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Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing

Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop
Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on Tunneling
Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical
DETAILS
Systems, National Research Council. (1982)
150 pages | 8.5 x 10 | PAPERBACK
ISBN 978-0-309-29617-5 | DOI 10.17226/18562
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Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on on...
�esign and Construction

of Deep Underground
Basing Facilities
for Strategic Missiles
Volume 2 Briefings on System Concepts
and Requirements
Background Information Presented at

a Workshop Conducted by the
U.S. National Committee on Tunneling Technology
Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems
National Research Council
NAS·NAE
JUN 0 1 1982
LIBRARY
NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS
Washington, D.C. 1982
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

(..,
Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee on...
fd.- ()Q s
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.0'IS7 NOTICE: The proj ect that i s the subj ec t of the report in Volume 1 was
,q;J, approved by the Governing Board of the National Re search Counc i l , whose
v.2. members are drawn from the coun c i ls of the National Academy of Science s ,
t! I the National Academy of Engineering , and the Institute of Medic ine . The
workshop partic ipants re spons ib l e for that report were chosen for their
competence s and with regard for appropriate balanc e .
Thi s vo lume contains transcripts of briefings that were arranged for
by the sponsor of the workshop conducted by the commi ttee . The purpose
of thi s volume i s to provide a record of the background information pre
sented t o the workshop partic ipants . The subj ect matter and content o f
the bri e f ings , as wel l a s the views expres sed there in , are the sole re
spons ibi l i ty of the speaker s .
Thi s document has not been subj ec ted to the critical review proce
dure s that are the custom of the National Research Counc i l . Therefore ,
its contents have not been approved by and may not be ascribed to the
workshop partic ipants , the committee , or the National Research Counc i l .
SPONSOR: Thi s proj ect was sponsored by the Strategic Structures Divi s ion ,
Defense Nuc lear Agency ( DNA ) , through a contrac t with the Boe ing Company ,
which serve s as a contractor to DNA .
Available from
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Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing Facilities for Strategic Missiles: Report of a Workshop Conducted by the U.S. National Committee ...
Preface
In re sponse to a reque st from the Chief of the Strategic Struc tures Di
vision , Defense Nuc lear Agency , the u.s. National Committee on Tunneling
Technology (USNC/TT ) convened a workshop on the technology for de s ign and
construction of deep underground bas ing fac i l i ties for the MX mi s s i l e .
In its reque st , dated October 9 , 1981 , the Defense Nuc lear Agency ( DNA )
ind icated its interest in " evaluating the constructib i l i ty , vulnerab i l ity ,
and survivab i l ity of deep underground defense systems , " and cal led on the
USNC/TT to he lp in a s s e s s ing current and developing tunne ling technology
that would be important in des igning and cons tructing deep bas ing fac i l
itie s . Citing a n " urgent need t o re spond quickly t o changing defense
needs , " DNA asked that the workshop be held in early November and that
a report on the proceedings be completed in Apri l 1982.
The workshop was he ld on November 5 and 6 , 1981 , in Washington , D . C .
In attendance were a l l avai lable members of the USNC/TT and several of
its subcommi ttees , as we l l as selected pa st member s of the committee and
other s who se expertise wa s j udged indi spens ible . The f irst day , after a
brief executive se s s ion deal ing with procedural matters , was devoted to
publ i c br ief ings by representative s of the U . S . Air Force , the Defense
Nuc lear Agency , and several contrac tor s (Merritt CASES , Inc . , the Boeing
Company , and R&D As sociate s , Inc . ) that have performed conceptual and
des ign work on a spe cts of the deep bas ing problem . Transcripts of the se
briefing s , which were arranged for by the sponsor as background for the
comm i ttee , appear in thi s volume . The subj ec t matter and content of the
bri e f ing s , as we l l as the views expre ssed therein , are the re spons ibility
of the speakers .
As part of its reque st , the Defense Nuc lear Agency had asked for
spe c i f i c guidance in six areas : ( 1 ) costing , contracting , per sonnel , and
management ; ( 2 ) siting ; ( 3 ) use of existing underground space ; ( 4 ) egre s s ;
( 5 ) mechanical mining ; and ( 6 ) construction planning and val idation . The
USNC/TT accordingly had establi shed a working group to deal with each of
the se topic s . In the evening of the first day the six working groups met
separate ly and deve loped pre l iminary dra ft reports for pre sentation on
the fol lowing day .
The morning of the second day was occupied with the pre sentation o f
working group reports , again in open sess ion . In the afternoon the as
semb led tunne ling technolog i sts met in executive s e s sion to di scu s s the
iii

pre l iminary working group reports and agree on the general outlines of
the ir revis ion as chapters in the committee ' s report , which appears as
Volume I , Eva lua tion of Technica l Issues.
That report avoids the strategi c and political i s sue s surrounding
the MX missile s i ting dec i s ion . It concentrates instead on the as yet
vaguely def ined technical requirements of the deep bas ing option , discus
s ing in general terms the technical and management i s sues rai sed by the
proposal . Its aim is to he lp the Defense Nuc lear Agency and the u.s. Air
Force to re f ine the ir plans in preparation for a f inal dec i s ion on the MX
mi s s ile ' s bas ing mode , expec ted in 1984 .
iv

Air force Deep Basing Program
COL. STANLEY D. BERRY

Ba llistic Missile Office (AFSC)
Nor ton Air For ce Base, Ca liforn ia
SVHHARY: It is well known that the President recently announced a new strategic mod
ernization plan and that the MX missile is a.key part of the plan. This briefing
states why intercontinental ballistic missiles are important and why the United States
needs the MX missile in a survivable basing mode.
The reason we have strategic forces is to deter an attack on the United States
or its allies.· That objective has been achieved over several decades with the use of
a "triad" of strategic forces, consisting of ( 1 ) bombers with air-launched missiles,
(2) submarines, and (3) land-based missiles. Each of the triad's elements has dif
ferent strengths and weaknesses, but the diverse capabilities of the combined forces
make it very difficult for an adversary to attack all elements successfully. The so
viets cannot guarantee that they can wage a successful attack without suffering dev
astating retaliation and destruction on their own homeland. This has provided strong
deterrence.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) contribute unique and essential char
acteristics to the triad of forces, such as accuracy, speed, good comm unications, low
cost, and a high state of readiness. However, ICBM survivability is degrading due to
a massive soviet buildup of its ICBM force, technical improvements in accuracy and
warhead technology, and extraordinarily high expenditures on their military forces.
Many alternative responses have been proposed, including launch under attack,
giving up the triad for a dyad, establishing a ballistic missile defense, and rebas
ing the MX. Rebasing is the alternative addressed in this presentation.
The MX in a survivable basing mode can help restore the military balance and en
hance world stability. There are many reasons why the MX in a deep basing system
makes sense. The Air Force needs the u.s. National Committee on Tunneling Technology's
help to resolve key technical, cost, and schedule issues, which are discussed in more
detail by Lt. Colonel Rule in his presentation.
As you know , the Pre s ident recently announced a new strategic package to
upgrade our strategic force s , and MX was a very key and a very knotty
problem for him . He kind of came out with the conclus ion that we really
did not have the right an swer now . I am going to te l l you today very
briefly why MX is important--why mis s iles are important--and hope fully
it wi l l be a speech that you have not , very many of you , heard be fore .
The reason we have strategic forces i s to deter the Soviet Union
from going to war with us , and clearly that is a worthwhile ob j ec tive .
Now , maybe we stumbled into it or maybe we planned it , but it doe sn't

make any di f ference-- somehow we came out with a triad of strategic force s .
F irst of a l l , we have the airplane ; the bomber was the first o f the se , and
we went for some time with j us t bombers as strategi c force s e s sentially .
Then along came the intercontinental bal l i stic mi s s i le s ( ICBMs ) and the
submar ine-launched bal l i stic missiles ( SLBMs ) . Each of the three ha s di f
ferent character i s tic s . An attack o n one doe s not nece s sarily mean a n a t
tack o n a l l , and the Soviets have t o b e able t o attack them a l l succ e s s
fully , or , in fact , you have deterred them .
Figure 1 shows the weapons inventories' changes over the years 19 5 0
t o 1979 , in each o f the three categorie s . In the early to middle 1 9 5 0 s ,
we bui lt up something l ike 1 , 5 0 0 or 1 , 60 0 airplane s , and then in came the
ICBMs and SLBMs. So , we have some 2 , 00 0 strategic systems of three dif
ferent kinds .
I wi l l talk to you now for the rest of the pre sentation about ICBMs ,
and the MX in particular . Figure 2 shows some of the advantage s of ICBMs.
I want to point out the word " survivable . " The reason we are in thi s
room today i s that the ICBM ha s lost i t s survivab i l i ty . Now , one of the
beauties of the triad is that i f you have three legs--three sets of stra
tegic weapon s--and one leg become s vulnerable , the other two can carry
you through that period of t ime so that the Soviets cannot attack you
with great ease or even be promi scuous in a world po l i tical s ituation ,
I might say . But the ICBM leg has become more and more vulnerable , and
through the 1980s it is de f in i tely not going to have the survivab i lity
characteristics that we wi sh , and that is why we are looking for a way
to base the MX mi s s i le .
I might also add that in the Pre s ident's recent strategic package
he said that we are going to buy the B-1 bomber . The B - 5 2 bomber , I a l
ways thought , was de s igned in 19 5 2 . I asked the pres ident of the Boe ing
Corporation once , and he said , "No , i t wa s de s i gned in a mote l room in
Dayton , Ohio , in 1948 . " I don't care what year it was ; I know that i t
i s a n o l d airp lane , and w e e i ther have t o have a new bomber o r w e sort
of have to give up on bombers , and the Pre s i dent went that way . So , we
have two legs of the triad that are having some problems , and hope fully
you are going to he lp us so lve thi s one in the ICBM leg .
Figure 3 shows where the pre sent ICBMS are located . We have three
Titan wing s -- in Arizona , in Kansas , and in Arkansas . We have six Minute
man mi s s i l e wings : Whiteman in Mis souri ; Warren in Wyoming ; Ell sworth i n
South Dakota ; Grand Forks and Minot i n North Dakota ; and Malmstrom Air
Force Base in Montana .
Just to show how obtrusive a mi s s i le s ite i s , F igure 4 is a photo
graph of one . It covers about an acre or so , and it sits out here in
the farmland . That particular one sits out in the farmland of North
Dakota , and it doe sn't seem to bother the neighbors a who le great deal .
That is what one looks l ike .
Through the 19 7 0 s , as you have heard , the Soviets have spent a lot
more money . I have got a couple of i l lustrations that show that . I
j ust want to talk f irst of a l l about deve lopment ( F igure 5 ) . It used to
be that the United State s spent a great deal more money than the Soviet
Union on the deve lopment of strategic and de fense te chno logy , but some
time about 19 7 0 there was a cro s sover , and although we made progre s s

toward the end of the 1 9 7 0 s , i t is c l ear that the Soviets are spending a
great deal more money than we are .
Now , that i s deve lopment money . F igure 6 shows that into the 19 7 0 s
the ir research , deve lopment , test , and evaluation (RDT&E ) dol l ar s , the i r
deve lopment funds , had gone up b y 9 2 percent , and our s were actually down
2 0 percent .
Figure 7 shows that the Soviets spent more on equipment and faci l i
t i e s than w e d i d during the time period . I read in a newspaper sometime
in the very recent past where the Sovie t Union actually for mi l itary ex
penditure s dur ing the decade o f the 19 7 0 s had spent a lmost $ 5 0 0 b i l l ion
more than the United State s , but in this pe riod ..... l ike 19 7 0 to 19 7 8 ..... they
had spent for equipment and fac i l ities $104 b i l l ion more than the United
State s had . That is documentable , and these are the kinds of things that
we could have bought wi th $104 b i l l ion . If we had spent that $104 b i l
l ion the B-1 , the MX , and the Trident would be in the field , a long with
the XM-1 tank and the F-14 , F-15 , F -16 , F-18 , and A-10 . It would have
paid for a l l those programs , and we are still struggl ing in the Depart
ment of Defense to do some of those things .
What that has led to i s the area of rough equivalence here that we
talk about , whe ther we are roughly equivalent with the Soviet Union . The
" in " phrase in town now , I think , is "window of vulnerabi l i ty . " Back at
the end of World War I I it wa s c lear that we had superior strength and
certainly in the early 19 5 0 s and 1960s . There was no que stion that we
had a deterrent force because in the Cuban mis s i l e c r i s i s there is very
little doubt that the Soviets looked at us and blinked and backed away .
Now , I am not sure that if that were to occur today they would blink and
back away .
We have 1 , 000 Minuteman mi s s i l e s (F igure 8 ) , and we have 54 Titans ,
which we are now taking out of the field . The Minuteman I I mi s s i l e s are
roughly 20 to 25 years old ; the Minuteman Ills are a little newer . The
Titans are 2 5 years old . You c an a l so see the Soviet mi s s i l e forces in
the f igure . Tho se indi cated as under deve lopment are actual ly , it seems ,
beginning to come out into the field . The SS-18 and the S S -19 ..... they have
about 1 , 00 0 of the smal ler mi ssiles that you see and about 3 0 0 SS-18 s ,
and they are brand new as compared to our 1 , 00 0 Minuteman I I s and Ill s .
That is why we are trying to build the MX mi s s i l e , and you people here
today , hope fully , are going to he lp us f igure out a good way to base the
mis s i l e , because there is very l ittle que stion that we need the mi s s i le .
The only que stion is about how we base it .
Figure 9 i l lustrate s what the Soviets have been doing over the year s .
At first they started out with s ingle reentry vehi c l e s . They have now
put MIRV s on the ir big mi s s i le s , and whi le thi s shows that there are 7
or 12 on there , the number is not particularly important at this point
in time ; the fact i s that if you can k i l l a target with one of those on
the left , you could k i l l 12 targets with one of those on the right . That
is where the problem come s in , because they have very large mi s s i le s , and
they can put an awful lot of warheads on them , and each one of them k i l l s
a separate target .
Figure 10 shows that a l so , through the years , they have moved the ir
Circular Error Probable ( CEP ) in . Now , CEP i s a term that you don ' t re
a l ly have to unders tand , but all it says i s how accurate the mi s s ile i s .

I f I am trying to k i l l Washington , D . C . , and I put a warhead over Balti

more , obvious ly i t doe sn ' t k i l l Washington , D . C . , and so accuracy i s very
important . Wh i le the figure i s an unc lass ified chart from the 197 8 to
1987 time frame , I can only te l l you that the ir mi s s i le s are becoming
very accurate , and they are at the po int at which they can de stroy with
one warhead virtually any target that they shoot at . They are that ac
curate .
F igure 11 l i s ts some of our alternative re sponses . One thing is to
launch under attack . That means that i f we see the ir mi s s i le s take o f f ,
and the Pres ident decides that we are going to lose our systems , then we
can launch while we are under attack to avoid that los s .
Now , that is not very pleas ing to many people ; it is not very plea s
ing t o the Pres ident ; it i s not very pleas ing t o the Congre s s , but that
is one of the things that can be done . Clearly that is not our nationa l
stated objective , although we do have the capab i l ity to do so .
We could move from a triad to a dyad , and one of the problems with
moving to a dyad i s that then if one of those legs gets vulnerable you
don ' t have two legs to he lp support you . If you move to a dyad , and one
leg is vulnerable , and a l l of a sudden they make a breakthrough on the
other leg , you know that you are pretty we l l he ld ho stage . We can de fend
s i los or we can rebase , and the rebas ing of the MX is what we are talking
about here today .
Through the years we have looked at an awful lot of ways to base the
MX missile . Each and every one of them , for one rea son or another , has
been rejected , and that i s why we are in the room today .
F igure 12 give s some stat i stics on the MX mi s s i le . It is 92 inche s
in diameter . I t we ighs 190 , 000 pounds . It is about 71 feet long . It
h a s about 8 , 000 pounds o f throw we ight , and could throw 10 reentry vehi
cles on that mi s s i le . I t i s , also , the large s t U . S . ICBM allowed under
SALT I I . (Even though the SALT II agreement was never rat i f ied here in
thi s nation , both s ide s have chosen to l ive to the terms of that agree
ment . )
Figure 1 3 shows what the mi s s i le looks l ike . I t is a three - s tage
solid rocket motor mi s s i le . The first stage we ighs some 106 , 0 00 pounds
and is about 50 feet long ; the second stage weighs about 40 , 000 pounds .
The third stage kind of looks like a donut , or a doorknob . It is very
sma l l . Of course , as soon as the prope l l ant is burned out the se stage s
fall off , and finally you are left in space with the fourth stage , which
maneuver s and very precise ly releases each individual reentry vehicle to
go to the target .
Figure 14 compares the Minuteman I I I mi s s i le with the MX. Remembe r
I told you that the Minuteman is some 15 to 20 years old . It we ighs
7 8 , 000 pounds . It is 66 inche s in diame ter at the bottom s tage . Then
it narrows down to 52 inches all the way , and we only can throw three
reentry vehicles with that , compared to ten with the MX.
Hope fully , if we are succe s s ful , the MX mis s i le will be added to
the U . S . inventory . Es sentially i t i s equivalent in size to the smaller
Soviet mis s i le s , which they are al lowed about 1 , 3 00 . The MX, of course ,
i s probably a l i ttle more capable than the Soviet mi ssiles o f the same
category , but they are probably going to have 1 , 000 of those and we are

talking about 100 or 2 0 0 MXs . So , even i f we get MX based as we desire ,

we are sti l l not asking for an equal inventory .
It is very c lear . The Soviet Union has built up a very large inven
tory of mi s s i le s , and it has got to be for other than self-defense rea
sons . You j ust don ' t bui l t an inventory of the se things without a pur
pose . It is pre tty c lear that the ir intentions are not a l l honorable .
The Pre s ident has told us , " Deve lop and produce 100 MX mis s i le s ; de
ploy some of the se mi s s i le s initially in s i los . " Part of our j ob out at
the Bal l i stic M i s s i le Office i s to des ign and produce the hardware neces
sary to go in some 40 or 5 0 Titan or Minuteman s i los . We have a l so been
instructed to pur sue as long-term options each of three categories of
things ; the dec i s ion date for the choice among the se three options i s
late 1984 . The f i r s t option i s continuous patrol aircraft--very large
airplane s that fly s lowly and low but can stay in the sky a long time .
The optimists bel ieve that perhaps we can get an airplane to s tay in the
air for 10 days at a time , and the idea is i f you have an airplane that
can be in the air for 10 days you fly from the East or We st Coast out
over the ocean , and the Soviets could not f ind it . There fore , the argu
ment goe s , that would be a nice , survivable way to base mi s s i le s .
The second concept is that of bal l i stic mi s s ile defense whereby we
could actually de fend our s i los wi th our own bal l i stic mi s s ile defense
system . Right now there i s a treaty that prohibits an effective bal l i s
tic mi s s i l e defense , because i t al lows you only 1 0 0 interceptor s . Now ,
.if this option were chosen , of cour s e , then we would have to te l l the
Soviets that it was in our be s t interests that we did not continue that
treaty . We have not done that as yet ; maybe in 1984 we wi l l . The third
opt ion , which i s why I am standing here talking to all you folks today ,
is deep underground bas ing . It is felt that i f we can put the se mi s s i le s ,
in some numbers , very deep be low the surface , the Soviets wi l l be unable
to des troy the system . Then the real is sue s are how much i t costs to
build a system l ike that and how we get the mis s i l e s out once we want to
fire them .
As I said , we are going to select the long-term bas ing mode s in 1984 .
All of the Air Force people in thi s room are advocate s of deep bas ing ,
and if you ask them que stions I am sure they wi l l a l l tell you a l l the
reasons why we think we can do this . But we certainly need your help .





U.S./USSR TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT EFFORT
.....
BILLION
0
FY 1978
DOLLARS
1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977

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Basing Alternatives and Technical Background
EUGENE SEVIN
Defense Nuclear Agency
Washington, D. C.
Gentlemen , I want to expres s appreciation on the part of the De fense

Nuc lear Agency {DNA ) for the fact that so distingui shed and pre stigious
a group as thi s i s devoting its thoughts and talents to the problems
that are fac ing the Department of Defense at the moment .
I would l ike to make a couple of po ints in the few minute s allotted
me . The first is that the deep basing option ha s been around for a num
ber of years ; a number of considerations and a number of inve stigations
have been directed to thi s pos s ibi lity , not only for mi ssile basing but
for other mil itary purposes .
It was not a system invented in the last minute s of the Presidential
dec i s ion . If there i s a window of vulnerab i l i ty at the moment , I would
l ike to believe there i s , also , a window of opportunity , so that by 1984 ,
i f the decis ion does not favor the scheme s we are thinking about now , at
least we have left some legacy to the engineering pro fess ion and we know
a bit more about things than we do at the moment , and there will be at
least a better bas i s on which to make inte l l igent engineering decisions
in the future .
So , I think we have an opportuni ty . Over the past 2 0 years we have
gotten to a point where we believe that there are certain essential at
tribute s of deep underground bas ing . So here is a mini -cour se in the
evolution ....my
. view of the evolution ..... of deep bas ing {F igure 1 ) . Things
started about the early to middle 1960s , with a view toward concentrating
re sources deeply underground and requiring proli feration of surface por
tal s to get out . There were two es sential problems . First , thi s was a
high-value target , and encouraged an enemy to direct a substantial at
tack toward it , and as the threat went up , the depth of burial went down ,
and pretty soon it went down to a point where economi cally , at least at
that point in time , it did not seem feasible . So , the concentration of
assets underground was deemed not a good idea . The second ob j ection was
that the means of egress depended on there being some portal or portals
remaining undamaged ; that i s , after attack they had to have the same
capabi lity as they had be fore attack , and with the increase in accuracy
that was mentioned by Co lone l Berry , and the l imited number of portals
20

21
whi ch could be afforded , each one could b e targeted , and there was no
way to get out .
During the so-cal led " Strat X study " in the later 1960s , the thought
was to distribute the underground assets wi thin an interconnected tunne l
system . The depth of burial was to be reduced by finding a hard rock
s i te , but a large number of exit portal s were required s ince , as be fore ,
some had to survive the attack . The uti lity of thi s scheme was found to
lie more in the distr ibution of assets than in the distribution of attack
points , but with increasing accuracy of the attacker , the requirement to
ensure the pos tattack integrity of an egres s portal had to be given up .
Somewhat later , in the early 19 7 0 s , several scheme s were deve loped
to restore a vertical egre s s shaft after attack . On a scale of bizarre
ness of from 1 to 10 , in my view the se schemes came out somewhere be
tween 5 and 9 . 9 .
While pos sible , I think i t i s definitely a chal lenge to make systems
of such a nature work , particularly in view of the unknown characteris
tics of the portal region after an attack . But clever s cheme s have been
proposed , and you wi l l hear about some of them , I believe , today�
To recapitulate , our view i s that we need to distribute assets at
some substantial depth below the ground . We need to give up the notion
that at least some egress portals must survive the attack . So , we have
to be completely self- sufficient from the inside out , and if we cannot
do that , then we probably do not have a credible scheme . There is an ob
vious consequence ; name ly , that the system response time wi l l not be as
immediate as some would l ike , and there fore that the attribute s of a
deep underground system , whi ch are more or les s constrained , have got to
be entirely con s i stent wi th the mi s s ion and roles that are expected of a
mi s si le force based in thi s manner .
Okay , so I guess my first po int i s that we have come a way . We have
a reasonable idea , not a s ingle concept , not a baseline concept today ,
but the general charac teristics and general attr ibutes of a deep under
ground sys tem are fai rly we l l understood . I think we have to be careful
to do something use ful in the relatively short time we have been given
by thi s Administration , and not to go too far afield from things that
have been properly discarded in the pa st . On the other hand , we should
not be dogmatic about rej ecting past ideas .
My second point has to do with uncertainti es . In deve loping and
dec iding to deploy a deep basing system , we are going to have to learn
to l ive with uncertainties to a degree beyond which perhaps we , as en
gineers , have been wi lling to admi t heretofore . F igure 2 i l lustrates
something of what i s known about the shock environments at depth intro
duced by nuc lear weapons detonated at the sur face . I have suggested a
porous rock , perhaps a tuff that we might find at the Nevada test site ,
and I show depth contour s at whi ch one could expect 0 . 5 ki lobar of stre ss
from a large megaton-size weapon ( in fact a 100-megaton weapon , which i s
a larger weapon than pre sently i s in anybody ' s arsenal ) . So , t o talk i n
terms of fac i l ities intended t o survive the se kinds of yields already i s
to s tre ss a n attacker , and probably cause him to aggregate smaller wea
pon s and set them o f f s imultaneous ly .

22
I have sugge sted a n uncertainty i n the data base that , expres sed i n
range , i s roughly a factor o f two , and is a consequence of several thi ngs ,
I believe . First of all , there is the essential uncertainty , or random
ne s s of behavior , as sociated with shock propagat ion in geologi c media .
Secondly , we suffer from the fact that the data base that we have , whi le
it is fairly substantial wi th regard to tamped bursts ( i . e . , nuc lear
bursts that are fully contained ) , has no relevant data on modern , high
yield weapons de tonated at the sur face of the ground . There fore , the
bas i s that we have for infe rring relat ionships between yield , stre s s ,
and depth of burial such as those shown in the f igure is indeed inferen
tial . That has been done in the past by s imulat ing a free surface burst
underground ..... setting off a sma l l weapon in a small cavity ..... and so the
data also is subj ect to uncerta inties of a systematic or bias nature .
We may be wrong in the key that we have chosen to use in unlocking the
tamp data and relating it to sur face burst conditions . Although we think
we have related the tamp data to sur face bur st condi tions in a de s ign
conservative way , we may be wrong . We plan to conduct an underground
test involving a cavi ty of 40 meters or larger that would a l low us to
s tudy the nature of the energy coupling of the bomb to the sur fac e , the
early stage s of crater formation , and sho ck propagat ion into the ground .
Thi s would be a very maj or undertaking , but we plan to do it .
I have talked so far about free field stre sses or free field condi
tions . Let me turn now to respon se of the buried fac i l iti e s . A third
element of uncertainty has to do with survivabil ity o f underground open
ings . In a hard rock .....perhaps a granitic rock , which is less di s s ipa
tive and more e lastic in its wave transmi s s ion characteristics ..... one would
f ind that the se kinds of environments would occur at greater depths than
in soft rock . At the s ame time , one could expect a cavity or a tunnel
to survive at higher stre s s leve l s . So the re is a trade between the
depth at which one would like to put the faci lity and the costs as sociat
ed with hardening or making the cavity survivable . The po int , o f course ,
is that the selection of a site from the point of view of survivability
is something that has to interact very strongly with site se lection from
the point of view of constructibi lity , ma intenance , and public accept
abi l ity .
From a survivab i l ity point of view , there is such a thing as a bene
ficial s ite� that i s a porous over hard layered s ite , perhaps with cap
rock at the sur face to discourage penetrating-type weapon s . One would
ut ilize the porous overburden for its dissipative ( shock attenuating )
properties , and then uti lize the stronger , more competent material be
low in which fac i l ities could survive at greater stre s s leve l s (or re
qui re a les ser amount of hardening ) .
Finally , this chart a l so carr ies an impli cat ion from an attacker ' s
point of view , since uncertainties in burial depth of a factor o f two
are rea l ly quite bothersome . Pres sure-range re lation s scale as the cube
root of weapon yield . Thus , for an attacker to be sure that he has im
po sed , say , 0 . 5 ki lobar stre s s on a fac i l ity at known depth of burial ,
he would have to increase the yields shown here by a factor of eight .
Where we may have de s igned a fac i l i ty to survive a 100-megaton attack ,

23
he may look upon i t a s a target requiring at least 800 megatons to en

sure acceptable ( to him ) leve l s of damage . Al so , the attacker i s going
to have a difficult time understanding what , in fact , he did accompli sh .
However , let me emphasize that thi s view of uncertainty , which may be
favorable from our perception of the attacker ' s problem , is not all that
helpful when we are planning an enormously expensive engineering under
taking and are expected to quanti fy , to the extent pos s ible , the notion
o f r i sk .
In summary , let me say that we think the required technology exi sts
( F i gure 3) in the sense that the work of the pa st years , much of which
you will hear about today , provides an exi stence proof , a proof of en
gineering pr inciple . There is a substantial amount of eng ineering data
that is not in hand , and , before the Air Force and the Department of De
fense could go forward with an acquisition program , risks would have to
be reduced to a point compatible with the way the Department of Defense
goe s about its business and makes its dec i s ions . We are entering into
a concept val idation program in whi ch we have to expand our considera
tion of admi ssible deep basing concepts , so that we have a fair set from
among whi ch to make a best choice . We have to document very wel l not
only why we have made the choice from among that set , but also that other
concepts were exc luded for good and sufficient reasons . So , we have to
document not only what we recommend to do but also what we have chosen
not to do , and we have to carry out tho se sorts of technology and engi
neering demonstration activities that , indeed , will provide suf fic ient
data for an informative and intel ligent engineering dec i s ion .
Over the past years , and most notably since 1 9 7 6 , we have tried to
addres s deep underground basing technology in a very sys tematic and rela
tively exhaustive fashion , trying to identi fy which aspects of design ,
construction and operation were in hand from an engineeri ng point of v iew ,
and whi ch , in fact , were technology i s sue s around which we either could
not pas s or for which proposed solutions s imply lacked credib i l ity . In
tho se latter areas is where we have concentrated our resources and ef
forts . I trust that we wi ll convey to you during the course of this
meeting where we think we are , and the basi s for our proposed efforts .
There i s a great dea l that needs to be done and we are apprec iative
of the fact that the u.s. Nat iona l Committee ha s chosen to address it
self to thi s problem which , to the Department of Defense , the Air Force ,
DNA , at the moment is of rea l ly very significant importance .

Deep Basing .,Evolution"
[Hard Rock Tunnels !
&if� [DeepSiiO!]
I Citadels l • 300ft deep
• 800 portals for
144 missiles
• 1&00 ft deepallo
exit
"'
Reconatliutable
.co.
• portal&
• Fluidized und bed
0.
• 3600 ft deep
• 20 portals/alte
• 10 sites
1 -Deep Tunnels !
·
• Tunnels in auitable geology

- - 2500 ft deep
'·-few hundred miles
• Self contained digout
- Horizontal
- Few days reaction time
F IGURE 1

Geology vs. Required Depth

Range of depth for % Kbar, 100 MT surface burst
Hard Rock: Porous Rock: Layered:

(Poroua Over Hn)
�---
Burllll
Depth "'
V1
Band of
.uncertainty
�� II 1 In peak
'1 F I '
atreu
Conservative (Sure Safe) design depth for 0.6

Kbar (72 &0 PSI) hard cavity to survive 100
Meaaton surface burst
Attacker's VIewpoint:
) 800 Megaton surface burst required for sure kill of 0.6

Kbar cavity at these depths
F I GU R E 2

Required Technology Exists
Requirement Experience Requirement Experience
Major underground Mines: subways:

Muck handling Mines; civil/comm'l
aqueducts: hwy.& rail
excavation & & diaposal tunneling
tunnels; hydro power
conatructlon
plants: NTS UGT
complexes: Chicago Megawatt aize DOE/EPRI/CON ED/
storm water sys:
fuel cella UTC demo in NYC
NORAD CMCC;site R
tv
Mines: submarines: Definition of Underground 0\
Routine under· hydro power planta: attack environ nuclear testa
ground crew underground offices
ectlvtty Survivable Underground
& factories & ware.
houses; NORAD; rock openings nuclear testa
Site R'
Prolonged crew Shock Isolation Minuteman; ahlpa;
Submarines. I
confinement space vehicles submarines
I
Control of toxic Mines; submarine•; Through-earth Mine rescue: UGT

contamlnanta In air space vehicle• communication data telem (Diacua
Thrower. Huaky Pup.
Wute h..t dlapoul · NORAD CMCC; Mighty Epicl;
aite R; aafeguard Sanguine
FIGU RE 3

Nuclear Weapons Effects and Results of Previous Tests
JOSHUA L. MERRITT
Merritt CASES, Inc.
Redlands, California
SUMMARY: The damage done at a given distance from ground zero at Hiroshima and Naga
saki would be inflicted by modern weapons at distances perhaps ten times as great.
Also, dramatic improvements in the accuracy of delivery systems for missiles make it
probable that a near-surface target (such as an egress portal) would be within the
crater produced by any weapons used to attack it. Furthermore, the numbers of poten
tial attacking weapons are such that using proliferation of targets (such as egress
portals) as a means of protection is not economically feasible.
Protection, however, can be afforded in a deep basing facility by burying the
facility deep enough to provide a suitable distance between the burst point of the
attacking weapons and the facility. The weapons effect of most concern is the stress
induced in the rock, propagating to the deeply buried facility. Results of tests in
rock, from which these stresses can be inferred, indicate that such an approach may
be feasible.
The structural damage observed in several completely contained nuclear events
(namely, events "Hard Hat, " "Pile Driver, " Mighty Epic, " and "Diablo Hawk") yields
data useful for planning the design and construction of deep basing facilities. Al
though much of it was inflicted on sophisticated, super-hard structures at high
stress levels, some unlined and rock-bolted structures survived impressive stresses
in the rock. The rock types included granite and tuff with a wide range of uncon
fined strengths and angles of internal friction, as measured by tests of conventional
cores.
I have been asked to summ a r i z e our experience over the last thirty-five
to forty years in weapon s e f fects, and parti cularly weapons e f fects on
deep underground s tructures. I must do so in an unc las s i f ied nature .
The experiences I sha l l cover, or at least touch upon, are our experi
ences in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The attack on those two c ities involved
so-cal led " nomina l " bomb s, a nominal bomb being 20 k i lotons of explos ive
energy . ( The Texas City ship explos ion in 1944, inc idental ly, was e sti
mated to be the equivalent o f two to four ki lotons o f explos ive energy . )
I wi l l then go into, in an unc las s i f ied way, a di scuss ion of the nuc lear
weapons e ffects, emphas i z ing cratering, stress with depth, and what we
know about the stress with depth . Fina lly, I shall very briefly go over
what we learned from a series of exper iments entitled " Hard Hat " in 19 6 3 ,
27

28
" Pi l e Driver" in 1966 , and-more recent ly-"D ining Car , " "Mighty Epi c , "
and "D iablo Hawk" beginning in 1 9 7 5 .
I mentioned the Hiroshima and Nagasaki experience s . F igure 1 i s
from a book entitled Effects o f Nuclear Weapons, the f i r s t edition of
which was produced in 1946 ; there have been several editions s ince then ,
the mo st re cent being in the 1 9 7 0 s . The se photographs show what happened
at 0 . 5 mile from ground zero at Naga saki ( F igure 5 . 3 4 a ) and what happened
0 . 3 mile from ground zero at Hiroshima ( Figure 5 . 34b ) ; there was total
de struction at those points . I mentioned thi s is a 2 0-kiloton nominal
bomb . The yields of the bombs we are talking about today are in the
ne ighborhood o f 20 megatons , a thousandfold as great . To a reasonable
degree of approximation , what happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki at abou t
0 . 5 m i l e would occur at 5 mi les f r om our current weapons . It i s a n awe
some amount of energy and an awe some amount of damage that c an be created
by that energy .
Colone l Berry has already mentioned CEP ( c ircular error probable ) .
Dr . Sevin has mentioned stress with depth . Figure 2 i s a cartoon which
I borrowed from Air Force Systems Command Manual 500-8, pub l i shed in
196 7 . I have added some rough outl ines to empha s i z e some of the points
that we need to at least touch on . The mo st important po int i s the cra
ter created by a sur face or near-surface burst of a nuc lear weapon . If
that bur st should occur at o r near the surface o f a very competent rock
-granite or basalt, as an example-the radius o f that crater* i s about
5 0 0 feet for a ! -megaton device . If you take that up to current opera
tional s i z e s , we could mult iply that by a factor o f three . So , instead
o f 500 feet in radius, we are talking some 1 , 5 0 0 feet in radius , about
0 . 2 5 mile for the radius of the crater . The depth of the crater , again ,
for 1 megaton for scal ing purpo ses is something on the order of 100 to
120 feet . You scale that up to, let us say , a 27-megaton devi ce , it be
come s 3 0 0 to 3 6 0 feet in depth . The ac curacy of the weapon is such that
if an enemy aims at a target , he can almost certainly place that target
within the crate r . For so i l s , to j ump to another extreme while not at
tempting to imply any solution in terms of s iting , the crater, instead
of be ing some 1 , 500 feet , could be on the order o f 3 , 0 00 feet in radius .
I marked a l so on the f igure "EMP " and "prompt radiat ion . " I will
not go into any depth on those . Suffice it to say that EMP ( e lectromag
netic pul se ) is the most awesome l ightning strike that you could imagine
multiplied by many , many-fold . The prompt rad iation i s also a sign i f i
cant i tem and could create s ignificant damage t o anything o n the surface .
As the stre ss waves propagate downward from the crater , we have the
d irectly induced ground shock , which Dr . Sevin has already touched upon .
F igure 3 shows our exper ience in hard rock on the left . The first
four are granitic s i te s . The French data i s in granite for weapon yields
of 3 . 6 k i lotons to 117 ki lotons . Hard Hat , in 196 3 , was conducted in
granite at the Nevada Te st S ite ( C l imax Stock granite ) wi th a yield of
5 . 9 k i lotons ; "Shoal , " north in Nevada , was again at a gran ite s ite with
*Here we are referring to the apparent crater , that which exists after
fal lback has occurred . The true crater and the as soc iated rupture zone
may be much larg. e r .

29
a yield of 1 2 . 5 k i lotons; Pile Dr iver , 59 to 61 ki lotons in 1966; and

the last three on thi s chart are for ande s ite at Amchitka , Alaska , rang
ing from 81 k i lotons for the "Longshot" event up to a 5 -megaton device
for the "Canikin" event . Plotted within the two bars is the summa ry o f
all the measurements o f particle ve loc ity in those particular shots and
then , us ing an acoustic impedance to relate particle ve loc ity in feet per
second to stre s s in k ilobars , we have a separate bar on the ordinate for
the s tress in ki lobars . The 0 . 5 ki lobar used by Dr . Sevin would corre
spond to a scaled di stance below a contained event on the order of 7 0 0
f e e t for a tota l confined explos ion . The preponderance of experiments
that we have conducted in the United States have been in the hard rock
and the tuf f at the Nevada Test Site . Mo st of the tuf f is at Area 1 2 ,
Nevada Test Site .
On the right-hand panel of F igure 3 we show the scatter bands of
data from the left-hand pane l . Super imposed on the right-hand pane l i s
the measured particle veloc ity from exper iments in tuf f . You can see
that the lower bound o f the data for hard rock becomes e s sentially the
mean for the data in the softer rock , spec i fically tuff . Aga in using an
acoustic impedance to convert particle veloc ity to stre s s , you f ind a
lower stre s s in tuf f as compared to granite . Dr . Sevin ha s already men
tioned the coupl ing . I would emphasize that the data shown in the f igure
are strictly from contained bursts . we have to convert from contained
bursts to the conditions o f a surface burst by use o f the coupl ing factor
mentioned by Dr . Sevin .
We made up Figure 4 in cartoon form to summa rize our data base for
behavior of l ined and unl ined openings in rock in the United State s . The
underground explosion test series conducted in 1948 to 19 5 3 , log i stically
supported out of Dugway Proving Ground , Utah , inc luded granite , l ime s tone ,
and sandstone , with a tunnel be low the burst po int . The burst point was
a buried burst; much of the data were gathered by documenting the behav
ior of thos e tunne l s fol lowing the detonation . They were all chemical
explosive s , ranging in s ize from 320 to 3 2 0 , 000 pounds . The sizes of the
tunne l s went from 6 feet in nominal s i z e for a modi f ied hor se shoe up to
30 feet in s i ze . The 3 0 - foot tunne l was subj ected to the e f fects of a
320 , 000-pound burst . The 6- foot tunnel s were subj e c ted to the e f fects
of a 2 , 560-pound charge or , in a few instance s , a 3 2 0 -pound charge . I
have flagged the test s ite s that I have a lready mentioned and the sizes
of weapons: 8 pounds to 160 tons for the UET ( underground explos ive
test ) series ; the nuc lear events go from 55 tons to 5 megatons , 5 mega
ton s being for the Amchitka shot . The series of exper iments have in
vo lved Hard Hat and P i l e Driver , as a lready mentioned . First i s a car
toon o f the se events whi ch I w i l l discuss in greater deta i l a bit later .
Next i s a cartoon of the Mighty Epic/Di ablo Hawk events that were con
ducted in the middle to late 1 9 7 0 s .
F inally , we summar ize the peak stre s s of up to a ki lobar ( a ki lobar
is 14 , 5 0 0 ps i ) for unl ined cases . For l ined cases we have exper ienced
all the way up to 5 k i lobars ( or 7 2 , 500 ps i ) stre s s in the rock . Final
ly , in the table we summa rize the types o f l inings , the environments ,
and the mater ials in whi ch we have conducted exper iments . The basalt ,
mentioned at the bottom of the chart , inc idental ly , was at the Nevada

30
Test Site � the salt i s located in two place s . We have done free-field
exper iments in those media also .
Let us move to the Hard Hat event ( F igure 5 ) . The Hard Hat event
was reached through a shaft 7 8 5 feet deep to the muck pocket � the muck
pocket went an additional 35 feet below the intersection with the nearly
hori zontal dr i ft . There were 3 exper imental stations and some 43 test
structures in the s e 3 area s . The device was emplaced in a 36- inch cased
dr i l l hole some 9 4 3 feet be low the sur face � as already indicated , it was
a 5 . 9 -kiloton devi ce . The working point , as we call it , or the zero
point , was depressed below the structure ' s dr ifts to get rid o f the shad
owing that might occur from one dr i f t to another if they happened to be
at the same e levation .
The plan view of those three drifts , A , B, and C , i s shown in F igure 6 .
" A " drift was some 2 5 0 feet from the zero point . " B " dri f t was 340 feet
and "C" 460 feet from the zero point . The 5 . 9-ki loton device was to the
left , off the f igure in thi s sketch . There were 10 structure s in A
drift , 18 in B dr ift , and 15 in C dr ift . The bas i c de s ign was for the
conditions e s t imated to occur in B dr ift , and then the structure s were
arrayed at three dif ferent locations in order to g ive a spectrum of dam
age . Stre s s leve l s inferred from measured particle veloc ities at A dr i f t
were 2 t o 4 k i lobars , and a t C dr ift , 0 . 5 to 1 k i lobar . A series o f
mainly cyl indr ical structures were involved , rang ing from the stronges t
s truc ture , a re inforced concrete structure 8 inche s thick surrounded by
20 inche s of polyurethane foam , to the weakest of the struc ture s , a
hor se shoe shape with 4- inch , 1 3 pound-per- foot steel shape s with 2 - inch
lagging between the shape s . I will not have time to go into any great
detai l on Hard Hat , but I think from the s l ides I shall show on P i l e
Driver , subsequently , w e can infer some of the cond it ions that occurred
in the Hard Hat experiment .
Now , moving to the P i le Dr iver exper iment ( Figure 7 ) , I shall show
a perspe c t ive with the acce s s shaft some 1 , 3 67 feet deep , extend ing to
a muck pocket 89 feet deep , and then some 1 , 4 0 0 feet along the acces s
dr i f t to a winze . The winze goe s down some 104 feet � the devi ce was
placed at the bottom of i t . The device was planned to have a 5 0 -ki loton
yield . It actua l ly turned out to be a 5 9 -ki loton yield and in some
re ference s it has been noted as a 6 1 -ki loton yield . The te st structures
wer e located in X dri f t , at 3 2 0 feet from the zero point , on out to C
drift at some 9 4 0 feet from the work ing point . Measured particle ve loc
i ty at X dr i f t was suffic iently high that i t corre sponds to about 3 0
k i lobar s--about 5 0 0 , 000 p s i -- in the rock , o n out t o about 10 , 000- 2 0 , 00 0
psi , o r 0 . 66 - 1 . 3 3 ki lobars , a t the most remote range .
From the perspective , you should note that we var ied the s i z e of
excavat ion from 44 to 7 feet in size . We also var ied configuration:
X intersections , T intersec tions and complete struc ture s , capsu les at
the bottoms of the X inter sections . The s tructural type s inc luded rock
bolts , un l ined openings , and var ious types of sophisticated lining , but
before we touch brief ly on the construct ion methods and the results of
that particular exper iment , I would l ike to note some of the maj or fea
tures of the geology at Area 15 of the Nevada Test S i te .

31
In F igure 8 , the plan is j ust reversed over the preced ing perspec
tive . The l ines are the surface maps of the var ious ma j or j o ints encoun
tered throughout the workings . The j oints were mapped at the tunnel lev
e l , some 1 , 400 feet below the sur face . At that l eve l , the contact between
a quartz monzonite and a granodiorite was as shown . The physical proper
ties o f the rock types were almost identical , but one was a much more
qui ckly cooled material than the other . Also at tunnel l eve l , we had a
hor seta i l fault that we picked up a def inite expre s s i on of at the base
o f the shaft and near C dr i ft , but we q id not pick it up c learly in B
dri ft . The granite was a j ointed rock and it did have some faulting and
discontinuities in it .
Some damage along natural j o ints c an be seen in F igure 9 . The dark
er areas in the roof in the foreground repre sent reg ions where sma l l
blocks o f rock fell .
F igure 10 is a post-te st picture of a more sophisticated structure .
Thi s one i s seven feet in internal diameter . It is 6 inches thick , has
nominally 0 . 5 percent re inforcement on each face in the c ircumferential
direction and 0 . 2 5 percent reinforcement on each face in the long itudi
nal direction . The "flex duct" used to provide air was instal led after
the reentry ; during the event itsel f the open ing was complete ly free of
materials . The power l ine was a lso brought in for electric power after
the event . Th� only things that exi sted within thi s structure at the
time of the event were the s ignal c ab le s , which were strapped to the wal l
with airplane c ab le in one case and with bungee cord in the other case .
You c an see the bungee cord in place . Surrounding th i s seven- foot struc
ture was some four feet of materia l , frequently re ferred to as Merlcrete .
It i s a foamed neat cement that has a f l at-top stre ss- stra in curve . That
structure survived somewhere between 0 . 66 and 1 . 3 3 ki lobars . Other struc
tures actually survived at a leve l o f two to four ki lobar s , as I shall
show in thi s next s l ide .
F i gure 11 shows a steel structure , but there i s a concrete structure
very s imi lar to the one we j ust saw in the background in this particular
view . Thi s f igure is in B drift . B dr i ft saw a measured particle ve loc
ity of about 110 feet per second , which , depend ing on how you want to
convert that into stres s , i s somewhere between 2 and 4 ki lobar s . The
concrete structure in the background survived . The steel structure in
the foreground used corrugated ste e l of two thicknesses . It was surround
ed by four feet of the foamed neat cement . It also survived two to four
k i lobar s . Again , there was a power l ine and a "flex duct" that were
put in after the event to g ive us venti lation and power . On the left
rib o f the structure are the cables for getting the instrumentation s ig
nal s out . They we re held down with bungee cord or with airplance cable .
They were covered wi th spray- in-place foam to further protect them .
I mentioned a rock bo lted section . F igure 12 shows a heavily rock
bolted sect ion . The rock bo lts are some two feet on centers . There are
at least two layer s of chain l ink fence on the sur face . The rock bo lts
are size number 1 1 ; they are 16 feet long . The opening i s 16 feet in
diameter . Thi s pic ture was taken after the event , and there i s no evi
dence of any d i stres s whatever in that particular structure . I would
hasten to add seve ral things , however . First , thi s is an end-on

32
conf igurat ion . ( The stre s s wave propagated in the direction o f the lon
g itudinal axi s . ) The working po int , if you eye down the rock bolt with
the white painted bear ing plate , is some 846 feet ahead of that . The
best estimate of the stress leve l at that part icular point is about 1 . 5
k i lobars , about 2 0 , 000 psi , in the rock . Also , I would empha size that
these rock bolts are very c losely spaced . The se rock bolts were a l so
tens ioned to 60 , 000 pounds force in each of the bolts after they were in
place , so that there was a fairly high conf ining stre s s intentionally
put on the rock .
F inally , in my last f ive minutes I shall try to br ing us up-to-date
wi th the recent serie s o f te sts and , because I am running out o f time ,
let me try to expedite thi s by first qu ickly indicating in plan view the
Mighty Epic event ( F igure 1 3 ) . The Mighty Epic event was originally
planned a s a l ine-o f - s ite ( LOS ) pipe exper iment , a s they are cal led , with
test chambers o f f the view on the right s ide to test other e f fects of the
dev ice . Of cour se , that device create s a stre s s wave that propagates out
ward and we took advantage o f that stre ss wave and added a series of
structures in the Mighty Epic event .
Mighty Epi c had as its ma in thrust look ing at so-called super-hard
con struction. The Diablo Hawk event follow ing it re loaded that super
hard construct ion in a se cond loading . In pass ing , let me briefly com
ment on the result of a reload ing of a structure where it first saw one
k i lobar propagat ing in a di rection perpendi cular to the longitudinal
axi s ( s ide-on ) in Mighty Epic ; and axially in Diablo Hawk with stress
leve l s , depending whe re you were in the dr ift , anywhere from one kilo
bar to about three-eighths ki lobar range . There was some distortion o f
the interior stee l r ing resulting from the second load ing , b u t the actual
measured d i s tortion was on the order of one-ha l f inch.
The Mighty Epi c working po int appears on the left . In Diablo Hawk ,
we not only re loaded the structures that you saw in the previous case ,
but we added a number of other expe riments. One was a sand- f i l led tun
nel to determine the behavior of potential underground reservo irs and
f inally , there was a series of s i z e - e f fects exper iments at 0 . 6 , 0 . 3 ,
and 0 . 1 5 ki lobar . The s i z e of the last set o f structures ranged from
9 inche s to 18 feet .
Construction of the horse shoe- shaped dr i fts for s i z e e f fects was
with a roadheader in a s ing le pass for the 9 - foot and 1 3 - foot openings .
Two passes were required for the 18- foot excavation . The completed
struc ture was some 54 feet long . The openings were large ly unl ined .
There were rock bolts between the var ious unl ined segments , so that in
the event that one of them fai led, it did not propagate to the next seg
ment . There was some d i s locat ion of the rock from the back in several
places in the unl ined openings, but probably nothing to cause any great
concern about moving per sonne l and equipment through that tunnel sub
sequently at the lowe st stre ss leve l .
In clos ing , I would like to emphas i ze that high- speed photography ,
taken in tho se types of dr i fts , which you will see later today , shows
what appears to be an awfully ho sti le environment , but there was no se
rious damage in many drifts . As suming , o f course , that one has provided
secondary protection for anything that might have been housed in the

33
drifts , I would not be concerned about surv1v1ng the environment shown

in the high- speed photograph . So , my time is doubtless up ; I shall
close at thi s point .
* * * * *
SPEAKER : Jay , what is the stre s s level for that unl ined tunne l ?
DR . MERRITT : The unlined tunne l shown i n the last sl ide saw 2 , 400 psi .
We had two other dr ifts of s imi lar size that saw 4 , 000 psi and 8 , 000 psi .
The 8 , 000 psi one was very heavily damaged . The one at 4 , 000 psi was
moderately damaged . Thi s one was l ightly damaged .
SPEAKER : On a scale of one to ten , at the present t ime , what is our re
l iabi l ity on the te st related to instrumentation cabl ing , etc . ? Where
would we stand in analyz ing where we go from here on that reliab i lity ?
DR . MERRITT : Gosh , I am not quite sure how t o answer that because , as

you are probably aware , we are active ly consider ing the deve lopment of
new gauges to allow us to go into still higher stre s s leve l s than we
have looked at there . There i s a lot of work in be ing able to do that .
The instrumentation for mos t of the things I have shown here , up to one
k i lobar in tuff , has survived quite we l l , with some exception s . There
is some faulting in thi s particular rock , and we did have one case , and
I emphasize one case , in which a fault did gu il lotine our instrumenta
t ion system .
SPEAKER : In our time span of collective ly analyzing and going into a

bas ing mode , do you think that between now and 1984 there is enough re
search and deve lopment being done in this field that should br ing us to
a better percentage of rel iabi lity? What I am referring to i s one o f
our discuss ions h a s t o b e what i s coming out o f new technology , an d i s
it suffic ient?
DR . LINGER : I think , in answer to that que stion , the instrumentation

technology has improved probably two orders of magnitude s ince the se
te sts were conducted , and I think that we wi l l see a high-speed photo
graph of thi s tunne l during the shot , and the man that is go ing to do
that is the manager of the Construction Divis ion at Nevada Test S ite ,
and I think he has tremendous reliabi l ity bui lt into his ins trumentation ,
more so now than ever before .
SPEAKER : What was that rock , the last one we were looking at , the un
l ined tunnel ?
DR . MERRITT : The unl ined tunnel there i s a tuf f at N tunne l , approxi

mately 1 , 400 feet below the local sur face . The unconfined compre s s ive
strength of that particular rock , us ing NX core s , is in the neighborhood

34
of 3 , 00 0 to 4 , 00 0 psi . I f you want to characterize it as a Mohr-Coulomb

mater ial , it probably has an angle of internal friction in the range of
10 to 15 degree s . Its spe c i f i c gravity i s r ight around two . Its seismic
veloci ty is about 8 , 000 feet per second .
I N DUSTRIAL STRUCTURES 1 67
F I GU R E 1 ( 5 . 34a ) Destroyed industr i a l area showing smoke

stacks s t i l l standing at 0 . 5 1 mile from ground zero at
Nagasaki ( from The Effects of Nuclear Weapons , 1 9 7 7 ) .

35
1 68 STRUCTURAL DAMAGE FROM AIR BLAST
F I GU R E 1 ( 5 . 34b ) A c ircular , 6 0 feet high , reinforced

concrete stack at 0 . 3 4 mile from ground zero at Hiroshima
( from The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 197 7 ) .

�p
Pllt ... PT Jti'., Nrlltl
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Gro u n d Sh oc k En v i ron m e n t &
FS R F
R ock O p e n i n g Rei n fo rcem e n t
• 1 94 8 TO TODAY
• T E ST S I T ES:
DUGWA Y P R O V I N G G R OU N D, UTAH
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e P E A K STR ESS
( F R E E·F I E L D, AT STRUCT U R E LOCI
UN L I N E D : 0 - 1 K BA R (14,600 PSI )
L I N E D: 0.2 - 5 KBAR (72,500 fiS I )
• ROCK TYPES
M t G H l V EP'tC/D I A B L O HAWK UGTS - NTS - 1 171 . 71
TUNN I L PUN
F I GU RE 4
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39
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F I GURE 5

40
TEST DRIFT A C2o
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F I G U RE 6

41
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43
F I G U R E 9 Fai lure along natural j o ints , Shop Dri ft

( event P i l e Driver ) .
F I GU R E 1 0 S tructure s with packing , sections CRl and

CRla ( event Pile Driver ) .

44
F I GU R E 1 1 S tructure with pack ing , section BR9

( event P i le Driver ) .
F I GU R E 1 2 S tructure with rock bo lts and me sh--end-on

loading , sec tions CRS and CR6 ( event P i l e Dr iver ) .

INTEJt,ACE ORin
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F I GU R E 1 3

Deep Basing Concept (Horizontal Egress)
JAMES A . WOOSTER
Boeing Aerospace Company
Seattle , Washington
SUMMARY: Recent developme nts and observed trends in the intercontinental nuclear
threat against potential strategic targets in the United States have caused much in
terest in new concepts for survivable basing of this nation's own high-value military
systems. President Reagan's October 2 , 1981 , announceme nt initiated the current in
vestigation of deep basing as one of three possible long-term basing modes for the MX
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) . The same threat trends (primarily for in
creasing accuracy, increasing numbe rs of large delivery vehicles, and increasing num
bers of individual nuclear weapo ns) that engendered today's IC BM rebasing activity
also affect our approach to the design of deep basing systems. Most impo rtantly, we
should avoid (a) any dependence on fixed surface eleme nts to pe rform mission-critical
functions and (b) the temptation to concentrate a great deal of target "value" in one
or a few deep underground cavities. In other words, we are driven to underground sys
tem concepts that can operate relatively independent of surface suppo rt after attack,
and that spatially distribute target value to make a nuclear attack on the system as
unrewarding as possible to the attacker. For a combination of reasons, bo th techni
cal and nontechnical, we also should avoid depe ndence on deception of the po tential
attacker regarding the exact underground locations of critical fixed system assets.
Recognizing the foregoing constraints, Boeing engineers in recent years have
studied a series of concepts for deep basing of an IC BM force. Their efforts led to
the description, in some detail, of a particular example of a deep basing system con�
cept, and to some parametric investigations of the anticipated cost and survivability
of such a system. The example is an interconnected network of horizontal tunn els,
excavated deep under a mesa or mountain ridge compo sed primarily of unsaturated por
ous rock. Access tunn els are horiz ontal, but passageways for postattack egress may
involve slope s anywhere between horizontal and vertical. Provisions are made for
critical subsystem equipment, pe rsonnel, and materials to be distributed amo ng many
separate locations within the tunnel network. Preliminary evaluation of this type
of system concept indicates that satisfactory nuclear survivability probably is
achievable at depths that appe ar to provide a reasonable number of candidate sites
in the United States.
Those of you who have an agenda will notice that thi s s lot on the agenda
is entitled " Hori zontal Egre s s Systems . " I want to take the l iberty now
of expanding that title a l ittle bit . I wi l l try to speak in ba s i cally
two categories . First I ' ll identi fy some of the overall system archi
tectural design options that we believe are ava i lable to des igners of
46

47
potential deep based systems . Then I would l ike to go into a spe c i f i c

example that w e have worked out in mo r e detail than the others and that
give s a reasonable outl ine , I bel ieve , of two things . One i s a system
with near horizontal egre s s capabil ity , and the other is some of the crit
ical subsystems that must be involved in j ust about any deep based sys tem
(particularly a manne d system) that might be cons idered .
Just before we start , I would l ike to recall several things that
speakers have said today . First o f all , Colonel Berry ' s pre sentation on
the evolution of the threat is pertinent because it te l l s us that as the
attacker ' s accuracy increases we cannot count on anything on the surface
to survive an attack . As the attacker ' s ab i l ity to del iver very large
amounts of yield to the target increases , we also are driven , as Dr . Se
vin pointed out , away from concepts that tend to concentrate high-value
assets in one place , regardle s s of their depth . Thus we are dr iven to
di stributed systems by those two trends in the threat .
Finally , some of the material that Dr . Merr itt j ust pre sented in the
way of weapon e f fects te sting , and particularly vulnerab i l ity testing , o f
various cavity lining systems and that sort o f thing give s u s some basis
for constructing analytical model s o f deep basing system vulnerab i lity in
the gro s s structural sense .
What I wi l l show you , I believe , wi l l i l lustrate how that type of in
formation can be used in at least the very pre l iminary stages of a system
des ign . I would also point out that in an attempt to meet my time sched
ule I am going to be walking through these charts at a speed o f about one
per minute . I won ' t be able to e l aborate on everything , but I want to
give you some ideas as to approache s that might be po s s ible .
An obvious one , I suppose , with which to start ( and with whi ch , in
deed , we did start ) i s the idea of distr ibuting a system in the sense o f
providing many self- sufficient deep sha fts , as i l lus trated in Figure 1 .
In other words , j ust very deep silos that are capab le of protecting the
mis s i le from attack and provide the capab i l ity , also , for s e l f - suffic ient
diqout and all the other functions that must be provided to support the
mi s s i le . In the plan view , because of nuclear attack cons iderations , you
are driven to some sort of a hexagonal ly packed layout to avo id the at
tacker ' s being able to get " bonus k i l l s . " In the e levation view you must
cons ider some po s s ible nonideal geologic conditions . At thi s stage o f
the game , about as far a s we went i n that direction was t o consider two
layer systems .
At the t ime when th is was being done there was a temptation to bring
in the idea of deception--in other words , having more deep shafts than you
actually have mi s s i le s . Recent event s in this type of busine s s , I think ,
would convince us all that deception is not a very viable approach to de
s ign . Deceptive bas ing schemes have a lot of ugly aspects as regards pub
lic acceptab i l i ty and cost , but neverthe less we tried various approache s .
You can try to shu f f le mi s s i l e s on the surface , as indicated in Fig
ure 2 . You could try to do it in a shal low tunne l , as shown in Figure 3 ,
to he lp conceal your activities in operating the system . Or , as i l lus
trated in F igure 4 , you could provide a shal low tunne l for mi s s i le shuf
fling and a deeper tunne l for less me chanical ly intens ive operations ,
such as minor maintenance .

48
We eventual ly came t o the conc lus ion that , at least conceptua l ly ,

thi s sort of a de s ign approach would lead us to a deep tunnel system
where the interconnecting tunnel s are as hard as the cavities that pro
tect the high-value assets . ( Such a concept is shown in F igure 5 . ) Al
though we can ' t be certain thi s is the ideal so lution , at least it i s a
very attractive one . I want to be care ful I don ' t say anything i s an
ideal so lution , because I think be fore I am through here you wi l l see
that the work we have done barely scratche s the sur face as to the pre
l iminary system design activity that we are fac ing in the next two years .
Returning to the que st ion of po stattack egres s , we bel ieve the un
certainties (primarily in the nature of crater-re lated damage to such a
s ite ) tend to drive you to con s ider the idea of creating entirely new
egress paths after attack and avoiding the immediate locale that was at
tacked . Such an approach seems superior to attempting to dig through or
otherwi se pas s through an environment of very disrupted material the me
chani cal nature o f which , or even the extent of which , you are unable to
predict prior to the actual attack . Thi s crater-rupture environment un
certainty make s des ign of a digout system (particular ly an automated one )
an a lmost intrac table engineering problem . F igure 6 i l lustrates the fore
going i s sue s .
There are also reasons for looking at the variation on that theme of
providing prestarted exit pathways that are not comple ted all the way to
the sur face . Thi s approach to sys tem de s ign has two attractions . One is
that if any o f the exits are not attacked or happen to survive for what
ever reason , they provide you potentially with a much shorter egre ss time ,
and that is mi l i tar ily a very attract ive feature .
Referring to Figure 7 , anothe r attractive thing about pre-established
exits is that we be l i eve they complicate the targe ting problem for the at
tacker . If he sees a system l ike thi s or be l ieve s that the sys tem is de
signed l ike thi s ( a c tual ly he would know i t ) he then must make a choice .
He mus t dec ide either to targe t the high-value assets at great depth ,
whi ch are we l l protected and thus require large amounts of his de l iverable
yield , or he can decide to use that yield in another way and attack your
pre started egre s s pathways . An attack against pre started egre s s pas sage
ways require s him to use up a s igni f icant fract ion of the yie ld that he
might a l locate against the entire system and thus leave large number s or
a large percentage of the higher value assets , such as mi s s i le s , power
plants , crews , e tc . , undamaged at the greater depth . I f so , they would
s t i l l remain a long-term threat to him , although perhaps not as immediate
a threat .
Although this is probably an obvious point , I want to mention brief
ly in pas s ing that the ba sing o f digout capab i l i ty in such a system also
c learly provides the capab i l i ty ( at least conceptua l ly ) of repa1r1ng some
o f the damage sustained during an attack . This idea is i llustrated in
Figure 8 . It give s the system flexibility , particular ly , we bel i eve , if
it is a manned sys tem . I t would have flexibility that an unmanned system
without thi s capab il ity could not exhibit .
I wi l l apologize for the cartooni sh nature of Figure 9 , but i f you
think about the problem of creating new egre s s pathways after attack and
avoiding damaged areas , we be lieve you wi l l be drawn to the idea that

49
perhaps vertical egres s paths may not have all the attractivene s s that
steeply or even shal lowly angled egre s s paths might have .
In particular , i f you are capable of f inding a site that al lows some
surface relie f , the task of tunne ling or otherwise excavating an egre s s
path , w e believe , might b e accomplished with l e s s of a demand o n techno
log i cal development . In other words , it takes more advantage of existing
underground excavation technology .
So , with that as background on the pre liminary search for a system
to examine in greater detai l , I wi ll proceed now to the system that we
have recently given some attention to . P lease understand , however , that
our elaboration of thi s concept was done only as an example . The motiva
tion for doing so was ( a ) to convince ourselve s that we understand all the
parts of such a system and how they must play together and (b ) to provide
a framework for the planning of required research , particularly re search
in nuc lear hardne s s and survivabi lity as they relate to mi s s ion-critical
subsystems .
Now , I have a series of four or five i l lustrative charts here which
tend to start , as you see in F igure 10 , with an external view of an i deal
ized s ite . The sur face relie f shown here probably i s physi cally unrealiz
able , but the point i s that a base such as you will see de scribed would
have very l ittle observable signature on the surface . You would see a
system of access roads and a system of access tunnel portals from the out
side leading into whatever escarpment was used as a host for the system .
As we see in F igure 1 1 , i f it were po s s ible to cut away and see what
is inside that ridge or me sa or mountain , whatever you want to call it ,
we propose that a tunnel system be excavated in that escarpment which ba
s i cally consists of , first of all , a peripheral tunne l that e s sentially
fol lows the lay of the land , the outs ide periphery of the ridge . For rea
sons which I probably don ' t have time to go into in detai l , we believe
that you would , also , be driven to have es sentially enough additional un
derground space to provide a redundant tunne l ( shown there in a z igzag
shape ) that connects with the bas ic peripheral tunne l .
We have shown the idea of providing prestarted exit tunne ls sloping
up nominally at a 2 0 -percent s lope . Thi s concept for pre started exits
i s one that we cho se rather arbitrar i ly for purposes of thi s exerc i se .
Figure 11 shows that for some distance (whi ch would have to be determined
by our estimate s of cratering weapon e f fects , etc . ) that exit tunnel would
not be completed all the way to the surface .
The acce s s tunne l s are shown again here in Figure 1 1 . They would
have to be provided at intervals , probably something on the order of every
10 mi les around thi s sys tem , for two reasons . One is that , as you people
are more aware than I , acce s s tunne l s would be neces sary for con struction
purposes during the deployment of the sys tem , and finally , of course , it
i s required to have some way to get crews , equipment , etc . , in and out of ·
the system during peacetime operat ion .

In Figure 1 2 we have made an attempt to show a c loser view of what
is in that internal tunnel arrangement . Thi s is a view that at least
tries to give a conceptual idea of what that system would look like from
a closer vantage point and what sort of equipment is requi red in it dur
ing the period of postattack egre s s operation .

so
We have shown that the machine t o b e used would b e a tunne l boring

machine ( TBM ) . I don ' t think that we need to select a particular device
at thi s time , and we realize that a standard TBM is probably not a good
choice , given the uncertainty about the type of material you wi ll be go
ing through . However , some sort of excavating capabi l ity has to be pro
vided along with some means of handl ing the spo i l s , a place to di spose
of them within the sys tem , and of course all the other critical items .
They include accommod ations for the crew ( in other words , the l i fe sup
port systems ) , shops for maintenance of the equipment being used , trans
porter-launchers which house and protect the environment of the mi ssile
wh ile it i s being stored and , also , serve the function of bringing it to
the sur face for launch a fter digout has been accompli shed , plus some sort
of survivable e lectric power system .
We chose to look at large -capaci ty hydrocarbon fue l cells as a candi
date for that system and , of course , recognized the need for a very im
portant and very elaborate environmental contro l system which provides
venti lation and disposal of waste heat in this system .
Before I proceed to a short discus s ion of some critical subsystems
besides the one s that you see there , I want to make a few points about
as sumptions that were made .
First of all , we made assumpt ions which I be l ieve are critical . One
i s that nothing in the layout of thi s system wi ll be unknown to the at
tacker , that he will have per fect pre -attack knowledge of the location
of everything underground . It i s very di fficult , we believe , to con
vince ourse lve s that we could keep that information secre t or even sig
nificantly uncertain .
Secondly , we a l so be l ieve that by the time the ful l range of threats
against such a system ha s been cons idered it wi ll be a requirement that
the system have maximum autonomy in the sense of not requiring exchange
of air or coolant fluids wi th the external sur face environment a fter at
tack . In other words , it truly must be a self-contained , buttoned-up ,
sealed operation after attack . For that reason , as many of you are well
aware , the problem of thermal e f fic iency of all the equipment involved ,
and particularly energy storage and energy convers ion sys tems , is ex
treme ly important . The problem o f dispos ing of waste heat in a fully
sealed system that i s housed in rock (particularly the types of rock that
we be l ieve would be attractive , which tends to be a rather good insulator
and not the most ideal medium for di sposing of waste heat ) wi ll have to
be given s igni ficant attention in the de sign of deep underground surviv
able basing systems .
The previous figure s have shown you a few of the critical subsys tems,
and I parti cularly want to point out that , as we are a l l aware , the post
attack egre s s is sue is the first one that people wi l l ask about in con
�idering thi s type of concept . It is my be lief that perhaps the second
que stion that wi l l be asked has to do with the survival of communications .
I f thi s sys tem i s to have any uti l i ty to the nation , some means of com
muni cating with it after attack must be provided . As you noticed in the
previous picture s , no des igns were chosen for that particular subsystem .
The reason i s that we don ' t be lieve it has been worked out , or that the
technology in general has deve loped to the po int at which a particular

51
des ign can . be chosen . Thus , although there are a number of promi s ing tech
nologies from mil i tary appli cations , oil explorat ion programs , �n1ng safe�
ty research , and that sort o f thing , that lead us to bel ieve that some sort
o f through-the-earth communications l ink would serve we l l as a last-ditch
s urvivable l ink to outside authority , we did not bel ieve that we could i den
t i fy a parti cular des ign as being even a reasonable candidate for an example .
Now , c learly you must have some criteria on which to j udge the bene
f its o f such a system o f deep based strategic mi s s i le s . Our aerospace dis
c ipl ine in thi s area tends to concentrate on these two criteria : how wel l
doe s i t survive a n attack of the type that w e think might b e mounted
against i t , and how much is i t go ing to cost?
At that po int , parti cularly with the last word , " cost , " ringing in
your ears , I would l ike to caution everyone that the amounts of re sources
that have been devoted thus far to thi s type o f conceptual system des ign
are by no means adequate to provide a lot of confidence in cost estimates .
I think that be fore we are through here you will understand that all the
confidence that we place in the estimated cost numbers that we have come
up with for thi s one particular example i s to convince us that it i s not
an order of magnitude cheaper than a lternative basing schemes , and neither
is it an order of magnitude more expens ive . It is in the same bal lpark .
I mentioned the capability of creating survivabi l i ty mode l s , given
some rather arbitrari ly chosen parameters at the outset about the type of
site that you wi l l be in . I n Figure 13 we show at least one mode l of the
survivability of tunne l s of about the s i z e that we are talking about in
dry , soft ( that i s , unsaturated and porous ) rock .
You can see that an analytical mode l ( which is a lot fuz z ier than
that nice crisp l ine of Figure 13 would tend to make you be lieve ) can be
created which , for example , shows that , from the fac i l i ty des igner ' s view
point , 100 megatons of attacking yield are required to irreparably damage
a single point on a tunnel at a depth of 3000 feet in the type of material
we are talking about . In other words , trying to provide a system that we
be lieve with great con fidence could survive a given attack , we would say
at that depth one point on the tunnel would require something like 100
megatons of attacking yield in a surface burst to create a severe enough
destructive environment to render that point or a few tens of feet along
the tunnel inoperable .
As Dr . Sevin mentioned in his pre sentation , the tunne l sys tem des ign
er ' s viewpoint i s not the only one that counts . The attacker ' s viewpoint ,
also , has to be taken into account . The attack planner has a lot of un
certainty about every step in the proces s of predic ting how much damaging
environment he can produce at this system ' s depth . Even conservatively
speaking , we beli eve that when those uncertainties are folded in ( a s you
wi l l see ) there is probably something l ike a factor of e ight between the
two points of view . I f , for example , the des igner felt he had a system
that was reasonably survivable against 100 megaton s de tonated on a par
ticular surface aim point , the attacker ( at least i f he uses targeting
phi losophie s that we bel i eve he would ) would be convinced tha t he had to
put 800 megatons on that aim po int to ensure a high confidence in de stroy
ing the deep tunne l target location . Such a calculation of target hard
ne s s would , in our opinion , tend to make any potential attacker look very
hard at other ways of neutra liz ing that target .

52
Now , given a model l ike that and some knowledge of other nuclear
weapon e f fects , you can come to some rough conclusion s about some of the
parametric var iations of such system de signs as a function of depth for
a given set of other postulated constraints . Some sort of a threat esti
mate must be obtained . Some requirement must be spe c i f ied for how many
mi s s i les out of the original number deployed must survive . Also neces sary
are some speci fication of the type of site and an agreement as to what the
proper kill mechan i sm i s ; that i s , that combination of weapon-induced en
vironments which wi l l render the system inoperable .
We have done a little bit of thi s kind of thing , and in Figure 14 we
can see a couple of curve s that are important for the type of system I
have j ust de scribed . As you can see , as you go deeper , you requi re fewer
mi s s i l e s to be deployed . Also as you go deeper , fewer mi les of tunnel
have to be cons tructed to interconnect tho se deployed mi s s i le s .
As you can see , the se curves do not have a definite optimum point .
However , they tend to te l l us that i f we are interested in fie lding a sys
tem that looks reasonable in terms of number of mi s s i l e s and i f all of our
other as sumptions about the threat , the nuclear weapon e f fects , and the
survivability of tunne ls are correct , then you want to be somewhere down
in the neighborhood of at least 2 000 feet deep , probab ly c loser to 3000
feet .
Again , I don ' t want to g ive the impress ion that there i s a lot of
conf idence in the se exact numbers . We did thi s type of analysis primar
i ly to show trends , to see if there were any obvious optimal depth points ,
and exac tly what were the trends of sys tem requirements as you go deeper .
Doing that and having some idea of how much it costs to dig tunne ls and
shafts , provide various pieces of equipment , etc . , you can make an esti
mate of how cost varies as a function of depth . Here we are going to get
into some Defense Department cost terms .
We see a few of the se terms in Figure 1 5 . Life cycle cost , for ex
ample , is the total cost of doing research , deve loping the system , de
ploying the sys tem , and operat ing the sys tem for a given period of years .
Re search and deve lopment cost , acqui sition cost , and operating and sup
port costs are depicted individually in F igure 1 5 .
Acqui sition costs are j ust the costs of actually produc ing and in
stalling all the necessary equipment , plus providing the necessary base
faci lities , inc luding underground cavities . Out of acqui sition costs ,
j ust for curiosity , we di splay how much of that in our estimate was occu
pied by the cost of excavating tunnel s and other cavities .
As you can see , depending on the system depth , it is a relatively
small fraction of the total . Figure 16 i s a di splay of the same data for
a particular sys tem depth in pie charts . P lease keep in mind that in de
ve loping thi s estimate we employed technique s good wi thin plus a factor
of two and minus cons iderably le s s than that . We can see , however , the
d ivi s ion between re search and development , acqui s ition , and operations
costs . Keep in mind , also , that in the research and development cost cat
egory we charged the deve lopment of the mis s i le itself against thi s system .
In acquisition we also charged the acqui stion of the mis s i le against this
sys tem , in deve loping a number which comes out into the few tens of bil
lions .

53
What we are probably more concerned about now , having been charged
by President Reagan with comparing three competing long-term MX bas ing
options , i s j ust the cos t of the bas ing system itsel f . To do that you
have to take out the cost of mi ssiles in both acquis i t ion and R&D . How
ever , the remainder of thi s acqui s i t ion pie ( which i s about two-thirds
o f i t ) is split about equal ly between equipment and other i tems and ex
cavation . The se costs mus t be charged against the cost of the basing
system . Again , i f you look at system acqui sition costs for bas ing only ,
then tunne ls , at least in thi s particular example , loom as a larger frac
tion of the total ( about hal f the total bas ing cost ) .
Again , I want to of fer the caution that thi s exerc i se was not done
with the intent or the claim that it produced a system that we could go
out and bui ld tomorrow , or a system that we could even stand up and say
today is the optimal system . We clearly cannot say that . We have not
done suf f i c ient research to identi fy an optimal system . We have not ex
erci sed all the pos s ible deep bas ing options in thi s way . However , we
feel that thi s example was useful , at least as a starter , in portraying
to the community the type of considerations that have to be included in
an R&D program such as we are facing right now .
With that , I wi ll c lose wi th a couple of minutes to spare .
* * * * *
SPEAKER : It went a little fast , but what cost per l inear foot of tunnel
are you talking about in those estimate s ?
MR .WOO S TER : The estimate , which was done in 19 7 8 do llars , I think came
out to something like $ 1 , 800 a foot , at the most .
SPEAKER : What size tunne ls were they ?
MR .WOO S TER : They varied . Di f ferent parts of the system had d i f ferent
tunnel diameters , but the access tunnel s were of about 18- foot diameter ,
and most of the rest of the tunnels we estimated would be 15 feet in
diameter .
SPEAKER : You pa s sed over the shell game of the old s i los very quickly .
What disadvantage did you see in those ?
MR . WOO S TER : I wi l l c i te two primary disadvantage s which we feel were

a great hindrance to the MX sur face shelter deceptive sy stem . The first
one i s that producing redundant she lters in which to house mi s s i le s , par
ti cularly in thi s deep based example , would be extremely expensive . While
i t might enhance survivability , the costs quickly get out o f hand , and
j us t from an economic standpoint we feel it would hinder feas ibility of
the idea .
The second one i s that in this country , with the soc iety as we have it
set up , maintaining deception in any system l ike that (with the po s s ible

54
exception of one where everything i s at great depth and ful ly concealed)

i s very d i f fi cult . I bel i eve we would be unable to as sure ourselve s that
we could maintain deception and be confident that we were indeed still
creating enough uncertainty in the eyes o f the attacker . So , s ince both
of tho se things were looked upon as c lose to be ing " show-stopper s " on the
previous concept , it would be nice to avoid them here .
SPEAKER : It might save us a l ittle money , but what are the Russ i ans
do ing ? What are they going to do to base their mi s s i l e s ?
MR .WOO S TER : I am not even brie fed into that activity , but w e ought to
be concerned with two aspects of what they will do . One of them , as you
said , i s looked at from the de fens ive point of view . Would they mirror
image a deve lopment like thi s i f we started it? That is an interesting
question . Perhaps it would be a good thing .
The second question i s , " How would they perhaps modi fy the force s they
have in order to attack a sys tem like thi s e f fectively? " I think in
that area lies one of the primary advantages of deep basing . I say so
because I bel ieve that the nuclear survivabi l ity of a properly de s igned
deep underground system will not be sensitive to changes in the enemy ' s
threat , or even to some very substantial change s in his threat .
SPEAKER : Your pre sentation wa s based on a prototype si te . Would the

system have multiple site s ?
MR .WOO S TER : I don ' t think that i s sue has been even addres sed yet . There
are some considerations that I thi nk would drive you to wanting to have
multiple sites , among them threats in the non-nuc lear category .
SPEAKER : Which mean s you have not e l iminated the pos s ibility of the
s i los ; you have not totally el iminated anything that you started in the
beginning . You are still go ing to have another look ?
MR . WOOSTER : That is right , i f we are permi tted to look .
SPEAKER : So you have not done our j ob?
MR . WOO S TER : That i s right . I certainly don ' t mean to imply that any
options have been foreclosed . We have some reasons for be lieving that
some of the 15- to 2 0 -year-old approache s no longer are viable because
of recent deve lopments in the threat , but there is sti ll quite a wide
spectrum of des ign approache s that we believe are still valid for in
ve stigation against today ' s and tomorrow ' s threat .
SPEAKER : Doe s your scheme depend on the se 5 percent and 20 percent

tunnel slope s , which are pretty tough to build?
MR. WOO S TER : No , i t doe s not . I think there are two main penalties for
going to shal lower slope s . One of them is that shallower s lopes make
acceptable sites harder to f ind . So , site avai lability from a topographic

55
point of view i s much enhanced if you can g o out at a steeper angle . Per
haps you don ' t even need any sur face relie f , i f you can convince yourself
you can dig out at a su fficiently steep angle .
SPEAKER : Conversely , talking about a postattack excavation , I would

think you might want to keep it s imp le , and you might want to make it
horizonta l , and that would limit your geographical s ites .
MR . WOO S TER : Ye s , it would .
SPEAKER : What digout times are being considered? How long do you have
to get out ?
MR . WOOSTER : The answer , as far as I know , i s no .
SPEAKER : The answer i s no . There is no constraint , but obvious ly faster

is better .
MR. WOO S TER : That is right . Through the several year s that our organi
zation has been looking at thi s particular problem there has been a dis
tinct pauci ty of specific requirements . We have had to postulate what
that system might be required to do , and it appears that in thi s program
there is going to be a de liberate approach which says that we want to
see what is pos s ible before we start laying any specific requirements
on the system .
There i s a wide variety of opinion as to what is de sirable . There are

some people in the Air Force who believe that if such a system cannot
launch instantaneous ly it has no credibil ity as a deterrent . There is
another variety o f opinion , perhaps in the " strategic thinker " category,
of people who say that as long as you can create enough uncertainty in
the attacker ' s mind that he cannot actual ly de stroy the mi s s i les , even
i f they cannot dig out at all , he still has to cons ider them in h i s cal- .
culations of threat against himself . That point of view i s not terribly
appealing to me e i ther . It does not constitute a very credible threat
against an attacker who otherwi se could bottle you up .
SPEAKER : What is to prevent the observations of rubble after the attack

and the immediate " zap " when you break through be fore you have the time
to get your mis s i le up? It i s obviously go ing to be a long period of
time .
MR .WOO S TER : Ye s . That question has not been addres s ed , and it will be
a key part of the R&D program , I would predict . However , I think that
one of the answers that is going to come out is that even a system such
as we are talking about , which has a high degree of self-sufficiency
po stattack , is not entirely independent of outside he lp . For example ,
one common thing that is said is that we must retain the capability to
deny enemy occupation of the s i te . Working that problem even further ,

56
then , perhaps denial of surveillance or at least interference with post

attack surveillance on the part of the adversary may also be a require
ment for systems like thi s .
DR . LINGER : That is one reason why there is a task force whose obj ective
is eqre s s . Eqress is the biq problem .
SPEAKER : I thouqht maybe they solved it already .
DR . LINGER : No , as a matter of fact , I think there miqht be some words

that will come out here that would help . Are there any other que stions
for Jim? Super . well , thank you , Jim , for an excellent presentation .

DEEP
BASED
SRF Sel f-Suffic ient Dee p Shafts
:.:.-.�;: D
· ··
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·.) CAVITY FOil DIGOUT MA11111AL ITOIIMI
CONCI" N0. 1
INDIVIDUAL DEEP IHAFTI, IILNUFFICIINT
WITH IIUNCT TO DIGOUT LAUNCH AND
CAPMIUTV.
PLAN VI EW ELEVATION
F I GU R E 1

DEEP
BASED
SRF
Self-Suffic ient Dee p Shafts ( Dece ptive)
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INDIVIDUAL IHArn, WHEN OCCUIII ID,
SELfo&UPfiCIENT WITH RESPECT TO DlctoUT
AND LAUNCH. GROUND MOIU UTY TO
CONCEAL SHAFT OCCUPANCY.
PLAN VI EW ELEVATION
F I GU R E 2

DEEP
BASED Dee p Shafts, Shal l ow Con necting Tu n nels
SRP
( Dece p tive)
ME-AnACK 8IIOUND IUIIPACI rTIIMIITION POINT

J
Ul
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PLAN VIEW ELEVATION
CONCin NO. J
VARIAnON Of CONCin NO. J
WITH UNOEIIGIIOUND IVITIM FOR
OEPLOVIIEN T AND MAINTINAIIICI .
FOR DIGOUT AND LAUNCH.

IVITIM E LEMENli iELf..UPPICIUIT
F IGURE 3

Deep Sh afts, Both Dee p and

DEEP
BASED Shal l ow Con necti ng Tu nnels
-
SRP
( Dece p tive)
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PLAN VI EW E LEVATION
CONCEPT NO. 4
VARIATION OF CONC!PT NO. I
WITH UNDERGROUND IYITEM POll
DEPLOYMENT AND MAINTINANCI.
FOR DIGOUT AND LAUNCH.

IYITEM E LE .. NTI IILF..UfFICIINT
F I GURE 4

DEEP
BASED Deep Shafts, Su rv ivable I ntercon necting
SRF
T u nnel at Depth ( Decept ive)
..��. "I I
ltRE-ATTACK GROUND SURFACE
. ::·-· :. ·�:: -� . .
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TUNNI L
PLAN VI EW E LEVATION
CDNCEn ND. Ii
INDIVIDUAL SHAFTI WITH DE E '-MIE D
HARDENED TUNNEL IYITEM FOil Ml·
ATTACK DECEPTION AND PDIT-ATTACIC
F I GU R E 5 LAUNCH E G R E II FROM IURV1VING IHAP1L

DEEP
BASED
Deep Tu nnel, D igout V ia S h afts
SRP
R a ised Post-Attack
SAMPLE DESIGN POSSIBI L I TY :

POST-ATTACK DIGOUT CAPABILITY THROUGH UNDISTURBED SITE MATERIAL • D
OR, THROUGH OVERSTR ESSED AND R UPTURED MATER IAL • D/2
OR, COMBINED, I F X + 2Y • LESS jY'HAN D
"'
II.)
RUPTURE AND DEIRII RUPTURE AND DE IRII
-- - - --
DIITRUCTION DEPLOYMINT TUNNEL
F IGURE 6
�l Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

DEEP Potential for Tu nnel

BASED
SRP Damage Repair After Attack
Dl ... M D lt&WTUM
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POST-ATTACK, SURVIVING TUNN.ELING E QU I PM ENT, @ , R E-ESTABLISHED TUNNEL TO A DIGOUT SHAFT

CR EATED BY A SURVIVING DIGOUT D EVICE, @) , PERMITTING MISSILE-LAUNCHERS, @) , TO REACH THAT
DIOOUT SHAFT FOR E XIT AND LAUNCH ••
F I GU R E 8

DEEP
BASED
Deep Tu n nel , D igou t Post-Attack ,
SRF
P resta rted E x its
SAMPLE DESIGN POSS I B I LITY :

POST-AnACK D I GOUT CAPABI L ITY THROUGH UNDISTURBED S I T E MAT E R I A L • D
OR, THROUGH OVE RSTR ESSED AND R UPTU R E D MAT E R I A L · D/2
OR, COM B I N E D, I F X + 2Y • LESS THAN D
0'1
w
BLOCKAGE RUPTURE AND DE BRIS RUPTURE AND DE BRIS
... _ _
DESTRUCTION DEPLDVMINT TUNNEL
F I GU R E 7

DEEP
BASED
Deep Tu nnel , N on-Vertica l
SRF
Post-Attack E gress
TUNN E LING EGRESS CAN BE SUBSTITUTED FOR THE SHAFT EGR ESS ASSUM ED IN CONCEPT NO. I WITH
RESULTING CIRCUMVENTION O F THE TRANSI T ION PROBLEM OF MOVING F ROM HOR I ZONTAL TUNNE L
INTO VERTICAL SHAFT. SLOPED START O F E G R ESS TUN N E L CAN B E ACHIEVED W I T H M I NIMAL UNDER·
CuniNG OF TH E TUNNEL F LOOR . THIS COULD BE PROVI DED PERIODICA L LY ALONG THE TUNN E L PRIOR
TO ATTACK. TUNNEL EGRESS ANGLE, e, WI L L DETERM I N E EG R ESS TUNNE L LENGTH, R E LATIVE TO
ALTE RNATIVE DIGOUT SHAFT LENGTH, 1/sin e •
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DEPLOYMENT TUNNE L U1
DtGOUT MUCK REMOVAL TO PRE-DUG

CAVITY OR REMOTE TUNNE L
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DEPLO TUNNE L J
F I GU R E 9

66
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DEEP BASI!D l 1ter•al Arra•ee•o•t of Deep U1dergre11d lase •
FSRP
D1rl•1 Pest-Attack Dlge1t Operatle1
flei-Cell Pewer U1lts (2) IIICfllf T11k1 fer

flti•Ctll Pewer U1lts
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F I GURE 1 2

DE EP BASED
FSR F . Tunnel Survivability in Dry Soft Rock
-- �------��--�---+-
• IURFACI IURIT
• 314 RlWI'URI ItiLL
• DEFENIE
CONIERVATIVE
- • TUNNE L MINIMALLY --+----�
LINED TO MEET
CONITRUC1'10N NIIDI
AnACICING
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csuu KI LLI JL esuR E IAF il TUNNEL DEPTH em
F I GU R E 1 3

DE EP BASED Required Force Size & Tunnel Length

FSR F
Change with Dep th
REQUIRED
[ I
DEPLOYMENT
OF MtaiLEI
POSI'ULATED
CONSTRAINTS:
• - DELIVERED
0, , , , ,
e THREAT
LRA IOMBER LOADS �:: -.J
3DOD .... 0
•so SURVIVING M IISI LEI SYSTEM DE"H IN FEET
• DRY. POROUS ROCK
• KILL CRITERION fDEF.
� ��----��--�-
CONSERVATIVE)
• 314 RUPTURE ZONE
f - 1.2 - D.25 KBAR STREa)
TOTAL
CONSTRUCTION
LENGTH
IN N.M.
� ---�
��------�
-�
OO�
G------�...
��
SYSTEM DE"H IN FEET
F I GU R E 14

f
IJfEP BASED
t'SRfo. Cost Breakdown
I
MOl l I I • 10 SURVIVING MIDI LU. I I
• NOMINAL THREAT.
• 3/4 RUPTURE KILL
• SURFACE IURIT.
• DRY lOFT ROCK.
-- �-------;---+ • MEIA ILOPE • EXIT ILOPE • 1.2
• CI RCULATION TUNNEL &OPE • Ul
ElniiATED
TEN-YEAR
UFE CYCLE COlT
o,J
....
11171 DOLLAIIIt
-- �------�--
101 ..-----+---
D �------�------��----��--------�------�
D 1,000 2.000 3,000 •.000 1.DDD
SYSTEM DEPTH fFT)
F I GUR E 1 5

DEEP BASED
!-'Sit f. Cost Breakdown for Baseline System
[- 1978 DOLLARS --)

TOTAL ACQUISITION COST VI.. CLU . ...
/
• BI LLION . ...
..... u.
:1./
•
1WIIS • MUCIC
IGUII'MENT
_ . .......
T•AINING
. .. .,
IU IGUIPIIENT IUJ
GINEIIIAL ...,_ ,
I ICO IU1
ACOUIIInON
....
lAC IAII •
IU..af�T .....
-..J
1\)
c1 . .., .
IIIICI LLAIIIE OUI ....
TOTAL 10 YEAR
uao n DUTH.
SYSTEM COlT
117 BI LLION .. IA ILOPI •U

IXIT ILOf'l •U
Q RC. lUIIIIII L ILGPI • ...
MIIII L U
IU4 ACCIU --" TUNNEL 1M DEPLOYED
II IU.VIVOU
.... ..sc.
W DT ... LII
H.U IIOADI I,JOI PIQIIU
F I GURE 1 6

Deep Silo Basing Systems
FRA NK PARR Y
R & D Associat es
Ma r ina Del R ay , Cal iforn ia
SVHNARY : An alternative to the horizontal tunne l basing mode (i . e . , the "Mesa " con
cept or any of its derivative s ) is the system of deep vertical silos . These are typ
ified by two main types , the " Sand Silo" and the " Pencil Pusher . "
Unlike the horizontal systems , the vertical systems are unmanned and would tend
to be operated very much l ike current Minuteman s i lo systems , with the exception that
the deep s i los might al&o be for "dormant " mi ssile storage . In this mode the missile
would be essentially " turned off" and would not be activated until eqress and launch
were required . The vertical systems would accommodate simi lar threats to the hor i
zontal systems , but in some conceptions might be based at a greater depth than the
horizontal systems with an attendant increase in hardnes s . One possible disadvantage
is that the vertical system must have fixed and known exits , whereas in the horizon
tal concepts the exit points could be unknown until egress . In general , designs have
been made to accommodate surface bursts of up to 100 megatons .
The " Pencil Pusher " (see Figure 3 ) was originated by the Lawrence Livermore Na
tional Laboratory in 1980 . The MX-sized missile canister is placed near the bottom
of a 3 , 000-foot hollow steel tube open at the bottom and terminating at the top in a
con ical raise borer . The steel tube is the "penc i l , " and the whole is sited below
the water table , which is at a depth of 2 , 000 feet . Thus , silos containing this sys
tem are some 5 , 000 feet deep . The required siting is for 2 , 000 feet of soft overbur
den over 3 , 000 feet of hard rock with the water table no lower than the interface . A
capsule of propel lant for eqress actuation is stored below the mi ssile canister . In
the storage position the pencil is ful l of water , and the buoyant mi ssile and propel
lant canisters are anchored at the bottom of the pencil . For egress the missile and
propellant canisters , both of which are buoyant in water , are released and floated to
the top of the penc il and there anchored . The propellant is then ignited . This pro
pel lant , possibly hydrazine , is des igned to burn slowly in a controlled manner and
expe ls water out of the pencil . This makes the whole penci l assembly very buoyant in
the lower water- filled 3 , 000 feet of the s i lo , giving an upthrust of several mill ion
pounds . This raises the whole assembly to the ground level either by simply forcing
it through a prepared upper f i l l or by using the raise borer . An alternative to the
buoyancy concept (see Figure 7 ) is the hydraul ic ram concept (see Figure 8 ) . In the
latter case , the lower 3 , 000-foot silo is pressurized by a reservoir and PUIIlP system ,
thus sliding the penci l through a seal system and forcing it through the upper fill
as shown . The ram concept can produce over twice the force of the buoyancy concept .
The "Sand Silo" concept (see Figure 1 3 ) was originated by Boeing about 1974 .
The MX-s ized mi ssile is encapsulated and placed at the bottom of a deep silo some 3 0
feet in diameter and 1 , 500 feet deep . Th e s i lo shaft above the missile capsule i s
f i lled with prepared sand . For capsule emplacement or eqress the sand is " f luidized"
by introducing a fairly uniform water content throughout the sand . The capsule is
operated somewhat like a submarine , for emplacement the capsule can be made heavy by
73

74
filling ballast spaces with water and thus making the capsule sink through the fluid
ized sand , with the latter behaving like quicksand . For egress , the reverse of this
process takes place r the capsule i s IIIAd e buoyant by "blowing " the ballast spaces .
This method of operation allows ready emplacement and also egres s from an undisturbed
silo . If , however , the s i lo has been subj ect to a nuc lear attack the upper silo could
be greatly di srupted and no longer have a prepared fill of known characteristics . It
is therefore desirable that the capsule carry a raise boring IIIAChine s o that in this
worst-case condition egress can be achieved by boring out the upper portion of the
silo .
In general , the deep silo systems are capable of more rapid egre ss than the Mesa
systems--perhaps hours instead of days . After attack , where egres s requires opera
tion of the raise borer IIIA chine , the silo systems would have the advantage of provid
ing a steady force on the rock face by virtue of their inherent upthrusts , whereas
the horizontal exit requires use of a conventional tunne l boring IIIAChine with a re
petitive " grab and thrust " mechanism .
The above i s an abbreviated descr iption o f the vertical silo deep basing systems .
Details of associated system requirements , such as siting r operations and IIIA intenance r
command , control , and commun ications , security , and cost are included in the briefing
charts .
It has been a long morning , and we are talking about tunne l s . I always
think of tunne l s as hori zontal . I am going to talk about something dif
ferent . I am not going to promise you a light at the end o f the tunne l ,
but at least I am going to turn them ups ide down and talk about vertical
systems .
I am going to talk briefly about the generic deep bas ing concepts
and then the very pre s s ing que stion : what are the threat and the envi
ronment that one mus t des ign to ? I have been involved in des igns in a
number of the se systems , and it i s always very d i fficult getting the nu
c lear communi ty to te l l me what to de s ign to .
Somehow we need some uni f ied threat to compare all thes e systems by .
I am going to talk first about the " Penc i l Pusher , " a concept originated
at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory on which we have done some very pre l im
inary engineering work . (As Jim Woos ter said , all the se things are very ,
very prel iminary . ) Then I am going to talk about one of J im Wooster ' s
systems , the vertical " Sand S i lo . " F inal ly , I will addre s s some of the
i s sue s at the end .
The problem , as has been explained , is to provide a land-based ICBM
e i ther as a secure reserve force or as an alternative primary basing mode
(Figure 1 ) . The potential solutions for the deep underground are the ver
tical , whi ch tend t o b e unmanned , and the horizontal , which tend t o be
manned .
I am going to talk about , as I said , the Sand S i lo and the Penc i l
Pusher in terms o f the system technology i s sue s and survivability ; what
actually is the threat you want to de sign to , and what is the environment
at depth ? Then the big thing we are all talking about here i s egre s s :
How feasible is it? How long doe s it take ? What powers doe s it want ?
An d s o on . The endurance and communication s , which J im brie f ly addre s sed ,
but which have not been properly dealt with yet , and s iting are some o f
the other i s s ue s .
Why vertical deep underground bas ing ? We ll , it is said--and let me
say here that I am not in a po s ition of advocacy here but am j us t trying

75
to present some things that have been developed and postulated--vertical

egr e s s might require only tens of hours , for the s imple reason that the
vertical shaft does ease the muck disposal problem provided you make
proper preparations for a muck p i t underneath .
The cost per uni t employed ( UE ) is comparable with tho se of a l l the
other systems ; they all cost around about $ 10 0 to $ 2 00 mi l l ion per mi s
s i l e for acqui s ition . The MX multiple aim point (MAP ) concept had the
same estimated costs .
Combined concepts are also pos s ible . For example , i f you make a
vertical deep s i lo , one could have a quick-respons e shallow s i lo at the
top .
Also , the egress system developed for the vertical s i lo might be
app l icable to the Mesa concept , and we bel ieve at thi s time that the se
types of concepts should be inc luded in the Air Force deep underground
program . Don ' t throw them out yet . They may have some value .
The two things I am go ing to be talking about , the Sand S i lo and
the Penc i l Pusher , were conce ived as responses to d i f ferent threats ( F ig
ure 2 ) . The Sand S i lo has a 5-megaton threat , wi th the shock spec trum
as shown . Boeing did a point design . R & D As sociates looked at the ir
envi ronment , and sure enough the Boeing points lay within that environ
ment . If you extend the threat to 25 megatons , the chart shows the un
certainty bound s -- this is actua l ly the same chart that Dr . Sevin showed
you-- and for the Penc i l Pusher we are us ing thi s environment , a soft
rock over a hard rock , with bas ing at 5 , 000-foot depths .
Because I am showing the Penci l Pusher (F igure 3 ) first doe s not
mean that it is either preferred over the Sand S i lo or not . I t j us t hap
pens that I have recently worked on thi s , so it is a little easier for me
to talk about i t .
The principle of the Penc i l Pusher , originated in 1980 by Livermore ,
was that one would dig a deep hol e in thi s layered medium with a lluvium
on top and competent rock be low . In the bottom 3 , 000 feet , one would
have a hollow steel penc i l - l ike obj ect . One would require the water ta
ble to be somewhere at the 2 , 000- foot level . In the bottom end of the
penc i l is the mi s s i le cani s ter . Be low that is the canister containing
"propel lant , " or some mater ial that can be burned to expe l the water in
the canister .
For egress , first of a l l the se two cani sters are raised to the top
of the penc i l , and then the propel lant can ister i s fired--under control ,
of course--so it can force the water out of the ins ide of the penc i l ,
and the whole thing then becomes very buoyant and can force its way up
through the upper prepared fill . Of course , the problem i s that after
an attack you may not have prepared f i l l anymore . Maybe you have 2 , 0 00
feet of prepared f i l l ; the top 1 , 000 feet i s gone or i s badly di srupted .
So , in all cases --and thi s applies to the Sand Silo as wel l -- I think one
has to have a raise borer of some sort on top . One advantage of thi s
type o f concept , which u s e s buoyancy f o r pushing up , i s that the rai se
borer has automatically got its force on the rock face . So you don ' t
have to keep grabbing and pushing , grabbing and pushing .
That i s the principle . The summa ry (F igure 4 ) is that for thi s l im
ited s tudy , a first-cut summary , it appears feasible with compatible

76
costs and po s s ible egre s s advantages , but a number o f i s sues require

clar i f ication . However , we did not uncover any obvious showstoppers .
Now , as a matter of intere st , we normally draw it exaggerated l ike
the left-hand diagram so you can see i t ; a true perspective view i s more
l ike the right-hand diagram .
General system considerations are shown in Figure 5 . The sure k i l l/
sure safe l imits are unte stable . That is a common deep underground ( DUG )
problem , but for a 100-megaton bur s t in a layered medium and 2 , 000 feet
of porous overburden where we have the equipment below in the 3 , 0 00 feet
of the Penc i l Pusher , the environment i s benign compared to that o f the
MX she lter MAP system . The s i z e we used for prel iminary engineering
based on that type of environment was , for block motion , 1 meter at 2 , 0 00
feet (which gave us a 1 3 . 5- foot lower shaft ) and 3 meters at 1 , 0 00 feet ,
with a 2 0 - foot upper shaft and rubbliz ing to a 500-foot depth .
S iting would requi re 2 , 0 00 feet of soft overburden , 3 , 000 feet o f
competent lower medium, and a water table that would enable u s t o keep
the bottom s i lo fi lled . There are quite a number of areas that sati s fy
the se conditions .
The egre s s uncertaintie s ( until determined otherwi s e , and I am sure
it is always going to be the case ) require some kind o f rai se borer cut
ters on the penc i l top , to get through the material you are not sure
about . If you have a fill that you know about , I am sure you can get
out very qui ckly .
When we started this we were using the buoyancy concept (Figure 6 ) ,
but thi s troubled us , large ly because of the control . I f you f i re the
propel lant , how do you control it after you have fired all of the pro
pellant? However , thi s is the type of force we can generate for such a
system i f we measure the tip depth . I f the tip is 2 , 000 feet down to
start with , it comes up , and it will go about 500 feet above . The fig
ure shows the sorts o f force s we can get by buoyancy , depending on the
initial water table depth . We are talking of 5 to 10 mill ion pounds of
upthrust in such a system .
It occurred to us that i f we could do thi s hydraulically we would
have more control over it ; as we changed pump speed and so forth we could
change pre ssure . So , we looked at a system whereby we pump water into
thi s lower cavity and force thi s whole thing up , filled with water again .
Everything else is the same as be fore . So , i f we forced thi s up through
a set of seals (a unique problem in itsel f ) , we can then talk about as
much as 20 mil l ion pounds or even for moderate pre s sure we can keep 10
to 15 mi l l ion pounds upthrust all through egre s s , and that , of cour se ,
we can control .
We can work anywhere on the force diagram at any particular depth .
There are pumps , not of thi s capaci ty , but I point out that in the North
Sea some of the pumps are at 10 , 000- foot depths , and they have as many
as 2 0 0 stage s , pumping water and oil up from that depth . F igure s 7 and
8 depict some of the feature s of the two concepts .
In the hard copies there are a number of detai led de signs . I have
not t ime to go through all those , but let us have a look at the energy
required in thi s system for egre s s ( Figure 9 ) .
Be fore attack , all of the energy needed would be suppl ied by land
l ine or an on-site powerhouse . There i s no need to worry about that ;

77
that i s straightforward . For after attack , w e j us t looked at a case i n

which w e stored all of the energy in l ithium sul fur batteries . These
batteries were sized and priced on the basi s of some work that Boeing
did s ome five or six years ago , when it was looking at a semidormant
system that could be stored for a long t ime . We based our sizes and
costs on that study , updating it , of course , for inflation .
The digout penetration , we assume , require s about 10 megawatt-hours .
That i s as suming a worst case , in which we have to dig through soft al lu
vium . If we go through our f i l ler medium--a formed concrete something
l ike Jay Merritt talked about in those shafts that were l ined--which we
believe we can dig through fairly quickly , we could get through very
quickly . However , we cannot al low ourselves that luxury . The whole
shaft may shift over , and we may have to dig through straight alluvi um .
So , 2 0 megawatt-hour s h a s a safety factor of two in i t .
The l i f ting energy is also o f interest . In one case it is by buoy
ancy , and here we have to f ire a gas generator with 840 k i lopounds o f
hydraz ine in i t . In the other case w e have pumps which have t o keep thi s
pen c i l pres s ing up by pumping a l arge volume of water under high pres sure .
For that we want about 2 0 megawatt-hours , and we double that for safety
and a llow for 40 megawatt-hours .
For postattack egre s s , we be l i eve we can get up in 4 0 hours i f it
were a l l al luvi um ; 2 0 hours if we had 1 , 00 0 feet o f undi sturbed foam
type or vermiculite concrete-- something of that nature--plus 1 , 000 feet
of earth destructive crater ; and 10 hours if it were all undisturbed .
Again , there i s great uncertainty here . That is a gue s s , extrapolating
data from smaller sizes and so forth .
We estimated the cost of both systems (Figure 10 ) . The buoyancy
concept would cost about $ 86 mil l ion per mi s s ile . Now , thi s is acquis i
tion only , n o O & M ( operation and maintenance ) , none o f the outs ide fa
c i l ities . Thi s is j ust the shaft , the digging machine s , the casings ,
the bottom tunne l l ined with quarter- inch steel , the penc i l , the mi s s i l e
and all those sorts o f things , and the power systems . O f that $ 86 mi l
l ion , the civil engineering ( the digging of the tunne l s , etc . ) i s about
$ 5 0 million ( Figure 1 1 ) .
For the hydraulic concept the cost of the shaft i s about the same-
a l ittle bit more because you have to dig cavi ties for pumps and so
forth--but the mechanical systems cost much more ( Figure 12 ) . You have
to provide all those pumps and you also have to provide a much thicker
wal led penc i l , because you are talk ing about a 3 , 000-psi pre s sure di f fer
ential ; much higher than in the buoyancy concept .
In the buoyancy case we are talking about 1 . 5- inch wal l s on the pen
c i l , as compared with the hydraul i c ram case o f 3- or 4-inch wal l s . So ,
it i s a lot of stee l , and that come s out to about $ 12 0 mi l l ion . The
co sts o f MX turned out to be about $ 7 0 or $ 8 0 million per mi s s i le . That
is the 2 3 shelters and all the assoc i ated costs .
Now , for the Sand S i lo (Figure 1 3 ) . Thi s was originated by Boeing
around about 19 7 4 , and most of these are Boeing charts with some charts
from a critique that R & D Associate s did at that t ime .
Thi s was planned at that t ime to be about 1 , 5 0 0 feet deep . It had
a wide shaft f i l led with sand , and the idea behind thi s concept i s that

78
you can get out very quickly i f you make that s and fluid . I n other word s ,
you make it quicksand , and buoyancy gets you up rather than your weight
pushing it down . That is what it really i s , quicksand .
To do that you have to have a mani fold with survivable water , and
you have to pump that into the sand , and then the can i ster being buoyant
will rise up , and we made a few mode ls of thi s . We d id not use water .
We used air , and indeed , you put a canister in there and without putting
air in you could not drag it out . So , you pumped air into the sand and
out it came . The problems , of course , are somewhat different at depth .
How do you get the water uni formly d i spersed in the sand ? In any case ,
I think the same problem occurs for all the se concepts .
What do you do about disruption (F igure 14 ) ? It i s all r ight i f
nothing i s disturbed and you have a nice , s tra ight s i lo , but the sort o f
thing that happens i s that the earth g e t s shi fted an d you may get 2 5 0
feet for a 5 -megaton blast , o r for a 100-megaton blast even more .
So , it i s our feel ing that for a l l the se vertical concepts you must
have a d igger at the top .
The ground rules that were used for Boeing ' s des ign of the Sand S ilo
pre scribed an ob j ective mi s s ion the same as the Minuteman ' s . The mi s
siles were to be sited in hardened and di sper sed fac ilities deep under
ground , colocated with Minutemen so that they could use Minuteman fac i l
ities . The numbers assumed t o b e used were 150 to 3 0 0 MX mis s i le s . The
fac ilities were expected to be able to survive direct hits by 5 -megaton
surface bursts . Operation and maintenance wer e to be roughly the same
as for the Minuteman missile . The que stion of command , control , and com
munications ( C 3 ) has not been addre s sed in detail , as J im pointed out .
Now , there i s one big advantage the Sand S i lo has over the Penc i l
Pusher , and that i s maintenance ( F igure 1 5 ) . With the Sand S i lo , main
tenanc e , if required , wi l l be be fore any disruption so you can fluidize
that sand and get the mis s i le out fairly quickly for maintenance . In
the Pencil Pusher , e specially i f you have a f i l l at the top of foamed
concrete , it is more difficult to get through that stuf f if you have to
dig i t out .
So , in a l l our Penc i l Pusher costing , we as sumed an auxi l iary shaft
go ing down with s ide drifts so that one could get to the guidance and the
interstages for maintenance if you wanted . That complicated the des ign ,
but the cost of tho se shafts was inc luded in that overall cost .
However , as I said be fore , maybe thi s sort of a system i s unmanned ,
and egre s s i s the only problem . Maintenance may b e a prob lem , but i t may
be also an opportunity to get the Air Force to go fully dormant on thes e
sys tems . I f they cannot g e t out in a hurry , why not g o fully dormant ?
Then maintenance costs should go way down . That i s something to think
about . I am not advocat ing it particular ly .
For the Sand S i lo , here i s an active egre s s concept ( Figure 16 ) .
You can see how complicated it gets to dig out of something l ike this .
There are a number of arms which grab the s ide and gradually tele scope
thi s thing out . None of thi s was costed in the Boe ing study , which is
probably why we get a s l ightly different answer in cost . Jim was asked
questions about tunne l co sts � Figure 17 is his o ld curve of what the
costs of tunnels were . Thi s was done in 1974 , and one has to double
the s e , roughly , for 1 9 8 1 co sts .

79
We are talking about 2 0 - o r 3 0 - foot tunnels , which a t that time had

cos ts of around a thousand dol lars a foot . In our digging �or the Pen
cil Pusher I used four thousand dollars a foot for the upper shaft and
five thousand dollar s a foot for the lower shaft , j ust for digging . That
doe s not inc lude the l inings . So , I tried to make that cost fairly con
servative .
For the Sand S i lo cost summary , I doubled the Boe ing estimate ( 1974 )
to get 19 8 1 dol l ar s , and that came out to be about $ 2 6 billion tor 3 0 0
un i t s employed ( inc luding R&D , acqui s i t ion , mil i tary construction , and
O&M ) . Acqui s ition plus construction costs ( to compare it with the Pen
cil Pusher , which was $ 80 mi l l ion in one case and $ 116 mi l l ion in the
other case ) came out to be $ 54 mi l l ion . It wasn ' t as deep , and there
was no digging machinery included in that .
Now , I would l ike to finish up by addre s s ing some of the i s sue s
listed in Figure 18 . Again , as somebody who gets into des igning concepts
for some of the se things , I th ink ground motions versus depth real ly want
de f ining so that the se sys tems can be truly compared . For egre ss--espe
cially for the vertical systems --the que stion is what i s the disruption
zone and what are its characteristics . How do you des ign your machine s
to get through it?
We did not have a lot of time or a lot o f money to do very deep
studies of egre ss and upper f i l ler trade-of fs , but we lighted on vermi c
ulite concrete , which i s k ind o f a foam concrete , as a suitable medium
for the upper f i l l . There are lots o f other things one could do there .
You could f i l l it with water . You could f i l l it with air , and add blast
door s . That would make maintenance very easy , but somehow it seems l ike
you really want to seal it o f f for other reasons and it seemed to us at
the time that the vermiculite concrete was pretty good . Egre ss mechanics
( force s , times , and control ) are also i s sue s .
The raise borer de sign that goe s a long with these systems needs · to
be de fined .
The water systems are obviously vital ; both Penc i l Pusher and Sand
S i lo have water systems . The Penci l Pusher needs seals , pumps , and a
water supply . It would be deep enough to be wel l be low the water table ,
so maybe supply is not a problem , but at least it should be looked at .
When you are pumping thi s water , how do you make sure that you keep
your pump supplied? For the Sand S i lo , fluidization is a peculiar prob
lem . How do you make sure that the sand doe sn ' t go into a s lugging mode ,
so that you get s lugs of sand and slugs of water and things l ike that?
As J im said , the auxil iary discip l ines have not been def ined , and
�
yet they have a very important e f ect on the system as a whole and on
its acceptability , maintenance , C , and security .
Then for thi s system there are some perturbations and options . One
of the things that we have addre ssed is an MX system , but one option
whi ch may be suitable , say , to secure reserve forces i s a small mi ssile .
Does going to a small mi s s i le , or a mi s s ile with a s ingle reentry vehicle
( RV ) make any dif ference to these systems ? Probably not , but it has not
been addre s sed .

80
Then .I talked about the dual mis s i le , the shal low s i lo plus the deep
s i lo , and mul timi s s ile . I f the se systems are so good , why can ' t you put
several mis s i le s in one silo , i f you could do the mechanics?
Now , a few words about some o f the advantage s o f all deep under
ground systems . We lost the MX MAP system for three bas ic reason s . One ,
it cost too much . I am not putting them in any particular order , but the
f inal cost of the MX system was about $ 3 . 7 , say , $4 mi l l ion per shelter
time s 2 3 she lters per mi s s i le . I t was not ac cepted by the publ i c with
all those she lters all over the place , and I think that deep underground
basing removes that public interface . It really i s j ust like the ordi
nary s ilos , which are accepted . . Whether it is Me sa or anything else , it
is out of view , so from that point of view i t i s acceptable . The other
thing that happened to the MX MAP system was that the argument was made
that if shelters cost $ 3 to $4 mi l lion ea�h you get threated to death .
It i s easier for the enemy to put one more RV on his big mis s i le than it
is for you to bui ld one more shelter . Thi s doe s not apply to deep bas
ing , whi ch requires the enemy to go the other way . I t requires him to
put very large�yield weapons on his mi s s i les , which i s very dif fi cult to
do . In other words , i f he has started fractionating , he has to go back
again .
So there are three thoughts , I think , which are worth bearing in
mind in cons idering the se things , and one of the primary one s i s cost .
I f it co sts too much , it will never be funded .
* * * * *
SPEAKER : Mr . Parry , you used the term " dormant . " I am not fami l i ar with
that .
MR . PARRY : Mi s s i le s l ike the Minuteman are cal led " active . " In other
words , their guidance is turned on , and they are running all the time .
So , they are ready to go as soon as the button is pushed . It take s
guidance and things time to warm up . Something l ike an MX mi s s i le would
require 10 to 15 kilowatts to keep it running . That i s a lot of power .
But there are systems whi ch are not qui te here , but on the horizon ,
whereby one could have mis s iles shut down and get them started up fairly
quickly , and people are beginning to talk about that as a way to go dor
mant . That is dormant . Partially dormant is where you keep something
warm and when required get it fully running quickly .
However , in the se underground systems it is going to take you hours to

get out . So , what is the point of keeping the mi ssile running down be
low? You really have a good opportunity to go truly dormant . In fac t ,
you really have no choi ce . So it is not a problem ; it is an opportuni ty .
SPEAKER : I did not quite understand the egre s s problem . You were going
to have a shaft in the upper 2 , 000 feet of alluvium?
MR . PARRY : Yes .

81
SPEAKER : Is that shaft going to actually be filled by vermiculite?
MR. PARRY : Yes . Vermiculite concrete .
SPEAKER : And so you have to dri ll through that even if there is no

destruction?
MR . PARRY : Yes , but that i s very easy to drill through . In fact , some
calculations that we did , which I have got here , suggest that you could
almost push your way through that . It disintegrates , e specially if you
put a fairly fine point on the front and push . It wil l dis integrate and
powder , and you can push your way through . Now , clearly some trade-offs
have to be done there . How survivable i s it? In the nuclear environ
ment how much of it will survive ? I did not say there were no problems .
There are a lot of problems .
SPEAKER : You have not addres sed shock mounting of any of thi s equipment .
What is the reliabi lity of thi s equipment s itting out there dormant year
after year and day after day?
MR . PARRY : It i s shock mounted .
SPEAKER : Everything is shock mounted?
MR . PARRY : Oh , yes . The mi s s ile has to be . It is really fairly fragi le .

Most of the mi ssiles cannot take more than about 5 g , and that is a good
mi s s i le . Shelf life more than anything e l se is the critical dormancy
problem .

DE EP UNDERGROUND BASING (DUG )
( PRoBLEM)
TO PROVI DE A LAND BASED ICBM
e SECURE RESE RVE FORCE

OR
• ALTE RNATE PRIMARY BASING
(X)
N
I SYSTEM/TECHNO LoGY ISSuES I
• SURVIVABI LITY
• THREAT
• ENVI RONMENT AT DEPTH
• EGRESS
• SAND SI LO • MESA
• ENDURANCE
• PENCI L PUSHE R • BRIMSTONE
e CQMMUNICAnONS
• SITING
F I GU R E 1

TH R EAT/ENVI RONMENT ASSUMPTIONS
e MNO IILO
ftCTRA
IHOCK
r-n•u-·
PEAK D�NT t•t
BOEING
0.1
...
l ifT
RDA •
U2I-UI
..
21 1fT
ROA •
1-10
·-
I
PEAK PAIITICLE VE LOCITY (lf'St m.o no-nao IIMIGO
PEAK ACCE LEMYION cot 220.0
• RQA CCOCI'IR. ICNDWLEI. MODI - Ifni
e PENCIL PUSHE R
1GO 1fT SURFACE 8URST
HARD ROCK: POROUS ROCK :
Q)
""'
�llANO OF
.. PEAK 0.1 KIAR

UNCERTAINITY
STRESS
"CONSERVATIVE CSURE SAFEI DESIGN DEPTH FOR 0.1 KIAR

"' 1110 MT (SU RE KllLI
F I GU R E 2

PENC I L PUSHE R CONC EPT

• ORIGINATED BY LLNL C1_,t
�. b.
2UDO FT
PROPELLANT
(X)
GASES DISPLACE
�
WATER FROM
PENCI L INTERIOR
PENCIL RISES
• •
. .
• •
, ,
HOLES AND I I
, ,
FILUD TO
PENCI L WATER v
31110 FT
UVEL SHOWN
MISSI LE LAUNCH
POST ATTACIC
CANS FLOATED TO TOP e PENCIL FREE F LOATED
e LOCKED INTO PLACE
e
OF PENCIL
e MISSI LE CAN LOCKED e PENCIL TOP AND MISSILE
PREATTACIC
CAN TOP EJECTED

e CANISTERS
IN PLACE
TO IDTTDM e MISSI LE FIRED
TETHERED
e GAS CAN F I R ED
F I GU R E 3

PENC I L PUSHE R SUMMAR Y
• "PENCI L-PUSHE R .. COHan SUGG ESTED BY LLN L
• DEEP SI LO BASING CIODD fT WITH WATE R TABLE NOT BE LOW 2GDO FT)
• BUOYANCY FORCES USED FOR EGRESS
• RDA FUNDED FOR UMITED STUDY
• ENGINEERING FEASIIIUTY/ALTERNATE SOLUTIONS
• ROM COSTS
• DEFINE ISSUES CD
""
e ""FI IIIT cur SUMMA R Y
•APPEARS FEASIBLE WITH COMPATIBLE COSTS AND POSSI B LE

EGRESS ADVANTAGES
BUT
• A NU.ER OF ISSUES R EQUIRE CLARIFICATION
HOWEVER
MISSI LE •NO OBVIOUS "SHOW- STOPPE RS..
PROPE LLANT
BOUYANCY CONCEn
CNOT TO SCALEt
F I GU R E 4

GENE RAL SYSTEM CONSID E R ATIONS
e THREAT
• KI LUSAFE LIMITS UNTESTABLE (COMMON DUG PROB LEM)
BUT FOR 1 00 MT IN LAYE R E D MEDIUM (2000 FT POROUS OVE RBURDEN)
BELIEVE EQUIPMENT BE LOW - 3000 FT IN ENVI RONMENT BENIGN C.F. MX MAP
• SIZI NG FOR PRE LIMINAR Y ENGINEER ING
• BLOCK MOTION - 1 M AT 2000 FT C 1 3 ,. FT LOWER SHAFT)
• SHI FTING SOI L - 3 M AT 1000 FT (20 FT lWPE R SHAFT)

• RUBBELIZING 500 FT
e SITING (-2000 FT SOFT OVERBURDEN, 3000 FT COMPETENT LDWE R MEDI UM) CD

0'1
• DEEP DESE RT VALLEYS
AR EA (NMI 2) WATE R TABLE (Fn
YUCCA (NTS - NV) 80 1 60012000
HUALAPI IAZ) 120 1000
PHOENIX, PICACHO, BULLARD WASH IAZ) 200 100012000
D R Y LAKE (NV) 1 00 200
• DEEP VOLCANIC SIN KS INTS - NV) >300 1 50012300
• LA Y E R E D ROCK SITES CAZ, CO) >400 5001 1 500
e EG R ESS UNCE RTAINTI ES

e UNTI L DETE RMINED OTHE RWISE "RAISE BOR I NG " CUTT E RS MUST B E
ASSUME D F O R EGRESS
F I GURE 5
! Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

BUOYANCY vs HYDRAU L I C RAM CONCEPTS

30
GROUND LEVEL
/MAX SURGE • JOO FT

(X)
-..1
\ -.--- • - -"' IWD tFn
\ '' '
• to IUD
5
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2210
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.
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-20110 - 11100 -tiiDO -1100 1100 -11100 -1100 0 ...
Ttf' DEPTH IFn TIP DEPTH IFTI
IIUOYANCY CONCEPTI I HYDRAULIC MM CONCEPT I
F I GU R E 6

88
;J
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- · - - · -· -·
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CD

89
EGR ESS - ENERGY AND TIMEL INES
JENERGY I
• PREAnACK !INClUDING MAINTENANCE) - AL L ENERGY SUPPL IED BY LANOLINE ANDIOR
ON-SITE POWERHOUSE
e POSTAnACK - ALL ENE RGY STORED IN uso2 BAn E R I ES
HYDRAULIC RAM
BUOYANCY CONCEPT
CONCEPT
REQUIR EMENTS
MWH FT3 MLB MWH FT3 MLB
c3 AND WINDING ENGINE 1 1 60 0.01 1 160 0.01
DIG OUT !PENETRATION) 20 3000 0.2 20 3000 G.2
LIFTING ENERGY
. 11,800 1.1 40 8000 0.4
"GAS GENERATOR CANISTER CONTAINING -140 KlB OF HYDRAZINE
J TIME LINE I
• PREAnACK
• MOST MAINTENANCE DOWN HOLE (SE R VICE SHAFTI
• MISSILE CHANGEOUT ( 10-20 HOURS DR ILl OUT, S3 Ml
e POST AnACK EGRESS
• 40 HOURS ALL ALLUV IUM

• 20 HOURS 1 1000 FT UNDISTURBED PlUS 1 000 FT DISRlWTED/CR ATERI
• 10 HOURS 12000 FT UNDISTURBED!
F I GURE 9
COST SUMMARY
• COSTS PE R U . E . l iM 1 • 1 1
• NO 0 AND M I NClUDED
BUOYANCY HYDRAU LIC

CONCEPT RAM CONCEPT
CIV I L ENG I N E E R ING 60 55
MECHANI CA L 17 42
DIG OU T SYSTEM 4 4
MISSILE 15 15
- -
• 1 1 11
NOTE : 100 U.E. ASSU MED FOR DEEP S I LO
F I GU R E 10

90
C I V I L E NG I N E E R I NG COST EST I MAT E

1M1 .
• FOR lOTH BUOYANCY AND HYDRAULIC RAM CONCEPTS
SITE SELECTION, 5000 FT • 3 IN TEST lO R E O.li
SURFACE PREPARATION 0.3
ASSOC IATED ROADS 14 Ml AT 1210 K/MII 1 .0
EXCAVATION ISEE HOTE l ) :
UI'I'ER HOLE 12000 FT • 20Fn SOFT ROCICI 10.0

lOWER HOlE 13000 FT • 13 1/2 FT HARD ROCKI 18.0
BOTTOM CAV I TY 120 FT • 30 FT DIAl 2.0
POWE R VAUlT 120 FT • 40 FT • 15 FTI 2.0
E lEVATOR SHAFT 15000 FT • 5 F T AT $1000/ F TI 5.0
INSPECTION GAllERY 17 F T • 20 FT DIAl 0.5
ACCESS TUNNEl II FT DIA • 3 FT LONGI 0.2
LINING CSEE NOTE 21 :

UPPE R HOLE CGUNNITE AT S2.51fT2 t 0.3
lOWER HOLE C840 T • 1 /4 IN STEEl PlATE) 1 .5
E lEVATOR SHAFT CIO T • Ill IN STE E l PlATEI 0.2
}
IOTTOM CAV ITY ( 1 21 CY R.C., I F T THICKI 0. 1
POWER VAUlT C l 21 CY R.C., I FT THICKI 0. 1
INSPECTION GAllE RY
U25 CY R .C., I FT TH IC K I 0.1
ACCESS TUNNEl
4 1 .1
VERMICULITE CONCRETE Fi lliNG AT $100/CY 130,000 CYI 10

SURFACE BUI LDINGS 1 .0
CONTINGENCY 1- IO%t 4.2
50.0
ADDITIONAl PUMP HOUSE, CAV ITIES AND SPi ll WAYS FOR HYDRAULIC RAM 5.0
NOTE 1 : E XCAVATION COSTS PEA J. SPE RRY, MINING AN D DR i l liNG ENGINEER :

UPPER SOFT ROCK $5000/F T , lOWER HARD ROCK 18000/F T
CONCR ETE (RE INFORCED R E BAR A N D ROCK lOllS) 1100/CY INSTAllED

NOTE 2: STE E l PLATE $ 1 /lB (U.S. STEEl EQUIVAL ENT 1011 10.86/lB FOR MX SHElTE R )
F I GURE 1 1

91
BUOYANCY CONCEPT ESTI MATE
MECHANICAL CUSS MISSILE AND DIG OUT EOUII'MENTI
STEEL PENCIL C3000 FT • 121 1N 00 • 1 .2 IN MEAN T, 4.7 • 1o& LB AT 12/LBI U

rROI'ELLANT 1137 K LB TOTAL AT S1.201l8 AVE R AGE I 1 .0
rROI'ELLANT CANIST E R f2ID KLB STE E L AT S3/LB , 38 KL B Ef'OXYIGLASS AT 12/LBI O.t
-LE CANISTER 1140 KLI STEE L AT S31lll G.4
OIIE 110 KLI - PER MXI 0.1
WINDtNG ENGINE ANO CAlLE 0.3
c3 AND ANTENNA 0.3
SUIIU RFACE POWER 1 1 .0 MWH, 0. 10 MLB, 1CIO C.F.t 0. 1
SUIIW' f'IUW ANO PLUMBING 0. 1
IUftFACE EQUII'MENT CPOWER, CRANES. ELEVATOR, ecc . t 2.5
SURFACE c3 U
15.8
CONTINGENCY C "" ftl 1 .2
1 7.0
HYDRAULIC RAM CONCEPT ESTIMATE

MECHANICAL CUSS MISSI LE AND DIG OUT EOUII'MENTI
STEE L PENCIL C3000 F T • 1 21 1N 00 • 3. 5 IN ME AN T, 1 5 • 1o8 Ll AT 12/LII 30.0
CANISTE R IMISII LE 1 1 40 KLB STEE L AT U/Lit 0.4
OIIE CIO KLB - PER MXI 0.1

WINDING ENGINE AND CABLE 0. 3
c3 AND ANTENNA 0.3
SUBSURFACE POWER 140 MWH, 0.40 MLB, IOOO C.F.I 3.5
PENCIL SEAL SYSTEM 0.4

SUIIW' f'UW'/PLUMIING 0. 1
SUR FACE EOUII'MENT CPOWER. CRANES, ELEVATOR, etc.l 2.5
SURFACE c3 G.2
31.3
CONTINGENCY C ._ ftl 3.7

42.0
F I GURE 1 2

92
SAND S l L O CON C E PT
• ORIGINATED BY BOE ING (11741
• EGRESS CAPSULE CSTEE U

• 1 1 FT DIA. 140 FT LONG
• MISSI LE
COMMUNICATIONS CABLE • OGE INCLUDING
TO HARDENED SURVIVABLE POWE R
SURFACE ANTENNA
"Y.-.ti--- • F LUIDIZATIDN MANIFOLD
• SURVIVABLE WATER
F I GU R E 1 3

C LOSE-IN N UC L EAR ENVI RONMENTS

I MT MJRFACE BURIT - -DIUM TO HARD ROCK
t----- - FT -------1
��
��
--�-------r-------
--� �
J:>.. EOM. SHAFT

..... J I r-r- , I .JC:::- I.:. J TIJ I -,.--L T �NT .
'- - FT HOIIIZONTAL
\0
""'
-
I
lO 1- FT � • ADEQUATE
� DIAIIITE II . FT
• TOLEIIMLE IUJPE
• PUNCH-THIIOUGH
• EXI'UJIIYE IIEIIOYAL
GIIOUIIID IHOCIC
IUIIIED ITitUC1UM
IHOCIC ATTENUATION
IT- 1UCID PII
ECJII- SHAFT
.. lAND-FILLED
• ATTENUATED IIDCK - lAND
._IFICANTLY REDUCED
FROII - WGIIADE
{
ATTENUATED
CIIITEIIIA • CN'IULE DE.GN
I ..
• N, ')' ltADIAnDN
DIIPLACEMEfn'
� 321 lfl
• EW
• THEIIMAL RADIATION
VELOCITY
�LEIIATION 220 01
CFIIEE FAU YALUEII
• IHOCIC .,._.TION
F I GU RE 14

MAJOR MAI NTENANC E MODE
lO GAIN ACCESS FOR MAINTENANCE lO REPLACE : REVERSE ACCESS PROCEDURE
COLlMII BY ..... NG WATER

1. FLUIDIZE SATURATED SAND
THROUGH MANIFOLD AT BOTTOM

\0
OF SHAFT �
2. ALLOW BURIED CAPSULE lO BE

BUOYED lO SURFACE BY UNREE LING
CN'IULE
TEn.R CABLE FROM WINDt IN
3. STOP F LOW OF WAliR, SOLIDIFYING

SAND COLlMII
4. REMOVE CLOSURES FROM

PRESSURE VE-L
I. REMOVE MISSILE AND/OR OGE

MODULE FOR INSPECTION, TEST,
REPLACE lENT
REPAIR, MODIFICATION OR
FLUIDIZATION MANIFOLD
SURVIVABLE WAliR
F I GURE 1 5

95
ACTIVE EGR ESS CONCEPT
l,�-�3"t=-
PILOT DRILL
CC*ICAL IDIIE R
IEJECTAILE HVDMUUC
MDlOII COWAitn.NT
ITAII UZER
... u
IMIEfiMOIT TELEICOPINO ITAOE

IECOND TE LIICIONIO ITAOE
1HIRD TEUICOPING ITAOE
SATURATED IMD
EOREII IHAFT
... u UCT -CIWI- 10M OEM

TE UICOPING ITAGE PCMIR IYSTIII fT\'Pt
IUUUtEAD
VERTICAL THRUI1'
FORWARD OUTRIGGER -
RIACTION ARM
OGE
VERTICAL THRUI1'
AFr OUTRIGGER -
RIACTICJN ARM
F I GURE 16

SHAFT E XCAVATION COST ISSUES

N'f'ROX • 2 FOR 1•1 COSTS
• 1174 DOLLARS
• THR EAT D E F I N I TION
• G ROUND MOTION 111 DEPTH
/__.T
• DISRUPTION ZONE D E F I N ITION
e EGRESS
D£EP DRI LL AND BLAST • UPPE R F I LLER TRADEOFFS

I HOLES FOR OEE P BURIED ICBM
I (ESTIMATE lASE D ON • EGRESS MECHANICS (FORCES, TIME, CONTROU
HARD ROCK SI LOI
I
I
II
e RAISE BORER D ESIGN
I
I • WATE R SYSTEMS
\0
• SEALS, PUMPS, SUPPLY (PPI 0\
/......_(___ • F LUIDIZATION (SSI
-- - --
HOLES IV ONA (ACTUAU
� DEEP ROTARY DRI LLE D
• AUXI LIAR Y DISCIPLINES D E F I N ITION
1CX, 1
- -- • MAINTENANCE
e el
• SECURITY
• SYSTEM PERTURBATIONS/OPTIONS
F I GU R E 1 5
• SMA L L MISSILE
• DUAL MISSI LE (SHAL LOW + DEEPI

• MU LTI MISSILE
F I GU RE 1 6

System Requirements
LT. COL . CARL W . RULE

B allistic Missile Office (AFS C)
Nor ton Air Force Ba se, Ca liforn ia
SUNHARY: S ince the Pres ident ' s announcement on October 2 , 1981 , the Air Force has
redirected its efforts toward near-term and long-term bas ing modes for the MX mi ssile .
This brief ing addresses the deep basing alternatives and pre liminary plans being for
mulated at this time . Main topics include details of the President ' s announcement ,
initial guidance from higher headquarters , various concepts under consideration , i s
sues t o be resolved , the organization o f the Ba l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Office , contractual
requirements , work in progress , future efforts , and ways in which the u . s . National
Commi t tee on Tunne ling Technology could help the Air Force .
Underground complexes are not new or revolutionary ideas . At least a dozen ma
j or studies have been completed since the late 1950s . Various concepts for deep bas
ing have included hor izontal tunnels , vertical shafts , an d various forms o f manned or
auto.ated eqres s . At this time no single concept is preferred by the Air Force ; care
ful evaluation over the next year wi ll have to be completed be fore the Air Force wi l l
have an official recommendation t o offer .
Most of the technology required for a deep basing system exists ; however , sev
eral feas ibi lity or "proof of concept" te sts may have to be performed in areas such
as eqres s through cratered or ruptured zones , COIIIDun ications through the earth , power
generation , and heat dissipation . Another key factor is s iting , because site-specific
geology affects survivability , cost , schedule , and environmental impact .
The deep basing program is in the early stage of def inition . The Air Force is
very serious about long-term bas ing programs and knows that extraordinary management
skill wi l l be required to meet obj ectives in the next year or two . The Air Force is
evaluating conceptual and location alternatives with the intent of making recomme nda
tions to the Secretary of Defense in 1984 or sooner .
Deep basing is an opportunity for the application of existing , emerging , and new
tunne ling , shafting , and mining technology . Knowledge gained will contribute to a
critical national defense program ; in addition , reapplication of the new technology
could help civi l works throughout the world .
I feel very honored to be ab le to partic ipate in today ' s program . I am

from the Bal l i stic Mi s s i le Off ice out at San Bernardino , in Cal i fornia .
As you might be aware , there are many other people here from Cali fornia .
That i s the place where house s periodically change z ip code s , and I think
it may be partially in response to some of Joe LaComb ' s activity after
looking at those movies here this morning .
97

98
The Air Force i s really an exc it ing career and for me every assign
ment has been interesting . The program that I am now embarked upon , the
deep bas ing program , is perhaps going to be the most intere sting of my
Air Force career . I t i s an important j ob . It has technical challenges
that indeed are going to be very large . We do recognize that we need
help in order to achi eve these goal s , and we hope that you share the
same enthusiasm that we have and help mee t some of the national defense
needs , as we l l as in the process to reapply some of the technology that
we come up with to perhaps help c ivil work s .
Thi s pre sentation has been adverti sed as be ing a systems requirement
type o f br iefing . What I intend for it to offer i s really an Air Force
perspec tive of some of the pre l iminary planning that we have done with
the deep bas ing program ever s ince the announcement was made by the Pres
ident on the second of October . F igure 1 lists some of the key points
that I would l ike to addre s s dur ing this short pre sentation . Col . Berry
has already addressed the Pres ident ' s announcement ( F igure 2 ) . Just to
recapi tulate some of the high points , it was back on the s econd of Octo
ber . Indeed , one of the three long-term options that we are going to
be concerned with i s go ing to be the deep bas ing mode , and that has not
yet been de fined very we l l , as we wi ll find out .
We will initiate an intens ive program so that the Department of De
fense and the Pres ident and Congre s s can make the dec i s ion as to which
o f tho se three bas ing mode s--or perhaps a combination of those bas ing
mode s -- i s to go into full- scale deve lopment in the 1984 time frame (Fig
ure 3 ) .
The deep bas ing concepts are really nothing new . We see from Figure
4 that when we go back into time , into the late 1950s , early 1960s , at
least one dozen of the se di fferent concepts have been looked at .
For one reason or another , due to cost uncertainty or evolution o f
the threat o r one o r more of the se reasons , the se have not really been
deployed , save for the contro l centers that we might have at the Cheyenne
Mountain complex , or the command and control centers that we have back
here on the East Coast . But due to the threat evolution and due to tech
no logy that has come about in the past years with the increased yield o f
Soviet weapons , a s we l l a s the ac curacy that they are now going to expe
r ience or are pro j ec ted to exper ience , deep bas ing i s being looked at i n
a new light and has indeed very much promise t o provide us a very s urviv
able intercontinental bal l i s tic mi ssile ( ICBM ) force .
Also in the figure is a conceptual depiction of what that under
ground complex might look like . I t need not neces sarily be vertical be
cause we have not made that dec i s ion at thi s time .
Some of the thing s fol lowing the Pres ident ial announcement : we have
received some guidance ( F igure 5 ) , none of which has been wri tten up to
thi s po int , but we are taking this as basic a s sumptions for the program ,
that we wi l l initiate a concept val idat ion program for 50 to 100 MXs or
the equivalent . That means that we will be doing parametric studies for
dif ferent size mi s s iles for a deep bas ing system . Pos tattack endurance
of at least a year wi l l certainly present some chal lenge s . Other sys tems
have started out with a goal to have survivabil ity of at least a year and
have reduced that goal because it was very d i f ficult to achieve . We

99
mentioned the rapid egre s s be fore ; there i s no firm requirement that has
been spe c i f ied as of thi s po int . Rapid egre ss i s very des irable , but
right now we don ' t have a quantitative requirement against which to mea
sure that .
"Mile stone I I , " for those who might not be fami l iar with the acqui
sition process in the Department of Defense , i s the dec i sion point where
key leaders within the Department review the program , the cost , the sched
ule , and the performance r i sk to see if it is worthy to go into ful l - scale
deve lopment . Thi s i s now scheduled to be in fi scal year 1984 , and o f
course that depends o n the funding leve ls that w e d o obtain . Of cours e ,
1984 being an e lection year , we sense that we would l ike to have that f i s
cal year 1984 date moved forward , and thi s was indeed brought out b y the
Pre s ident himself in the announcement .
The Initial Operational Capab i l ity ( IOC ) has not been de f ined . Tra
ditionally we , for ICBM systems , de fine roc as having 10 mi ssiles on alert
or having that capabi l i ty . For the deep bas ing we have not de f ined that .
It could very we l l be one . It could be j ust the completion of the command
and control center , or it will be perhaps a dif ferent de finition than that .
A detai led program plan is due to the Department of Defense in January
1982 , and at thi s time we are bus i ly prepar ing that .
The purpo se of Figure 6 i s to show that we are concerned not only
with the underground complex but also with all the var ious other elements
of a deep bas ing system . Here we see the underground complex which has
been repre sented . Thi s is very much l ike the one Jim Wooster presented
--Mes a concept--but we also want to keep aware o f the transportation net
work , the road network , as we l l as the main operating base . As we found
in the MX multiple protected she lters (MP S ) system , the main operating
base was , indeed , the thing that caused the most environmental impact .
We have already looked a little bit at the deep basing history ( F ig
ure 7 ) . I won ' t be labor thi s--Or . Sevin went through that thi s morning-
but it goe s back to the Br imstone concept , back in the 1 9 7 0 time frame ,
and the Strat-X deep tunne l in the 19 7 2 time frame , and we did have a
br ief ing by Mr . Parry on the Sand Silo and , of cour se , the Boe ing pre
sentation on the Me sa .
None of the se has been adopted of ficially as the system concept per
se. We are reviewing a l l the concepts that have been pre sented and try
ing to be ob j ective in a system de finition .
Jim Wooster ear l ier de scr ibed the "Me s a " base concept , with a per im
eter tunnel going all the way around the me sa , hor izontal tunne l s spaced
approx imate ly 10 mi l e s apart , and predug egress porta l s that approach a
steep s lope ideally , and are approximate ly 4 , 0 00 feet apart . Again , the
entire system , as I recall , was approximate ly 2 , 6 00 feet beneath the sur
face .
F igure 8 is a cross section of that , and as J im corrected us this
morning , thi s i s not pure ly a hori zontal system , but it is a nearly hori
zontal system . Here you can see the egress portals that are spaced every
mile or so apart , again 2 , 6 00 feet beneath the surface . The se egre s s
porta l s come very c l o s e t o the surface , but you still have some distance
to tunne l in order to egress when the time come s to launch . Of course ,
you have a place in the back to handle all the muck when it comes time

100
to egre s s , and on the right hand side we show there are some vertical
shafts for communication antennas .
Tunne l boring machi nes conceivably would be used fpr the initial
construction of the pro j ect . We unders tand that the se take about 1 , 0 0 0
hor sepower--perhaps 4 , 600 vo lts nominally--and the world record rate o f
tunne ling , I recal l , i s about 400 f e e t in a day , but w e d o exper ience ,
I gue s s , in practical appl icat ion such as Metro or in Chi cago , rate s
much lower than that--perhaps 3 0 to maybe 70 feet per day--and this i s
one of the big areas of concern .
The cost of be ing able to construct these tunne l s is an uncertainty .
Before , at one of the previous subpanel meetings , we heard that depending
on geology we could have tunne l ing costs from on the order of $ 2 0 0 a foot
all the way up to maybe as much as $ 2 , 5 00 a foot . With that band of un
certainty i t certainly has to be one of the key points o f our val idation
program to f ind out what tho se costs indeed would be . The purpose of
Figure 9 is to il lus trate the fact that we are not locked into any form
of egress or tunnel configuration . These are some of the ideas that are
avai l able and the one s that we are evaluating at thi s parti cular time .
In fact , it can be a combination of horizontal , as wel l as vertical , or
we can even have systems , as Mr . Parry had mentioned , l ike the Penci l
Pusher concept (Figure 10 ) , be ing completely vertical .
Now , going deep down in order to achieve survivability , one might
say , " How deep do you have to go ? " Our unders tanding of this particular
problem is the fact that it depends very much on the medium that you are
located in , whether i t i s igneous rock such as granite or perhaps l ime
stone o r unsaturated porous rock (Figure 11 ) . Of course , i n the latter
case--on the right-hand s ide--this doe s have better shock attenuating
feature s .
Depending on the hardne ss that we are able to achieve , we have a l
ready seen concepts be fore in tests that were conduc ted wi th tunne l s to
the hal f-kilobar leve l . We a l so heard of some that were to the 1-ki lobar
leve l , but it shows on F igure 11 here the se are not exactly the pro j ected
threats . What was done is to take the theoretical data that exi sts and ,
as suming that it was j ust go ing to be a one -time surface burs t , for in
stance , the 2 4 0 -megaton case could be really a comb ination o f 2 4 !O -mega
ton weapon s that go o f f s imul taneous ly .
We have done a rough calculation , and the concepts that we have
looked at really fall in the range between 2 , 0 0 0 feet and , in the case
o f the Penc i l Pusher concept , about 5 , 00 0 feet , and we can see the func
tion of how deep do we really have to go . The real point is that geology
is very , very important to how hard these actual tunne l s are go ing to be ,
and if we can make them � ki lobar is a very big que s tion or if we c an
make them 1 ki lobar in granite . Do they have to be l ined? What type o f
backing material is needed ? The se are que stions that are very per tinen t .
From the exi st ing l iterature we were able to review in the past cou
ple of weeks , we located a number o f sites that appear to be reasonable
for the types of concepts that were discus sed this morn ing (F igure 12 ) .
I would caution you to not take thi s as be ing an Air Force position that
we have narrowed in and that the se are the only candidate s . That is not
the case at all . What we are doing right now is trying to establish a

101
set of criteria that we can apply to the entire United States , inc luding
Alaska , Hawa i i , and the possessions , so as not to over look any reasonable
alternative . We have to consider such things as underground rai lroads .
I think that we should also cons ider the fact that there may be abandoned
mines on the East Coast that may be equally suitable . But for r ight now ,
us ing geotechnical criteria that have been e s tablished so far , the se ap
pear to be some of the reasonable areas .
F igure 1 3 was explained a l so by Dr . Sevin this morning . I did change
one part icular word , and that is in the title . We s ay that mo st of the
required techno logy exi sts . I think that in each one of the areas we
have demonstrated some form of the technology that would be applicable
to the deep bas ing sys tem . However , there are other things that have to
be tai lored very carefully for application to the conf iguration that we
come up with .
Some of the thing s on F igures 14 and 15 are very much on our minds .
They are not l i sted in any par ticular order of pr iority , but of cour se
we have seen var ious underground conf igurations thi s morning .
We , the Air Force , will have to go ahead and consider all the se con
figurations and come up with a concept or perhaps several concepts for
addi tional testing and for environmental analysis and costing .
Hardne s s and Vulnerabi lity is , indeed , a very important que stion as
to the exi sting s imulations ; are they adequate ? We are working very care
ful ly with the Defense Nuc lear Agency ( DNA } , as we ll as the Air Force
Weapons Laboratory , to find out how hard we can actually make the se tun
ne ls and whe ther they can withstand the current threat as we l l as re spon
sive threats .
Egre s s . Once you have a bur ied sys tem that has hardened , how do
you get out? In fact , onc e you are down in the depths , i f it doe s take
you a long time to get out , as you approach the surface you may , indeed ,
become very vulnerable . That is why pre servat ion of location uncertain
ty ( PLU ) was so very important in the MPS system . It may be very impor
tant , in fact , i f we have long egress t ime s for the deep bas ing system .
With quick egres s the PLU problem tends to be dimini shed , but until we
can demons trate that , we have to be very careful with the signatures that
we would be giving off as we egre s s so that we don ' t make our selve s vul
nerable to a se cond-wave attack .
Power . We would have to look at the potential use of nuc lear reac
tor s and fue l c e l l s . What type of power are we go ing to be us ing for at
least one year ' s endurance ? How are we go ing to power tho se parti cular
machines when it come s time to egre s s --perhaps the entire force--in a
very short span of time ?
Crew endurance . Again , we have many problems there , with medical
and s imple l i fe- support sys tems .
For launch control and communications , how do we communic ate with
the system that is located 2 , 6 00 feet beneath the surface ? That , we
think , is solvable , but it has yet to be demonstrated . Some work has
been done as far as emergency rescue mis s ions with mining operations over
the years , but we think that we wi l l need something particular ly adapt
able , so that we can communicate with the complex down within the moun
tain to the external wor ld .

102
Heat d i s s ipation become s very important with heat gradients that

increase as you go beneath the sur face , conce ivably 10 or 15 degree s
higher below the surface than at sea leve l and dur ing the button-up con
dition--dur ing that one-year time frame--we could have cons iderable prob
lems , particularly dur ing egress when a lot of heat would be generated .
Secur i ty , o f course .
The operational concepts --how do you logistically support thi s ?
Manned versus automated type s o f feature s , particularly in the
egre s s area .
Among the other i s sue s that we have is siting ( F igure 15 ) . I think .
that this is very , very important to determine where we want to conduct

our te sts . Does it have to be in the type of geology that i s actually
going to be in the deployment area , or can we j ust use representative
ground? Where , in fact , do we wan t to deploy the system? ·I will come
back to thi s on the next chart .
Constructib i l ity . By that we mean what type s of scenarios ; how many
men are required to do thi s ; how much do we expect thi s to cos t ; how long
would it take ? Those type s of cons iderations .
We know that there are go ing to be some feasibility demonstrations .
The two most l ikely , of course , would be egre s s and the attendant prob
lems with egre s s . Communications come s a very c lose second there . Power
and heat di s s ipation are also pos s ibi l ities .
The cost is very uncertain , as I ment ioned , due to the wide range
of pos s ibi lities in constructing thi s sys tem .
The environmental impact analys i s proce s s . We are currently going
through a process to narrow down all the concepts into one that we con
s ider to be a basel ine and , a lso , to come down and look at the pos s ible
locations for the sys tem , look at the se alternative s . Tho se two in com
bination we would be able to use for e�vironmental impact ana lys i s , as
we l l as the technical feasibi l i ty and cost estimate s . We have a base
comprehens ive plan that would be c losely rel ated to the environmental
impact work . That would be related to the external support fac i l ity .
Those are very time -consuming e f forts , and a little later I wi ll show
you the time l ines .
On si ting (Figure 16 ) , I promi sed that I would come back to thi s .
Thi s is one of the critical factors because the geology does determine
how survivable the system may be . The type of geo logy affects the cost
o f construction , affects how fast it can be done , and a f fects what type
of environmental impact we experience . Some of these important consider
ations might be considered by the Siting Work Group ; we heard about hav
ing steep escarpments as being de s irable . We already know that porous ,
unsaturated rock is desirable . We would l ike to have water to support
the people . Howeve r , water could be detrimental as far as construction
is concerned . The temperature gradient I mentioned before , as I did the
other items , whi ch I think are pretty self-evident .
Now for the people that are doing thi s (F igure 1 7 ) . I mentioned
before that the Bal listic Missile Office doe s have charge of the deep
bas ing team , and that at Norton we have both the Bal l i s tic Mi s s ile Of
fice and the Air Force Regional Civil Eng ineer . Colone l Berry i s locat
ed in the top command section . Beneath him we have Colone l Carl Case ,

103
who recently became the Director o f Advanced Strateg i c Mi s s i le systems

(ASMS ) . Thi s would be me (pointing to Deputy Director for Deep Basing ) ,
and then of course we have the entire BMO organization and the Air Force
Regional C ivi l Engineer (AFRCE ) as soc iated with the Corps o f Eng ineers
to support us with construction plans , co s ts , the environmental impact
analys i s proce s s , the siting work and the base comprehens ive plans .
In order to address the i s sues that I mentioned be fore , the se are
the types of contracts (F igure 18 ) that we are considering very , very
strongly for f i scal years 1982 through 1984 . System support would deal
with the integration of all the technology , such as the power , the l i fe
support , the heat s ink , the communications , and egre s s . · But egre ss we
broke out as a separate item of that system support that is e spe cially
important . We think that a sys tem de f inition as we l l as a demonstration
wi l l be cal led for . Construction val idation is pr inc ipal ly an e f fort to
go ahead and identify the cost in the scenarios , as I mentioned . The
site screening is a narrowing proce ss to , again , do a l iterature survey
followed up by a s i te characterization study that would actua l ly go out
and do core bor ing s to f ind out if Mother Nature is exactly as predicted
in the l iterature . Of course , the environmental impact and base compre
hensive plans would , also , be under contract .
Thi s is how it looks when you put it together (F igure �9 ) . We have
got our direction . We are currently undergo ing a concept screening ,
looking at a l l the viable concepts , trying to take the best features of
all o f those . We are deve loping the program plan that i s due to the
Secretary of Defense . We are developing our screening criteria , with
TRW do ing an awful lot of that work . We plan to have a contract that
would start later , po ssibly next spring to summe r , on the site character
ization . We have recently put out Commerce Business Da il y (CBD ) announce
ments for source s sought in each of three critical areas : sys tem support ,
egre s s , and construct ion va l idat ion . About 4 7 dif ferent agencies or com
panies have re sponded , inc luding 30 in the system support . We have 3 0
companies i n egres s , and we have 19 i n construction va l idation . With re
spect to survivab i l ity , we are working with the Air Force Weapons Lab
oratory , as we l l as the Defense Nuc lear Agency . Of course , we have to
have all of our cost data before the De fense Sys tems Acquis ition Review
Council ( DSARC ) II meeting that I mentioned , whi ch would be toward the
end of 1984 . Once we have the concept eva luated and we have the tenta
tive locations , tho se two items combined go into a description of the
proposed action and the a lternative s . That is the real kickoff point or
a key item in the environmental analys i s proce s s . That process take s 1 8
t o 2 0 months , and the f inal environmental impact statement (FE I S ) is r e
quired by law t o b e prepared before a dec i s ion is made .
F igure 2 0 lists the work in progre s s . Thi s inc ludes looking at the
organ ization . we are also very bus i ly engaged in program acquisition ,
mos tly contract work , getting our strategy approved , getting our state
ments o f work written , and prepar ing to review tho se part icular proposals
when they come back and to award tho se contracts . The POM , or Program
Obj ective Memorandum , is an Air Force programm ing document that we have
to use to j ustify the outyear funding . As for the public affairs pack
age , on the second of November you may have seen the Aviation Week article

104
by C larence Robinson , which has an awful lot on deep bas ing . Of course ,
we expect to rece ive an awful lot of input and questions from the public ,
and therefore we have to have a publ i c affairs package . We are working
very carefully with DNA and AFWL for the survivab i lity program , working
on that program management draft ( PMD ) with Headquarters USAF and the
program plan .
F igure 2 1 li sts some of the upcoming events that we see . Of course ,
f ir s t on the l i s t is our meet ing here today . Next week we expect to have
a brief ing at Norton Air Force Base for potential bidder s , those that
re sponded to the Commerce Business Da il y ( CBD ) , as we l l as other invited
contractor s . We expect to have our strategy brie fed to our Headquarter s
on the 17th , and i f they approve that strategy , our plans would cal l for
release o f the reque st for proposal ( RFP ) at the end o f thi s month . We
have some survivab i l ity management steer ing groups ( SMSG ) that are planned
here . I think they are in error . Right now the se date s are now going to
be toward the end of the month . Our program plan for the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD ) i s another thing that we c annot forget . The
c ontract awards , if our strategy is approved , would be in the spr ingtime ,
Apr i l or ( hopefully ) sooner . Of course , you know that , with the govern
ment procurement proces s , norma l ly that takes about 10 months to do . We
are working very di ligently to reduce that and take as little time as
pos s ible .
As F igure 22 says , we are in the very early stage of deve lopment o f
thi s proj ect . The A i r Force is , indeed , as ser ious as can b e about thi s
particular program . Our schedule i s very , very compres sed . We a r e look
ing at var ious concepts , as we saw today , and location al ternative s . Thi s
we view as a very golden opportunity f o r the appli cat ion of the existing
technologies as we l l as those that are emerging and new .
F igure 2 3 is to say that your he lp , I think , is not only he lpful ;
I think that it is go ing to be e s sential . Any feedback that we can get
on our pre l iminary program plans to see i f we have emphas i zed the righ t
things or i f we have neglected some things would be very , very use ful .
Your thoughts on contract approache s , as to how the industry as we l l as
government can share the r i sk , would be useful , and I know that there
are some thoughts within the community regarding this matter . Cost esti
mat ing i s also very much on our mind . We have to have a good handle on
that before we get to DSARC I I .
The siting criteria , again , is in my j udgment one of the most im
portant of a l l . In that regard I mentioned the fact that we would l ike
to look at the use of existing underground spaces , to see if they would
be applicable to our purpose s . Egress keeps coming up on everybody ' s
l i s t of things that have to be done ; the mechan ized mining , whether we
have machine s that can deal not only with construct ion but with egre ss
through rubble . The construct ion va lidation .
Some of the se thoughts as to what can be done as far as the future
involvement . We don ' t see thi s as be ing the end . We see this as really
the beginning . We know that there are newsletters that are put out by
the commun ity . There are magaz ine articles that we can use to he lp keep
everybody informed . There is a po s s ib i l ity that this group can serve as
an advi sory group or perhaps it would be better to go with specialized

105
consultants that you may know of . Your thoughts o n how the NRC (National
Research Counc i l ) could be involved in the future woul d be apprec iated .
* * * * *
SPEAKER : In terms of construc tion validation , what are your thoughts in

that are a ?
LT . COL . RULE : Cons truction validation , I think , i s one of the initial

activitie s that the Air Force Regiona l Civi l Engineer and the Corps of
Engineers will be involved in . This would be an opportunity to review
the scenario as to what type of machines are available ; how many people
are required ; what are the types of shif t requirements that would be
needed ; and how much would it cos t . The latter is probably the most im
portant thing . It is l ike an independent assessment of cost estimate s .
There may be an option within the contract , i f needed , i f there i s con
siderable uncerta inty in the costs . we may have to conduct an actua l
construction demonstr ation , but that at thi s po int appears to be an op
tion . We have made no f inal dec i s ion along those l ines .
SPEAKER : You had on your last illustrat ion contract approache s , and we
heard a lot about thi s technology and the dif ferent approaches being con
templated . What do you contemplate on contracting approache s ?
LT . COL . RULE : Do you refer to the type of contract , whether it is cost

plus incent ive fee (CPIF ) or fixed price or--
SPEAKER : That would be an i s sue , also , if you have systems as opposed

to breaking out contract approaches . You have the que st ion of whether
you are going to do things in house or contract them out . You have que s
tion s about phas ing from concept R&D to cons truction , and so forth . What
are your present initial thoughts ?
LT . COL . RULE : We are going to do a l ittle bit of everything . TRW i s

our sys tems engineering and techni cal advice contractor . They will be
there to he lp in a l l facets of the program , but there may be opportun i
t i e s f o r a n extens ion of that s t a f f where w e might have t o g e t other
Systems Engineering - Technical Advi sor types of contractors to augment TRW .
As far as the contract ing is concerned , we would l ike to make it competi

tive . In fact , that i s our goal . We view system support as be ing a ma
j or type of an e f fort to coordinate all the technologies that go into
sys tem definition and for the costing of that particular thing . We are
looking at , providing that the funding leve ls are suffic iently high ,
having multiple types of contracts for the key areas , such as system
support , such as egress--those two in particular . Con struction valida
tion is a third example . Tho se key things have been advertised in Com
merce Busi ness Dai ly .

106
With these. contracts we would env� s �on that there would be opportunities
--after the first year or two after the system is def ined and we start
to go into a feasibility demonstration-- for option po ints where the
multiple contracts might reduce down to j ust one in each of those re
spective areas , but r ight now we are planning to have a minimum of one
in each o f those key areas .
As far as being a research and deve lopment and having the uncertainti e s
involved with the program , I think that most o f the contracts would , i n
deed , i n the early phases have t o b e cost plus , but thi s is a strategy
that real ly has not been officially approved--that is my own personal
j udgment . We would have to work that up the l ine and get approva l , a s
I mentioned . The 1 7 th of November i s when we wi ll g e t guidance as to
which contracting method , what wil l be bas ic and what will be options .
I am maybe j ust nibbl ing around your que stion .
SPEAKER : What about beyond that point , after you get beyond the R&D
phase and start talk ing about constructing the se fac ilities?
LT . COL . RULE : That would be another series . You are j umping to con
struction . There would actua l ly be a ful l - scale deve lopment phase .
That would come after 1984 .
SPEAKER : Would that invo lve a prototype tunne l or tunnel s ?
LT . COL . RULE : Those types of th ing s--yes , sir--f light te s ting j ust a s
w e have with the MX . You actua lly build th ings to f u l l scale t o iron
out all the bugs that you can dur ing the ful l- scale deve lopment and to
prepare yourse l f for construction .
Construction would conce ivably be in the mid- 19 8 0 s , perhaps in the 1984-

8 5 time frame , but even that schedule ha s no t been defined � The initial
operational capabi lity date o f 1989 will give you some measure as to
when we have to begin the construct ion . Some of the se concepts that we
have looked at take on the order of maybe six or seven years to con
struct , normal ly .
SPEAKER : Has the Air Force ruled out the use of Ti tan I I and Minuteman
for the first 100 MXs ?
LT . COL . RULE : In the Pres ident ' s guide l ine s we we re told that we would
produce 100 and that they would be placed in exi sting s i los , not be ing
spe c i f i c as to whether they would be Minuteman or Titan , but I would
presume that they would be one or pos s ibly a combination of both . The
l ikel ihood of actua l ly deploying 100 in s i los is real ly not very great .
It would probably be some lower number , perhaps ha l f that many before we
eventually deploy the deep bas ing sys tem or start to deploy it .
SPEAKER : Deep bas ing would come after that?

107
LT . COL . RULE : Ye s , sir .

· The inter im solution to the s trategic problem
happens to be putting MX mis s i les into existing s i los . The long- term
solution-- for 1989 and beyond -- i s going to be deep basing , the ballistic
miss i le defense , the continuous-patro l aircraft , or in some mixture . It
c ould be one or the other . I don ' t know what combination . It i s un
l ikely that all three would be selected to go into ful l-scale develop
ment , due to the sheer cost of each of the programs .
SPEAKER : One th ing I think the Air Force needs to look at is the con
tracting procedures of your contract . They j ust don ' t work out . The
r isks and liabil ities are not shared properly . We have a l l been look
i ng at this � it is something you need to start now because it is going
to take many years to straighten it out .
LT . COL . RULE : Yes , s ir .
SPEAKER : And in some thing l ike thi s , with the magnitude of tax money
being spent , I think it is about time we s traighten it out .
LT . COL . RULE : It i s a go lden opportunity , sir , and we would look to

your thoughts , and I know that var ious members--and I hesitate to po int
anybody out , but I recognize Mr . A . A . Mathews as be ing one of the fore
most people that has thoughts along the se l ines , and we would be very
anxious to get those thoughts .
SPEAKER : I j ust gather that it is impl ied and it is almost pol icy
there wi l l be an egre s s after attack , vertica l , hor izontal , or s loping ,
but--
LT . COL . RULE : We have to have the c apability to egress after an attack .

Yes , sir . Whether it is actually a requirement that we wi l l do it in
order to make the system survive has yet to be def ined , but once you do
egre s s we have problems of how do you button it back up again , you know ,
to protect the equipment and people that are within the complex . But we
must look at that given the fact that we egre s s : How do we prote ct the
remaining portion of the sys tem and keep it survivable?

108
De e p •asl n g
• PRESIDE NT IA L ANNOUNCEMENT
• C ONC E PTS
• ISSUES
• CltGANIZATION
• CONTRACTUA L R E QUIREM ENT�SCHE DULE
• WCitiC IN PROGRESS
• UPCOMING EVE NTS
F I GU R E 1
Presid e n t R e ag a n • • An no u n c e m e n t
2 OCT 1981
• DEVE LOP AND PRODUCE 100 MX MISSI LES
• DEPLOY SOME MISSILE S INI T I A L L Y IN SILOS
• PURSUE LONG-TERM OPT IONS
• A IR MOB I L E
• BA LLISTIC MISSILE DE FENSE
• DEE P UNDERGROUND BASING
• SE LECT LONG-TERM BASING MODE lS) IN 1 984
F I GU R E 2

109
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110
Pla n n e d I n s t a l l a t i o n s - N e v e r C o n s t r u c te d
DAT U :
F R OM 51 .. 17 68 69 64 68 17 72 74 78 76 7 11
TO ., 16 17 68 70 66 72 68 74 76 71 71 711
' R I MA R Y F UN C T I O N
•
cJ
ICBM • • • • • • • • •
• • •
ROCK T Y Pf :
HA R D • • • • • • • •
�I
SO F T � • •
VARIED • e •
�------�r-��-r--i--r-t g.... +-�--t-+-1--r�

E X IST. MINES e f:.•
F AC I L I T Y T Y PE
c
ARSENAL •
. ;
DIST R I B UT E D • • • • • •
COMM 'O S T • • •
D£ £ r I I L O •
COMM IYS •
COMM E N TS N A T I O N A L N E E D F O R A DD I T I O N A L I T O N O R A D 6 S I T E R l
D E E P BA S E D F A C I L I T I E S N O T Y E T E S T A B L I S H E D
T E C H N O L O G Y N O .V A V A I L A B L E F O H LA R G E U N D E R
G R OU N D F A C I L I T Y C O N S T R UC T I O N A N D OP E R A T IO N
COST A N D PC T E t.: T I A L B E N E F I T S S I G N I F I C A N T
F I GU R E 4
Init i a l O S D G u i d a n c e
• INITIATE CONCEPT DEFINITION/VA LIDA TION
• SIZE FOR 50 - 1 00 MX OR EQUIVA LENT
• POST A TTAC K END�ANCE OF AT LE AST ONE YEAR
• R A P I D EGR E SS DESIR A B L E BUT NOT MANDATORY
• M I LESTONE II FY 84
• IOC 1 989
• P ROORAM P LA N JAN 82
F I GU R E 5

111
A De e p Ba s i n g Co n c e pt u a l C o n f i g u ra ti o n
- - � --: • .
t.A A I N PR OT E C T IV E TUNNE L
(2600 FT D£ PT H I
T R A NSPOR T AT ION
NE TW OR K
· -..
A IN OPE R A T ING ..
.....- --- R A I L R OA D
BASE
. "'-._ � ...
F I GU RE 6
De e p B a si n g " Hi sto ry "
laR ifiiSTONE I jSAND S I LO J
w
T
- 1 500 FT D E E ' S I LO ISURY1vt 5 lilT HITI
e SATURAT E D SAND
o E XTI ND E X ISTING HAOO
ROCK M I N E S
• - 3500 F T D E E ' e F l UI D I Z E AND F LOAT TO SURFACE
• - 20 PORTALS 'E R SITE

FOR LAUNCH
• E G R E SS UNCE RTAINTY
e VULN E RABI LITY e VULN E R AI I LI TV/COST
e CITADE L 1 - 200 EMTI
• CRAT E R
• PO R TALS
• SHA F T !COL LAPSE/LAT E RAL SHI FTSt
• POR T A LS • CONNECT! NG TUN N E L
• F LU I D I ZAT ION
�, /
l sTRAT-X DEE' TUNNE L l
e PE R I M I T E R TUNNE LS IN
0:�
SU I T A B L E M E SAS
• - 2 1 00 FT D E E '
• - F E W HUNDR E D M I L E S
e HARD ROCK TUNN E L NETWORK e SE LF CONTA I N E D DIGOUT
• - 300 F T DEE' • HOR I ZONTAL
• - 100 POR TALS 'E R WING OF • FEW DAYS R EACTION

144 MISSI LES TIME
F IGURE 7 ?

Mes a/Tu nne l Con cep t

SECTION VIEW (NOT TO SCA LE ) H i: UUN UAN I i l H l C l Atil t:.
COM M U N ICAT IONS
7
T
A N T E N N A CONC EPTS
r -
I
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1 - E V I H Y 10 M I . I t/y /. .D
STORAGE CAVIT I E S
FOR :
PRE DUG • M I SS I L E
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\ DI SPOSA L
• OPE R A HON
\ T UN N E L
B l T W H N M I SS I L E S l A l i ONS \
I US E U F O R H E A T S I N K C OO L A N T ST O R A GE 1 - - -
•
· - �
F O R A PA R T I C U L A R T H R E A T E S T I MA T E
SI T I N G DE P T H D S H E C r E U F OR M I N . COST . T R A D I N G W I T H T UNN E L L E N G T H 8o
•
P R O L I F E R A T I ON OF M I SS I L E S A N D R E LA T E D ASS E T S
F I GU R E 8

Deep T u n n e l Sand D u m p Concept
SAND F I L L E D
l A UNC H SHAF T
....
....
w
TUNNE
F IGURE 9

" Pe n c i l -P u s h e r ' ' •g ress C o n c e p t
�. h
· - ·. · · .
PE NCI L IN F L O A T INCi
2000 FT
POS I T ION L OCK E D TO
[�ffi?��;�� tfil . . .
SIDE S DF SH A FT
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OF PE NC I L
u
PAU T T A CK e L OCKE D INTO P L A CE
C A N T O P E JE CT E D
e CA NISTE R S e MISSI L E C A N L OCK E D ePE NCIL TOP AND M I SS I L E
T E THE RE D IN P L A CE
T O BOT TOM e CiAS C A N F IR E D e MISSI L E F IR E D
F I G U R E 10

115
Deep •as l n g
REQUIRED DE PTH FOR SURVIVABILITY

VS VAR IOUS THRE A T LEVELS
DEPTH DE PTH
IFTI IFTI
.. 1, 000 UNSA TURATED POROUS ROCK 400 �T

(e. g. (e. g. LIME STONE )
HARD ROCK
GR ANITE )
6, 000 240�T
6, 000
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F I GURE 1 1
Pote ntial Oeolog lcallw Su itable A re a s
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• rot- LAIII / CA- -
F I GU RE 1 2

M o s t R e q u i re d Tec h n o l og y • • • • ••
R E QU I R E M E N T E XPE R I E N C E R E QU I R E ME N T E XPE R I E NC E
M AJOR U N O E A G R O U N D M I N E S; SUBWA Y S ;
E XC A V A T I O N lk
M U C K H A N D L ING M I N E S . C I V I L/COM M ' L
AQUE DUCTS; lfW Y . a. D I SPO SA L
& R A I L T UN N E L S;
T UN N E L I NG
CONS T R UC T I ON
H Y DRO POW E R PLAN T S .
N T S UG T COMPL E X E S .
M E G AW A T T S I Z E DO E ' E P R I /CON E O/
C H I C AGO ST O R M W A T E R
SYS; NO R A O C MCC ; S I T E R
F U E L C E L LS UTC DE MO IN N YC
1-'
1-'
0\
OE F I N I T I ON O F UN DE R G R O UN D
R O U T I N E UNDE R · M I N E S ; SUBM A R I N E S . A T T A C K F. N V I HO N N UC L E AR T E S T S
GROUND C R EW H Y DRO POW E R P L A N T S .
UNDE A G R O UN D O F F I C E S
& F ACTOR I E S & W A R E ·
ACT I V I T Y
S u R V I V .O B L E UN D E R G RO U N D
HOUSES; NO R A D ; S I T E R f. vCK O f � h: I 1"4 G S N UC L E A R T ESTS
P R O L O NG E D C R EW SUBMA R I N E S, SHOC K I SO L A T I ON M I N U T E MAN; SH I PS;

CONF I N E M E N T SPAC E V E H I C L E S SUBMA R I N E S
COIII T R O L O F TOX IC M I N E S ; SUBMA R I N ES ; T H RO U G H E A R T H M I N E R E SCU E ; UG T
I
COIII TAMI NANTS IN A I R SPAC E V E H I C L E S COMM UN ICAT ION DA T A T H E M ! D I SCUS
T H R OW E R . HUSK Y
I
PUP. M I G H T Y E P IC ) ;
WAST E H E AT DISPOSA L NO R AO C MC C ; S I T E R ,
SANG U I N E
SA H G UA R D
--- - --
F I GU R E 1 3

M aJor Iss u e s M aJ o r Issues (C o n l ' d )
• SYSTE M DE FINITION ·
• UNDE RGROUND CONFIGUR A T ION

• SITING
• H A R DNE SS/VULNE RABIL ITY • TEST BED (S)
• E GR E SSI PLU • DE PLOYMENT AREA
• CONSTRUCT A BI L I T Y
• POW E R
• POSS I BLE FEASIBI LITY TESTS
• L I FE SUPPOR T - CREW E NDUR ANCE
• EGRESS
....
• L A UNO. CONTROL , COMMUNICATIONS ....
• COMM UN ICATIONS -.J
• HE A T D ISSI PA T ION • POWE R
• HE A T SINK
• SE CUR ITY
• COST UNCERTA INTY
• OPS CONCE PT
• ENVI R ONMEN TA L I MPACT ANA L YSIS PROCESS
• LOGISTICS
• CONCE PT
• MA NNE D VS AUTOMA TE D • LOCATION A L TE RNA TIVES
• BASE COM PREHENSIVE PLAN

F I G U R E 14
F I GU R E 1 5

118
Deep •••lng - Siting
• C R I TICA L FACTOR
• SURVIVA B I LITY
• COST
• SCHEDULE
• ENVIRONMENTA L IMPACT
• IMPORTANT CONSIDERAT IONS
• CiEOLOG ICA L/TOPOGRA PHIC C HA RACTER IST IC S

e WA TE R
• T E MP ERA TUR E CiRADI ENT
• MUC K DISPOSA L
• DEPTH R EQU IRE MENTS
• PUB LIC VS PR IVA T E LAND
• PROX IMITY TO M I LITA R Y BA SE S

• LECiA L, POLICY CONSTRA INTS
F I GU R E 1 6
l BMO/CC
J
l
DIRE CTOR ASMS
BMO/SY
I
DE PUTY DIRE CTOR
FOR
I
DE E P BASINCi
BMO A FR CE
SYSTE M E NCiiNE E R I NCi CONSTRUCTION PLA NS/COST

&
PROCiR AM INTE CiR A T ION E IAP/SITINCi
BCP
OTHE R PART ICIPANTS & INPUTS
HO USA F - - - POL ICY CiUIDANCE/D IR E CT ION

HO A FSC - - - POL ICY CiUIDANCE /DIR E CT ION
DNA - - - - - NUCLEAR E FFE CTS & SUR V IVAB I L I T Y
A FW L - - - - - SITINCi REQUIR E ME NTS, HAR DNE SS
SA C - - - - - OPE R A T IONA L CONCE PT
A FLC - - - - - LOCiiSTICS
F I GU R E 17

119
CONTRACT REQUIR EMENTS FY12 - FYI4
• SYSTEM SUPPORT
• POWER
• HEAT SINK
• COMMUNICATIONS
• EGRESS STUDY & DEMO
• CONSTRUCTION VALIDATION
• SITE SCREENING
• SITE CHARACTER IZATION
• BASE COMPR E .. NSIVE PLAN
F I GU R E 1 8
Ad v a n c e d D e v e l o p ft1 e n t Prog ra "'

MAJOit MILE STOtE SCHE DULE
FY 12 FY 13 FY 14
PROGRAM D.E CTION
CONCE PT IDENT I FICATION

AND SCREE NING
PROGRAM PLAN DE VE LOPME NT
SITING CONTRACTS
SCRE E NING
SITE CHARACTE R IZATION
D
SYSTEM SUPPORT CONTRACT (SI lJ
EGRESS TE CHNOLOGY CONTRACTS (S) lJ <>
D
<>
D
CONSTRUCTION VALIDA T ION
CONTRACT
SURVIVABILITY PROGR AM
COST E FFECTIVE NE SS MODE L

FfiS
E NVIRONME NTAL ANALYSES DOPA��------------------------�� -
'--.
.,
DSARC II Q
F I GU R E 1 9

120
W o rk I n P r o g r e s s
• ORGA NIZA T ION
• PROGRA M ACQUISITION
• CONTRACT STRA TEGY PA PERS
• SOURCE SE LECTION P LA N
• BUS INESS STRATEGY PANE L
• BIDDERS CONF ER ENCE
• STA TE MENTS OF WOR K
• RFP' S/T EC H REQUIR EMENTS DOC
• PROPOSA L REVIEW T E A MS
• ACQUISIT ION P LA N MODS
• D&F
• F Y 84 - 88 POM IMPUT
• PUB LIC A F F A I R S PAC KAG E
• LIA ISON W ITH DNA & A F W L
• PMD DRA FT
• PROGRA M P LA N
F I GU R E 2 0
U p c o m i n g • v e n ts
• 5 - 6 NOV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U. S. NATI ONA L COMMITTE E ON TUNNE LING TEC ...OLOGY
• 12 NOV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BR IE FING TO POT E NTIAL BI D DERS
• 17 NOV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BUSINESS STR A T EG Y PANE L
• 30 NOV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . R F P R E LE ASE
• 23 - 25 NOV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SMSG W OR K ING GROUPS
• 30 JAN 82 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PR OGRAM PLAN DUE TO OSO
• A PR IL 82 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . COMPE TITIVE CONTRACT AWARD
F I GU R E 2 1

121
Dee p Ba• l n g - S u m m a ry
• E ARLY STACiE OF DE VE LOPMENT
• SE R IOUS PROGRAM
• COMPRE SSE D S04E DULE
• AIR FOR CE NON EVALUAT ING CONCE PT AND LOCAT ION

ALTERNATIVE S
• OPPOR TUNITY FOR A PPL ICA TION OF E X IST ING, E MERGING

AND NEW TUNNE L I NG/MINING TE OtNOLOOY
F IGURE 22
De e p Ba• l n g - W h at Ne x t ?
• YOUR THOUGHTS WOULD BE HE LPF U L
• P R E LIMINA R Y PRCXiRAM P LAN
• CONTRACT A PPROAC HES
• COST E ST I MA T E S
• SITINO CRITE RIA/SCR E E NINO
• USE OF E X ISTINO UNDEROROUND SPAC E
• EGR E SS
• MECHANIZED MININO
• CONSTR UCTION VA LIDA TION
• F UTUR E INVO LV E ME NT POSSifl i U T IE S
• NEWSLETTER
• MAGAZ INE
• A DV I SOR Y GR OUP
• SPEC IA LIZED CONSU LT INO
F I GURE 2 3

Summary of Issues from TUCWC Meeting
JOSHUA L. MERRITT
Merr itt CASES , Inc.
R ed land s, Califor nia
SUMMARY: The meeting of the Tunneling and Underground Construction WOrking Group
(TUCWG) , which was held on 15 and 16 October at the Defense Nuc lear Agency , was a
precursor to look at some of the more critical problems and issues . Construction
and siting were the ma j or i s sues discussed .
The typical reaction voiced by most members of the group was that if we were re
quired to , we could proceed now with construction of a facility at approximate ly 2 , 600
feet in depth in a sandstone , for example . The ma j or considerations confronting us in
that case would be the fol lowing :
• Schedule
• Cost
• Other key is sue s to be expected and how the may best be resolved by a
program beginning now .
A feeling commo n among the members was that "digout , " or egress , as it has been
cal led , will have to occur at least in concept ; we have to be prepared to egres s af
ter an attack .
The urgent needs and recomme ndations di scussed included the following :
• Management organization
• Adequate staffing
• Definition of promis ing s ites
• Configuration compatible with chosen site .
A small group had studied earlier the possibility of using underground space al
ready in existence . The results of that study are included in this presentation . It
was not a n exhaustive study , but j ust a pre liminary look at what ma y be available and
use ful .
During the meeting of the Siting Subgroup , the issue of digout , or egress , was
discussed at length . A ma j or outcome of this subgroup meeting was a pre liminary ba
sis for applying decis ion analysi s techniques to the siting problem .
Several siting concept alternatives were di scus sed : mesas , ridges , and plains .
Concepts were solicited for generally de sirable site characteristics in teras of ver
tical relief , talus slopes , and other conditions .
Some possible schemes for solving the egress problem are discussed in this pre
sentation , inc luding methods for vertical , horizontal , and inclined egress .
In summary , it is important to point out that the problem of egress is not by
any means solved . Inputs in thi s area are urgently needed .
122

123
We have given to your chairman , Dr . Cording , about 2 0 copies of the re

ports that were received as a result of the meeting on October 1 5 and 16 .
They will be avai lable to you for cons ideration in your further de l ibera
t ions .
The meeting on October 15 and 16 was merely a precursor to begin to
look at some of the more critical problems and i s sues , and I would em
phasize at the out set that it was only a two-day meet ing . The first
three -quarters of the first day was spent on construction . The rest of
that day and the fol lowing day were spent on s iting i s sue s . Obvious ly ,
it has been a very brief consideration and certainly deserves a lot more
cons ideration .
I should f inally emphasize that the reports that you will rece ive ,
the 2 0 copies or so that we have , are l i s ted as draft reports of the in
dividual members of the working groups . P lease look at them as drafts .
Again , an awful lot of work needs yet to be done . I would emphasize ,
again , that thi s meet ing i s unclassified . Our meeting on October 15 and
16 was also unclas s i f ied , so that there is no c lassi fied information in
any of those reports whi ch will be available for your perusal .
F igure 1 l i sts the group that convened on October 1 5 . The working
group members are l i s ted at the top , and there were a number of other
attendees . The meeting was he ld at the Defense Nuc lear Agency .
F igure 2 l ists some of the meeting ' s conc lusions . Perhaps I was a
little too strong in calling this a " consensus . " There are perhaps some
items of consensus here . There are probab ly some items that might be
furthe r debated ; I apologize for using the word " consensus . " I think ,
however , it i s important to note the typical reaction . I merely quoted
Al Mathews in the typical reaction , but thi s reaction was also voiced by
the other members that have provided a report . The reaction is that i f
we were required t o proceed with the construction of a facil ity at , let
us say , 2 , 6 0 0 feet in depth in ( for example ) a sandstone , there is no
que s tion that we could go do i t . As Colonel Rule has indicated , the big
issue s are how quickly can it be done , what is the cost of doing i t , and
what are some of the other i s sues that might be resolved in the proc e s s ?
Another item that was common among a l l o f the written reports i s
that digout , o r egre s s as i t h a s been called here several time s today ,
is something that needs to have a great deal of work , and as one of the
per sons on the commi ttee has indicated , egres s , as a matter of policy ,
will have to occur at least in concept . We have to be prepared to egress
after an attack .
Some of the " urgent needs and recommendations " (Figure 3 ) are my
paraphrases of the var ious reports that were rece ived fol lowing the three
quarter day meeting . We touched o n one of the que stions that h a s been
raised before , and that is the management organization and the adequate
staff ing of thi s very important program of tremendous magnitude . Other
que stions are a l so shown in the f igure , and the f inal one is to define
the properties of promi sing sites and then configure , or optimize a con
figuration , to be compatible with that site .
In response to a request of the Under Secretary of Defense for Re
search and Development back in e ar ly August , we convened a smal l group
to look at what underground space exi sted and what the pos s ible use of

124
that space might be . Figure 4 shows some of the highlights of the con
c lus ion . Some 80 mineral mines were identi fied from a prel iminary inven
tory , and 35 of them had overburdens greater than 1 , 500 ft . Of that 3 5 ,
26 are currently operating , and there might be a problem of acqui sition
or perhaps , instead of acquisition , parallel use of the space . The four
operating mine s with vertical egres s are indicated . The " 8 ' x 1 0 "' not
ed in the figure is the typical size of the opening ; the 1 , 60 0 or 3 , 160
feet i s the depth . Of the remaining nine exi sting openings , seven non
operating mines are flooded , and the actual conditions of the underground
space there are unknown . Two nonoperating mine s are dry , as indicated .
The group looking at thi s problem--over a brief per iod of only two
or three days--identified the fact that , of course , several other govern
ment agencies ( one highl ighted in the figure , the Nuc lear Regulatory Com
mission ) have inve stigated exi sting space for possible use for nuclear
waste disposal . A third item from that particular study was that there
are abandoned rai lroad tunnel s that have the characteristics indicated ;
four in particular might be attractive in that they are in government
control led public areas .
The final area that was identi fied was l ime stone mine s . There was
no effort to look at natural l imestone caves within thi s very abbreviated
study , but there are lime stone mines in existence . There are a large num
ber with numerous sizes of openings and naturally dry conditions . They
may be weak , due to the room-and-pillar excavation that was used in these
l imestone and dolomite areas .
The recommended additiona l work to develop these data is indicated .
I would emphasize again that this was primar ily three people working for
two to three days ; it is certainly not an exhaustive study by any means .
It was merely the first cut at what might be avai lable and what might be
useful . There is a potential for a lot more cons ideration in that area .
The Siting Subgroup of the Tunne ling and Underground Construction
Working Group (F igure 5 ) met on Thursday afternoon and then continued on
Friday , October 16 . The subgroup members are as indicated , and the other
attendees of the October 16 meeting are listed at the bottom .
Obviously I lost my courage in call ing the material in Figure 6 a
consensus at thi s point . Again , the items of digout were of paramount
concern , and the figure l ists some of the things that Ron Heuer had to
say about digout . I would emphasize that he indicate s that obvious ly
i f we can go through soi l or alluvium we certainly s implify one of the
problems ; there are machine s that might go through that . At the same
time , of course , because we would have to carry along continuous support
for such a medium , we do not solve the entire problem by going through
al luvium .
Jim Gould had an important item for cons ideration , particularly in
view of the so-called " SUMS " involving the placing of mi s s i l e s on small
submarine s which came up as part of the multiple protective shelter (MPS )
con siderations (F igure 7 ) . He indicated that we might want to look at
some of the Continental She l f areas (possibly the United States terri
tories under the Great Lakes could be looked at as potential siting areas
as well ) . Although at the same time I must note that penetrating devices

125
can more �eadily g o into water th an they can into rock , there may b e some
other advantage s of locating off the Continental Shel f or under the Great
Lakes .
F inally , from the Siting Subgroup ( F igure 8 ) , I am remi s s in not
identifying the source of this informat ion : it was suggested by Gene
.
Waggoner as a po tential means of siting dec i s ion analys i s technique s in
a simplified way . In hi s report he gives a more complete dec i s ion analy
s i s approach to looking at s i ting . He noted in his letter transmitting
thi s material that I tem 2 may imme diately throw out a s i te if it i s de
termined that the particular characteristics of that site make its abi l
i ty t o survive attack very doubtful . Even though one might g o through a
we ighing of important parameters , one might s ingle out an item , such as
survivab i l ity . Since survivability i s the name of the game regardless
of how the site turns out otherwi se , obviously i f i t cannot survive it
would be eliminated from further cons iderat ion .
Now , to move to a different subj ect . The one perhaps that we are
here for is to look at siting concept alternatives . I had the staff put
together a complicated cartoon of things that you might wish to con s ider .
We have heard a lot about mesas because mesas provide horizontal egre s s
into the area both for construction as we l l as pos s ibly for mining out
after an attack . F igure 9 is intended mere ly to flag the fact that there
are mesas . One example i s Grand Me sa , Colorado . We have indicated in
the f igure that we wish to stand off somewhere between 2 , 000 and 3 , 5 0 0
feet , depending upon the type of rock that w e might b e i n as we l l as the
trade-offs of hardnes s with depth . We recognize that there may be sev
eral leve l s of ta lus s lopes that might exist against the me sa , not only
at different geographical locations , but even at the same mesa .
Conf iguration was intentionally left as a blob in F igure 9 because
it could be vertical , it could be hor izontal , or it could be a hybrid of
horizontal and vertical . It could also involve a situation where we
might have certain as sets at a greater depth than other assets . Depend
ing on the criticality and required hardne s s of tho se assets , we might
want to put them at a greater depth and thereby provide them greater
survivabil i ty .
F igure 9 g ive s one example of a r idge s ite : either s ide of Forty
Mile Canyon in Nevada . There is a fairly s ignificant vertical relief
there . There are many others throughout the country that might be pos
sibi litie s ; again , a blob i s indicated for the conf iguration . We might
have to go deeper into a ridge to make sure that we get our 2 , 00 0 to
3 , 500 feet of standoff distance between the neare st point on the surface
and the fac i lity , so that it may actually be , say , 4 , 000 feet be low the
local ridge l ine . Dotted l ine s are used to indicate the po s s ib i lity of
various leve l s of talus s lopes and alluvial fans adj acent to such a r idge .
The thi rd pos s ibi lity , of course , i s to go into a plain , such as the
basalt at the Columbia River Basin . We have indicated Washington near
Fairchi ld Air Force Base , but , of course , the basalt extends further . As
shown in Colone l Rule ' s ear l ier chart , it i s also in Oregon . If located
under a plain , we would have to have vertical egress systems as we l l as
vertical shafts in order to mount the construct ion . F inally , we solicit

126
your idea� or your concepts for what i s a de s irable s ite in terms of ver
tical relie f , talus s lope s , and other conditions .
F inally , I have a very complicated chart (Figure 10 ) that was put
together j ust as we were rushing out . I should start with the punch l ine
of " your concept " : we real ly want your concept and ideas ; what we are
mere ly trying to highlight here are some off-the-top-of-the-head kinds of
things that one might consider , and certainly by no means is it exhaustive .
It suggests some thoughts that one might want to cons ider as you go into
your del iberations on possible schemes for solving the egres s problem .
F irst , we started with vertical egre s s , where we as sumed that we
mine out after an attack us ing a raise c l imber and us ing the main tunne l
for muck disposal . The main tunnel for muck disposal may not be the most
attractive thing , but that perhaps is a point of departure .
I should have ment ioned the dashed line on the figure . The dashed
l ine is to indicate that in this particular case , of course , we could be
under a plain where we do not have any maj or vertical relief and would
have to go into a vertical egre s s system .
The mi s s i le would have to carry with it everything that i s required
to take it out of the hole , assemble itsel f , get its initial alignment ,
arid take off . There would have to be some sort of a chamber back into
the plain or out into the plain that allows you to make the transition
of that 70- to 100-foot mi s s i le .
As F igure 10 shows , in cartoon form , we could part ially or complete
ly predig the tunnel and backfill it wi th several alternative materials .
The plug at the top would probably have to be s igni f icantly deeper than
shown . As Dr . Linger has po inted out , if they actually knew the location
of the egre s s point (we certainly must a ssume that they would know ) , it
would then become a target . Consequently , the crater would come to per
haps a 300-foot depth and the plug shown might have to be more than 300
feet deep to ensure that it avoided the crater . With some of the mate
rials with which one might backfill a predug egres s way , you would still
have to use a raise c l imber or a raise borer in order to get rid of the
material .
Another po s s ibil ity would be to use pre set charges , not only to
break up the plug at the top and po s s ibly the bottom , but also the back
f i l l , to break up the natural arche s that are going to form as we try to
have 2 , 000 feet of muck fall through the shaft ; in this case , of course ,
we would not need a raise cl imber . I would hasten to add , however , due
to e lectromagnetic pulse ( EMP ) effects--- equivalent to the worst l ightning
storm you could imagine increased manyfold---protect ing the charge s from
that sort of electrical transient may be diff icult , but certainly it i s
something that could b e invest igated .
Also , there i s the pos sibility of having a predug muck pocket at the
base ; in that case , of cour se , one could eliminate any need for providing
conveying systems to get rid of the muck as it falls .
F inally , of course , is a pos s ibi l ity of using an offset vertical
egre s s system .
Another consideration for egre s s is proli feration . Proliferation ,
however , is not very attractive because , as indicated thi s morning , we
are talking about thousands of potential warheads to attack the triad ;

127
thus w e would need thousands of such openings , which is not cost-effec

tive . Addit ionally , we could have a defense overlay to protect some
openings .
Now , let me very quickly walk through the same sort of thing for
inc lined egre s s (F igure 1 1 ) . Inclined egre s s would require a s lope , of
course , that would depend on the talus configuration . It does not appear
as attractive to go out on the incl ine if you have to go a l l the way to
the upper surface . The angle is a variable depending on the s ite , as
we l l as perhaps some of the mechanization . Recogniz ing thi s , we can dis
cus s the same sorts of pos s ibi lities as we did for vertical egre s s . I
shal l not comme nt further except to point out that one needs , of course ,
some sort of a door to assure that the muck goe s into the muck pocket
and then drop the door in order to get access to take the mi ssile out .
For incl ined egre s s , I would emphasize another possibil ity . If we
can prove that we can get preset charges to survive EMP and other near
surface e f fects , we could have preset charge s on the s lope providing
there was no maj or talus slope . Preset charges could remove the top of
the slope and other charges could remove the final plug such that we
would get ac ces s pas s ively to the surface .
F inally , Figure 12 shows hor izontal or nearly horizontal egre s s .
The cross-hatching which now appear s on the talus slope indicates that
the final opening would have to come out on a clean surface , not through
the talus , although one could certainly come up with a scheme with a
shield and full l ining to go through the talus . We shall merely walk
through the several po s s ibi l ities for near horizontal egre s s .
In this case , blast doors might be an attractive addit ion , and I
would mention that the Defense Nuc lear Agency for years has used first
a structure called a tunne l and pipe seal ( TAPS ) at the Nevada Test Site ,
which i s de s igned for rather impres sive overpressures and temperatures .
More recently , they have used DACS ( DNA Auxiliary Closure System) and
variations of the DACS , which is a very rapidly c los ing blast door that
can take very high temperature s and pressures . For near hor i zontal
egress , we would excavate probab ly with a tunne l boring machine ( TBM ) or
some var iant of a TBM .
In summary , I would come back to my initial point : the three com
plicated figures (F igures 10 , 1 1 , and 12 ) merely lead up to the fact
that the problem has not been solved by any means . We need your inputs
very urgently in thi s area .

TUNNEL I NG AND llfDERGROUND CONSTRUCT I ON WORK I NG GROUP

15 OCTOBER 1981 PEEl i NG
WORKING GROUP MEMBERS :

E o J o CORD I NG� UN I VERS I TY OF I LL I NO I S
Jo Po GOULD1 MUESER1 RUTLEDGE
R, E. HEUER� CONSULTANT
DON A . L I NGE R 1 HQ� DNA
A , A . MATHEWS� CONSTRUCT I ON ENG I NEER I NG CON SULTANT
T . G o McCUSKER � TUNNEL CONSULTANT
J , L , MERR I TT � MER R I TT CASE S � I NC ,
EUGENE B . WAGGONER� CONSULT I NG E NG I NEER I NG GE OLOG I ST
P, .....
N
S, W I MPFEN1 CONSULTANT
CD
OTHER ATTENDE E S ;
K, No BAKER� ANSER K, B , MOR R I LL� MERR I TT CA SES� I NC , MAJ , R I C HAR D �ADLER

AFRCE -MX/DE E S
J, K. BEA TTY� TRW LTC JAME S K o MORROW� HQ � AFE SC/RDX
E. SEV I N� HQ � DNA
LT . JOHN A , CALLAHAN � AFWL PAUL P , O R K I LD1 USGS
CDR I T I J , D E EVYI HQI DNA MAR K J , OS TROWE R � HME R I
J, W, SEEL I G � ANSER
J AME S F ,
M I C HAE L J , SHOR E
DEV I NE 1 U SG S GENE PATTEN� USG S
OUSDREI S &TNF ( O&SS)
MAJ . JOHN E LL� � HQ/AF RO -M LTC D , D , P I EPENBURG � HQ� DNA
JAME S w .
ALAN J , S I LVER � TRW
FAYI TRW M, A, PLAMONDO N � A F WL
EUGENE C , ROBE R T SON�
LEONARD B . ST�PHEN S
PAUL R , F I SHE R � HQ� U SAC E USGS
AFRCE -MXIDE EC
COL , Eo D, FRANKHOU SER � HQ � DNA R , ROHR 1 ANSER
J , A , WOO$TER 1 BOE J NG
MAJ , M I CHAEL HAVEY� HQ/AF RO-M LTC , C , R ULE � BMO/EN (OBSERVE R )
F I GURE 1

129
C�SENSUS
F I RST �ET ING Of TUNNE L I NG AND UNDERGROUND
C�STRUCT I � WORK I NG GROUP
15 OCTOBER 1981
TYP I CAL REAC T ION ( QUOTE FROM A, A, MATHEWS ) :
EX I ST I NG TECHNOLOGY I S ADEQUATE TO ASSURE THE SAT I SFAC TOR Y COMPLET I ON O F

A L L UNDERGR OUND CONSTRUC T I ON NEC E S SARY _FOR T H E C � J S S I ON I NG OF AN ACC E P TABLE
DEEP BAS I NG S Y S TE" I N A S U I TABLE GEOLOG I C SETT I NG ,
H I GHLY PROM I S I NG AREAS F OR I "'ROVE"ENT Of TECHNOLOGY ( Q UOTE FRO" A , A o MATHEWS ) :
CONT I NUO U S CONC R E T E L I N I NG PLAC EMENT BEH I ND TIM

AUTOMAT I C APPL I CAT I ON OF SHOTC A E T E
VERY H I GH S P E E D R A I L HAULAGE
H I GH P R E S S UR E , P R E -C OOLED VENT I LAT I O N A I R
F RANG I BLE BAC K I NG FOR SUPPORT ELEME N T S
D I G-OUT , E S PEC I ALLY THROUGH R UBBLE , NE E D S D E V E LO PME NT/DEMONSTRAT I ON , CONS I DER AS EXAMPLES
( QUO TE F ROM A , E, HE UE R ) :
D I G OU T THROUGH C RA TER RUBBLE AT RATE S OF 100 FTIDAY KAY BE POS S I BLE IF:
I , DON E AT SLOPE S O F L E S S T HA N 20%

11, CRATER R UBBLE I S SO I L OR LOW STRENGTH ROC K
I l l , CRATER R UBBLE I S ABOVE THE WATER TABLE
C URRENTLY AVA I LABLE TUNNEL BOR I NG MACH I NE S ( SUC H A S THE LOVAT MACH I NE , FULL
SH I E LDED W I TH DRAG B I T C UTTE R S ) AND TUNNEL L I N I NG S Y STE"S (PRECAST CONC R E T E OR

STEEL R I B S W I TH WOO D LAGG I NG ) ARE L I KELY TO PROVE ADEQUATE FOR THESE COND I T I ON S ,
F I GURE 2
URGENT NEEDS/RECOMMENDAT I ONS

F I RST �ET I NG Of TUNNE L I NG AND UNDERGROUND
CONSTRUCT I ON WRK I NG GROUP
15 OCTIJlER 1981
PROCE ED W I TH H I GHL Y PRO" I S I NG AR E A S FOR I "PAOVE"E N T S IN TECHNOLOGY
E S TABL I SH A MANAGEMENT ORGAN I ZA T I ON AND PROV I DE ADEQUATE S TAFF NOW
STRUC TURE I NNOVAT I VE APPROAC HE S TO D E F I N I T I ON OF WOR K AR E A S AND CONTRAC T I NG
DEF I NE PROPERT I E S OF PRO" I S I NG S I TE S AND CONF I GUR E (OPT I " I ZE ) A SPEC I F I C

F AC I L I T Y FOR S I TE
F I GURE 3

130
EX I ST I NG UNDERGROUND SPAC E
FOR M I S S I LE OPERAT I ONS
PREL I M I NARY I NVENTORY OF 80 M I NERAL M I N E S OF WH I CH :

35 HAVE OVE RBUR DEN OF GREATER THAN 1500 FT ,
26 OF THE SE ARE OPERAT I NG : PROBLEM W I TH ACQU I S I ON?
� OPERAT I NG M I NE S ARE DR Y :
GREEN R I VER ( WYOM I NG ) 8 ' X 10 ' AT 1600 '
I
-
SAN MANUAL (AR I ZONA ) - 10 ' X 12 ' AT 3160 '

SAF FORD (AR I ZONA ) - UN KNOWN AT 2300 ' VERT I CAL ACCESS
WH I TE P I NE ( M I CH I GAN) - 8' X 1� ' AT 1500 '
7 NON-OPERAT I NG M I NES ARE F LOODED
2 NON-OPERAT I NG M I N E S ARE DR Y : .
LAKE SHORE (AR I ZONA ) - 8 ' X 12 ' AT 18()0 '

TUNGSTEN QUEEN ( NOR TH CAROL I NA ) - 10 ' X 12 ' AT 1700 '
I NVENTOR I E S BY OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENC I E S :
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM I SS I ON I NVE ST I GAT I ON FOR NUCLEAR WASTE D I SPO SAL
ABANDON ED RA I LROAD TUNNELS :

HOR I ZONJAL ACC E S S
E X I ST I NG TUNNEL SUPPORT
� LOCATE D W I TH I N GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED PUB L I C AREAS :
CASCADE TUNNE L ( WASH I NGTON )
ALP I NE TUNNEL ( COLORADO )
HAGERMAN TUNN E L ( COLORADO )
AT LANT I C -PAC I F I C T UNNE L ( COLORADO)
L I ME STONE M I N E S :
LARGE NUMBER AND NUME ROUS S I ZE S OF OPEN I NG S W I TH NATURALLY DRY COND I T I ONS
WEAK DUE TO ROOM AND P I LLAR TYPE EXCAVAT I ON METHODS
RECOMMENDED ADD I T I ONAL WOR K TO DEVELOP THES E DATA F URTHER :
EVALUAT E HARDNE S S OF OPEN I NG S
I N VE ST I GATE ABANDONED RA I LROAD TUNNELS
I NVE S T I GATE WOR K DONE BY OTH ER AGENC I E S
F I GURE 4

S I T I NG SUB-GROUP
TUNNE L I NG AND UNDE RGROUND CONSTRUC T I ON WORK I NG G ROUP
16 OCTOBER 1981 MEET I NG
SUB-GROUP MEMBERS :
.
PAUL R . F I SHE R , HQ , u sAC E
J, P, GOUL D , MU E S E R , R UT L E D G E
D E LON HAM P TO N , DE LON HAMPTON & A S SOC I AT E S
R, E, HE U E R , CONS ULTANT
DON A, L I NGER, HQ, DNA
J, L, MERR I TT , MERR I TT CASES, I NC ,
EUGENE C , R O B E R T SO N , USGS
.....
EUGENE B , WAG GO N E R , CON SULT I NG E NG I NE E R I NG GEOLOG I S T w
.....
O T H E R A T T E NDE E S :
J, K, BEATTY , TRW L TC D , D, P I EPENBERG, HQ , DNA

LT . JOHN A , CALLA HA N , A F WL M, A, P LAMO NDON, AFWL
JAME S W , FAY, TRW LTC C , RULE , BMO I E N
WE S MA N N , TRW MAJ , R I C HAR D SADLE R , A F R C E -MXID E E S
K, B, MOR R I L L , ME R R I T T CA S E S , I NC , M I C HA E L J , SHOR E , OUS DR E / S &T N F ( O& S S )
L TC JAME S K � MORROW, HQ, A F E SCIRDX ALAN J , S I LV E R , TRW
PAUL P , OR K I LD, USGS LE ONAR D B . S T E P HE N S , A F RC E - MXID E E C

MA R K J , O S TROWER , NME R I J, A, WOOS T E R , BOE I NG ( O B S E R VE R )
F I GU R E 5

132
Q UO T E F R OH R , HEUER
D I G OUT ,
SELECT S I TE SO THAT POT E N T I AL C RA T E R RUBBLE TO BE P E N E T R A T E D DUR I NG D I G OUT IS:
I . THROUG H LOW STRENGCH ROCK ( 2000 PSI OR L E S S ) OR SO I L ( SUCH AS
DE S E R T ALLUV I UM ) ,
I I , ABOVE WAT E R TAB L E ( WANT LOOSE P E R ME AB L E , RUBBLE TO BE DR Y , NOT
F UL L O F WAT E R ) ,
I l l , LOC ATED TO P E kM I T D I G OUT AT R E LAT I VE L Y F LAT I N CL I NA T I ON :
( A) P R E F ERAB L Y L E S S THAN 3%, AME NAB LE TO R A I L HAULAGE
(&) PO S S I B L Y U P TO 20%, U S I NG R UBB E R T I R E D VEH I C L E S W I TH
PROBABLE R E S UL T I NG S LOWER ADVANC E , H I GHER E N E R G Y RE Q U I R E ME N T S ,
GR EATER PROBLEMS W I TH POLLUT I ON OF B A S E A TMO S P H E R E , ETC ,
IV, LOC A T E D T O P E RM I T D I GOUT I NTO S T E E P SLOPE
( A) L E S S R UB BLE ACCUMULAT I ON ,
(&) GR EAT E R L I K E L I HOOD O F F AVOR ABLE GROUNDWA T E R TABL E ,
(C ) R E DUC E D D I G OUT D I S TANC E ,
QUOTE F ROM A , A, MATH E W S :
S I T I NG N E E D S ,
D E S I RAB L E G EOLOG I C , TOPOGRAPH I C AND GEOGRAPH I C C R I T E R I A SHOULD BE I DE NT I F I ED
AND All P O S S I B LE S I T E S H E E l i N G THE M I N I MUM S TANDAR D S S HOULD BE LOC A T E D , THE S E
S E L EC T I ON S C A N T H E N BE C LA S S I F I E D I N OR D E R O F PRE F E R E NC E ,
F I GU R E 6
QUOTE F ROH T , M'CUSKER :
E F F EC T OF GROUND T Y P E :
PRODUC T I V I T Y -- POTE N T I A L RAN K I NG : T UF F , � I ME S TONE ( MA S S I VE , NO G Y P S UM ) ,

S C H I S T / GNE I S S , B A SALT, GRAN I T E ,
HETAVOLC AN I C S W I TH H I GH HORN B L E N DE
CONTENT
B E HAV I O R UNDE R BLAST E F F EC T S
S HO C K I SOLAT I ON
CONSTR UC T I O N METHODS
QUOTE F ROH J , GOUL D :
A SC HEME THAT COULD B E CONS I DE R E D I S B A S I NG ON THE CONT I N E N TAL SH E L F W I TH
APPROACH T U N N E L S F R OM LAND ACC E S S PO I NT S , COAS T AL PLA I N S E D I ME N T S ALONG THE
H I D -ATLAN T I C B E TW E E N THE HUDSON R I VE R CANYON AND SOUTH G E ORG I A C OULD PROVE
F A VORAB L E , THEY I.NCLUDE HARD C LA Y S AND CALCAREOUS S E D I M E N T S W I TH VAR I OU S DE -
GR E E S OF C E M E N TAT I O N , IT I S PO S S I B L E THAT LAY E R S I N THE C OA S T AL PLA I N THAT WOULD
P R E S E N T D I S T I NC TLY F AVORAB LE SOFT G R OUND TUNNEL I NG C O N D I T I ONS COULD B E SELECTED .
FOR EXAM PL E , I N C OO P E R MAR L I N C HAR L E S TON , S.D., TUNN E L S 8 FEET I N D I AM E T E R W E R E
E XCAVA T E D BY A LOVA T T MACH I N E ADVANC I N G AT THE RATE OF ABOUT }60 FEET I N AN 8 HOUR
SH I F T W I THOUT TEMPORARY O R P E R MA N E N T S U PPO RT , OBV I OUSLY , EGR E S S FOR A DE E P BASE IN
THE 'ONT I N E NTAL SH E L F WOULD R E QU I R E S P E C I AL FAC I L I T I E S , I NC L U D I NG I N S T A L L I NG A C OM
P R E S S E D A I R LOC K A N D T H E LAUNC H I NG O F M I S S I L E S I N SOHE F A S H I ON S I M I LA R T O T HA T FROH A
T R I DENT SUBMAR I N E , WE, OF C O UR S E , HAVE NO I DE A IF SUCH AN AR RANG EME NT COULD DEVELOP
I N TO A PRAC T I CAL R E A L I TY , B U T AN UNDE RWAT E R HARDENED S I TE COULD E L I M I NAT E MANY OF
T H E PUBL I C PROBLEMS O F L A N D S I TE S ,
F I GU R E 7

DRAFT
f i Ku r � 1. E x d •p l e o f Ob ! � c t i v e s and A t t r i b u t e £
Score � r S i t e X
on A t t r i b u t e a
Obje: c t i ve: a Subob ) � c t l ve & A u r t bu t e s We lKh t
1
1. P r ov i d e a
qu1ck •1reaa 1 1
(apec l f lc w •
Ha x i • i z e a p e e d o f
t un ne l i n & i n rock Jl l"Ope n 1ea ) .1
co-.pl! t e n t r o c k
2 .
a d e p t h a v a i l a b l e and w •
2
H i n 1 • 1 z e a.aunt o f
2
r ub b l e to be angle o f c l i f f a
pene t r a t e d
2.
ll )
S u r v i ve t h e at t a c k H 1 n 1 • 1 z e p ene t r a ·a t h 1 ckneaa o f w •
1 )
t i on o f a u r f a c e c a p rock
Ha x i •i z e rate o f a t h i ckneaa of d r y w •
4 4 •
aho c k a t t e n ua t i o n po r o u s r o c k o r 4
a l l u v i u•
1-'
w
), End u r e wh i le
wa i t i n & w
4. H4 x 1 • i z e e a a e
of .cona t ru c t ion
�. Prov i de l o c a t i on&
acceptable to
t he pub l i c
ll
n • w •
n n
n
Ove r a l l a c o re for S i te X • a u• o f (acore t i .. a we·i gh t ) f o r each c r i t e r ia
F IGURE 8

S I T I NG/CONC E P T A L T E R NAT I VE S
- -
...... ... -
CONf I CURA T l ON 1
HESA
ON E E XAKP L E : G RA N D HESA, CO.
R I DGE S
E I TH E R S I D E O f fO RTY H I L E CANYON , N V . ....

w
ONE E XAKPL E :
- ,
0
0
....
""'
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0
0
0
,.
�
r;
CONF I GURAT I ON 7
P LA I N
ONE E XAMPL E : C O L UHB I A R I VE R BASAL T , WA .
F I GU R E 9

Prol i ferate or add defense overl ay
Pre-set charges
to ,.., ve pl ug ( s )
-and break a rche s
i n backfi l l
I
I
Pa rt i a l l y o r
ca.pl etel y pre-dug
and backfi l l ed
( severa l
al ternati ves for
1 Offset
.....
w
backfi l l )
U'l
�
,...
/ /
/
-
'
/
- -
\
\
(
\
" ""
I Pre-dug .uck poc ket
- -
F I GU R E 10 Pos s ible scheme for vertical egress ( compo s ite o f individual overlays ) .

Prol i fera te or add defense overl ay
Pre-set charges
Pa rti a l l y or
ca.pl etel y pre-dug
and backfi l l ed
( severa l a l ternati ve �)'.
for backfi l l ) �h ....
w
0'1
Pre-set charges to remove pl ugs Ma i n t u n n e l fo r muc k

--and break arches i n backfi l l d i s po s a l --exca v a te
w i th ra i se c l i mbe r
IW\XXXXJ
I
� Pre-dug muck pocket
\ - - /
F I GURE 1 1 Pos s ible s cheme for incl ined egre s s ( compo s ite of individual over lays ) .

Pro l f fe ra
te or add
de fen se ov
er l ay
r&M6&vMMNM19
....
w
Pa rt i a l l y -..I
or ca.p J et
P re -d ug an e ly
d ba ck f i l l
( se ve ra l a ed
l te rna t i ve
fo r ba clc f s
i11 )
\, _, ./ 1
Pre - s et
Pre-dug IIUclc PGc lce t to re.o ve
c ha rge s
pl ugs
f i GUR E 1
2 Pos sib
(compo s i t l e s cheme
e o f ind i fo r h o r i
vi d ual ove z on t a l , o
r lays ) . r n e arly
hori z on t al
, e gre s s

General Discussion of Egress Issues
SPEAKER : I s it a given here that in considering the egre s s alternative s

we wi l l have knowledge of what has happened on the sur face , in other
words the extent and depth o f crate r s ?
DR . LINGER : That i s one of the thing s that ha s been proposed . There

are a number o f rubble zone s and craters at the Nevada Te s t S ite . We
could go out , pre sumably within the next six weeks , two months , five
months , or whatever i s required , and view remote detection scheme s for
finding out j ust where is a rubble zone and what is its extent .
SPEAKER : We wi l l as sume that we will know where when we are planning

direc tion of egre s s ?
DR . LINGER : Not neces sari ly , because w e could only as sume that if what
I j ust outlined proved to be a viable technique , that i s i f we could
re l i ably predict where the crater wa s and--
SPEAKER : I am address ing myself to something e l s e . After the attack

wi l l you know where the --
DR . LINGER : I think what you are saying i s which egres s to come out
because of what happened on the outside , and I don ' t think that you
can really as sume that you wi l l know . I don ' t know .
SPEAKER : Can we as sume that you can talk to the out s ide and they can
talk back ?
DR . LINGER : That is right . I think that is something that you can

a s sume .
SPEAKER : Thi s 7 0 - foot long mi s s i le i s --
DR . LINGER : It is 100 feet long . Diame ter is what you--
138

139
SPEAKER : �t any rate you lay it down hor izontally , and then does i t
f ire o f f or d o you walk it out t o the end o f the mountain and then it
fires o f f ?
DR . LINGER : I t w i l l come out an d erect and f i r e i t s e l f o r i t would

come out and fire . I don ' t think it would fire in the tunne l . It
would have to come to the end .
SPEAKER : How do you walk it out? Are you go ing to lay a rail in thi s
tunne l ?
DR . LINGER : Therein l i e s a prob lem . How doe s one get it out? I don ' t
really know . I am not sure that anybody doe s . Carl will lend some
light to this .
LT . COL . RULE : With the multiple protective she lter system the means
of launche s i s kind of l ike in submar ines . We have a can i ster--a metal
lic cani ster or some form o f hard structure in which the mi s s i le i s in
place . That , in the old concept , would move outs ide o f the she l ter
area and erect up to a vertical pos ition , and then there would be a gas
that would form�e ither steam or a hot gas --to e j ect the mi s s ile from
the cani ster . The mi s s ile would ignite once it was c lear of the cani s
ter , but w e would have t o worry about putting that cani ster o n whe e l s
or transport o f some type in its underground complex , t o g e t through
the egre s s , to break the ground , and then to be able to get to a kind
of near-vertical atti tude and launch .
SPEAKER : Doe s that have a firm foundat ion ? When you get it out , you
have to tip it up , and it ha s got to not tilt?
LT . COL . RULE : You would like to have it stable , yes , sir .
SPEAKER : So all the supports and everything you erect have to be out
side the l imits o f that cani ster and still be capable of support ing the
weight of the cani s te r ?
LT . COL . RULE : That i s correct . You have a tremendous moment arm , you
know , getting from the hor i zontal to the vertical , but that has been
worked up . I t is an eng ineering problem that has been worked out for
the multiple protective she lter system .
SPEAKER : That would have to be done in the rubble zone ?
LT . COL . RULE : You have to get through the rubble zone and then be
able to erect it after you have egres sed .
SPEAKER : Be fore the Russians spot you on the ground .
SPEAKER : Jay , can it then guide i tse l f from either side of the mounta in?
I f you go out e i ther way it takes it from there ; you j ust get i t up in
the air?

140
DR . MERRITT : Conce ivab ly , of course , i f one went through the rubble

zone with some sort of a ligning sys tem the cani ster could be anchored
within that l in ing sys tem . It would not have to actually expose itse l f
o n the surface and erect itself from the rubble zone . It could b e di
rected from the lining and e j e cted by steam or otherwi se .
One other po int . Thi s is not my field , but I have been told by those
in mis s ile des ign that the interstage s and the pres sure s impl ied by hot
launch within a tunne l are such that you don ' t want to try to tackle
that problem . You have to can i sterize the mi s s i le such that it is a
cold launch up to some point and then hot launch outs ide of that envi
ronment .
DR . LINGER : Good que s tion . As Colonel Rule said , the MX is des i9ned
to come out , erect itself , co ld launch , and then fire .
SPEAKER : I had a que stion on the Me sa concept . You know everything

seems to be the attenuation of the tunne l s of the central contro l system
for a l l of thi s underground , based on number s we wi l l use l ike one di
rect hit . But i f you have a Mesa system wi th f ive or six tunne l s then
thi s whole thing has to be able to withstand--what? --half a dozen direct
or indirect hits over a two-day period?
DR . LINGER : I would go back to Dr . Sevin ' s chart which showed the depth
to which you had to go to survive , was it hal f a ki lobar or one ki lobar ?
Did you see at the bottom what he had for the threat? Did he have 800
megaton s which would have to be de l ivered? You would have to de l iver
tho se in packages and have them all go off at the same time .
SPEAKER : Is there any return , e ither repeatedly hitting the same place?
DR . LINGER : The Co lone l j ust mentioned that , and i t may apply to what
you are asking : whether or not somebody would keep repeatedly hitting
the rubble zone to try to dig you out and�
SPEAKER : No , that is not my ques t ion . We saw the exper iments of hal f
a ki lobar from one s ide , and what I am thinking of i s that those tun
ne l s may have to withstand one or two blasts from dif ferent directions
over a period of time ?
DR . LINGE R : Yes , and a rather large weapon yield altogether .
SPEAKER : It seems that the chamber to tilt thi s thing down or turn it
around i s going to be crucial . You would have to bu ild that with
skil led miner s before the shooting starts because you are j ust going to
have so ldiers in there to do the rest of i t .
DR . LINGER : This would be complete in itse l f . That i s , th is sys tem

would be complete with the neces sary radius and size to maneuver the
mi s s i le for each of the egre s s and each of the maintenance and operation

141
locations . As each sect ion i s completed , it would be complete in it

self .
SPEAKER : A variation of Wayne ' s que stion this morning about what are
the Rus sians doing . On the bas i s of a feat be ing better than a theory ,
the Swi s s and the Swedish have long been involved in the psychology of
burying everything and going deeper . Do we have knowledge or is that
not even worth looking at or is that none of our bus ine s s at all?
DR . LINGER : I don ' t think we could discuss it at thi s secur i ty leve l .

All I can say is Dick Robbins is coming in tomorrow and j ust ask him
about his two machine s whi ch are over there . Five years ago he gave
them the plans for hi s machine , and they went r ight back home and bui l t
one , and they have not g o t one o f their machines t o work yet . So , any
way , I don ' t know what they are doing . All I know i s I think they have
got bigger problems than we do .
SPEAKER : I think we are a l l as suming something here that has not been
said so far , and that is that the people in the tunnel wi l l not be deaf
ened so they wi l l b e unable t o hear orders and that they won ' t be in
j ured by the shock . Is that a viable as sumption?
DR . LINGER : Yes , and one thing that Joe LaComb said when he showed his
movie was that the tunnel survived , but it ind icated that i t would o f
necessity have t o b e furthe r protected ins ide f o r personne l and equip
ment , and I think he made that statement , and I think that is a very
good s tatement .
SPEAKER : I am concerned about the no ise leve l s as we l l as the physical

inj ury .
DR . LINGER : I am sure that the no ise leve l problem has got to be ad
dre s sed .
SPEAKER : I have one other que st ion somewhat in that same l ine . There
was some discuss ion about heat di s s ipat ion at certain depths after the
blast , but I heard nothing here about radiation when you remove thi s
rubble . What occurs a t that point?
DR . LINGER : I think the radiat ion problem , because o f the automation

of the mi s s i le as it come s out and erects and cold launche s , is not a
problem . I mean it is a so lvable problem . I think it is a so lved prob
lem .
SPEAKER : Then those people that remove the rubble are expendable , right ?
DR . LINGER : No . That i s one reason why I think that a l l of the discus

s ion has focused on TBMs , you know , that it i s as sume d that egre s s or
mining out would be as automated a s possible .

142
MR . LA COMB : I don ' t be lieve the radiat ion will b e a r e a l problem be
cause i t wou ld s imply be , even i f we had a hori zontal surface , i t would
be tied up mostly in blast funne l s , whi ch might be two , three , to four
feet thick that you could handle by shielding it out . I don ' t think i t
would b e a s ign ificant problem .
SPEAKER : You still have to dispose of it . You would be haul ing your
muck or your radiation muck down into the heart of the system .
DR . LINGER : You mean the egres s ? You are making an assumption that
you are going to haul the muck back down and not drop it in a pit .
SPEAKER : Even i f you drop it in the pit , it wi l l go into the pit but
it is still go ing down into the mountain .
DR . LINGER : Yes , but I thi nk that i s after the attack .
SPEAKER : The mi s s i le wi l l egre s s , erect , and fire o f f . You know you

are going to have to have a hardened s l ab there fore to do that . Then
the egre s s take s place , you are going to have a lot of muck lying around
on that s l ab , too . You may not be able to do it wi thout some actual man
power out there to fac i l i tate actual f i ring . Once it come s out you have
some of the radioac tive muck that i s bound to come back ins ide or fall
around it . I t wi l l get back into the hole i t came out o f .
DR . LINGER : As Joe LaComb said , I don ' t think the activity in that
material that is going to come back down i s go ing to be that hazardous ,
and I think that that is one of the dr ivers in try i ng to get the egre s s
out at a s lope where it can f a l l away o n the outs ide , where you don ' t
have to dig through what i s otherwise depo sited broken rubble . One of
the advantages o f the hor i zontal or near-hor i zonta l egre s s out through
a rock s lope is the fact that you won ' t have this rubble lying there to
worry about handl ing manually .
SPEAKER : The problems of egress due to rubble , radiat ion , and other
thing s that have been c i ted lead me to harbor the idea that the storage
o f a s ingle mi s s i le should be in a corkscrew , convo luted type of open
ing where you could have i t on rail and o f a diameter so that the mi s
s i le could b e lowered t o whatever point you want and a multip l i c i ty o f
opening s going out s o that i f one gets rubblized you have got four or
f ive other s .
DR . LINGER : That i s exac tly the point of thi s kind o f system , that the
egre s s can be chosen . You mightn ' t know exactly what the s i tuation was
out s ide at this egres s point but you would have an opportunity to go out
through multiple egre s s points , a l l of which would be unknown to the en
emy and all of which would be far enough apart so that in fact it would
be impo s s ible for him to cover that entire area with the kind o f rubble
that we are worried about .

143
SPEAKER : It would seem to me that the mi l itary had better make it po l

i c y that the se guys are con stantly digg ing tunne l s , because even with
trained tunne lmen we cannot a lways achieve the kind s of rate s that the se
policies are -- so they had j ust better dig holes in that mountain all the
t ime .
DR . LINGER : Actual ly what you are saying , and what I am sure a l l the
mining contractors like Traylor will reemphasize , is that once you get
them go ing you might as we l l keep them go ing because that is when you
get your production . I think that a point that should be made is that
s tarting with a relatively sma l l system and constant ly expanding i s
ideal for getting the ultimate system you want and absolute ly neces sary
for the operational capacity of the machine and men . That is what you
are saying . You have got to keep them going to keep them tuned to that .
SPEAKER : They have got to know how to repair that TBM . They have got
to know a l l thi s stuf f .
DR . LINGER : That i s a damn good point , and it is a point that should

be made because what it says is don ' t bui ld the whole thing and have
the machine s s itt ing down there . Keep bui lding it . Those are the kind s
o f point s , I think , that are important .
SPEAKER : I have heard comme nts about retaining communications , through

rock communications , and so forth . Have any thoughts been given at thi s
point t o ma intaining venti lat ion ? I f the main tunne l is blasted shut--
DR . LINGER : Yes , you have got a problem . You don ' t want to mine in the
wet area and yet on the other hand you are go ing to have to have water ,
and you are going to have to have some heat d i s s ipat ion med ium . Obvious
ly water wou ld be the be st . So , you are between a rock and a hard spot ,
and the best s i ting i s probably that that in fact has perched aquifers
that do replenish themse lve s and can be used as heat sink s , and that has
got to be a driver in the siting .
SPEAKER : Why i s it we have to leave so much mater ial between the point
of egres s and where the mi s s i le is go ing to be if we are go ing to have
to do some sort of mining ? I sn ' t it po s s ible to have some sort of me
chanical stopper system so that one of them might be hit and damaged ,
but there would be so many hor izonta l points of egres s that you have
lots of options to fol low? What you are really trying to do i s prevent
damage to the entire sys tem by a hit on one of the se points of hori zon
tal egre s s , and you have other options open for f iring mi s s i le s .
DR . L INGER : So you have a lot of potent ial egre sses a l l of which go

closer to the face than you would go for secured hardne s s , some o f
which you may get wiped out , and that i s a n alternative , and that i s an
alternative I am sure that will be cons idered , because it gives you the
multiple egre s s e s and it g ive s you a quicker out , than if you are at
2 , 0 00 feet to bore out .

144
SPEAKER : I t , also , cut s down on a lot o f the mining that might be re
qui red in c ircumstances like that .
DR . LINGER : Ye s , but they cannot go c lose enough so that the Rus s i ans
can ident ify where they are .
SPEAKER : But that is a parame ter of the system , according to some o f

the people I heard talk , that w e have t o as sume that they know every
thing about the sys tem to start with .
DR . LINGER : That I think was stated at the onset . Whether they would
know the exact location o f the egre s s , these bl ind egre s se s , I don ' t
think that was intended to cover that . I am not sure .
SPEAKER : Could we get clarifi cat ion of that? It can affect the who le
concept .
DR . LINGER : The egre s s won ' t go to the surface . They would go some dis
tance from the surface , and in the discus s ions I have been in on , it i s
as sumed that i n fact they wi l l not know where those egre sses are . They
may know where the ingre s s i s , you know , where you are taking things in .
They will certainly know where you are br inging the muck out be cause
there are go i ng to have to be multiple egre s s e s for the muck , but they
probably would not know . I think you could assume they would not know .
SPEAKER : I think it is fair to comment that the multiple-aim-po int con

cept of digging the tunne l s near the surface or all the way out , regard
l e s s i f you try to harden them or put blast doors or something to shut
them up , has been shown to be rea l ly not the r ight way to go because
for every tunnel we dig all they have to do is add one more MIRV and it
becomes cheaper for them to add a MIRV than for us to dig a tunne l , and
that has been the downfall o f the current she lter program in the pa s t .
That i s why we tried to go to a totally benign environment unt i l we have
to start showing our hand and at the same t ime protect ourselves .
DR . LINGER : And to translate -- " No , they won ' t know where those egre s se s
are . "
SPEAKER : I suggest that one way in which you can pre serve the location
a! uncerta inty of the egre s s s tub tunne l s , if you don ' t take them a l l
the way t o surface , i s s imply t o set them i n random directions wi thout
any survey work ever being done .
DR . LINGER :From some of the tunne l s I have been in I am not sure even
if you told them that there was a survey and gave it to them that they
would know where they were coming out .

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Design and Construction of Deep Underground Basing

FIND RELATED TITLES

National Research Council 1982. Design and Construction of Deep Underground

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�esign and Construction

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Air force Deep Basing Program

COL. STANLEY D. BERRY

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I f I am trying to k i l l Washington , D . C . , and I put a warhead over Balti­

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talking about 100 or 2 0 0 MXs . So , even i f we get MX based as we desire ,

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1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977

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Basing Alternatives and Technical Background

Gentlemen , I want to expres s appreciation on the part of the De fense

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he may look upon i t a s a target requiring at least 800 megatons to en­

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Deep Basing .,Evolution"

[Hard Rock Tunnels !

• Tunnels in auitable geology

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Geology vs. Required Depth

Hard Rock: Porous Rock: Layered:

Conservative (Sure Safe) design depth for 0.6

) 800 Megaton surface burst required for sure kill of 0.6

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Required Technology Exists

Requirement Experience Requirement Experience

Major underground Mines: subways:

Control of toxic Mines; submarine•; Through-earth Mine rescue: UGT

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Nuclear Weapons Effects and Results of Previous Tests

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a yield of 1 2 . 5 k i lotons; Pile Dr iver , 59 to 61 ki lotons in 1966; and

I f I am trying to k i l l Washington , D . C . , and I put a warhead over Balti

he may look upon i t a s a target requiring at least 800 megatons to en

DR . MERRITT : The unl ined tunnel there i s a tuf f at N tunne l , approxi

F I GU R E 1 ( 5 . 34a ) Destroyed industr i a l area showing smoke

F I GU R E 1 ( 5 . 34b ) A c ircular , 6 0 feet high , reinforced

then , perhaps denial of surveillance or at least interference with post