[G.R. NO.

156747 : February 23, 2005]

ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., and ALFIE LORENZO,

Petitioners, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSELITO TRINIDAD,

Facts:

On 10 July 1997, Alfie Lorenzo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano, Jr., and Roger Parajes,
columnist, publisher, managing editor, and editor, respectively of the newspaper “Abante”
were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, with the crime of
libel.

To which an article is published publicly imputing a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary
or an act, omission, condition, status or circumstance and causing in view of their
publication, discredit and contempt upon the person of said Joselito Magallanes Trinidad
a.k.a. Joey Trinidad a.k.a. Toto Trinidad, to his damage and prejudice.

On 12 September 1997, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the ground
that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the offense charged. According to
petitioners, as the information discloses that the residence of private respondent was in
Marikina, the RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over the case pursuant to
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as
provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed
and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time
of the commission of the offense…

In an Order dated 26 September 1997,[8] Judge Bruselas, Jr., ruled that “with the filing
of the ‘Motion to Dismiss,’ the court considers the accused to have abandoned their
‘Motion for Reconsideration and to Withdraw Plea’ and sees no further need to act on the
same.”

On 24 November 1997, the trial court rendered an Order dismissing the case due to
lack of jurisdiction. The court a quo noted that although the information alleged the
venue of this case falls within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, the evidence submitted for
its consideration indicated otherwise. First, the editorial box of Abante clearly indicated
that the purported libelous article was printed and first published in the City of Manila.
In addition, the trial court relied on the following matters to support its conclusion that,
indeed, jurisdiction was improperly laid in this case: a) on page 4 of the information, the
address of private respondent appeared to be the one in Marikina City although right
below it was a handwritten notation stating “131 Sct. Lozano St., Barangay Sacred Heart,
QC”; b) the two barangay certifications submitted by the petitioners; and c) the
Memorandum for Preliminary Investigation and Affidavit-Complaint attached to the
information wherein the given address of private respondent was Marikina City.

Undaunted, the public and the private prosecutors filed a notice of appeal before the court
a quo. In the Decision now assailed, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial
court’s conclusion and ordered the remand of the case to the court a quo for further
proceedings.

The Court of Appeals held that jurisprudentially, it is settled that the “residence of a person
must be his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or abode” and
for the purpose of determining venue, actual residence is a person’s place of abode and
not necessarily his legal residence or domicile. In this case, the defect appearing on the
original complaint wherein the residence of private respondent was indicated to be
Marikina City was subsequently cured by his supplemental-affidavit submitted during the
preliminary investigation of the case. Moreover, as the amendment was made during the
preliminary investigation phase of this case, the same could be done as a matter of right
pursuant to the Revised Rules of Court.

The petitioners thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Court of Appeals in a Resolution promulgated on 6 January 2003.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ruling that the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City has territorial Jurisdiction over the crime charged?

Ruling:

Jurisdiction has been defined as “the power conferred by law upon a judge or court to try
a case the cognizance of which belongs to them exclusively” and it constitutes the basic
foundation of judicial proceedings. The term derives its origin from two Latin words – “jus”
meaning law and the other, “dicere” meaning to declare. The term has also been variably
explained to be “the power of a court to hear and determine a cause of action presented
to it, the power of a court to adjudicate the kind of case before it, the power of a court to
adjudicate a case when the proper parties are before it, and the power of a court to make
the particular decision it is asked to render.”
In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that venue is jurisdictional. Thus, the place
where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction.

The law, is more particular in libel cases. The possible venues for the institution of the
criminal and the civil aspects of said case are concisely outlined in Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363.

In Agbayani v. Sayo, we summarized the foregoing rule in the following manner:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published.

2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the offense.

3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at
the time of the commission of the offense.

In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at the time of the publication
of the alleged libelous article, hence, he could only file his libel suit in the City of Manila
where Abante was first published or in the province or city where he actually resided at
the time the purported libelous article was printed.

A perusal, however, of the information involved in this case easily reveals that the
allegations contained therein are utterly insufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC of
Quezon City. Other than perfunctorily stating “Quezon City” at the beginning of the
information, the assistant city prosecutor who prepared the information did not bother to
indicate whether the jurisdiction of RTC Quezon City was invoked either because Abante
was printed in that place or private respondent was a resident of said city at the time the
claimed libelous article came out. As these matters deal with the fundamental issue of the
court’s jurisdiction, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates that
either one of these statements must be alleged in the information itself and the absence
of both from the very face of the information renders the latter fatally
defective. Sadly, for private respondent, the information filed before the trial court falls
way short of this requirement. The assistant city prosecutor’s failure to properly lay the
basis for invoking the jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon City, effectively denied said court
of the power to take cognizance of this case.

For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate
to reiterate our earlier pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit:

In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written
defamation, the complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the
time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private
individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place
where the written defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged.
That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was
printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action.
G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010

WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO

PERECHE, SR., Petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P.
GIMENEZ, Respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners Bonifacio et al were charged with the crime of libel after private respondent
Gimenez, on behalf of Yuchengco family and Malayan Insurance Co., filed a criminal
complaint before the Makati City Prosecutor for libel under Article 355 in relation to Article
353 of the Revised Penal Code .

The complaint alleged that petitioners, together with several John Does, publicly and
maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character
and reputation of Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., and Yuchengco family for exposing them to
public hatred and contempt, and published in the said website
http://www.pepcoalition.com a defamatory article persuading the public to remove their
investments and policies from the said company. This is after the petitioners filed to seek
their redress for their pecuniary loss under the policies they obtained from the company.
Makati City Prosecutor, after finding probable cause to indict the petitioners, filed separate
information against them .

Petitioners filed before the respondent RTC of Makati a Motion to Quash on the grounds
that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the
Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of
the RPC. Petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place
within the trial courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first
published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory
material was printed and first published, and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of
the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article.

Issue:

Whether petitioners’ Motion to Quash due to lack of jurisdiction is valid.

Held:

Yes. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential
element of jurisdiction. The venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private
individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory
article was printed and first published.
Analysis: The Amended Information in the case opted to lay the venue by stating that the
offending article was first published and accessed by the private complainant
in Makati City. In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite
allegation of printing and first publication. This is wrong. For the court to hold that the
Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply
because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the
libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise
accessed or capable of being accessed. This goes against the purpose as to why
Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the
criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from
inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed
in remote municipal courts (

IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners
motion to quash the Amended Information.

Note: RA 4363 amended Art 360 of the RPC which sets the venue for the filing of an
information for a libel case. The old rule allows the filing of an action for libel in any
jurisdiction where the libellous article was published or circulated. Clearly, the evil sought
to be prevented by the amendment was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue
in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than
harass or intimidate an accused.
To credit Gimenez’s premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on
petitioner’s website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the very ills that
the amendment to Art 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. For the Court to
hold that the amended information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati
simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to
the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise
accessed or capable of being accessed.
 [G.R. NO. 144887 : November 17, 2004]

ALFREDO RIGOR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-
G.R. CR No. 18855, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 163, in Criminal Case No. 86025, convicting petitioner Alfredo Rigor of violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law), and imposing upon him the
penalty of imprisonment for six (6) months and ordering him to restitute to the Rural Bank
of San Juan the sum of P500,000 and to pay the costs.

Facts: The prosecution evidence was furnished by witnesses Edmarcos Basangan of

Rural Bank of San Juan (RBSJ) and Esteban Pasion, employee of the Associated Bank. It
was shown that on November 16, 1989, appellant (petitioner herein) applied for a
commercial loan from the Rural Bank of San Juan, Inc., at N. Domingo St., San Juan,
Metro Manila in the sum of P500,000.00 . He signed a promissory note stating that an
interest of 24% per annum from its date will be charged on the loan. The loan was
approved by RBSJ's Bank Manager Melquecedes de Guzman and Controller Agustin Uy.

It was not the bank policy for a borrower to apply for a loan, obtain its approval and its
proceeds on the same day. Appellant's case was a special one considering that he is the
"kumpare" of the President of RBSJ and he is well-known to all the bank's directors since
he, like them, comes from Tarlac.

Appellant failed to pay his loan upon its maturity. He personally asked de Guzman for a
two-month extension and advised RBSJ to date to February 16, 1990 his Associated
Bank. Failing anew to pay, he asked for another two-month extension. Both requests de
Guzman granted. On April 16, 1990, appellant still failed to pay his loan. Basangan and
his co-employee, Carlos Garcia, went to Tarlac to collect from appellant the amount of the
loan. Appellant's written request for another 30-day extension was denied by de Guzman
who instead, sent him a formal demand letter dated April 25, 1990.

On May 25, 1990, Associated Bank check no. 165476 was deposited with PS Bank, San
Juan Branch. The check was later returned with the words "closed account" stamped on
its face. Associated Bank employee PASION declared that appellant's Current had been
closed.

Basangan and Garcia, in Tarlac, advised appellant of the dishonor of his check. Appellant
wrote Atty. Joselito Lim, RBSJ Chairman of the Board, about the loan and arrangements
as to the schedule of his payment. His letter was referred to de Guzman, who, in turn,
sent to him another demand letter dated September 17, 1990. He still refused to pay.

Issue: WON RTC of Pasig had jurisdiction to try and decide violation of BP 22 cases.

Ruling: YES.

Petitioner contends that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig had no jurisdiction over this
case since no proof has been offered that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or
that knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro
Manila.

The contention is untenable.

Analysis: As regards venue of a criminal action, Section 15, paragraph (a), of Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reflects the old rule, provides:

Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted.'

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of
the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred. (Emphasis supplied.)

Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing

crimes. In such crimes, some acts material and essential to the crimes and requisite to
their consummation occur in one municipality or territory and some in another, in which
event, the court of either has jurisdiction to try the cases, it being understood that the first
court taking cognizance of the case excludes the other. Hence, a person charged with a
transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was
in part committed.

The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and delivered at the Rural
Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila on November 16, 1989, and subsequently the check was
dated February 16, 1990 thereat. On May 25, 1990, the check was deposited with PS
Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro Manila. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled:

Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on the

check can be filed in any of the places where any of the elements of the offense occurred,
that is, where the check is drawn, issued, delivered or dishonored. x x x

The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the place of drawing and issuing.
The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or information. Although, the check was dishonored by the drawee, Associated
Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at RBSJ, San
Juan. The place of issue and delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential part
of the offense, was also overtly manifested in San Juan.

Conclusion: There is no question that crimes committed in November, 1989 in San Juan
are triable by the RTC stationed in Pasig. In short both allegation and proof in this case
sufficiently vest jurisdiction upon the RTC in Pasig City
G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts: Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Then, she was
charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC (perjury) “by falsely declaring under oath
in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any
other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency”. The
Certification was notarized in Makati City but was submitted and used in Pasay City, while the
Information against Union Bank and Tomas was filed in Makati.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash. She argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay
City Court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the
MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has
jurisdiction over the perjury case.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case
since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City. The MeTC-Makati
City also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside the
MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored
their petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet and Ilusorio v. Bildner which ruled that venue
and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented.

Issue:

Whether or not the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be – Makati City,
where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification
was presented to the trial court.

Ruling:

The SC denied the petition and held that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper
court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.

Analysis: The criminal charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a
falsity. Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue
should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who “makes an affidavit,
upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in
which the law so requires.” The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus,
the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn
before a duly authorized person.

Based on these considerations, SC held that its ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article
183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To
reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through
the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the
affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the
elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false
testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place
where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony
made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is
submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where
the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients
of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in
the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.
Petitioner: HECTOR TREÑAS
Respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 195002, January 25, 2012

DOCTRINE: In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise

jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside its limited
territory.

Facts:Elizabeth Luciaja gave P150,000.00 to Atty. Hector Treñas to assist in the titling of a house and
lot located in Iloilo City. Treñas prepared and issued a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. He
also gave Elizabeth three Revenue Official Receipts amounting to P120,000. However, when
Elizabeth consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted,
Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used the money for his other
transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed
against Hector.
An Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the RTC Makati City which
rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa. Petitioner appealed with the CA
which also rendered a Decision affirming that of the RTC.
Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that
₱ 150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Also, the evidence shows that the
Receipt issued by petitioner was without any indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile,
the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in
Iloilo City. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to
him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any
direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable presumption that things
happened according to the ordinary course of nature.

Issue:

1. Whether RTC Makati has jurisdiction over the controversy.

Ruling + Analysis:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the
action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. For jurisdiction to be acquired by courts
in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed
outside of that limited territory.

Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information. In this case, the prosecution failed to show
that the offense of estafa was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City.
Also, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as
to where the offense was committed.

Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented
by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed in
Makati City. There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution that
points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed.

There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, The RTC
of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.

The case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and
recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

DISPOSITION: There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati,
The RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.
 G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018

AAA*, Petitioner, v. BBB,* Respondent.

FACTS:

AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced 2 children.
In May 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent resident
status in September 2008. This petition nonetheless indicates his address to be in Quezon City
where his parents reside and where AAA also resided from the time they were married until March
2010, when AAA and their children moved back to her parents’ house in Pasig City.

AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no financial support,
and only sporadically. This allegedly compelled her to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs to
augment her income as a flight attendant. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment,
mistreatment of her and their CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse, BBB
supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with whom he
allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19, 2011 when AAA and
BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during her visit with their kids. As can
be gathered from earlier cited Information, despite the claims of varied forms of abuses, the
investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and
emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity.

A warrant of arrest and hold departure order were issued but BBB continued to evade arrest.
Consequently, the case was archived. However, on November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as
Counsel for the Accused With Omnibus Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold
Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest was filed on behalf of BBB. The motion to quash was
granted on ground of lack of jurisdiction (acts complained of had occurred in Singapore).

AAA’s motion for reconsideration was denied so she sought direct recourse to the Supreme Court
via petition for review under Rule 45 on pure question of law. In the main, AAA argues that mental
and emotional anguish is an essential element of the offense charged against BBB, which is
experienced by her wherever she goes, and not only in Singapore where the extra-marital affair
takes place; thus, the RTC of Pasig City where she resides can take cognizance of the case. In
support of her theory, AAA specifically cites Section 7 on Venue of R.A. 9262 and Section 4 on
liberal construction of the law to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against
women and their children.

In his Comment, BBB contends that the grant of the motion to quash is in effect an acquittal; that
only the civil aspect of a criminal case may be appealed by the private offended party, and that the
petition should be dismissed for having been brought before the Court by AAA instead of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as counsel for the People in appellate proceedings. BBB also
asserts that the petition is belatedly filed.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE
UNDER R.A. 9262 WHEN COMMITTED THROUGH MARITAL INFIDELITY AND THE ALLEGED
LILLICIT RELATIONSHIP TOOK PLACE OUTSIDE THE PHILIPPINES
Ruling: PHILIPPINE COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER PSYCHOLOGICAL VIOLENCE
UNDER R.A. NO. 9262 BECAUSE WHAT THE LAW PUNISHES IS THE VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, NOT THE MARITAL INFIDELITY PER SE.

Analysis: There is merit in the petition.

As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
Information, threshing out the essential elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 is
crucial. In Dinamling v. People, this Court already had occasion to enumerate the elements of
psychological violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, as follows:

 The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

 The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender
has a common child. As for the woman’s child or children, they may be legitimate or
illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
 The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
 The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the
children or similar such acts or omissions.

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional
anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator,
while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended
party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof
of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish
mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such
experiences are personal to this party.

R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on
the wife, NOT marital infidelity per se. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the
circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the
various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the
circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even
be causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the
victim is an essential and distinct element in the commission of the offense.

In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Trenas v. People, the Court explained that the
place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by
courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or
to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over
a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so show, the court may validly take cognizance of the
case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
Section 7, R.A. 9262 “Venue” pertains to jurisdiction.

As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where the crime or
any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. While the psychological
violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the
offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal to
the complainant. The resulting mental or emotional anguish is analogous to the indispensable
element of damage in a prosecution for estafa, viz:

The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses employed by the accused, as
show in the vouchers, might have been perpetrated in Quezon City does not preclude the institution
of the criminal action in Mandaluyong where the damage was consummated. Deceit and damage
are the basic elements of estafa. The estafa involved in this case appears to be transitory or
continuing offense. It could be filed either in Quezon City or in Rizal. The theory is that a person
charged with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense is in part
committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to the
crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the court of
either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court taking
cognizance of the case will exclude the others.

Acts of violence against women and their children may manifest transitory or continuing
crimes; meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation
occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court
wherein the any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains
jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same
excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly
tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.

It is necessary for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of
violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (c) was
committed outside the Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the
complaint was filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In the
present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig City
since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information relates to BBB’s
marital infidelity must be proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the
husband, and to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction. It likewise
remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband. What this case concerns itself is
simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may even be filed
within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that even if the alleged
extra-marital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is committed abroad,
the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of
Philippine courts.