Biosecurity

This article has multiple issues. Please help improve it or discuss these issues on the talk
page.
 It needs additional references or sources for verification. Tagged since February 2010.
 It needs to be expanded. Tagged since November 2008.

 It may require general cleanup to meet Wikipedia's quality standards. Tagged since
November 2008.

Biosecurity is a set of preventive measures designed to reduce the risk of transmission of

infectious diseases, quarantined pests, invasive alien species, living modified organisms. While
biosecurity does encompass the prevention of the intentional removal (theft) of biological
materials from research laboratories, this definition is narrower in scope than the
definition used by many experts, including the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization[1]. These preventative measures are a combination of systems and practices put
into its place at legitimate bioscience laboratories to prevent the use of dangerous
pathogens and toxins for malicious use, as well as by customs agents and agricultural and
natural resource managers to prevent the spread of these biological agents in natural and
managed. Reference no. 123
ecosystems<refname="sciencemag.org">http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/295/5552/44a
Meyerson and Reaser 2002, Science 295: 44</ref>. Although security is usually thought
of in terms of "Guards, Gates, and Guns", biosecurity encompasses much more than that
and requires the cooperation of scientists, technicians, policy makers, security engineers,
and law enforcement officials.

Components of a laboratory biosecurity program include:

 Physical security
 Personnel security
 Material control & accountability
 Transport security
 Information security
 Program management

Contents [hide]
 1 Animal Biosecurity
 2 Challenges in Biosecurity
 3 Biosecurity Incidents
 4 The Role of Education in Biosecurity
 5 Helpful References
 6 Conferences and related events
 7 Biosecurity Regulations
 8 Agents of Concern
 o 8.1 Human Agents
o 8.2 Zoonotic Agents
o 8.3 Animal Agents
o 8.4 Plant Agents
 9 Academic resources
 10 Notes

 11 See also

Animal Biosecurity

Animal biosecurity is the product of all actions undertaken by an entity to prevent

introduction of disease agents into a specific area. Animal biosecurity differs from
biosecurity which are measures taken to reduce the risk of infectious agent theft and
dispersal by means of bioterrorism[2]. Animal biosecurity is a comprehensive approach,
encompassing different means of prevention and containment. A critical element in
animal biosecurity, biocontainment, is the control of disease agents already present in a
particular area, and works to prevent novel transmissions [2]. Animal biosecurity may
protect organisms from infectious agents or noninfectious agents such as toxins or
pollutants, and can be executed in areas as large as a nation or as small as a local farm [3].

Animal biosecurity takes into account the epidemiological triad for disease occurrence:
the individual host, the disease, and the environment in contributing to disease
susceptibility. It aims to improve nonspecific immunity of the host to resist the
introduction of an agent, or limit the risk that an agent will be sustained in an
environment at adequate levels. Biocontainment, an element of animal biosecurity, works
to improve specific immunity towards already present pathogens[4].

Biosecurity means the prevention of the illicit use of pathogenic bioorganisms by

laboratory staff or others. Biosafty means the protection of laboratory staff from being
infected by pathogenic bioorganisms.

Challenges in Biosecurity

The destruction of the World Trade Center in Manhattan on September 11, 2001 by terrorists,
and subsequent wave of anthrax attacks on U.S. media and government outlets (both real
and hoax), led to increased attention on the risk of bioterror attacks in the United States.
Proposals for serious structural reforms, national and/or regional border controls, and a
single co-ordinated system of biohazard response abounded.

One of the major challenges in biosecurity is the increasing availability and accessibility
of potentially harmful technology.[5] Biomedical advances and the globalization of
scientific and technical expertise have made it possible to greatly improve public health.
However, there is also the risk that advances can lead to make biological weapons.[6]
The proliferation of high biosafety level laboratories around the world has many experts
worried about availability of targets for those that might interested in stealing dangerous
pathogens. Emerging and Re-emerging disease is also a serious biosecurity concern. The
recent growth in containment laboratories is often in response to emerging diseases,
many new containment lab's main focus is to find ways to control these diseases. By
strengthening national disease surveillance, prevention, control and response systems,
these labs are raising international public health to new heights.

emphasizes "long-term consequences of the

UNU/IAS Research into Biosecurity & Biosafety
development and use of biotechnology" and need for "an honest broker to create avenues
and forums to unlock the impasses."

Biosecurity Incidents
 1984 Rajneeshee religious cult attacks Dalles, Oregon

 Objective: Gain control of the Wasco County Court by affecting the

election
 Organism: Salmonella typhimurium, purchased from commercial supplier
 Dissemination: Restaurant salad bars
 751 illnesses, Early investigation by CDC suggested the event was a
naturally occurring outbreak. Cult member arrested on unrelated charge
confessed involvement with the event

 1990s Aum Shinrikyo attempts in Tokyo, Japan

 Objective: Fulfill apocalyptic prophecy

 Organisms: Bacillus anthracis (Vaccine strain), Clostridium botulinum
(Environmental isolate, Avirulent strain) Aum Shinrikyo ordered
Clostridium botulinum from a pharmaceutical company, and Ebola virus
(Attempted to acquire from Zaire outbreak under guise of an
“Humanitarian mission”)
 Dissemination: Aerosolization in Tokyo (B. anthracis and Botulinum
toxin)
 Leader Asahara was convicted of criminal activity

 2001 Anthrax attacks in the US

 1995—Larry Wayne Harris, a white supremacist, ordered 3 vials of Yersinia
pestis from the ATCC
 1995—Laboratory technician Diane Thompson removed Shigella dysenteriae
Type 2 from hospital’s collection and infected co-workers
 Professor Thomas Butler, United States, 2003

 30 vials of Yersinia pestis missing from lab (never recovered); Butler

served 19 months in jail
  Dr. Mario Jascalevich, New Jersey doctor, accused of poisoning 5 patients with
this plant-derived toxin - Tubocurarine: 1966
 Arnfinn Nesset, nursing home operator in Norway, killed 27 residents at a nursing
home with curacit: May 1977 – November 1980
 Dr. David Acer, Florida dentist, infects 6 patients with HIV, unclear if this was a
deliberate act: 1987–1990
 Dr. Ray W. Mettetal, Jr., a neurologist in Virginia, was found in possession of
ricin after arrest on another issue: 1995
 Debora Green, a physician, convicted of trying to murder her estranged husband
with ricin
 Richard Schmidt, a gastroenterologist in Louisiana, convicted of attempted
second degree murder for infecting nurse Janice Allen with HIV by injecting her
with blood from an AIDS patient: 1998
 Brian T. Stewart, a phlebotomist, sentenced to life in prison for deliberately
infecting his 11-month-old baby with HIV-infected blood to avoid child support
payments: 1999
 Physician reports theft of a vial of Mycobacterium tuberculosis: June 1999
 Japan 1964-1966, Dr. Mitsuru Suzuki was a physician with training in
bacteriology

 Objective: Revenge due to deep antagonism to what he perceived as a

prevailing seniority system
 Organisms: Shigella dysenteriae and Salmonella typhi
 Dissemination: Sponge cake, other food sources
 He was later implicated in 200 – 400 illnesses and 4 deaths
 Official investigation started after anonymous tip to Ministry of Health
and Welfare. He was charged, but was not convicted of any deaths

 Hospital in Dallas, TX, 1996, Diane Thompson was a clinical laboratory

technician

 Objective: Unclear, possibly revenge against former boyfriend and cover-

up by infecting co-workers
 Organism: Shigella dysenteriae Type 2, acquired from clinical laboratory
 Dissemination: Contaminated pastries in the office breakroom
 Infected 12 of her coworkers, She was arrested, convicted, 20 year
sentence

The Role of Education in Biosecurity

The advance of the life sciences and biotechnology has the potential to bring great
benefits to humankind through responding to societal challenges. However, it is also
possible that such advances could be exploited for hostile purposes, something evidenced
in a small number of incidents of bioterrorism, but more particularly by the series of
large-scale offensive biological warfare programmes carried out by major states in the
last century. Dealing with this challenge, which has been labelled the `dual-use` dilemma
requires a number of different activities such as those identified above as being require
for biosecurity. However, one of the essential ingredients in ensuring that the life
sciences continue to generate great benefits and do not become subject to misuse for
hostile purposes is a process of engagement between scientists and the security
community and the development of strong ethical and normative frameworks to
compliment legal and regulatory measures that are being developed by states.[7]

Helpful References
 Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Guidance

 WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 3rd edition, 2004

 Chapter 9 on Laboratory Biosecurity

 WHO/FAO/OIE joint guidance – Biorisk Management: Laboratory

Biosecurity Guidance, 2006
 CDC/NIH Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 5th
edition, 2007

 Extensive recommendations on biosecurity

 Laboratory Biosecurity Handbook, CRC Press, 2007

 Handbook of Applied Biosecurity for Life Science Laboratories, Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, 2009

 Training and Other Key Online Resources

 APBA: www.a-pba.org
 NIH/WHO TTT: beta.sandglass.com/asiapacific/index.html
 Biosecurity Engagement Program: www.BEPstate.net
 Sandia: www.biosecurity.sandia.gov

 USDA and pork producers

 US scientific societies

Conferences and related events

 Biosecuritycodes.org- A detailed list of past and future Biosecurity events dating
from 1928. Brought to you by the International Futures Program of the OECD. The site
is available in English and French with a limited Japanese version.
 MOP3 (Third Meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety) 13–17
March / Curitiba - Brazil
 BIOSAFETY and BIOSECURITY Training Course

 Fort Collins, CO

 Controlling Biorisks Course

  At Sandia National Labs, NM

Biosecurity Regulations

Biosecurity sign for use on a farm or agricultural area experiencing swine fever (Dutch
example).
 US Select Agent Regulations

 Facility registration if it possesses one of 81 Select Agents

 Facility must designate a Responsible Official
 Background checks for individuals with access to Select Agents
 Access controls for areas and containers that contain Select Agents
 Detailed inventory requirements for Select Agents
 Security, safety, and emergency response plans
 Safety and security training
 Regulation of transfers of Select Agents
 Extensive documentation and recordkeeping
 Safety and security inspections

 Biological Weapons Convention addresses three relevant issues:

 National Implementing Legislation

 National Pathogen Security (biosecurity)
 International Cooperation
 States Parties agree to pursue national implementation of laboratory and
transportation biosecurity (2003)

 UN 1540

 urges States to take preventative measures to mitigate the threat of WMD

proliferation by non-state actors
 “Take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to
prevent the proliferation of . . . biological weapons . . .; including by
establishing appropriate controls over related materials”

 European Commission Green Paper on Bio-Preparedness (November 2007)

  recommends developing European standards on laboratory biosecurity
including Physical protection, access controls, accountability of
pathogens, and registration of researchers

 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

 published “Best Practice Guidelines for Biological Resource Centers”

including a section on biosecurity in February 2007

 Kampala Compact (October 2005) and the Nairobi Announcement (July 2007)

 stress importance of implementing laboratory biosafety and biosecurity in

Africa

Agents of Concern

The following agents are deemed a biosecurity concern by the US Government through
the US Select Agent List. The list is divided between agents that can infect only humans,
zoonotic agents (which can infect both humans and animals), agents that can only infect
animals, and agents that can infect only plants.

Human Agents

(HHS SELECT AGENTS AND TOXINS)

 Abrin
 Cercopithecine herpesvirus 1 (Herpes B Virus)
 Coccidioides posadasii
 Conotoxins
 Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fevervirus
 Diacetoxyscirpenol
 Ebola virus
 Lassa fever virus
 Marburg virus
 Monkeypox virus
 Reconstructed replication competent forms of the 1918 pandemic influenza virus
containing any portion of the coding regions of all eight gene segments
(Reconstructed 1918 Influenza virus)
 Ricin
 Rickettsia prowazekii
 Rickettsia rickettsii
 Saxitoxin
 Shiga-like ribosome inactivating proteins
 South American Haemorrhagic Fever viruses

 Flexal Virus
  Guanarito virus
 Junin virus
 Machupo
 Sabia

 Tetrodotoxin
 Tick-borne encephalitis complex (flavi) viruses

 Central European Tick-borne encephalitis

 Far Eastern Tick-borne encephalitis
 Kyasanur Forest disease
 Omsk hemorrhagic fever
 Russian spring-summer encephalitis

 Variola major virus (Smallpox virus) and

 Variola minor virus (Alastrim)
 Yersinia pestis

Zoonotic Agents

(OVERLAP SELECT AGENTS AND TOXINS)

 Bacillus anthracis
 Botulinum neurotoxin
 Botulinum neurotoxin producing species of Clostridium
 Brucella abortus
 Brucella melitensis
 Brucella suis
 (formerly Pseudomonas mallei)
Burkholderia mallei
 (formerly Pseudomonas pseudomallei)
Burkholderia pseudomallei
 Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxin
 Coccidioides immitis
 Coxiella burnetii
 Eastern equine encephalitis virus
 Francisella tularensis
 Hendra virus
 Nipah virus
 Rift Valley fever virus
 Shiga toxin
 Staphylococcal enterotoxins
 T-2 toxin
 Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus

Animal Agents

(USDA SELECT AGENTS AND TOXINS)

  African horse sickness virus
 African swine fever virus
 Akabane virus
 Avian influenza virus (highly pathogenic)
 Bluetongue virus (Exotic)
 Bovine spongiform encephalopathy
 Camel pox virus
 Classical swine fever virus
 Cowdria ruminantium (Heartwater)
 Foot-and-mouth disease virus
 Goat pox virus
 Japanese encephalitis virus
 Lumpy skin disease virus
 Malignant catarrhal fever virus (Alcelaphine herpesvirus type 1)
 Menangle virus
 Mycoplasma capricolum/ M.F38/M. mycoides Capri (contagious caprine
pleuropneumonia)
 Mycoplasma mycoides mycoides (contagious bovine pleuropneumonia)
 Newcastle disease virus (velogenic)
 Peste des petits ruminants virus
 Rinderpest virus
 Sheep pox virus
 Swine vesicular disease virus
 Vesicular stomatitis virus (Exotic)

Plant Agents

(USDA PLANT PROTECTION AND QUARANTINE (PPQ) SELECT AGENTS AND

TOXINS)

 Candidatus Liberobacter africanus

 Candidatus Liberobacter asiaticus
 Peronosclerospora philippinensis
 Ralstonia solanacearum race 3, biovar. 2
 Sclerophthora rayssiae var. zeae
 Synchytrium endobioticum
 Xanthomonas oryzae pv. oryzicola
 Xylella fastidiosa (citrus variegated chlorosis strain)

Academic resources
 Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, ISSN
1538-7135, Mary Ann Lieber [8]
 Biosecurity Commons, a Wiki Database [1]
 "Dual-Use Biosecurity", a resource for normative material related to biosecurity
and dual use. [2]
Notes
1. ^ http://www.fao.org/biosecurity
2. ^ a b 1. Thomson, J. Biosecurity: preventing and controlling diseases in the beef herd.
Livestock Conservation Institute; 1991; 49-51.
3. ^ 5. Anderson, F. Biosecurity - a new term for an old concept: how to apply it. Bovine
Practitioner; 1998; 32:61-70.
4. ^ 8. Thomson, J. Biosecurity: preventing and controlling diseases in the beef herd. Livestock
Conservation Institute; 1991; 49-51.
5. ^ McClellan, Paul (27 March 2009). "Designer Plague". EDA Graffiti.
http://www.edn.com/blog/920000692/post/620041462.html. Retrieved 23 April 2009.
6. ^ [|The Institute of Medicine] (31 January 2006). "Globalization, Biosecurity, and the
Future of the Life Sciences". National Academies Press.
http://www.iom.edu/CMS/3783/17082/34042.aspx. Retrieved 23 April 2009.
7. ^ Bradford Project on Dual use/Biosecurity education http://www.bradford.ac.uk/bioethics/
8. ^ Mary Ann Liebert. "Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice,
and Science". http://www.liebertpub.com/Products/Product.aspx?
pid=111&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1. Retrieved 29 December 2008.

Biosecurity Commons [3]

See also
 Animal biosecurity  Heliciculture  Public toilet
 Animal farming  Human biosecurity  Plant biosecurity
 Beekeeping o Children o Crop
 Biosecurity Act 1993 biosecurity biosecurity
 Bioterrorism  Invasive species  Animal biosecurity
 Biorisk  Insect farming o Pet
 Food safety biosecurity
o Biosafety  Good Agricultural Practices  Quarantine
 List of government  Public health
biosecurity website  Biosecurity Australia
 United States Army
 Sericulture Medical Research
Institute of Infectious
Diseases
(USAMRIID)

 National Biodefense
Analysis and
Countermeasures
Center (NBACC)

This entry is from Wikipedia, the leading user-contributed encyclopedia. It may not have
been reviewed by professional editors (see full disclaimer)

Donate to Wikimedia

 
  
Related topics:
Life Technologies Corporation (Public Company)

Nanosphere Inc
Biosecurity protocol

Related answers:
NZ biosecurity and its organisations? Read answer...
What is the difference between biosecurity and biosafety? Read answer...

Help us answer these:

What does the biosecurity law save us from?
What is biosecurity and how does it affect on-property level quarantine?
What is a biosecurity program for a particular animal farm?

Post a question - any question - to the WikiAnswers community:

Copyrights:

Veterinary Dictionary. Saunders Comprehensive Veterinary Dictionary 3rd Edition. Copyri

2007 by D.C. Blood, V.P. Studdert and C.C. Gay, Elsevier. All rights reserved.  Read more
Wikipedia. This article is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike Lic
It uses material from the Wikipedia article Biosecurity.  Read more

Site
 Help | Sitemap
 ReferenceAnswers
 WikiAnswers
 VideoAnswers

Company
 About| Jobs
 Press Room
 Blog
 Investor Relations

Legal
  Terms of Use
 Privacy Policy
 IP Issues
 Disclaimer

Webmasters
 AnswerTips
 Widget Gallery
 Badges
 More…

Downloads
 1-Click Answers
 Browser Toolbar
 More…

Updates
 Email
 Watchlist
 RSS
 What's New

International Sites English Deutsch Español Français Italiano Tagalog

Copyright © 2010 Answers Corporation

ON FARM BIOSECURITY
José Barceló, Enric Marco,
B&M, C.V.P., Valldoreix, Barcelona, Spain
Introduction
Generically speaking biosegurity means “life security”. By on farm biosecurity
we refer to the application of health controls and measures to prevent the
introduction of new infectious diseases into herds and to avoid their spreading.
All too often we undervalue the importance of biosecurity. The ignorance of
many diseases and the existence of many others with different individual
epidemiologies could be the cause of certain incredibility that often has serious
consequences. However, this possible ignorance quite often turns into fear
leading to the adoption of exaggerated biosecurity measures that finally are not
applied.
The health status of a herd should not condition the introduction and application
out of biosecurity measures. A low health status does not justify the lack of such
measures as the possibility of new diseases always exists.
Although there are many references that demonstrate contamination of new
diseases due to the of lack of biosecurity measures, it is possibly situations
such as the recent outbreaks of Classical Swine Fever (CSF) in Holland, Spain
and Germany that confirm that biosecurity standards should always be
maintained as we never know what may happen in the future. In high-density
areas, only by assuming collective responsibilities may we achieve acceptable
levels of health security.
The most important factors to bear in mind in the prevention of possible new
diseases are, in this order: location, isolation of replacement stock and the
conditions of the farm itself

AGRICULTURA TROPICA ET SUBTROPICA VOL. 39(2) 2006 BIOSECURITY IN PIG

BREEDING HERDS
ROMÁN A.V., LUKEŠOVÁ D., NOVÁK P., ŽIŽLAVSKÝ M.
Abstract
Aim of this article has been to inform about promotion biosecurity to a livestock industry, the most
important sources of disease on pig units and key areas for consideration in terms of farm biosecurity.
Diseases exhibit a broad spectrum of infectivity and farms vary widely in their ability to institute preventive
measures. Each unit needs to be evaluated individually with particular reference to herd location,
preventable risks and financial constraints. Procedures need to be heightened during notifable disease
alerts. The Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) system, introduced originally for the food
industry, offers some useful principles that can be adapted for use on farm to deal with disease risks. This
identifies hazards, establishes critical limits and introduces monitoring and recording systems to deal with
the risks. The principal considerations with respect to biosecurity on pig farms are listed and discussed.
Key words: pig industry, disease risks, welfare, HACCP system.

INTRODUCTION
Infection present in faeces, saliva, nasal secretions, blood, milk or semen may be mechanically transmitted
between animals on a variety of different inanimate objects or formites. These include contaminated
clothing, boots, vehicles, equipment, bedding and feed.
The period of time that fomites remain infectious depends on the nature of the agent and environmental
factors such as temperature, exposure to ultraviolet light and the efficacy of disinfection procedure, e.g.
porcine parvovirus (PPV) and porcine circovirus (PCV-2) are very resistent and survive well for several
months under common environental condition in EU countries. Porcine respiratory and reproductive
syndrome (PRRS) virus surviving in the environment for several weeks in buildings. Swine dysentery
(Brachyspira hyodysenteriae) is reported to survive in moist faecaes for up to 40 days.
Disinfection is a targeted procedure aimed at reducting disease transmission via contaminated protective
clothing and boots, vehicles or equipment. Disinfectants require the effective removal of organic matter to
be fully efficacious. It is essentials to use the correct concentration (Novák et al., 2005).
Irrespective of how reliable the health status of the herd of origin is, it is important that incoming gilts or
boars undergo a period of isolation quarantine for at least three to four weeks. The duration will depend on
the particular diseases of concern, e.g. eight weeks for enzootic pneumonia (EP) Isolation allows pigs to
recover from the stress of journey and adapt to a new environment. Isolation provides an oportunity for
clinical inspection, laboratory testing and vaccination, if appropriate (Žižlavský et al., 2003). Laboratory
techniques are constantly being upgraded, particularly with the rapid advances in biotechnology and the
introduction of new PCR tests and ELISAs.
The Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) system, introduced originally for the food industry,
offers some useful principles that can be adapted for use on farm to deal with disease risks. This identifies
hazards, establishes critical limits and introduces monitoring and recording systems to deal with the risks
(Amass, 2002).
Principal considerations for farm biosecurity
Live pigs - contacts, new stock (including semen and embryo)
Direct contact with other live pigs, including feral wild boars, presents the main specific risk for aquiring
new infections.
Pigs may be clinically affected, apparently normal but incubating disease, convalescent carriers or long-
term excreters of pathogens. The disease transmission is exacerbated by stress due to loading, mixing and
transportation. Semen and embryos also present a risk in relation to viral diseases such as porcine
respiratory and reproductive syndrome (PRRS) and classical swine fever (CSF). Most herds buy in
breeding replacements for genetic improvement (Wrathall et al., 2004). It is important that these animals
are sourced appropriately and health-mached with the recipient herd, and undergo a period of isolation.
Health status is essentially an assessment of herd immunity and current disease activity. Ideally, incoming
replacements should be of similar or higher health status than the recipient herd to prevent them from
introducing infections not already present in the recipient herd.
Conversely, if they are inappropriately „disease free“ and immunologically naive to common infections,
they may need protecting by vaccination or acclimatisation before entering the new herd. This also applies
if a new
11 9 AGRICULTURA TROPICA ET SUBTROPICA VOL. 39(2) 2006
herd is likely to suffer a disease breakdown because of location (Dee, 2003).
Replacement profiling requires knowledge of the disease status of the herd of origin and the recipient herd.
Disease status information can be obtained from various sources:

• Records of clinical disease history

• Performance records

• Serological monitoring

• Necropsy findings

• Lung/snout scores

• Other abattoir reports

Infectious diseases of pigs

Many of this diseases have been highly contagious viral diseases, including transmissible gastroenteritis
(TGE), swine influenza (SI), Aujeszky´s disease (AD) and porcine respiratory and reproductive syndrome
(PRRS). Postweaning multisystemic wasting syndrome (PMWS), which is linked to porcine circovirus
(PCV-2) infection, has challanged the very survival of the pig industry elswhere (Straw et al., 1999). Even
long established endemic diseases, e.g. enzootic pneumonia (EP) and swine dysentery (SD), still cause
significant losses if introduced into naive herds (Žižlavský et al., 2000). The recent reappearances of
classical swine fever (CSF) and foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) were timely reminders that there is no place
for complacency in disease prevention programmes at both national and herd level.
Local spread
The generic term „local spread“ is often used in areas of high local livestock density where it is impossible
to determine precisely how an infectious agent enters a herd. Unexplained disease transmission over short
distances is often attributed to aerosol infection, but it is very difficult to exclude the possibility of local
spread by others routes, paricularly wildlife.
Aerosol spread appears to occur to a variable extent with a number of diseases including enzootic
pneumonia (EP), porcine respiratory and reproductive syndrome (PRRS) and postweaning multisystemic
wasting syndrome (PMWS). Long distance airborne spread in viral plumes is well recognised with foot-
and-mouth disease (FMD) and Aujeszky´s diseases (AD). Aerosol and airborn spread depend on numerous
factors such as:

• type of pathogen
• number and density of animals excreting
• susceptible to infection
• housing
• droplet size
• humidity
• ambient temperature
• ventialtion fans
• wind strength and direction
• sunlight
• topography
Herd location
Geographical location, paricularly proximity to other live pigs, is probably the overriding factor which
dictates the risk of a herd acquiring new disease.
The type, number and density of pig units in a 2 km radius are crucial. The position of major roads,
prevailing wind direction, drainage, vegetation and biosecurity measures adopted on nearby premises are
all significant.
Ideally, new pig units should be sited in areas of low pig density away from obvious risk factors such as
other pig herds, slaughterhouses, slurry lagoons, refuse tips and roads used by pig transporters.
A minimum distance of at least 500m between pigs farms may reduce the risk of acquiring common
infections. In many commercial herds in high pig density areas, it is very difficult or impractical to
maintain disease freedom from common endemic diseases (Žižlavský et al., 2003) such as porcine
respiratory and reproductive syndrome (PRRS), enzootic pneumonia (EP), swine influenza (SI) and
particularly postweaning multisystemic wasting syndrome (PMWS).
This is no excuse for a poor biosecurity, but an appreciation of what is realistically achievable is essential.
For some diseases, the use of vaccination, if available, may be more appropriate and cost effective than
relying on other biosecurity measures which are impractical due to factors beyond the owner´s kontrol
(Amass, 2002).
Vehicles for transporting pigs, equipment and consumables
Contaminated vehicles, particularly those used to transport livestock, and their drivers represent an
important means of disease transmission. Vehicles, trailers and other equipment should be farm-dedicated,
if possible. The degree of risk depends on how recently the vehicle hasbeen used on other pig or livestock
farms or for conveying pigs from market to slaughterhouse.
The increasing trend towards two-site and three-site production systems has led to more transportation of
live pigs. Transporting finishers to slaughter in the morning and weaners in the afternoon leaves
insufficient time between journeys for satisfactory cleaning and disinfection. Adopting a three-week batch
weaning system reduces theneed tomove pigs as frequently and facilitates the all-in, all-out approach,
which promotes good hygienic practice.
External vehicles should not be permitted onto a farm unless essential. These vehicles must be visibly
clean, washed and disinfected under supervision on hard standing areas off-site. The effectiveness of this
approach was demonstrated during the recent foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) epidemic. Particular attention
should be paid to weel arches and the undersite of vehicle.
12 0 AGRICULTURA TROPICA ET SUBTROPICA VOL. 39(2) 2006

 
An iframe capable browser is required to view this web site.
 

TECHNICAL ARTICLES - POULTRY INDUSTRY

TOPICS: Management (More..)
Technical Articles' List
Rate this article   Send to a friend    Who saw this article? (1838)
Biosecurity Practices in the East Algerian Poultry Farms
PUBLICATION DATE:  27/10/2008
RATING
AUTHOR:  N. Alloui, F. Ibrir, A. Ayachi and M.N. Alloui - ESPA Laboratory, Poultry Sciences Service,
University of Batna, Algeria (Presented at the Ist Mediterranean Summit of WPSA, Greece)
Biosecurity is a practice designed to prevent the spread of diseases in poultry farms. It is accomplished by
maintaining the facility in such a way that there is minimal traffic of biological organisms (viruses, bacteria,
rodents, vermin etc.) across its borders (Gernat, 2000).

The objective of this work was to determine the level of adoption within the Algerian poultry farms (broiler
chickens, laying hens) of a range of standard biosecurity practices (isolation, traffic control, sanitation,
vaccination…). Quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the biosecurity in the poultry houses has been
analysed using a method developed by the French Food Safety Agency (AFSSA) (Drouin, 1988; Drouin and
Toux; 2000).

A factorial analysis of the collected data has permitted to determine four classes of poultry farms.

Class 1 and 2 regroup 55% of the examined poultry farms, and were represented by farms that are very
badly maintained by breeders who do not respect the elementary hygiene measures (precarious buildings,
impure water, non respect of the sanitary vacuum, bad disinfection, presence of contamination vectors, lack
of incineration of the chickens corpses…). The two classes were given visual scores between 0 - 100 points
and CFU ( faecal streptococci) > 25.

Class 3 and 4 regroup 45% of the poultry farms, and demonstrated that the number of faecal streptococci
colonies /25 cm2 is the lowest (3 < CFU < 9) and (10 < CFU < 25) respectively. In these farms, <CFU<CFU
the sanitary teams apply very rigorous barriers of security and decontamination. Visual scores attributed to
these two classes ranged between 100-200 points.

The decline in the production performances (mortality, feed conversion, and laying rate) especially observed
in the poultry farms (class 1, 2) was because of the failing of the sanitary barriers during the production
period.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The investigation was realised in 40 poultry farms located in the East of Algeria, during the period between
2002-2006. The passage into buildings was made before the implementation of the breeding flock. For each
breeding, a technical index card was distributed to collect information (population density, vaccination, body
weight, feed consumption, feed conversion, and rate of laying, mortality, decontamination, and the period of
sanitary vacuum…).

Of the 40 poultry houses involved in this inquiry, 25 were broiler chickens- houses and 15 were layers
houses, with breeding capacities ranging from 5000-10.000 and 10.000 -30.000, respectively.

Quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the biosecurity in the poultry houses has been analysed using a
method developed by the French Food Safety Agency (AFSSA) (Drouin and Toux, 2000), which consists in
making two operations:

1-“hygienogramme”:  method based on the visual control of poultry house after decontamination. A score
between 0 – 200 points is attributed to the poultry houses according to the quality of the decontamination
and traffic control in the poultry houses.

2-bacteriological control:  16 contact limps of 25 cm2 (faecal streptococci) are used for each poultry house
(640 bacteriological samples for 40 buildings). Sampling was made after the decontamination (pest control,
rat extermination, cleaning and disinfection) of buildings, including the following places: doors, cages, and
carpets of droppings, ventilation circuits, feeding dishes, watering places, floors and walls.

After an incubation of 36 hours, the number of colonies was counted and the results were compared with the
norms established by the AFSSA - CIDEF (Cable and Fargeas, 2000).

All the gathered data were analysed by a factorial analysis of multiple correspondences (AFCM), in order to
determine different classes of biosecurity (hygienic status, traffic control, sanitary barriers) in the examined
poultry farms. For each type of biosecurity, production performances were determined by analysis of
variance.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Factorial analysis of multiple correspondences associated to a hierarchical ascending classification has

permitted to determine four classes of poultry farms.

Visual control of decontamination and traffic control are weak for most breeding (fig.1). From 40 poultry
farms, only two class (class 4 and 3) have a satisfactory biosecurity procedures, score (150 - 200) and (100-
150), respectively. These two classes account for 45% of the poultry farms.

In the other poultry farms (55%), biosecurity procedures were considered insufficient and the score is lower
than 100 points (class 1 and 2). The qualification of the staff in methods of decontamination plays a very
important role in the success of the fight against vectors and contaminants.

Bacteriological control (fig.2) revealed the following results in the different classes:

Class 4 regroups, unfortunately, 25% poultry farms and demonstrates that the number of faecal streptococci
colonies is the lowest (3 < CFU < 9). In these farms, the sanitary team apply very rigorous <CFU
sanitary barriers.

Class 3 constituted partially by 27.5% poultry farms. Bacteriological score of the decontamination can be
considered as acceptable (10 < CFU < 25) In this group, breeders are very aware of the problem of <CFU
hygiene measures, and they strictly apply the advice and orders of their veterinarian (medical prevention,
rigorous decontamination, under floor space, access to the strictly regulated poultry houses).

Class 2 (25 < CFU < 50) and class 1 (CFU > 51) regroup breedings that are very badly maintained by
breeders who do not respect the elementary hygiene measures (absence of pediluvium, precarious
buildings, non respect of the sanitary vacuum , auto medication, badly made disinfection, presence of
contamination vectors, corpses of animals on the site). These two classes represent 47.5 % of poultry farms.

The bad management of the cleaning, disinfection operation and the sanitary barriers failings during the
breeding period could be the causes (Drouin, 1988; Rokicki and Kolbuszewski, 1996; Rose and al.2000).

The breeders that respect the biosecurity measures obtain best performances in broiler farms (table 1).
Mortality rates are generally low in breeding where hygienic status ranged in the class 3 and 4. Weight gain
and feed conversion are slightly low in badly maintained breeding. These results confirm studies made by
the other authors (Drouin 1988, Cardinal et al., 2001).

Laying hens performances (table 2), notably the laying rate and the egg mass are slightly more favorable in
poultry farms where hygiene and traffic control are well applied (class 4). The analysis of the variance
allowed to confirming significant differences (p <0.05) especially between the classes (class 2 and 4) in the
mortality rate and the laying rate. The decline in performances especially observed in the poultry flock was
because of the failings of the sanitary barriers in production period (Drouin and al. 2000; Valancony et al.,
2001; WHO, 1993).

REFERENCES

Cable A., Fargeas E. 2000. Essais d’évaluation de la désinfection par voie aérienne. Sciences et
Techniques Avicoles, 32 : 5-9

Cardinal E., Dieng C., Pene G., Wadde I., Diallo A., Tall F., Kane P., Konte M. 2001.Les pratiques
hygiéniques des aviculteurs sénégalais, impact sur la productivité. IV Journée de la Recherche Avicole,
Nantes, 333-336

Drouin P.1988.L’Aviculture Française, ed. R. Rosset, 744 p

Drouin P., Toux, J.Y, 2000. La décontamination des poulaillers au sol. Sciences et Techniques Avicoles,
(hors série, sept), 39-52

Drouin P., Fournier G., Toux J.Y., Collin P. 2000. Disinfection of cage layer houses towards Salmonella
Enteridis: Causes of failure. Xth International Congress on Animal Hygiene, Maastricht, vol. 1, 161- 166

Gernat A. 2000. Poultry farm biosecurity. Ed. College of Agricultural. N.C. State University, 20p

Rokicki E., Kolbuszewski T.1996. Animal Hygiene, Ed.Warsaw Agric. University, Poland, 149 p

Rose N., Drouin P., Toux J.Y., Rose V., Beaudeau F., Collin P. 2000.On farm hygienic measures to improve
biosecurity towards Salmonella in chicken broiler units. Xth Int. Congress on Animal Hygiene, Maastricht,
vol.1, 288-290

Valancony H., Fournier G., Drouin P., Toux J.Y., Colin P. 2001.Disinfection of cage layer houses
contamined with Salmonella enteritidis. British Poultry Science, 42:39-40

WHO (1993) Guidelines on cleaning, disinfection and vector control in SE infected poultry farms.
WHO/Zoon./94, 172, 1-33
Table 1. Performances in broiler farms (day 49)
Table 2. Performances in laying hens farms

PUBLICATION DATE:  27/10/2008

RATING
AUTHOR:  N. Alloui, F. Ibrir, A. Ayachi and M.N. Alloui - ESPA Laboratory, Poultry Sciences Service,
University of Batna, Algeria (Presented at the Ist Mediterranean Summit of WPSA, Greece)
 
AUTHOR DETAILS (Hide...)

Nadir Alloui
Doctor of Veterinary Medicine
Algeria - Batna

RANK
 

17
Rate this article    Send to a friend    Who saw this article? (1838) 

Comments: (1)   
Post a comment
Francisco Gomez
Doctor of Veterinary Medicine
Staff: Smithfield Beef Group - MOPAC
United States - Texas
Rank
 

13
  Contact
  10/28/2008
It's a good article, the information is clear and direct; I really enjoy reading this time the communications. Make
sence to send my congratulations to this team.

Dr Gomez
Report Abuse
Comments: (1)   
Post a comment
 
 
 
 
 

ENGOREART AVG 20100822

Home   -   Forums   -   Technical Articles   -   Professionals Guide   -   News   -   Events   -   Companies and
Products   -   Thematic Index
 
Biosecurity in bre Search
   
Aquaculture
|
Mycotoxins
|
Feed Machinery
POULTRY INDUSTRY
Pig Industry
|
Dairy Cattle
|
Equines
Bangladesh    English Community
It is also important to ensure that personnel do not become contaminated during washing. Disposal plastic
boots sould be worn, if practicable. Vehicle footwells or floors inside the lorry cab are difficult to clean and
disinfect adequately, although the provision of rubber mats and disinfectant sprays may help. Fixed wheel
washes are helpful if they are of good design, but disinfectant mats for vehicles are oflimited value and
soon become heavily contaminated (Straw et al, 1999).
Feed lorries must be visibly clean and make deliveries from outsite the perimeter fence or at the periphery
of the farm usány farm-dedicated blower pipes.
High-health status and nukleus units should try to arrange feed deliveries for the first drop of the day at th
beginning of the week.
Contractors´ boxes and equipment that might have been used on other livestock premise should be
disinfected.
The anteroom or office delivery point area close to main entrance to a far mis a potential focus for
contamination by pathogens on cardboard containers used for items such as pharmaceutical products or
semen coolers. Surface disinfection and hygienic disposal of packaging should therefore be instituted, as
appropriate.
Loading and unloading of live pigs are procedures which offer opportunities for new infections to be
introduced by infected stock or fomites (contaminated vehikle, equipment or clothing). Vehicles delivering
pigs should be thoroughly cleaned and dried before transporting pigs onto a unit.
Pig transporters should not be allowed onto the main farm premise, if possible – a pourpose-built loading
bay with good washing, disinfecting and drainage facilities, located as far away as practicable from pig
acommodation, is ideal (Novák et al., 2005).
Outgoing pigs should be moved into the loading bay, with farm staff observing strict clean and dirty area
protocols to avoid contact with the collection vehicle. The loading bay and surrounding area should be kept
clean and disinfected.
Humans – visitors, farm staff etc.
The potential for the transmission of infectious aerosols by humans appears to have been greatly
exaggerated.
A policy of two or three pig-free days or 'downtime' for visitors and veterinary surgeons is widely imposed,
particularly on high-health status and nucleus breeding units. This concept has its origins in work
undertaken in the 1970s on the persistence and transfer of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) virus from the
mouth and nose of humans 28 hours (but not 48 hours) after exposure. However, contrary to common
perceptions, recent scientific evidence - particularly from the USA - and field observations from
experienced research workers suggest that people actually transmitting pathogens from their nose, mouth or
pharynx is minimal. Imposing a blanket downtime requirement causes great inconvenience and is
expensive to maintain (Straw et al, 1999).
Nucleus herds and others of high-health status will understandably wish to maintain 48 to 72 hours down-
time as an insurance policy and a deterrent for unwanted visitors. Where possible, it is prudent for
veterinary sur-geons and other essential farm visitors to attend herds higher up a breeding pyramid at the
beginning of the week. However, it is important that such measures are kept in perspective and do not
assume more importance than they merit. Provided a visit to a pig herd is followed by a complete change of
clothing, showering, hand (particularly fingernails) and hair washing, and nose blowing, a single overnight
pig-free period of at least 12 hours, as now suggested by several authorities, should be more than adequate
for most situations assuming other precautions are adopted. Notifiable disease outbreaks are an exception
and are covered by national rules. Additional showering-in on arrival may be unnecessary, but it increases
awareness and presents a useful physical barier in that street clothes are replaced by dedicated clothing.
In selected circumstances, if there are major concerns, the additional use of a disposable paper dusk mask
with the highest dust protection factor may be worth considering.
Formulating basic biosecurity rules for visitors (including vehicle drivers) and farm employees costs little
and can greatly reduce the risks of introducing infection by vomites, including dirty boots, contaminated
clothing or personal equipment.
Protocols will inevitably vary with the type of unit and circumstances, being higher and more onerous on
high-health status nucleus herds at the top of the breeding pyramid and during notifiable disease outbreaks
(Wrathall et al., 2004).
Feed, water and bedding
Salmonella species may potentially be introduced by contaminated feed (in addition to the risk of feed
deliv-ery vehicles acting as fomites). Feed should be obtained from mills operating in accordance with
relevant agricultural industries confederation codes of practice and using ingredients obtained from sources
with a consistently satisfactory bacteriological record. There is a small risk of acquiring infection (e.g.
Salmonella spp.) from contaminated water. Ideally, mains water should be used. Water from boreholes and
wells should be tested regularly for bacteriological duality (Novák et al., 2005).
The risks of straw, shavings and other bedding sub-strates acting as fomites should be reviewed. These
materials should not come from sources which might have been exposed to livestock or excrement, and
should be stored under cover and protected from contamination by birds or vermin.
Wildlife and vermin
The risk of rodents, fecal cats, birds, insects and other animals acting as vectors of disease is much more
diffi-cult to control than disease spread by humans,
12 1 AGRICULTURA TROPICA ET SUBTROPICA VOL. 39(2) 2006
equipment and vehicles.
Virus of transmissible gastro-enteritis (TGE) was notorious in countries of European Union for its
transmission by starlings and gulls, especially on out-door units and in uncovered feeding areas. Complete
bird proofing was attempted with partial success on some pig farms during the transmissible gastro-enteritis
(TGE) epidemics.
Other infections spread by birds inc1ude salmonellosis and avian tuberculosis (via infected peat used as
bedding). Even on outdoor units, practical measures such as installing rubber flaps on feeders reduce
disease risks and also allow considerable savings in feed costs. Mechanical transmission by insects,
particularly flies, has been implicated in the spread of several diseases, e.g. transmissible gastro-enteritis
(TGE), Streptococcus suis infection and porcine respiratory and reproductive syndrome (PRRS).
The increasing number of feral wild boar in some parts of EU countries, and the potential for their
expansion into new areas, pose very specific disease threats to outdoor herds. Commercial wild boar
production units must be licensed under the Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976 and secure escape-proof
perimeter fencing is essential. Conventional pig units in the vicinity need to adopt heightened precautions.
Outdoor pigs are inevitably exposed to Leptospira serovars, particularly Leptospira bratislava, from vari-
ous wildlife species including hedgehogs, foxes and rats. Rodents can introduce disease such as Salmonella
infection (which is also spread by feral cats), swine dysentery and Lawsonia intracellularis infection.
As with birds, a large rodent population represents a significant amount of food wastage, which is an added
incentive for control, even on outdoor units. Independent consultancy advice on pest control is very
important. It is advisable not to allow domesticated pets onto the farm premises, but if guard dogs are used
they should not be fed marrow bones. The veterinary surgeon should also remain alert to potential disease
transmission risks from domestic cats (Novák et al, 2005).
CONCLUSION
Disease imposes considerable constraints on the productivity and profitability of the livestock industry. Pig
producers have probably suffered more than other sectors from the devastating effects of a succession of
infectious disease outbreaks over the past 30 years. Many of these have been highly contagious viral
diseases.
The pig industry has been very proactive in promoting the benefits of biosecurity and implementation of its
Strategy for Pig Health and Welfare. The National Pig Associations in EU have developed a personalised
self-assessment audit to help producers improve biosecurity on their own farms. Such an approach offers an
ideal starting point for veterinary surgeons and producers seeking to identify cost-effective measures
appropriate to particular farm circumstances.
REFERENCES
AMASS S. F. (2002) Biosecurity: what does it all mean? In: Proceedings 33rd Annual Meeting of the
American Association of Swine Veterinarians, March 2-5 (Kansas City), 279-281.
DEE S. A. (2003) Biosecurity: a critical review of today' s practices. In: Proceedings of the 34th Annual
Meeting of the American Association of Swine Veterinarians, March 8 – 11 (Orlando, Florida), 451-454.
NOVÁK P., TREML F., PAŽOUT L., ŠLÉGEROVÁ S., VOKŘÁLOVÁ J., DVOŘÁKOVÁ J., KOVAŘÍK J. (2005):
Expectations for the objective estimation of breeding value on the pig breeding farms. In: Prevention in pig
breeding farms (In Czech). Ed.: Union of pig breeders in Czech and Moravia (Prague), pp. 40.
STRAW B.E., D´ALLAIRE S., MENGELING W.L. AND TAYLOR D.J. (1999): Diseases of Swine, 8th Ed.,
Blackwell Science Limited (Oxford), pp.880, ISBN 80-88700-58-2.
WRATHALL A. E., SIMMONS H. A., BOWLES D. J. & JONES S. (2004): Biosecurity strategies for conserving
valuable livestock genetic resources. Reproduction, Fertility and Development 16, 103-112.
ŽIŽLAVSKÝ M., LUKEŠOVÁ D., SMÍTKA Z., SVOBODOVÁ L., TYDLITÁT D. (2003): Disease Surveillance of
Lesions in Pigs at Slaughterhouses during Period 1996-2002 in the Czech Republic. In: Abstracts 19th
WAAVP, August (New Orleans, USA), 136.
ŽIŽLAVSKÝ M., BARTOŠ M., LUKAŠOVÁ D., BARTL J., SMÍTKA Z., THURNVALDOVÁ J.(2000): Prevalence of
lesions in pigs at slaughterhouses in the Czech Republic. In: Proceedings 16th International Veterinary Pig
Society (IPVS) September (Melbourne, Australia), 377.
Received for publication on February 28 , 2006
Accepted for publication on May 31 , 2006

Corresponding author:
Ing. Román A.V.
Czech University of Agriculture Prague
Institute of Tropics and Subtropics
165 21 Prague 6 - Suchdol, Czech Republic
E-mail: andreyroman@hotmail.com 12 2 AGRICULTURA TROPICA ET SUBTROPICA VOL. 39(2)
2006 12 3 AGRICULTURA TROPICA ET SUBTROPICA VOL. 39(2) 2006 12 4