessel
829
Mechanical plant electrical services
is heated to operating temperature by electrical fan
heaters.
A typical system diagram is shown in Fig 10.13.
Methane production plants include hydrogen produc­
tion and storage facilities as outlined in Sections 5.3
and 5.4 of this chapter.
5.5.2 Classification of plant areas
The classification of the areas of the plant, as defined
in BS5345 [5], is as fohows and electrical equipment is
provided accordingly (see Section 5.2.1 of this chapter):
• Electrolytic ceh room — Zone 1.
• Hydrogen compressor room — Zone 1.
• Methane reactor room — Zone 1.
• Methane compressor room — Zone 1.
• Storage area:
(a) Within 1 m of hydrogen storage vessel and above
h — Zone 1.
(b) Within 3 m of hydrogen storage vessel excluding
(a) — Zone 2.
(c) Remainder — non-hazardous.
• Electrical equipment room — non-hazardous.
5.5.3 Electrical, control and instrumentation
equipment
The hazards associated with the production and han­
dling of hydrogen and methane are similar and the
general requirements in respect of electrical equipment
are as detailed for hydrogen plant in Section 5.3 of
this chapter.
Central control of the methane production process
is provided at a gas production control panel located
in the electrical equipment r o o m , automatic and man­
ual control facihties being provided.
5.6 Nitrogen storage plant
5.6.1 General description of plant
Liquid nitrogen is stored in a vacuum-insulated vessel.
A bank of vaporisers, typically four, converts the liquid
into nitrogen gas for distribution. The vaporisers may
be any one of four types: electrical heat storage, am­
bient air fan-assisted, ambient air natural-draught, or
steam (when auxiliary steam is available). The choice
of vaporiser depends upon nitrogen production rate,
that of power stations usually dictating the use of
electrical or steam heated types because of their greater
capacity and compact size. Gas pressure at the exit
from the vaporisers is regulated by control valves whhin
the range 7 to 17 bar for distribution purposes.
Distribution is isolated if gas pressure exceeds 17 bar
or if its temperature fahs below 10°C. Gas pressure
830
C h a p t e r 10
is further reduced outside the storage plant for final
distribution. Make-up water supplies to electric heat
storage vaporisers are trace heated to prevent freezing.
A typical storage-compound layout is shown in
Fig 10.14 and a bulk storage system in Fig 10.15.
5.6.2 Electrical requirements
Electrical requirements are limited to supplies for va­
poriser heater control cabinets, heaters, motorised
valves, solenoid valves, trace heating and lighting. 415
V three-phase 50 Hz is provided for the purpose.
5.7 Carbon dioxide storage plant
5.7.1 General description of plant
Liquid carbon dioxide is dehvered by road tanker
and stored in a vacuum-insulated vessel. A fully auto­
matic refrigeration system is provided which maintains
the vessel pressure at 20 bar at - 17°C. Vaporisers
convert the liquid into carbon dioxide gas for distri­
bution. Vaporisers may be any one of four types;
electrical heat storage, ambient air fan-assisted, ambient
air natural-draught or steam (when auxiliary steam is
available). The choice of vaporiser depends u p o n car­
bon dioxide production rate, that of power stations
usually dictating the use of electrical or steam heated
types because of their greater capacity and compact
size. Gas distribution pressure is nominally 19 bar.
T o prevent the passage of liquid carbon dioxide through
the vaporisers and into the distribution system in the
event of a fauh, the gas temperature at the vaporiser
outlet is monitored. If the gas temperature falls to
- 10°C, a control valve isolates the feeder to the
distribution system.
A typical storage c o m p o u n d layout for generator
purging is shown in Fig 10.16 and bulk storage system
in Fig 10.17. Nuclear power stations need a larger
storage capacity and a greater number of storage ves­
sels and vaporisers, but the basic requirements are
the same as for fossil-fired stations.
5.7.2 Electrical requirements
Electrical requirements are limited to supplies for va­
poriser heater control cabinets, heaters, refrigeration
u n h s , motorised valves, solenoid valves and lighting.
415 V three-phase 50 Hz is provided for the purpose.
6 CW electrochlorination plant (sodium
hypochlorite production and storage)
6.1 General description of plant
Sodium hypochlorhe is produced for the treatment
of cooling water (CW). Sea water is pumped through
strainers to banks of electrochlorination cells. Thyristor
 C W Electrochlorination plant (sodium hypochlorite production and storage)

CARBON DIOXIDE
HYDROGEN
STORAGE
L.P. GAS
TANK
HOLDER

COMPRESSOR

DRYER

C02 H2 C02
f
MIX ER 1 MIXER 2

1 METHANATION
VESSELS
1
1ST STAGE 2ND STAGE 1ST STAGE 2ND STAGE
REACTION REACTION REACTION REACTION
VESSEL VESSEL VESSEL VESSEL

W CH4
RECUPERATIVE
HEAT Ζ CH4
1 EXCHANGERS
y

CONDENSERS

COMPRESSORS
(3 X 100%)

SEPARATORS

τ ο METHANE Η. P. STORAGE VESSEL

FIG. 1 0 . 1 3 Methane (CH4) production plant — system diagram

831
Mechanical plant electrical services C h a p t e r 10

1 TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVE

2 PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE

3 ISOLATING VALVE

4 RELIEF VALVE

HEATER
CONTROLS

1675

3660

ALL DIMENSIONS IN mm

FIG. 10.14 Nitrogen storage plant layout

controlled rectifier units provide LV variable voltage
D C supplies to the cells, thereby controlling the rate
of production of sodium hypochlorite by electrolysis
within the cells. A by-product of the process is hydro­
gen, which is of inadequate purity for use in a power
station and has, therefore, to be exhausted in a con­
trolled and safe manner. A solution of sodium hypo­
chlorite, hydrogen and sea water leaves the cells and
is fed to a hydrogen release tank, which exhausts the
hydrogen to atmosphere. The hydrogen-free sodium
hypochlorite solution then passes to a storage tank.
Sodium hypochlorite is pumped from the storage tank
to the dosing points in the water treatment plant. A
system diagram for a power station site is shown in
Fig 10.18.
The disposition of equipment whhin a typical C W
electrochlorination plant is illustrated in Fig 10.19.
Electrical equipment rooms housing 415 V swhchgear,
transformer/rectifier u n h s , control/mimic panel and
control air pumps are situated adjacent to the electro­
chlorination cell r o o m . Outside the building is a storage
area in which the sodium hypochlorite storage tanks,
sodium hypochlorite distribution pumps and hydrogen
release tanks are situated, the latter being above the
storage tanks and at a high level to ensure the safe
discharge of hydrogen.
6.2 Classification of plant areas
The classification of areas, as defined in BS5345 [5], is
as follows, electrical equipment whhin those defined
areas being provided accordingly (see Section 5.2.1 of
this chapter).
• Electrochlorination-ceh r o o m — Zone 1.
• The area directly above the hydrogen release tank —
Zone 1.
• Within 2 m of the hydrogen release tank — Zone 2.
• Electrical equipment room(s) — non-hazardous.
6.3 Electrical, control and instrumentation
equipment
6.3.1 General
Many similarities exist between the electrical require­
ments of this plant and of the hydrogen production

832
 C W Electrochlorination plant (sodium hypochlorite production a n d storage)

i DISTRIBUTION
[LINE

3 5m

FRONT ELEVATION

TURBINE HOUSE WALL

002 GAS TO
GENERATORS

¿H PRESSURE
Τ RAISING C O I L

L I Q U I D WITHDRAWAL
IF R E Q U I R E D

FIG. 1 0 . 1 5 Nitrogen storage system

plant described in Section 5.3.3 of this chapter. Re­

quirements which are simhar for both are described
in the fohowing sections: D C connections a n d busbars,
cabling, barrier unit cubicle, warning notices a n d gas
detectors, back-up protection, electropneumatic con­
verter equipment, a n d C a n d I air compressor control.

6.3.2 Production control panel

The production control panel is located in the electrical
equipment r o o m a n d constitutes the control centre for
the production a n d storage of sodium hypochlorite
and for its distribution for water treatment purposes.
Accommodated in the control panel are the following
facilities for automatic a n d manual control:

• A mimic diagram indicating the state of the plant. PLAN

• Transformer/rectifier controls a n d indicators.

• Sea water feed p u m p , filter controls a n d indicators.
• Electrochlorinator controls.
• Sodium hypochlorite storage tank level indication.
• Sodium hypochlorhe dosing
controls and indicators.
• C a n d I air compressor controls a n d indicators.
• Water treatment (sodium hypochlorite dosing) control.
• *Auto/manuar selection a n d *open/close' controls
and indicators for all control valves.
FIG. 1 0 . 1 6 Carbon dioxide storage plant layout
• A l a r m a n n u n c i a t o r panel, incorporating 'alarm
accept', 'reset' a n d 'test' b u t t o n s , a n audible alarm
and repeat alarm contacts t o initiate alarms in the
pump, flow valve Central Control R o o m .
The control system is designed for automatic control
of the plant under normal operational condition, w h h
the facility for m a n u a l control, if necessary. Overah
control of the system is via a programmable logic con­
troller ( P L C ) housed in the control panel.

833
Mechanical plant electrical services
LIQUID FILLING LINE VAPOUR BALANCE LINE
PRESSURE GAUGE
WITH HIGH/LOW • *
ALARM CONTACTS
REFRIGERATION
UNIT
PRESSURE SWITCH
FOR REFRIGERATION
CONTROL
CONTENTS GAUGE
FIG. 10.17 Carbon dioxide storage system
6.3.3 Sea water feed pumps and strainers control
The scheme shown in Fig 10.18 has three 415 V three-
phase 50 Hz sea water feed pumps each capable of
dehvering half of the total feed water flow required.
Two of the three p u m p s are selected to *duty' and one
to 'standby'. Loss of a duty p u m p automatically causes
the standby p u m p to start. T w o motorised sea water
strainers are provided, each having sufficient capacity
to handle the fuh plant output.
6.3.4 Transformer/rectifier controls
The scheme shown in Fig 10.18 has eight transformer/
rectifier equipment, each supplying D C current to its
associated electrochlorinator. The transformer/rectifier
units can be selected for automatic or manual control
either individually or as a group, thereby ensuring maxi­
m u m control flexibility.
6.3.5 Sodium hypochlorite storage
Production of sodium hypochlorite is governed by the
level in the storage tanks, leading to shut down if the
maximum level is reached. Similarly, a low level will
shut down the dosing p u m p s .
6.3.6 Dosing pump controls
The scheme shown in Fig 10.18 has four 415 V three-
phase 50 Hz dosing p u m p s , each capable of delivering
one-third of the maximum dosing rate. A 'three out of
four' duty selection scheme is provided; the fourth
p u m p is on standby and starts automatically upon fail­
ure of one of the duty pumps when automatic con­
trol is selected. Manual control of each p u m p can be
selected, if required, thereby ensuring maximum flexi­
bility of operation.
834
Chapter 10
VENT VALVE
PRESSURE GAUGE
FOR TESTING AND RESETTING
TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVE
BYPASS VALVE
LOCKED CLOSED
I 30kWI I
VAPORISER I * ^ X j f
VAPOUR DRAW-OFF LINE
CARBON DIOXIDE TO
GENERATORGAS
CONTROL PANELS
Automatic operation of the dosing system is con­
trolled by the production control panel logic system,
the number of pumps started being determined by
the number of hypochlorite generators needed to satisfy
chlorination requirements.
Hypochlorite flow from the dosing pumps is auto­
matically regulated by two motorised valves installed
in the p u m p outlets.
6.3.7 Electrical distribution
The majorhy of suppHes to the plant drive-motors
are 415 V three-phase 50 H z and are derived from two
contactor boards, each board being supplied separate­
ly. A n interconnector is provided between the two
boards. This ensures security of supply with the maxi­
m u m operating flexibility. Multiple drives, such as
transformer/rectifier equipment and dosing p u m p s ,
are spread over the two boards to minimise the effect
on plant operation of the loss of one b o a r d due to
supply failure.
The electrochlorinators present the largest individual
loads, each being in the order of 750 k W , and are
supplied at 3.3 kV three-phase 50 Hz by circuit-breakers
on two swhchboards. Hypochlorite dosing p u m p s ,
typicahy 55 k W , sea water feed p u m p s and venthation
fans are supphed by electrically-held contactors on
the 415 V boards.
7 Water treatment plant
7.1 Description of plant
The design of water treatment plant varies according
to the quahty of raw water which may be sea, river,
lake or towns water; the first two sources are the more
 W a t e r t r e a t m e n t plant

. CIRCULATING WATER
TOWNS —
. TOWNS WATER WATER
. CHLORINATED WATER

SEA
' WATER PUMPS

FROM CW
OUTFALL TO POINTS OF
CULVERTS APPLICATION

>-^SH>H-X

HYPOCHLORITE DOSING
PUMPS
V REMOVAL
' TANK

FIG. 1 0 . 1 8 C W electrochlorination plant — system diagram

ELECTROCHLORINATION
CELLS 3-3kV SWITCHBOARD
UNIT
HYDROGEN HYDROGEN GAS
SWITCHROOM
REMOVAL TANK DETECTOR TEST VALVES

FIRE PROTECTION
DOSING PUMPS RECTIFIER UNITS CONTROL PANEL EQUIPMENT
BATTERY ROOM UNIT
SWITCHROOM

FIG. 1 0 . 1 9 C W electrochlorination plant room — typical layout

common in the UK. Treatment of coohng water, boiler m a t i o n , organic growth a n d marine growth, any of
make-up feedwater a n d condensate are necessary t o which wih detract from the operating efficiency and hfe
prevent plant corrosion, sludge buUd-up, scale for- of the plant.

835
Mechanical plant electrical services Chapter 10

Raw water from most sources contains salts of cal­
cium, magnesium, sodium and potassium, together w h h
chloride and sulphate ions, dissolved oxygen and carbon
dioxide, and suspended solids. The concentration of
these impurities varies with the source of the water and
this, together with the use of the water, dictates the
overall design requirements of the feedwater treatment
plant.
Feedwater treatment comprises three stages; the main
water treatment plant, the boiler feedwater chemical-
dosing and the condensate polishing plant. The func­
tion of each plant is briefly described below and their
disposition in relation to the feedwater system shown
on Fig 10.20.
The function of the main water treatment plant
is to purify the raw water intake and render it suitable
for use as boiler make-up water. In the pre-treatment
section, the raw water is dosed chemically for p H cor­
rection and sohds coagulation, and then filtered to
remove suspended solids. After filtering, the water is
ahowed to settle in a tank before being transferred to
the ion-exchange section.
The ion-exchange section removes contaminants and .
organic material which has not been filtered out during
the pre-treatment process. Fihered water is passed
through resin-exchange cation, anion and mixed-bed
units after which it is of adequate quality for supply to
the boher make-up water tank.
During the ion-exchange process, the resins are de­
pleted. Regeneration equipment is provided which
receives, prepares and dilutes regenerating chemicals,
namely sulphuric acid and caustic soda. These are
passed through the resins to restore their ionic exchange
capacity.
The function of the boiler feedwater chemical-dosing
plant is to remove any traces of oxygen left after de-
aeration, to reduce the p H (acidity) level and to inhibit
corrosion. A m m o n i a and hydrazine liquid concentrates
are mixed with deionised water and the solutions
injected into the boiler feedwater, the a m m o n i a to
reduce the p H value and the hydrazine to remove the
traces of oxygen.
The purpose of the condensate polishing plant is
to pohsh, i.e., maintain low levels of suspended sohds.

EMERGENCY BOILER
FEED PUMPS

CHEMICAL
DOSING

FEED REGULATING
VALVES

DEAERATOR

MAIN BOILER
FEED PUMPS

CHEMICAL .
DOSING

DRAINS
COOLER

OUTSURGE

FIG. 10.20 Feedwater system flow diagram showing the interrelationship with water treatment plant

836

and deionise the turbine condensate recovered from
the condenser wehs. Condensate is deminerahsed by
mixed-bed unhs and returned to the steam generator
feedwater system. The levels of suspended solids and
the p H value are controlled to minimise corrosion of
the boiler drums, tubing and auxihary equipment.
Figures 10.21 and 10.22 show a simphfied arrange­
ment of the pre-treatment and ion-exchange plants at
a typical nuclear power station located on the coast
and utilising sea water. Primary water feed is by two
100% duty raw water p u m p s through sand-filter units
to a filtered water tank, from where it is pumped by
three 5 0 % duty filtered raw-water pumps through
cation units and anion units. Two 100% duty booster
pumps feed the water through mixed-bed u n h s to the
reserve feedwater tanks.
Figure 10.23 shows a simphfied regeneration system.
Three regeneration water pumps supply water from the
reserve feedwater tanks to acid and caustic dilution
RAW WATER
INLET
LOW PRESSURE
AIR
FROM AIR BLOWERS
FIG. 10.21 Water treatment plant — pre-treatment system
W a t e r t r e a t m e n t plant
tanks and thence to the respective anion, cation and
mixed-bed u n h s of the ion-exchange and condensate
polishing plants.
Figure 10.24 shows the condensate pohshing plant.
The primary condensate feed is via the condenser
extraction p u m p s into the mixed-bed units and thence
to the de-aerator via the feedheating u n h s as shown
in Fig 10.25.
Figure 10.26 illustrates the feedwater chemical dosing
system. T w o 100% duty a m m o n i a dosing pumps and
two 100% duty hydrazine dosing p u m p s are provided
to treat polished condensate and de-aerator inlet/outlet
feeds.
Cooling water is treated to prevent scale deposhion,
organic growth and algae on heat exchange surfaces
and to prevent marine growth.
Cooling water treatment consists of intermittent
dosing with chlorine or of continuous dosing with so­
dium hypochlorite. Sodium hypochlorite dosing is pre-
MAIN SYSTEM FLOW
LOW PRESSURE AIR
837
Mechanical plant electrical services Chapter 10

OUTLET TO
REGENERATION SYSTEM

LOW PRESSURE AIR

FROM
AIR BLOWERS

MAIN SYSTEM FLOW

LOW PRESSURE AIR

— — — ACID

CAUSTIC

FIG. 10.22 Water treatment plant - ion-exchange system

ferred for coastal stations because it has been shown
to be more effective in the treatment of marine growth.
It also eliminates the dangers associated with the storage
of liquid chlorine.
The electrochlorination plant (sodium hypochlorite
production and storage) at a nuclear power station is
described in Section 6 of this chapter. Four dosing
p u m p s are provided to inject sodium hypochlorite into
the coohng water system.
7.2 Electrical distribution system
3.3 kV and 415 V switchboards are provided to ensure
maximum security of electrical supphes to the water

838
 W a t e r treatment plant

BRINE TO
RFR ANION UNITS
MAIN SYSTEM FLOW
(ION EXCHANGE)

ACID
FROM BRINE
SATURATOR
CAUSTIC

RESIN TRANSFER
.--^ WATER/POLISHING
COMMON/
MAKE-UP , ( 4 V^ANT REGENERATION
STANDBYÍ
PUMP \|y WATER PUMP
PUMP viy

1 12

TO BRINE MEASURE
-txi- DOSING
PLANT
OUTLET MAIN TO
CONDENSATE
POLISHING PLANT

LCXH^<Kh fi><K>Kj-Ch

EJECTOR EJECTOR ó EJECTOR Ó lEJECTOR

CATION MIXED BED ACID ANION CAUSTIC MIXED BED CAUSTIC

DILUTION TANK DILUTION TANK DILUTION TANK DILUTION TANK

t
Amú το CAUSTIC
CAUSTIC
TO RFR TO MIXED
mm AMtQN BED UNITS
UNITS

FIG. 1 0 . 2 3 Water treatment plant — regeneration system

treatment plant. The distribution system is designed to
minimise disruption to the plant operation in the event
of supply failure by feeding the plant from alternative
switchboards and providing interconnection facihties.
For the water treatment plant described in the previous
section, the switchboards are divided into two sections,
each section being fed from independent sources and
the two sections interconnected.
The largest individual loads are the electrochlorina-
tors — typically 750 k W and supphed at 3.3 kV. T h e
3.3 kV and 415 V distribution system for the electro­
chlorination plant is described in Section 6.3.7 of this
chapter.
Other water treatment plant loads are fed from
415 V switchboards via latched contactors, this type
of contactor being used in view of the essential nature
of the plant and the need to safeguard against spuri­
ous tripping. The m a i n 415 V three-phase loads are as
follows — two 30 k W raw water p u m p s , three 40 k W
filtered water p u m p s , t w o 30 k W booster p u m p s , two

839
Mechanical plant electrical services C h a p t e r 10

CONDENSATE INLET FROM ' MAIN SYSTEM FLOW

REGENERATION PLANT

JO]
Ϊ
BYPASS
VALVE MIXED BED MIXED BED MIXED BED
UNIT A UNIT Β UNIT C

RESIN
TRAP

CONDUCTIVITY CONDUCTIVITY CONDUCTIVITY

ALARM ALARM ALARM

FEEDWATER
OUTLET
MAIN

RECIRCULATION
RECIRCULATION LOOP
PUMP

FIG. 1 0 . 2 4 Condensate polishing plant — system diagram

3 k W recovered water p u m p s , three 50 k W effluent Plant operation is controlled automatically by p r o ­

pumps and two 0.5 k W alum dosing pumps on the pre-
treatment a n d make-up plant; two 90 k W recirculation
pumps on the condensate pohshing plant; four 0.5 k W
hydrazine dosing p u m p s , four 1 k W a m m o n i a dosing
pumps and two 1 k W tank stirrers.
grammable logic controllers ( P L C ) . Logic-initiated
solenoid valves, which actuate the pneumatically-op­
erated a n d motorised control valves, are fitted with
override facihties which allow the plant t o be controlled
manually in the event of automatic control system
failure.

7.3 Electrical control

A suite of control panels located in the water treatment
plant building houses all the equipment necessary for
the fully automatic control, monitoring a n d alarm an­
nunciation functions of the plant, a n d manual control
facilities for maintenance a n d commissioning. Selected
alarms are repeated in the Central Control R o o m .
7.4 Motor drives
The majority of electric drive motors are 415 V three-
phase, squirrel cage, totally-enclosed fan cooled types
arranged for direct-on-line starting a n d having a degree
of protection of IP54 or IP55 weatherproof to s u h the
environment.

840
W a t e r t r e a t m e n t plant
(30
Si
T3
T3
c
13
C!
O
U
O
α
841
Mechanical plant electrical services C h a p t e r 10

AMMONIA
MEASURE

REGENERATION PUMP
WATER SUPPLY

VENT

ί
UNIT
AMMONIA "1
DILUTION Ί!
-M TANK 1

L/1 Un

t t ζi
DOSING
PUMPS η η ή

Ä Ä a ^
SYMBOL DESCRIPTION

MANUAL VALVE

!r-XH MANUAL VALVE (NORMALLY SHUT)

I — ^ ϋ LEVEL INDICATOR

I • 1 FLOW INDICATOR

VARIABLE STROKE PUMP

PULSE DAMPER
AMMONIA

•
DOSING
DELIVERY LIME STRAINER

RELIEF VALVE

FIG. 10.26 Feedwater chemical dosing system

7.5 Frost protection 8 Coal, ash and dust plant

Trace heating and immersion heaters are provided,
as necessary, to protect the plant against frost. A de-
tahed description is given in Section 5.1.7 of this
chapter.
7.6 Electrically-operated valve actuators
Motorised valves have actuators equipped with inte­
gral control gear. To facihtate maintenance and replace­
ment, each actuator is equipped with flexible control
and power cables fitted with connectors which couple
with a disconnection box. Fixed cabling is glanded
and terminated in the disconnection box in the normal
manner.
8.1 Coal handling plant
8.1.1 G e n e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n of p l a n t
Coal is delivered to a power station ehher by sea,
canal, road or rail: rail is the most c o m m o n in view
of the large and regular deliveries of coal required
by large modern power stations, especially since most
large coal-fired power stations are located inland.
O n those stations supplied by water, three methods
are used to unload coal from ships or barges:
• Various designs of continuous-unloaders which re­
move the coal from the barges or ships and feed it
directly onto a twin conveyor system.

842
 C o a l , ash and dust plant

Ί Γ

AMMONIA/
/ HYDRAZINE
9911 UNIT
IHYDRAZINE'
im
UNIT
HYDRAZINE
DILUTION
I
ι CATION DILUTION TANK
TANK
!

mi
* 4 π
D

^χι-^^
¿ ¿ * *

AMMONIA/HYDRAZINE
DOSING DELIVERY
HYDRAZINE
DOSING
DELIVERY

FIG. 10.26 (cont'd) Feedwater chemical dosing system

• Barge-unloaders which hoist and tip the barges one
at a time to discharge their loads of u p to 200 t
of coal into hoppers, from where it is fed by paddle
feeders onto a twin conveyor system.
• Travelhng/grabbing cranes which load the coal into
hoppers, from where it is fed by paddle feeder o n t o
a twin conveyor system.
More commonly, coal is delivered by trains working
at the power station on a merry-go-round system in
which the trains remain coupled and move contin-
uously at a speed in the order of 0.8 k m / h during the
unloading sequence. The wagons, which are of the
hopper-bottom type, pass through the unloading area
where they discharge their loads into underground hop-
pers and are automatically weighed 'full' and 'empty'
to establish the a m o u n t of coal dehvered. A minimum
of two conveyor systems, each of which can be op-
erated independently, are fed by twin-paddle feeders
from the associated wagon unloading hopper. A typical
rail unloading plant is illustrated in Fig 10.27.
F r o m the wagon unloading hoppers, the coal is
transported by a system of electrically-powered con-
veyors and flap (diverter) valves, either directly t o the
boiler bunkers or to the coal store. Metal detectors
and magnetic separators divert t r a m p iron and metalhc
objects from the coal stream. Trash screens remove
non-metallic objects and one or two stages of vibrating
screens and crushers ensure that the coal is reduced to
a size and consistency which is suhable for the mihs to

843
Mechanical plant electrical services C h a p t e r 10

P R I M A R Y DOOR CLOSING
MACHINES

HOPPER E X I T
EQUIPMENT CUBICLE

CONVEYOR
DRIVE U N I T

DOOR L O C K I N G
HOPPER MACHINES
ENTRANCE

C H U T E INSPECTION DOOR S E C O N D A R Y DOOR

CLOSING M A C H I N E S
\
F L A P VALVE HAND WINCH

SPARE P A D D L E FEEDER
F L A P VALVE
IN M A I N T E N A N C E BAY
HAND OPERATING
GEAR TAIL DRUM

DOOR O P E N I N G M A C H I N E S
(6 E A C H T R A C K )

DUST E X T R A C T I O N CARRIAGE

P A D D L E FEEDER

DOOR OPENING C A M RAIL

BELT SEALED TRUNKING

TWIN CYCLONES- HOPPER GRIDS

DUST E X T R A C T I O N

TRANSFER
CHUTES

CONVEYORS
T O J U N C T I O N HOUSE

FIG. 1 0 . 2 7 Coal handling plant — rail unloading plant layout

handle. Belt weighers are provided to determine the
weight of coal being delivered to store, reclaimed from
store, and delivered to the bunkers. Coal fed onto the
bunker feeder system is automatically sampled. The
conveyor system incorporates junction houses in which
plant is located. A typical junction house is shown in
Fig 10.28.
At most stations coal is delivered to or reclaimed
from store by travelling stacker/reclaimer bucket-wheel
machines. These machines are b o o m conveyor systems
which stack or reclaim coal whilst travelling the length
of the store on rails.
Dust suppression or extraction systems are pro­
vided at strategic locations, such as wagon unloading
hoppers, bunker tops, crusher buildings and junction
houses, where the concentration of airborne coal dust
might otherwise constitute a hazard.
Figure 10.29 shows the coal plant conveyor system
at a large power station.
8.1.2 Electrical supplies
Most loads for flap valves, conveyors, vibrating feeders,
crushers, paddle feeders, magnetic separators, fans and
trash screens generally are supplied at 415 V three-phase
50 Hz from the 415 V Coal Plant Switchboard, although
3.3 kV supphes may be used when the duty demands.
Stacker/reclaimer machines are supphed at 3.3 kV.
Electrical distribution is designed to safeguard the
independent operational requirements of the duplicated
coal plant facilities and to ensure that an electrical fault
will not result in the total loss of coal supplies to the
boilers.
A typical distribution diagram is shown in Fig 10.30.
8.1.3 Electrical control
A control desk and mimic panel in the Coal Plant
Control R o o m forms the central control facility for
the coal plant. M a n u a l / a u t o m a t i c control facilities and
plant status indicators are provided. Control of the
stacker/reclaimer machines is from the machines, only
status indications being provided in the control r o o m .
Wagon unloading and lineside signalling control is from
either the control r o o m or the wagon unloading house,
supervision of this and other important aspects, such
as the coal stores, being assisted by television monitors
and cameras (Fig 10.29).
Sequential control of conveyors and paddle feeders
is provided for start-up and shutdown. This is essential
to avoid coal spillage which might otherwise occur
due to the differing rates of acceleration and decelera­
tion of the conveyors attributable to the wide variation
in their lengths and hfts.
8.1.4 Conveyors
Conveyors are driven by 3.3 kV or 415 V three-phase
50 Hz squirrel-cage induction motors through fluid

844
 C o a l , ash a n d dust plant

JUNCTION HOUSE

PRIMARY DRIVE

CONVEYORS 10A \

- A C C E S S FLOOR
SECONDARY DRIVE

TRANSFER
CHUTES

TAIL PULLEY
CONVEYORS

GRAVITY
TENSION
PULLEY

GUIDE RAILS

FIG. 1 0 . 2 8 Coal handling plant — junction house layout

couplings to protect the conveyors during start-up. length of the conveyor alongside the access way.
The motors are totally-enclosed, fan cooled, w h h a Switches are located at intervals along the trip wire.
degree of protection of I P 5 5 . Each conveyor is equipped The trip wire m a y be a wire rope arranged t o operate
with an emergency trip-wire system running the full trip switches directly, or a cable designed to trip relays

845
Mechanical plant electrical services C h a p t e r 10

TRANSFER TOWER 3

JUNCTION HOUSE 7

RECLAIM FEEDER 1

C • CAMERA

STORE SOUTH

FIG. 1 0 . 2 9 Coal handling plant — conveyor system

846
 C o a l , ash a n d dust plant

lV3-3kV ll/3-3kV
COAL PLANT COAL PLANT
AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER λ' AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER bT

SWITCH BOARD Ä' SWITCH B O A R D *B'

3 3kV
COAL PLANT
AUXILIARIES
BOARD

7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
STACKER/ V . STACKER/
RECLAIMER RECLAIMER
MACHINE 1 CONVEYORS Á' CONVEYORS B' MACHINE 2

3-3/0-415V 3-3/0-415kV
COAL PLANT COAL PLANT
AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER A AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER B'

SWITCH BOARD Ä' SWITCH BOARD'B'

7 7 7 7 7 7/7
V V
CONVEYORS CONVEYORS
AND
AND
MISCELLANEOUS PLANT
MISCELLANEOUS PLANT
Ä' SIDE
B'SIDE

FIG. 1 0 . 3 0 Coal handling plant — power distribution diagram

upon deflection. The trip switches are connected direct­
ly into the conveyor drive m o t o r contactor control
circuit to cause the conveyor to stop when initiated.
Each conveyor is fitted w h h a speed detector. Belt-
driven speed detectors are prone to slip when dusty or
wet and have been dropped in favour of electronic
pulse or simhar types. The conveyor is tripped if the
conveyor belt shps or breaks.
8.1.5 Stacker/reclaimer machine
The stacker/reclaimer machine is supplied by a reeling-
d r u m trailing-cable system. These cables carry the power,
control and communication supplies necessary for hs
operation. The machine may be operated by electric
motors or electrohydrauhc devices.
The 3.3 kV three-phase 50 Hz power supply is
stepped down to 415 V by a transformer located on
the machine. Supphes for bucket wheel, b o o m con­
veyor, travel and b o o m control drive motors are taken
from a m o t o r control panel specially designed w h h
IP54 protection to prevent coal dust ingress. Drive
motors are 415 V three-phase 50 H z totally-enclosed,

847
Mechanical plant electrical services
fan cooled squirrel-cage induction motors with pro­
tection to IP55.
An operator's cabin is located to give a clear view
for operational purposes. All control equipment is
of dust-tight construction having IP54 protection. A
complete set of controls for both manual and semi­
automatic operation is provided. Driver supervision is
required at all times to supervise stacking and reclaim­
ing operations and to safeguard the machine.
Controls are provided for travel, luff and slew mo­
tions, and for other service requirements, such as audi­
ble alarms, machine access lighting and floodlighting.
Deadman-type controls are provided for travel, luff
and slew motions, these controls automatically return­
ing to the off position when released by the operator.
To safeguard personnel, b o o m and elevator con­
veyors are equipped with trip-wire systems. Emergency-
stop pushbuttons are located on access platforms, in
the operator's cabin and in the electrical equipment
enclosure. An emergency trip causes all machine drives
to be de-energised.
8.2 Ash and dust handling plant
8.2.1 G e n e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n of d u s t h a n d l i n g p l a n t
Dust is collected in hoppers below the precipitators and
boiler economisers (Fig 10.31). Air-jet blowers transfer
the dust from the precipitator dust collection hoppers
to the precipitator surge hopper, and from the eco-
nomiser dust collection hoppers to the boiler-grh surge
hopper. A boiler-grh p u m p transfers grh from the
boiler-grit surge hopper to the precipitator surge hop­
per. From there, dust is pumped into a c o m m o n storage
bunker. Aeration fans ensure that dust in the surge
hoppers and in the storage bunker is maintained in a
fluid state. From the storage bunker, dust is trans­
ferred by rotary feeders onto a system of conveyors,
which feed h to the disposal area.
The dust-handling plant for a large modern power
station is outlined in Fig 10.32.
8.2.2 G e n e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n of ash h a n d l i n g p l a n t
The design of the ash handhng plant is dependent upon
the method of ash disposal. It may be pumped into
a disused quarry or transported from the power station
for processing into buhding materials. A typical system,
outhned below, includes both facilities.
Ash from the boiler is collected in a hopper directly
below the furnace, whence it is removed by high pres­
sure water jets and discharged, via sluiceways, into ash
crushers. The crushed ash fahs into ash tanks, and is
then projected by wat er-jet pumps supplied by H P
sluice pumps through discharge pipelines to ash pits,
where h is allowed to settle. After settlement and
drainage, the ash is removed by grabbing crane for
disposal by road vehicles or by conveyor to a disposal
ph.
848
Chapter 10
The motive water is p u m p e d from the ash pits to
settling lagoons. After settlement, it is recirculated by
return water p u m p s , via the ash water reservoir, to
the H P sluice p u m p s .
The system for a large modern power station is
illustrated in Fig 10.33.
8.2.3 Electrical s u p p l i e s
The supply requirements of the ash and dust handling
plant are met by an integrated distribution system,
comprising 3.3 kV and 415 V three-phase 50 Hz switch­
boards, diversely supplied and interconnected to en­
sure maximum system availabihty and to minimise
disruption due to supply fauhs. The 3.3 kV switch­
board feeds the H P sluice pumps and the transformer
feeders to the 415 V switchboard. Other requirements,
such as movable ash hoppers, trace heating, ash-grab­
bing crane, conveyor drives, ash crushers, dust condi­
tioners, rotary feeders and aeration fans are supphed
from the 415 V b o a r d .
8.2.4 Electrical c o n t r o l
With the exception of the ash-grabbing crane and
mobile dust hoppers, the ash and dust plant is con­
trolled from a mimic control panel, normally sharing a
control room with the coal plant. Local control facilities
are provided on the major items of plant to satisfy
safety and maintenance requirements.
A sequence control and interlock system is provided
to ensure correct start-up and shutdown. This system
covers airheater, economiser and precipitator hopper
jet-blowers, grh and dust p u m p s , dust bunker aeration
fans, rotary feeders, dust conditioners, conveyors, and
other items of plant which must be operated in a
specific sequence to ensure the correct functioning of
the overall plant.
Direct control is provided of sluice p u m p s , gland-
sealing water and make-up p u m p s .
Instrumentation, discrepancy equipment and alarm
equipment is incorporated in the mimic control panel
to enable plant status to be monitored.
8.2.5 M o b i l e ash h o p p e r s
Ash is discharged from the ash phs via mobile ash
hoppers onto a conveyor system for disposal. Each
hopper is supphed at 415 V three-phase 50 Hz through
a reehng-drum type traihng-cable system. Motor con­
trol gear, protected to IP55 weatherproof, is provided
on the hopper for travel, traverse and conveyor func­
tions and for an anti-collision system. Drive motors are
415 V three-phase 50 H z totally-enclosed fan cooled
squirrel-cage induction m o t o r s .
8.2.6 Ash-grabbing crane
The ash-grabbing crane is generally as described in
Section 3 of this chapter, and is supplied at 415 V
 C o a l , ash a n d dust plant

Γ-0 O O O
rO Κ) On On
rO rO rO ΟΙ Ol Ol
0 0 O O
PRECIPITATOR DUST
COLLECTION HOPPERS

PRECIPITATOR
SURGE
HOPPER

I PRECIPITATOR
DUST PUMPS

O -o Γ-0

o -o
BOILER
GRIT
SURGE
HOPPER ECONOMISER DUST
COLLECTION HOPPERS

BOILER
I GRIT PUMP

o
BOILER UNIT 1

TARGET BOX

REVERSE AIR FANS REEK AIR FANS

AERATION FANS
" T O
AIR SLIDE FANS

ROTARY FEEDERS Φ Φ AIR SLIDE

CONVEYORS
® ®

WATER MAIN
PROBE AIR
FANS

!
DUST
CONDITIONERS
I CONDITIONERS I

uu DRY DUST COLLECTION

I I I BY ROAD VEHICLES

I DUST CHUTE
JUNCTION
\\ I CONVEYORS HOUSE

I
DUST CONDITIONER HOUSE
!

FIG. 1 0 . 3 1 Dust collection plant

849
Mechanical plant electrical services
WING CONVEYOR
FIG. 1 0 . 3 2 Dust handling plant
three-phase 50 Hz by a reehng-drum, traihng-cable
system.
8.2.7 Trace heating
The preciphator surge-hopper is equipped w h h trace
heating to prevent condensation within the hopper
during shutdown. If not prevented, heavy condensation
would sohdify the ash and cause blockages.
8.2.8 Local c o n t r o l p a n e l s
Local control panels and cable termination boxes are
provided of weatherproof, dust-tight construction to
IP55 or IP65, depending upon the severity of the
environment. Facilities are provided on local control
panels for full manual control of the plant item.
8.2.9 Conveyors
Conveyors are driven by 415 V three-phase 50 Hz
squirrel-cage induction motors through fluid couplings
850
C h a p t e r 10
EMERGENCY
JUNCTION HOUSE STOCKING OUT CONVEYOR
EMERGENCY
STOCKING OUT CONVEYOR
to protect conveyors during start-up. The motors are
totally-enclosed, fan cooled with protection to IP55.
Each conveyor is equipped with an emergency trip­
wire system running the full length of the conveyor
alongside the access way. Switches are located at inter­
vals along the trip wire. The trip wire may be a wire
rope, arranged to operate trip switches directly, or a
low voltage electric cable arranged to operate a trip
relay. In the latter system, a trip relay is energised
through the cables and the swhches between which
they are suspended. U p o n deflection of a cable, the
relay circuit is broken by the associated switches. Since
a cable fault or breakage wih also cause the trip relay
to operate, the system is self-monitoring.
The contacts of the trip switches or relays are con­
nected directly into conveyor drive-motor contactor
circuhs and cause the conveyors to stop when the trip
is operated.
Each conveyor is fitted with a speed detector. Belt-
driven speed detectors are prone to shp when dusty
or wet and have been dropped in favour of electronic

pulse or similar types. The conveyor is tripped if the
conveyor beh slips or breaks.
8.2.10 S u m p p u m p , grit p u m p a n d d u s t p u m p
controls
Sump pumps are controlled by sump content measure­
ment, the sump level being measured by uhrasonic
or echo-detection systems which utilise the reflective
characteristics of the surface of the water. P r o b e -
type level measurement systems are not used since the
build-up of deposhs on the probes due to the pre­
sence of ash and dust in the sumps can prove trouble­
some.
JUNCTION HOUSE
JUNCTION HOUSE
BELT WEIGHERS
JUNCTION HOUSE
DUST CONDITIONER HOUSE
FIG. 10.32 (cont'd)
Dust pumps and grit pumps are controlled by hopper
content measurement, load cells or level probe systems
being used for this purpose.
9 Electrostatic precipitators
9.1 General description of plant
A n electrostatic preciphator removes dust from flue
gases by charging the particles in an electrostatic field
set up between discharge and collecting electrodes
causing them to be separated from the gas stream. The
gases are drawn through large chambers containing
collecting electrodes in the form of large vertical flat
Electrostatic precipitators
plates, which channel the gases and attract the charged
dust particles. The accumulated dust is released from
the electrodes by intermittent mechanical rapping and
is collected in the dust hoppers below. The discharge
electrodes are shuated between the collecting elec­
trodes/plates, suspended from insulators. Dust tends
to accumulate on these electrodes in small quanti­
ties and this is also released by rapping, to maintain
efficiency.
Collecting electrodes along the length of the preci­
pitator are divided into a number of zones, typically
six, each of which is provided with its own high voltage
and rapping gear. For a typical power station having
500 or 660 M W u n h s , the total gas flow from a boiler
DUST BUNKER HOUSE
AIR SLIDE CONVEYORS
ROAD VEHICLES
FILLING SHUTES
Dust handling plant
is shared between three precipitators, known as 'flows',
each flow consisting of approximately sixty gas paths.
Figure 10.34 shows the general arrangement of a pre­
cipitator having six zones.
A D C vohage of between 20 kV and 30 kV, produced
by transformer/rectifier u n h s , is apphed between the
discharge electrodes and collector plates, the voltage
being controlled automatically at a level just less than
that which would cause flashover, to provide maximum
discharge current (termed corona discharge), and hence
m a x i m u m operating efficiency.
In order to maintain a free flow of dust, the dust
collecting hoppers are electrically-heated and thermally-
insulated to maintain a high dust temperature. Com­
pacting of the ash is prevented by electrically-driven
aeration fans feeding air into the dust hoppers.
851
Mechanical plant electrical services C h a p t e r 10

RAW WATE
R MAKE-U
P

ASH PIT WATE

R PUMP
S

SEAL WATE
R
TROUGH

ί Μ t t Μ t t t Μ Μ
<~ '^l'^ ^ 1 ^ ^ 1 ^ '^l^ -i'

\ \ \ \ \ \ \ -^Λ \ \ \ \
^ R ASH HOPPE
BOILE
R ^
SEAL ~ \j/ \l/ \ l / \j/ \l/ \ l / \ l / \ l / \U \ l / \ l / \ j / \ l / \ l / "z
TROUGH
OVERFLOW

ASH
EXTRACTIO
N
CHAMBER
S

J
ASH CRUSHE
R
GLAN
D SEALIN
G

HP SLUIC
E WATE
R

SLUIC
E WATE
R

GENERA
L SERVIC
E WATE
R

ASH/SLURR
Y OVERFLO
W AND DRAINAG
E SUM
P

FIG. 10.33 Ash handling plant

852
 Electrostatic precipitators

DISCHARGE ELECTRODES * DC SEALING END

RAPPING GEAR (HV CABLE CONNECTION)

DISCHARGE ELECTRODE
SUPPORT FRAME

COLLECTING
, ELECTRODES
(PLATES)

* T O P GRID PORTABLE
* UPPER SIDE ACCESS " EARTHING ACCESS
TO PLATE RAPPING GEAR

PLATE RAPPING
RAPPING DRIVE . GEAR

GAS κ
FLOW

• LOWER SIDE ACCESS

TO PLATE RAPPING GIRDER

* BOTTOM GRID AND

PORTABLE EARTHING ACCESS

HIGH LEVEL PROBE .

LOW LEVEL PROBE -

HV CONTROL HOUSE

Η
Γ

NOTE: * DENOTES MECHANICAL KEY-INTERLOCKED ITEMS

FIG. 10.34 Precipitator general arrangement

9.2 Electrical supplies supphed from 415 V three-phase 50 H z switchboards,

separate boards being provided for each precipkator
flow. They feed high voltage control cubicles located
9.2.1 415 V s w i t c h b o a r d s
with the switchgear in the Precipkator Control House.
The electrical requirements of the precipitators are Other feeds go t o the collector-plate rapper motors,

853
Mechanical plant electrical services C h a p t e r 10

discharge-electrode rapper motors, dust-hopper heaters
and aeration fans, control house ventilation fans and
hopper level equipment. Figure 10.35 shows a typical
control house distribution equipment system.
9.2.2 High voltage control cubicles
Each high voltage control cubicle accommodates the
automatic control equipment, power thyristors and
power distribution equipment associated with one zone
of the precipitator gas flow.
Controls and indicators for the precipitators are
provided in the Preciphator Control House and the
Central Control R o o m , control normally being carried
out from the latter. Automatic and manual control
fachities are available.
Particular attention is paid to the design of the power
thyristor and diode equipment to ensure high reliability
and long service life, having regard for the inability
of semi-conducting devices t o withstand deviations
outside their specified operating conditions. Overload
and short-circuit protection are provided by high speed
semiconductor fuses. Surge suppression circuits are
incorporated to protect thyristors and diodes against
supply voltage transients which may occur in service.
Thyristors and diodes are conservatively rated in re­
spect of their current carrying ability, junction operat­
ing temperature a n d heat-sink performance at the
maximum air temperature likely t o occur inside the
equipment cubicle during operation.
Automatic voltage control is provided by thyris­
tors. T h e electrode voltage is continually monitored
and varied by the thyristor control circuits, using
wave-chopping techniques t o maintain the highest per­
missible precipitator operating voltage a n d operating
efficiency. Typically, the high vohage must be about
20 kV for corona discharge t o occur. R a n d o m arc­
ing may occur at about 32 kV so the automatic volt­
age control must maintain the voltage just below this
level. T w o basic systems of monitoring a n d control­
ling the electrode voltage are in use. In the first system
electrode voltage, electrode current and A C supply
vohage are monitored and compared. When arcing
occurs the electrode vohage falls whilst the electrode
current and A C supply vohage increase. This situa­
tion is recognised by the comparator a n d , by control
of thyristors in the A C supply, the electrode voh­
age is reduced t o the optimum level at which arcing
ceases.
In the second system, the arcing rate is monitored
and the electrode voltage varied by control of thyristors
in the A C supply t o maintain the r a n d o m arcing rate
within acceptable hmits commensurate with maximum
operating efficiency of the precipitator.

1200A M A I N
M A I N SUPPLY
OFF L O A D
415V 3 PHASE ISOLATOR
50Hz
INSULATOR HEATING
80A THERMOSTAT INSULATOR HEATER
DISTRIBUTION
FUSED (1 of 24)
FUSEBOARD
SWITCHES

30A DISCHARGE RAPPER

19.5kVA
FUSED TROL M O T O R S (6)
SWITCHES C O L L E C T I N G RAPPE
M O T O R S (12)

415V 3 PHASE
AND NEUTRAL
HIGH VOLTAGE
CONTROL CUBICLE
Η TRANSFORMER/
RECTIFIER UNIT
l ¿ V ^ E A R T H I N G SW^^TCH
DISCHARGE
ELECTRODES

HIGH VOLTAGE
CONTROL CUBICLE
Η TRANSFORMER/
RECTIFIER UNIT
-EARTHING SWITCH
DISCHARGE
ELECTRODES

lOOOA
HIGH VOLTAGE
CONTROL CUBICLE
Η TRANSFORMER/
RECTIFIER UNIT
EARTHING SWITCH
ZONE 3 DISCHARGE
ELECTRODES

Η
FUSED
SWITCHES TRANSFORMER/ ZONE 4 DISCHARGE
HIGH VOLTAGE
CONTROL CUBICLE RECTIFIER UNIT ELECTRODES
^ lo^^EARTH
EARTHING SWITCH

HIGH VOLTAGE
CONTROL CUBICLE
Η TRANSFORMER/
RECTIFIER UNIT
Í 1(>D^EARTH ING SWITCH
DISCHARGE
ELECTRODES

Η
ZONE 6
HIGH VOLTAGE TRANSFORMER/ DISCHARGE
CONTROL CUBICLE RECTIFIER UNIT ELECTRODES
EARTHING SWITCH

Η
30A
HOPPER H E A T I N G 240/110V THERMOSTAT
FUSED HOPPER HEATER
CONTROL TRANSFORMER (1 OF 3)
SWITCHES
(1 OF 3)
15A
FUSED VENT F A N 1
SWITCHES
15A
FUSED VENT F A N 2
240V SINGLE SWITCHES
PHASE \. HOPPER H I G H
6A HOPPER LEVEL PROBE CONTROLLER LEVEL PROBE
FUSED DISTRIBUTION (1 OF 9) HOPPER LOW
SWITCHES FUSEBOARD LEVEL PROBE

FIG. 1 0 . 3 5 Precipitator control house electrical distribution diagram

854

9.2.3 Transformer/rectifier equipment
The transformer/rectifier equipment is supphed from
two phases of a 415 V three-phase 50 Hz supply. T o
simphfy high voltage connections, the equipment is
normahy located on the top of the precipitator. In
this location, oh-filled O N A N (oil insulation, natural
circulation, air cooled, natural ventilation) equipment
is not used, the L N A N (synthetic hquid insulation,
natural circulation, air cooled, natural ventilation) type
being employed to minimise maintenance: in parti­
cular, this avoids the regular insulating-oh treatment
necessary w h h mineral-oil insulated (ONAN) trans­
formers and the dangers associated with oil spillage.
O N A N equipment is only allowed if located at ground
level. Transformers comply w h h BEBST2 [20] and
BS171 [19]. Coolant-hquid-immersed rectifiers are sohd
state to BS4417 [26].
9.2.4 High voltage chamber enclosures
Separate housings are provided for each precipitator
zone as shown on Fig 10.34. Located on the t o p of the
precipitator, they provide protection for the exposed
HV connections and allow access for maintenance.
Access is controlled by the maintenance interlocking
system described in Section 9.3 of this chapter.
9.2.5 High voltage insulators
High voltage insulators are mounted out of the gas
stream and inside the HV enclosure for ease of main­
tenance. Each insulator is fitted w h h a thermosta­
tically-controlled heater to prevent condensation.
9.3 Maintenance interlocking and locking
Maintenance interlocking is provided for each flow to
ensure the correct sequence of operation of the LV
transformer/rectifier supply cubicle isolating devices,
HV chamber earthing switch and H V enclosure access
doors associated with each zone, so that safety of
personnel is assured.
Coded-key interlocks and exchange boxes form the
basis of the interlock scheme. The scheme ensures t h a t
all zones of a flow are electricahy isolated and me­
chanically shut-off by closing inlet and outlet dampers
before access to the flow can be gained. Figure 10.36
shows a typical maintenance interlocking scheme.
The interlocking scheme shown in Fig 10.36 ahows
half-zones to be isolated and earthed individually if
a fauh occurs, and the remainder to be operated nor­
mally. However, all zones must be isolated and earthed
before keys are released from the exchange box to
afford access into the flow. Simharly, all access points
must be closed and secured, and the keys thus released
inserted into the exchange box before H V supplies can
be reconnected.
In addition to the interlocks, access ways which allow
entry to the flow or H V enclosure are provided with
Fuel oil plant
an independent system of locking. Isolating and H V
earthing switches are provided with an additional means
of locking in the isolated or earthed positions. This
ensures the correct control of access by personnel.
9.4 Earthing
In addition to the normal earthing requirements, pre­
cipitators are provided with the following special earth­
ing facilities to ensure the safety of personnel. H V
connections are provided with isolating and earthing
switches which are operable from outside the H V en­
closure. They ensure that all sections of the H V system
are earthed. Operation of these switches is subject to
the maintenance interlocking scheme described in the
previous Section 9.3.
In addition to H V supply earthing, provision is
m a d e for the connection of portable earths to the
H V grids prior to personnel gaining access to a flow.
The arrangement of portable earthing leads prevents
the closure of access points when the earths are con­
nected. This safeguards against restoration of the
H V supplies when earthing facilities are being used.
9.5 Interference suppression
H V rectifiers, connections, swhches and leads are
screened to prevent radio and television interference.
10 Fuel oil plant
10.1 General description of plant
Fuel oil is required:
• For main boiler start-up a n d , in some instances, for
oil overburn to meet load requirements at coal-
fired power stations.
• For main boiler firing at oil-fired power stations.
• For on-load firing of auxhiary bohers.
For all these systems, fuel oil is unloaded or fed into
storage tanks which form the supply point for the oh
feed system to the burners. Electrically-driven pumps
are used to feed oil into the storage tanks, to transfer
011 between tanks and to supply oil from the storage
tanks to the burners.
Since the o h is of high viscosity, h s temperature
must be raised to render it suitable for pumping and
combustion. Storage t a n k s and oil pipes are heated
continuously by steam, electrical trace heating or im­
mersion heaters. O n steam heated systems, electrically-
driven p u m p s are used to transfer the condensate.
When oil is delivered by rail or road tanker, it is
not possible to drain the tanks completely using the
main unloading p u m p s . Residual oU is gravity fed into
an oil drain t a n k from where it is transferred to the
main storage tanks using electricahy-driven p u m p s .
855
Mechanical plant electrical services C h a p t e r 10

ZONE

2 3 4 5 6 ^

4A13 4A23 4A33 4A43 4A53 4A63 INSULATOR ENCLOSURE DOOR

© © © © © ©
4A14 AMA 4A34 4A44 4A54 4A64 ROOF ACCESS
(TOP GRID)
© © © © ©
4A15 4A25 4A35 4A45 4A55 4A65 PORTABLE EARTHING ACCESS
(TOP GRID)
© © © © ©
4A16 4A26 4A36 4A46 4A56 4A66 UPPER SIDE ACCESS
© © © © © © (PLATE RAPPING GEAR)

4A17 4A27 4A37 4A47 4A57 4A67 LOWER SIDE ACCESS

© © © © © © (PLATE RAPPING GEAR)

4A18 4A38 4A58 HOPPER SIDE ACCESS

© © © (BOTTOM GRID AND
PORTABLE EARTHING)

FLOW 4A SECONDARY KEY EXCHANGE BOX

4A

FLOW 4A PRIMARY KEY EXCHANGE BOX

rro ζτπ

4A12- 4A12- 4A22- 4A22- 4A32- 4A32- 4A42- 4A42- 4A52- 4A52- 4A62- 4A62-

H.V. H.V. H.V. H.V. H.V. H.V.

SUPPLIES SUPPLIES SUPPLIES SUPPLIES SUPPLIES SUPPLIES
TO HALF TO HALF TO HALF TO HALF TO HALF TO HALF
ZONES ZONES ZONES ZONES ZONES ZONES
4A1 4A2 4A3 4A4 4A5 4A6

Fl R HALF ZONE
EARTH SWITCHES

W'ri ? i i
H.V. H.V. HV. 0 HV. 0
i H.V
DOUBLE KEY INTERLOCKS
(BOTH KEYS WITH SAME
HV. NUMBER) ON TRANSFORMER
D.C. EARTHING SWITCHES
DC DC D.C. DC. D.C. ? i

4A11 4A1 4A21

4
4A2 4A31
A.
4A3 4A41 4A4 4A51 4A5 4A61 4A6
TRANSFORMER-RECTIFIER
SET

4A10 . 4A20 ,4A30 . 4A40 .4A50 4A60

CONTROL CUBICLES FOR

4A1 4A2 4A3 4A4 4A5 4A6 TRANSFORMER-RECTIFIER
SETS

•4A10 •^4A20 •^4A30 %A40 •^ASO '^4A60

NOTES
1 NUMBERING OF LOCKS AND KEYS IS SHOWN FOR PRECIPITATOR
CASING 4A FOR OTHER CASINGS BOILER NUMBER AND LETTER
WILL CHANGE ACCORDINGLY

2 POSITION OF KEYS DURING NORMAL SERVICE (PLANT ENERGISED)

IS SHOWN BY THE SYMBOLS

# KEY TRAPPED IN EARTHING SWITCH OR DOOR LOCK

@ KEY TRAPPED IN EXCHANGE BOX

LOCK DESIGNATION
4 KEY 12-FITS LOCKS 12- AND 12
KEY 12 FITS LOCK 12 ONLY
ZONE NUMBER

PRECIPITATOR
LETTER

BOILER NUMBER
TYPICAL KEY AND LOCK
IDENTIFICATION

FIG. 1 0 . 3 6 Precipitator maintenance interlocking system

856

Figure 10.37 shows the fuel oh system at a 2000 M W ,
power station designed to handle fuel oils delivered
by ship and varying in viscosity from 24 χ 1 0 " ^ t o
1.5 X 10~^ m ^ / s (24-1500 centistokes) at minimum
storage temperature. Electrical trace heating is provided
on the supply pipework and operates continuously when
all but the hghtest (distiUate) oils are being p u m p e d .
Steam is used in the fuel-oil heaters to raise the oil
temperature to that required for combustion, 140°C
for heavy oh and 43°C for distillate oil. U n b u r n t hot
oh from the burners is recirculated back to the storage
tank.
The choice of electrical or steam heating depends
on the availability of steam and the economics of in­
stalhng and operating the heating system. Electrical
trace heating is ideal for oh pipehnes since the heat
needed to maintain the oil in a fluid condition is
relatively small. Because of the large quantity of oil in
storage tanks, steam or electric heating is viable and
the availability of steam at the storage tank location is
a major consideration. Fuel oh heaters require a large
heat input and steam heating, when it is readily avail­
able at that location, is preferred.
10.2 Pumps
The design of the system and the number and rating
of the pumps ensures maximum availabüity of oil
MAIN JETTY
LOADING ARMS
FIG. 10.37 Fuel oil system
Fuel oil plant
supplies and allows for the routine maintenance of
pumps.
P u m p drives are 415 V three-phase 50 H z squirrel-
cage induction m o t o r s , totally-enclosed, fan cooled
and arranged for direct-on-hne starting, using contac­
tors. A minimum degree of protection of IP54 is pro­
vided, except for o u t d o o r use when IP55 weatherproof
is n o r m a l .
10.3 Oil heating
10.3.1 Tank heating — electrical
Immersion heaters are supphed at 240 V from a 415 V
three-phase and neutral supply, their position in the
storage tanks being below the burner feed p u m p take­
off level to ensure that they remain immersed in oil
at all times. The heaters are controlled by two thermo­
stats connected in series with each other: one thermostat
functions normally t o control the heater supply con­
tactor, the other is a safety device to trip the contactor
when the oil temperature rises above the normal hmit.
T o ensure that operation of the safety device is re­
cognised, it has t o be manually reset.
10.3.2 Tank heating — steam
Steam flow to heating coils is regulated by thermo­
statically controhed steam valves, the arrangement of
IMPORT/EXPORT OIL
MAIN FUEL OIL
RECIRCULATING OIL
857
Mechanical plant electrical services
the thermostats being as described in the previous
Section 10.3.1.
10.3.3 Pipe h e a t i n g — electrical
Pipe heating is achieved by trace heating apphed di­
rectly to the surface of the pipe or embedded in the
thermal insulation. Directly applied systems can be
supplied at 240 V 50 Hz, since they are protected against
accidental damage by the thermal insulation. For safe­
ty, embedded cables are supplied at 110 V 50 Hz by a
transformer which has its 110 V winding centre-tapped
to earth. Temperature control is by thermostats equip­
ped with contacts which operate to raise an alarm when
the control temperature band is exceeded.
10.4 Storage tank instrumentation
Storage tanks are equipped with two high-level and
two low-level proximity switches. The first high-level
switch trips the fihing p u m p , closes the inlet valve and
initiates a remote alarm; the second initiates an extra-
high level alarm if the oil level rises substantially above
the first switch. The first low-level switch initiates a
remote alarm; the second initiates an extra-low level
alarm and trips the oil heating supplies if the oil level
falls substantially below that detected by the first
switch. This maintains the oil level above the top of
the outlet pipe.
Local and remote oil level and temperature indica­
tions are provided.
10.5 Valve actuators
A C motorised valves equipped with integral contactor
gear are used in oil pipelines. Actuator motors are either
totally-enclosed (TE) or totally-enclosed fan cooled
(TEFC), squirrel-cage induction motors of weather­
proof construction (IPW to BS4999) [2], suhable for
operation on a nominal 415 V three-phase 50 Hz supply.
Thermal protection is built into the motor winding in
accordance whh BS4999, part 72 [2]. The motors have
high torque and low inertia, and are designed for con­
tinuous operation without injurious heating for one
complete travel of the actuator or 5 minutes, whichever
is the shorter, when the supply voltage is reduced to
7 5 % nominal at 50Hz. This ensures high rehabihty in
service throughout their design hfe of 30 years.
The actuators have a degree of protection to IP65
of BS5490 [3] and are capable of operation in steam
and dust laden atmospheres within the ambient con­
ditions defined in BS5967 Part 1 [27] — operating
conditions for industrial process measurement and
control equipment — Class DI (5 to 100% relative
humidity, - 2 5 ° + 70°C).
Housed in each actuator enclosure are a 415 V three-
phase 50 Hz reversing-type contactor, loss of supply-
single phasing protection, a 415 V/110 V transformer
providing 110 V A C control supplies, valve o p e n / c l o s e /
858
C h a p t e r 10
stop controls, a remote/local control selection switch
and o p e n / c l o s e / s t o p relays for remote control. Power
and control connections are carried in flexible cables
from the actuator to a local termination box. Plug
and socket connections into the termination box faci­
litate the maintenance or replacement of the actuator
without disturbing the fixed, armoured cable connec­
tions into the termination box.
Each actuator is equipped with a valve position
indicator, a potentiometer for remote position indica­
tion and valve open/close hmit switches for remote
control and indication purposes.
10.6 Lightning protection
A lightning protection scheme is provided for the oil
storage tanks by conductors connecting the tank to
earth electrodes.
11 Air confipressors
11.1 General description of plant
Compressed air at various pressures and flow rates is
produced by compressors, normally electrically-driven,
to satisfy the requirements of control and instrumenta­
tion, dust plant jet-blowers and dust pumps, boiler soot-
blowing, automatic boiler control, boiler blowdown,
turbine forced cooling, breathing apparatus and reactor
purging as appropriate to the type of power station.
The main building complex of a power station is
served by two primary compressed air systems —
'general services air' and 'control and instrument air'.
Figures 10.38 and 10.39 show typical control and
instrumentation and general service compressed air
systems for a power station. The 'general services'
system is designed for a flow rate of 0 . 4 - 1 . 0 m ^ / s at
pressure of 7.2 bar, the 'control and instrument air'
system for 0.2 m ^ / s at 8.5 bar. Certain plants remote
from the main complex, such as those producing
hydrogen and sodium hypochlorite, are provided whh
independent air compressor plant.
Control and instrumentation air system requirements
are most stringent in respect of the quahty of the
compressed air produced and its integrity. A typical
system consists of two or three 100% duty electrically-
driven air compressors, each complete with air coolers
and oil/water separators, feeding two independent air
receivers and air dryer systems via a manifold.
A typical general services air system consists of two
5 0 % duty electrically-driven air compressors, each com­
plete with air coolers and oil/water separators, supply­
ing a c o m m o n air receiver.
11.2 Air compressor drive motors
The drives are usually squirrel-cage induction m o t o r s ,
suitable for direct-on-hne starting on 11 kV, 3.3 kV
 Air compressors

M M MAI
N AIR

CONTRO
L AIR

COOLIN
G WATE
R

FIG. 1 0 . 3 8 Control and instrumentation compressed air system

or 415 V three-phase 50 Hz supplies, of totally-enclosed proximately 3.5 k W , at 240 V single-phase 50 Hz.

fan cooled construction, as described in Section 2.2
of this chapter. They drive the compressors through
either V-belts or flexible couplings and gearboxes. The
V-belts and flexible couplings protect the motor from
shock loading and vibration.
Heaters are equipped with dual thermostats, one for
normal temperature control and the other acting as a
safety device in the event of failure of the control
system. The latter is manually reset and initiates remote
and local alarms to warn of failure.

11.3 Heaters 11.4 Automatic and safety controls

Heaters in compressed air driers and compressor oil The compressed air systems are designed to operate
sumps are either connected in balanced three-phase automatically, all operating conditions, such as air pres­
banks and supplied through electrically-held contactors sures and temperatures, being continuously monitored.
at 415 V three-phase 50 Hz or, for ratings u p to ap- Plant start-up, shutdown and duty selection are per-

859
Mechanical plant electrical services Chapter 10

SIGNAL LINE FROM OTHER

RECEIVERS

MAIN AIR

CONTROL AIR

COOLING WATER

FIG. 10.39 General service compressed air system

860
 Heating and ventilating plant

formed in the central control r o o m and plant failure
alarms are displayed there. Control panels shuated
local to the compressors house all the alarms, indica­
tions and controls necessary for the maintenance and
local control of the plant.
When steam is available, it may be used as the heat
source for the system, otherwise electrical heating is
employed. The principal electrical requirements are
outhned in the fohowing sections.

12.2 Control gear

12 Heating and ventilating plant The heating and ventilation system is supplied from a
415 V three-phase 50 H z m o t o r control centre. The
12.1 General description of plant switchboard and control panels are located adjacent
to the heating and ventilation equipment, and accom­
Heating and ventilation in a power station is provided m o d a t e the controls and instrumentation necessary for
for the fohowing reasons: the automatic operation and maintenance of the sys­
• T o protect equipment r o o m s , such as telephone ex­ tem. Essential controls and alarms are provided in the
changes, during operation by creating a positive central control r o o m .
pressure in the r o o m to prevent the ingress of
airborne dirt.
12.3 Classification of electrical equipment
• To ventilate equipment r o o m s , such as switchrooms,
and to maintain the air and equipment temperatures Electrical equipment is specified to ehher Categories 1
within acceptable hmits. or 2 of C E G B specification U S / 1 2 / 5 0 [28] to suh the
application.
• T o ventilate equipment rooms where emissions dur­
Category 1 is defined as equipment, malfunction
ing normal plant operation would create a hazard
or failure of which could be the primary cause of
if ahowed to collect, e.g., battery r o o m s .
unwanted tripping or closing or the immediate loss of
• T o maintain a stable environment for sensitive equip­ availabihty of primary equipment. Category 2 equip­
ment such as computers. ment is that which could have a direct or immediate
effect on the operational availabihty of primary plant,
• T o ensure an acceptable working environment for
if another a b n o r m a h t y exists or arises before the defect
personnel in offices, control r o o m s , etc.
is remedied, or could cause operational inconvenience.
• T o protect personnel from the effects of the acci­ The m o r e stringent requirement of Category 1 is
dental release of hazardous substances into the air specified in areas where loss of heating and ventila­
during plant operation. tion is not acceptable; namely computer rooms or, in
• T o provide a hot water supply. nuclear stations, locations where either, (a), heating
and ventilating equipment fulfils a function essential
• To remove smoke in the event of a fire. to the safety of personnel or t o the reactor in the
event of an incident, or (b), the failure of a fan or
Heating and ventilation systems are designed to suit the its standby could result in the loss of differential
specific requirements of each power station. All use a pressure which exists for the purpose of containing
combination of air-conditioning units, fihers, coohng airborne contamination or the maintenance of clean
air and extraction fans, water-chiller units, air dampers, conditions.
motorised valves and water heaters. Elsewhere Category 2 equipment is specified.
The design requirements for heating and ventilation
in a typical power station are as fohows:
12.4 Drive motors
In general, drives for fans, p u m p s , compressors and
Area Temperature, °C Relative Air changes damper/valve actuators are 415 V three-phase 50 Hz
max min humidity, per hour
squirrel-cage induction m o t o r s , suhable for direct-on­
line starting. All motors are totally-enclosed and have
Control room 22 18 45--55 3
a minimum degree of protection of IP54. Those situated
Computer rooms 22 18 45--55 27
outdoors and exposed to the weather or situated in
Equipment rooms 22 18 45--55 12 areas protected by waterspray fire protection, have a
Cable marshalling rooms - 10 2 degree of protection of IP55 weatherproof.
Conference rooms 22 18 40--60 17 Motors driving contaminated air ventilation fans
Laboratories 22 18 40--60 7 could, during routine filter replacement, be contami­
Light workshops - 18 2 nated themselves. T o minimise contamination in these
Heavy workshops - 15.5 2 circumstances, they have a degree of protection of
Main stores - 13 1 IP55 and are capable of being totally overhauled on-
site under strictly controlled conditions.

861
Mechanical plant electrical services
12.5 Air conditioning units
Air conditioning units generally consist of a chiller
unit, humidifier, airheater and fan.
12.5.1 Chiller unit
The chiller unit and air cooled condensers form a sealed
refrigeration unit. Included in the refrigeration system
is a compressor, driven ehher through a flexible cou­
phng or via a multiple vee-belt by a 415 V three-phase
50 Hz totahy-enclosed fan cooled squirrel-cage induc­
tion motor. Hermetically-sealed motors are not used
since they preclude maintenance. When oil sump heaters
are used, they are supphed at 240 V single-phase 50 H z .
12.5.2 Humidifier
Steam generated by an electrode or electrically heated
boiler unit, forming an integral part of the air condi­
tioning unit, is injected into the air stream to increase
humidhy. Operation of the boiler is fully automatic
upon demand from a humidistat located in the air
intake.
12.5.3 Airheater
A battery of electrical heater coils, heats the air pro­
gressively as it is drawn into the air conditioning unit
and is automatically controlled by an inlet-air thermo­
stat in conjunction with a temperature controller.
12.5.4 Fan
A fan driven by a 415 V three-phase 50 H z squirrel-
cage induction motor draws air through the air con­
ditioning unit.
12.6 Water heating plant
Water heating equipment uses electric immersion heaters
complying with the relevant British Standards and the
fohowing requirements.
Steel heater bodies are coated internally with an anti-
corrosive epoxy-resin coating to ensure a life compati­
ble with that of the power station. Make-up water is
provided from a header tank.
Each heater is provided with a pressure relief valve,
an automatic air release valve, a water temperature
indicator, inlet and outlet water isolating valves, a water
drain valve, thermometer pockets in the inlet and outlet
pipework, and water temperature thermostats to faci­
litate hs commissioning and safe operation.
Twin water thermostats are fitted — a self-resetting
control thermostat and a manuahy-reset safety thermo­
stat which is set to operate at a higher temperature
to safeguard against control circuit failure.
12.6.1 Heating elements
Immersion heaters are of the tubular-sheathed type,
862
C h a p t e r 10
rated at 240 V single-phase 50 Hz and connected in
balanced three-phase banks with the star point brought
out for operation on a 415 V three-phase 50 Hz four-
wire supply. Each heater is provided w h h a spare three-
phase bank of elements for use during maintenance on
the duty elements.
12.7 Cabling and terminations
Each bank of heating elements is connected by flexible
high temperature single-core cable to an adjacent junc­
tion box which forms the interface with the fixed cable
system. The flexible cables have silicone rubber insula­
tion and heavy duty oil-resisting and flame-retardant
rubber sheaths to BS6007 Table 5 [29] allowing a
maximum continuous conductor temperature of 85°C.
The cables are run in flexible conduit for protection.
12.8 Water circulating pumps
Duty and standby p u m p s are provided to circulate
water through each group of water heaters. The motor
control scheme is arranged for manual selection of
either p u m p for duty running and automatic selection
of the standby unit in the event of failure of the duty
pump.
A pressure switch in the inlet pipe to each water
heater is connected to raise an alarm in the event of
p u m p failure and to act as an addhional plant inter­
lock to ensure that water heater elements cannot be
energised under no-flow conditions.
13 Fire fighting equipment
13.1 General description of system
Fire protection in a power station consists of the fol­
lowing systems:
• Waterspray and sprinkler systems.
• External fire hydrant system.
• Fixed foam pipework system.
• Fixed Halon 1301/system.
Halon 1301 bromotrifluoromethane (BTM) gas pro­
tection is installed in cable marshalhng r o o m s , com­
puter equipment r o o m s , instrumentation rooms and
false floor voids below safety equipment. Each distri­
bution system is designed to supply BTM gas to the
scene of the fire from storage cylinders, the system
being initiated either automatically by heat or smoke
detectors, or manually.
Fixed foam pipework systems are provided to pro­
tect diesel and auxiliary boiler fuel oil tanks, diesel
generators and transformers that are too remote to
be served by the waterspray and mulsifyre systems.
F o a m generators are provided at each location. A

spraywater system, supplemented by hydrants, provides
protection within the main equipment areas and a
system of fire hydrants covers those areas not provided
with spraywater protection.
Diesel-driven fire p u m p s s u p p l y w a t e r t o a
spraywater trunk main. A separate fire hydrant ring
main is supplied by a combination of electrically-driven
and diesel-driven p u m p s , to provide security of supply.
Spraywater systems are divided into wet and dry
systems. In a dry system, pressurised water is contained
by control valves, held closed by a compressed air
system incorporating heat or smoke detectors. U p o n
detection of a fire, air is released causing the control
valves to open and release water under pressure to the
sprinkler heads. A wet system is permanently filled with
water, which is released by detectors incorporated in
the sprinkler heads, upon the occurrence of fire. Dry
systems are commonly employed outdoors, where freez­
ing temperatures are hkely.
Four categories of spraywater system are provided
to meet differing requirements; namely, waterspray,
mulsifyre, protectorspray and sprinkler, Waterspray is
a large volume, high intenshy, fine spray system capable
of emulsifying the surface of burning oil and is used
in auxiliary boiler houses, on turbine oil tanks and
in other areas where oil fires may occur. Mulsifyre is
similar to waterspray but provides a less dense cover­
age and is used on oil-filled transformers and oil
coolers. Protectorspray is a low velocity water spray
system to protect plant from external fires, typical
examples being hydrogen storage vessels. Sprinkler
systems are provided for the treatment of localised fires
in equipment rooms, switchrooms and cable flats.
Coal plant conveyors are protected by a separate
dry-type sprinkler system. Control valves are main­
tained in the closed position by a compressed air system
as described above and opened by the release of air
caused by a detector operating in the event of fire.
Extraction systems are installed to remove smoke
generated during a fire to facilitate access and minimise
any damage which may be caused by its presence. This
is particularly important in the event of cable fires
which can generate large volumes of highly toxic and
corrosive smoke.
13.2 Controls and alarms
The spraywater system, fire pumps and detector air
compressors are designed for automatic operation.
Local control panels for the diesel-driven fire p u m p s
accommodate all the equipment necessary for auto­
matic operation, duty selection and manual control
facilities. Plant status indications and alarms are dis­
played on the local panels and are wired from repeater
contacts to a fire control panel located in the central
control r o o m .
The operation of a section control valve, as a result
of one or more detectors operating due to a fire, raises
an alarm on the central fire panel and automatically
Fire fighting equipment
inhiates a local audible alarm u p o n detection of water
flow or loss of air pressure in the detector pipework.
The alarm at the central fire panel identifies the loca­
tion of the fire, allowing appropriate action to be taken
to safeguard personnel and plant.
Plant status and alarms associated with the elec­
trically-driven detector air compressors, including low
air pressure alarms, are displayed on the central fire
panel. Low air pressure and loss of air pressure in the
detector system are sensed and raised as separate alarms
in order to differentiate between system faults (causing
*low pressure') and fires (causing l o s s of pressure').
13.3 Diesel-driven fire pumps
Several diesel-driven fire p u m p s are provided, each
of which is equipped with electrical starting gear and
a 24 V battery. Normally operation is automatic, the
p u m p s being started singly in sequence, initiated by
pressure switches connected in the water ring main and
set to operate sequentially as water pressure falls. When
a fire occurs and water is discharged from the ring
main, the p u m p s are started in sequence until the
discharge flow is balanced by input and the ring main
pressure is restored.
Trickle- and boost-charging facihties are provided for
each 24 V starting battery. In addition to the battery
charger controls, the local control panel contains bat­
tery condition and charging indications, p u m p status
indications and alarms, and m a n u a l starting controls.
M a n u a l starting controls and alarms are repeated on
the central fire panel.
Figure 10.40 shows the starting scheme for a typical
diesel-driven fire hydrant p u m p . The design emphasis
is to minimise the chances of the diesel not starting
when called u p o n to do so. T o this end, the design
includes the following features:
• Duphcate 24 V batteries and chargers.
• Duphcate starting contactors.
• Automatic starting with engine-cranking timer and
repeat-start feature.
• Automatic disconnection of cranking circuits when
engine is running.
• Remote and local m a n u a l start facilities.
13.4 Air compressors
Automatically controlled electrically-driven air com­
pressors are installed to charge the detector systems of
dry installations. Compressors are started and stopped
automatically to compensate for variations in detector
pipework air pressure.
Compressors are installed in pairs and are designated
main and standby. Each compressor is controlled by
a pressure switch connected in the air supply hne from
the compressor to the protection system. The main
compressor is started first and the standby unit is
863
Mechanical plant electrical services C h a p t e r 10

240/50-50V

RECTIFIER- RECTIFIER-
CHARGER CHARGER
UNIT 1 UNIT 2

I MAIN AUXILIARY
I BATTERY BATTERY

-O I O- CRANKING
MOTOR

-O ί O

AUTO START
I MAIN STARTING
REPEAT
—oTo— START
ry^^Y^ CONTACTOR
UNIT

1 AUXILIARY
MANUAL START ' STARTING
! CONTACTOR
-O I Ο­ -RVVS—
Ι
I

TEST START PUSHBUTTON ι M A N U A L STARTI

F A I L E D TO S T A R T
¡ RELAY

-o lo- Ο Ο -TYV»
ENERGY START PUSHBUTTON

-O ο­ AUTO
START
PUMP ON DEMAND ENGINE RUNNING Timer
- 1 0 Ö1 4 ö o > HDTÖ-

FAILED TO
i sta_rt__

CRANKING
TIMER

FAILED TO START
RELAY

-oT I M Eo-
R

ENGINE RUNNING
SWITCH ENGINE RUNNING
RELAY

-o o

R E M O T E / A U T O S T A R T SWITCHES PUMP ON
(OPEN TO START)
I DEMAND
RELAY

FIG. 10.40 Fire hydrant pump schematic diagram

864

brought into service if the air pressure continues to
fah. Drive motors are totahy-enclosed fan cooled
squirrel-cage induction types supplied at 415 V three-
phase 50 Hz from contactor switchgear.
13.5 Trace heating
Sections of pipework and valve manifolds which may
be exposed to low temperatures during the winter are
electrically trace-heated and insulated. Trace heating is
supphed at 240 V single-phase 50 Hz and is thermo­
statically controHed as described in Section 5.2.7 of
this chapter.
13.6 Detectors and distributors
13.6.1 Quartzoid bulbs
The bulb of a detector contains a hquid which has a
freezing point below any natural chmatic figure and a
high rate of expansion with increase of temperature.
A small amount of vapour is trapped when the bulb is
hermetically sealed. As the hquid in a bulb expands
under the influence of heat from a fire, the pressure in
the bulb rises until the vapour is absorbed by the liquid
and bursting pressure is reached. When the bulb
shatters, one of three actions occurs:
• The compressed air is released in a detector line to
initiate operation of a water control valve, or;
• A valve installed in the water pipework leading to
the distributors is directly operated, or;
• Water is released from a sprinkler.
Thermoelectric quartzoid bulb sprinklers are similar
to those described above, but include a *one-shot'
actuator mechanism. A n electrical signal from the
control cubicle of a heat-detecting cable system (see
Section 13.6.2 of this chapter) causes the actuator
mechanism to operate, shattering the quartzoid bulb
and releasing spray water. If the 'one-shot' actuator fails
to operate, the bulb will burst under the influence of
heat from a fire, as previously described.
13.6.2 Heat-detecting cable systems
Heat-detecting cable systems are installed extensively
in power stations in cable tunnels and cable flats, where
the nature of the materials installed requires that fire
is detected and treated with a minimum of delay to
limit the damage to plant and the danger to personnel.
These systems respond far more quickly than is possible
using conventional quartzoid bulb heat-detectors and
smoke detectors.
In cable installations, the heat-detecting cable is
suspended above the cables and under the cables im­
mediately above the floor to provide rapid response to
both cable and external fires.
Fire fighting equipment
Heat-detecting cables are of two types, integrating
and non-integrating, and are supplied at low voltage
from a control unit. The insulation resistance of an
integrating cable decreases progressively as tempera­
ture increases whilst that of a non-integrating cable
drops suddenly at a specified temperature. Reduction
of the cable insulation resistance to that appropriate
to the alarm temperature is sensed by a control unit
which raises an alarm and initiates the spraywater
system by transmitting an electrical signal to actuate
the thermoelectric quartzoid bulbs.
Heat-detecting cable continuhy and supply integrity
are monitored continuously and an alarm is raised on
the central fire panel if either fails.
13.6.3 S m o k e detection
Smoke detectors are of the point type, using scattered
or transmitted light, or ahernatively an Ionisation cham­
ber. These devices are used on their own or in com­
bination with heat detectors in areas such as amenity
buildings, administration offices, workshops and stores
where large scale, rapidly-propagating fires are un­
likely. In these situations, the detection system is used
to raise alarms and to locate the fire, enabhng manual
fire fighting equipment to be deployed and the buildings
cleared of personnel.
Ionisation chamber detectors consist of a chamber in
which a radioactive source ionises the air and causes
a small detectable current to flow between charged
electrodes. The magnitude of this current is propor­
tional to the level of Ionisation whhin the chamber
which is reduced by the presence of the particulate
matter in smoke.
Optical smoke detectors contain photoelectric devices
which are sensitive to changes in the level of m o n o ­
chromatic light received either by direct transmission
from the source or indirectly by scatter. Particulate
matter in smoke varies the level of hght falling on the
photocell and hence the level of electrical signal flowing
through the device.
A c o m m o n control unit supphes the smoke detectors
at low voltage and monitors the level of signal con­
tinuously to detect any variation indicative of the pre­
sence of smoke at a detector head. T o prevent spurious
operation, a time delay of between 2 and 10 seconds
is built into the alarm-initiating circuit. If the alarm
condhion exists at the end of the timed period, the
control unit initiates audible and visible alarms locally
and on the central fire panel and indicates the location
of the detector head which has operated.
A u t o m a t i c supervision of detector electrical circuits
and supphes is incorporated in the control unit.
A typical smoke detector system is shown in Fig
10.41.
865
 Mechanical plant electrical services C h a p t e r 10

KEY
RELAY RELAY
BREAK GLASS
CALLPOINT

o DETECTOR

^
OUTPUTS TO
FIRE PROTECTION
SYSTEM FOR EACH ZONE

OUTPUTS TO CCR FOR

ALARM AND FAULT INDICATION

24 V D C
POWER UNIT
10 V A C
RELAY
UNINTERUPTABLE CONTROL UNIT
POWER SUPPLY
ZF BELL ZF
RELAY MONITORING Μ RELAY
240 V D C No 1 UNIT No 2

240 V D C 21 V D C
Ó
0 ZONE 2 O

ZONE 1 ZONE 4 E T C .

ALARM
BELL Ó
ZONE 3
ALARM BELLS
DETECTORS A N D CALLPOINTS
(UP TO 32 ZONES)

FIG. 10.41 Smoke detection system

13.7 Fire dampers and smoke extraction
To prevent the spread of fire and smoke by venthation
and air conditioning systems, dampers are incorporated
to shut off the ducts in the event of fire. These dampers
are closed either electricahy by the heat or smoke detec­
tion system, or mechanically by the operation of heat-
fusible links. They remain closed until manually opened
when the fire has been extinguished. The dampers form
part of a smoke extraction system and are operated in
conjunction with extraction and ventilation fans.
13.8 Control cabling
Connections between control units, fire detector heads,
control valves, manual alarm-initiating devices and
other equipment essential for the operation of the fire

protection systems are run in short-time rated fire­
proof cables. These cables are designed t o remain
functional for a m i n i m u m of twenty minutes in a test
fire of 1000°C. Special attention is paid to the location
and installation of these cables t o prevent accidental
damage, a n d preserve their integrity in a fire, thereby
ensuring that the operation of fire protection systems
is not jeopardised.
13.9 Batteries and chargers
In keeping w h h the high integrity requirements of fire
protection systems, control supphes are derived from
24 V lead-acid batteries operating in conjunction with
automatic charging equipment. T h e chargers are sup­
plied at 240 V single-phase 50 H z a n d equipped with
trickle- a n d boost-charging m a n u a l selection facilities,
battery charging current a n d vohage indicators, local
alarms a n d repeat contacts for raising alarms on the
central fire panel.
14 References
[1] BS5000: Rotating electrical machines of particular types for
particular applications
[2] BS4999: General requirements for rotating electrical machines
[3] BS5490: Classification of degrees of protection provided by
enclosures
[4] BS4683: Electrical apparatus for explosive atmospheres
[5] BS5345: Selection, installation and maintenance of electrical
apparatus for use in potentially explosive atmospheres
[6] CEGB Specification EES (1980): General specification for elec­
tronic equipment — this specification succeeds EES (1970): and
EES (1962) bearing the same title
[7] BS800: Specification for radio interference limits and measure­
ment for equipment embodying small motors, contacts, control
and other devices causing similar interference
References
[8] BS466: Electric overhead travelling cranes
[9] BS88: Cartridge fuses for voltages up to and including 1000 V
AC and 1500 V DC
[10] BS5424: Control gear for voltages up to and including 1000 V
AC and 1200 V DC
[11] ESI Standard 37-1: 415 V AC switchgear, control gear and
fusegear
[12] BS3579: Heavy duty electric overhead travelhng and special
cranes for use in steelworks
[13] BS2655: General requirements for electrical, hydraulic or hand
powered lifts
[14] BS5655: Lifts and service lifts
[15] BSCP407: Electrical, hydraulic and hand powered Hfts
[16] BSCP326: The protection of structures against lightning
[17] CEGB Specification US/76/10: Control and instrumentation;
General technical requirements
[18] BS417: Semiconductor rectifier equipment including
transformers
[19] BS 171: Power transformers
[20] British Electricity Board Standard BEBST2: Specification for
transformers and rectifiers
[21] BS2757: Classification of insulating material for electrical
machinery and apparatus on the basis of thermal stability in
service
[22] BS159: Busbars and busbar connections
[23] BS 158: Marking and arrangement of switchgear busbars, main
connections and small wiring
[24] BS6346: PVC insulated cables for electricity supply
[25] BSCP1003: Electrical apparatus for use in explosive atmos­
pheres of gas or vapour
[26] BS4417: Semiconductor rectifier equipment including trans­
formers
[27] BS5967: Operating conditions for industrial process measure­
ment and control equipment
[28] CEGB Specification US/12/50: General technical requirements
for instrument and control equipment
[29] BS6007: Specification for rubber insulated cables for electric
power and lighting
867
 C H A P T E R 11

Protection

1 Introduction 8 Station transformer protection

2 Design criteria 9 H V / L V connections and generator v o l t a g e / H V

circuit-breaker protection
3 Overall protection logic
9.1 Phase to phase and earth faults
4 Boiler protection 9.2 HV circuit-breaker faults
4.1 General 9.3 Generator voltage circuit-breaker or switch
4.2 Low drum level or loss of boiler water disconnector
4.2.1 Steam/water mixture mass velocity
10 Pumped-storage plant protection
4.2.2 Steam/water mixture quality
4.3 Loss of feedwater flow 10.1 Dynamic braking overcurrent protection
4.4 Loss of electric load 10.2 Under frequency protection
4.5 Methods of protection 10.3 Over frequency protection
4.5.1 Low drum level protection 10.4 Overspeed in excess of 10%
4.5.2 Loss of feedwater protection 10.5 Loss of pumping power
4.5.3 Boiler circulating pumps — unconditional signal 10.6 Emergency stop pushbuttons
4.5.4 Sudden loss of steam demand (turbine trip) 10.7 Overvoltage
10.8 Excitation equipment protection
5 Turbine protection 10.9 Stator cooling air over-temperature
5.1 Turbine trips 10.10 Bearing temperatures and oil levels
5.2 Loss of lubricating oil pressure 10.11 Back to back starting protection
5.3 Condenser vacuum low (exhaust pressure high) 10.11.1 Generator runaway
5.4 Condensate conductivity high 10.11.2 Incorrect excitation levels on the generator-motor
5.5 Manual trip lever 10.11.3 Excess heating of the stationary field winding in
5.6 Overspeed trip the event of a failure to start of generator-motor
5.6.1 Choice of interlock 10.12 Excitation transformer
5.6.2 Setting of the low forward power relay 10.13 Station transformer
5.7 LP exhaust steam temperature high 10.14 Starting transformers
5.8 Loss of electric governor 10.15 Starting equipment
5.9 Low steam inlet temperature and pressure 10.16 Protection during starting
10.17 Protection of the pump-turbine and the upper/lower
6 Generator protection
reservoirs
6.1 Stator earth faults (low impedance earthing) 10.17.1 Category A trips
6.2 Stator earth faults (high resistance earthing) 10.17.2 Category Β trips
6.2.1 Current transformer requirements for protection using
relay R1 11 DC tripping systems
6.2.2 Matching transformer 11.1 Logic diagram
6.3 Stator phase to phase faults 11.2 Tripping schematic diagram
6.4 Stator turn to turn faults 11.3 Trip supply and circuit supervision
6.5 Negative phase sequence 11.4 General comments on the tripping arrangements
6.6 Loss of generator excitation
12 Auxiliaries systems
6.7 Pole slipping
6.8 Loss of stator water flow 12.1 Operating criteria
6.9 Hydrogen temperature high 12.2 Protection requirements
6.10 Hydrogen/stator water cooling flow 12.3 Auxiliary transformers
6.11 Excitation failure 12.3.1 Phase to phase and earth fault protection
6.12 Motoring of the generator 12.3.2 Winding faults and transformer overloads
6.13 Emergency pushbutton 12.3.3 HV inverse time and high set instantaneous
overcurrent
7 Generator transformer and unit transformer protection 12.3.4 Standby earth fault
7.1 Phase to phase and earth fault protection 12.4 Auxiliary generators
7.2 Generator transformer HV inverse time and high set 12.4.1 Mechanical trips
instantaneous overcurrent 12.4.2 Electrical protection
7.3 Unit transformer HV inverse time and high set 12.4.3 Gas turbines
instantaneous overcurrent 12.5 Motors
7.4 Standby earth fault 12.5.1 Motor circuits at 415 V (contactor circuits)
7.5 Generator transformer and unit transformer internal faults 12.5.2 Motor circuits at 11 kV and 3.3 kV
7.6 Winding temperature 12.5.3 Thermal overload relay
7.7 Conservator 'low oil level' alarm 12.6 Cables
7.8 Pressure relief device alarm 12.7 Busbar protection
7.9 Freezer air drier alarm 12.8 High breaking capacity (HBC) fuses
7.10 Overfluxing 12.9 Protection co-ordination

868
 Introduction

12.9.1 Characteristics of 415 V fuses 12.9.6 Discrimination

12.9.2 Characteristics of inverse time relays 12.9.7 Techniques to obtain close co-ordination between
12.9.3 Characteristics of definite time relays protection stages
12.9.4 Characteristics of thermal relays 12.9.8 Application to a typical system
12.9.5 Calculations 13 Reliability

1 Introduction • Step-up and step-down transformers, switchgear and

The power station generating system basicahy comprises
four main plant areas (Fig 11.1):
• Steam raising plant (steam generator) or, for hydro
stations, a water supply a n d / o r storage system.
• A steam or water turbine.
• A generator.
connections.
The last equipment connects the generator to h s loads.
A small percentage of the power (5 to 1 0 % , approx­
imately) provides services inside the power station (this
auxihary system is dealt with in Chapter 2), the re­
mainder goes to the transmission network. It can be
seen from Fig 11.1 that the power station system is

• TRIPPING • TRIPPING
SYSTEM SYSTEM
1 2

SEND AND RECEIVE TRIP SIGNALS

θ
TRANSFORMERS TRANSMISSION
STEAM SWITCHGEAR
GENERATOR CONNECTIONS SYSTEM

STATION AUXILIARIES

FUEL SUPPLIES . LUBRICATING OIL SUPPLIES

RECTIFIERS . HEATERS . MOTORS . VALVES

STATION AUXILIARIES
ELECTRICAL SUPPLY SYSTEM

• TRIPPING SYSTEMS 1 AND 2 CONTAIN UNIT TRIPPING LOGIC SHOWN IN FIG. 11.2

FIG. 11.1 Overall generating protection scheme

869
Protection
very closely interconnected, so that a single failure
requires more than the disconnection of the faulted
plant, both electricahy and mechanically. This chapter
deals with:
• The electrical and mechanical protection of the plant
items for which fauhs resuh in the tripping of one
of the main plant items (main u n h protection).
• The protection against electrical faults in the aux­
iliary system (auxiliary system protection).
• The methods adopted to initiate the tripping of the
other associated main plant items.
For completeness, individual plant protection systems,
both mechanical and electrical, are explained a n d ,
where explanations are to be found in other chapters
concerned with that plant item, reference is made to
those chapters.
Included in the sections dealing with the protection
of transformers, are the generator transformer, the
station transformer, the unit transformers, together
with their main electrical connections, switchgear and
disconnectors (isolators). In nuclear power stations, the
station transformer has become another unit trans­
former and the level of protection has been raised to
that of the unit and generator transformers, irrespective
of the supply voltage.
Details of the relays used today are given; in parti­
cular, where electromagnetic types have been replaced
by digital, but with the developments in digital relay
design, protective systems employed by the C E G B are
continually changing. When dighal unit protection sys­
tems were introduced in the late 1980s, protection
schemes changed from two trip channels (1 out of 2)
to three independent protection systems, each pro­
viding protection such that failure of one would nehher
cause nor prevent a trip. This improved rehability and
provided the facility for on-load testing from the elec­
trical trip initiating device to the turbine stop valves.
This is explained in Section 11 of this chapter on D C
tripping.
2 Design criteria
Before describing the individual protective systems,
certain design criteria have to be estabhshed. Generally
the protection system is designed so that if faults
occur, the faulty plant is disconnected, whilst continuity
of supply from the generators is maintained, consistent
with system stability. Listed below are major require­
ments on which protection selection and settings are
based:
• Faults on plant items must be disconnected as quickly
as possible to minimise damage.
• The protective systems shah be stable for fauhs
outside the protective zone.
870
Chapter 11
• Faults which are not cleared by the faulty item's own
protection, will be cleared by secondary or back-up
protection.
• Protection of plant is designed to match as closely
as possible the plant operating characteristics, e.g.,
negative phase sequence protection is designed to
match the generator thermal withstand to negative
phase sequence currents.
• In general, protection systems should be designed
so that no single failure of a protective device causes
a trip or permits a fault to remain connected to
the system. The exception is where the reliability of
the protective system is such that failure to trip is
not considered credible, i.e., where equipment is
installed in controlled temperature and humidity
conditions and is fully dust-proofed. This applies
particularly to electrical protection systems employ­
ing electromagnetic relays where risk of malfunction
is very low. All other protection devices, such as
plant-mounted tripping devices, employ systems of
at least *two out of three'. It is hkely that the com­
pactness of digital relays will encourage full re­
dundancy to be built into electrical protection as
weh.
• T o facilitate testing or fault investigation with the
generating unit on-load and one of the tripping
systems isolated, the ahocation of the output con­
tacts of the protective relays must be such that the
operation of any one relay does not cause tripping
of more than one tripping system.
• Standing trip conditions when the generator unit is
out of service must be avoided. For example, turbine
and generator mechanical trips which would remain
operated after the unit has been shut down are re­
moved by normally open pressure switches mounted
in the turbine hydraulic fluid pressure system.
• The facilities associated with a tripping system shall
be physically segregated from the other tripping
systems as far as is practicable, by using separate
relay panels, separate terminal blocks in marshalling
and terminating cubicles, and diverse routing of
secondary cables.
• The detailed electrical connections for the protective
relay circuits have to be in accordance with the
appropriate C E G B Standards.
3 Overall protection logic
A n overall protection logic diagram typical of nuclear
stations is shown and described fully in Section 11 of
this chapter, together with the tripping schematic de­
veloped from it.
The role of the unit protection is:
• T o accept protection tripping signals from each of
the main plant items numbered 1 to 4 in Fig 11.1.

• To bring as many of the main plant items as ne­
cessary to a safe condhion by means of a tripping
logic.
Each of the main plant items has its own protection
system and a typical turbine protection system (item 2,
Fig 11.1) is shown in Fig 11.2. Operation of any one
of the protection devices shown, operates a trip re­
lay to trip the unit protection. The unit protection
system therefore receives the same trip signal for several
different fauh conditions sent to each of its tripping
systems, of which there are two at present. T w o types
of signal can be received from the turbine, low va­
cuum is G r o u p 2 and all others are G r o u p 4. The
significance of the groups is explained in Section 11 of
this chapter.
Electrical fault protective relays for the generator
and hs associated transformers and connections, are
housed in the same relay r o o m as the unit protection
relays and therefore each relay directly trips into the
u n h protection trip relays. This avoids additional delays
due to interposing trip relay operation, which is vital
for electrical fauhs which must be cleared as quickly as
possible. Speed of tripping is not so critical for boiler,
turbine and generator mechanical faults, where usually
delays of several seconds can be tolerated.
4 Boiler protection
4.1 General
Faults can occur on a boiler or its auxiliaries which
can be isolated without a boiler trip, i.e., on m o t o r s ,
cables, actuators, etc., and for information the reader
is referred to Volume F on control and instrumenta­
tion. For those which require a trip of the boiler (either
immediately, or on completion of a sequence), a signal
is also given to trip the turbine fohowed by the
remainder of the unit. It is one of the functions of the
unit protection to ensure that plant items are tripped
in the correct order, e.g., the high voltage circuit-
breaker is delayed and not tripped before the turbine
stop valves have closed. The logic of sequential tripping
is shown in Fig 11.35.
A unit tripping interface is provided for a number
of boiler operation problems which if not dealt with
would lead to damage. These are associated with feed-
water or steam supply abnormahties.
4.2 Low drum level or loss of boiler water
If drum water level falls below a certain level, there
is a danger of departure from nucleate boiling, which
is when the bubbles of steam form a homogeneous
solution and are continually breaking away from the
walls of the furnace tube. A departure from this con­
dition occurs when the steam forms a blanket on the
inner surface of the tube and results in a decrease of
Boiler protectiori
the heat transfer coefficient by the order of a mag­
nitude or m o r e . This produces a rise of tube metal
temperature, the magnitude and rate depending on tube
thickness, tube material and local heat flux. The in­
crease of metal temperature may cause furnace tube
failures due either to diminished material strength or
to increased on-load corrosion, but each incident re­
duces tube hfe.
The local heat flux at which the departure from
nucleate boiling occurs is defined as the critical heat ßux
and is a function of operating pressure, tube diameter,
tube orientation, mixture mass velocity and mixture
quality. In a given boiler, operating at a given pressure,
the only variables that affect departure from nucleate
bohing are steam/water mixture mass velocity and
steam/water mixture quality.
4.2.1 S t e a m / w a t e r mixture mass velocity
In assisted circulation boilers, steam/water mixture
mass velocity can only be altered from the normal
operating value to an appreciable extent by the failure
of one or m o r e of the circulating p u m p s . The protection
is described under loss of feedwater flow in Section
4.3 of this chapter.
For natural circulation boilers, the steam/water
mixture mass velochy is not significantly ahered from
its normal value by any of the operating variables other
than the steam/water mixture quality.
4.2.2 S t e a m / w a t e r mixture quality
Steam water mixture quality is affected by d r u m water
level, since this affects the efficiency of separation of
steam and water and hence the risk of departure from
nucleate boiling. The lowest d r u m level at which the
above condition occurs is determined for each boiler
a n d a unit trip is initiated when the load drops to this
level. At a level above this, an attempt is made to
prevent the water from reaching the trip level by an
emergency start of the starting and standby electric feed
pumps.
4.3 Loss of feedwater flow
Loss of feedwater flow produces a rapid fah in drum
level which, as stated above, causes a departure from
nucleate boiling when a certain level is reached. In some
boilers, this will not lead to a dangerous shuation at a
d r u m level higher than that detected by the low drum
level protection. A unit trip from loss of feedwater has
not been required on units since 1974. The length of
time that it can be allowed to persist depends on cir­
culation margins. T h e need for inclusion of detection
of loss of feedwater in the system of protection against
departure from nucleate boiling therefore depends on
the characteristic of the particular boiler and auxilia­
ries, and is determined for each application of the
protection system.
871
 Protection Chapter 11

(+)110V AUXILIARY TRIP CIRCUIT 1 110V O

PS4 RL16 RL7

L IRL13

RELAY FLUID

PDS3 L J

COOLANT RL22
-o ! o
L I
CONDENSER LEVEL

LUBRICATING OIL

GOVERNOR FAIL D061

O O-

RL67

AUXILIARY TRIP
- o f o- CIRCUIT 1

}
RELAY FLUID
RL73 PRESSURE SWITCH
INTERTRIP
DEFECTIVE

(+)110V AUXILIARY TRIP CIRCUIT 2

PS5 RL27>4

L 'r^^^
PS8 O -
CATEGORY
RELAY FLUID A

L J

STATOR COOLANT ryAi Foot

^^^^RL2^

LSW6
CONDENSER LEVEL L I

LUBRICATING OIL RL28 CATEGORY

G O V E R N O R FAIL D062
RL29
-O O -

AUXILIARY TRIP

RL73
} CIRCUIT 2
PRESSURE SWITCH
INTERTRIP
DEFECTIVE

©nov AUXILIARY TRIP CIRCUIT 3

iiovG

PS6 R L S W RL9

L
PS9
CATEGORY
RELAY FLUID

L J

^ ^ R L 3 ^

LSW7
CONDENSER LEVEL RL66
L I

LUBRICATING OIL ^ :RL32 L CATEGORY

> Β
GOVERNOR FAIL D063
-O O -

RL69

I 1 AUXILIARY TRIP
CIRCUITS
RELAY FLUID
RL 7 3 PRESSURE SWITCH
INTERTRIP
DEFECTIVE

FIG. 11.2 Typical turbine protection system

872
 Boiler protection

(+)110V

TRIPPING SYSTEM 1

RL1 RL2
-O O- -O O

I—o 0 — o o—
. RLS RL61 COIL A RL61^C0ILC
, , ^ τ

RL6^ COIL Β
0 — o
RL6 RL1

—o TURBINE TRIP
RL61 SOLENOID 1
COIL Β TRIP SUPERVISION
ALARM

RL67 RL6I RL69

-O O-

RL9
u RL7
-O O- -O O-
TURBINE TRIP
SOLENOID 1

(+)110V 110V^

TRIPPING SYSTEM 2

. "'-4 RL5 RL2

O O f -O O

RL40 RL40

. RLS RL2 RL3 RL62 COIL A RL62COILC

-Τ
-O O -O O — O O —
RL62 COIL Β

RL6 RL3 RL1

O O- -O O-

TURBINE TRIP
"^RL6?" SOLENOID 2
RL7 RL8 TRIP SUPERVISION
•O O - -O O- ALARM

RL67 RL68 Ι

RL8

LJ
-O Ο­

J
RL9 RL7
-O O- O O-
TURBINE TRIP
SOLENOID 2

~^RL62^
COILA

FIG. 11.2 (cont'd) Typical turbine protection system

4.4 Loss of electric load
If steam demand is lost due to the loss of electric load,
the tripping of the turbine emergency stop valves and
governor stop valves is initiated. Overheating of the
superheater a n d / o r reheater tubes, due to the cessation
of steam flow, occurs rapidly unless the firing is
extinguished or reduced to a very low level.
4.5 Methods of protection
The various abnormal operational states already men­
tioned are detected by the various devices described
below. These shut down the unit plant, as described
earlier in Section 3 of this chapter.
4.5.1 Low drum level protection
Low d r u m level protection uses spare contacts on the
relays contained in the Hydrastep water level gauge
equipment that is used to indicate the d r u m water level
(see Fig 11.3). T o avoid spurious trips, these trip sig­
nals have to be validated by separate water level trip­
ping gauges. Identical Hydrastep water level gauges are

873
Protection Chapter 11

χ SIDE STEAM DRUM Β SIDE

WATER LEVEL UNDER CERTAIN

OPERATING CONDITIONS

ODD

EVEN

_DRUM_LEyEL
CONTROL ROOM LEVEL ALARMS

HI/LO HI/LO

POWER FAULT FAULT POWER

UNIT A UNIT B'

LOGIC
ODD EVEN UNIT ODD EVEN

A B'

A Β

POWER POWER
SUPPLY SUPPLY
SOURCE SOURCE
Y •
V

STEAM

WATER

DISPLAY UNIT

FIG. 11.3 Four-vessel Hydrastep system block diagram

874
 Boiler protection

fitted at each end of the d r u m to improve rehabihty
and to indicate the water level at each end of the d r u m .
The gauge pressure vessels are connected to the d r u m
by pipes and valves, such that they represent extensions
of the drum and hence contain the same water level as
the drum, whhin the limits created by denshy error and
pressure drop due to condensate flow. The connection
of the vessels to the drum is shown in Fig 11.4.
The operation of the Hydrastep water level gauge
system depends on the difference in the electrical re­
sistivities of pure water and steam under operating con­
ditions, which is t w o , or m o r e , orders of magnitude.
Therefore, by making resistivity measurements at a
number of points arranged vertically in a pressure ves­
sel attached to the boiler d r u m , h is possible to say,
at any level, all measurements above represent steam

DRUMVENT

CONDENSATE WEIR

LONG RANGE
LEVEL TRANSMITTER

(a) Typical gauge-glass & remote level transmitter connections at boiler drum.
Twin gauge glasses used to give a wider range of WATER SIDE
measurement for chemical clean and steam purge CONNECTION
TRANSMITTER

CONSTANT HEAD
DEVICE

DIFFERENTIAL hR
PRESSURE
TRANSMITTER

LEVEL SIGNAL

PRESSURE
TRANSMITTER
ELECTRONIC PRESSURE
SIGNAL
DENSITY
COMPENSATOR

(b) Hydrastep system pressure vessel (c) Density compensation system for boiler water drum level

FIG. 11.4 Connection of a Hydrastep vessel to the boiler steam drum

875
Protection
(high resistivity) and ah measurements below represent
water (low resistivity). Figure 11.5 shows a resistance
measuring cell.
Each vessel has 12 electrodes mounted along its
length, and the resistance of each electrode is mea­
sured between the electrode and the vessel wall to deter­
mine whether there is steam or water at that level.
Level is indicated by means of coloured lamps; green
for water and red for steam (Fig 11.3). The signals
derived from each resistance cell operate a changeover
relay whose contacts operate the coloured lamps and
provide signals for tripping and alarm purposes. The
additional vahdation pressure vessels at each end of
the drum provide extra security for tripping purposes.
Whilst the main level indication contains 12 electrodes,
the vahdation pressure vessel has only six to cover
the range around the trip level. The time between de­
tecting a low level and internal damage to the boiler
is about 14 seconds at full load. Both gauges at the
same end of the drum must be detecting a drum level
below the trip level before a trip is initiated to the
boiler firing trip relays. Allowance is also made in
each gauge for a faulty level indicator by checking that
the electrode above is also detecting a low level. This
checking is carried out in the logic unit shown on
Fig 11.3.
Operation of the Hydrastep system at one end of
the drum or the other, wih either trip the boiler firing
trip relays to trip the boiler firing, or trip the boiler
directly from its own protection.
4.5.2 Loss of f e e d w a t e r protection
Figure 11.6 shows a simple representation of a feed-
heating system. It is not representative of any parti-
ELECTRICAL
CONNECTION
TO DETECTOR
RETAINING NUT
CLAMPING PLATE
PRESSURE VESSEL BODY
SEALING JOINT
CERAMIC INSULATOR
ELECTRODE TIP
RESISTIVITY CELL
FIG. 11.5 Hydrastep resistance measuring cell
876
Chapter 11
cular system but illustrates the extent of the loss of
feedwater protection.
Steam from the boiler is supphed to the H P turbine
via stop and governor valves. Exhaust steam from the
H P turbine is returned to the boiler for reheating. It
is then fed through similar valve arrangements into an
I P turbine and thence to L P cyhnders.
F r o m the L P cylinder, the steam passes through
condensers and the condensate is then pumped by an
extraction p u m p through a series of heaters, to raise
its water temperature, and back to the boiler. O n the
outlet side of the heater chain, it is current practice to
install two electrically-driven feed pumps and one steam
turbine driven p u m p , the turbine being fed with steam
bled from the main turbine; a h h o u g h future plant may
omit the steam turbine driven p u m p . Protection is
provided to detect a loss of feedwater caused by the
failure of one or two emergency feed p u m p s or the
main turbine driven feed p u m p . The protection operates
as follows.
Two time intervals ti and t 2 seconds have to be
determined, ti being the time between the detection of
loss of feedwater and the onset of departure from nu­
cleate boiling for unit loads above the maximum cor­
responding to the output from one electric feed p u m p ,
t 2 being the time taken at lower loads. The time inter­
vals tl and t 2 have to be determined for every apphca­
tion of the protection to a particular boiler/turbine
feedheating system. For loads below the output of one
electric feed p u m p , the protection can be omitted if
t 2 is of sufficient duration to ensure that adequate
protection is provided by the low drum level protection.
Figures 11.7 and 11.8 show typical schematic diagrams
for one or two standby electric feed p u m p s .
The loss of feedwater is sensed by measurement of
differential pressure across each p u m p discharge non­
return valve (NRV).
Duplicate transmitters are provided across each NRV
(A and Β in Figs 11.7 and 11.8). Each transmitter drives
a trip amplifier which is set to a differential pressure
consistent whh the boiler design and they are arranged
to meet the following conditions:
• One turbine feed p u m p in service — load in excess
of that met by one electric feed p u m p capacity. On
detection of loss of feedwater from the turbine feed
p u m p , a conditional *loss of boiler water' trip is
automaticahy initiated and will be effected, unless
two electrical feed pumps are installed and both are
run-up and delivering within ti seconds (Fig 11.7).
• Turbine feed p u m p in service — load not in excess
of that met by one electric feed p u m p . On detection
of loss of feedwater from turbine feed p u m p , a con­
ditional l o s s of boiler water' trip is automatically
initiated and whl be effected, unless at least one
electric feed p u m p is run-up and delivering within
t 2 seconds.
• Two electric feed p u m p s in service — load in excess
of that met by one electric feed p u m p (Fig 11.7).
Boiler protection
α
ε
<
877
 Protection
θ CHANGEOVER ON
HV CB LOAD GREATER THAN
AUX. SWITCH V % MCR
— - O O- -o o — — O
CONTACTS
CLOSE ON
HIGH REVERSE
DIFFERENTIAL
PRESSURE
V = LOAD THAT CAN BE MET WITH EMERGENCY FEED PUMP
FIG. 11.7 Loss of feedwater protection for a system using one electric feedpump
The scheme shows the turbine feed pump time delay with two sets of contacts which operate after ti and t i seconds.
An alternative scheme may be adopted using a separate time delay for each time setting.
O n detection of loss of feedwater from either one
or two of the electric feed p u m p s , a conditional
l o s s of boiler water' trip is automatically inhiated
and wih be effected, unless the turbine feed p u m p is
run-up and dehvering within ti seconds.
• One or two electric feed pumps in service — load
not in excess of that met by one electric feed p u m p
capacity. On detection of loss of feedwater from
one electric feed p u m p , a conditional *loss of boiler
water' trip is automatically initiated and will be
effected, unless the other electric feed p u m p is de­
livering rated flow, or the turbine feed p u m p is trail­
ing and is brought manually to rated delivery within
t2 seconds.
During start-up, the boiler is protected against a low
drum water level by the *drum level' low trip and the
feedwater trip is vetoed for the fohowing reason.
On initial light-up, the electric feed p u m p may not
be required to deliver feedwater to the d r u m and will
not be put into service until it is required later on.
This is so because some units are able, during initial
light-up, t o generate sufficient steam for a supply t o
the turbine feed p u m p to enable it to meet feedheater
requirements. In these circumstances, it is necessary
to veto the trip initiation from loss of feedwater in
order to avoid a permanent boiler firing trip being
estabhshed.
878
Chapter 11
I c^
EMERGENCY FEED PUMP
EMERGENCY START RELAY
The l o s s of feedwater' trip is therefore conditioned
by the generator H V circuit-breaker, as shown in Figs
11.7 and 11.8, to remove the trip whenever the gen­
erator is on open-circuit. Under these circumstances,
the boiler is protected against a low d r u m level by the
l o w d r u m level' protection.
4.5.3 Boiler circulating pumps — unconditional
signal
O n boilers which require forced feedwater circula­
tion between the d r u m and the boher furnace, all
available boiler circulating p u m p s are operated at all
loads. The boiler system is designed such that full load
can be met using three out of four circulating water
pumps (Fig 11.9). Therefore the minimum number for
avoidance of a trip is dependent on whether the unit
load is above that at which at least three pumps are
required.
When the boiler is operating at loads above this
level with only three p u m p s in operation, the loss of a
further p u m p wih automatically initiate an uncondi­
tional l o s s of boher water' trip. When the boiler is
operating at or below this load with only two p u m p s
running, the loss of one of these p u m p s automatic­
ally initiates an unconditional *loss of boiler water'
trip. The scheme shown in Fig 11.9 satisfies these trip
requirements.
 Turbine protection

Θ CHANGEOVER ON
Θ
HV CB LOAD GREATER THAN
AUX. SWITCH BOILER
1 ' % MCR

τ
^ FIRING
— — O O O TRIP
RELAY

-ο I Ο- O O

TURBINE FEEDPUMP
NRV D.P.

•A'
EMERGENCY FEEDPUMP
NRV D.P.

CONTACTS TIME DELAY

CLOSE ON RELAY
HIGH
REVERSE
DIFFERENTIAL
PRESSURE

'B'
EMERGENCY FEED PUMP
NRV D.P.
TIME DELAY
RELAY

EMERGENCY FEEDPUMP
' EMERGENCY START RELAYS

•L = LOAD THAT CAN BE MET WITH 2 EMERGENCY FEED PUMPS

FIG. 1 1 . 8 Loss of feedwater protection for a system using two electric feedpumps

4.5.4 S u d d e n loss o f s t e a m d e m a n d ( t u r b i n e t r i p ) ensures that tripping of the steam generator is not

prevented by opening of the circuit-breaker from a
This form of protection apphes equahy to conventional
u n h trip, which sends a trip to the turbine and the
and nuclear plant.
circuh-breaker at the same time.
The control of the turbine steam valves is by a fluid
By tripping the steam generator following a turbine
pressure system which holds the valves open against a
trip when the generator is on-load, its tubes are pro­
spring load. Release of this pressure operates pressure
tected against overheating. Excess steam wih exhaust to
switches in the fluid system. Referring forward to Fig
atmosphere. It is to be noted that if the generator is
11.36, which shows a tripping scheme for nuclear plant;
deloaded and a steam generator trip is not required, the
operation of the pressure switches via time delay relay
operator must open the generator circuit-breaker first
T D R l contacts, operates trip relay 7, which sends a
before tripping the turbine.
signal to trip the steam generator. If any of the 400 kV
disconnectors or circuit-breakers are open, then T D R l
is de-energised and prevents a trip of the steam gen­
erator when the turbine-generator is not connected to
5 Turbine protection
the transmission system. This ahows for a turbine trip As with the boiler, fauhs can occur on the turbine and
when the generator is off-load w h h o u t tripping the its auxiliaries which can be isolated w h h o u t tripping the
steam generator. The time delay provided by T D R l turbine: Volume C, Chapter 2 T u r b i n e plant systems'

879
Protection Chapter 11

valve actuators, and diverting the fluid remaining in

TRIP
TRIP
SUPPLY
(FROM LOSS OF FEEDWATER
PROTECTION SCHEME) SUPPLY the actuators to flow to drain. Volume C, Chapter 2
φ CLOSE ON LOAD describes the system in detail, but the basic operation
GREATER THAN 'Ρ' % MCR
O O of the hydraulic control system is as follows.
Fluid pressure is required to hold the turbine stop
PUMP Ά' D P . SW and governor valves, which control the steam supply
to the turbine, open against spring pressure. In the
absence of fluid pressure, the springs close the steam
PUMP Α' C.B. AUX. SW
valves. Hydraulic control fluid is supplied to the steam
valves via two emergency trip valves, and the turbine
PUMP B' D P . SW is tripped by the operation of either of these valves
diverting the hydraulic fluid to drain. The trip plungers
in the emergency trip valves are held in the closed
PUMP'B'C.B. AUX. SW
position by means of a spring which is held com­
pressed by a trip latch. This latch is released either by
PUMP'C D P . SW energising the trip solenoid or by acting directly on the
trip latch from the overspeed bolts or the manual trip
lever. This causes the emergency trip valve to open,
PUMP Ό ' C.B. AUX. SW
isolating the supply of hydraulic fluid to the turbine
valve operating gear, and putting the hydrauhc fluid
PUMP O'D.P.SW to drain, with consequent loss of fluid pressure and
closure of the main steam valves.

PUMPO'C.B. AUX SW
F^^^
5.1 Turbine trips
The following turbine protection devices trip the turbine:
• Loss of lubricating oil.
• Condenser vacuum low (exhaust pressure high).
• Condensate conductivity high.
• Manual trip lever.

X • Overspeed trip.
C D

• L P exhaust steam temperature high.

Β • Loss of electric governor.
• Low steam inlet temperature and pressure.
A

They are typical of modern plant. A full description of

A C
. BOILER FIRING
TRIP RELAY
Β D
FIG. 1 1 . 9 Loss of boiler water protection against
failure of the boiler circulating pump
identifies these. All unit protection devices which trip
the u n h , are arranged to work directly into each emer­
gency trip valve tripping circuit (Fig 11.10). This ap­
phes to all faults where serious damage could occur
before an operator could take corrective action. The
philosophy is applied, bearing in mind the need for
maximum availability and the need to limit automatic
trips, to those where there is insufficient time for the
operator or control system to take corrective action.
The turbine is tripped by interrupting the supply
of hydraulic control fluid to the turbine main steam
the systems is given in Volume C, Chapter 2.
The turbine trip systems are designed to give full
redundancy of trip initiating devices (Design criteria.
Section 2 of this chapter) and on-load testing u p to
the emergency trip valves. Weekly on-load testing of
the turbine emergency trip valves is essential as part of
the procedure to avoid an uncontroHed overspeed of
the turbine for failure to close the main turbine stop
valves. On-load testing is done by isolating each emer­
gency trip valve solenoid in turn and using the protec­
tion devices to operate the isolated trip valve.
5.2 Loss of lubricating oil pressure
The fluid for operating the turbine valves, forms a
separate system from the lubricating oil system. The oil
in the lubricating system is circulated by a centrifugal
type p u m p , directly driven from the turbine-generator
shaft (Fig 11.11). This p u m p receives oh under pressure
from an oil-turbine-driven boost p u m p and delivers
 Turbine protection

UNIT PROTECTION
INTERPOSING R4 INTERPOSING R5
er 7^ O O O-
INTERTRIP RECEIVE TR1
7^ 0
INTERTRIP RECEIVE TR2

INTERPOSING R6 . TRIP RELAY 1

TRIP RELAY 2

TRIP RELAY 3
)S0L1

TRIP RELAY 4

TRIP RELAY 5
SOLENOID
CIRCUIT -O O-
SUPERVISON
TRIP RELAY 6

UNIT TRANSFORMER TRI

UNIT TRANSFORMER TR2

>>-
TURBINE
TRIPPING
SYSTEM 1
SEE FIG 11.2

— ^

SOLENOID CIRCUIT
SUPERVISION

FIG. 11.10 Emergency turbine trip valve — typical tripping circuit

oil by way of the oil turbine t o the turbine-generator
bearings. The main oil p u m p also delivers oil direct
to the generator hydrogen seal oh system.
Pressure drop through the oh turbine reduces the
oil pressure to that required for the turbine bearings.
The oil turbine is mechanicahy coupled t o the boost
p u m p , which has its suction flooded in the main oil
tank and delivers oil t o the main oil p u m p inlet. A n
oil tank mounted A C motor-driven lubricating oil p u m p
is also provided to supply oil t o the turbine-generator
bearings during run-up a n d rundown of the unit.
Falling lubricating oil pressure to the turbine-gen­
erator bearings automatically starts the A C motor-
driven lubricating oil p u m p . If this p u m p fails t o start,
or completely loses h s pumping, further reduction in oil
pressure t o the bearings wih cause a D C motor-driven
oil p u m p to start automatically a n d , at the same time,
a turbine-generator trip is initiated.
Turbine tripping is initiated directly by loss of lu­
bricating oil pressure. Duplicated spring-loaded trip
cyhnders in t h e front pedestal are pressurised by the
lubricating oil pressure. O n loss of bearing oil pressure,
oil is released from the trip cylinders, a n d mechani­
cal linkages displace the trip latches of the duphcate
trip gear. This causes the emergency trip valves t o
operate. Tripping is delayed by t h e action of a dead­
weight accumulator which maintains minimum supply
pressure during transient pressure fluctuations. Each
trip can be on-load tested.
5.3 Condenser vacuum low (exhaust
pressure high)
Each of the two direct-acting vacuum trip units con­
sists of t w o sensing elements. Each of the four elements
compares condenser vacuum with absolute vacuum, and

881
 Protection Chapter 11

SHAFT DRIVEN
MAIN OIL PUMP

VAPOUR
EXTRACTOR

FULL FLOW
DUPLEX
FILTER

RETURN
OIL
STRAINERS

TO JACKING
OIL PUMPS

OIL TURBINE A.C. MOTOR DRIVEN D.C. MOTOR DRIVEN

DRIVEN LUBRICATING OIL LUBRICATING OIL PUMP
BOOST PUMP PUMP

FIG. 11.11 Lubricating oil system

both elements of ehher unit are required to sense
low vacuum before direct tripping of the turbine can
occur. The turbine tripping is inhiated when ehher of
the low vacuum trip units senses low vacuum and, by
direct mechanical action, causes lubricating oil to be
released from a corresponding trip cylinder (same one
as for lubricating oil). This then causes the correspond­
ing emergency trip valve to operate. The system can
be on-load tested by admitting air to hs sensing ele­
ments: this includes operation of the trip valve. Opera­
tion of a by-pass interlocking valve prevents operation
of the main stop valves. This valve has to be in the
by-pass position before on-load testing can be carried
out.
The above arrangement causes a trip of the unit by
fluid pressure swhches in the hydrauhc control fluid
supply to the emergency trip valves. This trip is routed
via the low forward power relay and is therefore time
delayed. Motoring of the set under low vacuum con­
ditions would cause rapid overheating of the turbine
blades. This shuation could arise if the low forward
power relay interlock fails to close. A direct electrical
trip from the low vacuum to the generator circuit-
breaker is therefore provided: this has to be done
electrically since operation of the power fluid pressure
switches is a delayed trip. The following explains how
the electrical trip for low vacuum on a modern 660 M W
turbine-generator is achieved.
Turbine tripping is effected electrically by pres­
sure switches which monitor the vacuum of the three
condensers. The two vacuum hues are brought out
downstream of an arrangement of a ball shuttle valve,
which automatically selects the condenser with the
poorest vacuum and connects it to each of the two
vacuum lines. The three condensers are interconnected
by balance pipes, and hence trip initiation occurs if
the vacuum in any condenser fahs below the trip set­
ting. Four pressure switches are provided, arranged in
a 'two from t w o ' logic configuration per trip channel.
5.4 Condensate conductivity high
Turbine tripping is initiated by conductivity trans­
mitters used to monitor condensate contamination at
the outlet from the condensate polishing plant and from
the condensate extraction pumps discharge pipework.
A set of four transmitters is provided corresponding
to each location and these will operate in a 'two from
two' logic configuration per tripping channel for each
set of transmitters. Each transmitter can be checked
on-load, in turn, by adjustment of its set point.
5.5 Manual trip lever
The turbine manual trip lever mechanically forces both
of the trip linkages connected to the two emergency
trip valves into the trip position. The trip latches be­
come displaced and cause the associated emergency trip
valves to operate.

882

5.6 Overspeed trip
There have been incidents resuhing in turbine-genera­
tors reaching a dangerous overspeed and every effort
has been made in formulating the protection to reduce
this danger. Overspeed occurs when the steam passing
through the turbine exceeds that required to match
the load. The turbine speed is controlled by the gov­
ernor to a speed less than the overspeed trip setting.
In the event of the speed governor and its control
system failing to close the governor valves, an over-
speed trip device attached to the shaft of the turbine
acts directly to trip the emergency trip valves, closing
both the governor and main stop valves. However, none
of these safety measures whl be effective if for some
reason the governor and main stop valves fail to close
properly. This could be for the fohowing reasons:
(a) Damage to main steam valve spindle or seat, e.g.,
cracking, surface pick-up or galling (swelhng due
to corrosion).
(b) Hydraulic contamination of the hydraulic control
fluid on a massive scale.
(c) Water carryover from the boiler causing distortion
of the main steam valve ducts.
On-load testing arrangements, routine monitoring of
the fluid condition, the existence of a secondary method
of valve closure and the fact that the emergency stop
valves and governor valves are series connected, com­
bine to make the probabihty of the steam valves not
closing due to causes (a) and (b) not credible. On
the other hand, water carryover causing distortion and
preventing valve closure remains a possibility. Thus
there is a danger of overspeed. This risk is minimised
by a protection interlock which ensures that the power
output from the machine is reduced to a low level
before the generator circuit-breaker is opened. The
method relies on the fact that an overspeed cannot
occur provided that the output from the generator
is absorbed by the grid. If the generator remains syn­
chronised until such time as the steam flow to the
turbine has reached a safe level, then the danger of
excessive overspeed is removed.
In fact, the same argument could be used for the
majority of the mechanical protection systems on the
turbine. Loss of lubricating oil pressure is no more
likely to cause water carryover or valve distortion
than, say, a trip from a relay detecting an overcurrent
condition. The decision was made that ah protection
systems which could tolerate a few seconds delay (until
the turbine input power reached a low level), would
be routed through an interlock which measures the
power delivered to the turbine and prevents the open­
ing of the generator circuit-breaker if this power is
too high.
A scheme was developed incorporating this inter­
lock which categorised the various boiler/turbine-gen­
erator protective systems as fohows:
Turbine protection
Category A Those protecting against fauh conditions
which cannot tolerate a trip delayed until a low power
condition is reached.
Category Β Those protecting against fault conditions
which could tolerate a trip delayed unth a low power
condition is reached.
For faults in Category A , avoidance of overspeeding
rests solely with the steam/governor valves closing
correctly, whereas those in Category Β have the low
power interlock effectively preventing the protection
from opening the generator circuit-breaker, thus re­
taining the turbine-generator in synchronism until the
steam supply is reduced to such a level where over-
speed cannot occur.
Except for two — loss of excitation and generator
transformer winding temperature — all of the elec­
trical protection systems to be described in Sections
6 to 9 of this chapter were selected for Category A
because of the danger from high fault currents if these
were ahowed to persist for the length of time it could
take to reach a low power level. For these faults the
turbine hydrauhc fluid system has to work correctly.
Generator transformer winding temperature and gen­
erator loss of excitation trips were considered as the
two protection systems that could wait for a low power
condition.
5.6.1 C h o i c e of interlocic
The interlock could be based on an accurate measure­
ment of steam flow or differential pressure across the
turbine but this is difficuh to perform and investiga­
tions by the C E G B into these and other methods of
measurement have not proved rewarding. It was decided
therefore, that low power to the turbine could be mea­
sured by the electrical power output from the gen­
erator, using a sensitive low forward power relay. The
contacts of this relay are in series with the Category Β
trip relay contact. The unit can only be tripped from
Category Β protection systems when the contacts on
the low forward power relay close to indicate a power
condhion less than 0 . 7 % from the generator to the
system.
5.6.2 S e t t i n g of t h e l o w f o r w a r d p o w e r relay
A figure of 0 . 7 % forward power was chosen as the
setting point since, from curves prepared by the C E G B
(Fig 11.12), h can be seen that the maximum allow­
able overspeed of 2 5 % (guaranteed tested figure) is
produced when the steam input exceeds the total ma­
chine losses by 0 . 7 % at synchronous speed, and this
sets the upper limit of operation of the relay. A low
forward power relay was chosen as hs contacts are
closed while the generator is being run-up and synchro­
nised, thus permitting the protection to be in service.
Further, a small steam leak occurring when the steam
883
 Protection C h a p t e r 11

OVERSPEED FOR 0.7% FULL LOAD RELAY SETTING

TURBINE
LOSSES
AGAINST
SPEED

660MW

POWER INPUT LINES

GIVING 0.7%
FORWARD POWER
SETTING
AT SYNCHRONOUS SPEED

1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.8

SPEED RATIO, p.u. SPEED 3000 r/mIn = 1.0

FIG. 11.12 Low forward power relay setting point for 60, 100 and 660 MW units

valve has nominally closed could be sufficient to cancel
the motoring power, leaving the machine to float or
run generating at low power, which is why a reverse
power relay would not operate and is not suitable.
The operating limits chosen are 0 . 2 % to 0 . 7 % forward
power.
Senshive low forward power relays, such as the
Brown-Boveri type P P X 110/111, have been specifi­
cally designed and approved for this purpose. Power
measurement is by three-phase power measurement at
rated voltage. The principle of operation is explained
with the aid of a block diagram (Fig 11.13). The voltage
and current transformers of the generator are connected
to the interposing transformers A or B, respectively.
These transform the input values to the necessary level
for the relay electronics. The current signal is converted
into a squared voltage signal and during the negative
half-cycles it is switched to the low pass filter by means
of the field-effect transistor switch. This determines
the linear average value and generates a D C voltage
proportional to the active power. The phase correction
network serves to compensate the phase angle errors
of the measurement transformers. For three-phase con­
nection the changeover switch on the summing ampli­
fier must be set in position 3 W M , and for two-phase
connection (2 wattmeter method) in position 2 W M .
The summing amplifier adds the voltages propor­
tional to the phase loads. The voltage at hs output.
proportional to the three-phase power, is fed to the
trigger which has an adjustable setting. Load selection
is by means of the m a x / m i n switch located immediately
after the trigger device.
Blocking gates are provided to inhibit relay operation
if:
• The power supply is too low.
• The relay is blocked externally.
For relay type P P X l l O the operating signal passes
via the timing element a n d , if required, via bridg­
ing link (2) to an auxiliary relay. A second parallel
route for the signal is via an inverter to the output
terminal.
O n the type P P X l l O relay, tripping can be delayed
by 0 . 5 - 5 s and indicated by an L E D ; the setting nor­
mally chosen is 2 s. The auxiliary relay can be applied
to supervise the 15 V stabihsed power supply by clos­
ing the bridging link (3).
Two timing elements are supplied with the type
P P X l l l relay, one delays the operating signal by 0 . 5 -
5 s and the other by 5 - 5 0 s.
The following protective devices operate through the
low forward power relay:
• All turbine trips, except the low vacuum electrical
trip of the trip valves.

884
 Turbine protection
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Protection
• All generator mechanical trips, plus the generator
electrical trips, which are described in Section 6 of
this chapter.
5.7 LP exhaust steam temperature high
If the vacuum is low and the spraywater system is being
used to keep the turbine blades cool, a measurement
of exhaust steam temperature is an indication of the
failure of the spraywater system. This is not always
a u n h trip and depends on the turbine manufacturer.
The spraywater system has its own protection; if it
fails, the turbine is tripped and this will trip the u n h
through low hydraulic fluid pressure.
5.8 Loss of electric governor
The latest turbines are fitted with electronic governors
employing a redundancy system of electrical control
channels in order to provide adequate security. As
a final protection, in the event of fahure of a suffi­
ciently large number of channels to invalidate the re­
dundancy system, or of any other failure which renders
the governor inoperative, a signal will be given to trip
the u n h via the low forward power interlock relay.
5.9 Low steam inlet temperature and
pressure
Consideration of an incident in 1960, where a turbine
oversped out of control, suggested that a loss of firing
occurred and the feedwater regulation system was un­
able to cope with the transient. The result was water
carryover that caused the turbine to overspeed. In that
combination of circumstances, it was reasonable to
contend that the major fault was a loss of firing and
that the best available indication of this condition was
low steam inlet pressure at the turbine. An unloading
system had been evolved in 1954 for apphcation to
60 M W and higher rated turbine-generators. The prin­
ciple was to commence deloading at 90% of normal
operating pressure and to reduce the load to 10% M C R
by the time pressure had fallen to 8 5 % of normal.
Hence the unloading gear offered reasonable protec­
tion against water carryover, since the most probable
cause of carryover was the combination of feedwater
regulation or partial firing. Later, in 1969, a form
of tripping from low steam inlet pressure was recom­
mended. However, due to the low reliability of the
system, which caused a number of spurious trips, the
equipment was taken out of service in the mid-1970s.
The principle of low steam inlet pressure protection,
whilst being acceptable when the grid was supported
by a large number of small units which operated at fixed
pressure in the 7 0 % to 100% M C R range, was not
suitable for newer modes of operation, which included
shding pressure operation. T o continue whh hs ap­
plication therefore required an updating of the design.
C h a p t e r 11
refurbishment of the hardware and the application of
sophisticated veto facilities. This was considered in­
appropriate and expensive and therefore the discon­
tinuation of the application of low steam pressure
deloading and trip equipment on high pressure fossil-
fired plant was recommended on all 500 M W and 660
M W u n h s , the main grid supporting stations.
This change in protection philosophy left the turbine
at risk to water carryover in the event of a total loss
of boiler firing. It is now standard practice on all the
660 M W u n h s at conventional power stations to design
on the basis of the operators taking corrective action,
which must be done within 1 minute. T o facilitate
this, the fohowing features are provided:
• A suitable alarm is initiated from a total loss of
firing.
• The status of the flames in the furnace is displayed.
• The pertinent steam pressures and temperatures are
displayed.
• A n emergency trip pushbutton is provided.
All the above facilities are mounted on the appropriate
unit control panel/desk within a single viewing angle.
Nuclear power stations, w h h once-through boilers,
have a short time constant for the passage of steam
from the boiler to turbine, and there is insufficient
time for the operator to be sure of preventing water
carryover to the turbine for abnormal boiler condi­
tions, as in conventional stations. There was therefore
no alternative but to provide an automatic trip by the
inferred measurement of steam saturation from read­
ings of steam temperature and pressure.
6 Generator protection
The protection arrangements for the generator neces­
sarily include the main connections and transformer
windings connected at the generator terminal voltage.
The generator transformer protection arrangements will
overlap with generator protection, especially where the
generator is directly connected to its transformer. The
generator protective systems are hsted on Fig 11.35.
6.1 Stator earth faults (low impedance
earthing)
Prior to 1950, estabhshed practice was to earth the
generator star point using a vohage transformer, the
secondary of which generally operated an alarm. Fol­
lowing a number of serious breakdowns in the gen­
erator windings during 1950 and 1951, this practice
was discontinued and replaced by low resistance earth­
ing using a hquid earthing resistor. The aim was to
limit the fauh current to 300 A for all sizes of gen­
erators. The time rating of the resistor was 30 seconds,
although 10 seconds was ahowed if difficulty in ac-

commodation made this necessary. This pohcy was
fohowed for ah machines including 500 M W .
The earth fauh protection using this method of
earthing, consisted of two series-connected relays (Fig
11.14) supplied from a single 300 A current transformer
in the generator neutral connection. The first of these
relays is an instantaneous type and the second has
an inverse time characteristic.
The factors affecting the choice of the relay char­
acteristics and settings are described in the following
paragraphs.
The zero sequence voltage for a fault on the trans­
mission system is in the region of 50 to 60 kV and
the maximum surge vohage is limhed to approximately
1100 kV by the setting of the co-ordinating gaps. In
the normal way, earth fault protection on the gen­
erator should not detect these voltages as the LV
winding is delta connected. However, the interwinding
and winding to earth capacitances form a potential
divider with the generator neutral earthing system and
a small part of the zero sequence voltage and the surge
voltage wih appear on the LV side. With a relay setting
of 5 % of the nominal earth fauh current, chosen to
protect as much of the winding as possible without the
danger of malfunction from standing capacitance cur­
rents on the LV side, there is a danger that operation
from zero sequence voltages could occur if the relay was
instantaneous.
At this level of earth fauh current (15 A), h was
necessary for the protection to be time-delayed to
grade with the protection on the HV side of the gen­
erator transformer. The 10% setting (30 A) was above
the calculated transmhted voltages appearing across
the earthing system and therefore was made instan­
taneous. So two relays were provided, one set at 5 %
with an inverse time characteristic and one set at 10%
with an instantaneous operating time.
Core burning with levels of earth fault current u p
to 300 A is inevitable, despite instantaneous tripping,
so an ahernative form of earthing consisting of high
MAIN
GENERATOR
EARTH FAULT
RELAYS
LIQUID
EARTHING
RESISTOR
FIG. 11.14 Low resistance earthing
Generator protection
resistance, which limited the m a x i m u m earth fault cur­
rent with nominal terminal voltage at each earthing
point to 10 A , was subsequently introduced.
6.2 Stator earth faults (high resistance
earthing)
Following a desire to keep the core burning effects
of earth faults to a m i n i m u m , methods of earthing
through a higher impedance have been introduced.
The C E G B initially assessed two systems of earthing
which limited the fauh current to 2 - 3 A and 10-15 A
respectively. The factors under consideration were that
whilst the resistance in the generator neutral requires
to be as high as possible, h must not be so high as to
give rise to excessive overvoltages caused by neutral
displacement.
The displacement of the neutral in relation to the
vohage of the line terminals due to abnormal sys­
tem conditions, other than short-circuits, is known as
neutral inversion. Consider a set of impedances star
connected to the neutral N , Fig 11.15 (a). Then, if the
sum of the phase voltages to Ν is zero, Ν is defined
as the geometric centre. In the general case, where the
neutral Ν is not directly earthed, if an unbalance of
the phase to neutral impedances occurs, then a vohage
will appear between neutral and true earth. Considering
Fig 11.15 (b); let Ρ be at the geometric centre, i.e.,
the voltages to it Ea, Eb, Ec, sum to zero. Let the star
admittances to the neutral point Ν be Ya, Yb and Υς.
Then if Ν is an isolated neutral, the sum of the
currents entering Ν is zero. Let D be the voltage
between Ρ and Ν
la = (Ea - D) Ya
lb = (Eb - D) Yb
Ic = (Ec - D) Yc
Since la + lb + Ic = 0 then
EaYa + EbYb + EcYc = D(Ya + Yb + Yc) (H-l)
From this, if Ya = Yb = Yc, (Ea + Eb + Ec) = 3D
and, since Ea + Eb + Ec = 0, then D = 0, Ν
coincides with Ρ and, if Ρ is an earth point, then Ν is
also at earthed potential.
Now if the 'a' phase is open-circuit so that its ad­
mittance to Ν is zero, (Xa = and Ya = 0) and if
Yb = Yc, then from Equation (11.1) D = i - E a and,
on a balanced system of voltages, Ν has moved to N '
(Fig 11.15 (b)). Thus the voltage between Ν and earth
= Τ a. If the three-phase system becomes unbalanced,
with the 'a' phase purely capacitative and *bV*c' phases
capacitative and inductive then
Ya = j ω C , Yb = l/j(ωL - l/ωC) = - jωC/(ω2LC-1).
Then, from Equation (11.1) D = Ea ( ω 2 L C ) / ( ω 2 L C - 3)
and Ν moves along A B depending on the value of ω^Ι,Ο
887
Protection Chapter 11

and the vohage between Ρ and Ν can be very large

if ω^LC approaches 3 in magnitude, i.e., series re­
sonance occurs and Ν moves to infinity.
As far as the generator and hs earthing system is
concerned, the latter condition is unhkely but it does
demonstrate that excessive overvoitages can occur if
POSITION OF ·Ν· IF
a- PHASE IS OPEN the phase to neutral impedances become unbalanced
when the neutral is not grounded.
Excessive overvoitages can also be caused by arcing
ground faults on an unearthed generator system result­
ing from cyclically recurrent earth faults in the manner
(a) & (b) Neutral inversion
described below. When the earth first occurs, the neu­
tral will oscillate sinusoidally at system frequency. In
the worst case, if the arc is extinguished when the neu­
tral is at phase to neutral voltage, the trapped charge
in the system capacitance will hold the neutral at this
VOLTAGES

I
peak vohage so that the fauhed phase vohage wih now
oscillate from ground potential to twice the phase to
neutral vohage. Should the arc restrike when the phase

/ voltage is at a maximum then it is brought down to

ground potential and the voltage on the neutral be­

w /N

1f/
comes phase to neutral voltage. The neutral then oscil­
lates sinusoidally at system frequency as before. This
condition is reached through an oscillation whose
magnitude is controlled by the circuit damping and an
oscillation frequency based on the natural frequency
of the system. This is shown in Fig 11.15 (c).
Work carried out in the U S A shows that the critical
damping which will reduce these excessive overvoitages
EARTH FAULT
CURRENT PHASE 'a'
u l-
1
to a minimum is when the value of the earthing resis­
tor R = 1/3 the per phase generator capacitance to
ground (Fig 11.15 (d)).
The value of R for critical damping on the C E G B
generator voltage system is such as to limit the current
(c) Overvoitages due to fault current cessation at system frequency zeros
on a system with the neutral insulated. to 2 to 3 A .
However, experience has shown that resistance earth­
ing of the neutral point which restricts the earth fault
current to not less than 5 A , provides an effective earth
anchor under all operating conditions and avoids the
two conditions described.
I 320- A practical resistance, designed for direct connec­
tion to meet these crheria, would be both unwieldy
κ 280-
and costly, since the resistance would have to be about
O
1300 Ω and the design such as to ensure against me­
^ 240-
Σ chanical failure. Use is therefore made of a matching
O 200 Η transformer with a suitable turns ratio, chosen to per­
o
Η·
160- mit a robust heavy current low-valued resistor to be
> 120· connected to the low vohage winding having a value,
I-
i when viewed from the high voltage side, equal to that
w 80-
required for direct connection.
The choice of such high values and the use of a
transformer introduces certain other technical problems,
—ι 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1 8 2.0 apart from those arising from overvoitages mentioned
kW DISSIPATION OF R previously, and the choice of transformer and relay
' CAPACITATIVE 3 0 CHARGE, kVA
(d) Damping effect of NER on generator overvoitages
connections is influenced by other considerations. These
are as fohows:

FIG. 11.15 Overvoitages on high resistance neutral due • The working flux density of the transformer has
to neutral inversion and arcing ground fauks to be chosen to ensure that under maximum vohage

888

conditions across the primary (maximum field-forc­
ing of the generator on open-circuit), the core iron
is weh below its knee point. This is to prevent the
possibihty of ferro-resonance w h h the generator
capacitances causing overvoltages on the generator
system under fault conditions. Ferro-resonance is a
condition where the transformer exciting impedance
forms a resonant circuit w h h the supply system
capacitance. The resonant frequency is usually sub­
normal. If the neutral is displaced as described
previously, it could drive the transformer into sat­
uration, the transformer could then resonate with
the system capacitance. If the frequency passes
through a third sub-harmonic, the oscihation could,
by absorbing energy from the system, be maintained
indefinitely. Allowing for an open-circuit overvoltage
of the generator of 140%, the flux density at this
voltage is arranged to be between one-half and two-
thirds of that at the knee point.
• The X : R ratio due to leakage reactance of the
transformer and the combined resistance of the
transformer winding and earthing resistor should be
less than 2. This requirement keeps the power factor
of an arcing ground fault as high as is practical in
the interests of keeping restriking transients down.
• The impedance to earth of the neutral point of the
generator should not be so high as to allow the
effects of voltage unbalance produced on the H V
side of the generator transformer by system earth
faults, to transmit voltages on to the neutral earthing
resistor via the transformer interwinding capacitance
and thereby to cause unwanted operation of the
stator earth fault protection.
MAIN
GENERATOR
FIG. 1 1 . 1 6 Generator neutral earthing by distribution transformer
Generator protection
• With the relay setting sensitivity being such as to
detect 0.5 A ( 5 % of 10 A) in the generator neutral,
the effect of harmonic generated voltage, acting
through the machine capacitance to earth and the
neutral resistor in series, has to be taken into con­
sideration in the relay design. Both earth fault re­
lays are tuned to 50 H z to eliminate these third
harmonic currents.
T o avoid the problems introduced by designing for
low neutral currents, it is present practice to design
for neutral currents of 1 0 - 1 5 A . This has been done on
all 660 M W sets. The practice of designing for 2 - 3 A
used in t h e p a s t , led t o p r o b l e m s in locating
earth faults which caused the operation of protection
circuhs. A description of the design of the matching
transformer and the current hmiting resistance is given
in Chapter 3.
The earth fault protection using resistance earth­
ing through a distribution transformer is shown in
Fig 11.16. T w o methods of protection are used. One
(relay R l ) is C T operated and the other (relay R2)
VT operated. In both methods of protection, the relay
used is the same and comprises an induction disc with
an adjustable inverse t i m e / v o h a g e characteristic (Fig
11.17). The coh circuit is tuned for system frequency
by a series-connected reactor and capacitor. These
components are energised from a tapped auto-trans­
former which provides the adjustment of the relay
vohage. At vohages above the setting, the reactor sat­
urates and detunes the circuit, giving the relay a high
continuous voltage rating.
Tuned w o u n d shading coils are fitted so that the
relay develops maximum torque at the system frequency
SETTING
RESISTOR
INTERPOSING
VOLTAGE
TRANSFORMER
889
Protection Chapter 11

Tc current transformer turns ratio

TRIP CCT. SUPPLY le current transformer magnetising current
Isr relay current at setting
ALARM TRIP Vr relay setting voltage
relay impedance at setting
Required fault setting = (IfTv)(5/100)
relay circuh current I = If (0.05 x Tv)/Tc
Tc (le + Isr + Vr/Zr) = If (0.05 X Tv)

The knee point voltage Vk must be greater than that

required to drive current through the secondary cir­
cuh impedance for maximum earth fauh conditions,
therefore Vk must not be less than 1.4 IfTv/Tc(Rc +
Ret + Rw)V

where Ret = resistance of the current transformer

Rw = resistance of the wiring to the relay
Rr = resistance of the relay
Rs = resistance of the setting resistor
Re = RrRs/(Rr + Rs)

The rated primary current A i (not turns ratio) must

DISC UNIT
FIG. 11.17 Earth fault protection relay
and is much less sensitive to third harmonic frequency.
A setting range of 5 . 4 - 2 0 V is provided (the third
harmonic setting is at least 20 times higher). Where
the relay is CT-operated, a setting resistor is used in
parallel with the relay as shown in Fig 11.16. Where
the relay is directly measuring the voltage across the
earthing resistor (also shown in Fig 11.16), an inter­
posing voltage transformer is used to hmit the maxi­
m u m voltage across the relay under the worst fauh
conditions to less than its continuous voltage, and
to enable a setting of the protection to be 5% of
the maximum earth fault current on open-circuit and
nominal generator terminal volts. In order to help
clarify the protective arrangement the following shows
the process adopted to arrive at this 5% earth fault
setting of each protective system.
Many C E G B power stations have the earthing system
designed for a continuous rating. This is because the
stator earth fault protection was routed through the
low forward power relay interlock and therefore could
be maintained for the operator to clear the low forward
power condition. However, in light of experience where
an earth fault developed into a phase-to-phase fault
before the protection tripped the HV circuit-breaker,
the stator earth fault protection is now a direct trip.
The matching transformer was therefore made much
larger than it needed to be.
6.2.1 Current transformer requirements for
p r o t e c t i o n using relay R l
Let If = earth fault current at nominal voltage
Tv = matching transformer turns ratio
be equal to 1.4TvTf.
The calculation becomes very involved unless some
values are now given to the C T ratio and the setting
vohage on the relay. F r o m experience, the C T ratio
is chosen as 300/1 and the voltage setting on the relay
5.4 V (minimum). The maximum voltage across the
relay is specified not to exceed 120 V. The other con­
sideration is to maintain the voltage characteristic of
the relay, i.e., the vohage across the relay proportional
to fault current. So the resistor current needs to be
large compared with the magnetising current of the
C T at the maximum fault current. The matching trans­
former ratio is 66 : 1 (33 k V / 0 . 5 kV) so, with a nominal
10 A earthing current, the setting current is 33 A (5%
X 660). With the minimum voltage setting on the
relay of 5.4 V, the setting resistor value Rs = 5.4
(300/33) = 49 Ω.
The maximum continuous fault current through the
setting resistor, assuming a maximum open-circuit voh­
age from the generator of 1.5 times nominal voltage
and a fault just less than 5% from the generator neu­
tral, wih be (1.5 X 33/300) A , so the continuous rating
of Rs has to be not less than (1.5 x 33/300)^ χ 49
= 1.33 W .
6.2.2 Matching transformer
The short time rating is 15 A for 3 s, based on a 1 s
operating time of the protection at the maximum fault
(15 A) and 45 A for 1 s for a short-circuh of the
loading resistor. The continuous rating is 0.5 A , based
on a fault current just below the protection setting.
Where a generator voltage circuit-breaker is used,
the same arrangement is used on the neutral connection
of the earthing transformer (Fig 11.18). The earthing
transformer provides an earth for the connections and
transformers windings at the generator voltage when

890

GENERATOR SYSTEM
MATCHING
TRANSFORMER
FIG. 1 1 . 1 8 Neutral earthing of a generator system with a generator voltage circuit-breaker
the generator vohage circuit-breaker is open. This
protection is time delayed to grade with the generator
stator earth fault protection which trips only the
generator vohage circuit-breaker. If the fault current
continues to flow in the earthing transformer neutral,
this protection trips the H V circuit-breaker and the
unit transformer LV circuit-breakers to isolate the
fault, resulting in a loss of supply to the unit auxiliaries.
If the fauh current ceases to flow in the earthing
transformer neutral, indicating a generator stator earth
fault, then the supplies to the unit auxiliaries are main­
tained. This is very important at nuclear power stations
where h is essential to maintain grid supphes to the
essential auxiliaries without the need to run auxiliary
generation.
In order to keep costs down, however, the generator
voltage circuit-breaker used on earher nuclear stations
was replaced by a generator voltage switch discon­
nector, so that grading could not then be obtained
and both generator earth fault systems tripped the
generator by opening the H V circuit-breaker without
a time delay.
If the primary or secondary of the matching trans­
former becomes short-circuited, the earth fauh pro­
tection of the generator is lost. The fault would then
be detected by stator differential protection (see Section
6.3 of this chapter) if provided. The overall protection
of the generator and its step-up transformer is insensi­
tive to earth faults, so that at conventional stations
where stator differential is not provided, an earth fault
would go undetected. Even at nuclear power stations
utilising isolation at generator voltage, approximately
10% of the winding would be unprotected, the actual
amount depending on the setting of the stator differ­
Generator protection
INTERPOSING
VOLTAGE
TRANSFORMER
ential protection. In order to hmit the possibility of
an earth fault on the neutral connection, which effec­
tively shorts out the earth fauh protection, the earthing
transformer is mounted very close to the generator
neutral connection and additional protection is pro­
vided from a current transformer mounted in the gen­
erator neutral connection operating into an instan­
taneous relay (R3 on Fig 11.16). The protection is set
to detect fault currents in excess of 25 A . The earthing
transformer system for earthing on the generator trans­
former side of the generator voltage circuit-breaker
(required only when a generator voltage circuit-breaker
or switch disconnector is used) has the matching
transformer under oil in the same t a n k , so reducing the
possibihty of short-circuhing the protection and thus
the additional protection of an instantaneous relay in
the neutral is not provided.
6.3 Stator phase to phase faults
Phase to phase faults clear of earth are less c o m m o n
t h a n phase to earth, but earth faults can develop into
phase to phase fauhs. They may occur on the end
portion of the stator cohs or in the slots, if the wind­
ing involves two coil sides of different phases in the
same slot. If the latter, the fault will involve earth
in a very short time and will be cleared by the earth
fauh protection but only after a time delay, due to
the inverse character of the relay. Fast protection
against phase to phase fauhs is achieved using the
circulating current principle, with either a differential
protection system, using biased relays, or a differential
system of protection using high impedance relays. The
method adopted depends upon the plant included in
891
 Protection
the protection zone, a biased relay if across the gen­
erator and generator transformer, or a high impedance
relay circuit if across the generator only. Before ex­
plaining the C E G B philosophy on the choice of zones
of protection, an explanation is required of the prin­
ciples of these two protective schemes.
Both protective systems employ current transformers
on both sides of the protected plant. The C T ratios
are chosen such that the current flows only in the se­
condary windings of the current transformers and not
in the relay operating coil circuits under load or through
fault conditions. Under internal fault conditions, the
secondary equivalent of the fault current flows in the
relay operating circuits. However, when the generator
and generator transformer are included in the protected
zone, the following complications are introduced:
• On energisation, the magnetising current surge pro­
duces an out of balance current in the relay op­
erating coils.
• All generator transformers are equipped with tap­
changers, and the transformation ratio can only be
matched at one tap position. Thus, at other tap
positions, out of balance currents flow in the relay
operating coils making it difficult to obtain a low
setting.
• Differences in the design characteristics of the CTs
on the high and low voltage sides are often un­
avoidable.
The effect of magnetising inrush current is ehminated
by means of a harmonic bias unit which selects the
second harmonic component of this current and uses
it to restrain the relay during the surge period. The out
of balance currents caused by off-nominal tap posi­
tions and the differences in C T design characteristics
are overcome by the use of bias windings in the relay.
Figure 11.19 shows a typical magnetising current surge.
The waveform indicates a predominance of second
harmonic. Figure 11.20 shows a relay using a trans­
ductor (Reyrolle 4C21). The harmonic bias u n h is a
simple tuned circuit which responds to the second
harmonic component of the magnetising current. The
rectified output of BR2 is injected into the transductor
input biased winding and restrains the relay.
lliJiJüιιι^ΛΛ>LλΛΛJv^
n- CYCLE
• INSTANT OF SWITCHING
FIG. 11.19 Typical transformer magnetising current
waveform
892
Chapter 11
The out of balance currents and current transformer
mismatch currents are not large enough to overcome
the D C bias M M F (Fig 11.21), so that the flux change
is small. For internal fauhs, the operating M M F pro­
duced by the much greater current involved (about 20
times) exceeds the bias M M F , resulting in a large change
in working flux in the output coil to the relay. Hence
the minimum operating current of the relay depends
on the bias current. This produces a characteristic for
the relay as shown in Fig 11.22. It can be seen that,
for fauhs near t o the neutral of the transformer which
have only a small effect on the bias current, the relay
is very insensitive. Further, the higher the bias setting
the more insensitive the relay becomes. The current
transformer ratios are therefore chosen to match the
middle of the tapping range rather than the nominal
tap, which is nearer to one end of the winding. For
example, with a ± 10% tapping range, the relay is set
to cover a deviation of 1 0 % .
A factor of 2 is applied to ensure stabihty under
through-fault conditions, i.e., 2 0 % bias. The operating
current setting, i.e., n o bias current, is fixed at 2 0 % .
This gives an actual setting of 5 0 % with full-load bias
current. Note that halving the operating current setting
to 10% reduces the actual setting with full-load bias
current to only 4 0 % , so that a setting lower than 2 0 %
is not chosen.
The setting leaves the b o t t o m end of the winding
unprotected, so that additional earth fault protection
is provided to cover this part of the winding. This is
also necessary for faults higher up the winding if the
neutral of the transformer is earthed through an earth­
ing resistor which restricts the earth fault current to less
than full-load current.
A further consideration in earth fault sensitivity is
that the majority of power station power transformers
are s t a r / d e h a connected or star/star with one star point
unearthed. Typical connections are shown in Fig 11.23.
If the star point of the biased differential relay is
connected t o the star point of the interposing current
transformer, there is a mismatch of the zero sequence
currents under through earth fault conditions. The
relay acts as a shunt path t o the tertiary winding of
the interposing C T . It is C E G B practice, therefore, to
eliminate the zero sequence currents from the relay
circuit by leaving the star point of the relay operating
coils unearthed.
Figure 11.24 shows the arrangements for the gen­
erator and the unit transformer when the generator
has a means of disconnection at generator voltage. The
C T knee point requirements for restricted earth fault
protection and biased differential are the same, so the
two protection systems are combined on the same set
of current transformers.
The earth fault protection is designed on the same
basis as all differential protection, using a high im­
pedance relay circuit. The basic principle of the pro­
tection is that it should be stable for the heaviest
through fault and that the worst condition for this is
 Generator protection

GENERATOR CURRENT
TRANSFORMER TRANSFORMER

TRANSDUCTOR
INPUT BIAS
WINDING

INPUT OPERATING
WINDING

RELAY
ELEMENT

OUTPUT
WINDING TO
RELAY
OPERATING
COIL

HARMONIC
BIAS
UNIT

FIG. 11.20 Transformer biased differential relay

if one C T of a balancing pair saturates and the other
one does not. This gives the maximum voltage appear­
ing across the relay circuit.
The principles adopted are as follows:
(a) The relay circuit is of such high impedance that
h can be set above the maximum voltage that can
occur for through fault currents for which the
protection should be stable.
(b) The knee point voltage of the CTs must be twice
the setting voltage.
In considering (a), the worst case is where one C T in a
balancing circuh saturates. It is assumed that this C T
then produces no output and presents its resistive
burden only. Referring to Fig 1 1 . 2 5 , Vs must be
greater than Ips ( R A + R c ) or Ips ( R B + R D ) ,
where Ips = m2iximum secondary through fault current
Vs = relay setting voltage.
This is the simple case and is the basis of the cal­
culation when applying high impedance differential
protection to the generator. The generator transformer
protection is more comphcated when biased differential
protection and earth fault protection are combined on
the same current transformer and reference now is
again m a d e to Fig 1 1 . 2 3 . The comphcations are that
apart from the resistances of the primary circuit con­
taining the restricted earth fauh relay, there are also
the reflected impedances of the overall differential
relay circuit.
If we consider first of all the earth fault at X in
red phase Fig 1 1 . 2 3 , the secondary earth fault current
in the primary of the interposing CTs will produce

893
Protection Chapter 11

χ
3

MMF

FIG. 1 1 . 2 1 Biased differential relay operation

The fauh setting is (Is + 3 I i + I 2 ) / T i

where Is = relay current at Vs vohs

11 = magnetising current of line CT at Vs volts
12 = magnetising current of C T in the trans­
former neutral

In order to achieve a low setting on a transformer

4 6 8 10 12 14
BIAS CURRENT I (MULTIPLES OF RELAY RATING)
FIG. 1 1 . 2 2 Biased differential relay operating
characteristics
currents in red and yellow of the overall biased differen­
tial relay, as shown. Now assuming the voltage across
the operating coils (Ro) of the biased differential relay
is zero, the resistance of the loop is
(A + Β + F + G) + (H + 2K 4- Rb) [ T 2 / T 3 ] ^ = R,
where the second term is the resistance of the circuit
across the secondary of the interposing transformers
referred to the primary winding.
Vs must be > I p / T i χ R for the line CT saturated
or > I p / T i X Ν for the neutral CT saturated
whichever is the greater.
with a tapchanger, biased differential protection with
a low impedance operating coil is required. If the
protective zone contains the generator only, then the
differential protection using a high impedance operat­
ing coil circuit is required giving a lower setting for
the protection, fast operating times and a high degree
of stability. There is therefore a case for two protec­
tion zones, one across the generator and one across
the transformer, since one zone covering both must
always be a compromise.
Where a generator is directly connected to the LV
side of the generator transformer, as has been the
practice for all fossh-fired power stations to date, any
fault inside the zone must open the high voltage circuit-
breaker. The protection of the stator against phase
fauhs is therefore included in the generator transformer
biased differential protection using a biased relay, and
a separate zone of protection for stator winding phase
faults is not provided, i.e., one zone only. Nothing
would be gained from an operational point of view
by detecting whether the fault is in the generator or in
the transformer. Further, ah protection CTs can be
mounted on the generator neutral connections, which
from a practical point of view is an advantage. Refer­
ence to Fig 11.26 shows the arrangement.

894

GENERATOR
MAIN
TRANSFORMER
GENERATOR CTs
-PR
FIG. 11.23 Overall biased differential protection circuit
Without the fast differential protection on the gen­
erator and connections, additional protection is re­
quired to provide fast clearance of generator faults, or
fauhs on the connections to the transformers. Winding
faults start as earth faults and are generally cleared by
earth fault protection. The C E G B provides additional
fast phase-fauh protection by means of a high set
instantaneous relay on the H V side of the generator
step-up transformer. Protection using an instantaneous
relay is more fully explained under H V and LV connec­
tions protection, but the principle is to obtain a setting
for an instantaneous relay which is stable for system
(400 kV) fauhs but is senshive enough to detect gen­
erator terminal fauhs.
Where a generator voltage circuit-breaker is pro­
vided at the generator voltage level, as at some nuclear
stations and at Dinorwig pumped-storage station, a
fault on the generator detected by the protection as
being on the generator can be cleared by opening that
generator voltage circuit-breaker, thus maintaining es­
sential supplies to the unit auxiharies via the generator
transformer and unit transformer. Furthermore, ac­
commodation for the current transformers can be p r o ­
vided in the generator voltage circuit-breaker. A two
zone differential protection scheme is therefore used.
Back-up protection for stator winding phase faults
is provided by means of a directional overcurrent relay.
Generator protection
EARTH FAULT MAIN
CTs AT POINT X ^ CIRCUIT-BREAKER
RPh
BLUE
j. INTERPOSING
V' TRANSFORMERS
T1 = TURNS RATIO OF LINE AND NEUTRAL
CURRENT TRANSFORMERS
12 _ TURNS RATIO OF INTERPOSING
T3 "CURRENT TRANSFORMERS
A typical directional relay consists of a voltage polaris­
ing u n h and an ordinary overcurrent u n h .
The directional element relay (Fig 11.27) operates
o n the induction wattmeter principle and consists es­
sentially of an aluminium sector mounted on a vertical
spindle and arranged to rotate in the airgap between
magnetic fields derived from line current and vohage
transformers. Under healthy system conditions, the
torque produced on the relay restrains operation. On
current reversal, here a fauh on the generator, the
torque reverses and causes the moving sector to close
contacts in the shading coil of the inverse time over-
current unit. This ahows settings lower t h a n normal
generator load currents to be set on the relay and
restricts operation to faults on the generator permh-
ting fast back-up protection for generator phase to
phase faults, which can be cleared by opening the
generator voltage circuit-breaker. By positioning the
CTs in the generator voltage circuit-breaker on the
generator side, faults can be cleared from the system by
opening the generator voltage circuit-breaker only. A
direct (Category A) trip of the generator and turbine
is also initiated.
The protection used for the connections from the
generator vohage circuh-breaker to the generator trans­
former is described in the Section 9 of this chapter,
on the protection of H V and LV connections.
895
Protection Chapter 11

BIASED
DIFFERENTIAL DIFFERENTIAL DIFFERENTIAL
PROTECTION PROTECTION PROTECTION

-βά-

Δ Y
t3b idb dtt
MAIN MAIN GENERATOR GENERATOR
GENERATOR VOLTAGE SWITCH TRANSFORMER

EARTHING
TRANSFORMER

UNIT BIASED
TRANSFORMER DIFFERENTIAL
PROTECTION

FiG. 11.24 Overall unit differential protection scheme with generator vohage switch

FIG. 11.25 Generator phase and earth fauh protection

896
 Generator protection

GENERATOR
TRANSFORMER

FIG. 11.26 Overall unit differential protection scheme without generator voltage switch

the standard H V test (this apphes particularly to

the overhang portion of the winding).

• Winding vibration/movement under fault and nor­

mal load cychng conditions, coupled with the asso­
ciated loosening of electrical connections.

• Moisture, due to stator conductor coohng water

AUX. S U P P L Y

ALARM i TRIP
leakage into the gas system.

• Moisture due to insufficient dry-out of the generator

V» vA A/ A ν » C.J.
when placing it in initial service, or after a pro­
SHORTING
CONTACTS longed outage when the stator has been degassed for
CURRENT
maintenance/repairs.
COIL

• Complete or local loss of stator conductor cooling

water during test or fauh conditions.
I ^_ _J
U(7)
VOLT- .
VOLTAGE V
POLARISING^
y
• Contamination of the stator winding coohng circuit.
POLARISING^ ^
jm
The present protection arrangement relies on the inter­
DISC UNIT
turn fault developing into a fault capable of being
detected by one of the protective systems described.
Evidence shows that it can take several seconds for
an interturn fault to develop into either a phase to
phase or phase to earth fault, by which time severe
stator damage can occur. Protection which detected
the shorted turn condition could avoid much of the
FIG. 11.27 Directional element relay for phase fault damage by earlier tripping of the machine.
protection Several systems for the detection of such faults have
been, and are being, considered by the C E G B . One,
6.4 Stator turn to turn faults called *spht phase protection', utilises the fact that each
stator winding consists of two parahel windings and
Turn to turn winding faults may start from the follow­
detects turn to turn fauhs by measuring any difference
ing causes:
in the current in the two windings. This protection
• The use of faulty material or damage caused during is not yet recommended as a trip function, due to
manufacture, which may not have been detected by the difficulty in arriving at a setting that is stable for

897
Protection
system faults but sensitive enough to detect a turn to
turn fault. At present, a prototype is in service but on
'alarm' only.
6.5 Negative phase sequence
Negative phase sequence (NPS) currents in the gen­
erator stator are caused by unbalanced loading or un­
balanced faults. Unbalanced loading is usually caused
by an open-circuit of one phase at some point in the
system external to the generator and may persist for
sufficient time to cause dangerous overheating of the
generator rotor.
With the increase in size of units, the allowable
time for the negative phase sequence currents to flow
in the generator without damage has diminished. For
this reason, the negative phase sequence protection
must trip the unit directly (Category A ) . This protec­
tion is duplicated, one relay connected into each trip­
ping system. A sensitive negative phase sequence alarm
with continuous remote indication is also provided to
warn the operator of increase in N P S level in the
generators.
6.6 Loss of generator excitation
Failure of the excitation system results in the genera­
tor losing synchronism and operating as an induction
generator, drawing its excitation from the system.
Before proceeding further to describe the form of
protection, a discussion on the mechanism of *asynchro-
nous' running and operation as an induction generator
is required. There are several words associated with
engineering which have a prefix a such as asymmetrical,
astatic, etc., in which the a in front of the stem word
can mean either *not' or 'other than'. 'Asynchronous'
means 'other than synchronous' and, as apphed to any
rotating A C electrical machine, means non-synchronous
operation. Asynchronous operation as applied to a
turbine-generator, however, is confined to describing
its operation out of synchronism but with the rotor
winding unexcited. It is technically asynchronous when
pole shpping, but the term 'pole shpping' is reserved
in Britain for simple running out of synchronism with
the rotor winding excited. Pole slipping causes severe
voltage, power and reactive VA surges to take place
on the system whereas asynchronous operation, al­
though technically a pole slipping condition, is quite
innocuous as far as the system is concerned. The effect
on the transmission system is small but the voltage
depressions on the power station auxiliary system can
be large enough to cause voltage instability of the in­
duction motor drives.
T o understand the mechanism of asynchronous run­
ning, a reference to the steady state performance chart
(Fig 11.28), shows that under conditions of minimum
excitation, the smallest current to support full load
M W is 1.63 p . u . (typical of a machine where Xa =
2.0 p . u . ) . In this condition, the whole of the rotor
898
C h a p t e r 11
-MW (MOTOR) p.u.
0.20
2,0 1 63 1 5 10
EXCITATION ρ u ROTOR, A
FIG. 11.28 Basic performance diagram
flux is used in producing real power (MW) and the
rotor current is supphed from the stator by transformer
action. If, for example, 94000 ampere-turns are nor­
mally needed to maintain full output (60 M W gen­
erator), then, if the field swhch is open, the rotor is
reduced to one effective turn, i.e., axially down one
side and back up the other. The current required is
then 94 000 A . Further, in order to produce the voltage
required to drive this current through the rotor iron
and end bells,the rotor has to be driven asynchronously
at a speed above nominal, i.e., higher than 3000 r / m i n
for a two pole machine, and it behaves as an induction
generator. The currents flow in the surface of the
rotor due to skin effect, concentrating in the outer
centimetre or so. It can be seen therefore that as far
as the rotor is concerned, the situation is eased if the
turbine is tripped, since the power output drops from
the loaded condition to that required to overcome the
losses in the generator and turbine. The generator then
behaves hke an induction m o t o r on hght load. The
current required reduces to a level that can be tolerated
as a continuous operation as far as the machine is
concerned. However, MVArs are still drawn from the
system (rated M V A / X d ) , resulting in an unacceptable
drop in vohage to the auxiliary system if allowed to
persist for any length of time.
In the past, protection provided for this type of
fault was arranged to operate an alarm only. However,
with the increased outputs and higher specific electrical
loadings of modern generators, the time available to
run under loss of synchronism conditions is much
reduced. This is primarily because of the aster rate of
heating of the rotor surfaces, and consequently the
increased risk of damage. Additionally, the generator
and unit transformer voltage is considerably reduced
under loss of synchronism conditions. Depending on
system connection and loading condition, the voltage
reduction could be sufficiently severe to cause opera­
tion of the undervoltage protective devices fitted to
boiler auxiliaries. Hence, it has been decided to arrange
 Generator protection

for automatic tripping of the unit in the event of loss At balance, - lcos(0 - Θ) = K(V + I Z B ) sin φ
of excitation. or - lcos(0 - e)/Ksin φ = V -F I Z B
'Loss of generator excitation' protection is pro­
vided by an impedance measuring relay. The relay -cos(0-e)
giving, Ζ = — = - ZB
observes the change in impedance of the generator I Ksin0
from normal load condhions to that of total or partial
loss of excitation and is time delayed to avoid tripping where Ζ is the impedance the relay is measuring.
during recoverable transients.
The relay is basically a m h o type relay and the In the field failure relay, the polarising flux is made
theoretical circuh is shown in Fig 1 1 . 2 9 . A voltage to be in phase with the applied voltage by tuning the
I Z B is injected into the voltage circuit from the trans­ polarising coils to u n h y power factor and the flux in
actor and the polarising and restraint fluxes are dis­ the restraint coh to lag the voltage by 60° (φ = 60°).
placed by the tuning capachor C. The auto-transformer
adjusts the voltage applied to the restraining coil by Thus Ζ = - cos (Φ - 90) - ZB
a factor K. V3K
Referring to the loss of excitation phasor diagram = - Ki[cos<^ cos 90 H- smφ sin 90] - ZB,
shown on Fig 1 1 . 3 0 : where Ki = 2/V3K

The operating torque of the relay

= - Kisin0 - Z B

α Φροί Φορ sin [ ( 9 0 + (φ - θ ) ] and the relay characteristic plotted on an R-X diagram
α - (V + ΙΖΒ) Χ ICOS (φ - θ) is shown in Fig 1 1 . 3 1 .
It is not intended that this protection should pro­
The restraint torque vide cover for all possible pole shpping conditions but
oc Φροί Φres sin φ it must not operate under recoverable system swing
condhions. W h h the heating time constants involved,
oc + Κ (V -h I Z B ) 2 sin φ
a unit trip can be routed through the low forward power
interlock relay, although the C E G B now favours a
Hence the torque on the relay is direct trip.
oc - (V I Z B ) X Icos(</> - θ) A typical tripping system is shown in Fig 1 1 . 3 2 and
- K(V + I Z B ) 2 sin φ the operation is described as follows. Operation of the

RELAY
C
RELAY MOVEMENT
OPERATING (INDUCTION C
COIL \ ^ CUP) f>
CURRENT/VOLTAGE
TRANSACTOR o RESTRAINT
COIL

POLARISING
COILS

AUTOTRANSFORMER (

TRANSACTOR VOLTAGE OUTPUT

FIG. 1 1 . 2 9 Loss of generator excitation protection circuit

899
Protection Chapter 11

Φ =φροΙ AND φ res REACTANCE (X)

θ = MAXIMUM TORQUE ANGLE
0 = ANGLE BY WHICH THE
CURRENT I LAGS THE
VOLTAGE V
RESISTANCE (R)

LOCUS OF GENERATOR IMPEDANCE

WITH LOSS OF EXCITATION

FIG. 11.31 Loss of excitation relay operating

characteristic
I AND φ op

FIG. 11.30 Loss of excitation phasor diagram 6.7 Pole slipping

loss of excitation relay (LOE) picks up 40X operating
timers 2A and 2B. Timer relays 2A and 2B are then
'sealed' by contacts 2A and 2BX and therefore time
out irrespective of the loss of excitation relay. If timer
relay 2A times out before timer 2B operates auxiliary
relay 2BX, any operation of the loss of excitation relay
will cause a trip signal to be sent by relay 40Y. Relay
40Y is self-sealing to ensure operation of the unit
protection for fleeting operation of the loss of excitation
trip relays. Operation of the unit protection trip relays
will reset relay 40Y.
Pole shpping protection is only fitted subject to system
requirements. Sustained pole slipping can cause:
• Large fluctuations in voltage and frequency at the
generator terminals which affect the station auxiliary
power supplies, possibly leading to loss of boiler
firing a n d / o r failure of station auxihary motors,
fohowed by shutdown of the generating plant.
• Large fluctuations in voltage and, to a lesser extent,
frequency on the adjacent grid system which may
produce disturbances on consumer loads and on
other generating plant.

I LOE 2A TR3 2A 2Β
• 0

TR4 2ΒΧ

0
40X 40Y

TIMER RELAYS

-40X -40Y

TRIP

FIG. 11.32 Loss of excitation trip circuit

900

• Rapid fluctuations in generator speed during pole
slipping and of the steam demand from the boiler,
possibly resulting in loss of control of boiler, with
consequential damage to plant.
• Internal damage to generators due to overheating
or mechanical stress: also, mechanical damage to
shafts.
• Flow of synchronising power to and from pole slip­
ping generators, which may result in indiscriminate
operation of certain transmission protection, leading
to cascade tripping of circuits and further instabihty
and disconnection of supphes.
Since the response of conventional generation and
transmission systems wih be uncertain under pole slip­
ping conditions, and the rapid re-synchronising of a
pole slipping generator is unlikely, special protection
must be provided, but only where system design con­
siderations show that pole slipping is a possibUity.
General apphcation of pole slipping protection is not
recommended to date as it may reduce the reliability
of the supply system.
Pole slipping protection is very complex and full
details can be found in C E G B reports.
The requirements are that when the system centre,
voltage zero, occurs anywhere in the zone from the
HV terminals of the generator transformer to the gen­
erator a trip is initiated. Impedance relays are provided
to detect that pole slipping has occurred. The protec­
tion is blocked if the loss of excitation relay has
operated and started a trip sequence. The measuring
relays are capable of detecting the first pole slip in
the range of 0 . 1 % to 1 0 % . Pole slipping counting
relays are provided in the range 1-10, to initiate a trip
after a preselected number of pole slips as a back-up
to pole slipping of other generators. In choosing the
number of pole shps, the machine capability must be
considered. All the relays are reset in a range 0 - 5
seconds if no further pole slipping takes place before
the preselected number of pole slips has been reached.
The protection is operated from current and vohage
transformers at the H V and LV terminals of the gen­
erator transformer. The relays on the H V side of the
transformers are directional only and limit the opera­
tion for one pole slip of the pole slipping impedance
relays to the zone mentioned above.
6.8 Loss of stator water flow
On modern high rated generators, i.e., above 200 M W
rating, the stator winding is cooled by the circulation
of low conductivity water; the water being pumped
through the stator windings and a water/water cooler
by one of two 100% duty electrically-driven stator water
pumps, the other being on standby. These pumps have
an automatic changeover feature. In addition, there
is a further emergency stator water p u m p supplied with
current from a separate direct current source. The
Generator protection
stator water is cooled by distilled water in the water/
water coolers. The stator water also passes through
strainers and an electrical heating unit.
After leaving the stator winding and neutral ter­
minals of the generator, the water flow is measured,
using an orifice plate. The orifice plate is provided w h h
a duplicate arrangement of pressure switches, using
four pressure switches arranged so that two must op­
erate to trip the unit.
If the water flow through the stator fails when the
generator is excited, then action must be taken quickly
to prevent overheating.
Loss of stator water flow is detected by differential
pressure switches, which measure the differential pres­
sure across the metering orifice plate in the stator
water outlet pipework. A n additional set of indicating
pressure switches is arranged to give an independent
alarm.
The duplicated pair of two pressure switches activates
two timers, one set for a 10-second delay and the other
for a 20-second delay. If at the end of the 10-second
delay the standby p u m p has failed to return the stator
water flow to above the 8 0 % threshold, then the third
emergency p u m p is started.
If starting the third emergency p u m p fails to restore
the water flow to above 8 0 % , operation of one of the
duphcate pair of pressure switches will trip the turbine
after the 20-second delay.
This duplicated arrangement, apart from providing
protection redundancy, allows the on-load testing of
each pair of switches in turn. It is to be noted that
three pressure swhches can provide the same protection,
using a *two out of three' arrangement to trip, and this
has been used on recent installations.
The tripping of the turbine steam valves shed load
a n d , because of the margin of thermal capacity in the
generator, the *stator coolant flow low' protection can
operate through the low forward power relay.
6.9 Hydrogen temperature high
This protection trip is not provided on ah generators.
Alarm only is given on some generators. The rotor
circuit is cooled by hydrogen gas. This hydrogen gas
is cooled by the c o m m o n water cooling circuit which
also cools the stator water.
Failure of the gas flow circuit or restriction of the
cooling water causes the temperature of the hydrogen
gas to rise. Reduction of load could reduce the tem­
perature to a safe condition, providing that the operator
has, depending on the generator design, time to take
corrective action. If however, there is insufficient time,
then an automatic trip of the turbine is required, with
unit tripping through the low forward power relay. The
thermal capacities are such that the latter is acceptable.
Warning of a gradual blockage of water coohng
systems is given by an alarm at a temperature setting
below the trip getting. It is unlikely that gas failure
will occur but the differential pressure across the cir-
901
Protection
culatory fans is measured and an alarm is initiated,
if the pressure fahs below a preset value.
6.10 Hydrogen/stator water cooling flow
A failure of the common water coolant flow for both
hydrogen and stator water causes a temperature rise
in both circuits. If the time constant of the rotor
cooling circuit is such that this will reach a dangerous
condition before the stator circuit, then measurement
of hydrogen temperature protects against loss of the
common primary coolant. If, however, the stator circuit
temperature reaches a dangerous condition first, then
additional protection is required to monitor stator
water temperature. The method adopted by the C E G B
is to monitor stator water temperature on the discharge
line from the generator. A Category A trip of the unit
is required, as the time available for the operator to
take action is too short.
6.11 Excitation failure
The rapid advance in the technology of semi-conductor
devices has led to their use in excitation systems em­
ploying A C exciters. Rectifier systems used, consist of
a number of three-phase full wave rectifier sections
connected in parallel and designed to give adequate
reliabihty over long periods. Protective devices include
fuses to protect the diodes from damage by overcur-
rents, and resistance/capacitance networks to suppress
voltage surges appearing across the diodes. Three basic
types of transient are likely to affect the rectifiers in
an A C excitation system:
(a) Field forcing.
(b) Induced current surges following a sudden short-
circuh at or near the generator terminals, or from
faulty synchronising.
(c) Voltage surges due to rapid flux changes in the
rotor magnetic circuit when the rotor winding is
effectively open-circuited.
The first two can be catered for by suitable choice of
the vohage and current ratings of the diodes. The fuses
protecting the diodes are designed to clear safely if a
diode cell failure occurs during the transient defined
under (c) above.
The rectifier system is designed so that two parallel
sections of a bridge arm can fail without interfering
with the operation of the generator.
If more than two paths fah, this wih resuh in a short-
circuh of the bridge arm because of diode overcurrent.
Rectifier bridge arm protection therefore operates if
more than two paths have failed; it immediately trips
the main exciter field circuit-breaker and sends a trip
to the u n h protection system through the low forward
power relay. Note that this protection operates for
short-circuits either on the A C or D C , or between
902
Chapter 11
A C and D C , of the rectifier bridge and also for inter­
phase fauhs on the excher winding. Loss of excita­
tion protection will operate if the rectifier bridge arm
protection fails to operate and excitation failure has
occurred.
All excitation fauhs initiating a trip of the main
exciter circuit-breaker also initiate a trip to the unit
and do not wait for the loss of excitation protection
to operate.
6.12 Motoring of the generator
If the steam supply to the turbine is cut off, with the
electrical generator left connected to the system, then
motoring whl take place. This means that the generator
acts as a synchronous m o t o r and draws power from
the grid system. In this situation, the turbine-generator
continues to rotate at synchronous speed and, if al­
lowed to persist for too long, the turbine blades may
be damaged.
However, with the protective arrangements described
in this chapter, the circumstances giving rise to motor­
ing are hkely to be most infrequent in the hfe of the
unit, since all of the faults hsted on the logic diagram
(Fig 11.35) wih be cleared by opening the H V and
generator voltage circuit-breakers before motoring can
take place.
Those protective devices which operate through the
low forward power relay should trip the circuit-breakers
when the forward power is about 0,5% of full load
(MW). The main danger arises if the low forward power
interlock relay fails to close due to malfunction; if so,
operator action is necessary to disconnect the generator
safely from the system.
6.13 Emergency pushbutton
Operation of the emergency pushbutton will initiate
the tripping of the turbine steam valves and, provided
that these valves close correctly, the remaining main
plant will be tripped via the low forward power relay
interlock. If the relay contacts do not close, then the
operator must take the necessary action for dealing with
the emergency such as tripping the unit auxiliaries.
The boiler firing is tripped automatically from loss of
relay fluid pressure.
Inserting the low forward power relay interlock in
the tripping circuit of the pushbutton, reduces the
risk of the operator opening the generator H V circuit-
breaker if the emergency is caused by the turbine
valves failing to close properly.
7 Generator transformer and unit
transformer protection
The generator and unit transformers can be subjected
to a number of faults which require an immediate
trip of the u n h in order to limh the damage to the
 Generator transformer a n d unit transformer protection
transformers. These are phase to phase fauhs and earth
fauhs on the windings, interturn fauhs (possibly on
the end windings caused by line surges), core faults due
to core insulation failure, failures of the cooling system
and tank faults causing loss of oil and consequent
dangerous conditions. Faults external to the trans­
formers, if not cleared quickly, cause overheating and
mechanical stress.
Protective systems are provided to remove the trans­
formers from the grid system should any of these faults
occur. Some of the protection systems are arranged to
give a prior alarm of a possible dangerous condition
developing.
7.1 Phase to phase and earth fault protection
Phase to phase fauh protection of the generator trans­
former and unit transformer is provided by biased
differential protection (described under generator pro­
tection) and, where the generator is directly connected
to the generator transformer and unit transformer, the
protection of the generator transformer includes the
generator stator windings and LV connections. The unit
transformer has its own biased differential protection.
Earth fault protection of the LV windings of the
generator transformer, the HV windings of the unit
transformer and the connections between, is included
in the stator earth fault protection (see Sections 6.1
and 6.2 of this chapter, 'Generator stator earth faults').
Earth fault protection of the generator transformer
high voltage winding and the low voltage winding of the
u n h transformer is included with the biased differential
protection of each transformer (see Fig 11.23).
When a generator voltage circuit-breaker or switch
disconnector is provided, there wih be no infeed from
the generator w h h the switch open. In this case, the
HV earth fault relay impedance could cause saturation
of the H V side interposing CTs and prevent operation
of the biased differential relay. Electrical protection
for earth fauhs is therefore entirely dependent on the
HV earth fault relay and so the relays are duplicated.
7.2 Generator transformer HV inverse tinne
and high set instantaneous overcurrent
The inverse time overcurrent protection is provided as
a back-up protection against system infeed to a gen­
erator circuit fault not cleared by main protection.
The high set instantaneous overcurrent protection is
supplied from the same CTs as the inverse time over-
current protection and located at the HV circuit-breaker,
providing protection for as much of the generator
circuit as possible. The setting must be high enough to
remain stable for faults external to the generator circuit
but low enough to detect some generator faults at
conventional power stations. Where a generator voltage
circuit-breaker is provided, the high set overcurrent
protection must not operate for faults on the connec­
tions or on the generator that could be cleared by
opening the generator vohage circuit-breaker. In addi­
tion, the setting has to remain stable for magnetising
in-rush currents, since the generator transformer can
be switched in from the H V side with the generator
voltage circuit-breaker open.
This protection complements the protection for the
H V feeder and the generator transformer. It also com­
plements the protection for generator terminal phase
faults for directly connected generators.
7.3 Unit transformer HV inverse time and
high set instantaneous overcurrent
The inverse time overcurrent protection provides back­
u p for all H V and LV winding fauhs and auxihary
system faults. As the inverse time protection has to
grade with the 11 kV interconnector protection, the
operating times for H V terminal faults are long.
High set overcurrent protection is therefore provided
to give fast clearance for these faults and arranged to
operate into tripping system 2, whilst the I D M T over-
current protection operates into tripping system 1 (see
Fig 11.35). Relays w h h low transient overreach are
provided and set to remain stable for LV faults. A
Category A u n h trip is required.
The definition of low transient overreach as applied
to high set overcurrent protection is as follows:
The overreach ( O R ) is the difference between the
R M S value of the steady state current to operate the
relay (Is) and the R M S value of current which, when
fully offset, will just operate the relay (lop), expressed
as a fraction of (lop), i.e..
OR = (Is - Iop)/Iop or lop = IS/(OR + 1)
Referring to Fig 11.35, if the u n h transformer is
60 M V A with a reactance of 1 5 % , a fault on the LV
side of the transformer wih be 60/0.15 M V A = 400
MVA.
If the quoted overreach for the relay is 5 % , then
the fault (expressed in MVA) to cause relay operation
is 400/1.05 M V A .
So, to remain stable, the relay must be set greater
than 1.05 χ 400 M V A and C E G B practice with this
type of relay would be to use a factor of 1.5 (i.e., 600
M V A setting) on a through fault of 400 M V A .
7.4 Standby earth fault
This provides protection for earth faults on the unit
switchboard busbars or between the unit transformer
circuh-breaker and hs associated current transformers
and back-up protection to the transformer LV wind­
ings and connections. Standby earth fault relays are
set to grade w h h all 11 kV interconnector earth fauh
protection.
Since for nuclear power stations, the supply to the
auxiliary system is arranged so that it is possible to
903
Protection
lose a unit supply and still continue operating, the
HV overcurrent and standby earth fault protection
must be two stage. The first stage is arranged to trip
the unit transformer circuit-breaker only, with the
second stage tripping the unit directly. For all other
stations, the standby earth fauh relay trips the u n h
transformer circuit-breaker, followed by a unit trip
through the low forward power relay. The overcurrent
protection becomes a Category A trip.
7.5 Generator transfornner and unit
transformer internal faults
Buchholz protection is provided for faults which do
not immediately affect the hne currents to the trans­
former. Examples of these faults are:
• Hot spots due to core insulation failure.
• Faulty joints.
• Interturn faults.
These faults produce locahsed heating, causing decom­
position of the oh and a release of gases. The gases
are detected by the Buchholz device connected in the
pipe to the conservator.
The protection also provides an alternative protec­
tion for phase to phase faults and some winding earth
fauhs.
For a detailed explanation of Buchholz protection,
refer to Volume K, Chapter 11.
7.6 Winding temperature
Transformer ratings are based on the temperature rise
above a defined maximum ambient temperature and
so a degree of overload can be tolerated at lower
ambient temperatures and for certain load cycles. How­
ever, with generator and u n h transformers, there is
little chance of accidental overload, as they are both
under supervision and are designed to meet the maxi­
m u m unit auxiliary load and generator capabilities.
Overloading from fault conditions is prevented by the
protection systems already mentioned.
Some protection, however, must be provided to de­
tect an over-temperature condition caused by a major
breakdown in the cooling system, at first initiating an
alarm for the operator to start the standby cooling
equipment. If the temperature continues to rise to a
dangerous level, isolation of the transformer is by a unit
Category Β trip which opens the HV circuit breaker.
For those stations where it is possible to lose a unit
transformer supply and still continue operating, a trip
of the u n h transformer LV circuit-breaker may remove
the over temperature condhion on the unit transformer.
This does not apply to the generator transformer, which
must be isolated from ah supplies.
Unit transformers with natural cooling require a
winding temperature alarm only. An overload of the
904
C h a p t e r 11
unit transformer can be experienced during paralleling
of auxihary switchboards but other protection arrange­
ments, such as alarms (if paralleled for longer than
10 minutes) and operating procedures, guard against
this condition.
Over-temperature conditions can be detected by ther­
mal image techniques and reference should be made
to Chapter 3 on transformers.
7.7 Conservator Ίονν oil level' alarm
All water/oil cooled transformers (of 200 M V A and
above) connected to 275 kV and higher vohage levels,
and ah units at nuclear power stations together with
their associated unit transformers, have additional pro­
tection to safeguard the unit against loss of oil.
Transformers not covered by a low level alarm are
protected to a limited extent against low oil level by
the Buchholz gas and oil actuated relays.
7.8 Pressure relief device alarm
The purpose of this device is to relieve tank internal
pressure during fault conditions and thereby reduce
the possibility of damage to the transformer tank. The
device has output contacts, which may be arranged to
initiate a trip or alarm.
7.9 Freezer air drier alarm
This protection is fitted to all generator transformers
operating at 132 kV and above. An alarm only is
required.
A n alarm is also required to indicate loss of elec­
trical supply to the equipment.
7.10 Overfluxing
During run-up conditions, a failure of both automatic
voltage regulator (AVR) channels in automatic control,
or incorrect operation whilst under manual control,
can cause overfluxing of the generator transformer
and unit transformers.
A control is provided as an integral part of the
A V R . This control, however, does not operate when
the AVR is on 'manual' and may also not be effective
above speeds near to synchronism.
Overfluxing relays, which measure the ratio of volt­
age to frequency, are therefore provided for protection
of the generator and unit transformers in all modes
of excitation control and also when the transformers
are connected to the generator alone. Overfluxing of
the transformer when connected to the system is rare,
but it is particularly vulnerable to overfluxing during
commissioning tests or the testing of the excitation
equipment.
A direct trip of the main exciter circuit-breaker is
therefore required when any switch disconnectors or
circuh-breakers on the H V side of the generator trans-
 H V / L V connections and generator v o l t a g e / Η V circuit-breaker protection
former are open and all switch disconnectors and
circuit-breakers closed on the LV side. This is achieved
by using monitoring relays to indicate the position
of the HV and LV circuit disconnectors or breakers
and automatically switching-in the protection when the
transformers are connected to the generator but not
the system.
Some excitation systems have a time lag between a
healthy AVR taking over from a faulty one, i.e., those
using a main and standby A V R . For these systems, the
time setting for the overfluxing relay to trip the main
exciter circuit-breaker must not be less than the time
for this changeover to take place.
8 Station transformer protection
The station transformer is protected by a Buchholz
relay with alarm and trip contacts, a winding tempera­
ture and pressure relief device both set to alarm and a
conservator tank low oil level relay, also set to alarm.
Protection against phase fauhs is provided by an
overall biased differential scheme which meets the same
requirements as the generator/generator transformer
overah biased differential protection. This protection
includes restricted earth fault protection for both the
HV and LV windings.
Back-up protection consists of one ordinary inverse
and three high set overcurrent relays. The ordinary
inverse relay apart from operating on transformer
winding fauhs, provides back-up protection for the
11 kV supply system and so has to grade with the pro­
tection on this system. In the event that this protection
is operating for an uncleared fauh on the 11 kV supply
system, the protection is made two stage by means of
a time delay relay. The first stage trips the 11 kV circuit-
breaker and the second stage (0.3 second delay) will
inhiate a u n h trip. A guard relay is required to allow
the close grading between the first and second stage
of 0.3 s.
Back-up earth fault protection of all 11 kV system
fauhs is provided by two single-pole relays operated
from a current transformer in the neutral of the trans­
former LV winding. The protection is again in two
stages. Both relays are ordinary inverse relays but are
set to grade in the same way as the high vohage (11 kV)
overcurrent protection.
9 HV/LV connections and generator
voltage/HV circuit-breaker protection
9.1 Phase to phase and earth faults
The connections between the HV circuit-breaker and
the generator transformer HV bushings are protected
by two independent high speed fully discriminative
protective systems. They are referred to as T i r s t Main
Generator Feeder Protection' and ^Second Main Gen­
erator Feeder Protection'. The protective systems em­
ployed are of the differential circulating current type
described earlier under 'generator protection', utihsing
high impedance relays, where pilot lengths are less
than 600 m and an approved form of pilot wire pro­
tection using British Telecom type pilots, on lengths
over 600 m.
The connections between the generator and the con­
nected transformer windings are protected by differ­
ential high impedance circulating current protection
as previously described under 'generator protection'.
Reference to Fig 11.24 shows that balancing CTs pro­
vided when using biased differential protection (Fig
11.26) are omitted. When ahocating a setting to the
protection, therefore, a check is made that:
• The setting is above the maximum fault current for
a fault on the LV side of the unit transformer.
• At minimum earth fauh levels, the operating vohage
across the relay is twice the setting.
9.2 HV circuit-breaker faults
System faults on the generator HV circuit-breaker are
cleared by the busbar protection. This protection is
arranged to trip the unit directly, in addition to the
circuit-breaker, for ah stations except where special
provision has been m a d e for the unit to have a run-
through capability (i.e., nuclear power stations). A
failure of the circuit-breaker to open, caused by a
control system or mechanical linkage fault, must trip
the unit directly. The reasons for tripping the unit are
given in Section 4 of this chapter on 'boiler protection'.
If the generator H V circuit-breaker fails to open
to clear a generator circuit fault, then all circuits con­
nected to the same section of busbar are tripped.
9.3 Generator voltage circuit-breaker or
switch disconnector
Where a generator voltage circuit-breaker is used to
isolate the generator for certain fault conditions, the
appropriate protection arrangements have been men­
tioned previously in this chapter. Additional protection
is, however, required to deal with the situation arising
if the circuh-breaker fails to operate to clear a fauh
when asked to d o so. In these circumstances 'circuit-
breaker fail' protection, which detects current flow
following operation of a trip relay, ensures That the
fauh is cleared by a direct trip of the unit via the
generator H V circuit-breaker.
Phase discrepancy protection is also provided for
the generator vohage circuit-breaker to detect when
one or more phases are out of step, because these
circuit-breakers comprise separate isolated single-phase
interrupters and the three phases open and close with­
out mechanical interlinkage between phases. It detects
malfunction of the circuit-breaker for any opening or
closing operation by monitoring the auxiliary switch
905
Protection
position of each phase. The protection acts either direct­
ly into the pneumatic system of the circuit-breaker or
makes a second attempt at tripping the circuh-breaker.
It trips the 400 kV circuit-breaker if, after a delay,
the generator voltage circuit-breaker is stih out of step,
through the circuit-breaker fail protection which is pro­
vided on the generator vohage circuit-breaker. T h u s ,
following a failure to open correctly for a trip on fault,
the 400 kV circuit-breaker is opened.
The circuit-breaker fail protection must operate as
fast as possible discriminating only with the main pro­
tection. No discrimination between the phase discre­
pancy protection and the circuit-breaker fail protection
is required.
10 Pumped-storage plant protection
Protection detahs given in this section are based on
experience of one type of hydro-electric power station:
the pumped-storage plant at Dinorwig. The layout of
the connections and protection is shown in Fig 11.33.
The protection of the transformers and connections are
as at a conventional station since these only are required
to operate in the normal frequency range.
However, unhke conventional stations, the synchro­
nous machines at Dinorwig operate either as motors
or generators depending on system requirements. They
normally p u m p at night, when demand is low, and
generate for periods during the day to meet peak load
conditions or outages of other generating plant. The
station has a complex generator voltage 18 kV system,
whh protection operating over a wide range of fre­
quencies, the machines being excited at increasing and
decreasing frequency during start-up or run-down se­
quences. Consequently, special protection had to be
provided for this purpose. Due to instability, some
protection systems are switched out by a frequency
relay outside the reliable operating frequency range and
the conventional protection takes over. The complete
protection system is not described because of its com-
plexhy: only the salient features are highlighted.
The Dinorwig system (Fig 11.33) has a highly selec­
tive starting system, which either provides variable-
frequency synchronous motor starting supphes from
one of two variable-frequency rectifier/inverter supply
systems, or starts by using another machine as a gen­
erator in a 'back to back' arrangement.
The generator transformer, in addition to couphng
each machine to the 400 kV system, provides a supply
to the many auxhiary supply transformers. The trans­
former and generator protection systems for normal
frequencies are the same as for conventional stations,
using generator voltage circuit-breakers but special pro­
tection is provided for operation outside the 4 7 - 5 1 Hz
frequency range. There are only two protection systems
in this variable frequency category; one is the over-
current protection for the starting busbars and the
other is the machine differential protection, which was
specially designed to provide low current settings at
906
C h a p t e r 11
the low frequencies. These two protection systems are
switched out when the machine is up to normal fre­
quency. The other protection systems operating outside
the normal frequency range which are not switched out
are:
• Voltage operated stator earth fault (explained under
generator stator earth fauhs).
• High set earth fauh (generator neutral).
• High set earth fault (unit transformer HV neutral).
Note that here the matching transformer is not under
oil and that additional protection is required.
• Dynamic braking overcurrent.
The first three have already been explained in Section
6 of this chapter. The fourth applies only to Dinorwig
and is now explained.
10.1 Dynamic braking overcurrent protection
In order to bring the generator to rest quickly and allow
a restart ehher in the same mode or in the reverse
m o d e , a three-phase short-circuit is applied to the ma­
chine terminals. The current is limited to be within the
normal machine current. A dynamic braking overcur­
rent relay, set above full load current, protects the
machine should this switch be applied incorrectly or
the control system develops a fauh (Fig 11.33). In
addition, for an electrical fauh on the generator, an
inhibit signal is provided from the protection to pre­
vent apphcation of the dynamic braking switch.
For ah other fault trips, a signal is sent to ensure
safe shutdown of the unit.
Because of possible overspeed of the turbine u p to
76.5 Hz and the system requirement to operate down
to 45 Hz, ah generator protection, i.e., protection in
service when the generator circuit-breaker is open, must
operate correctly over this frequency range. Special
protection is provided during starting sequences. All
other protection must operate up to 52 Hz (over
frequency trip level).
For a controlled shutdown, i.e., unloading before
opening the LV circuit-breaker, the trip signal to the
LV circuit-breaker is either from auxiliary contacts
indicating main inlet valve (MIV) or guide vanes (GV)
closed or from a time delay relay set between 0 - 3 0
seconds; setting, to be determined, must be greater than
MIV (or GV normal closing time).
10.2 Under frequency protection
In the pumping m o d e , protection is provided to prevent
operation below 49 H z (Fig 11.34). It is also a system
requirement that all p u m p s must be tripped if the
frequency lies in the range 4 9 . 0 - 4 9 . 5 H z . This is
necessary if the system frequency is low due to insuffi­
cient generation, hence requiring any units which are
pumping to be tripped.
 P u m p e d - s t o r a g e plant protection

GENERATOR-MOTOR
TRANSFORMER 2
(420/18kV)

(SHEET 1)
TO FIG 11.33 SHEET 2 TO FIG. 11.33 SHEET 3

FIG. 11.33 Protection system for Dinorwig pumped storage plant — simplified schematic

907
Protection Chapter 11

FROM UNIT 1
FIG 11.33 SHEET 1

TO 415V
UNIT SERVICES
BOARD 1

(SHEET 2)
I l k V STARTING BOARD 1

FIG. 11.33 (cont'd) Protection system for Dinorwig pumped storage plant — simplified schematic

908
 Pumped-storage plant protection

FROM UNIT 2
FIG 11.33 SHEET 1

SYSTEM PROTECTION SYMBOLS

AVR AUTOMATIC VOLTAGE REGULATOR

BREAKER FAIL CURRENT CHECK

DBJ BIASED DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION

€t] EARTH FAULT (IDMT)

EARTH FAULT (EXTREMELY IDMT)

FEEDER PROTECTION - FIRST MAIN

^ j FEEDER PROTECTION - SECOND MAIN

G O V E R N O R RELAY

JHVCJ HIGH VOLTAGE CONNECTION PROTECTION

[ J ^ T ] INSTRUMENTS

[LE] LOST EXCITATION

LOW VOLTAGE CONNECTION PROTECTION

METERING

NEGATIVE PHASE SEQUENCE

NEUTRAL EARTH FAULT

2-POLE OVERCURRENT
(EXTREMELY IDMT)

i 3-POLE OVERCURRENT
(DEFÍNATE MINIMUM TIME)

2-STAGE.3-POLE OVERCURRENT
(EXTREMELY IDMT)

OVERFLUXING PROTECTION

RESTRICTED EARTH FAULT

STANDBY EARTH FAULT

STATOR DIFFERENTIAL

SYSTEM CURRENT CHECK

|5ΥΝ| SYNCHRONISING

VAfl REACTIVE POWER

TRANSFORMER PROTECTION SYMBOLS

( B) B U C H H O L Z (2-FLOAT) PROTECTION

O IL TEMPERATURE

NOTE:
THIS CIRCUIT REPEATED
TO 415V THREE TIMES TO PROTECT (pp) DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE
UNIT SERVICES SIX GENERATOR-MOTOR UNITS
BOARD 2
CT LOST LOAD
(SHEET 3)

FIG. 11.33 (cont'd) Protection system for Dinorwig pumped storage plant — simplified schematic

909
Protection
FREQUENCY
RELAY 1
STAGE 1 > 52 Hz
STAGE 2 < 49 Hz
^M3G ÖM3PP
^
Μ7
MO
Μ2
GENERATOR
FIG. 11.34 Over/under frequency protection
A n under frequency relay is set nominally at 49 Hz
for both these duties. Two frequency output stages
in the same relay are used and arranged to trip the
generator voltage circuit-breaker. The frequency re­
lay is configured to measure system frequency, i.e.,
h is connected to the VT at the 18 kV terminals of
the generator transformer. Note that each frequen­
cy relay has four output stages which can be set
for a combination of 'over' and 'under' frequency
protection.
10.3 Over frequency protection
The turbine and generator are capable of operation u p
to 750 r / m i n (75 Hz). The overspeed protection and
control in the governor and the response of the guide
vanes in closing, may cause transient overspeeds of
76.5 Hz under load rejection. T o protect generators
connected to the same system as the Dinorwig machines
from overspeeding, over frequency protection is re­
quired to trip the Dinorwig machines by opening the
generator circuit-breaker at a frequency of 52 H z . T o
enable synchronisation to be estabhshed as soon as
possible after overspeeding, the excitation is left on
and the machine is brought under control by governor
action, tripping of the main and governor valves occur­
910
Chapter 11
TRIP
SIGNAL TO THE GENERATOR
VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKER
TRIP
SIGNAL TO SHUT DOWN THE
UNIT PUMPING MODE ONLY
1
ring only at excessive overspeeds. Note that protection
associated with the generator will therefore have to
function correctly up to a maximum of 76.5 Hz. A
frequency output stage in the same frequency protection
relay as that used for under frequency, is used in the
over frequency mode (see Fig 11.34) and a trip of
the generator voltage circuit-breaker is provided. The
relay setting is 52 H z .
Failure of the VT secondary fuse in the supply to
the frequency relay is arranged to bring u p an alarm
but not to initiate a trip.
10.4 Overspeed in excess of 10%
Following a loss of load, the turbine speed will try to
rise above 55 Hz because of the overall response of
the governor system (including the inlet guide vanes
closing). If the governor system functions correctly,
then the turbine speed wih start to fall below 110%
overspeed. Protection of the turbine is required if the
governor system fails. This is achieved by a trip signal
derived from three electrical speed switches operating
through a time delay relay (0-30s) which allows time
for the governor control system to act to bring the
turbine under control. The generator voltage circuit-
breaker is tripped after the time delay relay operates.

indicating a failure of the governor control system to
contain the speed.
During a pump-turbine start-up, a protection trip
signal from the turbine control system is sent if the
motor being started reaches a speed in excess of llO^o.
10.5 Loss of pumping power
If the power fails whilst the machine is in the pumping
mode, the water flow reverses in the turbine, causing
excessive vibration from an uncontrolled reverse water
flow. An immediate trip of the u n h is needed to close
the main inlet valve and bring it to a safe condition.
A relay is provided to measure output power from
the generator: this is interlocked w h h an auxiliary
switch on the inlet guide vanes such that it is only
armed when the inlet guide vanes are open. The setting
is just below the power required for the condition when
the main inlet valve is open and the runner watered.
This power level is estimated to be 63 M W .
10.6 Emergency stop pushbuttons
Two emergency stop pushbuttons are provided, one lo­
cal to the turbine-generator and one on the control desk.
10.7 Overvoltage
Because of the overvohages expected if Dinorwig is
isolated from the main system, with either or both
hnes to the substation at Pentir still connected, and
the capacity of the generator-motor/pump-turbine t o
overspeed by 5 0 % , an instantaneous overvohage relay
is used to protect the supply transformers connected
at 18 kV. The setting is 130% of nominal voltage.
Overvoltage protection for the generator is provided
in the AVR and is set for 120%. It is inhibited when
the machine is synchronised to the system.
10.8 Excitation equipment protection
Protection of a sustained D C short-circuit is provided
by a definite time overcurrent relay operated from CTs
in the 3.3 kV circuit-breaker, tripping that circuit-
breaker only. Thyristor short-circuits are taken care
of by the thyristor fuse. All cable phase faults from
the exchation transformer to the 3.3 kV circuit-breaker
and all LV winding phase fauhs are detected by the
HV (18 kV) extremely inverse overcurrent relay. Over-
current protection on the excitation transformer p r o ­
vides back-up protection of the exchation equipment.
Protection co-ordination must take account of the
current/time characteristic of the machine field, as weh
as that of the fuses protecting the thyristors.
10.9 Stator cooling air over-temperature
The stator is air cooled, with water coohng the air.
P u m p e d - s t o r a g e plant protection
Operator action only is needed for *stator water coolant
flow low'. A trip initiation is, however, required for
high stator cooling air temperature. The temperature
detector is set to operate at a temperature of approxi­
mately 6 5 ° C . The inherent thermal capacity of the
machine allows for unloading before initiating a unit
trip, i.e., the guide vanes are closed before tripping
the generator voltage circuit-breaker. Interlocking duty
by the guide vanes compares with the low forward
power interlock on fossil-fired and nuclear stations and
is achieved by the D C tripping system.
10.10 Bearing temperatures and oil levels
The guide a n d thrust bearing temperatures are moni­
tored and an automatic unit trip initiated, after first
closing the guide vanes, if temperature limits are
exceeded.
10.11 Back to back starting protection
During back to back starting, protection is required
against three conditions:
• Generator runaway.
• Incorrect exchation levels on the generator-motor.
• Excess heating of the stationary field winding in the
event of failure of a generator-motor to start.
10.11.1 Generator runaway
This condition can result from:
• Incorrect excitation.
• Excess generator accelerating torque.
• Excess m o t o r retarding torque.
This protection is achieved by setting an overcurrent
relay operated from a C T in the tee-off to the start­
ing system (Fig 11.33). This is designed to trip the
unit if the current exceeds 8000 A for longer than
30 seconds, or to trip instantaneously if the current
exceeds 21000 A . The basis for the settings is that
if the two machines *lock' together on a back to back
start, the current whl fall below 8000 A before 30 s and
will never exceed 21000 A . So if the current exceeds
21000 A (approximately 2 χ full load), this indicates
an electrical fault o n the starting busbar system: hence
this protection deals with busbar faults. At the design
stage, busbar protection was considered, i.e., a bal­
anced system of protection, but w h h the added com­
plexity of trying t o obtain a balance at low and nominal
frequencies h was hkely to be unreliable. The instan­
taneous overcurrent relay is more rehable although
not as discriminative. However, with the high integrity
designed into the starting busbars, using air insulated
and isolated connections, a busbar fault is very unhkely
to occur.
911
Protection
10.11.2 I n c o r r e c t e x c i t a t i o n levels o n t h e
generator-motor
For a back to back start the generator exchation level
is set to 1 p.u. and the motor excitation to 0.8 p . u .
(1 p.u. excitation is the excitation for the nominal
voltage with the machine on open-circuit). The various
conditions of incorrect excitation are:
(a) N o generator excitation, 0.8 p . u . motor excitation.
(b) 1.0 p.u. generator excitation, no motor excitation.
Protection is required to limit motor damper cage
overheating.
(c) Failure/deviation of either excitation set
during run-up.
Since failure to start is inevitable for (a) and (b) and
probable for (c), maladjusted excitation settings are
arranged to trip. All three conditions are detected by
conditioning the start signal such that excitation in
both machines has to be correct before a start can be
made.
10.11.3 Excess h e a t i n g of t h e s t a t i o n a r y f i e l d
w i n d i n g in t h e e v e n t of a f a i l u r e t o s t a r t of
generator-motor
This protection is provided by monitoring the starting
time from the field circuit-breaker closing until the
machine is up to speed. The starting time allowed by
the protection must be compatible with the inverter
starting time, to avoid the need for separate protection
for both starting modes.
10.12 Excitation transformer
Earth fauh protection of the 18 kV winding is included
in the unit transformer earth fault protection scheme.
Earth fault protection of the LV winding is part of
the exchation equipment earthing which consists of
high impedance earthing through a resistor. T o pre­
vent voltages being transferred through interwinding
capacitance coupling, an earthed screen is provided
between windings. The transformer windings and con­
nections are protected by an extremely inverse relay
and two high set overcurrent relays. These relays ini­
tiate a Unit trip. The extremely inverse relay used for
this protection has to grade with the fuses protecting
the excitation thyristors. All excitation transformers
have a Buchholz gas (alarm), a Buchholz gas (trip),
a pressure relief device (alarm) and a conservator tank
low level (alarm). The excitation transformer is natural­
ly cooled so the winding temperature indicator gives
an alarm only. All the protection systems mentioned
above, depending on circuh conditions, trip their own
unit, the banked generator-motor unit, the 400 kV
circuit-breakers and send a trip signal to the starting
busbar system to trip the generator-motor, if they are
in a starting sequence.
912
C h a p t e r 11
10.13 Station transformer
The protection arrangements are similar to that for a
normal transformer on a fossil-fired station, except
that the H V winding earth fault protection is included
in the generator HV earthing protection system and
the 18 kV connections to the HV winding are included
in the 18 kV connections protection.
10.14 Starting transformers
Starting transformer I The protection of starting
transformer 1 is the same as the station transformer.
point Starting transformer 2 Starting transformer 2 is
connected Dynll and will require the same protection as
the starting transformer 1, except that the secondary
circuits of the overah protection C T allow for a delta/
star transformer instead of the star connection on
starting transformer 1.
10.15 Starting equipment
The starting equipment comprises an input and output
transformer stepping down to 3 kV, thyristor-controlled
rectifiers and inverters and a D C link, including a D C
circuit-breaker.
11 kV protection on the input to the rectifier trans­
former includes three-pole extremely inverse overcur­
rent relays, two-pole instantaneous high set overcur­
rent relays and a single-pole high stability earth fault
relay. Overall biased differential protection is also
provided.
Protection of the 18 kV side of the inverter trans­
former is three-pole extremely inverse overcurrent relays
and two-pole instantaneous high set overcurrent relays.
The 18 kV overcurrent protection CTs are located
between the 18 kV transformer disconnector and the
18 kV transformer winding.
Protection of the thyristors is by fuses and there is
protection to detect asymmetrical currents caused by
thyristor or control fahure. Current asymmetry pro­
tection is provided both on the input to the rectifiers
and the output of the inverters (i.e., on the A C side of
both).
Protection against D C short-circuhs is provided by a
two-stage definite time overcurrent relay, the first stage
suppressing the starting equipment, the second stage
tripping the 11 kV A C B on the starting transformer
after a time delay. It must grade with the thyristor fuses
and the rectifier transformer H V overcurrent.
Both transformers incorporate a Buchholz gas (alarm
and trip), an oil temperature (alarm) and a pressure
relief device (alarm).
In addhion to the above the rectifier/inverter equip­
ment has undervohage protection to detect loss of
supply.
The trip to the 11 kV circuit-breaker is delayed, to
allow the starting equipment to shut down and attempt
to clear the fault for the following protection:

• Current asymmetry protection on the rectifier and
inverter equipment.
• The first stage of the overcurrent protection on the
input to the rectifier.
• AH auxhiary supply faults for the rectifier/inverter
system.
10.16 Protection during starting
The protection during starting when the frequency is
below 45 Hz requires special consideration. During start­
ing, the machine terminal voltages are proportioned
to frequency for constant excitation, whilst machine
fault currents are almost independent of frequency for
constant excitation. Voltage transformers will perform
satisfactorily under these condhions, whereas CTs and
relays designed for 50 Hz working do not. Therefore,
for three-phase and phase to phase faults, and also
phase to earth fauhs, at a time when the neutral resistor
has flashed over or is shorted out, some form of special
protection is needed. Starting protection is provided to
detect phase to phase faults (earthed or unearthed)
down to as low a frequency as possible. A non-dis­
criminative form of protection is the minimum require­
ment for plant protection. A protective relay using a
rectified input (and therefore independent of frequen­
cy), is used for low frequency operation and is switched
out above a frequency of 45 Hz to prevent operation
for through-fault conditions when the system frequency
is 50 Hz and the machine is synchronised. A selective
tripping scheme of the starting busbar trip system must
only isolate connected plant from the fauhed zone.
For earth fauhs, limited by the machine neutral
earthing resistor, fault currents are hmited to 10 A as
for fossil-fired stations, by the resistance in the dis­
tribution transformer secondary circuit. Special p r o ­
tection is therefore not necessary for the following
reasons:
• The machine can be operated with an earth fault until
the operating frequency of the protection is reached.
• The magnitude of earth fauh currents falls w h h
frequency as the earth fault loop is predominantly
resistive and the ratio of voltage to frequency is
kept constant.
• The time delay for unloading is not required during
the start-up period, therefore the tripping can be
made instantaneous when the operating zone of the
protection is reached.
10.17 Protection of the punnp-turbine and
the upper/lower reservoirs
This section hsts the Category A and Category Β trips
that are designed to protect a pump-turbine installation
such as that used on the Dinorwig pumped-storage
scheme, i.e., they are typical only for reversible p u m p -
turbines using guide vanes.
P u m p e d - s t o r a g e plant protection
10.17.1 Category A trips
Category A trips result in an emergency shutdown
of the unit a n d include the following areas of
protection:
• Governor air/oil receiver oil pressure low Operates
to trip the unit when there is only a sufficient vol­
u m e of fluid available to close the guide vanes (GVs),
and hold them closed without the release of air into
the control air pipework.
• Governor pilot oil pressure low This trip is initiated
if oh pressure to the pilot servomotor falls to the
minimum safe level. This level is set below the l o w
pilot oil pressure' at which the actuator is auto­
matically switched from *Auto' to 'Manual'.
• Governor supplies failure and electrical governor
fault These trips are monitored and conditioned
whhin the electrical governor. A c o m m o n signal is
initiated to trip the unit when the governor is in
control and a loss of electrical supphes, or a fault
occurs, which prevents the governor from controhing
the turbine.
• Electrical overspeed The unit is tripped if the tur­
bine overspeeds and the governor fails to compen­
sate within a preset time. This time is adjustable over
a 0 - 3 0 s range, thus avoiding possible damage to
the wearing rings caused by vibration under pro­
longed running at overspeed.
• Draft tube valve (DTV) not fully open and DTV oil
pressure low These trips primarily safeguard the
pump-turbine against damage caused by operation
under cavitation conditions in the pumping mode,
although the trips are operative in all modes. The
D T V movement is the final protection. The loss of
oil pressure trip normally operates before the DTV
starts to close, enabling the unit to be brought to
a safe condition before the inevitable closure of
the D T V .
• Water churning protection * This trip protects
against running the pump-turbine in water with either
the main inlet valve (MIV) or the GVs closed, in
any condition other than the transition from spin
modes to operational modes.
• Governor air/oil receiver level low This feature
supplements the governor a i r / o h pressure low trip
and also covers for the eventuahty of an incorrect air
precharge pressure causing air entrainment in the
control oh pipework.
• Excessive/partial GV opening and pump speed pro­
tection T o avoid p u m p water flow instability con­
ditions in the pumping m o d e , the p u m p speed/head
characteristics require the GV opening and p u m p
speed to be within prescribed limits. Trips are pro­
vided to avoid vibration damage if the p u m p op­
erates outside these limits.
913
Protection
10.17.2 C a t e g o r y Β trips
Category Β trips result in a controlled shutdown of
the unit and include the following areas of protection:
• GV out of step This protection is initiated if
blockage of, or damage t o , a single GV causes h to
move out of step with the other GVs.
• GV start position 2 exceeded with generator circuit-
breaker open If, under starting conditions, 'start
position Τ is exceeded after the turbine has attained
9 0 % speed, the unit is shut down because turbine
acceleration would not be reduced and synchronising
would not be possible.
• Suction cone water level high In the p u m p start
and spin modes, a unit shutdown is initiated if
the water level under blowdown conditions is too
high to permit the pump-turbine to spin in air only.
• Shaft seal cooling water flow low Protection against
seal wear
• Wearing rings cooling water flow low Failure of
coohng water flow to the wearing rings when
operating in p u m p start or spinning in air modes,
causes the unit to shut down to prevent damage to
the wearing rings and possible damage to the rotor.
• Wearing rings temperature high Additional protec­
tion against damage to wearing rings.
• Bearing temperature (pads and oil) high.
• Bearing oil levels low.
• Main inlet valve (MIV) air/oil receiver oil pressure/
oil level low Operation of the unit in the pumping
or generating modes requires the MIV to be fully
open. In the event of a loss of oil pressure the MIV
would start to close under the action of the counter­
weights and a controlled shutdown is required. The
low oil level trip backs-up the low pressure trip and
also prevents the release of air into the control oil
pipework in the event of incorrect precharge for the
air pressure and a controlled shutdown must be
initiated.
• Headgate, stopgate or tailgate closing Operation
with gates closed (or closing) is unacceptable so the
unit is shutdown under these circumstances.
• Failure to establish cooling water flow at lOVo speed
This shutdown protection operates to prevent over­
heating of the various CW-cooled plant items. Above
10% speed an alarm only is raised which requires
operator action.
• MIV partially closed when GVs are not fully closed
In normal operation the MIV must be fully open,
if it does start to close for any reason, the unit must
be shut down.
• Μ valve, Ρ valve or F valve open The Μ and Ρ
valves are used during spinning in air modes; the
914
C h a p t e r 11
Μ valve drains water away from the peripheral
chamber to prevent water build-up between the GVs
and the runner, and the Ρ valve bleeds air away
from the spiral casing in order to prevent a build-up
of air which would otherwise be passed through
the system when normal operational modes were
instituted. The F valve is used to bleed air out of
the pump-turbine casing when making the transition
from spin mode to operational modes. If any of
these valves are open during pumping or generation,
a controhed shutdown is initiated.
• Μ valve and Ρ valve closed in spin mode If either
the Μ or Ρ valve is not open in the spinning in air
m o d e , an unacceptable air a n d / o r water accumula­
tion can occur in the pump-turbine, the u n h is there­
fore shut down.
• Upper/lower reservoir levels high When the water
level in the upper reservoir (pumping mode) or the
lower reservoir (generating mode) reaches the maxi­
m u m permissible level, the unit is shut down.
• Sequence control faults A unit shutdown is ini­
tiated for any failure of the p u m p start-up sequence
to achieve a given plant state within a predetermined
time or number of operations. Possible causes in­
clude excessive p u m p priming time, excessive p u m p
loading time, second failure of p u m p synchronising
or excessive p u m p start-up time.
• Air admission valve open in pump service or in the
spin pump to pump transition On-load air admis­
sion is required during generation modes but is not
permitted during pumping modes. In circumstances
where the air admission valve is open during the
pumping modes, the u n h is shut down.
• Blowdown air admission valves open in pump service
or in the spin pump to pump transition If the
blowdown air admission valves are open when the
main p u m p isolator is closed and the MIV is not
fully closed, the unit is shut down to prevent air
admission to the system during pumping.
11 DC tripping systems
11.1 Logic diagram
The logic diagram (Fig 11.35), which is typical of
stations with a generator voltage circuit-breaker, lists ah
the unit trip-initiating devices and details which plant
has to be tripped to bring the unit into a safe condition.
The groups formed by plant items to be tripped are
explained down the left hand side of the drawing.
G r o u p 1 and G r o u p 3 contain the same plant items,
except that G r o u p 3 trips the steam generator and tur­
bine first, fohowed by the other plant items via the
low forward power relay. G r o u p 1 is designated a
Category A trip and G r o u p 3 a Category Β trip.

In order to cater for several primary circuit con­
figurations and to avoid confusion, the logic diagram
takes the following format:
• Groups 1 and 3 are always Category A and Category
B, respectively, requiring opening of the generator
high vohage circuh-breaker to clear the fauh.
• Groups 2 and 4 are also always Category A and
Category Β but apply to those stations requiring
the opening of the generator voltage circuit-breaker
to clear the fault, leaving the generator and unit
transformers connected.
These are the four basic tripping groups. Groups 5,
etc., are special but always maintain the same identity
irrespective of the primary circuit configuration.
Each trip initiating device has a unique number and
this number is cross-referenced to the tripping schema­
tic shown on Fig 11.36. The group numbers are also
identified on both the logic diagram and the tripping
schematic.
The turbine tripping shown on the top left hand side
of Fig 11.35 is typical of one manufacturer of tur­
bines. The turbine tripping sequence is described in
Section 3.4.2 of this chapter and the figure shows the
schematic arrangement. C E G B practice is to draw a
logic diagram first, which meets all the requirements
of the station operations system, and the tripping sche­
matic is developed from this.
11.2 Tripping schennatic diagram
Having completed the logic diagram, the next step is to
prepare a tripping schematic diagram (Fig 11.36) for
each tripping system. Modern practice is to provide
two separated tripping systems which are fundamentally
the same. In those cases where the protective relay
system is not duplicated, e.g., biased differential pro­
tection, then the tripping contacts are included in only
one of the tripping systems.
The allocation of protection systems to each tripping
system is always the same. Figure 11.36 is arranged
with ah the trip initiating devices, in groups as allocated
in the logic diagram, down the left hand side and the
output trip relays down the right. Where possible, trip­
ping functions are commoned on trip relays and opera­
tion of several trip relays are required to perform a
group trip. The basis of the selection of a trip function
to a relay is to allocate all functions which have to
be tripped fohowing the operation of the low forward
power interlock to the main tripping relays (sometimes
called the master trip relays). These trip relays are
always numbered 1 and 2. The turbine and steam gen­
erator are ahocated to separate trip relays, so that any
of the trip signals allocated to Category Β trip the
turbine trip relay first. Then, on operation of the low
forward power interlock relay, they trip the main trip
relays 1 and 2. Pressure switches in the turbine fluid
system operate the steam generator trip relays. T o date.
D C tripping systems
all C E G B power stations have used this format for
their tripping systems except Dinorwig where, because
of the complexity of the tripping circuits and the need
to reduce the number of trip relays, diodes were used
to connect trip initations to trip output relays, each
one allocated a tripping function.
Matrix tripping systems are being considered by the
C E G B , especially where integrated generator circuit
protection systems, w h h buih in test facihties, are being
offered. The matrix effectively copies the logic diagram.
The trip initiations are connected to horizontal bus
wiring and the output devices to the vertical bus wires.
The intersections of the vertical and horizontal bus-
wires can be coupled by diode links represented by
plugs on a matrix b o a r d .
All the trip relays, or any repeating relay which is
receiving signals from outside the relay r o o m , must
have a minimum operating current of 50 m A to avoid
operation from induced current or capacitor discharge
currents. A 10 ^ F capacitor charged u p to 150 V is
discharged through the relay to check for non-operation
on capacitor discharge currents from the negative pole
of the battery.
11.3 Trip supply and circuit supervision
Only trip supply supervision is provided on trip relay
circuits with looping of the wiring to the positive and
negative poles (Fig 11.37).
Excessive looping through multicore cables is not
used, thus avoiding the consequent large voltage drops
in the wiring which would prevent trip relay operation.
Trip circuit supervision is provided on all turbine
and circuit-breaker trip coils because of the possibility
of open-circuhs on these cohs. Figure 11.38 shows a
simplified circuit. Where the trip coil and associated
Β relay is duplicated (which has been done on the
majority of recent schemes), it is not possible to monitor
both coils in the 'breaker closed' position since either
circuh will maintain a trip heahhy indication. However,
there are two trip coils and therefore one can fail to
operate. Furthermore, in the pre-open supervision,
circuh-breaker fail and phases out of step protection
provides additional back-up protection.
11.4 General comments on the tripping
arrangements
Figure 11.36 represents the basic tripping scheme as
used on nuclear power stations. It is easily adapted for
conventional stations w h h very little change in the
format.
All protection relays are ordered from this master
tripping schematic diagram. The interfaces with the out­
put relays on the turbine and reactor are also shown.
The block for reactor tripping (Group 4) shows a fuh
*two from four' quadrant trip. Each of the smaller blocks
A l , A 2 , etc., represents a *two from three' quadrant
915
Protection Chapter 11

BLED STEAM NON­

RETURN VALVES
BLED STEAM TURBINE TURBINE
ISOLATION VALVES TRIP TRIP
SOLENOIDS VALVES
DISARM GOVERNOR

HP STOP VALVE
& SOLENOID
IP STOP VALVE
& SOLENOID
HP GOVERNOR
VALVE & SOLENOID
IP GOVERNOR TURBINE PROTECTION
VALVE & SOLENOID WITHIN THIS BLOCK
IS TYPICAL ONLY

GROUP DEFINITIONS
SEE NOTE (d)
1 A DIRECT TRIP TO SHUT DOWN THE UNIT (SEE NOTE (a)) WITH DISCONNECTION FROM THE
SYSTEM BY OPENING THE HV CIRCUIT BREAKER (PREPARES CB FAIL PROTECTION).
2 A DIRECT TRIP TO SHUT DOWN THE UNIT (SEE NOTE (a)) WITH DISCONNECTION FROM THE
SYSTEM BY OPENING THE GENERATOR VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKER. REACTOR
3 AN INDIRECT TRIP TO SHUT DOWN THE UNIT (SEE NOTE (a)) BY TRIPPING THE TURBINE/BOILER GUARD
LINES
(FROM LOSS OF POWER FLUID) & COMPLETING A UNIT TRIP VIA THE LOW FORWARD POWER
RELAY WITH DISCONNECTION FROM THE SYSTEM BY OPENING THE HV CIRCUIT BREAKER.
4 AN INDIRECT TRIP TO SHUT DOWN THE UNIT (SEE NOTE (a)) BY TRIPPING THE TURBINE/BOILER
(FROM LOSS OF POWER FLUID) & COMPLETING A UNIT TRIP VIA THE LOW FORWARD POWER
RELAY WITH DISCONNECTION FROM THE SYSTEM BY OPENING THE GENERATOR VOLTAGE
CIRCUIT BREAKER.
5 A TRIP TO OPERATE THE MAIN EXCITER FIELD CIRCUIT BREAKER & GENERATOR VOLTAGE
CIRCUIT BREAKER WHEN THE GENERATOR HV CIRCUIT BREAKER IS OPEN & THE GENERATOR
VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKER IS CLOSED.
6 A TRIP TO UNIT TRANSFORMER CIRCUIT BREAKERS.
7 A TRIP OF A SECTION OF HV BUSBARS WHEN THE GENERATOR HV CIRCUIT BREAKER
FAILS TO OPEN FOR A GROUP 1 TRIP
NOTES
(a) A DIRECT TRIP MEANS A TRIP OF THE TURBINE TRIP SOLENOIDS HP & IP GOVERNOR &
STOP VALVES SOLENOIDS SENDING A SIGNAL TO THE REACTOR FROM LOSS OF POWER
FLUID (THIS ENSURES THE TURBINE IS TRIPPED FIRST FOR ALL EXCEPT REACTOR
PROTECTION, MAIN EXCITER FIELD CIRCUIT BREAKER & FOR GROUPS 1 & 3 UNIT
TRANSFORMERS LV BREAKERS). AN INDIRECT TRIP IS A TRIP OF THE TURBINE, A SIGNAL TO
THE BOILER/REACTOR & A TRIP OF THE OTHER PLANT ITEMS FOLLOWING OPERATION OF TURBINE
j T R i p BY GROUPS!
THE LOW FORWARD POWER RELAY. 1,2.3 & 4
(b) WHERE TEN MINUTES RUN-THROUGH IS POSSIBLE. BUSBAR PROTECTION & BACK-TRIP
RECEIVEJRIP THE HV CIRCUIT BREAKER ONLY
(c) AN ADDITIONAL TRIP INTO THE STOP. GOVERNOR & TURBINE TRIP VALVES SOLENOID CIRCUITS.
(d) INTERLOCKED BY CIRCUIT ISOLATORS & CIRCUIT BREAKER POSITION SWITCHES SO THAT
WHEN THE GENERATOR IS ON OPEN CIRCUIT THE BOILER OR REACTOR IS NOT TRIPPED.
THE SIGNAL MUST BE TIME DELAYED SO THAT THE LOSS OF POWER FLUID PRESSURE
SWITCHES OPERATE BEFORE THE CIRCUIT BREAKER OPENS.

-T GRID VOLTAGE

KEY DIAGRAM
GENERATOR
TRANSFORMER

EARTHING
TRANSFORMER ^ (^TRANSFORMERS
SEE NOTE (c)

11kV UNIT
BOARD Β

FIG. 1 1 . 3 5 Overall protection logic diagram for main generating units

916
 D C tripping systems

GROUPS
z2 MECHANICAL PLANT & ELECTRICAL SEE
TRIP INITIATIONS NOTE (a)
LL
TURBINE
Ι­
o D O V A / P Q PI 1Ι Ι Π P Q P Q Q I I D C C \ A / I T P U 4 C C T D I P P i M 1 OXA/ D D d C C I I D C
ά r U W t n rLUlU r n t o o U n t oWI 1 U n t o 1 n i r U N LUW r n t b o U n t
Ι
2 LOW VACUUM TRIP
2 LOSS OF LUBRICATING OIL PRESSURE
1 2 CONDENSATE CONDUCTIVITY HIGH
1 2 LOW INLET STEAM TEMPERATURE & PRESSURE (AGR ONLY)
1 2 HIGH WATER LEVEL IN STEAM GENERATOR (PWR ONLY)
2 OVERSPEED TRIP
2 LOCAL TURBINE TRIP LEVER
1 2 LOSS OF SPEED GOVERNOR
REACTOR (FOR NUCLEAR STATION ONLY)
TRIPS ACCORDING TO REACTOR TYPE

GENERATOR
1 2 LOSS OF EXCITATION 1 & 2
1 2 EXCITATION FAIL TRIP (ALSO STANDBY EXCIT FAIL)
1 2 STATOR EARTH FAULT INVERSE HIGH RESISTANCE 1 & 2
1 2 NEGATIVE PHASE SEQUENCE 1 & 2
1 2 STATOR DIFFERENTIAL 1 & 2
1 2 STATOR EARTH FAULT INSTANTANEOUS
1 2 STATOR COOLANT FLOW LOW
1 DIRECTIONAL OVERCURRENT
GENERATOR TRANSFORMER
1 OVERALL PROTECTION
1 BUCHHOLZ SURGE
1 HV OVERCURRENT IDMT
2 HV RESTRICTED EARTH FAULT
2 HV HIGH SET OVERCURRENT
1 2 OVERFLUXING 1 & 2
1 WINDING TEMPERATURE (HV & LV)
UNIT T R A N S F O R M E R ( S )
2 HS OVERCURRENT
1 OVERALL PROTECTION
1 BUCHHOLZ SURGE
1 HV IDMT OVERCURRENT (2nd STAGE)
2 LV RESTRICTED EARTH FAULT
2 LV STANDBY EARTH FAULT (2nd STAGE)
1 HV IDMT OVER CURRENT (1st STAGE)
2 LV STANDBY EARTH FAULT (1st STAGE)
1 WINDING TEMP (NOT REQD ON AN TRANSFORMERS)
HV CONNECTIONS (POWER STATION)
1 FIRST MAIN FEEDER PROTECTION
2 SECOND MAIN FEEDER PROTECTION
1 FIRST INTERTRIP RECEIVE
2 SECOND INTERTRIP RECEIVE
G E N E R A T O R HV F E E D E R (TRANSMISSION STN)
1 2 HV BUSBAR PROTECTION
1 2 HV BUSBAR BACK TRIP RECEIVE
1 FIRST MAIN FEEDER PROTECTION
2 SECOND MAIN FEEDER PROTECTION

1 FIRST INTERTRIP RECEIVE

2 SECOND INTERTRIP RECEIVE
2 TRIP INITIATION HV CIRCUIT BREAKER FAIL
EARTHING TRANSFORMER
1 EARTHING TRANSFORMER BUCHHOLZ
EARTH FAULT INVERSE HIGH RESISTANCE 1 & 2
1 2
G E N E R A T O R VOLTAGE CIRCUIT B R E A K E R
1 2 FAIL PROTECTION
COMMON EQUIPMENT
1 2 EMERGENCY STOP BUTTON - CCR
1 2 EMERGENCY STOP BUTTON - LOCAL
LV CONNECTIONS (POWER STATION)
1 2 LV CONNECTION PROTECTION 1 & 2

FIG. 11.35 (cont'd) Overall protection logic diagram for main generating units

917
Protection Chapter 11

1 PROTECTION SUPPLY SUPERVISION

REPP SELP RESET
-O O - Τ γ Λ Τ η Ι Ρ RELAY 1
R E A C T O R E S S E N T I A L P L A N T P R O T E C T I O N ( G A S C I R C U L A T O R T R I P FAIL S T A G E 2)

^ 1 FIRST
^INTERTRIP
- SEND

• SECOND
> INTERTRIP
" I SEND

[-^-a>
ALARM &
INDICATIONS

FIRST
PROTECTION SUPPLY SUPERVISION
SUPPLY
••TRIP RELAY - E
• { F I R S T MAIN G E N E R A T O R F E E D E R P R O T E C T I O N ] .-AUTO RESET
TRIP RELAYS 1A& I B
AUX. RELAY

GEN. TRANSF. RESTRICTED EFI

TRIPRELAYIA

UT C O V E R A L L P R O T E C T I O N

UT Ό ' O V E R A L L P R O T E C T I O N

^ — ^ U T ' C BUCHHOLZ S U R G E TRIP TURBINE TRIP S O L E N O I D 1

RELAY
^ ^ UT Ό ' B U C H H O L Z S U R G E AUTO J—o : Q -
RESET " - - Κ TURBINE TRIP S O L E N O I D 2
• • S T A T O R DIFFERENTIAL 1
S T A T O R Ε F I N V E R S E HIGH
RESISTANCE 1 ALARM & ' Γ
GEN S W DISCONNECTORI
NEGATIVE P H A S E S E Q U E N C E 1 INDICATION

^ G E N . TRANSF. OVERALL PROTECTION

' UNST FMFP I ^L¡-9" ^ U T Ό ' LV CIRCUIT B R E A K E R

^ ^ G E N . S W I T C H D I S C O N N E C T O R FAIL 'UNSTSMFPF^U^ " U T ' D ' L V CIRCUIT

^ — ^ E A R T H I N G T R A N S F B U C H H O L Z SSUI
URGE ^ I " BREAKER

G E N MAIN E X C I T E R FIELD CBI

LV. CONNECTIONS PROT 1 I
UT 'C HV O V E R C U R R E N T S E C O N D S T A G E G E N FIELD C B
D O——O O-
T R I P RELAY IB
bcirr oc T D R (0 - 1.0 S E C TO
OPERATE)

U T Ό · HV O V E R C U R R E N T S E C O N D S T A G E

TO TRIP
CONTACTS

EARTHING TRANSF, E.F

I N V E R S E HIGH R E S I S 1
-o I o-
•o | o -
, LOW FORWARD
' T R I P RELAY
I P O W E R RELAY 1
- AUTO RESET
¥-o t o T R I P RELAY 3^
AUX RELAY ^-V^
IP R 7 IP R 8 TRIP RELAY 3
-O O - - O O - -O o-
LOW
VACUUM TRIP
& STATOR
COOLANT TEMP
I -4
HIGH
TRIP TURBINE TRIP SOLENOID 1
RELAY
AUTO , — 0
RESET L_I ' TURBINE TRIP S O L E N O I D 2

Γ—Ο I O — •
CS: GEN. S W DISCONNECTOR

"GEN MAIN E X C I T E R FIELD C B

' GEN. ' G E N S W D I S C FAIL

• FIELD C B . CURRENT CHECK

- TRIP RELAY
l-4o oH
TRIP R E L A Y S ^ - AUTO RESET]
A U X . RELAY rwKrs
TRIPRELAY 5
L O S S O F EXCITATION 1

HV G E N E R A T O R T R A N S F .
^ W T (ONE PER PHASE) .
G R O U P 3<; LV G E N E R A T O R T R A N S F .
Q W T ( Q N E P E R PHASE) TRIP TURBINE TRIP S O L E N O I D 1
RELAY ' r-
, EXCITATION FAIL AUTO - ' '

TS
RESET TURBINE TRIP S O L E N O I D 2

L O S S O F EXCITATION R E L A Y
ALARM A N D
INDICATION

FIG. 1 1 . 3 6 Overall protection schematic diagram for main generating units

918
 D C tripping systems

TRIP RELAY
AUTO RESET!

CCR
-O O-
TRIP RELAY 7
EMERGENCY PUSH BUTTONS

L ^
r>r>r^
^
I

η TRIP TURBINE TRIP SOLENOID 1

- I RELAY
• f AUTO
J RESET TURBINE TRIP SOLENOID 2

INTERPOSING RELAYS
FOR GENERATOR/TURBINE
TRIP INITIATING
DEVICES AND FOR
} ALARM &
INDICATION
TWO KEY-LOCKED BOXES AND
TEST SWITCHES CONTROLLED
TURBINE POWER- BY THE SAFETY KEY LOCKING
FLUID PRESSURE SYSTEM (FORTRESS LOCKS)
FAILURE
Ν Τ
I I

-o I φο o Ο­
Ι ' Τ
ÍREA'CTOR QUADRANTS TRIPPING . ΤΟ GUARD LINE
ISYSTEMSA1,A2,B1,B2ETC > CIRCUITS AND

π: irr
IRELATE TO QUADRANTS A, B, C & D REACTOR
|& ARE CONNECTED IN 2 OUT OF 3 I INTERTRIPPING
CONFIGURATION AT THE REACTOR |

A2 C2 4o o-\
-O O-

SWITCHGEAR AUX. SW
^DISCREPANCY

-o | o
GENERATOR SWITCH

Γ DISCONNECTOR
DISCO

TIME DELAY (2 sees)

•TIME DELAY RELAY 2

SWITCHGEAR RELAY 1
POSITION RELAY OVERFLUXING PROTECTION
TRIP RELAY 1

TRIP ••GENERATOR MAIN EXCITER

RELAY • FIELD CB
AUTO
RESET " GENERATOR SWITCH
• DISCONNECTOR
OVERFLUXING
PROTECTION
RELAY 1 ALARMS
INDICATION

UNIT TRANSF. C
LV TRIP RELAY 1
UNIT TRANSF Ό' HV FIRST STAGE OVERCURRENT
' lo ΤΥ-ΥΛ
UNIT TRANSF Ό' WINDING
Q TEMPERATURE ry/^

TRIP RELAY
AUTO RESET

GROUP 6·
" UNIT TRANSF 'C
• LVCB

UNIT TRANSF Ό'

LV TRIP RELAY 1
I UNIT TRANSF. Ό' HV FIRST STAGE OVERCURRENT
' UNIT TRANSF Ό' WINDING rvv^
^TEMPERATURE
-4
TRIP RELAY
INDICATION AUTO RESET

"UNIT TRANSF Ό'

NOTE GROUP 7 (HV CB FAIL) NOT SHOWN - L V CB

FIG. 11 .36 (cont'd) Overall protection schematic diagram for main generating units

919
Protection Chapter 11

AUXILIARY TRIP
SWITCH

o- -O I O-

SUPERVISION
^RELAY^

FIG. 11.37 Trip supply supervision

AUXILIARY
SWITCHES TRIP COIL
- O I O—

; ^ _ 0 ^

Β
ALARM

FIG. 11.38 Trip circuit supervision

trip. For security, each of the smaher blocks A l , A 2 ,
etc., is separately cabled to the u n h protection relay
panel.
12 Auxiliaries systems
12.1 Operating criteria
Before considering the detailed protection requirements
for the auxiliaries systems, it is necessary to define the
relevant operating criteria. These will generally be the
same as those defined in Section 2 of this chapter for
the main plant systems. It is, of course, important to
maintain continuity of supply to auxiliary plant as far
as possible and also the stabihty of the unfaulted parts
of the systems. The selection and setting of protection
devices for the auxiliaries systems should therefore be
based upon the fohowing major requirements:
ensure that the distribution system can restore itself
within the limits of stability.
• The protection must be stable in transient condi­
tions, such as m o t o r starting, and shall not operate
for current surges caused by fauhs external to the
auxiliaries systems, which the main generator can
safely withstand and which do not damage the pro­
tected plant.
• The characteristics of protection equipment must
match the operating characteristics of the plant it
is protecting and provide discrimination with the
protection of other plant connected to the auxiliary
system.
• All auxiliaries system faults must be cleared before
the short-circuit capability of the cables, connec­
tions and switchgear supplying the faulted plant is
exceeded.

• Faults external to major power sources, i.e., unit

transformers and diesel-driven generators, must only
open the circuit-breakers controlling these power
sources after all other protection nearer the fault has
fahed to clear the fault.
• Faults internal to a major power source shall cause
its circuit-breaker to open as fast as possible to
12.2 Protection requirements
This section deals with the protection aspects of plant
and equipment connected to the 11 kV, 3.3 kV and
415 V auxiharies systems. The various protection
schemes used to cover the different protection require­
ments for the various kinds of auxiliary plant normally

920

found in a power station are reviewed. The overah
objective, as defined above, is to provide safe and
rehable protection to ensure that the faulted element
is removed as quickly as possible, thus minimising
disruption to the remainder of the system.
Synonymous with this requirement is the need to
provide protection which will be highly selective and
discriminative in its action, and that the operation of
all the relays is co-ordinated to give complete protec­
tion to the circuits concerned and ensure that, as far
as possible, only faulted plant is disconnected.
12.3 Auxiliary transformers
The principles adopted to protect the generator and unit
transformers, described in Section 7 of this chapter,
apply equally to the auxihary transformer circuhs. Due
in the main to the smaller ratings, there are the fol­
lowing differences in the methods adopted when apply­
ing the protection.
12.3.1 Phase to phase and earth fault protection
C E G B practice on auxiliary transformer circuhs is not
to provide biased differential protection on 3.3/0.415
kV transformers, and below 10 M V A on 11/3.3 kV
transformers. However, if two auxiliary 11/3.3 kV
transformers are required to operate in parallel, then
biased differential protection is fitted to b o t h , irre­
spective of rating: this is to avoid both transformers
tripping for a phase to phase fault on either trans­
former. Referring to Fig 11.39, if biased differential
WHEN SPECIFIED
LV PROTECTION
BIASED
DIFFERENTIAL
PROTECTION
LV SWITCHGEAR
AUXILIARY
TRANSFORMER
RESTRICTED
3
EARTH
FAULT
STANDBY
EARTH
FAULT
FIG. 1 1 . 3 9 Auxiliary transformer protection
Auxiliaries systems
protection were not provided, phase to phase faults
would be cleared by the inverse time overcurrent relay
on the H V side of the transformer and, since both
these relays would 'see' the same fault current, both
transformers would be tripped.
With the low cost of current transformers at 1 1 /
3.3 kV and no restrictions on space for mounting
them in the circuh-breakers, the restricted earth fauh
protection is fitted as a separate protection scheme.
Figure 11.39 shows how the protection is apphed. The
high voltage restricted earth fault protection is con­
nected in the residual circuit of the overcurrent pro­
tection and because the H V side of the transformer is
delta connected, earth fault currents do not appear in
the relay coil for fauhs on the LV side. The relay is
therefore of the instantaneous high impedance type
as used on the main supply transformers and described
in Section 7 of this chapter.
The LV restricted earth fault protection uses the
standard scheme of three CTs in the LV circuit-breaker
balancing against one current transformer in the trans­
former neutral. This arrangement and the overall biased
differential protection arrangement is shown in Fig
11.39.
12.3.2 Winding faults and transformer overloads
Winding fauhs in all oil-filled auxiliary transformers
are detected in the same fashion as for the major
transformers described in Section 7.5 of this chapter.
However, since all auxiliary transformers are naturally
cooled, winding temperature protection gives an alarm
HV PROTECTION
3 - POLE
RESTRICTED
OVERCURRENT
EARTH RELAY
FAULT
921
Protection
only. The winding temperature device is similar to
that used on oil-filled transformers and explained in
Chapter 3. On the smaller oil-filled transformers ( 3 . 3 /
0.415 kV), without a conservator oh tank, the Buch-
holz relay is replaced by a top-oil temperature device
which is set to alarm for an overload condition. This
is more fully described in Chapter 3.
These 3.3/0.415 kV transformers and ah air insu­
lated transformers rely on the earth fault protection
for fast clearance of winding faults.
12.3.3 H V inverse t i m e a n d h i g h s e t
instantaneous overcurrent
The protection is apphed in the same way as for the
u n h transformer described in Section 7.3 of this chapter
and shown in Fig 11.39.
The auxiliary transformer back-up protection for
hne to line faults on both the H V and the LV trans­
former connections and all plant connected to the
LV side of the transformer, is provided by a relay which
has an inverse characteristic, except on 3.3/0.415 kV
transformers where the relay has to operate in con­
junction with a 415 V fuse. In this case, an extremely
inverse relay is used, since its characteristic is very
similar to that of a fuse. This gives better co-ordination
between relay and fuse and is explained fully in Section
12.9 of this chapter. This relay is connected to current
transformers which are located on the H V side of the
transformer (Fig 11.39). The three-pole elements ensure
the same clearance times for all line to line faults on
the LV side of the transformer.
On 3.3/0.415 kV transformers of 1 M V A and below,
a switching device is used on the 3.3 kV side of the
transformer circuit. This consists of a circuit-breaker
and a fuse (see Chapter 5). F a u h s above the circuh-
breaker fault interrupting capability are cleared by the
fuse and the combination, as far as the protection is
concerned, can be treated as a circuit-breaker, allowing
the use of instantaneous relays. Figure 11.40 shows
that the instantaneous relay reduces protection clear­
ance times for cable faults, the time reduction being
between 50 and 100 ms.
All high set instantaneous overcurrent relays have
a low transient over-reach to prevent operation due
to fauhs on the LV side of the transformer. This is
explained in Sections 7.3 and 12.9 of this chapter.
12.3.4 Standby earth fault
Back-up earth fault protection against all earth fauhs
occurring on the LV side of the transformer is pro­
vided by a single-pole inverse time relay. This relay is
operated from the neutral C T which is located in the
neutral of the LV winding. The protection application
is described in Section 7.4 of this chapter.
12.4 Auxihary generators
As part of the design philosophy or the maintenance
922
C h a p t e r 11
OVERCURRENT
PROTECTION RELAY
400A
FUSE
o.H
HIGH SET
INSTANTANEOUS -
OVERCURRENT
PROTECTION RELAY
0.0Γ
10
CURRENT, MVA
FIG. 11.40 Protection co-ordination for a fused
switching device
of secure electrical supplies to both station and unit
auxiharies boards, h has been the practice for many
years to provide additional local generation at strategic
points within the power station network, so that the
safe operation and control of certain essential plant
can be carried out during periods of enforced dis­
connection from the grid system (see Chapter 1). This
is achieved by connecting diesel or gas turbine driven
generators directly to the 11 kV, 3.3 kV or 415 V
busbars of selected auxiliary switchboards. In this
context, the term *local generation' refers to generators
which are connected to these switchboards as com­
pared with the main generator which provides genera­
tion to the national grid system.
The protection scheme for local generation plant
must take into account, and cater for, the mechanical
failures of the prime mover.
The protection scheme divides faults into those which
must trip circuits and those which alarm. The distinc­
tion is made on the basis that an operator cannot be
expected to correct a fault in less than five minutes
from it happening. Any fault which cannot be sustained
for five minutes without becoming a danger to person­
nel or causing serious damage must be arranged to
imtiate an automatic trip. The phhosophy is similar to
that adopted for the protection functions of the main
generator unit.
T o illustrate the protection philosophy for local
generating plant, a diesel generator system is described
to show how the electrical and mechanical protection
requirements of the generator set are met and how

they fit into the overah protection scheme. F r o m a
protection point of view, the tripping functions can
be divided into two main categories — mechanical
and electrical.
12.4.1 M e c h a n i c a l trips
Consideration of mechanical faults will be confined
to those which necessitate tripping of the generator
circuit-breaker. The protection requirements in respect
of ah other types of mechanical fauh are deah with
in Chapter 9.
As mentioned previously, the essence of any pro­
tection system is that it must be capable of detecting
any abnormal condhion in the equipment it is protec­
ting at an early stage and of providing means of
isolating the faulty element before any serious damage
occurs.
This philosophy is achieved by measuring the flow,
temperature and pressure of the fluids which are essen­
tial to the healthy operation of the engine. It is normal
to choose lubricating oil and coohng water for this
purpose, since their behaviour accurately reflects the
state of the engine.
The potentially damaging situations in which pro­
tection is needed, are listed below. The detection of any
of these fauhs resuhs in the tripping of the circuh-
breaker and eventually the shut down of the engine:
• Lubricating oh pressure low.
• Lubricating oil temperature low.
• Coohng water temperature high.
• Coohng water flow low.
• Engine overspeed.
It wih be apparent from this hst, that faults associated
with the fuel system supplying the diesel engine do not
require circuit-breaker tripping. Serious consequences
could ensue if the generator is not disconnected quickly
from the electrical system when fuel supply is lost,
but the tripping of the circuit-breaker for failure of
the fuel supply system is unnecessary if a supply of
fuel to the engine can be maintained for a finite period
of time. The design of the fuel system is intended to
cater for this. As described in Chapter 9, the fuel oil
supply arrangements on site consist of a main t a n k ,
day tank and a gravity tank. The main tank supplies
the day tank, which in turn supphes the fuel to the
engine via the normal fuel feed system. The gravity
tank acts as a back-up supply in the event of failure
of the day tank supply system for any reason.
Under normal operating conditions, fuel oil p u m p s
are fitted in duplicate to feed the fuel oil to the engine
under pressure from the day tank. Should either or
both of these pumps be lost, then the system transfers
automatically to the gravity tank system whereby fuel
is gravity fed to the engine. The diesel engine wih
continue to run for several hours under this regime
Auxiliaries systems
but at a reduced generated output, typically between
20 and 4 5 % of the generator full load capability.
It follows that when fuel oil is avahable from the
gravity t a n k , it is not necessary to provide a trip signal
to the generator circuit-breaker for fuel system faults.
Under these conditions, sufficient time is available for
the operator to take remedial action and synchronous
m o t o r operation of the generator is neither harmful to
the generator nor to the auxiliary supply system.
With this fuel system design it is only necessary from
a protection point of view to provide an alarm to
indicate the loss of one fuel oil p u m p , alerting the
plant operator to monitor the situation and take the
appropriate action.
12.4.2 Electrical protection
A typical electrical protection scheme for the generator
and connected loads is shown in Fig 11.41. The protec­
tion scheme illustrated is designed to give phase and
earth fault protection, using a combination of main and
back-up systems to ensure that a fauh on the generator
circuit disconnects the generator as quickly as possible.
The discrimination necessary can only be obtained by
correct relay co-ordination. It is necessary to disconnect
the generator rapidly in order to minimise damage, to
maintain continuity of supply to other connected loads,
and also to maintain a stable auxiliary supply system.
The network shown is a single busbar system feeding
two outgoing feeders, each of which is controhed at
both ends by circuh-breakers.
Any phase or earth faults occurring on the generator
windings will be detected by a differential protection
system, as described in Section 6.3 of this chapter.
The zone of protection extends beyond the feeder side
of the circuit-breakers, which means that the generator
protection system also caters for phase and earth fauhs
on the busbars as well as the circuit-breaker itself
and part of the feeder circuit-breakers. The protection
system is arranged to trip the generator and the two
feeder circuit-breakers.
The feeder protection is described in Section 12.6
of this chapter.
Standby earth fault (two-stage)
Should an earth fauh on the system not be cleared
by any of the protection schemes described above,
then the two standby earth fault protection relays fitted
to the generator neutral will clear the fault. The pro­
tection scheme is described in Section 7.4 of this
chapter. The first stage trips the generator circuit
breaker only: if this fahs to clear the fauh in 0.3 s,
the second stage trips the generator. Thus the protec­
tion acts as a back-up to the generator protection
but is principally for the protection of the busbars,
circuh-breakers and uncleared fauhs on the 3.3 kV
system. It therefore must co-ordinate w h h the 3.3 kV
auxiliary system protection. This is dealt with in Section
12.9 of this chapter.
923
Protection
3 - POLE
OVERCURRENT
Χ X 3 - POLE
OVERCURRENT
RELAY
DIFFERENTIAL DIFFERENTIAL
PROTECTION PROTECTION
-3 -3
X Χ
ESSENTIAL AUXILIARIES
SWITCHBOARD
FIG. 1 1 . 4 1 Electrical protection scheme for an auxihary diesel generator
N o reverse power relays have been fitted to guard
against the generator running as an induction gen­
erator. The mechanical protection already outlined,
adequately protects the diesel generator against loss
of drive and the fitting of circulating current protection
to the generator removes the need for fast operating
reverse power protection for generator faults. The
overcurrent protection of the feeder circuits provides
back-up protection for uncleared generator fauhs, as
is the case for the main generator at fossil-fired power
stations.
12.4.3 Gas turbines
Gas turbines, as well as being used as prime movers
for the generation of emergency electrical auxiliary
supplies, are also used for grid supply system support
and black start (loss of grid supply). If the last two
functions are not required, dieseis have the advantage
of faster, more reliable starting for emergency supplies
to auxiliaries. Gas turbine units are very much larger
than diesel sets, sizes varying between 17.5 M W and
70 M W . The protection requirements are the same
as for diesel generators, except that the gas turbines
has a unit transformer directly connected to supply
its auxiliaries. This modifies the protection to that
shown in Fig 11.42.
The electrical protection requirements of gas turbine
units include both generator and u n h transformer pro­
924
Chapter 11
•w=R-
2 - STAGE
STANDBY EARTH
FAULT RELAY
RELAY
Τ
DIFFERENTIAL
PROTECTION
tection. A unit scheme is used to detect phase and earth
faults in the machine generator windings and its con­
nections at 11 kV. The zone of protection indicated
includes the interconnecting cables between the alter­
nator and incoming side of the 11 kV switchboard as
well as between the alternator and the H V connections
of the 11 kV/415 V gas turbine unit transformer. Back­
u p overcurrent protection is provided using a vohage
controlled overcurrent relay. Referring to Fig 11.43,
the relay has two operating characteristics determined
by the operation of the instantaneous undervoltage
unit. O n overloads, its characteristic matches the ther­
mal characteristic of the generator. Under fault con­
ditions, the undervoltage element operates, changing
the characteristic to the fault characteristic and ensures
positive operation on the low value of sustained fault
current encountered on synchronous machines. The
fault characteristic is the standard I D M T and therefore
ahows close grading with the overcurrent protection
on the outgoing circuits of the 11 kV switchboard.
The gas turbine unit has negative phase sequence
protection fitted to protect the machine against un­
cleared faults external to the machine. It is omitted on
emergency dieseis in nuclear power stations in the
interests of safety and continuous running during a
reactor post-trip situation.
A two-stage standby earth fault protection is pro­
vided as back-up protection for the uncleared earth
faults in the gas-turbine generator circuit and 11 kV
 Auxiliaries systems

VOLTAGE
CONTROLLED
OVERCURRENT
RELAY GAS TURBINE
GENERATOR

-RR-

•X-
BIASED
DIFFERENTIAL
PROTECTION

\—x- DIFFERENTIAL
PROTECTION

GT UNIT
TRANSFORMER

3 - POLE
OVERCURRENT
RELAY

FIG. 11.42 Electrical protection scheme for an auxiliary gas-turbine generator

auxiliary system faults. It also acts as protection to • Bearing temperature high.

trip the generator for all 11 kV busbar fauhs. The first
• Rotor temperature high.
stage of the protection is designed therefore to open
the 11 kV circuh-breaker only and, if this fails to • Gas inlet temperature high.
clear the fault, the second stage trips the gas turbine. • Overspeed trip.
The protection fitted to the 11/0.415 kV gas tur­
bine u n h t r a n ^ o r m e r is the same as that described in Electric generator
Section 12.4.2 of this chapter.
• Outlet coohng air temperature high.

Mechanical trips • Lubricating oil tank level low.

The fohowing is a hst of the gas turbine mechanical • Excessive vibration.
trips: • Exciter bearing temperature high.
Gas generator • Air inlet differential pressure high.
• Low vent temperature high. • Lubricating oil pressure low.
• Lubricating oil pressure low. • Generator reading temperature high.
• Anti-icing system failure.
• Flame failure. All the above protective devices trip the generator
11 kV circuit-breaker and shut down the gas turbine
• Cell temperature high. by tripping the fuel valves.
• Air intake differential pressure high.
• Excessive vibration.
12.5 Motors
• Fuel inlet pressure low.
T h e protection scheme for a m o t o r circuit is based
• Gas pressure unbalance. on a thermal overload relay which, in addition to the
thermal overload, protects against open-circuit unbal­
Power turbine anced phases and stalling conditions. Phase to phase
• Excessive vibration. and phase t o earth fault protection is provided, depend­
ing on whether the circuit is controlled by a circuit-
• Lubricating oil pressure low.
breaker or a m o t o r switching device which can interrupt
• Stator temperature high. the maximum fauh current for the swhchboard, or a

925
Protection Chapter 11

-A
S1 S2

S1 S2

-C
S1 S2

TRIP ALARM GOT.

11 12'< ^ 2 0 ^ ^
lt 2 4 ^ 3 4 ^ 4 ^ st ?| 7 t i t 9-? iSt
A

Q • VOLTAGE
UNIT

DISC UNIT
NOTE­
ALL THREE ELEMENTS
ARE THE SAME AND ONLY
ONE IS SHOWN. ALARM AND
TRIP CIRCUITS ARE PARALLELED

30-

28-

26-

24-

22-

20-
LÜ
18-

ü 16-

5 14H

ΐ 12H
o
ιοΗ

6-

4-

2-

—I 1 1 1 1 1 1— —I
4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
CURRENT IN MULTIPLES OF PLUG SETTING

Time-current characteristics at time multiplier setting 1.0

FIG. 11.43 Voltage-controlled overcurrent relay

contactor with a limited fault interruption capability.
At 11 kV, all circuits have circuh-breakers and at
3.3 kV ah circuhs have ehher circuh-breakers or motor
switching devices. At 415 V, motor circuits are con­
trolled by a fused contactor which is limited to inter­
rupting the m o t o r starting currents; this restriction
prevents the use of an instantaneous relay to provide
instantaneous protection for phase to phase faults.
The protection philosophy adopted by the C E G B on
m o t o r circuits is discussed in the following sections.

926
 Auxiliaries systems

12.5.1 M o t o r c i r c u i t s a t 415 V ( c o n t a c t o r circuits)

Protection against phase to phase fauhs is provided
by the fuse.
Protection against phase to earth faults is also THERMAL OVERLOAD/SINGLE
provided by the fuse for fuses u p to 250 A . On m o t o r PHASING/PHASE UNBALENCE.ETC.

circuhs using a 250 A or greater fuse (50 k W motors

and above), an instantaneous earth fault relay is pro­
vided together with an inhibit overcurrent relay which
prevents the earth fault relay from tripping the con­
tactor for faults outside its capability. The reason for
special earth fault protection on these circuits is that
the earth fault loop impedance may restrict the fault
current to less than 1000 A , resulting in very slow
clearance on circuits with large fuses. This resuhs in
increased damage to plant and danger to personnel.
This is discussed further in Section 12.9.5 of this
INHIBIT STABILIZING EARTH
chapter. The protection circuit is shown in Fig 11.44. RELAY RESISTANCE FAULT
RELAY
The thermal overload relays are either directly con­
nected into the supply lines to the machine or via
current transformers, depending on the rating of the
machine. C E G B practice is that an overload relay can FIG. 11.44 Protection circuit for motors of 50 kW
and above for contactor circuits with 250 A fuses
be directly connected on circuhs having full load cur­ (or greater). The earth fault element is time-delayed
rents up to and including 60 A where the wiring is to allow the instantaneous overcurrent relay to
static. Where relays are mounted on hinged panels, operate first
they may be directly connected u p to and including
25 A only. For circuits above these ratings, protective
12.5.2 M o t o r c i r c u i t s a t 11 k V a n d 3.3 k V
relays are current transformer operated.
On electrically-held contactors, the protection relay The thermal overload protection on these circuits is
contacts interrupt the A C supply to the contactor coil. essentially the same as that supphed on the 415 V
The circuh is shown in Fig 11.45 (a). For latched con­ m o t o r circuits which use current transformers. Phase
tactors, the protection relay contacts close to activate to phase and phase to earth fault protection is added
a DC-operated trip coil. The circuit is shown in Fig in the form of instantaneous relays. It is essential to
11.45 (b). have this form of protection even on 3.3 kV motor

110V AC 110V AC
PROTECTION
INTERPOSING PLANT RELAY
RELAY INHIBIT PROTECTION OVERCURRENT ETC
O-
CONTACTOR
CONTACT CONTACTOR COIL
SWITCH POSITION
(a) Electrically-held contactors SWITCH

+110V DC -DC
PROTECTION OVER CURRENT RELAY
RELAY CONTACT INHIBIT TRIP RELAY
-O O ho cH
250A FUSES & ABOVE

-O O-
"ΈοΝΤΑσιΌρ"
CONTACTOR TRIP COIL
POSITION SWITCH
-110V
(b) Latched contactors

FIG. 11.45 Protection tripping schematic for motor contactor circuits

927
Protection
switching devices, as the earth fauh currents are hmited
to 1000 A. The fuses fitted as standard in these de­
vices are 400 A , resulting in very slow clearance on
earth faults. Additionally, the switching device operated
from the relay will clear the fault without blowing
the fuse. This also apphes on phase to phase faults
to a limited extent at low fault infeeds which can be
cleared by the circuit-breaker in the motor switching
device arrangement.
12.5.3 T h e r m a l o v e r l o a d relay
Referring to Fig 11.46, the thermal overload relay
consists of three bimetal strips, one in each phase of
the motor, which become heated as a result of the
motor current flowing through them, causing bending
or rotational movement which closes a pair of contacts
to initiate a trip or alarm signal. The precise physical
movement of the bimetallic strip is a function of the
relay setting current.
The bimetallic strips are helically wound and, when
they carry the motor hne current, the heat generated
causes the assembly to rotate about a c o m m o n axis,
so that it closes the trip or alarm contact on the relay
if the motor rating is exceeded. One important feature
which this relay embodies is temperature compensation
to accommodate for any changes in ambient tempera­
ture, so that the actuating helix will either 'wind u p '
or 'wind down' depending on whether there is a rise
or fah in temperature.
The contact arrangement is shown in Fig 11.46.
The three thermal elements are mounted axially in­
line and are insulated from the case and from one
another. The two outer elements are connected together
to form one pole of the trip circuit, whhst the centre
element forms the other. A radial arm on the centre
element carries a lattice frame fitted with five contacts,
one of which is the overload contact.
Each of the arms on the outer movements carries
two contacts which normally float between a pair of
contacts on the centre frame and protect against phase
unbalance or open-circuit. Under normal operating con­
ditions, all three contact-carrying arms deflect through
the same angle so that the two contacts on each of
the two outer arms remain midway between the two
pairs of contacts on the centre contact frame.
The thermal characteristic required varies with the
run-up time and the heating-up and coohng-down time
of the motor. The thermal overload relay used by the
C E G B has three characteristics of which the 20-minute
type is most commonly used (Fig 11.47). This gives
an operating time for motor starting currents (5 to 8
times relay rating) of 40 seconds, approximately, and
suits most motors used by the C E G B on their auxiliary
systems. Applying one characteristic to all motors
cannot give close protection for all m o t o r s , but has
proved very reliable and gives effective protection.
Ideally, the relay should match closely the ther­
mal characteristic of the motor both heating-up and
928
C h a p t e r 11
cooling-down and ensure that its operation at all times
stays within the safe withstand capability of the ma­
chine. With this kind of relay, a compromise is reached
where, in some areas, the m o t o r is overprotected.
The instantaneous earth fauh relay uses a stabilis­
ing resistance in series with a low impedance current
operated relay. The principle adopted has already been
explained in Section 6.3 of this chapter and it is con­
nected (as explained in Section 12.3.1) to the auxihary
transformers. The stabilising resistance prevents opera­
tion due to current transformer saturation caused by
m o t o r starting currents. The relay must also have a
low transient overreach to allow a low setting without
picking u p on the first peak of the starting current.
For certain applications, the provision of adequate
stalling protection can sometimes be a problem. This
is particularly so where the safe stah time for the
motor is close to or longer than its run-up time, as in
submerged coohng water p u m p s , or where the motor
is close to its stall capability when it is operating at
high load conditions. Under these circumstances, a
special stalling relay is required in order to provide
close relay settings between tripping time and motor
stah withstand time. Referring to Fig 11.48, the cur­
rent transformer/control contactor operates at values
of current above three times rated relay current to
switch in the thermal element. If the current fahs be­
low three times, as in a healthy motor start, the thermal
u n h is disconnected.
In addition to the electromechanical thermal over­
load relays discussed, electronic relays are now being
produced. The C E G B have not to date (1988) approved
the use of the electronic relay, mainly because of its
inability to provide fast phase to phase and phase to
earth fault protection. It is proposed to use electro­
mechanical protection, as provided in the past, in
combination w h h an electronic relay for thermal over­
load protection. The advantage of the electronic re­
lay over the electromechanical as a thermal overload
device is that the relay thermal characteristic matches
the mathematical thermal model of the motors more
closely.
Owing to modern advances in insulation technology,
the quality of the insulation nowadays is such that less
is required than was previously necessary for the same
motor design, with a consequent reduction in frame
size for the same rating. This results in a smaller heating
time constant with which the electromechanical relay
is unable to cope for all the requirements, and it is
becoming increasingly unsuhable for close protection
of motors of present day design. The requirements are:
• T o fit the relay *cold' operating curve below the
motor *cold' thermal withstand curve.
• T o fh the relay *hot' operating curve below the
m o t o r 'hot' thermal withstand curve.
• T o fh the relay 'hot' operating curve above the
m o t o r 100^0 vohs and 8 0 % vohs starting current/
time characteristic.
 Auxiliaries systems

OVERLOAD CONTACT RUNNING LOAD

ADJUSTMENT INDICATING POINTER

HEATER CALIBRATING
ADJUSTMENT

PRESET
OVERLOAD POINTER

COMPENSATING ACTIVE
BIMETAL HELIX BIMETAL HELIX

FIG. 11.46 Thermal overload relay

20 MIN BAND
1000 Η

10 MIN BAND

? lOOH
<
oc
CL
o
RUNNING (HOT)
CONDITIONS FROM
100% LOAD
105%-125% SETTING
10
2 3 4
MULTIPLES OF RATED CURRENT

FIG. 11.47 Motor thermal relay — 20 minute characterisdc

In view of the above, h is clear that in order to obtain
good thermal protection between motor and overload
relay, it is desirable to have a protective device which
is more able to match closely the thermal characteristic
of the machine it is protecting. Such a device is an
electronic protection relay which has a range of set­
tings to cater for most drives which are commercially
available on the market. Thermal imaging is achieved
by electronic circuits whose behaviour is determined
by a mathematical model that describes the thermal
characteristics of the m o t o r . The relay can be either
analogue or digital in operation, the digital relay being
more flexible. Further, quantities measured by the re­
lay can be displayed at the relay by means of a liquid
crystal device, or simhar. At 415 V, such sophisticated
protection might not be considered necessary. How­
ever, there are essential motors connected at 415 V
which are required to run following a reactor trip at a
nuclear power station to maintain reactor safety, and
unnecessary tripping of one of these motors by hs ther­
mal relay renders it unavailable until the relay resets to
allow a m o t o r start. Digital relays can be programmed
to trip the m o t o r , for example, on vohage disturbance,
before the m o t o r reaches a temperature which would
preclude an immediate restart.
Digital type protection relays, using microprocessors,
therefore have very wide ranging capabilities. Most
relays employing digital techniques will memorise the

929
Protection
CURRENT TRANSFORMER/CONTROL
CONTACTOR (AUTO-WOUND BALLAST
BELOW 5 AMPERES) RESISTOR
BIMETALLIC UNIT
TRIPPING CONTACTS
CASERIES FLAG
JC INDICATOR
FIG. 11.48 Stalling relay schematic diagram
values of circuit parameters, e.g., load current in each
phase, thermal overload capacity actually used u p and
also the amount remaining before reaching trip state,
percentage unbalance currents, earth fault a n d short-
circuit currents. This information can be easily accessed
at the relay to give running values of the various
parameters as well as pre- and post-fault trip data.
Other useful features include a pre-trip alarm and trip
inhibit facility.
12.6 Cables
So far, the protection requirements of m o t o r s , trans­
formers, and generators have been discussed: these
schemes usually also protect their cables which are con­
nected to them. In these instances, fauhs in the cable
are cleared by the main protection. Should these faults
persist undetected by the main protection, the back-up
protection will clear the fault, its current and type
setting determining the short-circuit rating of the cable.
For cables not connected to the items of plant refer­
red to above, e.g., interconnectors, the same philosophy
of main and back-up protection is adopted. T h e main
protection is circulating current high impedance as
described in Section 6.3 of this chapter. Figure 11.49
shows the 11 kV and 3.3 kV U n h Board cable intercon­
nector, where it can be seen that the main protection
consists of a circulating current scheme. Back-up pro­
tection is provided by a combined overcurrent and
earth fault relay which is located at each end of the
interconnector. The relay used for this purpose consists
of three elements, two used for overcurrent protection
and the third for earth fault protection.
At 415 V, the protection requirements are a little
different, in that the circulating current protection is
phase to earth only and the back-up protection is pro­
930
Chapter 11
vided by the overcurrent relay on the H V side of the
transformer. This operates in two stages; the first stage
trips the interconnector, the second stage the trans­
former H V and LV circuh-breakers.
12.7 Busbar protection
Whilst the busbar protection schemes available are
perfectly adequate to cater for phase faults and earth
faults, their use within the C E G B for power station
systems has always been the subject of debate.
Experience indicates that busbar faults are very in­
frequent. The busbars are usuahy air insulated, which
itself reduces significantly the possibility of busbar
faults. This supports the view that a dedicated busbar
protection scheme is unnecessary.
The C E G B has not used busbar protection on any
660 M W unit power station other than Drax where,
having been installed in the late 1960s on the first half,
it was repeated for consistency on the second half. It
has been considered for many years that to introduce a
separate form of protection specifically to cover busbar
faults reduces the overall reliability of the electrical
system, since it complicates the protection scheme and
increases the risk of malfunction. This would result
in shutting down the complete switchboard, causing
severe operational inconvenience and would be costly in
lost production. This is particularly so for unit boards,
which supply all the motors essential for the running
of the main u n h . At 11 kV for example, h would
possibly resuh in the loss of a boiler feed p u m p , cooling
water p u m p s , induced draught and forced draught fan
motors and would inevitably result in the tripping of
the main unit. The risk of losing such strategic items
of plant, with the consequential loss of generation, due
to the possible malfunction of a busbar protection
scheme is unacceptable. For this reason, busbar pro­
tection is n o longer fitted to auxiliary switchboards in
this way.
There is, however, stih a need to guard against any
fauhs hkely to affect the busbars. The method adopted
to cover for busbar faults uses the protection arrange­
ments already discussed under transformer protection,
i.e., the standby earth fauh protection wih operate for
any busbar fault involving earth, and the back-up
overcurrent protection fitted to the H V side of the
transformer will operate for any busbar phase to phase
faults. At 415 V, where busbar faults have been caused
by h u m a n error when using multirange instruments, the
back-up protection is set down to 150 ms. This can
only be achieved by ehminating all forms of overcurrent
protection using inverse time relays on the 415 V supply
system. This method of protection at 415 V is helped
considerably by the design of that system. This is ex­
plained in Section 12.9 of this chapter.
12.8 High breaking capacity (HBC) fuses
The fuse has shown itself to be an extremely rehable
and safe form of protection a n d has been used in this
 Auxiliaries systems

1st STAGE OF 1st STAGE OF

OVERCURRENT ON OVERCURRENT ON
3.3kV TRANSFORMER 3.3kV TRANSFORMER
PROTECTION (415V INTERCONNECTOR ONLY) PROTECTION

Ϊ
nn no nn nn
no
rp r
Ί
NOT REQUIRED
TWO-STAGE ^ ON 415V ^ TWO-STAGE
OVERCURRENT OVERCURRENT
AND EARTH AND EARTH
FAULT RELAY FAULT RELAY

DIFFERENTIAL
PROTECTION RELAY

FIG. 1 1 . 4 9 11 kV, 3 . 3 kV and 4 1 5 V interconnector protection

way over a long period of time with great success.
Whilst the principal function of the high breaking
capacity (HBC) fuse is to provide short-circuh pro­
tection, it can also provide an adequate degree of
overload and earth fault protection for smaller circuits.
It must be reahsed that, when considering the earth
fauh protection properties of the fuse, a significant
amount of earth fault current must flow before the
device operates, so an adequate earth path must be
provided back to the star point of the transformer.
Most 415 V circuhs are fuse protected and fuses
are used to a significant extent for 3.3 kV circuits.
CEGB practice on the use of fuses as protection and
their co-ordination with other protection is explained
in the fohowing section.
always be maintained if a 2:1 ratio in fuse sizes is used.
Experience shows this is to be so, a h h o u g h at very
high fauh currents which are operating b o t h fuses in
less than 5 m s , some grading may be lost with a 2:1
ratio.
12.9.2 Characteristics of inverse time relays
There are three types of recognised inverse time over-
current relay and the characteristics are specified in
l E C 2 5 5 - 4 (BS142), they are:
• Ordinary inverse.
• Very inverse.
• Extremely inverse.

Typical characteristics for overcurrent relays are shown

in Fig 11.51. The characteristic equation, as specified
12.9 Protection co-ordination
in BS 142, is
k
12.9.1 Characteristics of 415 V fuses t =
In order to maintain a degree of interchangeability, (G/Gb)^ - 1
fuses are specified which fah into the characteristic where t = theoretical operating time, s
bands of l E C 269 (BS 88). Figure 11.50 shows the k = constant for that relay
characteristic bands for 10 A , 20 A, 40 A , 80 A , 160 A , G = current in relay, A
315 A , and 630 A fuses. The lower curve of each b a n d Gb = relay setting current, A
is the pre-arcing time of the fuse in the size stated and a = index characterising the algebraic function
the upper curve is the total operating time of that size.
All fuse characteristics conforming to this standard The ratio G/Gb is therefore the plug setting multipher.
must he within these b a n d s . This includes the ± lO^o By careful choice of the values k and a, the three
tolerance allowed to the manufacturer on his published inverse curves at a time muhiplier of u n h y can be pro­
characteristic. This ensures that when replacing fuses, duced. Suggested values of k and a for the four types
grading between them will always be maintained. For of relay are given below:
example, a 315 A and a 630 A fuse of any manufacturer
Ordinary Very Extremely Long-time
which conforms to the upper and lower limit of the
inverse inverse inverse inverse
fuse bands of BS88 will always grade with one another. 0.14 13.5 80.0 12.0
These curves indicate that grading between fuses will 0.02 1.0 2.0 1.0

931
Protection
10 000-1
1000 Η
500
CURRENT, A
F I G . 1 1 . 5 0 4 1 5 V fuse characteristics
Since the characteristic curves are based on the time
multipher (1.0) then, when co-ordinating relays at other
time multiphers, a check must be made using the actual
curves specified by the manufacturer and the setting
adjusted (if necessary) to obtain the required grading
margin. This is particularly important when using very
and extremely inverse relays, where the time of opera­
tion is not always proportional to time multiplier set­
ting. These comments do not apply to electronic relays
the characteristic values for which are shown above and
for which the time multiplier is directly proportional.
The setting accuracy is also to much closer tolerances
(±5%).
Relay errors must be whhin those quoted in BS142.
In that standard the allowable error at twice the setting
is more than twice the ahowable error at 20 times the
setting. This does not usually affect co-ordination mar­
gins between relays, where the most critical margins
more often than not occur at the higher current multi­
ples. It can affect the grading between a fuse and a relay.
12.9.3 Characteristics of definite time relays
The characteristic of a definite time relay with 2, 4
932
Chapter 11
1000 5000 10 000 20 000 30 000
and 8 s settings is shown in Fig 11.51. The operating
time is independent of the current input which means
that the grading interval can be reduced as C T errors
do not have to be included. This is offset to some
extent by the fact that the allowable relay errors are
± 1 0 % instead of ± 7 . 5 % . F r o m a practical point of
view, the inverse and the definite time relays could be
treated in the same way as far as grading margins are
concerned.
Section 12.9.6 of this chapter gives the equation for
the grading interval. In order to simplify the grading
process, the C E G B co-ordinates the system using in­
verse time relays and reserves the application of definite
time relays to specific cases, as follows:
(a) For fast clearance over a wide range of fault levels.
When grading with a fuse this can sometimes be
better achieved using a definite time relay than with
an extremely inverse time relay. At the lower plug
setting and time multiplier setting of the extremely
inverse relay, co-ordination between fuse and relay
is lost at the lower fauh levels. F a u h s between
phases generally produce higher fauh current than
for earth fauhs at 415 V, where the earth fauh

CURRENT IN MULTIPLES OF SETTING
FIG. 11.51 Characteristics of an overcurrent relay with
various time settings
loop impedance can be high. It can also be used
successfully where h is difficuh to clear low level
earth fauhs on interconnector circuhs and busbars.
At 415 V, it would be grading with a fuse, so that
its current setting must be high enough to co-ordi­
nate w h h the largest fuse on the outgoing circuits.
(b) They are ideal for use throughout the supply system
as back-up protection, such as on radial feeders at
the same voltage level. Radial feeders are rarely
used on C E G B auxihary systems other than 415 V
where fuses are the only protection.
(c) Where above a fixed current setting, operation is
required in a definhe time.
They cannot provide close grading with a mixture of
fuses and inverse relays unless the definite time relay
is the first relay in the grading chain. A n inverse relay
wih always grade much closer to another inverse relay
than a definite time relay.
It is practice in modern relays to incorporate both
inverse time and definite time characteristics in one
relay.
12.9.4 Characteristics of thermal relays
The characteristics of thermal relays are designed to
Auxiliaries systems
follow the thermal capability of the protected plant
and, in particular, of induction motors (see typical
characteristics on Fig 11.47 and compare with those
on Fig 11.51). They have longer operating times than
the inverse relays. The relay has other protection func­
tions such as stall, single phasing, negative phase se­
quence and earth fault protection. It is only necessary
for co-ordination purposes to know the characteristics
of the instantaneous a n d thermal relay a n d , if working
in conjunction with a fuse, the fuse characteristic. The
process will be explained later to show how the com­
bined characteristic m a d e u p of a fuse, an instantan­
eous relay and a thermal relay reduces clearance times
of back-up protection further u p the system and, in
the case of large motors connected at 11 kV, deter­
mines whether differential protection is required.
12.9.5 Calculations
The data required for a co-ordination study are:
• A single hne diagram of the supply network, as
shown in Fig 11.52.
• The impedances of all power transformers, rotating
machines and feeder circuits.
The impedances are first converted to the per u n h (p.u.)
value by using p . u . value = actual value/base value,
where the base value chosen depends on the actual
value. If actual value is:
(a) Volts The base value is the nominal phase to
neutral vohage of the relaying point.
(b) Amps The base value is preferably the fuh load
current of the circuh protected. This is not essential
but is a convenient value to choose.
(c) Ohms The base value in ohms is then (a) divided
by (b). The per unit system can be completely de­
fined by specifying (a) and root 3 times the product
of (a) and (b), i.e., a base M V A value. If the base
value in ohms is required, h is given by:
(phase to phase voltage in k V ) ^ / M V A base
Note: Any two base quantities will fix the third but
(a) must be one of t h e m .
The m a x i m u m and m i n i m u m values of short-circuh
current that are expected to flow through the relay
during normal and transient conditions are next cal­
culated. Generally, when considering the settings of
overcurrent relays, the minimum short-circuit is not
required since the current setting is dependent on the
m a x i m u m continuous loading of the circuit, the relay
resetting current ratio and the primary current setting
of the relays in front. The recommendation is to use
a factor of 1.3 times the largest of these three values.
However, for the instantaneous relays, as with unit
protection relays, it is important to check that at the
minimum fauh level the current is at least twice the
933
Protection C h a p t e r 11

400kV

GENERATOR TRANSFORMER

®
-RR-

Θ 660 MW
GENERATOR

' U N I T TRANSFORMER
60 MVA
18.6% IMPEDANCE

750 MVA
11kV
- f ^ — X

(D
11/3.3kV AUXILIARY
TRANSFORMER 10 MVA
8% IMPEDANCE

250 MVA 250 MVA

3.3kV
• y y — X

(D
3.3/415V
I AUXILIARY

Θ
TRANSFORMER
I 1.6 MVA
6% IMPEDANCE
1500kW

415V

630A 0

100 kW

FIG. 11.52 Network single line diagram

The network shows a main (660 MW) generator supplying an 11 kV busbar through its unit transformer. The supply
to the 3.3 kV and 415 V busbars are by unit auxiliary transformers 11/3.3 kV and 3.3/0.415 kV respectively. For the
sake of clarity, representative motors have been shown at 3.3 kV and 415 V only. The 11/3.3 kV systems each have
bus-section circuit-breakers and each section is supplied by an alternative transformer. However, to demonstrate the
co-ordination of the relays it is not necessary to include these alternative supplies.

setting current and the current transformer knee-point
is not reached before twice the relay setting current.
This will ensure positive operation of the instantaneous
relay.
This can be checked simply by the fohowing method:
(i) Calculate the relay circuit impedance at twice
the setting. This is the sum of the relay, plus the
leads, plus the C T , plus any other relays in the
circuit.
(ii) Either from the accuracy limit factor or from the
C T magnetising characteristic, derive the C T knee
point voltage. The accuracy l i m i t f a c t o r is defined
as the primary current up to which the trans­
former maintains its accuracy within its prescribed
limits of error, expressed as a multiple of its rate
current.
(ih) Divide (ii) by (i), giving the knee-point vohage:
this should be greater than twice the setting.
Suppose the current transformer is 10 VA with an
accuracy hmit factor of 15 and a rated secondary cur­
rent of 1 A . Then, if the secondary burden is 1 Ω, the
current transformer can dehver 15 χ 10 volts (knee
point voltage) into 1 Ω which is 150 A . A setting of 75
times is therefore possible. Fifteen to 20 times is more
likely to be the required setting on high set instan­
taneous relays.

934

In calculations to determine the maximum operating
fauh levels, a simple calculation based on the system
impedance which is the equivalent to the switchgear
rating is recommended for the following reasons.
Calculations based on incoming transformer circuit
impedances alone could result in an underestimate of
the peak current for which the instantaneous relay is
required to remain stable. This is not so important for
the grading between inverse time relays by themselves
as the contributions from induction motors, which con­
stitute the switchgear making requirement, are of a
transient nature (10 cycles) and have no effect on the
grading between them. However, if the protection at
the relaying point contains high set overcurrent relays,
for example, on transformer circuits, the first few cycles
of an offset current waveform may cause unwanted
operation of the instantaneous relay under through-
fault conditions if an underestimate of the fault current
has been made. A n example of the calculation is given
in Sections 12.9.6 and 12.9.8 of this chapter, neglect­
ing induction motor infeeds. A decrement curve needs
to be calculated from generator data or obtained from
the manufacturers of the generator, for systems where
the predominating infeed is from local generation. The
protection may be required to operate when the gen­
erator is disconnected from the system, in which case
the grading of the system worked out for connection
to the supply network will have to be rechecked. The
procedure is to estabhsh relay settings for all conditions
when running in parallel with the supply network and
then examine the relay performance when supplied from
local generation only. It may not always be possible
to grade the protection adequately for both situations
and thought has to be given to splitting the network,
when operating on local generation, in such a way that
continuity of supply can be maintained for faults on
the network.
Current transformer performance curves should be
checked for output at the grading point determined by
the maximum fault level or at the setting of the high
set overcurrent if there is one. It is important for over-
current relays that the current transformer does not
saturate at maximum fauh level, as the operating time
would be increased and then may not co-ordinate with
the backing relay driven from current transformers that
do not saturate.
12.9.6 Discrimination
Discrimination is required for both current and time.
Current grading
For relays which carry the same p . u . current under fault
or load conditions, it is essential that they do not op­
erate in the same time. At the maximum fault current,
this is avoided by adjusting the time of operation. At
the minimum fault or load current, inverse time relays
whh the same setting could operate in the same time
due to the nature of the characteristic, irrespective of
Auxiliaries systems
the time setting. This is mainly due to the fact that
below twice the current setting, the relay characteristic
tends to be asymptotic to the time axis; it is there­
fore indeterminate and certainly not accurate enough
to ensure grading. In addition to this, the errors are
more than twice those at the higher fauh levels. Prac­
tical experience shows that w h h the backing relay set
at least 1.3 times the one nearest the fault, grading is
assured. Grading between fuse and relay must be at
least three times and this may be insufficient if a low
time multipher is chosen. Only a plot of both fuse and
relay characteristic will confirm this.
Time grading — relay to relay
The grading point is determined at the intersection
characteristic of the high set instantaneous relay setting
and the inverse time relay (point X , Fig 11.53) or point
Y, the m a x i m u m fault level, if the protection does
not include a high set.
The grading interval (At -\- B) between protective
devices is m a d e u p of a fixed interval (B) and one de­
pending on the operating time of the relay in front
(At).
The fixed interval Β is made u p of two compo­
nents; the first is the fault current interrupting time of
the circuit-breaker. The operating time of the circuit-
breaker includes the time from trip coil energisation to
arc extinction. Usually 100 ms is ahowed for this, giving
a margin of safety as the actual time is normahy 70
to 80 m s . The second component is the overshoot time
of the relay. W h e n the relay is de-energised, operation
may continue for a little longer until all the stored
energy is dissipated, e.g., disc type relays have energy
stored in the disc, solid state relays have energy stored
in capacitors. The overshoot time is defined as the
difference between the operating time of the relay at a
specified value of the input current and the maximum
duration of this current which, if suddenly reduced to
a current which will not cause relay operation, is then
insufficient to cause operation due to overshoot. In
other words, if two relays are operating to a trip con­
dition, the following relay with the longer time set­
ting must not continue to the tripping point due to its
inertia. The time allowed for the overshoot is 50 ms and
must not exceed 100 ms (Fig 11.54).
If a margin of safety is allowed, a reasonable fixed
grading margin (B) is 250 ms to include both com­
ponents.
The time coefficient A depends on several factors.
All measuring devices such as relays and current trans­
formers are subject to some degree of error. The op­
erating time characteristic of either or both relays
involved in the grading may have a positive or negative
error, as may the current transformer. The errors are
taken in accordance with BS 142, which calls for a relay
error class of E 7 . 5 , i.e., 7.5^o at twenty times setting.
It could be that one relay is slow and the other relay
is fast so that must be allowed. Allowing 10<7o for
current transformer errors, the total error at any time
935
Protection Chapter 11

nkv SYSTEM GRADING

BUS SECTION
IDMT
57.16 MVA GENERATOR TRANSFORMER
TMS=0.175
- BUS SECTION
3.3kV
IDMT
11.43 MVA
TMS=0.125

60 MVA
UNIT TRANSFORMER
IDMT
76.32 MVA 415V
TMS=0.25
O 630A

HIGH SET
OVERCURRENT
484 MVA

100
CURRENT.MVA

FIG. 11.53 Network protection grading diagram

will be 0.25t, where t is the operating time of the relay
in front. This does not apply to current independent
relays, since they are independent of current trans­
former errors. The total grading interval is (0.25t +
0.25).
The resulting time of operation of the next relay for
I D M T relays is the operating time of the relay in front
(t) plus the grading interval (At + B), giving t + (At
+ B) = (1.25)t + 0.25; and between definite time
relays, which are independent of current transformer
errors above their setting and meeting class ElO (i.e., A
= 0.2), giving t + 0.2t + 0.25 = (1.2)t + 0.25.
Time grading — relay to fuse
As far as the practice of grading inverse time relays
with fuses is concerned, providing that the relay is not
closer in time than 150 ms at the maximum fault level,
the time grading is achieved. It was mentioned in the
section on current grading that at low time muhiplier
setting, the fuse and relay may not grade at the low
fault level. This is shown in Fig 11.55 region *X', where
relay 2 (a) meets the requirement at the higher fault
levels but crosses the fuse characteristic at the lower
fault level. This is easily checked by plotting the grading
curves. The crossing of the fuse curve at the low fault
level can sometimes be allowed on the basis that phase
to phase faults at a low level are unusual and, by the
nature of the transformer phasor relationship, grading
is achieved for earth faults. T o achieve fast operating
times and good co-ordination a relay with an extremely
inverse characteristic should be used.
Transient overreach
For a given R M S value of operating current, a relay will
usually operate at a lower value due to the offset of
the inhial peaks of fauh current. The degree of offset

936

RELAY OPERATING CHARACTERISTIC
FIG. 11.54 Relay overshoot
Overshoot = ti - Í2:
where t2 = relay operating time at l o p
t2 = time when switching from lop to I the relay
just does not operate
I = 85% of relay setting current (usually)
will depend on the X / R ratio of the fauh circuit and
the point-on-wave at which the fault occurs. This fac­
tor can lead to relays operating for faults outside
the intended protective zone and is called transient
overreach.
The definition of transient overreach is the differ­
ence between the R M S value of the steady state cur­
rent which when steadily increased will operate the relay
(Is) and the RMS value of current which, when fully
offset by point-on-wave switching, whl just operate the
relay (lop) expressed as a percentage of lop (see Fig
11.56 (a)), i.e., (Is - Iop)/Iop x 100%. If, for exam­
ple. Is = 2 A and lop = 2/1.05 A , the overreach
equals 5 % and a setting of 2.1 A on the relay would
prevent operation for currents less than 2 A . This is
not a practical setting as no allowance has been m a d e
for errors in relays, current transformers and inrush
currents on transformers and motor circuhs, the C E G B
would therefore use a minimum setting of 1.5 χ 2 =
3 A.
Consider an instantaneous relay on the H V side of
the 10 M V A 11/3.3 kV transformer (Fig 11.52) with
a fauh current through it as shown on Fig 11.56 (b).
The 10 M V A transformer has an 8% reactance. As­
sume the 11 kV busbar fauh level is 750 M V A which,
expressed as a per u n h impedance, is Ζ = 10/750 =
0.01333.
So, the fauh level on the 3.3 kV side is 10/(0.08 +
0.1333) = 107.1 M V A . The A C component of the
current waveform, expressed in M V A is 107.1 M V A .
It is required to find the magnitude of the first peak
so that the relay setting can be determined which will
not operate for fauhs on the LV side of the trans­
Auxiliaries systems
former. Whilst operation for faults on the LV side
of the transformer circuh is desirable, the relay cannot
distinguish between these and faults on the outgoing
circuhs from the 3.3 kV swhchboard. T o calculate the
setting for the high set instantaneous relay, proceed
as follows.
Referring to Fig 11.56 (b), we know that the RMS
value of I A C , expressed in M V A , is 107.1 M V A . We
need to calculate the value of the D C component and
hence the peak current.
t = time, s
Τ = circuit time constant, s
IDC = IAC e x p ( - t / T ) (11.1)
The reactance to the fauh is 0.08 + 0.01333 = 0.09333
p . u . , assuming that R is 0.00667 p . u . , making X / R =
14 ( t a n - 1(14) = 86°). For 50 H z , w = 314. Therefore
T = X / R w = 14/314 = 0.0446. The first peak occurs
at (t = 0.01 s),
e x p ( - t / T ) = e x p ( - 0 . 0 1 / 0 . 0 4 4 6 ) = 0.799
Therefore I D C = U c x 0.799 and I M C = U c + I D C
The formula for the envelope AA" is
I M C = I A C Χ (1 + e x p - t / T ) = U c x (1.799)
Using this formula,
IAC = V 2 x 1.799 X 107.1
= 2.55 X 107.1
= 273.1 M V A .
So, on this system to avoid the first peak of 273.1
M V A , a relay responding to the peak currents would
need to be set above 273.1 M V A , preferably at (2.9 χ
107.1) = 310.6 M V A , whereas using a relay with a
transient overreach of 5 % at an angle between the fault
current and system vohage greater than 86°, a factor
of 1.5 would allow for errors and magnetising inrush
currents. O n relays w h h overreach quoted at angles
less t h a n 86°, a factor of 2 should be used if the
system fault angle exceeds 86°.
The settings for the three types of relay to ensure
grading would be:
• N o quoted overreach 310.6 M V A .
• 5 % to 10% overreach >86° 160.6 M V A .
• 5 % to 10% overreach >86° 214.2 M V A .
M o d e r n electronic relays will give 5 % at 84° and 10%
at 88°.
This brings in the need to use relays with low
transient overreach, so that a setting as close as pos­
sible to the through-fauh setting of 107.1 M V A can be
achieved.
937
Protection
a b c
CURRENT.MVA
FIG. 11.55 Protection grading for phase fauk relay-to-fuse, demonstrating non-grading at low fault levels.
12.9.7 Techniques to obtain close co-ordination
between protection stages
Fuse to fuse
Section 12.9.1 recommends that the choice of fuses
should be restricted to the characteristic bands of TEC
269 (BS88). The pre-arcing and total operating time
characteristic plus tolerance ( ± 1 0 % ) must he inside
the characteristic band of l E C 269 (BS88).
If the circuit is a motor circuit, providing that
the pre-arcing characteristic of the fuse selected does
not lie outside the lower band of BS88, the same cur­
rent rated fuses of different manufacture can be inter­
changed without losing co-ordination through ageing
of the fuse. Fuse ageing is caused by frequent op­
eration into the fuse pre-arcing time and will cause
operation of the fuse at lower current values than
specified.
This can incur delays whilst the cause of the fuse
blowing is being investigated or even loss of production
if the motor is being brought on in an emergency.
938
Chapter 11
As an alternative to using the BS88 bandwidths for
grading, h is possible to use the manufacturer's pub-
hshed data for a particular fuse. This generally gives a
much narrower operating bandwidth and a possible
reduction in the 2:1 principle for discrimination, thus
achieving closer grading, faster fault clearance times
and smaller fuse sizes in the fuse switch on a motor
circuit, with consequent better protection.
If this course is adopted, the user must ensure that
only fuses from the same manufacturer and of the
same type are used for replacements. T o do otherwise
would invahdate the overah discrimination. Taking
into account the long lifetime of the equipment being
protected, the continued availability of a particular fuse
is not guaranteed. Also there is a real possibility that
the user unwittingly replaces a fuse with a different
make without first checking its characteristic, with a
possible risk of losing discrimination. Using l E C 269
(BS88) as the basis avoids this risk, i.e., only fuses
(including tolerances) complying w h h l E C 269 (BS88)
are ordered and used as replacements.

ENVELOPE OF FULLY OFFSET
BY POINT OF WAVE SWITCHING
UJ
CC
CC
=)
ϋ verse characteristic should always be used if grading
(a)
>-TIME
— Β
OFFSET CURRENT WAVE
FIG. 1 1 . 5 6 Transient overreach
Part of the assessment of the protection system
involves estimating the likely fauh clearance times to
ensure that the plant is correctly rated (cables, switch-
gear, etc.) and that no danger exists for personnel who
might be in close proximity to the faulted plant. Gen­
erally, the phase to phase faults are not limiting factors
as these are generally high enough to cause rapid clear­
ance of the fault by the fuse. However, phase to
earth faults, even direct to the sheath, can be long in
clearing if the cable to the protected plant is very long.
CEGB practice is that if the sheath is only earthed at
the sending end, then to prevent a dangerous con­
dhion arising at the far end of the cable, the protection
clearance time for an earth fault condition should not
be more than 0.46 seconds. This time is based on the
earth potential rise and duration following faults on
the power station auxiliary system.
A voltage of 650 V for 0.2 s has been internationally
estabhshed and is based on experience of the I^R with­
stand of a h u m a n being. Where R is the resistance of
a h u m a n being and I the current flowing through the
body. For back-up protection clearance times, the
C E G B adopts a figure, based again on international
findings, of 430 V. Therefore if the time ahowed at
Auxiliaries systems
650 V is 0.2 s, then (650/430)^ χ 0.2 = 0.46 s, is
the back-up clearance time allowed.
Fuse to relay
At low vohage (415 V), a relay w h h an extremely in­
with a fuse, as the relay characteristic follows that of
the fuse very closely.
If the relaying point is on the H V side of the trans­
former, then a three-pole overcurrent relay is always
used to ensure that one phase of the relay carries the
equivalent of a three-phase fault current, irrespective
of whether the fauh, if on the LV side, involves two
or three phases. The relay will then always operate
in three-phase fault current operating time for all phase
to phase fauhs on the LV side of the transformer.
When co-ordinating the fuse and the relay, the grading
interval has to be maintained when the fuse is carrying
phase to phase fauh current and the relay is carrying
the equivalent three-phase fault current, i.e., 2/V3
times the fuse current. The exercise in the next Section
12.9.8, will show that n o adjustments are necessary
to allow for the difference in operating currents due
to the rounding upwards of the current and time multi­
plier settings (TMS) to obtain a practical relay setting.
If the relay grading with the fuse is for earth fault
protection and the relaying point is at 415 V, the current
setting range must be m a d e high enough. For instance,
a setting range of 1 0 - 4 0 % on an earth fauh relay will
not allow grading with a 200 A fuse since a setting of
at least 7 5 % is required. The grading of the earth fauh
relay with a 630 A fuse requires a setting of at least
100%, or preferably 120%. This is illustrated in Fig
11.57.
A higher current setting on the phase fauh relay at
a lower time multiplier will give faster operation at the
higher fauh levels. Considering Fig 11.58, the relay can
be set at 120% T M S 0.45 or 150% T M S 0.2. The reason
that the 120% setting requires a 0.45 T M S and not
0.275 as would be required for grading at the highest
fauh level, is that grading is not being achieved at the
lower fauh level and this can be seen by reference back
to Fig 11.55, where it is demonstrated that relay 2
would not grade at point X . With the 150% and 200%
settings, the grading is determined by the minimum
operating time of the relay.
In Section 12.9.1 of this chapter, h is stated that
closer grading can be obtained if the combined char­
acteristics of the thermal relay and the fuse are taken
into account. At 415 V, this wih rarely occur, since the
majority of the circuits are controlled by contactors
and the main protection is the fuse in the fuse swhch.
At 3.3 kV, fuses and switches are co-ordinated to
give a full fault clearance capability, allowing the use
of instantaneous relays. This means that the circuit-
breaker handles fauhs u p to 50 M V A but above this
level the fuse operates. The co-ordination is by time.
The operating time of the circuit-breaker and protec-
939
Protection
CURRENT.MVA
FIG. 11.57 Grading of earth fault relays
tion (80 ms) at this fauh level is always longer than
the fuse operating time (65 ms), see Fig 11.58. It may
also mean that, with one transformer supplying the
board, which is normal, the circuit-breaker could clear
the fault due to the limited fault infeed and only when
two transformers are paralleled will the fuse be required
to interrupt the fauh. W h h this combination, the relay
on the bus-section circuit only needs to grade with the
point of intersection of the thermal relay and high set
instantaneous relay at the lower fauh level, and not
the fuse. This is explained as fohows.
Figure 11.55 shows the three characteristics, con­
sisting of a thermal relay with a high set instantaneous
relay on a 1 M V A m o t o r at 3.3 kV and a 400 A fuse
combination. The shaded portion is the operating area.
The 3.3 kV bus-section overcurrent relay has to be set
at 150% to grade with the high set on the m o t o r and
the overcurrent relay on the incoming 5 M V A trans­
940
Chapter 11
400A
FUSE ι
415V
630 A FUSE
10
former has to be set to 2 0 0 % to grade with the 3.3 kV
bus-section relay. If the bus-section relay (3) was grad­
ing with the fuse, its plug setting would have to be
about 2 5 0 % and relay (4) 3 2 5 % . Figure 11.58 shows
relay (3) set at 150% and relay (4) at 2 0 0 % . This is the
maximum size of m o t o r (1500 kW) that the protection
can grade w h h o u t using a very high setting on the in­
coming transformer overcurrent. The alternative may
be to use differential protection on the m o t o r to get a
lower setting if the overcurrent relay on an outgoing
3.3/0.415 kV transformer is not the limiting factor for
relay (3) (as h is in this instance, i.e., relay (3) cannot
get closer to relay (2)).
415 V motor protection
Motors at 415 V are commonly switched by a contactor
and protected by a combination of a thermal relay and

CURRENT.MVA
FIG. 11.58 Protection grading for phase fault relay-to-fuse, demonstradng faster operadon at high fault levels.
a fuse. Larger motors, requiring relatively large fuses
(in excess of 200 A) need extra protection against earth
faults, since the fuse cannot safely cope with low values
of earth fauh current. For an example of an apphcation
of addhional protection to contactor circuhs, consider
the 630 A fuse on the 100 k W m o t o r . A contactor is
required which will meet the following requirements —
a continuous rating of 200 A (20% overload on full load
current of 162 A ) , and has a capabihty t o meet the cut­
off current of the 630 A fuse at 24.09 M V A (see Table
11.1). Assume the duty required of the contactor is to
AC3 duty in BS5424. This means a breaking current of
six times the A C 3 duty of the contactor quoted by the
manufacturer. A typical figure could be 190 A for a 200
A contactor, giving a figure of 1140 A . Referring to Fig
11.59, h can be seen that the earth fauh relay would
have to be delayed in excess of 100 seconds even if the
fuse characteristic lay close to the minimum pre-arcing
time of the fuse to ensure the contactor is not called
upon to clear a fauh above its rating. The solution is
Auxiliaries systems
^dd—X '
t o provide a definite time earth fault relay w h h a fast
operating time (300 ms) and prevent its operation above
the contactor rating (see Fig 11.59) by means of an in­
stantaneous relay. Ideahy, the fuse should clear ah fauhs
above the contactor rating a n d the protection should
initiate opening of the contactor for faults within its
rating. The fuse, however, is selected for its ability to
withstand the m o t o r starting current peaks and con­
sequently fault clearance by the fuse may be slow not
to correspond to the m o t o r fuh load current for some
faults above the contactor rating. For phase to phase
faults, fuse protection is usually adequate and the ad­
dition of the earth fault relay covers for earth faults.
A range of special m o t o r circuit fuselinks are avail­
able which are physically smaller than the standard
general purpose fusehnk. These fuselinks are given a
dual rating, e.g., 200M315. A fusehnk with this desig­
nation is rated to operate at 200 A continuously but
has a time current characteristic for short-circuits that
falls within the standardised zone for a 315 A fuse.
941
Protection Chapter 11

TABLE 11.1

Plant protection data

Maximum CT High set

fault primary relay Relay
Device type CT ratio setting
current current current
MVA MVA
MVA MVA

(1) 415 V fuse 630, A 24.09

(2) XIDMT 3.3 kV/415 V, 1.6 MVA 250 300/1 1.71 36.14 2.06

(3) XIDMT 3.3 kV bus-section 125 2000/1 11.43 11.43

(4) IDMT 11/3.3 kV 10 MVA 750 600/1 11.43 187.9 17.14

(5) IDMT 11 kV bus-section 323 3000/1 57.16 57.16

(6) IDMT 23.5/11 kV, 60 MVA 8000 1500/1 61.05 484 78.32

10000 η
MINIMUM
IPRE-ARCING TIML
630Α
FUSE
1000 Η

100 Η

UJ
•Σ
SETTING OF
INSTANTANEOUS^,
INSTANTANEOUS EARTH FAULT OVERCURRENT-^ I
PROTECTION + 100ms TIME DELAY INHIBIT I
TOTAL FAULT J
CLEARANCE TIME |
FOR EARTH FAULT ¡
CONTACTOR OPERATING
0.H TIME j MAXIMUM
\ ^OPERATING TIME
630A FUSE

ο.οΗ
— I —
10 100 1000 10000 100000
CURRENT.A
COMPOSITE PROTECTION CURVE
USED FOR GRADING.

FIG. 1 1 . 5 9 4 1 5 V motor circuit protection co-ordination

Use of these fuses therefore requires less space for
the fuses in a starter for a given motor size, or a given
fuse accommodation will allow a larger motor to be
operated. However, the latter m o d e of operation could
permh a cut-off current and energy let-through in
excess of the proven and certified rating of the equip-
ment concerned. This aspect must be considered and
satisfied for every application of motor circuit fuse-
hnks, preferably at the design stage.
12.9.8 Application to a typical system
From the system diagram, a path is chosen that gives
the highest settings for current grading. A typical path
is shown in Fig 11.52; from the largest fuse at 415 V
through the section switch at 3.3 kV, onto the 11 kV
busbar via the largest transformer, onto the 3.3 kV
busbar and then through the bus-section switches at
11 kV. This ensures that ah the bus-section switches
are set to grade with any outgoing circuit and all
the incoming transformers wih grade with the section
switches.
Since the grading depends on the largest fuse it is
essential to allocate fuses to circuits. N o n - m o t o r cir-
cuits must ensure that the fuse will protect the cable.
This means that the fuse must have a rating above
the cable continuous rating but that a fault on the
cable must be cleared before the whole cable receives

942

permanent damage. Phase to phase fauhs are cleared
very quickly by the fuse so are not a h m h a t i o n . Phase
to earth faults, however, could be low and may take
the fuse a long time to clear. The cable size and length
must be such that a short-circuh to the sheath at the
farthest end of the cable is cleared by the fuse in less
than 0.46 s (see previous section); this ensures that
dangerous overvoltages do not occur on the cable
sheath.
On motor circuits, the fuse selection is m o r e
comphcated. The fohowing must be considered:
• The thermal capabihty of a fuse must whhstand two
consecutive motor starts w h h o u t any potential deter­
ioration in subsequent performance.
• Motor fuh load current, as determined from the
average efficiencies and power factors recommended
in Table 3 of I E C T C 2 .
• Nominal motor starting currents, as calculated from
Is = kW ratio/1.73 kV, using the ratio of starting
kVA to output k W derived from Table 41 of BS4999,
part 4 1 .
• Average motor run-up time, as determined from
empirical formula 3 + k W / 7 . 4 6 in Table 1 of BS587
for times u p to 5 s and rounded u p to nearest 10 s
maximum for times greater than 5 s.
• The permissible deviations of not more t h a n 10% in
terms of current from fuse manufacturers published
curves, as allowed in BS88 P a r t 2 1975.
• The fuse characteristic curve bandwidths, as defined
in BS88 1975.
For example, consider the 100 k W motor on the system
diagram:
Fuh load current 162 A
Nominal start (BS4999 ratio) 780 kVA
Starting current 1085 A 13
Starting time 3 + k W / 7 . 4 6 10 s
Assuming two starts 20 s
Examination of Fig 11.50 gives a fuse size of 630 A
The fohowing steps are taken t o determine settings
for the relays (current and time multiphers) to obtain
co-ordination between the relays and the (relays -\-
fuses).
Table 11.2 must now be drawn u p for ah the relays
and the fuses on the path must be chosen, determining
the high set instantaneous relay settings as described in
the previous section. The procedure is as fohows:
• Column 1 is self-explanatory.
• Column 2 is determined from Section 12.9.6 of this
chapter, e.g., for the 1.6 M V A transformer, the
highest setting current is 1.3 χ full load current of
the transformer, i.e., 2.08 M V A . Therefore, 125%
(2.06) the nearest relay tap setting, is suitable for
this relay.
Reliability
• Columns 3 and 4 also derive from Section 12.9.6;
column 3 is the nearest high set overcurrent relay
setting or, if there is no relay, the maximum fault
current through the I D M T relay. For example, the
fuse grading current and cut-off M V A is the maxi­
m u m fauh M V A , from Table 11.2, i.e., 24.09 M V A .
• Column 5 is the current setting multiple at the
grading point. For example, grading the bus-section
with the 1.6 M V A transformer, the grading current
(MVA) (column 4) is the setting of the high set on
the 1.6 M V A transformer (36.14 M V A ) . This is 17.72
times the 1.6 M V A transformer relay setting and 3.17
times the setting of the bus-section relay.
• C o l u m n 6 is derived directly from column 5, using
the characteristic curve for an extremely inverse
relay with a time setting multipher of 0.45, already
determined when grading it with the fuse.
• Column 7 uses the grading equation, i.e., 1.25 χ
0.17 = 0.46 s.
• C o l u m n 8 is obtained by using the value for Relay 2
in column 5 and the characteristic curves for an
inverse time relay to obtain the time in column 7.
Completed resuhs are shown in Table 11.2 with
additional explanations to derive the values in the
columns.
All grading points have been checked for phase to
phase faults. N o aherations in settings had to be car­
ried out since the nearest time multiplier and current
setting multiplier in an increased direction had been
selected. Figure 11.53 and Table 11.3 give the computer
grading curves. If the time multiphers are rounded
u p to the nearest step, 0.025, the pick-up and time
setting multiplier figures compare exactly with columns
2 and 8 in Table 11.2.
Reliability
In order that protection equipment can operate effi­
ciently and without interruption throughout hfe, it
is essential that it must possess the highest possible
reliabihty and availabihty. In this context, h should
be remembered that protection is normally quiescent
but must operate rehably *first time'. It is vital, not
only that the equipment is installed and operated in
the prescribed manner and in the right service con­
ditions, but also that it receives regular attention in
hne w h h manufacturer's recommendations.
Records of relay unreliabhity show that the ma­
jority of failures are attributable to b a d connections
between components by way of dry solder joints, bro­
ken conductors, defective connector contacts and faulty
wiring, etc. It is acknowledged that it is virtual­
ly impossible to avoid a h hardware failures in a pro­
tection system, but the probabihty of such events
happening is reduced by careful design and by the
adoption of good quality assurance procedures by the
943
Protection Chapter 11
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944

manufacturer. Thorough testing of instahed systems is
also essential.
The design should ensure that a component is chosen
so that h operates around the mid point of its overall
rating range. Only components complying with BS9000
must be used.
To reduce the failure rate of components such as
resistors and capacitors, each must be *burnt-in'. Di­
odes and transistors only require a spot check m a d e
on them to establish correct operation. The a m o u n t
of heat generated by components must be kept to a
minimum since this can adversely affect the reliability
of temperature dependent devices, such as transistors,
in close proximity to them. This problem is further
exacerbated for protection relays, because they are
always accommodated inside metal or plastic enclo­
sures. Where there is a high risk of component failure
or non-operation, redundancy can be used to ensure
that high reliability is achieved.
Continuous monitoring of the hardware and inbuilt
self-checking of microprocessors are now standard
features of most digital type protection relays to pro­
vide early detection of failure.
The rehabihty of solid state protection relays is
improved significantly by using digital rather than ana­
logue type relays. This is because large scale integrated
components reduce the number of connections required
considerably. Analogue relays require many more com­
ponents, with consequent increase in the number of
electrical connections.
Another factor affecting reliability is the immunity
of the relay to electromagnetic interference. A power
station environment is very heavily polluted with elec­
trical noise and it is essential that the relay is designed
and constructed to withstand the effects of such pol­
lution without malfunction or non-operation.
T o enhance reliability, the C E G B operates a type
approval procedure which evaluates fully the perform­
ance of the relay under both normal and abnormal
operating conditions. This evaluation takes the form
of type testing at the manufacturer's works and field
trials on selected circuits of the power system. Wherever
possible, the field trials are on circuits that are hkely
to have wide variations in operating conditions.
Type testing not only checks the capability of the
relay to withstand without deterioration all of the op­
erating conditions it is hkely to meet when used in
service but also ensures that the design includes a
margin over normal service requirement.
The following tests are typical of the type tests
carried out on protection relays:
• Drop.
• Vibration.
• Electrical stress.
• Impulse.
• High frequency disturbance.
• Spark.
Reliability
• Radio frequency interference.
• Supply variations/interruptions.
• Dry heat.
• Low temperature.
• Insulation resistance.
The main criterion used to evaluate the relay is a
check that the operating time of the various protection
functions is unaffected by the application of the type
tests, that correct fault indication is given and that it
clears when the relay is reset.
However, at the present time the electromechanical
type of protection relay is still being manufactured and
is still freely available on the commercial market. The
d e m a n d for such a relay is due mainly to the fact that
users prefer to stay with equipment that they are fami­
liar with and which has shown itself to be reliable in
operation, resulting in a high degree of confidence in
its use and application. Added to this is the fact that
some users may wish to rephcate an existing protec­
tion scheme for a new installation which means using
electromechanical relays, thus ehminating the need for
additional sets of spares with the attendant savings in
spares holding, storage space, administrative costs and
the retraining of staff.
Another, and perhaps more significant reason for
the demand for electromechanical relays, is the mar­
ket in Third World countries which is influenced by
cost and considerations of famiharity, simphcity and
reliabihty.
Nevertheless as far as the C E G B is concerned, future
protection schemes will tend to be based on the use
of sohd state technology.
Further improvements in the quahty of thermal over­
load protection as applied to motors can be achieved
with the digital type relays which are unobtainable
from the electromechanical type of protection relay.
Use can be m a d e of the temperature detectors in the
stator core of the machine during the manufacturing
stage. The output signals from the detectors act as
inputs to the relay which, in turn, enable the thermal
model of the relay to react more quickly to changing
temperature conditions in the m o t o r . In addition,
further temperature measurements can be taken of the
air temperature within the m o t o r by placing detectors
at both the inlet and outlet sides of the machine. A n
overload condition will give rise to an increase in air
temperature at the outlet and this signal can be fed
into the thermal model as above. These techniques
provide enhanced thermal overload protection and will
result in a significant reduction in motor winding burn­
outs, thus minimising the risk of costly repair/replace­
ment and the resulting loss of production which this
would entail.
The electronic protection relay is generally more
costly than its electromechanical counterpart. It is to
be expected, however, that with the increasing accept-
945
Protection
anee of solid state technology and with the advances
made in manufacturing techniques by the application
of large scale integration, the cost of equipment will
drop significantly in the foreseeable future.
The benefits of using a microprocessor-based system
have already been outlined. Such a system can easily
form an integrated protection scheme which is parti­
cularly useful. The parameters contained in each pro­
tection relay can be fed into a junction unit local to
the plant and then to a supervisory microcomputer
local to the plant, or to some other remote location.
The linking of each individual relay into the micro­
computer system enables better information to be pre­
sented to the operator whilst allowing the ongoing
process of monitoring and supervising of the protec­
tive system to proceed without affecting the basic level
FIG. 1 1 . 6 0 Plant momtoring data link system
946
C h a p t e r 11
of protection. The system must be designed so that,
in the event of a fault occurring in the supervi­
sory computer, the protection reverts to the individ­
ual protection fitted to each m o t o r . This ensures that
under this type of fahure m o d e , the motor is always
protected.
Figure 11.60 illustrates a simphfied scheme for an
integrated protection system. The exploitation of the
facilities provided by existing microprocessor-based
protection relays to form an integrated system, where
a group of motors can be monitored from a central
point, is seen as a significant future development.
The hnk between the supervisory computer and the
protection junction wih be hard wired, although the
prospect of using fibre-optic over long distances and
in a noisy electrical environment will be reviewed.
11 kV MOTOR PROTECTION
RELAY
MAIN
JUNCTION BOX
3.3kV
V MOTOR PROTECTION
I RELAYS
JUNCTION BOX

The data from the dighal protection devices will
be displayed local to the plant rather than increasing
the data load at the C C R .
From a manufacturing point of view the develop­
ment has reached a stage where working systems are
available. However there is a need for considerable
operating experience in order that the best system is
evolved, fully reflecting the operating requirements
of the station. From an economic point of view, the
increased cost of such a system is hkely t o be offset
by the benefits obtained through enhanced system re­
habihty and plant availabihty.
It is unlikely that the above approach will be used
on every power station drive. Each motor circuit will
be considered on the basis of its importance t o the
operation of the station and the costs of providing
such a system.
One of the main benefits of making available in­
formation of the sort mentioned, is the diagnostic
features it affords in the post-fault analysis of tripped
plant. With conventional relays, like the bimetalic ther­
mal relay, all that is known about a trip condition is
that the parameters of the fault condition had reached
a value corresponding to the value set on the relay. For
example if the motor tripped on unbalance, the relay
could not indicate the degree of unbalance present at
the time of trip, whereas with the digital type of relay,
this information would be readily available.
The diagnostic benefits can be further extended by
building into the relay a facility which stores the
information on a disc or magnetic tape.
The information can be retrieved and analysed off­
line and whl provide information on the behaviour
of the motor over a period of time prior t o fault to
help explain the reasons for the failures. Such infor­
mation might indicate, for example, that the drive was
unsuhable for the load apphcation or that incorrect
settings had been applied t o the relay.
When compared with the bimetallic relay, the elec­
tronic type has the disadvantage that it requires an
auxiliary power supply for h s operation. Loss of power
supply renders the relay inoperative and in the case
of digital readout type relays will cause all memorised
values to be lost, a serious disadvantage when the relay
has operated and it is necessary to establish the nature
and magnitude of the fauh. T o overcome this pro­
blem, a battery back-up can be used which will permit
retention of the memorised values for periods ranging
from 30 minutes to 3 hours duration, enough time for
the plant operator to record the data.
Another requirement peculiar to solid state equip­
ment is the ability t o withstand often harsh electrical
environmental interference conditions without malfunc­
tion. In this regard the relay must operate successfuhy
in the presence of radio interference, power frequency,
impulse, high frequency disturbance, spark
trical stress Added t o this are the environmental
signals.
requirements imposed by temperature, humidity, me­
chanical shock, mechanical vibration a n d , in the case
Reliability
of nuclear applications, seismic requirements. It is
acknowledged that, whilst these same physical envi­
ronmental requirements apply t o electromechanical type
relays, the sohd state relay is far more vulnerable and
susceptible to damage from these effects and therefore
requires more careful design and construction.
A n important advantage of all digital type relays
is the abihty to accommodate changes in protection
apphcation. This is possible since ah relay functions
are written in software and any alterations to circuit
application can be achieved by merely changing the
software only, the hardware remaining unchanged. This
means that standard hardware can be used for dif­
ferent types of protective relay equipment. Modifi­
cations t o conventional analogue protection schemes
often require major changes in hardware.
When compared with the electronic analogue type
relay, the digital relay offers a significant reduction in
equipment size owing t o the use of large scale inte­
grated components and microprocessor technology with
consequent less space on the relay panel. Additionally,
since digital relays only handle small values of current
and vohage which are converted into dighal form, the
burden placed upon current and voltage transformers
is significantly smaller than for conventional relays.
Typical figures are of the order of 0.01 VA per phase.
Owing to the low burden some manufacturers recom­
mend the use of instrument class current transformers.
Caution should be exercised in adapting their use since,
under maximum fault conditions, instrument class CTs
saturate a lot sooner than protection class CTs (as
witness in Fig 11.61) with consequent failure to operate.
The reliability of digital relays is enhanced by the
self-checking techniques that are built-in. Should any
component prove defective, then circuit failure wih be
indicated by an alarm a n d / o r L E D facility.
SECONDARY
VOLTS
and elec­
EXCITING CURRENT
FIG. 11.61 Instrument and protective CTs
947
 C H A P T E R 12

Synchronising

5.3.3 Voltage measurement

1 Introduction
5.4 Automatic synchronising relay
2 Basic terms and synchronising criteria 5.4.1 Steam turbine-generator synchronising
2.1 Definitions 5.4.2 Gas-turbine generator synchronising
2.2 Switching operations 5.4.3 Diesel generator synchronising
2.3 Generator synchronising
6 Derivation of synchronising supplies
2.4 Synchronising errors
2.4.1 Voltage error 6.1 Secondary supplies
2.4.2 Phase error 6.2 Selection of voltage transformer supplies
2.4.3 Frequency error 6.2.1 Single voltage supply
2.5 Faulty synchronising 6.2.2 incoming and running voltage
6.3 Measurement accuracy
3 Synchronising methods
6.3.1 Voltage transformers
3.1 Manual synchronising 6.3.2 Interposing voltage transformers
3.2 Automatic synchronising 6.3.3 Burdens
4 Synchronising faciPities and controls 6.3.4 Lead resistance
4.1 Synchronising facilities 6.4 Synchronising supplies
4.2 Synchronising controls 6.4.1 Steam turbine-generator
4.2.1 Steam turbine-generator 6.4.2 11 kV gas-turbine generators
4.2.2 11 kV gas-turbine generators 6.4.3 3.3 kV and 11 kV distribution switchgear
4.2.3 3.3 kV and 11 kV distribution switchgear 6.4.4 3.3 kV diesel generators
4.2.4 3.3 kV diesel generators 7 Synchronising schemes
5 Synchronising equipment 7.1 Standard schemes
5.1 Synchronising trolley 7.2 11 kV distribution circuit
5.1.1 Voltmeters 7.3 Steam turbine-generator — generator voltage
5.1.2 Phase angle voltmeters circuit-breaker
5.1.3 Synchroscope 7.3.1 Manual synchronising
5.2 Guard relay 7.3.2 Automatic synchronising
5.3 Check synchronising relay 7.4 Site commissioning tests
5.3.1 Phase measurement
5.3.2 Slip frequency measurement 8 References

1 Introduction Under these conditions, the nominal 50 Hz system

frequency is controlled partly by the automatic action
Practically all of the generating capacity on the C E G B of the prime-mover governors and partly by changes
system is connected, through generator transformers, in total generated output instructed by system control
to the 400 kV or 275 kV transmission system. There are
centres and achieved by changing the governor set
other sources of generation, such as 11 kV gas-turbine
point. T o avoid hunting, governors are designed to
generators used to meet peak demand or emergency gen­
stabilise the frequency at a level corresponding to each
eration and some diesel generators generating at 3.3 kV,
new instructed output level. Any excess or shortfall
but these amount to a very small total capacity.
in output therefore produces a corresponding increase
These synchronous generators operate in parallel,
or decrease in system frequency, a change in output
the total load dispatched being equal to the sum of
being required to return the frequency to the datum
consumer demand and system losses. The real power
level (50 Hz). By adjustment of the total number of
is shared in proportion to their driving power and
megawatts sent out, the system frequency can be
the reactive power in proportion to their excitation.
finely controlled and under normal conditions it is
Consumer demand is constantly changing, being char­
maintained within the range 4 9 . 8 - 5 0 . 2 H z . Outside
acterised by the cyclic daily variation between night
these limits, the C E G B has a statutory duty to main­
time and daytime load, with relatively short periods
tain the frequency within the range 4 9 . 5 - 5 0 . 5 H z .
of rapidly changing load at times of peak demand.

948

In exceptional circumstances, the frequency may fall
below this lower limit but operation below 48 H z
should not persist for periods longer than 15 minutes
at any one time.
An increase in consumer demand may be met by
raising, within limits, the output from generators al­
ready in service or by increasing the number of genera­
tors operating in parahel on the system; the appropriate
action being directed from the system control centre.
Each time an additional generator is brought into
service, it must be electrically connected to the system
by following a procedure called synchronising.
Feeder or distribution circuits also need to be paral­
leled when being re-arranged for reasons such as main­
tenance. Each time two parts of the system are to be
electrically connected this must also be done by follow­
ing a synchronising procedure as the same requirements
apply.
Generators or systems with low internal impedance
can only be synchronised when certain electrical con­
ditions are satisfied. At the instant of making the con­
nection, the differences in voltage, phase and frequency
must be smah. Synchronising a generator is therefore
the last step in the start-up sequence, performed after
the prime-mover has been brought up to operating
speed and the generator open-circuit voltage established
at its nominal value. By comparing the two supplies,
adjustments are made to reduce the differences to
within specified limits, at which moment the generator
circuit-breaker is closed.
The procedure for synchronising two parts of the
system is normally less involved. The two supplies are
remotely electrically connected and therefore operate
at a common frequency. In this case synchronising
requires no more than a check to ensure that the voltage
and phase are within prescribed limits, at which point
the switch is closed.
The precision required makes an overall high stand­
ard of design essential and a large measure of stand­
ardisation in the provision of synchronising equipment
has been adopted. The control schemes are based on
standard diagrams and only approved equipment is
purchased. The equipment needs to be consistently
accurate in performance and the design of the syn­
chronising scheme must ensure that the risk of error
when synchronising is as small as possible. The de­
sign contains in-buih safeguards against error or in­
advertent operation, since faulty synchronisation would
impress a disturbance on the system, with the shock
possibly being sufficient to result in serious plant
damage.
2 Basic terms and synchronising criteria
2.1 Definitions
The basic terms used in this chapter are defined as
follows:
Basic terms and synchronising criteria
System The C E G B interconnected system of power
stations, transmission hues, and switching and transfor­
ming stations.
Switch The main circuit-breaker or swhch disconnec­
tor (previously called a switch isolator).
Running supply The supply on one side of the switch
across which synchronising is to be effected, which
is associated with the main system or switchgear bus­
bars. The running supply voltage and frequency are
termed the running voltage and running frequency,
respectively.
Incoming supply The supply on the opposite side of
the switch across which synchronising is to be effected,
usually the feeder or generator side to which is con­
nected the supply that is to be brought into synchronism
w h h the main system or switchgear busbars. The in­
coming supply voltage and frequency are termed the
incoming voltage and incoming frequency, respectively.
Synchronising The overall operation of ensuring that
the two alternating current supplies to be paralleled
are, within prescribed limits, in a state of equal mag­
nitude, equal frequency and phase coincidence followed
by closure of the appropriate switch (circuit-breaker
or switch disconnector) to parallel the two supphes.
Figure 12.1 shows the phasor relationship between
the incoming and running supply prior to starting to
synchronise a generator and at the instant before the
switch main contacts close.
This definition of synchronising assumes that the
two alternating current supplies are capable of being
V 4 V
f' Φ i
α, φ
INCOMING VOLTS (V ) RUNNING VOLTS (V )
(a) Phasor relationship at some instant prior to synchronising
RED
YELLOW
V, i i V
f, a \
r BLUE a. a '^BLUE
INCOMING VOLTS (V ) RUNNING VOLTS (V )
(b) Phasor relationship at the instant before switch contacts close
FIG. 12.1 Phasor relationship between incoming and
running supplies
949
Synchronising
paralleled successfully. For three-phase systems this
requires that they have the same nominal vohage and
frequency, are balanced systems (i.e., phase to neu-
tral voltages are of equal magnitude and 120° (elec)
apart), and also have common phase rotation and
phase relationship.
Voltage difference The difference in magnitude be-
tween the incoming voltage and the running voltage.
Voltage error The voltage difference at the instant
before the switch main contacts close.
Phase displacement The electrical angle between the
incoming vohage and the running voltage. Alternatively
this is termed phase angle, however, both are usually
abbreviated to phase. When zero this is termed phase
coincidence.
Phase error The phase displacement at the instant
before the switch main contacts close.
Frequency difference The difference in magnitude
between the incoming frequency and the running fre-
quency. When the frequency difference is smah, this
is termed the slip frequency and is usually abbreviated
to slip.
Example: If the incoming frequency (fj) is 50.06 Hz
and the running frequency ( f r ) is 50.01 Hz, determine
the shp frequency ( f s ) :
fs = f¡ - fr
= 50.06 - 50.01
- 0.05 Hz
Ahernatively, slip frequency may be expressed as a
percentage of the nominal system frequency, i.e.,
percentage slip frequency =
[slip frequency/system frequency] 100
In the above example, the percentage slip frequency =
[0.05/50] 100 = O . m .
Slip frequency is also a measure of the rate-of-change
of phase. Again using the example, the rate-of-change
of phase = 0.05 χ 360 = 18° (elec)/s or, conversely,
equals 20 s per slip cycle.
Switch closing time The overall closing impulse re­
sponse time of the switch when measured from the
initiation of the closing signal to the closure of the
switch main contacts.
This can be divided into two components; the time
taken for the control circuit relays and closing coil to
operate and the main contact mechanism travelling
time.
The swhch closing time depends on the switchgear
type and consequently there is a fair variation in times.
For a generator voltage circuit-breaker, the control cir­
950
Chapter 1 2
cuh operating time is typically 6 0 - 8 0 ms and the main
contact mechanism travelhng time is 245-255 ms. Typi­
cal operating times for an interposing relay used for
remote switching are 3 5 - 4 0 ms and for a closing contac­
tor or solenoid coil 1 5 - 2 0 ms. This last time is normally
included in the measured closing time for the switch
itself. The closing time for a transmission voltage air-
blast circuit-breaker is typicahy 7 5 - 8 0 ms and for a
switch disconnector 150-170 ms. For 3.3 kV and 11 kV
air-break switchgear the closing times are normally some­
where in the range 150-350 ms. Vacuum and SF6 switch-
gear closing times at these voltages are around 50 ms.
T o include all possibilities, the switch closing times
for a steam turbine-generator circuit-breaker or switch
disconnector at generator or transmission vohage is
taken to be within the range 7 5 - 3 5 0 ms and for 3.3 kV
and 11 kV air-break switchgear within the range 1 0 0 -
450 ms. The actual value is obtained from site mea­
surement. Under normal conditions, the consistency of
closing is assumed to be within ± 5 ms of the measured
closing time. Changes in switch closing circuit D C aux­
ihary supply voltage, which may be between ± lO^o, can
cause a further variation in normal switch closing times.
Advance angle The angle in advance of phase coin­
cidence at the instant when the switch closing impulse
is generated. This compensates for the switch closing
time. Correct selection of the advance angle for a given
slip frequency results in phase coincidence at the instant
the switch main contacts close.
Example: A switch has a closing time ( t c ) of 300 ms,
determine the correct advance angle when the slip fre­
quency ( f s ) is 0.15 Hz. Expressed as rate-of-change of
phase fs = 0.15 χ 360 = 54° (elec)/s
Advance angle = fs x tc
= 54 X 0.3
= 16.2° (elec)
Figure 12.2 shows the relationship between advance an­
gle and switch closing time for different slip frequencies.
SUP FREQUENCY
0.15 Hz
0.05 Hz
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
SWITCH CLOSING TIME, s
FIG. 12.2 Relationship between advance angle and
switch closing time
 Basic t e r m s a n d synchronising criteria

The power o u t p u t / s p e e d characteristic of the gen­
erator prime-mover is controhed by a speed governor
and there are three important parameters related to
the governor which affect this characteristic.
Governor speed droop The change in prime-mover
speed from no-load to full-load expressed as a per­
centage of the no-load speed. This feature is necessary
to ensure that generators share load when operating
in parallel and permits the adjustment of the load
contribution made by each generator. The speed d r o o p
is adjustable, a low setting being 4 % or less u p to
a high setting of 259^0 (see Fig 12.3).
Governor set point This is the setting position of the
speed d r o o p characteristic, as shown in Fig 12.4.
Before starting to synchronise, the prime-mover speed
must be within the governor set point limits, posi­
tions (a). Within these limits, the speed can be raised
or lowered for synchronising by adjustment of the
governor set point. Position (b) shows the governor
set to super-synchronously synchronise the generator,
see Section 2.3 of this chapter, i.e., with the incoming
frequency slightly higher t h a n the system running fre­
quency. Once synchronised the generator prime-mover
speed is controhed by the system frequency. The gover­
nor set point position now corresponds to the generator

25% SPEED DROOP

49 50
FREOUENCY, Hz

2820 2880 2940 3000 3060 3120 3180

SPEED, r/min

FIG. 1 2 . 3 Governor speed droop

SYSTEM
RUNNING
FREQUENCY
I

GOVERNOR UPPER
SET POINT LIMIT

FREQUENCY, Hz

2700 2760 2820 2880 2940 3000 3060 3120 3180

SPEED, r/min

FIG. 1 2 . 4 Governor set point

951
Synchronising
producing a small load and is used to control power
output. Position (c) shows the governor set at fuh-load.
Governor rate The rate-of-change of the governor
set point if a continuous raise signal is apphed.
Different governor rates may be apphed depending
on the operating mode, but for synchronising it es-
tabhshes the maximum rate-of-change of slip frequen­
cy. Typicahy at synchronisation the governor rate of
a steam turbine-generator is 0.05 H z / s .
2.2 Switching operations
Having described the basic terms, the next step is to
determine the switches in a power system that need
synchronising facilities. This is done during the design
of the electrical system by examination of the switching
requirements during normal operation, breakdown or
maintenance outages, or during and after an emergency.
Synchronising facilities are needed at every switch that
may be selected to parallel supplies. In a power sta­
tion, this is at generator voltage circuit switches and
at certain switches in the electrical auxiliaries system,
such as I n c o m e r ' *bus section' and interconnector'
circuits, which can be regarded as distribution circuits.
At switches where two supplies cannot be paralled for
system design reasons (e.g., fault level), electrical or
mechanical interlocks are provided to prevent incorrect
operation.
In any power system, there are a number of fun­
damental types of swhching operation. At switches
fitted with synchronising facihties, these include the
following:
(a) The circuits being connected are dead uncharged
circuits. This is predominantly a testing requirement.
(b) The switch connects a live circuit to a dead un­
charged circuit. The live supply may be either a
system or a generator.
(c) The switch connects two parts of a system which
are already synchronously connected via a parallel
path. The two parts may differ in voltage and
phase but the frequency is c o m m o n .
(d) The switch connects two independent systems.
The two systems may differ in voltage, phase and
frequency.
(e) The switch connects a generator tb a system. The
two supplies may differ in vohage, phase and
frequency.
Although, strictly, in (a) and (b) there is n o synchro­
nising requirement, the synchronising instruments are
stih used (as described in Section 3.1 of this chapter),
and therefore this switching operation is sometimes
termed override synchronising.
There is no basic mismatch in (c), although there
will be some inequality in voltage and displacement
952
C h a p t e r 12
in phase brought about by circuit loading and trans­
former differences, etc. The m a g n h u d e of the phase
displacement to some extent depends on the length
and complexity of the parallel p a t h . In a power sta­
tion, the differences are not usually significant and
may be regarded as fixed; however, if the phase dis­
placement between the voltages is changing, as is more
likely to occur at a transmission station, this produces
an apparent shp frequency. Voltage adjustment is not
normally necessary.
The type of switching operation described in (d) is
usually associated w h h a system splh, i.e., the system
has become subdivided into two or possibly more parts
as the result of a fault or major incident; this arises
infrequently at transmission stations. It may then be
necessary to adjust generating station(s) frequency and
vohage, as appropriate, if the two system parts are
outside prescribed limits.
A similar situation occurs at a power station when
synchronising the emergency supply system to off-site
supplies fohowing the earher loss or disconnection of
the latter. Again, this operation is rare.
The switching operation described in (c) is usually
termed *check synchronising' (after the check synchro­
nising relay described later in this chapter) and that in
(d) is termed 'system synchronising'. However, since the
two forms of synchronising involve the system, both
switching operations are regarded as system synchronis­
ing for the purposes of this chapter. Furthermore, in
(c) the two parts of the system are synchronously
connected, termed synchronous system synchronising',
whilst in (d) the two parts of the system are not of
the same frequency, termed asynchronous system syn­
chronising. With both switching operations power re­
distribution occurs on switching.
Similarly, for the purpose of this chapter, switch­
ing operation (e) is termed generator synchronising.
Since as with (d) the two supplies are not of the same
frequency, this is termed asynchronous generator syn­
chronising. Means of adjusting both vohage and fre­
quency are necessary. This is the most c o m m o n form of
switching operation.
There are two methods of generator synchronising:
• Super-synchronously synchronising, with the incom­
ing frequency higher than the running frequency.
• Sub-synchronously synchronising, with the incoming
frequency lower than the running frequency.
2.3 Generator synchronising
Power station generators will also operate as synchro­
nous m o t o r s , i.e., instead of being mechanically driven
to produce electrical power, they run as motors, draw­
ing power from the system. Without further adjust­
ment of the governor, this will occur on synchronising
if done sub-synchronously or possibly after synchro­
nising with the two frequencies almost equal, should
the system frequency rise immediately. Motoring can

damage the prime-mover; in steam turbine-generators,
prolonged motoring affects turbine final stage vacuum
and blade cooling. T o prevent motoring or the opera­
tion of reverse power trips, synchronising must take
place super-synchronously. The prime-mover speed gov­
ernor is set with the incoming frequency above the
running frequency (as shown in Fig 12.4) and the gen­
erator automatically picks-up load on synchronising.
The load pick-up must only be a small proportion
of full-load output, typically 1 - 5 % . To combine this
requirement with satisfactory synchronising, the prime-
mover speed is increased to take the incoming fre­
quency above the running frequency, and then slowly
reduced. Synchronising follows when the shp frequency
is less than the maximum allowed and is within the
specified load pick-up band.
The load pick-up is determined by the speed d r o o p
setting and the shp frequency (governor set point). This
is given by:
% load pick-up =
% slip frequency
X 100
% speed d r o o p
Example: Determine the slip frequency band for a
load pick-up between 1% and 5 % , with a speed d r o o p
of 4 % and a system frequency of 50 H z .
% slip frequency =
% load pick-up χ % speed droop
100
Slip frequency =
% slip frequency χ system frequency
100
Rearranging and substhuting:
Shp frequency for 1% load pick-up =
% load pick-up χ % speed droop
100
system frequency
100
= [1 X 4/100] X 50/100 = 0.02 Hz
Slip frequency for 5 % load pick-up =
[5 X 4/100] X 50/100 = 0.1 Hz
Shp frequency band = 0.02 to 0.1 Hz
Generators are synchronised sub-synchronously where
rapid synchronisation is required, normally as part of a
fully automatic start-up control sequence which includes
Basic terms and synchronising criteria
generator loading. As the prime-mover is accelerated
up to synchronous speed, the difference between the
lower incoming frequency and running frequency is pro­
gressively reduced, synchronisation commencing when
the difference is less than the maximum shp frequency
ahowed.
Where the above considerations do not apply, syn­
chronising may be performed using either method when
within the m a x i m u m slip frequency allowed.
2.4 Synchronising errors
Although the ideal conditions for generator synchronis­
ing are hkely to be approached closely, for a number
of reasons there are limits to the accuracy which can be
obtained. These include matching and measurement
accuracy, and where a small slip frequency is required
for load pick-up reasons, as already described. For­
tunately, h is not necessary that the exact conditions
be attained, as true synchronism is brought about after
the two supplies have been synchronised through the
action of generator synchronising currents. These flow
in the stator windings with consequent effects imposed
on the rotor and persist until self-extinguished when
the synchronising errors have been eliminated. On syn­
chronising, the initial sub-transient current produces
the most effective corrective response. Thereafter, the
current transient declines in magnitude, the rate de­
pending on the generator transient reactance and the
progressive decrease in the synchronising error. Fre­
quency difference and phase displacement, which de­
m a n d rotor movement relative to the air gap rotating
field, require the flow of real power (called synchro­
nising power) which produces a synchronising torque.
It is this torque, acting on the generator rotor and
coupled drive together with governor and damping ef­
fects, which captures and locks the rotor into the syn­
chronous position. Initially, the rotor overshoots and
tends to oscihate or hunt about the synchronous posi­
tion. Additional damping is provided by rotor damping
bars and with normal synchronisation the oscillations
quickly decay.
2.4.1 V o l t a g e error
The condition immediately after synchronising is shown
in Fig 12.5, where the generator incoming voltage V\
per phase is slightly less than the system running voltage
Vr per phase. The two voltages are almost coincident,
the voltage error being represented by the phasor Vs.
This results in the generator drawing a synchronising
current Is from the system approximately in quadra­
ture w h h vohage Vs. This similarly leads the running
voltage Vr and is essentially a magnetising current which
strengthens the generator magnetic field. Synchronism
is rapidly achieved with predominantly reactive power
taken from the system.
The converse also applies if the incoming voltage
Vi is shghtly higher than the running voltage Vr, when
953
Synchronising Chapter 12

chronisation the incoming a n d running voltages are

SYNCHRONISING VOLTS superimposed onto each other; the resultant voltage,
(Vs) represented by the voltage (Vs), is a pulsating wave
whose magnitude at any instant is the voltage dif­
ference ( V i - V r ) as shown in Fig 12.7. This voltage
is obtained by reversing the phase of the running volt­
INCOMING RUNNING VOLTS age (Vr) and adding the reversed wave to the incoming
VOLTS (V) (V) voltage (Vi). This results in a synchronising current (Is)
being drawn from the higher frequency generator sup­
ply, the real power component of which produces the
synchronising torque required t o achieve synchronism.
SYNCHRONISING
CURRENT(y Similarly, if the situation is reversed and the system
running frequency is higher than the generator fre­
NOT TO SCALE quency, then real power is taken from the system.
If the frequency difference in Fig 12.7 continues,
FIG. 12.5 Voltage error
the amplitude of the resuhant pulsating voltage con­
tinues to increase with each cycle until a maximum of
a lagging de-magnetising current flows from the sys­ (Vi + Vr) is reached when the two voltage waves are
tem to the generator t o weaken the generator magnetic in antiphase. If further continued, the resultant voltage
field. progressively decreases as the two voltages move back
into phase. T h e envelope of the modulated wave (Vi -
2.4.2 Phase error Vr) is shown dotted. The beat frequency of the modu­
lated wave is equal to the shp frequency. If the slip
The immediate effect after synchronising w h h the gen­
frequency is smah, e.g., 0.05 H z or 20 s/slip cycle, h
erator incoming voltage Vj displaced behind the system
takes 10 seconds for the resultant voltage to rise from
running voltage Vr by an angle θ is shown in Fig 12.6.
being zero at phase coincidence t o peak value.
The voltage phasor between corresponding phases Vs,
W h h the vohage and phase matched, the synchro­
results in the generator drawing a synchronising current
nising current produced by a small slip frequency is
Is from the system. As the stator impedance is pre­
generally not significant since the change to a high re­
dominantly reactive, this is nearly in quadrature with
sultant voltage is not rapid. It also follows that if the
voltage Vs, which is nearly in phase with the running
voltage and phase error are small, this does not greatly
vohage Vr. Real power is taken from the system which
increase the synchronising current.
produces the torque required to pull the rotor into
synchronism.
The converse also applies if the incoming vohage Vj 2.5 Faulty synchronising
leads the running vohage Vr. The generator produces a
For each synchronising condition, as the error in­
synchronising current, the active component of which
creases in m a g n h u d e so does the disturbance or shock
produces the required synchronising torque.
this imposes on the generator and the system. In par­
ticular, large phase displacement and frequency differ­
2.4.3 Frequency error ences result in generator hunting, a condition where the
If the generator incoming frequency (fi) is slightly synchronising torque accelerates the rotating system,
greater than the system running frequency (fr) on syn- overpowering the rotor damping, etc., resulting in the
rotor swinging past the synchronous position under
hs own inertia. A n opposing torque is produced to
SYNCHRONISING retard and reverse the direction of motion, the cycle
VOLTS (Vgl
continuing until eventually the oscillation is reduced
INCOMING
VOLTS (V) by damping and the rotating system held in the syn­
chronous position. T o produce the fluctuating torque
required, the generator has to alternately supply and
absorb sizeable synchronising power with an initial
RUNNING
VOLTS (V transient which can involve currents in excess of gen­
SYNCHRONISING
CURRENT(y erator rating. Mechanical forces are proportional to
the squares of the currents with the maximum me­
chanical force related t o the peak current value. In this
respect, the duration of the synchronising torque is
not as important as the magnitude a n d number of force
NOT TO SCALE
reversals. T h e heavy power transfer results in a voltage
disturbance which m a y also adversely affect the power
FIG. 12.6 Phase error system to which the generator is connected, although

954

f. > f
— Ar —
SLIP FREQUENCY
FIG. 12.7 Frequency error
it is highly unhkely that this would result in transient
instability of the system.
The parameters which determine the power swing
on the system can be summarised as:
• Phase angle and shp frequency between the two
vohages.
• Vohage m a g n h u d e and system loop impedance.
• Relative size of the generator and system (connected
capachy, inertia and fauh level).
• Speed of governor response.
• Mechanical d a m p i n g of the turbine-generator
rotating system.
The effect of the disturbance on a turbine-generator is
to stress the stator and rotating parts, depleting design
life expectancy in certain respects, typically:
• Stator end windings, being the weakest part of the
stator, may distort and in so doing, damage the end
insulation. Although there is httle hkehhood of per-
manent deformation, small elastic deflections may
eventually adversely affect the insulation.
• Torsional oscillations stress the shaft system and in
particular the shaft couphngs.
• L P turbine blade root stress due to the effects of
blade dynamics.
Synchronising m e t h o d s
V¡ = INCOMING VOLTAGE
Vr = RUNNING VOLTAGE
V3 = SYNCHRONISING VOLTAGE
= FREQUENCY OF V^
f. = FREQUENCY OF V
1I
1 I
UUU
ENVELOPE OF
MODULATED WAVE
V. + V
i A
NOT TO SCALE
If the divergence in slip frequency is sufficiently large,
the pullout torque of the rotor is exceeded and gen-
erator pole slipping occurs. Faulty synchronising at
a phase angle of about 120° gives rise to high shaft
torques and stresses, which may exceed those resulting
when a three-phase short-circuh is cleared.
3 Synchronising methods
T w o quite different methods have been developed for
synchronising. The first and oldest method, dating back
to the nineteenth century, is performed by the operator
and is called manual synchronising.
For many years, m a n u a l synchronising was carried
out using a set of three lamp bulbs. These were con-
nected across the supphes t o measure the sum of the
two voltages. When the two voltages were equal and
in phase, the voltage across the lamps was at maximum
and the lamps were at their brightest. This was known
as the 'lamp bright' m e t h o d . T o d a y , the correct syn-
chronising conditions are determined by observing a
set of instruments.
The second m e t h o d is automatic synchronising and
employs a purpose designed control unit to perform
the complete operation without any need of supervision
by the operator. Automatic synchronising is initiated
within the operating range of the control unit by the
operator, or by an auxihary relay if incorporated into
a larger automatic control scheme.
955
Synchronising
Both methods are used for system and generator
synchronising but only automatic generator synchro­
nising incorporates voltage and frequency control. At a
power station, system synchronising is carried out man­
ually and generator synchronising is normally carried
out automatically, using a device called an automatic
synchronising relay. Manual synchronising facilities are
provided as back-up for generator synchronising in case
the automatic synchronising relay fails. Both methods
are also used for system synchronising at transmission
stations. Automatic synchronising employs a device
called a system synchroniser used, for example, in auto-
switching schemes such as delayed auto-reclose.
3.1 Manual synchronising
The instruments provided for manual synchronising
are an incoming vohmeter, a running vohmeter, a phase
angle voltmeter (i.e., an instrument which measures a
voltage corresponding to a phase angle) and a synchro­
scope which measures slip frequency and phase.
The three vohmeters are used to synchronise when
conditions are synchronous, i.e., system synchronising.
The incoming and running voltmeters plus the synchro­
scope are used to synchronise when conditions are
asynchronous, i.e., generator synchronising, and when
needed for system synchronising.
In brief, to system synchronise, both voltages are
first measured and compared. With zero frequency
difference shown by the synchroscope, the phase is
measured with the phase angle voltmeter. If both volt­
age and phase measurements are within prescribed
limits, as is normal, the switch is closed. T o generator
synchronise, one voltage (which may be the incoming
or running voltage) is adjusted as necessary to reduce
any voltage difference to within prescribed hmits. The
incoming frequency is then adjusted until the slip fre­
quency is less than the maximum allowed. For load
pick-up the adjustment must produce the incoming
frequency high and faihng to super-synchronously syn­
chronise. Switch closing follows as soon as the phase
is within prescribed limits and is initiated at the instant
the phase is at the correct advance angle, or as close
to this as can practicably be achieved.
Repetition of the synchronising instruments at each
switch control position at which synchronising faci­
lities are required is not necessary. The synchronising
instruments themselves may be used to synchronise
at any switch control position if the vohmeter scales
are changed, these are therefore combined (as far as
is allowed) into a common set. The synchronising
instruments are housed in a mobile trolley to ensure
that the indications are clearly legible at each switch
control position if located at more than one control
panel, as is the case in a power station. To accom­
modate four system voltage levels (i.e., 3.3 kV, 11 kV,
generator and transmission vohages), two separate sets
of instruments are provided, each with dual scale voh­
meters.
956
Chapter 12
T o transfer the instrument circuitry, the trohey is
equipped with two leads and plugs, and each switch
control position at which synchronising facihties are
required is provided with a synchronising socket (this
is not always necessary and a c o m m o n socket may be
provided at a convenient point). Prior to use, the syn­
chronising trolley is positioned adjacent to the switch
control position concerned and plugged into the socket
to prepare the circuitry for synchronising.
The level of operator ability required depends on
the switching operation, but at least demands a tech­
nical understanding of the principles involved and of
the accuracy that must be applied. For system syn­
chronising, the operation normally amounts to little
more than a check of voltage and fixed angular dis­
placement and little skill is involved. With a frequency
difference, the full procedure is required. As the slip
frequency is reduced, sensitive adjustments to prime-
mover speed need to be made to obtain the desired
response.
The characteristics of the prime-mover governor may
also lead to some change of slip near the point of closing
the switch. In particular, attention must be paid to
the selection of the correct advance angle for initiating
the switch closure, estimated from the product of the
observed slip frequency in (°elec)/s (estimated from
the time taken for the phase to traverse a given angle,
e.g., 360°) and the known switch closing time for the
switch concerned. From experience, this process is often
simplified to a fixed angular allowance.
In addition to being competent in the above respect,
the operator must be fuhy aware of the function he
is performing and conscious of the consequences of
error and the result of incorrect operation so that no
chances are taken.
As a safeguard against the risk of h u m a n error or
malfunction of the synchronising instruments resulting
in the connection of unsynchronised supphes, a device
called a check synchronising relay is added. This se­
parately measures the voltage, phase and slip frequency,
inhibiting the switch closing signal unless the supply
differences are whhin preset limits. The employment
of this relay is termed check operative. T o assist the
operator, a 'check synch monitor' lamp can be added
to indicate when satisfactory synchronising condhions
are present. The slip feature is switched out of service
for generator synchronising to permit the switch to
be closed with a slip frequency greater than the re­
lay setting permits, as required for load pick-up. (If
motoring is not a consideration, e.g., gas turbines, this
feature may be retained if preferred for operational
reasons.) Check synchronising relays are also used as
system synchronisers in auto-switching schemes at trans­
mission stations. In this apphcation, the check syn­
chronising relay initiates the switch closing signal when
the differences between two supplies are within preset
limits.
The synchronising equipment is also provided for
manual override synchronising, i.e., when one supply

is live and the other supply is dead or both supplies
are dead, as an additional safeguard against operator
error. Since this supply condhion would operate the
check synchronising relay, a check synchronising relay
by-pass facility is fitted. In this switching operation,
only the vohages are measured and having checked that
synchronising is not required, the switch is closed.
The by-pass facility is termed check inoperative and
is only used under clearly defined conditions. However,
the check synchronising relay may also have to be
by-passed in an emergency, manual synchronising then
relying only on the synchronising instruments. This
may be necessary if both the automatic and check
synchronising relays have failed and it is considered
essential to provide additional generation.
It is not intended that the check synchronising relay
be used as an automatic synchroniser when generator
synchronising. The operator must not be allowed to
transfer all responsibility to the relay by the premature
operation or holding over of the control switch while
waiting for the relay inhibit to be released. Therefore
a device called a guard relay is fitted. This permits the
check synchronising relay to decide whether the control
switch was operated before or after prescribed synchro­
nising conditions were reached, inhibiting the close sig­
nal if before. For the same reason, a guard relay is also
instahed for system synchronising when this involves a
frequency difference. The relay may also be used to
prevent a standing output signal from a faulty check
synchronising relay permitting the switch to be closed.
The advantages of manual synchronising are as
follows:
• The operator has complete control of the switching
operation.
• The requirements for each type of switching op­
eration are accommodated in a c o m m o n set of
equipment.
• Equipment can be transferred between circuits with
the same check synchronising relay setting.
• Instruments required are relatively basic and unhkely
to fah.
• C o m m o n mode failure cannot occur when manual
synchronising is used as the back-up to automatic
synchronising (as may happen if back-up is provided
by a second automatic synchronising relay).
• Low caphal cost of the equipment, if considered in
relation to hs wide apphcation.
In summary, manual synchronising supervised by a
check synchronising relay is appropriate for the less
demanding requirements of system synchronising, as
cahed for in periodic maintenance switching, etc.
Manual synchronising has an advantage as back-up for
generator synchronising where automatic synchronis­
ing is the normal method and also for use at switches
where generator synchronising is expected to be in­
Synchronising m e t h o d s
frequent and an automatic synchronising relay is not
provided. A guard relay prevents premature switch
closing and in exceptional circumstances the check
synchronising relay may be by-passed. Minor disad­
vantages are the inconvenience of having to move the
synchronising trolley before and after use and the re­
striction in access to other controls when synchronising
in an area with limited free space. Where seismic re­
quirements are included, a parking position is provided
to prevent unrestrained movement.
3.2 Autonnatic synchronising
The action of an automatic synchronising relay in
synchronising a generator is similar to manual synchro­
nising but with improved speed and accuracy. On being
switched into service, the incoming and running voltage
and frequency are monitored by matching circuits which
send out signals to controhers to reduce the differences
to within permissible hmits. When these conditions are
met, contacts on phase sensors close at the correct
advance angle to initiate the closing of the switch.
Synchronising may be performed sub-synchronously
(incoming frequency low), super-synchronously (in­
coming frequency high) or within a maximum slip fre­
quency if there is no requirement for a particular
m e t h o d . Table 12.1 shows the synchronising method
employed by the C E G B for each type of generator.
The relay is preset, selecting the synchronising method,
maximum slip frequency setting, voltage error setting,
switch closing time and speed signals to the prime-
mover speed governor.
Automatic synchronising relays, unhke the synchro­
nising instruments, are regarded as fixed equipment and
provided on a one per generator basis. There is no
requirement for interchangeability, although relay mod­
els for this duty are available with external facilities
for the selection of up to three different swhch closing
times. There is one exception where a c o m m o n auto-
TABLE 12.1
Synchronising method for each type of generator
Generator type Synchronising method Reason
Steam turbine- Super-synchronously Prevent motoring
generator (prime-mover damage)
Gas turbine Sub-synchronously^^^ Rapid synchronisation
Diesel generator Super-synchronously Prevent motoring
(reverse power relay
tripping)
Pumped-storage
Motoring mode Super/sub- Maximum chance of
synchronously^"^ synchronisation
Generating mode Sub-synchronously Rapid synchronisation
(i) May be done super-synchronously if required for operational
reasons
(ii) Using starting equipment (automatic synchronising relay does
not control the machine speed)
957
Synchronising
matic synchronising relay may be used for diesel gen­
erators. As described later, this is a non-essential duty.
The advantages of using an automatic synchronising
relay are as follows:
• The complete synchronising operation is carried out
automatically.
• Synchronising is performed consistently, with a de­
gree of precision and final accuracy which cannot
be approached by manual means.
• Synchronism is achieved rapidly, minimising the
synchronising time.
• The resuhant disturbance to the generator and system
after the switch closes is kept to a minimum.
• Synchronising can be incorporated into a compre­
hensive unit automatic start-up sequence.
• Operator work load is reduced when synchronising
has to be performed at regular intervals or a number
of generators need to be synchronised in succession
over a short period of time.
• It is capable of operating whh falling vohage and
frequency.
• The risk of h u m a n error is largely removed.
• The demand for skihed operating staff is reduced.
• It permits the synchronising of remotely operated
plant at unmanned generating stations.
For the above reasons, especially accuracy, automatic
synchronising is the normal method of steam turbine-
generator synchronising. Usuahy, reasonable time is
available for this operation, but it may have to be done
quickly when system conditions demand rapid connec­
tion of a generator for system security or load despatch
reasons.
Automatic synchronising is essential for rapid syn­
chronisation of the gas turbines used for emergency
generation, which are required to be brought from
rest to fuh-load in less than two minutes. In the event
of a transmission system disturbance causing a fah in
frequency, a low frequency relay initiates starting at
a preset value. As a design basis for operation, the
severest system conditions are assumed to be a fre­
quency fall of 1 cycle every 25 seconds down to 40 Hz
and a voltage fah of 1.5% every 25 seconds.
The ability to synchronise with a falling frequency is
also used at pumped-storage power stations when syn­
chronising in the pumping m o d e , as the machine speed
fahs too quickly for an operator to respond manually.
4 Synchronising facilities and controls
4.1 Synchronising facilities
The major synchronising facilities in a power station
are remote from the switchgear and are situated in the
958
C h a p t e r 12
central control r o o m at the unit control desk and at
other control panels, i.e., the electrical auxiliary and
transmission system control panels and gas-turbine
remote control panel, if provided. Gas turbines are
also provided w h h synchronising facihties at the local
control panel as is switchgear in switchrooms or at
plant locations if required.
The synchronising fachities at each of these locations
for three standardised generator/transmission voltage
switchgear schemes and the electrical auxiliaries system,
including gas turbine and diesel generator switchgear,
if provided, are shown in Table 12.2. This does not
include the synchronising fachities for the transmission
station switchgear at the transmission control panel,
as these extend beyond the scope of this chapter.
The synchronising facilities for the steam turbine-
generator are located at the unit control desk, irre­
spective of whether synchronising is with generator or
transmission voltage switchgear. For generator voltage
switchgear (Table 12.2, scheme (a)), synchronising nor­
mally takes place across the generator voltage circuit-
breaker and automatic and manual synchronising
facilities are provided. Automatic synchronising is the
normal m o d e , backed up by manual synchronising
with check operative. Manual synchronising with check
inoperative is also provided when it is necessary to bring
a generator into service with the transmission supply
absent. In addition, manual synchronising facilities,
with check operative and check inoperative, are pro­
vided for the associated transmission vohage circuh-
breaker. Manual synchronising with check operative
is provided for re-synchronising the steam turbine-
generator on restoration of transmission supplies fol­
lowing loss or disconnection. Manual synchronising
with check inoperative is prevented, except when the
generator voltage circuit-breaker is open.
In both transmission voltage switchgear schemes
(Table 12.2, schemes (b) and (c)), the steam turbine-
generator is synchronised across the transmission
vohage circuit-breaker and switch disconnector, respec­
tively. Automatic and manual synchronising facihties
are provided for both schemes. Automatic synchronis­
ing is the normal mode while manual synchronising
with check operative is available as back-up. Manual
synchronising with check inoperative is also provided
for the circumstances referred to in scheme (a).
Each steam turbine-generator switch is equipped with
a fixed set of synchronising equipment. This includes
the automatic synchronising relay, where apphcable,
the check synchronising relay and guard relay plus the
associated control circuhry. The one exception is for
the manual synchronising instruments mounted on
the synchronising trolley, which are c o m m o n .
The main 3.3 kV and 11 kV electrical auxiharies
system is set out as a mimic diagram on the electrical
auxiliaries control panel. This consists of standard
symbols, signs and lines, etc., arranged in such a way
that they represent the circuit layout of the switch-
gear, transformers, generator main plant, etc. Different
 Synchronising facilities a n d controls

TABLE 12.2

Synchronising facilities

Synchronising Controls
Circuit Switch
Location Facility

steam turbine- (a) Transmission voltage circuit-breaker with generator Unit control desk Generator voltage switch
generator voltage switch Automatic/manual (i) Check operative
GENERATOR (ii) Check inoperative
SWITCH
Transmission voltage circuit-breaker
Manual (i) Check operative
TRANSMISSION
CIRCUIT-BREAKER -/4 (ii) Check inoperative'

(b) Transmission voltage circuit-breaker with no switch Transmission voltage circuit-breaker

at generator voltage Automatic/manual (i) Check operative
(ii) Check inoperative

TRANSMISSION
CIRCUIT-BREAKER

(c) Transmission voltage switch disconnector (with Transmission voltage switch disconnector
transmission voltage circuit-breaker) with no switch at Automatic/manual (!) Check operative
generator voltage (ii) Check inoperative

^^SWITCH I /
DISCONNECTOR
TRANSMISSION
CIRCUIT-BREAKER

11kV gas
turbine Gas turbine local Automatic
control panel

Circuit-breaker
Gas turbine remote Automatic/manual (i) Check operative
control panel (ii) Check inoperative

3.3kV and Manual (i) Check operative

Electrical auxiliary
11 kV distn. Circuit-breaker control panel (ii) Check inoperative
switchgear

a) Electrical auxiliary Automatic/manual (i) Check operative

3.3kV control panel (ii) Check inoperative
diesel
generator
Circuit-breaker (b) Diesel generator local Automatic/manual (i) Check operative
control panel (ii) Check inoperative

Electrical auxiliary Automatic

control panel

* Inhibited when generator voltage switch closed

colours identify each system vohage and limited opera­
tional information is displayed. T o remotely open and
close each circuit switch, a control switch is fitted at
each circuit switch position. A synchronising socket is
installed near each circuit control switch where m a n u a l
synchronising facilities are required. A c o m m o n set of
synchronising equipment is provided including check
synchronising relay, guard relay and associated control
circuitry mounted inside the synchronising trohey.
Manual synchronising with check operative is in­
stalled for system synchronising, with manual synchro­
nising and check inoperative normally available in the
absence of one or both supphes. Identical facilities,
located in a 3.3/11 kV synchronising trolley, are pro­
vided in switchrooms, etc., if these are required.
Synchronising facilities for 11 kV gas turbines are
based on the requirements of Design M e m o r a n d u m
066/1 [1]. The main facilities are located at the gas
turbine remote control panel and automatic and m a n ­
ual synchronising facihties are installed on the same
operating basis as already described in scheme (a). The
c o m m o n synchronising trolley equipment is used for
m a n u a l synchronising.
Identical automatic synchronising facilities are pro­
vided at the gas turbine local control panel, which is
required to contain all the controls and instrumenta­
tion including the automatic synchronising relay ne­
cessary to operate the plant. Although used primarily
for commissioning, local facihties permit plant opera­
tion should the remote facilities fail.
Diesel generators at 3.3 kV are not used as sources
of generation to meet system d e m a n d but to provide
essential power station supplies in an emergency fol­
lowing the loss of external supphes. There is n o set

959
Synchronising
standard for the apphcation of diesel generator syn­
chronising facilities, so two recent designs at nuclear
power stations are described. Automatic synchronising
facilities are provided, although they are not used in
an emergency. They are included for operator con­
venience during the regular 'on load' testing necessary
to demonstrate the high level of availability required
of such plant. With the first scheme, two additional
synchronising trolleys, equipped for manual and auto­
matic synchronising, are provided for synchronising at
the electrical auxiharies control panel. In the second
scheme, automatic synchronising facilities are provided
for each diesel generator at the electrical auxiliaries
control panel, and automatic and manual synchronising
facilities are provided at each local control panel.
Manual facihties, with check operative and check in­
operative, are provided on the same operating basis as
already described.
4.2 Synchronising controls
Many precautions need to be incorporated into the
design of a synchronising scheme to prevent error or
incorrect operation. Of particular concern is that part
of the operation done manually; therefore, the syn­
chronising procedure includes measures designed to
minimise the risk of h u m a n error by making each man­
ual step in the operation the end result of considered
action on the part of the operator. Several of these
measures, which are concerned w h h the operation of
the synchronising equipment, have already been de­
scribed in Section 3 of this chapter. Further measures
are included in the preparatory actions performed prior
to starting the actual synchronising operation and, for
manual synchronising, extend to the operation of the
circuit control switch.
The measures included in the preparatory actions,
which apply to each circuit equipped for synchronising,
ensure that:
• The same basic procedure is followed to prepare
each circuit for synchronising.
• The circuit switch cannot be closed without first
following the procedure of actuating a control switch
to select the synchronising mode, i.e., automatic,
manual with check operative or inoperative.
• Secondary voltage circuits are not established until
the control selector switch is actuated.
At generator and transmission voltages, certain 'auto
synch/manual synch' control selector switches are m a d e
key-operated and a separate key-operated control se­
lector switch is installed for the 'check operative/check
inoperative' facility. In addition, no synchronising op­
eration on a transmission voltage switch can take place
at the unit control desk w h h o u t first actuating a key-
operated 'generator unit desk' control selector switch
located on the transmission control panel.
960
C h a p t e r 12
A proprietary design of miniature lock is fitted for
the key-operated control selector switches, which can
only be operated with the key in position. The key is
free to be removed in the ' o f f position and is trapped
in all other positions: when not in use, the keys are
normally kept in a separate key parking socket. The
key patterns produced are coded by the manufacturer
and a small number of these have been selected by the
C E G B to form different key groups. Each key group
is dedicated to a particular control selector switch
function.
Two key groups are used at the u n h control desk.
One key group (ov) is fitted to the 'check operative/
check inoperative' control selector swhch and the other
key group (k) is fitted to the synchronising mode con­
trol selector switch in the generator voltage switchgear
scheme (a) (key-operated control selector switches may
be fitted with the other two schemes). The third key
group (s), located at the transmission control panel,
is used to synchronise a transmission voltage switch.
The purpose of this key group is to ensure that syn­
chronising can only take place on one circuh at a time
at the transmission station.
T o enable synchronising to be carried out in the
central control r o o m , the 'local/remote/test' control
selector switch at the circuit switch local control panel
or switchboard must be selected to the 'remote' position.
This transfers operation control from the local ' o p e n /
neutral/close' control swhch to a discrepancy control
switch, which is the final initiating control whose design
features need to be described.
Discrepancy control switches inform the operator of
the circuit switch position while going through the m o ­
tion of actuating the switch. On being rotated through
a quarter of a turn in the appropriate direction, an
internal discrepancy light flashes to alert the operator
that the switch indicates (by a coloured line or arrow
on a white background) the wrong sense. The switch
will continue to flash if left in the wrong sense. Having
cautioned the operator, with further rotation the Open'
or 'close' signal is initiated, and as soon as the circuit
switch has operated, the discrepancy light extinguishes
to inform the operator that the switching operation
is now complete. On release, the control switch has
an inbuih return action to bring the switch to rest
indicating the new circuit switch position.
The operation of the synchronising controls can now
be described.
4.2.1 Steam turbine-generator
F i g u r e 12.8 s h o w s t h e s t e a m t u r b i n e - g e n e r a t o r
synchronising controls on the unit desk.
Voltage and speed controls
The vohage at the low vohage terminals of generator
transformers must be kept at 100% of rated voltage at
all times to maintain the voltage constant at the aux­
iharies connected via unit transformers to this point.
 Synchronising facilities and controls

GENERATOR SYNCHRONISING

23.5kV 400kV
SYNCH SELECTION SYNCH SELECTION

OFF OFF
AUTO 'MANUAL AUTO I MANUALI
SYNCH/Q\SYNCH SYNCH
(S)
(k) (k)

CHECK SYNCH CHECK SYNCH

OP OP

é -
(ov)
INOP
((Θ))
BUZZER
(0)-IN0P
(ov)

CHECK SYNCH
MONITOR
CIRCUIT BREAKER CIRCUIT BREAKER
HV SYNCHRONISE
OPEN OPEN AVAILABLE
I I
CLOSE CLOSE
LAMP
TEST

- O - INDICATOR LAMP

SYNCHRONISER CHECK SYNCH SYNCHRONISING

LOCKED OUT MONITOR COMPLETE

FIG. 1 2 . 8 Steam turbine-generator synchronising controls on the unit desk

Steam turbine-generators are therefore fitted with
automatic vohage regulators which are normally set
to maintain the terminal voltage at its nominal value.
Vohage matching is therefore carried out using the
generator transformer on-load tapchanger by raising
and lowering the tap position.
The tapchanger alters the transformer open-circuit
voltage by adjusting the effective number of turns in
the high vohage winding. In total, there are nineteen
tap positions, with a voltage step of 1.11% nominal
between each tap position. 'Raise' and 'lower' refers
to changing to a higher or lower tap position num­
ber, respectively. If synchronising at the generator
vohage circuit-breaker, this is by adjustment of the
running vohage and, at the transmission voltage switch,
by adjustment of the incoming voltage. With the lat­
ter, the 'raise' tapchange operation reduces the trans­
former open-circuit vohage and, similarly, the 'lower'
tapchange operation increases the transformer open-
circuit voltage.
The turbine speed governor set point controller (as
described in Section 2.1 of this chapter) is used to
raise or lower the generator incoming frequency.
Generator voltage circuit-breaker (with transmission
voltage circuit-breaker) scheme
Manual synchronising of the steam turbine-generator
commences with the connection of the synchronising
trolley plug to the generator voltage circuit-breaker
synchronising socket. The selection of manual synchro­
nising is made by key operation (k) of the Off/auto
s y n c h / m a n u a l synch' control selector switch to the
'manual synch' position. Actuation connects the incom­
ing and running supplies to the synchronising instru­
ments. The supplies are also connected to the check
synchronising relay with key-operated (ov) 'check in­
operative/check operative' control selector switch se­
lected to the 'check operative' position. The auxihary
power supply is permanently connected to the check
synchronising relay.
The generator vohage circuit-breaker is closed by
operation of the discrepancy control swhch, provided
that the check synchronising relay output contacts have
previously closed. Satisfactory conditions are indicated
by the illumination of a check synchronising relay
monitor l a m p . The guard relay inhibits the close signal
a n d the display of the check synchronising monitor
lamp if the discrepancy control switch is prematurely
operated.
Actuation of the key-operated (ov) selector to the
'check inoperative' position energises an auxiliary relay
which by-passes the check synchronising relay out­
put contacts. Manual synchronising in this mode is
normally restricted to closing onto a dead circuit. Se­
lection of automatic synchronising by key operation
(k) of the control selector switch to the 'auto synch'
position, energises auxiliary relays which connect the
incoming and running supphes and the auxiliary power
supply to the automatic synchronising relay. With the

961
Synchronising
equipment prepared and the steam turbine-generator
running, manual initiation of the *auto synch' start
button instructs the automatic synchronising relay to
begin synchronising.
Manual synchronising facihties for the transmis­
sion voltage circuit-breaker are available at the trans­
mission control panel and the unit control desk. T o
estabhsh manual synchronising at the u n h control
desk, the key-operated (s) control selector switch at
the transmission control panel is selected to the
'generator unit desk' position. This illuminates a Ή Υ
synchronise available' lamp at the unit control desk.
The initial preparation for synchronising at the
unit control desk is by plug connection of the trol­
ley. Selection of manual synchronising is by actua­
tion of key-operated (k) 'off/manual synch' control
selector switch to the 'manual synch' position. This
connects the incoming and running supphes to the
synchronising instruments and to the check synchro­
nising relay provided the key-operated (ov) 'check
operative/check inoperative' control selector switch is
selected to the 'check operative' position. The auxil­
iary power supply to the check synchronising relay
is permanently energised. The circuit-breaker is closed
by operating the discrepancy control switch, with the
conditions the same as described for the generator
circuit-breaker.
Manual synchronising without check synchronising
is by operation of the key-operated selector (ov) to
the 'check inoperative' position. Manual synchronising
in this mode is inhibited, except when the generator
voltage circuit-breaker is open.
Transmission voltage circuit-breaker (with no
voltage circuit-breaker) scheme
To establish either manual or automatic synchronising
at the unit control desk, the key-operated (s) control
selector switch at the transmission control panel is
selected to the 'generator u n h desk' position. Synchro­
nising is then carried out as for the generator voltage
circuit-breaker except that the transmission voltage
circuit-breaker discrepancy control swhch is used.
Transmission voltage switch disconnector (with
transmission voltage circuit-breaker) scheme
The synchronising controls are transferred to the unit
control desk by selection of 'generator unit desk' on
the key-operated (s) control selector switch at the trans­
mission control panel. Synchronising is again carried
out as for the generator voltage circuit-breaker except
that the transmission vohage switch disconnector dis­
crepancy control switch is used.
4.2.2 11 k V g a s - t u r b i n e g e n e r a t o r s
Gas turbine synchronising facilities are available at the
gas turbine remote control panel after the selection of
'remote' at the gas turbine local control panel.
962
C h a p t e r 12
T o synchronise manually 'no-load' is selected at the
control selector switch and to synchronise automati­
cally either 'peak' or 'standby' is selected.
Manual synchronising begins after the gas turbine
has been started and run-up under the supervision of
the automatic sequence control system. It commences
with the insertion of the plug into the synchronising
socket which connects the auxiliary power supply to the
check synchronising relay. Synchronising is with 'check
operative' selected at the control selector switch on
the synchronising trolley which connects the running
voltage and the incoming voltage to the synchronising
equipment. The voltage is raised and lowered by ad­
justment of the automatic voltage regulator (this may
be by adjustment of the generator transformer on-load
tapchanger with peak-lopping gas turbine schemes).
The speed is altered by adjusting the gas turbine speed
governor set point controller. Closure of the 11 kV gas
turbine circuit-breaker, which is initiated by operating
the discrepancy control switch, cannot be carried out
until the check synchronising relay output contacts have
closed, confirming that the synchronising conditions
are correct. The guard relay prevents the circuit-breaker
being closed by premature operation of the discrepancy
control switch.
Selection of either 'peak' or 'standby' energises a
relay which connects the auxiliary power supply to
the automatic synchronising relay. When the gas turbine
is running u p in speed, a further relay energises which
connects both the running vohage and the incoming
voltage to the automatic synchronising relay, causing
the synchronising operation to begin. Circuit-breaker
closure disconnects both the running and incoming
generator voltage from the automatic synchronising relay.
4.2.3 3.3 k V a n d 11 k V d i s t r i b u t i o n s w i t c h g e a r
Manual synchronising facilities only are available at
the electrical auxiliaries control panel. The operation
commences with plug connection of the synchronising
trolley to the appropriate circuit, which connects the
auxihary power supply to the check synchronising re­
lay. With 'check operative' selected and the 3.3 kV
or 11 kV circuit-breaker open (to connect running
voltage) both the running voltage and incoming voltage
are connected to the synchronising equipment. Voltage
controls are not provided since with normal voltage
regulation the voltage difference should be slight. The
3.3 kV or 11 kV circuit-breaker is closed by operating
the discrepancy control switch, initiation being per­
mitted by the check synchronising relay and guard relay
if synchronising conditions are correct.
Manual switching with 'check inoperative' selected
is normally restricted to closing the circuit-breaker onto
a dead busbar.
The above also applies to manual synchronising
in swhchrooms or other plant locations, if this facility
is installed, except that switch closing is initiated by
operating the local 'open/neutral/close' control swhch.

Local facilities are otherwise used for closing onto a
dead busbar.
4.2.4 3.3 k V diesel g e n e r a t o r s
The two recent synchronising schemes referred to in
Section 4.1 of this chapter (scheme (a) and scheme
(b)), are described in the following paragraphs.
Scheme (a)
Manual and automatic facilities are available at the
electrical auxiliaries control panel after the selection
of 'remote' at the local control panel. The 3.3 kV diesel
generator synchronising trolley is used for synchro­
nising. Both manual and automatic synchronising
operations begin after the diesel generator has been
started and run-up under the supervision of the auto­
matic sequence control system, and commence with
the insertion of the synchronising plug into the ap­
propriate circuit socket.
For manual synchronising, 'check operative' is se­
lected at the control selector switch on the synchronis­
ing trolley which connects the incoming and running
vohage to the synchronising equipment. Voltage and
speed control are by adjustment of the automatic volt­
age regulator and speed governor controller, respective­
ly. Closure of the 3.3 kV diesel generator circuh-
breaker is achieved in the same manner as previously
described. Manual synchronising with check inoperative
is again normally used for closing onto a dead circuit,
as happens fohowing the loss of external supphes.
Moving the control selector switch to the 'automatic
synchronising' position connects the incoming and run­
ning voltage to the relay. With the equipment pre­
pared, manual operation of the 'auto synch initiate'
pushbutton on the synchronising trolley prepares the
D C output circuits which control the voltage, speed
and circuit-breaker closing.
Scheme (b)
Only automatic synchronising facilities are available in
the central control room at the electrical auxiliaries
control panel after the selection of remote at the local
control panel. This removes the need for the addhional
3.3 kV diesel generator synchronising trolleys in the
central control r o o m . Synchronising is achieved, as
before, by depressing the 'auto synch initiate' push­
button located on the control panel.
Automatic and manual synchronising facihties are
available at the local control panel, the synchronising
operation being as already described.
5 Synchronising equipment
5.1 Synchronising trolley
Figure 12.9 shows a typical control r o o m synchronising
trolley which is a compact floor-standing unit mounted
Synchronising equipment
on castors for ease of mobility. The housing is a sheet
steel fabrication which matches the design of the con­
trol desk in profile and colour. The trolley contains two
sets of instruments, one for synchronising 3.3/11 kV
circuhs and the other for synchronising generator/grid
voltage circuits. The check synchronising relay, guard
relay and interposing transformers for synchronising
3.3/11 kV circuits only are internally m o u n t e d . Accom­
m o d a t i o n for the two flexible trailing cables is located
on either side of the trolley. Each cable is for one set
of synchronising instruments and is approximately 3 m
long. A n approved design of synchronising plug ter­
minates the free cable end. This, as described earher,
fits into mating sockets m o u n t e d on the mimic panels
and control desk. The plug contains male pins and the
sockets have shrouded female connectors. Parking
sockets on the trolley locate the plugs when not in use.
When viewed from the front, the 3.3/11 kV instru­
ments are located on the left hand side and the genera­
t o r / g r i d vohage instruments are located on the right
h a n d side of the trolley. The voltmeters, phase angle
voltmeters and synchroscopes are mounted on the steep­
ly inclined front face and the selector switches and
'synchroniser locked out' indicator are mounted below
on the slightly inclined desk t o p . Centrally mounted
on the desk is a four-position system voltage switch,
for the selection of the various manual synchronising
facilities.
The four control selector switch positions are:
1 3.3/11 kV, check inoperative
2 3.3/11 kV, check operative
3 Off
4 Generator/transmission voltage (e.g., 23.5/400
kV)
The synchronising instruments provided for duties
associated with selector switch positions 1 and 2 are:
• Running voltmeter
• Incoming voltmeter
• Phase angle voltmeter
• Synchroscope
• Phase angle voltmeter switch
(black scale/red scale/off)
• Shp feature switch (in/out)
• Synchroscope swhch (on/off)
• 'Synchroniser locked out' indicator
The synchronising instruments provided for duties
associated with selector switch position 4 are:
• Running voltmeter
• Incoming voltmeter
• Phase angle voltmeter
• Synchroscope
963
Synchronising Chapter 12

MANUAL SYNCHRONISING TROLLEY

INCOMING VOLTS
23.5kV/400kV PHASE ANGLE
VOLTMETER

RUNNING VOLTS

SYNCHROSCOPE

SLIP FEATURE
SWITCH (IN/OUT)

SYNCHROSCOPE
(ON/OFF)

PHASE ANGLE
VOLTMETER SWITCH
(BLACK/RED/OFF)

SYNCHRONISER
LOCKED OUT
INDICATOR

SYSTEM
VOLTAGE SWITCH

FIG. 1 2 . 9 Control room synchronising trolley

Phase angle voltmeter switch substantially linear and match to whhin 2° at all major
(black scale/red scale/off) marks on the scale. The phase angle voltmeters are
the same size as the incoming and running voltmeters
Synchroscope switch (on/off) and the synchroscopes are of the same type and m a k e .
The two scales marked on the vohmeter and phase
The incoming and running voltmeters are of the same angle voltmeter, the maximum number permitted on an
size and have the same scales. The scale shapes are instrument, are marked in different colours for clarity.

964
 Synchronising equipment

One scale is in black and the other red against a white
background. Since there are two sets of numbers and
colours, these instruments should only be read at a
short distance. The selector switches are mounted w h h
either the 'off or 'out' positions at the 12 o'clock
positions, except for the phase angle vohmeter switches
where this is the 'black' scale position. This switch
is spring-loaded to return automatically to the 'black'
scale positions from the 'red' scale position, when re­
leased. A notice is displayed adjacent to the switch
to warn that the phase angle vohmeter switch has to
be returned to the ' o f f position before synchronising,
as it is not a rotating instrument. Each synchronising
instrument has a clear external label. When separate
synchronising trolleys are provided for synchronising
3.3 kV diesel generators, the automatic synchronising
relay is housed inside the trolley with the other manual
synchronising equipment. A different size of synchro­
nising plug is fitted to prevent incorrect use. The
synchronising instruments are centrally mounted and
the synchronising control selector switch has the follow­
ing four positions:
R M S v o h s . With the two voltages equal, 1% = 0.6°
(elec).
The instrument is a more accurate means of mea­
suring the phase angle for system synchronising than
the synchroscope, which is not calibrated in degrees
and therefore only provides an indication of this value.
The phase angle voltmeter specification is the same
as that for the incoming and running voltmeters except
for the voltage range and scales. The inner black scale
reads 0 - 2 4 0 % and is used initially, subsequently
switching to the outer red scale (which reads 0 - 6 0 % )
for more accurate measurement, the scale interval being
2 0 % for the black and 5 % for the red scales respec­
tively. Both scales have 12 corresponding divisions. The
0, 8 0 % , 160% and 2 4 0 % positions on the black scale
and the 0, 2 0 % , 4 0 % and 6 0 % positions on the red
scale are major marks and all other scale marks are
minor m a r k s . The instrument is calibrated so that the
black 2 4 0 % is displayed for an input of 152.5 V A C
and the red 6 0 % , for an input of 38.1 V A C . A n exter­
nal range change resistor is used to change the scales.
A typical instrument dial face is shown in Fig 12.10.

1 Manual synchronising, check inoperative

5.1.3 Synchroscope
2 Manual synchronising, check operative
The synchroscope is the principal instrument for man­
3 Off
ual synchronising. This is a two-winding instrument
4 Automatic synchronising which, when connected between two supplies, is in
effect a two-phase m o t o r with a pointer fixed to its
'Auto synch complete' and 'Auto synch locked out' rotor. W h e n revolving, the pointer indicates the shp
indicators are mounted with the synchronising controls. frequency and when it is moving slowly or is station­
ary, indicates the phase angle between the vohages
5.1.1 Voltmeters applied to the two windings. The synchroscope, there­
fore, not only gives a positive indication of the instant
Each voltmeter is a part-circular scale instrument of
the rectifier moving coil type. The resistance of the
instrument is not less than 1000 Ω/V. The red outer
scale reads the higher of the two system vohages and
scale numbers are hmited to three digits. The pair of
voltmeters scaled for use with the electrical auxiliaries
system are calibrated to display 3.3 kV and 11 kV at
63.5 V input. The black inner scale extends from 2.1 kV
to 4.2 kV and the outer red scale from 7 kV to 14 kV.
The pair of voltmeters, calibrated for use with gen­
erator voltage and transmission voltage circuits, typi­
cally display 23.5 kV and 396 kV (for 400 kV system
voltage) at 63.5 V input. The inner black scale extends
from 14.2 kV to 28.4 kV and the outer red scale from
240 kV to 480 kV.

5.1.2 Phase angle v o l t m e t e r s

Phase angle vohmeters work on the principle that, if

the incoming and running supply voltages are equal,
the phasor difference voltage is a measure of the phase
angle. With the instrument connected across the two
supplies, the same reading is indicated for a given
phase angle irrespective of whether the incoming volt­
age is in advance of the running voltage or vice versa.
The scale is cahbrated in % of single-phase-neutral FIG. 12.10 Phase angle voltmeter dial face

965
Synchronising
to close the switch, but also indicates any adjustments
that need to be made to the speed governor set point
to reduce the frequency difference.
Zero phase displacement and slip frequency are
i n d i c a t e d when t h e p o i n t e r coincides with t h e
synchronising mark at the 12 o'clock position and is
stationary. If the two frequencies are exactly equal
but have a phase displacement, the pointer assumes a
position with respect to the synchronising mark cor­
responding to the phase angle. If the frequencies are
different, the speed of r o t a t i o n of the pointer
corresponds to the shp frequency, i.e., the slower the
pointer revolves, the smaller the frequency difference.
When moving slowly, the phase angle is likewise indi­
cated between the position of the pointer and the
synchronising mark. The direction of pointer rotation
indicates which of the two frequencies is higher. This
is clockwise if the incoming frequency is higher,
indicated by an arrow and the word 'fast' or a ' + '
sign, and anticlockwise if the incoming frequency is
slower, indicated by an arrow and the word 'slow' or
a ' - ' sign. Indications are displayed at the right and
left upper quadrants of the dial face (Fig 12.11).
Synchroscopes typically operate over the frequency
range 4 7 - 5 1 Hz and have an accuracy for practical
purposes of ± 2 ° (elec) When not in use, or with one
circuit de-energised, the pointer is biased away from
the synchronising mark by an angle exceeding 45°. The
synchroscope is normally brought into service when
the two voltages have been equalised and the frequency
difference is ^ 1 . 5 Hz to ensure that the pointer starts
to rotate in the correct direction. When manually syn­
chronising a steam turbine-generator, the speed gov-
FiG. 12.11 Synchroscope dial face
966
C h a p t e r 12
ernor set point is adjusted until the synchroscope
pointer is moving slowly or creeping in the 'fast'
(clockwise) direction at, say, 30° (elec) per second.
Switch closure is initiated with the pointer on the 'slow'
side of the instrument at the moment the correct
advance angle in front of the synchronising mark is
reached. For a switch with a closing time of, say,
300 ms, the correct advance angle would be about 9°
(elec). While the angle is indicated by the synchroscope
pointer, the dial face is not calibrated and therefore
the phase angle must be estimated.
5.2 Guard relay
The function of a guard relay, as described earlier, is
to ensure that the operator fohows the correct synchro­
nising procedure by preventing operation of the switch
closing circuit if the 'close' signal is initiated prior
to the check synchronising relay, indicating that con­
ditions are satisfactory for synchronising. There are a
number of ways this control feature can be incorpo­
rated into the closing circuit logic and a detailed de­
scription of guard relay operation as employed by the
C E G B is given in Section 7 of this chapter. In brief,
the guard relay has two coils, both of which control
relay operation. At 3.3/11 kV, only one coü is ener­
gised and this operates the relay allowing closing circuit
operation if the close signal is correctly inhiated.
However, if the close signal is prematurely initiated,
this energises the second relay coil which de-energises
the relay thus preventing closing circuit operation. This
also causes the 'synchroniser locked out' indication to
be displayed on the synchronising trolley. The control
selector switch must be switched to the ' o f f position
to reset the relay.
5.3 Check synchronising relay
This, as mentioned earher, is a device for checking
that the voltage, phase and, when required, slip fre­
quency of the two supphes being manually synchro­
nised are within preset limits. Figure 12.12 shows a
typical check synchronising relay.
The relay is connected into the switch closing circuit
in series with the discrepancy control switch. Initiation
of switch closure via the interposing relay is permitted
by the check synchronising relay output contacts if
the above measurements are within preset limits, other­
wise the closing signal is inhibited.
Check synchronising relays have been available for
many years. Fohowing various stages of development,
in which electronic circuitry superseded electromechani­
cal means, present day units are compact static devices
(except for the output relay) and are virtually main­
tenance free. Several types of relay are available, offer­
ing one or more measuring functions. All include phase
measurement, with the addition of slip frequency and
voltage measurements, if required by the user. The
C E G B specifies a unit having all three functions, with
 Synchronising equipment

0 SKD (S)
SK D11XX1C
NO.090789N
% V i V2 ~ K1
90 1.3
87.5 2.9
85 4.0
82.5 5.2
80 6.6

/θ 20°
Vn 63.5/110V~ 50Hz
RaAYUNEARTHBI
NIBMALLY Vx 50 V -
BOUITEI
t K2
2 sec 2.7
3 5.3
4 6.6
5 74
6 8.0
10 9.1

Θ 0

FIG. 12.12 Typical check synchronising relay

external connections to by-pass slip frequency mea­
surement for generator synchronising. The slip feature,
as later described, is only intended for the measure­
ment of the small slip frequencies associated with sys­
tem synchronising. Undervoltage is the only vohage
condition specified to prevent closing. As a precaution
against malfunction, electrical isolation is required
between both A C inputs, the D C power supply in­
put and the output terminals. Isolating transformers
are normally fitted at the A C input and an electro­
mechanical relay indicates the check synchronising re­
lay output. The relay contacts must be capable of
switching the load of the interposing relay over a
minimum of two thousand operations. A simplified
block diagram of a check synchronising relay is shown
in Fig 12.13.
5.3.1 Phase m e a s u r e m e n t
One of the simplest ways of determining phase angle
is to compare the voltage envelope produced by the
modulated beat waveform with a D C reference voltage
(Fig 12.14 (a)).
A permissive output is obtained when the voltage
waveform is less than the D C reference. The phase
setting is determined by the magnitude of the D C
reference. The intersection between the two voltages
is symmetrical about the phase coincident poshion.
The actual angle over which synchronising can occur
is therefore twice the setting value Θ, extending from
where one voltage is the setting value in advance of
the other to the setting value where the voltage posi­
tions are reversed. The effect of minor variations in
supply vohage may be almost eliminated by arranging
that the D C reference is proportional to the scalar
sum of the two supphes.
Performance is further improved if the voltage
envelope is full wave rectified. This assists the smooth­
ing by effectively d o u b h n g the high frequency com­
ponent as shown in Fig 12.14 (b).
A phase angle setting of 20° (elec) is used for all
power station applications and also normally at trans­
mission stations. A setting accuracy of - 2 ° -1-0° (elec)
is specified, although better t h a n this is normahy
obtained. The total variation from the actual setting
under all combinations of specified variations in A C

967
Synchronising C h a p t e r 12

ADD
D.C. REFERENCE VOLTAGE

110V
COMPARATOR
VOLTAGE AND
DETECTOR GATE INTEGRATING
AMPLIFIER
63.5V

ANGLE
SUBTRACT
RECTIFY SET^
Θ DRIVE UNIT

63.5V

0
110V
K2 ^ LINK TO
TIMER INCLUDE
K1 TIMER
VOLTAGE
LOCKOUT

OUTPUT
STABILISED RELAY
POWER SUPPLY OUTPUT
TO ALL MODULES CONTACTS

48V D.C.

FIG. 12.13 Simplified block diagram of a typical check synchronising relay

DC R E F E R E N C E LEVEL allow the permitted closing angle to exceed the phase

angle setting.

5.3.2 Slip f r e q u e n c y m e a s u r e m e n t

Slip frequency can be measured by determining the

PHASE C O I N C I D E N C E
(a) Modulated beat waveform
DC R E F E R E N C E LEVEL
-θ-
phase angle traversed in a defined period. If the phase
angle is already measured as described, the slip mea­
surement can be readily obtained by arranging for the
output to drive an accurately calibrated timer.
With this method of shp measurement, it is con­
venient to present slip settings in terms of time. The
relationship between timer setting (t), phase angle set­
ting (Θ) and shp frequency ( f s ) is t = ( 0 / 1 8 0 ) / f s
seconds. For example, w h h a phase setting of 20° (elec)

ílfTíríιrtlH
(b) Full wave rectified modulated beat waveform
FIG. 12.14 Phase measurement
synchronising supphes, D C power supply and ambient
temperature must not exceed ± 2 ° (elec) and must not
and a slip frequency limh of 0.028 H z (10° (elec)/s)
this gives a timer setting of 4 s.
The limitation with this m e t h o d of slip measure­
ment is that time is taken t o measure the slip frequency
when the phase is within the phase angle setting.
Therefore this method of shp measurement is only
suitable for the measurement of small slip frequencies.
For example, with a shp setting of 2 seconds (0.055 Hz)
and slip frequency of 0.04 H z , an angle of approx 29°
(elec) is traversed before synchronising is permitted,
as shown in Fig 12.15.

968

PHASE
COINCIDENCE
SYNCHRONISING SYNCHRONISING
PERMITTED OVER
INHIBITED OVER
29° (ELEC) ANGLE 11° (ELEC) ANGLE
PHASE ANGLE SETTING 2 0 ° (ELEC)
FIG. 1 2 . 1 5 Limitation of slip frequency measurement
Besides resulting in a sizeable phase error, the time
available for initiating switch closure is less t h a n one
second (as indicated to the operator by the 'check
synch monitor' lamp, where fitted). This period is
unhkely to be adequate for the operator to respond
and therefore this method of shp measurement is un­
suitable for generator synchronising with load pick-up.
The swhch closing time has to be considered when
selecting the shp frequency setting. If switch closure
is initiated when the phase displacement is increasing
at a position corresponding to the phase angle setting,
the phase error will be greater than this value by an
amount equal to the advance angle when the switch
main contacts close. The maximum acceptable slip for
system synchronising is 0.055 H z (20° (elec)/s). Using
this value as an example, with a switch closing time
of 300 ms the cumulative phase error under these
conditions (with a phase setting of 20° (elec)) is 26°
(elec). To reduce this additional error, a requirement
has been introduced that the time taken to traverse the
phase angle setting must he greater than 10 times the
switch closing time or 2 seconds, whichever is the
greater. Therefore, in the example above with a switch
closing time of 300 ms, the minimum timer setting is
3 seconds. This setting corresponds to a maximum
slip frequency h m h of 0.037 Hz (13° (elec)/s) and the
cumulative phase error is reduced to approximately
24° (elec).
To span the range of swhch closing times, adjust­
able timer settings between 2 seconds (0.055 Hz) and
10 seconds (0.011 Hz) are specified. These settings are
adjustable either continuously or in one second stages
up to 6 seconds (0.018 Hz) with n o intermediate steps
then before the 10 seconds (0.011 Hz) setting. Accu­
racy of slip measurement is better than ±5%.
There is a further requirement that at least 2 seconds
must elapse between the application of the 'incoming'
and 'running' supphes to the relay and an output be­
ing given. This ensures that slip frequency is correctly
measured, particularly if it is greater than the maxi­
Synchronising equipment
m u m acceptable value. W h h slip measurement as de­
scribed, this time delay is automatically provided by
the slip measurement timer; otherwise, a separate timer
is incorporated, having an accuracy better than Η- 2 0 %
- 0 % . This timer is also by-passed for generator
synchronising.
5.3.3 Voltage measurement
The undervoltage check facility inhibits synchronising
if ehher the incoming or the running vohage is less
than a preset percentage of nominal voltage. Accurate
voltage measurements can be made by separately com­
paring the two vohage inputs, after being rectified and
smoothed, w h h a stabilised D C reference vohage
obtained from the relay power supply. The magnitude
of this reference represents the nominal system voltage.
Vohage settings are adjustable either continuously or
in 2 . 5 % steps over the range 8 0 - 9 0 % of nominal sys­
tem voltage. For steam turbine-driven generators, the
normal setting is 8 5 % and for all other applications,
including transmission stations, the normal setting is
80%.
Using the above methods of measurement, check
synchronising relay operation can now be described.
On being switched into service, the incoming and
running voltages are measured and, assuming that both
are greater than the preset percentage hmit of nominal
system vohage, an output initiated by the phase mea­
surement circuit starts the slip frequency timer when
the phase is less t h a n the phase angle setting, i.e., the
vohage waveform is less than the D C reference. The
timer energises the output relay on completion of its
timing cycle provided the output from the phase
measurement circuh persists, i.e., the vohage waveform
has remained less than the D C reference. Energising
the output relay signals permission to close the switch.
5.4 Automatic synchronising relay
Automatic synchronising relays monitor the voltages
and frequencies of the incoming and running supplies
and give out signals which are used to control the
incoming voltage (or running voltage) and the incom­
ing frequency. The relay senses voltage and frequency
differences. On detecting differences the matching
circuits signal corrections, the voltage corrections being
signalled either prior to or simultaneously with frequen­
cy corrections. Once preset conditions are obtained, a
pulse signal is sent out to energise the interposing relay
which, in turn, closes the switch.
Early designs were electromechanical devices; one
example used electromagnets and springs similar to a
wattmetric element to produce restraining and operating
torques in an aluminium disc. When the operating
torque was apphed for a sufficiently long period, this
gradually wound-up a thread a r o u n d a grooved puhey
against the force of the spring until, eventually, the
relay contacts closed when the voltages were equal and
969
Synchronising Chapter 12

phase coincided. Development progressed with the
growing need for a higher degree of precision and
reliability resulting from the increase in size of gen­
erators being installed and the increasing trend towards
automation of power stations. This improvement
continued with the introduction of static circuitry until,
with present day relays, models with multifunction
specifications capable of operating over a wide voltage,
frequency and slip frequency range are available to suit
most user needs.
Figures 12.16 and 12.17 show a typical automatic
synchronising relay and hs associated simphfied block
diagram respectively.
The relay is designed to fail safe and duplication
of circuitry is extensively employed in order that com­
ponent failure is promptly detected. The malfunction
of any component prevents closure of the switch and
results in lockout of the synchroniser. Lockout is an
inhibit which, once initiated, remains operative until
the synchroniser is switched off. Other lockout features

O O O o O O O o O O
ASYNCHRONOUS VOLTAGE FREQUENCY RELAY UNIT POWER SUPPLY
DETECTOR DETECTOR DETECTOR

OUTPUT SIGNALS

RAISE W RUNNING INCOMING

SET MAXIMUM VOLTAGE LIVE LIVE
SLIP SET VOLTAGE I) LOWER Ä )
20 MISMATCH SET GOVERNOR ^SEQUENCE ^
PULSE WIDTH COMPLETE
OR UNIT
FAULTY

SECONDS PER PERCENT SET PAUSE W RAISE W AUXILIARY

CYCLE TIME 'Ν'ί'ΑΤΕ FREQUENCY LIVE
(2)P.T. CLOSURE LOWER®
+ 15V OV -15V
Θ Θ Θ Θ Θ

FIG. 12.16 Automatic synchronising relay

•SYNCHRONISER
LOCKOUT
INDICATION
VOLTAGE
MATCHING UNIT LOW VOLTAGE MONITOR
EXTERNAL
ADJUSTMENT - RAISE VOLTAGE
FOR VOLTAGE
ERROR LIMIT AND V,>VR INTERLOCKED
LOW VOLTAGE SIGNALS TO AVR
LOCK-OUT OR ONLOAD
TAP CHANGER
-LOWER VOLTAGE
INPUT
TRANSFORMERS
FREQUENCY
MATCHING UNIT
INCOMING INTERLOCKED
SUPPLY EXTERNAL LOGIC UNIT . SIGNALS TO
ADJUSTMENT FOR Γ PRIME MOVER
RUNNING PULSE SIGNAL (URGE SIGNAL OR LOW SLIP LOCK-OUT) (INCLUDING OUTPUT
RELAYS) SPEED GOVERNOR
SUPPLY TO SUIT GOVERNOR
CHARACTERISTICS -LOWER SPEED
7^

ASYNCHRONOUS DUPLICATE SIGNALS TO

POWER PHASE DETECTING INTERPOSING RELAY
SUPPLY UNIT
UNIT
EXTERNAL
ADJUSTMENT FOR
SWITCH CLOSING TIME
AND MAXIMUM SLIP
FREQUENCY
•SYNCHRONISING
COMPLETE-
INDICATION

FIG. 12.17 Simplified block diagram of a typical automatic synchronising relay

970

operate if either the incoming/running vohage or
frequency falls below a minimum value. The voltage
monitoring facihty is also used to monitor the auxiliary
power supply D C voltage.
Circuit interlocks are provided to prevent signals to
raise and lower voltage or frequency being dispatched
simuhaneously.
The accuracy to which the two voltages are matched
is finely controlled, adjustments covering the range 0
to ±10% of running voltage typically being provided.
The tolerance required on setting is ± 1 % of nominal
voltage, although better than this can be obtained.
The voltage error setting is normally 4 % (nominal).
The required synchronising method is selected by
means of external control options. To synchronise super-
synchronously, a continuous 'raise' signal to drive the
speed above synchronous rapidly, fohowed by pulsed
'lower' signals to control the speed for synchronising,
are sent to the governor. T o synchronise sub-synchro­
nously, a continuous 'lower' signal (if necessary) and
pulsed 'raise' signals are sent to the governor. Figure
12.18 shows the two control signals to the speed
governor.
The pulses, a maximum of one per slip cycle, are sent
out near the 180° point on the beat waveform.
The maximum slip frequency at which synchro­
nising can be carried out is adjustable, typical settings
of 4, 6, 8, 12 and 20 seconds per slip cycle being
available (whh an accuracy of ±10%), The slip fre­
quency setting is determined by the unit synchronising
requirements.
180° 180°
BEAT
WAVEFORM
PULSE CYCLE
PULSE
. SIGNAL
CONTINUOUS
. SIGNAL
t, = PULSE WIDTH
= PAUSE WIDTH
+ = PULSE CYCLE NOT TO SCALE
FIG. 12.18 Governor signals
Synchronising equipnient
If the slip frequency should become t o o slow or a
point is reached where the two supplies have identical
frequencies at a phase angle unacceptable for synchro­
nising, the frequency matching circuit would give no
further output signal unless one of the frequencies
drifted. T o overcome this problem, an urge circuh is
incorporated which sends a signal to the prime-mover
speed governor if a fixed time has elapsed, typically
20 seconds, since the last 'raise' or 'lower' instruction.
The urge circuit sends a pulse in the same sense as the
previous pulse.
With steam turbine-generators, this signal is adapted
into a minimum shp frequency setting to prevent motor­
ing. This is called 'low slip lockout' and is a fixed
setting. A typical value is 14 seconds per shp cycle.
T o synchronise a steam turbine-generator super-syn-
chronously, one speed control pulse must not produce
a frequency change or slip bandwidth ( f c ) greater than
the difference between the maximum slip frequency
( f s m a x ) and the minimum shp frequency ( f s m i n ) - If the
governor rate with a continuous pulse is ag, then the
pulse width selected must be less t h a n t i m a x = U/^g
seconds.
Example A steam turbine-generator is required to
be automatically synchronised with approximately 5 %
load pick-up and a low slip lockout of 14 s/shp cycle.
With a governor rate of 0.05 H z / s and speed droop
of 4%, determine the m a x i m u m slip setting and the
m a x i m u m governor pulse width. The maximum slip
settings avahable are 4, 6, 8, 12 and 20 s/slip cycle.
X 50 = 0.1 Hz
100 100
0.1 Hz = 10 s/slip cycle
If the m a x i m u m slip setting of 8 s/slip cycle is selected
from the range of settings available, the maximum
slip frequency is 0.125 H z
1
f. = 0.071 H z
14
so, fc = 0.125 - 0.071 = 0.054 Hz
The governor pulse width must be less than
0.054
tlr = 1.08 s
0.05
The signal pulse width is adjustable to cater for a
variety of governor rates, typically 0.1 to 2.0 s. The
recommended setting would be 0.8 times the maximum
pulse width, i.e., 0.86 s in this example.
Figure 12.19 shows an example of the modulated
beat waveform and governor pulse signals during syn­
chronising under the above conditions.
971
Synchronising C h a p t e r 12

(ω2)^ = (ωι)2 -F Iva

= 0.168Hz ζ = 0.125Hz f = 0.082Hz rearranging

(ω2)2 - (ωι)2
ν =
2α

where ο: = angle of rotation, radians

ωι = initial angular velocity, radians/s

CHANCE TO CHANCE TO SYNCHRONISE ω2 = final angular velocity, radians/s

SYNCHRONISE (IF FIRST CHANCE MISSED)
V = angular acceleration, radians/s^

angular acceleration ^ ^^te of change of

180° 180" 180° 180° now
frequency

angular velocity
= frequency
5.09s 7.14s 11.33s 27Γ

0.86s 0.86s 0.86s 0.86s

therefore, converting the equation to frequency:
7Γ ^ 9

FIG. 12.19 Beat waveform and governor pulse signals Rate of change of frequency = —(f2 - fi)
during synchronising

The maximum allowable rate of change in frequency is

The number of possible chances to close the switch
within the slip bandwidth can also be specified, al­
though this is normally not done by the C E G B . If it
is specified, one speed control pulse must not produce
a frequency change greater than:
brought about by a deceleration of the rotating shaft
from the maximum to the minimum slip frequency
setting over one beat cycle, i.e., a = 2τγ, This is also
the maximum allowable governor rate if the two are
to remain in step. Therefore:

(fsmax )^ ~ (fsmin )^
shp bandwidth ägmax
f e n =

number of chances to close switch

where fsmax = fi (neglecting the negative sign as
Example A p u m p e d - s t o r a g e g e n e r a t o r is to be fsmin = f2 this is a deceleration)
synchronised sub-synchronously in the generating m o d e
when a shp frequency of 1% is attained. If the re­
A governor rate less than the m a x i m u m allowable is
quired number of chances to close is 3 and the governor
recommended, i.e., recommended governor rate =
rate is 0.4 H z / s , determine the maximum pulse width.
0.8 X maximum allowable governor rate.
With pulsed signals, the governor rate is reduced in
Slip bandwidth = 50 χ 1% 0.5 Hz
proportion to the ratio of pulse width to pulse cycle.
0.5
fen = 0.17 Hz i.e., actual governor rate =

pulse width
Maximum pulse width timax = fcn/ag governor rate x
pulse cycle
= 0;17/0.4
= 0.425 s In this case, the actual governor rate is the recommend­
ed governor rate.
W h h large steam turbine-generators, the high inertia The minimum pause width can be calculated using
prevents the speed falling quickly and therefore the the above equations. A typical automatic synchroniser
minimum pause width, i.e., time between successive has adjustable pause widths between 0.5 to 10 s.
l o w e r ' pulses, is increased (instead of every beat cycle)
to prevent a large discrepancy arising between the Example A 660 M W steam turbine-generator has a
actual turbine-generator shaft speed and the governor governor rate of 0.1 H z / s . The m a x i m u m shp setting is
set point. 8 s/slip cycle with a low slip lockout of 14 s/slip cycle.
The equation for rotational motion w h h a constant With a pulse width of 0.2 s, determine the minimum
angular acceleration is given by: pause width setting.

972

_ (fsmax)^ (fsmin)^
igmax
2 lish open-circuit voltage and control of voltage (run­
(0.125)2 - (0.071)2
2 super synchronously within the fohowing operational
= 0.005 H z / s
Recommended = 0.8 X 0.005 = 0.004 H z / s
governor rate
Pulse cycle = pulse width χ
governor rate
recommended governor rate
= 0.2 X 0.1/0.004 = 5 s
Minimum = pulse cycle - pulse width
pause width
= 5 - 0.2 = 4.8 s
The switch close signal must only be sent out when both
supplies are within the specified limits. The phase angle
sensing elements, which initiate switch closure, are
therefore duplicated and the output contacts are con­
nected in the positive and negative sides of the inter­
posing relay. The required duration of the closing pulse
is for a period of < 0.55 s and > 1.0 s and is typical­
ly set at 0.75 s. The output contacts are rated to switch
the load of the interposing relay and its associated
wiring over many operations. The relay is a single-shot
device and therefore both elements must signal in step,
otherwise lockout facihties are initiated which remain
operative until re-primed. The relay can only be re-
primed by being switched off. This occurs a u t o m a ­
tically after successful operation of the relay.
The relay is set to the closest available setting to
the measured switch closing time during commission­
ing. A range of steps w h h 25 ms intervals between
50 ms and 500 ms is typically provided. In this respect,
it is important that the switch closing times are con­
sistent if the relay is to remain correctly matched.
Under these conditions, accuracy of synchronising with
a phase error less than 8° (elec) is specified. However,
better performance w h h a phase error less t h a n 5° (elec)
is normahy obtained. After synchronisation, the in­
coming and running vohages are disconnected and re­
mote indications are given out that synchronising is
complete and that the synchroniser is locked out.
5.4.1 S t e a m turbine-generator synchronising
Automatic synchronising relays for steam turbine-gen­
erators can be used for synchronising across genera­
tor voltage or transmission voltage circuit-breakers.
Steam turbine-generators are run-up and operated
either manually or under the supervision of an a u t o ­
Synchronising equipment
matic sequence control system. At a suitable point,
the automatic voltage regulator is switched in to estab­
ning) and speed is passed to the automatic synchroniser.
A u t o m a t i c synchronisation is required to be achieved
hmits:
Frequency range 47-51 Hz m any
Voltage range 85-1150/0 (nominal) combination
Voltage error setting 4% (nominal)
Maximum slip setting 0.2% above synchronous
Phase error 8° (elec)
Load pick-up 1-5% full-load
T h e voltage difference across the circuit-breaker is
reduced in steps by operation of the generator trans­
former on-load tapchanger until voltage matching bet­
ter t h a n 4% error setting is attained. With an initial
speed of between 46.5 H z ( - 7 % ) and 51.5 H z ( + 3%),
the governor set point is adjusted to cause the unit to
approach synchronous speed from a higher speed. The
action continues until the speed has fallen below the
m a x i m u m shp setting of 0 . 2 % . With a speed d r o o p of
4 % , this corresponds to a load pick-up within 1 - 5 %
of fuh-load. Provided these conditions d o not change,
the phase angle sensing elements at the first chance
initiate the closing of the switch at a point which wih
result in the main contacts closing with a phase error
less t h a n 8° (elec).
Lockout facilities operate if:
• Either incoming or running voltage drops below
8 5 % of nominal.
• T h e steam turbine-generator speed is n o longer fast,
i.e., a low slip condition which could result in the
generator motoring.
• C o m p o n e n t failure occurs.
• Synchronising is complete.
Indications of 'synchronising complete' or 'synchroniser
locked out' inform the operator of the end result. A
buzzer also sounds when the switch has closed.
5.4.2 Gas-turbine generator synchronising
Gas-turbine generators are run-up and operated under
the supervision of the automatic sequence control
system. The synchronising operation forms part of this
control sequence and the synchronising unit is auto­
matically switched in at a speed which will ensure that
synchronising can take place at the minimum speci­
fied system frequency, while permitting the speed to
be adjusted as rapidly as the machine and control
characteristics permit. Having taken control of voltage
and speed, the automatic synchroniser is required to
achieve synchronisation within the following opera­
tional limhs:
973
Synchronising
Frequency range 40-51 Hz ] in any
Voltage range 80-115% (nominal) J combination
Frequency fall 1 Hz every 25 s
Voltage fall \.5Vo (nominal) every 25 s
Voltage error setting
4^0 (nominal)
Maximum slip setting 1% below synchronous (unless other­
wise specified)
Phase error 8° (elec) normal, 16° (elec) permissible
Speed adjustment continues sub-synchronously until
the maximum shp setting of 1% is reached, while the
vohage is regulated by adjustment of the automatic
voltage regulator for emergency gas turbines (incom­
ing) or by adjustment of the generator transformer
on-load tap-changer (running) for peak lopping gas
turbines, unth the voltage difference is within the voh­
age error setting of 4 % . Providing these conditions
do not change, the phase angle sensing elements at the
first chance initiate the closing of the switch at a point
which will result in the main contacts closing with a
phase error less than 8° (elec). T o take account of
inherent variations in turbine governor characteristics,
which can cause some change of slip at the point of
synchronising as well as changes in D C auxiliary supply
voltage which can result in a variation in normal switch
closing time, a maximum phase error of 16° (elec) is
permissible.
If, for operational reasons, it is required to syn­
chronise the machine with the incoming supply fre­
quency greater than the running supply frequency, then
the synchroniser reduces the speed to within the maxi­
m u m slip setting value and synchronises the unit within
the voltage and phase error settings given.
Lockout facilities operate if:
• Either incoming or running voltage drops below
8 0 % of nominal.
• Any auxihary supply is absent.
• Component failure occurs.
• Synchronising is complete.
Indications of 'synchronising complete' and 'syn­
chroniser locked out' or 'synchroniser failed and locked
out' inform the operator of the outcome.
5.4.3 Diesel g e n e r a t o r s y n c h r o n i s i n g
Diesel generators are run-up and operated under the
supervision of an automatic sequence control system.
The automatic synchroniser is manually or automati­
cally switched-in as part of the control sequence, at a
speed at which the synchroniser can take over control
of voltage and speed and achieve synchronisation super-
synchronously within the fohowing operational limits:
Frequency range 47-51 Hz m any
Voltage range 85-1150/0 (nominal) combination
Voltage error setting 4<7o (nominal)
974
C h a p t e r 12
Maximum slip setting 0.2%
Phase angle error 8° (elec) normal, 16° (elec) permissible
Load pick-up \-5% full-load
Speed control is initiated after voltage matching has
been achieved. The voltage is regulated by adjustment
of the automatic voltage regulator for emergency diesel
generators until the voltage difference between the in­
coming and running voltage is within the voltage error
setting of 4 % . F r o m an initial speed of between 46.5 Hz
( - 7 % ) and 51.5 Hz ( + 3%), the governor set point
is adjusted to cause the unit to approach synchron­
ous speed from a higher speed. This action continues,
making further adjustments to voltage, if necessary,
until the speed has fallen just below the maximum slip
setting of 0 . 2 % . With a speed d r o o p of 4 % , this
corresponds to a load pick-up within 5 % of fuh-load.
Provided these conditions do not change, the phase
angle sensing elements at the first chance initiate the
closing of the swhch at a point which will resuh in
the main contacts closing with a phase error of 8° (elec).
As for gas turbines, to take account of inherent
variations in engine governor characteristics which can
cause some change of slip at the point of synchronising,
and changes in D C auxiliary supply voltage which can
result in a variation in normal switch closing time, a
maximum phase error of 16° (elec) is permissible.
Lockout facihties operate if:
• Either incoming or running vohage drops below 8 5 %
of nominal.
• The diesel generator speed is no longer fast.
• Component failure occurs.
• Synchronising is complete.
Indications of 'auto synch locked out' when a close
signal has been given and 'auto synch complete' when
the switch has closed, inform the operator of the end
results. A buzzer also sounds when the swhch has
closed.
6 Derivation of synchronising supplies
6.1 Secondary supplies
Synchronising is performed w h h incoming and running
supphes which simulate the primary circuit conditions.
These are obtained from vohage transformers (VTs)
and transferred to the synchronising equipment. Clear­
ly the secondary voltages must be derived in a manner
satisfactory for synchronising purposes. This requires
consideration of the selection of the supphes that are
measured and the degree of accuracy within which mea­
surements are m a d e .
The measuring circuits operate at a nominal voltage
of 63.5 V A C . The connections between the VTs and
synchronising equipment are direct wired (transducers
 Derivation of synchronising supplies

are used at transmission stations controlled by a tele­
control system, however, this is beyond the scope of
this chapter). Since this leaves frequency unchanged,
only the measurement of voltage and phase needs to
be considered.
Overall measurement to whhin an accuracy of 2 %
primary voltage and approximately 2° (elec) of phase
are obtained with correct circuit adjustment under
normal system conditions.
6.2 Selection of voltage transformer supplies
6.2.1 Single voltage supply
It is first necessary to consider a distribution switch in
the process of being commissioned which is about t o
be used to system synchronise for the first time. The
running supply is obtained from a voltage transformer
(VT) associated with a switch that has already been
commissioned w h h phase connections known to be
correct. The running supply can therefore be used as
a reference for checking the phase connections of the
incoming supply. Assume that three-phase VTs are
available, enabling the voltage magnitude on each phase
and the voltage difference across the three pairs of
corresponding phases (i.e., R-R B-B Y-Y) to be mea­
sured at secondary terminals.
The number of connection configurations for the
incoming supply is six. Only one of these is correct,
the other five being obtained by crossing the phases,
as tabulated below:
Incoming supply phasing
(1) R Y Β
(2) Β R Y T o meet the second requirement, VTs of the same
(3) Y Β R
(4) R Β Y T o obtain a proper and accurate measurement of the
(5) Β Y R primary voltage, voltage transformers are preferably
(6) Y R Β connected to the busbar immediately adjacent to the
The correct phase connections, as in (1), are confirmed
after the measurement of a vohage of equal magnitude
(approximately) on each phase and a voltage differ­
ence of zero (approximately) across the three pairs of
corresponding phases. In (2) and (3), the phase rotation
and installation which have escaped earher detection,
although it must be added that many prior steps are
taken to check that this does not happen. Once the
phasing out procedure described has been properly
carried out and the circuit commissioned, it is reason­
able to assume that the primary connections and the
direction in which prime-movers rotate will remain
unchanged. O n this basis, synchronising can safely be
performed using a single representative voltage supply
since, with balanced symmetrical three-phase supplies,
the synchronising measurements whl be identical for
ah three phases.
T o summarise, three-phase VT secondary supphes
are needed for commissioning tests to estabhsh that
the phase connections are correct. In certain instances,
it is necessary for commissioning tests to be carried
out using an adjacent circuit three-phase VT if the
circuit being commissioned has only a single-phase VT
installed. After it has been established that the phase
rotation and phase relationships are correct, each three-
phase system is represented for synchronising purposes
by a single supply voltage which may be either a single-
phase or hne voltage.
6.2.2 Incoming and running voltage
T o be able to synchronise using the secondary voltages
obtained from the incoming and running VTs, these,
as shown in Fig 12.20, must:
• Measure the same primary circuh vohage (e.g., red
phase or red/yellow hne voltage).
• Have the same primary/secondary voltage transfor­
mation ratios and angular displacements.
design and m a k e are usually provided for both incoming
and running supplies.
switch. This applies at the main generator circuit-
breaker and to the incoming supply at a switchboard
INCOMING VOLTS (V,) RUNNING VOLTS (Vr)
.RED

is correct but the phase relationship is wrong and, in

SECONDARY SECONDARY
(4) (5) and (6), both the phase rotation and phase INCOMING RUNNING
VOLTAGE υ VOLTAGE Η
relationship are wrong.
It can be seen that in addition to vohage magnitude
a minimum of two, and preferably three, voltage dif­
ference measurements are needed to system synchronise
correctly. The same applies w h h generator synchro­
nising, but here it is also possible, though not correct,
to synchronise with (2) and (3), the generator phase
NOT TO SCALE
identification, in effect, being rotated.
The purpose of commissioning tests, in part, is to
find any errors or mistakes in the design, manufacture FIG. 12.20 'Incoming* and 'running' secondary supplies

975
Synchronising
where the VT is positioned on the outboard or circuit
side of the switch. However, it is not normal practice
to obtain the running supply at a swhchboard (or
transmission substation) by connecting a VT to the
main busbars as it is considered that this would re­
duce busbar integrity by introducing a potential source
of failure. The running supply is therefore obtained
from a VT on the outboard side of a switch already
connected to the main busbars. Where several VTs
may be connected to the main busbar at the same
time, a voltage selection scheme is provided to choose
the running voltage.
Voltage selection schemes discriminate in favour
of the VT associated with the circuit allocated the
highest priority and also prevent the VT secondaries
from being paraheled. If the VT associated with the
circuit with the highest priority is open, the VT asso­
ciated with the circuit with second priority is selected,
and so on. Main incomers are normally allocated highest
priority, followed by interconnectors with generator
circuits last.
Vohage selection and repeat relays are used to
produce the required logic, the scheme being designed
to ensure that under all conditions of voltage selection
the required voltage accuracy at the synchronising
equipment is sthl obtained.
The different scheme arrangements for a 3.3 kV or
11 kV switchboard are set out in a series of standardised
drawings, a typical example being given in Fig 12.21.
This is for a switchboard with three incoming circuits.
From examination of the relay logic, it can be seen
that VT secondaries are connected to the RYB bus wires
in the priority order shown.
6.3 Measuremerit accuracy
6.3.1 Voltage transformers
Voltage transformers (VTs) are divided into different
classes of accuracy, with specified limits of percentage
voltage ratio error and phase displacement error for a
given range of operating conditions. The actual error
for a given accuracy class and under normal operating
conditions, is determined by the size and power factor
of the secondary load or burden. Burden is defined as
the value of the impedance of the external secondary
circuit, expressed in ohms (or in volt-amperes at rated
secondary voltage), at the relevant power factor.
Voltage transformers on most circuits are provided
for more than one purpose. These include supphes for
other voltage measuring and recording instruments,
e.g., busbar voltage and system frequency, metering,
protection, automatic voltage regulators, etc., as weh as
for synchronising equipment. The individual burdens
may vary over a wide range of volt-amperes and power
factors.
The VT class of accuracy required is determined
by the secondary supply with the highest accuracy
requirement.
976
C h a p t e r 12
For interchangeability reasons, dual rating VTs are
instahed for a number of applications, with more
than one VT per phase if needed to accommodate the
number of supphes required. These combine the dif­
ferent accuracy requirements for metering, measure­
ment, protection, etc., in one VT, the hmit of voltage
and phase error depending on the size of the output
burden and power factor for a given range of primary
vohage conditions. The requirements for a dual rated
50/150 VA unit with three hmits of accuracy are:
VA rating, power factor Voltage error, Phase displacement
and voltage range minutes
0-50 VA/0.8 pf lag ±0,2 ±10
0.8-1.2 p.u. rated primary
voltage
50-150 VA/0.8 pf lag ±1.0 ±40
0.8-1.2 p.u. rated primary
voltage
0-150 VA/0.8 pf lag ±3.0 ±120
0.05-0.8 p.u. rated primary
voltage and
1.2-1.9 p.u. rated primary voltage
The different VT secondary supplies are separated or
fused either individuahy or in small logical groups.
This approach is essential with capacitor VTs used at
transmission vohages, where h is not always possible to
obtain satisfactory discrimination with fuses in series
owing to the low short-circuit currents available. The
factors which determine the distribution of the sup­
phes are the importance, accuracy, burden requirements
and security against protection or equipment failure
due to loss of supply. W h h the exception of 3.3 kV and
11 kV switchgear, the supply distribution arrangements
are detailed on standard diagrams. A fused supply is
provided for the exclusive use of the synchronising
equipment.
6.3.2 Interposing voltage transformers
Voltage transformer accuracy is not the only source of
secondary voltage error. This also occurs due to lead
resistance (see Section 6.3.4 of this chapter). The sum
of these two errors in the incoming and running supply
will not be the same at the synchronising equipment,
particularly if the lengths of the connecting cables and
hence lead resistances are significantly different. Clearly
it is important for synchronising purposes that the
errors in the measured voltages are as small as prac­
ticable. However, there is a further reason why this
is important should the two supphes become electri­
cally connected. Although the direct interconnection
of VT secondaries is not permitted, w h h preventive
steps taken internally and externally to the synchro-
 Derivation of synchronising supplies

2nd PRIORITY 1st PRIORITY 3rd PRIORITY

Δ A Δ

i
- VOLTAGE TRANSFORMERS
A Β C
I< I< Li
Li)
Φ
-9
I
I I
0 6

POS POS POS

I I
6

LOC LOG LOG

0
I I
6

RB-3 RA-3

I 0 I
I I
I
0

RB/4

¿1 (
RA-1 RA-2 RB-1 RB-2 RC-1 RC-2
^ RELAY -¡RELAY i RELAY
JRA/3 5RB-4 I JRC/2
L_ J

RED
YELLOW
BLUE

FIG. 12.21 3.3 kV or 11 kV voltage selection schemes

nising equipment, there remains a smah risk that this secondary voltages would contribute to the load of
might occur through a fauh or sneak circuit. In this the transformer with the lower secondary voltage in
instance, the transformer with the higher of the two the same way that power transformers share load in

977
Synchronising
parallel. If the voltage difference is smah, this condition
would probably remain undetected during normal
service with fuse protection. Complications may arise
for protection, metering, etc., which may also involve
other circuits.
To reduce the voltage error in the incoming and
running supply, an interposing voltage transformer
(which also provides D C electrical isolation) is installed
between the VT secondary and the synchronising equip­
ment, as shown in Fig 12.22. Tappings are provided to
facilitate a certain amount of on-site voltage adjust­
ment. With nominal system voltage, each interposing
VT tapping is selected to indicate 63.5 V ± 1 % at the
synchronising equipment with the switch both open and
closed. With a voltage selection scheme this includes
each alternative source of running supply.
The interposing VTs have a ratio between primary
and secondary windings of 110/63.5 V (63.5/63.5 V at
transmission vohage) and have a minimum rating of 25
VA with a maximum limit of 50 VA, except at trans­
mission voltage where this is reduced to 36 VA. It is,
however, preferred that a single rating is used through­
out the synchronising scheme for interchangeabihty
reasons. Vohage adjustment is in steps of 0.5 V over
the range 0 to -1-5 V above rated secondary voltage.
The tappings may be divided between the primary and
secondary windings as convenient. The transformers
in general comply with BS3941 [2] accuracy Class 1.0;
i.e., percentage voltage error ± 1 % , phase displacement
±40 minutes, at any vohage between 8 0 % and 120%
of rated voltage and with burdens of between 2 5 %
and 100% of rated burden at a power factor of 0.8
lagging, except that the range of voltage error is between
5 % and 100% of rated burden at unity pf. To ensure
that saturation does not occur during over-vohage
conditions, the transformer knee point must not be
less than three times the rated voltage. As an additional
safety precaution, an earthed electrostatic screen is
fitted between the primary and secondary windings.
6.3.3 Burdens
To reduce the loading on the VTs and avoid undue
voltage drop in the connecting leads, the synchronising
equipment is required to have a low burden or VA
rating. At transmission voltage, the total burden im-
INTERPOSING INTERPOSING
VT VT
SYNCHRONISING
EQUIPMENT
MAIN VT MAIN VT
FIG. 12.22 Simplified arrangement of interposing
voltage transformers
978
C h a p t e r 12
posed on a main VT by the synchronising equipment
must not exceed 40 VA (this includes voltage selection
scheme relay burdens, etc.). Similarly, other devices
connected to the main VT are required to have a low
burden, due care being taken to ensure that the rated
burden is not exceeded for ah conditions of switching.
Typical maximum burdens under the worst condition
of operation that can be imposed on an interposing
VT are given below:
Manual synchronising
1 — Synchronising voltmeter, 0.5 VA
1 — Synchronising phase angle voltmeter, 0.5 VA
1 — Synchroscope, 5 VA (per supply)
1 — Check synchronising relay, 5 VA
(per supply)
Automatic synchronising
1 — Automatic synchronising relay, 5 VA
(per supply)
The above burdens may be exceeded provided that the
total burden from ah hems remains whhin the specified
maximum.
6.3.4 Lead r e s i s t a n c e
The principal effect of lead resistance is to reduce
the magnitude of the secondary voltage resulting in a
voltage error at the synchronising equipment.
With a single-phase transformer and a purely resistive
burden the voltage drop would be the product of the
lead loop resistance and the load current. In reality,
it also depends on the power factor of the synchro­
nising equipment burden which introduces a phase as
well as a voltage error. The calculation is complicated
further when applied to three-phase VTs and three-
phase groups of single-phase VTs connected in star, as
the burden across one pair of phases affects the errors
across the other two pairs of phases.
Multipair telephone type cable is used to transfer
the vohage supplies from the electrical auxiliary switch-
gear to the control r o o m . T o limit the voltage drop
produced by this type of cable which, due to its smah
conductor size, has a relatively high resistance, these
circuits operate at the main VT secondary voltage of
110 V A C . A c o m m o n set of interposing VTs is
employed for all circuits which are located inside the
synchronising trolley.
With generator and transmission voltage switchgear,
the interposing VTs are provided for each supply. These
are normally housed in cubicles located close to the
switchgear or in a protection equipment r o o m . Here,
multicore control cable is used which has a lower re­
sistance than multipair cable, the secondary circuits
to the control r o o m operating at 63.5 V A C .
The maximum lead loop resistance values per kilo­
meter for the two cable types normally concerned are
as follows:
 Derivation of synchronising supplies

Multipair cable 0.5 mm^ (1/0.8 mm) — 73.4 Ω to compensate for the reduction in circuit burden when
copper conductor (2000 m at 20°C) the synchroscope is switched off.
Multicore control 2.5 mm^ (7/0.67 mm) — 15.12 Ω
cable copper conductor (2000 m at 20°C)
6.4 Synchronising supplies
As an example, consider an interposing VT connected
to the synchronising trolley via an 8 0 0 m (loop) length 6.4.1 Steam turbine-generator
of multicore cable. The measured output voltage at the
Transmission voltage switchgear
transformer secondary terminals is 6 3 . 5 V A C with a
burden of 1 2 . 7 VA at a pf of 0 . 8 6 lagging. The per­ Voltage supplies are obtained from the transmission
centage vohage measurement error at the synchronising station. Single-phase VTs are installed, which are nor­
equipment would be as follows (see Fig 1 2 . 2 3 ) : mally capacitor VTs as these are more economic than
electromagnetic VTs. In accordance with C E G B Stand­
15.12 X 800 ard 99384 [3], present standard designs are to BS3941
RL = = 6.04 Ω and rated at not less than 100 VA with accuracy either
2000
Class 1 (vohage error ± 1 % , phase displacement ±40
minutes) or Class 3P (voltage error ±3%, phase dis­
Is 12.7/63.5 = 0.2 A
placement ±120 minutes) and cover the range of bur­
LRrcoso dens between 097o and 100% of rated burden, at a
% error X 100 power factor of 0.8 lagging. The incoming and running
Vt supphes are derived from the yehow phase to earth
primary voltage, in accordance with Engineering Re­
0.2 6.04 0.86
X 100 commendation SI5 Part 3 [4].
63.5

Generator voltage circuit-breaker

= 1.6%
The incoming supply for the generator voltage circuit-
where Vt voltage at interposing transformer se­ breaker is obtained from VTs installed in the main
condary terminals connections on the generator side of the switch. A
group of three single-phase units is required since the
Vs voltage at synchronising equipment
main connections are phase isolated. The VTs are of
terminals
the solid insulation type, individually mounted in metal­
Is load current clad enclosures, a set of four being installed on each
RL lead resistance phase. The VT windings are connected in star-star with
both neutrals earthed. The rated line to earth secondary
Although the voltage drop can be compensated for by vohage is 110/V3 V. The connection arrangement is
adjustment of the interposing VT t a p , as already de­ in accordance w h h C E G B Standard 994274 [5]. The
scribed this may introduce other difficulties with voltage transformers comply with ESI Standard 3 5 - 5 [6], which
selection schemes and where possible unduly long con­ generally specifies BS3941 except that the performance
nections are best avoided. In exceptional circumstances and testing requirements extend beyond the current
it may be necessary to parahel cable cores to reduce the British Standard. The ratings and hmits of accuracy are
voltage d r o p . as given in Section 6.3.1 of this chapter.
A high lead resistance may also necessitate the fitting The running supply is obtained from the genera­
of ballast resistors to the synchroscope o n / o f f switch tor transformer side of the generator vohage circuh-
breaker. This may be from transformers of the same
design and m a k e installed in a single bank in the main
connections, or from an additional winding in the inter­
connected star transformer used to earth the main
connections at this point (see Chapter 3, Section 2.5.5).

6.4.2 11 k V g a s - t u r b i n e g e n e r a t o r s

There are two options available for obtaining the

incoming supply: to use a VT at the 11 kV switchboard,
or to use the gas turbine VTs directly connected to the
generator terminals. The former, along with the running
NOT TO SCALE
supply, is obtained from the 11 kV switchboard as
described in Section 6.4.3 of this chapter. The latter are
sohd insulated single-phase units complying with ESI
FIG. 1 2 . 2 3 Voltage drop due to lead resistance Standard 3 5 - 6 [7] and m o u n t e d in metalclad enclo-

979
Synchronising
sures, forming a three-phase-connected bank. The rat­
ings and h m h s of accuracy are as given in Section 6.3.1
of this chapter, with the connection arrangement in
accordance with C E G B Standard 994274.
6.4.3 3.3 k V a n d 11 k V d i s t r i b u t i o n s w i t c h g e a r
Star-star connected VTs are located in the fixed, metal
enclosed portion of the switchboard on the outboard
or circuit side of each generator or distribution cir­
cuit-breaker. The transformers are of the dry-type de­
sign with ratios, ratings and accuracy complying with
BS3941. The VTs have a rated hne-to-line secondary
vohage of 110 V and a rating of 50 VA, accuracy class
0.2 (voltage error ± 0 . 2 % , phase displacement ± 1 0
minutes) when metering supplies are taken. Otherwise
a rating of 200 VA and accuracy class 1.0 (voltage
error ± 1 % , phase displacement ±40 minutes) is used.
Dual rating transformers may be supplied for this
purpose.
The yellow phase secondary is earthed. This pro­
vides two 110 V rated single-phase to earth supplies,
connection between red and blue phases not being
permitted. The burdens are divided between the two
supplies with the red to yellow phase supply always
selected for synchronising.
6.4.4 3.3 k V diesel g e n e r a t o r s
The incoming and running supplies are derived from
3.3 kV switchgear voltage transformers as described in
Section 6.4.3 of this chapter.
7 Synchronising schemes
7.1 Standard schemes
The schematic drawings for two standard synchro­
nising schemes are shown in Figs 12.24 and 12.25.
Figure 12.24 shows the manual synchronising scheme
for an 11 kV switchgear distribution circuh. Figure
12.25 shows the manual and automatic synchronising
scheme for a steam turbine-generator generator volt­
age circuh-breaker based on C E G B Standard 993610
[8].
The equipment in the schematics is shown in the
open, reset and de-energised condition, irrespective of
whether the equipment in normal operation is closed
or continuously energised.
The equipment is connected to 63.5 V A C , 110 V A C ,
110 V DC and 48 V D C and comphes with the re­
quirements of C E G B Specification U S / 1 2 / 5 0 [9] and
C E G B Specification U S / 7 6 / 1 0 [10]. Electronic equip­
ment comphes whh C E G B Specification EES (1980)
[11]. It should be noted that the schemes are designed
to be readily extendible.
Automatic synchronising relays and check synchro­
nising relays are C E G B approved. To obtain type ap­
980
C h a p t e r 12
proval, relay manufacturers must demonstrate that
the relays comply with the apphcable C E G B standards
by completing a series of type tests.
7.2 11 kV distribution circuit
The procedure for manual synchronising is as follows
(refer to Fig 12.24):
(a) Connect the synchronising trolley to the distribu­
tion switch synchronising circuits by inserting the
synchronising plug into the socket provided at the
Electrical Auxiharies Switchgear Control Panel.
(b) Select '3.3 kV/11 kV check operative' at the man­
ual synchronising control selector switch on the
synchronising trolley. This:
• Energises one coil of the GR relay.
• Closes the GR contact in the close interposing
relay coil circuit which now requires both the
discrepancy control switch contact and the SYN
contact to close to cause operation.
• Closes the GR contact in the G R A coil circuit
which now awaits SYN contact to cause op­
eration.
(c) Check that the voltage difference and phase angle
between the two supplies are satisfactory, using
the synchronising trohey instruments.
(d) The check synchronising relay confirms that con­
ditions are satisfactory by closing SYN contacts.
This:
• Energises the G R A relay.
• Opens the G R A contact in the second GR coil
circuit.
(e) Initiate switch closing by rotating the discrepancy
switch to the 'close' position. This energises the
close interposing relay coil. It is worth noting that
if the operator attempts to close the switch by op­
eration of the discrepancy switch when the per­
mitted synchronising conditions are absent, the
following will result:
• The second coil of GR will energise, causing GR
relay to d r o p off.
• GR contact in the close interposing relay coil
circuit will open.
• The 'synchroniser locked-out' indicator is dis­
played.
Lockout is now maintained until the energisation
of the second GR coil via the SYN contact is inter­
rupted, by selecting ' o f f at the manual synchro­
nising control selector switch.
 Synchronising schemes

INCOMING (V.T.)
MANUAL SYNCHRONISING
SELECTOR SWITCH
3.3 & I l k V

O INSERT ACTUAL

ñ
LU GRID VOLTAGE

OS BUSBAR (RUNNING) VOLTS

Ü OO 0

GR
-O O-
CHECK IN OUT
G17 SYNCHRONISING
RELAY (SYN)
SLIP FEATURE
SWITCH

CB.

running
OFF ON 331
VOLTS
-o I ώ ο -
-o I 9 ο­ 321 SYNCHROSCOPE
ι o-
INCOMING
OFF B R — VOLTS
O I m o - iHi:
' PHASE ANGLE
O I g I o- VOLTMETER
48V 48V
Θ 2| ^
SYNCHRONISER LOCKED OUT

INDICATOR LULU LJ_ > >

GUARD X X LJ- - ^ C ^
ÜÜ O 0
RELAY (GR)
•-0 ! . I I I I

3.3&I 11kV
I I I

Θ INSERT ACTUAL
GRID VOLTAGE
Ι
-O Ο­
GUARD RELAY
PISCREPANCY I AUXILIARY^GRA)
SWITCH -O I o-
LU U J LU
Z Z CO CO
LULU O O
ILO. ^ IJ CLOSE Z | S L U 1
CK- INTERPOSING i^i^ O O
I I I I RELAY ^^¿0

i-o d

POWER
SUPPLY

FIG. 1 2 . 2 4 Manual synchronising of an 11 kV distribution circuit

981
Synchronising
7.3 Steann turbine-generator — generator
voltage circuit-breaker
7.3.1 M a n u a l synchronising
The procedure for manual synchronising is as follows
(refer to Fig 12.25):
(a) Connect the synchronising trolley to the generator
synchronising circuits by inserting the synchronising
plug into the socket provided at the Unit Desk.
(b) Select ^Generator/Transmission' (e.g., 23.5 kV/400
kV) vohage at the manual synchronising control
selector switch on the synchronising trolley.
(c) Select 'Manual Synch' at the key-operated con­
trol selector switch 1. Key-operated control selec­
tor switch 2 is already set at 'Check Operative'.
This:
• Energises the GSY relay, which closes GSY-1
and GSY-2 to connect running and incoming
supphes to the synchroscope and voltmeters, and
closes GSY-3 and GSY-4 contacts on either side
of the close interposing relay coil.
• Energises the OR relay, which closes OR-1 and
OR-2 to connect running and incoming supplies
to the check synchronising relay, closes OR-3
which energises H C relay and opens OR-4, re­
moving SYN-2 contact by-pass.
• H C relay is now energised, which opens HC-1
and HC-2, disconnecting the running and incom­
ing supphes from the automatic synchronising
relay unit, closes HC-3 and HC-5 in the 'manual
synch' circuit on either side of the close inter­
posing relay coil and opens HC-4 and HC-6
in the 'auto synch' circuit on either side of the
close interposing relay coil.
• Energises one coil of GR relay, which opens
G R - 1 , disconnecting the 'check synch monitor'
lamp, closes GR-2 (which energises G A R relay
if the discrepancy control switch is prematurely
operated) and opens GR-3 in the SYN-2 contact
circuit.
(d) The governor set point (incoming frequency) and
generator transformer tap position (running volt­
age) are adjusted using the unit controls and the
synchronising trolley instruments until satisfactory
conditions are obtained.
(e) The check synchronising relay confirms that con­
ditions are satisfactory^by closing SYN contacts:
• SYN-1 energises the second coil of GR relay,
causing GR to drop off.
• GR-1 closes to illuminate the 'check synch moni­
tor' lamp.
982
C h a p t e r 12
• GR-2 opens.
• GR-3 closes which, with SYN-2 already closed,
completes the closing circuit except for the dis­
crepancy switch.
(f) Inhiate swhch closing by rotating the discrepan­
cy control switch 1 to the 'close' position. This
completes the circuit which energises the close in­
terposing relay coil I P C . Contact IPC-1 initiates
circuit-breaker closure.
(g) Key-operated control selector switch 1 is returned
to the 'off position which restores the circuitry
to the initial condition.
7.3.2 Automatic synchronising
(a) Select 'Auto Synch' at the key-operated control
selector switch 1, this:
• Energises the GSY relay, which closes GSY-1 and
GSY-2 to connect running and incoming supplies
to the automatic synchronising relay and closes
GSY-3 and GSY-4 contacts on either side of the
close interposing relay coil.
• Energises C relay, which closes C - 1 .
• Energises C A relay, which closes CA-1 (110 V
A C supply to the automatic synchronising relay).
• Energises N P relay, which closes NP-1 NP-2,
NP-3 and N P - 4 .
(b) Depress the 'auto synch start' button. This ener­
gises ST relay, which closes ST-1 (start hold) and
ST-2, ST-3 and ST-4 (speed and vohage control).
(c) The automatic synchronising relay signals that
conditions are satisfactory for synchronising. The
duplicate 'auto synch' contacts close and energise
the close interposing relay coil IPC.
(d) Contact IPC-1 initiates circuit-breaker closure.
(e) Key-operated control selector switch 1 is returned
to the ' o f f position, which restores the circuhry
to the initial condition.
7.4 Site comnnissioning tests
The following lists the test sequence for commissioning
a synchronising scheme. It is for guidance only and is
not intended to be a complete description of all the
testing that may be necessary:
(a) Wiring inspection and circuit/wiring diagram checks.
(b) If applicable, confirm that the correct number and
type of synchronising keys are available and that
any excess keys are removed from site.
 Synchronising schemes

C H E C K S Y N C H R O N I S I N G RELAY

DATA P R O C E S S I N G
I 2 I INPUT RELAY
L-^^^ (SYNCHRONISING
COMPLETE)

•TO D P S Y S T E M ( S )

EARTHING GENERATOR
TRANSFORMER VT
MAIN
CVT

MAIN GENERATOR

TRANSMISSION
SWITCH TRANIFORMER ^^SWÍTCH°"

4A (-0 _ 1A GSY-1 HC-1

—O o-
110V J
2A 1
J
GENERATOR
, , CA-1 AUTOMATIC SYNCHROSCOPE
EARTHING nU o_o- AND . SYN
TRANSFORMER VOLTMETERS ^ (20°)

SYNCHRONISER
(PART) ^

GSY-2 HC-2

OR-2
-o p-

FiG. 12.25 Manual and automatic synchronising of a generator voUage circuh-breaker for a steam-driven
turbine-generator

983
Synchronising
(c) Synchronising trohey instrument checks:
• That running and incoming vohs are correctly
displayed.
• That with either voltage removed, the synchro­
scope pointer drops away to at least 45° and
does not continue to rotate.
• That 'fast' and 'slow' directions of synchroscope
are correct.
• That phase angle is correctly displayed.
(d) Check synchronising relay checks:
• That the D C power supply is applied correctly
to the relay and that this supply is not used for
any other purpose.
• That the relay does not function w h h either A C
supply absent.
• Where applicable, set the relay to the required
time setting.
• Set under voltage lockout and prove operation.
• Prove correct phase angle operation.
(e) Prove primary circuit phase rotation and phase
relationship between voltage transformers.
(f) Prove that the incoming and running volts are
switched correctly to the synchronising equipment.
(g) By making the necessary temporary connections
and using a common injection voltage at the main
VT secondaries, prove that the incoming and run­
ning voltages at the synchronising equipment ter­
minals, using an instrument of known accuracy, are
63.5 V ± 1 % . If necessary adjust the interposing
transformer tap setting. Following hve synchro­
nisation checks with the switch closed, the voltages
at the equipment terminals should be rechecked
with the primary voltage at nominal value.
(h) Perform a number of live manual synchronising
tests with 'check operative' selected.
(i) Automatic synchronising relay (if applicable):
• Check that the auxiliary power supply is not used
for any other purpose.
• Select the required synchronising method.
• Voltage and speerf matching tests. Two variable
frequency and voltage sources are used to simu­
late the incoming and running supplies. In a series
of tests, the voltage and frequency are altered in
accordance with raise/lower signals. The voltage
differences at which signals cease/commence and
the slip frequency at which the 'switch close'
signals commence/cease are recorded.
984
C h a p t e r 12
• Phase angle error test. The test arrangement is
as above, except that the closing of each 'switch
close' signal output contact is recorded in such a
way that angular error can be determined.
• Prove lockout facilities.
• Check the range of speed governor pulse/pause
length.
• Check the switch closing signal pulse length.
• Check the VA loading on incoming, running and
auxiliary supply.
• Check remote indications.
• Check that the connections and switching from
the automatic synchronising relay to voltage and
frequency controls are correct.
• Adjust switch closing time, maximum slip fre­
quency, voltage error, low voltage lockout and
speed governor pulse/pause widths to the required
settings.
Note:
If the governor rate is not known, this can be
determined by measuring the voltage beat waveform
between the incoming and running voltages using a
UV recorder. Starting at about 47 Hz, a continuous
'raise' signal is applied to the speed governor (the
running frequency is assumed to be constant) which
produces a trace as shown in Fig 12.26.
The governor rate can be calculated from:
ag = 2(ti - t2)/tit2(ti+ t2) Hz/s
(j) Prior to live synchronising tests, 'dead bar' (i.e.,
with the switch electrically isolated) synchronising
tests may be carried out. A UV recorder is used to
monitor the beat waveform, switch close initiation
signal and a signal from the switch which indicates
when the primary contacts have closed. The unit
is run-up and the automatic synchronising relay
allowed to perform the synchronising operations.
F r o m the recording, the accuracy of closing the
switch can be determined as shown in Fig 12.27. If
the switch closing time ta is more than the setting
increment from the selected swhch closing time,
then the setting should be changed accordingly and
the test repeated.
(k) Finally live synchronising tests are carried out,
recording all necessary parameters including the
beat waveform and the switch initiation signal. A
number of synchronising operations are performed.
These tests are carried out with the generator
transformer tap at the lowest and highest position
with the incoming frequency at 47 and 51 H z ,
 Synchronising schemes

VOLTAGE BEAT WAVEFORM

Á
ft\

tl

NOT TO SCALE

FIG. 12.26 Determination of governor rate

followed by a test with the incoming and run­ by projecting the waveform to the position where
ning voltage and frequency set equal. F r o m the re­ phase coincidence would otherwise have occurred,
cordings obtained, the phase error can be checked as shown in Fig 12.28.

SWITCH
CLOSED
SWITCH
INITIATION-

BEAT WAVEFORM BEAT WAVEFORM

, > PHASE ERROR <

I PHASE ERROR

180° OUT OF PHASE PHASE

COINCIDENCE
PROJECTED
t^ = 180° θ = 1_80° xt2 PHASE
COINCIDENCE
NOT TO SCALE
NOT TO SCALE

FIG. 12.27 Dead bar synchronising FIG. 12.28 Live synchronising

985
Synchronising
8 References
[1] CEGB Design Memorandum 066/1: Application and control
of emergency gas turbine generating plant on new power
stations
[2] BS3941: Specification for voltage transformers: 1975
[3] CEGB Standard 99384: Standard circuit ratings, current trans
former and voltage transformer requirements for main plant
[4] Engineering recommendation SI5 Part 3: Basic diagrams for
voltage and current transformer secondary circuits
[5] CEGB Standard 994274: Standard circuit diagrams of generator
single-phase VT circuits
986
C h a p t e r 12
[6] ESI Standard 35-5: Generator voltage transformers for 500/
660 MW turbine-generators
[7] ESI Standard 35-6: Generator voltage transformers for gas
turbines
[8] CEGB Standard 993610: Standardisation of synchronising
equipment
[9] CEGB Specification US/12/50: General technical requirements
for ancillary electrical equipment
[10] CEGB Specification US/76/10: Instrument and control equip­
ment, general technical requirements
[11] CEGB Specification EES (1980): General specification for
electronic equipment
 SUBJECT INDEX
AC commutator motors, 626 conservators
AC converter drives low oil level, 904
variable-speed, 626-627 DC systems, 766
Access covers diesel generators, 792
portable earth testing, 796
isolated phase busbars, 310 fire fighting, 863
Access lighting, 599 lists, 820
cranes, 817 remote
Access platforms unintermptable power supply systems, 62
enclosures thermostats
isolated phase busbars, 313 gas production plant, 824
Access ways Alum dosing pumps
lighting, 593 water ü-eatment plant
Accommodation power distribution, 840
batteries, 757-760 Aluminium
telecommunications rooms, 652 cables, 435
Active failure rate conductors
power systems generator connections, 288
reliability evaluation, 92 power cable fittings, 533
Actuator drives electric motors, 629
low voltage switchgear generator main connections, 304
capability, 391 power cable fittings
Advance angle bolting, 535
synchronising preparation
definition, 950 termination connections, 535
Advanced gas-cooled reactors Aluminium hydroxide
auxiliaries systems, 16 additive
cables ethyl vinyl acetate, cables, fire performance, 526
segregation, 436 Ambient temperature
cabling, 430 cables
electric motors, 641-642 maximum operating temperature, 450
loss of grid supplies, 34 Ambulance services
Olympus gas turbines, 36 communication links, 650
oxygen, 821 Ammeters
station electrical systems switchgear, 373
analysis diagram, 152 low voltage, 405
computer reliability analysis, 166 Amplitude modulation
Air telecommunications, 680
circuit-breaker switching Analogue signals
Dinorwig, 345 control and instrumentation
Air admission valves cables, 476
pumped-storage plant Analysis
protection, 914 reliability
Air compressors power systems, control, 96
automatic operation Analysis parameters
fire fighting, 863 power systems
diesel generators, 784 computer reliability analysis, 161
electric motors, 858 Antennas, 684
electrical services, 858-861 coaxial cables
fire fighting, 863 characteristic impedance, 686
Air conditioning coupling equipment, 702
electrical services, 862 input impedances, 687
enclosures leaky feeders, 691
isolated phase busbars, 309 lighming protection, 705
Air heaters mounting arrangements, 687
electrical services, 862 power handling capability, 687
Air pipework radiating cables, 691
diesel generators, 784 radio frequency received power, 684
Air receivers radio paging systems, 667
diesel generators, 784 radio systems
testing, 795 pumped-storage power stations, 736
Aircraft obstmction lighting, 598 telecommunications, 684-696
Alarm bells typical arrangements, 689
power feeds vehicle, 714
cabling, 491 Anti-collision systems
Alarm signals cranes, 679, 816
siren systems, 722 Antimony trioxide
Alarms {see also Audible alarms; Emergency alarm signals; additive
Nuclear alarms) polyvinyl chloride, cables, fire performance, 526
battery chargers, 769,772 Arcing
control boards, 772 DC switchgear, 413

987
Subject Index

Arcing rate synthetic liquid filled, 267

electrostatic precipitators, 854 Average outage duration
Arcing time GRASP 1
fuses presentation of results, 111
definition, 412 power systems
Area grids reliability, quantitative evaluation, 90
control centres Average repair time
communication links, 650 power systems
Armour loss ratios reliability evaluation, 92
cables, 451 Avon gas-turbine generating set
Armour wire electrical auxiliaries systems, 35
cross-sectional area, 616
Asbestos Back to back starting
fire barriers, 548 pumped-storage plant
Ash protection, 911
handling plant Ball bearings
electrical services, 842-851 electric motors, 636
Ash hoppers Barring gear
mobile diesel generators, 782
electrical control, 848 protection, 793
Aspiration Battery chargers — see Chargers
diesel generators, 788 Batteries {see also Lead acid cells; Planté batteries;
Asynchronous generator synchronising, 952 Recombination cell batteries), 749-763
Asynchronous system synchronising, 952 accommodation, Ί5Ί-Ί60
Audible alarms ambient temperatures, 757
cabling, 491 boost charging, 761
Audible calling units, 721 control, 772
Audible warning systems, 652 capacity, 750
auxiliary telecommunications room, 653 cell life, 761
Auto loading charging, 750,760-763
diesel generators circuit monitoring, 769
performance tests, 797 connectors
Auto starting corrosion, 762
diesel generators containers, 750
performance tests, 797 failure, 762
Automatic controls corrosion
air compressors, 859 acid/air interface, 761
Automatic synchronising, 955, 957 current feedback
burdens, 978 control boards, 771
steam turbine-generators direct wire telephone systems, 722
generator voltage circuit-breakers, 982 discharge, 750
Automatic synchronising relays, 956,957,969 discharge rate, 750
Automatic voltage control electrical systems, 69-70
electrostatic precipitators, 854 electrolytes
Automatic voltage regulators contamination, 762
data emergency supply equipment, 749
load flow analysis, power systems, computer reliability fire fighting, 867
analysis, 145 ftilly charged, 750
stability analysis, 183 initial charge, 767
diesel generators, 791 inspection, 762
performance tests, 797 life, 763
testing, 796 limited voltage recharging, 761
generator transformers maintaining charge, 767
protection, 904 maintenance, 760-763
loss of grid supplies, 33 maintenance-free, 749
models negative plates, 750
stability analysis, 181 nickel-cadmium cells, 752
power systems on-site testing, 760-763
performance analysis, 179 pasted flat plate lead-acid cells, 751
stability analysis plate groups, 750
power systems, 180 plates, 750
system stability analysis, 184 positive plates, 750
Auxiliary electrical systems rating, 750
computer reliability analysis, 136 recombination cells, 752
Auxiliary power systems replacement, 763
fault levels, 326 sealed lead-acid, 752
voltages, 326 separators, 750
Auxiliary switches, 369 temperature, 750
Auxiliary systems terminals
protection, 920-943 corrosion, 762
Auxiliary Telecommunications Room, 652,653 tests, 760-763
Auxiliary transformers tubular plate lead-acid cells, 750
air-cooled, 264 types, 750-753
cast-resin insulation, 265 uncharacteristic behaviour of odd cells, 763
cooling, 263 unintermptable power supply systems, 60
design, 263 voltage, 749
insulation, 263 Battery rooms, 757
magnetising inrush currents, 269

988
 Subject Index

access, 760 circuits

lighting, 597 electrical isolation, 660
main connections, 757 communication links, 650
ventilation, 757 construction sites, 741
Battery systems, 763-766 national cable network
DC systems access, 658-660
tests, 763 telephone services, 660-662
duplication, 766 Bromotrifluoromethane
float charging, 760 fire fighting, 862
Beam clamps Building factor
cable support systems, 498 transformers
Bearings (see also Ball bearings; Frictionless bearings; Plain cores, 200
bearings; Rolling element bearings; Split-type roller Buildings
bearings; Tilting-pad bearings) lightning protection, 582
electric motors, 635-637 special considerations, 583
pumped-storage plant metal decking
protection, 911,914 lightning protection, 582
Bellows Busbar indices
insulation evaluation techniques
isolated phase busbars, 305 power systems, computer reliability analysis, 105
Bidirectional branches GRASP 1
power systems presentation of results, 111,112
computer reliability analysis, definition, 95 power systems
Black start computer reliability analysis, 113-115
electrical systems, 29 Busbars (see also Isolated phase busbars)
gas-turbine generators, 35 data
Blowdown air admission valves load flow analysis, power systems, computer reliability
pumped-storage plant analysis, 144
protection, 914 DC switchgear
Body proximity loss short-circuit withstand strength, 414
radiating cable, 693 earthing
Boiler feed pumps switchgear, 368
electric low voltage switchgear
switchgear, 38 short-circuit withstand strength, 391
electric motors, 640 materials
electrical systems, 39 generator main connections, testing, 315
Boiler feedwater phase angles
chemical-dosing plant system stability analysis, 184
electrical services, 836 PQ
Boiler houses load flow analysis, 123
cables, 506 protection, 930
Boiler make-up feedwater PV
treatment, 836 load flow analysis, 123
electrical services, 835 slack
Boilers load flow analysis, 124
circulating pumps power systems, computer reliability analysis, 147
protection, 878 switchgear
protection, 871-879 low voltage, 402
Bolting rated short-time current, 380
terminations types
power cable fittings, 535 load flow analysis, 123
Boost charging voltages
batteries, 761,762,767 system stability, 183
control, 772 system stability analysis, 184
Booster pumps Bushings
water treatment plant connections
power distribution, 839 transformers, 228
Brackets generator main connections
cable support systems, 496 testing, 314
Brakes
lifts, 819 Cl channels
Braking resistors surface mounting
loss of grid supplies, 33 cable support systems, 497
Braking systems Cab control
cranes, 811 cranes, 811
Branches Cable boxes
definition connections
power systems, computer reliability analysis, 95 transformers, 231
power systems Cable flats
computer reliability analysis, numbering, 94 lighting, 593
Brass Cable glands, 531-533
preparation bonding
termination connections, 536 earthing systems, 550
British Telecommunications pic construction, 531
cables, 659 design, 531
on-site duct routes, 659 earth bonding, 568
on-site requirements, 659 earthing bond connections
segregation, 659

989
Subject Index

sizes, 567 fire barriers, 540-550

installation, 533 fires, 545
sizing, 532 installation, 435,512-522,604
Cable interface loss reduced fire propagation, 523
radiating cable, 694 insulation
Cable network systems cables, 443
applications, 486 interference
design, 486 control and instrumentation, 476
jumpering, 482-494 layout, 435
Cable pulling linear heat detecting, 442
hand, 520 maximum route lengths, 618
installation, 519 maximum temperature
jamming, 520 ambient temperature, 450
motorised rollers, 521 mechanical performance, 444-447
running bond techniques, 521 multicore
winch, 520 interference, 480
Cable support systems interference, control and instrumentation, 480
application, 501 shaped solid aluminium conductors, 535
bridge and tower assemblies, 505 multicore PVC-insulated
design, 501 reactance, 609
ladder racks, 517 resistance, 609
Cable supports multipair
seismically qualified, 509 earthing networks, 566
Cable systems, 429-435 interference, control and instrumentation, 477
control and instrumentation paper insulation, 437
design, 480^82 performance
design, 601,603 fire conditions, 522-531
design and management techniques, 601-606 PVC-insulated
heat-detecting, 865 current ratings, 611
layout, 429^35,603 rating factors, 454
planning, 601 reactance, 608
Cables (see also Coaxial cables; Control cables; Earth bond reactor safety trip systems, 434
cables; Earth cables; Linear heat detecting cables; restraint, 512
Radiating cables; Short-timefireproofcables; Triaxial routing, 604
cables) safety
415 V, 441 nuclear power stations, 431
3.3 kV, 439-441 scheduling, 604
11 kV, 437^39 segregation, 429
accessories, 531-540 separation, 429
auxiliary systems short-time fireproof, 442,522
protection, 930 single
British Telecommunications pic, 659 fire tests, 523
bunched single-core, 438
fire performance, 523 fire performance, 524
buried direct in the ground in parallel, installation, 457
installation, 457,517 single-core elastomeric-insulated
thermal parameters, rating factors, 614 resistance, 608
thermal resistance, 452 sizes, 466
cable support systems, 494-512 steelwork
design, 494 cleating, 513
design and management, 603 telephones
carriers, 499 ducts, construction sites, 741
cleating thermal resistance, 451
design, 513 in free air, 452
concrete troughs toxic gas emissions
installation, 517 fire performance, 530
continuous operation tunnels, 502
current rating, 448 lighting, 593
contract management information, 604 types, 4 3 5 ^ 7
control and instrumentation, 476-^94 control and instrumentation, 476
corrosive gases voltage regulation, 464
fire performance, 529 Cabling, 427-622
current ratings control and instrumentation
permissible, 453 earthing, 569
DC power circuits, 441 gland bonding, 569
design, 442-443 electrolytic cells
design clearance, 604 hydrogen production, 825
ducts emergency alarm signals, 724
installation, 457,517 fire fighting, 866
thermal parameters, rating factors, 615 heating and ventilation, 862
thermal resistance, 453 lighting, 600
elastomeric-insulated low smoke
current ratings, 610 telephone systems, 663
electric motors on-site
starting, 463 future trends, 745
starting current, 463 private automatic exchanges, 661
starting times, 464 siren systems
electrical tests, 447 nuclear power stations, 732

990
 Subject Index

switchgear, 369 synchronising, 957

low voltage, 402 Check synchronising relays, 956,966
system design, 11 Chiller units
telecommunications electrical services, 862
on-site, 661-663 Chimneys
telephones aircraft obstmction lighting, 598
user distribution frames, 663 lighming protection, 578
total project information, 605 Chlorination plant
Cage induction motors, 624-625, 802 electrical systems
boiler feed pumps, 640 maintenance interlocking, 82
double-cage rotor, 625 lighting, 597
starting current, 624 Chlorosulphonated polyethylene mbber
stator windings, 624 cables
trislot rotor, 625 fires, 523
Cantilever arms Chokes
cable support systems, 502,516 battery chargers, 768
Capacitors gas production plant, 822
failure rates, 945 Circuit-breakers
generator main connections air break
testing, 315 feeder circuits, 467
Capacity motor circuits, 468
batteries, 749 closed/open state
Capstan effect indication, 373
transformers control, 331
performance, 216 DC, 414
Carbon dioxide definition, 334
storage plant design, 352-380
electrical services, 830 electrical interlocks, 361
uses, 821 fault levels
Cartridge fuselink station electrical systems, computer reliability analysis,
definition, 410 168,169
CEGB faults
corporate telephone network, 650 generators, protection, 905
Cell life first-pole-to-clear factor, 356
batteries, 761 generator voltage, 895
Central control equipment protection, 905
radio paging systems, 667 steam turbine-generators, synchronising, 982
Central control rooms steam-turbine-generators, synchronising supplies, 979
control panel synchronising, 961
power supplies, 724 generator voltage/HV
controllers protection, 905
emergency alarm signals, 723 low voltage, 405
lighting, 598 low voltage switchgear
supervisor's desk capability, 391
speech communication, 726 maintenance, 379
Central Electricity Generating Board — see CEGB moulded case
Certification fuuire trends, 422
switchgear, 334-340 operating mechanisms, 379
Charger output voltage phase-segregated generators
unintermptable power supply systems, 62 metalclad, 423
Chargers, rated short-circuit breaking current, 356
batteries, 69-70 rated short-circuit making current, 357
alarms, 769 reclosing
current feedback, control boards, 771 power systems, computer reliability analysis, 100
display, 772 stuck probability
electronic circuit boards, testing, 774 reliability evaluation, 93
fire fighting, 867 transmission voltage
low voltage detection, 769 synchronising, 962
on-site tests, 774 type tests, 336
output voltage, testing, 773 Circuits
performance tests, 773 data
power supplies, 768 load flow analysis, power systems, computer reliability
power supply, control boards, 772 analysis, 144
protection, 769 stabihty analysis, power systems, 180
routine tests, 774 Circulating pumps
soak tests, 774 boilers
supply voltage transients, 768 protection, 878
temperature rise tests, 773 Circulating water pumps
testing, 773 nuclear reactors
type testing, 773 electric motors, 645
visual checks, 773 Circulator main drive motors
equipment, 769 nuclear reactors, 642
ratings, 767 Cleating
Charging {see also Boost charging; Float charging) cables, 513
batteries, 750,760-763 Coal
Charging systems delivery, 842
duplication, 766 handling plant
Check inoperative electrical services, 842-851

991
Subject Index

Coal plant control rooms conductivity

electrical control, 844 high, protection, 882
Coal-fired boiler units polishing plant
electric motors, 640-641 electrical services, 836
Coal-fired power stations treatment
reference design electrical services, 835
electrical systems, system indices, 115 Condensers
Coaxial cables vacuum low
control and instrumentation, 476 proteaion, 881
Coded-key devices Conductors
switchgear, 361 aluminium
low voltage, 404 generator main connections, 304
Coding power cable fittings, 533
electrical systems cables
quality assurance, 45 electrical resistance, 451
Comité Consultatif International de Radio maximum temperature, 449
sequential single frequency code signalling, 683 temperature rise, 450
trunked radio systems, 675 connection to plant
Comité Consultatif International de Télégraphique et isolated phase busbars, 310
Téléphonique, 675 continuously-transposed
dual tone multi-frequency signalling, 683 transformer windings, construction, 208
Commissioning copper
cable systems, 601 power cable fittings, 534
earthing systems, 573 crimped terminations
network cable systems, 490 control cables, 537
Common mode failure expansion joints
diesel generators, 778 isolated phase busbars, 306
evaluation isolated phase busbars, 304
power systems, reliability evaluation, 92 joints
rate isolated phase busbars, 311-312
power systems, reliability evaluation, 93 painting
Communication systems isolated phase busbars, 309
commissioning, 651 power cables
maintenance, 651 terminations, 533-537
Component active failure switchgear
power systems rated short-time current, 380
reliability evaluation, 92 terminations
Component passive failure control cables, 537-539
power systems thermal parameters
reliability evaluation, 92 rating factors, 612,613
Components transformer windings
power systems continuously-transposed strips, construction, 208
computer reliability analysis, numbering, 94 windings
Composite error transformers, construction, 206
current transformers, 285 Connections
Compressed air HV/LV
starting system protection, 905
diesel generators, protection, 793 Connectors
Compressed air systems batteries
generator main connections corrosion, 762
testing, 315 Conservation
Compression fittings oil
power cables transformers, 227
copper conductors, 534 Conservators
Compressor rooms low oil level
lighting, 592 alamis, 904
Compressors {see also Air compressors) Construction sites
diesel generators electrical supplies
testing, 795 equipment, 414-421
generator main connections telecommunications, 741-744
testing, 315 telephone cable ducts, 741
hydrogen production Contactor gear
control, 827 mechanical plant, 805
Computer programs Contacto