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Hayden Captal APT Presentation
Hayden Captal APT Presentation
Hayden Captal APT Presentation
Hayden Capital
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Brands pay a 3 – 6% fee to Afterpay for this service (inclusive of processing fees). In return, brands realize the benefit of 1) higher conversion
rates, 2) larger order sizes, 3) lower return rates, 4) customer lead generation from Afterpay, 5) co-marketing with Afterpay, and 6) Afterpay takes
the customer credit risk with brands being paid upfront.
Afterpay Statistics:
For 2020 Fiscal Year (ended June 2020); Take-rate inclusive of late-fees and Paynow revenues
Active Merchants:
• Australia & New Zealand: 42,800
• United States: 11,500
• United Kingdom: 1,100
However starting in the 2000’s, credit card usage started to decline relative to debit cards…
Debit vs. Credit Card Transactions Declining Transaction Values, Driven By Debit Cards
From Nilson Report (LINK) From Reserve Bank of Australia (LINK)
Number of Credit Cards Owned by Age Group Debit + Cash Are Top Payment Methods for Millennials
From Experian and Shift Processing 73% of Millennials primarily use Debit Cards or Cash for their daily purchases (LINK)
Consumers pay 0% interest, with late-fees (if any) charged at a flat-rate (vs. compounding interest as with a credit card), and immediate service
shut-off in the case of a missed payment (so late-fees / the outstanding balance doesn’t escalate).
• Credit cards earn their profits off the consumer and earn more when balances are carried-forward and when consumers spend more. This
incentive is contradictory to the consumer’s best interest, as credit card companies want to maximize interest payments.
• Instead, BNPL products make their profits from the merchants. Merchants pay a higher fee (vs. credit cards processing fees), in return for
benefits like higher conversion rates, larger basket sizes, new customer traffic, etc.
• In this way, it’s a win-win-win for the merchant, customer, and BNPL provider.
BNPL Market Share in the US Why Don’t Millennials Own a Credit Card?
From Cardify Survey (LINK) Of Millennials who don’t have a credit card, ~61% is due to an aversion to debt (vs. not getting approved)
Afterpay Klarna
Business Model: BNPL Product: Klarna has 3 different products:
• Pay in 4 over 6 weeks 1. BNPL
• $10 late fee + additional $7 after one week late, • Pay in 4 over 6 weeks
aggregate capped at 25% of purchase value • $7 late fee
• 3 - 6% merchant fee • Up to 5.99% merchant fee
• Note: Unlike other competitors (such as Klarna) which perform 2. Financing
credit checks, Afterpay does not and instead relies upon their • Finance purchase over 3 - 36 months
own methods to mitigate risk (see later slides) • 0% - 29.99% APR for consumers (19.99% standard)
• Up to 3.29% merchant fee
3. Pay in 30
• Allows customers to order multiple items, and pay within 30 days for
only the items they keep (for example, order 10 dresses, return 9 of
them, and pay for just the 1 they keep)
• Up to 5.99% merchant fee
Gross Merchandise Value AUD $11.1 Billion ~USD $40 Billion
(GMV): (aggregate between the 3 products)
Revenue: AUD $519 Million ~USD $800 Million
Smaller
Active Players:
Customers: ZipCo, OpenPay, Sezzle, among many others…
9.9 million 85 million
(aggregate between the 3 products)
Active Merchants: 55,400 235,000
(aggregate between the 3 products)
Headquarters: Melbourne, Australia Stockholm, Sweden
Notable Investors: Publicly-listed on ASX, Tencent, Coatue, Matrix Partners Sequoia, Dragoneer, Silver Lake, GIC, Snoop Dogg, Blackrock
Anthony, then CIO at Guinness Peat Group and a former investment banker at Credit Suisse, would see Nick’s light also on late at night, and
one day approached him stating “Every time I’m working late at night, I see your light on, also working late at night.” That conversation struck
up a friendship.
Through Nick’s business, he could see the issues with ecommerce firsthand – low conversion rates (out of 100 visitors, only 3 would make a
purchase), and the shift among younger consumers towards debit for daily purchases (which meant it was harder to buy high-priced items).
Eventually this insight led the two to form Afterpay years later.
As the CIO of an investment holding company, Anthony introduced Afterpay to one of their portfolio holdings, Touchcorp, to handle the
payment processing. Afterpay merged with Touchcorp in 2017 (who by that time already owned a 26% stake in Afterpay), and concurrently
uplisted to the ASX where the shares trade today.
1. Afterpay Revenue: This is the main Buy Now Pay Later business, and comprises the vast majority of Afterpay’s revenues. Consumers
receive the service for free, and pay off their purchases over a 6-week period. Payments are then made in 2-week intervals across four
equal installments (at time of purchase, T+2 weeks, T+4 weeks, and T+6 weeks). Merchants integrate Afterpay into their item description
and checkout pages, and pay 3 – 6% of merchandise value.
– This comprises ~84% of total revenues.
– ~90% of transactions are paid with a debit card, which has lower processing fees than credit.
2. Late Fees (Other Income): Late fees are used to encourage customers to pay their outstanding balances on time. The terms differ by
country, however generally the late fee is $7 – 10 for a missed payment. The late fees in total (across all the installment periods) will not
exceed 25% of the order value.
– This comprises ~13% of total revenues.
– Late fees as a percent of revenues have been declining over time, and was ~21% and ~20% of revenues in 2017 and 2018
respectively. The decline is a function of more mature customer cohorts, who are familiar with the platform and loyal users (due to
the one-strike policy, “bad” customers have already been kicked off the service).
3. Pay Now Revenue: This is the legacy Touchcorp business. Touch provides services to other businesses, such as fraud protection,
compliance, data collection, customer identification, transaction integrity, and card payment solutions. Touch derives transaction fees for
these services, in the form of either a fixed fee or percentage of transaction volume.
– This comprises ~3% of total revenues. We expect Pay Now revenues to decline as a percentage of total revenues as the main
Afterpay BNPL business grows.
Fashion & beauty are “impulse” / “emotional” purchases (no one needs a new dress).
• This means the customer journey / shopping experience starts with “browsing / discovery”, as opposed to shopping with intent (knowing
exactly the item you want). As such, many transactions start on the Afterpay app, which then directs free traffic to brands that offer
Afterpay service.
• Other BNPL competitors need to compete on the item description page or check-out page, only after the customers know what item they
want to buy.
• Afterpay customers choose to pay with Afterpay first, then decide the exact item to purchase.
In fashion & beauty retail, there’s very much an element of FOMO – brands are constantly watching what competitors are doing. If competitors
offer Afterpay, you better have it too.
• We’ve heard from multiple brands that offering Afterpay has now become “table stakes” in the fashion industry.
This is exemplified further by Afterpay’s customer-generated fan groups across Social Media.
• Afterpay has hundreds of thousands of “fans” within Facebook groups, who chat about Afterpay’s new features, new brand partners,
provide technical support to each other (“how to use X feature”), etc.
• In the US, Afterpay has ~280K Instagram followers (LINK) vs. Klarna at just ~75K followers (LINK). Over time, we’ve found Instagram
followings to be a decent proxy for company’s brand loyalty and relative mind-share.
– Afterpay’s US follower base is also growing quicker, at +17K new followers per month vs. Klarna’s +2K per month
Afterpay Has 500K+ Fans Across Social Media Customers Use Afterpay up to ~25 Times per Year
Afterpay has the most devoted fans among all payments companies Afterpay’s Australia & New Zealand Customers
Asking its Fans Which Brands They Want on Afterpay 86% of Afterpay’s US Orders Are From Repeat Customers
Afterpay USA Instagram post from September 29, 2020 (LINK) In Australia, this is even higher at 98%
Despite there being +10 different competing BNPL providers in the market, brands want to only work with the largest and most reputable
BNPL providers. They also are more likely to go with who their competitors are using (i.e. FOMO).
• The request-for-proposal process is arduous, so why partner with the #4 player when you can get the #1 for a similar cost. Afterpay’s scale
also offers a larger customer base - since customers already have Afterpay accounts, there’s no additional friction of signing up. This
generates higher conversion rates / fewer abandoned baskets.
Customer Behavior Changes When Afterpay is Offered Brand Economics – With Afterpay vs. Without
From Afterpay 2020 Presentation and Management Consultant Survey Despite higher fees, brands make higher margins & profits with Afterpay
Non-Afterpay Afterpay Afterpay
Customer Customer Customer
(acquired via (acquired via (acquired via
In USD Facebook) Facebook) Afterpay app) Notes
Avera ge Order Va l ue $ 80.00 $ 100.00 $ 100.00 Afterpay AOV is ~US$100, Afterpay increases
x Gros s Ma rgi n 45% 45% 45% AOV by 25%
= Gros s Profi t $ 36.00 $ 45.00 $ 45.00
- Avg. Cos t per Acti on $ 10.98 $ 9.15 $ - Conversion is +20% of regular customer
- Tra ns a cti on Fee $ 1.20 $ 3.80 $ 3.80 1.5% for Non-Afterpay, 3.8% for Afterpay
= Profit per Order $23.82 $32.05 $41.20
memo: Profit Margin % 29.8% 32.1% 41.2%
memo: Incremental Profit $ $8.23 $9.15
Customers Have the Cash to Repay BNPL Balances Afterpay Outstanding Balance vs. Credit Cards
BNPL usage is a preference, not an act of desperation (LINK) From Afterpay 2020 Presentation
The company is very well-known in Australia & New Zealand, and is one of the most popular stocks among local investors. Despite that, there
is still controversy / edge available today, around the US business. (Note, this is also why this report is focused predominately on the US market.)
• Afterpay is reinvesting is all of its profits from the ANZ business, into the US market which they entered just two years ago.
• As such, our thesis (and source of future returns) comes from determining whether the company can replicate a similar level of success in
the US, as they have in Australia.
• With the US having 10x the population and similarly 11x the ecommerce market size (~$400BN), there is still ample appreciation potential
if we are correct.
Afterpay Memes Afterpay Australia is Highly Profitable
From Afterpay Obsession and #Afterpaytruth From Afterpay 2020 Presentation
$ 1,990
$ 1,541
$ 1,150
$ 515 $ 713
$0
13.3x
10.3x
7.7x
3.4x 4.8x
0.0x
On the competitive front, we don’t believe there will only be one winner in this market, given the “commoditized” nature of the product itself.
• Rather, like Visa vs. Mastercard, the market will consolidate to a handful of players. Thereafter, the relative popularity of the players will
likely be determined by who can cultivate customer payment habits first (and keep them addicted), and who can increase the number of
available merchants quickest.
• On this front, Afterpay’s data indicates that not only are its customers sticker vs. competitors (user retention), but also that the customers
who do find value in the service and remain customers, continue to transact more and more frequently. These customers eventually more
than compensate for the initial users who dropped off (net dollar retention >100% after 2 years).
• Part of this is because of the fashion & beauty category Afterpay’s chose to focus on. Out of all ecommerce categories, Fashion not only
has the highest online purchase propensity, but also the highest frequency of purchase per year (LINK). Higher purchase frequency builds
familiarity with Afterpay, and deeper in-grains the payment habit.
Afterpay US KPIs Are Outperforming ANZ Afterpay US Customers Are Stickier Than Competitors’
From Afterpay 2020 Presentation From Afterpay 2020 Presentation
• # of Orders per Customer: This is driven by a combination of customer maturity (experienced customers are familiar with how the
product works, and it becomes a part of their shopping habit), as well as the number of merchants who accept it (more merchant partners
= greater opportunity to use it)
• Avg. Order Size: This will likely remain constant going forward, unless Afterpay enters other higher AOV categories. This likely won’t
happen until they have already “won” and built up brand loyalty in the fashion & beauty markets. Note, this is already happening in
Australia, with Afterpay leveraging its brand into other categories, and only ~35% of total GMV coming from the fashion category.
• Take-Rate: Take-rates are a function of the average merchant size (the larger, well-known merchants have negotiating power to get the
lowest fee rate of 3% + co-marketing dollars). Smaller SME merchants are charged higher take-rates (up to 6%), and thus are twice as
profitable.
– In order to raise take-rates, Afterpay needs to get SMEs onboard which in turn requires industry-wide adoption from the large
brands (as mentioned previously, brands typically operate based on competitive FOMO). Essentially, large brands drive brand
awareness / are for marketing, while the profits come from the SME merchants.
“The Flywheel”:
More merchants = more use cases = customers & higher order frequency = FOMO by smaller merchants wanting a piece as Afterpay gains share in retail
payment transactions = more SME merchants = higher profits for Afterpay (which is reinvested into co-marketing) = more merchants. And the cycle repeats…
Klarna is Afterpay’s largest competitor both in the US and Globally. Klarna is still a private company, so US-specific merchant data is hard to
come by. However, we can use sites like SimilarTech to obtain an approximate, directional indication.
• As expected, Afterpay is winning in its Australian home market, while Klarna is winning in its European home market. (SimilarWeb also
corroborates this (Afterpay; Klarna)).
• In the US, Afterpay has +41% more merchants than Klarna (9,202 vs. Klarna’s 6,543).
– (Note, these figures differ from Afterpay’s US merchant count, since SimilarTech classifies it based on merchant headquarters, vs where a company actually
sells its products. For example, SHEIN is a Chinese fashion brand but has local websites / apps that sell globally).
Afterpay US Has More Merchants Than Klarna US Offering BNPL Options is Now Table-Stakes For Retailers
From SimilarTech (LINK) From PYMNTS Survey, LINK
“When PYMNTS and PayPal surveyed consumers, it was found that a primary factor motivating
most of them to shop with one merchant versus another is the availability and acceptance of their
preferred payment methods.
PYMNTS’ research suggests that 48 percent of consumers who prefer POS credit
(buy now, pay later options) would not buy from merchants that did not offer
it…
Banking Services: Afterpay announced just a few weeks ago (Oct. 20, 2020) that they are partnering with WestPac to allow Australian customers
to open Afterpay checking & savings accounts (LINK).
• Afterpay avoids needing a banking license, by partnering with WestPac’s 10x platform.
• The most exciting aspect of this, is that it has the potential to lower Afterpay’s cost basis by cutting out Visa & Mastercard (“the rails”),
with payments that can be transferred directly from customer accounts to merchant bank accounts. They already have a partnership with
Plaid and this would accelerate that initiative. This would be significant, as processing fees currently comprise ~26% of revenues.
• Additionally, Afterpay will be able to see transaction data for all purchases (not just those using Afterpay). This gives them insight into how
Afterpay customers are spending outside their sites, and they can use this information to better target new merchants, or sell these data-
insights as a service to its merchant customers (“what other stores do X company’s customers, also shop most frequently?”).
International Expansion: Afterpay acquired Pagantis (August 21, 2020) and Empatkali (August 26, 2020), which gives them a toe-hold in
Continental Europe and Asia.
• Both of these initiatives are still very early. Pagantis is approved to operate in Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, and soon Germany. Currently
Afterpay only operates in the United Kingdom in Europe, under the “ClearPay” brand.
• We have heard that Pagantis will close later this year, and then will take some time to integrate into the systems. The European expansion
likely won’t occur until the second half of 2021.
• Empatkali is a Singaporean BNPL company that operates in Indonesia. This was a small acquisition (~$2M USD), and from what we’ve
heard, was largely an “acqui-hire” for the team. The Asia roll-out, if it happens, will likely happen only after the Pagantis roll-out and will
focus on the “developed” markets of Hong Kong and Singapore where consumer habits are similar to Afterpay’s existing customer base
and have similar taste in brands.
Afterpay “Pulse” Rewards: This summer (July 2020), Afterpay announced the launch of a rewards program called Pulse in the US (will be rolled
out to other countries as well). Instead of rewarding customers who spend more (for example, 1 point per $1 spent), the Pulse program instead
incentives customers to make payments on-time.
• Pulse is an invite-only program. To be invited, users must make 30 on-time payments, on orders over +$40, over a 6-month period. This
translates to 10 purchases (the initial 25% payment doesn’t count), or at least $400 GMV every 6 months.
• Compared to the 4.8x purchases per year and $713 annual GMV for US customers currently, this program will hopefully encourage
customers to use the Afterpay payment option for even more purchases (and further build the habit).
• Customers who meet these requirements (you need to re-qualify every 6-months), get access to exclusive promotions / offers, the ability to
pay $0 up-front, reschedule upcoming payments, and use Afterpay for select retailers that currently aren’t official merchant partners (via
virtual gift cards).
• While rewards points aren’t a part of the program yet, one doesn’t have to imagine too much that this will eventually be a part of the Pulse
program (especially since the top reason – at 59% of users – for Millennials and Gen-Z to use credit cards is to earn rewards; LINK).
Some of these initiatives will undoubtedly fail, or need to pivot in the future. However what’s more important, is that it shows the aggressiveness and willingness of the
Afterpay team to try and experiment with new initiatives.
In today’s constantly changing world, only the most innovative companies will thrive. Innovation by definition requires trial-and-error, since it’s hard to know how
consumers will react until the initiative launches. These projects (and undoubtedly many more to come) are evidence that Afterpay has the DNA of an innovative firm.
We expect Afterpay to generate ~AUD $22 Billion in GMV (FY 2021E), realizing ~AUD $1 Billion in revenues and a ~4.6% take-rate (we
expect take-rates to decline slightly in the short-term, as the US business grows quicker than the more mature Australian business).
• Over the next 3 years, we are expecting the company to decelerate, but still grow at an impressive ~50 - 100% per year. This is largely
driven by the US market (which grew +330% in FY 2020). New merchant adoption is still strong, in-store roll-out just began a few
months ago, and purchase frequency will increase as the number of merchant partners & brand awareness grows (similar to what Australia
experienced a few years ago).
At our original purchase, this equates to a ~0.3x Price / GMV multiple. This is less than half the comparable multiple, versus mature
ecommerce companies (Afterpay is essentially a hybrid ecommerce + payments company).
• Additionally, Afterpay was experiencing an +80% growth differential (growing much quicker than mature ecommerce firms), while will also
generate similar margin profiles after its US investment phase is finished (Afterpay’s Australia market already has ~40% EBITDA margins).
The reason we were able to acquire shares at this price, is that the market was concerned about 1) loss ratios increasing during a downturn and 2)
growth slowing due merchant and customer adoption declining during a recession. Both of these proved false…
• Loss Ratios actually declined during the period from ~1% to ~0.7% in the FY 2H 2020 (Jan – June 2020). This was a result of Afterpay
dialing back some of its credit book / risk metrics, the quick turnover of its credit book (only 6 weeks) which enables Afterpay to react
quickly to changes, and the adjustment of Afterpay Australia’s loan terms from 8 weeks to 6 weeks (thus requiring a 25% initial payment) to
match the US.
• Additionally, we knew that merchant adoption was actually increasing via our conversations with brands, as these merchants 1) emphasized
online channels when their stores closed, and 2) were desperate for any tools that would enable higher revenues & more purchases from
online, as they sought to keep their business afloat.
Hayden’s Initial
Afterpay Investment
How will competition react in the United States (and other markets like Europe)? Klarna, Paypal, etc. certainly won’t stand-still as
Afterpay accelerates its market share. Will Afterpay be able to maintain its take-rate?
• Currently there is enough “white space” for players to focus on converting new merchants, rather “stealing” merchants from other players.
However this becomes a bigger risk as the market matures and the amount of “white space” available shrinks.
• So far Afterpay has been able to maintain its take-rate, even in most cases where it directly faces competition under-cutting them with lower
fees, during the RFP process. This is because the other benefits (lead generation, co-marketing, merchants realizing higher conversion,
AOVs, etc.) has been enough for merchants to justify the higher take-rate. But how does this change over time?
Can Afterpay successfully expand outside of its core Fashion & Beauty categories in the United States (in Australia it’s already done
so with fashion only ~35% of GMV)? Will it be able to roll-out in-store payment in the United States successfully?
• Doing so will expand the use-cases for the product, as well as increasing the purchase frequency & in-graining payment habits / mindshare.
Afterpay has been successful doing this in Australia, but will consumers respond similarly in the US?
• If not, what happens when the fashion & beauty online end-markets mature? Will Afterpay need to grow volume via new geographies, and
what “right to win” does it have in those markets?
How will this industry be regulated in 5 – 10 years? Especially in more regulation-heavy markets like Europe? How does this affect
Afterpay’s business model?
• Currently Afterpay has avoided regulation, due to the short-term and interest-free nature of the loans. This is due to the BNPL industry
being nascent and thus regulation hasn’t caught up yet. How does this change as the entire industry grows and attracts regulatory attention?
• Will the bad-actions of a competitor, attract scrutiny from regulators for the entire industry, despite Afterpay itself not being at fault? How
do you control / bear the consequences of your competitors?
• Can Afterpay work with regulators to find a mutually beneficial regulatory framework? Can Afterpay “shape the regulation” for the entire
BNPL ecosystem? Will new Australian regulation encourage retailers to pass on payment fees to the consumers?
What happens when Gen-Z matures? Will “Gen Alpha” (the kids of Millennials) have the same preferences as previous generations?
• Will they rebel, and want to use different tools than their parents? Will new technology / devices enable new payment methods?
Pratyush is the founder of Farrer Wealth, a financial advisor representing Families and HNW individuals based in Singapore.
Hayden Capital
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