Zilsel1942 The Genesis of The Concept of Physical Law

Philosophical Review
The Genesis of the Concept of Physical Law

Author(s): Edgar Zilsel
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 51, No. 3 (May, 1942), pp. 245-279
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
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Number 3 Whole
Volume LI May, I942 lNumber303
THE
PHILOSOPHICALREVIEW
THE GENESIS OF THE CONCEPT OF
PHYSICAL LAW*
I NVESTIGATION of physicallaws is amongthemostimportant
tasksof modernnaturalscience.The naturalistobservesrecur-
rentassociationsof certaineventsor qualities.He is convincedthat
these regularities,observed in the past, will hold in the future
as well, and he calls them"laws of nature",especiallyif he has
succeeded in expressingthemby mathematicalformulas.Know-
ledge of physicallaws is of the greatestimportanceboth to the
theoristand to the engineer.Whoever knows a law of natureis
able to predictand, consequently,to controlevents: withoutin-
vestigationof laws there is no moderntechnology.As Western
civilizationof themodernera is based materiallyon its technology,
so it is distinguishedspirituallyfrom the culturesof all other
periodsand nationsby makingtheinvestigation of naturallaws the
basic task of science. To primitiveand oriental civilizations
the conceptof physicallaw is quite unknown.We shall see that
it was virtuallyunknownto antiquityand the middle ages, and
thatit did not arise beforethe middleof the seventeenthcentury.
It is strangethat,in spiteof itsimportance,thegenesisof thecon-
cept of naturallaw has not yet been thoroughlyinvestigated.Yet
thisis buta symptomof theratherunsatisfactory stateof research
in thefieldof thehistoryof ideas in general.We mustnotconfuse,
however,the juridical term"naturallaw" with the same termin
the sense in which it is used by our naturalists.As is generally
known,the juridical concept (ius natural, lex naturalis) desig-
*This essayis partof a studyundertaken
withthehelpof grantsfrom
theCommittee in Aid of DisplacedForeignScholars,theSocial Science
ResearchCouncil,and theRockefellerFoundation.
245
246 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LI.
nates moral commandsthat are based not on statutelaw but on

reason,divinecommandment, and moralinstinct,and are common
to all nations. It asserts how reasonable beings shall behave,
whereas naturallaws, as theyare studiedby modernnaturalists,
stateand describeas a merematterof facthow physicalprocesses
do takeplace. Numeroushistoricalinquirieson the formerconcept
have clarifiedits development.'On the otherhand, the historical
remarkson the conceptof physicallaw are as rare as theyare
poor. In this fieldthe most valuable preliminarywork has been
done, up to now, by the authorsof a few dictionaries.2 We shall
use thematerialcollectedby themand tryto increaseit in essential
points.Since thehistoricalproblemwe are dealingwithis intricate
and theliteraturethatmustbe takenintoaccountis veryextensive,
we do not make a claim to completeness.The juridical conceptof
natural law will not be discussed in this article.Yet we cannot
disregardit completely,since it cannotbe neatlyseparatedfrom
the naturalist'sconceptin its embryonicstage.
The conceptof physicallaw, as it is used in modernnatural
science, does not containany ideas of commandand obedience.
Yet it obviouslyoriginatesin a juridical metaphor.In a well
governedstatetherewill be laws whichare forthe mostpart ob-
served by the citizens. Lawbreaking will occur comparatively
seldom,and will be punishedwhen detected.The more powerful
the government and the clevererthe police is, the rarerit will be.
Let us suppose now the governmentto be omnipotentand the
police to be omniscient.In this ideal case the behavior of the
citizenswould completelyconformto the demandsof thelawgiver
1 Cf. thearticle"NaturalLaw" in theEncyclopaediaof theSocial Sciences

(New York, 1933), Xi, 284ff.(GeorgesGurvitch).
2 The remarks in ErnstCassirer,Das Erkenntnisproblem (2nd ed., Berlin,
I9WI), I, 367ff.and especiallyin Franz Borkenau,Der Ubergangvom
feudalenzum biirgerlichen Weltbild(Paris 1934), I5-97 are not quite re-
liable. The article"law" in Murray'sNew EnglishDictionarygives most
valuable material.Some materialis to be found in Littre's French,in
Liddell-Scott'sGreek,and in Harper's Latin Dictionary.The Thesaurus
LinguaeLatinae has notyetproceededto thearticle"lex". The Vocabulario
delta Crusca and Du Cange, GlossariumMediae et InfimaeLatinitatis,do
not containmaterialreferring to our problem.Hans Kelsen in his article
"Die Entstehung des Kausalgesetzesaus dem Vergeltungsprinzip",Journal
of UnifiedScience (Erkenntnis),i940, 69 ff.,and his book Vergeltungund
Kausalitdt (which will appear in Holland) derivesthe ideas of causality
and physicallaw fromthe juridicalidea of retribution. Kelsen's valuable
papercouldnotbe used in thisarticle.
No. 3.] GENESIS OF CONCEPT OF PHYSICAL LAW 247
and laws would be always observed. With such an ideal state

naturewas comparedin the seventeenthcentury.The observable
recurrent associationsof physicalevents,in whichthephilosophers
and scientistsof the period began to be interested,were inter-
preted as divine commandsand were called natural laws. Thus
the conceptof natural law originatedin theologicalideas. Later
these non-empiricalcomponentsfell graduallyinto oblivion.Our
historicalinvestigation, therefore,will have to trace the idea of
God as a lawgiverto natureand the influenceof this idea on the
risingnatural sciences. Since one is, generallyspeaking,inclined
to consider contemporaryideas as a matterof course and to
ascribethemuncritically to thinkersof thepast,we shall bringinto
prominencethedifferences frommodernthinking beforetheseven-
teenthcentury.Finally we shall tryto explain sociologicallywhy
the conceptof physicallaw was lackingthenand whyit developed
in the period of Descartes, Hooke, Boyle, and Newton.
2. The rootsof our conceptgo back to antiquity.They consistin
a few passages of the Bible and the Corpus Juris.A few other
ancient ideas are of less importance.
The divine lawgiveris the centralidea of Judaism.Since God
in additionis the creatorof the world,it is easy to understand
that the idea arose of his not only having given the moral and
rituallaws to his people,butalso havingprescribedcertainprohibi-
tions to the physicalworld. In a descriptionof God's power and
omniscienceJob 28, 26 says that God made a law for the rain
(and a way forlightning and thunder).The Hebrew textuses the
word chok. This is derivedfromthe verb chokak,meaningto en-
grave, and is the same termwhich is used for moral and ritual
laws in the Old Testament.The Septuaginttranslatesvery freely
"he numberedthe rain (p(O0NeV)", the Vulgate literallygives
ponebat legem.The same word choke,whichhoweverin this con-
textmeans ratherboundary,is used in Job 26, Io, whichsays that
the Lord made a boundary (Septuagint: xp6araycua, Vulgate:
terminus) to the water,untillightand darknesscome to an end.
Likewise Job 38, io says the Lord set a boundary(chok, 6pea,
terminus),bars, and doors to the ocean. The followingverse II,
withoutusing the term"law", pronouncesthe wordingof a divine
command or, better,prohibition: the Lord says to the sea:
"Hitherto shalt thou come but no further;and here shall thy

proud waves be stayed".The Hebrew text uses the futureto ex-
press thecommand,as is usual in Hebrew and is done also in the
Ten Commandments. The Septuagintand the Vulgate too trans-
late literallyby the future.
There are a fewmoreanalogouspassages in the Old Testament
Psalm I04, 9 says the Lord has set a boundary(gevol, terminum)
to thewatersthattheymaynotpass over; thattheyturnnot again
(Hebrew: future)to covertheearth.Proverbs8, 9 eventwiceuses
the word law choke), for whichin the translations, however,two
different termsare used. It says the Lord gave his decree (chok,
terminum)to the sea that the waters should not pass his com-
mandment(chok, legem). And Jeremiah5, 22 says the Lord has
placed the sand for the bound of the sea by a perpetualdecree
(chok, xpba,7 praeceptum),thatit cannotpass it; and though
thewaves thereoftoss themselves, yetcan theynotprevail; though
theyroar,yetcan theynot (Hebrew: future)pass over it.3
We have met with the most ancientstage of the conceptof
physicallaw in ten versesof the Old Testament.The influenceof
the Bible on occidentalthinkingis immense.These verses were
quoted throughcenturiesagain and again, and have decidedly
contributedto the formationof conceptsin risingnaturalscience.
Viewing the text of the Vulgate (which beforethe rise of Pro-
testantismwas the reallyeffectivefactor),we twicefindthe term
law (lex) (Job 28, 26 and Prov. 8, 29) and once (Job 38, II) the
wordingof a divineprohibition. In thispassage and especiallyin
Jeremiah5, 22 the idea is distinctlyimpliedthatthe sea, to which
the divine commandis addressed,wishes to offerresistancebut,
beingtoo weak, is forcedto bow beforethe supremepower of the
Lord. This mightbe a survivalof primevalanimismand demon-
ology.As subject to divinecommandsrain,lightningand thunder,
winds,and earthand, especially,the sea are given: thelaboratory,
whichis theverybirthplaceof thescientific conceptof naturallaw,
'The followingJob-versesare somewhatless important:28, 25 The
Lord made the weightforthe windsand themeasurefor the waters;38, 5
He gave the measuresto earthand stretcheda lineupon it; 38, 8 He shut
up the sea withdoors.-I am greatlyindebtedto Dr. Boas Kohn, librarian
of the JewishTheological Seminaryof America,for his information on
the Hebrew text.
still is far remote.The empiricalbackgroundof the biblicalidea,

presumably,is the observationthat thereare certainpermanent
traitsin nature: the waves of the sea advance and recede,when
tossed up by a gale, but,eventually,the dividingline betweensea
and land remainsunchanged;wind and weatherproduceconsider-
able destruction,but, after all, life goes on as usual. These ob-
servationsreferto certainempiricalregularitiesand would not be
so differentfromthe statementsmade in modernphysicallaws,
if onlythe regularitieswere specified.A statementof the circum-
stances with which,in spite of storms,the situationof the sea-
shore is regularlyassociated,would make predictionspossibleand
would be a geophysicallaw. Of course, the authors of the Old
Testamentwere not interestedin statementslike that.They were
inspired by the emotionalidea that nature,being ruled by the
Lord, mustbehaveas it does, and theyrestricted themselvesto the
vaguest indicationsas to how naturebehaves. The same idea of
"must" participatedin the formationof the modernconceptof
physicallaw, but it was supplemented by the exact descriptionof
the empiricalfacts.In the furtherdevelopmentthe idea of neces-
sitygraduallyrecededto the backgroundand eventuallyvanished,
the observablerecurrentassociationsof events remainingas the
only contentof physicallaws.4
3. To classical antiquityalso the idea is not quite foreignthat
physicalprocessesare superintended and enforcedby God or gods
as by judges. It is impliedas early as in the oldest philosophical
fragmentin the Greek language thatis literallyleftto us. In the
firsthalf of the sixth centuryB.C. Anaximandersays5 that all
'It is remarkablethatin the greatdocumentof ancientEgyptianmono-

theism,in Akhenaton'smajor Hymn to Aton,the sun-godAton is praised
as the creatorof the universebut not as lawgiver: neithermoral nor
physicallaws are mentioned(cf. JamesH. Breasted: The Dawn of Con-
science,New York I933, 28I ff.).This is possiblyconnectedwiththe fact
that, apparently,some social conditionsobstructedthe developmentof
legislationin Egypt,in contrastto Babyloniawhichproducedthe code of
Hammurabi.Actuallythe Babyloniancreation-story in the Gilgameshepic
conceivesthe sun-godMardukas the lawgiverto the stars.Tablet 7 raises
the rhetoricalquestion:"who prescribesthe laws for (the star-gods)Anu,
Enlil, and Ea, who fixestheirbounds?"and explainsthat Marduk"main-
tains the stars in their path" by giving"commands"and "decrees" (cf.
MorrisJastrow:The Civilizationof Bdbyloniaand Assyria (Philadelphia
I915), 44I last lineff.).
5Diels, Fragmenteder Vorsokratiker, 5th ed., Berlin I934, I2 B i.
thingsarise fromtheindefinite, theprimarysubstance,and return

to it "accordingto necessity.For theypay fineand penaltyto each
otherfortheiriniquityaccordingto time'sorder."The inevitability
of a certainphysicalprocess is expressedhere in juridical terms.
Yet gods as lawgiversor judges are not mentioned.They appear
half a centurylater in Heraclitus. "The Sun", Heraclitus says,
"will not transgresshis measures; otherwisethe Erynyes,the
bailiffsof Dike (the goddessof justice), will findhim."6In Anaxi-
mander the physicalregularitywhich is interpreted by him half
mythologically, half juridically,is stillbased on metaphysicalcon-
struction;nobodyhad ever observedthat all thingsspring from
and returnto the indefinite. In Heraclitus,on the otherhand,the
physical statementis based on actual observation,the regular
course of the sun being an empiricalfact. The regularityitself,
however,is presumedas obvious and not described.
With progressingrationalismthe scantyindicationsof a juridi-
cal interpretation of the course of nature vanished again in the
followingperiod. In the period of the sophiststhe terms"law"
and "nature",yoven and v6,uo;, becameevenopposites,"law" desig-
natingeverything that is, as a mere convention,artificially
intro-
duced by men. Democritusthereforedid not know anythingof
"natural laws", thoughhe attemptedto explain all physicalphe-
nomenaby causes. A centurylater Aristotlefor the same reason
neverused thelaw-metaphor.7 Plato uses theterm"laws of nature"
only once to characterizethebehaviorof thehealthyin contrastto
the sick human body.8As a characterization of the healthyand
normal state the phrase occurs also in the second centuryA.D.
Ibid., 22 B 94. FragmentB II4 says: "all humanlaws are derivedfrom

the one divine law. This . . . is stronger than everything."In a somewhat
dubiousscholiumto a medicalpoemof NicanderHeraclitusis said to have
called fireand the sea slaves to the winds"accordingto divinelaw" (xa&a
Otdov vojov ibid.,22 A i4a).
7 Cf. Bonitz,Index Aristotelicus. In Physics II, i93a15, Aristotlepoints
out that,if a wooden bed is dug in and sends up a shoot,the shoot is
wood butnot a bed. He contraststhe perishableand artificialshape of the
bed withits permanent and naturalmaterialby callingthe formera mere
"arrangement accordingto law" (xa-r&v6[tov &6aeTaLV). This is the strict
oppositeto the terminology of modernscience,in whichlaws always refer
to the permanent traitsof the
' Tim. 83e: when a man is physical processes.
sick,the blood picks up the components of
the food "contraryto the laws of nature"(naQaoTou; Tig V(ro9 v6ROi).
Cf. Ast,Lexicon Platonicum.
No. 3.] GENESIS OF CONCEPT OF PHYSICAL LAW 25I
in Lucianus.9The law-metaphorplays a certainpart in the Stoics

only.The Stoics were determinists and believedin fateand divine
providence.Living in a period of risingmonarchiestheyviewed
the universeas a great empire,ruledby the divineLogos. Conse-
quentlythe idea of a naturallaw was not unknownto them.For
the most part it referredto moral prescriptions based on reason.
This Stoic idea is the source of the juridical conceptof natural
law, which influencedjurisprudence and political philosophy
throughtwo thousandyears. A few times,however,althoughthe
two meaningswere neverneatlyseparated,the idea was appliedby
thestoicsto physicalprocessestoo. Zeno,thefounderof theschool,
speaks of natural laws in this ambiguous way. His disciple
Cleanthes mentionsthe "law accordingto which the prince of
naturesteersthe universe"threetimesin his well knownhymnto
Zeus. A few verses later the firstpassage speaks of the obedience
of the firmament and the stars; the two otherpassages referto
moral law. His followerChrysippusonce comparesthe universe
at lengthto a state and calls reason (6yog) a law (v6toq) to
nature.10In Cicero On Laws, however,the conceptof naturallaw
is not applied to physicalobjects.
The Stoics were notmuchinterestedin physicalphenomenaand
nevergave instancesof naturallaw in its physicalmeaning.Such
instancesappear about the beginningof the Christianera in Ovid.
Ovid complainsonce of the betrayalof a friend;his faithlessness
is so monstrous,that the riverswill flow uphill,the sun will go
backwards,water will produce fireand firewater,in short,"all
thingswill proceed reversingnature's laws (naturae praepostera
legibus ibunt)".11 Possibly the idea that the ordinarycourse of
naturemustbe ascribedto laws is influenced by the Stoics. On the
otherhand the term"law" in Ovid designateshardlymore than
the opposite to disorder: in several passages unarrangedhair is
9Amores 22: "thelegislature

of nature"(a ap
ri- oo vojoiEhta) is ob-
servedamonganimals,as pederastyis unknownto them.
10Zeno: Arnim,StoicorumVeterumFragmenta,I fg. i62; Cleanthes:
ibid., I fg. 537 p. I2I 1. 35, p. I22 1. 20, p. I23 1. 5; Chrysippus: ibid., II fg.
528, cf. fg. 9I9.
11Tristia I, 8
verse 5. In Met. I5, 7I (1Kim) Ovid says of Pythagoras
thathe knewall secretsof nature,theoriginsof snow,lightning,and earth-
quakes-and the "law accordingto whichthe stars move".
called "hair withoutlaw (sine lege)" by him.'2A ratherisolated

passage in the Stoic Seneca, however,seemsnearerto themodem
usage of language. Seneca is not surprisedthat comets,being a
veryrarephenomenon, are "not yetsubjectedto certainlaws (non-
dum tencrilegibus certis)"; posteritywill be surprised,he says,
that we ignoredsuch obvious things.'3Possiblythe Stoic idea of
the divine law which is identicalwith the divine reason is here
involved.
At any rate the law-metaphorwas not quite unknownto the
ancients.This is illustratedbythetermastronomy. The Greekword
nomosmeanslaw, and the scienceof thestarscould nothave been
called astronomyif the idea had not existed that the order and
regularityof the stellar movementswere analogous to human
law. The names astronomyand astrologyoriginallywere synony-
mous.'4 As early as the fifthcenturyB.C. the term"astronomy"
was familiarto Aristophanes.15 Some authors,such as Aristotle,
Archimedes,Polybius, and Hipparch, use the term "astrology"
only. Others, such as Pappus and Seneca, prefer "astronomy".
With the increasinginfluxof orientalsuperstition magicalaspects
eventuallyprevailedin the term"astrology".In the fifthcentury
A.D. the Latin encyclopediasfor monks explain "astronomy",
literallytranslatingthe Greekterm,as the sciencedealingwiththe
"law of the stars (lex astrorum)".16 In the astrologicalliterature
of late antiquitysometimeslaws of nature are mentionedin an
entirelymagical sense. Thus the astrologerVettiusValens (about
I50 A.D.), discussingastrologicalpredetermination, speaks of the
"legislation"of nature,fate,and the stars.'7
12Met. I, 477; Ars. amat.III, I33. (On Ovid cf. Deferrari-Barry-McGuire,
A Concordanceof Ovid, WashingtonI939, s.v. lex.)
3Natural.quaest.VII, 25, 3-5.
14On the names "astronomy" and "astrology"cf. Pauly-Wissowa,Real-
encyclopadied. class. Alterturnswissensch., Stuttgarti896, s.v. Astronomie
(Hultsch). In additioncf. ThesaurusLinguae Latinae sv. astrologia,as-
tronomia,astronomicus, astronomus.
ANudbes194, 201.
Cassiodorus inst. 2, 7; Isidorus diff.2, I52.
'TAnthologiae (Kroll) 5, cap. 9 p. 219 1.26ff.fate (FitaQtv) has given
a law (vEvogo-[thENEv) to everybeing,surrounding it withan unbreakable
wall; (The term itaQ[vinseems to indicateinfluenceof the Stoics) ; 7
cap. 3 p. 272 1.gff.:nature(cpaudyt) gave a law (evogoriThfanv)and encom-
passed manwiththewall of necessity;9 cap. 7 p. 343 1.33ff.: thestarsorder
the universeby theirinfluencewithoutever transgressing the boundaries
of legislature (vogofuctas).
4. On thewholeone musttakegood care notto overestimate the

similarityof the classical conceptof nature and modernnatural
science. Deterministicideas were known to the ancients. They
were indicatedas earlyas in Heraclitus'doctrineof thefieryLogos
who rules the universeand expresseshimselfin the cyclicchange
of matter.They were explainedin detail in the Stoic doctrineof
fate.Neverthelesstwopointsmustnotbe overlooked.First,ancient
determinists spoke muchmore frequently of the logos thanof the
nomos, more frequentlyof the reason than of the law of the
universe.Secondly,theclassicaldeterminist doctrinehad a tingeof
mythand emotionratherthanof scienceand experience.Heraclitus
and the Stoics feltthedevelopment of thewholeuniverseas neces-
sary and enforced,but were not interestedin singlephysicallaws.
How far remote from natural science the determinismof the
Stoics was is revealedby theirgivingvaticinationas a verification
of their doctrineof fate.'8 The superstitiousStoics were deter-
minists.On theotherhand theancientrepresentatives of thescien-
tificinterpretationof nature,such as Democritusand Lucretius,
who consistently advocatedcausal explanationsof nature,did not
use the law-metaphor. It is significant
that,whereasmoderntrans-
lations of Lucretius speak of physicallaws again and again, this
term was unknownto Lucretius himself.'9Lucretius,following
Epicurus, stressedthreebasic principlesof nature.In his poem
they play a part analogous to physicallaws in modernscience:
nothingcan be producedfromnothing,nothingcan be annihilated,
and the amount of motion in nature is constant.20 But since all
quantitativedetailsare lacking,his "laws of conservation"(as one
is temptedto call them) are extremely vague. Moreover,Lucretius
does not call themlaws, but speaks of principles.In Epicurean
philosophythere are and can be no "laws" of nature,since the
gods do not take care of the world.
8 Cf. Arnim, loc. cit.vol. 2 cap. 6 ? 4 pp. 270-272.
"The very completeIndex Lucretianus,Gotoburgii9iI, by Johannes
Paulson,givesonlythreepassagesin whichtheterm"law" is used in a non-
juridical sense. III, 69cy(Munro) states that the human soul is not im-
mortalbut is subjectto the "law of death (leti lege)"; V, 58 statesthat
all thingsmustperishand nothingcan break,'thelaws of time(aevi leges)";
and V, 720 denies the existenceof chimeras,statingthatmembersof the
bodycan combineonlyif theyare adaptedto eachother;all animalsare bound
"bytheselaws" (tenerilegibushisce).
I, I49ff.; I, 2i6ff.; II, 7I (Munro).
There hardlyis roomforphysicallaws in ancientscienceeither.

Aristotle makes a few general statementsapproximatelycor-
respondingto laws of motion-sublunar bodies tend to their
naturalplace, celestialbodies move in circles-but theyare vague,
incorrect,and formulated teleologically.
And, of course,theywere
not called "laws" by Aristotle.20a Peculiarly enough only three
physicallaws were correctlyknownto the ancients:the law of the
lever,the optical law of reflexion,and the law of buoyancy.All
threeof themare discussed in Archimedes,who, however,never
used theterm"naturallaw". AlthoughArchimedes, by farthemost
eminentphysicistof antiquity,certainlyverifiedall threelaws by
experiments(the law of buoyancywas even discoveredby him
experimentally), he does not explain themempirically.He rather
follows the deductivemethodof Euclid, starts frompostulates,
and deduces and proves his physicalstatements, as if theywere
mathematical theorems.21 Even froma mereexternalpointof view
his methodis Euclidean, in so far as all theoremsare numbered
as the theoremsin Euclid. In a mathematicaltreatise,however,
there is obviouslyno room for the law-metaphor:Archimedes
speaks as littleof the "law" of buoyancyas Euclid speaks of the
"law" of Pythagoras.22 The deductivemethodin Archimedesprob-
ably originatedin the same remarkablesociologicalphenomenon
which also caused the poor state of physicsin antiquity.Ancient
civilizationwas based on slave labor and, in general,theirpatrons
and representatives did not have occupations,but lived on their
rents.In ancientopinion,therefore,logical deductionand mathe-
matics were worthyof free-bornmen, whereas experimentation,
as requiringmanual work,was consideredto be a slavishoccupa-
tion. Archimedeshimselfgave expression to this contemptfor
manual labor and technology.23 On the whole the developmentof
,la
The Mechanica,ascribedto Aristotle,is probablyspurious.It knowsthe
principleof the leverwithoutusingthe term"law." Cf. above footnote7.
21 Buoyancy:
de corp.fluit.I theorems3-7; lever: de plan.aequ. theor.6f.
The law of reflexionis used half a centurybeforeArchimedesin Euclid's
Optics,theor.i9 (Euclid, Opera, ed. Heiberg-Mengevol. 7 p. 31); it was
knownto Archimedes(cf. scholium7 to Euclid's Catoptrics,ibid. p. 348;
Archimedes'Catoptricsis lost) and is givenas theoremi in the (spurious)
Catoptricsof Euclid.
22Even todayphysicistsstill speak ratherof the principlethan of the
law of Archimedes.
23 Cf.
Plutarch,Vitae, MarcellusI4 and I7.
physicswas seriouslyimpairedin antiquityby the contemptfor

manual work, technology,and experimentation.And where
physicscomesto a standstillin a ratherembryonic stagetheconcept
of physicallaw cannot develop.
Anotherliterarydocumentof antiquityhas contributeda few
ideas to the modernconceptof physicallaw. This is the Corpus
Juris. In the introductory sections,both of the Pandects and of
the Institutes,the Stoic idea of natural law (jus naturale) is
explained.In contrastto statutelaw naturallaw is based on mere
reason, does not change,and is commonto all nations.For the
most part moral obligations-veneration of God, obedience to
parents-are given as examples.24On the otherhand it is stated
that "naturehas taughtall animalsthe naturallaw". From it the
intercourseof male and female,begettingand educationof the
offspring, derive.Obviouslyin thisexplanationtwo different ideas
are mixed.On theone handa statement is made on mattersof fact.
The empiricalfactthatmammalspropagateby sexual intercourse
and take care of theiroffspring could be called a biologicallaw in
the modernmeaningof the word. On the otherhand these facts
are interpretedas resultsof a sortof legal permissionor command,
natureor God beingthe lawgiver.25 This confusionfacilitatedthe
applicationof the law-metaphorto physicalfacts even centuries
later. In the historyof ideas the Corpus Juriswas almostas in-
fluentialas the Bible.
5. The ChristianMiddle Ages did not make any contribution to
the developmentof our concept.We need not enlarge,therefore,
on medievalauthors.Of course the Bible passages on God as the
lawgiverof the universewere oftenquoted and paraphrasedby
thechurchfathersand Scholastics.The ideas also of theStoics and
the CorpusJurison naturallaw (jus naturale) were exertingsome
influence.A passage in the ChristianoratorArnobius (about 300
A.D.) is of some interest,since it gives a few instancesof the
physical regularitieswhich were explained by the theologians
throughdivine laws. In orderto prove thatthe Christianreligion
is not anythingmonstrousArnobius20 asks his audience whether
24Dig.I, 1, 3; Inst. I, :2.
25Inst. I, 2, II: naturalia iura . . . divine providentidconstitute.
26Adv. Gentiles I, 2.
256 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LL
"the laws initiallyestablished"have been overthrownsince the

timethe new faithhas spread.All instancesare givenin the form
of rhetoricalquestions. He explains that the elementshave not
changedtheirqualities.The structureof the machineof the uni-
verse (presumablyhe has in mind the astronomicalsystem) has
not dissolved.The rotationof the firmament, therisingand setting
of the stars,have not changed.The sun has not growncold. The
change of the moon, the turn of the seasons and of long and
shortdays,have neitherstoppednor been disturbed.It still rains,
seeds still germinate,treesstillproduce and lose theirleaves, etc.
On the whole he takes his instancesfromthe same fieldas the
Bible and Ovid do; and,of course,thereis no questionof laboratory
physics.A certainpredilectionfor astronomicaland cyclicproc-
esses is significant.
About 400 A.D. St. Augustine27 developedthe
conceptof God's eternallaw by whichthe universeis ruled.Au-
gustine's eternallaw stems from the biblical idea of the divine
lawgiver,but is an entirelyteleologicalconcept.It is identicalwith
the impenetrable providenceof God and has nothingto do withthe
physicallaws of themodernscientists.
An extensivediscussion in Thomas Aquinas throws light on
the Scholastic conceptof law and may be analysedhere, as far
as our subject is concerned.Thomas combinesseeming logical
exactnesswithconsiderableempiricalvagueness.A law, according
to his definition,28
is "a rule and measure of acts". Yet we shall
see that in one case physicalprocessesand phenomenaare also
covered by this concept.Thomas distinguishespositive fromna-
turallaw (jus naturale).29 The formerneeds promulgation by the
lawgiver (and consequentlyhas no bearingon our subject); the
latterdoes not,since "it is promulgatedby the very factthatGod
instilledit intoman's mind,so as to be knownby himnaturally".30
Later, naturallaw is definedas "theparticipationof theeternallaw
in reasonablecreatures".3'With the "eternallaw" (lex aeterna)
we have transcendedthe provinceof human actions. It is "the
27E.g., de lib. arb. I, 6; de civ.dei XIX, i2.
28
SummcaTheol. II, i qu. 90, art. I resp.
29Ibid.qu. 7i, art.6, resp.4.
3"Ibid.qu. go, art. 4, obj. i resp.The agreementwiththe ancientconcept
of naturallaw is obvious.
31 Qu. 9i, art. 2, obj. 2 resp.Here the termlex naturalis,notjus natural,
is used.
type (ratio) of divinewisdomas directingall acts and motions".32

Thomas explains that God governs the acts and motionsof all
creaturesand is to the world as the artistis to his work. Since in
every artistthe type of the order (ratio ordinis) which is pro-
duced by him pre-exists,the type (ratio) of the divine wisdom
bears the characterrationedm)of law. So the idea is distinctly
expressedthat the whole of nature (not only human actions) is
subject to law. Two points,however,mustbe broughtintopromi-
nence.First,thewholeidea thatthetypeof theorderof theworld
pre-existsin God is obviouslyPlatonic.And, secondly,the order
Thomas has in mind is a teleological,not a causal one: to the
words "divinewisdom",quotedabove,he makesthe significant ad-
dition"movingeverything to its due end (ad debitumfinem)".3
The distancefromthemodernconceptof physicallaw is consider-
able.
Somewhatlater34objectionsare discussed,statingthatirrational
beings cannot be subject to the eternallaw, since it cannot be
promulgatedto themand since theydo not participatein reason.
The objections are refutedand it is expresslystated that "all
movementsand actionsof the whole of natureare subject to the
eternallaw". What promulgationis to man "the impressionof an
inward active principle" (i.e. an Aristotelianentelechy) is to
natural things.As the only instance,however,the sea is given,
which,accordingto Prov. 8, 29, receiveda law fromGod. As to
natural law Thomas shares the ambiguitywiththe Corpus Juris.
On the one hand he gives moralpreceptsas instances(evil has to
be avoided); on the otherhe quotes the Pandects and explains
thatsexual intercourseand educationof the offspring amongani-
mals are based on natural law. Man has some natural laws in
commonevenwithinanimatethings:notonlyman,but,as Thomas
maintains,every substancestrivesto preserveits being.35
82 Qu. 93, art. I resp (cf.
qu. 9i, art. i).
3 The teleologicalcharacterof theorderof theworldis stressedand identi-
fiedwithdivineprovidenceI qu. 22, art. I. Ibid. art. 2 obj. i and 3 it is ex-
plainedthatDemocritusand theEpicureansdeniedprovidence(and withit,
as we may add, order and eternallaw) by ascribingthe course of nature
to "necessityof matter".
3 Op. cit.qu. 93, art. 5, obj. I and 2.
" Ibid., qu. 94, art. 2-It is not quite clear whetherin Thomas
physical
regularitiesbelongto naturalor to eternallaw. In the articlejust quoted
On the whole Thomas combinesthe biblicalidea of God as the

lawgiver of the universeand the ancientconceptof naturallaw
with Platonic and Aristotelianideas. His conceptof eternallaw,
therefore,is entirelyteleologicaland identicalwith the idea of
divine providence.Moreover,our discussionis apt to give a dis-
tortedview of his interestin physicalregularities.The passages
of the Summa Theologicain whichtheyare mentionedhave been
singled out froma very extensiveexposition.In the editionof
Pope Leo XIII (Rome, i892) theyfilljust two pages, whereas
his whole discussionof law extendsover two hundredand seven
pages. ActuallytheSumma Theologicais interestedin all theologi-
cal problemsconnectedwith the conceptof law and deals with
physicalphenomenaonly in so far as theyare mentionedin the
Bible and the Corpus Juris.
6. In discussingauthorsof the modernera we have to show,
first,that the conceptof physicallaw was not knownbeforethe
seventeenthcentury.Since numerousauthorsmustbe considered,
we shall treatthemin groups withoutstrictlyobservingthe tem-
poral sequence.We may beginwitha few theologiansand jurists.
The widelyread handbookof jurisprudenceDoctor and Student
by ChristopherSaint Germain,publishedin Latin in i532 and in
English in I530 and I53I, brieflyrepeats the opinions of Thomas
and the Corpus Juris on eternal law, to which the universeis
subject,and on naturallaw. Of the lattertwo meaningsare dis-
tinguished,one referringto reasonablecreaturesonly,the otherto
The firstmeaningis merelyjuridical, the second
all creatures.36
coversalso biologicaland physicalphenomena.Seventyyearslater,
Richard Hooker advocatesthe same ideas more extensivelyin the
firstchaptersof his well knowntreatiseThe Laws of Ecclesiastical
Polity, published in I592 or I594.37 Of course he knows and
discusses God's eternallaw which is identicalwith divine provi-
dence. As to naturallaw he separatesthenaturallaw of reasonable
a few of themare countedwithnaturallaw. In qu. 93, art. 5, on the other

hand,theyare countedwitheternallaw. Naturallaw is restricted to reason-
able beingsin qu. 9i, art.2, obj. 2.
36 I5th edition,London I57I, chap. I p. 3 and chap. 5 p. 5f. On the first
editionscf. S.E. Thorne,"St. Germain'sDoctor and Student",The Library,
IVth series, vol. X (1930) pp. 42I-426.
3 Book I, chap.3. Works (ed. Keble,7thed.,Oxfordi888) I 200ff.
beings and the natural law which is kept "unwittinglyby the

heavensand elements".38 He adds thatthe latter"hath in it more
thanmenas yetattainedto knowor perhapsevershallattain".The
verylaws of nature,whichone centurylaterbecamethemostim-
portantsubject of scientific are consideredunrecog-
investigation,
nizable. Hooker quotes the Bible on God as the lawgiverof rain
and sea and gives an enumerationof naturallaws reminiscent of
Ovid and Arnobius.39 The elementsdo not changetheirqualities;
thecelestialspheres,sun and moon,moveregularly;theturnof the
seasons,windand rain,enabletheearthto bear fruit.If thisorder
were disturbed,"what would become of man whom these things
do all serve"? ObviouslyHooker's conceptof naturallaw is still
entirelyanthropocentric and teleological.
Nothingessentialabout our problemis containedin Jean Bodin,
themosteminentpoliticalphilosopherof theperiod.40On theother
hand an importantadvance to logical clarificationof the law-
conceptwas made in Suarez. In his Tractatusde Legibus (i612)
the Spanish Neo-Scholasticconsistentlyclings to the distinction
between "morals" and "nature"'4' and restrictsthe term "law",
in its propermeaning,to the former.Suarez opposes thedefinition
of law in Thomas Aquinas because it disregardsthisdistinction.42
"Things lackingreason",he says,43"properly,are capable neither
of law nor of obedience.In this the efficacy
of divinepower and
natural necessity . . . are called law by a metaphor." The wording
of the Scripture(he quotes the well knownpassages) is said to
be in accordance with this explanation.In the sectionon eternal
laws44the Bible passages are interpretedin the same way and the
statementthatirrationaland even inanimatebeingscan be subject
to the eternallaw is called "a mere mode of expression".43The
Corpus Juris too, when speakingof naturallaws among animals
38 Chap. 3 p. 206. "Ibid. p. 207.
40De la Republique(I577) does not give a generalanalysisof the law-
concept.UniversaeNaturae Theatrum(FrancofurtiI597) restricts itselfin
thepreface(fol. 3) to a fewgeneralities on the unchangeable
courseof the
celestialspheres.Methodusad facilemhistoriarum cognitionem(I566) men-
tions "some eternallaw of nature"accordingto whicheverything under-
goes a cyclicchange: vices followvirtue,ignorancescience,darknesslight
(VII, 36). The astronomicalpatternis manifest.
"Moralia et naturaliaII 2 ? 12.
'I, I ?I. , I ?2. II, 2 ??4, IO, 12, I3.
II, 2 ?I2: quaestionemesse de modoloquendi.
(which, actually,are led "by natural instinct"),makes use of a

"metaphor".46 "The real naturallaw inheresin the humanminds
only."47Certainly,Suarez knows as littleof naturallaws in the
modernmeaningof thewordas Thomas did,buthis conceptof law
is considerablymoremodern.The intellectual changefromThomas
to Suarez will be explainedin our last paragraph.
7. Beyond the ranks of theologicaland juridical writersabout
i6oo natural law is scarcelymentioned.In I570 John Dee, the
alchemistto Queen Elizabeth, mentionsthat nature "abhorreth
emptyspace so much,that,contraryto ordinarylaw, theElements
will move or stand".47aMontaignein his Essais (I582) uses the
termnaturallaw onlyonce and in its juridicalsense.48Shakespeare
once makes Falstaffspeak jokinglyof naturallaw in its juridical
meaning.In Cymbeline(i609), on the otherhand,he calls it "na-
ture's law" that the human embryoremainsnine monthsin its
mother'swomb.49Shakespearethus adds one more instanceof a
prescientificnatural law to the instances in the Bible, Ovid,
Arnobius,and Hooker.
The term is used more frequentlyin Francis Bacon. In his
Advancementof Learning (i605) Bacon discussesthepyramidof
the sciencesand gives knowledgeof "the Summarylaw of nature"
as its "verticalpoint".50He expresses,however,his doubtwhether
this knowledgecan be attainedby man. The theologicaloriginof
the idea is revealedby a Latin quotation,speakingof "the work
operatedby God fromthe beginningto the end". In the Novum
Organum (i620) theterm"law" is veryoftenused synonymously
with"form"."When we speak of forms",Bacon says,51"we mean
nothingelse but those laws and determinations of the pure act
which set in order and constitute a simple nature.... The form
of heat and the law of heat are the same thing."These "laws" or
"forms"were treatedas rathermysteriousentitiesby Bacon him-
46 I 3 ?8. 47 I, I ?9.
47a Prefaceto Billingsley'sEuclid translation, Sig. dj ro.
4 Essais 2, I2: thereis no naturallaw, sincethe customsof the various
nationsare different (ed. Villey,Paris I930, vol. II p. 494f.).
49 2 HenryIV, III, 2 last Cymbeline V, 4 verse37.
" Works (Speddingand lines; Ellis) VI 222.
"1Nov.Org. II, I7 (Fowler, 2nded., Oxford i889), p. 389. 6f. cf. ibid.I,
5I p. 228f.,I, 75 p. 268; II, 2 p. 346; II 4 and 5 p. 348ff.;II, I7 p. 399; II, 52
P. 597.
No. 3.] GENESIS OF CONCEPT OF PHYSICAL LAW 26i
self. They are nearerto alchemythan to modernscience,are con-

sideredby Bacon as the veryessencesof thingsand qualities,and
are, obviously,survivalsof the Aristotelianand Scholasticformae
substantiates.The only questionis how Bacon came to introduce
the term"law" for this medievalconcept.As the passage in the
Advancementof Learning indicates,the Bible suggestedthis ex-
pression.Thus Bacon's terminology again reveals the theological
roots of the conceptof physicallaw. How far remote,however,
Bacon still is fromthis conceptis illustratedby the remarkable
factthathe was ignoranteven of the law of thelever.52
8. Now we have approachedthe periodof risingnaturalscience
and it is time to look for the conceptof natural law among its
pioneers.The result,however,differsconsiderablyfromexpecta-
tion.
Copernicus(0543) speaksof the"machineof theworld founded
by the best and mostregularartificer",53but neverof laws of this
machineor of thesolar system.The same holdsof William Gilbert,
who was among the earliestadherentsof Copernicusin England.
In his De Magnete (i6oo), when discussingthe precessionof the
vernal point, he once speaks of a "rule and norm of equality"
that may be ascribed to complicatedastronomicalmovementsby
some hypothesis.54 This correspondsalmostexactlyto the modern
conceptof physicallaw, thoughthe termis not used. The isolated
passage mustnot be overestimated. De Magneteis thefirstprinted
book on experimentalphysicsby a scholar.Gilbertmakes careful
and numerous empiricalobservations,but still restrictshimself
in his theoreticalexplanationsto metaphysicalgeneralitieson the
animationof the globe and the magnet.In his extensivediscus-
sions of magneticphenomenahe once makes threerathervague
statementswhich may be called magneticlaws.55They are, how-
52De AugmentisV, 3, IO.
5" DeRevolutionibus, prefaceto Paul III. Thornedition(Curtze) p. 5 1.32.
6 De MagneteVI, 9 p. 237.
"5Ibid. II, 32 p. 99. Since theyare forthe mostpartoverlooked, theymay

be discussedhere.Theystatethatequal loadstonesapproacheach otherwith
equal "incitation". The same holds forbothmagnetizedand non-magnetized
ironbodies.-In Gilbert'stimetheoretical mechanicsin generaland an exact
conceptof forcein particularwerenotyetdeveloped.His threelaws compare
magneticforcesdynamically by the "incitation"
of themovement theycause,
"incitation"probablybeingsomething vague betweenvelocity,impulse,and
kineticenergy.He restrictshimselfto the case of equalityof forcesand
ever, given in a shortchapter,entitled"some problems",are not

referredto further,and are called neitherlaws nor rules.
An abundanceof physicallaws is to be foundin Galileo. In his
manuscriptLe Mecaniche,composedin about I598 when he was
a youngprofessorin Padua, he discussesthe lever,the windlass,
and thepulley,and gives theconditionsof equilibriumin quantita-
tiveterms.56 Yet theterm"law" is neverused. His Discoursesand
Mathematical Demonstrations on two new Sciences (i638)
laid the foundationstoneof modernmechanicsand mathematical
physicsin general.In this work57he discussesthe dependenceof
the period of a pendulumon its length,the dependenceof the
number of vibrationsof a stringon its length,tension,cross
section,and specificgravity,in quantitativeterms.He does not
expresstheserelationsby mathematicalformulas,but paraphrases
themin words. And he never calls them "laws" or "rules", but
occasionally refers to the law of the pendulumas a "propor-
tion".58The same work containshis greatestachievement,the
statementof the law of falling bodies, and his discussion of
projection.59Again the terms"law" and "rule" do not occur.The
results are given in the form of numberedtheorems,proposi-
tions,lemmata,and corollaries,connectedby mathematical demon-
strations.Though the investigationis a model of experimental
research,its literaryexpositionclingsto the traditionaldeductive
formof Archimedesand Euclid.60
ApparentlyGalileo did not know the term"naturallaw". When
he occasionallymentionsthe law of the lever in the Discorsi, he
paraphrasesit by a long sentenceand refersto it,a few lineslater,
as the "ratios" (ragioni) of the lever and as "that principle"
does not give a real measurement. His laws correspond approximately to
Newton's third law (action equals reaction).
" Opere, edizione nazionale, II, I47ff.
"Ibid. VIII, I39ff. and I43ff.
5 Ibid. I39, 1.29ff.
59Ibid. I97ff. and 288ff.
60Ibid. 266 Archimedes, Euclid, and Apollonius are referred to. The de-
ductive expositions are given in the Latin, the experiments in the Italian,
sections of the Discorsi. This is a survival of the social prejudice against
manual labor. Respectable science deduces and uses the Latin language; ex-
perimentationis the business of vernacular speaking craftsmen.-Ibid. pp.
I56-i65ff. he discusses quantitatively,how the strengthof a pillar depends
on its breadth, weight, and length. The results are not called "laws", but
are numbered as propositionsand corollaries on the margin.
(questo principio).61 It is significant

thatthe modernEnglish and
German translationsoften speak of physicallaws, when Galileo
expresses himselfdifferently. When the translatorspeaks of the
most perfectlaws of nature, Galileo only speaks of the "most
orderlyworld" mondooordinatissimo); whenthetranslatordenies
thatanythingcan happenagainstthe laws of nature,Galileo only
says "againstnature" (controa natura).62 Galileo came nearestto
the law-metaphorwhenhe discussedtheologicalobjections.A few
years beforethe condemnationof the Copernicandoctrineby the
churchhe defendedthe rightsof free investigationin a letterto
Castelli (i6I3). The Holy Writ, he writes,63and Nature both
originatein theDivine Word, the formeras a dictationof theHoly
Ghost,the latteras "an executorof God's orders" (ordini di Dio)
-orders, not laws.
The law-metaphororiginatesin the Bible, but what was new
in Galileo's investigationwas not influenced by theBible. It cannot
be verifiedhere that Galileo's conceptof sciencesprungfromthe
methodof contemporary technology,since the verificationwould
imply an analysis of the origin of modern natural science in
general. The superior craftsmenof the sixteenthcentury,the
artistsand militaryengineers,were accustomednotonlyto experi-
mentation,but also to expressingtheirresultsin empiricalrules
and quantitativeterms.The substantialformsand occultqualities
of the scholarswere of littleuse to them.They looked forservice-
able, and, if possible, quantitativerules of operationwhen they
had to constructtheirliftingengines,machines,and guns. In the
manuscriptsof Leonardo da Vinci (about I500) over and over
again such quantitativerules of operationare given. They are
usually formulatedin the mannerof cooking recipes: "If you
want to know", Leonardo says explainingthe drawingof a bent
lever, "how much more than MB AM weighs,look how many
timesCB is containedin AD" etc.oaaThe mathematicalfunction-
" Ibid. VIII, 152 1. 3ff., and i6
iQ (Dialogo).
- Ibid. VII, 431.6 (Dialogo) and VIII, 6o 1.I4 (Discorsi).
6Ibid. V, 282 1.30. Literally conforminghis letter to the Grand Duchess
of Tuscany (i6I5) ibid. 3i6 1.25.
63a Ravaisson-Mollien,
Les Manuscriptsde Letonardde Vinci,Paris i89i,
vol. 6, Ms. 2038 fol 3r. On the other hand Leonardo, discussing the propaga-
tion of light, says in a more poetical and theological vein: "O marvellous
Necessity . .. by a supreme and irrevocable law every natural action obeys
concept,appliedto physicalphenomena,appearedforthefirsttime
in theliteratureof mankindin a prescriptionforgunners.In I546,
eighteenyears beforethe birthof Galileo,Tartaglia,in a booklet
on gunnery,fortification,and applied mathematics,pointed out
thatan elevationof 25' gives a gun a certainrange; if the eleva-
tion is 30? the range is "much greater", if 350 "greater", if 400
"somewhat greater", if 450 "a bit greater", if 50? "a bit smaller",
if 550 "somewhatsmaller"and so forth.One can make a table of
theranges,Tartagliacontinues,and give it to theofficer;theofficer
can tell the gunnerhow to level the gun, but the table itselfcan
be keptsecret,just as "the apprenticescan carryout the prescrip-
tions"accordingto the directionsof theapothecary.Tartagliawas
a quite poor, selfeducatedmathematicsteacher and adviser to
gunners,architects,and merchants,ten pennies a question. He
was not a universityscholar but belonged with the superior
artisans.osb
These quantitativerules of the early capitalisticartisans are,
thoughtheyare never called so, the forerunnersof the modern
physical laws. Galileo set the investigationof functionalrela-
tions betweenphysicalquantitiesas the main task for science.64
The concept of physical law and its paramount scientificim-
portancewas perfectlyfamiliarto him. But the term"law" was
never used by him,since he cared more for his experimentsthan
forthewritingsof thetheologiansand the CorpusJuris.
Stevinand Pascal proceededin a way similarto Galileo's: both
were entirelyfamiliarwith the conceptwithoutever using the
term"naturallaw". Stevin (I585 and i6o8) views the mechanical
problemswiththe eyes of an engineer.Still he explains important
laws of statics (the mechanicaladvantageof the inclinedplane,
the principleof Archimedes)in the deductiveway of Euclid, giv-
ing numbereddefinitions, postulates,and propositions.65 Pascal
thee by the directestpossibleprocess. . . thou by thy law containestall

effectsto issue fromtheircauses in the briefestpossibleway" (Codice
Atlantico, ed. Pinnati, Milan igoi, III, ii6i).
"' Quesitiet inventioni I, i; "tenpennies"(scudi) ibid.III, i0.
6 Galileo himself declaredtheproblemof the curveof projection(which
puzzledthe gunnersof the period) as the startingpointto his studyof the
law of fallingbodies.Opere,letter2300 to Marsili (i632), XIV, 386.
65Hypomnemata Mathematica,i6o8,vol. 4, Statics.
(i663) expresslyrejects the doctrinesof abhorrenceof vacuum

and of occult qualities.66He knows that all machinessatisfythe
principleof work,that the heightsof two liquids in a communi-
catingtube are inverselyproportionalto theirdensities,and dis-
cusses the principleof Archimedes-all thiswithoutever speaking
of laws.67Occasionallyhe mentionsmeteorological"rules" forthe
variationsin the heightof the barometer.68 His ignoranceof the
law-metaphor is remarkable, since he was intentlydealing with
theologicalproblems;his physicaland his religiousinterestsseem
to have been separatedby an impenetrablewall. The doctrineof
natural law in the juridical meaning,however,was known and
agreed to by him.69
9. Kepler seemsto be thefirstnaturalistwho,occasionally,used
the law-metaphor.His well knownthreelaws of planetarymove-
ment,however,neverare called laws by him.The firstand second,
given in his AstronomiaNova (i609), are paraphrasedin long
expositions;70 the third,publishedin HarmonicesMundi (I6i9),
once is called a "theorem".71
On the otherhand Kepler frequently comparesthe inversepro-
portionof velocityand solar distanceof a planet (which is the
basis of his second law) to the analogous proportionbetweenthe
forceand arm of a balanced lever. And in this contexthe some-
timesspeaksof the"law", morefrequently howeverof the"ratios",
of the lever.72Sometimeshe uses the termlaw as almostsynony-
mous with measure or proportion.Once he draws a diagramin
order to clarifythe question"which laws are required"in repre-
sentinga planetaryorbit. Or he remarksthat the earth receives
"the laws of itscelerityand slowness"in proportionto itsapproach
to and its movementaway from the sun.73Other passages are
66 Traitez de l'equilibreetc. CEuvres(ed. Brunschvicg-Boutroux III, 224
and 254.
Ibid. I63, I7I, I78. 68Fragments,
cEuvres,II, 520.
Pensees,(Euvres XIII, 2I6 no. 294. TOIII cap. 59f.
71 V cap. 3 (Opera, ed. Frisch V, 280).
T2Astr.Nov., Opera III, 39I: legestaterae;EpitomeAstr.Cop. Operavol.

VI, 373: quae sunt huius celeritatiset tarditatisleges et exempla? Exemplum
genuinum est in statera.-Rationes staterae; Astr. nov. Opera III, 300, 390,
39I and Ep. Astr. Cop.,Opera VI 405.
T3Astr. Nov. Opera III, 3I5: quibus legibus opus sit ad . . . orbitam
repraesentandam; ibid. I49: leges celeritatis et tarditatis suae accipere ex
modulo accessus . . . et recessus.
nearer to modernterminology. He discussesthe spread of forces

fromthe sun and pointsout thatthe forcediminisheseitherwith
the second or with the thirdpower of the distance; this follows
"from the verylaw of emanation",for the force,althoughbeing
immaterial,is "not free fromgeometriclaws".74The background
of theseexpositionsis formedby theologicalideas. Kepler ends a
long astronomicaldiscussionwiththeremarkthatsome "geometri-
cal incertitude"is impliedin the problem."And I do not know",
he adds,75 "whetherthis is not repudiatedby God himself,who,
up to now, is always found (deprehenditur)to be proceedingin
a mathematicalway." From this the Pythagoreandoctrine in
Kepler's Harmonicesmund-i statingthat
followsquite consistently,
God orderedtheuniverseaccordingto theprincipleof "geometrical
beauty".In a letterto Fabricius (May i605) Kepler reportsthat
he has most laboriouslytreatedthe irregularitiesof the planetary
movement"until theywere at last accommodatedto the laws of
nature".76It can hardlybe doubtedthatthese laws of natureare
nothingelse than the divine principlesof mathematicalbeauty.77
Kepler was at the same timea Pythagoreanand a devoutPro-
testant.His firstwork,the MysteriumCosmographicum(1596),
explained the solar systemby means of the fivePlatonic bodies.
His HarmonicesMundi (i6i9), whichgave the thirdlaw among
numerousmathematical relationswithoutany physicalimportance,
advocatedthe harmonyof the spheres.He consideredit his scien-
tifictask to reveal the mathematicalorder of the universe,to
describe its beauty,and to praise God as its founder.Thus he
changedthe divinelaws of the Bible intogeometricprescriptions
and used the term"law" almostas synonymous withratioor pro-
portion.He is distinguished fromthenumerousNeo-Pythagoreans
of thelate Renaissance by his care for empiricalobservationand
his mathematical geniuswhichsuccceededin discoveringthe regu-
laritiesin apparentlymostirregularphenomena.His interpretation
of theselaws, however,stillis animistic.Afterhavingstated"the
laws and quantityof the variation"of the planetaryvelocity,he
" Ibid. 303. 75 Ibid. 71
Opera III, 37.
397.
7In his Ad Vitellionem Paralipomena(i604, Opera II) he gives many
opticallaws (not yetthelaw of refraction).The term"law" is neverused;
theyare numberedas propositions and corollariesin the mannerof Euclid.
raises the question"whetherthe laws are such,thattheyprobably

can be known to the planet". He explains extensivelythat the
movementof the planetprobablyresultsfromthe "wrestling"of
its animal and its magneticfaculty,the "mind" of the planetper-
ceivinga certainangleand reckoningits sine.This sense-perception
withouteyesdoes not seemimpossibleat all to him.For an analogy
he refers,on the one hand,to the sublunarbodies adjustingtheir
behaviorto thestarsand, on theother,to his own motherwho has
bornall of her childrenunderthesame constellationwithoutmak-
ing use of eyes.78ObviouslyKepler's conceptof law is quite near
to astrology.79
The conceptof naturallaw occurs fullydevelopedin Descartes.
In his Discours de la Afethode(i637) Descartes startsthe short
expositionof his new philosophyof naturewith the declaration
thathe has found"laws whichGod has put intonature".God has
impressedthe ideas of themon the human mind in such a way,
thattheiruniversalvaliditycannotbe doubted.80 In the following
it is explained that God, after the creationof matter, let nature
develop fromchaos in accordanceto theselaws. Even if God had
created several worlds the "laws of nature" (loix de la nature)
would be valid in all of them.The laws themselves,however,are
not given in the Discours. When discussingthe circulationof the
blood Descartes only mentionsthat "the rules (regles) of nature
are identicalwiththe rulesof mechanics".82 As an appendixto the
"8Astr.nov. cap. 57 (Opera III, 392-397); Cf. ibid. cap. 39 pp. 3I7-320.
The astrological passage p. 3I9.
"The question how the planets manage to move regularly results from
the elimination of the solid spheres by Tycho Brahe, as Kepler himself
states (ibid. p. 319). The same problem had been discussed a few years
before (1591) by Patrizzi (Nova de UniversisPhilosophia,Pancosmia I2;
2nd. ed. Venice I593, fol. 9I col. 3). Though Patrizzi does not speak of laws
and contrasts only the "order of the world" to chaos, he is quite near to
an embryonicconcept of natural law. Like Kepler he refers to the animae
rationales of the stars obeying "God's providence" and compares them to
manoeuvringsoldiers, obeyingthe order of the officer.God correspondsin this
metaphor to the officerand the natural laws to his orders.-Patrizzi's mili-
tary metaphor reveals the importance of social changes for the history
of ideas. He himself gives ancient Spartans and Macedonians as examples.
A medieval author, however, could not have thought of the military meta-
phor, since battles in the feudal period consisted of a multitude of duels
with very little discipline. Obviously Patrizzi is inspired by the new in-
fantrytactics which, in early capitalism, had developed from the armies of
Swiss mercenaries.
"0 Disc. 5 (iiEuvres,ed. Adam-Tannery, VI 41).
81 Ibid. 42f. cf. 45 1. I Iff 82 Ibid. 541. 26f.
Discours Descartes publishedhis Dioptrique. There the laws of

reflexionand (for the firsttime) of refractionare discussed.In
connectionwith the latterthe term"law" is used too.83
The PrincipiaPhilosophiae (i644) is the new work announced
in the Discours. There Descartes explains in the second book84
that the productof mass and velocityremainsconstantin nature,
since God and his operationsare perfectand immutable."And
fromthis immutability of God", Descartes continues,"some rules
or laws of naturewhichare the causes ... of thevariousmotions,
can be understood."85 He gives threelaws, the firstand second
expressingthe law of inertia,thethirdstatingthatin everyimpact
"one body gives as muchof its movementto theotheras it loses".
They are alternatelyand repeatedlycalled laws and rules. The
immutability of God and his operationsand the creationof the
worldare mentionedseveraltimes.86 In orderto makequantitative
calculationof movementpossibleDescartes adds seven "rules" of
impactwhich,however,are partlyincorrect.87 He closes thesection
withtheremarkthatin his opinionno other"principlesof physics"
are necessary in the explanationof all phenomenain nature.88
Being a mechanist,he believeshe has exhaustednot only all me-
chanicalbut all physicallaws by his enumeration.
Descartes discusses naturallaws in a few more places. In the
thirdbook of the Principiahe statesthatit is a "law of nature"
that all bodies movingin circlestryto recede fromthe centre.89
He immediatelyexplainsthathe does not intendto ascribeminds
to movingbodies by this statementand thus shows how carefully
he avoids the vitalisticconceptsof the middleages.90A quantita-
tive determinationof the centrifugalforce,however,is not yet
given. Near the end of the work he states,summarizing,that it
has discussed "what must follow fromthe mutual impactof the
bodies accordingto mechanicallaws, confirmedby certain and
everydayexperiments".91 His laws or rulesof impactare discussed
S' UEuvres VI, IOO 1. 27f. The law of refraction
was discoveredby Snell
in i62i and firstpublishedby Descartes.
84 Princ.II ?36. cEuvresVIII 6i.
85Ibid.II ?37 (p. 62). In the Discoursalso Descarteshad statedthathis
laws of natureare derivedfromno otherprinciplebut God's perfection
(VTI 1. 5). 88 Ibid. II ??37-42. 8 I ??45-52.
88 II ?64. 89 III
?55 98 II ?56.
"' IV ?200.
frequentlyin his correspondence,among others in a letter to

ChristianHuyghens.92
Descartes was a consistentmechanist.Convincedthatin the last
analysis all physicalphenomenaconsistin movementand impact,
he strictlydenied any teleological,anthropocentric, or animistic
explanation of nature. The soullike substantial formsof the
Scholasticswere discardedby him. On the otherhand he was a
devout Catholic.Adaptingthe traditionalideas of God and soul
to the new mechanisticscience,and stressingthe idea of inde-
structibility,he createda new conceptof substance,able to cover
both matterand mind.To substantialsouls he clung as firmlyas
he eliminatedall soullike componentsfromthe physical world.
Thus he introducedintohumanthinkinga dualismof matterand
mind,of outer and inner world,which in similarrigorhad no-
where and never before existed. There is hardly any other
philosopheras characteristic of the modernera and Westerncul-
ture as is Descartes.93When we comparewithotherculturesand
omitdetails,all modernWesternphilosophersappear moreor less
as Cartesians,since all of themdeal with the mind-body-problem
and theproblemof theexternalworld.At theendof thenineteenth
centuryonly, since the breakdownof mechanisticphysics (and
withthe fadingof religiousorthodoxy),theinfluenceof Cartesian
metaphysicsis beginningto decline.
The Cartesian conceptof the world combinedthe basic ideas
of theBible and thenew physics.By thesame combination of ideas
he became the most importantpioneerof the conceptof natural
law which influencedthe thinkingof the modernera as strongly
as his dualism.Like Galileo,he took overthebasic idea of physical
regularitiesand quantitativerules of operationfromthe superior
artisansof his period.And fromtheBible he tooktheidea of God's
legislation.By combiningboth he createdthe modem conceptof
natural law.94Galileo understoodthe scientificimportanceof the
92"Laws" and "rules" alternately;No. 114 to Huyghens(II, 50); No.
37I to Clerselier(IV, 183ff.); No. 179 to Mersenne(IV, 396); No. 5I4
Burman (VI, i68); No. 566 to Morus (VJ, 405).
9 Cf. Edgar Zilsel, Problems of Empiricism,Encyclopediaof Unified
Science,II/i8, Chicago I94I, ?3.
" The relationsof Descartes to contemporary technologyrecede to the
backgroundin his writings.Yet in his Discours he stressesthe utilityof
his principlesand refersto the "variouscraftsof our artisans"((Guvres
interdependence of physicalquantitiesat least as clearlyas Des-

cartesand madeuse of moreand of morecomplicatedmathematical
functions.But thelaw-metaphorwas unknownto him.Kepler did
speak of laws, but his law-conceptwas too animisticto influence
risingphysicsgreatly.Descartes only combinedthe law-metaphor
with a mechanisticconceptof naturallaw. His influenceboth on
philosophyand on physicscan be in Spinoza, in thephysicistsof
theRoyal Society,and in Newton.
io. Spinoza gives a chapter on divine law in his Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus(i670). In this he distinguishesthe laws
"dependingon necessityof nature" fromthe laws resultingfrom
humandecrees.As an instanceof theformerhe gives theprinciple
of the conservationof the quantityof motionfollowingDescartes.
He amplifies,however,the extentof the Cartesian law-concept
fromphysicsto psychologyby adding the law of associationby
contiguity(as it is called today). Moreoverhe stressesuniversal
determination:"everythingis determined", he says, "by the uni-
versal laws of nature."95This idea is emphatically repeatedin the
chapteron miracles.The immutableand universallaws of nature
are mentionedagain and again and are expresslyidentifiedwith
the "decrees of God". Miracles whichapparentlycontradictthem
are denied and explained by human ignorance.96 The opposition
of "naturallaw" and miracle,repeatedin the followingperiodover
and over again, apparentlyoccurs here for the firsttime.In the
Theologico-PoliticalTreatise Spinoza is still tryingto hide his
pantheism.He speaks,therefore, of thedecreesof God in a rather
ambiguous way. Since he did not believe in God's personality,
however,he noticed,in contrastto Descartes,that applicationof
the term"law" to physicalthingsis based "on a metaphor(per
translationem)".9 Possibly this insightwas also influencedby
Suarez, who was knownto Spinoza.
VI 62). The Cartesiandualismpresupposesthe New Testament(concept
of soul), his law-conceptthe old (God, the lawgiver).
9 Tract. Theol.-Pol. cap. 4. Opera (ed. Vloten-Landin 4 vols., The
Hague I914) II I34.
96 Cap. 6 (ibid. I56-I70 passim).
Cap. 4 p. I35.-In his firstwork (i663), the RenatiDes CartesPrincipia
Philosophiae, he gives the Cartesian seven "rules" of motion (II, prop.
24-31). In the annexed Cogitata Metaphysica. he often speaks of the "de-
crees" of God (I, cap. 3).
No. 3.] GENESIS OF CONCEPT OF PHYSICAL LAW 27I
The deterministexplanationof mental phenomenais carried

out in Spinoza's Ethics. The famous preface to the third part
beginswiththe statementthathumanaffectstoo "followthe com-
mon laws of nature". Alluding to the originof the term"law",
Spinoza explainsthatman in naturedoes not forma state within
the state and expresslydenies Descartes' doctrineof free will.
Actually"the laws and rules of nature,accordingto whichevery-
thinghappens and is transformed, are the same everywhereand
always". Thereforehe will deal withhumanbehaviorin a strictly
causal way withoutany valuation-a modernauthorwould have
said, in the mannerof the naturalsciences. Since Spinoza, how-
ever,consideredthedeductivemethodof Euclid themostscientific,
he says he will treathumanactionsas if thequestionwereof lines,
planes, and bodies. In the followingthis programis carried out
more geometrico.Yet Spinoza is, of course, not able to give
quantitativelaws of psychology.The laws of natureare occasion-
ally mentionedin later sectionsalso of the Ethics and in his cor-
respondence.98 sinceit occursin a letter
One passage is interesting,
to Oldenburg,the secretaryof the Royal Society, and since it
expressly states that all physical processes follow "the laws of
mechanics". Like Descartes and virtuallyall physicistsof the
period he is a consistentmechanist.
On the whole Spinoza has taken over the theisticconceptof
naturallaw fromDescartesand has reinterpreted it in a pantheistic
way. At the same timehe has extendedit to theprovinceof mental
phenomena.His ethicalideals being entirelyStoic, he is a deter-
minist.Yet his determinism is neithermagic nor theologicalbut
mechanistic,as it is in Hobbes and as it became in the natural
sciencesof the followingperiod. Spinoza is the firstauthorcom-
bininggeneralmetaphysicaldeterminism withthemodernconcept
of natural law.
In i638, six yearsbeforepublicationof his Principia,Descartes
had writtento the young ChristianHuyghenson his laws of im-
pact.99Withthese"laws" or "rules" Huyghensoccupiedhimselfin
various manuscriptsfor many years, since he noticedthe incor-
9 Ethics4, app.,cap. 6f.-Letterno. I3 (to Oldenburg,
leges mechanical).
Cf. lettersno. 31, 33, 42.
9 Cf. above footnote92. Huyghenswas theni9 yearsold.
rectnessof Descartes' statements.He discoveredthe conservation

of kineticenergyin elasticimpactsand publishedhis resultsin a
letterto theJournaldes Scavans, Sur les reglesdu movement dans
la rencontredes corps (i669). Afterhis deatha treatiseof his on
the same subject De Motu corporumex percussioneappeared in
his Opuscula Postuma (1703). In all these papers the laws of
impactare alternatelycalled "rules" and "laws".'00A Latin trans-
lation of his letterto the Journaldes Scavans was publishedalso
in the PhilosophicalTransactions(i669), the new journal of the
newly foundedRoyal Society. In the brief English introduction
Oldenburg,the secretaryof the Society,speaks alternatelyof the
"laws" and of the "rules" of motion.'0'
On the same problemtwo Latin papers of Wallis and Christo-
pher Wren had appeared one year before (i668) in the Philo-
sophical Transactions.The whole discussionwas startedby the
Royal Society.Wallis' paperhas thetitleA summaryaccountgiven
by Dr. JohnWallis of the GeneralLaws of Motion.Wren's article
is called Lex naturaede CollisioneCorporum.'02 As thesepapers
show,theterm"law" firstbecamecustomary amongphysicistswith
the laws of impact.In this the influenceof Descartes is obvious,
though the papers of Huyghens,Wallis, and Wren, no longer
containtheologicalremarks.Possiblytheterminology of theTrans-
actions was influencedalso by Spinoza, the friendof Oldenburg.
The firstvolumesof the Transactionsoccasionallyspeak of natural
laws in other contextstoo. They reporton a paper of a French
Gentleman,Mr. Auzout, who believed he had found laws of
cometarymovement.'03 And theymention"odd laws" of variation
of thebarometerand the "laws of refraction"in optics.'04
The last two passages refer to two new physical instruments
1 Huyghens,(Euvres Completes(ed. Soc. Holl. d. Sc.) XVI 95
(ins.
of i652), i04 (ms. of i654), 139 (ms. of i656), i8i (letterto the Journ.
d. Sc.), pp. 33, 91 (de motu corp.).-In his Horologium Oscillatoriurn
(Ibid. XVIII 69ff.)and his De vi centrifuge(ibid. 366ff.)the term"law"
is not used,thoughimportant physicallaws are statedfor the firsttime.
11Phil. Trans. IV (i669), 925.-The Royal Societywas foundedin I663;
the Trans. appearedfirstin i665.
102
Ibid. III (i668) 864ff.
103Phil. Trans. I 4. Auzout speaksof "laws"
also in his Frenchpamphlet
on the cometof i664/65,printedin i665 in Paris (pp. I and 7). -He be-
lieves thatthe cometin questionmovesin a circle.He is proudof having
found
104
this hypothesis uponthreeobservationsonly (Phil. Trans.I i9).
Phil. Trans. I 3If.
of the eminentmicroscopistand experimentalist Robert Hooke

and are almost literallytaken from the preface to his Micro-
graphia (i665). Hooke was Curator of the Society and had to
preparethe experimentsfor theirmeetings.He discoveredthe so-
called law of Hooke, statingthat the stressof an elasticbody is
proportionalto its strain.In his Lectures de PotentiaRestitutiva
(i678) he calls it a "Rule or Law of Nature".'05This is the first
time that a physicallaw, referredto in moderntextbooksunder
the name of its discoverer,is called a law by the discovererhim-
self. As early as in i662 Hooke used theterm"law" occasionally
also in his notes on his experimentson Boyle's law.'06
Sir RobertBoyle was amongthe eminentmembersof theRoyal
Society. He publishedhis law (the volume of a gas is inversely
proportionalto its pressure) in his Defense of thedoctrinetouch-
ing the Spring and Weightof theAir (i66o) withoutusing the
term "law". It is always called a hypothesisby him.'07On the
otherhand he frequently speaks of naturallaws in his theological
writings.In his Free inquiryinto thevulgarlyreceivedNotion of
Nature (composed in i666) he declares the term"law", when
applied to inanimatethings,"an improperand figurativeexpres-
sion", explaining this at great length.'08In the explanationhe
strangelyassumes thatthe law-metaphorascribesteleologicalten-
dencies to physicalobjects. When an arrow, shot by a man, he
says, moves towardsthe mark,"none will say thatit moves by a
law but by an external . . . impulse".'09 Nevertheless he himself
speaks in what follows very often of the "laws of motionpre-
scribedby the authorof things"."10 He confessesto belongto the
"modern naturalists and divines", explaining the phenomena
through"physico-mechanical principlesand laws". Animisticin-
terpretationsof nature,therefore,are combattedby him,but he
immediately adds that"sometimes"thereare miracles."' The paper
containsnumerousbiblicalquotationsand a long polemicagainst
Descartes."2It is significant
thattwenty-one yearsbeforethepub-
105
Reprintedin R. T. Gunther,Early Science in Oxford,Oxford I938,
VIII 334 and 336.
100 Ibid. VI 83. 10. Works (ed. Birch) I I58, i62.
100
Ibid. V I70ff. 109
P. I7I
11o P. I77, cf.pp. I94, 225, 1
25I, 252. P. 2I5.
112 P. 242.
lication of Newton's Principia the memoryof the metaphysical

characterand theologicalorigin of the conceptof natural law is
completelyalive in a treatiseof a physicistof the Royal Society.
Newton'sPhilosophiaeNaturalisPrincipiaMathematica(1687)
has definitely made the term"law" a familiarcomponentof the
scientificvocabulary.Particularlyhis famousthree"laws of mo-
tion",givenat thebeginningof thework,"3were takenoverby all
physicistsof the followingperiod.The referenceto Wren,Wallis,
and Huyghens,and theirlaws of impact,in this section'14 reveals
theoriginof theterminology. The term"law" is appliedby Newton
also to his gravitation-formula.
The "laws and measuresof gravi-
tation" appear as early as in the preface. And at the end of the
Principia,just afterthe famousrefusalto inventhypothesesabout
thecause of gravitation,Newtonstates:"it is sufficient
thatactually
gravitationexists and acts accordingto the laws given by us.1""5
In severalproblemsthe mathematical and formalside is conspicu-
ous in his conceptof law. He looks for "the law of the centripetal
force",given the orbitof a movingbody. In one special case the
solutionis: theforceis proportionalto thedistancefromthecenter.
On the other hand a different"law" (the law of gravitation)
results,if otherorbitsare given."6Here "law" is obviouslyalmost
synonymouswith "proportionality" withoutany tingeof meta-
physics.
Still theological componentshave not vanished in Newton's
physics.Though he nevermentionsthedivineoriginof thenatural
laws, he declares that only creationof the worldby an intelligent
Entitycan explain the remarkablecoincidenceof the directions
and planes of the planetarymovements.The planetsstay in their
orbits"by thelaws of gravitation, but theycould not,initially,re-
ceive the regularpositionof the orbitsby these laws'".7 There
113 Opera (ed. Harsley) II. 13ff. They state, as is generally known, the
principle of inertia, the proportionalityof force and change of momentum,
and the equality of action and reaction. The section is named "Axioms or
Laws of Motion".
114 P. 23. As in Descartes, Wren, Wallis, and Huyghens, the laws of impact
are alternatelycalled "laws" and "rules".

115 Opera III, I74. His third letter to Bentley says: "Gravity must be
caused by an agent acting constantlyaccording to certain laws" (IV 438).
"6I, sect. 2 prop. IO, probi. 5. Cf. I sect. 3, prop. ii, probl. 6, and prop. i2f.
7 Lib. 3, scholium generate (III I70).
followsa long exposition,explainingwithclassical and biblicalci-

tationsand a footnoteon the etymologyof the word "God", that
everythingis in God. Altogetherin the Principia theologyhas
retreatedfromthe laws to (as the modernphysicistwould put it)
the initialconditions.However, Newtonwould have certainlyad-
mitted,if he had been asked, thatthe laws too were establishedby
God. Of course Newton knew also Descartes. It cannotbe ex-
plained,as he states,by Cartesianvortices"thatthe movementof
the comets followsthe same laws as the planets"."8
Newton realized the noveltyand scientificimportanceof the
conceptof physicallaw. He startshis workin theprefacewiththe
statement:"the modernscientists,omittingthe substantialforms
and theoccultqualities,have undertakento explainthephenomena
of naturebymathematical laws." The essentialpointof themodern
scientificmethodis explained here with surpassingclarity.And
he concludeshis workregretting theimperfectstateof knowledge
in the fieldsof cohesion,nerve activity,and electricity.It is not
yet known,he writes,"by which laws" thesephenomenamustbe
explained.Thus thefirstand thelast sentenceof thePrincipiadeal
with natural laws. Still the term "law" occurs more rarelythan
in a moderntextbookon physics.It does not occur at all in his
Lectiones Opticae and his Opticks,not even in the sections on
reflexionand refraction."9
We need not tracethe originsof our conceptfurther.Whoever
knows the immenseinfluenceexertedby Newton's Principia on
the scienceand even the whole literatureof the followingperiod,
will not be surprisedat the rapidspread of theidea of naturallaw
in eighteenth-century physics,philosophy,and deistic theology.
The conceptwas simplytakenover in theshape in whichit appears
in Newton. As a consequence,the physicalmeaningof the term
"natural law" gradually displaced the juridical. Voltaire, who
contributedmost to the popularizationof Newton's ideas on the
continent,is already entirelyfamiliarwith the idea that nature
is governedby laws, successfullyinvestigatedby scientists.120No
I bid.,I 70. IV Opera III, IV.
"2'Elements de la philosophicde Newton (1738) 3, I: ((Euvres, Firmin
Didot, V, 72I), les lois de attraction; 3, 3 (p. 726): lois de la chutede
corps trouvees par Galilee; 3, 5 (p. 730): lois de la gravitation,regles de
doubt Newton's Principia (i687) is the turningpoint in the rise

of this idea. Whereas Locke's Essay concerningHuman Under-
standing (i690) does not yet know the conceptof natural law
in its physicalmeaning,it already is a matterof course in Ber-
keley's Treatise concerningthe Principles of Human Knowledge
(I7IO). In i655 Hobbes' De Corporedoes not speak of laws. In
i642 his De Cive and in i645 his Leviathan discuss naturallaw
in its juridicalmeaningonly.'2' In I748, on the otherhand, Mon-
tesquieu's L'esprit des lois dedicatesthe firstchapterto physical
laws.
ii. Finally,we musttryto give an explanationof the develop-
mentdescribed.Why has it takenplace in theway and at thetime
given?We cannotexplainhere whyat thetimeof Galileothe idea
of mechanical regularitiesarose. This explanationexceeds our
presenttask,sinceit is linkedwiththemuchmoregeneralproblem
of the origin of experimentalscienceand the quantitativespirit,
and will be attemptedat anotherplace. Here it may be indicated
only that in all civilizationsexperimentation originatesin handi-
craft.In the period of nascentcapitalismexperimenting artisans
began to look for quantitativerules of operation.The roots of
these mechanicalrules, therefore,must be searched for in the
sociologicaland technologicalconditionsof handicraftin theearly
modernera. They roseto sciencein Galileo.121a
However, why were these mechanical regularitieseventually
interpreted as divinelaws of nature? This is not a mere question
of terminology. Withoutthe metaphysicalcomponents,contained
in the law-metaphor,they could hardly have obtained their
scientificand philosophicalimpetus.Referenceto the strengthof
religioustraditiondoes notgivea sufficient answerto our question.
The idea of laws, given by God to nature,does not occur in all
religions.It is lackingin ancientEgypt,'22and specialinvestigations
would be requiredto decide whethersimilar ideas were known
Kepler. Essai sur la naturedu feu 2, 3, (ibid. p. 776): eight"laws". His
DictionnairePhilosophique(1764), however,gives the juridical meaning
only s.v. "loi naturelle" (VIII 2Iff.).
121 Locke, Essay I, 3 ?IW, mentionsthe juridicalmeaningonly.Berkeley,
Principles?30. Hobbes,De Cive cap. 2-4, LeviathanI, chap. 4f., II chap.26.
121a Cf. Edgar Zilsel,"The SociologicalRoots of Science,"The American
Journal of Sociology XLVII (1942) 545 fif.

122 Cf. ?2 footnote4.
in Persia and India. In Babylonia with its Hammurabicode and

in the Old Testamentwith its abundanceof ritualand otherlaw
it has developed,but everyonewho knows how in Christianity
different ideas were emphasizedor recededto the backgroundin
different periods,will notdoubtthatthedivinecommandsto nature
in the Book of Job could have easily stayeduninfluential in the
historyof ideas. In fact God's "eternallaw", as we have metwith
it in Thomas Aquinas,was nota leadingidea of medievalCatholic-
ism. The idea of divineprovidencecertainlywas important, as far
as humanfateswereconcerned,sinceit givesconsolationand hope.
As far,however,as it implieseternallaws of nature,it was con-
finedto beingmentionedby learnedtheologians.The Middle Ages
perceived the reign of God much more in miraclesthan in the
ordinarycourse of nature.Cometsand monsterswere of greater
momentto medievalpietythan the daily sunriseand normaloff-
spring.How was it thatin the modernperiodthe idea of God's
reignover the world shiftedfromthe exceptionsin natureto the
rules?
The expressions"reign over the world" and "law of nature"
spring froma comparisonof natureand state.Is it not almosta
matterof coursethatthe conceptof the divinereignchangedwith
changes in the structureof the state? In the feudal state of the
middle ages governmentand law differedentirelyfromthe cor-
respondinginstitutions of the modernera. Thomas Aquinas lived
in a periodwhenItalian feudalismwas alreadydisintegrating under
the influenceof the risingmoneyeconomy.Yet he mentionstraits
of humanlaw, in his discussionof eternaland naturallaw, which
would hardlyfitthe physicallaws of modernscience.There are,
he says, "special laws" forthevariousestatesof society;to priests
This
it is "law" to pray,to princesto govern,to soldiersto fight.'23
would still agree withphysicallaws: the laws of mechanicsdiffer
from the laws of electricity.But Thomas thinksthe individual
can occasionallychangehis estateand "law" by orderof his lord;
e.g., a "soldier" (a nobleman) can be turnedout of the "army"
(of nobility)and can becomesubjectto ruralor mercantilelaw.'24
Summa
Ibid. qu.Theologica II, I qu. 95,art. 4, resp. 2.
123
124
9i, art.6 resp.
To thisthereis no analogyin modernphysics.The "laws" Thomas

is herespeakingof are, obviously,thebondsof feudalism,varying
accordingto the estate of the individual.They are not based on
statutelaw but on sacredtraditionand do not derivefromrational
regulationsof a legislator.Which paragraphof whichcode orders
theprinceto rule and the prieststo pray?
The feudalstatewas an extremely loose organization.The bonds
by which it was tied togetherwere irrationaland considereda
matterof course. If the princeissued regulationstheywere most
frequentlyprivilegesgiven to single noblemen,monasteries,and
towns, correspondingrather to exceptions than to rules. The
medievalinterpretation of natureseems to correspondto this or-
ganizationof the state: the Lord does miracles,they are note-
worthy;the regularcourse of nature,on theotherhand,is sacred
but a matterof course. At any rate the idea of a comprehensive
multitudeof rational physical "laws" could not have arisen in
feudalism,even if the correspondingphysical facts had been
known.
It is generallyadmittedthatthe Stoic doctrineof the one Logos
rulingthe universeis correlatedwiththe rise of monarchiesafter
Alexanderthe Great.The analogymighthold forthemoderncon-
cept of naturallaw. It will be rememberedthat Patrizzi had ex-
plained the orderlycourse of the stars by comparingthem to
soldiersobeyingthecommandof theirofficers :125 theloose knightly
armies of feudalismhad been displacedby the mercenaryarmies

of early capitalismwith theirrationaldiscipline.The application
of the law-metaphorto physicalphenomenahas probablybeen
produced by the analogous change of the entire state. Money
economydisruptedthebondsof feudalismand traditionalism, made
rationalregulationsand statutelaw necessary,and increasedim-
menselythe power of the prince.Even in England,whereRoman
law was not introduced,thisprocesstookplace undertheTudors;
it reachedits peak,however,in seventeenth-century absolutismon
the continent.It is not a mere chance that the Cartesianidea of
God, the legislatorof the universe,developed fortyyears after
Bodin's theoryof sovereignty. Perhapsit is not evena coincidence
"2 Cf. ?9 above,footnote79.
thatboththinkerswere French: France was the nativecountryof

centralizedabsolutism.At any rate the doctrine of universal
naturallaws of divineoriginis possibleonlyin a statewithrational
statutelaw and fullydevelopedcentralsovereignty.Possibly the
changein the structureof the statealso gives the explanationwhy
the metaphoricalcharacterof the term "law", when applied to
unreasonablebeings, was not noticed before Suarez.'26 Under
feudalismeven animals and thingscould be summonedand pun-
ished. Thomas hardly thoughtof legal actions against animals,
when discussingGod's eternallaw; but only rationalstatutelaw
is, with necessity,restrictedto rationalbeings. Man is a social
being.He seemsto be inclinedto interpret naturenotonlyaccord-
ing to the needs but also after the patternof society.Yet one
difficultyin our sociologicalexplanationmustbe mentioned.How
could medievaltheologiansspeak of the legislatureof God, when
the powerof theprincewas verylimited?The idea, however,had
not originatedin feudalism.It had been conceivedunder entirely
different sociologicalconditions.Its authorswere Jews who had
outgrowntheirpast of Bedouin clan-organization centuriesago,
and its sociologicalpatternwas the despotismof ancientoriental
states.The idea could be preservedin a rudimentary formthrough
two thousandyears,even througha period in whichit did not fit
the sociological conditions,till it awoke to new life in early
capitalisticabsolutism.This fact,and thereare numerousanalogies,
is veryimportant forthetheoryof history.Ideologiesare extremely
conservative.They never can be explained by presentconditions
alone, but mirrorthe whole past too. At any rate historicalprob-
lems are verycomplex.Even if thissociologicalexplanationshould
be falsifiedby futureinvestigations, the materialhere collected
on the genesisof the conceptof physicallaw remains.
EDGAR ZILSEL
THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH, NEW YORK, N.Y.
126AfterSuarez (i6I2) this insightwas to be foundin Spinoza (i670)

and Boyle (i666). In Thomas (about I270) it is stilllacking.

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Philosophical Review

The Genesis of the Concept of Physical Law

nates moral commandsthat are based not on statutelaw but on

1 Cf. thearticle"NaturalLaw" in theEncyclopaediaof theSocial Sciences

and laws would be always observed. With such an ideal state

"Hitherto shalt thou come but no further;and here shall thy

still is far remote.The empiricalbackgroundof the biblicalidea,

'It is remarkablethatin the greatdocumentof ancientEgyptianmono-

thingsarise fromtheindefinite, theprimarysubstance,and return

Ibid., 22 B 94. FragmentB II4 says: "all humanlaws are derivedfrom

in Lucianus.9The law-metaphorplays a certainpart in the Stoics

9Amores 22: "thelegislature

called "hair withoutlaw (sine lege)" by him.'2A ratherisolated

4. On thewholeone musttakegood care notto overestimate the

There hardlyis roomforphysicallaws in ancientscienceeither.

physicswas seriouslyimpairedin antiquityby the contemptfor

"the laws initiallyestablished"have been overthrownsince the

type (ratio) of divinewisdomas directingall acts and motions".32

On the whole Thomas combinesthe biblicalidea of God as the

a few of themare countedwithnaturallaw. In qu. 93, art. 5, on the other

beings and the natural law which is kept "unwittinglyby the

(which, actually,are led "by natural instinct"),makes use of a

self. They are nearerto alchemythan to modernscience,are con-

"5Ibid. II, 32 p. 99. Since theyare forthe mostpartoverlooked, theymay

ever, given in a shortchapter,entitled"some problems",are not

(questo principio).61 It is significant

thee by the directestpossibleprocess. . . thou by thy law containestall

(i663) expresslyrejects the doctrinesof abhorrenceof vacuum

T2Astr.Nov., Opera III, 39I: legestaterae;EpitomeAstr.Cop. Operavol.

nearer to modernterminology. He discussesthe spread of forces

raises the question"whetherthe laws are such,thattheyprobably

Discours Descartes publishedhis Dioptrique. There the laws of

frequentlyin his correspondence,among others in a letter to

interdependence of physicalquantitiesat least as clearlyas Des-

The deterministexplanationof mental phenomenais carried

rectnessof Descartes' statements.He discoveredthe conservation

of the eminentmicroscopistand experimentalist Robert Hooke

lication of Newton's Principia the memoryof the metaphysical

are alternatelycalled "laws" and "rules".

followsa long exposition,explainingwithclassical and biblicalci-

doubt Newton's Principia (i687) is the turningpoint in the rise

Journal of Sociology XLVII (1942) 545 fif.

in Persia and India. In Babylonia with its Hammurabicode and

To thisthereis no analogyin modernphysics.The "laws" Thomas

armies of feudalismhad been displacedby the mercenaryarmies

thatboththinkerswere French: France was the nativecountryof

126AfterSuarez (i6I2) this insightwas to be foundin Spinoza (i670)

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