CUSTOMER SERVICES DIRECTORATE

2 ROND POINT EMILE DEWOITINE

31700 BLAGNAC FRANCE
TELEPHONE + 33 (0)5 61 93 33 33

ALERT OPERATORS TRANSMISSION - AOT

SUBJECT: ATA 35 – Inspection of Crew Oxygen Cylinder for missing sub-component

AIRCRAFT TYPE: A318, A319, A320, A321

OUR REF.: A35N012-19 Rev 01 dated 22-JUN-2021

OUR PREV REF.: A35N012-19 Rev 00 dated 06-MAR-2019.

EFFECTIVITY DATE:
Date of publication of this AOT A35N012-19 Rev 01 + 10 working days.

0. REASON FOR REVISION

The purpose of this new revision is to introduce the following changes

- Extension of the number of parts to be inspected (new batch from OCT – 2017 to DEC –
2017 included) and additional parts in the period of JAN -2018 to NOV-2018.
- Minor corrections in the text to improve clarity

Note: The revised paragraphs are indicated between ***BEG REV*** and ***END REV***.

***BEG REV***
1. AIRCRAFT AFFECTED

All A320 family aircraft equipped with Crew Oxygen cylinders as per Ref. 1.
***END REV***

2. REFERENCED DOCUMENTATION

2.1 APPENDIX

***BEG REV***
Appendix 1: Airbus special procedure “On-Aircraft Pressure Release Procedure for Crew Oxygen
Cylinders with Identified Hand Valve Defect”

Appendix 2: SAFRAN / AVOX Service Bulletin 10015804-35-01 Rev 03 (Or Higher) “OXYGEN –
CYLINDER – POSSIBLE MISSING COMPONENT ON OXYGEN VALVE ASSEMBLY”
***END REV***

2.2 REFERENCES

***BEG REV***
Ref. 1: SAFRAN / AVOX Service Bulletin 10015804-35-01 Rev 03 (Or Higher) “OXYGEN – CYLINDER
– POSSIBLE MISSING COMPONENT ON OXYGEN VALVE ASSEMBLY” (see AOT Appendix 2)

Ref. 2: Airbus AMM Task 35-00-00-860-801-A “Special Precautions When Working on a Gaseous
Oxygen System”

Ref. 3: EASA_AD_2019-0085_2 dated 18-APR-2019

***END REV***

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3. REASON

The purpose of this AOT is to advise A320 Family operators about findings on Crew Oxygen Cylinder
Assemblies and to request inspection of Oxygen Cylinders which are in operation and in stock.

3.1 FACTS

Two instances have been reported and confirmed of a cylinder & hand valve with oxygen leakage from
the valve assembly vent hole.

During the tear down analysis of the hand valve assemblies it was revealed that an internal part (guide)
was not assembled onto the stem. The absence of the guide can lead to an oxygen leakage and creates
a situation that increases the probability of significant oxygen leakage through the valve assembly vent
hole that would result in depletion of the oxygen cylinder.

In the two reported cases (from shop), after a leak was observed during cylinder opening, a manual
closing and reopening of the cylinder hand valve initiated ignition events internally and created a spark
of fire from the valve assembly vent hole.

***BEG REV***
This potentially missing guide is P/N 10015804 and may be missing on hand valves of oxygen cylinders
P/N 89794077 (composite) and P/N 89794015 (composite) and P/N 891511-14 (steel) produced in the
period of JAN-2018 to NOV-2018. This population has been identified in the previous Rev 00.
In the Rev. 01 in this document, the period is extended from OCT-2017 to DEC-2017 and additional parts
produced in the period of JAN-2018 to NOV-2018 have been added.
***END REV***

3.2 CONSEQUENCES

If a discrepant cylinder assembly was installed on the aircraft and left in the open position without
immediate failure, there is a possibility that the O-ring / backing ring might displace at a later time due to
environmental effects (vibration and temperature); this might occur on ground or during flight.

A discrepant assembly presents risk to maintenance personnel on ground, as the two known ignition
events demonstrate.

Both of the observed ignitions in shop during opening of the hand valve were preceded by an opening of
the valve where leakage alone was observed, and the valve was then closed. A valve which is opened
and exhibits leakage, may be closed and must not be reopened; it is important to instruct maintenance
personnel to observe this precaution and not reopen a valve from which such a leakage was observed.

3.3 AIM
***BEG REV***
The aim of this AOT is to mandate a one-time inspection of all potentially affected assemblies installed on
airline aircraft and in spare stocks as described in Ref. 1.

4. SHORT TERM ACTION

All A320 family operators who are impacted as listed in Ref. 1 are required to perform the inspection in
accordance with Ref. 1 and Ref. 2 for specific precautions to be taken.

In case of finding, take corrective actions for the Crew Oxygen Cylinders in accordance with Appendix
1.

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The one-time inspection must be performed within 60 days, from the effectivity date of the AOT
A35N012-19 Rev 01.

NOTE: This AOT is classified mandatory or expected to be classified mandatory by an Airworthiness

Directive (AD). The accomplishment instructions marked as Required for Compliance (RC) must be
done to comply with the AD. “RC” is indicating these paragraphs accordingly.

NOTE: The accomplishment instructions of this AOT include procedures given in other documents or
in other sections of the AOT. When the words ’refer to’ are used and the operator has a procedure
accepted by the local authority he belongs to, the accepted alternative procedure can be used. When
the words ’in accordance with’ are used then the given procedure must be followed.

NOTE: The access and close-up instructions, not comprising return to service tests, in this AOT do not
constitute or affect the technical intent of the AOT. Operators can therefore, as deemed necessary, omit
or add access and/or close-up steps to add flexibility to their maintenance operations as long as the
technical intent of the AOT is met within the set parameters.
***END REV***

4.1 PLANNING AND MANPOWER

4.1.1 ACCOMPLISHMENT TIMESCALE - RC

***BEG REV***
Identify and perform a one-time inspection on cylinder(s) hand valve(s) in accordance with Ref. 1 before
any action on the valve or within 60 days after the effectivity date of this AOT, whichever occurs first.
Maintenance records can be used as a mean to identify the cylinder(s) hand valve(s) installed on aircraft.
***END REV***

4.1.2 MANPOWER

The estimated time to perform this one-time inspection is 0.3 M/H

***BEG REV***
In case of finding, the bleeding of an open cylinder performed in accordance with the procedure
provided in Appendix 1 will take between 10 and 20 minutes if the cylinder is at nominal pressure (1850
psi).
***END REV***

Bleeding time will be lower for lower cylinder pressures.

Bleeding of a closed cylinder is not necessary.

4.2 DESCRIPTION

Perform a one-time inspection on cylinder(s) hand valve(s) as described in Ref. 1 in order to detect a
discrepant hand valve assembly.

Cylinders to be inspected are all cylinders having a P/N 89794077 or P/N 89794015 or P/N 891511-14
with a Serial Number as listed in the appendix attached as per Ref. 1, and in each of the following
situations:
- Cylinder is installed on aircraft
- Cylinder is in stock

Important Note: In case a cylinder is installed on aircraft and must be opened or re-opened after
maintenance activity, it is highly recommended to perform the inspection before opening the cylinder due
to potential ignition risk with spark of fire through the valve vent hole.

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4.2.1 ACCESS

For cylinders installed on aircraft, access to the crew Oxygen cylinder(s) is obtained as follows:
- Put an ACCESS PLATFORM 2M (6 FT) in position at access door 812.
- Open access door 812.

4.2.2 INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS - RC

One-time inspection of cylinders in stock or installed on aircraft is done as described in Ref. 1.

The inspection consists in basic gap measurement on the cylinder valve.

4.2.3 FINDINGS - RC
***BEG REV***
Apply the instructions in accordance with Ref. 1 in order to determine if each inspected cylinder is
“Acceptable” or “Unacceptable”.

In case of “Unacceptable” finding for a cylinder installed on aircraft or in storage with the valve in the
closed position, apply the instructions in accordance with Ref. 1.

In case of “Unacceptable” finding for a cylinder installed on aircraft – with valve normally opened – do not
touch or rotate the hand valve and apply the instructions in accordance with Ref. 1. The cylinder has to
be bled on aircraft, follow the special procedure to bleed a cylinder with finding “Unacceptable”, in
accordance with Appendix 1.

Caution: During accomplishment, ensure that all the procedures are performed in accordance with Ref.
2.
***END REV***

4.3 SPARES AND TOOLING

Inspection of cylinders in stock or installed on aircraft requires an “oxygen clean” pin gauge (or equivalent)
with a diameter of 2 mm (0.079”) refer to Ref. 1.

Any permanent blue marker is also needed in order to mark inspected valve assemblies without findings
(OK).

In case of finding on aircraft, a cylinder which is removed can only be replaced by the same P/N (no
interchangeability available).

5. FURTHER INFORMATION

5.1 FOLLOW-UP PLAN

***BEG REV***
Apart from the actions described in this AOT and Ref. 1, the operators shall verify that any oxygen
cylinder installed on aircraft in the future with a P/N 89794077 or P/N 89794015 or P/N 891511-14 and
with a Serial Number as listed in the appendix attached as per Ref. 1 has been inspected in accordance
with Ref. 1. Oxygen cylinder marked with a blue paint dot on the valve means that the Oxygen Cylinder
has been inspected and identified as “Acceptable”.
***END REV***

5.2 IMPACTED DOCUMENTATION

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N/A

6. AOT APPROVAL

The technical content of this document is approved under the authority of DOA nr. EASA.21J.031.

7. REPORTING

Questions about this AOT are to be addressed to Airbus Customer Services through TechRequest on
Airbus World, selecting Engineering Domain, Section Engineering Support and ATA 35-11.

As per latest reporting policy (Ref to OIT 999.0018/16), all inspection results (with or without findings) are
to be addressed to Airbus Customer Services through the generic e-mail address:
inspection.results@airbus.com.

Best Regards,

Christian FREMONT Jean-Pierre GOMEZ

VICE PRESIDENT ENGINEERING SUPPORT VICE PRESIDENT A320 PROGRAMME
CUSTOMER SERVICES CUSTOMER SERVICES

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