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CHAPTER IV Now, philosophy is not concerned with the

meaningless sound, whether it be inarticulate or
articulate. Again, the sound which has meaning is
Being is the common name for all things which
either articulate or inarticulate. Thus, an inarticulate
are. It is divided into substance and accident.
sound which does have meaning is one such as the
Substance is the principal of these two, because it has
barking of dogs, because this sound, since it is the
existence in itself and not in another. Accident, on the
sound made by a dog, signifies the dog. It also signifies
other hand, is that which cannot exist in itself but is
the approach of some person. It is, however,
found in the substance. For the substance is a subject,
inarticulate, because it is not written. And so,
just as matter is of the things made out of it, whereas
philosophy is not concerned with this kind of sound
an accident is that which is found in the substance as in
either. Now, the articulate sound which has meaning is
a subject. Copper, for example, and wax are substance;
either universal or particular. Man, for example, is
but shape, form and colour are accidents. And a body is
universal, whereas Peter and Paul are particular. It is
a substance, whereas colour is an accident. For the
not with the particular term that philosophy is
body is certainly not in the colour; rather, the colour is
concerned; rather, philosophy is concerned with that
in the body. Nor is the soul in knowledge; rather,
sound which has meaning, is articulate, and is
knowledge is in the soul. Nor are the copper and wax
universal, or, in other words, common and predicated
in the shape; rather, the shape is in the wax and the
of several things.
copper. Neither is the body said to belong to the
colour; rather, the colour to the body. Nor does the wax
Again, such a term is either essential or non-
belong to the shape; rather, the shape to the wax. What
essential. Thus, that term is essential which signifies
is more, the colour and the knowledge and the shape
the essence, or, to be more precise, the nature, of
are subject to change, whereas the body and the soul
things. On the other hand, that is non-essential which
and the wax remain the same, because substance is not
signifies the accidents. For example: Man is a rational
subject to change. Also, the substance and the matter of
mortal animal. All of these terms are essential, for,
the body is just one thing, while there are many
should you remove one of them from the man, he
colours. Similarly, in the case of all others things, the
would no longer be a man. If you say that he is not an
subject is substance, whereas that which is found in the
animal, then, he is not a man. In the same way, if you
substance as in a subject is accident.
say that he is not mortal, then he is not a man, because
every man is at once animal, rational, and mortal. So, it
Now, substance is defined as follows: Substance
is for this reason that these are called ‘essential,’
is a thing which exists in itself and has no need of
namely, that they complete man’s nature, so that
another for its existence. Accident, however, is that
without them it is impossible for the man to be a man.
which cannot exist in itself, but has its existence in
And similarly with every individual thing, those
another. God, then, is substance, and so is every
elements which go to make up the nature are called
created thing. God, however, even though He is
essential. Non-essential, however, are the accidents
substance, is super-substantial. There are also
which can be or not be in the subject—in a man, say, or
substantial qualities about which we shall have
a horse, or some such other thing. Take the colour
something to say.
white, for instance. Whether one be white or black, one
is by no means any less a man.
CHAPTER V
Consequently, these and the like are non-essential,
Since it is our purpose to discuss every simple which is to say, they are accidents, and they or their
philosophical term, we must first of all know with what opposites may inhere in us. The essential term either
sort of terms it is that philosophy is concerned. So, we shows what a thing is or of what sort it is. Thus, for
begin our discussion with sound itself. A sound is example, when we are asked what a man is, we say
either meaningless or it has meaning. If it is that he is an animal. Then, when we are asked what
meaningless, then it signifies nothing; but if it has a sort of animal he is, we say a living and a mortal one.
meaning, then it signifies something. Then, again, a So, the essential term, which shows of what sort
meaningless sound is either articulate or inarticulate. something is, is called difference. That term which
Now, that sound which cannot be written is shows what something is either signifies several
inarticulate, whereas that which can be written is species, in which case it constitutes the genus, or it
articulate. Thus, for example, the sound made by a signifies several individuals differing from one another
stone or a piece of wood is an inarticulate and numerically but by no means specifically, in which
meaningless one, because it is not written and has no case it constitutes the species. An example of the
meaning. But such a sound, for example, as scindapsus former, that is to say, of genus, is substance. Substance
is meaningless, yet articulate; for it can be written, signifies both man and horse and ox, because each one
although it does not mean anything, because there of them is termed a substance and is such, although
never has been a scindapsus, nor is there any now.
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each one is a different species. An example of the
latter, that is to say, of species, is man, because this
term signifies several men, or, more exactly, all
numerically different men. Thus, Peter is one and Paul
is another, and they are not one but two. In species,
however, that is to say, in nature, they do not differ, for
all are called men and are such.
Consequently, there is that which is more
particular and is numerically different, as, for example,
Peter, an individual, a person, and a hypostasis. This
signifies a definite person. For, when we are asked who
this man is, we say that he is Peter. The term ‘other’
signifies the same thing, for Peter is one and Paul is
another. Likewise the terms ‘he,’ ‘this,’ and ‘that’—
these and such others as stand of themselves are
applied to the individual. But that which includes the
individuals is called species and is more general than
the individual, because it does include several
individuals. An example would be man, because this
term includes both Peter and Paul and all individual
men besides. This is what is called nature and
substance and form by the holy Fathers. Now, that
which includes several species is called genus, an
example of which is animal, for this includes man, ox,
and horse, and is more universal than the species.
Moreover, both species and genus were called nature
and form and substance by the holy Fathers.
Furthermore, the species— that is, the nature and the
substance and the form—does not produce something
which is ‘other’ or something which is ‘of another
sort,’ but rather ‘another’ of the same sort. Thus, we
may say that by nature man is one thing and the horse
another, but we may not say that they are one and
another of the same sort. Speaking specifically, one
says ‘this,’ and ‘it,’ and ‘that,’ and the like, all of which
declare in what something is. The specific difference,
however, constitutes something ‘of a different sort.’
Thus, the rational animal is a thing of one sort, while
the irrational animal is something of another sort. The
specific difference furthermore constitutes ‘such’ a
thing, and ‘what kind’ of a thing, and ‘what sort’ of a
thing. The non-essential term may be applied either to
one species or to several. If it applies to one, then it is
called a property. For example, the property of laughter
belongs to man alone and that of neighing to the horse
alone. If, however, it is to be found in several species,
then it is an accident. Take whiteness, for example.
This exists both in man and in the horse, and in the dog
and many other species.
Now, these are the five terms to which every
philosophical term may be reduced. Accordingly, we
must know what each one means and what they have in
common with one another and in what they differ.
They are genus, species, difference, property, and
accident.
Genus is that which is predicated—that is,
affirmed and expressed (for to be predicated is to be
affirmed in respect to something) —of several things
that are specifically different in respect to what
pertains to their essence. Species, on the other hand, is
that in which something is, but which is predicated of
several things that are numerically different. And
difference is that which is predicated of several things
specifically different in respect to their particular sort,
and it is included in the definition as essential. This is
that which cannot be and not be in the same species
and cannot not be in the species to which it belongs.
When present, it assures the existence of the species;
when absent, the species is destroyed. Also, it is
impossible for it and its opposite to be in the same
species. Thus, for example, the rational cannot not be
in man, because that which is irrational is not man.
When it is present, it constitutes the nature of man;
when it is absent, it destroys it, because that which is
irrational is not man. Now, one must know that this is
called essential, natural, constituent, and
distinguishing, and specific difference, essential
quality, and natural property of a nature. It is very
properly said by the philosophers to be a difference
which is presentative of the nature possessing it and
most proper to this nature itself. A property is that
which exists in one species and in the entire species,
and which is always in it and is conversely predicable
with it. Take, for example, the property of laughter.
Thus, every man can laugh and everything that can
laugh is a man. An accident is that in which something
is of a certain sort and which is predicated of several
things differing in species but which does not enter into
the definition. It can either be or not be, for, when
present, it does not assure the existence of the species,
and when it is absent, the species is not destroyed. It is
called a non-essential difference and quality. It is either
separable or inseparable. That accident is separable
which is sometimes present and sometimes absent in
the same hypostasis, as would be sitting, lying,
standing, sickness, or health. That, on the other hand, is
inseparable which is not constituent of a substance
because it is not found in the entire species, but which,
nevertheless, when it does become present in some
hypostasis, cannot be separated from it. Such, for
example, are the having of a snub nose, being hook-
nosed, being gray-haired, and the like. This inseparable
accident is called a characteristic peculiarity. This is
because such distinctiveness produces the hypostasis,
which is to say, the individual—and an individual is
that which subsists in itself of substance and accidents,
is numerically distinct from the others of the same
species, and does not signify what but whom. In the
following we shall, with God’s help, learn more
accurately about these things.