A.C. No.

7158, March 09, 2015

YOLANDA A. ANDRES, MINETTE A. MERCADO, AND ELITO P.

ANDRES , Complainants, v. ATTY. SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is a Complaint for Disbarment1 filed against then Labor Arbiter Salimathar V.

Nambi (respondent) on the ground of gross ignorance of the law in issuing an Amended
Alias Writ of Execution against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and its incorporators, the herein
complainants, who are not parties to the case.

Factual Antecedents

On December 10, 2003, respondent rendered a Decision2 in a consolidated labor

case3 against M.A. Mercado Construction and spouses Maximo and Aida Mercado
(spouses Mercado), the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents,

M.A. Mercado Construction and Maximo and Aida Mercado to reinstate the complainants
to their former position[s] without loss of seniority rights and to pay jointly and
severally, their full backwages from October 28, 2000 up to the date of this decision
plus ten (10%) percent attorney’s fees of the total monetary award. The Research and
Information Unit of this Office is hereby directed to compute complainants[’] monetary
award which shall form part of this decision. The complaint for damages is dismissed.
The complaint against Shoemart, Inc., is likewise DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO
ORDERED. 4

The respondents in the labor case, namely the Spouses Mercado, doing business under
the name and style of M.A. Mercado Construction, interposed an appeal which was
dismissed for failure to post an appeal bond. Thus, an Alias Writ of Execution was
issued to implement the Decision. Thereafter, the complainants in the labor case filed
an Ex Parte Motion for Amendment of an Alias Writ of Execution.5 They claimed that
they could hardly collect the judgment award from M.A. Mercado Construction because
it allegedly transferred its assets to M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. They thus prayed that the
Alias Writ of Execution be amended to include M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its
incorporators/stockholders6 as additional entity/personalities against which the writ of
execution shall be enforced. In an Order7 dated February 10, 2006, respondent granted
the motion to amend the alias writ of execution. Accordingly, on February 17, 2006 an
Amended Alias Writ of Execution was issued to enforce the monetary judgment
amounting to P19,527,623.55 against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its incorporators.
By way of special appearance, M.A. Blocks Work, Inc., together with three of its
stockholders who are the complainants in this administrative case, namely Yolanda A.
Andres, Minette A. Mercado and Elito P. Andres, filed an Urgent Motion to Quash8 the
Amended Alias Writ of Execution, contending that they are not bound by the judgment
as they were not parties to the labor case. In an Order9 dated March 13, 2006,
however, respondent denied the Urgent Motion to Quash. Aggrieved, herein
complainants filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment, which we referred to the IBP
on March 4, 2007 for investigation, report and recommendation.10

IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In his Report and Recommendation11 dated September 6, 2010, the Investigating

Commissioner found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended
that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. This was
adopted and approved with modification by the IBP Board of Governors in an April 12,
2011 Resolution, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLUTION NO. XIX-2011-110 Adm. Case No. 7158 Yolanda A. Andres, et al.
vs. Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
“A”; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, considering respondent[’s] contumacious disregard of the
lawful Order of Supreme Court and the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, and for
his failure to appear despite due notices, Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.12(Emphasis in the
original).

Issue

Whether respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Our Ruling

At the outset, it must be emphasized that in this administrative proceeding, our

discussion should be limited only on the issue of whether respondent acted in gross
ignorance of the law when he granted the motion to amend the alias writ of execution;
when he issued an Amended Alias Writ of Execution to enforce the monetary judgment
against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its incorporators; and when he denied
complainants’ Urgent Motion to Quash. As a rule, for one to be held administratively
accountable for gross ignorance of the law, there must be a showing that the error was
gross and patent as to support a conclusion that the actor was so moved with malice,
bad faith, corruption, fraud, and dishonesty. As such, our discussion should be focused
primarily on whether respondent grossly erred in issuing the above orders as to amount
to malice, bad faith, corruption, fraud and dishonesty. On the other hand, we need not
delve into the issue of whether there is an apparent misapplication of the doctrine of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction when respondent issued the Amended Alias Writ of
Execution. For one, it is outside the ambit of this administrative proceeding. Moreover,
the issue of whether the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction applies is the
subject of an appeal brought by complainants before the National Labor Relations
Commission and eventually to the Court of Appeals.13 We perused the records of the
case particularly respondent’s Order14 dated March 13, 2006 denying complainants’
Urgent Motion to Quash. Therein, we note that respondent’s ruling was not arrived at
arbitrarily; on the contrary, he cited grounds based on his personal assessment of the
facts at hand, viz:
As culled from the case record, there is substantial evidence that respondents Maximo
A. Mercado and Aida A. Mercado, who are doing business under the name and style of
M.A. Mercado Construction put up a corporation in the name of M.A. Block Works, Inc.
where individual movants are one of the incorporators. We give credence to the
argument of the complainants that the incorporators therein are relatives of Maximo A.
Mercado and Aida Mercado as shown by the Articles of Incorporation adduced by the
former. The incorporators listed have similar family names of the Mercados and the
Andreses and common address at Gen. Hizon, Quezon City and 50 Daisy St., Quezon
City, and Maximo A. Mercado is the biggest stockholder. Aside from the Articles of
Incorporation, complainants also submitted a Letter of Intent/Notice To Proceed where
respondents, despite their representation that they have already ceased their business
operation, are still continuing their business operation. The documents submitted by the
complainants were corroborated by certification issued by Maggie T. Jao, AVP-Assistant
Controller of SM Prime Holdings, Inc. that based on their records, an amount of
P3,291,300.00 representing a sum total of all goods, effects, money and credit that was
garnished belong to M.A. Mercado Construction and/or Maximo Mercado and/or Aida
Mercado and/or M.A. Block Works, Inc. and/or Gertrudes Casilda A. Mercado, Yolanda
A. Andres, Minette A. Mercado and/or Elito P. Andres. This Office has therefore, enough
reason to conclude that respondents Maximo A. Mercado and Aida Mercado and the
movants herein are one and the same. Movants are alter egos or business conduits to
defraud the complainants and to consequently evade payment of judgment award. x x
x As respondents are duly notified and aware of the execution proceedings, the
argument of denial of due process is untenable.15
It is apparent from the foregoing disquisition that respondent’s conclusion had some
bases and was not plucked from thin air, so to speak. Clearly, respondent did not act
whimsically or arbitrarily; his ruling could not in any manner be characterized as
imbued with malice, fraud or bad faith. To reiterate what we have already stated above,
we are not here to judge in this present administrative proceeding whether
respondent’s ratiocination on the application of the piercing of corporate veil is correct;
our only concern here is to decide whether respondent’s error was so gross as to
amount to fraud and dishonesty. Based on the above-quoted disquisition, it cannot be
said, by any stretch of imagination, that respondent’s error, if any, was so gross or that
he was actuated by malice when he issued the above orders. His conclusion was
reached after an examination of the documents presented and evaluation and
assessment of the arguments raised by the parties. He did not capriciously rule on the
issues presented; on the contrary, he exerted efforts to weigh the positions of the
contending parties. In any event, we hold that respondent should not be held
accountable for committing an honest mistake or an error in the appreciation of the
facts of the case before him. Otherwise every labor arbiter or any judicial or quasi-
judicial officer for that matter, would be continually plagued with the possibility of being
administratively sanctioned for every honest mistake or error he commits. For sure, this
would not augur well to the administration of justice as a whole. Pertinently, the Court
ruled in Andrada v. Judge Banzon,16viz:
Well-settled is the rule that unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty,
corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice,
respondent judge may not be held administratively liable for gross misconduct,
ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions
and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases. Further, to hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous rule or decision he renders would be
nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable. To hold
otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of the administration of justice can be infallible
in his judgment.17
Based on the foregoing, we have no basis to hold respondent administratively liable for
gross ignorance of the law. However, we note that respondent had consistently and
obstinately disregarded the Court’s and IBP’s orders. It is on record that respondent
totally ignored the Court’s June 7, 2006 Resolution18 directing him to file his
Comment. He also failed to attend the mandatory conference before the IBP’s
Commission on Bar Discipline despite notice.19 Neither did he file his Position Paper. As
a former Labor Arbiter, respondent should know that orders of the court “are not mere
requests but directives which should have been complied with promptly and
completely.”20 “He disregarded the oath he took when he was accepted to the legal
profession ‘to obey the laws and the legal orders of the duly constituted legal
authorities.’ x x x His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey
court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court
directives as an officer of the court.”21 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. –
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis
supplied)

Considering that this appears to be respondent’s first infraction, we find it proper to

impose on him the penalty of reprimand with warning that commission of the same or
similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, the Court REPRIMANDS respondent Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi for

obstinately and unjustifiably refusing to obey lawful orders of the Court and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act or offense shall be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Resolution be
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted in Atty. Nambi’s record as a
member of the Bar.
OCA IPI NO. 14-220-CA-J

RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28, 2014 OF WENEFREDO PARREÑO, ET AL., AGAINST
HON. CELIA C. LIBREA-LEAGOGO, HON. ELIHU A. YBAÑEZ AND HON. AMY C. LAZARO-
JAVIER, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP NO.
108807

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

We hereby resolve the administrative complaint  brought against Court of Appeals (CA) Associate
1

Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez and Associate Justice Amy C.
Lazaro- Javier for their undue delay in rendering the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 entitled
Susan Enriquez and Alma Rodriguez v. Wenefredo Parreño, Ronnie Cuevas and Joseph
Denamarca.

Antecedents

Complainants Wenefredo Parreno and Ronnie Cuevas, with Joseph Denamarca, filed a protest in
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources of the National Capital Region (DENR-NCR)
against the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14391 and TCT No. 14188 in favor of
Susan Enriquez and Alma Rodriguez covering two lots inside the Signal Village, Taguig.  The 2

DENR-NCR dismissed the protest,  but the dismissal was subsequently reversed by the
3

DENR.  Aggrieved, Enriquez and Rodriguez appealed to the Office of the President (OP), which
4

denied their appeal.  With their motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied,  Enriquez
5 6

and Rodriguez appealed to the CA by petition for review,  and it is such appeal from which this
7

administrative complaint arose.

It appears that on June 26, 2012, the Special Sixteenth (16th) Division of the CA issued its resolution
submitting C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 for decision.  However, the complainants lament that from the
8

issuance of the resolution until the filing of their complaint on February 8, 2014, the respondents,
who comprised the Special 16th Division of the CA, had not rendered the decision, which the
complainants insist was in patent violation of the mandatory period within which the respondents
should decide under Section 15(1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
9

The Court required the respondents to submit their comments on the administrative complaint.

In her comment,  Justice Librea-Leagogo narrated that she became the Chairperson of the CA 16th
10

Division effective June 4, 2012 conformably with CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR, and she served
as such until July 5, 2012 in accordance with the successive reorganizations implemented in the CA
under CA Office Order No. 198-12-ABR  and CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR,  respectively. Citing
11 12

Section 1, Rule VI of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (2009 IRCA),  Justice Librea-
13

Leagogo denied liability for incurring any undue delay because of her short stint as the Chairperson
of the 16th Division, and considering further that C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 followed Justice Ybañez
as the assigned ponente in his transfer to the Fourteenth (14th) Division pursuant to CA Office Order
No. 220-12-ABR, and eventually to the Thirteenth (13th) Division, the Division that ultimately
promulgated the awaited decision on February 28, 2014. 14
Justice Ybañez admitted in his comment  that C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 was part of his initial
15

caseload following his transfer to Manila in December 2009. He stated that he had conscientiously
complied with the Zero Backlog Project (ZBP) initiated by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. by
giving utmost priority to the older cases assigned to him; that he had already assigned C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 108807 to a member of his legal staff, but the latter had meanwhile fallen seriously ill; that due to
lack of personnel and a heavy caseload, he had hired a contractual-lawyer who later resigned upon
being offered a permanent position in another agency of the Government; that after disposing of the
older cases assigned to him, he had rendered the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 on February
28, 2014 before becoming aware of the administrative complaint; and that he had not been remiss in
his duty and responsibility to promptly administer justice by virtue of his disposing a monthly average
of 15 cases.16

Justice Lazaro-Javier explained her participation in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 as limited to the
adoption and promulgation on June 26, 2012 of the resolution submitting the case for decision
because only filled in the brief vacancy occasioned by the temporary absence of Justice Victoria
Isabel Paredes, then the regular Member of the 16th Division. She pointed out, however, that she
had nothing more to do with the case upon the return of Justice Paredes; hence, she could not be
administratively liable for any delay in deciding the case. 17

Issue

Are the respondents liable for undue delay in deciding C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807?

Ruling

The administrative complaint is without merit.

The Constitution mandates a lower collegiate court like the CA to resolve a case within 12 months
from the submission of the last required pleading or as set by the court itself. This is clear from
paragraphs (1) and (2), Section 15 of Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or
resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for
all lower courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.

xxxx

Did the respondents incur any administrative liability for the delay?

Although C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 was submitted for decision by the Special 16th Division on June
26, 2012 after the parties did not file their memoranda,  it was the 13th Division of the CA
18

(composed of Justice Ybañez as the ponente, Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as the Chairman, and
Justice Melchor Quirino C. Sadang) that promulgated the decision on February 28, 2014, or nearly
20 months later. Accordingly, the Court answers the query in the negative, for, pursuant to Section 1,
Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA, the adjudication of cases was the responsibility of the assigned Justice
and the Members of the Division to which he or she then belonged. Determining who should be
administratively accountable must consider the specific role each of the respondents played leading
to the resolution of C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807. Under the applicable rule of the 2009 IRCA, the
liability for undue delay in resolving C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 might devolve only on the Members of
the 13th Division who actually promulgated the decision.

Justice Librea-Leagogo and Justice Lazaro-Javier were not accountable for the delay in rendering
the judgment. Justice Librea-Leagogo had a limited participation in respect of C.A.- G.R. SP No.
108807 because the reorganization of the CA ensuing after the promulgation of the resolution by the
Special 16th Division on June 26, 2012 caused her transfer to the 15th Division through CA Office
Order No. 220-12-ABR,  terminating her responsibility in C.A.- G.R. SP No. 108807. Justice Lazaro-
19

Javier should also be exculpated because her participation was limited to her acting as a special
Member of the 16th Division in lieu of Justice Paredes. Such substitution prevented a vacuum in the
regular 16th Division, and conformed to the procedure stated in Section 6(d), Rule I of the 2009
IRCA.  The constitution of the Special 16th Division was by virtue of CA Office Order No. 220-12-
20

ABR. 21

Justice Ybañez, as the ponente for C.A. G.R. SP No. 108807, carried the case with him when he
was transferred to the 13th Division. But whether or not he was administratively liable for the delay of
eight months should depend on the relevant circumstances. Although often holding that a heavy
caseload is insufficient reason to excuse a Judge from disposing his cases within the reglementary
period,  the Court has applied this rule by considering the causes of the delay. In Marquez v.
22

Manigbas,  the Court relieved the respondent judge from liability because the delay had been
23

caused by the sudden deluge of cases brought about by the expansion of the jurisdiction of the
municipal trial courts. In Santos v. Lorenzo,  the Court held that a delay of seven months in deciding
24

a case could be excused because of the heavy caseload of the trial courts in the National Capital
Judicial Region. In Lubaton v. Lazaro,  the Court, in sparing the respondent from the sanctions
25

earlier imposed for undue delay, cited the good faith of the judge, the motivation of the complainant
for bringing the charge, and the excessively heavy caseload of 3,500 cases, 1,800 of which involved
detainees, leaving her only Fridays for the study of her cases and the resolution of pending incidents
and issuance of the proper orders. The Court, in reversing the sanctions, observed that "it would be
unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the Court to disregard respondent Judge's limitations and
exact a rigid and literal compliance with the rule."
26

The delay in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 could not be said to have been incurred by Justice Ybañez
with malice or deliberate attempt to impede the dispensation of justice.  He assigned C.A.-G.R. SP
1âwphi1

No. 108807 to a member of his legal staff, but the latter had fallen seriously ill in the meantime,
forcing him to hire a contractual-lawyer for the purpose. The latter subsequently joined another
agency of the Government on a permanent basis. Thus, Justice Ybañez could promulgate the
decision only on February 28, 2014. His explanation for the delay, being entirely plausible, is
accepted.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES for lack of merit the administrative complaint against Justice
Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, Justice Elihu A. Ybañez and Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier.
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2399               November 19, 2014
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 13-4013-RTJ]

GASPAR BANDOY, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 45, and ACTING PRESIDING
JUDGE, BRANCH 46, both at REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE, OCCIDENT AL
MINDORO, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

For review before the Court is this administrative case against respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr.
(Judge Jacinto, Jr.) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branches 45  and 46,  San Jose, Occidental
1 2

Mindoro, filed by Gaspar Bandoy (Bandoy) for Grave Abuse of Authority in relation to Criminal Case
No. 2-1928,  entitled "People of the Philippines v. Caspar Bandoy, Peter Alfaro and Randolph
3

Ignacio" and Criminal Case No. Z-1910, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Romulo De Jesus, Jr."

Complainant Bandoy alleged, inhis verified complaint,  that he was one of the accused in Criminal
4

Case No. 2-1928, for Serious Illegal Detention filed by Romulo De Jesus, Jr. (De Jesus, Jr.),which
was raffled to Branch 44 of the RTC, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro (RTC-Br. 44), with Judge
Jacinto, Jr. as the Assisting Presiding Judge. Bandoy claimed that the case was initiated by De
Jesus, Jr. to get back at him for being instrumental in the filing of an earlier criminal complaint
against him for Violation of Article XXII, Section 261, paragraph 7, number 14 of the Omnibus
Election Code (Ballot Switching). The said case was likewise raffled to RTC-Br. 44.

Bandoy also averred that he was an election watcher of former Mayor Joel Panaligan during the
2007 local elections, while De Jesus, Jr., a teacher of their municipality’s public elementary school,
was one of the chairpersons of the Board of Election Inspectors; thatthey were both assigned in
Precinct 3-A of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro; that De Jesus, Jr. was rumored to be closely
associated with the rival mayoralty candidate, Voltaire Anthony C. Villarosa (Voltaire), son of House
representative Amelita C. Villarosa (Cong. Villarosa)and Mayor Jose Tapales Villarosa (Mayor
Villarosa) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; that in the said local elections, De Jesus, Jr. was caught
in the act of ballot switching, which was captured on video by a member of the media, a certain
Randy Bool; that by virtue of a search warrant from the Commission of Elections (COMELEC), De
Jesus, Jr. was caught in possession of some ballots insidehis backpack; and that as a result of this
incident, De Jesus, Jr. was criminally charged with the offense of ballot switching. Accordingly, on
August 17, 2007, a warrant of arrest was issued against De Jesus, Jr. 5

According to Bandoy, on August 20, 2007, De Jesus, Jr. personally appeared before Provincial
Prosecutor Levitico Salcedo to file a criminal case for Serious Illegal Detention against him, Peter
Alfaro, Randolph Ignacio, and then Election Supervisor, Atty. Judy Lorenzo (Atty. Lorenzo).
Apparently, De Jesus, Jr. did this while there was a standing warrant of arrest against him. Worse,
De Jesus, Jr. remained at-large until he was able to post bail on March 7, 2008 before then Las
Pinas RTC Judge Raul B. Villanueva.  Because complainant Bandoy was charged with Serious
6

Illegal Detention, the provincial prosecutor recommended "no bail" leaving them incarcerated for
morethan two years. 7

Bandoy further claims that Judge Jacinto, Jr. committed grave abuse of his authority by displaying
manifest bias and partiality in favor of De Jesus, Jr. when he granted several postponements of De
Jesus, Jr.’s arraignment, originally scheduled on April 23, 2008,  but was reset for seven times until
8

De Jesus, Jr. entered a plea of not guilty supposedly inside Judge Jacinto, Jr.’s chambers on July 6,
2011.9

Bandoy emphasized that many of the said resettings were mostly due to De Jesus, Jr.’s non-
appearance for failure to locate him at his given address. Despite these supposed obvious court
defiance, Judge Jacinto, Jr. remained lenient and seemingly tolerated his continuous non-
appearance in the court’s subsequent scheduled hearings. Another example of Judge Jacinto, Jr.’s
supposed unreasonable bias towards Bandoy was his lack of interest to dispose of the case of
serious illegal detention despite De Jesus, Jr.’s obvious dilatory tactics and unjustified absences
when his appearance was necessary.

Bandoy, along with his co-accused, moved for reconsideration and filed a petition for review before
the Department of Justice (DOJ)to have the serious illegal detention case against them dismissed.
Meanwhile, coaccused Atty. Lorenzo filed a separate petition with the Court of Appeals (CA)and won
the case. The Court later affirmed the dismissal of the case against her. At first, the DOJ denied their
petition. Upon reconsideration, however, the DOJ, under the helm of Justice Secretary Leila De
Lima, directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Occidental Mindoro, to cause the withdrawal
of the case against Bandoy and his co-accused.  Accordingly, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
10

filed its Motion to Withdraw Information.

Judge Jacinto, Jr., in an order,  dated July 5, 2011, denied the motion to withdraw information. In the
11

end, Bandoy was only able to regain temporary freedom when Judge Jacinto, Jr. finally resolved  to 12

allow him to post a bail bond of ₱100,000.00 each or a total of ₱300,000.00.  Bandoy added that
13

Voltaire was a principal sponsor in the wedding of Judge Jacinto, Jr.’s child.

Thereafter, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was assigned to another sala, while Judge Wilfredo De Joya Mayor
(Judge Mayor) became the assisting presiding judge of Branch 44. It was during this time that the
case for serious illegal detention was temporarily dismissed, but upon reconsideration, Judge Mayor
decided to reinstate and continue the case against Bandoy. Meanwhile, the case of ballot switching
against De Jesus, Jr. was dismissed on October 25, 2012,  while their bail for the serious illegal
14

detention case was cancelled. 15

According to complainant Bandoy, the compelling force that made him initiate this present
administrative case was because Judge Jacinto, Jr. would take over Judge Mayor’s assignments on
account of the latter’s compulsory retirement from service on December 1, 2012, which would
include their pending serious illegal detention case. He claimed that Judge Jacinto, Jr. ordered the
police and the CIDG to re-arrest him and his coaccused even though there was no warrant of arrest
against them.  He begged the Court not to let Judge Jacinto, Jr. handle their case of serious illegal
16

detention for fear that they would have to endure another bout of extreme bias and partiality from
him.

In his Comment,  Judge Jacinto, Jr. denied being an ally of the Villarosa clan.  He also denied
17 18

having a hand in the order to arrest Bandoy and his co-accused as the Chief of PNP and the CIDG
Chief, both of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, merely consulted him on how to go about the order of
cancellation of bail that Judge Mayor issued. He explained "wala po akong alam sa Kautusan kaya
binasa po sa akin ang nilalaman nito sa cellphone at pagkatapos ay nagwika po akong parang may
kulang sa Kautusan at kapag nakansela ang piyansa ay babalik sila sa selda dahil wala na po silang
piyansa (as a consequence thereof)."  Judge Jacinto, Jr. even refused to issue a warrant of arrest
19

when he was asked because he was not handling the case anymore. 20
Bandoy, in his Reply,  brought to the attention of the Court that Judge Jacinto, Jr., in order to
21

thwartthe enemies of his supposed master, Mayor Villarosa, issued warrants of arrest against ten
individuals.  He also divulged that the audit team from the Court was personally assisted by Judge
22

Jacinto, Jr. and given accommodations in "Aroma Center," one of the properties of Mayor
Villarosa.  Bandoy was thankful that Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not deny the fact that the police officials
23

wanted to arrest them even without a warrant of arrest.  Bandoy showed a timeline of events
24

supposedly depicting how De Jesus, Jr., through the tolerance and partiality of Judge Jacinto, Jr.,
evaded arraignment on numerous occasions effectively delaying the progress of the case for ballot
switching and even actually conducting the arraignment in his chambers.  He further reiterated his
25

plea not to let Judge Jacinto, Jr. preside over the affairs of Branch 44.

In his Rejoinder,  Judge Jacinto, Jr. stated that he was again assigned as Assisting Presiding Judge
26

of Branch 44.  He clarified that he indeed issued warrants of arrest against ten individuals in
27

connection with a serious illegal detention case against them, but only after a finding of probable
cause by the public prosecutor handling it. Judge Jacinto, Jr. reiterated that he merely affirmed the
finding of probable cause, which justified the issuance of the warrants of arrest as the charge was a
non-bailable offense.  He likewise denied seeking any favor from Mayor Villarosa to accommodate
28

the audit team in their property, the Aroma Family Hotel. He explained that the audit team paid him a
"courtesy call" where he assured the team of his cooperation.  He again restated that the police
29

officials merely coordinated with him as was customary because he was the Executive Judge of the
municipality.  Judge Jacinto, Jr. believes that Bandoy’s accusations against him were designed to
30

oust him as Presiding Judge of Branches 45 and 46 of San Jose and even as Assisting Presiding
Judge of Branch 44, Mamburao, both in the province of Occidental Mindoro. 31

In its Report,  dated June 03, 2014, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) did not give
32

credence to Bandoy’s allegation that Judge Jacinto, Jr. issued an order for his arrest without a
warrant and to the insinuation that the Court’s audit team was conveniently housed in Aroma Family
Hotel of the Villarosas for failure to present proof.  The OCA observed, however, that Judge Jacinto,
33

Jr. never refuted the allegations of leniency over the several resettings of the arraignment of De
Jesus, Jr. and that the arraignment was held in his chambers. As such, the OCA equated his silence
to admission. 34

Thus, the OCA recommended that:

1. The administrative complaint against Presiding Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr., Branch 45,
Regional Trial Court, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, be RE-DOCKETED as regular
administrative matter; and

2. Respondent Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr. be found GUILTY of Bias and Partiality and Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Procedure and, accordingly, be FINEDin the amount of Forty
Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely. 35

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA.

Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code ofJudicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the law
and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence and diligence are prerequisites to the
due performance of judicial office. 36
Everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know the law. One who accepts the exalted position of
a judge owes the public and the Court the duty to maintain professional competence at all times. 37

In this case, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was directly confronted with an allegation that he arraigned De Jesus,
Jr. inside his chambers.  He was given the opportunity to answer, but he chose not to delve into it.
1âwphi1

Ultimately, Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not squarely face the issues being imputed against him, which was
quite irregular since it was his name and his capacity as a member of the bench, that was being
challenged. As aptly observed by the OCA, "the natural instinct of man impels him to resist an
unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. It isagainst human nature to just remain reticent
and say nothing in the face of false accusations."  His silence introduces doubt in the minds of the
38

public, which is not acceptable.

Given the exacting standards required of magistrates in the application of the law and procedure, the
Court finds Judge Jacinto, Jr. administratively guilty of gross ignorance of Rule 116 of the Revised
Rules of Court, specifically Section 1(a) thereof requiring arraignment of an accused to be made in
open court, to wit:

Section 1. Arraignment and plea, how made. – (a) The accused must be arraigned before the court
where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in
open courtby the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or
information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he
pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other then those named in
the complaint or information.

(Emphasis supplied)

The procedural steps laid down in Section 1(a) of Rule 116 are not empty rituals that a judge can
take nonchalantly. Each step constitutes an integral part of that crucial stage in criminal litigation
"where the issues are joined x x x and without which the proceedings cannot advance further." 39

Thus, anything less than is required by Section 1(a) of Rule 116 constitutes gross ignorance of the
law.  There is gross ignorance of the law when the error committed by the judge was "gross or
40

patent, deliberate or malicious."  It may also be committed when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails
41

to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.  Gross
42

ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith. 43

The Court has impressed upon judges that they owe it to the public and the legal profession to know
the very law that they are supposed to apply in a given controversy.  They are called upon to exhibit
44

more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, to be conversant with the
basic law, and to maintain the desired professional competence.  When a judge displays an utter
45

lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes
the public and the Court the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws
and prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of
injustice.
46

Canon 2,  Rule 2.01  and Canon 3  of the Code of Judicial Conduct likewise emphasize that judges,
47 48 49

as officers of the court, have the duty to see to it that justice is dispensed with evenly and fairly. Not
only must they be honest and impartial, but they must also appear to be honest and impartial in the
dispensation of justice. Judges should make sure that their acts are circumspect and do not arouse
suspicion in the minds of the public. When they fail to do so, such acts may cast doubt upon their
integrity and ultimately the judiciary in general.  As held in Joselito Rallos, et al., vs. Judge Ireneo
50

Lee Gako Jr., Branch 5 RTC, Cebu City: 51

Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be impartial but should also appear
impartial." Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would
become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must
not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any
suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.

This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court judges
like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the
litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of
the people’s sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond reproach.

Here, the Court cannot fathom why the arraignment of De Jesus, Jr. was postponed from 2007 to
2011 without appropriate action coming from the court. Judge Jacinto, Jr. should have availed of
known legal remedies to compel De Jesus, Jr. to personally appear for his arraignment, but he did
not. The appearance of leniency seemingly exhibited in favor of De Jesus, Jr. gives an impression of
bias and partiality that should be addressed and corrected. 1âwphi1

Consequently, under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-
SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Section 11 (A) of the
same Rule provides that the penalty to be imposed if a respondent Judge is found guilty of a serious
charge is either a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not more than ₱40,000.00, suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months, or
dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned
or controlled corporations.

The Court is aware of the other pending administrative cases against Judge Jacinto, Jr., but they
cannot be fully considered in the imposition of the penalty in this case as they are still under review
and evaluation. Thus, a fine of ₱40,000.00  is deemed appropriate under the circumstances.
52

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of
the Law and Procedure and of Bias and Partiality. Accordingly, he is FINED in the amount of Forty
Thousand (₱40,000.00) Pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2443
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3521-RTJ)

ARMANDO M. BALANAY, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JULIANA ADALIM WHITE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Eastern Samar, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law and serious misconduct filed by
complainant Armando M. Balanay against respondent Judge Juliana Adalim-White.

Factual Antecedents

On September 20, 2010, complainant filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a
verified Affidavit-Complaint  charging respondent with gross ignorance of the law for allowing Isidoro
1

N. Adamas, Jr. (Adamas) six furloughs despite being charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 10-
07, a non-bailable offense. Worse, respondent granted Adama's motions without requiring the
prosecution to comment or giving it opportunity to be heard thereon.

Complainant likewise charged respondent with serious misconduct in precipitately dismissing

Criminal Case No. 10-07 by declaring that the prosecution had no witnesses to present when the
records showed otherwise. According to the complainant, the prosecution wi1nesses were not able
to attend the hearing on July 22, 2010 because they were not duly notified. In fact, he and his son
were willing to testify provided they are placed under the witness protection program.

Complainant further claimed that respondent falsified the July 22, 2010 transcript of stenographic
notes (TSN) in Criminal Case No. 10-07. He averred that during the hearing held on said date, the
prosecution made a reservation to present additional witnesses. Respondent, however, instructed
her court stenographer, Prescila V. Mosende (Mosende), to delete from said TSN such reservation
and insert therein other statements which were not made during the said hearing. In support of his
allegations, complainant submitted a piece of paper  containing respondent’s handwritten notes that
2

were incorporated in the July 22, 2010 TSN.

Complainant sought the dismissal of respondent from the service with forfeiture of her retirement
benefits.

In her Comment,  respondent admitted that she instructed Mosende to correct the July 22, 2010 TSN
3

to make it more coherent and accurate. She claimed that the changes were based on her own notes
which Mosende adopted after verifying them from the taped recordings of the proceedings.
Respondent maintained that the prosecution never made any reservation to present additional
witnesses.

Respondent explained that she granted Adamas six furloughs based on the affidavits of desistance
subscribed before Prosecutor Raquel G. Kho (Prosecutor Kho) which were already attached to the
records of Criminal Case No. 10-07. She also insisted that Adamas is not a flight risk because he
voluntarily surrendered himself to the police.
Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and that complainant be cited for contempt.

On June 15, 2011, this Court referred this administrative matter to the Court of Appeals, Cebu
Station for raffle among the Justices therein and for the Justice to whom this case would be
assigned to conduct an investigation and submit a report and recommendation. 4

Report and recommendation of Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy.

On July 31, 2013, Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy (Justice Diy) submitted her Final Report and
Recommendations.  She opined that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for allowing
5

Adamas several furloughs based on motions that did not contain a notice of hearing, did not comply
with the 3-day notice rule, and were not set for hearing. She, however, recommended that
respondent be absolved from the charge of serious misconduct in dismissing the case for want of
proof of corruption or willful intent to violate the law. She noted that the propriety of such dismissal
was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari. With regard the alleged falsification
of the TSN, Justice Diy recommended its dismissal for failure to formally offer in evidence the
subject July 22, 2010 TSN. Nonetheless, she found respondent guilty of simple misconduct
considering that the records amply show that respondent attempted to alter the questioned TSN.

Justice Diy recommended that respondent be fined in the amounts of P30,000.00 for gross
ignorance of the law and P10,000.00 for simple misconduct.

On November 11, 2013, we referred this administrative matter to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation.

OCA’s Recommendation.

In its Memorandum  dated May 21, 2014, the OCA agreed with Justice Diy that respondent patently
6

and inexcusably transgressed the rules on motions and for which misfeasance she is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law. With regard the charge of serious misconduct, the OCA found substantial
evidence to support the same. For the OCA -

the copy of the altered TSN and the scratch paper containing the statements to be inserted in the
TSN that were handwritten by respondent Judge herself attached to the complaint-affidavit, the
testimony of Mosende that it was [the] respondent Judge who ordered the insertion of the
statements, the admission of [the] respondent Judge x x x that she ordered the insertion of the said
statements, and the transcription of the stenographers of the Court of Appeals of the hearing
covered by the altered TSN 7

sufficiently established that respondent caused the unauthorized alteration of the TSN which
amounts to serious misconduct.

Moreover, the OCA noted that this is not the first time that respondent has been found
administratively liable, viz.:

In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2147 [Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2365-RTJ] (Mayor Diego T. Lim vs. Judge
Juliana A. White, Regional Trial Court, Br. 5, Oras, Eastern Samar), respondent judge was charged
with impropriety and found guilty of conduct unbecoming under Section 1, Rule 140 for which she
was reprimanded and warned. In A.M. No. RTJ-14-2474 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3777-RTJ]
(Vilma Sulse, et al. vs. Judge Juliana Adalim White, Regional Trial Court, Br. 5, Oras, Eastern
Samar), respondent Judge was again found guilty of impropriety and fined ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) and sternly warned. 8

The OCA, thus, recommended that respondent be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
gross misconduct, and that she be suspended from office without salary and other benefits for six
months. 9

Issue

Is respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law and serious misconduct?

Our Ruling

We adopt the findings and recommendations of the OCA, except as to penalty.

Respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Respondent admits allowing Adamas six consecutive furloughs to attend regular sessions of
the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Oras, Eastern Samar based on very urgent motions
that did not contain notice of hearing and were not heard in open court. Thus:

ATTY. ARELLANO:

Now, you said that furlough was granted by [you] on June 18, 2010, right?

JUDGE WHITE:

Yes, sir.

ATTY. ARELLANO:

Did you hear that motion first before you granted it?

JUDGE WHITE:

No, sir.

Q :Why not?

A :I did not hear it anymore because there is already an affidavit of desistance coming from the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and so I feel that the evidence is not strong anymore and I
examined the circumstances of the accused, Mr. Isidoro Adamas. The offense was committed on
May 28, he surrendered to the authorities on June 1 and the information was filed. To me he was not
a flight risk. 10

ATTY. ARELLANO:

When you read the first motion asking for a furlough on June 18, 2010, you will agree with me that it
no longer occurred to your mind to ask the prosecution, specifically Public Prosecutor Raquel G.
Kho, to comment or opposed tet [sic] said motion. You did not ask Public Prosecutor Kho to
comment, is that right?

A :I did not ask him to comment, but we met [at] the lobby and we talked about [those] furloughs and
the affidavit of desistance.

Q :Madame Witness, you are a Regional Trial Court Judge x x x Are you saying that a casual
meeting outside the courtroom at the lobby will suffice? Is that what you mean?

A :No, but the affidavit of desistance was subscribed by Prosecutor Kho.

Q :I am just asking. Is that what you mean that it is sufficient already? Yes or no?

A :Yes, I supposed so because I did that.

xxxx

Q :So that is the practice of others in your Court to notify the other parties of the pending motion
even outside [your] courtroom even if you met the other party casually in the lobby of the court? (sic)

A :Usually, we notify them formally but it doesn’t prevent me especially lawyers, fiscals to talk with
them.

xxxx

ATTY. ARELLANO:

Now, Madame Witness, being a judge, are you aware of the provisions of the Rules of Court that a
notice which does not contain proof of service to other parties and in case if it is litigious does not
contain (sic) notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper?

A :That is correct[,] sir.

xxxx

Q :x x x Would that be enough for you to disregard the Rules of Court that a motion which does not
contain service to the other party or a notice of hearing specifically in this particular criminal case
wherein the accused was charge (sic) of (sic) a capital offense of murder. Was the existence of the
affidavit of desistance enough for you to disregard the application of the Rules of Court?

A :No, they were only asking for a furlough and I felt that Isidoro Adamas must attend that session
because he is a public official.

Q :I understand that he needed to attend. Now when you felt that he needed to attend the session,
was that also enough for you to disregard the rules that a motion must contain proof of service to the
other party and a notice of hearing? Was that enough for you to disregard those rules?

A :Yes, I considered the fact that Mr. Isidoro Adamas is a public official. So he has to work. 11

xxxx
Q :Madam Witness, you will agree with me that this motion was filed on June 18, 2010 at 8:50 a.m.,
as shown by the rubber stamp marking.

A :Yes, sir.

Q :And considering that the movant accused wanted to attend the session of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Oras, Eastern Samar on June 18, 2010 also on that very same day at 9 o’clock in the
morning you immediately granted this motion in your Order dated June 18, 2010 given in chambers
before 9 a.m.?

A :That is correct. There is no time indicated here. So, I don’t know. I cannot recall now, but that is
the Order. 12

It is basic, however, that bail hearing is necessary even if the prosecution does not interpose any
objection or leaves the application for bail to the sound discretion of the court.  Thus, in Villanueva v.
13

Judge Buaya,  therein respondent judge was held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the
14

law for granting an ex parte motion for bail without conducting a hearing. Stressing the necessity of
bail hearing, this Court pronounced that:

The Court has always stressed the indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail. Where
bail is a matter of discretion, the grant or the denial of bail hinges on the issue of whether or not the
evidence on the guilt of the accused is strong and the determination of whether or not the evidence
is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the judge to
properly exercise this discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence
of guilt is strong. This discretion lies not in the determination of whether or not a hearing should be
held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the prosecution's evidence of guilt
against the accused. 1âwphi1

In any event, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, a hearing for a petition for bail is required
in order for the court to consider the guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
in fixing the amount of bail. This Court has repeatedly held in past cases that even if the prosecution
fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an accused, the court may still
require the prosecution to answer questions in order to ascertain, not only the strength of the State's
evidence, but also the adequacy of the amount of bail. 15

A fortiori, respondent is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for granting ex
parte motions to allow Adama’s temporary liberty without setting the same for hearing. If hearing is
indispensable in motions for bail, more so in this case where the motions for the temporary liberty of
Adamas were filed without offering any bail or without any prayer that he be released on
recognizance. Besides, the reasons relied upon in said motions – to allow Adamas to attend
the Sangguniang Bayan sessions – had already been rebuked by this Court. In People v. Hon.
Maceda  reiterated in Trillanes IV v. Judge Pimentel Sr.,  this Court held that "all prisoners whether
16 17

under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor engage in
any business or occupation or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention."

That the prosecution has already filed affidavits of desistance  and that, to the opinion of
18

respondent, the accused is not a flight risk, do not justify non-compliance with procedural rules. It is
basic that bail cannot be allowed without prior hearing. It is also basic that litigious motions that do
not contain a notice of hearing are nothing but a useless piece of paper which the court should not
act upon. These rules are so elementary that not to know them constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. | In Atty. Adalim-White v. Judge Bugtas  (where incidentally herein respondent was the
19

complainant), we elucidated on gross ignorance of the law as follows:

We have held time and again that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. It is imperative that he be conversant with basic
legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should strive for excellence
exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the
rule of law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything
less than that would be gross ignorance of the law. x x x

Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

We also agree with the OCA that there is substantial proof to hold respondent liable for gross
misconduct even if the altered TSN was not formally offered in evidence. Respondent admitted in
her Comment  dated November 24, 2010 and Memorandum  dated May 1, 2013 that she instructed
20 21

Mosende to make some changes in the July 22, 2010 TSN, viz.:

When the draft [TSN] of the July 22, 2010 proceedings was submitted for correction to respondent
by the court stenographer, Ms. Prescila Mosende, the missing or omitted statements were brought to
her attention. To rectify the errors in the draft, respondent showed her notes to Ms. Mosende and
later transcribed it for the latter on another sheet of paper. Ms. Mosende verified the corrections by
referring it to her tape recordings.
22

The sheet of paper  mentioned on respondent’s Comment and Memorandum, on the other hand,
23

contains her handwritten notes that read as follows:

Court - What about this secret witness [whose identity] you do not want to make known x x x. Has an
application for witness protection program been applied with the DOJ?

Fiscal Kho - I believe not yet your honor. I myself [do] not know his identity. Last night your honor
Fiscal Umil informed me of his plan that a certain witness will be enrolled in the Witness Protection
Program.

Court - Why is there no formal notice to the Court?

Fiscal Kho - I just learned this last night during the wake.

Upon the instructions of respondent, these notes were, in turn, incorporated in the July 22, 2010
TSN and certified as true and correct by Mosende.

To determine the accuracy and correctness of said TSN, the investigating justice directed two
stenographic reporters  of Court of Appeals, Cebu Station to make their own transcription of the
24

proceedings in Criminal Case No. 10-07 held on July 22, 2010 based on audio records. From their
transcriptions, the above-quoted exchanges between respondent and Prosecutor Kho do not exist.
Indubitably, respondent tried to make it appear that she and Prosecutor Kho made the above-quoted
statements during the proceedings held on July 22, 2010 when in truth no such statements were
actually made.

A TSN "is supposed to be a faithful and exact recording of all matters that transpired during a court
proceeding."  Respondent’s act of directing her subordinate to alter the TSN by incorporating therein
25

statements pertaining to substantial matters that were not actually made during the hearing
constitutes gross misconduct which warrants administrative sanction.

Proper Penalty
The OCA recommended the penalty of suspension of six months without salary and other benefits
against respondent. In Mayor Lim v. Judge White,  however, we reprimanded respondent for
26

unbecoming conduct and warned her that the commission of similar acts of impropriety will be dealt
with more severely. Then in Sulse v. Judge White,  we again found respondent guilty of impropriety
27

and conduct unbecoming of a judge and imposed a penalty of fine of Pl0,000.00 with stem warning
that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt with more severely. Since respondent had
previously been adjudged guilty and penalized for various infractions, with repeated warnings of
more 'severe sanction in case of repetition, we deem it appropriate to increase the recommended
penalty of six months suspension to one year without salary and other benefits.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Juliana Adalim-White GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF

THE LAW and GROSS MISCONDUCT and SUSPENDS her from office for one (1) year without
salary and other benefits, and STERNLY WARNS her that this Court will not hesitate to impose the
supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, with all its accessory penalties, in case she commits
the same or other similar acts.

SO ORDERED.