Integrated Theater Commands – Is It The Right Way / Time For Proposed Restructuring?

By
Lt Gen Arun Sahni, PVSM, UYSM, SM, VSM, Former Army Commander, IA

01 Jan 2020, was historic in the annals of India’s Armed Forces, as it witnessed the
appointment of independent India’s first ‘Chief of Defense Staff’ and establishment of a
‘Department of Military Affairs’. The creation of Joint Theatre Commands, as a step for
promoting Jointness amongst the Armed Forces, was one of the mandates entrusted to the
CDS. This subject has led to extensive discussion and debate, including heated exchanges on
the need and relevance of the proposed theatre commands for India, within the Armed
Forces and in the open print, visual and social media. One of the major reasons for this
protracted debate is that the proposal, has not evolved from within the Armed Forces, but
has been seen as a diktat. A disruptive reorganization in any large Institution or
organization, should logically emanate from within the organization, either being need
based or to enhance operational efficiency.
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The aim of this article is to revisit the issue of ‘theaterisation’, ‘de novo’, as the ongoing
debate has raised some very basic issues with respect to the requirement, relevance and
timing for this organizational restructuring. This does not in any manner forestall
restructuring to set up Integrated organizations for addressing the new threat vectors,
created by militarization of erstwhile ‘global commons or measures to enhance jointness
and avoid duplicity, within the three services. Incase theaterisation is the logical direction
for enhanced jointness, then will suggest a revised mandate and road map for this transition
with minimum turmoil and maximum gain. Prudence suggests that current strife astride our
external borders, is not the opportune time for bold restructuring of field formations. Joint
Theater Commands should be the logical culmination of the integration process, post
harmonization of interservice differences.

So let me start by questioning the premise - Is there an operational necessity and urgency
for theaterisation, in the case of India, or is it a case of FOMA (Fear of Missing Out) or aping
USA and China?

USA, as the lone superpower in the world, has assigned a global mandate to its Armed
Forces, of ‘force projection’ and timely ‘Out of Area Operations’. It has therefore divided the
globe into theatres, with its global presence anchored on its maritime strength cum
resources. In case of a military engagement in a desired target area, it apportions requisite
combat resources under a nominated Force Commander to execute operations. Operations
in Middle East, Iraq and till recently Afghanistan, under CENTCOM, bear testimony to this
modus oprendi. It has adequacy of combat resources to suballocate for its global military
footprint. It has a 24/7, reliable and state of art ISR capability, to ensure timely deployment
of combat power, at the desired target. It has also located its resources at various overseas
bases or with friendly countries, for addressing its perceived sensitivities and execute a near
real time ‘global strike capability’. It has the technological and manufacturing prowess to
proactively address the deficiencies and ensure that its forces are ahead of the technological
curve.
The changes in China, with respect to theaterisation, is not the same as USA. It has in reality
designated its Regional Commands as Theatres. There has been no major reallocation of
combat resources, between the regions/theatres. The Force multipliers under the PLASSF
have been deployed as hitherto fore in different theatres, to ensure that the requisite
cutting edge technological resources, are available to the deployed combat forces. The ‘joint
force headquarters’, raised are more for synergy during planning and higher direction of
war. It also ensures tighter control by the Party, on the PLA. In case of both these countries,
the changes are based on nation specific operational considerations.

It is also apparent that in the case of both USA and China, there is adequacy of resources
and the desired capabilities across spectrums are assigned separately for spatially displaced
combat forces, that are not integral to the Armed Forces. It is a whole of nation approach
and ‘Theatres’ are empowered with the complete spectrum of required expertise, be it
intelligence, administration or diplomatic support.

A reappraisal of the operational performance of the Indian Armed Forces in the current
formulation to meet external threats, confirms that they have acquitted themselves with
aplomb. Be it the 1971 Indo- Pak war, that resulted in dismemberment of Pakistan and
creation of Bangladesh or the Kargil Conflict of 1999, to the current faceoff with China in
Ladakh. In 1971, the air power ensured decimation of the meagre air resources of Pakistan
in erstwhile East Pakistan and thereafter supported the land offensive. The Indian Navy
while addressing the sea challenge, reallocated and relocated adequate resources to block
the sea egress routes of the withdrawing Pakistani forces from the eastern theatre, resulting
in the largest surrender by any Army, post 2nd World war. Airborne operations were
executed with the pooled air resources to supplement ground offensive, leading to early
capitulation of the enemy forces in East Pakistan. These complex operations were steered
under the aegis of Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee. The success of Kargil conflict was
again due to synergistic employment of combat resources of the Army and Air Force. The
Ladakh confrontation is once again witnessing army - air force synergy, to mitigate the
dynamically changing ground situation in Ladakh. The navy in the meantime has been
facilitating India’s military diplomatic initiatives.

It would be fair to state that there have been instances of disagreement amongst the three
service Chiefs, during the planning stage, but were resolved in time for successful outcomes.
This cooperative and joint functioning has also been repeatedly witnessed in HADR missions,
be it the climate catastrophe in Uttarakhand, or the recent overseas evacuation operations
and covid emergency support activities. The three pillars of the Armed Forces have not been
found wanting and neither has there been a negative impact on their operational efficiency.

However, the lessons learnt from all major and limited military conflicts, has highlighted the
operational deficit and negative impact on tactical operations, due to lack of operational
control of the Army on the deployed CPMFs (BSF or the ITBP), astride active borders. In
addition, Intelligence failure at the macro level has been another major shortcoming. Also,
the ground forces continue to be denied the mandate for trans-border intelligence
activities, be it human or electronic, a pre requisite for undertaking tactical actions to meet
emerging challenges. If the aim of organizational changes is to enhance India’s
comprehensive power on the external frontiers, then there is a need to include these key
elements appropriately, in the proposed Joint Theatres. Are these being redressed in the
current mandate of theaterisation? As per available information ,it is a No.

The other argument for this transformative reform, is that it will foster a very high order of
jointness. Jointness in my view is more in spirit, with an emphasis on ‘functioning together’.
Whereas Integration refers to formal combining of constituent elements into a single
structure for ‘unified command’. But history of India’s conflicts reaffirms that the services
have continuously displayed ‘jointness’.

Some of the other key factors that demand a relook of the timing and proposed roadmap
for envisaged disruptive organizational changes, are the existing threat cum border realities,
changing character of war and Service specific culture, ethos and policies.

The changing character of war is a consequence of induction and development of new age
technologically advanced weapons platforms with enhanced precision, longer ranges and
unparalleled destructive capacities and the emergence of new frontiers of disruptive
warfare. As an outcome of the militarization of the global commons of cyber, space and EM
spectrum. These have not only added complexities but changed the ‘character of war’. Both
India’s adversaries have and are constantly upgrading their capabilities and exploiting these
new domains, with China already enmeshing these advanced capabilities, in its war fighting
doctrine. India has also instituted measures to address these new realities with tri service
joint structures, as functioning and domination of these domains, transcends individual
services. Also, these new domains are not only a threat during hostilities but even now
during NWNP.

Also, any future conventional conflict will be limited in time, as in a globalized world, the
negative impact on economy due to disruption of intricately linked supply chains, will not be
acceptable. Thus, short intense hybrid conflicts, limited in time and space, are the reality in
the foreseeable future. They do not allow India the luxury of inexperienced operational and
strategic leadership, for complex and intense operations, that require innovative utilization
of service specifics combat power for successful outcome of conflicts. The military maxim
captures the spirit of military leadership succinctly – ‘war is both an art and a science’.

The Ladakh face off with China, has closed the debate with respect to the existence of ‘two
front threats’, to India. It has also sealed the argument that the era of limited conflict is
passe and India’s future capability development should only be tailored to meet the threats
from ‘new age warfare’. We have to draw an informed balance during force modernization
and capability development. It has to address the reality of India’s disputed borders, that
span hazardous and dangerous terrain profiles, from the Siachen glacier to rugged
mountains, deserts, jungles and plains with dense urban centers. Tactical acumen and deep
understanding of the complexities of fighting in these disparate and specific terrains, is a
must in short intense conflicts. More so as the deployment of forces on the ‘line of control’
with Pakistan, are ‘eyeball to eyeball ‘and the deteriorating relations with china, triggered
by the Ladakh imbroglio, is leading to a near permanency of a denser deployment of troops,
in climatically hazardous high altitudes areas on India’s northern borders. Concurrently,
increasing Chinese footprints in South Asia and Indian Ocean, with growing naval power,
demands a higher degree of vigilance and domination by the navy, of our areas of interest
and influence. Geo political flux due to the Pandemic, including tectonic changes in
Afghanistan, with the forthcoming total withdrawal of the US and Coalition forces, has
created an unstable, dynamic and complex situation, in the Region. Respecting the
sensitivity of the present time and the necessity to address fast changing emerging realities,
it is imperative that experiential tactical and operational leadership, is there at the
command level, in the respective Services and there is minimal turbulence in the
organizational structures.

There is a need to appreciate that the latent strength of the three services are their
respective organizational cultures. Also, they have a different functioning ethos and
manning policies. Therefore, any restructuring for joint structures has to be sensitive to
these intangibles and be realistic of the Service specific shortages of combat resources. Let
me explain?

The Army and Navy are structured with decentralized distribution of combat resources at
different hierarchical levels of Command, based on the task, capability implies, entrusted to
different levels of command. Additional combat resources are released at inflexion points to
either the subordinate commander or there is change in the level of command. In the case
of Air Force, the speed of application of combat power and the vastness of the battlespace,
results in centralized control of resources. These are tailored in different configurations for
execution of desired tasks, with rapid capability to group and regroup. Air bases are also
equipped with war waging and maintainability resources for specific types of aircrafts, but
this does not inhibit emergency deployments. The Airforce due to its unique capabilities can
concurrently shape the battlespace on different fronts with limited resources, based on
operational priorities. These subtleties need to be encapsulated in any joint organization.
Concurrently, there is a need to harmonize the HR policies of the three services. Presently,
the three are governed by separate terms of service, army acts and also the reporting and
promotional conventions are different. Let me try and explain this anomaly with an
example. Officers serving in the Integrated Defence Staff, are from different services in the
hierarchical chain, in different verticals. The subordinate officer is reported upon by his
senior in the chain of command, even if he is from a different service. The yardsticks of
assessment of the three services is different and that impacts the individual, in service
specific promotions. In the case of indiscipline, the concerned individual has to be reverted
under an officer from his parent service. The reporting norms and vacancies for promotion
are again at variance, in the three services. These points of friction need to be addressed
before we create turbulence in the field formations that are facing the brunt of
uncertainties, astride India’s active frontiers.

The recommended road map for the ‘integration’ within the Armed Forces, should be
premised on a ‘vision document’ by the Government. The detailed mandate should
empower these ‘joint theater commands’ with the resources, including those outside the
MoD, to redress the operational shortcomings experienced in past conflicts. The structural
organizational changes need to be tailored for ‘short intense hybrid conflicts’, requiring near
instantaneous decision making by the op-strat military leadership. These decisions should
be contingent on real time ISR, acquired from multiple agencies and sensors and their input
and representation should also be mandated. The luxury of long drawn-out discussions for
placement of accretional elements under command/control of the force commander, is a
story of the past. This should then lead to a pilot project – tailored and tested over time,
before restructuring the sharp end of the three services - its field formations.

Towards harmonizing the policies and related human related issues concurrently, it is
proposed that we should raise either or both, an ‘Integrated Logistics Command’ or an
‘Integrated Training Command’, under the pilot, to cut out duplicity of structures and
instituting common HR related policies of manning, promotion and discipline, in the armed
forces. This will also facilitate change of mindsets and existing culture, in the three services.
Concurrently, in harmony with the laudatory initiatives of ‘Make in India- Defence’, ensure
prioritized modernization and capability development. I conclude by stating the famous one
liner - remember there is no place for a runner up in war.