TAJAN VS CUSI the enjoyment of the professional privilege accorded to him

may and ought to be forfeited. The law accords to the

FACTS:
 The petitioner was accused by respondent judge of
preparing false factual averments.
 The petitioner was required by the respondent judge to
explain within 72 hrs why the former should not be
suspended in the practice of law.
 The petitioner questioned the proceedings contending that
the respondent judge had no jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner.
ISSUE:
 W/N respondent judge had jurisdiction over the petitioner
since the case involves disbarment.
RULING:
Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance the power
to investigate and suspend members of the bar.
 It should be observed that proceedings for the disbarment
of members of the bar are not in any sense a civil action
where there is a plaintiff and the respondent is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They
are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
Welfare.
 Procedure prescribed for the suspension of a lawyer by the
Court of First Instance differs from that observed by the
Supreme Court.—Sections 3 to 6 of Rule 139 are not
applicable to the investigation of complaints against
attorneys in the Court of Appeals and in Courts of First
Instance.

YES. Petition without merit.

DOCTRINE:

 Court of First Instance has authority to investigate and

suspend erring attorneys.—An attorney-at-law is an officer
of the court in the administration of justice and as such he
is continually accountable to the Court for the manner in
which he exercises the privilege which has been granted to
him.
 His admission to the practice of law is upon the implied
condition that his continued enjoyment of the right
conferred is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe
person to exercise it.
 When it appears by acts of misconduct that he has
become unfit to continue with the trust reposed upon him,
his right to continue in the enjoyment of that trust and for
ALCALA VS. DE VERA
FACTS:
 The respondent Atty. De Vera was charge with gross
negligence and malpractice for not notifying the petitioners
over the decision in a civil case wherein the respondent
was their counsel.
 In the civil case filed against the petitioner, the trial court
rendered a judgment rescinding the contract of sale
executed over parcels of land which allegedly did not exist.
 The petitioners alleged they suffered damages because of
failure to notify them and that they have lost their right to
appeal.
ISSUE:
 W/N Atty. De Vera was guilty of gross negligence thus
should suffer disbarment.
pecuniary damage to his clients. For this reason, this Court
is not disposed to impose upon him what may be
considered in a lawyer’s career as the extreme penalty of
disbarment.
 Court authority to impose disbarment should be exercised
with discretion and caution.—The disbarment of an
attorney is not intended as a punishment, but is rather
intended to protect the administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this important function
shall be competent, honorable, and reliable; men in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence.
 Failure of lawyer to notify his clients of decision rendered in
case; Liability of lawyer for negligence.—In failing to inform
his clients of the decision in the civil case handled by him,
the lawyer failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence
as men of the legal profession commonly possess and
exercise in such matters of professional employment.

RULING:

 No. The respondent was guilty of simple negligence.

DOCRINE:

 Disbarment not warranted where although lawyer

negligent, no material or pecuniary damage resulted to
clients.—While there is no finding of malice, deceit, or
deliberate intent to cause damage to his clients, there is,
nonetheless, proof of negligence, inattention, and
carelessness on the part of the lawyer in his failure to give
timely notice of the decision to the clients. Fortunately for
him, his negligence did not result in any material or
CANTIBUHAN VS CRUZ
FACTS:
 Two of the petitioners were senior law students in UP Law,
as part of the law curriculum they are required to render
legal assistance.
 The said petitioners filed separate appearances as friends
of petitioner Catimbuhan.
 Respondent fiscal opposed the appearances and the
respondent judge disallowed the appearances of
petitioners.
ISSUE:
 W/N petitioners may appear as private prosecutor in this
case.
RULING:
 YES. TRO lifted.
DOCTRINE:
 Non-lawyers, including senior law students, can appear in
the municipal trial court as private prosecutors for accused
persons under the supervision and control of the fiscal;
Permission of the fiscal not necessary for one to enter his
appearance as private prosecutor.
 Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly
provides that in the municipal court a party may conduct
his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed
by him for the purpose
HYDRO RESOURCES VS. PAGALILAUAN
FACTS:
 Private respondent ban was working as legal assistant for
the petitioner.
 Aban was terminated by the petitioner on the ground of
failure to perform his duties.
 Aban filed a complain for illegal dismissal in NLRC.
 Labor arbiter ruled in favor of Aban.
 Petitioner contends that Aban was not an employee and
he was performing an acts constituting practice of law thus
NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE:
 W/N private respondent Aban was an employee of the
petitioner in this case.
RULING:
 YES. Petition is dismissed,
DOCTRINE:
 Employer-employee relationship; Lawyers; A lawyer may
be an employee of a private corporation or even of the
government.–––A lawyer, like any other professional, may
very well be an employee of a private corporation or even
of the government. It is not unusual for a big corporation to
hire a staff of lawyers as its in-house counsel, pay them
regular salaries, rank them in its table of organization, and
otherwise treat them like its other officers and employees.
 This Court has consistently ruled that the determination of
whether or not there is an employer-emloyee relation
depends upon four standards: (1) the manner of selection
and engagement of the putative employee; (2) the mode of
 payment of wages; (3) the presence or absence of a power
of dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of a power
to control the putative employee’s conduct. Of the four, the
right-of-control test has been held to be the decisive
factor.”
 In case at bar the lawyer is an employee of the petitioner
corporation.–––Aban was employed by the petitioner to be
its Legal Assistant as evidenced by his appointment paper
(Exhibit “A”). The petitioner paid him a basic salary plus
living allowance. Thereafter, Aban was dismissed on his
alleged failure to perform his duties well. (Exhibit “B”).
Aban worked solely for the petitioner and dealt only with
legal matters involving the said corporation and its
employees. He also assisted the Personnel Officer in
processing appointment papers of employees. This latter
duty is not an act of a lawyer in the exercise of his
profession but rather a duty for the benefit of the
corporation.
RAMOS VS. RADA
FACTS:
 Respondent was a court messenger in CFI Cam Norte.
 He was appointed by the CAvesco Marketing as an
administrator to manage and supervise real properties in
Cam Norte.
 The complaint against him was filed October 3 and he
requested permission regarding his private employment
only on October 27.
 There was no showing that his duties as court messenger
was affected by his employment as administrator in private
company.
ISSUE:
 W/N a court messenger may engage in private business
without obtaining permission of court.
RULING:
 No. Rada was guilty of technical violation and he was
reprimanded. However, he may apply for permission.
DOTRINE:
 Court messenger engaged in private business
reprimanded for failure to obtain permission of court.—
Rada has violated the civil service rule prohibiting
government employees from engaging directly in a private
business, vocation or profession or being connected with
any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of
the Department. But, indubitably, also, his private business
connection has not resulted in any prejudice to the
Government service. Thus, his violation of the rule—the
lack of prior permission—is a technical one, and he should BELTRAN VS ABAD
be meted no more than the minimum imposable penalty,
FACTS:
which is reprimand.
 Respondent Abad passed the Bar. However, he failed to
take the oath and sign in roll of attorneys.
 Beltran, president of Phil. Trial Lawyers Assoc. charged
the respondent of practicing law without being a member
of the Bar.
 These were the excuse of Abad:
o He [aid bar admission fee, certification fee, and
membership dues.
o A letter of request from the clerk of court of SC
shows that he was on the list of those qualified to
take the oath as member of the bar.
o He alleged that while waiting his turn to take oath,
he was called by the chief justice regarding a
complaint against him by certain Uy (deceased)
thus his taking of oath was suspended.
o IBP of Quezon City included his name of qualified
voter for the election in IBP.
ISSUE:

 W/N the explanation given by the respondent constitutes

membership in the bar thus, taking oath and signing in the
roll of attorneys are not needed.
RULING:

 NO. Act of respondent constitutes contempt of court.

DOCTRINE:

 Successful bar candidates; Practice of Law; Essential

requisites for becoming a lawyer.—Respondent Abad
should know that the circumstances which he has narrated
 do not constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and
the right to practise law thereafter. He should know that
two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to
be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered
by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
(Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.)
 Contempt; Practicing law without having been previously
admitted to the Philippine bar, although already successful
bar candidate, constitutes contempt of court; Fine of
P500.00 or 25 days imprisonment for failure to pay the
fine.—The proven charge against respondent Abad
contempt of court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e), Rules of Court.) Mr.
Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00)
pesos payable to this Court within ten (10) days from
notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days
imprisonment.
DIAO VS MARTINEZ
FACTS:
 Diao was admitted to the bar.
 He was charged by Martinez for falsely representing the
requisite academic qualifications for Bar exam.
 The SG submitted a report that Diao had not completed
the required pre – legal education prescribed by the
Department of Private Education:
o He did not complete HS
o He never attended Quisimbing College
 Diao admits but alleged that he passed the General
Classification Test in US army which is equivalent to HS
diploma.
ISSUE:
 W/N Diao should be removed from the roll of attorneys.
RULING:
YES.
DOCTRINE:
 Admission to bar obtained under false pretenses.—
Admission to the Bar obtained under false pretenses must
be revoked.
 Requisites to become attorney-at-law.—Before the study of
law, an applicant for admission must have completed the
prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner.