CASE TITLE: Caltex v.

Palomar TOPIC/S: Fundamental Rules of

DOCKET NO.: G.R. No. L-19650 Construction
CASE DATE: September 29, 1966 ASSIGNED STUDENT: Noleth
PONENTE: CASTRO, J. Cabral

FACTS:
• In 1960, Caltex had promotional scheme: Caltext Hooded Pump Context.
• Participants estimate the actual number of liters a gas will dispense during a specified
period. No fees or consideration, nor purchase of Caltex products were required.
• Foreseeing the extensive use of mails to publicize the promotional scheme, Caltex made
representations with the postal authorities to secure advanced clearance for mailing.
• Palomar, the acting Postmaster General, opined that the scheme falls within the purview of
The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law and declined to grant the requested
clearance.
• Caltex sought a reconsideration. Palomar maintained that if the contest was pursued, a
fraud order will be issued against Caltex. Thus, this case at bar.

ISSUE/S:
1. WON the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief.
2. WON the proposed contest violates “The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law.”

RULING:
1. Yes. The petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, since it qualifies for the
four requisites on invoking declaratory relief available to any person whose rights are affected by a
statute.
2. No. The promotional scheme does not violate the The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal
Law,” because it does not entail a lottery or gift enterprise.

RATIONALE/LAWS:
1. With Caltex’s bent to hold the contest and Palomar’s threat to issue a fraud order, there is an
ominous shadow of imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and
stabilized by a declaration relief.
• SECTION 1, RULE 66 of the old Rules of Court: “Declaratory relief is available to person
whose rights are affected by a statute, to determine any question of construction or
validity arising under the statute and for a declaration of rights thereunder.”
• Four requisites: (1) There must be a justiciable controversy, (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse, (3) the party seeking declaratory relief
must have a legal interest in the controversy, and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for
judicial determination.
2. Fundamental Rules of Construction: “Construction” is the process of discovering and
expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a
given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that
the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
• Is Caltex’s promotional scheme a lottery?
o Lottery extends to all schemes for the distribution of prize by chance. The three
essential elements of a lottery are: (1) consideration, (2) prize, and (3) chance.
o SC explained that the contest scheme is not a lottery but it appears to be more of a
gratuitous distribution. In here, no fees or consideration, nor purchase of Caltex
products were required to participate.
• Is Caltex’s promotional scheme a gift enterprise?
o Even if the term Gift Enterprise is not yet defined explicitly, there appears to be a
 consensus among lexicographers that the term is commonly applied to a sporting
artifice of under which goods are sold for their market value, but by way of
inducement to purchase the product, the purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.
o SC explained that the contest scheme does not sale of anything to which the chance
offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all
qualified contestant irrespective of whether or not they buy Caltex’s products.

3. In the end, SC ruled out that under the prohibitive provision of the Postal Law, gift enterprise
and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the
element of consideration. Finding NONE in the contest scheme, it was ruled out that Caltex may
not be denied the use of the mails for the purpose thereof.
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and ZAMBOWOOD MONTHLY EMPLOYEES UNION, ITS OFFICERS
AND MEMBERS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CARLITO A. EISMA, LT. COL. JACOB CARUNCHO, COMMANDING OFFICER,
ZAMBOANGA DISTRICT COMMAND, PC, AFP, and ZAMBOANGA WOOD PRODUCTS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-61236 January 31, 1984

Doctrine: "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction
and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them."

Facts:

1. National Fedaration of Labor(NFL) is a union of employees of respondent Zamboanga Wood

Products(Zamboanga).

2. NFL charged Zamboanga before the Ministry of Labor for underpayment of monthly living allowances.

3. NFL commenced a strike.

4. Zamboanga filed a complaint for damages before the Court of First Instance(CFI) because of the strike.

5. NFL filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that the Labor Arbiter has the exclusive
jurisdiction over the case, not the CFI.

Issue:

Whether the CFI or the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case.

WoN construction is needed

Ruling:

Labor Arbiter.

No.

Reason:

Since jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively

from the statutes of the forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute now in
force. The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130,
made clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction for damages would once again be vested in labor
arbiters.

CASE TITLE: Paat vs Court of Appeals ASSIGNED STUDENT:
G.R. NO.: 111107 Delalamon, Vincent Amadeus B.
CASE DATE: January 10, 1997
PONENTE: Torres, Jr., J.:

FACTS:

• On May 19, 1989, the truck of private respondent Victoria De Guzman was seized by the DENR
because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found
concealed in the truck.
• Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO)
issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15)
days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited.
• Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation
• On June 22, 1989, Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner
Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of
Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277.

Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To
Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations,
the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest
products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used
either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter.

• Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order
of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12,
1989.
• Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private
respondents' statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for
reconsideration would be denied then "this letter should be considered as an appeal to the
Secretary.
• Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was
filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan, which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck
to private respondents.
• Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court
contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
• The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated December 28, 1989. Their motion for
reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with
the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial court's order ruling that the question
involved is purely a legal question.
• On September 9, 1993 petitioners brought the case to SC with prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE(S):

Whether the Secretary of DENR and his representatives were empowered to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?

RULING:

YES, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated October 16, 1991
and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order
promulgated on September 27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is directed to
resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.

RATIONALE / LAWS:

It is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be
given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its
jurisdiction.

P.D. 705 Section 68-A as amended by Executive Order no. 277

Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order
Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the
Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products
illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land,
water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulations and policies on the matter.

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are
given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest
laws, rules and regulations. The phrase "to dispose of the same" is broad enough to cover the act of
forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government.
DISSENTING: (if required)

CONCURRING: (if required)

CASE TITLE: People of the Philippines vs. Mapa
DOCKET NO.: GR No. L-2230 ASSIGNED STUDENT:
CASE DATE: August 30, 1967 Delector, Joanna Geralyn
PONENTE: Fernando, J.

FACTS:

- Mapa Y Mapulong was accused of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56, and as further amended by
Republic Act No. 4 committed as follows:

• That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one
home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition,
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding
authorities. Contrary to law.
- On June 2, 1962, accused was appointed as the secret agent of the Governor of Batangas, Hon. Feliciano
Leviste. The Governor also directed him to proceed on a confidential mission in Manila, Pasay and Quezon
City.
- The lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime of illegal possession of firearms.
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to the Supreme Court.
- The accused admits and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the pistol found in his possession was
without license or permit.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from
the requirement of having a license of firearm

RULING:

NO. The judgment appealed from was affirmed. The secret agent is not exempt.

RATIONALE / LAWS:

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Only
those mentioned in the provision are accorded protection from the prohibition of carrying firearms. To the
exception, the law states that “firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers,
sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails,” are not
covered “when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties.” Secret agents are not included in the exception list of people who are
entitled to not have their guns registered. Because of this, Mapa’s carrying of his gun without the necessary
permits is illegal.

The relevant Statutory Construction here is: “Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.” Given that the law is adequate, the
court need not squabble over the what the law meant. No construction or interpretation is necessary.
DISSENTING: (if required)

CONCURRING: (if required)

Paras vs COMELEC
GR. 123169, November 4, 1996

Facts:

 Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won
during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay
was filed by the registered voters of the barangay.
 Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set
the recall election on November 13, 1995. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the
petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred
the recall election in view of petitioner's opposition.
 December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995.
To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining
order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed
the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for
contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval.
 January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election on January
13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction.
 January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the
Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition.
 Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place
within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13,
1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by
Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the recall election was valid.

RULING:

1. No, the recall election was not valid. It is a rule in Statutory Construction that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be considered together
and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective
local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather
than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase “regular
local election” to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a
recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that
the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be avoided under
which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.