PT&T v.

NLRC
G.R. No. 118978, 23 May 1997

Lomosad, Frillin M.

FACTS:

PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman
specifically as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited
for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods. De
Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee. She indicated in the
portion of the job application form under civil status that she was single although she had
contracted marriage a few months earlier.

When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor sent de Guzman a
memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy including a reminder about the
company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from
the company and Labor Arbiter handed down a decision declaring that petitioner illegally
dismissed de Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee. It was
apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in
violation of company policies.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate
the services of an employee.

RULING:

No. Private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could
not be properly characterized as in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did
mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. Thus, could not
be a ground to terminate her services.

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that
company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to
their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination
or those provided by law.

PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our
labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with
PT&T were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married women are
not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts
of dishonesty.

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on
the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection
with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a
woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an
intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very
essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately,
family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect,
disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land
not only for order but also imperatively required. However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace
did commit an act of dishonesty, which should be sanctioned and therefore agreed with the
NLRC’s decision that the dishonesty warranted temporary suspension of Grace from work.

Estrada v. Escritur
A.M. P-02- 1651, 4 August 2003

Malate, Desmarc G.

FACTS:

Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro
Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253,
RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living
with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son.
Escritor’s husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into
the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada
is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor,
Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain
employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity
with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991
a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the congregation. Such
declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize
their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has
been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures
for executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapio’s in
Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central
Office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of “gross and
immoral conduct” and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.
RULING:

No. Given that the state lacked compelling state interest to overthrow the freedom clause.

Art 32 of the Civil Code provides that “Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter
for damages” and one of the rights as provided by part 1 of this article states “Freedom of
Religion”. The freedom clause as expressly given by this article, gives every person the right
to freely exercise his/her religion which is protected by the state. As provided by this case,
Jehova’s Witness allowed the cohabitation of a man which is still married but separated as a
fact and a woman which was left by her husband which is capacitated to marry again. Thus,
this unique case yielded many opinions and at the end, still upheld the freedom of religion
and dismissed the petition.

The case was REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is
ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the
sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present
evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and
practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30)
days from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.

As previously discussed, our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise
Clause. 171 Thus, in arguing that respondent should be held administratively liable as the
arrangement she had was "illegal per se because, by universally recognized standards, it is
inherently or by its very nature bad, improper, immoral and contrary to good conscience,"172
the Solicitor General failed to appreciate that benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.

Finally, even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state,
i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible
on religious liberties.174 Again, the Solicitor General utterly failed to prove this element of
the test. Other than the two documents offered as cited above which established the
sincerity of respondent’s religious belief and the fact that the agreement was an internal
arrangement within respondent’s congregation, no iota of evidence was offered. In fact, the
records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to procure any such evidence to show that the
means the state adopted in pursuing this compelling interest is the least restrictive to
respondent’s religious freedom.

Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent
Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for
exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court
recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious
freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom,
however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state
interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric
of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state
interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant administrative complaint is dismissed.
Goitia v. Campos-Rueda
G.R. No. 11263, 2 November 1916

Nataa, Vera L.

FACTS:

Eloisa Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were legally married in Manila and thereafter lived
together for about a month before petitioner returned to her parent’s home because of the
following reasons: (1) Defendant demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on
her genitals; (2) Defendant made other lewd demands; and (3) Defendant maltreated
petitioner by word and by deed on the ground that the latter refused to do any of defendant’s
demands other than legal and valid cohabitation.

Petitioner filed an action against her husband for support outside their conjugal domicile. The
trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband
to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting
her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.

RULING:

Yes. Campos Rueda was held liable to support his wife. The law provides that the husband,
who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed
pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this option given by
law is NOT absolute.

This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of
marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of
which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it
by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A
judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a
penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for
the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from
necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as where
the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting
her.

In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd
designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the
husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home. The pro tanto
separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public
policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a
stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is
tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does
NOT in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife
in the situation of a feme sole.

Balogbog v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 83598, 7 March 1997

Olasiman, Jason S.
FACTS:

Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against their
Aunt Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their grandparents’ estate
at the Court of First Instance of Cebu City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and
Gaudioso appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They
have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their older brother who died in 1935.
Ramoncito and Generoso was claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by
Catalina Ubas and that, as such they were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of
their grandparents. However, Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their
brother has 2 sons and that he was married. They started to question the validity of the
marriage between their brother Gavino and Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself admitted
during a police investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is
the son of his elder brother Gavino.

In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parent’s marriage,
they presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and
Matias Pogoy who both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife
and that they have three children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a “receipt”
presumably the marriage certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family
residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to
the effect that the office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina which
was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as
well.

Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have
been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was
the law in force at the time of the alleged marriage was celebrated.

Art. 53 provides that “marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven
only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof
have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which
case any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession by parents of the status of
husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their
children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gavino and Catalina’s marriage is valid.

RULING:

Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering
Gavino and Catalina’s marriage as valid and thus entitles Ramonito and Generoso one third
of their grandparents’ estate.

The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take
effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the
extension of that code of this country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force.
Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must
be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of
the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules of evidence.
Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting
themselves as husband and wife are legally married.

Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it

would not mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence may be presented where
in this case evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove
the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that they have three children, one of whom,
Petronilo, died at the age of six and that they are recognized by Gavino’s family and by the
public as the legitimate children of Gavino.

Cosca v. Palaypayon
A.M. No. MTJ-92- 721, 30 September 1994

Santiago, Prince Dave C.

FACTS:

The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta
(Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server).
Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-
Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.

Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a
marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying the
marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo &
Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio
Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the
marriage contracts of the following couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In
addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be
submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony.

Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the
Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave
strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract
and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the
problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license
and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil registrar.
The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their
marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. It was alleged that
copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged
marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were
not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage
license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the
requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests
which he again did not sign the marriage contract.

An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.

RULING:

No. Bocaya & Besmonte’s marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with
the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs
taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya
declared that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization and
bring with them their marriage license. They already started living together as husband and
wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge explained that
it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However, considering that
there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage
certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated.

Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that “in the absence of any of the essential
or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the
formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.

On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between
Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage
license was dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit
that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already.
However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and
7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years already before they got
married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years
old when they started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been
aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have
executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement.
Alcantara v. Alcantara
G.R. No. 167746, 28 August 2007

Tambolero, Daisy Mae O.

FACTS:

Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent Rosita
A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the
required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a
person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged
their wedding before a certain priest. They got married on the same day. They went through
another marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage
was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged
marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a
sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply
for a license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after
due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil
Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.

Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a marriage
license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of
Carmona, Cavite. Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children. Petitioner only
filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. After hearing,
the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an absence of marriage license that would render the marriage
between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?

RULING:

No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested.

To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that
the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the
very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage
license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner
and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also
issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in
that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely
Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact
issued to the parties herein. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular
conduct of official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage
license to impugn the validity of his marriage.

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims
that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that
there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a
marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting
parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the
completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not
affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage
does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- which they appeared before a “fixer” who arranged
everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain priest -- will not
strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a
marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary.
Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage
license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All solemnizing officer
needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be
presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain
whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.

Article 53 of the Civil Code which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the
parties’ states:

Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his
marriage since all the elements in Article 53 are present in the case at bar.

Navarro v. Domagtoy
A.M. No. MTJ-96- 1088, 19 July 1996

Acopiado, Ariel M.

FACTS:

Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two
specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in office and ignorance of the law.

It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on
September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with
Ida Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal
home in Bukidnon and has not returned and been heard for almost seven years. The said
judge likewise solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario
outside his court’s jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but
he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50
km away.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.

RULING:

In the first allegation, Remarriage of Gaspar Tagadan is void.

The law provides that: “A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.”; “For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse”

Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Penaranda. Whether wittingly, or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint
affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a
bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.

The second marriage is also void.

The law provides that marriage may be solemnized by an incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court's jurisdiction. Additionally Art. 8 of the Family Code provides that: “Marriages
shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church,
chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case
may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or
in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request
the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house
or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect."
In as much as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, he was also not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Dapa, Surigao del
Norte. By citing the aforementioned laws and its exceptions therein as grounds for the
exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law

Because of the respondent’s failure to apply the legal principles applicable in these cases,
the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law because of this he is
suspended for a period of six months.
Aranas v. Judge Occiano
A.M. No. MTJ-02- 1309, 11 April 2002

Aguila-Granada, Cherrie Mae E.

FACTS:

Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge Occiano with gross ignorance
of the law. Occiano is the presiding judge in Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, he
solemnized the marriage of Aranes and DominadorOrobia on February 17, 2000 at the
couple’s residence in Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction and
without the requisite of marriage license.

It appeared in the records that petitioner and Orobia filed their application of marriage
license on January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will be issued on January 17, 2000 but
neither of them claimed it. In addition, no record also appeared with the Office of the Civil
Registrar General for the alleged marriage.

Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents and first
refused to conduct the marriage and advised them to reset the date considering the absence
of the marriage license. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of
visitors and fear that the postponement of the wedding might aggravate the physical
condition of Orobia who just suffered from stroke, he solemnized the marriage on the
assurance of the couple that they will provide the license that same afternoon. Occiano
denies that he told the couple that their marriage is valid.

ISSUE:

Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage
license and conducting it outside his territorial jurisdiction.

RULING:

Yes. The Court held that Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued
marriage license and conducting it outside his territorial jurisdiction. The territorial jurisdiction
of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur.

Article 7 of the Family Code provides that marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; (2) Any priest, rabbi, imam,
or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and
registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority
granted by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting
parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect; (3) Any ship captain or
airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31; (4) Any military commander of a unit
to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military operation,
likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32; (5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-
consul in the case provided in Article 10.

Previous jurisprudence (Navarro v. Domagtoy) established that a priest who is

commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so
only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or
a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages,
regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However,
judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability.

His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur
therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not
amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.

Laxamana v. Baltazar
G.R. No. L-5955, 19 September 1952

Bato, Neah Hope L.

FACTS:

In July 1952 the mayor of Sexmoan, Pampanga, was suspended. The vice-mayor Jose T.
Salazar, assumed office as mayor by virtue of section 2195 of the Revised Administrative
Code. However, the provincial governor, acting under section 21 (a) of the Revised Election
Code (R.A. 180), with the consent of the provincial board appointed Jose L. Laxamana, as
mayor of Sexmoan, who immediately took the corresponding official oath.

Thus, this quo warranto proceeding based solely on the petitioner's proposition that the
section first mentioned has been repealed by the subsequent provision of the Revised
Election Code.

ISSUE:

Whether this petition should be granted, and Laxamana declared the lawful mayor of
Sexmoan.

RULING:
No. In fact even after the Revised Election Code was enacted, the Department of the Interior
and the office of executive Secretary who are charged with the supervision of provincial and
municipal governments have "consistently held that in case of the suspension or other
temporary disability of the mayor, the vice-mayor shall, by operation of law, assume the
office of the mayor, and if the vice-mayor is not available, the said office shall be discharged
by the first councilor."

By virtue of section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code to wit: “Temporary disability of
the mayor. Upon the occasion of the absence, suspension, or other temporary disability of
the Mayor, his duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor, or if there be no Vice-Mayor, by
the councilor who at the last general election received the highest number of votes.”

This quo warranto petition is dismissed with costs. So ordered.

Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete

G.R. No. L-40098, 29 August 1975

Buenafe, Aileen B.

FACTS:

Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who
was a partner in the commercial partnership, glory commercial company with Antonio Lim
Tanhu and Alfonso Ng Sua’’. Defendants Antonio Lim Tan Hu, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua,
Lim Teck Chuan, and Eng Chong Leonardo, through fraud and conspiracy, took actual and
active management of the partnership and although tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan was the
manager of glory commercial company, defendants managed to use the funds of the
partnership to purchase lands and building in the cities of Cebu, Lapu-Lapu, Mandaue, and
the municipalities of Talisay and Minglanilla.

She alleged in her complaint that at the time of death of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, the
defendants, without liquidation, continued the business of glory commercial company, by
purportedly organizing a corporation known as the glory commercial company, incorporated
and sometime in the month of November, 1967, defendants, particularly Antonio Lim Tan
Hu, by means of fraud deceit, and misrepresentations did then and there , induce and
convince her to execute a quitclaim of all her rights and interests, in the assets of the
partnership of glory commercial company.

Thereafter, in the year 1968-69, the defendants who had earlier promised to liquidate the
aforesaid properties and assets in favor, among others of plaintiff and until the middle of the
year 1970 when the plaintiff formally demanded from the defendants the accounting of real
and personal properties of glory commercial company, defendants refused and stated that
they would not give the share of the plaintiff.

ISSUE:

Whether Tan Put has right over the liquidated properties of the partnership.
RULING:

Tan has a right over the liquidated properties of partnership. The supreme court hold that
there is no alternative but to hold that plaintiff Tan Put’s allegation that she is the widow of
Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan has not been satisfactorily established and that, on the contrary,
the evidence on record convincingly shows that her relation with said deceased was that of
common-law wife. Moreover, the Supreme Court said that the lower courts committed an
error by awarding 1/3 of the partnership properties to Tan because there has been no
liquidation proceedings yet. And if there has not been any liquidation of the partnership, the
only rights plaintiff could have would be to what might result after much liquidation to belong
to the deceased partner (her alleged husband) and before this is finished, it is impossible to
determine, what rights or interest, if any the deceased had. In other words no specific
amounts or properties may be adjudicated to the heir or legal representative of the deceased
partner without the liquidation being first terminated.

Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that they take
each other as husband and wife “shall be set forth in an instrument” signed by the parties as
well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary
evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract. While a
marriage may also be proved by other competent evidence, the absence of the contract
must first be satisfactory explained. Surely, the certification of the person who allegedly
solemnized a marriage is not admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of
the contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to the
court.

In the case at bar, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Philippine
Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent evidence, there being
absolutely no showing as to unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the
authenticity of the signature of said certifies, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant
provincial fiscal not being authorized by law, since it is not part of the functions of his office.
Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay. As regards the
testimony of the plaintiff herself on the same point and that of her witness Antonio Nuñez,
there can be no question that they are both self-serving and of very little evidently value, it
having been disclosed at the trial that plaintiff has already assigned all her rights in this case
to said Nuñez, thereby making him the real party in interest here and, therefore, naturally as
biased as herself. Besides, in the portion of the testimony of Nuñez copied in Annex C of
petitioner’s memorandum, it appears admitted that he was born only on March 25, 1942,
which means that he was less than eight years old at the supposed time of the alleged
marriage. If for this reason alone, it is extremely doubtful if he could have sufficiently aware
of such event as to be competent to testify about it.

Vda. De Chua v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-40098, 29 August 1975

Caipang, Lea A.
FACTS:

Roberto Lim Chua, during his lifetime, lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A.
Vallejo from 1970-1981. The couple had two illegitimate children, Roberto Rafson Alonzo
and Rudyard Pride Alonzo, all surnamed Chua. Roberto died intestate in Davao City on May
28, 1992. Vallejo filed on July 2, 1992 with RTC-Cotabato a petition for declaration of
guardianship of the two child and their properties worth P5,000,000.00.

Antonietta Garcia Vda De Chua, the petitioner, filed a motion alleging that she was the true
wife of Roberto. However, according to Vallejo, she is not the surviving spouse of the latter
but a pretender to the estate since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman
and died a bachelor.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner is indeed the true wife of Roberto Chua.

RULING:

The court ruled that petitioner was not able to prove her status as wife of the deceased. She
could not produce the original copy or authenticated copy of their marriage certificate.
Furthermore, a certification from the Local Civil Registrar was presented that no such
marriage contract between petitioner and Roberto Chua was ever registered with them,
attested by Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the alleged
marriage. The evidences presented by the Petitioner was not enough to convince the court
that she is indeed the lawful wife of Roberto Lim Chua.

Hence, it is clear that petitioner failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the
lawful wife of the deceased. According to the court the best evidenceis a valid marriage
contract which she failed to produce.

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro

G.R. No. 116835, 5 March 1998

Capin, Mary Jade L.

FACTS:

On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil
ceremony without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally
attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage,
including the procurement of the marriage license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states
that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June
24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.

The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife until when Castro
discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their
cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October
19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of
Cardenas and was brought to US. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in
order her marital status before leaving for the States. She filed a petition in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F.
Cardenas. As ground therefor that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the
solemnization of their marriage.

As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig,
Metro Manila that their marriage license cannot be located and does not appear in the
records. Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June
24, 1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She
affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.

The trial court denied the petition. Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to
respondent appellate court. The CA reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the
marriage null and void. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent
are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig
prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.

RULING:

Yes. The documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro
sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license. The court affirmed the
decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied by any
circumstances of suspicion sufficiently proves that the office did not issue a marriage license
to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any
other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of
her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he
chose to ignore.

At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing
marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the
essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void
ab initio.

As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty,
inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data. The certification of "due search and inability to find"
issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that
his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.

Republic v. Iyoy
G.R. No. 152577, 21 September 2005

Denura, Lady Rubyge A.

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals. CrasusIyoy
was married to FelyIyoy in 1961 and this marriage gave birth to five children. FelyIyoy
eventually left for the States to provide for their family in 1984 and in lessthan a year sent
Crasus documents to sign with regard to a divorce that she applied for. Crasus eventually
found out that Fely married Stephen Micklus in 1985 and their relationship has conceived of
a child. Crasus eventually questioned the validity of Fely’s subsequent marriage. The Court
of Appeals in deciding this case sided with Fely.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a divorce decree acquired by a Filipino from the United States is valid and
recognized in the Philippines.

RULING:

The court decided in the negative and reversed the Appellate Court’s decision. Basing from
the facts, Fely only became a citizen in 1988 and acquired the divorce in 1984, marrying
Micklus a year after. This means that paragraph two of Article 26 cannot be applied in such a
way that, Fely is not yet considered an alien at the time the divorce was acquired and
therefore she does not have the capacity to remarry and the marriage is still considered as
subsisting. The Civil Code also provides that Filipino Citizen, with regard to family laws and
status are governed by Philippine laws regardless of where they are. Fely, being a Filipino
Citizen then, is not permitted by our laws to acquire a divorce decree since such is not
recognized in the Philippines.

“Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

“WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY

CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY
THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO
SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.”
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
(9a)

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court
shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.

Quita v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 124862, 22 December 1998

Eguia, Paula Bianca B.

FACTS:

Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May
1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their
relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter
she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a
divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration
concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent
Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse
of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed
Padlan, named in the petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition.
The RTC expressed that the marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the
death of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo
was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to
petitioner. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

ISSUE:

Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?

RULING:

If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. No dispute exists either as to
the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs
that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them
as heirs of Arturo Padlan; nor as to their respective hereditary shares. Arturo was a Filipino
and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. The
implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from
Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her
citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the
aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either
supporting or opposing the evidence.

The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to
resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and
were married in the Philippines." It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. The question to be
determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from
Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved
by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of
petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered
void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a
surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate
relationship.

The petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of
the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision
holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The
Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited
to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

Republic v. Orbecido
G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005

Fernandez, Aisha Mie Faith M.

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III, respondent married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City and had 2 children. The wife went to the
United States to work. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen, obtained a divorce decree and married another man.

Orbecido filed a petition for authority to remarry under the Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the lower court granted the same. The
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a divorce decree acquired by a Filipino from the United States is valid and
recognized in the Philippines

RULING:
Yes, the respondent can remarry. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. The reckoning point
is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.

However, in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted as to the claim of
Orbecide that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce
decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry.
Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor. Thus, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is
GRANTED.

Bayot v. CA &Vicenta Bayot

G.R. No.155635, 7 November 2008

Gahuman, Kristine Camille B.

FACTS:

On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in
Muntinlupa. They had a child name Alix, born in November 27, 1982 in California.

In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic, which
resulted to judgment ordering the dissolution of the marriage and the distribution of conjugal
properties

After obtaining a Department of Justice affirmation of her Filipino citizenship, she then filed a
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
incapacity, seeking for distribution of conjugal properties and support.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action
and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.

RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss but CA reversed lower court’s decision. According
to the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss, since the marriage
between the spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree was granted since
Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied for the decree.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.
RULING:

Yes, the divorce is valid.

Article 26 (2) of the Civil Code states that: “Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and
remains to be one, being born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which
follows the principle of jus soli granting American citizenship to those who are born there.
She was, and still may be, a holder of American passport. She had consistently professed,
asserted and represented herself as an American citizen, as shown in her marriage
certificate, in Alix's birth certificate, when she secured divorce in Dominican Republic.

Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of
America, a country which allows divorce. The fact that Rebecca may have been duly
recognized as a Filipino citizen by affirmation of the DOJ Secretary does not invalidate the
foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in 1996. In determining whether
or not a divorce is secured abroad would come within the jurisdiction of the country's policy
against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a
valid divorce is obtained.

Roehr v. Rodriguez
G.R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003

Granada, Immanuel Y.

FACTS:

Wife Rodriguez filed for declaration of nullity of marriage, which was subsequently
moved for dismissal by husband Roehr, a German national. Pending decision, the husband
obtained a decree of divorce from a German Court, providing for (1) the dissolution of their
marriage and (2) the grant of parental custody of the children to Roehr.

Thereafter, wife moved for partial reconsideration with a prayer that the case proceed
for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the
properties between the Roehr and Rodriguez. Motion was granted and thus challenged by
Roehr.

ISSUE:

W/N there is nothing left to be tackled by the Court since there are no conjugal
properties alleged in the annulment and the divorce decree provides for the finality of the
custody of children.

RULING:
No. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and
support of the children, must be determined by our courts. The Court held that before our
courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody
to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment
had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of
the Rules of Court.

Pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Moreover, Section 50 of the Rules of Court states that the effect of a judgment of a tribunal
of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to
the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the
judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

Since the proceedings in the German court were summary, the wife was not given
opportunity to challenge said judgment. Therefore, the divorce decree did not provide for the
finality of the custody of children.

Cang v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 105308, 25 September 1998

Guige, Marife G.

San Luis v. San Luis

G.R. No. 133743, 6 February 2007

Lagare, Liezel O.

FACTS:

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo),
who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo
contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out
of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On
August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with
whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, and then surnamed Sagalongos, with
whom he had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of
their marriage up to his death.

Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146.

Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper
venue and failure to state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying the
two motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for
letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been
filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without
legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
the orders of the trial court, and, hence, the case before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration

RULING:

Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A.,
then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This
provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides
that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co- ownership, it is
not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proven.

Morover, the Supreme Court found that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition
for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as
his co- owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its
October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed.
It was also REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas
G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010

Lim, Gretchen Rina A.

FACTS:

Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization and was married to the respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on the
part of his wife. He went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted.

Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, the petitioner went to the Pasig Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and the respondent’s
marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National
Statistic’s Office informed the petitioner that the marriage between him and the respondent
still subsists under the Philippine Law and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular
No. 4, Series of 1982.

Accordingly, the petitioner subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial
recognition of foreign divorce but was subsequently denied since he is not the proper party
and according to Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the
right to petition for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

RULING:

No, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a
proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding,
would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as
a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy
against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the
marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Ninal v. Bayadog
G.R. No. 133778, 14 March 2000

Lomosad, Frillin M.

FACTS:

Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3
children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito
to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of
EngraceNinal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without
any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at
least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on
February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage
license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who
could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?

2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of
Pepito’s marriage after his death?
RULING:

1. The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. The two
marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
(FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage
under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio.
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage
of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband
and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.

In this case, they cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed
that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit,
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had
started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their
five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his
marriage to Norma is still void.
2. No. Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial
decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though
no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction. Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns
the conferring of legal rights upon the parties is as though no marriage had ever taken place.
And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any
civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both
the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it
will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage
which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime
of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made
good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter
into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to
that effect.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heir ship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.

Manzano v. Sanchez
A.M. No. MTJ-00- 1329, 8 March 2001

Malate, Desmarc G.

FACTS:

Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization. He was married to the respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on the part
of his wife. He went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted.
Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, he registered the divorce decree in the Civil
Registry Office and was informed that the foreign decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC where respondent failed to submit any
response. The RTC denied the petition on the basis that the petitioner lacked locus standi.
Thus, this case was filed before the Court.

ISSUE:

WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition a court
of this jurisdiction from the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
RULING:

No.Not all of the requirements are met by the couple making the said marriage null and void.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before
any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state
under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no
legal impediment to the marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites
must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time
of marriage;

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five
years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. Making the decision of the
solemnizing officer questionable.

Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry
each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their
marriage contract that they are both “separated” is an impediment that would make their
subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with
another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

Mariategui v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 57062, 24 January 1992
Nataa, Vera L.

FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his
lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children
with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del
Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the
other hand had a son. On the other hand, Lupo’s second wife is Flaviana Montellano where
they had a daughter. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and
had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got
married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as
husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.

Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and
was subjected to a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration
of the lot was issued. The siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of
the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated
Dec. 1967.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid.

RULING:

Yes. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage,
no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its
validity are present.

Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the
following rationale that the basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to that case, to be in fact married.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between
Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as
husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful
wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that
things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of
life.

Hence, Felipa’s children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.

Republic v. Dayot
G.R. No. 175581, 28 March 2008
Olasiman, Jason S.

FACTS:

Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of
a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least
5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They
were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on
June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office
of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa
was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn
affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.

RULING:

CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the
time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started
living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their
marriage on November 1986. Jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year
common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back
from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been
for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the
marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken. Findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit
relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed
and attested to by the parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void ab
initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to
impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

Domingo v. Court of Appeals

GR No. 104818, 17 September 1993

Santiago, Prince Dave C.

FACTS:
Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration
of nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been
previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage
when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from
Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with
another woman and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by
Roberto. The latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of
such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the
declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide
a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of
remarriage.

RULING:

The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage.
However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in
good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the
said person is freed from being charged with bigamy.

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for
the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Other specific effects flowing
therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:

Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be,
shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith,
his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property
shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the
guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;

(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted
the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of
law;

(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad
faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as
irrevocable; and

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to
inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be
void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by
one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law.

Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion
that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that
purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of
nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of
property relations governing them.

Republic v. CA Molina
G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997

Tambolero, Daisy Mae O.

FACTS:

Spouses Roridel and Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
Church in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo
showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father since he preferred
to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them.

Sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then
Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a
very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March
1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio
City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them.

Reynaldo had shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential
marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who
thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couples best interest to
have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an
incompatible marriage from the start.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING:

No, the marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. In the case at
bar, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove
that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of thoughtfulness and gentleness on
Reynaldo’s part and of being conservative, homely and intelligent on the part of Roridel,
such failure of expectation is not indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity.

Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, “A marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.”

The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code
are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity;

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision;

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage;

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex;

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage;

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision;

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts;

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that "the
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability."

Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995

Acopiado, Ariel M.

FACTS:

Leouel, a First Lieutenant of the Philippine Army, married Julia in a municipal trial court and
thereafter, in a church. She gave birth to a baby boy and was named Leouel Jr.
Occasionally, the couple quarreled over a lot of things including the interference of Julia's
parents into their family affairs.

Julia went to US to work as a nurse and promised husband that she will return once her
contract will have expired. She never did. Leouel tried to find her in the US but somehow
failed to contact her or get in touch with her.

Leouel filed a petition to have their marriage declared null and void, citing Article 36 of the
Family Code. He argued that Julia's failure to return home and communicating with him for
more than 5 years constitute psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

RULING:
No. Julia's failure to return to her husband and communication with him do not constitute
psychological incapacity.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) juridical antecedence, (b) gravity and
(c) incurability.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.In the case at bar, although Leouel stands
aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged psychological incapacity of
his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not
come close to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano
G.R. No. 149498, 20 May 2004

Aguila-Granada, Cherrie Mae E.

FACTS:

Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, left respondent Lolita Hamano and their daughter a
month after the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to
support his family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for 2 months,
he never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters the respondent
sent. He even visited the Philippines but did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the
other hand, exerted all efforts to contact him, but to no avail.

Respondent filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, in which the trial court rendered it so.

CA affirmed trial court’s decision contesting before the SC that the requirements in Molina
and Santos were not applicable for the case at bar involves a “mixed marriage,” the husband
being a Japanese national.

ISSUES:

1) WON Toshio is psychologically incapacitated.

2) WON requirements in Molina and Santos applicable in mixed marriages.

RULING:

1) NO. The totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. His act of abandonment
was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness.

As the Court ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of
a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying
with the obligations essential to marriage.

Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor
proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness.

2) YES. In proving psychological incapacity, no distinction must be made between an alien

spouse and a Filipino spouse. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological
incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the
norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless
of nationality.

In proving psychological incapacity, no distinction must be made between an alien spouse

and a Filipino spouse. The Court cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely
because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign
national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were
formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general.

Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.

Choa v. Choa
G.R. No. 1473376, 26 November 2002

Bato, Neah Hope L.

FACTS:

Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2 children namely Cheryl
Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an annulment of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards,
he filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on
psychological incapacity. The case went to trial and the trial court further held that Alfonso
presented quantum evidence that Leni needs to controvert for the dismissal of the
case.Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and deportation which
shows latter’s psychological incapacity because according to him it clearly showed that his
wife not only wanted him behind bars but also to banish outside the country.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING:

The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the case do not in any
way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. The evidence was insufficient
and shows grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and
complained about three aspects of Leni’s personality namely lack of attention to children,
immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly
or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity.

The law provides that: “Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) juridical
antecedence, (b) gravity and (c) incurability.” In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by
respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other. There
was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the
problems besetting their marital union.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity.Furthermore, the testimonial
evidence from other witnesses failed to identify and prove root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity.
It just established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a defect that could possibly be
treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. The totality of evidence presented was
completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity more so without any
medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.

Antonio v. Reyes
G.R. No. 155800, 10 March 2006

Buenafe, Aileen B.

FACTS:

Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989.
Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a
subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5
months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things. She even did not conceal
bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband as adopted child of their
family. They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally
left her for good in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his
marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their
marriage null and void.

RULING:

The court held that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as

opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own
testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying
and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his
allegations on his wife’s behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondent’s
fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to
live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered
her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.

The root causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically
identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondent’s psychological
incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence
of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage
without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the
basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore,
Reyes’ case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her
behavior remain unchanged.

Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA

G.R. No. 119190, 16 January 1997

Caipang, Lea A.

FACTS:

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoiwas married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding,
they proceed to the house of defendant’s mother. There was no sexual intercourse between
them during their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to
have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went with
them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long
walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until
March 1989 they slept together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examination to an
urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989.

The result of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was
kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why
Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the country.

Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on
the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to have
their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is
physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still
overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical
examination and the result was there is no evidence of impotency and he is capable of
erection.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitute
psychological incapacity.

RULING:
The Supreme Court had laid down some of the instances that proved the existence of
psychological incapacity. The incapacity of the spouse must such that, it prevents him from
complying with the essential marital obligations as state in the Family Code, like:
(a) To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
though sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage;

(b) To live together under one roof for togetherness spells the unity in marriage;

(c) To observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, for love, sexual comfort and loyalty to one
another are the basic postulates of marriage;

(d) To render mutual help and support for assistance in necessities, both temporal and
spiritual, is essential to sustain the marriage;

(e) To jointly support the family for the spouses are joint administrators in the partnership;

(f) Not to commit acts which will bring danger, dishonor or injury to each other or to the
family for the safety and security of the family at all times is a primordial duty of the spouses;

The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative

of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly
demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marital obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one
of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus
constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the
marriage.

Navarro v. Navarro
Capin, Mary Jade L.

Barcelona v. CA
G.R. No. 130087, 24 September 2003

Denura, Lady Rubyge A.

FACTS:

Respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married union begot five children. On
29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon filed a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona. Petition further alleged that petitioner Diana
was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present
time. The petition alleged the non-complied marital obligations. During their marriage, they
had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family,
wasa disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her
sister‘s house or would play tennis the whole day. When the family had crisis due to several
miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to
herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband.

On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and
on the pretext of re-evaluatingher feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily
leave their conjugal dwelling. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the
respondent‘s pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling. The
respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with theessential obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and
until the present time. Such incapacity wasconclusively found in the psychological
examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and therespondent Diana
claims that petitioner falls short of the guidelines stated in Molina case and there is no cause
for action.

ISSUE:

Whether of not petitioner stated a cause of action against Diana.

RULING:

YES, since petition stated legal right of Tadeo, correlative obligation of Diana, and her act or
omission as seen infacts FAILURE TO STATE ROOT CAUSE AND GRAVE NATURE OF
ILLNESS. Sec 2 of rules of declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage – petition does not
need to show root cause sinceonly experts can determine it b the physical manifestations of
physical incapacity. PETITION IS DENIED, THERE IS CAUSE OF ACTION.

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The Supreme Court held that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those
enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability.

The elements of Psychological incapacity are:

(a) Grave – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c) Incurable and Permanent – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Tongol v. Tongol
G.R. No. 157610, 19 October 2007

Eguia, Paula Bianca B.

FACTS:

Orlando G. Tongol and Filipinas M. Tongol were married on August 27, 1967. Out of their
union, they begot four children, namely: Crisanto, Olivia, Frederick, and Ma. Cecilia. On May
13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
gains, which was granted in a Judgment issued by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143 on
April 24, 1995.

On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. Orlando
alleged that Filipinas was unable to perform her duty as a wife because of Filipinas
unbearable attitude that will lead to their constant quarrel. In her answer with Counter-
Petition, Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation have been fruitless and that their
marriage is a failure. However, she claims that their marriage failed because it is Orlando`s
insufficiency to fulfill his obligation as married man. Both parties underwent a psychological
exam which proved that the respondent Filipinas Tongol has a psychological insufficiency.

Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony, that of his sister, Angelina Tongol, and
of Annaliza Guevara, an employee in the pharmaceutical company owned by the spouses
Tongol. Orlando also presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist who conducted a
psychological examination of both parties. Orlando submitted documents evidencing their
marriage, the birth of their four children, the RTC decision granting the petition for dissolution
of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the written evaluation of Dr. Villegas regarding the
spouses' psychological examination. On the other hand, record shows that evidence for
Filipinas only consisted of her own testimony.

On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149, rendered a Decision dismissing the
petition on appeal, the CA affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the RTC. Hence, herein petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented in the present case is enough to
sustain a finding that herein respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
essential marital obligations.
RULING:

The Court cannot see how respondent's personality disorder would render her unaware of
the essential marital obligations, or to borrow the terms used in Santos Case, "to be truly in
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage." What has been established in the instant case is
that, by reason of her feelings of inadequacy and rejection, respondent not only encounters
a lot of difficulty but even refuses to assume some of her obligations towards her husband,
such as respect, help and support for him. However, this Court has ruled that psychological
incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or”neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations.

Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and satisfactorily explain if the personality disorder of
respondent is grave enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. There is no evidence that such incapacity is incurable. Neither in her written
evaluation nor in her testimony did Dr. Villegas categorically and conclusively characterizes
respondent's inadequate personality disorder as permanent or incurable.|||

The psychological incapacity considered under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. The fourth guideline in Molina requires that the
psychological incapacity as understood under Article 36 of the Family Code must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage,
like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. In the present case, the testimonies
of petitioner and respondent as well as the other witnesses regarding the spouses'
differences and misunderstanding basically revolve around and are limited to their
disagreement regarding the management of their business. A mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. In
addition, it is true that the marital obligations of a husband and wife enumerated under the
Family Code include the mutual responsibility of the spouses to manage the household and
provide support for the family, which means that compliance with this obligation necessarily
entails the management of the income and expenses of the household. While disagreements
on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of one's marriage as to make
the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a sufficient ground to declare a marriage null and void.

Marital obligation includes not only a spouse's obligation to the other spouse but also one's
obligation toward their children. In the present case, no evidence was presented to show that
respondent had been remiss in performing her obligations toward their children as
enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code. D

It is not disputed that respondent is suffering from a psychological disorder. However, the
totality of the evidence presented in the present case does not show that her personality
disorder is of the kind contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code as well as
jurisprudence as to render her psychologically incapacitated or incapable of complying with
the essential obligations of marriage.

Te v. Te
G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009

Fernandez, Aisha Mie Faith M.

FACTS:
 Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the
Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowena’s close
friend but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena,
which happened in January 1996. It was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward
refused bickering that he was young and jobless.

Her persistence, however, made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month;
he, providing their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat ticket.

They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s
house and Edward to his parents’ home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage
license. Edward was prohibited from getting out of the house unaccompanied and was
threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the house, and
stayed with his parents. Edward’s parents wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena
refused and demanded that they have a separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it was
better for them to live separate lives and they then parted ways.

After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to
Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that admittedly, the SC may have inappropriately imposed a set of
rigid rules in ascertaining Psychological Incapacity in the Molina case. So much so that the
subsequent cases after Molina were ruled accordingly to the doctrine set therein. And that
there is not much regard for the law’s clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as “courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.” The SC however is not abandoning the Molina guidelines, the
SC merely reemphasized that there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which
should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36 such as in
the case at bar. The principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat
for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisionsofchurchtribunals.

The SC then ruled that the marriage of Kenneth and Rowena is null and void due to both
parties’ psychological disorder as evidenced by the finding of the expert psychologist. Both
parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, Kenneth
cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect
and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions
without advice from others. He is too dependent on others. Rowena cannot perform the
essentialmaritalobligationsaswellduetoherintoleranceandimpulsiveness.
Ting v. Ting
G.R. No. 166562, 31 March 2009

Gahuman, Kristine Camille B.

FACTS:

Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez met each other in medical school and they married each
other after several years. Years after, Benjamin became a full-fledged doctor and he
practiced at the Velez Hospital owned by Carmen’s family. Benjamin and Carmen had six
children during their marriage. But after 18 years of marriage, Carmen went to court to have
their marriage be declared void on the ground that Benjamin was psychologically
incapacitated. She alleged that even before she married Benjamin, the latter was already a
drunkard; that Benjamin was a gambler, he was violent, and would rather spend on his
expensive hobby; that he rarely stayed home and even neglected his children and family
obligations.

Carmen presented an expert witness, Dr. Oñate, to prove Benjamin’s psychological

incapacity. However, Oñate merely based her findings on the statement submitted by
Benjamin. Oñate was not able to personally examine Benjamin because at that time,
Benjamin was already working as an anaesthesiologist in South Africa. On his part,
Benjamin opposed the petition. He also presented his own expert witness to disprove
Carmen’s allegations. Obra was not able to personally examine Benjamin but he also
evaluated the same deposition evaluated by Oñate. Also, Benjamin submitted himself for
evaluation to a South African doctor (Dr. Pentz) and the transcript of said evaluation was
submitted to Obra and the latter also evaluated the same. Obra found Benjamin not to be
psychologically incapacitated.

The trial court, and eventually the Court of Appeals, ruled in favor of Carmen.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Benjamin Ting’s psychological incapacity was proven.

RULING:

No, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was insufficient to prove that petitioner
is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more
particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the
marriage 18 years ago.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an absolute insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The psychological illness that
must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a disorder so grave
and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s defects were present at the time of
the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already
knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such
statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part
of her husband. Neither did the evidence presented prove such defects to be incurable. The
evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the significant evidence in determining
whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, the
Court was not convinced that the opinions proiced by these experts strengthened
respondent’s allegation of psychological incapacity. The two provided absolutely
contradicting psychological evaluations.

Azcueta v. Republic
G.R. No. 180668, 26 May 2009
Granada, Immanuel Y.

FACTS:

Petitioner Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta got married on July 24, 1993. They
separated in 1997 after four years of marriage and bore no child.

Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, claiming that her husband Rodolfo was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

According to petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually

failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the essential responsibilities and duties of
husband

Petitioner also complained of physical violence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding that
Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.

RULING:

Yes. After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that there was sufficient
compliance with the guidelines in the Molina case to warrant the annulment of the parties’
marriage under Article 36.

The Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina stringent
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff;

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision;

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage;

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable;

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage;

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children;

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts.

In all, the Court agrees with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code is proper under the premises.

Najera v. Najera
G.R. No. 164817, 3 July 2009

Guige, Marife G.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with
Alternative Prayer for Legal separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator
Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains. Petitioner alleged that she and
respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in the
(United States of America). They were married but are childless.

Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage,
and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage; (1) that respondent was jobless
and was not exerting effort to find a job at the time of marriage; only with the help of
petitioner’s elder brother, who was a seaman, was respondent able to land a job as a
seaman; (2) that while employed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient
financial support); (3) that respondent would quarrel with petitioner and falsely accuse her of
having an affair with another man whenever he came home, and took to smoking marijuana
and drinking; (4) that on July 1, 1994, while he was quarreling with petitioner, without
provocation, he inflicted physical violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a bolo; and
(6) after the said incident respondent left the family home, taking along all their personal
belongings, and abandoned the petitioner. Petitioner reported the incident at the police
station of Bugallon, Pangasinan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not thetotality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting
the annulment of their marriage under Article 1: of the Family Code.

RULING:

No. The evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence or grossly
abusive conductof respondent toward petitioner and respondent’s abandoment
of petitioner justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds for legal separation only
and not for annulment of marriage under Article 1: of the Family Code.

Suazo v. Suazo
G.R. No. 164493, 10 March 2010

Lagare, Liezel O.

FACTS:

Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old only. Without
any means to support themselves, they lived with Angelito’s parents while Jocelyn took odd
jobs and Angelito refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Petitioner urged him to
find work but this often resulted to violent quarrels. A year after their marriage, Jocelyn left
Angelito. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since lived. 10 years
later, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36 Psychological
incapacity. Jocelyn testified on the alleged physical beating she received. The expert witness
corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony. Both her psychological report and testimony
concluded that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated. However, B was not personally
examined by the expert witness.

The RTC annulled the marriage on the ground that Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital
obligation, such as “immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and
responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family
or excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the
condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks” but the CA reversed
it and held that the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and
has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations
of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified.

The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social
personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate
medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at
best, could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like
immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the
failure or refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who
felt that he had been forced into a loveless marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of
the Family Code.

RULING:

The Court fined the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in
setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s marriage with
Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.

Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological incapacity. The

psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition only in an indirect manner – she
derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause
cannot of course be doubted. The psychlologist, using meager information coming from a
directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not
have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological
condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s
psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito’s. The methodology employed simply
cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to
evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the
psychologist’s report and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelito’s
purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder
as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the
bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave.
Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
A’s testimony regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while
indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity.
All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations.

It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had

difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in
the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with
his essential marital obligations – must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the
like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as
the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
Republic v. Galang
G.R. No. 168335, 6 June 2010

Lim, Gretchen Rina A.

FACTS:

In March 1994, Nestor and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga. In August 1999, Nestor
filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy alleging
the latter’s psychological incapacity to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as the
same was a kleptomaniac, gambler and a swindler; that Juvy suffers from “mental
deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and affection
[towards him and their] child” basing these allegations on Juvy’s unwillingness to prepare
breakfast and the incident where Juvy almost lost their son in the market. He posited that
Juvy’s incapacity was “extremely serious” and “appears to be incurable.”

Nestor presented Anna Liza Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she conducted
psychological test on the former. In her Psychological Report, the psychologist made the
findings on couple, stating that the husband is psychologically mature while his wife is not,
without citing the tests conducted and the reason for the wife’s incapacity.

RTC ruled on the nullity of the marriage which was affirmed by the CA, citing that the facts
presented satisfied the Santos doctrine.

ISSUE:

Whether there is basis to nullify the respondent’s marriage to Juvy on the ground that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity that
prevented her from complying with her essential marital obligations.

RULING:

None. The Supreme Court held that the totality of Nestor’s evidence – his testimonies and
the psychologist, and the psychological report and evaluation – insufficient to prove Juvy’s
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The
defect should refer to “no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.” It must be confined to “the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. [Louel Santos v. CA]

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and
(c) incurability. The defect should refer to “no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
It is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the
Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. [Brenda Marcos v.
Marcos]

Instead of serving as a guideline, Molina Doctrine unintentionally became a straightjacket; it

forced all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it. [Ngo Te v.
Yu-Te] In Ting vs. Velez-Ting, far from abandoning Molina, the Ngo Te case simply
suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements; the Ngo Te case merely stands for a
more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based
on psychological incapacity.

In the present case, the psychologist did not even identify the types of psychological tests
which she administered on Nestor and the root cause of Juvy’s psychological condition.
There was no showing that any mental disorder existed at the inception of the marriage. The
report failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvy’s alleged condition, specifically, why and
to what extent the disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated her to comply with her marital
duties; the report did not even categorically state the particular type of personality disorder
found. The report failed to establish the incurability of Juvy’s condition. The report’s
pronouncements that Juvy “lacks the initiative to change” and that her mental incapacity
“appears incorrigible” are insufficient to prove that her mental condition could not be treated,
or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond her means to undertake.

Petition was granted. Galang’s petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Juvy
Salazar under Article 36 of the Family Code was dismissed.

Tenebro v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 150758, 18 February 2004

Lomosad, Frillin M.

FACTS:

Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together
continuously and without interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed
Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going
to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a certain
Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas
countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record
of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void
ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Tenebro can use psychological incapacity as ground for absolution of bigamy
case against him.

RULING:

No. In invoking Article 36 of the Family Code, petitioner failed to realize that a declaration of
the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely
no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned

The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological

incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for
bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or
subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to
Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely
regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of
a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings”. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Morigo v. People
G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004

Malate, Desmarc G.

FACTS:

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while
but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became
sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991
she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married
Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground
that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for
a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the
bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab
initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.

ISSUE:
Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before
his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.

RULING:

No. considering that the first marriage was void ab initio makes Morigo acquitted in the
Bigamy case.

As provided by Art. 3, part 3 of the Family Code “ A marriage ceremony which takes place
with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not
less than two witnesses of legal age”. “The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in
Article 45.” As provided by Art. 4. Given these 2 articles, Morigo’s first marriage is
considered void ab initio.

Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed
a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his
marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit
bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
Weigel v. Sempio-Dy
G.R. No. L-53703, 19 August 1986

Nataa, Vera L.

FACTS:

Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was married with a certain
Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latter’s former
marriage. Having been allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she contents that the
first marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was married to another woman
before their marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether Karl’s marriage with Lilia is void.

RULING:

Yes. It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force
committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void
but merely viodable, and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been
made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to her first husband.
Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing
evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still needs a
judicial declaration before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilia’s marriage are
regarded void under the law.

Terre v. Terre
A.M. No. 2349, 3 July 1992

Olasiman, Jason S.

FACTS:

Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo, her first cousin. Atty. Jordan
Terre successfully convinced Dorothy that her marriage was void ab initio for the reason of
public policy and that they are free to contract marriage. They got married in 1977 where he
wrote single under Dorothy’s status. After getting Dorothy pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned
them and subsequently contracted another marriage to Helina Malicdem in 1986. Atty. Terre
was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Terre’s marriage with Dorothy is null and void.

RULING:

Dorothy’s first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering that Merlito is her first cousin
thereby against public policy.

Article 40 states that the absolute nullity of a former marriage may be invoked for the
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.

However, she did not file any declaration for the nullity of their marriage before she
contracted her marriage with Atty. Terre thus, her second marriage is void.

Valdes v. RTC
G.R. No. 122749, 31 July 1996

Santiago, Prince Dave C.

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their
mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their
mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership.

ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.

Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property
shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family.

People v. Aragon
G.R. No. L-10016, 28 February 1957

Tambolero, Daisy Mae O.

FACTS:

Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in Cebu . While his
marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused under the name of Proceso Aragon,
contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol in Iloilo City. The sponsors of the accused
and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, who was then an employee of the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomesa, a clerk in the said office. After the
said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo. As the accused
was then a traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he maintained Maria
Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his first wife, Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City. After
Maria Gorrea's death, and seeing that the coast was dear in Cebu, the accused brought
Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she worked as a teacher-nurse. It would seem that
the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu, for Faicol suffered
injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment in the hands of the accused. On
January 22, 1953, the accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of
undergoing treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, the accused contracted a third
marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang.

The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang in Sibonga,
Cebu. Although the accused made an attempt to deny his previous marriage with Maria
Faicol, the Court, however, believes that the attempt is futile for the fact of the said second
marriage was fully established not only by the certificate of the said marriage, but also by the
testimony of Maria Faicol and of EulogioGiroy, one of the sponsors of the wedding, and the
identification of the accused made by Maria Faicol.

The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in
Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage
void ab initio, defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang
without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by
the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the latter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the third marriage is null and void.

RULING:

No. The action was instituted upon the complaint of the second wife whose marriage with
Rosima was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was
entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and prosecution against Rosima for
contracting marriage cannot prosper.

The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal
and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity,
as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. There is here no pretense that appellant's
second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de
Asis, had been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as
to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a subsequent court. (People v.
Mendoza)

Mercado v. Mercado
G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000

Acopiado, Ariel M.

FACTS:

Dr. Vincent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted
marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed
bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity
of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and
Oliva null and void.
ISSUE:

Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the former
marriage.

RULING:

Yes. Mercado is guilty of bigamy.

The law provides that: “The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.” A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies
even if the earlier union is characterized by the statute as “void.”

In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right
after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He
contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the
first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.

Bobis v. Bobis
G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000

Aguila-Granada, Cherrie Mae E.

FACTS:

On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B.
Javier. Without the said marriage been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same
respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January
25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on
petitioner’s complaint- affidavit, information for bigamy was filed against respondent.
Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.

ISSUE:

Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy

RULING:

No. The subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
does not constitute a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.

A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused. Its two essential elements are: (a) the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage, cannot be said to have validly entered into the
second marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage
will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first
marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal
intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second
marriage with petitioner. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact
that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage.
Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge.
It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.

Cariño v. Cariño
G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001

Bato, Neah Hope L.

FACTS:

SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license. They had
two children. He then married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no
children in their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.

He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City
the claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from
various government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a
total of P21,000.

Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively
denominated as "death benefits." Yee admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place
during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the
marriage between Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that she became aware of
the previous marriage at the funeral of the deceased.

In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.

RULING:
No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cariño falls under the Article 148 of the
Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages,
adulterous or concubinage relationships.

As regards to the First marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 Santiago:

Article 147 Family Code-Property Regime of Union without Marriage.

“When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired
by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation.”

As regards to the Second marriage between Yee and SPO4 Santiago:

Article 148 Family Code - Rules on Co-ownership regarding polygamous/ bigamous

marriages, adulterous or combuniage relationships.

“In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed
to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If
the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited
in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.”

Article 40 of the Family Code - Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

“The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”

Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the
deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the
deceased through their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party
belong to him or her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the
deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the
same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his
legal heirs. And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not one of them.

As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void
due to absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the
deceased even if she did not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in
respect thereto, entitling Nicdao to share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of
bad faith in the first marriage, she can claim one-half of the disputed death benefits and the
other half to the deceased' to his legal heirs, by intestate succession.

The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been
solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and
SPO4. Under Article 40, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second
marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void,
before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would
be void. However, for purposes other than to remarry, no prior and separate judicial
declaration of nullity is necessary.

De Castro vs De Castro
G.R. No. 160172, 13 February 2008

Buenafe, Aileen B.

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get
married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October
1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office
of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push
through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13
March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless,
after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did
not live together as husband and wife.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid.

RULING:

No. The marriage between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.

Under the Article 4 of the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential
requisites shall render the marriage voidable.

Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present: (1) Legal
capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and (2) Consent freely
given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A
valid marriage license; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance
of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that
they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age.

In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did
not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an
affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years. However,
respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during
cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in
the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement
for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband
and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.

The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. In the
instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they
could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper.
They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and
present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

Republic v. Nolasco
G.R. No. 94053, 17 March 1993
Caipang, Lea A.

FACTS:
Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England. After that,
Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of
Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got married in
January 1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco
received a letter from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after,
Janet left. Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janet’s whereabouts. He
did so by securing another seaman’s contract going to London. He wrote several letters to
the bar where they first met but it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a
declaration of presumptive death of Janet.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead?

RULING:

There are 4 requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances
laid down in Article 391, Civil Code.

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry.

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead.

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.

The Supreme Court ruled that Nolasco’s efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show
that he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking
assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another contract.
More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find
his wife.

Lukban v. Republic
G.R. No. L-8492, 29 February 1956

Capin, Mary JadeL.

FACTS:

Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in 1933 and after a violent quarrel he
left Lukban and has not been heard of since then. She diligently looked for him asking the
parents and friends but no one knew his whereabouts. She believes that husband is already
dead since he was absent for more than 20 years and because she intends to marry again,
she desires to have her civil status put in order to be relieved on any liability under the law.
ISSUE:

Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death before she can remarry.

RULING:

The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration of presumptive death of her
husband because Civil Code prevails during their marriage in 1933. It provides that “for the
purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially
declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions
for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage,
however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not
know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to
be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

In Re Gue
G.R. No. L-14058, 24, March 1960
Denura, Lady Rubyge A.

Armas v. Calisterio
G.R. No. 136467, 6 April 2000

Eguia, Paula Bianca B.

FACTS:

Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an estimated value of
P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife Marietta Calisterio. Teodorico was the
second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James William Bounds.
James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta
were married eleven years later without Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration
that James was presumptively dead.

Petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed a petition entitled,
"In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia
Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio
and the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being
allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano C.
Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and that
the inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been
settled.

Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with James
Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for
more than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico.
Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration
of the estate of the decedent.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage between Teodorico and Marietta is valid.

RULING:

The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was solemnized on
08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which
took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its
retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the New
Civil Code which provides:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null
and void by a competent court.

For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to
be held valid, the spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later
marriage must have done so in good faith. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong — it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach
of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. The Court does not find these
circumstances to be here extant.

Judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the
prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these
exceptional cases is, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared
null and void by a competent court." It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these
cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.

It remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William Bounds, had
been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a
second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage,
having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid
notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.

The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to
indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon
its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal
portions — one portion going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of
the deceased spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net
estate of the deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and
nieces (the latter by right of representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and
sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other half.

Republic v. Callejo
G.R. No. 159614, 9 December 2005

Fernandez, Aisha Mie Faith M.

FACTS:

Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January 1995. Lea arrived home late in
February 1995 and Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for
her to go back to her parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan checked if she went to her
parents’ house but was not there and even inquired to her friends. He went back to the
parents-in-law’s house and learned that Lea had been to their house but left without notice.
He then sought help from the Barangay Captain. For some time, Alan decided to work as
part-time taxi driver and during his free time he would look for Lea in the malls. In June 2001,
Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station and an alarm notice was
issued. He also reported the disappearance in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a petition in
March 2001 for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife.

ISSUE:

Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

RULING:

The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he
has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse
may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-
grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde
en motivos racionales.Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an
overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend,
even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded
in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments,
prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives
of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or
throw light on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a
well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn
from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the
absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. Although
testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded belief of the present spouse that
the absent spouse is already dead, in Republic v. Nolasco, the Court warned against
collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds
through existing legal means. It is also the maxim that men readily bekieve what they wish to
be true.

The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-founded belief, before he filed his
petition with RTC, that his spouse was dead. He failed to present a witness other than the
Barangay Captain. He even failed to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to
corroborate his testimony. He also failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding
Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced his credibility
had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea's whereabouts considering that
Lea's father was the owner of Radio DYMS. He did report and seek help of the local police
authorities and NBI to locate Lea but he did so only after the OSG file its notice to dismiss
his petition in RTC.

SSS v. Bailon
G.R. No. 165545, 24 March 2006

Gahuman, Kristine Camille B.

FACTS:
In 1955, Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon. More than 15
years later, Clemente filed an action to declare the presumptive death of Alice, she being an
absentee. The petition was granted in 1970.

In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The two live together until Clemente’s death in 1998.
Jarque then sought to claim her husband’s SSS benefits and the same were granted her. On
the other hand, a certain Cecilia Bailon-Yap who claimed that she is the daughter of Bailon
to a certain Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that they be given the reimbursement for
the funeral spending for it was actually them who shouldered the burial expenses of
Clemente.

They further claim that Clemente contracted three marriages; one with Alice, another with
Elisa and the other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive and kicking and Alice
subsequently emerged. Cecilia claimed that Clemente obtained the declaration of Alice’s
presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of Alice or if not he
could have easily located her in her parent’s place. She was in Sorsogon all along in her
parents’ place. She went there upon learning that Clemente had been having extra-marital
affairs.
SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her and to return the
same to Cecilia since she shouldered the burial expenses and that the benefits should go to
Alice because her reappearance had terminated Clemente’s marriage with Harque. Further,
SSS ruled that the RTC’s decision in declaring Alice to be presumptively death is erroneous.
Teresita appealed the decision of the SSS before the Social Security Commission and the
SSC affirmed SSS. The CA however ruled the contrary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared presumptively dead
automatically terminates the subsequent marriage.

RULING:

No. If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage,
either by affidavit or by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made
known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.

Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former
spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance,
and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the
subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.

If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance

or by judicial declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, the action for
annulment became extinguished as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code,
requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of
the parties involved.

Voidable marriage under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.

And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from
such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse," as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the
annulment proceeding.

In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon’s and
respondent’s marriage prior to the former’s death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the
dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.

Valdez v. Republic
G.R. No. 180863, 8 September 2009

Granada, Immanuel Y.
FACTS:

Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl
named Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring
home any money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited
until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her parent’s home. 3 years have passed
without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to
separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other
and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married
Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s application for naturalization in US was denied
because petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner
filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.

RULING:

Yes. Petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive
death of Sofio.

Pursuant to Article 83 of the Civil Code, any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such
first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null
and void by a competent court.
Therefore, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court
declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken
place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.
Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to
petitioner’s capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the
Civil Code.

Anaya v. Palaroan
G.R. No. L-27930, 26 November 1970

Guige, Marife G.
FACTS:

Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action for
annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through
force and intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage
and granting Aurora’s counterclaim. While the amount of counterclaim was being
negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-
marital relationship with a close relative of his, according to her, the non-divulgement to her
of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed for the
annulment of her marriage with Fernando on such ground.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

RULING:

The concealment of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman was not one of
those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph providing that “no other misrepresentation or deceit as to..
chastity” shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does
not constitute fraud and therefore would not warrant an annulment of marriage.

Buccat v. Buccat
G.R. No. 47101, 25 April 1941

Lagare, Liezel O.

FACTS:

It was established before the trial court: The Plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938. After
several interviews, both were committed on September 19 of that year .On November 26 the
same year, the plaintiff married the defendant in a Catholic Cathedral in Baguio. They, then,
cohabited for about eighty-nine days. Defendant gave birth to a child of nine months on
February 23, 1939. Following this event, Plaintiff and Defendant separated. On March 20,
1939 the plaintiff filed an action for annulment of marriage before the CFI of Baguio City. The
plaintiff claimed that he consented to the marriage because the defendant assured him that
she was virgin. The trial court dismissed the complaint.

Hence, this appeal. Basically, Godofredo Buccat (Plaintiff) and Luida Mangonon
(Defendant) got married on November 26, 1938. Luida gave birth after 89 days and on
March 20, 1939 Godofredo filed for annulment of marriage before the CFI because he was
led to believe by Luida that she was a virgin. The trial court dismissed the complaint, so
Godofredo appealed.

ISSUE:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be granted on the grounds that
Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?

RULING:

No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in
which the State is interested and where society rests.

In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy
constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law
student, did not suspect anything about Luida’s condition considering that she was in an
advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged
stomach ) when they got married. As she gave birth less than 3 months after they got
married, she must have looked very pregnant even before they were married. Thus, consent
freely given: ARTICLE 4 and 45 FC.

SC affirmed the lower court’s decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant

Aquino v. Delizo
G.R. No. L-15853, 27 July 1960

Lim, Gretchen Rina A.

FACTS:

The trial court dismissed the complaint for Aquino did not show any birth certificate to show
the child was born within 180 days after the marriage between the parties. Later on Aquino
presented evidence to show proof of the child’s birth but still his petition was denied. The CA
denied Aquino’s appeal on the theory that it was not impossible for the parties to have sex
during their engagement so that the child could be their own and finding it absurd for Aquino
not to notice or suspect that Delizo was pregnant when he married her. In a motion for
reconsideration filed by Aquino, Delizo and her counsel did not file an answer thus the
motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal of Aquino’s complaint is correct.

RULING:

No. The dismissal is not correct. Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the
fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage.

Concealment of the wife the fact that at the time of the marriage she was pregnant by a man
other than his husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage.
Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time
of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was
readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff.

According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a
woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the
lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed
only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of
pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the
umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.
Jimenez v. Canizares
L-12790, 31 August 1960

Lomosad, Frillin M.

FACTS:

Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Remedios
Canizares on the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the
penetration of a male organ for copulation. It has existed at the time of the marriage and
continues to exist that led him to leave the conjugal home two nights and one day after the
marriage. The court summoned and gave a copy to the wife but the latter did not file any
answer. The wife was ordered to submit herself to physical examination and to file a
medical certificate within 10 days. She was given another 5 days to comply or else it will be
deemed lack of interest on her part and therefore rendering judgment in favor of the
petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the testimony of the husband.

RULING:

No. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole
testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing
the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent
cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because from the
commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from
taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show
indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the
suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by
nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless
compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may do without doing violence to and
infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is
not being compelled to be a witness against herself.

Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in

favor of potency. The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of
sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as
husband and wife.

The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings in accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as to costs.

Almelor v. RTC
G.R. No. 179620, 26 August 2008

Malate, Desmarc G.

FACTS:

Manuel married Leonida in 1989. They are both medical practitioners. They begot 3 children.
11 years later, Leonida sought to annul her marriage with Manuel claiming that Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. Leonida testified
that Manuel is a harsh disciplinarian and that his policy towards their children is often
unconventional and was the cause of their frequent fight. Manuel has an unreasonable way
of imposing discipline towards their children but is remarkably so gentle towards his mom.
He is more affectionate towards his mom and this is a factor which is unreasonable for
Leonida. Further, Leonida also testified that Manuel is a homosexual as evidenced by his
unusual closeness to his male companions and that he concealed his homosexuality from
Leonida prior to their marriage. She once caught Manuel talking to a man affectionately over
the phone and she confirmed all her fear when she saw Manuel kiss a man. The RTC ruled
that their marriage is null and void not because of PI but rather due to fraud by reason of
Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality (Art 45 of the FC). The CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to fraud
by reason of Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality.

RULING:

No. It is found out that there was no concealment of homosexuality done by Manuel.

To nullify an existing marriage, there are requisites which are provided by the Family Code.
As expressly stated in Art. 45 part 3 of the Family Code, “That the consent of either party
was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife”. It was not
proven that Manuel concealed his homosexuality which would eventually lead to fraud.

The SC emphasized that homosexuality per se is not a ground to nullify a marriage. It is the
concealment of homosexuality that would. In the case at bar however, it is not proven that
Manuel is a homosexual. The lower court should not have taken the public’s perception
against Manuel’s sexuality. His peculiarities must not be ruled by the lower court as an
indication of his homosexuality for those are not conclusive and are not sufficient enough to
prove so. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in the
complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality
from Leonida and that Leonida’s consent had been vitiated by such.

Sin v. Sin
G.R. No. 137590, 26 March 2001

Nataa, Vera L.

FACTS:

This is a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity.

Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987.
Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage.
Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial
evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florence’s petition and throughout its trial, the
State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a
manifestation dated November 1994 stating that he found no collusion between the parties,
he did not actively participated therein. Other than having appearance at certain hearings,
nothing more was heard of him.

ISSUE:

Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the participation
of the State in the proceedings.

RULING:

No. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition.

Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed”. A declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code requires the application of procedural and substantive
guidelines. While compliance with these requirements mostly devolves upon the petitioner,
the State is likewise mandated to actively intervene in the procedure. Should there be non-
compliance by the State with its statutory duty, there is a need to remand the case to the
lower court for proper trial.

In this case, it can be argued that since the lower court dismissed the petition, the evil
sought to be prevented (i.e., dissolution of the marriage) did not come about, hence, the lack
of participation of the State was not preserved. The task of protecting marriage as an
inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma
compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense
of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.The records are bereft
of evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus; the case is
remanded for proper trial.

Ocampo v. Florenciano
G.R. No. L-13553, 23 February 1960

Olasiman, Jason S.

FACTS:

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several
children who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several
occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose
Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture
where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with
several other men other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left
plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in
the act of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a
petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided she is not
charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal
separation in 1955.

ISSUE:

Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment

disallowed by the Family Code.

RULING:

Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the
existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of
judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of
judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the
adultery independent of the defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the
decree of separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but
upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based
exclusively on defendant’s confession. The petition should be granted based on the second
adultery, which has not yet prescribed.

Tuason v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 116607, 10 April 1996

Santiago, Prince Dave C.

FACTS:

On June 1972, respondent Victoria Lopez Tuazon married petitioner Emilio Tuazon. Due to
the series of physical abuse against the respondent, the petitioner use of prohibited drugs,
cohabitating with three women, leaving the conjugal home and giving minimal child support,
abuse of conjugal property use and incurring of bank debts without the respondent consent,
respondent filed a petition for annulment of marriage in 1989 on the ground of psychological
incapacity and prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from
further dissipation.

Petitioner filed his Opposition in April 1990 and was scheduled to present his evidence.
Counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement, however, petitioner failed to appear. The
trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of marriage and awarding the custody of
common children to respondent. No appeal was taken.

Thereafter, respondent filed Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties which was opposed by petitioner.
Petitioner filed a Petitioner from Relief of Judgment on the held decision. The trial court
denied the petition which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in the absence of petitioner in the hearing, the court should have ordered a
prosecuting officer to intervene.

RULING:

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional
cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another
remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an
adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself
of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the
effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence;
otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost
thru inexcusable negligence.

Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites the Family Code
which provides that in actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting
officer should intervene for the state because the law looks with disfavor upon the haphazard
declaration of annulment of marriages by default. He contends that when he failed to appear
at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have ordered the prosecuting officer to
intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his non-appearance.

Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:

Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court
shall order the prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.

Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment.

The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the
Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to
answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action
alleged by private respondent. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing
several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear
that every stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by
collusion.

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care
that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioners vehement opposition to the
annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties.
There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of
the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a
prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to
the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.

Lapuz-Sy v. Eufemio
G.R. No. L-30977, 31 January 1972

Tambolero, Daisy Mae O.

FACTS:

Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August
1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days.
They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943
when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage.
Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go
Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which
among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of
the conjugal partnership profits.

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the
ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties
adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed,
respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular
accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to
dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition
was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the
death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to
substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.

ISSUE:

Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation,
abates the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

RULING:

As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his

marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic upon
the death of the latter, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her
demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by
either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved
and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the
appellant.

In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under
Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been
contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when
she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as
soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2,
of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of
any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership
that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly provided in Section 2 of the
Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.

Gandionco v. Penaranda
G.R. No. L-7294, 27 November 1987

Acopiado, Ariel M.

FACTS:

Private respondent filed for legal separation against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court
presided over by respondent judge. Private respondent invoked concubinage as a ground.
The court rendered the decision ordering petitioner to pay his wife and child support
pendente lite. The court also denied his petitioner's petition to suspend hearing pending the
criminal case filed against him by his wife for concubinage.
Petitioner contends that the 1985 Rules of Court provide that civil cases are suspended such
as legal separation and the incidents attached to it like support pendente lite pending a
criminal case arising from the same offense until final judgment has been rendered.
Petitioner also claims that the presiding judge was biased and should no longer preside over
the case by reason of his decision and his denial of petitions to suspend the hearings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a civil action must be suspended pending a criminal action for the same
offense.

RULING:

No. The court ruled that a civil action for legal separation can proceed simultaneously with a
criminal case arising from the same offense.

The court interpreted the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure stating that: “a civil action for
legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a
criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one “to enforce the civil
liability” arising from the offense even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are
related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains, custody of offspring, support, and disqualification from inheriting from
the innocent spouse, among others. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of
concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal
separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.

The civil action is not suspended because it does not intend to produce the civil liability
arising from offense prosecuted under the criminal action but rather it intends to obtain the
right to live separately with the legal consequences aforementioned. The support pendente
lite was also found to be correctly granted, and in case petitioner does not agree with the
amount may file a motion in court for modification or reduction.

Bugayong v. Ginez
G.R. No. L-10033, 28 December 1956

Aguila-Granada, Cherrie Mae E.

FACTS:

Petitioner, a US Navy serviceman, began receiving letters informing him of the alleged acts
of infidelity of his wife, the respondent. He admitted that respondent even informed him by
letter that a certain Eliong kissed her.

Petitioner, then, sought for his wife and when the two met, they both proceeded to a certain
house where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day. Then they repaired to the
petitioner’s house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the following
day, petitioner tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she
had committed adultery. But respondent, instead of answering the query, merely packed up
and left, which the petitioner took as confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on his wife.
Petitioner went to Ilocos “to soothe his wounded feelings.”

Petitioner, then, filed for legal separation against his wife, who in turn filed a motion to
dismiss on ground of condonation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is condonation.

RULING:

Yes. Pursuant to previous jurisprudence, there is condonation to the alleged adultery on the
part of the husband.

Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot by eiher of them.
Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the
petition.

Further, single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient
to constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that
they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
Moreover, pursuant to foreign jurisprudence, a divorce suit will not be granted for adultery
where the parties continue to live together after it was known or there is sexual intercourse
after knowledge of adultery or sleeping together for a single night.

Since the parties have stayed together as husband and wife for more than two nights after
the knowledge of wife’s infidelity, condonation is established.
Brown v. Yambao
G.R. No. L-10699, 18 October 1957

Bato, Neah Hope L.

FACTS:

On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain
legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while
interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas
internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom
she begot a baby girl that Brown learned of his wife’s misconduct only in 1945, upon his
release from internment and that they have lived separately thereafter.

Brown prayed for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children
issued of the marriage; that the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff;
and for their remedy as might be just and equitable.
The court subsequently declared Juanita Yambao in default, for failure to answer in due
time, despite service of summonsand directed the City Fiscal or his representatives to
investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code, if collusion exists between the
parties.

During the cross-examination of the plaintiff by Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose, it was
found out that after the liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had
begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal
separation asked, on the ground that, while the wife's adultery was established, Brown had
incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action under Article 100 of
the new Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for legal separation should be granted?

RULING:

No.The court below correctly held that the appellant's action was already barred, because
Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his
wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945.Appellant's brief does
not even contest the correctness of such findings and conclusion.
Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that:“The legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by
either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the
dismissal of the petition.”

In the case at bar, it is pursuant to the second sentence of the aforementioned law, wherein
Brown and Yumbao are both offenders, hence, a legal separation cannot be granted.

Article 102 of the Civil Code provides that:“An action for legal separation cannot be filed
except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the
cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred.”

In the case at bar, Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years
after he learned of his wife's adultery.

It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts
can take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or
annulment of marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such
decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.

Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for denying the remedy
sought (commission of similar offense by petitioner and prescription of the action), it
becomes unnecesary to delve further into the case and ascertain if Brown's inaction for ten
years also evidences condonation or connivance on his part. Even if it did not, his situation
would not be improved. It is thus needless to discuss the second assignment of error.

The third assignment of error being a mere consequence of the others must necessarily fail
with them. The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

Pacete v. Carriaga
G.R. No. L-53880, 17 March 1994

Buenafe, Aileen B.

FACTS:

Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion,
as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of
property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and
they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage
with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979.
Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to
continue living with Clarita.

The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file
an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court
forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on
February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiff on March 17, 1980.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its
decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and
held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.

RULING:

The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the
defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion
between parties exists. If there is collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the
State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”

The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article
88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an
action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period.
In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by
the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults
in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in
an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between the parties
exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the
evidence submitted is not fabricated.”

Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-49542, 12 September 1980

Caipang, Lea A.

FACTS:

Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang were

married in 1946 after having lived together for two years and had 6 children. They started a
buy and sell business and sari-sari store in Davao City. Through hard work and good
fortune, their business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice
and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate etc. Their relationship became
complicated and both indulged in extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so
they separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu for good. When she returned
in Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. She then
decided to take the initial action. In April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal separation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has effect on
the legal separation.
RULING:

The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal
separation. When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the separation is complete after
the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects, such as
the liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor terminated.

The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal
property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the effects of such
final decree, the law on intestate succession should take over the disposition of whatever
remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse.

Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. Article 106
of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code provides the effects of the decree of
legal separation. These legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable
incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of determining the share
of each spouse in the conjugal assets.

Potenciano v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 139789, 139808, 19 July 2001

Capin, Mary Jade L.

FACTS:

Erlinda Ilusorio, the the wife of Potenciano, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals for
habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium. However, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or
detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio.

Erlinda Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to
have custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio. This case was consolidated with another
case filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio
appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused to
see her. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for lack of merit, and
granted the petition to nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda
Ilusorio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a court can validly issue an order compelling the husband to live together
and observe mutual love, respect and fidelity

RULING:

The Supreme Court agrees that as spouses, they are duty bound to live together and care
for each other as provided by Article 68 and 69. However, there was absence of empathy
between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972.
Only the moral obligation of the spouses constitutes the motivating factor for making them
observe the said duties and obligations which are highly personal. Therefore, they deny the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Ty v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 127406, 27 November 2000

Eguia, Paula Bianca B.

FACTS:

Edgardo M. Reyes married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29,
1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August
4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage
null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.The church wedding on August 27,
1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.

Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent
wed Ofelia P. Ty on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of
Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.

On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig,
Branch 160, praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that
they had no marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at the time he
married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married
petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The
decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while
his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.

ISSUE:

Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage of Reyes is required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly.

RULING:

Private respondents first and second marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively,
are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. Pertinent to the present controversy, Article
83 of the Civil Code provides that:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and before any person believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court.

As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code
contains no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on that time provides the
following:

People v. Mendoza and People v. Aragon, this Court held that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same factual
milieu. Accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage.
After the death of his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage during the subsistence
of the second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The Court
acquitted accused on the ground that the second marriage is void, having been contracted
during the existence of the first marriage. There is no need for a judicial declaration that said
second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void, and the first one terminated by
the death ofhis wife, there are no two subsisting valid marriages. In Odayat v. Amante
(1977), the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza precedents. We exonerated a clerk of
court of the charge of immorality on the ground that his marriage to FilomenaAbella in
October of 1948 was void, since she was already previously married to one Eliseo Portales
in February of the same year. The Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of void marriages.

On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, the court applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon.
The Court held that since the second marriage took place and all the children there under
were born before the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time. The first
marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need
for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case,
therefore, we conclude that private respondent's second marriage to petitioner is valid.

Ilusorio v. Bildner
G.R. No. 139789, 12 May 2000

Fernandez, Aisha Mie Faith M.

FACTS:

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at
millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of
Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years
and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia,
Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at
Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when
he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in
Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother
overdose Potenciano which caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998,
Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano
due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May
1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo
instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA
petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents
refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning
to Antipolo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.

RULING:

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which
the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where
a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms,
where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become
arbitrary.It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.The essential object
and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint,
and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
Potenciano’s liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86
years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated.
He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right
of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise,
he will be deprived of his right to privacy.

The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a
wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private
reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his
right. Coverture is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion
of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.

Arcaba v. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael

G.R. No. 146683, 22 November 2001

Guige, Marife G.

FACTS:

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No.
437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in
January 1956. Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed
of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of
¼ of the property in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take
care of him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and
Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Francisco’s house as
well as the store inside.

According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On
the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her
that Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper
who could enter the master’s bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was
too old for her. She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got
married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco who was 75
year old widower. The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family
was provided with food and lodging. Francisco’s health deteriorated and became bedridden.
Tabancura testified that Francisco’s only source of income was the rentals from his lot near
the public streets.

In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos” where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his
house to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his
name. This was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner.
Atty Lacaya notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.

In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of
P57, 105 and assessed value of P28, 550. The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his
heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was
valid.

RULING:

The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein
donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain
documents bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit,
sanitary permit and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not
demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver –employee.

Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is
already old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least; cohabitation is a public
assumption of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such.

Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family
Code.

San Luis v. San Luis

G.R. No. 133743, 6 February 2007

Lagare, Liezel O.

FACTS:

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo),
who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo
contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out
of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On
August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with
whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, and then surnamed Sagalongos, with
whom he had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of
their marriage up to his death.

Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146.

Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper
venue and failure to state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying the
two motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for
letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been
filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without
legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
the orders of the trial court, and, hence, the case before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration

RULING:

Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A.,
then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This
provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides
that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co- ownership, it is
not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proven.
Moreover, the Supreme Court found that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co- owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family
Code.

The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its
October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed.
It was also REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

Malang v. Moson
G.R. No. 119064, 22 August 2000

Lim, Gretchen Rina A.

FACTS:

Abdula contracted marriage with Aida and had 3 sons with her. Abdula then married for a
second time with Jubaida and no child was born out of that marriage. Abdula divorced Aida.
Abdula then married Nayo and they also had no child. Thereafter, he contracted another
marriage with Mabay and had a daughter with her. Not long after, Abdula married 3 other
Muslim women but eventually divorced them. Abdula then married his 4th wife Neng,
excluding the wives he divorced. They were childless. Abdula died without leaving a will.

ISSUE:

What law governs?

RULING:

The Civil Code since the Muslim Code has not yet taken effect. Abdula died intestate on
December 1993. It is the Muslim Code which should determine the identification of the heirs
in the order of intestate succession and the respective shares of the heirs.

The Muslim Code took effect on February 4, 1977. If a Muslim died before the effectivity of
the Muslim Code, the order of succession shall be governed by the Civil Code. The status
and capacity to succeed on the part of the individual parties who entered into each and
every marriage ceremony will depend upon the law in force at the time of the performance of
the marriage rite.

If the Muslim marriage took place during the effectivity of the Civil Code and before the
effectivity of the Muslim Code, he cannot marry again because under the Civil Code, only
one marriage is valid. But when the marriage took place when the Muslim Code has taken
effect, subsequent marriages are allowed and valid.

The right of the spouses to inherit will depend on whether or not they have been validly
married. If they are not validly married, then they do not have successional rights over their
partner. The status and capacity to succeed of the children will depend upon the law in force
at the time of conception or birth of the child. As to property relations, it is the Civil Code that
determines and governs the property relations of the marriages in this case, for the reason
that at the time of the celebration of the marriages in question, the Civil Code was the only
on marriage relations, including property relations between spouses, whether Muslim or non-
Muslim.

Uy v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 109557, 29 November 2000

Lomosad, Frillin M.

FACTS:

Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter,
filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and
be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his
functions. She further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that
would require her to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such
necessities. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article
124 of Family Code and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary
proceedings.

The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
petition made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and
properties of his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions
on summary proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing special proceedings
in the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for
notice and a hearing on the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the Family Code
comes under the heading on “Separation in Fact between Husband and Wife” contemplating
a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued that this should not
be applied in their case.

During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law.
Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular
accident rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, may assume sole
powers of administration of the conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with
improvements.

RULING:

No. SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to
cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In
this case, trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose
condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial
guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court.

The law provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers
and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as
administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s
estate required of judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under Family
Code. SC further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an opportunity to
be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due process.

In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules
of Court. Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the requirements of the summary
judicial proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the
petition to the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show the cause why the petition
should not be granted.

De Leon v. De Leon
G.R. No. 185063, 23 July 2009

Malate, Desmarc G.

FACTS:

On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single, and the People’s Homesite and
Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on
installment of a 191.30 square-meter lot situated in Fairview, Quezon City. Subsequently, on
April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a civil rite officiated by the Municipal
Mayor of Zaragosa, Nueva Ecija. To this union were born Danilo and Vilma.Following the full
payment of the cost price for the lot thus purchased, PHHC executed, on June 22, 1970, a
Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
173677 was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, "single."

Subsequently, Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000, sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita, and husband
Felix Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas), petitioners herein. The conveying Deed of Sale dated January
12, 1974 (Deed of Sale) did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita.

Thereafter, or on May 23, 1977, Bonifacio and Anita renewed their vows in a church wedding
at St. John the Baptist Parish in San Juan, Manila.

On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died. Three months later, the Tarrosas registered the Deed
of Sale and had TCT No. 173677 canceled. They secured the issuance in their names of
TCT No. N-173911 from the Quezon City Register of Deeds. Danilo and Vilma filed on May
19, 2003 a Notice of Adverse Claim before the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to protect
their rights over the subject property. Very much later, Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a
reconveyance suit before the RTC in Quezon City.
The Tarrosas, in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, averred that the lot Bonifacio
sold to them was his exclusive property inasmuch as he was still single when he acquired it
from PHHC. As further alleged, they were not aware of the supposed marriage between
Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.

ISSUE:

Is the land purchased on installment before marriage, where some installments were paid
during the marriage is conjugal property?

RULING:

No. Given that the subject property is presumed to be conjugal, which in turn makes the
contract between Bonifacio and the Tarrosas void under Art. 166 of the Civil Code.

As Provided by Art. 160 of the Civil Code, the subject property is “… presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife.” Since Art. 166 of the Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband
may alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that the
acts or transactions executed against this mandatory provision are void except when the law
itself authorized their validity.

As a final consideration, the Court agrees with the CA that the sale of one-half of the
conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership is void. Prior to the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere
expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into
a title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and
settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanenteliquido"
(haberganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its
dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not
vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the
marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are
net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.

Therefore, even on the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his portion of the conjugal
partnership, the sale is still theoretically void, for, as previously stated, the right of the
husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership.

Nevertheless, this Court is mindful of the fact that the Tarrosas paid a valuable consideration
in the amount of PhP 19,000 for the property in question. Thus, as a matter of fairness and
equity, the share of Bonifacio after the liquidation of the partnership should be liable to
reimburse the amount paid by the Tarrosas.

Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz

G.R. No. L-19565, 30 January 1968

Nataa, Vera L.
FACTS:

Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married in Bacolod and begotten 6
children. During their coverture, they acquired several parcels of land and were engage in
various businesses. The plaintiff filed an action against her husband for the separation of
their properties. She further alleged that her husband aside from abandoning her also
mismanaged their conjugal properties.

On the other hand, Severino contended that he had always visited the conjugal home and
had provided support for the family despite his frequent absences when he was in Manila to
supervise the expansion of their business. Since 1955, he had not slept in the conjugal
dwelling instead stayed in his office at Texboard Factory although he paid short visits in the
conjugal home, which was affirmed by Estrella. The latter suspected that her husband had a
mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the urgency of the separation of property for the
fear that her husband might squander and dispose the conjugal assets in favor of the
concubine.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and whether or not
there has been an abused of his authority as administrator of the conjugal partnership.

RULING:

No. The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations and support
of the family.

To be legally declared as to have abandoned the conjugal home, one must have willfully and
with intention of not coming back and perpetual separation. The law provides that there
must be real abandonment and not mere separation. The abandonment must not only be
physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion.Therefore, physical
separation alone is not the full meaning of the term "abandonment", if the husband, despite
his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of
the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife.

In the case at bar, the Court believed that the defendant did not intend to leave his wife and
children permanently. Thus, the SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal
or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the
progress of the business constitutes abuse of administration. In order for abuse to exist,
there must be a willful and utter disregard of the interest of the partnership evidenced by a
repetition of deliberate acts or omissions prejudicial to the latter.
Partosa-Jo v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 82606, 18 December 1992

Olasiman, Jason S.

FACTS:
The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent.
The latter admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a
complaint against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an
earlier action for support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite disposition of
the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property.
Jose elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The complaint on
the separation of property was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that
separation by agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima contested
that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents
during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never
agreed to be separated permanently. She even returned to him but the latter refused to
accept her.

ISSUE:

WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal
property.

RULING:

The petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the
conjugal property of the spouses be divided between them, share and share alike. The
division will be implemented after the determination of all the properties pertaining to the said
conjugal partnership including those that may have been illegally registered in the name of
the persons. SC is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary
modification instead of dismissing the case filed.

Art. 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval, shall not
affect the conjugal partnership, except that:

(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may
petition the court for a receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal partnership
property or separation of property.

For abandonment to exist there must be an absolute cessation of marital relations, duties
and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The fact that Jo did not accept her
demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. From 1968
until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to Prima. Hence, the physical
separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support
to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation
of their conjugal property.

BA Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 61464, 28 May 1988

Santiago, Prince Dave C.

FACTS:

Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced
by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as a representative of A&L Industries.
Augusto presented an alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who
managed the business and under whose name the said business was registered,
purportedly authorized the husband to procure the loan and sign the promissory note.
2months prior the procurement of the loan, Augusto left Lily and their children which in turn
abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became due and demandable,
Augusto failed to pay the same.

The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that said spouses
were guilty of fraud consisting of the execution of Deed of Assignment assigning the rights,
titles and interests over a construction contract executed by and between the spouses and
A. Soriano Corporation. The writ hereby prayed for was issued by the trial court and not
contented with the order; petitioner filed a motion for the examination of attachment debtor
alleging that the properties attached by the sheriff were not sufficient to secure the
satisfaction of any judgment which was likewise granted by the court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the
husband.

RULING:

Yes. A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is Lily Yulo. The said
proprietorship was established during the marriage and assets were also acquired during the
same. Hence, it is presumed that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the
spouses and be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband. However, for the
property to be liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. The obligation was contracted by Augusto for his own
benefit because at the time he incurred such obligation, he had already abandoned his
family and left their conjugal home. He likewise made it appear that he was duly authorized
by his wife in behalf of the company to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, there
must be the requisite showing that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the spouses.

Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the
partnership.

However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage,
that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate
children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is
bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the
liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purpose above-mentioned.

Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto
against his conjugal properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of attachmentcannot be
issued against the said properties and that the petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual
damages amouting to P660,000.00.

Johnson v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 102692, 23 September 1996

Tambolero, Daisy Mae O.

FACTS:
Delilah Vinluan purchased products from petitioner for her retail business under the name of
“Vinluan Enterprises” incurring an obligation of P235,880.89 for which she issued seven
checks of varying amounts and due dates that bounced and were dishonored for having
been drawn against insufficient funds. Partial payments were made after several demands.
When no further payments were made to settle the obligation, J&J filed a complaint against
the spouses for collection of the principal obligation plus interest with damages. RTC
rendered decision in favor of J&J and found that there was no “privity of contract between
J&J and defendant husband Alejo Vinluan regarding the obligations incurred by the wife”.
Husband was made a co-owner of the enterprise afer the obligation involved in this action
has been incurred.

The court then issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to execute judgment on the
properties of the wife. However, the 2 notices of levy on execution covered not only her
exclusive paraphernal properties but also the properties of the conjugal partnership of the
spouses. This led the husband to file a third-party claim seeking the lifting of the levy on the
conjugal properties. Trial court denied the third-party claim since Alejo’s consent became
evident when he did not seek the intervention of the Court to air his objections in his wife’s
engaging business coupled by the fact that he made several representations for the
settlement of his wife’s account.

Thus, even his capital may be liable aside from the conjugal and paraphernal property.
Private respondent elevated the matter to CA, charging the trial court with grave abuse of
discretion for effectively reversing its own final judgment. CA upheld private respondent.
Hence this petition by J&J.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the husband may be held liable for the debts incurred by his wife without his
consent and did not benefit the conjugal partnership?

RULING:
No, the husband cannot be held liable for the debts incurred by his wife without his consent.
The wife and her paraphernal property can be held liable. And since the power of the
execution of judgment extends only to properties belonging to the judgment debtor alone,
the conjugal property and the capital of the husband cannot be levied upon. In any event
that Delilah’s paraphernal properties are insufficient, in order to bind the conjugal partnership
properties, the debts and obligations contracted by either the husband or the wife must be
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and that the husband must consent to his wife’s
engaging in business. The respondent court already found that the husband did not give his
consent neither did the obligation incurred by the wife redound to the benefit of the family.

Art. 117. The wife may exercise any profession or occupation or engage in business.
However, the husband may object, provided:

(1) His income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing, and

(2) His opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds.

In case of disagreement on this question, the parents and grandparents as well as the family
council, if any, shall be consulted. If no agreement is still arrived at, the court will decide
whatever may be proper and in the best interest of the family."

Spouses Laperal v. Spouses Katigbak

G.R. No. L-16991, 31 March 1964

Acopiado, Ariel M.

FACTS:

In August 1950, the Laperals filed a case and was granted by the trial court against the
Katigbaks in recovery of P14,000 and jewelry amounting to P97,500 or in lieu thereof, to pay
such amount. A month after the decision was rendered, Evelina filed a complaint against
her husband for judicial separation of property and separate administration which was
granted by the court and was sought for annulment by the Laperals.

Specifically, CFI Manila declared the property covered by TCT No.57626 as separate or
paraphernal property of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak. The spouses Laperal disagree with this
finding reiterating that its improvements and income are conjugal assets of the Spouses
Katigbak.

When the spouses Katigbak got married, neither of them brought properties unto the
marriage. Ramon’s occupation rendered him a monthly income of P200.00. The property in
question was registered in the name of “Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak married to Ramon
Katigbak”. The latter declared that her mother was the one who bought the property for her
and had placed it only in her name as the practice of her mother in buying properties and
placing them directly in the names of her children. The husband having no interest with the
property only signed the document for the purpose of assisting his wife.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the property in question constitutes the paraphernal property of Evelina.

RULING:

Yes. The property in question is an exclusive property of Evelina.

It is true that the law states that all properties acquired during the marriage are presumed
conjugal. It is however not conclusive but merely rebuttable, unless it be proved that the
property belongs exclusively to the husband and wife.

In the case at bar, the deed of the land is under the name of the wife. At the time it was
purchased, the property was of substantial value and as admitted, the husband by himself
could not have afforded to buy considering his singular source of income.
Villanueva v. Intermediate Appellate Court
GR No. 67582, 29 October 1987

Aguila-Granada, Cherrie Mae E.

FACTS:

Modesto Aranas, husband of Victoria, inherited a land from his father. Dorothea and
Teodoro, Modesto’s illegitimate children, borrowed money from private respondent Jesus
Bernas, mortgaging as collateral their father’s property. In the loan agreement, Aranas
described themselves as the absolute co-owners. Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay the
loan resulting to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage in 1977 and thereafter Bernas
acquired the land as the highest bidder. Aftewards, the Aranases executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition in 1978, in which they adjudicated the same land unto themselves in
equal share pro-indiviso. Bernas then consolidated his ownership over the lot when the
mortgagors failed to redeem it withn the reglementary period, and had the title in the name of
Modesto cancelled and another TCT issued in his name.

In 1978, petitioner Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against
respondents spouses Jesus and RemediosBernas, for the cancellation of the TCT under the
name of the Bernases, and they be declared co-owners of the land. Petitioner alleged that
spouses Modesto and Victoria in 1987 and 1958 executed 2 separate wills: first bequeathing
to Consolacion and Raymundo and to Dorothea and Teodoro, in equal shares pro diviso, all
of said Victoria’s shares from the conjugal partnership property; and second Modesto’s
interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his separate properties
bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro. Trial court dismissed the complaint, declaring herein
respondents as the legal owners of the disputed property. IAC likewise affirmed the lower
court’s decision.

ISSUE:

WON Villanueva had a right over the land and the improvements thereon made by Victoria
who rendered the lot as conjugal property.
RULING:

No. Villanueva did not have a right over the land and the improvements thereon made by
Victoria who rendered the lot as conjugal property. There was no proof presented by
Villanueva. Such proof is needed at the time of the making or construction of the
improvements and the source of the funds used thereof in order to determine the character
of the improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership or to one spouse separately.
Article 148 of the Civil Code clearly decrees: that to be considered as "the exclusive property
of each spouse" is inter alia, "that which is brought to the marriage as his or her own," or
"that which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title."

What is certain is that the land on which the improvements stand was the exclusive
property of Modesto and that where the property is registered in the name of one spouse
only and there is no showing of when precisely the property was acquired, the presumption
is that is belongs exclusively to said spouse. Therefore, the land was not a conjugal
partnership property of Victoria and Modesto. It was Modesto’s exclusive property since he
inherited it from his parents. Moreover, since Victoria died ahead of Modesto, Victoria did
not inherit said lot from him and therefore had nothing of the land to bequeath by will of
otherwise to Consolacion.

Bank of Philippine Islands v. Posadas

GR No. 34583, 22 October 1931

Bato, Neah Hope L.

FACTS:

BPI, as administrator of the estate of deceased AdolpheSchuetze, appealed to CFI Manila

absolving defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, from the complaint filed against him in
recovering the inheritance tax amounting to P1209 paid by the plaintiff, Rosario GelanoVda
de Schuetze, under protest, and sum of P20,150 representing the proceeds of the
insurance policy of the deceased.

Rosario and Adolphe were married in January 1914. The wife was actually residing and
living in Germany when Adolphe died in December 1927. The latter while in Germany,
executed a will in March 1926, pursuant with its law wherein plaintiff was named his
universal heir. The deceased possessed not only real property situated in the Philippines
but also personal property consisting of shares of stocks in 19 domestic corporations.
Included in the personal property is a life insurance policy issued at Manila on January 1913
for the sum of $10,000 by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Manila Branch. In
the insurance policy, the estate of the deceased was named the beneficiary without any
qualification. Rosario is the sole and only heir of the deceased. BPI, as administrator of the
decedent’s estate and attorney in fact of the plaintiff, having been demanded by Posadas to
pay the inheritance tax, paid under protest. Notwithstanding various demands made by
plaintiff, Posadas refused to refund such amount.

ISSUE:
WON the plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds of the insurance.

RULING:

SC ruled that (1) the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on
which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute community property,
and belong one-half to the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; (2) if the
premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are
likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part; and (3) the proceeds of a
life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the
testamentary administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate
administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter, if they
belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in
these Islands or outside.
In the case at bar: A husband insured himself during his marriage and made his estate, not
his wife, as beneficiary. The premiums paid were borne by the Conjugal Partnership, Later,
the husband died. The heirs of the husband as well as the wife are entitled to the proceeds
of the insurance. The proceeds of a life Insurance policy payable to an insured person’s
estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute conjugal
property, and belong one-half exclusively to the husband and the other half to the wife. If the
premiums were paid partly with separate property, and partly with conjugal funds, the
proceeds are in like proportion separate in part and conjugal in part. This is the just
interpretation of the article. To have the estate as the sole beneficiary would be to sanction a
fraud upon the wife.

Hence, the defendant was ordered to return to the plaintiff one-half of the tax collected upon
the amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the late
Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first
premium.

Wong v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 70082, 19 August 1991

Buenafe, Aileen B.

FACTS:

Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children however, even
during the early years of their marriage; the spouses had been most of the time living
separately. During the marriage or on about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of
land in Angeles from his father using the money borrowed from an officemate. Sometime in
June 1972, Katrina entered an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter consigned the
former pieces of jewelry valued at P321, 830.95. Katrina failed to return the same within the
20 day period thus Anita demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in September
1972, check of P55, 000 which was dishonored due to lack of funds.

The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money
against Katrina and her husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was only in
behalf of Katrina. Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of execution was
thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of Romarico Henson
married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public auction to Juanito Santos and
the other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such redemption, Romarico filed an
action for annulment of the decision including the writ and levy of execution.

ISSUE:

WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be satisfied through the
conjugal property.

RULING:

The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business deal with
Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor
authorized her to enter into such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the
marriage with unclear proof where the husband obtained the money to repay the loan.
Hence, it is presumed to belong in the conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they
are exclusive property of the husband and even though they had been living separately.

Under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988), a wife
may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the
support of the family or when she borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things
necessary for the support of the family if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum; when
the administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by
the husband and when the wife gives moderate donations for charity.

The conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrina’s obligations as she exclusively incurred
the latter without the consent of her husband nor they did redound to the benefit of the
family. There was also no evidence submitted that the administration of the partnership had
been transferred to Katrina by Romarico before said obligations were incurred. In as much
as the decision was void only in so far as Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned,
Spouses Wong may still execute the debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively.

Ayala Investments v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 118305, 12 February 1998

Caipang, Lea A.

FACTS:

Yes. Campos Rueda was held liable to support his wife. The law provides that the husband,
who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed
pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this option given by
law is NOT absolute.

This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of
marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of
which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it
by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A
judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a
penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for
the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from
necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as where
the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting
her.

In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd
designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the
husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home. The pro tanto
separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public
policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a
stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is
tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does
NOT in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife
in the situation of a feme sole.

ISSUE:

Whether or not loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments as guaranteed by Alfredo
Ching be redounded to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.

RULING:

No, the conjugal partnership of private respondents is not liable for the obligation by the
respondent-husband.

Article 121 of the Family Code provides that. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: x
xx (2) all debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated
Administrator-Spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains x xx. The burden of
proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies
with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such.

The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of
Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioners-
appellees. In the case at bar, respondent-appellant AIDC failed to prove that the debt was
contracted by appellee-husband, for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains.

Carlos v. Abelardo
G.R. No. 146504, 4 April 2002

Capin, Mary Jade L.

FACTS:
Respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached the petitioner
requesting the same to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 (P625,000.00) for the
purchase of a house and lot. To enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life
independently, petitioner issued a Banker’s Trust check in the name of certain Pura Vallejo,
seller of the property, who acknowledged its receipt. The amount was in full payment of the
property.

When petitioner inquired from the spouses as to the status of the amount loaned to them,
the latter acknowledged their obligation but pleaded they were not yet in a position to make a
definite settlement of the same. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to
petitioner’s inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various death threats against
petitioner. Petitioner, then, made a formal demand for the payment.

Respondent claimed that the said US$25,000.00 was never intended as loan. It was his
share of income on contracts obtained by him from H.L. Carlos Construction Inc., a firm
owned by petitioner. He further averred that he did not sign the acknowledgment executed
and signed by his wife.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not US$25,000.00 amount to a loan.

2. Whether or not respondent is solidarily liable with his wife despite lack of consent of the
former.

RULING:

1. YES. Respondent cannot allege as a defense that the amount of US$25,000.00 was
received as his share in the income or profits of the corporation and not as a loan. Firstly,
respondent does not appear to be a stockholder nor an employee nor an agent of the
corporation, H.L. Carlos Construction, Inc., thus, he has no right to participate in the income
of profits thereof nor has he a right to receive any salary or commission therefrom. Secondly,
the amount advanced for the purchase of the house and lot came from the personal account
of the petitioner, not from the corporation’s. Hence, the US$25,000.00 is a loan.

2. YES. Article 121 of the Family Code explicitly provides that conjugal partnership shall be
liable for “debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other
to the extent that the family may have been benefited.”

“While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by
his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to
purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his family.
Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, he shall be solidarily
liable for such loan together with his wife.”

Mariano v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 51283, 7 June 1989
Denura, Lady Rubyge A.

FACTS:

The proceedings at bar concern (1) an attempt by a married man to prevent execution
against conjugal property of a judgment rendered against his wife, for obligations incurred by
the latter while engaged in a business that had admittedly redounded to the benefit of the
family, and (2) the interference by a court with the proceedings on execution of a co-equal or
coordinate court. Both acts being proscribed by law, correction is called for and will hereby
be effected. The proceedings originated from a suit filed by Esther Sanchez against Lourdes
Mariano in the Court of First Instance at Caloocan City, for recovery of the value of ladies’
readymade dresses allegedly purchased by and delivered to the latter.

Daniel Sanchez, Esther’s husband, now made his move. He filed a complaint for annulment
of the execution in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City in his capacity as administrator
of the conjugal partnership. He alleged that the conjugal assets could not validly be made to
answer for obligations exclusively contracted by his wife, and that, moreover, some of the
personal property levied on, such as household appliances and utensils necessarily used in
the conjugal dwelling, were exempt from execution.

ISSUE:

WON the claim that property levied on in execution of a judgment is not property of the
judgment debtor, Daniel Sanchez’s wife, but of the conjugal partnership of the Sanchez
Spouses.

RULING:

In the case at bar, the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a “stranger” to the
case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife. In any case, whether by intervention in the
court issuing the writ, or by separate action, it is unavailing for either Esther Sanchez or her
husband, Daniel, to seek preclusion of the enforcement of the writ of possession against
their conjugal assets. For it being established, as aforestated, that Esther had engaged in
business with her husband’s consent, and the income derived therefrom had been
expended, in part at least, for the support of her family, the liability of the conjugal assets to
respond for the wife’s obligations in the premises cannot be disputed.
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the
partnership.

However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage,
that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate
children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is
bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the
liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purpose above-mentioned.

Ching v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 124642, 23 February 2004

Eguia, Paula Bianca B.

FACTS:

The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of P9,000,000 from
the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). As an added security for the said loan, Alfredo Ching,
together with Emilio Tadeo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guaranty with the
ABC binding them to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI
obligations owing to the ABC. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans.

Hence, the ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary
attachment. Citing as one of the grounds for the writ was the fraud defendants employed in
incurring the obligations by representing themselves as having the financial capacity to pay
the loan when in fact they did not have such capacity. In the meantime, on July 26, 1983, the
deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp
stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching.

On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching, filed
a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment. She alleged inter alia that the 100,000 shares
of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their
marriage out of conjugal funds after the Citycorp Investment Philippines was established in
1974. She, likewise, alleged that being the wife of Alfredo Ching, she was a third-party
claimant entitled to file a motion for the release of the properties. She attached therewith a
copy of her marriage contract with Alfredo Ching.

ISSUE:

Is the conjugal partnership liable for the payment of the liability?

RULING:

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the
marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife. In Tan v. Court of Appeals, the court held
that it is not even necessary to prove that the properties were acquired with funds of the
partnership. As long as the properties were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they
are presumed to be conjugal in nature. In fact, even when the manner in which the
properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties
will still be considered conjugal. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties
acquired during the marriage subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence to overcome the same.

In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares
of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its
corporate books in the name of the petitioner-husband when the said corporation was
incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done during the subsistence of the marriage of the
petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership
property of the petitioners. The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the
petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money. The barefaced fact that the
shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp Investment Philippines
solely in the name of the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the petitioner-
husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same.

For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband
alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to
make a conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to one of
the spouses is to frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost concern
for the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the
power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal
partnership.

In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the
petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty
and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The
contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of
the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband
entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership
would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such
benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.

If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the
money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that
contract falls within the term "… obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here,
no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the
time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services,
the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business
or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or
does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the
family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. In this case, the petitioner-husband acted merely as a
surety for the loan contracted by the PBMCI from the private respondent. The petition is
GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE AND
REVERSED. The assailed orders of the RTC are AFFIRMED.
Buado v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 145222, 24 April 2009

Fernandez, Aisha Mie Faith M.

FACTS:

On April 30 1984, Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado, petitioners, filed a complaint for
damages against Erlinda Nicol for her civil liability arising from criminal offense of slander
filed by petitioners. Trial court rendered a decision to let Erlinda Nicol pay for damages.
Finding Erlinda Nicol‘s personal properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment. The sheriff
levied and auctioned the property of Erlinda. An auction sale was held with the petitioners as
the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Buado. After
almost one year, the husband of Erlinda, Romulo Nicol, filed a complaint for the annulment
of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and deputy
sheriff. He argued that there was no proper publication and posting for the auction sale. He
also claimed that the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol amounted to P40,000 only. The
spouses Buado obtained the P500, 000 worth of property for only P51,685. The Regional
Trial Court dismissed the petition of Romulo Nicol.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and held that Branch 21 has
jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by the respondent in this case. The petitioners filed a
petition where they said that the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion for
reversing the decision given by the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arising from her criminal liability is chargeable
to the conjugal partnership.

RULING:

NO. Erlinda Nicol‟s liability is not chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family
Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.Unlike in the system of absolute
community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is
chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the
exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system
of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make
advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.

Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable
to the conjugal partnership. In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that the car which was
claimed by the third party complainant to be conjugal property was being levied upon to
enforce "a judgment for support" filed by a third person, the third-party claim of the wife is
proper since the obligation which is personal to the husband is chargeable not on the
conjugal property but on his separate property. Hence, the filing of a separate action by
Romulo Nicol was proper. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Mallilin v. Castro
G.R. No. 136803, 16 June 2000

Gahuman, Kristine Camille B.

FACTS:

Mallilin and Castillo cohabited together while their respective marriage still subsisted. During
their union, they set up Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation. The business
flourished and the couple acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely
in Castillo's name. Due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Mallilin filed a
complaint for partition and/or payment of Co-ownership share, accounting and damages
against Castillo. Castillo, in her answer, alleged that co-ownership could not exist between
them because according to Article 144 of the Civil Code, rules on co-ownership shall govern
the properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not
married, they are not capacitated to marry each other because of their valid subsisting
marriage. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real and personal properties involved
in Mallilin's action of partition on the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own
money and registered solely in her name.

ISSUE:

Whether or not co-ownership exists between them.

RULING:

Yes. Co-ownership exists between Mallilin and Castillo even though they are incapacitated
to marry each other.

Art 148 provides that properties acquired through the parties joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions
which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. The determination of
the contributions needs to be made in a judicial proceeding as it requires a finding of facts.

Their union suffered the legal impediment of a prior subsisting marriage. Article 144 of the
Civil Code does not cover parties living in an adulterous relationship. Their property regime
falls under Article 148 of the Family Code where co-ownership is limited.

Francisco v. Master Iron Works Construction Corp.

G.R. No. 151967, 16 February 2005

Guige, Marife G.

FACTS:
Josefina Castillo was 24 years old when she and Eduardo Francisco got married on January
1983. The latter was then employed as Vice President in a Private Corporation. Josefina
acquired two parcels of land where Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
Josefina, married to Eduardo. An affidavit of waiver was executed by Eduardo where he
declared that prior to his marriage with Josefina, the latter purchased the land with her own
savings and that he waived whatever claims he had over the property. When Josefina
mortgaged the property for a loan, Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. In
1990, Eduardo who was then a General Manager, bought bags of cement from defendant
but failed to pay the same. The latter filed a complaint for recovery and trial court rendered
judgment against Eduardo. The court then issued a writ of execution and the sheriif issued a
notice of levy on execution over the alleged property of Josefina for the recovery of the
balance of the amount due under the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a third party
claim over the 2 parcels of land in which she claimed as her paraphernal property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo.

RULING:

The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her
personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was the sole owner. The
Deed of Absolute Sale on record showed it was issued after her marriage. Their case fall
under Article 148 and since they got married before the Family Code, the provision, pursuant
to Art 256, can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights. Petitioner
likewise failed that she had any vested right.

Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that invalidates such
marriage, Art 148 should be applied. In the absence of proof that the wife/husband has
actually contributed money, property, or industry to the properties acquired during such
union the presumption of co-ownership will not arise.

The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision of CA that the property was conjugal
was affirmed.
Abing v. Waeyan
G.R. No. 146294, 31 July 2006
Lagare, Liezel O.

FACTS:

In 1986, John Abing and Juliet Waeyan cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. Together, they bought a 2-storey residential house. In December 1991, Juliet left
for Korea and worked thereat, sending money to John which the latter deposited in their joint
account. In 1992, their house was renovated and to it was annex a structure which housed a
sari-sari store. In 1994, Juliet returned.

In 1995, they decided to partition their properties as their relationship soured. They executed
a Memorandum of Agreement. Unfortunately, the document was left unsigned by the parties
although signed by the witnesses thereto. Under their unsigned agreement, John shall leave
the dwelling with Juliet paying him the amount of P428,870.00 representing John's share in
all their properties. Juliet paid John the sum of P232,397.66 by way of partial payment of his
share, with the balance of P196,472.34 to be paid by Juliet in twelve monthly installment.

Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance. John demanded Juliet to vacate the annex
structure. Juliet refused, prompting John to file an ejectment suit against her. John alleged
that he alone spent for the construction of the annex structure with his own funds and thru
the money he borrowed from his relatives. He added that the tax declaration for the structure
was under his name.

ISSUE:

Does John exclusively own the property subject of the suit?

RULING:

No. Other than John's bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and money he
borrowed from his relatives, spent for the construction of the annex structure, evidence
wants to support such naked claim.

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.

The law is clear. In the absence of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by common-
law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their
joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by
the rules on co-ownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in common "in
equal shares."

Being herself a co-owner, Juliet may not be ejected from the structure in question. She is as
much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as John. Juliet's failure to pay John the
balance of the latter's share in their common properties could at best give rise to an action
for a sum of money against Juliet, or for rescission of the said agreement and not for
ejectment.
Agapay v. Palang
G.R. No. 116668, 28 July 1997
Lim, Gretchen Rina A.

FACTS:

Miguel Palang married his first wife Carlina in 1949. In 1972, Miguel returned to the
Philippines for good but did not choose to leave with his wife and daughter Herminia. In July
1973, then 63 years old Miguel contracted his second marriage with 19 years old Erlinda
Agapay.

In May 1973 or two months prior to their marriage Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a
parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan. Upon the death of
Miguel in 1981, Carlina and Herminia filed a case to recover the ownership and possession
of the Agricultural land in Pangasinan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property acquired during the illicit cohabitation or subsequent void
marriage (Erlinda and Miguel) belongs to conjugal property of the first and valid marriage
(Carlina and Miguel).

RULING:

Yes. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for
cases of cohabitation when a man and woman who are not capacitated to marry each other
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under
a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage, said union was patently void
because earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the
latter’s de facto separation.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is
required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of
equal shares.

Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy-and-
sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade the SC that she actually contributed
money to buy the riceland. Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the
purchase price of the riceland, SC finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over
the same.
Juaniza v. Jose
G.R. No. L-50127-28, 30 March 1979

Lomosad, Frillin M.
FACTS:

Eugenio Jose, a registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an
accident of collision with a freight train of the PNR that took place in November 1969
resulted in the 7 deaths and 5 physical injuries of its passengers. That time, Eugenio was
married to Socorro but had been cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo, defendant-appellant for 16
years as husband and wife. Trial court decision rendered them jointly and severally liable to
pay damages to the heir of the deceased, Victor Juaniza. A motion was prayed for by
Rosalia for the decision to be reconsidered.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Eugenio and Rosalia are co-owners of the jeepney.

RULING:

No. Eugenio and Rosalia are not co-owners of the jeepney.

It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144
of the Civil Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way
be incapacitated to contract marriage. It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the
registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from
consequences incident to its operation, or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein.

Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to
contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the afore-cited provision of the Civil Code,
Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal
partnership of Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo
for damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of
the jeepney which figured in the collision. Rosalia Arroyo, who is not the registered owner of
the jeepney can neither be liable for damages caused by its operation.

Tumlos v. Fernandez
G.R. No. 137650, 12 April 2000

Malate, Desmarc G.

FACTS:

Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed against
Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged that they
are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through their tolerance they allowed
the Tumlos’ to occupy the apartment for the last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was
agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month while the other defendants promised to pay
1,000 a month which was not complied with. Demand was made several times for the
defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need of the property for the construction of
a new building.
Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that
they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was likewise alleged that they
lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that
Gullerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she
discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of their marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.

RULING:

No. It is well settled that Mario is still validly married with Lourdes and actual contribution
needs to be proven.

Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman who is not legally capacitated to
marry each other, but who nonetheless lives together conjugally, may be deemed co-owners
of a property acquired during the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an actual
contribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere cohabitation without proof of contribution will not
result in a co-ownership.

SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject property. The
claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there was no other evidence
presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having
cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two children were true, the claim of co-
ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma
and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. The property relation governing their
supposed cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is
required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisitions of
common property by one who has no salary, income, work or industry. Such is not included
in Art 148. If actual contribution is not proven then there can be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.
Docena v. Lapesura
GR No. 140153, 28 March 2001

Nataa, Vera L.

FACTS:

Casiano Hombria, private respondent, filed a complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land
against his lessees, petitioner-spouses, Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The spouses claimed
ownership of the land based on the occupation since time immemorial. The petitioners filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial judge in issuing orders and that of the sheriff in issuing the writ of demolition.

The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the petition was filed beyond the 60-day
period provided in the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and that the certification of non-
forum shopping attached thereto was signed by only one of the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is sufficient that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only
one of the petitioners.

RULING:

Yes, such certificate signed by Antonio Docena alone should be deemed to constitute
substantial compliance with the rules.

Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband
and the wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent
of both spouses is required, joint management or administration does not require that the
husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of
management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases as provided
under Article 124 of the Family Code. It is believed that even under the provisions of the
Family Code, the husband alone could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to
contest the writs of demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals
without being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum
shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect.

The two petitioners in this case are husband and wife and their residence is the subject
property alleged to be a conjugal property. In view of the property involved which is a
conjugal property, the petition questioning the writ of demolition thereof originated from an
action for recovery brought against the spouses and is clearly intended for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership and the wife as point out was in the province of Samar whereas the
petition was prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid application of the rules on forum shopping that
would disauthorize a husband’s signing the certification in his behalf and that of his wife is
too harsh. Hence, petition was granted and the case was remanded to the CA for further
proceedings.

Martinez v. Martinez
GR No. 162084, 28 June 2005
Olasiman, Jason S.

FACTS:

Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land.
The former executed a last will and testament directing the subdivision of the property into 3
lots bequeathed to each of his sons namely Rodolfo, Manolo (designated as administrator of
the estate), and Daniel Jr. In October 1997, Daniel Sr. died. Rodolfo then found a deed of
sale purportedly signed by his father on September 1996 where it appears that the land was
sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila and was also issued to them. Rodolfo filed a complaint
against his brother Manolo and sister-in-law Lucila for the annulment of the deed of sale and
cancellation of the TCT. Spouses wrote Rodolfo demanding him to vacate the property
which the latter ignored and refused to do so. This prompted the spouses to file a complaint
for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo. This matter was referred to the barangay for
conciliation and settlement but none was reached. It was alleged in the position paper of the
spouses that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made but the same proved
futile.

ISSUE:

WON spouses Martinez complied with the requirements of Art 151 of the Family Code.

RULING:

No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but the same
have failed.

Lucila Martinez, the respondent’s sister-in-law was one of the plaintiffs in the case at bar.
The petitioner is not a member of the same family as that of her deceased husband and the
respondent. Her relationship with the respondent is not one of those enumerated in Article
150. It should also be noted that the petitioners were able to comply with the requirements
of Article 151 because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding
against the respondent for unlawful detainer in the katarungan Pambarangay in compliance
with PD. 1508 and that after due proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at
resulting in the barangay chairman’s issuance of a certificate to file action.

Hontiveros v. RTC
GR No. 125465, 29 June 1999

Santiago, Prince Dave C.

FACTS:

Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against
private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners alleged that
they are the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from
the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case. In the reply, private
respondents denied that they were married and alleged that Gregorio was a widower while
Teodora was single. They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of and income
from the land. On the contrary, according to the private respondents, the possession of the
property in question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of
possession. Trial court denied petitioner’s motion that while in the amended complaint, they
alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made, it was not verified as
provided in Article 151.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted
towards a compromise.

RULING:

SC held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant and Maria
Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article 151.

Art. 151 (1). No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should
appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact
made, the same case must be dismissed.

Under this provision, the phrase “members of the same family” refers to the husband and
wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters whether
full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal
effects in this jurisdiction. Teodora and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros’ are regarded as
strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151.

Manalo v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 141297, 8 October 2001

Tambolero, Daisy Mae O.

FACTS:

Troadic Manalo who died on February 1992, was survived by his Pilar and his 11 children.
The deceased left several real properties in Manila and a business in Tarlac. In November
1992, herein respondents, 8 of the surviving children, filed a petition with RTC Manila for the
judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for appointment of their brother
Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof. Hearing was set on February 11, 1993 and the
herein petitioners were granted 10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of
the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition
for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that
earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made
prior to the filing of the petition but that the same have failed.

RULING:

No, SC ruled that herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule
1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased
Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough, to wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it
should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035.

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is
clear from the term suit that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another
or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords
him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A
civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Besides, an excerpt from the
Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission
to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial
and involve members of the same family.

Albano vs. Gapusan

AM No. 1022-MJ, 7 May 1976

Acopiado, Ariel M.

FACTS:

Redentor Albano filed a complaint against Judge Gapusan seeking disciplinary action
involving latter’s malpractice in his notarization of a separation agreement between Valentina
Andres and Guillermo Maligta and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership.
In the abovementioned separation agreement, it was stipulated that the spouse guilty of
adultery or concubinage shall be barred to file an action against the other. Respondent judge
denied that he drafted the said agreement and explained that the spouses had been
separated for a long time when they signed it and the wife had begotten children with her
paramour. He further added that there was a stipulation in the said agreement that the
spouse would live together in case of reconciliation.

ISSUE:

WON Judge Gapusan should be reprimanded because of notarizing the void agreement
between the spouses.

RULING:

Yes. A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by
encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal
partnership.

The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. To
preserve the institution of marriage, the law considers void any contract for personal
separation between husband and wife and every extra-judicial agreement for the dissolution
of the partnership.
There is no question that the stipulation contained in the said separation agreement is
contrary to law, morals and good customs. SC held the action of respondent judge Gapusan
as contrary to law and as a member of the bar, censured him for having notarized the above-
mentioned void agreement.

Modequillo v. Breva
GR. No. 86355, 31 May 1990

Aguila-Granada, Cherrie Mae E.

FACTS:

The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at PoblacionMalalag, Davao del Sur
on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land
located at DalagbongBulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A
motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the
family home is built since 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities
mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the
family home is not one of those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is
alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original
possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential house in
the present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153.

ISSUE:

WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home in as much as it does not fall
under the exemption from execution.

RULING:

No. The subject property is deemed to be a family home but it does not fall under the
exemption from execution of the money judgment aforecited.

Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall
also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not
mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing
family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply
means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2,
Title V have a retroactive effect.

The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of
the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was
rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988. Therefore, this case does not fall under the exemptions
from execution provided in the Family Code.

As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on
whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.

Manacop v. Court of Appeals

GR No. 104875, 13 November 1992

Bato, Neah Hope L.

FACTS:

Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a
bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant
to a deed of assignment signed between petitioner’s corporation and private respondent
herein (FF Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money
with a prayer for preliminary attachment against the former. Consequently, the
corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of
a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop Construction President, the
petitioner. The latter insists that the attached property is a family home having been
occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from attachment.

ISSUE:

WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.

RULING:

The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under
Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner’s included, are deemed
to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Since
petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is
therefore not exempt form attachment.

Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the
time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or
extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it
is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the
necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or
head of the family who owns the home.

Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:

“The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:

(1) For nonpayment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;

(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who
have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the
family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.”
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family
home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by
operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a
family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one
year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).

Article 153 of the Family Code Has No Retroactive Effect

The petition was dismissed by SC.

Arriola v. Arriola
G.R. No. 177703, 28 January 2008

Buenafe, Aileen B.

FACTS:

Fidel Arriola who married twice died and is survived by his legal heirs: John Nabor Arriola
(respondent), his son with his first wife, and Vilma G. Arriola, his second wife and his other
son, Anthony Ronald Arriola (petitioners). On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a
decision ordering the partition of the parcel of land left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by
and among his heir John, Vilma and Anthony in equal shares of one-third each without
prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any. However, the parties failed
to agree on how to divide the property and so the respondent proposed to sell it through
public auction. The petitioners initially agreed but refused to include in the auction the house
standing on the subject land because it is a family home.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject house is a family home.

RULING:

Yes. The subject house is a family home that it cannot be sold through public auction.
Based on Article 152, the Family Home, constituted jointly by the husband and wife or any
an unmarried head of the family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside,
and the land on which it is situated.

Article 153, the Family Home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any
beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of
the value allowed by law.

Article 159, the Family Home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of
the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reason.

Applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land
on which it stands is deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and the
petitioner Vilma from the moment that began occupying the same as a family residence 20
years back. Therefor the house cannot be forced to sale by the respondent because family
home is exempt on such sale.

Angeles vs. Maglaya

G.R. No. 153798, 2 September 2005

Caipang, Lea A.

FACTS:

Petitioner is the wife of the deceased while the respondent is the child of the deceased in his
first wife. Respondent seeks administration of the estate of the deceased but opposed by the
surviving wife (2nd wife) alleging that the respondent is an illegitimate child of the deceased.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is illegitimate precluding her to become the administratrix.

RULING:

No, respondent is not illegitimate.

Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: “Children conceived
or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.”

The issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgments; or

2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

The court ruled that the respondent is not an illegitimate child of the deceased and is entitled
to become the administratrix of the latter’s property.

Andal v. Macaraig
Capin, Mary Jade L.

Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 105625, 24 January 1994

Denura, Lady Rubyge A.

FACTS:

Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various properties located
in Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while his husband died in 1989. Vicente’s sister and nephew
filed a complaint for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate in favor of
the nephew, herein private respondent. The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised
and cared by the deceased spouses since childhood, though not related to them by blood,
nor legally adopted. The latter to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses
submitted documents such as her certificate of live birth where the spouses name were
reflected as her parents. She even testified that said spouses continuously treated her as
their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, the relatives of Vicente declared that said
spouses were unable to physically procreate hence the petitioner cannot be the biological
child. Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of
the spouses.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner’s certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her legitimacy.

RULING:

The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The mere registration of a child in his or her
birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It does not
confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such act amounts
to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public
document.
It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the latter. In the notarized document, they stated that
they were the sole heirs of the deceased because “she died without descendants and
ascendants”. In executing such deed, Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live
Birth of the petitioner where it appeared that he was the petitioner’s father.

Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by
proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child;
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3)
that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or
ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or
undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive
period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the
legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to
apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of
the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear
submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel.

As between the paternity by the husband and the paternity by the paramour, all the
circumstances being equal, the law is inclined to follow the former. Thus, the child is given
the benefit of legitimacy.

Concepcion v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 123450, 31 August 2005

Eguia, Paula Bianca B.

FACTS:

Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, was
married in December 1989 and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990.
The husband filed on December 1991, a petition to have his marriage annulled on the
ground of bigamy since the wife married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December
1980, whom according to the husband was still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial
court ruled that the son was an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife
while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa argued that there was nothing in the
law granting “visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child”. She
further wanted to have the surname of the son changed from “Concepcion to Almonte”, her
maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use his mother’s surname. After the
requested oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of
Gerardo but of Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario.

ISSUE:

Whether the child is the legitimate child of Ma.Theresa and Gopiao or the illegimate child of
Ma.Theresa and Gerardo.
RULING:

The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is
clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a
guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
Code provides:

Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. Gerardo
has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband
Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose
Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the
husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa
was void from the very beginning; he never became her husband and thus never acquired
any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
During the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon
City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola
Heights are only a scant four kilometres apart.

Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful
husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for them to
engage in the marital act. Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to
defeat the assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no
such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the
issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.

First, the import of Ma. Theres as statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son
with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration ― an avowal by the mother
that her child is illegitimate ― is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the
Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against
the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a
valid marriage.

Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an
instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that there occurred
absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was that she never lived with Mario.
She never claimed that nothing ever happened between them. Telling is the fact that both of
them were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose Gerardos conception and
birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity to each other only
serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of physical access was never
established beyond reasonable doubt.

Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresa’s statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a
right exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs. A mother has no right
to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, Ma. Theresa is not
permitted by law to question Jose Gerardos legitimacy.

Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she
had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. The proscription is
in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the
intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children.

The Court upholds the presumption of his legitimacy. As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo
shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in
conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. A persons surname or family
name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from parent to child. Hence,
Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not
related to him in any way.

Liyao v. Liyao
G.R. No. 138961, 7 March 2002

Fernandez, Aisha Mie Faith M.

FACTS:

William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother
(Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda
Liyao to recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to
be entitled to all successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment
of the status as the child of the deceased having been recognized and acknowledged as
such child by the decedent during his lifetime. There were two sides of the story. Corazon
G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten
(10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late
William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William’s untimely demise on December 2, 1975.
They lived together in the company of Corazon’s two (2) children from her subsisting
marriage. On the other hand, one of the children of the deceased stated that her mom and
the deceased were legally married and that her parents were not separated legally or in fact.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of the
deceased.

RULING:

Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed
to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a
declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice
and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.The presumption of legitimacy of the child,
however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the
contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides:

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty
days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

1)by the impotence of the husband;

2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was
not possible;

3) By the serious illness of the husband.

The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at
the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for
the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the
legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the
child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in
proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code.
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with
the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to
decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic
interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such
legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would
amount of an insult to his memory.

Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive evidence
presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

Eceta v. Eceta
GR No 157307, 20 May 2004

Gahuman, Kristine Camille B.

FACTS:

Petitioner and her husband acquired several properties, among which is the disputed
property. They begot a son who sired an illegitimate daughter, herein respondent. Upon his
death, petitioner and respondent are his compulsory heirs.

Respondent filed a case before RTC for Partition and Accounting with Damages against
petitioner alleging that by virtue of his father’s death, she became petitioner’s co-heir and
and co-owner of the disputed property. In her answer, Rosalina alleged that the property is
paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively.

During the pre-trial conference, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts wherein they
both admitted their relationship to one another, i.e., that petitioner is respondent’s
grandmother.

ISSUE:

Whether the admission made by petitioner that respondent is her granddaughter is enough
to prove respondent’s filiation with the only son of petitioner.

RULING:

No. The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In
fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself
a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.

Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly
authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresa’s birth certificate
thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to
have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa.
Constantino v. Mendez
G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992

Granada, Immanuel Y.

FACTS:

Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as represented by Amelita, her mother, sought

monthly support from Ivan Mendez including Amelia’s complaint on damages. The latter and
Amelita met in a restaurant in Manila where she was working as a waitress. Ivan invited him
at his hotel and through promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
Amelita, afterwards, he admitted being a married man. In spite of that, they repeated their
sexual contact. Subsequently, she became pregnant and had to resign from work.

Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and moral damages, acknowledging
Michael as Ivan’s illegitimate child and giving monthly support to the latter which was set
aside by CA.
ISSUE:

WON the alleged illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support.

RULING:

No. The illegitimate child is not entitled for the monthly support since Amelita Constantino
has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of
her son Michael Constantino.

Pertinent provisions of the Family Code are as follows:

Article 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless
otherwise provided in this Code.

Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.

Michael Constantino is a full-term baby born on August 3, 1975 so that citing medical
science, the conception of the child must have taken place about 267 days before August 3,
1975 or sometime in the second week of November, 1974. While Amelita testified that she
had sexual contact with Ivan in November 1974, nevertheless said testimony is contradicted
by her letter addressed to Ivan Mendez, informing the latter that the former is four (4) months
pregnant so that applying the period of the duration of actual pregnancy, the child was
conceived on or about October 11, 1974. Consequently, in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence establishing paternity or filiation, the complaint must be dismissed.

Bernabe v. Alejo
G.R. No. 140500, 21 January 2002
Guige, Marife G.
Jison v. Court of Appeals
GR No. 124853, 24 February 1998

Lagare, Liezel A.

FACTS:

Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison,
for recognition as illegitimate child of the latter. The case was filed 20 years after her
mother’s death and when she was already 39 years of age.

Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he
impregnated Esperanza Amolar, Monina’s mother. Monina alleged that since childhood, she
had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his
acts and that of his family. It was likewise alleged that petitioner supported her and spent for
her education such that she became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank Examiner.
Monina was able to present total of 11 witnesses.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.

RULING:

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same
way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides
the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.

“To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must
be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to
consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and
care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that
they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and
treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously”.

The following facts were established based on the testimonial evidences offered by Monina:

1. That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was
employed by the former;

2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct.
SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competence evidence as to the issue of paternity. Francisco’s lack of participation in the
preparation of baptismal certificates and school records render the documents showed as
incompetent to prove paternity. With regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was
25 years of age attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the position that if
Monina were truly not Francisco’s illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to have
gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation. Monina’s evidence
hurdles the “high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish one’s
illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on “open and continuous possession”.
Hence, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her
action well within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her
action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied.

De la Cruz v. Garcia
G.R. No. 177728, 31 July 2009

Lim, Gretchen Rina A.

FACTS:

Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the
Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include
the signature of the deceased father, and “because he was born out of wedlock and the
father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his
paternity to the child.”

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against
Gracia. The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned
handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor
Christian can be considered as recognition of paternity.

RULING:

Yes, it can be considered as a recognition of paternity.Article 176 of the Family Code, as

amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the
latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring through an admission made in a
pubic of private handwritten instrument.

Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the
putative father in the private handwritten instrument.

The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging
parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate
or illegitimate child is made:

Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed
by the acknowledging parent; and

Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other
evidence.

BBB v. AAA
G.R. No. 193225, 9 February 2015

Lomosad, Frillin M.

FACTS:

BBB and AAA allege that they started to date seriously only in 1996. AAA was then a
medical student and was raising her first child borne from a previous relationship, named
CCC, a boy. During their relationship, AAA bore two more children namely, DDD (born on
December 11, 1997) and EEE (born on October 19, 2000). BBB and AAA married in civil
rights to legalize their relationship. The birth certificates of the children, including CCC’s, was
amended to change their civil status to legitimated by virtue of the said marriage. Later on,
their relationship turn sour and they decided to live separately. Citing economic and
psychological abuse, AAA filed an application for the issuance of a Temporary Protection
Order with a request to make the same permanent after due hearing, before the RTC.
Finding good ground in AAA’s application, the RTC issued a TPO. The TPO was thereafter,
made permanent by virtue of a Decision of the RTC dated August 14, 2007.

BBB appealed before the CA. CA affirmed RTC’s decision but ordered the remand of the
case for the latter to determine in the proper proceedings to determine who shall be awarded
custody of the children. The CA found that under the provisions of RA9262, BBB had
subjected AAA and their children to psychological, emotional and economic abuses. BBB
displayed acts of marital infidelity which exposed AAA to public ridicule causing her
emotional and psychological distress. While BBB alleged that FFF was only a professional
colleague, he continued to have public appearances with her which did not help to dispel
AAA’s accusation that the two had an extra-marital relation. BBB filed a Manifestation and
Motion to Render Judgment Based on a MOA alleging that he and AAA had entered into a
compromise regarding the custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD
and EEE: that BBB shall have the custody over both children.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC should determine who shall be awarded custody over the children.

RULING:

YES. All told, the Court finds no merit in BBB’s petition, but there exists a necessity to
remand the case for the RTC to resolve matters relative to who shall be granted custody
over the three children, how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount and
manner of providing financial support. The RTC and the CA found substantial evidence and
did not commit reversible errors when they issued the PPO against BBB. Events, which took
place after the issuance of the PPO, do not erase the fact that psychological, emotional and
economic abuses were committed by BBB against AAA. Hence, BBB’s claim that he now
has actual sole care of DDD and EEE does not necessarily call for this Court’s revocation of
the PPO and the award to him of custody over the children.

This Court, thus, affirms the CA’s order to remand the case for the RTC to resolve the
question of custody. Since the children are now all older than seven years of age, they can
choose for themselves whom they want to stay with. Pursuant to Articles 201 and 202 of the
Family Code, husband’s resources and means and the necessities of the wife and the
children are the essential factors in determining the amount of support, and the same can be
reduced or increased proportionately

If all the three children would manifest to the RTC their choice to stay with AAA, then the
PPO issued by RTC shall continue to be executed in its entirety. However, if any of the three
children would choose to be under BBB’s care, necessarily, the PPO issued against BBB
relative to them is to be modified. The PPO, in its entirety, would remain effective only as to
AAA and any of the children who opt to stay with her. Consequently, the RTC may
accordingly alter the manner and amount of financial support BBB should give depending on
who shall finally be awarded custody over the children.The RTC is reminded to be
circumspect in resolving the matter of support, which is a mutual responsibility of the
spouses. The parties do not dispute that AAA is now employed as well, thus, the RTC
should consider the same with the end in mind of promoting the best interests of the
children.

Herrera v. Alba
G.R. No. 148220, 15 June 2005

Malate, Desmarc G.

FACTS:

On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (respondent), represented by his

mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support
and damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with
counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also
denied physical contact with respondent’s mother.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C.
Halos, Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle
University where she taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of the
Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute (UP-NSRI), a DNA analysis laboratory. She
was a former professor at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where
she developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her
testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the
test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity. Petitioner opposed DNA
paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued
that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DNA Paternity testing violates Herrera’s right against self-incrimination.

RULING:

No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is not
yet recognized in the Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order of the trial
court, the prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, in 2002 there is already no
question as to the acceptability of DNA test results as admissible object evidence in
Philippine courts. This was the decisive ruling in the case of People vs Vallejo (2002).

It is also considered that the Vallejo Guidelines be considered by the courts. The Vallejo
Guidelines determines weight and probative value of DNA test results.

The Vallejo Guidelines:

1. how the samples were collected;

2. how they were handled;

3. the possibility of contamination of the samples;

4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples;

5. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests; and

6. the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

Agustin v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 16257, 15 June 2005

Nataa, Vera L.

FACTS:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological
father, petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendent lite before the Quezon City
RTC.In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered
into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but
despite Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock,
Martin. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel
shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for
Martin’s support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the
child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.

On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and
Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe’s leg.
This incident was reported to the police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with
leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued
Arnel for support. Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties
to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his
constitutional right against self-incrimination and moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of
cause of action.

The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court, thus this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and
was a form of unreasonable search.
RULING:

No. In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would
be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of
the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A
positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court
has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing

In no uncertain terms, the Court also underscored that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. Intrusions
into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and
the common good.

In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice
or personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court
of Appeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its
decision and resolution, and any error made would have only been an error in judgment. As
we have discussed, however, the decision of the respondent court, being firmly anchored in
law and jurisprudence, was correct.

Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Diaz

G.R. No. 171713, 17 December 2007

Olasiman, Jason S.

FACTS:

Minor Diaz filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court for compulsory recognition with
prayer for support against Rogelio Ong, she was represented by her mother Jinky. Before
the case, Jinky married a certain Hasegawa Katsuo, Japanese. That same year, Jinky met
Rogelio, they fell in love. The next year, Rogelio and Jinky cohabited. After four years,
Joanna was born, Rogelio recognized Joanna as his, however, that same year, Rogelio
abandoned them and stopped giving support to Joanna, he alleged that he is not the father
of Joanna, hence this petition. RTC rendered a decision and declared the minor to be the
illegitimate child of Ong with Jinky Diaz, and ordering him to support the child until she
reaches the age of majority. Ong opposed the CA’s order to directing the Estate and Joanne
Rodgin Diaz for DNA analysis for determining the paternity of the minor Joanne.

During the pendency of the case, Rogelion Died. The Estate filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Court of Appeals. They contended that a dead person cannot be
subject to testing. CA justified that "DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms,
would be the most reliable and effective method of settling the present paternity dispute.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DNA analysis can still be done even if the person is whose DNA is the
subject is dead.
RULING:

Yes.The court held that the death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of
DNA analysis so long as there exist, suitable biological samples of his DNA. The New Rules
on DNA Evidence permits the manner of DNA testing by using biological samples--organic
material originating from the person's body, for example, blood, saliva, other body fluids,
tissues, hair, bones, even inorganic materials- that is susceptible to DNA testing. In case
proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to adequately found or would be hard to get,
DNA testing, which examines genetic codes found from body cells of the illegitimate child
and any physical remains of the long dead parent could be resorted to.

Conde v. Abaya
G.R. No. L-4275, 23 March 1909

Santiago, Prince Dave C.

FACTS:

Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia died on the
1899. Paula Conde, as the mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom
she states she had by Casiano Abaya moved the settlement of the intestate succession.

An administrator has been appointed for the said estate. However, Roman Abaya brother of
Casiano came forward and opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as being the
nearest relative of the deceased. The court declares Roman Abaya to be the sole heir of
Casiano Abaya and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the property of said
estate.

Paula Conde filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the relationship
alleged by Roman Abaya but that she considered her right was superior to his and moved
for a hearing on the matter. She prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to
the property left by Casiano Abaya.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner may enforce an action in the acknowledgment of the natural
child from Casiano Abaya.

RULING:

The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal character and
generally pertains exclusively to him. Only the child may exercise it at any time during his
lifetime. As exception, and in three cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child,
to wit: (a) if he or she died during his or her minority, (b) while insane, or (c) after action had
already been instituted.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime
and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute
the action.

Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his or her legitimacy lasts
during his or her whole lifetime, he or she may exercise it either against the presumed
parents or his or her heirs. The right of action which the law concedes to the natural child is
not transmitted to his ascendants or descendants.

Marquino v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 72078, 27 June 1994

Tambolero, Daisy Mae O.

FACTS:

Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition,
Support and Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana was born on December 1926 allegedly of
Eutiquio and in that time was single. It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew
her since she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete. She likewise
received financial assistance from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the
status of an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of the father and his
family. The Marquinos denied all these. Respondent was not able to finish presenting her
evidence since she died on March 1979 but the suit for compulsory recognition was done
while Eustiquio was still alive. Her heirs were ordered to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs.

Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of respondent court in holding

that the heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue the action already
filed by her to compel recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish
such action and can be continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased parent.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not, the right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted to
the heirs and;

2. Whether or not Article 173 can be given retroactive effect.

RULINGS:

The first issue to be resolved is whether or not the right of action to compel recognition is
intransmissible in character.

Article 285 of the Civil Code provides that an action for recognition of natural children may
be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may
file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;

(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which
nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.

In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from discovery of the
document. The rationale for the rule is to give the alleged parents opportunity to be heard.
The reason for the exceptions is to protect the heirs.

Our law providing for the intransmissibility of an action for recognition, however, has been
superseded by the New Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. Under Article 173
of the Family Code, it is now provided:

Article 173 of the Family Code states that “The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by
the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die
during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five
(5) years within which to institute the action.”

The action commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both
of the parties. Pursuant to this provision, the child can bring the action during his or her
entire lifetime (not during the lifetime of the parents) and even after the death of the parents.
In other words, the action does not prescribe as long as he lives.

The ruling of the second issue is with Article 173 of the Family Code states that it cannot be
given retroactive effect so as to apply to the case at bench because it will prejudice the
vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of the death of their father,
EutiquioMarquino. "Vested right" is a right in property which has become fixed and
established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. It expresses the concept of
present fixed interest, which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against
arbitrary State action.

Grande v. Antonio
GR. No. 206248, 18 February 2004

Acopiado, Ariel M.

FACTS:

Respondent [the father] filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the
two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from
Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec.
19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he
wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official
declaration of his children’s surname as Antonio citing the “best interest of the child”.
Respondent’s petition was granted by RTC and modified by the CA. In CA’s decision, it
reversed the granting of the custody of the two children to the respondent but affirmed the
surname change to of the same to Antonio. Aggrieved, wife filed petition for certiorari in SC.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the father can exercise parental authority and consequently, custody, over
his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.

Wether or not the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
children upon his recognition of their filiation.

RULING:

On the first issue, no, petitioner cannot exercise custody over the children.

Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence,
respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother,
then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be
unfit.

Respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely
affected the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors, she
cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over their children.

On the second issue, the answer is still a no.

An acknowledged illegitimate child isunder no compulsion to use the surname of his

illegitimate father.
Even if IRR of RA 9255 provides that a surname change “shall” be necessary upon
recognition of paternity, it is of no moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of
"may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate father’s surname discretionary governs,
and illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known.
Case is remanded to lower court to determine the choice of said children.
Angeles v. Tabiliran
AM No. MTJ-92-716, 25 October 1995

Aguila-Granada, Cherrie Mae E.

FACTS:

Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the grounds
of gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge. With respect
to the charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge scandalously and publicly
cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with TeresitaBanzuela.
Tabiliran and Priscilla got married in May 1986. On the other hand, with respect to the
charge on deceitful conduct, petitioner claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate children
with Priscilla be registered as “legitimate” by falsely executing separate affidavits stating the
delayed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight when in
fact, he knew these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate. The judge averred
that 25 years had already elapsed since the disappearance of her wife in 1966 when he
married Priscilla hence the cohabitation was neither bigamous nor immoral. However, as
early as 1970, based on the record, Priscilla had begotten her 3 children (1970, 1971 and
1975).

ISSUE:

WON the three children can be considered legitimate.

RULING:

No. The three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since
at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and
Teresita.

Article 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time
of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other
may be legitimated.

Reasons for this limitation:

1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;

2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;

3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy
the sanctity of marriage;

5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the
child.

Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents, who,
at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other, are natural. Since the three children do not fall under Article 177, they cannot be
legitimated.

Teotico v. Del Val

GR No. L18753, 26 March 1965

Bato, Neah Hope L.

FACTS:

Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She executed a will
written in Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before Notary Public by her and
the witnesses. Among the legacies made in the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who
was married to the testatrix’s niece, Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of Maria’s interest in the
Calvo Building were left to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal
parts to her grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses. Josefina was likewise
instituted, as sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise
disposed by will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed
by Ana del Val Chan, claiming that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister
of Maria) and an acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that said
will was not executed as required by law and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable
to execute the will at the time of its execution and was executed under duress, threat, or
influence of fear.

ISSUE:

WON defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.

RULING:

It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding is that he must have an interest in the estate, will or in the property to be affected
by either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or
one who has a claim against it as creditor. Under the terms of the will, defendant has no
right to intervene because she has no such interest in the estate either as heir, executor or
administrator because it did not appear therein any provision designating her as heir/ legatee
in any portion of the estate. She could have acquired such right if she was a legal heir of the
deceased but she is not under the CIVIL CODE. Even if her allegations were true, the law
does not give her any right to succeed the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose and
Francisca because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the
legitimate relatives of her natural father and that relationship established by adoption is
limited solely to the adopter and adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the
adopting parents except only as expressly provided by law. As a consequence, she is an
heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
"The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting parent, and
does not extend to his other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the
adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the
adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption,
except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither
are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship
created is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and do not extend to the
relatives of either."

Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in the
probate proceeding.

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Bobiles

G.R. No. 92326, 24 January 1992

Buenafe, Aileen B.

FACTS:
Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and
who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old. Salvador Condat,
father of the child, and the social worker assigned was served with copies of the order
finding that the petition was sufficient in form and substance. The copy was also posted on
the bulletin board of the court. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. The judgment
declared that surname of the child be changed to “Bobiles”.

ISSUE:

WON the petition to adopt Jason should be granted considering only Zenaida filed the
petition.

RULING:

Yes. In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the interests and
welfare of the child are of primary and paramount consideration. The welfare of a child is of
paramount consideration in proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its
adoption by another, and the courts to which the application for adoption is made is charged
with the duty of protecting the child and its interests and, to bring those interests fully before
it, it has authority to make rules to accomplish that end. Ordinarily, the approval of the
adoption rests in the sound discretion of the court. This discretion should be exercised in
accordance with the best interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the parents
over the child are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of grave abuse, the exercise
of this discretion by the approving official will not be disturbed

Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition
for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her
petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her
filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot
be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be
for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. The
representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly
recommended the approval of the petition for adoption and the trial court dispensed with the
trial custody for several commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living
with the adopting parents since infancy. Further, the said petition was with the sworn written
consent of the children of the adopters.
Tamargo v. CA
GR. NO. 85044, 3 June 1992

Caipang, Lea A.

FACTS:

In October 1982, AdelbertoBundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an
air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners, natural parents of
Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom
he was living the time of the tragic incident.In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a
petition to adopt AdelbertoBundoc. Such petition was granted on November 1982 after the
tragic incident.

ISSUE:

WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting
parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where
actual custody was lodged with the biological parents

RULING:

No.

Article 58 Torts of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides that “Parents and guardians
are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in
accordance with the Civil Code.” Accordingly, Article 221 of the Family Code (replacing the
provisions of the New Civil Code) provides that: “Parents and other persons exercising
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or
omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law”. The court also reiterates that
the benefit of the child is of paramount consideration. Retroactivity may be essential if it
permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.

Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents,

their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In
the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still
lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit
for damages

SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to
impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or
physical custody over the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of
trial custody however in this case, trial custody period had not yet begin nor had been
completed at the time of the shooting incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the
natural parents of Adelberto.
Landingin v. Republic
G.R. No. 164948, 27 June 2006

Capin, Mary Jade L.

In re Lim
G.R. No. 168992-93, 21 May 2009

Denura, Lady Rubyge A.

FACTS:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as
shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears
as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an
American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children
by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a
child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the
trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years
and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their
consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

RULING:

Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case
at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The
use of the word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is
in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly.
The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements
that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification
to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one
of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character
and well-being.

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of
good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude,
emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years
older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in
keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference
between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the
biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptees parent;

(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals:
Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines,
that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to
the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption
decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or
any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her
country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her
adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and
certification of the aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the
following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and
clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however,
That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of
the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.

Javier v. Lucero
G.R. No. L-6706, 29 March 1953

Eguia, Paula Bianca B.

FACTS:

Alfredo Javier Sr. and SaludArca had begotten a son before they got married, named Alfredo
Jr. After the celebration of marriage, the father went to US since he was listed as US Navy.
The mother and Alfredo Jr. went to live with her parents while the husband was in US.
When the relationship between the spouses becomes strained, husband petitioned for
divorce before State of Alabama. After the decree was issued, Alfredo Sr. subsequently
married twice (having been divorced with the former before celebration of subsequent
marriage).

An action for alimony was filed where respondent Judge ordered the father to give a monthly
allowance of P60 to his wife and son. The father filed notice of appeal questioning the status
of the wife; second, the fact that his son was over 21 years old making him no longer entitled
to be supported and third, decision is vague and silent in relation to granting the son
entitlement to support even if over 21 years old for purposes of completing his education/
training for some profession, trade or vocation. Nevertheless, the judge directed the father
to pay the monthly pensions notwithstanding pendency of the appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Alfredo Jr. is entitled for support.

RULING:

Under the new Civil Code, Article 290 support also includes the education of the person to
be supported "until he complete his education or training for some profession, trade or
vocation even beyond the age of majority" and on the basis of this article support was
granted to Alfredo Javier Junior. Said the Court, "while it is true that plaintiff Alfredo Javier
Junior, who was born on December 2, 1931, has reached the age of majority on December
2, 1952, yet, under the last part of article 290 of the new Civil Code, support may be given
him even beyond the age of majority in order to enable him to complete his education, for
some trade or profession."

Unquestionably, Alfredo Javier, Jr. is the son of petitioner Alfredo Javier, and if financial
assistance is to be rendered only at the termination of the appeal his education or the
completion thereof, would be unduly delayed. That is good reason for immediate execution.
Petitioner claims that according to the records Alfredo Javier Jr. "is no longer studying". Yet
probably he stopped going to school due to lack of means, since the petitioner himself
admits that his son is just a pre-law graduate. It is mark worthy that the son has not forfeited
his right to support.

De Asis v. De Asis
G.R. No. 127578, February 15, 1999

Gahuman, Kristine Camille B.

FACTS:

Private respondent, in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de
Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support against petitioner before the RTC of
Quezon City, alleging that petitioner is the father of subject minor, and the former refused
and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands.
Petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor alleged and that he cannot be required to
provide support for him. The mother’s child sent in a manifestation stating that because of
petitioner’s judicial declarations, it was futile and a useless exercise to claim support from
him. Hence, she was withdrawing her complaint against petitioner subject to the condition
that the latter should not pursue his counterclaim. By virtue of the said manifestation, the
parties mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint. The motion was granted
by the trial court, which then dismissed the case with prejudice.

Subsequently, another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against
petitioner, this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal
guardian, herein private respondent. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of res judicata. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that res judicata is
inapplicable in an action for support for the reason that renunciation or waiver of future
support is prohibited by law. The trial court likewise denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. CA dismissed the same.

ISSUE:

WON an action for support can be barred by res judicata?

RULING:

No, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and can not bar the filing of another
action, asking for the same relief against the same defendant.

The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is provisional because the
amount may be increased or decreased depending upon the means of the giver and the
needs of the recipient (Art. 297); and that the right to receive support cannot be renounced
nor can it be transmitted to a third person; neither can it be compensated with what the
recipient owes the obligator (Art. 301). Furthermore, the right to support can not be waived
or transferred to third parties and future support cannot be the subject of compromise (Art.
2035).

In the case at bar, respondent minors mother, who was the plaintiff in the first case,
manifested that she was withdrawing the case as it seemed futile to claim support from
petitioner who denied his paternity over the child. Since the right to claim for support is
predicated on the existence of filiation between the minor child and the putative parent,
petitioner would like us to believe that such manifestation admitting the futility of claiming
support from him puts the issue to rest and bars any and all future complaint for support.

The manifestation sent in by respondent’s mother in the first case, which acknowledged that
it would be useless to pursue its complaint for support, amounted to renunciation as it
severed the vinculum that gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his
putative parent, the petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the
petitioner and respondent’s mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and
support conditioned upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise
which cannot be countenanced. It violates the prohibition against any compromise of the
right to support.

It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon a compromise. Acknowledgment,
affecting as it does the civil status of persons and future support, cannot be the subject of
compromise. (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil Code).

Mangonan v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125041, 30 June 2006

Granada, Immanuel Y.

FACTS:
On 17 March 1994, Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica
and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support
pendente lite with the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975,
petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge
Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while
respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the
required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by
the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. On 25 March 1976, or within seven
months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina.
According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon,
raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of
the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States
of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had
moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts
(Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and Western New England
College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were, however,
financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education.

ISSUE:

1. Whether Francisco is obliged to support Rica and Rina.

2. Whether Francisco can avail of the option under Article 204 anent his obligation.

RULING:

1. Yes. Francisco is obliged to support his granddaughters Rica and Rina in default of the
father.

Pursuant to Article 199 of the Family Code, whenever two or more persons are obliged to
give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein
provided:

(1) The spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;

(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and

(4) The brothers and sisters.

There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the
parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to
support their children’s college education. In view however of their incapacities, the
obligation to furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco as the next
immediate relative of Rica and Rina.
2. No. Francisco cannot avail of the option under Article 204 anent his obligation.

Article 204 of the Family Code provides that the person obliged to give support shall have
the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter
alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.

In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the
second option. With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one another by the
parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult
for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered and claimed as
family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given the moral obstacle, the Court
could not see Rica and Rina moving back to the Philippines in the company of those who
have disowned them.

Lim v. Lim
G.R. No. 163209, 30 October 2009

Guige, Marife G.Salientes v. Abanilla

G.R. No. 162734, 29 August 2006

Lagare, Liezel O.

FACTS:

Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes
are the parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with
MarieAntonette's parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to
in-laws problems, private respondent suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own
house, but Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of the Salientes. Thereafter,
he was prevented from seeing his son. Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity
and as the representative of his son filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody which
the trial court granted. However, petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article 213
of the Family Code, which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
They maintain that herein respondent Loran had the burden of showing any compelling
reason but failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof, and even assuming that there
were compelling reasons, the proper remedy for private respondent was simply an action for
custody, but not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against
the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. Respondent on the
other hand, asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who
restrains the minors’ right to see his father and vice versa.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus is available and should be granted to the
petitioner.
RULING:

Yes. Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a
person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and
petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint
custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to
be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both
parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondents
cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence,
the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him. In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s
welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally
provide that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his
welfare shall be the paramount consideration. Again, it bears stressing that the order did not
grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the
minor in court and explain why private respondent is prevented from seeing his child. This is
in line with the directive in Section 9 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC that within fifteen days after the
filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court shall issue an
order requiring the respondent (herein petitioners) to present the minor before the court. This
was exactly what the court did. Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the
judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by
the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private respondents’ petition for
custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the
said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.

Espiritu v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 115640, 15 March 1995
Lim, Gretchen Rina A.

FACTS:

Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law relationship of
husband while in US. Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer,
National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary post. They begot a child in 1986
named Rosalind. After a year, they went back to the Philippines for a brief vacation when
they also got married. Subsequently, they had a second child named Reginald.

In 1990, they decided to separate. Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of
Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California.
Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left them with his sister. When Teresita
returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody of the children.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the custody of the two children should be awarded to the mother.

RULING:
No. In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be
the paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be
separated from the mother for compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is the
best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive. At the time
the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over 7 years of age. The choice of the
child to whom she preferred to stay must be considered.

It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt. She
was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother’s infidelity. Furthermore,
there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying
his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the
position to extend. On the other hand, the mother’s conviction for the crime of bigamy and
her illicit relationship had already caused emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at
least with the daughter.

Hence, the custody of the minors was reinstated to their father.

Amadora v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-47745, 15 April 1988

Lomosad, Frillin M.

FACTS:

Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by
PablitoDaffon resulting to the former’s death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through
reckless imprudence. The victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for
damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of
boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students. Complaints against the
students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and
reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school was an
academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. Those students were
not in the custody of the school since the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear
identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary
diligence through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners
on the other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school to
comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports).

ISSUE:

Whether or notCollegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.

RULING:

No. Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should not be held liable.

Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that “teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody. Responsibility shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.”

Even though at the time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of
the school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened; it was
immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was
important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high
school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the
teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a general authority
over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-
charge of particular classes.

In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable
considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later
returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher
authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was shown to necessarily
link this gun with the shooting incident.

Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only
the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage
caused by the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were
held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.

Ylarde v. Aquino
GR No. L33722, 29 July 1988

Malate, Desmarc G.

FACTS:

Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School in
Pangasinan. Defendant Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. During that time, the school
had several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop destroyed in World
War II. Defendant decided to help clear the area so he gathered 18 of his male students
and ordered them to dig beside a one ton concrete block in making a hole where the stone
can be buried. It was left unfinished so the following day he called 4 of the 18 students
including the NovelitoYlarde to complete the excavation. Defendant left the children to level
the loose soil while he went to see Banez for the key to the school workroom where he can
get some rope. It was alleged that before leaving, he told the children “not to touch the
stone”. After he left, the children playfully jumped into the pit when suddenly the concrete
block slide down. Unfortunately, NovelitoYlarde was pinned to the wall causing serious
physical injuries which as a consequence led to his death, 3 days thereafter. The parents of
the victim, herein petitioners, filed a suit for damages against both Aquino and Soriano.

ISSUE:

WON both Soriano and Aquino can be held liable for damages.
RULING:

No. As given by Art. 2180, only the teachers are liable for the damages caused by their
pupils.

Art 2180 paragraph 7 states “Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.”

As regards the principal, we hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the
child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades.
This is in line with our ruling in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, 4 wherein this Court
thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the
teacher and not the head of an academic school that should be answerable for torts
committed by their students.

As held in Amadora vs CA, “it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school
that should be answerable for torts committed by their students”. Where the school is
academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed
by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, this is the general rule.
However, in cases of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he,
who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in
general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in
nature, in which case it is the head thereof that shall be answerable. Hence, Soriano as
principal cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school
and he did not give any instruction regarding the digging.

A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his students should make sure that the children are
protected from all harm. The excavation instructed clearly exposed the students to risk and
should not be placed under the category of Work Education such as school gardening,
planting trees etc. Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence where instead of availing
himself of adult manual laborers he instead utilized his students. Furthermore, the warning
given is not sufficient to cast away all serious danger that the concrete block adjacent to the
excavation would present to the children. He is therefore ordered to pay damages to the
petitioners.

St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos

GR No. 143363, 6 February 2002

Nataa, Vera L.

FACTS:

Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited
schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the
campaign. Along with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by
James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the
jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this
accident. Spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed a case against James
Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio
Villanueva and St. Marys Academy

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner should be held liable for the damages.

RULING:

No. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner
St. Marys Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident,
petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.

The CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the
Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and
not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for petitioner to be
liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the
proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident. In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it
must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must
be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In
other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no
matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of
the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.

In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the
proximate cause of the death of the victim. Also, there was no evidence that petitioner
school allowed the minor to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. Hence, the
registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the
road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Wherefore, the case was remanded to
the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.

Silva v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 114742, 17 July 1997

Olasiman, Jason S.

FACTS:

Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local

actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children:
Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It
began, according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his
vigorous objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in
fact, had never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually
parted ways. On February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to allow Silva, in apparent
contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his company on
weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who
averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could
affect the moral and social values of the children. The Trial Court granted herein petitioner
visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case should he
take out the children without the written consent of the mother or respondent herein.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner shall have to comply with a written consent from Gonzales
whenever he will take out his children as granted visitorial rights to him by the trial court.

RULING:

The decision of the trial court is REINSTATED, reversing thereby the judgment of the
appellate court which is hereby SET ASIDE.

There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare is always the
paramount consideration. The Court shares the view of the Solicitor General, who has
recommended due course to the petition, that a few hours spent by petitioner with the
children, however, could not all be that detrimental to the children.

There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough recognition on the inherent
and natural right of parents over their children. Article 150 of the Family Code expresses that
"(f)amily relations include those x x x (2) (b)etween parents and children; x x x." Article 209,
in relation to Article 220, of the Code states that it is the natural right and duty of parents and
those exercising parental authority to, among other things, keep children in their company
and to give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding.
The Constitution itself speaks in terms of the "natural and primary rights of parents in the
rearing of the youth. There is nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions are meant
to solely address themselves to legitimate relationships. The Court appreciates the
apprehensions of private respondent and their well-meant concern for the children;
nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue designs
more than a parent’s natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief visits,
his own children. The trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to understandably provide this
precautionary measure, i.e., "in no case (can petitioner) take out the children without the
written consent of the mother."

David . Court of Appeals and Ramon Villar

G.R. No. 111180, November 16, 1995
Santiago, Prince Dave C.

FACTS:

Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a

businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four
children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private
respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was
born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls,
namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.

The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J,
to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to
Villar's legal wife.

After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were
eventually accepted by his legal family.

In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to
go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the
child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next
school year.

On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mother has the rightful custody of the child.

RULING:

Yes. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental
authority of his mother who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody
of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by
private respondent; she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority
of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of
each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for
this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall
remain in force.

The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for
ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under
Art.213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."

In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven
years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the
mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody
over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live
with his mother.

Eslao v. Court of Appeals and Cordero

G.R. No. 116773, 16 January 1997

Tambolero, Daisy Mae O.

FACTS:

When Reynaldo Eslao died, Maria Paz's husband, she entrusted care and custody of her
youngest child Angelica to her grieving mother-in-law stating that she needed the company
of the child to at least compensate for the loss of her late son. She then returned to her
mother's house with her another daughter, Leslie. Years later, Maria Paz got married to a
Japanese-American and live with him in the US. She then returned to the Philippines to be
reunited with her children and bring them to the US. She then informed Teresita about her
desire to take custody of Angelica her new husband's willingness to adopt her children.
Teresita refused, and accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica when she was 10 days
old. Teresita added that she would be deserving to take care of Angelica; that she had
managed to raise 12 children of her own herself; that she has the financial means to carry
out her plans for Angelica; that she maintains a store which earns a net income of about
P500 a day, she gets P900 a month as pension for the death of her husband, she rents out
rooms in her house which she owns, for which she earns a total of P6,000 a month, and that
from her gross income of roughly P21,000, she spends about P10,000 for the maintenance
of her house.

Maria instituted an action against Teresita over the return of the custody of Angelica to her.
After the trial on the merits, the trial court granted the petition. CA affirmed in the full decision
of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Teresita Sagala-Eslao should be given the custody of the child.

RULING:

No, Sagala-Eslao cannot be given the custody of the child. Article 210 of the Family Code
states that “Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except
in the cases authorized by law.”

In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA 407we stated, viz:

[Parental authority] is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the
purpose of the childrens physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of
their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority,
there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a
sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.

Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law [Article 210]. The right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution. [Art.222-
224] when a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather,
even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority.Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same.

The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-
bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company [Article 209 and 211].

Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor
child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did
not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to
parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in
cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution
which do not appear in the case at bar.

Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 70890, 18 September 1992

Aguila-Granada, Cherrie Mae E.

FACTS:

Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until the former broke up with the latter
after she found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted
reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats. One day,
they were found dead from a single gunshot wound each coming from the same gun. The
parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell
to recover damages. Trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence but
was set aside by CA.

ISSUE:

WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.

RULING:

Yes. The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from
criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or
who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent such damages.

Under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the
responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor
offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules
shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.

Since the parents failed to establish in its defense, the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent such damage, the court held that the civil liability of the parents
for quasi-delict of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary.

Laperal v. Republic
GR No. 18008, 30 October 1962
Bato, Neah Hope L.

FACTS:

In 1958, petitioner Elisea L. Santamaria was decreed legally separated from her husband
Enrique R. Santamaria. In 1960, she filed a petition to be allowed to change her name
and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name EliseaLaperal. The City Attorney of
Baguio opposed the petition on the ground that the same violates the provisions of Article
370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.

The court denied the petition. Upon petitioner's motion, however, the court, treating the
petition as one for change of name, reconsidered its decision and granted the petition on the
ground that to allow petitioner, who is a businesswoman decreed legally separated from her
husband, to continue using her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances
and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Hence, this appeal by the State.

ISSUE:

Should petitioner be allowed to change her name or be permitted to resume using her
maiden name?

RULING:
No. Article 372 of the Civil Code reads:

ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surname employed before the legal separation.

Legal separation alone is not a ground for wife's change of name. A woman’s married status
is not affected by a decree of legal separation, there being no severance of the vinculum and
under Article 372 of the New Civil Code, and she must continue using the name and
surname employed by her before the separation.

It is doubtful whether Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, which refers to change of name in
general, may prevail over the specific provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code with
regard to married women legally separated from their husbands. Even, however, applying
Rule 103, the fact of legal separation alone is not sufficient ground to justify a change of
name, because to hold otherwise, would be to provide an easy circumvention of the
mandatory provisions of said Article 372.
The language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation has
been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal
separation. This is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there
being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that the wife should
continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned.

Even applying Rule 103, the fact of legal separation alone — which is the only basis for the
petition — is, not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of petitioner, for to hold
otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Article
372.

The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname may cause undue
confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the
decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her
and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no
more occasions for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

Llaneta v. Agrava
G.R. No. L-32054, 15 May 1974

Buenafe, Aileen B.

FACTS:

Atanacia Llaneta was married with Serafin Ferrer whom she had a child named Victoriano
Ferrer. Serafin died and about four years later Atanacia had a relationship with another man
out of which Teresita Llaneta, herein petitioner, was born. All of them lived with Serafin’s
mother in Manila. Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer’s using the surname of
Ferrer in all her dealing even her school records. She then applied for a copy of her birth
certificate in Sorsogon as it is required to be presented in connection with a scholarship
grant. Subsequently, she discovered that her registered surname was Llaneta and that she
was the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father. She prayed to have her name
changed from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer since not doing so would result in
confusion among persons and entitites she dealt with and would entail endless and
vexatious explanations of the circumstances.

ISSUE:

Whether Teresita can have her surname changed to Ferrer.

RULING:

Yes, Teresita can have her surname changed to Ferrer In her official dealings, this would
likewise mean a lifelong fending with the necessary affidavits. Moreover, it is a salutary law
that would allow Teresita, inspite of her illegitimate birth, to carry on in society without her
unfortunate status being bandied about at every turn.

In the case at bar, however, the late Serafin Ferrer's widowed mother, Victoria, and his two
remaining brothers, Nehemias and Ruben, have come forward in earnest support of the
petition. Adequate publication of the proceeding has not elicited the slightest opposition from
the relatives and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer. Clearances from various Government
agencies show that Teresita has a spotless record. And the State (represented by the
Solicitor General's Office), which has an interest in the name borne by every citizen within its
realm for purposes of identification, interposed no opposition at the trial after a searching
cross-examination, of Teresita and her witnesses.

Whether the late Serafin Ferrer, who died some five years before Teresita was born, would
have consented or objected to her use of his surname is open to speculation. One thing,
however, is beyond cavil: those living who possess the right of action to prevent the surname
Ferrer from being smeared are proud to share it with her.

Remo v. Sec. of Foreign Affairs

G.R. No. 169202, 5 March 2010

Caipang, Lea A.

FACTS:

Maria Virginia V. Remo (Remo) is a Filipino citizen, married to Francisco R. Rallonza. Her
Philippine passport, which was to expire on 27 October 2000, showed “Rallonza” as her
surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle name. While her
marriage was still subsisting, she applied for the renewal of her passport with the
Department of Foreign Affairs office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to
her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. When her request was denied,
she made a similar request to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign
Affairs denied the request, holding that while it is not obligatory for a married woman to use
her husband’s name, use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the
married name has not been used in previous application. The Secretary explained that under
the implementing rules of Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a
woman applicant may revert to her maiden name only in cases of annulment of marriage,
divorce, and death of the husband.

Remo brought the case to the Office of the President which affirmed the Secretary’s ruling.
The CA also affirmed the ruling. Remo filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Remo argued that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996) conflicted with and was an
implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using her
maiden name upon marriage, as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Shari’a
District Court [311 Phil. 696, 707 (1995)]

ISSUE:

Whether or not Remo, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport,
can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the
subsistence of her marriage.

RULING:

No. Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement passport while her marriage
subsists.

Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil Code and as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable
Judge Shari’a District Court (supra), a married woman has an option, but not an obligation,
to use her husband’s surname upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using
her maiden name because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only
her civil status. RA 8239 does not conflict with this principle.
RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married
woman from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) allows a married woman who applies for a passport for
the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her
husband’s surname.

In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s
surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s
surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an
authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her
maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her
maiden name.

However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport,
she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases enumerated
in Section 5(d) of RA 8239: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of
marriage. Since Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden
name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman’s reversion to the
use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.

Yasin case not in point

Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which involved a Muslim
divorcee whose former husband is already married to another woman, Remo’s marriage
remains subsisting. Also, Yasin did not involve a request to resume one’s maiden name in a
replacement passport, but a petition to resume one’s maiden name in view of the dissolution
of one’s marriage.

Special law prevails over general law

Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a
special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of
Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in
statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law.

Implied repeals are disfavored

Remo’s theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal
is disfavored. The apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be
harmonized as much as possible, so that each shall be effective. For a law to operate to
repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so
repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act. This, Remo failed to establish.

State is mandated to protect integrity of passport

Remo consciously chose to use her husband’s surname in her previous passport
application. If her present request would be allowed, nothing prevents her in the future from
requesting to revert to the use of her husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in one's
name and identity in a passport, which is considered superior to all other official documents,
cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of
passport holders will arise.

The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport
applicant’s constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and
maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and travel documents proceeding from it
as a Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the Government. The holder is
merely a possessor of the passport as long as it is valid.

Valino v. Adriano
G.R. No. 182894, 22 April 2014

Capin, Mary Jade L.

Republic v. Valencia
G.R. No. L-32181, 5 March 1986

Denura, Lady Rubyge A.

FACTS:

Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of
birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu. The case was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3043-R.

The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for correction
of entry in the Civil Registry, contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of mere
clerical errors, those harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of a name that
is merely mispelled, occupation of parents, etc., and not changes or corrections involving
civil status, nationality, or citizenship which are substantial and controversial.

Respondent Leonor Valencia, filed her reply to the opposition wherein she admitted that the
present petition seeks substantial changes involving the civil status and nationality or
citizenship of respondents, but alleged that substantial changes in the civil registry records
involving the civil status of parents, their nationality or citizenship may be allowed if- (1) the
proper suit is filed, and (2) evidence is submitted, either to support the allegations of the
petition or to disprove the same; that respondents have complied with these requirements by
filing the present special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court and that they have caused
reasonable notice to be given to the persons named in the petition and have also caused the
order for the hearings of their petition to be published for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.

Subsequently, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that since the petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo Go and
Jessica Go from "Chinese" to "Filipino" and their status from "Legitimate" to Illegitimate", and
changing also the status of the mother from "married" to "single" the corrections sought are
not merely clerical but substantial, involving as they do the citizenship and status of the
petitioning minors and the status of their mother.

ISSUE:

May a change in the record of birth in a civil registry, involving the nationality or citizenship of
a person, be granted in a summary procedure?
RULING:

The Supreme Court likewise held that corrections involving the nationality or citizenship of a
person were substantial and could not be effected except in adversarial proceedings.

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving the nationality or citizenship,
which is undisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted
in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be
enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. The SC
adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and
the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceedings.

Rule 108 of the Revise Rules of Court now provides for such a procedure which should be
limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the matter of
correcting entries in the civil register. Rule 108, lie all the other provisions of the Rules of
Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule- making authority under
Sec. 13 of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which directs that such rules of court 'shall not
diminish or increase or modify substantive rights.' If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond
innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or
obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations
concerning citizenship, legitimacy or paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule
108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying
substantive rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil
Code.

Thus, Valencia requires that a petition for substantial correction or change of entries in the
civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who
have or claim any interest that would be affected thereby. It further mandates that a full
hearing, not merely a summary proceeding, be conducted.

Final Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the RTC Br. 67, Paniqui,Tarlac

Eguia, Paula Bianca B.

FACTS:

This administrative matter arose from the judicial audit and physical inventory of cases
conducted on 20-24 June 2005 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch
67, then presided by Judge Cesar M. Sotero who compulsorily retired on 23 February 2006.
The Audit Team recommended in its Memorandum dated 11 July 2005 that Judge Sotero
and Clerk of Court Paulino I. Saguyod be directed to explain the following within ten (10)
days from notice among others, why petitions for change of name and/or correction of
entries in the civil registry were granted without the required hearing and publication, in
gross violation of the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.

Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod explained that almost all of these petitions may be
covered by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048 which authorizes city or municipal civil registrars to
correct clerical or typographical errors in an entry and/or change the first name or nickname
in the civil registry without need for a judicial order. The petitions were filed before the trial
court because there was no incumbent Local Civil Registrar and the OIC-Civil Registrar
could not act on these petitions under R.A. No. 9048. Since R.A. No. 9048 allows corrections
of entries without hearing and publication for as long as the necessary documents are
submitted, the trial court considered the same procedure as applicable to the petitions for
correction of entries filed before it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Sotero is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in granting petitions for
change of name and/or correction of entries in the civil registry were granted without the
required hearing and publication.

RULING:

The Court agrees that indeed Judge Sotero is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Articles 376 and 412 of the New Civil Code are the substantive laws covering the alteration
or correction of entries in the civil registry. Civil registry records are public documents and
are accepted as prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein, which is why prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 9048, changes or corrections thereof could be made only upon
judicial authorization. Rules 103 and 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provide the
procedure for such alterations in the civil registry.

The procedure for change of name under Rule 103 is a proceeding in rem and as such strict
compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, is essential in
order to vest the court with jurisdiction. The reason for this is that a change of name is a
matter of public interest.

Petitions for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are governed by Rule
108. This rule covers petitions for corrections of clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous
nature, as well as petitions which seek to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries
for as long as all the procedural requirements in said rule are followed. In Republic v.
Bautista, citing Republic v. Valencia, it was declared that the proceedings under Rule 108
may either be summary or adversarial in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the
civil registry is clerical, the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects
the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial and the
procedure to be adopted is adversarial. The procedure under Rule 108 becomes the
appropriate adversarial proceeding to effect substantial changes in the registry only if the
procedural requirements therein are complied with.

R.A. No. 9048, enacted in 2001, substantially amended Articles 376 and 412 of the New
Civil Code, to wit:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name
or Nickname.No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which
can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations.

Thus, under this new law, clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname may be corrected or effected by the concerned city or municipal registrar or consul
general, without need of any judicial order.

A review of the deliberations on R.A. No. 9048 clearly shows that it was enacted to give the
people an option to have the erroneous entries in their civil records corrected via an
administrative proceeding before the local civil registrar that is less expensive and more
expeditious.

Under the bill, any person who wants an entry corrected needs only to file a verified petition
supported by certain documents with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality
where the records sought to be corrected are kept and, in case the petitioner has already
migrated to another place, the petition may be filed with the local civil registrar where he
resides. Publication of the petition for correction of entry is dispensed with and in lieu of
publication; the petition needs only to be posted in a conspicuous place in the office of the
local civil registrar for ten (10) consecutive working days. However, regarding petitions for
change of first name, the petition has to be published once a week for two (2) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, with the petitioner also submitting a certification
that he has no pending case or prior criminal record. The local civil registrar is mandated to
decide the petition not later than five (5) working days after the prescribed posting period.
The decision of the local registrar is subject to the automatic review of the Civil Registrar
General who shall act within ten (10) working days from receipt of the decision. If the Civil
Registrar General finds that the correction is not clerical or typographical in nature or that it
affects the civil status of the person, he shall set aside the decision and advise the petitioner
to file the necessary petition with the RTC in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court.

Since R.A. No. 9048 refers specifically to the administrative summary proceeding before the
local civil registrar it would be inappropriate to apply the same procedure to petitions for the
correction of entries in the civil registry before the courts. The promulgation of rules of
procedure for courts of justice is the exclusive domain of the Supreme Court. Moreover, as
observed by the OCA, there is nothing in R.A. No. 9048 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations that warrants the adoption of the procedure set therein for petitions before the
courts even for the purpose of expediting the resolution of said petitions.

Thus, there should be recourse to the procedure prescribed for the courts as if R.A. No.
9048 were not enacted at all. In other words, the procedure provided in the Revised Rules of
Court for such petitions remains binding and should be followed by the courts. The
procedural requirements laid down in Rules 103 and 108 still have to be complied with. In
the case at hand, Judge Sotero should have applied the procedure prescribed in Rules 103
and 108 in resolving the petitions before him, not the procedure prescribed in R.A. No. 9048
or the procedure provided in Section 3, Rule 9 which applies in civil cases where the
defendant is declared in default.

Petitions for change of name and correction of entries in the civil registry are actions in rem,
the decision on the petition being binding not only on the parties thereto but on the whole
world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication gives
notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who
might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established.
It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party to the case and
vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.

In the case at bar, the more than 300 cases for correction of entries filed before the RTC of
Paniqui and decided by Judge Sotero do not fall within the purview of R.A. No. 9048. In
other words, not all of said petitions pertain to the change of first name or nickname or the
correction of typographical errors in the entries of the registry. Some of said petitions involve
substantial changes in the registry such as change of age, sex, status, and nationality, and
even of middle names and surnames of the petitioners. Judge Soteros conduct in acting on
the petitions, without full compliance with the procedural requirements under Rules 103 and
108 of the Revised Rules of Court, is appalling. The records of the cases show that Judge
Sotero did not comply with the administrative procedure under the said law. Thus, while R.A.
No. 9048 requires that the petition for correction of entries be posted in a conspicuous place
for ten (10) consecutive days, the records show that some of the petitions were decided less
than ten (10) days from the date of filing. Clearly then, there was no way that the 10-day
posting requirement could have been accomplished. The petitions for change of name were
also granted even without publication of the order of hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation.

Silverio v. Republic
G.R. No. 174689, 22 October 2007
Fernandez, Aisha Mie Faith M.

FACTS:

Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male transsexual, that
is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that he had always
identified himself with girls since childhood. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment, breast augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From then on,
petitioner lived as female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his
name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to
female. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of the
Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a
decision in favor of the Republic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth certificate.

RULING:

Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname
without judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law which does
not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can
legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All
entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct.
Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that all other
matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually
done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of
entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition
for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner
seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the
courts. Hence, petition is denied.

Republic v. Cagandahan
G.R. No. 166676, 12 September 2008

Gahuman, Kristine Camille B.

FACTS:

On December 11, 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

She alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981, registered as a female in the Certificate
of Live Birth but while growing up developed secondary male characteristics and eventually
diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH). Further alleges that she had clitoral
hypertrophy in her early years, at age six, after an ultrasound, it was discovered that she had
small ovaries but at 13 years old, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had diminished,
stopped growing and had no breast or menses. For all intents and purposes, as well as in
disposition, considered herself male. To prove her claim, respondent presented Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, UP-PGH, who issued a medical certificate stating
that respondent is genetically female but her body secretes male hormones, has two organs
of which the female part is undeveloped.

The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive
weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor
General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to
appear in his behalf.

RTC granted respondent’s petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court.

RULING:

No. The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and
the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No.
9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of
such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for
a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Respondent undisputedly has CAH. CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex
anatomy.Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally
intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high
levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering
him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.

In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent and in the absence of

evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society
who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified
the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.

As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of
name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. Such a change will conform with the
change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.