Legal Ethics Philippine Supreme Court Decisions

Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Lexoterica 2009 – June 2014

April 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Delay. A magistrate’s delay in rendering a decision or order and failure to comply with this
Court’s rules, directives and circulars both constitute less serious offenses under Rule 140,
Section 9 of the Rules of Court. Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. vs. Judge William Simon P.
Peralta, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1917, April 16, 2009.
Delay. Respondent committed undue delay in disposing of the cases assigned to him. Judges
have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay. A judge who fails to do so has to
suffer the consequences of his omission, as any delay in the disposition of cases undermines the
people’s faith in the Judiciary. Provincial Prosecutor Manuel F. Torrevillas vs. Judge Roberto A.
Natividad etc., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1976/A.M. No. RTJ-06-1977, April 29, 2009.
Delay; burden of proof. In the absence of fraud, bad faith, evil intention or corrupt motive, the
complainant may not be allowed to question the judiciousness of the decisions rendered and
orders issued by the respondent, since the same may only be assailed through the appropriate
judicial remedies under the Rules of Court and not through an administrative complaint. In this
case, complainant did not exhaust available judicial remedies to challenge the decisions and
orders. Moreover, the OCA found that the complainant failed to prove that respondent was
guilty of delay in the resolution of pending incidents. Settled is the rule that in administrative
proceedings, the burden of showing that the respondent committed the acts complained of
devolves on the complainant. In fact, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of
proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases
his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense. Prosecutor
Jorge D. Baculi vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2176, April 20, 2009.
Disbarment. Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.
While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to
show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. In cases where we
have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment imposed on the lawyer, we
have taken into account the remorse of the disbarred lawyer and the conduct of his public life
during his years outside of the bar. Re: 2003 Bar Examinations Atty. Danilo De Guzman
(Petitioner), B.M. No. 1222, April 24, 2009.
Dishonesty. There is no need to stretch one’s imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion

that respondent committed dishonesty and abused the confidence reposed in him by the
complainant and her spouse. Records show that two lots had been sold by respondent as
evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of 11 March 1990. Respondent, however, taking
advantage of the absence of complainant and her spouse from the Philippines and their
complete trust in him, deceitfully informed them in a letter dated 20 March 1990 that he had
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sold only one. It can be reasonably deduced from the exchanges between the parties that the
proceeds of the first lot had been transmitted to complainant and her spouse. Respondent’s
contention, though, that he had been authorized to retain the proceeds of the second is specious,
as complainant and her spouse could not have given the same, having been left in the dark as
regards its sale. And despite repeated demands, to date, there is no showing that the outstanding
amount has been paid. Thus, respondent’s deceitful conduct warrants disciplinary sanction and
a directive for the remittance of the remaining proceeds is in order. Nelia Pasumbal De-
Chavez-Blanco represented by Atty. Eugenia J. Muños vs. Atty. Jaime Lumasag, Jr., A.C. No.
5195, April 16, 2009.
Disclosure of confidential information. The information the complainant disclosed does not
qualify as confidential information, as the term is defined under Section I, Canon II of the Code
of Conduct for Court Personnel: Confidential information means “information not yet made a
matter of public record relating to pending cases, as well as information not yet made public
concerning the work of any justice or judge relating to pending cases, including notes, drafts,
research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations, and
similar papers.” As the records indicate, the decision adverted to has already become final; in
fact, a certificate of finality has already been issued, and an entry of judgment had already been
made. At best, the complainant was only guilty of releasing information without observance of
the internal procedures of the court, and for undertaking the dissemination of the copies of the
documents disclosed without being the staff member authorized to do so. Dorothy Fe Mah-
Arevalo vs. Elmer P. Mpe, A.M. No. P-09-2622, April 7, 2009.
Dishonesty. The respondent’s conduct clearly shows lack of forthrightness and

straightforwardness in his dealings with his superiors amounting to dishonesty. Dishonesty is a
malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary. The Court had repeatedly held that everyone
in the judiciary, from the presiding judge to the clerk, must always be beyond reproach; they
carry this heavy burden to ensure that the institution we save – the judiciary – is always kept
above suspicion. Atty. Marlyds L. Estardo-Teodoro Vs. Carlos S. Segismundo, A.M. No. P-08-
2523, April 7, 2009.
Failure to notify client. The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever
present the need for the lawyer to inform timely and adequately the client of important
developments affecting the client’s case. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on
how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests. The Court finds well-taken the
recommendation of the IBP to suspend Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina from the practice of law for one
year. Carlito P. Carangdang vs. Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina, A.C. No. 7813, April 21, 2009.
Grave misconduct. Respondent sheriff was unauthorized to receive money intended for
complainant’s bailbond. Whether or not respondent was able to file the bailbond for
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complainant was immaterial. The mere fact that respondent received money and agreed to
facilitate the posting of bail created the wrong impression that he had the power and authority to
secure a court process. Respondent opened himself to suspicion that he was going to benefit
from the transaction. There is no doubt that respondent is guilty of grave misconduct. He used
his position as sheriff for pecuniary gain when, in fact, he had no business getting involved in
the processing of bail. He flagrantly disregarded established rules of procedure and law when he
misrepresented that he could expedite complainant’s application for bail. Domingo U. Sabado,
Jr. vs. Laniel P. Jornada etc., A.M. No. P-07-2344, April 15, 2009.
Grave misconduct. We sustain the findings of the OCA and hold respondent Manio guilty of
dishonesty and grave misconduct for the second time. The detailed narration of the facts in the
unrebutted affidavit of Mallonga and the letter of Judge Aquino, taken together with the copy of
the fake resolution, substantially supported the administrative charges of dishonesty and grave
misconduct against respondent Manio. She took advantage of her official position and
defrauded a potential litigant. Her acts clearly constitute dishonesty which is the “disposition to
lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or
integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray.”On the other hand, the forgery that she committed in furtherance of the deceit
constitutes grave misconduct or a “flagrantly or shamefully wrong or improper conduct.” Peter B.
Mallonga vs. Marites R. Manio / Hon. Lyliha Abella-Aquino vs. Marites R. Manio, A.M. No. P-
07-2298/A.M. No. P-07-2299, April 24, 2009.
Gross ignorance of the law. Judge Pagayatan displayed gross ignorance of the law when he
abandoned his duty to personally and independently evaluate the prosecution’s motion to admit
the third amended Information, which excluded several accused therefrom, and relied entirely
on the directive of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño ordering such an amendment. Verily, Judge
Pagayatan’s actions patently indicate his insufficient grasp of the law. Dolores S. Bago vs. Judge
Ernesto P. Pagayatan etc., A.M. No. RTJ-07-2058. April 7, 2009.
Gross ignorance of the law. The judge showed gross ignorance of the law when he archived
Criminal Case No. 2000-08-00-01 immediately after the warrant of arrest was issued against the
accused. He violated Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92, which allows the archiving of a
criminal case if, after the issuance of the warrant of arrest, the accused remains at large for six
(6) months from delivery of the warrant to the proper peace officer. Everyone, especially a
judge, is presumed to know the law; when the law is sufficiently basic or elementary, not to be
aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. However, for full liability to attach for
ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of
official duties must not only found to be erroneous; more importantly, it must be established that
he was motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive. Prosecutor
Robert M. Visbal vs. Judge Wenceslao B. Vanilla, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1651, April 7, 2009.
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Gross ignorance of the law. In disregarding the rules and settled jurisprudence, Judge Rosete
showed gross ignorance of the law, amounting to bad faith. Mutya B. Victorio vs. Judge Maxwell
S. Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1706, April 16, 2009.
Gross ignorance of the law. In the discharge of a judge’s duties, however, when the inefficiency
springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle, the judge is
either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds, or is too vicious that
the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial
authority. If the rule or law is so elementary, as the above-quoted sections of Rule 114 are, not
to know it or to act as if he does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law, without even
the complainant having to prove malice or bad faith on the part of the judge, as it can be clearly
inferred from the error committed. Provincial Prosecutor Manuel F. Torrevillas vs. Judge Roberto
A. Natividad etc., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1976/A.M. No. RTJ-06-1977. April 29, 2009
Gross ignorance of the law. Competence is the mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an
utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of
the courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge,
he owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the
Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic procedural rules must be at the palm of his
hands. A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural
rules. Thus, this Court has been consistent in ruling that when the law is so elementary, for a
judge not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Verily, failure to follow basic
legal commands embodied in the law and the rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from
which no one is excused, and surely not a judge like respondent.Prosecutor Jorge D. Baculi vs.
Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2176. April 20, 2009
Gross misconduct. This Court agrees with the OCA’s recommendation that Tanudra be
dismissed from service because of the following acts: her act of accepting money as facilitation
fee which was clearly not part of her official duties as a Court Stenographer; refusing to return
the same despite repeated demands for its return; and then later on blaming a fellow court
officer for such failure. Clearly, such actuations of Tanudra are tantamount to dishonesty and
gross misconduct.
Gross misconduct has been defined as the transgression of some established or definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence. Dishonesty on the other hand
is the “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle.
Moreover, as correctly observed by the OCA, it is of no moment that the act of dishonesty of
Tanudra does not relate to the performance of her official duties. The government cannot
tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if she performs her duties correctly and well,
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because by reason of her government position, she is given more ample pportunities to commit
acts of dishonesty against her fellowmen, even against offices and entities of the government
other than the office where she is employed; and by reason of her office, she enjoys and
possesses a certain influence and power which render the victim of her great misconduct,
oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and counteract her evil acts and
actuations. Erlina P. Jolito vs. Marlene E. Tanudra/Erlina P. Jolito vs.George E. Gareza, A.M. No.
P-08-2469/A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2857-P, April 24, 2009.
Insubordination. Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a superior

officer is entitled to give and have obeyed. The term imports a willful or intentional disregard of
the lawful and reasonable instructions of the employer.
Clearly, respondent’s conduct towards complainant constitutes insubordination. Complainant,
as the chief of her office, acted within her authority when she summoned the employees
involved in the reported November 2, 2006 incident into her chambers for a meeting to
ascertain what actually happened during that time and to undertake the appropriate measures to
maintain peace in her office. In that meeting, however, respondent deported in a manner
reflecting lack of restraint and disrespect towards his superior. And if this was not enough, he
rudely and unceremoniously walked out of the meeting. He even had the audacity to ignore
complainant’s requests for him to return to the meeting. Worse, after hiding in the comfort
room of the clerk, he went home without so much as seeking leave from the judge. Without a
doubt, respondent’s actions amount to gross insubordination, not to mention gross disobedience
and disrespect to the judicial authority and the position of complainant judge. Judge Pelagia
Dalmacio-Joaquin vs. Nicomedes C. Dela Cruz etc., A.M. No. P-07-2321, April 24, 2009.
Just cause for dismissal. There is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that petitioner
was dismissed for a just cause. Petitioner was at the scene of the attack and actively encouraged
her husband’s attack on her supervisor. Rosario A. Gatus vs. Quality Hounse Inc., and
Christopher Chua, G.R. No. 156766, April 16, 2009.
Negligence. The failure to implement a writ of execution maybe classified as simple neglect of
duty which has been defined as the failure of an employee to give one’s attention to a task
expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference. Under Rule IV, Section 52, B 1 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense punishable by suspension from office
for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense.
Here, not only was there a long delay in the full implementation of the writs of execution issued
in Civil Case Nos. 192-L, 193-L, 194-L and 197-L but there was likewise an utter failure to
implement the writs issued in Civil Case Nos. 195-L and 198-L. Hence, the Court deems it
appropriate to impose on respondent sheriff a penalty of suspension from office for three (3)
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months. Estelito R. Marabe vs.Tyrone V. Tan, A.M. No. P-05-1996, April 21, 2009; see also
Wilson C. Ong vs. Ariel R. Pascaio, A.M. No. P-09-2628, April 24, 2009.
Simple misconduct. Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in
character, improper or wrong behavior. It is any unlawful behavior by public officers in relation
to the duties of their offices, willful in character. The term embraces acts which the office
holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of an
affirmative duty to act.
Respondent committed misconduct when he verbally abused his co-employees and appeared at
his place of work drunk. Drinking during office hours may constitute misconduct and is
prohibited under the Civil Service Rules. Judge Pelagia Dalmacio-Joaquin vs. Nicomedes C. Dela
Cruz etc., A.M. No. P-07-2321, April 24, 2009.
Solicitation. Soliciting is prohibited under The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. Section 2,
Canon I thereof provides that “[c]ourt personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or
benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall
influence their official actions;” while Section 2(e), Canon III states that “Court personnel shall
not x x x solicit or accept any gift, loan, gratuity, discount, favor, hospitality or service under
circumstances from which it could reasonably be inferred that a major purpose of the donor is
to influence the court personnel in performing official duties.” Such acts are strictly prohibited
to avoid the perception that in exchange for certain favors, court personnel can be influenced to
act in favor of a certain party or person. In re: Improper Solicatation of Court Employees / Office
of the Court Administrator vs.. Sheela R. Nobleza, A.M. No. 2008-12-SC/A.M. No. P-08-2510,
April 24, 2009.
May 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Misconduct. In preparing and notarizing the illegal lease contracts, respondent violated the
Attorney’s Oath and several canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. One of the
foremost sworn duties of an attorney-at-law is to “obey the laws of the Philippines.” This duty is
enshrined in the Attorney’s Oath and in Canon 1, which provides that “(a) lawyer shall uphold
the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.”
Rule 1.02 under Canon 1 states: “A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance
of the law or at decreasing confidence in the legal systems.” Willem Kupers vs. Atty. Johnson B.
Hontanosas, A.C. No. 5704, May 8, 2009.
Misconduct. The rule clearly requires that the sheriff executing writs shall provide an estimate of
the expenses to be incurred, and such estimated amount must be approved by the court. Upon
approval, the interested party shall then deposit the amount with the clerk of court and ex-
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officio sheriff. The expenses shall be disbursed to the assigned deputy sheriff to execute the writ,
subject to liquidation upon the return of the writ. Any amount unspent shall be returned to the
interested party.
In this case, Sheriff Lindo failed to comply with the prescribed rule. His act of receiving an
amount for expenses to be incurred in the execution of the writ, without having made an
estimate and without securing prior approval of the court, is a violation of the prescribed rule.
Sheriff Lindo should not have received from Aprieto any money without having submitted the
expenses for approval of the court. He did not even advise Aprieto that he was not authorized to
receive any amount from her and that the money for expenses should be deposited with the
clerk of court. Virginia L. Aprieto vs. Noel C. Lindo, A.M. No. P-07-2356, May 21, 2009.
July 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney-client relationship. Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and
actively communicating with complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands
from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship.
Respondent cannot shield herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by simply
saying that the assistance she rendered to complainant was only in the form of “friendly
accommodations,” precisely because at the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she
was already privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had been referred to her by the SEC.
Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by arguing that no written
contract for the engagement of her services was ever forged between her and complainant. This
argument all the more reveals respondent’s patent ignorance of fundamental laws on contracts
and of basic ethical standards expected from an advocate of justice. The IBP was correct when it
said: The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a
professional relationship between the parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential
element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish
the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in
any matter pertinent to his profession. Rolando B. Pacana, Jr. vs. Atty. Maricel Pascual-
Lopez, A.C. No. 8243, July 24, 2009.
Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Perez claimed that her transactions with
Agustin, Jr. had no relation to her position as court stenographer and that they were private in
nature. The Court is not impressed. The image of the Judiciary is mirrored in the conduct of its
personnel whether inside or outside the court. Thus, court personnel must exhibit a high sense
of integrity not only in the performance of their official duties but also in their personal affairs.
While there is nothing wrong in engaging in private business, caution should be taken to
prevent the occurrence of dubious circumstances that may impair the image of the Judiciary.
Every act of impropriety ultimately affects the dignity of the Judiciary, and the people’s faith in it.
As the OCA correctly stated, Perez’s “activities dragged the Court into the fake receipts scam at
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the City Treasurer’s Office.” Perez must be held accountable. Liberty M. Toledo vs. Liza Perez,
Court Stenographer III, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Manila, A.M. No. P-03-1677 & A.M.
No. P-07-2317, July 15, 2009.
Conflict of interest. Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent
should have done was either to advise complainant to engage the services of another lawyer
since she was already representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as
representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be
permitted to do both because that would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules
on conflict of interest. Rolando B. Pacana, Jr. vs. Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez, A.C. No. 8243,
July 24, 2009.
Dishonesty. Estonilo’s act of punching in another employee’s daily time card falls within the
ambit of falsification. Worse, he did not do it for only one co-employee, but for two others. He
made it appear as though his co-employees personally punched in their daily time
cards. Estonilo also made Padilla’s daily time card reflect a log-in time different from
the latter’s actual time of arrival, as well as made Bambilla’s daily time card falsely show that
the latter was at the Supreme Court premises in BaguioCity when he was not there at all. It is
patent dishonesty, which inevitably reflects on Estonilo’s fitness as an employee to continue in
office and on the level of discipline and morale in the service.
Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary. We have defined
dishonesty as the “(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.”[14] Falsification of daily time
records is an act of dishonesty, for which all three respondents must be held administratively
liable under Rule XVII, Section 4 of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations (Civil
Service Rules).
Under Rule XIV, Section 21 of the Civil Service Rules, falsification of official documents (such as
daily time records) and dishonesty are both grave offenses. As such, they carry the penalty of
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits,
and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service. Re: Unauthorized
disposal of unnecessary and scrap materials in the Supreme Court Baguio Compound, and the
irregularity on the bundy cards of some personnel therein, A.M. No. 2007-17-SC, July 7, 2009.
Dishonesty. Even assuming that the payment of P10,000.00 was made on behalf of the
defendant, respondent acknowledged having received a total of P12,500.00 as sheriff’s expenses.
The estimated expenses which he submitted to and were later approved by the RTC amounted
to only P7,500.00, which reveals that complainant had, in fact, overpaid him by P2,500.00.
While respondent was able to submit a Liquidation of Expenses dated August 30, 2005 in which
he claimed to have spent P13,000.00, he was only able to present two receipts to prove his
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expenses: (1) P1,500.00 issued on June 6, 2005 as rent for the jeep hired to haul objects and
(2)P2,000.00 issued on July 1, 2005 as guarding fee for two (2) tricycles. Notably, it does not
appear that said liquidation was approved by the RTC. Respondent has undoubtedly violated
Section 4, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, which provides that court
personnel shall not accept any fee or remuneration beyond what they receive or are entitled to
in their official capacity. Respondent failed to substantiate that the expenses amounting to
P9,500.00, without receipts to qualify the same, was actually incurred and duly accounted
for. Geronimo Francisco vs. Sebastian Bolivar, etc., A.M. No. P-06-2212, July 14, 2009.
Dishonesty. Respondent was undeserving of the trust reposed in him. Instead of using the
money for the bond of the complainant’s son, he pocketed it. He failed to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in his dealings with his client. He failed to live up to his fiduciary duties. By
keeping the money for himself despite his undertaking that he would facilitate the release of
complainant’s son, respondent showed lack of moral principles. His transgression showed him
to be a swindler, a deceitful person and a shame to the legal profession. Dolores
C. Belleza vs. Atty. Alan S. Macasa, A.C. No. 7815, July 23, 2009.
Dishonesty. Dishonesty is a serious offense which has no place in the judiciary. Each false
entry in the DTR constitutes falsification and dishonesty. The falsification of a DTR constitutes
fraud involving government funds. It bears stressing that the DTR is used to determine the salary
and leave credits accruable for the period covered thereby. Falsifying one’s DTR to cover up
absences or tardiness automatically results in financial losses to the government because it
enables an employee to receive salary and earn leave credits for services which were never
rendered.
Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty and
falsification of official document are punishable with dismissal even for the first offense.
However, the Court, in certain instances, has not imposed the penalty of dismissal due to the
presence of mitigating factors such as the length of service, acknowledgment of the infractions,
and remorse by the respondent. Judge Jaime L. Dojillo, Jr. vs. Concepcion Z. Ching,
etc./Concepcion A. Ching vs. Judge Jaime L. Dojillo, Jr., etc., A.M. No. P-06-2245/A.M.
No. MTJ-09-1741, July 31, 2009.
Execution of judgment. Sheriffs have an important role to play in the administration of justice
cannot be overemphasized. They form an integral part, as they are called upon to serve writs,
execute all the processes, and carry into effect the orders, of the court. When placed in their
hands, it is their duty, in the absence of any instruction to the contrary, to proceed with
reasonable celerity and promptness, to execute writs according to their mandate.
As noted by the OCA, no restraining order was issued by the appellate court on October 17,
2003 to excuse the delay in the execution of the writ. It was only on October 21, 2003 or four
days later that the appellate court issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the
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motion for reconsideration. At all events, even if a writ is later ruled to be improvidently or
improperly issued, the sheriff is not in a position to question it, as his duty in executing the same
is purely ministerial. Atty. Nelson T. Antolin, et al. vs. Judge Alex L. Quiroz, et al./Edwin
V. Garrobo Vs. Judge Alex L. Quiroz, RTV, Pasig City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2186/A.M. No. RTJ-09-
2187, July 14, 2009.
Exhaustion of judicial remedies. The rule on exhaustion of judicial remedies does not erase the
gross ignorance of the law that he exhibited. It is not a mandatory sine qua non condition for the
filing of an administrative case in the way that it is required in the filing of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 and other similar rules in the Rules of Court. The filing of an
administrative case is not an extraordinary remedy that demands that the lower court or tribunal
be given every opportunity to review its finding. In fact, it is not a remedy at all required in the
underlying case that was attended by gross ignorance to challenge or reverse the ruling in that
case. It is a totally separate matter whose objective is to seek disciplinary action against the
erring judge. Prosecutor Robert M. Visbal vs.Judge Wenceslao B. Vanilla, MTCC, Br.
2, Tacloban City, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1651, July 15, 2009.
Falsification. Although dishonesty through falsification of DTRs is punishable by dismissal, such
an extreme penalty cannot be inflicted on an errant employee such as herein respondent,
especially so in cases where there exist mitigating circumstances which could alleviate her
culpability. Respondent has been Branch Clerk of Court for about ten (10) years and this is her
first administrative complaint. The OCA recommended that respondent be suspended from the
service for one (1) year without pay, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely. Concerned Employees of the Municipal Trial Court
of Meycauayan, Bulacan Vs. Larizza Paguio-Bacani,
Branch COC II, MTC, Meycauayan, Bulacan, A.M. No. P-06-2217, July 30, 2009.
Grave abuse of authority. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to
preserve order in judicial proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of justice. The
courts must exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that
power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they exercise. Thus,
judges have, time and again, been enjoined to exercise their contempt power judiciously,
sparingly, with utmost restraint and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and
preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication. Respondent judge’s act
of unceremoniously citing complainant in contempt is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of
the authority vested upon him by law. Venancio Inonog vs.Judge Francisco B. Ibay, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 135, Makati City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175, July 28, 2009.
Grave misconduct. We thus find petitioner guilty of grave misconduct. By his actuations, he
violated the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. Public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
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responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives. Public servants must bear in mind this constitutional mandate at all times to guide them in
their actions during their entire tenure in the government service.
Under the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules, grave misconduct is punishable by
dismissal from service. Atty. Emmanuel Pontejos vs.
Hon. Aniano Desierto and Restituto Aquino, G.R. No. 148600, July 7, 2009.
Grave misconduct. Grave Misconduct is a malevolent transgression of some established and

definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public
officer or employee which threatens the very existence of the system of administration of
justice. Estonilo, Padilla, and Bambilla committed grave misconduct in unlawfully bringing
scrap materials out of the court premises and using the court vehicle for the purpose, deviating
from the established or definite rule of action.
Section 52(A)(3) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service classifies grave
as a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense. Re: Unauthorized disposal of
unnecessary and scrap materials in the Supreme Court Baguio Compound, and the irregularity
on the bundy cards of some personnel therein, A.M. No. 2007-17-SC, July 7, 2009.
Grave misconduct. Under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, it is a serious charge to
borrow money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court. Under
the same provision, an act that violates the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes gross
misconduct,[42] which is also a serious charge. In either instance, a serious charge is
punishable by: 1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture
of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; 2) suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months; or 3) a fine of more
than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000. Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan vs. Presiding
Judge Pornillos, RTC Br. 10, Malolos City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183, July 7, 2009.
Grave misconduct. We do not find respondents guilty of grave misconduct. Misconduct is a

transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. And when the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are manifest, the public officer
shall be liable for grave misconduct. Respondents rightfully determined the occupation by
the SPFMPCI members unauthorized (albeit on a different basis). The Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in her
capacity as the Ombudsman vs. Rufino V. Maijares, Roberto G. Ferrera, Alfredo M. Ruba and
Romeo Querubin. G.R. Nos. 170615-16. July 9, 2009.
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Gross ignorance of the law. Instead of first ruling whether the case fell under the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure, Judge Pangilinan immediately issued a warrant of arrest and fixed
complainant’s bail at P2,000. There being no showing that complainant failed to appear in court
when required by Judge Pangilinan, the warrant of arrest he issued had no legal basis.
Judge Pangilinan’s faux pas cannot be countenanced. For when a judge shows unfamiliarity
with the fundamental rules and procedures, he contributes to the erosion of public confidence
in the judicial system and is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedures. Lanie
Cervantes vs.. Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan, and Clerk of Court III Carmencita P. Baloco,
etc., A.M. No. MTJ-08-1709, July 31, 2009.
Gross ineffiency. The Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all lower courts
shall be decided or resolved within 90 days from the time they are submitted for decision.
Respondent repeatedly ignored this mandate. She also violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct which requires judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and
decide cases within the required periods.
Failure to comply within the mandated period constitutes a serious violation of the
constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. The Court has always
considered a judge’s delay in deciding cases within the prescribed period of three months as
gross inefficiency. Re: Report on the Judicial Audit in Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Jiminez-
Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental/ Judge Pricilla Hernandez, A.M. No. 03-170-MCTC, July 14,
2009.
Gross inefficiency. No less than the Constitution mandates that all cases or matters must be
decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission to the Supreme Court,
and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and
three months for all lower courts. In implementing this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon
6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts in the section on “Competence and Diligence”
that judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. Failure to decide cases within
the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reason, constitutes gross inefficiency
warranting the imposition of an administrative sanction on the defaulting judge. Re: Report on
the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, Malabon City, A.M. No.
08-3-73-MeTC, July 31, 2009.
Falure to decide cases. Judge Pantanosas, Jr.’s explanation that the undecided cases were never
brought to his attention during his incumbency deserves scant consideration. Proper and
efficient court management is the responsibility of the judge, and he is the one directly
responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions. It should be emphasized that the
responsibility of making a physical inventory of cases primarily rests on the presiding judge. He
ought to know the cases submitted to him for decision or resolution, and he is expected to keep
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his own record of cases so that he may act on them without undue delay. It is incumbent upon
him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court so that no disorderliness can
affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition.
A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel
since proper and efficient court management is his responsibility. Court personnel are not the
guardians of a judge’s responsibilities. The efficient administration of justice cannot accept as an
excuse the shifting of the blame from one court personnel to another. A judge should be the
master of his own domain and take responsibility for the mistakes of his subordinates. Re:
Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch
2, Cagayan De Oro City, A.M. No. 02-8-207-MTCC, July 27, 2009.
Negligence. Respondent is guilty of simple neglect of duty, defined as “the failure to give
attention to a task or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference,”[16] which is
classified as a less grave offense under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service and punishable with suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first
offense and dismissal for the second offense. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Officer-in-
charge and Legal Researcher Nilda Cinco, RTC, Br. 28, Catbalogan, Samar, A.M. No. P-06-2219,
July 13, 2009.
Negligence; failure to file memorandum on appeal. The appellant is duty-bound to submit his
memorandum on appeal. Such submission is not a matter of discretion on his part. His failure to
comply with this mandate or to perform this duty will compel the RTC to dismiss his appeal.
Respondent’s failure to file the required pleadings is per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Natividad Uy vs.. Atty. Braulio RG Tansisin, A.C. No. 8252, July
21, 2009.
Negligence. A lawyer’s negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the
relationship of counsel and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice
the rights of a litigant, particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of the ethics of the legal
profession, a lawyer’s lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client is both unprofessional and
unethical.
If his client’s case is already pending in court, a lawyer must actively represent his client by
promptly filing the necessary pleading or motion and assiduously attending the scheduled
hearings. This is specially significant for a lawyer who represents an accused in a criminal
case. Dolores C. Belleza vs.Atty. Alan S. Macasa, A.C. No. 7815, July 23, 2009.
Negligence. When respondent accepted the amount of P50,000.00 from complainant, it was
understood that he agreed to take up the latter’s case, and that an attorney-client relationship
between them was established. From then on, it was expected that he would serve his client,
herein complainant, with competence, and attend to her cause with fidelity, care and devotion.
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The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling complainant’s case
and subsequently failing to render such services is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence. Trinidad H. Camara, et al. vs. Atty. Oscar Amondy Reyes, A.C. No. 6121, July
31, 2009.
Simple misconduct. Misbehavior by court employees within and around their vicinity
necessarily diminishes their dignity. Any fighting or misunderstanding becomes a disgraceful
sight reflecting adversely on the good image of the Judiciary.
Indeed, the two are guilty of conduct unbecoming of court employee amounting to simple
misconduct, classified as a less grave offense under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service which merits suspension for one month and one day to six months for the
first offense, and dismissal for the second offense.
Under Section 53 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, in the
determination of the penalties to be imposed, the extenuating, mitigating, aggravating or
alternative circumstances, among other considerations, may be taken into account. As
recommended then, the length of service, the performance ratings, and the number of times an
employee has been administratively charged may be considered. Re: Fighting incident between
two(2) SC shuttle bus drivers, namely, Messrs. Edilbert L. Idulsa and Ross C. Romero, A.M. No.
2008-24-SC, July 14, 2009.
Simple misconduct. Sheriff Jundarino’s duty is to implement the Writ of Execution dated 28
November 2007 at No. 2519 Granate St., Sta.Ana, Manila. Given Quilo’s assertions that his
residence was actually at No. 2518 Granate St., San Andres Bukid, Manila, and that he was not
even a party to Civil Case No. 158273-CV, the more prudent course of action for
Sheriff Jundarino was to defer implementation of the said Writ until a determination by
the MeTC of Quilo’s Motion to Quash the same. It bears to stress that said Motion was already
scheduled for hearing on 28 March 2008, just a day after Sheriff Jundarino’s second visit
to Quilo’s residence on 27 March 2008.
Without even considering whether Quilo’s residence is the same as the property involved in
Civil Case No. 158273-CV, the Court finds that Sheriff Jundarino’s acts herein – i.e., his rude
and inappropriate remarks and aggressive behavior during his visits to Quilo’s residence on 12
February 2008 and 27 March 2008 to implement the Writ of Execution issued in the
aforementioned case; as well as his unreasonable insistence on implementing the said Writ on
27 March 2008 despite the fact that Quilo’s Motion to Quash the same was already set to be
heard the very next day, 28 March 2008 – constitute simple misconduct. Edgardo A. Quilo Vs.
Rogelio G. Jundarino, Sheriff III, Metropolitan Trail Court, Branch 19, Manila, A.M. No. P-09-
2644, July 30, 2009.
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Simple misconduct. Mom-issuance of official receipt for stenpgraphic fees is simple
misconduct. Gaspar R. Dutosme Vs. Atty. Rey D. Caayona, A.M. No. P-08-2578, July 31, 2009.
Unauthorized practice of law. Additionally, a judge should not permit a law firm, of which he
was formerly an active member, to continue to carry his name in the firm name as that might
create the impression that the firm possesses an improper influence with the judge which
consequently is likely to impel those in need of legal services in connection with matters before
him to engage the services of the firm. A judge cannot do indirectly what the Constitution
prohibits directly, in accordance with the legal
maxim,quando aliquid prohibitur ex directo, prohibitur et per obliquum or what is prohibited
directly is prohibited indirectly.
By allowing his name to be included in the firm name “Bartolome Lelina Calimag Densing &
Associates Law Offices” while holding a judicial office, he held himself to the public as a
practicing lawyer, in violation of the Rules and the norms of judicial ethics.
Under Sections 9 and 11(B), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10
SC, unauthorized practice of law is classified as a less serious charge punishable by suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months,
or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding
P20,000. Atty. Florencio Alay Binalay vs. Judge Elias O. Lelina, Jr., A.M. No. P-08-2132, July 31,
2009.
Violation of lawyer’s oath. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code

of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct
by, inter alia, taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest – to obtain
funds for his BATAS Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and
his television program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order
restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the
complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its products.
At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which mandates lawyers to “uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.” For he defied said status quo order, despite his
(respondent’s) oath as a member of the legal profession to “obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities.” Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio,
Jr., A.C. No. 7199, July 22, 2009.
August 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
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Bias. Equally tenuous is complainant’s contention that the CA’s finding of grave abuse of
discretion of the part of respondent Judge proves the latter’s bias and partiality. A finding of
grave abuse of discretion does not necessarily prove that respondent Judge displayed a
preference for one of the party-litigants. As aptly observed by the Investigating Justice, the
reversal of a judge’s order by a superior court in a certiorari case is, in itself, not a ground for an
administrative action against the judge. Respondent Judge, by granting the petition for relief in
Civil Case No. B-1016 on the ground that complainant failed to disclose a verbal agreement
between her family and defendants therein, may have committed an error of judgment.
However, in the absence of bad faith, such erroneous judgment cannot be a ground for
disciplinary action. Adelpha E. Malabed vs. Judge Enrique C. Asis, RTC, Br. 16, Naval
Biliran, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2031, August 4, 2009.
Dishonesty. The making of untruthful statements in the PDS amounts to dishonesty and
falsification of an official document. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries
the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government
service.
Respondent, a judge, knows (or should have known) fully well that the making of a false
statement in his PDS could subject him to dismissal. This Court will not allow him to evade the
consequences of his dishonesty. Being a former public prosecutor and a judge now, it is his duty
to ensure that all the laws and rules of the land are followed to the letter. His being a judge
makes it all the more unacceptable. There was an obvious lack of integrity, the most
fundamental qualification of a member of the judiciary. Olga M. Samson vs. Judge Virgilio G.
Caballero, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138, August 5, 2009.
Dishonesty. It was established that the OCC logbook indicated the time as reflected in
respondent’s DTR but his actual time of arrival at the RTC-San Fernando was actually later than
the time as reflected in the DTR. The discrepancy was explained by the fact that, as respondent
himself admitted, he punched in at the RTC-Guagua which is not his official work station.
OCA Circular No. 7-2003 is clear and states that court personnel should indicate in their bundy
cards the “truthful and accurate times” of their arrival at, and departure from, the office. That
office is the official work station of the court personnel. In the present case, respondent’s official
work station is RTC-San Fernando and not RTC-Guagua. Respondent’s punching in at RTC-
Guagua was a clear violation of OCA Circular No. 7-2003. As we have ruled in Garcia v. Bada
andServino v. Adolfo, court employees must follow the clear mandate of OCA Circular No. 7-
2003.
Section 4, Rule XVII (on Government Office Hours) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V
of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws also provides that
falsification or irregularities in the keeping of time records will render the guilty officer or
employee administratively liable.[3] Falsification of time records constitutes dishonesty, which is
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a grave offense punishable by dismissal from the service. Office of the Court Administrator
vs. Lyndon L. Isip, Sheriff IV, RTC, OCC, City of San Fernando, Pampanga, A.M. No. P-07-2390,
August 19, 2009.
Failure to pay debt. Indeed, when Sermonia backtracked on her promise to pay her debt, such
act already constituted a ground for administrative sanction, for any act that would be a bane to
the public trust and confidence reposed in the judiciary shall not be countenanced. Sermonia’s
unethical conduct has diminished the honor and integrity of her office, stained the image of the
judiciary and caused unnecessary interference, directly or indirectly, in the efficient and
effective performance of her functions. Certainly, to preserve decency within the judiciary, court
personnel must comply with just contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical
standards. Like all other court personnel, Sermonia is expected to be a paragon of uprightness,
fairness and honesty not only in all her official conduct but also in her personal actuations,
including business and commercial transactions, so as to avoid becoming her court’s albatross
of infamy.
The gravamen of Sermonia’s offense is her unwillingness to pay a just obligation. The penalty
imposed by the law is not directed at Sermonia’s private life, but at her actuation unbecoming a
public official. Teopicio Tan vs. Salvacion D. Sermonia, Clerk IV, MTCC, Iloilo City, A.M. No. P-
08-2436, August 4, 2009. see also Wilson B. Tan vs. Jesus F. Hernando, A.M. No. P-08-2501,
August 28, 2009.
Grave abuse of authority. Respondents became administratively liable for grave abuse of
authority when they forcibly levied and took away properties belonging to a third person and,
thereafter, appropriated the levied property for themselves. Respondents’ grave abuse of
authority amounted to gross misconduct, which under the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, Rule IV, Section 52 A (3) thereof, is a grave offense punishable by
dismissal even for the first offense. Hector P. Teodosio Vs. Rolando R. Somosa, et al.. A.M. No.
P-09-2610, August 13, 2009.
Grave abuse of authority. Sheriff who caused the demolition of petitioners’ properties without an
order for the purpose in the court of implementing a writ of execution commits grave abuse of
authority. Simeon Guariño, et al. vs. Cesar F. Ragsac, et al., A.M. No. P-08-2571, August 27,
2009.
Immorality. The evidence presented is enough to hold respondent guilty of the charge of
immorality or disgraceful and immoral conduct. It is elementary that administrative proceedings
are governed by the substantial evidence rule. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The
standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that the
person indicted was responsible for the alleged wrongdoing or misconduct.
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The acts imputed against respondent, a married man, consist of his cohabitation with a woman
other than his legal wife and there is a strong likelihood that respondent fathered a child with
the said woman. It is morally reprehensible for a married man or woman to maintain intimate
relations with a person other than his or her spouse. Moreover, immorality is not based alone on
illicit sexual intercourse. It is not confined to sexual matters, but includes conducts inconsistent
with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful,
flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members
of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. Lolita S.
Regir vs. Joel Regir, A.M. No. P-06-2282, August 7, 2009.
Misbehavior. Courts are looked upon by the people with high respect. Misbehavior by judges
and employees necessarily diminishes their dignity. Any fighting or misunderstanding is a
disgraceful occurrence reflecting adversely on the good image of the Judiciary. By fighting
within the court premises, respondent judges failed to observe the proper decorum expected of
members of the Judiciary. More detestable is the fact that their squabble arose out of a mere
allowance coming from the local government. Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali, RTC, Br. 212,
Mandaluyong City vs. Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante, RTC, Br. 211, Mandaluyong City/Judge
Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante, RTC, Br. 211, Mandaluyong City vs. Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali,
RTC, Br. 212, Mandaluyong City, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2124/A.M. No. FTJ-08-2125, August 27,
2009.
Misconduct. The evidence on record clearly establishes that the first petition filed by Mendoza
for extrajudicial foreclosure against mortgagor David Joson was stamped received and docketed
as Foreclosure No. F0184.[10] The corresponding filing fees and cost of publication were paid.
The Notice to Parties of Sheriff’s Public Auction Sale[11] and the Notice of Extrajudicial
Foreclosure with Auction Sale of Real Property under Act No. 3135, as amended, were likewise
issued by Tablizo. Thus, when Tablizo cancelled the auction sale for no reason and without the
knowledge and consent of the Executive Judge, he did so in clear violation of his ministerial
duties as Ex-Officio Sheriff in applications for extrajudicial foreclosure under the Administrative
Order.
As to the second petition for extrajudicial foreclosure filed by Mendoza against mortgagor
spouses Ricardo and Adelina Abrasaldo which was allegedly refused outright by Tablizo, the
evidence on record shows that the said petition[12] was marked with the receiving stamp of the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes. The same petition
also bears the mark “F-0193” at the upper right-hand corner of the first page. The mark appears
to denote that the petition, docketed as Foreclosure No. F0193, is an Extrajudicial Foreclosure
Sale under Act No. 3135, as amended. It raises valid suspicion, however, why the receiving
stamp was left blank despite the docket number written on the petition. This unexplained act on
the part of Tablizo shows another violation of his ministerial duties as Ex-Officio Sheriff in
applications for extrajudicial foreclosure under Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1984. We
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have reminded sheriffs time and again that, as court employees, they must conduct themselves
with propriety and decorum so that their actions must be above suspicion at all times. Leo
Mendoza vs. Prospero V. Tablizo, A.M. No. P-08-2553, August 28, 2009.
Negligence. As gleaned from the cited case and from the Return of Service of Summons of
Process Server Eduardo R. Rabena and his explanation, respondent is liable for simple neglect or
dereliction of duty.
A process server’s primary duty is to serve court notices. This requires utmost dedication on his
part to ensure that all notices assigned to him are duly served on the parties.
Considering the grave responsibilities imposed on him, Eduardo R. Rabena, despite his
explanation that he had performed his duty with utmost good faith, proved to be careless and
imprudent in discharging his duties. Neither neglect nor delay should be allowed to stall the
expeditious disposition of cases. As such, he is indeed guilty of simple neglect of duty, which is
the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task. Simple neglect of duty
signifies “disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.” Judge Alma Crispina B.
Collado-Lacorte vs. Eduardo Rabena, A.M. No. P-09-2665, August 4, 2009.
September 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Disbarment; prescription. Neither the lapse of time from the occurrence of the cause nor the
motivation for the filing of the complaint diminished the Court’s inherent power to discipline a
member of the Bar whenever appropriate. First of all, the ordinary statutes of limitation had no
application to disbarment or suspension proceedings against members of the Bar. Indeed, such
proceedings are sui generis. They are not akin to the trials of actions or suits in which interests
and rights are enforced by the plaintiffs against the defendants, but are rather investigations into
the conduct of the members of the Bar made by the Supreme Court within the context of its
plenary powers expressly granted by the Constitution to regulate the practice of law. The
proceedings, which the Court may even motu proprio initiate, have neither plaintiffs nor
prosecutors. The public interest is their primary objective, the true question for determination
being whether or not the respondent members of the Bar are still fit to be allowed to retain their
memberships and to enjoy the privileges appurtenant to such memberships. Imelda Bides-
Ulaso vs. Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana, A.C. No. 7297, September 29, 2009.
Disbarment; withdrawal by complainant. The agreement between Bides and Ulaso stipulating
the withdrawal of the disbarment case against the respondent did not terminate or abate the
jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue the present administrative proceeding
against the respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar. Imelda Bides-Ulaso vs. Atty. Edita
Noe-Lacsamana, A.C. No. 7297, September 29, 2009.
Dishonesty. The Court finds well-taken the evaluation and recommendation of the OCA on the
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charge for discourtesy. The Court finds well-taken too the evaluation and recommendation of
the OCA on respondent’s failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 141, Section 10 of the
Rules of Court. It finds the OCA’s characterization of such failure as “Inefficiency and
Incompetence in the Performance of Official Duties” – a grave offense – too harsh,
however. Leticia Sales vs. Arnel Jose A. Rubio, Sheriff IV, RTC, OCC, Naga City, A.M. No. P-08-
2570, September 4, 2009.
Dishonesty. By misrepresenting her educational attainment to qualify for her present position,
respondent has committed dishonesty. Dishonesty has been defined as intentionally making a
false statement on any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or
fraud in securing one’s examination, registration, appointment or promotion. It is also
understood to imply a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. Judge Jenny Lind Aldecia-
Delorino vs. Marilyn De Castro Remigio-Versosa, Clerk III, Regional Trial Court, Branch
137, Makati City, A.M. No. P-08-2433, September 25, 2009.
Dishonesty. Based on the foregoing, the Court is more inclined to believe that when
complainant and defendants-spouses failed to reach an agreement, respondent came forward as
a third-party claimant to prevent the levy and execution of said properties. He, therefore,
violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,which provides that a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Under this rule, conduct has
been construed not to pertain exclusively to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties.
In previous cases, the Court has held that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor; or unworthy to continue as an officer of
the court. John Christen S. Hegna vs. Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga, A.C. No. 5955. September
8, 2009
Grave misconduct. Ganzan’s failure to remit her collections, amounting to P256,530.25 and to
report/collect fines totaling P50,050.00, constitutes gross neglect of duty, dishonesty, and grave
misconduct. She has transgressed the trust reposed in her as cashier and disbursement officer of
the Court. Therefore, the Court is left with no other recourse but to declare Ganzan guilty of
dishonesty and gross misconduct.
Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292 and other pertinent Civil Service Laws, dishonesty and grave misconduct are considered
grave offenses, for which the penalty of dismissal is prescribed even at the first instance. Section
9 of said Rules additionally provides: “The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of
eligibility and retirement benefits, and the disqualification of re-employment in the government
service. This penalty is without prejudice to criminal liability of the respondent.” Office of the
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Court Administrator vs. Clerk of Court Fe P. Ganzan, MCTC, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental, A.M. No.
P-05-2046, September 17, 2009
Grave misconduct. It is undisputed that accused were charged with a non-bailable offense; that
they were released from detention on the basis merely of the Custody Receipt signed by the
respondent, which was a clear violation of Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which
explicitly provides that “no person under detention by legal process shall be released or
transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail.” As a court employee,
respondent is cognizant of this requirement as in fact he admitted in his Comment that a motion
for temporary release should have been filed in court.
As a court employee, respondent is expected to follow the law and the rules and procedures
prescribed by the Court. The facts in this case clearly indicate that respondent deliberately
circumvented the law to favor his accused-relatives. This is a grave misconduct which merits the
penalty of dismissal. P/Supt. Rene Macaling Orbe vs. Marcos U. Digandang, Process Server,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City, A.M. No. P-09-2685, September 3, 2009.
Gross ignorance of the law. Judge Reyes is discharged from the service for gross ignorance of the
law and conduct unbecoming of a judge. Prosecutor Romana R. Reyes vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes,
etc./Armi M. Flordeliza, et al. Vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes, etc./Andree K. Lagdameo vs. Judge Julia
A. Reyes, etc./timoteo A. Migriño, etc. vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes/Florencio Sebastian, Jr. vs. Hon.
Judge Julia A. Reyes, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 69, A.M.
No. MTJ-06-1623/A.M. No. MTJ-06-1625/A.M. No. 06-1627/A.M. No. P-09-2693/A.M.
No. MTJ-06-1638, September 18, 2009.
Gross ignorance of the law. Respondent is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure for
taking cognizance of the petition for indirect contempt, despite the non-payment of docket fees.
Rule 71, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that an indirect contempt proceeding, which is
not initiated motu proprio by the court, shall be commenced by a verified petition that fully
complies with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions, including the
payment of docket fees. That Rule being so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes Gross
Ignorance of the Law or Procedure. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Judge Ernesto
P. Pagayatan/Leticia Lourdes Camara vs. Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan, A.M. No. RTJ-07-
2089/A.M. No. RTJ-0921-99, September 8, 2009.
Gross negligence. Indeed, Romero’s gross negligence in driving the shuttle bus is evident. Gross
negligence has been defined as the want or absence of even slight care or diligence as to
amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of persons or property. It evinces a thoughtless
disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.
In A.M. No. 2008-13-SC, the Court ruled that “a government employee holding a casual or
temporary employment cannot be terminated within a period of his employment except for
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cause.” We sustain the recommendation of the OAS that there is a sufficient cause to terminate
Romero’s employment, his gross recklessness in driving the shuttle bus having been established
by substantial evidence. Moreover, the presence of mitigating circumstances, such as his length
of service or this being his first offense, should not be taken into account considering that the
paramount concern in this case is the need to safeguard the lives and limbs of the shuttle bus
passengers. Complaint of Atty. Wilhelmina D. Geronga against Mr. Ross C. Romero, driver,
shuttle bus no. 5 for reckless driving, A.M. No. 2009-04-SC, September 4, 2009.
Immorality. Under Sections 8 and 11 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a judge found guilty of
immorality can be dismissed from the service, if still in the active service, or may forfeit all or
part of his retirement benefits, if already retired, and disqualified from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled corporations. We
have already ruled that if a judge is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against
him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. This quantum of evidence,
complainant failed to satisfy.
The testimonies of Mutia and Zozobrado are specious and insufficient to convincingly prove
that respondent committed disreputable conduct. This considered, complainant should not have
refused to testify during the hearing. More than anyone else, it was complainant who had a
direct interest in making sure that the evidence adduced met the necessary burden of proof,
considering that the allegations in her complaint involved charges that cannot be lightly dealt
with. She should have been more zealous in prosecuting her complaint.
Nevertheless, we agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice that although the charges of
immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service were not satisfactorily
proven by complainant, respondent cannot be completely exonerated. Mutia’s testimony that he
saw Judge Macias having dinner with Seranillos and entering a bedroom with her may not
satisfactorily prove the charge of immorality, but this act certainly suggested an appearance of
impropriety, Judge Macias being a married man. Such behavior undeniably constituted
unbecoming conduct, a light offense punishable by a fine not less than P1,000.00 but not
more thanP10,000.00. In light of the circumstances affecting not only the reputation of Judge
Macias himself but the image and reputation of the whole judiciary as well, we find it
reasonable to impose upon him the maximum fine of P10,000.00. Margie Corpus Macias Vs.
Mariano vs. Mariano Joaquin S. Macias, Presiding Judge, Branh 28, Regional Trial
Court, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1650, September 29, 2009.
Influence peddling. After a careful study of the instant case, we find no sufficient evidence to
support complainant’s claim. Except for complainant’s bare allegations, there is no proof that
respondents engaged in influence peddling, extortion, or in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral,
or deceitful conduct. It is axiomatic that he who alleges the same has the onus of validating
it. Gregory U. Chan vs.NLRC Commissioner Romeo L. Go, et al., A.C. No. 7547, September 4,
2009.
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Loan to client. The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees,
stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond,
etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of
his judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the
case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer
lends money to the client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an
interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. Either of these
circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or
to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the
client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause. Pedro L. Linsangan vs.
Atty. Nicodemes Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009.
Misappropriation. We find respondent guilty of misappropriating judiciary funds – which act

constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct. Respondent did not deny committing the
irregularities imputed against her or submit an explanation thereof despite several opportunities
given her. In her letter dated November 12, 2004, respondent acknowledged sole responsibility
over said infractions and admitted using the missing judiciary funds for her personal gain; she
even offered to restitute the undeposited collections. Respondent’s offer to restitute the whole
amount would not serve to exonerate her from administrative liability; much more in this case
where out of the total missing amount of P8,694,578.56, respondent only returned the measly
sum of P100,601.00. The infraction had been committed; it could not be erased by mere offer of
restitution. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Concepcion G. Espineda, etc., A.M. No. CTA-
08-2, September 4, 2009.
Mistajke. It has been held that not all mistakes of members of the Bar justify the imposition of
disciplinary actions. An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. For an honest
mistake or error, an attorney is not liable. Wen Ming W. Chen a.k.a. Domingo Tan vs. Atty. F.D.
Nicolas B. Pichay, A.C. No. 7910, September 18, 2009.
Negligence. It is with respect to respondent’s receipt of the proceeds of complainant’s bonus in

June 2006 that this Court, as did the OCA, faults respondent for being remiss in his duties in
failing to submit a return of the writ. While respondent belatedly executed a Sheriff’s Report
dated May 13, 2008, the same fails to comply with the mandate of Section 14 of Rule 39.
In fine, respondent is indeed guilty of simple neglect of duty. Under Rule IV, Section 52 (B) (1)
of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the first offense of simple
neglect of duty is penalized with suspension for one month and one day to six months. Dr.
Salome U. Jorge vs. Carlos P. Diaz, Deputy Sheriff, RTC, Branch 20, Tacurong,
Sultan Kudarat, A.M. No. P-07-2332, September 4, 2009.
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Non-compliance with court order. Atty. Venida apologized for the late filing of both his partial
and full comments. But tried to exculpate himself by saying he inadvertently misplaced the
complaint and had a heavy workload (for his partial comment). He even had the temerity to
blame a strong typhoon for the loss of all his files, the complaint included (for his full comment).
His excuses tax the imagination. Nevertheless, his apologies notwithstanding, we find his
conduct utterly unacceptable for a member of the legal profession. He must not be allowed to
evade accountability for his omissions.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation
of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Rolando Saa vs. Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commission on Bar Discipline, Board of Governors, Pasig City and Atty. Freddie A. Venida, G.R.
No. 132826, September 3, 2009.
Notarial law. Specifically, the notarial certification contained in the jurat of the amended
verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping – “SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE
ME, on this 18th day of June 2003, affiant IRENE BIDES, showing to me her CTC Nos. 11833475
issued on November 21, 2002, in Manila” – indicated both the necessity for the physical
presence of Bides as the affiant and the fact that the signing was done in the presence of the
respondent as the notary. The physical presence of Bides was required in order to have her as
the affiant swear before the respondent that she was that person and in order to enable the
respondent as the notary to ascertain whether Bides had voluntarily and freely executed the
affidavit. Thus, the respondent, by signing as notary even before Bides herself could appear
before her, failed to give due observance and respect to the solemnity.
Being a lawyer commissioned as a notary, the respondent was mandated to discharge with
fidelity the sacred duties appertaining to her notarial office. Such duties being dictated by public
policy and impressed with public interest, she could not disregard the requirements and
solemnities of the Notarial Law. It was emphatically her primary duty as a lawyer-notary to obey
the laws of the land and to promote respect for the law and legal processes. She was expected to
be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. She ought to have
remembered that a graver responsibility was placed upon her shoulders by virtue of her being a
lawyer. Imelda Bides-Ulaso vs.Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana, A.C. No. 7297, September 29, 2009.
Solicitation of clients. With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is
the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him
by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. Again the Court notes
that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits
from Labiano’s “referrals.” Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection to his office.
Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot
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escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR. Pedro L. Linsangan vs.
Atty. Nicodemes Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009.
October 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Lawyers
Confidential information. It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise
a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be confidential.
Since the proposed amendments to the by-laws must be approved by at least a majority of the
stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with the SEC, the information
could not have been intended to be confidential. Thus, the disclosure made by respondent
during the stockholders’ meeting could not be considered a violation of his client’s secrets and
confidence within the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rebecca J. Palm vs. Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr., A.C. No. 8242, October 2, 2009.
Conflict of interest. In Quiambao v. Bamba, the Court enumerated various tests to determine
conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to
use against his former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous employment. The Court has ruled that what a lawyer owes his former client is to
maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will
injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him.
There is no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a case filed by Comtech.
The case where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa case filed by Comtech against its
former officer. There was nothing in the records that would show that respondent used against
Comtech any confidential information acquired while he was still Comtech’s retained counsel.
Further, respondent made the representation after the termination of his retainer agreement with
Comtech. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that
occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose
upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously
handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship
has terminated. Rebecca J. Palm vs. Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr., A.C. No. 8242, October 2, 2009.
Indirect contempt. It is reasonable to conclude that the two lawyers crafted the complaint and
incorporated therein all the unfounded accusations against the respondent in order to conceal
their inadequacies in the handling of their client’s cases. To say the least, the complaint was
most unfair to the respondent who, as the record shows, was simply keeping faith with her
avowed objective of expediting the proceedings in her court by, among other measures,
requiring lawyers to be prepared at all times and to be fair and candid in their dealings with the
court. Juan Pablo P. Bondoc vs. Judge Divina Luz P. Aquino-Simbulan, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-09-
2204, October 26, 2009.
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Misconduct. When a lawyer accepts to handle a case, whether for a fee or gratis et amore, he
undertakes to give his utmost attention, skill and competence to it, regardless of its significance.
Thus, his client, whether rich or poor, has the right to expect that he will discharge his duties
diligently and exert his best efforts, learning and ability to prosecute or defend his (client’s)
cause with reasonable dispatch. Failure to fulfill his duties will subject him to grave
administrative liability as a member of the Bar. For the overriding need to maintain the faith and
confidence of the people in the legal profession demands that an erring lawyer should be
sanctioned. Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza vs. Atty. Vivian G. Rubia, A.C. No. 6166, October 2,
2009.
Judges and court personnel

Absence without leave. Gina’s applications for leave from March 1, 2007 up to March 31, 2007
and from May 1, 2007 up to July 31, 2007 inclusive were disapproved and considered
unauthorized, as reflected above. A court employee’s absence without leave for a prolonged
period of time disrupts the normal functions of the court; constitutes conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of public service; contravenes a public servant’s duty to serve the public with the
utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; and manifests disrespect for
one’s superiors and colleagues, in particular, and for the service and the public at large, in
general. Gina must thus be dropped from the rolls. Re: Dropping from the rolls of Ms. Gina P.
Fuentes, Court stenographer I, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Mabini, Compostela Valley, A.M.
No. 09-3-50-MCTC, October 9, 2009.
Habitual drunkenness. Time and again, this Court has pointed out the heavy burden and
responsibility which court personnel are saddled with, in view of their exalted positions as
keepers of the public faith. They should, therefore, be constantly reminded that any impression
of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided.
Those who work in the judiciary must adhere to high ethical standards to preserve the court’s
good name and standing. They should be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency,
and they must discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence, since they are officers
of the court and agents of the law. Indeed, any conduct, act or omission on the part of those
who would violate the norms of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to
diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary shall not be countenanced.
In the instant case, respondent cannot take refuge behind his alleged ailment to justify his
infractions. In fact, respondent made no categorical denial of the accusations against him. He
merely sidestepped the same by explaining that he had been drinking in order to ease the pains
brought about by his leg injury. He shifted the blame on the medications he took for his failure
to perform his duties as court interpreter. He had been constantly reminded of his unfavorable
behavior but he remained unrepentant. The only time he took an effort to make excuses for
himself was when an administrative complaint was already filed against him. However, the fact
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remains that, even by his own admission, respondent had been remiss in the performance of his
duties. Judge Rene B. Baculi vs. Clemente U. Ugale, A.M. No. P-08-2569, October 30, 2009.
Ignorance. The respondent judge ought to have known that the joint decision was already final
and executory and could no longer be disturbed when he made his adjustments. This legal
reality, known as the rule of immutability of judgment, is an elementary principle of law and
procedure. Once a judgment becomes final, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering
it or by the Highest Court of the land. The only recognized exceptions are the correction of
clerical errors, or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries, which cause no prejudice to
any party, and where the judgment is void. To be sure, the respondent judge’s ground for
modifying the joint decision is not among these recognized exceptions.
For modifying a final and executory decision in the course of its execution, we find the
respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Where the law is straightforward and its
application to the facts plainly evident, not to know the law or to act as if one does not know it,
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. The respondent judge violated Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates professional competence on the part of a judge. A
judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep
abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence; otherwise, he erodes the confidence of the public
in the courts. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice. George
P. Mercado (Substituted by his wife, Rebecca Royo-Mercado, and Children, namely, Rebecca
Gay, Kristina Evita, Cris Oliver and Marian Rica, all surnamed Mercado) vs. Hon. Erasto D.
Salcedo, (Ret.) Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Tagum City, Davao Del Norte, Branch
31/State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco vs. Hon. Erasto D. Salcedo, (Ret.) Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Tagum City, Davao Del Norte, Branch 31, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1781/A.M.
No. RTJ-03-1782, October 16, 2009,
Ignorance. Rodrigo C. Calacal (respondent), a Utility Worker I of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Alfonso Lista-Aguinaldo, Ifugao, without obtaining a travel authority required by OCA
Circular No. 49-2003, left the country on May 15, 2008 for Singapore where he stayed up to
June 6, 2008.
On the Court’s directive to explain why he failed to comply with OCA Circular 49-2003,
respondent proffered unawareness of the circular as there is no copy in his office. Anyway, he
stated that the Clerk of Court approved his leave application.
Unawareness of the circular is not an excuse for non-compliance therewith, violation of which
is penalized with reprimand on the first offense, suspension for 1-30 days on the second offense,
and dismissal on the third offense. Office of the Administrative Services (OAS)- Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) Vs. Rodrigo C. Calacal, Utility Worker 1, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, (MCTC), Alfonso Lista-Aguinaldo, Ifugao, A.M. No. P-09-2670, October 16, 2009.
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Misconduct. Compounding respondent’s acts of lasciviousness and drunkenness during office

hours were, by his own admission, his smoking within court premises during office hours and
leaving his post during office hours in violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 9-
99.
In Merilo-Bedural v. Edroso, the therein respondent court utility worker who committed
lascivious acts against a fellow court employee was found by the Court guilty of “gross
misconduct and immorality prejudicial to the best interests of the service” and was dismissed
from the service.
Respondent’s gross misconduct and immorality as reflected above, not to mention his violation
of a Supreme Court circular, merit his dismissal. The exacting standards of morality and decency
expected of those in the service of the judiciary must be maintained, failing which the respect
and confidence in the judiciary will be eroded. Angelita I. Dontogan vs. Mario Q.
Pagkanlungan, Jr., A.M. No. P-09-2620, October 9, 2009.
Misconduct. The absenteeism of judges or court employees and/or their irregular attendance at
work is a serious charge that, if proven, may warrant the imposition of the penalty of dismissal
or suspension from service. Unauthorized absence and irregular attendance are detrimental to
the dispensation of justice and, more often than not, result in undue delay in the disposition of
cases; they also translate to waste of public funds when the absent officials and employees are
nevertheless paid despite their absence. As heretofore mentioned, the Supreme Court regulates
the conduct of court officials and employees and it acts through its subordinates, among them in
this case, the respondent judge. His responsibility in this administrative supervision is direct by
virtue of the delegation made by this Court. By conducting a superficial investigation and by his
slanted findings that caused the OCA to recommend the dismissal of the administrative
complaint against Judge Agayan and his court personnel, the Court’s administrative machinery
failed; the respondent judge’s intent to shield another judge, resulting in the lack of objectivity
of his report, deprived the Court of the opportunity to act properly on the reported violations of
the norms of conduct of judges and court employees.
Serious misconduct, as defined, refers to weighty and serious transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the
public officer. It warrants dismissal from the service when the judicial act is corrupt and inspired
by an intention to violate the law, and when it translates to wrongful intention rather than mere
error of judgment.
In this case, by giving premium to personal relations and personal feelings rather than to the
faithful discharge of his duty as investigating judge, the respondent judge acted dishonestly and
inefficiently, coupled with a deliberate and wrongful intent to perform his duties unfaithfully.
This is no less a serious misconduct than a corrupt act undertaken for monetary gains; one as
well as the other eroded public confidence in a judge’s ability to render justice. George P.
Mercado (Substituted by his wife, Rebecca Royo-Mercado, and Children, namely, Rebecca Gay,
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Kristina Evita, Cris Oliver and Marian Rica, all surnamed Mercado) vs. Hon. Erasto D. Salcedo,
(Ret.) Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Tagum City, Davao Del Norte, Branch 31/State
Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco vs. Hon. Erasto D. Salcedo, (Ret.) Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Tagum City, Davao Del Norte, Branch 31, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1781/A.M. No. RTJ-
03-1782, October 16, 2009,
Misconduct. The act of borrowing a vehicle by a judge or any court employee is not per se a
violation of judicial norms and standards established for court personnel, as borrowing is a
legitimate and neutral act that can happen in everyday life. However, judges and court
employees – by the nature of their functions and of the norms and standards peculiar to their
positions – live their lives under restrictions not otherwise imposed on others; specifically, they
cannot simply borrow in situations when this act may or can affect the performance of their
duties because of the nature of the thing borrowed or the identity of the borrower, or in
situations when borrowing would involve ethical questions under express rules. In this case, the
complaint alleged that what the respondent judge borrowed was in fact a vehicle that was the
subject of a previous litigation before his sala; the respondent judge borrowed, too, from a
lender who still had cases before his sala.
We hold, based on our examination and analysis of the records, that the respondent judge went
over the dividing line that separates permissible from impermissible borrowing. George P.
Mercado (Substituted by his wife, Rebecca Royo-Mercado, and Children, namely, Rebecca Gay,
Kristina Evita, Cris Oliver and Marian Rica, all surnamed Mercado) vs. Hon. Erasto D. Salcedo,
(Ret.) Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Tagum City, Davao Del Norte, Branch 31/State
Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco vs. Hon. Erasto D. Salcedo, (Ret.) Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Tagum City, Davao Del Norte, Branch 31, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1781/A.M. No. RTJ-
03-1782, October 16, 2009,
Misconduct. The investigation established that De Rivera had deliberately and knowingly
conspired with Key, Luzadas, and other court employees to facilitate the fraudulent release of
the retirement and leave credits benefits of Lantin. She tampered with court records, specifically
the date of receipt of the application for retirement benefits, in violation of Section 3, Canon IV
of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. She accepted the application from Key although the
latter was not the designated agent in the SPA, an act amounting to misconduct. De Rivera
accepted PhP 30,000 in connection with an illegal transaction, which constitutes grave
misconduct. She used her official position to secure unwarranted benefits, privileges, or
exemptions for herself and others, contrary to Canon I of the Code, Fidelity to Duty.
From the investigation, it can be gleaned that Villapando worked closely with De Rivera and, by
his own admission, received money from her. He went beyond his official functions and
followed up the papers of Lantin with unusual zeal and received money from Key after the SC
clearance was completed. He committed grave misconduct for accepting money in exchange
for routing the papers of the judge. He is guilty of the same offenses as De Rivera––Grave
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Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, violation of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel, and violation of Sec. 3(b) of RA 3019 and of RA 6713; and is also
guilty of violating Sec. 1 of Canon IV on the Performance of Duties, Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel. He should be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits.
From the investigation, it can be gleaned that Villapando worked closely with De Rivera and, by
his own admission, received money from her. He went beyond his official functions and
followed up the papers of Lantin with unusual zeal and received money from Key after the SC
clearance was completed. He committed grave misconduct for accepting money in exchange
for routing the papers of the judge. He is guilty of the same offenses as De Rivera––Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, violation of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel, and violation of Sec. 3(b) of RA 3019 and of RA 6713; and is also
guilty of violating Sec. 1 of Canon IV on the Performance of Duties, Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel. He should be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits.
De Rivera admitted that she received thirty thousand pesos (PhP 30,000) from Key allegedly to
facilitate the processing of Lantin’s retirement papers. She, however, denied receiving an
additional forty thousand pesos (PhP 40,000). She claimed that she gave money to Villapando,
Butch N. Borres, and Edison P. Vasquez, although she did not say how much. She said she did
not know how the other offices had cleared Lantin. She gave no explanation why she accepted
the retirement papers of Lantin; why she asked no identification from Key; and why she
processed the papers even if incomplete. She denied taking part in processing the SC clearance
of Lantin. Betty Ignacio, to whose account the two checks issued to Lantin were allegedly
deposited, in a Sworn Affidavit, said that Luzadas sent her a text message that it was De Rivera
who facilitated the processing of the judge’s retirement claims. De Rivera stopped reporting for
work after she was preventively suspended for ninety (90) days.
The investigation established that De Rivera had deliberately and knowingly conspired with Key,
Luzadas, and other court employees to facilitate the fraudulent release of the retirement and
leave credits benefits of Lantin. She tampered with court records, specifically the date of receipt
of the application for retirement benefits, in violation of Section 3, Canon IV of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel. She accepted the application from Key although the latter was not
the designated agent in the SPA, an act amounting to misconduct. In Re: Fraudulent release of
retirement benefits of Judge Jose C. Lantin, former Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San
Felipe, Zambales, A.M. No. 2007-08-SC, October 9, 2009.
Misconduct. As Judge Farrales noted in her Report, Rimando should have first demanded full
payment of the amounts stated in the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision, which
dispositive portion was, it bears reiteration, incorporated in the writ. But he did not. Without
determining with certainty that the van belonged to the judgment debtor, and despite the
information given to him at the time of seizure that it did not belong to the judgment debtor, he
went ahead and seized the van.
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On top of this, Rimando falsely made it appear in the “Notice of L[i]s Pendens” addressed to the
district head of the Olongapo City LTO that the van was the “subject matter” in the civil case.
Not only did Rimando thus make a false statement. His statement betrayed his ignorance. For
under Section 14, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court and Section 76 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529, a notice of lis pendens applies only in actions affecting the title or the right of possession
of realproperty. Besides, the van was not the subject matter of the civil case.
As if Rimando’s faux pas were not enough, he even attempted to release the van on a non-
working day and would have succeeded were it not for Judge Gonzales’ order against it. His
claim that his attempt was made after ascertaining that the van did not belong to the judgment
debtor is an admission of his slip reflected above.
Rimando is, for refusal to comply with Judge Gonzales’ order for him to explain his actions, also
liable for Gross Insubordination, what Necesario v. Dinglasa describes as the indifference of a
respondent to an administrative complaint and to resolutions requiring comment thereon. Judge
Jacinto C. Gonzales vs. Clerk of Court and City Sheriff Alexander C. Rimando, et al., A.M. No. P-
07-2385. October 26, 2009.
Misconduct. Complainants testified, and respondent was unable to rebut, that he had shouted at
and uttered vindictive words against them, and even humiliated them while they were doing
their job and attending to the needs of the public. In his desperate attempt to exonerate himself,
respondent could only impute malicious motive to complainants, averring that they merely had
an axe to grind against him; and that they had defied, disobeyed, and refused to recognize him
as head of the OCC-MTCC. Unfortunately for him, his explanations do not excuse his actions.
Respondent’s acts are absolutely unbecoming a court employee who is expected to display
proper decorum. In Villaros v. Orpiano, the Court stressed that “the behavior of all employees
and officials involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is
circumscribed with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and
decorum at all times in order to merit and maintain the public’s respect for and trust in the
judiciary.”
High-strung and belligerent behavior has no place in government service, where the personnel
are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times even when confronted with
rudeness and insolence. More so is such conduct exacted from court employees, since they
have to earn and keep the public’s respect for and confidence in the judicial service. This
standard of conduct must apply to the court employees’ dealings not only with the public, but
also with their co-workers. Joana Gilda L. Leyrit, et al. Vs. Nicolasito S. Solas, Clerk of Court IV,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Iloilo City/Ma. Theresa Zerrudo, et al. vs. Nicolasito S.
Solas, Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Iloilo City, A.M. No. P-08-
2567/A.M. No. P-08-2568, October 30, 2009.
Neglect of duty. Respondent’s proffered excuse — that she had to prioritize the transcription of
stenographic notes taken in other cases which were needed in the next scheduled hearings —
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does not impress, however. It bears noting that the stenographic notes subject of the request of
Angela’s counsel were taken in 2006 yet and had remained untranscribed even despite the lapse
of more than one year when the present complaint was filed, and four months despite the
payment of respondent’s fees for the purpose. Her having had heavy work is not, as the OCA
observed, an adequate excuse. Elisa C. Ruste vs. Cristina Q. Selma, A.M. No. P-09-2625.
October 9, 2009.
Neglect of duty. An order or resolution of the Court is not to be construed as a mere request
which could be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. To do so shows disrespect
to the Court.
Without the least delay, every court officer or employee is duty bound to obey the orders and
processes of the Court and to exercise at all times a high degree of professionalism.
Respondent, being a clerk of court, has the duty to immediately deposit the various funds he
collects because he is not authorized to keep them in his custody. He failed in his duty,
however.
Delay in depositing funds collected constitutes simple neglect of duty. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Alfredo Manasan, Clerk of Court II, MCTC, Orani-Samal, Bataan, A.M. No. P-
07-2415, October 19, 2009.
Neglect of duty. We find Genabe guilty for simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty has
been defined as the failure of an employee to give attention to a task expected of him and
signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.
Genabe had been permitted to attend a two-day seminar in Baguio City on the premise that no
work would be left pending. She was assigned to summarize the testimonies of three defense
witnesses for a criminal case set for promulgation. The records reveal that Genabe was only able
to summarize the TSN of one witness consisting of 46 pages and failed to finish the TSN of the
other two witnesses consisting of 67 pages. Before leaving for Baguio, Genabe had three
working days to complete the task. However, the assignment remained unfinished. When such
task was assigned to another court employee, it only took the other employee two and a half
hours to complete the TSN of the two witnesses. Re: Order dated 21 December 2006 issued by
Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City, suspending
Loida M. Genabe, Legal Researcher, same court/Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City Vs. Loida M. Genabe, Legal Researcher, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 275, Las Piñas City, A.M. No. 07-2-93-RTC/A.M. No. P-07-2320, October 29, 2009.
Power to discipline. The guidelines clearly provide that the authority of judges to discipline
erring court personnel, under their supervision and charged with light offenses, is limited to
conducting an inquiry only. After such inquiry, the executive judge is required to submit to the
OCA the results of the investigation and give a recommendation as to what action should be
taken. An executive judge does not have the authority to act upon the results of the inquiry and
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thereafter, if the court employee is found guilty, unilaterally impose a penalty, as in this case. It
is only the Supreme Court which has the power to find the court personnel guilty or not for the
offense charged and then impose a penalty.
In the present case, Judge Maceda suspended Genabe for the offense of neglect of duty. Under
Section 52(B), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense which carries a penalty of one month and one day
to six months suspension for the first offense. Under A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, an executive judge
may only conduct an investigation for all offenses. After the investigation, the executive judge is
mandated to refer the necessary disciplinary action to this Court for appropriate action. Re:
Order dated 21 December 2006 issued by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 275, Las Piñas City, suspending Loida M. Genabe, Legal Researcher, same court/Judge
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City Vs. Loida M. Genabe,
Legal Researcher, Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City, A.M. No. 07-2-93-RTC/A.M.
No. P-07-2320, October 29, 2009.
November 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Interest; attorney’s fees. The imposition of any interest, as prayed for in this petition, on any
amount payable to petitioners is unwarranted. Contracts for attorney’s services are unlike any
other contracts for the payment of compensation for any other services which allow the
imposition of interest in case of delay under the provisions of the Civil Code. The practice of law
is a profession, not a moneymaking venture. Jose Feliciano Loy, et al. vs. San Miguel Corporation
Employees Union-Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (SMCEU-PTGWO), et
al., G.R. No. 164886. November 24, 2009
Misappropriation. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the
disbarment or suspension of a lawyer for the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client such that he
must promptly account for whatever money or property his client may have entrusted to him. As
a mere trustee of said money or property, he must hold them separate from that of his own and
make sure that they are used for their intended purpose. If not used, he must return the money
or property immediately to his client upon demand, otherwise the lawyer shall be presumed to
have misappropriated the same in violation of the trust reposed on him. A lawyer’s conversion
of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional ethics.
Here, respondent Mijares chose not to be heard on his evidence. Technically, the only evidence
on record that the Court can consider is the University’s evidence that he got P500,000.00 from
complainant for expenses in facilitating and processing its title application; that he undertook to
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return the money if he did not succeed in his purpose; that he falsely claimed having obtained
the MMDA approval of the application; and that he nonetheless refused to return the money
despite repeated demands. Unopposed, this evidence supports the finding of guilt of the
Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors. Arellano University, Inc. vs. Atty.
Leovigildo H. Mijares III, A.C. No. 8380, November 20, 2009.
December 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Legal Ethics
Abuse of court processes and legal procedure; forum shopping The successive filings of a
petition for certiorari, petition for annulment of judgment, two petitions for annulment of the
complainant’s certificate of title, and a petition for declaratory relief, all containing a prayer
for injunctive relief, reveal the respondent’s persistence in preventing and avoiding the
execution of the final decisions of the lower courts against his client. Under the circumstances,
the respondent lawyer’s repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate means allowed by
professional ethical rules in defending the interests of his client. These are already uncalled for
measures to avoid the enforcement of the final judgment of the lower courts. The respondent
violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The respondent also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which are directed against the
filing of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Conrado Que v. Atty. Anastacio Revilla,
Jr., A.C. No. 7054, December 4, 2009.
Gross negligence. A lawyer, when he undertakes a client’s cause, makes a covenant that he will
exert all efforts for its prosecution until its final conclusion. He should undertake the task with
dedication and care, and he should do no less, otherwise, he is not true to his lawyer’s
oath. Respondent was woefully remiss in his duty to display utmost diligence and competence
in protecting the interests of his clients. Petitioners lost the civil case in the trial court because
they were barred from presenting their evidence as a result of their being declared in default as a
consequence of respondent’s failure to submit a pre-trial brief and to attend the pre-trial
conference. Petitioners’ appeal to the Court of Appeals from the adverse default judgment of the
trial court was dismissed on account of respondent’s failure to file an appeal brief. Respondent
is guilty of gross negligence and misconduct in violation of Canon 17, and Rules 18.02 and
18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Cesar Talento and Modesta
Herrera Talento v. Atty. Agustin Paneda, A.C. No. 7433, December 23, 2009.
Judicial ethics
Bad faith defined; absence of proof. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong; a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it partakes of the
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nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
some motive or self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes. Evident bad faith connotes a
manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage. In
issuing, ex parte, an order which was effectively a Temporary Restraining Order with an
indefinite term, the respondent judge was found to have violated Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules
of Court. However, the charge of bad faith and manifest partiality was rejected by the Supreme
Court. No evidence was adduced to prove that the issuance of the assailed order was motivated
by bad faith. Further, the Supreme Court found that in issuing the assailed order, respondent
judge was not at all motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred and some other motive; rather,
he took into account the circumstances obtaining between the parties. Mayor Hadji Amer
R. Sampiano, et al. v. Judge Cader P. Indar, A.M. RTJ-05-1953, December 21, 2009.
Grave misconduct and dishonesty; court personnel. A court employee is not prohibited from
helping individuals in the course of performing her official duties, but her actions cannot be left
unchecked when the help extended puts under suspicion the integrity of the Judiciary. Indeed,
she is strictly instructed not to use her official position to secure unwarranted benefits, privileges,
or exemptions for herself or for others. The evident purpose of the instruction is precisely to free
the court employees from suspicion of misconduct.
The respondent did not comply with the instruction. Instead, she used her official position as an
employee of the Judiciary to attempt to influence Judge Guerrero to rule in favor of litigant
Garcia, her landlord. She was thereby guilty of misconduct, defined as a transgression of some
established or definite rule of action; or, more particularly, an unlawful behavior on the part of a
public officer or employee. Her misconduct is “grave misconduct” warranting dismissal from
the service. The respondent was also liable for dishonesty when she attended the proceedings
in the case involving her landlord but did not file applications for leave and did not reflect her
absence in her daily time records. Judge Juanita V. Guerrero v. Juanita V. Ong, G.R. No.
182336, December 23, 2009.
Gross ignorance of the law; interference with co-equal court. Two Regional Trial Court Judges
were found administratively liable for “gross ignorance of the law” in issuing a Temporary
Restraining Order against the execution of a demolition order issued by another Regional Trial
Court. The Supreme Court held that when the respondent judges acted on the application
for TRO, they were clearly aware that they were being asked to act on matters already before
another RTC – a co-equal court, which was already exercising jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the petition brought before them. They nonetheless opted to interfere with the
[demolition] order of a co-equal and coordinate court of concurrent jurisdiction, in blatant
disregard of the doctrine of judicial stability, a well-established axiom in adjective law. Heirs of
Simeon Piedad v. Executive Judge Cesar Estrena and Judge Gaudiso Villarin, A.M. RTJ-09-2170,
December 16, 2009.
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Gross neglect of duty; clerk of court. A clerk of court who issued a certificate of finality of a
purported decision which, however, turned out to be spurious and non-existent as it cannot be
found in the court’s records and solely on the basis of her familiarity with the signature of the
presiding judge as appearing in the purported decision was found administratively liable for
gross neglect of duty.
Citing the high degree of responsibility, integrity, efficiency and ethics required of public officers
by the Constitution, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (R.A. No. 6713), and the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, the Supreme Court
stated that “conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice – from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, is circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility.”
The Court rejected the respondent clerk of court’s defense that she acted with diligence and in
good faith when she issued the certification based on her familiarity with the presiding judge’s
signature. The Court ruled that, in the absence of the record showing the genuineness of the
purported decision, no certification should have been issued and that, at the very least, the
respondent should have informed the presiding judge about the request for certification and the
fact that there exist no records to support the certification. Atty. Eduardo E. Francisco v. Liza
O. Galvez, A.M. No. P-09-2636, December 4, 2009.
Impropriety; judge. Respondent Judge clearly fell short of the exacting standards set by the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. His acts of receiving lawbooks worth fifty
thousand pesos, cellular phones and monthly cellular phone prepaid cards from the property
guardians of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras, who was then the ward of the court, constitute impropriety
which the Supreme Court cannot allow. Respondent Judge’s act of issuing Orders directing the
manager of the PNB, La Union Branch to draw checks amounting to thousands of pesos from
the account of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras creates the impression of impropriety and subjects the
court to suspicion of irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings. Heirs of the Late Rev. Fr.
Jose O. Aspiras v. Judge Clifton U. Ganay, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2055, December 17, 2009.
Sheriffs’ and process servers’ expenses for service of writs and processes. In the implementation
of writs or processes of the court for whic expenses are to be incurred, sheriffs are mandated to
comply with Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC to
the effect that the sheriff or process server must first prepare an estimate of the expenses for
approval by the court, and that the interested party may then deposit the amount as indicated in
the approved estimate with the clerk of court or ex oficio sheriff for disbursement to the deputy
sheriff assigned to effect the service of the writ or process, subject to liquidation within the same
period for submitting a sheriff’s return. In this case, the respondent served the writ of execution
without presenting to the complainant a court approved estimate of expenses and without the
required deposit from the complainant to the clerk of court. While the record reveal the
existence of an approved Itemized Estimated Amount of Expenses, a copy of that same itemized
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estimated expenses was only given to the complainant almost four months after the writ of
execution was served on the losing party. Likewise in contravention of Rule 141, respondent
sheriff directly received money from the complainant. Respondent is found guilty of neglect of
duty. Emma B. Ramos v. Apollo R. Ragot, A.M. No. P-09-2600, December 23, 2009.
January 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Bar discipline case; cases against judge. Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC (Re: Automatic
Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan, Judges of Regular and Special Courts, and Court Officials Who Are Lawyers as
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar),
this administrative case shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a
member of the bar. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Harun B. Ismael, A.M. No. RTJ-
07-2045, January 19, 2010.
Delay; rendering an order. A delay of nearly three years of a Court of Appeals Justice in
resolving a Motion for Inhibition directed against her constitutes undue delay in rendering an
order.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the Constitution directs that “All cases or matters filed after the
effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from the
date of submission for the Supreme Court, and unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve
months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.”
Respondent’s justification for the delay in resolving the motion for inhibition – in deference to
the authority of the SC to resolve the issues raised in the petition for certiorari does not impress.
Section 7 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for certiorari shall not interrupt
the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding with the case.
This rule must be strictly adhered to by appellate and lower courts notwithstanding the
possibility that the proceedings undertaken by them tend to or would render nugatory the
pending petition before the SC.
But even gratuitously crediting respondent’s justification for the delay, since the Court resolved
the complainant’s petition for certiorari on April 7, 2007, still given the nature and history of the
cases, respondent unduly delayed the resolution of a mere motion for inhibition – only on
October 8, 2008, after the Court referred the present complaint to the appellate court and after
complainant filed a reiterative motion.
Under Section 9(1) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or
order is a less serious charge. Ramon C. Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals Associate Justice Amelita
G. Tolentino, A.M. No. CA-10-49-J, January 28, 2010.
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Delay; resolution of cases. Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the Constitution provides that lower
courts have a period of 90 days only within which to decide or resolve a case from the time it is
submitted for decision. In this case, more than three years beyond the 90-day reglementary
period lapsed before the case was decided by Judge Cruz.
The reasons proffered by the said judge failed to persuade the Court. First, he claims that his
illness primarily caused the delay in the disposition of the case. However, the case was
submitted for decision before he claimed to be indisposed. There was also no showing that
respondent judge was continually ill from the time that the case was submitted for decision until
the promulgation of the judgment. Removal of cataract from both eyes does not entail prolonged
confinement. Besides, granting that his illness hindered the efficient performance of his
functions, all respondent judge had to do was request for an extension of time within which to
decide the case. Second, he claims that the delay was partly due to heavy pressure of work.
Precisely, a judge is mandated to resolve cases with dispatch. Section 5, Canon 6 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct categorically exhorts all judges to “perform all judicial duties,
including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.”
Delay in the disposition of cases not only deprives litigants of their right to speedy disposition of
their cases, but also tarnishes the image of the judiciary. Procrastination among members of the
judiciary in rendering decisions and taking appropriate actions on the cases before them not
only causes great injustice to the parties involved but also invites suspicion of ulterior motives
on the part of the judge, in addition to the fact that it erodes the faith and confidence of our
people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Luminza Delos Reyes
vs. Judge Danilo S. Cruz and Clerk of Court vs. Godolfo R. Gundran, Both of Reginal Trial Court,
Branch 152, Pasig City, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2152, January 18, 2010.
Delay; resolution of cases. Failure to decide or resolve cases within the reglementary period
constitutes gross inefficiency and is not excusable. It is a less serious charge and is punishable
by either suspension from office without salaries and benefits for not less than one month but
not more than three months, or a fine of more than Php 10,000 but not exceeding Php 20,000.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge shall perform all judicial duties,
including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code admonishes all judges to dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the period specified in Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII of
the Constitution. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Harun B. Ismael, A.M. No. RTJ-07-
2045, January 19, 2010.
Delay; transmitting case record to Court of Appeals. As for Clerk of Court Gundran, Section 10,
Rule 141 of the Rules of court states that it his duty to verify the correctness and completeness of
the records of the case. However, in this case, he relegated the performance of his job to
another court employee without any justifiable reason. Difficulty in completing the records of
the case is also not a justifiable ground for non-transmittal of the records. Under the rules, when
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the records cannot be completed, respondent should “indicate in his letter of transmittal the
exhibits or transcripts not included in the records being transmitted to the appellate court, the
reasons for their non-transmittal, and the steps taken or that could be taken to have them
available.”
Clerks of Court are essential judicial officers who perform delicate administrative functions vital
to the prompt and proper administration of justice. Their duty is, inter alia, to assist in the
management of the calendar of the court and in all matters that do not involve discretion or
judgment properly belonging to the judge. They play a key role in the complement of the court,
as their office is the hub of adjudicative and administrative orders, processes and concerns. As
such, they are required to be persons of competence, honesty, and probity, they cannot be
permitted to slacken on their jobs. Luminza Delos Reyes vs. Judge Danilo S. Cruz and Clerk of
Court V Godolfo R. Gundaran, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2152, January 18, 2010.
Grave misconduct and dishonesty; court personnel. Respondent’s act of taking off the shock
absorbert of a motorcycle which forms part of the prosecution’s evidence in a criminal case
without the knowledge of the evidence custodian or the owner, for personal gain, and thereafter
replacing it with a damaged one to prevent detection constitutes dishonesty and grave
misconduct.
Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the
administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the
cause. It generally means wrongful, improper, or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate, and intentional purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or
criminal intent. On the other hand, the term “gross” connotes something “out of all measure;
beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful.”
Dishonesty has been defined as intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or
practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination,
registration, appointment or promotion. It is also understood to imply a disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
A public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees are duty-bound to serve with the
highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and shall remain accountable
to the people. Persons involved in the administration of justice ought to live up to the strictest
standard of honesty and integrity in the public service. The conduct of personnel connected
with the courts should, at all times, be circumspect to preserve the integrity and dignity of our
courts of justice. As forerunners in the administration of justice, they ought to live up to the
strictest standards of honesty and integrity, considering that their positions primarily involve
service to the public. Gerardo Q. Ferreras vs. Rudy P. Eclipse, A.M. No. P-05-2085, January 20,
2010.
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Grave misconduct; court personnel. Respondent sheriffs were found guilty of grave misconduct
in demanding and collecting sums for the implementation of a Writ of Demolition without
providing corresponding official receipts therefor, and subsequently not implementing the writ.
Under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the sheriff is required to secure the court’s prior
approval of the estimated expenses and fees needed to implement the court process.
Following the abovementioned rule, a sheriff is guilty of violating the Rules if he fails to observe
the following: (1) prepare an estimate of expenses to be incurred in executing the writ, for which
he must seek the court’s approval; (2) render an accounting; and (3) issue an official receipt for
the total amount he received from the judgment debtor. The rule requires that the sheriff execute
writs and processes to estimate the expenses to be incurred. Upon approval of the estimated
expenses, the interested party has to deposit the amount with the Clerk of Court and Ex-
Officio Sheriff. The expenses shall then be disbursed to the executing Sheriff, subject to his
liquidation, within the same period for rendering a return on the process or writ. Any unspent
amount shall be refunded to the party who made the deposit.
Sheriffs are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the
performance of their duties. To do so would be inimical to the best interests of the service,
because even assuming arguendo that the payments were indeed given and received in good
faith, this fact alone would not dispel any suspicion that such payments were made for less than
noble purposes. Corollary to this point, a sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money
from a party-litigant without observing the proper procedural steps; otherwise, such act would
amount to dishonesty and extortion.
A sheriff is an officer of the court. As such, he performs integral part of the administration of
justice, since he is called upon to serve the orders and writs and execute all processes of the
court. As such, he is required to live up to the strict standards of honesty and integrity in public
service. His conduct must at all times be characterized by honesty and openness and must
constantly be above suspicion. Benjamin E. Sanga vs. Sheriffs Florencio SJ. Alcantara and Sales T.
Bisnar, A,M. No. P-09-2657. January 25, 2010.
February 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Court personnel; administrative complaint; effect of resignation. Respondent Nuñez has filed his
resignation on September 5, 2008, which was subsequently accepted by the Court, subject to
the usual clearance requirements and without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings
in the instant administrative case. Nonetheless, the fact of his resignation and our approval
thereof does not render moot the complaint against him. Our jurisdiction over him is not lost by
the mere fact that he resigned during the pendency of the case. To deprive the Court of
authority to pronounce his innocence or guilt of the charges is undoubtedly fraught with
injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. What would prevent a
corrupt and unscrupulous government employee from committing abuses and other
condemnable acts knowing fully well that he would soon be beyond the pale of the law and
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immune to all administrative penalties? Resignation should be used neither as an escape nor as
an easy way out to evade administrative liability by court personnel facing administrative
sanction. If only for reasons of public policy, the Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction
over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for acts
performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants
and the general public. If innocent, respondent official merits vindication of his name and
integrity as he leaves the government which he served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves
to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the
situation. Judge Delia P. Noel-Bertulfo, Municipal Trial Court, Palompon, Leyte vs. Fyndee P.
Nuñez, Court Aide, Municipal Trial Court, Palompon, Leyte, A.M. No. P-10-2758, February 2,
2010.
Court personnel; conduct prejudicial to best interest of service. Sheriffs are officers of the court
who serve and execute writs addressed to them by the court, and who prepare and submit
returns on their proceedings. As officers of the court, they must discharge their duties with great
care and diligence. They have to perform faithfully and accurately what is incumbent upon
them and show at all times a high degree of professionalism in the performance of their duties.
Despite being exposed to hazards that come with the implementation of the judgment, sheriffs
must perform their duties by the book.
When the judgment obligee is not present at the time the judgment obligor makes the payment,
the sheriff is authorized to receive it. However, the money received must be remitted to the
clerk of court within the same day or, if not practicable, deposited in a fiduciary account with
the nearest government depository bank. Evidently, sheriffs are not permitted to retain the
money in their possession beyond the day when the payment was made or to deliver the money
collected directly to the judgment obligee.
Good faith on the part of respondent, or lack of it, in proceeding to properly execute his
mandate would be of no moment, for he is chargeable with the knowledge that being an officer
of the court tasked thereto, it behooves him to make due compliance. As implementing officers
of the court, sheriffs should set the example by faithfully observing and not brazenly
disregarding the Rules of Court. Incredibly, respondent even blatantly admitted that he followed
the same procedure in some of the other writs of execution that he enforced. Domingo Peña, Jr.
vs. Achilles Andrew V. Ragalado II, etc.,A.M. No. P-10-2772, February 16, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Respondents are indeed guilty of dishonesty, defined as “the
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray.” Dishonesty, which is a grave offense, is punishable by dismissal even for the
first offense.
Respondents are guilty too of violation of reasonable office rules and procedures. In Estardo-
Teodoro v. Segismundo where the therein respondent court personnel failed to secure
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permission for his travel to Manila to obtain summons in a civil case in a court and visited the
residence of the defendants in that civil case, in violation of an office memorandum issued by
the clerk of court and noted by the executive judge, the Court held that the therein respondent
violated “reasonable office rules and procedures.” Such violation is classified as a light offense.
While respondents committed two offenses ─ leaving the court premises without any travel
order, which is a light offense, and dishonesty for fraudulently punching in their bundy cards,
which is a grave offense – the mitigating circumstances considered by the OCA (affliction of
Stage 2 Breast Cancer and first time offenders) justify the imposition of the recommended
penalty of six-month suspension for each respondent. Re: Irregularity in the use of bundy clock
by Sophia M. Castro and Babylin V. Tayag, Social Welfare Officers II, both the Regional Trial
Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, Angeles City, A.M. No. P-10-2763, February 10, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty Respondent Nuñez is charged with Gross Dishonesty for allegedly
taking money from the complainant. Based on the evidence submitted, the Court finds that
there is more than substantial evidence to prove that respondent Nuñez is guilty of
dishonesty. Ma. Irene R. Legaspi narrated that respondent admitted his
culpability. The NBI agent, Allan Tubi, likewise testified that respondent admitted stealing the
money of Judge Bertulfo.
Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, dishonesty is
considered a grave offense for which the penalty of dismissal is prescribed even at the first
instance. In this case, dismissal can no longer be imposed in view of respondent’s
resignation. Thus, in lieu thereof, we hereby order the forfeiture of whatever benefits still due
him from the government, except for the accrued leave credits, if any, that he had earned, and
his disqualification from further employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Judge Delia P. Noel-Bertulfo,
Municipal Trial Court, Palompon, Leyte vs. Fyndee P. Nuñez, Court Aide, Municipal Trial
Court, Palompon, Leyte, A.M. No. P-10-2758, February 2, 2010.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. The attachment to the journal entry voucher of what
to Ilagan was an “unfamiliar” remittance voucher, as well as his awareness of previous “series of”
experiences of the Accounting Division regarding misdelivered “zero-balance” vouchers, should
have put him on guard in processing Judge Tan’s remittance voucher. He should not have
merely “assumed,” to use his word, that such unfamiliar voucher was a mere duplicate.
Given Judge Tan’s contributory negligence, the Court sees it fit to only obligate Ilagan to
reimburse the amount paid by Judge Tan for the interest and surcharges on
the unremitted P88,666.00 as of October 8, 2002, or the date the GSIS actually informed Judge
Tan of her outstanding obligation.
Ilagan is thus administratively liable for simple neglect of duty, defined as failure to give proper
attention to a task expected of an employee resulting from either carelessness or
indifference. Re: Complaint of Judge Rowena Nieves A. Tan for late remittance by the Supreme
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Court of her terminal leave pay to GSIS to apply for payment of her salary load to said
agency, A.M. No. 2007-02-SC, February 10, 2010.
Judges; delay in rendering decisions. The Constitution provides that all lower courts must decide
all cases filed within three months. Further, the Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge
shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide the cases within the required periods.
Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary,
lowers its standards, and brings it to disrepute. Judges should not abuse the grant of an extension
to decide a case, and strive to decide the case within the extended period granted by the Court.
Under Sec. 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is
classified as a less serious charge punishable with suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or a fine of more
than P10,000.00, but not exceeding P20,000.00.
In this case, Judge Batingana decided Civil Case No. 2063 four years after the first extension
granted to him by the Court, and two years after the Court denied his seventh request for
extension and directed him to submit a copy of his decision through the OCA, but he failed to
decide Civil Case No. 1759 despite the numerous extensions granted to him. Request of Judge
Niño A. Batingana Regional Trial Court, Brach 6, Mati, Davao Oriental for extension of time to
decide Criminal Cases Nos. 2063 and 1756, A.M. No. 05-8-463–RTC, February 17, 2010.
Judges; gross inefficiency. With respect to cases reported by the OCA which remain undecided
even beyond the reglementary period, it appears that in most of these cases, thirty (30) days had
elapsed from the date of submission of the case for decision. Respondent insists that the
reckoning period should be ninety (90) days as provided under the Constitution. However, the
cases enumerated by the OCA appear to fall under the Rules on Summary Procedure, where the
required period to decide the same is thirty (30) days. Otherwise, the OCA would not have
reported that the decisions in these cases are already overdue.
In her desperate attempt to vindicate herself with respect to supposed decisions of cases which
were found to have gone beyond the ninety (90) day reglementary period, respondent tried to
mislead the Court in her Comment and Supplemental Comment by arguing that since she has
not yet issued an Order declaring the cases as submitted for decision, the same are not yet ready
for judicial determination such that the ninety (90) day reglementary period in deciding the said
cases does not yet run. She also contended that in determining the period for the decision in the
subject cases to become due, the OCA “failed to show whether other pleadings have yet to be
filed by the parties after the cases were deemed submitted for decision.”
Respondent’s arguments have again exposed her gross ignorance of the law and mires her even
more into a deeper hole from which there was neither reprieve nor escape. Respondent should
be aware of the basic rule that once a case is submitted for decision, no further pleadings are
required to be filed. Moreover, there is no need to issue an order declaring a case to be
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submitted for decision in order that the ninety (90) day period in deciding the same shall begin
to run.
Failure to promptly decide cases in accordance with the Constitution or the Rules of Court
constitutes gross inefficiency. Judge Dolores L. Español, etc. vs. Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas,
etc., A.M. No. MTJ-03-1462, February 11, 2010.
Judges; undue delay in rendering decision. Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution
provides that all lower courts must decide or resolve all cases or matters filed within three
months. Moreover, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge shall dispose of
the court’s business promptly and decide the cases within the required periods.
The Court granted Judge Batingana an extension of 90 days, or until February 11, 2008, to
decide Criminal Case No. 4645-05. However, he decided the case only on July 8, 2009, or after
one year and almost five months from the extension granted.
As oft stated, justice delayed is justice denied. The honor and integrity of the judiciary is
measured not only by the fairness and correctness of decisions rendered, but also by the
efficiency with which the disputes are resolved. Judges are therefore mandated to perform their
duties with utmost diligence in order to preserve the confidence of the public in the judiciary.
Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is
classified as a less serious charge punishable with suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. Request of Judge Niño A. Batingana Regional Trial
Court, Branch 6, Mati, Davao Oriental, for extension of time to decide Criminal Case No. 4745-
05, A.M. No. 08-2-107-RTC, February 1, 2010.
Lawyers; disbarment case; unavailability of procedural defenses. Laws dealing with double
jeopardy or with procedure – such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or
in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant –
do not apply in the determination of a lawyer’s qualifications and fitness for membership in the
Bar. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is
a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications
are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second,
lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases,
is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through the Court. In this sense, the
complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the
charge is wholly his or her own; effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who
brought the matter to the attention of the Court. Maelotisea S. Garrido vs. Atty. Angel
E. Garrido and Romana P. Valencia, A.C. No. 6593, February 4, 2010.
Lawyers; disbarment; gross immorality. Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant,
or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable
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members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of
decency. We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct
requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession,
specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyer’s oath, and of the ethical rules of
the profession. He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of
his admission to the Bar. As a lawyer, he violated his lawyer’s oath, Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, all of which
commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the
crime of bigamy, as he entered this second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia
was subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage
to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which commands that he “shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct”; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that “[a] lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession”; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that, “[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.”
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality. To have
good moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not
enough that he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a
person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is known.
The requirement of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the
public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to
protect errant lawyers from themselves. Each purpose is as important as the
other. Maelotisea S. Garrido vs. Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Romana P. Valencia, A.C. No. 6593,
February 4, 2010
Lawyer’s fees. A client has an undoubted right to settle a suit without the intervention of his
lawyer, for he is generally conceded to have the exclusive control over the subject-matter of the
litigation and may, at any time before judgment, if acting in good faith, compromise, settle, and
adjust his cause of action out of court without his attorney’s intervention, knowledge, or consent,
even though he has agreed with his attorney not to do so. Hence, a claim for attorney’s fees
does not void the compromise agreement and is no obstacle to a court approval.
However, counsel is not without remedy. As the validity of a compromise agreement cannot be
prejudiced, so should not be the payment of a lawyer’s adequate and reasonable compensation
for his services should the suit end by reason of the settlement. The terms of the compromise
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subscribed to by the client should not be such that will amount to an entire deprivation of his
lawyer’s fees, especially when the contract is on a contingent fee basis. In this sense, the
compromise settlement cannot bind the lawyer as a third party. A lawyer is as much entitled to
judicial protection against injustice or imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the client is
against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not only to ensure that a
lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see to it that a lawyer is paid his just fees.
Even if the compensation of a counsel is dependent only upon winning a case he himself
secured for his client, the subsequent withdrawal of the case on the client’s own volition should
never completely deprive counsel of any legitimate compensation for his professional
services. In all cases, a client is bound to pay his lawyer for his services. The determination of
bad faith only becomes significant and relevant if the adverse party will likewise be held liable
in shouldering the attorney’s fees. Atty. Mangontawar M. Gubat vs. National Power
Corporation, G.R. No. 167415. February 26, 2010.
Lawyers; negligence. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
for the rule on negligence and states:
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
The Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to
perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation. The circumstance that
the client was also at fault does not exonerate a lawyer from liability for his negligence in
handling a case.
All court rulings drive home the fiduciary nature of a lawyer’s duty to his client once an
engagement for legal services is accepted. A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the
responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence. The lawyer bears the duty
to serve his client with competence and diligence, and to exert his best efforts to protect, within
the bounds of the law, the interest of his or her client. Accordingly, competence, not only in the
knowledge of law, but also in the management of the cases by giving these cases appropriate
attention and due preparation, is expected from a lawyer.
In addition to the above finding of negligence, the Court also finds Atty. Macalalad guilty of
violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to
account for all the money received from the client. In this case, Atty. Macalalad did not
immediately account for and promptly return the money he received from Atty. Solidon even
after he failed to render any legal service within the contracted time of the engagement. Atty.
Elmer C. Solidon vs. Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad,A.C. No. 8158, February 24, 2010.
March 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Court personnel; administrative proceedings; desistance. Complainant Plaza manifested before

the Court his intention to desist from pursuing the case. However, we remind complainant that
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the discretion whether to continue with the proceedings rests exclusively with the Court,
notwithstanding the complainant’s intention to desist. This Court looks with disfavor at
affidavits of desistance filed by complainants, especially if done as an afterthought. Contrary to
what the parties might have believed, withdrawal of the complaint does not have the legal effect
of exonerating respondent from any administrative disciplinary sanction. It does not operate to
divest this Court of jurisdiction to determine the truth behind the matter stated in the
complaint. The Court’s disciplinary authority cannot be dependent on or frustrated by private
arrangements between parties. An administrative complaint against an official or employee of
the judiciary cannot simply be withdrawn by a complainant who suddenly claims a change of
mind. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court
personnel, would be undermined. Ryan S. Plaza, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court, Argao,
Cebu vs. Atty. Marcelina R. Amamio, Clerk of Court, Genoveva R. Vasquez, Legal Researcher
and Floramay Patalinhug, Court Stenographer, all of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Argao,
Cebu, A.M. No. P-08-2559, March 19, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Complainant stated that respondent Atty. Cariño may not have
disclosed to the Supreme Court, in the course of her application as Clerk of Court, her pending
administrative and criminal cases before the Ombudsman. Respondent Atty. Cariño vehemently
denied the allegations against her. She claimed that she was just being truthful when she
answered “No” to item number 37(a) of her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) which states: “Have you
ever been formally charged?” She admitted that she was aware of the two (2) complaints filed
against her and her former Regional Election Director before the Ombudsman. She, however,
pointed out that these cases are still in the preliminary investigation and pre-charge stages, since
probable cause has yet to be determined by the investigating officers and as such, should not be
considered as formal charges yet.
If we but look at the attachments to the complaint itself, it is evident that at the time respondent
Atty. Cariño was applying for the position of Clerk of Court, she had not yet been “formally
charged” administratively or criminally. Clearly, there were no final dispositions of the cases
yet. In fact, the complainant even stated in his Complaint that those cases were not yet resolved
by the Ombudsman. Thus, it is only after the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause
and filing of the information in court that she can be considered formally charged. In fact, the
reckoning point is the filing of the information with the written authority or approval of the
Ombudsman. To rule otherwise would subject herein respondent, or any civil servant for that
matter, to extreme hardships considering that a government official or employee formally
charged is deprived of some rights/privileges, i.e., obtaining loans from the Government Service
Insurance System or other government-lending institutions, delay in the release of retirement
benefits, disqualification from being nominated or appointed to any judicial post and, in some
instances, prohibition to travel. Crisostomo M. Plopinio vs. Atty. Liza Zabala-Cariño, etc., A.M.
No. P-08-2458, March 22, 2010.
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Court personnel; dishonesty. Clerks of court, in particular, are the chief administrative officers of
their respective courts. They must show competence, honesty and probity, having been charged
with safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings. Furthermore, they are judicial
officers entrusted with the role of performing delicate functions with regard to the collection of
legal fees, and are expected to correctly and effectively implement regulations. Hence, as
custodians of court funds and revenues, they have always been reminded of their duty to
immediately deposit the various funds received by them to the authorized government
depositories for they are not supposed to keep funds in their custody.
The clerk of court is primarily accountable for all funds that are collected for the court, whether
personally received by him or by a duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision and
control. As the custodian of court funds, revenues, records, properties and premises, he is liable
for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of said funds and properties. A clerk of court
found short of money accountabilities may be dismissed from the service.
In this case, the financial audit conducted in the MTC of Bongabon, Nueva Ecija showed that
respondent incurred cash shortages. While he was able to reduce his accountability by
producing the required documents, he could not account for the balance. This indicated two
things: (1) respondent’s gross negligence and very poor management of the records of collected
fees and (2) his failure to account for the remainder which gave rise to the presumption that he
misappropriated the same for his personal use. He failed to fully account for the funds despite
the ample time he was given to do so. His continued failure to remit court funds and to give a
satisfactory explanation for such failure constitutes grave misconduct, dishonesty and even
malversation. These, as well as his gross negligence, are all grave offenses that merit the
supreme penalty of dismissal even for the first offense. Office of the Court Administrator vs.
Macario C. Villanueva, etc., A.M. No. P-04-1819, March 22, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Section 22(a), (b) and (c) of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws,
classifies Gross Neglect of Duty, Dishonesty, and Grave Misconduct as grave offenses. The
penalty for each of these offenses is dismissal even for the first offense.
The long delay in the remittance of the court’s funds, as well as the unexplained shortages that
remained unaccounted for, raises grave doubts regarding the trustworthiness and integrity of
Atty. Caballero. Her failure to remit the funds in due time constitutes gross dishonesty and gross
misconduct. It diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Dishonesty, being in the
nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even if
committed for the first time. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Jocelyn G. Caballero, Clerk of
Court, Regional Trial Court, Kidapawan, North Cotabato, A.M. No. P-05-2064, March 2, 2010.
Court personnel; duty to deposit authorized government depositories immediately. Time and
again, we have reminded court personnel tasked with collections of court funds, such as Clerks
of Courts and cash clerks, to deposit immediately with authorized government depositories the
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various funds they have collected, because they are not authorized to keep funds in their
custody. In this case, respondents violated Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 50-95, which
commands that all fiduciary collections shall be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court
concerned, upon receipt thereof, with an authorized government depositary bank. Section B (4)
of SC Circular No. 50-95, on the collection and deposit of court fiduciary funds, mandates that
all collections from bail bonds, rental deposits, and other fiduciary funds shall be deposited
within twenty-four (24) hours by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof with the
Land Bank of the Philippines. Along the same vein, SC Circular Nos. 13-92 and 5-93 provide
the guidelines for the proper administration of court funds. SC Circular No. 13-92 commands
that all fiduciary collections “shall be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned,
upon receipt thereof, with an authorized government depositary bank.” Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Atty. Mary Ann Paduganan-Peñaranda, Office of the Clerk of Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental and Ms. Jocelyn Mediante, A.M. No.
P-07-2355, March 19, 2010.
Court personnel; duty to deposit funds; belated compliance cannot erase liability. Atty.
Caballero’s belated turnover of cash deposited with her is inexcusable and will not exonerate
her from liability. Clerks of Court are presumed to know their duty to immediately deposit with
the authorized government depositories the various funds they receive, for they are not
supposed to keep funds in their personal possession. Even undue delay in the remittances of
the amounts that they collect at the very least constitutes misfeasance. Although Atty. Caballero
subsequently deposited her other cash accountabilities with respect to the Fiduciary Fund, she
was nevertheless liable for failing to immediately deposit the said collections into the court’s
funds. Her belated remittance will not free her from punishment. Even restitution of the whole
amount cannot erase her administrative liability. More so, in the instant case, she failed to fully
comply with all the Court’s directives. Clearly, her failure to deposit the said amount upon
collection was prejudicial to the court, which did not earn interest income on the said amount
or was not able to otherwise use the said funds. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Jocelyn G.
Caballero, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Kidapawan, North Cotabato, A.M. No. P-05-
2064, March 2, 2010.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. Noel and Amelia are liable for violation of Sec. 1, Canon I
of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, which pertinently provides that court personnel
shall not use their official position to secure unwarranted benefits, privileges, or exemption for
themselves or for others. By misrepresenting they could help influence either the outcome of a
case or set a case for agenda by the Court En Banc for which they demanded and received
payment, Noel and Amelia committed grave misconduct. It shows the corruption of Noel and
Amelia, who used their station or character as Court employees in misrepresenting they could
set a case for agenda by the Court En Banc and procuring financial benefits for that vicious
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act. Re: Complaints of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia Serafico, A.M.
No. 2008-20-SC, March 15, 2010.
Court personnel; gross neglect of duty. Shortages in the amounts to be remitted and the years of
delay in the actual remittances constitute neglect of duty, for which Atty. Caballero should be
administratively liable –more so, since she failed to give a satisfactory explanation for said
shortages.
Clerks of court perform a delicate function as designated custodians of the court’s funds,
revenues, records, properties, and premises. As such, they are generally regarded as treasurers,
accountants, guards, and physical plant managers thereof. It is the clerks of court’s duty to
faithfully perform their duties and responsibilities as such, to the end that there is full
compliance with their function: that of being the custodians of the court’s funds and revenues,
records, properties, and premises. They are the chief administrative officers of their respective
courts. It is also their duty to ensure that the proper procedures are followed in the collection of
cash bonds. Clerks of court are officers of the law who perform vital functions in the prompt
and sound administration of justice. Their office is the hub of adjudicative and administrative
orders, processes and concerns. They are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction, or
impairment of such funds and property.
It is the duty of the clerks of court to perform their responsibilities faithfully, so that they can
fully comply with the circulars on deposits of collections. They are reminded to deposit
immediately, with authorized government depositaries, the various funds they have collected,
because they are not authorized to keep those funds in their custody. The unwarranted failure to
fulfill these responsibilities deserves administrative sanction, and not even the full payment of
the collection shortages will exempt the accountable officer from liability.
These circulars are mandatory in nature and designed to promote full accountability for
government funds; no protestation of good faith can override such mandatory nature. By failing
to properly remit the cash collections constituting public funds, Atty. Caballero violated the trust
reposed in her as disbursement officer of the judiciary. Her failure to explain the fund shortage
satisfactorily and to restitute the shortage and fully comply with the Court’s directives leave us
no choice but to hold her liable for gross neglect of duty and gross dishonesty. Hence, for the
delay in the remittance of cash collections in violation of Supreme Court Circulars No. 5-93 and
No. 13-92, and for her failure to keep proper records of all collections and remittances, Atty.
Caballero is found guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty punishable, even for the first offense, by
dismissal. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Jocelyn G. Caballero, clerk of Court, Regional
Trial Court, Kidapawan, North Cotabato, A.M. No. P-05-2064, March 2, 2010.
Court personnel; guilty of two or more charges; Lesser offense an aggravating

circumstance. Grave misconduct is punishable with dismissal from the service for the first
offense under Sec. 52 (A)(3) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service. Moreover, under Sec. 55 of said Rules, if the respondent is guilty of two (2) or more
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charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be the penalty for the most serious charge,
and the rest considered as aggravating. It is also worthy to note that the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel provides that “all provisions of law, Civil Service rules, and issuances of the
Supreme Court or regulating the conduct of public officers and employees applicable to the
Judiciary are deemed incorporated into this Code.” Conformably, in the instant case, the
penalty for grave misconduct, which is the more serious charge, must be applied, and the
charge of disgraceful and immoral conduct considered as merely an aggravating
circumstance. Re: Complaints of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia
Serafico, A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, March 15, 2010.
Court personnel; immorality. The investigation established that both Noel and Amelia had
subsisting marriages when they got married. It is, thus, apparent that both had legal
impediments to marrying when they married each other.
While the trial court is the proper forum to rule their subsequent marriage as bigamous, from a
criminal point of view, Noel and Amelia are nonetheless liable for immorality by the mere fact
of living together and contracting a subsequent marriage before their respective first marriages
were judicially dissolved. In effect, Noel, who was still married to Rosemarie Jimeno, and
Amelia, who was still married to Marc Michael A. Nacianceno, not only contracted an
apparently bigamous marriage, but also cohabited as man and wife in violation of their prior
marital status and obligations solemnly assumed before God and man. Indeed, we find that
Noel and Amelia made a mockery of marriage, which is a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity. Their act of contracting a second marriage while their respective first marriages
were still in place is contrary to honesty, justice, decency, and morality.
For marrying each other despite their subsisting prior marriages, Noel and Amelia acted
reprehensibly and are guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct. They are, thus, liable to
suspension for at least six months under Section 52(A)(15) of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Re: Complaints of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against
Spouses Noel and Amelia Serafico, A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, March 15, 2010.
Court personnel; misconduct. The contention of the Clerk of Court that there was no danger to
the building and the records since the raffle draw was merely held at the ground floor lobby and
that those who attended the raffle draw were decent people, majority of whom are women, is
untenable. Time and again, the Court has always stressed in pertinent issuances and decisions
that courts are temples of justice, the honor and dignity of which must be upheld and that their
use shall not expose judicial records to danger of loss or damage. So strict is the Court about
this that it has declared that the prohibition against the use of Halls of Justice for purposes other
than that for which they have been built extends to their immediate vicinity including their
grounds. If the building housing the Argao Hall of Justice is such an important historical
landmark, all the more reason why activities, such as Sara Lee raffle draw, should not be held
within. At most, the said Hall of Justice could have been made part of a regular local tour, to be
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viewed at designated hours, which viewing shall be confined to certain areas not intrusive to
court operations and records. Ryan S. Plaza, Clerk of Court Municipal Trial Court, Argao, Cebu
vs. Atty. Marcelina R. Amamio, Clerk of Court, Genoveva R. Vasquez, Legal Researcher and
Floramay Patalinhug, Court Stenographer, all of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Argao,
Cebu, A.M. No. P-08-2559, March 19, 2010.
Court personnel; neglect of duty. It is the duty of clerks of court to perform their responsibilities
faithfully, so that they can fully comply with the circulars on deposits of collections. Delay in
the remittances of collections constitutes neglect of duty. The failure to remit judiciary
collections on time deprives the court of the interest that may be earned if the amounts are
deposited in a bank. Under the Civil Service Rules and the Omnibus Rules implementing it,
simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense penalized with suspension for one month and one
day to six months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Atty. Mary Ann Paduganan-Peñaranda, Office of the Clerk of Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental and Ms. Jocelyn Mediante, A.M. No.
P-07-2355, March 19, 2010.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. Bengson’s act of dealing with Hernando, more particularly
of offering her services to facilitate the titling of Hernando’s property, whether directly or
through another, certainly fell short of the above yardstick or standard for court employees and
personnel. She definitely had no business indulging, even indirectly, in the processing or the
titling of the property.
Now, in Dela Cruz v. Zapico, this Court reiterated that misconduct generally means wrongful,
unlawful conduct, motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. Thus, any
transgression or deviation from the established norm, whether it be work-related or not, amounts
to misconduct. Undeniably, Bengson’s solicitation and misrepresentation amounted to Simple
Misconduct. Priscilla L. Hernando vs. Juliana Y Bengson, etc., A.M. No. P-09-2686, March 10,
2010.
Judges; gross inefficiency. Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates lower
courts to decide or resolve cases or matters for decision or final resolution within three (3)
months from date of submission. Failure to decide cases within the 90-day reglementary period
may warrant imposition of administrative sanctions on the erring judge.
Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business
promptly and to decide cases within the required period. Thus, all cases or matters must be
decided or resolved by all lower courts within a period of three (3) months from submission.
Furthermore, the Court, in Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999, requires all
judges to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases,
because failure to comply therewith violates the constitutional right of the parties to speedy
disposition of their cases.
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Likewise, Administrative Circular No. 28, dated July 3, 1989, expressly provides that:
(3) x x x Lack of transcript of stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to interrupt or
suspend the period for deciding the case x x x.
Under Section 9(1), Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision
constitutes a less serious charge punishable under Section 11(b) of the same Rule by either
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month but not
more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) but not
exceeding Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
Because Judge Emuslan could not proffer any valid excuse, his failure to decide the 43 cases
translates to gross inefficiency in the performance of his duties. He should be held
administratively liable. Re: Cases Submitted for decision before Hon. Meliton G. Emuslan,
former Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, A.M. No. RTJ-10-
2226, March 22, 2010.
Judges; gross misconduct. This is a case about the improper conduct of an MTC judge who kept
properties owned by the complainant while conducting a preliminary investigation. During the
ocular inspection, Judge Ocampo allegedly took pieces of antique, including a marble bust of
Spelmans’ mother, a flower pot, a statue, and a copper scale of justice. A week later, Judge
Ocampo went back and further took six Oakwood chairs and its table, four gold champagne
glasses, and a deer horn chandelier. Judge Ocampo denied the charge, pointing out that
Spelmans’ wife, Villan (the complainant in that theft case), gave him certain household items for
safekeeping before she filed the case of theft against Rencio.
Respondent judge should be made accountable for gross misconduct constituting violations of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Section 6 of Canon 1, Section 1 of Canon 2, and
Section 1 of Canon 4. From the circumstances, his acts were motivated by malice. He was not a
warehouseman for personal properties of litigants in his court. He certainly would have kept
Spelmans’ properties had the latter not filed a complaint against him. He was guilty of
covetousness. It affected the performance of his duties as an officer of the court and tainted the
judiciary’s integrity. He should be punished accordingly. Roland Ernest Marie Jose Spelmans vs.
Judge Gaydifredo T. Ocampo, Municipal Trial Court, Polomolok, South Cotabato, A.M. No.
MTJ-07-1663, March 26, 2010.
Judges; simple misconduct. There was no showing from Judge Barillo that he exerted any effort
at all to ascertain the correct rule or procedure regarding the lifting of suspension of lawyers, or
to determine if the suspension of Atty. Paras had indeed already been lifted before the said
counsel was allowed to resume his practice of law. Significantly, upon verification by the Court
of the status of the suspension of Atty. Paras, it appeared that, based on the records of the Office
of the Bar Confidant, the suspension imposed on Atty. Paras in A.C. No. 3066 was yet to be
lifted. In our opinion, Judge Barillo was negligent in failing to confirm such fact.
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Still, the Court is not convinced that Judge Barillo should be held liable for gross misconduct
and gross ignorance of the law absent any evidence showing outright bad faith. It may truly be
said that the various faux pas committed by Judge Barillo are examples of poor judgment and
negligence. However, equally important to note is the fact that there is no allegation, much less
a genuine showing, that Judge Barillo was impelled by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some
other corrupt motive in committing the acts for which he was charged. Neither were allegations
of corruption nor imputations of pecuniary benefit ever asserted against him.
Thus, contrary to the findings of the OCA, the transgressions committed by Judge Barillo in this
case are not flagrant enough or motivated by any ill motive so as to be classified as grave
misconduct or to warrant a finding of gross ignorance of the law. Nevertheless, the Court rules
that Judge Barillo is guilty of simple misconduct in view of the commission of acts which
subjected the MTC to distrust and accusations of partiality. Hon. Hector B. Barillo, Acting
Presiding Judge, MTC, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental vs. Hon. Ralph Lantion, et al./Walter J.
Aragones vs. Hon. Hector B. Barillo, Acting Presiding Judge, MTC, Guihulngan, Negros, G.R. No.
159117/A.M. No. MTJ-10-1752, March 10, 2010.
Lawyer’s liability for filing complaint with Ombudsman. In our view, the complainants’ errors
do not belong to the genre of plain and simple errors that lawyers commit in the practice of their
profession. Their plain disregard, misuse and misrepresentation of constitutional provisions
constitute serious misconduct that reflects on their fitness for continued membership in the
Philippine Bar. At the very least, their transgressions are blatant violations of Rule 10.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: “Rule 10.02. A lawyer shall not
knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of
opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision
already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not
been proved.”
To emphasize the importance of requiring lawyers to act candidly and in good faith, an identical
provision is found in Cannon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Moreover, lawyers are
sworn to “do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court…” before they are even
admitted to the Bar. All these the complainants appear to have seriously violated.
In the interest of due process and fair play, the complainants Lozano should be heard, in
relation to their criminal complaint before the Ombudsman against retired Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. and retired Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, on why they should not
be penalized as members of the Bar and as officers of this Court, for their open disregard of the
plain terms of the Constitution and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, and their misuse and
misrepresentation of constitutional provisions in their criminal complaint before the Office of
the Ombudsman. Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum dated January 11, 2010 of Acting Director Aleu
A. Amante, PIAB-C Office of the Ombudsman, A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC, March 2, 2010.
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Lawyers; deceitful conduct. The overt act in arranging the meeting between Judge Dizon and
complainants-litigants in the Coffee Shop of the East Royal Hotel made it clear that Respondent
consented to Judge Dizon’s desire to ask money from the complainants-litigants for a favorable
decision of their case which was pending before the sala of Judge Dizon. The admission proved
that the respondent had known all along of the illegal transaction between the judge and the
complainants, and belied his feigned lack of knowledge of the delivery of the money to the
judge.
The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins an attorney from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, or deceitful conduct. Corollary to this injunction is the rule that an attorney shall at
all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar. The respondent did not measure up to the exacting standards of the Law
Profession, which demanded of him as an attorney the absolute abdication of any personal
advantage that conflicted in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interest of his clients. For
monetary gain, he disregarded the vow to “delay no man for money or malice” and to “conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity
as well to the courts as to my clients” that he made when he took the Lawyer’s Oath. He also
disobeyed the explicit command to him as an attorney “to accept no compensation in
connection with his client’s business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.” He
conveniently ignored that the relation between him and his clients was highly fiduciary in
nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character.
Verily, the respondent was guilty of gross misconduct, which is “improper or wrong conduct,
the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of
duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment.” Any
gross misconduct of an attorney in his professional or private capacity shows him unfit to
manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or
disbarment, because good moral character is an essential qualification for the admission of an
attorney and for the continuance of such privilege. Spouses Manuel C. Rafols, Jr., et al. vs. Atty.
Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., A.C. No. 4973, March 15, 2010.
Lawyers; lifting order of suspension; guidelines. The following guidelines are to be observed in
the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law: (1) After a
finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall
render a decision imposing the penalty; (2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is
immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a
motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and
executory; (3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn
Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she
has desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his
or her suspension; (4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of
the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by
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him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel; (5) The Sworn Statement shall be
considered as proof of respondent’s compliance with the order of suspension; and (6) Any
finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground for
the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted. Ligaya
Maniago vs. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010.
Lawyers; misconduct. The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking over the Board
of Directors and the GEMASCO facilities, respondent violated the provisions of the Cooperative
Code of the Philippines and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He also violated the Lawyer’s Oath,
which provides that a lawyer shall support the Constitution and obey the laws.
When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against complainant, he
violated the Lawyer’s Oath that a lawyer shall “not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same.” When, after obtaining
an extension of time to file comment on the complaint, respondent failed to file any and ignored
this Court’s subsequent show cause order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which states that “A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.”
The Court notes that respondent had previously been suspended from the practice of law for six
months for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he having been found to have
received an acceptance fee and misled the client into believing that he had filed a case for her
when he had not. It appears, however, that respondent has not reformed his ways. A more
severe penalty this time is thus called for. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa Vs. Atty. Oscar
Paguinto, A.C. No. 6273, March 15, 2010.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple

misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
established rule must be manifest. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the
act of an official or employee who unlawfully or wrongfully uses his station or character to
procure some benefit for himself or for another, contrary to the rights of others.
Medrano knowingly and corruptly submitted spurious or irregular bail bonds for the approval of
the judge. He categorically admitted his offense, giving the simple explanation of having
thereby accommodated ill-intentioned people. His anomalies for a consideration appeared to
be not isolated, but repeated many times. He thereby converted his employment in the court
into an income-generating activity. His grave misconduct was, therefore, a grave offense that
deserved the penalty of dismissal for the first offense pursuant to Sec. 52-A of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Hon.
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Marilou Runes-Tamang, Presiding Judge, MeTC Pateros, Manila and Presiding Judge, MeTC San
Juan, Metro Manila, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1558, April 7, 2010.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. No less than the Constitution mandates that “public office is
a public trust.” Service with loyalty, integrity and efficiency is required of all public officers and
employees, who must, at all times, be accountable to the people.
The outright admission of Clerk IV Aranzazu Baltazar to committing malversation of funds
shows her blatant disregard for these principles she had sworn to uphold, thereby eroding public
trust. When asked to explain, Ms. Baltazar readily confessed her shortage and willingly
executed an affidavit, dated April 5, 2004, wherein she admitted that she had committed grave
negligence and malversation of funds when she allowed other court employees to borrow from
the court funds in her custody, causing the shortage as discovered by the audit team.
Ms. Baltazar was grossly inefficient in handling the finances of the court. Her bare admission
that she had indeed allowed other employees to borrow from the court funds shows her
extensive participation in the irregularities reported by the audit team. There is no doubt that
these acts constitute a grave offense. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Atty. Fermin M. Ofilas,
et al., A.M. No. P-05-1935, April 23, 2010.
Court personnel; gross dishonesty. Contrary to the P400,000.00 assessment made by respondent,
the complainant should have been assessed legal fees only amounting to P75,525.00, based on
SC Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, which was issued by the Court to serve as
reference for Clerks of Court in the assessment of the legal fees to avoid any
confusion. Respondent also violated SC Circular No. 26-97 dated May 5, 1997 for failing to
issue the original receipts and merely furnishing complainant with photocopies of receipts.
Respondent’s case is not simply non-abidance with court circulars and directives. Complainant
in good faith trusted respondent’s word when the latter made an assessment of the fees he must
pay. Unfortunately, respondent abused this trust and confidence reposed on her and used her
position to extract exorbitant amounts from complainant under the guise of legal fees for her
personal gain. A very obvious indication of respondent’s dishonest motive is the huge
difference in the amounts, P324,475.00 to be exact, which eliminates any possibility that
respondent may have only made the wrong assessment in good faith. Worse, respondent is
nowhere to be found and thus the amounts collected are still unaccounted for.
Under the circumstances, respondent is clearly guilty of gross dishonesty and grave misconduct
which the Court cannot countenance. The Court will not tolerate any conduct, act or omission
by any court employee violating the norm of public accountability and diminishing or tending
to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Jonathan A. Rebong vs. Elizabeth R. Tengco,
et al., A.M. No. P-07-2338, April 7, 2010.
Court personnel; gross neglect of duty. The 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court requires
that all applications for bail and judicial bonds shall be coursed, before their approval by the
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Judge concerned, through the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized personnel, who shall see to
it that the bonds are in order. As the Branch Clerk of Court of the MeTC in San Juan, Sorio was
the administrative officer of the branch, who had the control and supervision of all court records,
properties and supplies. With her responsibilities as such, Sorio should have ensured that all bail
bonds and their supporting documents were in order before endorsing them to Judge Tamang for
approval. Sorio should have rejected the bail bonds of Covenant due to the latter’s blacklisting
and its lack of clearance from the Supreme Court to issue such bail bonds. She cannot now
simply feign ignorance and escape liability upon the implausible pretext that some bail bonds
did not pass through her.
Likewise, Sorio did not explain the non-transmittal of some approved bail bonds and their
supporting documents to the courts, before which the criminal cases of the accused concerned
had been filed and pending. Based on the record, Judge Tamang had given instructions to Sorio
and Medrano to immediately release the bail bonds upon her approval of them. However,
during the hearing before the Investigating Judge, Sorio admitted her failure to see to their
immediate release, although such was her primary responsibility as the Branch Clerk of Court. It
must be remembered that her obligation does not end with the initial verification and signing of
the documents, but extends until the bail bonds and their supporting documents are transmitted
to the courts concerned for appropriate action.
Thus, Sorio was remiss in the performance of her duties. She fell short of the task of effective
supervision of the court staff. The recommendation of the OCA that Sorio be administratively
sanctioned for gross negligence of duty was, therefore, proper. Re: Anonymous Letter-
Complaint against Hon. Marilou Runes-Tamang, Presiding Judge, MeTC Pateros, Manila and
Presiding Judge, MeTC San Juan, Metro Manila, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1558, April 7, 2010.
Court personnel; incompetence. It is clear that Velasco failed to exercise due diligence in the
performance of his duties. The writ of demolition covered only Lot Nos. 80-A and 81-A. He
was informed beforehand that complainant’s house was constructed on Lot No. 81-B. He relied
on the representative of the plaintiff in Spl. Civil Case No. 645 who told him that complainant’s
house should be included in the demolition instead of conducting a relocation survey on the
areas involved in the case.
We reiterate that sheriffs, as public officers, are repositories of public trust and are under
obligation to perform the duties of their office honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their
abilities. Sheriffs are bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in the performance of their
official duties, particularly where the rights of individuals might be jeopardized by their
neglect. In this case, Velasco failed to act with caution in the implementation of the writ of
demolition, which resulted to damage to complainant. Dalamacio Z. Tomboc, et al. vs. Sheriff
Liborio M. Velasco, Jr., et al., A.M. No. P-07-2322, April 23, 2010.
Court personnel; misconduct. As a clerk of court, Sorio is specifically mandated to safeguard

the integrity of the court and its proceedings, and to maintain the authenticity and correctness of
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court records. For the substantial alterations made on exhibits 12, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31;
and for the loss of the 17 February 1999 TSN in the records of Criminal Case No. 44739, which
significantly affected the very integrity and authenticity of the court records, Sorio does not
deserve to remain clerk of court one day longer. We have no choice but to dismiss her from the
service. Her failure to obey this mandate constituted grave misconduct and conduct highly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service based on our ruling in Almario v. Resus [318 SCRA
742 (1999)]. Had Sorio performed her duty to properly supervise the transmittal of all the
records of Criminal Case No. 44739 – including the pagination, marking, and indexing of the
exhibits – the alterations in the exhibits and the loss of the 17 February 1999 TSN in the records
of Criminal Case No. 44739 would not have taken place. Rufina Chua vs. Eleanor A. Sorio, et
al., A.M. No. P-07-2409, April 7, 2010.
Court personnel; usurpation of authority. A review of the records shows that no evidence was
presented during the investigation to prove that the acts of respondents amounted to usurpation
of authority. It is apparent that the issuance of the Writ of Execution was within the scope of
duties of Jamora as Branch Clerk of Court. It was also proven that the Writ of Execution was
indeed issued on June 29, 2005. Significantly, Reyes failed to show proof that there was no writ
of execution yet at the time he filed his petition for relief from judgment.
As to the liability of Alejo in the alleged hasty implementation of the writ of execution, we find
the same to be unmeritorious. When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it becomes his
ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to implement it in
accordance with its mandate. This duty, in the proper execution of a valid writ, is not just
directory, but mandatory. He has no discretion whether to execute the writ or not. He is
mandated to uphold the majesty of the law as embodied in the decision. In the instant case,
respondent Sheriff was merely performing his ministerial duty when he implemented the writ of
execution issued by the court. Alejo, however, should be reminded that it is required of him to
pay the required fees before the implementation of the writ of execution. Atty. Alberto III
Borbon Reyes vs. Clerk of Court V Richard C. Jamora, et al., A.M. No. P-06-2224, April 30, 2010.
Judges; gross ignorance of the law. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance
of the law for issuing a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in favor of petitioner Albert Chang
Tan in SP Case No. M-6373, since a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife
under R.A. No. 9262, the Anti–Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
Indeed, as a family court judge, Judge Arcaya-Chua is expected to know the correct
implementation of R.A. No. 9262. Francisco P. Ocampo vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua/Office
of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua/Office of the Court Administrator vs.
Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua, et al./Sylvia Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua,A.M. OCA IPI
No. 07-2630-RTJ/A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049/A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141/A.M. No. RTJ-2093, April 23,
2010.
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Judges; gross ignorance of the law. When the law or procedure is so elementary, such as the
provisions of the Rules of Court, not to know, or to act as if one does not know the same,
constitutes gross ignorance of the law, even without the complainant having to prove malice or
bad faith.
Section 7 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is plain and simple: it limits the imposable penalty for
contempt committed against a lower court to a fine not exceeding P5,000 or imprisonment of
one month, or both. In this case, respondent Judge issued an Order finding complainants guilty
of contempt committed against the Municipal Trial Court and sentencing them to suffer
imprisonment of four months to be served in the Municipal Jail of Himamaylan, and issued on
even date warrants for their arrest. Respondent is thus liable for gross ignorance of the
law. Maria Panco, et al. vs. Judge Y Aguirre, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-09-2196, April 7, 2010.
Judges; gross ignorance of the law. While a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of
the law for every erroneous order that he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal
principle involved is sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law. Indeed, even though a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for
every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be
negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. It does not mean
that a judge need not observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his
official functions. This is because if judges wantonly misuse the powers vested on them by the
law, there will not only be confusion in the administration of justice but also oppressive
disregard of the basic requirements of due process.
The rule is very explicit as to when admission to bail is discretionary on the part of the
respondent Judge. In offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death, the accused has no
right to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong. Thus, as the accused in Criminal Case No.
3620-01 had been sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the bail should have been cancelled,
instead of increasing it as respondent Judge did.
Clearly, in the instant case, the act of Mangotara in increasing the bail bond of the accused
instead of canceling it is not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on the part
of respondent Judge, but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so gross and
patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross
ignorance of the law. It is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and
changes therein, as well as with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court. One cannot seek
refuge in a mere cursory acquaintance with the statute and procedural rules. Ignorance of the
law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one – not even judges. Hadja Sohurah
Dipatuan vs. Presiding Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190, April 23, 2010.
Judges; simple neglect of duty. Judge Tamang admittedly approved not only the bail bonds
issued by Covenant, a blacklisted bonding company, but also the bail bonds in some instances
for accused persons charged in criminal cases pending outside her territorial jurisdiction. Yet,
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she insisted that she did not thereby transgress the Code of Judicial Conduct, because she had
relied on the representation of her duly authorized personnel that the bail bonds were in order.
Judge Tamang’s excuse of simply relying on the representation of the court personnel who
unfortunately took advantage of her leniency and kindness betrayed a deficiency in that
requisite degree of circumspection demanded of all those who don the judicial robe. She cannot
now thereby exculpate herself, for, in fact, such reliance was actually her admission of being
neglectful and of lacking the diligent care in paying attention to the judicial matters brought to
her for signature. A carelessness of that kind and degree ran contrary to the competence
expected of her as a dispenser of justice and as a visible representation of the law.
She was thereby guilty of a neglect of duty, for, according to Judicial Audit and Physical
Inventory of Confiscated Cash, Surety and Property Bonds at RTC, Tarlac City, Brs. 63, 64 &
65 (A.M. No. 04-7-358-RTC, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 21), the judge is still bound to review the
supporting documents before approving the bail bonds, even if it is the Clerk of Court who has
the duty to ascertain that the bail bonds are in order, and that all requisites for approval have
been complied with. We thus find her guilty of simple neglect of duty, a light charge under
Section 10, Rule 140, Rules of Court, for we are all too aware of the pitfalls that a judge like her
frequently stumbles into when detailed in another station. She became an unwitting victim of
the continuing illegal activities of Medrano, who took advantage of her being too busy with her
judicial and administrative duties and tasks to have noticed and prevented his illegal
activities. Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Hon. Marilou Runes-Tamang, Presiding
Judge, MeTC Pateros, Manila and Presiding Judge, MeTC San Juan, Metro Manila, A.M. No.
MTJ-04-1558, April 7, 2010.
Judges; simple negligence. Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
which pertains to the Discipline of Justices and Judges, does not provide any penalty for simple
negligence. The Court, though, deems simple negligence as falling within the ambit of simple
misconduct.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior, especially by a government official. To constitute an administrative offense,
misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and
duties of a public officer.
In this case, there was ostensible legal basis for Judge Paderanga to dismiss an action for failure
of the plaintiff to attend the mediation conference. However, Judge Paderanga’s Order dated
November 9, 2005, dismissing Civil Case No. 2005-160, was improperly and prematurely
issued. Judge Paderanga failed to take into consideration that Bacalzo, the plaintiff, could not
have attended the mediation conference scheduled on November 4, 2005 because the said date
had been declared a regular holiday under Presidential Proclamation No. 933. The declaration
of November 4, 2005 as a holiday was a development totally outside Bacalzo’s control for
which she should not be sanctioned with the dismissal of the case. Evidently, Judge Paderanga
failed to exercise the necessary diligence before issuing the Order dismissing the case, to the
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prejudice of Bacalzo. This, however, makes Judge Paderanga liable for simple negligence, and
not gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority, as charged by Senarlo. Cecilia
Gadrinab Senarlo vs. Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-06-2025, April 5,
2010.
Judges; violation of Code of Judicial Conduct; penalty. Before this Court is the Motion For
Reconsideration, filed by respondent Judge, of the Decision finding him guilty of violating Rule
2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and ordering him to pay a fine of P5,000.00. In his Motion,
respondent Judge alleged that the penalty of fine of P5,000.00 was too severe, considering that
he is a first-time offender.
While this Court is duty-bound to sternly wield a corrective hand to discipline its errant
employees and to weed out those who are undesirable, this Court also has the discretion to
temper the harshness of its judgment with mercy. Thus, in the interest of fair play and
compassionate justice, considering that this was respondent Judge’s first offense, we resolve to
grant the instant motion for reconsideration. In lieu of fine, Judge Cesar O. Untalan of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati City, is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in his
official and personal deportment, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Alfredo Favor vs. Judge Cesar O. Untalan, et
al, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2158, April 13, 2010.
Lawyers; gross misconduct. A lawyer who obtains possession of the funds and properties of his
client in the course of his professional employment shall deliver the same to his client (a) when
they become due, or (b) upon demand. In the instant case, respondent failed to account for and
return the P300,000.00 despite complainant’s repeated demands.
Atty. Alvero cannot take refuge in his claim that there existed no attorney-client relationship
between him and Barcenas. Even if it were true that no attorney-client relationship existed
between them, case law has it that an attorney may be removed, or otherwise disciplined, not
only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, making him unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
Atty. Alvero’s failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and upon
demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral
soundness, and warranted the imposition of disciplinary action. It gave rise to the presumption
that he converted the money for his own use, and this act constituted a gross violation of
professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. They constitute
gross misconduct and gross unethical behavior for which he may be suspended. Reynaria
Barcenas vs. Atty. Anorlito A. Alvero, A.C. No. 8159, April 23, 2010.
Lawyers; misconduct. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides,
“A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.” Conduct, as
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used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. A lawyer
may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The
test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and
good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
In the present case, respondent acted in his private capacity. He misrepresented that he owned
the lot he sold to complainant. He refused to return the amount paid by complainant. His refusal
to return the money paid for the lot is unbecoming a member of the bar and an officer of the
court. By his conduct, respondent failed to live up to the strict standard of professionalism
required by the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent’s acts violated the trust and
respect complainant reposed in him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. As a
final blow, he denied having any transaction with complainant. It is crystal-clear in the mind of
the Court that he fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We cannot, and we should not, let respondent’s dishonest and deceitful conduct
go unpunished. We consider a penalty of two-year suspension more appropriate considering the
circumstances of this case. Alfredo Roa vs. Atty. Juan Moreno, A.C. No. 8382, April 21, 2010.
Attorney’s fees; quantum meruit. The principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves)
may be a basis for determining the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees. Quantum meruit is a
device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a
person to retain benefit without paying for it. It is applicable even if there was a formal written
contract for attorney’s fees as long as the agreed fee was found by the court to be
unconscionable. In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on
the basis of quantum meruit, factors such as the time spent, and extent of services rendered;
novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; importance of the subject matter; skill
demanded; probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered
case; customary charges for similar services; amount involved in the controversy and the
benefits resulting to the client; certainty of compensation; character of employment; and
professional standing of the lawyer, may be considered [Orocio v. Anguluan, G.R. Nos. 179892-
93, January 30, 2009]. Indubitably entwined with a lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable fee
is the power of the Court to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees if the same is excessive and
unconscionable in relation to Sec. 24, Rule 138 of the Rules. Attorney’s fees are
unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice, decency or unreasonableness.
Verily, the determination of the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees requires the presentation of
evidence and a full-blown trial. It would be only after due hearing and evaluation of the
evidence presented by the parties that the trial court can render judgment as to the propriety of
the amount to be awarded. Hicoblino M. Catly (Deceased), Substituted by his wife, Lourdes A.
Catly vs. William Navarro, et al., G.R. No. 167239, May 5, 2010.
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Judges; gross inefficiency. Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution mandates lower
court judges to decide a case within the reglementary period of 90 days. The Code of Judicial
Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 likewise enunciates that judges should administer justice
without delay and directs every judge to dispose of the court’s business promptly within the
period prescribed by law. Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done
are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of
cases. Thus, the 90-day period is mandatory.
Judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Any delay, no matter how short, in the
disposition of cases undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary. It also
deprives the parties of their right to the speedy disposition of their cases. Failure to decide a
case within the reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency
warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge.
The inefficiency of Judge Andoy is evident in his failure to decide 139 cases within the
mandatory reglementary period for no apparent reason. Some of these cases have been
submitted for resolution as early as 1997. Judge Andoy, upon finding himself unable to comply
with the 90-day period, could have asked the Court for a reasonable period of extension to
dispose of the cases. The Court, mindful of the heavy caseload of judges, generally grants such
requests for extension. Yet, Judge Andoy also failed to make such a request. Re: Cases
submitted for decision before Hon. Teresito A. Andoy, former Judge, Municipal Trial Court,
Cainta, Rizal, A.M. No. 09-9-163-MTC. May 6, 2010.
June 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attoney; grossly immoral act. Respondent’ acts of converting his secretary into a mistress;
contracting two marriages with Shirley and Leny, are grossly immoral which no civilized society
in the world can countenance. The subsequent detention and torture of the complainant is gross
misconduct which only a beast may be able to do. In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are
grossly immoral and acts which constitute gross misconduct, respondent has ceased to possess
the qualifications of a lawyer.Rosario T. Mecaral vs. Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez, A.C. No. 8392,
June 29, 2010.
Attorney; representation within bounds of the law. Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer
shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. For this reason, Rule 15.07 of
the Code requires a lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with the law and principles of
fairness. A lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client. It is his duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice
and refrain from doing an intentional wrong to their adversaries. Rural Bank of Calape, Inc.
(RBCI), Bohol vs. Atty. James Benedict Florido, A.C. No. 5736, June 18, 2010.
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Court personnel; dishonesty and falsification of public document. Dishonesty is defined as
intentionally making a false statement on any material fact in securing one’s examination,
appointment, or registration. Dishonesty is a serious offense which reflects a person’s character
and exposes the moral decay which virtually destroys honor, virtue, and integrity. It is a
malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary, as no other office in the government service
exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness from an employee than a position in the
judiciary. A birth certificate, being a public document, serves as prima facie evidence of filiation.
The making of a false statement therein constitutes dishonesty and falsification of a public
document. Anonymous vs. Emma B. Curamen, A.M. No. 08-2549. June 18, 2010.
Court personnel; gross misconduct. Pagulayan indeed committed the transgression Judge Beltran
charged. What Pagulayan did is the nightmare of every decisionmaker and magistrate who is
usually the last to know that somebody has used his or her name to ask for money – “para kay
Fiscal o para kay Judge” as mulcters reputedly always say. Pagulayan’s misconduct, it must be
stressed, brought dishonor to the administration of justice in particular and, to the public service
in general. Indeed, Pagulayan failed to live up to the standards of honesty and integrity required
in the public service. In the words of the Constitution, public office is a public trust and
Pagulayan betrayed this trust. Under Civil Service rules, gross misconduct is a grave offense and
punishable by dismissal. Judge Orlando D. Beltran vs. Vilma C. Pagulayan, Interpreter III, RTC,
Branch 2, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, A.M. No. P-05-2014, June 29, 2010.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. The acts of Rantael in taunting and uttering invectives at
Caya and causing the latter physical harm by pulling her hair within the court premises, and
during working hours, exhibit discourtesy and disrespect not only to her co-workers but also to
the court. Such behavior of letting personal hatred affect public performance falls short of the
standard laid down in A.M. No. 03-16-13-SC or the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which
took effect on 1 June 2004. Without doubt, Rantael’s actuations failed to live up to the high
standard required of personnel in the judicial service. Thus, she must be held administratively
liable for simple misconduct. Simple misconduct has been defined as an unacceptable behavior
that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public officers. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Cristita L. Caya and Rhodora Atienza-Rantael, A.M. No. 09-2632, June 18,
2010.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. In Collado-Lacorte v. Rabena, Labis, Jr. v. Estañol, Reyes
v. Pablico, and several other cases, the Court found process servers liable for simple neglect of
duty for failure to serve court notices properly. Simple neglect of duty is failure to give proper
attention to a required task. It signifies disregard of duty due to carelessness or
indifference. Marie Dinah S. Tolentino-Fuentes vs. Michael Patrick A. Galindez, A.M. No. 07-
2410, June 18, 2010.
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Court personnel; use of prohibted drugs. As dispensers of justice, all members and employees of
the Judiciary are expected to adhere strictly to the laws of the land, one of which is Republic Act
No. 9165 which prohibits the use of dangerous drugs. Likewise, we can no longer countenance
his manifestations of queer behavior, bordering on absurd, irrational and irresponsible, because
it has greatly affected his job performance and efficiency. By using prohibited drugs, and being a
front-line representative of the Judiciary, De Guzman has exposed to risk the very institution
which he serves. It is only by weeding out the likes of De Guzman from the ranks that we would
be able to preserve the integrity of this institution. Office of the Court Administrator Vs. Florecio
Reyes, Officer-in-charge, and Rene De Guzman, Clerk, Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, A.M. No. P-08-2535, June 23, 2010
Judges; simple misconduct. Judge Carbonell had no authority to render a decision on the subject
civil case. As clearly laid down in Circular No. 19-98, the pairing judge shall take cognizance of
all cases until the assumption to duty of the regular judge. Since Judge Tabora was already
present and performing her functions in court, it was improper for Judge Carbonell to have
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6840 without the approval of the regular presiding judge.
For violating Section 2, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct [on Impartiality], we find
Judge Carbonell guilty of simple misconduct. Simple misconduct has been defined as an
unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public
officers. Judge Mona Lisa T. Tabora, Regional Trial Court, Br. 26 San Fernando City, La union vs.
Judge Antonio Carbonell, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27 San Fernando City, La Union, A.M.
No. 08-2145. June 18, 2010.
Attorney; attorney’s fees. The issue of the reasonable legal fees due to respondent still needs to
be resolved in a trial on the merits with the following integral sub-issues: (1) the reasonableness
of the 10% contingent fee given that the recovery of Tiwi’s share [in unpaid realty taxes] was not
solely attributable to the legal services rendered by respondent, (2) the nature, extent of legal
work, and significance of the cases allegedly handled by respondent which reasonably
contributed, directly or indirectly, to the recovery of Tiwi’s share, and (3) the relative benefit
derived by Tiwi from the services rendered by respondent. The amount of reasonable attorney’s
fees finally determined by the trial court should be without legal interest in line with well-settled
jurisprudence. Municipality of Tiwi, represented by Hon. Mayor Jaime C. Villanueva and
Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi Vs. Antonio B. Betito, G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010.
Attorney; engagement of private counsel by GOCC. In Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol

Steel Corporation, we listed three (3) indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire a private
lawyer: (1) private counsel can only be hired in exceptional cases; (2) the GOCC must first
secure the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government
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Corporate Counsel, as the case may be; and (3) the written concurrence of the COA must also
be secured. Failure to comply with all three conditions would constitute appearance without
authority. A lawyer appearing after his authority as counsel had expired is also appearance
without authority. Rey Vargas, et al. vs. Atty. Michael Ignes, et al., A.C. No. 8096, July 5, 2010.
Attorney; engagement of private counsel by LGU. Pursuant to this provision [Section

444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC], the municipal mayor is required to secure the prior authorization of
the Sangguniang Bayanbefore entering into a contract on behalf of the municipality. In the
instant case, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi unanimously passed Resolution No. 15-92
authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer of her choice to represent the interest of Tiwi in the
execution of this Court’s Decision in National Power Corporation v. Province of Albay. The
above-quoted authority necessarily carried with it the power to negotiate, execute and sign on
behalf of Tiwi the Contract of Legal Services. Municipality of Tiwi, represented by Hon. Mayor
Jaime C. Villanueva and Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi Vs. Antonio B. Betito, G.R. No. 171873, July
9, 2010.
Attorney; gross misconduct. In Lao v. Medel, we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts
and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of law. However, in this case, we deem
it reasonable to affirm the sanction imposed by the IBP-CBD, i.e., Atty. Valerio was ordered
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years, because, aside from issuing worthless
checks and failing to pay her debts, she has also shown wanton disregard of the IBP’s and Court
Orders in the course of the proceedings. A-1 Financial Services, Inc. vs. Atty. Laarni N.
Valerio, A.C. No. 8390, July 2, 2010.
Attorney; violation of attorney-client relationship. We find no merit in petitioners’ assertion that

Atty. Binamira gravely breached and abused the rule on privileged communication under the
Rules of Court and the Code of Professional Responsibility of Lawyers when he represented
[respondent] Helen in the present case. Notably, this issue was never raised before the labor
tribunals and was raised for the first time only on appeal. Moreover, records show that although
petitioners previously employed Atty. Binamira to manage several businesses, there is no
showing that they likewise engaged his professional services as a lawyer. Likewise, at the time
the instant complaint was filed, Atty. Binamira was no longer under the employ of
petitioners. Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corporation and Lambert Lim vs. Helen
Binamira, G.R. No. 170464. July 12, 2010.
Court personnel; immoral conduct. Employees of the judiciary are subject to a higher standard
than most other civil servants. Immorality has been defined to include not only sexual matters
but also “conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity,
and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to
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opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good
order and public welfare.” There is no doubt that engaging in sexual relations with a married
man is not only a violation of the moral standards expected of employees of the judiciary but is
also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage which this Court abhors and is,
thus, punishable. Julie Ann C. Dela Cruz vs. Selima B. Omaga, A.M. No. P-08-2590, July 5,
2010.
Judge; abuse of authority. In issuing the Direct Contempt Order without legal basis, Judge
Francisco is more appropriately guilty of the administrative offense of grave abuse of authority,
rather than gross ignorance of the law and incompetence. Olivia Laurel Vs. Judge Pablo B.
Francisco/Judge Pablo B. Francisco Vs. Olivia Laurel/Judge Pablo B. Francisco Vs. Olivia
Laurel/Judge Pablo B. Francisco Vs. Gerardo P. Hernandez, et al./Judge Pablo B. Francisco Vs.
Nicanor B. Alfonso, et al./Judge Pablo B. Francisco Vs. Caridad D. Cuevillas/Judge Pablo B.
Francisco Vs. Hermina S. Javier, et al./Judge Pablo B. Francisco Vs. Atty. Rowena A. Malabanan-
Galeon, et al./Judge Pablo B. Francisco Vs. Atty. Rowena A. Malabanan-Galeon//Judge Pablo B.
Francisco Vs. Atty. Rowena A. Malabanan-Galeon, et al./Joel O. Arellano and Arnel M. Magat Vs.
Judge Pablo B. Francisco, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1992/A.M. No. P-10-2745/A.M. No. RTJ-00-
1992/A.M. No. P-10-2746/A.M. No. P-102747/A.M. No. P-10-2748/A.M. No. P-10-2749/A.M.
No. P-10-2750/A.M. No. P-10-2751/A.M. No. P-03-1706/A.M. No. RTJ-10-2214, July 6, 2010.
Judge; bias and partiality. Established is the norm that judges should not only be impartial but
should also appear impartial. Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions,
but must do so in a manner free from any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.
This reminder applies even more to lower court judges like herein respondent because they are
judicial front-liners who have direct contact with litigants. Atty. Jose A. Bernas vs. Judge Julia A.
Reyes, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 69, Pasig City, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1728, July 21, 2010.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. To be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge
must be shown to have committed an error that was “gross or patent, deliberate or
malicious.” Also administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law is a judge who – shown
to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption – ignored, contradicted or
failed to apply settled law and jurisprudence. As a matter of public policy though, the acts of a
judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are
erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are
sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. Rolando
E. Marcos vs. Judge Ofelia T. Pinto, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2180, July 26, 2010.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known
rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We find that the respondent judge’s error does not
rise to the level of gross ignorance of the law that is defined by jurisprudence. We take judicial
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notice of the fact that at the time he issued the Writ of Amparo on January 23, 2008, the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo has been effective for barely three months. At that time, the respondent
judge cannot be said to have been fully educated and informed on the novel aspects of the Writ
of Amparo. More importantly, for full liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed
order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be
found to be erroneous; it must be established that he was motivated by bad faith, dishonesty,
hatred or some other similar motive. Ruben Salcedo vs. Judge Gil Bollozos, A.M. No. RTJ-10-
2236, July 5, 2010.
Judge; simple misconduct. The Judge’s act of solemnizing the marriage of accused’s son in the
residence of the accused speaks for itself. It is improper and highly unethical for a judge to
actively participate in such social affairs, considering that the accused is a party in a case
pending before her own sala. In pending or prospective litigations before them, judges should
be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their
personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity. Considering the above
findings, it is apparent that respondent judge’s actuations constitute simple misconduct. Rolando
E. Marcos vs. Judge Ofelia T. Pinto, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2180, July 26, 2010.
Attorney; gross discourtesy. When Milagros finally met respondent on September 30, 2008 [in
order to collect on his debt to her], respondent, in the presence of several others, told her “Eh
kung sabihin ko na sugar mommy kita,” adding that “Nagpapakantot ka naman sa akin.” The
Court finds that respondent is indeed guilty of gross discourtesy amounting to conduct
unbecoming of a court employee. By such violation, respondent failed to live up to his oath of
office as member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and violated Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Court has consistently been reminding officials and employees
of the Judiciary that their conduct or behavior is circumscribed with a heavy burden of
responsibility which, at all times, should be characterized by, among other things, strict
propriety and decorum. As such, they should not use abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing
and improper language. Their every act or word should be marked by prudence, restraint,
courtesy and dignity. Aside from violating Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
respondent appears to have also violated Rule 8.01 of the same Code. Complaints of Mrs.
Milagros Lee & Samantha Lee against Atty. Gil Luisito R. Capito, A.M. No. 2008-19-SC. August
18, 2010
Attorney; mistake binding on client. A client is generally bound by the mistakes of his lawyer;
otherwise, there would never be an end to a litigation as long as a new counsel could be
employed, and who could then allege and show that the preceding counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned. The legal profession demands of a lawyer that
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degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family; such lawyer should
adopt the norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. Moreover, a lawyer owes it to
himself and to his clients to adopt an efficient and orderly system of keeping track of the
developments in his cases, and should be knowledgeable of the remedies appropriate to his
cases. National Tobacco Administration vs. Daniel Castillo, G.R. No. 154124,August 13, 2010.
Attorney; mistake of counsel. Granting that their counsel made a mistake in entering into such
stipulations, such procedural error unfortunately bound them. The Court has consistently held
that the mistake or negligence of a counsel in the area of procedural technique binds the client
unless such mistake or negligence of counsel is so gross or palpable that would require the
courts to step in and accord relief to the client who suffered thereby. Without this doctrinal rule,
there would never be an end to a suit so long as a new counsel could be employed to allege
and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or
learned. Gilbert Urma, et al. vs. Hon. Orlando Beltran, et al., G.R. No. 180836, August 8, 2010.
Attorney; notarization of falsified deed, We cannot overemphasize the important role a notary
public performs. In Gonzales v. Ramos, we stressed that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless routinary act but one invested with substantive public interest. The notarization by
a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarized document is, by law, entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the public’s
confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined. The records
undeniably show the gross negligence exhibited by the respondent in discharging his duties as a
notary public. He failed to ascertain the identities of the affiants before him and failed to comply
with the most basic function that a notary public must do, i.e., to require the parties’
presentation of their residence certificates or any other document to prove their identities. Given
the respondent’s admission in his pleading that the donors were already dead when he
notarized the Deed of Donation, we have no doubt that he failed in his duty to ascertain the
identities of the persons who appeared before him as donors in the Deed of Donation. Under
the circumstances, we find that the respondent should be made liable not only as a notary
public but also as a lawyer. He not only violated the Notarial Law (Public Act No. 2103), but
also Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Luzviminda R. Lustestica
vs. Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe, A.C. No. 6258. August 24, 2010.
Attorney; reinstatement. The Court, in the recent case of Ligaya Maniago v. Atty. Lourdes I.
De Dios,issued the guidelines on the lifting of orders of suspension, and has advised strict
observance thereof. However, the Court will not hesitate to withhold the privilege of the
practice of law if it is shown that respondent, as an officer of the Court, is still not worthy of the
trust and confidence of his clients and of the public. Thus, applying the guidelines
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in Maniago, the Court Resolved to GRANT Respondent’s Petition for Reinstatement, effective
upon his submission to the Court of a Sworn Statement attesting to the fact: 1) that he has
completely served the four (4) suspensions imposed on him successively;2) that he had desisted
from the practice of law, and has not appeared as counsel in any court during the periods of
suspension; and 3) that he has returned the sums of money to the complainants as ordered by
the Court, attaching proofs thereof. Carlos Reyes vs. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan/Celia Arroyo-Posidio
vs. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan/Violeta Tahaw vs. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan/Mark Yuson vs. Atty.
Jeremias R. Vitan, A.C. No. 5835/A.C. No. 6051/A.C. No. 6441/A.C. No. 6955, August 18,
2010.
Attorney; violation of rules on forum shopping and abuse of judicial processes. A lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice.
The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the court’s processes and improper conduct
that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as
contempt of court. Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions
(which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to
disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his
duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions
as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor. The filing of another action
concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every
effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. By
his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a
lawyer’s mandate “to delay no man for money or malice.” Atty. Josabeth V. Alonso, et al. vs.
Atty. Ibaro B. Relaminda, Jr., A.C. No. 8481, August 3, 2010.
Court personnel; grave misconduct and dishonesty. Respondent was found wanting, and her
admission to tampering the duplicate and triplicate copies of the court’s official receipts shows
her blatant disregard for her responsibilities as an officer of the court. The fact that respondent is
willing to pay her shortages does not free her from the consequences of her wrongdoing. As
Clerk of Court, respondent is entrusted with delicate functions in the collection of legal
fees. She acts as cashier and disbursement officer of the court; and is tasked to collect and
receive all monies paid as legal fees, deposits, fines and dues, and controls the disbursement of
the same. She is designated as custodian of the court’s funds and revenues, records, properties
and premises, and shall be liable for any loss or shortage thereof. Hence, even when there is
restitution of funds, unwarranted failure to fulfill these responsibilities deserves administrative
sanction, and not even the full payment of the collection shortages will exempt the accountable
officer from liability. Her failure to account for the shortage in the funds she was handling, to
turn over money deposited with her, and to explain and present evidence thereon constitute
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gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct. Office of the Court Administrator vs.
Marina Garcia Pacheco, COC, MCTC, Paete, Laguna, A.M. No. P-02-1625, August 4, 2010.
Court personnel; misconduct; lack of evidence. We find Judge Manalastas’ recommendation to

be in order. Indeed, PO2 Gabriel failed to prove his complaint against Sheriff
Ramos. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Complaint for Grave Misconduct filed by PO2
Patrick Mejia Gabriel against Sheriff IV William Jose R. Ramos, RTC, Branch 166, Pasig City, is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.PO2 Patrick Mejia Gabriel vs. William Jose R.
Ramos, A.M. No.P-10-2837, August 25, 2010.
Judge; conduct unbecoming. Verily, we hold that respondent Judge Belen should be more
circumspect in his language in the discharge of his duties. A judge is the visible representation
of the law. Thus, he must behave, at all times, in such a manner that his conduct, official or
otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny. The ethical principles and sense of
propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial system.
A judge must consistently be temperate in words and in actions. Respondent Judge Belen’s
insulting statements, tending to project complainant’s ignorance of the laws and procedure,
coming from his inconsiderate belief that the latter mishandled the cause of his client is
obviously and clearly insensitive, distasteful, and inexcusable. Such abuse of power and
authority could only invite disrespect from counsels and from the public. Patience is one virtue
that members of the bench should practice at all times, and courtesy to everyone is always
called for. Atty. Raul L. Correa vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Regional Trial Court, Branch
36 Calamba City, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2242, August 6, 2010.
Judge; delay in rendering decision. To ensure the strict observance of the constitutional mandate
for all lower courts to decide or resolve cases or matters within the reglementary period, the
Court issued Administrative Circular No. 13-87. And the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary which took effect on June 1, 2004 expressly requires judges to perform all
judicial duties, “including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness.” Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct also echoes the mandate to
decide or resolve cases or matters within the reglementary period by requiring judges to dispose
of the court’s business promptly and decide or resolve cases or matters within the required
periods. Heavy workload per se is not an excuse in not observing the reglementary period of
deciding cases. An appointment to the Judiciary is an honor burdened with a heavy
responsibility. When respondent accepted the appointment, he also accepted the heavy
workload that comes with it. Re: Request of Judge Salvador Ibarreta, Jr., RTC, Br. 8, Davao City,
for extension of time to decide, A.M. No. 07-1-05-RTC, August 23, 2010.
Judges; inhibition. The rule on compulsory disqualification and voluntary inhibition of judges is
provided under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. While the second paragraph does not
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expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition and leaves it to the sound discretion of
the judge, such should be based on just or valid reasons. The import of the rule on the
voluntary inhibition of judges is that the decision on whether to inhibit is left to the sound
discretion and conscience of the judge based on his rational and logical assessment of the
circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him. It makes clear to the occupants of the
Bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that
calls for adjudication, there might be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of
objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that
lead to preferences and predilections are many and varied. The issue of voluntary inhibition is
primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. It is
a subjective test, the result of which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any
manifest finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality. The discretion given to trial judges is an
acknowledgment of the fact that they are in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition,
as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.Inhibition is
not allowed at every instance that a schoolmate or classmate appears before the judge as
counsel for one of the parties, however. In one case, the Court ruled that organizational
affiliation per se is not a ground for inhibition. Kilosbayan Foundation, et al. vs. Leoncio M.
Janolo, Jr., etc., et al., G.R. No. 180543, August 18, 2010.
Judge; simple misconduct, etc. Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the legal requirement
for all of them to sit together as members of the Fourth Division “in
the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto.” It is simply not enough that the
three members of the Fourth Division were within hearing and communicating distance of one
another at the hearings in question, as they explained in hindsight, because even in those
circumstances not all of them sat together in session. It is of no consequence, then, that no
malice or corrupt motive impelled respondent Justices into adopting the flawed procedure. As
responsible judicial officers, they ought to have been well aware of the indispensability of
collegiality to the valid conduct of their trial proceedings. For this reason alone, respondent
Justices’ adoption of the irregular procedure cannot be dismissed as a mere deficiency in
prudence or as a lapse in judgment on their part, but should be treated as simple misconduct,
which is to be distinguished from either gross misconduct or gross ignorance of the law. Justice
Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted randomly asking the counsels appearing before them from
which law schools they had graduated, and their engaging during the hearings in casual
conversation about their respective law schools. They thereby publicized their professional
qualifications and manifested a lack of the requisite humility demanded of public magistrates.
Their doing so reflected a vice of self-conceit. We point out that publicizing professional
qualifications or boasting of having studied in and graduated from certain law schools, no
matter how prestigious, might have even revealed, on the part of Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez, their bias for or against some lawyers. Their conduct was impermissible,
consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
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Judiciary, demands that judges avoid situations that may reasonably give rise to the suspicion or
appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with individual members of the
legal profession who practice regularly in their courts. In this regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of
theNew Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, mandates judges to carry out
judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses,
lawyers, court staff, and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground,
immaterial to the proper performance of such duties. Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J.
Jamsani-Rodriguez vs. Justice Gregory S. Ong, et al., A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, August 24, 2010.
Judge; undue delay in rendering decision. It bears stressing that ejectment cases must be
resolved with great dispatch. Their nature calls for it. That explains why Section 10 of the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure which applies to an ejectment complaint, among others,
directs that within 30 days after the receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the
expiration of the period for filing the same, the trial court should render judgment on the
case. Without any order of extension granted by this Court, the failure to decide even a single
case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency. Rule 3.08 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct requires that a judge should be diligent in discharging administrative responsibilities
and should maintain professional competence in court management, hence, it is incumbent
upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system so that no disorderliness can affect
the flow of cases and their speedy disposition. Josephine Sarmiento, et al. vs. Hon. Aznar D.
Lindayag, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-09-1743, August 3, 2010.
Judge; violation of Code of Judicial Conduct. In Ladignon v. Garong, respondent judge’s act of
using the official letterhead of his court and signing the same using the word “judge” in his
letter-complaint to the First United Methodist Church in Michigan, USA, was held to be
violative of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics and Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. In view of the foregoing, we find respondent judge guilty of violation of Section 4 of
Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary [for committing a similar act]. Michael B. Belen vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 Calamba City, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2139, August 6, 2010.
Attorney; mistake binding on client. Petitioner cannot simply harp on the mistakes and
negligence of his lawyer allegedly beset with personal problems and emotional
depression. The negligence and mistakes of counsel are binding on the client. There are
exceptions to this rule, such as when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law, or when the application of the general rule results in the outright
deprivation of one’s property or liberty through a technicality. However, in this case, we find no
reason to exempt petitioner from the general rule. The admitted inability of his counsel to attend
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fully and ably to the prosecution of his appeal and other sorts of excuses should have prompted
petitioner to be more vigilant in protecting his rights and replace said counsel with a more
competent lawyer. Instead, petitioner continued to allow his counsel to represent him on
appeal and even up to this Court, apparently in the hope of moving this Court with a fervent
plea for relaxation of the rules for reason of petitioner’s age and medical condition. Verily,
diligence is required not only from lawyers but also from their clients. Gregorio Dimarucot y
Garcia vs.. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183975,September 20, 2010.
Attorney; mistake binding on client. Considering the initial 15-day extension granted by the CA
and the injunction under Sec. 4, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure against further
extensions “except for the most compelling reason”, it was clearly inexcusable for petitioner to
expediently plead its counsel’s heavy workload as ground for seeking an additional extension of
10 days within which to file its petition for review. To our mind, petitioner would do well to
remember that, rather than the low gate to which parties are unreasonably required to stoop,
procedural rules are designed for the orderly conduct of proceedings and expeditious settlement
of cases in the courts of law. Like all rules, they are required to be followed and utter disregard
of the same cannot be expediently rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction
which was never intended as an unfettered license to disregard the letter of the law or, for that
matter, a convenient excuse to substitute substantial compliance for regular adherence
thereto. When it comes to compliance with time rules, the Court cannot afford inexcusable
delay. J. Tiosejo Investment Corporation vs.. Sps. Benjamin and Eleanor Ang, G.R. No. 174149,
September 8, 2010.
Attorney’s fees. It is settled that a claim for attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the very
action in which a lawyer rendered his services or in a separate action. But enforcing it in the
main case bodes well as it forestalls multiplicity of suits. The intestate court in this case,
therefore, correctly allowed Atty. Siapian to interject his claim for attorney’s fees in the estate
proceedings against some of the heirs and, after hearing, adjudicate the same on April 3, 1997
with an order for Arturo, et al to pay Atty. Siapian the fees of P3 million due him. Since the
award of P3 million in attorney’s fees in favor of Atty. Siapian had already become final and
executory, the intestate court was within its powers to order the Register of Deeds to annotate
his lien on the Estate’s titles to its properties. The Estate has no cause for complaint since the
lien was neither a claim nor a burden against the Estate itself. It was not enforceable against the
Estate but only against Arturo,et al, who constituted the majority of the heirs. Heirs and/or Estate
of Atty. Rolando P. Siapian, represented by Susan S. Mendoza vs. Intestate Estate of the Late
Eufrocina G. Mackay as represented by Dr. Roderick Mackay, et al., G.R. No. 184799,
September 1, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Dishonesty is defined as “intentionally making a false statement in

any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception of fraud in securing his
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examination, registration, appointment or promotion.” Chulyao employed her sister, Pangowon,
to take the July 31, 1988 CSPE conducted in Baguio City for her and in her behalf and claimed
the result thereof as her own in her personal data sheet accomplished on April 23,
2007. Dishonesty and falsification are malevolent acts that have no place in the Judiciary. Re:
Complaint of the Civil Service Commission vs. Rita S. Chulyao, A.M. No. P-07-2292, September
28, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Azurin’s act of deliberately not registering in the CTRM to hide his
habitual tardiness for the third time, which is punishable by dismissal, constitutes
dishonesty. Dishonesty refers to a person’s “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.” By repeatedly
making it appear that he has consistently rendered a full day’s service, when he had actually
been tardy, Azurin defrauded the public and betrayed the trust reposed in him as an employee
of the highest Court. Azurin’s dishonesty definitely falls short of the strict standards required of
every court employee, that is, to be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Re: failure
of various employees to register their time of arrival and/or departure from office in the
chronolog machine, A.M. No. 2005-21-SC, September 28, 2010.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. There is no doubt that Padillo received from
Escalona P20,000 purportedly “for fiscal & judge” and “for warrant officer” and this amount was
“intended to facilitate” the case against Dalit. Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct of
Court Personnel provides that “(C)ourt personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or
benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall
influence their official actions.” Lourdes S. Escalona vs. Consolacion S. Padilla, A.M. No. P-10-
2785, September 21, 2010.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. This Court cannot tolerate misconduct on the part of its
employees. The reported exchanges between Bunao and Wee in the court premises, and in the
presence of Judge Mendrado V. Corpuz and Assistant Prosecutor Alfredo A. Balajo, Jr., is
disgraceful behavior. Shouting at each other within the court premises exhibits discourtesy and
disrespect not only towards co-workers but to the court as well. The conduct and behavior of
every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the
presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by strict propriety and decorum
so as to earn and keep the public’s respect for the judiciary. This standard is applied with
respect to a court employee’s dealings not only with the public but also with his or her co-
workers in the service. Tanching L. Wee, etc., et al. vs. Virgilio T. Bunao, Jr., etc / Virgilio T.
Bunao, Jr., etc. vs. Tanching L. Wee, etc., A.M. No. P-08-2487/A.M. No. P-08-2493, September
29, 2010.
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Court personnel; violation of office rules and regulations. Considering the various justifications
proffered by respondent employees for failure to register their time of arrival and departure in
the CTRM (for example, [1] domestic and office concerns, [2] long travel time, [3] forgetfulness,
and [4] malfunctioning CTRM), the Court finds no error in the recommendation of the OAS
finding them guilty of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations, more specifically
Administrative Circular No. 36-2001. As stated by the OAS, “rules and regulations are [issued]
to attain harmony, smooth operation, maximize efficiency and productivity, with the ultimate
objective of realizing the functions of particular offices and agencies of the government.” Thus,
any breach of such rules and regulations cannot be countenanced. Re: failure of various
employees to register their time of arrival and/or departure from office in the chronolog
machine, A.M. No. 2005-21-SC, September 28, 2010.
Judge; grave misconduct. [N]o judge has a right to solicit sexual favors from a party litigant even
from a woman of loose morals. In Tan v. Pacuribot, this Court further stressed: We have
repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to so conduct themselves as to be beyond
reproach and suspicion, and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal
behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their everyday lives. For no
position exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual
than a seat in the Judiciary. Judges are mandated to maintain good moral character and are at all
times expected to observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency. Susan O.
Reyes vs. Judge Manuel N. Duque, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2136,September 21, 2010.
Judges; inhibition. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition,
especially when the charge is without basis. Extrinsic evidence must further be presented to
establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be
inferred from the decision or order itself. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the
judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma
of being biased or partial. BGen. (Ret.) Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Hon. Jose R. Hernandez, G.R.
Nos. 173057-74, September 20, 2010.
Judge; undue delay in rendering decision. Respondent indeed gave the defense ten (10) days to
submit its reply to the prosecution’s comment on the motion for reconsideration and, thereafter,
she would resolve all pending incidents in said consolidated cases. The reglementary period to
resolve the motion in question began to run from February 8, 2009 or after the lapse of ten
days from January 29, 2009. Respondent, however, did not act on the matter and allowed a
hiatus in the consolidated criminal cases. A judge cannot choose to prolong the period for
resolving pending incidents and deciding cases beyond the period authorized by law. Let it be
underscored that it is the sworn duty of judges to administer justice without undue delay under
the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Judges should act with dispatch
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in resolving pending incidents, so as not to frustrate and delay the satisfaction of a
judgment. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles vs. Judge Maria Elisa Sempio Diy, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2248,
September 29, 2010.
Motion for reconsideration; second motion for reconsideration. While as a general rule the
Court does not give due course to second motions for reconsideration, this is not without
exceptions, as when there is an extraordinarily persuasive reason and after an express leave has
been obtained, both of which are present in this case. In denying respondent’s first motion for
partial reconsideration, the Court applied the ruling in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Delia H. Panganiban where it was held that a Judge’s unblemished record will not justify her
lapses. However, as correctly pointed out by respondent in her second motion for partial
reconsideration, said case should not have been applied, as it presupposes that respondent
indeed committed lapses which her long service and unblemished reputation would not justify
while she has always maintained that she had not committed the act complained of, that is, the
non-filing of the leaves of absence for May 3 and August 3, 2005 because she did not have
to. Indeed, if respondent committed no lapse or violation, then the Court’s denial of her first
motion for partial reconsideration on the basis of the Panganiban decision deserves to be
reviewed. Sr. State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco vs. Hon. Adoracion G. Angeles, A.M. OCA IPI
No. 05-2353-RTJ, September 6, 2010.
Attorney; misconduct. Respondent (lawyer) was ordered to reimburse his client

Php16,300.00. Nine years after the directive was made, he effected payment. Respondent’s
belated “compliance” with the order glaringly speaks of his lack of candor, of his dishonesty, if
not defiance of Court orders, qualities that do not endear him to the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers. The lack of any sufficient justification or explanation for the nine-year delay in
complying with the Resolutions betrays a clear and contumacious disregard for the lawful orders
of this Court. Such disrespect constitutes a clear violation of the lawyer’s Code of Professional
Responsibility. Leonard W. Richards vs. Patricio A. Asoy, A.C. No. 2655, October 12, 2010.
Court personnel; conduct prejudicial to best interest of the service. This case filed by Argoso
against Regalado involves money received by Regalado from an interested party to implement
a writ of execution. Regalado should not have received money from Argoso for his
transportation to Daet, without previously submitting his expenses for the court’s
approval. Regalado’s admission that he received money without complying with the proper
procedure in enforcing writs of execution, made him guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. Levi M. Agroso vs. Achilles Andrew Regalado II, etc., A.M. No. P-09-2735,
October 12, 2010.
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Court personnel; dishonesty. Respondent (clerk of court) failed to regularly submit monthly
reports of collections and deposits, as required by SC Circular No. 32-93, and official receipts
and other documents, despite the Court’s repeated orders. The failure to remit the funds in due
time amounts to dishonesty and grave misconduct, which the Court cannot tolerate for they
diminish the people’s faith in the judiciary. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Marcela V.
Santos, Clerk of Court II etc., A.M. No. P-06-2287, October 12, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty etc. Fernandez deserves to be sanctioned. Her habitual tardiness
and absenteeism, coupled with her submission of a falsified document to cover up some of her
absences, do not speak well of her fitness for employment in the public service, especially in the
judiciary. We cannot ignore the gross dishonesty involved in her submission of a falsified
document to cover up several unauthorized absences. Isabel D. Marquez vs. Jocelyn C.
Fernandez, A.M. No. P-07-2358, October 19, 2010.
Court personnel; gross misconduct. On several instances, Abellanosa demanded and received
various sums of money from party-litigants in cases pending before the RTC of Makati, Branch
137. Also, the Order of the Makati RTC Branch 137 was published in the Taliba newspaper, but
it did not go through the mandated procedure for distribution of judicial notices or orders by
raffle to qualified newspapers or periodicals under P.D. No. 1079. Abellanosa’s acts of
soliciting money from litigants to facilitate the publication of their petitions or orders of the court
clearly manifested her desire to achieve personal gain and constitutes gross misconduct which is
deplorable. Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino vs. Jessica B. Abellanosa, etc./Jessica B.
Abellanosa, etc. vs. Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino/Jessica B. Abellanosa etc. vs. Rowena
L. Ramos, etc., A.M. No. P-08-2472/A.M. No. RTJ-08-2106/A.M. No. P-08-2420, October 19,
2010.
Court personnel; misconduct. Marcelo deserves to be sanctioned for the grave transgressions he
committed while in office. As clerk of court, he was in charge of the court’s funds and was
responsible for their collection and safekeeping. Marcelo made collections for the court’s
several funds and never bothered to deposit these collections in the official court depository
bank – a violation of the rule that all clerks of court are required to deposit all collections with
the LBP within twenty-four (24) hours upon receipt of the collections. Marcelo also held on to
his collections, thus committing another violation. Clerks of court may not keep funds in their
custody. His acts and omissions constitute a betrayal of the trust and confidence the Court
reposes on a senior officer. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Rodelio E. Marcelo and Ma.
Corazon D. Espanola, MTCC, San Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan,A.M. No. P-06-2221. October 5,
2010.
Court personnel; misconduct. Under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 1991, an
officer or employee of the civil service is considered habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness,
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regardless of the number of minutes, ten (10) times a month for at least two (2) months in a
semester, or for at least two (2) consecutive months. We consistently ruled that non-office
obligations, household chores, and domestic concerns are not sufficient reasons to excuse or
justify habitual tardiness. Hence, Ms. Eseller’s reasons for her tardiness – her need to attend to
her children and her problems in the workplace – cannot exculpate her. By being habitually
tardy, Ms. Eseller fell short of the stringent standard of conduct demanded from everyone
connected with the administration of justice. Leave Division-OAS, Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Bethel I. Eseller, Interpreter II, MTCC, Branch 3, Bacolod City, A.M. No. P-10-
2807, October 6, 2010.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. The rule requires that the sheriff executing the writs shall
provide an estimate of the expenses to be incurred that shall be approved by the court. Upon
the court’s approval, the interested party shall then deposit the amount with the clerk of court
and ex-officiosheriff. Thereafter, the expenses shall then be disbursed to the assigned deputy
sheriff who shall execute the writ subject to the latter’s liquidation upon the return of the
writ. Any amount unspent shall be returned to the interested party. Clearly, the rule does not
allow direct payment of sheriff expenses from the interested party to the sheriff. The respondent
failed to comply with the rules and is therefore, liable for simple misconduct. Renato Miguel D.
Garcia vs. Ricky Montejar etc., A.M. No. P-10-2860, October 20,2010.
Judge; ignorance of the law. Respondent Judge should have granted the plaintiff’s motion for
immediate execution considering that the defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas bond
despite having appealed. Respondent Judge’s excuse, that he had lost jurisdiction over the case
by virtue of the defendant’s appeal, was unacceptable in light of the clear and explicit text of
Section 19 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. He could not credibly justify his omission to act
according to the provision by claiming good faith or honest belief, or by asserting lack of malice
or bad faith. These justify non-compliance only when there is an as-yet unsettled doubt on the
meaning or applicability of a rule or legal provision. Lourdes B. Ferrer and Prosperidad M.
Arandez vs. Judge Romeo A. Rabaca, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 25, Manila, A.M. No.
MTJ-08-1580, October 6, 2010.
Judge; release of retirement benefits. Judge Luczon averred that Trinidad Irorita filed a
disbarment case against his father, Atty. Jimmy Luczon. He maintained that he is not the Atty.
Jimmy Luczonreferred to as respondent in the instant case. He retired from the service as
Presiding Judge of RTC Tuguegarao Branch 1. His retirement benefits, however, have yet to be
released since the necessary clearances cannot be issued due to the pendency of the instant
case. The Court orders the Office of the Bar Confidant to make the necessary correction in the
records of both Atty. Jimmy C. Luczon and Judge Jimmy Henry F. Luczon, Jr., in order to
facilitate the release of the retirement benefits of Judge Luczon. Trinidad Irorita vs. Atty. Jimmy
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Lucson, A.C. No. 3872, October 4, 2010.
Judge; undue delay. Section 15(1), Article VIII, of the Constitution requires a trial judge to
dispose of all cases or matters within three months from the time of their submission for decision.
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to dispose of their
courts’ business promptly and to decide cases within the required period. Judge Herrera was
guilty of undue delay in the disposition of the cases pending him his court. His failure to decide
his cases with dispatch constituted gross inefficiency. His plea of heavy workload, lack of
sufficient time, poor health, and physical impossibility could not excuse him. Without an order
of extension granted by the Court, a failure to decide even a single case within the required
period rightly constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction. Re: Cases
submitted for decision before Judge Damaso A. Herrera, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Biñan,
Laguna A.M. No. RTJ-08-1924, October 13, 2010.
Judge; undue delay. Any delay in the determination or resolution of a case, no matter how
insignificant the case may seem to a judge, is delay in the administration of justice in general.
Respondent Judge Montojo’s delay in acting on pending cases clearly demonstrated his
inefficiency. He failed to control the proceedings or course of the cases; to impose deadlines in
the submission of documents or performance of acts incident to the disposition of cases; and to
resolve pending incidents on time, and take appropriate action on incidents arising in the course
of proceedings. A judge should at all times remain in full control of the proceedings in his
sala. Narciso Bernando, Jr. vs. Judge Peter M. Montojo, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1754, October 20,
2010.
Judge; undue delay in rendering decision. The subject criminal cases – violation of B.P. Blg. 22
– are covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC. Section
17 of this Rule requires the court to promulgate a judgment not later than thirty (30) days after
termination of trial. Judge Andoy should have rendered a decision within 30 days from the
termination of trial. Even assuming that the subsequent resettings of the cases for trial were valid,
he should have rendered a decision within 30 days from the date the cases were finally
considered submitted for decision. His failure to meet this deadline is a patent indication that he
did not take into account and had disregarded the Rule on Summary Procedure. Cirila S.
Raymund vs. Judge Teresito A. Andoy, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1738, October 6, 2010.
Judge; undue delay in rendering decision. Respondent Judge failed in his duty to promptly and
expeditiously dispose of the subject civil case. In so failing, he ran afoul of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 28 dated July 3, 1989, whose paragraph three provides: The ninety
(90) day period for deciding the case shall commence to run from submission of the case for
decision without memoranda; in case the court requires or allows its filing, the case shall be
considered submitted for decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or upon the
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expiration. The respondent should have issued the order directing the stenographers to submit
the TSNs after the complainant had manifested that the defendants had not filed their
memorandum. Eduardo B. Olaguer vs. Judge Alfredo D. Ampuan,A.M. No. MTJ-10-1769,
October 6, 2010.
Judge; various offenses. Five administrative cases were filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) against Judge Alberto L. Lerma (respondent judge) for violating Supreme
Court rules, directives, and circulars, for making untruthful statements in his certificates of
service, for gross ignorance of the law and/or gross negligence, for delay in rendering an order,
for abusing judicial authority and discretion, and for serious irregularity. He was found guilty of
all of the charges. The totality of all these findings underscore the fact that respondent judge’s
actions served to erode the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Alberto L. Lerma/Atty. Lourdes A. Ona vs. Judge Alberto L. Lerma/Jose
Mari L. Duarte vs. Judge Alberto L. Lerma/ Ret. General Meliton D. Goyena vs. Judge Alberto L.
Lerma/Office of the Court Administrator Vs. Judge Alberto L. Lerma, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2076/A.M.
No. RTJ-07-2077/A.M. No. RTJ-2078/A.M. No. RTJ-07-2079/A.M. No. RTJ-07-2080, October 12,
2010.
Judges; violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. That the assailed Resolutions issued by
respondents favored Northern Islands Co., Inc. and the Guy family does not necessarily render
respondents guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, absent proven particular acts of
manifest, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, good faith and regularity being
generally presumed in the performance of official duties by public officers. In order for this
administrative offense to prosper, the subject order or actuation of the judge in the performance
of his official duties must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, more
importantly, must be attended by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. 3-D Industries, Inc.
and Smartel Phil., Inc. vs. Justices Vicente Q. Roxas and Juan Q. Enriquez, A.M. No. CA-10-50-J,
October 5, 2010.
Plagiarism. The passing off of the work of another as one’s own is an indispensable element of
plagiarism. Whether or not the footnote is sufficiently detailed, so as to satisfy the footnoting
standards of counsel for petitioners is not an ethical matter but one concerning clarity of
writing. The statement “See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law
(2005)” in the Vinuyadecision is an attribution no matter if Tams thought that it gave him
somewhat less credit than he deserved. Such attribution altogether negates the idea that Justice
Del Castillo passed off the challenged passages as his own.
The Vinuya decision lifted passages from Criddle-Descent’s article. Criddle-Descent’s footnotes
were carried into the Vinuya decision’s own footnotes but no attributions were made to the two
authors. One of Justice Del Castillo’s researchers, a court-employed attorney, explained how
she accidentally deleted the attributions, originally planted in the beginning drafts of her report
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to him. She said that she did her research electronically. In the course of editing and cleaning
up her draft, the researcher accidentally deleted the attributions. Given the operational
properties of the Microsoft program in use by the Court, the accidental decapitation of
attributions to sources of research materials is not remote.The Microsoft Word program does not
have a function that raises an alarm when original materials are cut up or pruned.
Petitioners’ theory that intent is not material in committing plagiarism since all that a writer has
to do, to avoid the charge, is to enclose lifted portions with quotation marks and acknowledge
the sources from which these were taken, ignores the fact that plagiarism is essentially a form of
fraud where intent to deceive is inherent. Plagiarism presupposes intent and a deliberate,
conscious effort to steal another’s work and pass it off as one’s own.
The subject passages were reproduced in the Vinuya decision without placing them in quotation
marks. But such passages consisted of common definitions and terms, abridged history of
certain principles of law, and similar frequently repeated phrases that, in the world of legal
literature, already belong to the public realm. The judge is not expected to produce original
scholarship in every respect.
Since the attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis were accidentally deleted, it is impossible for
any person reading the decision to connect the same to the works of those authors as to
conclude that in writing the decision Justice Del Castillo “twisted” their intended
messages. And the lifted passages provided mere background facts that established the state of
international law at various stages of its development. These are neutral data that could support
conflicting theories regarding whether or not the judiciary has the power today to order the
Executive Department to sue another country or whether the duty to prosecute violators of
international crimes has attained the status of jus cogens.
On occasions judges and justices have mistakenly cited the wrong sources, failed to use
quotation marks, inadvertently omitted necessary information from footnotes or endnotes. But
these do not, in every case, amount to misconduct. Only errors that are tainted with fraud,
corruption, or malice are subject of disciplinary action.
The Justice’s researcher was competent in the field of assignment given her. She finished law
from a leading law school, graduated third in her class, served as Editor-in Chief of her school’s
Law Journal, and placed fourth in the bar examinations when she took it. She earned a master’s
degree in International Law and Human Rights from a prestigious university in the United States
under the Global-Hauser program. Justice Del Castillo did not exercise bad judgment in
assigning the research work in the Vinuya case to her. In the matter of the charge of
plagiarism, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, October 12, 2010.
Statement of UP Professors. While the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on
the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as
an established fact, but a truth. They expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s
explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a
contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized. The statement
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bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The first paragraph concludes with a
reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty
and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The authors also not only assumed that
Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism, they went further by directly accusing the Court of
perpetrating extraordinary injustice by dismissing the petition of the comfort women in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary. They further attempt to educate this Court on how to go about the review
of the case. The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of “polluted
sources,” the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the supposed
alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency
and respect.
The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law regarding the allegations
of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was totally unnecessary, uncalled for
and a rash act of misplaced vigilance. Of public knowledge is the ongoing investigation
precisely to determine the truth of such allegations. More importantly, the motion for
reconsideration of the decision alleged to contain plagiarized materials is still pending before
the Court. We made it clear in the case of In re Kelly that any publication, pending a suit,
reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel with
reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court
and is punishable.
The UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would
not reverse the Vinuya decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and
officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which
they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust
in the administration of justice. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A
Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC. October 19,
2010.
Attorney; gross misconduct. Deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross misconduct, for
which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They must, at all
times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which
include prompt payment of financial obligations. Manuel C. Yuhico vs. Atty. Fred L.
Gutierrez, A.C. No. 8391, November 23, 2010.
Attorney; gross misconduct. There is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous
cases in different fora, as long as he does so in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and
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without any ill-motive or purpose other than to achieve justice and fairness. In the present case,
however, we find that the barrage of cases filed by the respondent against his former client and
others close to her was meant to overwhelm said client and to show her that the respondent
does not fold easily after he was meted a penalty of one year suspension from the practice of
law. Atty. Carmen Leonor M. Alcantara, et al. vs. Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera, A.C. No. 5859,
November 23, 2010.
Court personnel; gross dishonesty. Saddi’s failure to turn over up to this time the full amount of
his collections and to adequately explain and present evidence thereon constitute gross
dishonesty, grave misconduct, and even malversation of public funds. The delayed remittance
of his cash collections and failure to submit monthly reports of court funds he received
constitute gross neglect of duty. Dishonesty alone, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries
the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except
accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government
service. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Gregorio B. Saddi, A.M. No. P-10-2818,
November 15, 2010.
Court personnel; immorality. Immoral conduct is conduct which is “willful, flagrant, or

shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community.” Abandonment of one’s wife and children, and cohabitation with a
woman not his wife, constitutes immoral conduct that is subject to disciplinary action. Thelma T.
Babante-Caples vs. Philbert B. Caples etc., A.M. No. HOJ-10-03, November 15, 2010
Court personnel; loafing. The Civil Service Commission Rules define “loafing” as “frequent
unauthorized absences from duty during regular office hours.” The word “frequent” connotes
that the employees absent themselves from duty more than once. First, respondent’s claimed
activities (smoking, reading newspapers and discussing legal matters with the police), even if
true, would not consume as much as 2 to 3 hours of his time. Second, any discussions of legal
matters with the police should be upon the instructions of his judge. Finally, the respondent
should only read newspapers and smoke during breaktime; these activities should never be
done during working hours. Exec. Judge Aurora Maqueda Roman vs. Virgilio M. Fortaleza, A.M.
No. P-10-2865, November 22, 2010.
Court personnel; misconduct. The Court finds respondent guilty of violating Section 9 (b), Rule
39 of the Rules of Court, considered a less grave offense, when, instead of faithfully
implementing the alias writ upon the properties subject of the writ therein defendant Powroll
and its stockholders, he arrogated upon himself the authority to levy the three motorcycles
belonging to RUSI Marketing, which was not even a party to the case. It may seem that the list
of stockholders of both companies are the same, but such fact did not give respondent the
blanket authority to undertake the levy on the properties of RUSI Marketing as the said company
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was not named as a defendant in the civil case and there was no judgment rendered against
it. Moreover, RUSI Marketing is a separate entity from that of its stockholders and, therefore, its
properties do not necessarily include the properties of its stockholders. Antonio T. Ramas-
Uypitching vs. Vincent Horace U. Magalona, A.M. No. P-07-2379, November 17, 2010.
Court personnel; misconduct. Fixing may range from the patently corrupt act of serving as
middleman between a litigant and the decision maker, to rendering illegal and out-of-the-way
assistance such as providing referral service to lawyers and other participants in court cases, or
providing information such as the identity of the ponente, all for a fee, or, likewise for a fee,
intervening to facilitate court processes such as the release of court papers or providing advance
and illegitimate copies of drafts or final but unpromulgated decisions. Pastor C. Pinlac vs. Oscar
T. Llamas, etc., A.M. No. P-10-2781, November 24, 2010.
Judges; gross ignorance of the law. With the numerous cases already decided on the matter of
bail, we feel justified to expect judges to diligently discharge their duties on the grant or denial
of applications for bail. Judge Buaya granted the ex-parte motion to grant bail on the same day
that it was filed by the accused. He did this without the required notice and hearing. He
justified his action on the ex-partemotion by arguing that the offense charged against the
accused was a bailable offense; a hearing was no longer required since bail was a matter of
right. Under the present Rules of Court, however, notice and hearing are required whether bail
is a matter of right or discretion. Lorna M. Villanueva vs. Judge Apolinario M. Buaya, A.M. No.
RTJ-08-2131, November 22, 2010.
Administrative proceeding; settlement does not render case moot. The fact that the complainant
manifested that he is no longer interested to pursue the administrative case against the
respondent since he and the latter have already agreed to settle their dispute amicably would
not render the case moot. The withdrawal of complaints cannot divest the Court of its
jurisdiction nor strip it of its power to determine the veracity of the charges made and to
discipline, such as the results of its investigation may warrant, an erring
respondent. Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the complainant
who may, for reasons of his own, condone what may be destestable. Neither can the Court be
bound by the unilateral act of the complainant in a matter relating to its disciplinary power. The
Court’s interest in the affairs of the judiciary is of paramount concern. For sure, public interest is
at stake in the conduct and actuations of officials and employees of the judiciary, inasmuch as
the various programs and efforts of this Court in improving the delivery of justice to the people
should not be frustrated and put to naught by private arrangements between the
parties. Fernando P. Chan vs. Joven T. Olegario, Process Server, Regional Trial Court, Branch 6,
Iligan City, A.M. No. P-09-2714, December 6, 2010.
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Attorney; negligence. Respondent Atty. Elayda failed to inform his clients, petitioners herein, of
the dates of hearing and the adverse decision against them, which eventually became final and
executory as no appeal was filed therefrom, to the prejudice of his clients. A lawyer is duty
bound to uphold and safeguard the interests of his clients. He should be conscientious,
competent and diligent in handling his clients’ cases. Atty. Elayda should give adequate
attention, care, and time to all the cases he is handling. As the petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Elayda
is expected to monitor the progress of said spouses’ case and is obligated to exert all efforts to
present every remedy or defense authorized by law to protect the cause espoused by the
petitioners. Respondent is guilty of gross negligence. Spouses Virgilio and Angelina Aranda vs.
Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda, A.C. No. 7907. December 15, 2010
Court personnel; conduct unbecoming of court employee. Respondent Olegario, a court process
server, evaded the payment of his debt for seven (7) years. Respondent Olegario is guilty of
conduct unbecoming of court employee. The Court stressed the need for circumspect and
proper behavior on the part of court employees. While it may be just for an individual to incur
indebtedness unrestrained by the fact that he is a public officer or employee, caution should be
taken to prevent the occurrence of dubious circumstances that might inevitably impair the
image of the public office. Employees of the court should always keep in mind that the court is
regarded by the public with respect. Certainly, to preserve decency within the judiciary, court
personnel must comply with just contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical
standards. Like all other court personnel, Olegario is expected to be a paragon of uprightness,
fairness and honesty not only in all his official conduct but also in his personal actuations,
including business and commercial transactions, so as to avoid becoming his court’s albatross of
infamy. The penalty imposed by the law is not directed at Olegario’s private life, but at his
actuation unbecoming a public official. Fernando P. Chan vs. Joven T. Olegario, Process Server,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Iligan City, A.M. No. P-09-2714, December 6, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Respondent Genabe, a court staff, continued to render service
despite her 30-day suspension and has quarrelsome deportment. Respondent is guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and conduct unbecoming of a court
employee. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with the dispensation of justice,
from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk must be characterized with propriety and decorum.
Also, every “official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, like
the Court of Appeals, from the Presiding Justice to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Atty. Jonna M. Escabarte, et al. vs. Ms.
Loida Marcelina J. Genabe / Ms. Loida Marcelina J. Genabe vs. Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, et
al., A.M. No. P-09-2602, December 1, 2010.
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Court personnel; dishonesty. Respondent Manubag falsified her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) in
connection with her application for the position of clerk of court by stating therein that she was
a Bachelor of Science in Commerce graduate when in fact she was not. Dishonesty means a
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray. The significance of accomplishing PDS with utmost honesty cannot be
overemphasized. It is a requirement under Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection
with one’s employment in the government. Thus, the making of false statements in completing
the PDS is intimately connected with such employment. Making erroneous entries to
accomplish the PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document. Dishonesty
and falsification are considered grave offenses for which the extreme penalty of dismissal from
the service of employees found guilty of such offenses is prescribed even for the first
offense. Retired employee, MTC, Sibonga, Cebu vs. Merlyn G. Manubag, Clerk of Court II,
MTC, A.M. No. P-10-2833. December 14, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty and gross misconduct. Respondents, clerks of court, failed to
deposit collections and tampered deposit slips. Respondents are guilty of dishonesty and gross
misconduct, which are grave offenses punishable by dismissal. The Clerk of Court performs a
very delicate function. He or she is the custodian of the court’s funds and revenues, records,
property and premises. Being the custodian thereof, the Clerk of Court is liable for any loss,
shortage, destruction or impairment of said funds and property. Hence, Clerks of Court have
always been reminded of their duty to immediately deposit the various funds received by them
to the authorized government depositories, for they are not supposed to keep the funds in their
custody. The same should be deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the City,
Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where the court is located. Delayed remittance of cash
collections by Clerks of Court and cash clerks constitutes gross neglect of duty. The failure of a
public officer to remit funds upon demand by an authorized officer shall be prima
facie evidence that the public officer has put such missing funds or property to personal
use. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Juliet C. Banag, Clerk of Court and Ms. Evelyn R.
Galvez, Interpreter etc., A.M. No. P-09-2638, December 7, 2010.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. Respondent sheriff levied upon a personal property not
belonging to the judgment debtor. He was found guilty of simple misconduct. The sheriff cannot
and should not be the one to determine which property to levy if the judgment obligor cannot
immediately pay because it is the judgment obligor who is given the option to choose which
property or part thereof may be levied upon to satisfy the judgment. It was improper for
respondent to have enforced the writ of execution on a property that did not belong to the
judgment debtor/obligor. Respondent evidently failed to perform his duty with utmost diligence.
“Misconduct” is defined as any unlawful conduct, on the part of a person concerned in the
administration of justice, prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the
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cause. It generally means wrongful, improper, unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose. Crispin Sarmiento vs. Luisito P. Mendiola, Sheriff III,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila, A.M. No. P-07-2383. December 15, 2010
Court personnel; simple neglect. A sheriff’s duty in the execution of a writ issued by a court is
purely ministerial. When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence
of instructions, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its
mandate. Sheriff’s must exert every effort to see to it that the final stage in the litigation process
– the execution of a judgment – is carried out in order to ensure a speedy and efficient
administration of justice. A decision left unexecuted or indefinitely delayed due to their
inefficiency renders it useless. Worse, parties prejudiced by the inaction tend to condemn the
entire judicial system for the lapse.
Respondent Deputy Sheriff Velasco failed to implement the writ of execution and submit period
report as required by Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. His acts show his lack of
diligence and zeal in the performance of his duties. By his actuations, he displayed conduct
short of the stringent standards required of Court employees. The Court found him liable for
simple neglect of duty, which has been defined as the failure of an employee to give one’s
attention to a task expected of him, signifying a disregard of duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference. German Agunday vs. Lemuel B. Velasco,A.M. No. P-05-2003, December 6, 2010.
Government lawyers; prohibition against private practice. As a rule, government lawyers are not
allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession during their incumbency. By way
of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the
following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law;
and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official
functions. The last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 6713 provides an exception to the
exception. In case of lawyers separated from the government service who are covered under
subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice
law in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers,
after leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility is the term “intervene” which we previously interpreted
to include an act of a person who has the power to influence the proceedings. Otherwise stated,
to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent
must have accepted engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office,
he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with
the sales application covering Manuel’s land when the former was still a member of the
Committee on Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent
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was engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent
was limited only in the preparation of a single document and private practice of law
contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self
to the public as a lawyer. Jovito S. Olazo vs. Justice Dante O. Tinga (Ret.), A.M. No. 10-5-7-
SC. December 7, 2010.
Government lawyers; promoting private interests. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits a lawyer in the government service from using his or her public position
to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to
interfere with his or her public duties. The restriction extends to all government lawyers who use
their public offices to promote their private interests. Promotion of private interest includes
soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or
her office, or may be affected by the functions of his or her office. Private interest is not limited
to direct interest, but extends to advancing the interest of relatives. We also ruled that private
interest interferes with public duty when the respondent uses the office and his or her
knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives.
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof
that the respondent (retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga) abused his position
as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the manner defined under
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Jovito S. Olazo vs. Justice Dante O. Tinga
(Ret.), A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC. December 7, 2010.
Judge; making untruthful statements. Respondent Judge failed to indicate in his Certificates of
Service for May and June 2005 his absences. Canon 3 generally mandates that a judge should
perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence. Rule 3.01 requires that a
judge be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence, while Rule 3.09 commands
a judge to observe high standards of public service and fidelity at all times. A judge’s submission
of false certificates of service seriously undermines and reflects on the honesty and integrity
expected of an officer of the court. This is so because a certificate of service is not merely a
means to one’s paycheck but is an instrument by which the Court can fulfill the constitutional
mandate of the people’ s right to a speedy disposition of cases. Respondent Judge is guilty of
making untruthful statements in his Certificates of Service. Atty. Norlinda R. Amante-Descallar vs.
Judge Reinerio [Abraham] B. Ramas, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2015. December 15, 2010.
Judge; misconduct. Judge Maceda was accused of mishandling the court’s training fund
obtained from the local government because of lack of liquidation report. Judge cannot be held
liable. Nevertheless, in view of the nature of the fund, which required no liquidation and is not
an accountable judicial fund), the Court believed that the Judge should have taken steps—such
as informing the court staff or filing of a report with the Office of Court Administrator—on how
the fund was handled. This precautionary move would have placed the Judge above any
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suspicion of impropriety. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all their activities. Atty. Jonna M. Escabarte, et al. vs. Ms. Loida Marcelina J. Genabe / Ms. Loida
Marcelina J. Genabe vs. Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, et al.,A.M. No. P-09-2602, December 1,
2010.
Judge; undue delay in rendering decision. Respondent Judge Asdala violated the 90-day
reglementary period for rendering decisions. Respondent judge is guilty of undue delay in
rendering a decision. Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution requires judges to decide all
cases within three (3) months from the date of submission. This Constitutional policy is
reiterated in Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that a judge
should administer justice impartially and without delay; and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the same
Code provides that a judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods. The 90-day period is mandatory. Failure to decide cases within the
reglementary period constitutes a ground for administrative liability except when there are valid
reasons for the delay. The raison d’etre behind the rule on mandatory compliance with the
constitutionally prescribed periods is that the honor and integrity of the judiciary is measured
not only by the fairness and correctness of the decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency
with which disputes are resolved. Thus, judges must perform their official duties with utmost
diligence if public confidence in the judiciary is to be preserved. There is no excuse for
mediocrity in the performance of judicial functions. The position of judge exacts nothing less
than faithful observance of the law and the Constitution in the discharge of official
duties. Carmen Edaño vs. G. Asdala, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2007. December 6, 2010.
Attorney; dishonesty. Respondent was accused of filing various pleadings on behalf of parties
who were already deceased. To all attorneys, truthfulness and honesty have the highest value,
for, as the Court has said in Young v. Batuegas: “A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore
upon his admission to the Bar that he will ‘do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in
court’ and he shall ‘conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.’ He should bear in mind
that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and
the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts,
on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and
pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client’s rights and is
expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client’s cause, his conduct must never be at
the expense of truth.” Respondent lawyer was found not liable as he had disclosed in a
pleading the death of the deceased parties and the fact that he was representing the successors
in interest of the deceased parties. Jessie R. De Leon vs. Atty. Eduardo G. Castelo, A.C. No.
8620, January 12, 2011.
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Court personnel; conduct prejudicial to service. The respondents were accused of failing to
serve a court order and delaying the issuance and implementation of the writ of execution. Due
to this negligence, the writ’s implementation was delayed for almost two years, thereby gave the
defendants sufficient time to conceal and/or dissipate their assets to thwart plaintiffs’ efforts to
recover in full the judgment awarded to them. Court employees bear the burden of observing
exacting standards of ethics and morality. This is the price one pays for the honor of working in
the judiciary. Those who are part of the machinery dispensing justice, from the presiding judge
to the lowliest clerk, must conduct themselves with utmost decorum and propriety to maintain
the public’s faith and respect for the judiciary. Respondents were held guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the interest of the service. Judge Philbert I. Iturralde, et al. vs. OIC Branch Clerk of
Court Babe SJ. Ramirez, et al., A.M. No. P-03-1730, January 18, 2011.
Court personnel; dereliction of duty. Respondent received sheriff’s fees without court approval,
accepted monthly allowance in the course of the performance of his duties and engaged in
moonlighting activities by assisting in the collection of rents for one of the parties. Respondent is
guilty of dereliction of duty. A sheriff may collect fees for his expenses from the party requesting
the execution of a writ but only in accordance with the procedure laid down Section 9, Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, i.e., subject to the approval of the court. Moreover, sheriffs are not
allowed to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their
duties. To do so would be inimical to the best interest of the service because even assuming
arguendo such payments were indeed given and received in good faith, this fact alone would
not dispel the suspicion that such payments were made for less than noble purposes. Sheriffs
cannot receive gratuities or voluntary payments from parties they are ordered to assist. Court
personnel shall not accept any fee or remuneration beyond what they receive or are entitled to
in their official capacity. Furthermore, respondent received money for extra work he rendered.
Respondent’s defense that he is not using government time in doing his duties is not tenable
considering that there is a prohibition for all officials and employees of the judiciary to engage
directly in any private business, vocation or profession even outside office hours. Respondent’s
acts can be considered as moonlighting, which, though not normally considered as a serious
misconduct, amounts to malfeasance in office. Reina Edenlyne Garcia vs. Robert V. Alejo, Sheriff
IV, RTC, Br. 142, Makati City, A.M. No. P-09-2627, January 26, 2011.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Respondent failed to (1) immediately account for and return the
excess in the cash bond she received; (2) issue appropriate receipts; (3) safekeep monies
received; and, (4) remit/deposit cash bonds in the government depository upon receipt. The
Court ruled that these constituted dishonesty and grave misconduct for which she deserves to be
dismissed from the service. Dishonesty is any act which shows lack of integrity or a disposition
to defraud, cheat, deceive or betray. It consists of an intent to violate the truth, in a matter of fact
relevant to one’s office or connected with the performance of his duties. Office of the Court
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Administrator vs. Marissa U. Angeles, etc./ Judge Analie C. Aldea-Arocena vs. Marissa U.
Angeles, etc., A.M. No. P-11-2887/A.M. No. P-10-2880, January 18, 2011.
Court personnel; dishonesty. The OCA audit team found that there were shortages in the
Judiciary Development Fund and Fiduciary Fund. Respondents admitted making false entries in
the receipts but justify their actions by saying that they were just following the orders of their
superior. The Court found them guilty of dishonesty. A cash clerk is an accountable officer
entrusted with the great responsibility of collecting money belonging to the funds of the court
and, thus, considered as public funds. It was incumbent upon them to be more circumspect and
discerning in performing their assigned tasks, even in the seemingly inconsequential details –
such as making sure that there was a carbon paper to make duplicate and triplicate copies when
issuing receipts. Moreover, restitution of the missing amount does not erase their liability. A
public servant is expected to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity,
and should be made accountable to all those whom he serves. There is no place in the judiciary
for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. Report of
the Financial Audit Conducted on the Books of Account of Sonia L. Dy and Atty. Graciano D.
Cuanico, Jr., RTC, Catarman Northern Samar/Virgilio O. Gallano vs. Atty. Graciano D. Cuanico,
Jr., Clerk of Court and Sonia L. Dy, Social Welfare Officer II etc., A.M. No. P-07-2364/A.M. No.
P-11-2902. January 25, 2011.
Court personnel; dishonesty. The OCA audit team discovered unreported and unremitted
collections that respondent made in connection with his duties. The Court found him guilty for
dishonesty and grave misconduct. He violated OCA Circular 50-95, which states that “all
collections from bail bonds, rental deposits, and other fiduciary collections shall be deposited
within 24 hours by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the Land Bank of
the Philippines.” Likewise, he violated OCA Circular 26-97, which directed judges and clerks
of court to compel collecting officials to strictly comply with the provisions of the Auditing and
Accounting Manual citing Article VI, Sections 61 and 113 which required collecting officers to
promptly issue official receipts for all money received by them. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Victorio A. Dion, Former Clerk of Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San
Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan, A.M. No. P-10-2799, January 18, 2011.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. An Information was filed against respondent for possession
of dangerous drugs. Consequently, an administrative complaint was filed against him. The Court
defines misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave
if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to
disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished
from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as
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an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who
unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for
another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. An act need not be tantamount to a
crime for it to be considered as grave misconduct as in fact, crimes involving moral turpitude
are treated as a separate ground for dismissal under the Administrative Code. Respondent
committed grave misconduct which, under Section 52 (A)(3), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases, is a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first offense. Office
of the Court Administrator vs. Claudio M. Lopez, Process Server, MTC, Sudipen. La Union,A.M.
No. P-10-2788, January 18, 2011.
Court personnel; gross misconduct. Respondent sheriff refused to take any sincere effort to
implement the Writ of Execution in order to compel the complainant to agree to his demand for
a 35% share in whatever may be collected. The Court found the respondent guilty of gross
misconduct. Time and again, the Court has pointed out the heavy burden and responsibility
which court personnel are saddled with in view of their exalted positions as keepers of the
public faith. They should, therefore, be constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety,
misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. Those who
work in the judiciary must adhere to high ethical standards to preserve the courts’ good name
and standing. They should be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency, and they
must discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence, since they are officers of the
court and agents of the law. Indeed, any conduct, act or omission on the part of those who
would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the
faith of the people in the judiciary shall not be countenanced. Office of the Court Administrator
vs. Jose M. Ramano, Deputy Sheriff, Regional Trial Court, Branch 140, Makati City, A.M. No. P-
90-488. January 25, 2011.
Court personnel; gross neglect of duty. The settled rule is that a clerk of court is grossly negligent
for his or her failure to promptly remit or deposit cash collections with the local or nearest Land
Bank of the Philippines Branch, in accordance with Court administrative circulars and issuances.
No protestation of good faith can override the mandatory observance of court circulars which
are designed to promote full accountability of government funds. Restitution of the amount of
the shortages does not erase administrative liability. Office of the Court Administrator vs.
Merlinda T. Cuachon and Fe P. Alejano, Court Stenographer, MCTC, Ilog-Candoni, Negros
Occidental, A.M. No. P-06-2179, January 12, 2011.
Court personnel; misconduct. Respondent sheriff levied on the trucks of the complainant even if
the notice of levy was addressed to another person. The complainant claimed ownership of the
trucks but the respondent sheriff went ahead with the levy without taking steps to first ascertain
the trucks’ ownership. Well-settled is the rule that “[t]he duty of a sheriff in enforcing writs of
execution is ministerial and not discretionary.” However, “errors in the levy of properties do not
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necessarily give rise to liability if circumstances exist showing that the erroneous levy was done
in good faith.” In the instant case however, the conduct of respondent is inexcusable. The facts
clearly show that the two (2) trucks seized by her did not belong to the addressee of the notice
but to herein complainant. What is more, she could have acted in good faith and checked from
the LTO the identity of the registered owners of the said vehicles before proceeding with their
seizure. Respondent is guilty of misconduct in the discharge of her functions. Misconduct is a
transgression of an established rule of action. More particularly, misconduct is the unlawful
behavior of a public officer. It means the “intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a
rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official.” In order for
misconduct to constitute an administrative offense, it should be related to or connected with the
performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. Corazon Tenorio,
represented by Imelda Tenorio-Ortiz vs. Alyn C. Perlas, Sheriff III, A.M. No. P-10-2817, January
26, 2011.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. Respondent failed to reflect in the minutes of the
hearing the correct documentary evidence marked. A court interpreter is duty-bound to prepare
and sign the minutes of court sessions which is an important document, for it gives a brief
summary of the events that take place thereat including a statement of the date and time of the
session; the name of the judge, clerk of court, court stenographer, and court interpreter who are
present; the names of the counsel for the parties who appear; the parties presenting evidence;
the names of the witnesses who testified; the documentary evidence marked; and the date of the
next hearing. Failure to reflect in the minutes the correct documentary evidence marked
constitutes simple neglect of duty, defined as the failure to give attention to a task expected of
him and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. Freddy Reyes
vs. Vivian Pabilane, Court Interpreter, MTC, Tagkawayan, Quezon, A.M. No. P-09-2696, January
12, 2011.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. Respondent clerk of court failed to detect the
irregularities committed by the court employees in handling the court funds. The Clerk of Court
is primarily accountable for all funds that are collected for the court, whether personally
received by him or by a duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision and control. Being
the custodian of the court’s funds, revenues, and records, the Clerk of Court is likewise liable for
any loss, shortage, destruction, or impairment of said funds and property. The Court held that
his failure to properly supervise and manage the financial transactions in his court constituted
simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is the failure to give attention to a task, or the
disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. As the Court has pronounced in the past,
even simple neglect of duty lessens the people’s confidence in the judiciary and, ultimately, in
the administration of justice. Thus, the Court cannot allow those who commit this offense to
escape liability. Report of the Financial Audit Conducted on the Books of Account of Sonia L.
Dy and Atty. Graciano D. Cuanico, Jr., RTC, Catarman Northern Samar/Virgilio O. Gallano vs.
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Atty. Graciano D. Cuanico, Jr., Clerk of Court and Sonia L. Dy, Social Welfare Officer II
etc., A.M. No. P-07-2364/A.M. No. P-11-2902. January 25, 2011.
Judges; administrative Proceedings against judges; how instituted. Section 1, Rule 140 provides
three ways by which administrative proceedings against judges may be instituted: (1) motu
proprio by the Supreme Court; (2) upon verified complaint with affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said
allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous complaint supported by public records of indubitable
integrity. An unverified complaint against a judge, where the facts alleged are disputed or are
not easily verifiable from public records, will generally be dismissible for being
unsubstantiated. Re: Letter-complaint of Atty. Ariel Samson C. Cayetuna, et al., all employees of
Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias against Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias, CA –
Mindanao Station, A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-127-CA-J. January 11, 2011.
Administrative proceedings; substantial evidence required. As correctly pointed out by the

Investigating Judge, to sustain a finding of administrative culpability, only substantial evidence is
required. The present case is an administrative case, not a criminal case, against
respondent. Therefore, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, and the
dismissal of the criminal case against the respondent in an administrative case is not a ground
for the dismissalof the administrative case. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Claudio M.
Lopez, Process Server, MTC, Sudipen. La Union, A.M. No. P-10-2788, January 18, 2011.
Judge; burden of proof. It is well-settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof
that respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant. Re: Letter-
complaint of Atty. Ariel Samson C. Cayetuna, et al., all employees of Associate Justice Michael P.
Elbinias against Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias, CA – Mindanao Station, A.M. OCA IPI No.
08-127-CA-J. January 11, 2011.
Judge; burden of proof. The respondent Justice and court employee were charged of corruption.
Where one seeks the imposition of a penalty upon a judicial officer or magistrate on the ground
of corruption, it behooves him/her to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt, for the
general rules with regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal cases apply. The Court ruled
that the corruption charges were not proved by sufficient evidence. It emphasized that while the
Court will never tolerate or condone any act, conduct or omission that would violate the norms
of public accountability or diminish the people’s faith in the judiciary, neither will it hesitate to
reject suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice. Re: Anonymous Letter Relative to the Alleged Corruption in the Court of Appeals,
Cagayan de Oro City, A.M. No. 07-6-14-CA, January 18, 2011.
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Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Respondent was charged with gross ignorance of the law for
reversing motu proprio a final and executory order rendered by another court ten years earlier.
The Court ruled that the respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He failed to conform
to the high standards of competence required of judges under the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge exhibits an utter lack of know-how with
the rules or with settled jurisprudence, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of
our courts. It is highly crucial that judges be acquainted with the law and basic legal principles.
Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one – not even
judges. Imelda R. Marcos vs. Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan,A.M. No. RTJ-07-2062. January 18,
2011.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Respondent judge failed to cause the raffle of an injunction
case and failed to follow the procedural requirements in issuing a TRO and a writ of preliminary
injunction as he issued them without prior notice to the defendant and without a hearing. The
Court found respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law and procedure. Though not
every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law or of the rules, and that, when committed in
good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, the rule applies only in cases within the
parameters of tolerable misjudgment. When the law or the rule is so elementary, not to be
aware of it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. A judge is
expected to keep abreast of the developments and amendments thereto, as well as of prevailing
jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice. In the
absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action. However, the assailed judicial acts must not be in gross violation
of clearly established law or procedure, which every judge must be familiar with. Spouses
Democrito and Olivia Lago vs. Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr., RTC, Br. 43. Gingoog City, A.M.
No. RTJ-10-2255, January 17, 2011.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Respondent judges, without authority, took cognizance of
cases pending before another court in the absence of a presiding judge for that court. The Court
held that they were guilty of gross ignorance of the law. While they might have been motivated
by noble intentions in taking cognizance of the pending cases because they wanted to uphold
the accused’s right to liberty, they still cannot escape liability. However well-intentioned they
might have been, they still did not have the authority to act on the cases as these were not
pending before their respective salas. Their lack of authority was so patent and so self-evident;
to disregard it would itself be ignorance of the law. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge
Benjamin P. Estrada, RTC, Br. 9, Malaybalay, Bukidnon and Judge Josefina Gentiles-Bacal, RTC,
Br 10, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2173, January 18, 2011.
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Judge; gross incompetence and inefficiency. Respondent judge failed to decide 102 criminal
cases and 43 civil cases within the reglementary period. As a general principle, rules
prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are
considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and
speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as
mandatory. In the same vein, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is emphatic
in enjoining judges to administer justice without delay by disposing of the court’s business
promptly and deciding cases within the period prescribed by law. Corollary to this,
Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999, requires all judges to scrupulously
observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases, because failure to comply
therewith violates the constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition of the cases. Only
in certain meritorious cases, that is, those involving difficult questions of law or complex issues,
may a longer period to decide the case be allowed but only upon proper application for
extension of the period has been made by the concerned judge. Respondent judge is guilty of
gross incompetence and gross inefficiency. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Former Judge
Leonardo L. Leonida of the RTC, Br. 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2198. January 18,
2011.
Judge; impropriety. Respondent judge sent a letter, in his official letterhead, to one of the parties
in a case pending before his own court, inviting the latter to a conference to discuss the case.
The Court found the respondent guilty of impropriety. Employees of the court have no business
meeting with litigants or their representatives under any circumstance. This prohibition is more
compelling when it involves a judge who, because of his position, must strictly adhere to the
highest tenets of judicial conduct; a judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity
and independence. Mansueta Rubin vs. Judge Jose Aguirre, Jr., RTC, Br. 55, Himamaylan,
Negros Occidental, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2267, January 19, 2011.
Judge; gross misconduct. Respondent judge obtained commodity and cash loans from the
complainant for the construction of his home. Respondent judge pleaded innocence reasoning
that the loans were obtained when there was no case pending in his sala where the complainant
is a party. The above disclaimer notwithstanding, the Court held that respondent judge is guilty
of gross misconduct. Respondent judge violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Although at
the time he and his family had business dealings with complainant there was no pending case
involving the businessman, he should have been more circumspect in securing the construction
materials. The sphere of complainant’s business operations was within his territorial
jurisdiction. As the OCA aptly noted, “it is neither impossible nor remote that a case might be
filed in his court with complainant as a party. In such a case, his (respondent) business and
financial dealings with complainant would create a doubt about his fairness and impartiality in
deciding the case and would tend to corrode the respect and dignity of the court.” In addition,
the Court found that Judge respondent committed impropriety in talking with litigants outside
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court proceedings. His improper conduct was further aggravated by the fact that these
conversations took place in the absence of the opposing litigants and/or the opposing
counsel. Time and again, the Court have emphasized that judges are expected to conduct
themselves in a manner that would enhance respect and confidence of the people in the judicial
system. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges
must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid any
appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people’s faith in the
Judiciary. These standards apply not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which
the decision is made. Victoriano Sy vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-09-2189,
January 18, 2011.
Judge; gross misconduct. Respondent committed acts unbecoming of a judge, in particular,

talking to a prospective litigant in his court, recommending a lawyer to the litigant, and
preparing a motion for the litigant, which pleading was filed in his court and was acted upon by
him. The conduct of a judge should be beyond reproach and reflective of the integrity of his
office. Indeed, as stated by the OCA, the said acts of respondent violate Section 1 of Canon 2
(Integrity), Section 2 of Canon 3 (Impartiality), and Section 1 of Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. The aforementioned acts of respondent
constitute gross misconduct. “Misconduct” means a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, wilful in character, improper or wrong behavior. “Gross” has been
defined as “out of all measure, beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to
be excused.” Florenda V. Tobias vs. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., MCTC, Valladolid, Negros
Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1734, January 19, 2011.
Judge; gross misconduct; penalty. Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross
misconduct constituting a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct as a serious charge. Under
Section 11 of the same Rule, the respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be meted any
of the following sanctions: (1) Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits
as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or reappointment to any
public office; (2) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
months but not exceeding six months; or (3) A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00. Victoriano Sy vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Br. 24, Koronadal
City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2189, January 18, 2011.
Judge; insubordination; simple misconduct. Some court personnel’s bundy cards were punched-
in even though they were in fact absent. Respondent judge failed to investigate the bundy cards
incident from the time the leader of the judicial audit team had reported it to him in his capacity
as the Acting Executive Judge and despite an order from the OCA for him to do so. Section 3,
Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary directs a judge to take
or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for
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unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware. This imperative duty
becomes the more urgent when the act or omission the court personnel has supposedly
committed is in the nature of a grave offense, like the bundy-cards incident involved herein. For
disobeying or ignoring the directive to investigate the bundy-cards incident, respondent judge is
guilty of insubordination, an omission that constitutes simple misconduct. In re: Report on the
Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Br. 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and Report
on the Incident at Br. 49, Same Court, A.M. No. 08-4-253-RTC, January 12, 2011.
Judge; misconduct. Office of the Court Administrator uncovered the mismanagement of the
records of Urdaneta RTC Branch 45 presided by respondent judge. An orderly and efficient case
management system is no doubt essential in the expeditious disposition of judicial caseloads,
because only thereby can the judges, branch clerks of courts, and the clerks-in-charge of the
civil and criminal dockets ensure that the court records, which will be the bases for rendering
the judgments and dispositions, and the review of the judgments and dispositions on appeal, if
any, are intact, complete, updated, and current. Such a system necessarily includes the regular
and continuing physical inventory of cases to enable the judge to keep abreast of the status of
the pending cases and to be informed that everything in the court is in proper order. In contrast,
mismanaged or incomplete records, and the lack of periodic inventory definitely cause
unwanted delays in litigations and inflict unnecessary expenses on the parties and the State.
Although the presiding judge and his or her staff share the duty of taking a continuing and
regular inventory of cases, the responsibility primarily resides in the presiding judge. The judge
should not forget that he or she is duty-bound to perform efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable
promptness all his or her judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions.
Respondent judge is of simple misconduct. In re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and Report on the Incident at Br. 49, Same
Court, A.M. No. 08-4-253-RTC, January 12, 2011.
Judge; undue delay in the disposition of cases. The respondent judge failed to resolve the case
within the 90-day reglementary period. No less than the Constitution sets the limits on this all-
important aspect in the administration of justice. It mandates that lower courts have three (3)
months or ninety (90) days within which to decide cases or matters submitted to them for
resolution. Also, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to dispose of the Court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the prescribed period. It cannot be over emphasized that
judges need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously. Delay in the disposition of cases is a
major cause in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the justice system. For this
fundamental and compelling reason, judges are required to decide cases and resolve motions
with dispatch within the reglementary period. Failure to comply constitutes gross inefficiency, a
lapse that warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions against the erring
magistrate. Prosecutor Hilario Ronson H. Tilan vs. Judge Ester Piscoso-Flor, RTC, Br. 34, Banaue,
Ifugao, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2188, January 10, 2011.
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Administrative proceedings; compromise agreements. The compromise agreement between

complainant and respondent, or the fact that complainant already forgave respondent, does not
necessarily warrant the dismissal of the administrative case. Three reasons justify the
continuation of the administrative matter despite the compromise agreement or the
forgiveness. One, the Court’s disciplinary authority is not dependent on or cannot be frustrated
by the private arrangements entered into by the parties; otherwise, the prompt and fair
administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, will be undermined. Two,
public interest is at stake in the conduct and actuations of the officials and employees of the
Judiciary. Accordingly, the efforts of the Court in improving the delivery of justice to the people
should not be frustrated and put to naught by any private arrangements between the parties.
And, three, the Court’s interest in the affairs of the Judiciary is a paramount concern that bows to
no limits. Benigno B. Reas v. Carlos M. Relacion, A.M. No. P-05-2095. February 9, 2011.
Administrative Proceedings; substantial evidence. Bayani was charged with dishonesty for
failure to disclose in her Personal Data Sheet that she was previously admonished in an
administrative case. Bayani invoked good faith as her defense. The Court ruled that while her
defense of good faith may be difficult to prove as clearly it is a question of intention, a state of
mind, erroneous judgment on the part of Bayani does not, however, necessarily connote the
existence of bad faith, malice, or an intention to defraud. In administrative proceedings, only
substantial evidence is required to warrant disciplinary sanctions. Substantial evidence is
defined as relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Thus, after much consideration of the facts and circumstances, while the Court has
not shied away in imposing the strictest penalty to erring employees, neither can it think and
rule unreasonably in determining whether an employee deserves disciplinary sanction. Bayani
was admonished and warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant the
imposition of a mere severe penalty. Re: Anonymous Complaint against Ms. Hermogena F.
Bayani for Dishonesty, A.M. No. 2007-22-SC. February 1, 2011.
Attorney; gross misconduct. While respondent’s five-year suspension from the practice of law on
account of an earlier administrative case was still in effect, she appeared and actively
participated in at least three cases where she misrepresented herself as “Atty. Leizl Tanglao”
when in fact her name is Luna B. Avance. She then refused to heed two orders from the SC for
her to answer the new charge against her for which she was found guilty of indirect contempt
and fined in the amount of P30,000. However, the respondent failed to pay the fine imposed. In
view of the foregoing, the Court found the respondent unfit to continue as a member of the bar.
As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer’s duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court.
The highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer’s obedience to court
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orders and processes. Here, respondent’s conduct evidently fell short of what is expected of her
as an officer of the court as she obviously possesses a habit of defying the Court’s
orders. Failure to comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination or
disrespect which merits a lawyer’s suspension or even disbarment. Teresita D. Santeco v. Atty.
Luna B. Avance, A.C. No. 5834. February 22, 2011.
Attorneys; plagiarism. The rule exonerating judges from charges of plagiarism applies also to
lawyers. Although as a rule they receive compensation for every pleading or paper they file in
court or for every opinion they render to clients, lawyers also need to strive for technical
accuracy in their writings. They should not be exposed to charges of plagiarism in what they
write so long as they do not depart, as officers of the court, from the objective of assisting the
Court in the administration of justice. In matter of the charges of plagiarism, etc. against
Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC. February 8, 2011.
Attorney; willful disobedience of lawful orders of court. Respondent willfully disobeyed the
Court when she continued her law practice despite the five-year suspension order against her
and even misrepresented herself to be another person in order to evade said penalty. Thereafter,
when she was twice ordered to comment on her continued law practice while still suspended,
nothing was heard from her despite receipt of two Resolutions from this Court. Neither did she
pay the P30,000.00 fine imposed in the September 29, 2009 Resolution. Under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from office as an
attorney for gross misconduct and/or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court. In repeatedly disobeying the Court’s orders, respondent proved herself unworthy of
membership in the Philippine Bar. Worse, she remains indifferent to the need to reform
herself. Clearly, she is unfit to discharge the duties of an officer of the court and deserves the
ultimate penalty of disbarment. Teresita D. Santeco v. Atty. Luna B. Avance, A.C. No.
5834. February 22, 2011.
Court personnel; dishonesty. In her Personal Data Sheet, Bayani stated that she was never
convicted of any administrative offense, when in fact in 1995, she was admonished, in a
Memorandum issued by the Office of Administrative Services – Office of the Court
Administrator (OAS-OCA) but signed by then Chief Justice Narvasa, for being remiss in the
performance of her duties. Bayani explained that it was due to her understanding that there was
no conviction on the administrative case against her, because she was merely admonished and
warned therein. The Court ruled that Bayani is not guilty of dishonesty. Dishonesty is defined as
intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to
practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or
promotion. Thus, dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence.
Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of
dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances which gave rise
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to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was
committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the
consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. While
Bayani made an erroneous judgment in choosing not to disclose her previous infraction, she
cannot be blamed for believing that such was irrelevant to: (1) question no. 25 – for this incident
had long been resolved and is no longer pending; and (2) question no. 27 – for clearly being
admonished and warned for being remiss in the performance of her duties do not necessarily
equate to conviction as question no. 27 seeks to determine. Re: Anonymous Complaint against
Ms. Hermogena F. Bayani for Dishonesty, A.M. No. 2007-22-SC. February 1, 2011.
Court personnel; falsification. Respondent court personnel, in apparent collusion with the
presiding judge of their court (who passed away before the case was decided), falsified court
records and made it appear that a public prosecutor appeared during the supposed hearings of a
number of cases for annulment of marriage, when, in truth, the prosecutors who supposedly
appeared were either on leave or had already been re-assigned to another station. Falsification
of an official document such as court records is considered a grave offense. It also amounts to
dishonesty. Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Administrative Code of 1987, dishonesty (par. a)
and falsification (par. f) are considered grave offenses warranting the penalty of dismissal from
service upon commission of the first offense. Furthermore, falsification of an official document is
punishable as a criminal offense under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and dishonesty is
an impious act that has no place in the judiciary. Respondents were found guilty of falsification
of official documents and dishonesty and were dismissed from service. Vivian T. Dabu, Asst.
Provincial Prosecutor v. Eduardo Roden E. Kapunan, Presiding Judge, Branch 51 and Acting
Judge, Branch 52, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1600. February 1, 2011.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. The salary check of the complainant was inadvertently
surrendered to respondent. However, respondent failed to immediately return the check to
complainant. Respondent’s failure to immediately return complaint’s salary check was improper
and constituted misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established rule of action, an
unlawful behavior, or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves
any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or disregard of
long-standing rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the
misconduct is only simple. That respondent did not maliciously or deliberately take
complainant’s salary check rendered him liable only for simple misconduct. Under Section 52
(B) (2), Rule IV, of the Revised Uniform Rules On Administrative Cases In the Civil Service,
simple misconduct is a less grave offense with a penalty ranging from suspension for one month
and one day to six months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. Benigno B.
Reas v. Carlos M. Relacion, A.M. No. P-05-2095. February 9, 2011.
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Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. . Respondent sheriff enforced the writ of execution and
evicted the complainant without the required prior notice to vacate. The requirement of a notice
to vacate is based on the rudiments of justice and fair play. A notice be served on the person
against whom the judgment for the delivery or restitution of real property is rendered and all
persons claiming rights under him. It is only when such persons resist after service of notice and
demand to vacate that the sheriff can forcibly enforce the writ by bodily removing them from the
premises. Failure to observe the requirements of Section 10(c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
constitutes simple neglect of duty, which is a less grave offense punishable by one (1) month
and one (1) day to six (6) months suspension. Manuel P. Calaunan v. Reynaldo B. Madolaria,
Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 217, Quezon City, A.M. No. P-10-2810. February 8, 2011.
Judge; delay in disposition of cases. Complainant is the private complainant in a BP 22 case

before the sala of respondent judge. Even as the case was covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure, Respondent judge constantly postponed hearings without valid cause. Respondent
judge is liable for delay in the disposition of cases tantamount to inefficiency and incompetence
in the performance of his official duties. Although the postponement of a hearing in a civil or
criminal case may at times be unavoidable, the Court disallows undue or unnecessary
postponements of court hearings, simply because they cause unreasonable delays in the
administration of justice and, thus, undermine the people’s faith in the Judiciary, aside from
aggravating the financial and emotional burdens of the litigants. For this reason, the Court has
enjoined that postponements and resettings should be allowed only upon meritorious grounds,
and has consistently reminded all trial judges to adopt a firm policy against improvident
postponements. Yet, respondent judge postponed five hearings for lack of material time without
bothering to state the specific causes why his court lacked material time. He also reset four
hearings supposedly upon the agreement of the parties, which the complainant credibly denied
because that was prejudicial to his interest. Respondent judge cited the absence of the public
prosecutor in one hearing and of the PAO lawyer in two hearings as justifications for the
cancellation of the hearings. Such excuses for delay were not credible, however, for he could
have summoned a relief prosecutor and a relief PAO attorney, or made arrangements for their
attendance pursuant to the Court’s Circular 1-89 (dated January 19, 1989) to avoid unnecessary
postponements. Daniel G. Sevilla v. Judge Francisco S. Lindo, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
55, Malabon City, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1714. February 9, 2011.
Judge; delay in disposition of cases. Respondent judge failed to resolve a motion within the
prescribed period. Respondent judge insisted that the delay was not intentional but simply
brought about by sheer volume of work in his sala. Respondent judge is guilty of undue delay in
resolving a motion. The Court has consistently held that failure to decide cases and other
matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition
of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate. Delay in resolving motions and
incidents pending before a judge within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days fixed by the
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Constitution and the law is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. The Court finds no
merit in Respondent judge’s explanation that the reason for the delay in resolving the motion
was the pressure from equally urgent matters in connection with the 800 pending cases before
his sala. Firstly, he is duty-bound to comply with the above-cited rules under the Canons in the
Code of Judicial Conduct, and the administrative guidelines laid down by this Court. Secondly,
the Court is not unmindful of the circumstances that may delay the speedy disposition of cases
assigned to judges, Respondent judge should have seasonably filed a request for an extension to
resolve the subject motion. For failing to do so, he cannot evade administrative liability. Pio
Angelia v. Judge Jesus L. Grageda, RTC, Branch 4, Panabo City, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2220. February
7, 2011.
Judge; failure to comply with SC directives and circulars. Respondent judge failed to file the
required comment as required by the Supreme Court’s show cause resolution in a pending
administrative case against him despite several opportunities given to him. Compliance with the
rules, directives and circulars issued by the Court is one of the foremost duties that a judge
accepts upon assumption to office. The obligation to uphold the dignity of his office and the
institution which he belongs to is also found in Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct under
Rule 2.01 which mandates a judge to behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Under the circumstances, the conduct exhibited by
respondent judge constitutes no less than clear acts of defiance against the Court’s
authority. His conduct also reveals his deliberate disrespect and indifference to the authority of
the Court, shown by his failure to heed our warnings and directives. Respondent judge’s actions
further disclose his inability to accept the Court’s instructions. Moreover, his conduct failed to
provide a good example for other court personnel, and the public as well, in placing
significance to the Court’s directives and the importance of complying with them. Respondent
judge was held administratively liable. Judge Napoleon E. Inoturan, RTC, Branch 133, Makati
City v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., MCTC, Valladolid, San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental/Sancho E. Guinanao v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., MCTC, Valladolid, San
Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362/A.M. No. MTJ-11-
1785. February 22, 2011.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Respondent, a MTC judge, conducted a preliminary
investigation and found probable cause to hold the complainant for trial for the crime of direct
assault. The conduct of preliminary investigation by respondent judge was in direct
contravention of A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, which took effect on 3 October 2005, amending Rules
112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by removing the authority to
conduct preliminary investigations from judges of the first level courts. Thus, under Section 2 of
Rule 112, only the following officers are authorized to conduct preliminary investigations: (a)
Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants; (b) National and Regional State Prosecutors;
and (c) Other officers as may be authorized by law. Clearly, MTC judges are no longer
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authorized to conduct preliminary investigation. The complainant is charged with direct assault
with an imposable penalty of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years. It was therefore incumbent
upon respondent judge to forward the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor for preliminary investigation, instead of conducting the preliminary investigation
himself. When a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law.
Anything less is gross ignorance of the law. Judges should exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules, and should be diligent in keeping abreast
with developments in law and jurisprudence. Respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of
the law. Lydelle L. Conquilla v. Judge Lauro G. Bernardo, MTC, Bocaue, Bulacan, A.M. No. MTJ-
09-1737. February 9, 2011.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Complainant filed a Motion for Inhibition against respondent
judge. Complainant alleged that during the hearing of the Motion for Inhibition, respondent
became very emotional, coerced her to testify without the assistance of counsel and demanded
a public apology from her; and that while she requested to refer the motion to the Executive
Judge, respondent interrogated her relentlessly following which he issued an Order finding her
guilty of Direct Contempt and was detained for 19 days. Respondent judge is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law. The penalty for direct contempt if imprisonment is imposed should not, as
Section 1 of Rule 71 provides, exceed 10 days. In this case, Complainant was detained for 19
days or 9 days more than the limit imposed by the Rules. Moreover, Respondent judge did not
fix the bond, in violation of the same Section 2 of Rule 71, which complainant could have
posted had she desired to challenge the order. And on the same day the Order was issued,
respondent ordered the confinement of complainant to the provincial jail.Josephine Jazmines
Tan v. Judge Sibanah E. Usman, RTC, Branch 29, Catbalogan, Samar, A.M. No. RTJ-11-
2666. February 15, 2011.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Respondent judge, acting as an investigating judge, issued
orders archiving several criminal cases instead of forwarding them to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor for review and appropriate action (this rule is prior to the amendments introduced by
A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC removing from judges of first level courts the authority to conduct
preliminary investigations). The Court found the respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of
the law. A judge owes it to himself and his office to know basic legal principles by heart and to
harness that knowledge correctly and justly, failing which public’s confidence in the courts is
eroded. In issuing the orders archiving the criminal cases, respondent judge failed to consider
that he was acting not as a trial judge but an investigating judge of an MTC whose actions were
thus governed by Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure on preliminary
investigations. He ought to have known that after conducting preliminary investigation on the
criminal cases, it was his duty to transmit his resolution thereon to the provincial or city
prosecutor for appropriate action. His failure to do so betrays an utter lack of familiarity with the
Rules. The complaint against respondent is for gross ignorance of the law in which the acts
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complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence; it must have been
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption the presence of which in the present
case is not clear. Be that as it may, such leeway afforded a judge does not mean that he should
not evince due care in the performance of his adjudicatory functions. Sanctions are still in order
as such lapses in judgment cannot be countenanced. As the Court has repeatedly stressed, a
judge, having applied for the position and appointed as such, is presumed to know the law.
Thus, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. Rene C. Ricablanca v. Judge Hector B. Barillo, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1710. February 15, 2011.
Judge; gross inefficiency. It took respondent judge more than two years to decide an ejectment
case after it was declared submitted for resolution. The delay in deciding a case within the
reglementary period constitutes a violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct which mandates judges to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly and with promptness. In line with jurisprudence, respondent judge
is liable for gross inefficiency for his failure to decide a case within the reglementary
period. Judge Napoleon E. Inoturan, RTC, Branch 133, Makati City v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco,
Jr., MCTC, Valladolid, San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental/Sancho E. Guinanao v.
Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., MCTC, Valladolid, San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362/A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785. February 22, 2011.
Judge; gross misconduct. Respondent judge made or allowed many unreasonable

postponements that inevitably delayed the proceedings and prevented the prompt disposition of
the case out of manifest bias in favor of the accused. Thus, he flagrantly violated the letter and
spirit both of Rule 1.02 of theCode of Judicial Conduct, which enjoined all judges to administer
justice impartially and without delay; and of Canon 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which
required him as a trial judge “to be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him,
remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied.” That his conduct proceeded from his
bias towards the accused rendered his acts and omissions as gross misconduct. It is settled that
the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent
to violate the law, or disregard of long-standing rules, which must be established by substantial
evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Daniel G. Sevilla v. Judge Francisco S. Lindo,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, Malabon City, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1714. February 9, 2011.
Judges; plagiarism. SC Associate Justice Castillo was accused of plagiarism in connection with
the decision he wrote for the Court in the case entitled “Vinuya v. Romulo” (G.R. No. 162230).
The Court dismissed the charges against Justice Castillo. Plagiarism, a term not defined by
statute, has a popular or common definition. To plagiarize, says Webster, is “to steal and pass
off as one’s own” the ideas or words of another. Stealing implies malicious taking. Black’s Law
Dictionary, the world’s leading English law dictionary quoted by the Court in its decision,
defines plagiarism as the “deliberate and knowing presentation of another person’s original
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ideas or creative expressions as one’s own.” The presentation of another person’s ideas as one’s
own must be deliberate or premeditated—a taking with ill intent. While the academic
publishing model is based on the originality of the writer’s thesis, the judicial system is based on
the doctrine of stare decisis, which encourages courts to cite historical legal data, precedents,
and related studies in their decisions. The judge is not expected to produce original scholarship
in every respect. Citing published articles or work of a number of legal writers, the Court ruled
that a judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted from a charge of
plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts published in
a legal periodical or language from a party’s brief are used without giving attribution. Judges are
free to use whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve the matter before them, without
fear of reprisal. This exemption applies to judicial writings intended to decide cases for two
reasons: the judge is not writing a literary work and, more importantly, the purpose of the
writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim
of legal plagiarism. In matter of the charges of plagiarism, etc. against Associate Justice Mariano
C. Del Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC. February 8, 2011.
Judge; propriety. Respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest of the complainant for direct
assault. Upon learning about the warrant, complainant alleged that she called respondent
judge’s wife, who said she would help in having the bail reduced to P6,000.00 and would have
the case for direct assault against herein complainant dismissed provided herein complainant
cancel the wife’s debt ofP35,000.00 and provided that complainant loan the wife an additional
amount of P50,000.00. Respondent judge denied any knowledge of the loan. Though the Court
ruled that the complainant failed to substantiate her claim, nevertheless, the Court notes that
although respondent judge denies knowledge of such transaction between his wife and
complainant, respondent judge did not categorically deny his wife’s debt to complainant. Canon
4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct stresses the importance of propriety and the appearance
of propriety to the performance of all the activities of a judge. Respondent judge should bear in
mind that judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities. Furthermore, judges and members of their families are prohibited from asking for or
accepting any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted
to be done by him in connection with the performance of judicial duties.Lydelle L. Conquilla v.
Judge Lauro G. Bernardo, MTC, Bocaue, Bulacan, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1737. February 9, 2011.
Judge; violation of SC rules, directives, and circulars. Respondent judge granted bail even in the
absence of any written application. Respondent judge invokes the constitutional right of the
accused to bail and Section 17(c), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
does not require that a person be charged in court before he or she may apply for bail. To his
mind, there was already “a constructive bail given that only the papers were needed to
formalize it.” The Court held that respondent judge is guilty of a less serious charge of violation
of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars under Sec. 9, Rule 140. Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the
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Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure allows that any person in custody who is not yet charged
in court “may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is
held.” However, in the case at bar, despite the absence of any written application, respondent
judge verbally granted bail to the accused. Moreover, in clear departure from Sec. 14 of Rule
114, respondent judge verbally ordered the clerk of court to accept the cash deposit as bail, to
earmark an official receipt for the cash deposit, and to date it the following day. The bail should
be deposited in the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal
treasurer. Worse, respondent judge did not require the accused to sign a written undertaking
containing the conditions of the bail under Sec. 2, Rule 114 to be complied with by the
accused. Immediately upon receipt by the clerk of court of the cash deposit of PhP 30,000 from
the accused, respondent judge ordered the police escorts to release the accused without any
written order of release. In sum, there was no written application for bail, no certificate of
deposit from the BIR collector or provincial, city or municipal treasurer, no written undertaking
signed by the accused, and no written release order. As regards the insistence of respondent
judge that such may be considered as “constructive bail,” there is no such species of bail under
the Rules. Despite the noblest of reasons, the Rules of Court may not be ignored at will and at
random to the prejudice of the rights of another. Procedural rules have their own wholesome
rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the
Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality. In this case, the reason of
respondent judge is hardly persuasive enough to disregard the Rules. Gaudencio B. Pantilo III v.
Judge Victor A. Canoy, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2262. February 9, 2011.
Judge; undue delay. Complainant filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal before the sala of
the respondent judge. From the filing of the Motion, a period of more than five (5) months had
to pass before the respondent judge finally directed a writ of execution be issued. However, the
Court ruled that respondent judge is not administratively liable due to the defective notice of
hearing in complainant’s motion. First. Rather than being addressed to the adverse party, the
notice of hearing in complainant’s motion was directed to the Branch Clerk of Court. Such gaffe
actually contradicts a basic purpose of the notice requirement—i.e., to inform an adverse party
of the date and time of the proposed hearing. Second. The notice of hearing did not specify a
date and time of hearing. The notice is merely an instruction for the clerk of court to submit the
motion “for the consideration and approval” of the trial court “immediately upon receipt” or “at
any time convenient” with the said court. Jurisprudence had been categorical in treating a
litigious motion without a valid notice of hearing as a mere scrap of paper. An important aspect
of the above judicial pronouncement is the absence of any duty on the part of the court to take
action on a motion wanting a valid notice of hearing. Accordingly, a judge may not be held
administratively accountable for not acting upon a “mere scrap of paper.” To impose upon
judges a positive duty to recognize and resolve motions with defective notices of hearing would
encourage litigants to an unbridled disregard of a simple but necessary rule of a fair judicial
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proceeding. Marciano Alcaraz v. Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala, Regional Trial Court, Branch 87,
Quezon City, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2272. February 16, 2011.
Judge; undue delay. During a judicial audit, it was discovered that there were many pending
cases before the sala of the respondent judge which were awaiting resolution but were already
beyond the reglementary period. The Supreme Court is aware of the heavy caseloads heaped
on the shoulders of every trial judge. But such cannot excuse him from doing his mandated
duty to resolve cases with diligence and dispatch. Judges burdened with heavy caseloads
should request the Court for an extension of the reglementary period within which to decide
their cases if they think they cannot comply with their judicial duty. Corollarily, a heavy
caseload may excuse a judge’s failure to decide cases within the reglementary period but not
their failure to request an extension of time within which to decide the case on time. Hence, all
that respondent judge needs to do is request for an extension of time over which the Court has,
almost customarily, been considerate. Moreover, it is not enough that he pens his decision; it is
imperative to promulgate the same within the mandated period. The lack of staff that will
prepare and type the decision is equally inexcusable to justify the delay in the promulgation of
the cases. Failure to render decisions and orders within the mandated period constitutes a
violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3, of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which then makes respondent
judge liable administratively. Section 9, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court classifies undue
delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge punishable under Section 11 (B)
of the same Rule. Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 56, Mandaue City, Cebu, A.M. No. 09-7-284-RTC. February 16, 2011.
Administrative Cases Initiated by Supreme Court; procedure. Respondent law professors asked
for alternative reliefs should the Court find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the
Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing and for that purpose, they be allowed to require the
production or presentation of witnesses and evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the plagiarism case against
Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of, and evidence
that were presented or may be presented in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. It should
be clarified that this is not an indirect contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which requires a
hearing) has no application to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause Resolution this
case was docketed as an administrative matter. The rule that is relevant to this controversy is
Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme
Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.—In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme
Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may
refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or
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judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner
provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation shall be
conducted directly by the Supreme Court.
From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation, through a referral
to the specified officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is
only if the Court deems such an investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of
Rule 139-A will be followed. As respondent professors are fully aware, in general,
administrative proceedings do not require a trial type hearing. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty
entitled “Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme
Court,” A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.
Administrative Proceedings; burden of proof. A complaint charging Judge Kapili with Conduct
Unbecoming of a Member of the Judiciary, and Gross Misconduct amounting to Violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct was dismissed because of the failure of the complainant to meet the
burden of proof required in administrative proceedings. Administrative charges against judges
have been viewed by this Court with utmost care, as the respondent stands to face the penalty of
dismissal or disbarment. Thus, proceedings of this character are in their nature highly penal in
character and are to be governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases. The charges
in such case must, therefore, be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Jocelyn Datoon v. Judge
Bethany G. Kapili, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Maasin City, Southern
Leyte, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2247, March 2, 2011.
Attorney; breach of fiduciary duties. Atty. Ricafort’s act of obtaining money from his clients
under the respective pretexts that the amount would be deposited in court and that he would
prepare and file the memorandum for them erected a responsibility to account for and to use the
amounts in accordance with the particular purposes intended. For him to deposit the amount in
his personal account without the consent of the clients and to fail to file the memorandum and
not return the money upon demand, constituted a serious breach of his fiduciary duties as their
attorney. He reneged on his duty to render an accounting to his clients showing that he had
spent the amounts for the particular purposes intended. He was thereby presumed to have
misappropriated the moneys for his own use to the prejudice of his clients and in violation of
the clients’ trust reposed in him. He could not escape liability, for upon failing to use the
moneys for the purposes intended, he should have immediately returned the moneys to his
clients. Atty. Ricafort’s plain abuse of the confidence reposed in him by his clients rendered
him liable for violation of Canon 16, particularly Rule 16.01, supra, and Canon 17, all of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. His acts and actuations constituted a gross violation of
general morality and of professional ethics that impairs public confidence in the legal profession
and deserves punishment. Erlinda R. Tarog v. Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort, A.C. No. 8253, March
15, 2011.
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Clerk of Court; gross inefficiency. Atty. Lometillo utterly failed to perform her duties with the
degree of diligence and competence expected of a clerk of court. The performance of one’s
duties in a perfunctory manner is never justified especially when reliance on employees of
lower rank projects nothing else but gross inefficiency and incompetence. Next to the judge, the
clerk of court is the chief administrative officer charged with preserving the integrity of court
proceedings. A number of non-judicial concerns connected with trial and adjudication of cases
is handled by the clerk of court, demanding a dynamic performance of duties, with the prompt
and proper administration of justice as the constant objective. The nature of the work and of the
office mandates that the clerk of court be an individual of competence, honesty and integrity.
The Clerks of Court perform a very delicate function as custodian of the court’s funds, revenues,
records, property and premises. They wear many hats – those of treasurer, accountant, guard
and physical plant manager of the court, hence, they are “entrusted with the primary
responsibility of correctly and effectively implementing regulations regarding fiduciary funds”
and are thus, “liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and
property.” Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Magdalena L. Lometillo, Former Clerk of
Court VII, Victoria S. Patopaten, Cashier II, Linda C. Guides, Administrative Officer I, Lenny
Gemma P. Castillo, Clerk III, and Brenda M. Linacero, Clerk III, All of Regional Trial Court, Iloilo
City, A.M. No. P-09-2637. March 29, 2011.
Clerk of Court; gross neglect of duty. Atty. Lometillo’s 42-year stint in office provides the Court a
reasonable expectation that she was aware of the consequences that “delay in the remittances of
collections constitutes neglect of duty.” Surely, her long service to the judiciary must have
made her realize the effect of delayed deposit of collections: that the court is deprived of the
interest that may be earned if the amounts are deposited in a bank. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Atty. Magdalena L. Lometillo, Former Clerk of Court VII, Victoria S. Patopaten,
Cashier II, Linda C. Guides, Administrative Officer I, Lenny Gemma P. Castillo, Clerk III, and
Brenda M. Linacero, Clerk III, All of Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City,A.M. No. P-09-2637. March
29, 2011.
Court Personnel; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Bengson should be
liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in view of her act of offering her
services for facilitation of the land transfer papers at the BIR and representing that her half-sister
and niece had the power, influence and capacity to facilitate the titling of subject
property. Bengson’s act begrimed both the image and integrity of her office. At this point, the
Court would like to once again underscore that the conduct of every court personnel must be
beyond reproach and free from suspicion that may cause to sully the image of the judiciary.
They must totally avoid any impression of impropriety, misdeed or misdemeanor not only in the
performance of their official duties but also in conducting themselves outside or beyond the
duties and functions of their office. Every court personnel are enjoined to conduct themselves
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toward maintaining the prestige and integrity of the judiciary for the very image of the latter is
necessarily mirrored in their conduct, both official and otherwise. They must not forget that they
are an integral part of that organ of the government sacredly tasked in dispensing justice. Their
conduct and behavior, therefore, should not only be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility but at all times be defined by propriety and decorum, and above all else beyond
any suspicion. Priscilla L. Hernando v. Juliana Y. Bengson, Legal Researcher, RTC, Branch 104,
Quezon City, A.M. No. P-09-2686. March 28, 2011.
Court Personnel; grave misconduct. Respondent Sheriff’s unilateral and repeated demands for
sums of money from a party-litigant, purportedly to defray the expenses of execution, without
obtaining the approval of the trial court for such purported expense and without rendering to
that court an accounting thereof, in effect, constituted dishonesty and extortion. That conduct,
therefore, fell far too short of the required standards of public service. Such conduct is
threatening to the very existence of the system of the administration of justice. For grave
misconduct, dishonesty and neglect of duty, Archibald C. Verga, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 33, Butuan City, was suspended from office without pay for six months. In Sanga v.
Alcantara, the Court had another occasion to remind sheriffs on the performance of their
duty: Under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the sheriff is required to secure the
court’s prior approval of the estimated expenses and fees needed to implement the court
process. A sheriff is guilty of violating the Rules if he fails to observe the following: (1) prepare
an estimate of expenses to be incurred in executing the writ, for which he must seek the court’s
approval; (2) render an accounting; and (3) issue an official receipt for the total amount he
received from the judgment debtor. The rule requires that the sheriff execute writs or processes
to estimate the expenses to be incurred. Upon the approval of the estimated expenses, the
interested party has to deposit the amount with the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff. The
expenses shall then be disbursed to the executing Sheriff, subject to his liquidation, within the
same period for rendering a return on the process or writ. Any unspent amount shall be
refunded to the party who made the deposit. A sheriff is an officer of the court. As such, he
forms an integral part of the administration of justice, since he is called upon to serve the orders
and writs and execute all processes of the court. As such, he is required to live up to the strict
standards of honesty and integrity in public service. His conduct must at all times be
characterized by honesty and openness and must constantly be above suspicion. Dy Teban
Trading Co., Inc. v. Archibald C. Verga, Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 33 Butuan City, A.M. No. P-11-
2914, March 16, 2011.
Court Personnel; grave misconduct. Respondent Taguba’s act of collecting or receiving money
from a litigant constitutes grave misconduct in office. Grave misconduct is a grave offense that
carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even on a first offense. Court personnel,
from the lowliest employee, are involved in the dispensation of justice; parties seeking redress
from the courts for grievances look upon court personnel, irrespective of rank or position, as part
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of the Judiciary. In performing their duties and responsibilities, these court personnel serve as
sentinels of justice and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and
dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s trust and confidence in this institution. Therefore, they
are expected to act and behave in a manner that should uphold the honor and dignity of the
Judiciary, if only to maintain the people’s confidence in the Judiciary. This expectation is
enforced, among others, by Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
which mandates that “[c]ourt personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based
on any or explicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official
actions.” Section 2(e), Canon III, on the other hand, mandates that “[c]ourt personnel shall
not x x x [s]olicit or accept any gift, loan, gratuity, discount, favor, hospitality or service under
circumstances from which it could reasonably be inferred that a major purpose of the donor is
to influence the court personnel in performing official duties.” The acts addressed are strictly
prohibited to avoid the perception that court personnel can be influenced to act for or against a
party or person in exchange for favors. Milagros Villaceran and Omar T. Miranda v. Judge
Maxwel S. Rosete and Process Server Eugenio Taguba, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2,
Santiago City, Isabela, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1727, March 22, 2011.
Court Personnel; immoral conduct. The sole issue in this case is whether respondents Halasan
and Largo, who admitted to having an illicit relationship with each other, are guilty of
disgraceful and immoral conduct. The Court once again reminds its employees that the image of
a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the women and men who
work in the judiciary, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court employees are
enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and
private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the court of justice. In this
case, we found respondents Halasan and Largo guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct for
which they may be held administratively liable. Presiding Judge Jeoffre W. Acebido, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City v. Ludycissa A. Halasan, Court Stenographer III,
and Joel A. Largo, Utility Worker I, Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City, A.M.
No. P-10-2803. March 30, 2011.
Court Personnel; immorality. This is an administrative complaint for immorality filed against
respondent Gibas and respondent Lintao who were accused of having an illicit relationship.
Court employees should maintain moral righteousness and uprightness in their professional and
private conduct to preserve the integrity and dignity of the courts of justice. Court personnel
should avoid any act of impropriety which tarnishes the honor and dignity of the Judiciary,
thus: Every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty. Like any public servant, he must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not
only in the performance of his official duties but in his personal and private dealings with other
people, to preserve the court’s good name and standing. It cannot be overstressed that the image
of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who
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work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court employees have been enjoined
to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private
conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of courts of justice. Emmanuel M.
Gibas, Jr. v. Ma. Jesusa E. Gibas, Court Stenographer I, Municipal Trial Court, Guiguinto,
Bulacan, and Franconello S. Lintao, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos City,
Bulacan, A.M. No. P-09-2651, March 23, 2011.
Court Personnel; misconduct. Aromin actually interfered with the execution of a valid
certificate of sheriff’s sale in behalf of her friend without regard to the impropriety of her acts
considering that she is a court employee. As a public servant, she should have known that she
is enjoined to uphold public interest over and above personal interest at all times. Employees of
the judiciary should be living examples of uprightness not only in the performance of official
duties but also in their personal and private dealings with other people so as to preserve at all
times the good name and standing of the courts in the community. The image of the court, as
being a true temple of justice, is aptly mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men
and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowliest of its
personnel. Angelina C. Lim and Vivian M. Gaduang v. Maribeth G. Aromin, Records Officer I,
OCC, MTC, Meycauayan, Bulacan, A.M. No. P-09-2677, March 9, 2011.
Court Personnel; professionalism. An administrative complaint was filed against a court

employee for using her position to assist a friend in stopping the implementation of a court’s
judgment. In addition, the court employee was absent from work to attend to this and did not
even file a leave. Time and again, the Supreme Court has emphasized that court personnel must
devote every moment of official time to public service. The conduct and behavior of court
personnel should be characterized by a high degree of professionalism and responsibility, as
they mirror the image of the court. Specifically, court personnel must strictly observe official
time to inspire public respect for the justice system. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel mandates that court personnel shall commit themselves exclusively
to the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours. Angelina C. Lim and
Vivian M. Gaduang v. Maribeth G. Aromin, Records Officer I, OCC, MTC, Meycauayan,
Bulacan, A.M. No. P-09-2677, March 9, 2011.
Court Personnel; punctuality. Administrative employees of the Court are being sanctioned
herein for their habitual tardiness. It is a canon under the Constitution that a public office is a
public trust. This canon includes the mandate for the observance of prescribed office hours and
the efficient use of every moment of such hours for the public service, because only thereby
may the public servants recompense the Government and the people for shouldering the costs
of maintaining the Judiciary. Accordingly, court officials and employees must at all times strictly
observe official hours to inspire the public’s respect for the justice system. Absenteeism and
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tardiness are, therefore, impermissible. Re: Employees Incurring Habitual Tardiness in the
Second Semester of 2009, A.M. No. 2010-11-SC, March 15, 2011.
Court Personnel; reassignment by executive judge. Section 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel expressly states that court personnel shall not be required to perform any
work outside the scope of their job description. While the executive judge may not require
court personnel to perform work outside the scope of their job description, except duties that are
identical with or are subsumed under their present functions, the executive judge may reassign
court personnel of multiple-branch courts to another branch within the same area of
administrative supervision when there is a vacancy or when the interest of the service requires,
after consultation with the presiding judges of the branches concerned. The reassignment of
court personnel in multiple-branch courts to another branch within the same area of the
executive judge’s administrative supervision must involve (1) work within the scope of the court
personnel’s job description or (2) duties that are identical with or are subsumed under the court
personnel’s present functions. Executive Judge Leonilo B. Apita, RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City v.
Marissa M. Estanislao, Court Legal Researcher II, RTC, Br. 34, Tacloban City, A.M. No. P-06-
2206, March 9, 2011.
Court Personnel; temporary designation. This is an administrative complaint of first impression

involving the designation of court personnel, specifically a legal researcher as court interpreter,
by an executive judge. While the Manual for Clerks of Court provides that court personnel may
perform other duties the presiding judge may assign from time to time, said additional duties
must be directly related to, and must not significantly vary from, the court personnel’s job
description. However, in case of a sudden vacancy in a court position, the judge may
temporarily designate a court personnel with the competence and skills for the position even if
the duties for such position are different from the prescribed duties of the court personnel. The
temporary designation shall last only for such period as is necessary to designate temporarily a
court personnel with the appropriate prescribed duties. Such temporary designation cannot go
on for an indefinite period, or until the vacancy is filled up. Executive Judge Leonilo B. Apita,
RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City v. Marissa M. Estanislao, Court Legal Researcher II, RTC, Br. 34,
Tacloban City, A.M. No. P-06-2206, March 9, 2011.
Court Personnel; temporary designation. Requiring a Legal Researcher to perform the work of a
Court Interpreter is counter-productive and does not serve the ends of justice. Not only will
respondent jeopardize her present position as Legal Researcher by constantly shifting from one
job to another, her qualification as Court Interpreter will also be put in question. This
arrangement does nothing but compromise court personnel’s professional responsibility and
optimum efficiency in the performance of their respective roles in the dispensation of
justice. Executive Judge Leonilo B. Apita, RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City v. Marissa M. Estanislao,
Court Legal Researcher II, RTC, Br. 34, Tacloban City, A.M. No. P-06-2206, March 9, 2011.
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Judges; administrative complaint not a substitute for judicial remedy. An administrative

complaint for gross ignorance of the law was filed against Judge De Vera for denying admission
of a position paper due to her mistaken belief that the same was filed out of time. Upon a
showing of the judge’s good faith and efforts to rectify her mistake, the complaint was
dismissed. An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or
erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a
motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari. Disciplinary proceedings
against a judge are not complementary or suppletory to, nor a substitute for these judicial
remedies whether ordinary or extraordinary. For, obviously, if subsequent developments prove
the judge’s challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against her at
all. Besides, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision
rendered, assuming she has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make her
position doubly unbearable. Atty. Rafael T. Martinez and Spouses Dan and Edna Reyes v. Judge
Grace Gliceria F. De Vera, Presiding Judge, MTCC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, A.M. No. MTJ-
08-1718, March 9, 2011.
Judges; administrative complaint not a substitute for judicial remedy. As to the allegation of
grave misconduct against Judge Paño in holding a hearing notwithstanding the fact that
defendant’s counsel already rested his case, the same has no leg to stand on. Time and again,
the Supreme Court has ruled that the acts of a judge, pertaining to his judicial functions, are not
subject to disciplinary action, unless they are tainted with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad
faith. If the complainant felt aggrieved, his recourse is through judicial remedies, i.e., to elevate
the assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and correction. Indeed, disciplinary
proceedings and criminal actions against magistrates do not complement, supplement or
substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. An inquiry into their civil,
criminal and/or administrative liability may be made only after the available remedies have
been exhausted and decided with finality. Ferdinand C. Bacolot v. Hon. Francisco D. Paño,
Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 93, San Pedro, Laguna, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2241, March 9, 2011.
Judges; conduct unbecoming of a judge. In his Comment on an administrative complaint filed

against him, respondent judge used derogatory and irreverent language in relation to the
complainant. Verily, we hold that Judge Amila should be more circumspect in his language. “It
is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of
patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language.
He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise
and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his
persuasiveness.” Accordingly, respondent Judge Venancio J. Amila is hereby found guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a judge. Lydia A. Benancillo v. Judge Venancio J. Amila, A.M. No. RTJ-
08-2149, March 9, 2011.
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Judges; gross ignorance of law. An administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law was
filed against Judge De Vera for denying admission of a position paper due to her mistaken belief
that the same was filed out of time. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough
that the subject decision, order or actuation of respondent judge in the performance of her
official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, she must be
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt
motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with
ignorance of the law can find refuge. The complaint is dismissed. Atty. Rafael T. Matinez and
Spouses Dan and Edna Reyes v. Judge Grace Gliceria F. De Vera, Presiding Judge, MTCC, San
Carlos City, Pangasinan, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1718, March 9, 2011.
Judges; gross misconduct. When Judge Limbona was appointed as a judge,

he took an oath to uphold the law, yet in filing a certificate of candidacy as a party-list
representative without giving up his judicial post, he violated not only the law, but the
constitutional mandate that “no officer or employee in the civil service shall engage directly or
indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.” The NBI investigation on the
authenticity of Judge Limbona’s signatures on the certificate of candidacy unqualifiedly
established that the judge signed the certificate of candidacy, thus negating his claim that his
signatures were forged. The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a partisan political activity as
the candidate thereby offers himself to the electorate for an elective post. For his continued
performance of his judicial duties despite his candidacy for a political post, Judge Limbona is
guilty of grave misconduct in office. While we cannot interfere with Judge Limbona’s political
aspirations, we cannot allow him to pursue his political goals while still on the bench. We
cannot likewise allow him to deceive the Judiciary. In light of the gravity of Judge Limbona’s
infractions, we find OCA’s recommended penalty of dismissal to be appropriate. Under the
Rules of Court, dishonesty and gross misconduct are punishable by dismissal. Ashary M. Alauya,
Clerk of Court, Shari’a District Court, Marawi City v. Judge Casan Ali M. Limbona, Shari’a
Circuit Court, Lanao del Sur, A.M. No. SCC-98-4, March 22, 2011.
Judges; impropriety. Respondent judge acted inappropriately in calling the complainant and the
intervenors to a meeting inside his chamber and using derogatory and irreverent language in
relation to a complainant. Accordingly, he was found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
judge. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of the
judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be models of propriety at all times. Sections 1 and
6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct clearly enjoin judges not only from committing
acts of impropriety but even acts which have the appearance of impropriety. The Code
recognizes that even acts that are not per se improper can nevertheless be perceived by the
larger community as such. “Be it stressed that judges are held to higher standards of integrity
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and ethical conduct than attorneys and other persons not [vested] with public trust.” Lydia A.
Benancillo v. Judge Venancio J. Amila, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149, March 9, 2011.
Judges; undue delay in rendering a decision or order. It took respondent judge six (6) years to
resolve, on technicality, a case governed by the rule on summary procedure. When confronted
with administrative charges of delay, the Court shall be guided by the period allowed by
law. Reglementary periods fixed by law and the various issuances of the Court are designed not
only to protect the rights of all the parties to due process but also to achieve efficiency and order
in the conduct of official business. The Court has time and again admonished judges to be
prompt in the performance of their solemn duty as dispenser of justice, since undue delays
erode the people’s faith in the judicial system. Delay not only reinforces the belief of the people
that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly, but invites suspicion, however unfair, of ulterior
motives on the part of the judge. The raison d’être of courts lies not only in properly dispensing
justice but also in being able to do so seasonably. Josefina Naguiat v. Judge Mario B. Capellan,
Presiding Judge, MTCC, Br. 1, Malolos City, Bulacan, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1782, March 23, 2011.
Law Professors; academic freedom; limitation. A novel issue involved in the present controversy,
for it has not been passed upon in any previous case before this Court, is the question of
whether lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic freedom as a defense in an
administrative proceeding for intemperate statements tending to pressure the Court or influence
the outcome of a case or degrade the courts. Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of
the “free speech” defense in other bar discipline cases, academic freedom cannot be
successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in jurisprudence is that the
constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by
their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the public’s faith
in the legal profession and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of
expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the academic
freedom of law professors. It is not contested that respondent professors are, by law and
jurisprudence, guaranteed academic freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine what
they will teach their students and how they will teach. We must point out that there is nothing in
the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can teach and
the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic
freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious
conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case,
without observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers. Re:
Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation in the Supreme Court,” A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.
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Law Professors; engaged in practice of law. It would do well for the Court to remind
respondent law professors that, in view of the broad definition in Cayetano v. Monsod, lawyers
when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other
disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath
to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors
must be measured against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of
members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the
fact that they are lawyers. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A
statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the allegations of
plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court,” A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.
Law Professors; freedom of expression and speech; limitation. Respondent law professors claim
that the Court, upon its issuance of the Show Cause Resolution, has interfered with their
constitutionally mandated right to free speech and expression. In a long line of cases, this Court
has held that the right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the
equally primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due
influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar,
jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose
statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have
exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency. Verily, the accusatory and vilifying
nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be
deemed as protected free speech. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity:
A statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the allegations
of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court,” A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8,
2011.
Law Professors; respect for courts. For the disposition of the Court are the submissions of 37
respondent law professors in response to the Resolution directing them to show cause why they
should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for issuing a statement which alleged acts of
plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court. Even as lawyers passionately and
vigorously propound their points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal
profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the
Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under
established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors
or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an
indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity
towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of
their status in the academic community or the law school to which they belong. Re: Letter of
the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of
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the Philippines College of Law on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court,” A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.
Attorney; negligence. A complaint for disciplinary action was filed against Atty. Macario Ga due
to his failure to reconstitute or turn over to his client the records of the case in his possession.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to serve their clients with
competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 state: Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable; Rule 18.04. A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information. Respondent Atty.
Ga breached these duties when he failed to reconstitute or turn over the records of the case to
his client, herein complainant Gone. His negligence manifests lack of competence and
diligence required of every lawyer. His failure to comply with the request of his client was a
gross betrayal of his fiduciary duty and a breach of the trust reposed upon him by his
client. Respondent’s sentiments against complainant Gone is not a valid reason for him to
renege on his obligation as a lawyer. The moment he agreed to handle the case, he was bound
to give it his utmost attention, skill and competence. Public interest requires that he exert his
best efforts and all his learning and ability in defense of his client’s cause. Those who perform
that duty with diligence and candor not only safeguard the interests of the client, but also serve
the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the community’s respect for the
legal profession. Patricio Gone v. Atty. Macario Ga, A.C. No. 7771, April 6, 2011.
Court personnel; conduct unbecoming. Sheriff Villarosa’s failure to comply with Section 9 of
Rule 39 by delaying the deposit of the final amount he received (from a judgment debtor
pursuant to a writ of execution) and not delivering the other amounts to the Clerk of Court; and
to faithfully account for the amounts he received thru his failure to deliver the exact amounts,
are clear manifestation of conduct unbecoming of a government employee, tantamount to grave
abuse of authority and dishonesty. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees enunciates the state policy to promote a high standard of ethics in
public service, and enjoins public officials and employees to discharge their duties with utmost
responsibility, integrity and competence. Section 4 of the Code lays down the norms of conduct
which every public official and employee shall observe in the discharge and execution of their
official duties, specifically providing that they shall at all times respect the rights of others, and
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order,
and public interest. Thus, any conduct contrary to these standards would qualify as conduct
unbecoming of a government employee. Ma. Chedna Romero v. Pacifico B. Villarosa, Jr.,
Sheriff IV, RTC, Br 17 Palompon, Leyte, A.M. No. P-11-2913, April 12, 2011.
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Court personnel; falsification of public records. Respondent misrepresented in his Personal Data
Sheet his educational attainment and civil service eligibility for appointment as Clerk of Court III
of the RTC of Cebu City. Section 52, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) and other pertinent Civil Service Laws
classify dishonesty and falsification of a public document as grave offenses such that even the
first offense of this nature is already punishable by dismissal from the service. Apropos is this
Court’s counsel in Aldecoa-Delorino v. Remigio-Versoza on how it views, and intends to deal
with such acts of dishonesty, thus: Let this case serve as a warning to all court personnel that
the Court, in the exercise of its administrative supervision over all lower courts and their
personnel, will not hesitate to enforce the full extent of the law in disciplining and purging from
the Judiciary all those who are not befitting the integrity and dignity of the institution, even if it
would mean their dismissal from the service despite their length of service. Any act of
dishonesty, misrepresentation, or falsification done by a court employee that may lead to moral
decadence shall be dealt with severely. Respondent Clerk of Court is found guilty of gross
dishonesty and falsification of public records, and is dismissed from the service. Antonio
Exequiel A. Momongan v. Primitivo A. Sumayo, Clerk III and Ariel A. Momongan, Process
Server, A.M. No. P-10-2767, April 12, 2011.
Court personnel; gross dishonesty. Respondent misrepresented in his Personal Data Sheet his
educational attainment and civil service eligibility for appointment as Clerk of Court III of the
RTC of Cebu City. This misrepresentation amounts to plain and simple dishonesty which, in this
case, refers to the act of intentionally making a false statement on any material fact in securing
one’s appointment. It is a serious offense reflective of a person’s character and the moral decay
he suffers from, virtually destroying all honor, virtue and integrity. It is a malevolent act that has
no place in the judiciary. No other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for
moral righteousness from an employee than a position in the judiciary. Respondent’s insistence
that any deficiency arising from the lack of a college diploma was cured by his satisfactory
performance ratings arising from his many years in public service deserves scant consideration.
But even assuming arguendo that respondent’s ratings mirror his performance, the core issue
here is his fitness to continue serving in a sensitive post. Antonio Exequiel A. Momongan v.
Primitivo A. Sumayo, Clerk III and Ariel A. Momongan, Process Server, A.M. No. P-10-2767,
April 12, 2011.
Court personnel; gross negligence. We agree with the OCA finding that Atty. Fabro was guilty of
gross negligence of duty as branch clerk of court for being remiss in his duty to transmit to the
CA the records of civil cases within the required period (the records were elevated to the Court
of Appeals after six years from issuance of the RTC Order requiring him to do so). Judge Renato
A. Fuentes v. Atty. Rogelio F. Fabro, A.M. No. P-10-2791. April 6, 2011.
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Court personnel; immoral conduct. This case involves an administrative complaint filed against
a court stenographer for Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct. The Court defined immoral conduct
as conduct that is willful, flagrant or shameless, and that shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. To justify suspension or
disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or an act so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. Mere sexual relations
between two unmmaried and consenting adults is not enough to warrant administrative sanction
for illicit behavior. The Court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a man and a
woman who are not married, where both are not under any impediment to marry and where no
deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or
disciplinary action. While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to a certain
extent, private conduct, it is not within our authority to decide on matters touching on
employees’ personal lives, especially those that will affect their and their family’s future. We
cannot intrude into the question of whether they should or should not marry. However, we take
this occasion to remind judiciary employees to be more circumspect in their adherence to their
obligations under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The conduct of court personnel must
be free from any taint of impropriety or scandal, not only with respect to their official duties but
also in their behavior outside the Court as private individuals. This is the best way to preserve
and protect the integrity and the good name of our courts. In this case, the acts complained of
cannot be considered as disgraceful or grossly immoral conduct. Mary Jane Abanag v. Nicolas
B. Mabute, A.M. No. P-11-2922, April 4, 2011.
Judge; disciplinary action. Assuming for the sake of argument that respondent judge erred in
issuing the questioned order, he cannot be held liable for his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, for as long as he acted in good faith. A judge is not required to be faultless because
to demand otherwise would make the judicial office untenable for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the administration of justice can be infallible. As a matter of policy, a
judge cannot be subject to disciplinary action for his erroneous actions, unless it can be shown
that they were accompanied by bad faith, malice, corrupt motives, or improper considerations.
In the absence of such proof, the decision or order in question is presumed to have been issued
in good faith by respondent judge. This was emphasized in the case of Balsamo v. Judge Suan,
where the Court explained: “The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being
biased and partial. Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of
his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate
intent to do an injustice. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can
find refuge.” Antonio Monticalbo v. Judge Cresente F. Maraya, Jr., RTC, Br. 11, Calubian,
Leyte, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197, April 13, 2011.
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Judge; gross ignorance of law. Complainant insists that respondent judge erred in ruling that his
counterclaim for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses was covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure and points out that his claim exceeds the P10,000.00 limit set in the Rule on
Summary Procedure. Complainant is mistaken. The rule now has placed the ceiling at
P100,000.00. A judge can be held liable for gross ignorance of the law if it can be shown that
he committed an error so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith. In addition
to this, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but
should also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. Antonio Monticalbo v.
Judge Cresente F. Maraya, Jr., RTC, Br. 11, Calubian, Leyte, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197, April 13,
2011.
Judge; misconduct. We pass upon the unsigned letter complaint for administrative action and
disbarment against Justice Inting for gross neglect of judicial duties in deciding a case. In
administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in the
complaint with substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. We set the applicable standard in
deciding cases involving accusations of misconduct leveled at judges in Concerned Lawyers of
Bulacan v. Villalon-Pornillos, where we said: “The burden of substantiating the charges in an
administrative proceeding against court officials and employees falls on the complainant, who
must be able to prove the allegations in the complaint with substantial evidence. In the absence
of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that respondent regularly performed her duties will
prevail. Moreover, in the absence of cogent proof, bare allegations of misconduct cannot prevail
over the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. In fact, an
administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating
eye, for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that the respondent
stands to face the sanction of dismissal and/or disbarment. The Court does not thus give
credence to charges based on mere suspicion and speculation.” Given the lack of any evidence
to prove that Justice Inting acted with any bad faith or ill-motive, we dismiss the complaint
against her. Re: Complaint of Concerned Members of Chinese Grocers Association Against
Justice Socorro B. Inting of the Court of Appeals, A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-177-CA-J, April 12, 2011.
Judge; presumption of good faith. In cases where a judge is charged with bribery or grave
misconduct, bias or partiality cannot be presumed. Neither can bad faith or malice be inferred
just because the judgment or order rendered by respondent is adverse to complainant. In order
to merit disciplinary action, it must be established that respondent’s actions were motivated by
bad faith, dishonesty or hatred or were attended by fraud, dishonesty or corruption. In the
absence of such proof, the decision or order in question is presumed to have been issued in
good faith by respondent judge. This was emphasized in the case of Balsamo v. Judge Suan,
where the Court explained: “The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly
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indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being
biased and partial. Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of
his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate
intent to do an injustice. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can
find refuge.” Antonio Monticalbo v. Judge Cresente F. Maraya, Jr., RTC, Br. 11, Calubian,
Leyte, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197, April 13, 2011.
Justice; conduct unbecoming. We point out that publicizing professional qualifications or

boasting of having studied in and graduated from certain law schools, no matter how prestigious,
might have even revealed, on the part of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, their bias for or
against some lawyers. Their conduct was impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid
situations that may reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality
in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practice
regularly in their courts. Judges should be dignified in demeanor, and refined in speech. In
performing their judicial duties, they should not manifest bias or prejudice by word or conduct
towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds. Their language must be guarded and
measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. In this regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, mandates judges to carry out judicial
duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers,
court staff, and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial
to the proper performance of such duties. In view of the foregoing, Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez were guilty of unbecoming conduct, which is defined as improper performance.
Unbecoming conduct “applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social
behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.” Assistant Special
Prosecutor III Rohermina J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, et al., A.M. No. 08-19-
SB-J, April 12, 2011.
Justice; simple misconduct. The procedure adopted by respondent Justices for their provincial
hearings was in blatant disregard of PD 1606, as amended, the Rules of Court, and the Revised
Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Even worse, their adoption of the procedure arbitrarily
denied the benefit of a hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan to all
the affected litigants, including the State, thereby rendering the integrity and efficacy of their
proceedings open to serious challenge. Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors
men forgive and time forgets. They are expected to have more than just a modicum
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. For this reason alone, respondent Justices’
adoption of the irregular procedure cannot be dismissed as a mere deficiency in prudence or as
a lapse in judgment on their part, but should be treated as simple misconduct, which is to be
distinguished from either gross misconduct or gross ignorance of the law. The respondent
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Justices were not liable for gross misconduct – defined as the transgression of some established
or definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence, or the
corrupt or persistent violation of the law or disregard of well-known legal rules – considering
that the explanations they have offered herein, which the complainant did not refute, revealed
that they strove to maintain their collegiality by holding their separate hearings within sight and
hearing distance of one another. Neither were they liable for gross ignorance of the law, which
must be based on reliable evidence to show that the act complained of was ill-motivated,
corrupt, or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or in persistent disregard of well-known
legal rules; on the contrary, none of these circumstances was attendant herein, for the
respondent Justices have convincingly shown that they had not been ill-motivated or inspired by
an intention to violate any law or legal rule in adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been
seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of cases in the provinces. Assistant
Special Prosecutor III Rohermina J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, et al., A.M. No.
08-19-SB-J, April 12, 2011.
Court personnel; gross dishonesty and gross misconduct. It is the clerks of court’s duty to
faithfully perform their duties and responsibilities as such “to the end that there was full
compliance with function, that of being custodians of the court’s funds and revenues, records,
properties and premises.” They are the chief administrative officers of their respective courts. It
is also their duty to ensure that the proper procedures are followed in the collection of cash
bonds. Clerks of court are officers of the law who perform vital functions in the prompt and
sound administration of justice. Their office is the hub of adjudicative and administrative orders,
processes and concerns. Thus, the unwarranted failure to fulfill these responsibilities deserves
administrative sanction and not even the full payment of the collection shortages will exempt
the accountable officer from liability. By failing to properly remit the cash collections
constituting public funds, Recio violated the trust reposed in her as disbursement officer of the
Judiciary. Her failure to explain satisfactorily the fund shortage, and to restitute the shortage and
fully comply with the Court’s directives leave us no choice but to hold her liable for gross
neglect of duty and gross dishonesty. Office of the Court Administrator v. Recio, A.M. No. P-11-
2932. May 30, 2011
Court personnel; duty of sheriff. A court sheriff’s act of distorting the facts in his Officer’s Return
during the implementation of a writ issued by a trial court is a matter that remains within the
supervisory control of the court. The alleged errors committed by the court’s ministerial officers,
like the respondent sheriff, should be correctible by the court. The alleged irregularities should
have been brought first to the RTC for its resolution. The same is true with the writ of possession
itself. It was the judge’s responsibility as the writ was issued by the court. The respondent
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sheriff’s duty, it must be stressed, is only to implement the writ and this duty is
ministerial. Maylas v. Esmeria, A.M. No. P-11-2932. May 30, 2011
Court personnel; misconduct. A complaint for Grave Misconduct was filed by Judge Tan against
Quitorio, then an RTC Legal Researcher, for allegedly drafting a resolution of a motion to
dismiss in a case which was not assigned to him and for thereafter informing one of the parties
in that case that he had already submitted the draft to Judge Tan and that the said party should
follow it up with the judge. Misconduct has been defined as “a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence
by a public officer.” The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, all of which must
be established by substantial evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave
misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or
fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some
benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. The Court
finds itself hardly convinced that Quitorio prepared the draft resolution of the motion knowing
that the case was not assigned to him in the absence of clear evidence of that fact. However,
Quitorio’s admission that he informed a party about the submission of his draft resolution to
Judge Tan, and advised said party to follow it up with Judge Tan in her sala, is violative of the
confidentiality required of court personnel and constitutes simple misconduct. A court
personnel is prohibited from disclosing confidential information to any unauthorized
person. Tan v. Quitorio, A.M. No. P-11-2919. May 30, 2011.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. A security guard employed by the Supreme Court was
charged administratively for the theft of used galvinized iron sheets in the SC Compound in
Baguio City. There is reasonable ground to believe that Tugas is indeed responsible for the
taking of the GI sheets. It is hard to believe that Tugas, being the back post guard at the time, did
not hear the rattling and clanging sound of GI sheets being moved and dropped below the
perimeter fence. Tugas’ attire at the night of the incident matched that of the culprit as described
by the boarder. Misconduct has been defined as “a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
officer.” The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption,
willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, all of which must be
established by substantial evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave
misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or
fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some
benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. Furthermore,
misconduct warranting removal from office of an officer must have direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to misadministration or
willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office. Security guards, by
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the very nature of their work, are mandated to secure the court premises and protect its property
from pilferage. Tugas is bound to safeguard the court premises and its properties. Tugas very
clearly violated his duty by taking the GI sheets with the intention to use it for personal house
repairs. He unlawfully used his position to procure benefit for himself, blatantly contrary to his
duty. With the element of corruption accompanying his unlawful behaviour, Tugas is guilty of
grave misconduct. Re: Theft of the Used Galvinized Iron Sheets in the SC Compound,
Baguio, A.M. No. 2008-15-SC. May 31, 2011.
Administrative proceedings; quantum of evidence. It is a settled rule that in administrative

proceedings that the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in his or her
complaint with substantial evidence. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail. Illupa vs.
Abdullah, A.M. No. SCC-11-16-P. June 1, 2011
Administrative proceedings; mitigating circumstances. In several jurisprudential precedents, the

Court has refrained from imposing the actual administrative penalties prescribed by law or
regulation in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondents’ length of
service, the respondents’ acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse,
family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondent’s advanced age,
among other things, have had varying significance in the determination by the Court of the
imposable penalty. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Aguilar, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2087, June 7,
2011
Court personnel; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Respondent was found
to have knowingly delayed the release of a warrant of arrest against an accused in a criminal
case until the accused had left the country. For knowingly delaying the release of the warrant of
arrest, respondent had placed the court in a very negative light. It prejudiced the Court’s
standing in the community as it projected an image of a Court that is unable to enforce its
processes on time. For this reason, we find her liable not only for simple neglect of duty, but for
the more serious offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Respondent
clerk of court’s very much delayed action on the complainant’s request for a copy of the warrant
of arrest in the criminal case and in the delivery of the warrant to the police authorities cast
doubts on the capability of the court to administer justice fairly and expeditiously. Such act is
likely to reflect adversely on the administration of justice. Thus, the respondent should be made
to answer for her infraction in a way that will serve as a lesson to everyone in the judiciary to be
forthright in his dealings with the public, and to act speedily on matters within his area of
responsibility, regardless of who is involved. The prejudice she caused and her liability for her
conduct can in no way be extinguished or mitigated by the issuance of a second warrant of
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arrest, or by the complainant’s subsequent voluntary desistance from pursuing the case. The
harm had already been done on the aggrieved party and on the judiciary when these
developments transpired. Sonido vs. Ilocso, A.M. No. P-10-2794. June 1, 2011
Court personnel; conduct unbecoming. The respondent MTCC court interpreter harassed and
threatened her neighbors and even used the police to perpetrate these acts. By her actions, she
directly implied that she was using her court position to unilaterally enforce what she wanted.
Employees of the judiciary should be living examples of uprightness, not only in the
performance of official duties, but also in their personal and private dealings with other people,
so as to preserve at all times the good name and standing of the courts in the community. Any
scandalous behavior or any act that may erode the people’s esteem for the judiciary is
unbecoming of an employee. The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that court personnel must
not only be, but also be perceived to be, free from any impropriety with respect to both their
official duties and their behavior anywhere else. The respondent’s ugly display of an oppressive
and overbearing character failed to meet the exacting standards required of employees of the
judiciary and deserves administrative sanctions from the Court. The respondent’s continued
harassment of complainants to force them to leave the premises so she could occupy the whole
place cannot and should not be countenanced. Clearly, respondent is guilty of oppression and
of conduct unbecoming a court employee — acts that amount to simple misconduct. Mendez
vs. Balbuena, A.M. No. P-11-2931. June 1, 2011
Court personnel; grave misconduct. Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of
justice and high standards are expected of them. Their conduct, at all times, must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum but must, at all times, be above suspicion. Part of this
stringent requirement is that agents of the law should refrain from the use of abusive, offensive,
scandalous, menacing or otherwise improper language. Judicial employees are expected to
accord due respect, not only to their superiors, but also to others and their rights at all times.
Their every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy and
dignity. The respondent’s arrogant behavior was a violation of these rules of conduct for judicial
employees. Flores vs. Pascasio, A.M. No. P-06-2130, June 13, 2011
Court personnel; grave misconduct. Respondent sheriff was found guilty of two offenses: (1)
failure to make a return of a writ of execution within the period provided by the Rules of Court;
and (2) failure to turn over the checks he received by virtue of the implementation of the writ to
the court issuing it within the same day he received them. The duty of a sheriff to make a return
of the writ is ministerial and it is not his duty to wait for the plaintiff to decide whether or not to
accept the checks as payment. When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in
the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with celerity and promptness to
execute it according to its mandate. A sheriff has no discretion whatsoever with respect to the
disposition of the amounts he receives. If he finds that there is a need to clarify what to do with
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the checks, prudence and reasonableness dictate that clarification be sought immediately from
the clerk or judge issuing it. A sheriff is expected to know the rules of procedure pertaining to
his functions as an officer of the court, relative to the implementation of writs of execution, and
should, at all times, show a high degree of professionalism in the performance of his duties. Any
act deviating from the procedure laid down by the Rules is misconduct that warrants
disciplinary action. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Tolosa,A.M. No. P-09-2715. June 13,
2011
Court personnel; gross neglect of duty. [Respondent] should be reminded that it is the duty of
the court stenographer who has attended a session of a court to immediately deliver to the clerk
of court all the notes he has taken, the same to be attached to the record of the case. The failure
to submit the TSNs within the period prescribed constitutes gross neglect of duty. Gross neglect
of duty is classified as a grave offense and punishable by dismissal even if for the first offense.
The performance of a stenographer’s duty is essential to the prompt and proper administration of
justice, and his inaction hampers the administration of justice and erodes public faith in the
judiciary. No less than the Constitution mandates that public officers must serve the people with
utmost respect and responsibility. Public office is a public trust. Absin vs. Montalla, A.M. No. P-
10-2829. June 21, 2011
Court personnel; misconduct. Clerk of Court Joaquino was found guilty of grave misconduct,
abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the law. He filed a second motion for reconsideration
contending that the penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay is too harsh and severe for
the offense he was found guilty of. The Court, in the spirit of compassion, lowered the penalty
imposed but warned him that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future shall merit
his dismissal from the service. Clerks of court occupy a sensitive position in the judicial system,
they are required to safeguard the integrity of the court and its proceedings, to earn and preserve
respect therefor, to maintain loyalty thereto and to the judge as superior officer, to maintain the
authenticity and correctness of court records, and to uphold the confidence of the public in the
administration of justice. Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Joaquinto, A.M. No. P-10-283,
June 8, 2011
Judge; dishonesty. The accomplishment of the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) is a requirement under
the Civil Service Rules and Regulations for employment in the government. Judge Aguilar was
guilty of dishonesty in filling out her PDS when she answered that she had no pending
administrative case against her and that she had not been formally charged nor found guilty of
any administrative charge. Her failure to disclose such facts in her PDS filed upon her
assumption of office when she already had notice of the adverse decision therein constitutes
dishonesty, considered a grave offense under the Administrative Code of 1987, as well as the
Civil Service Rules, with the corresponding penalty of dismissal from service even for the first
offense. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Aguilar,A.M. No. RTJ-07-2087, June 7, 2011
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Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Considering that complainant had already manifested in court,
albeit belatedly, the presence of what it considered to be a valid Certification to File Action in
court due to unsuccessful conciliation, respondent judge’s act of referring the case
to barangay conciliation rendered its purpose moot and academic. The rules of procedure are
clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for interpretation. The failure to apply elementary
rules of procedure constitutes gross ignorance of the law and procedure. Neither good faith nor
lack of malice will exonerate respondent because the rules violated were basic procedural
rules. All that was needed for respondent to do was to apply them. Diaz vs. Gestopa, A.M. No.
MTJ-11-1786. June 22, 2011
Judge; gross inefficiency. Respondent judge is liable for gross inefficiency for failing to adopt a
system of record management in her court. Furthermore, respondent judge resolved a motion for
reconsideration which was filed way beyond the required period. There was also a delay in
sending the records of the appealed case to the CA. Respondent judge violated Rule 3.05,
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that “A judge shall dispose of the
court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.” Bareng vs.
Daguna, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2246. June 1, 2011
Lawyers; administrative proceedings vis-à-vis contempt proceedings. When the Court initiates
contempt proceedings and/or disciplinary proceedings against lawyers for intemperate and
discourteous language and behavior directed at the courts, the evil sought to be prevented is the
same – the degradation of the courts and the loss of trust in the administration of justice. For
this reason, it is not unusual for the Court to cite authorities on bar discipline (involving the duty
to give due respect to the courts) in contempt cases against lawyers and vice versa. When the
Court chooses to institute an administrative case against a respondent lawyer, the mere citation
or discussion in the orders or decision in the administrative case of jurisprudence involving
contempt proceedings does not transform the action from a disciplinary proceeding to one for
contempt. Re: Letter of UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of
the University of the Philippines College of Law etc.,A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, June 7, 2011
Shari’a Court personnel; abuse of authority. Respondent, a clerk of court of a Shari’a court, was
found not to have abused his authority in issuing a certificate of divorce upon the request of the
complainant’s wife. The issuance of a certificate of divorce is within the respondent clerk of
court’s duties as defined by law in the Muslim Code of the Philippines. The respondent merely
performed his ministerial duty. The alleged erroneous entries on the Certificate of Divorce
cannot be attributed to respondent considering that it is only his duty to receive, file and register
the certificate of divorce presented to him for registration. Further, even if there were indeed
erroneous entries on the certificate of divorce, such errors cannot be corrected nor cancelled
through an administrative complaint. Illupa vs. Abdullah, A.M. No. SCC-11-16-P. June 1, 2011
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Court personnel; dishonesty and conduct prejudicial. A complaint was filed against the
respondent alleging that he accepted employment as Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Supreme
Court, and thus received salaries and other benefits as such, while still remaining an active
member and officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The Court found that respondent
was liable for gross dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. His
non-disclosure of the material fact that he was still employed as an active member of the PNP
and receiving his monthly salaries during the period that he was already a Court employee is
considered substantial proof that he tried to cheat/defraud both the PNP and the Court.
Respondent transgressed the Constitution and the Civil Service law on the prohibition on dual
employment and double compensation in the government service. Re: Gross violation of Civil
Service Law on the prohibition against dual employment and double compensation in the
government service committed by Mr. Eduardo V. Escala, etc. A.M. No. 2011-04-SC, July 5,
2011
Court personnel; effect of absences without approved leave. An administrative case was filed
against Cabrera, a Utility Worker in the MTCC of Lipa City, who has failed to file his Daily Time
Records (DTRs) and to seek leave for any of his absences. The Court held that pursuant to the
Omnibus Rules on Leave, an employee’s absence without official leave for at least 30 working
days warrants his separation from the service. A public office is a public trust. Public officers
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with the utmost degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. By going on AWOL, Cabrera grossly
disregarded and neglected the duties of his office. He failed to adhere to the high standards of
public accountability imposed on all those in government service. Re: Dropping from the Rolls
of Cornelio Reniette Cabrera, etc. A.M. No. P-11-2946. July 13, 2011
Court personnel; habitual tardiness. Respondent, a clerk of court of the RTC in Lucena City, was
found to have been tardy in reporting for work more than ten times each month from July to
October 2010. Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 23, Series of 1998 provides that “any
employee shall be considered habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of
minutes, ten (10) times a month for at least two (2) months in a semester or at least two (2)
consecutive months during the year. Habitual tardiness is an administrative offense that
seriously compromises work efficiency and hampers public service. By being habitually tardy,
respondent has fallen short of the stringent standard of conduct demanded from everyone
connected with the administration of justice. The Clerk of Court plays a vital role in ensuring
the prompt and sound administration of justice. Moral obligations, performance of household
chores, traffic problems and health, domestic and financial concerns are not sufficient reasons to
excuse habitual tardiness. Re: Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, OCA v.
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Francisco A. Pua, Jr. Clerk of Court V, RTC, Br. 55, Lucena City. A.M. No. P-11-2945. July 13,
2011
Court personnel; habitual tardiness. The Leave Division of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) reported on the tardiness incurred by respondent court stenographer. The OCA
recommended that the case be redocketed as a regular administrative matter and that she be
reprimanded for habitual tardiness with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense
would warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty. Moral obligations, performance of
household chores, traffic problems, health conditions, domestic and financial concerns are not
sufficient reasons to excuse habitual tardiness. Respondent submitted an answer to the
complaint acknowledging her infraction and begging the indulgence of the Court. The Court
found the penalty of severe reprimand to be proper for her infraction. Office of the
Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator vs. Leda O. Uri, etc.A.M. No. P-10-
2852. July 27, 2011
Court personnel; misconduct. Respondent sheriff was charged with negligence and grave
misconduct as he was allegedly negligent in levying upon a motor vehicle and proceeding with
its auction sale without looking into the car’s Certificate of Registration to determine whether it
was encumbered or not. The Court held that it was irrelevant for the complainant to argue that
the respondent failed to check the car’s certificate of registration to determine if it was
encumbered because the encumbrance, until foreclosed, will not in any way affect the
judgment debtor’s rights over the property or exempt the property from the levy in any event. A
sheriff’s duty to execute a writ is simply ministerial and he is bound to perform only those tasks
stated under the Rules of Court and no more. Any interest a third party may have on the
property levied upon by the sheriff to enforce a judgment is the third party’s responsibility to
protect through the remedies provided under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Golden Sun Finance
Corporation, rep by Rachelle L. Marmito vs. Ricardo R. Albano, etc, A.M. No. P-11-2888. July
27, 2011
Court personnel; sheriff’s duty to give notice prior to demolition. With respect to Sheriff
Calsenia, the Court finds that he failed to strictly comply with the requirement of prior notice to
vacate before demolition as required by the rules. It is the duty of the sheriff to give notice of
such writ and demand from the defendant to vacate the property within three days. Only after
such period can the sheriff enforce the writ by the bodily removal of defendant and his personal
belongings. The law discourages any form of arbitrary and oppressive conduct in the execution
of an otherwise legitimate act. Any act deviating from the procedure prescribed by the Rules of
Court is tantamount to misconduct and necessitates disciplinary action. Spouses Sur and Rita
Villa, et al. v. Presiding Judge Roberto L. Ayco, et al.A.M. No. RTJ-11-2284. July 13, 2011
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Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Respondent Judge failed to conduct a pre-trial conference
contrary to elementary rules of procedure which he should have known all too well considering
his long years of service in the bench. Such ignorance of a basic rule in court procedure, as
failing to conduct pre-trial, sadly amounts to gross ignorance and warrants a corresponding
penalty. As to the allegations of poor judgment and gross ignorance of basic legal principles in
granting the motions for execution pending appeal for flimsy and unsupported reasons, the
particular reasons relied upon by respondent judge for issuing the writ of execution pending
appeal are so unreliably weak and feeble that it highlights the lack of knowledge of respondent
judge with regard to the proper appreciation of arguments. Dire financial conditions of the
plaintiffs supported by mere self-serving statements as “good reason” for the issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal does not stand on solid footing. It does not even stand on its
own. National Power Corporation, represented its President Cyril Del Callar vs. Judge Santos B.
Adiong, Regional Trial Court, BR. 8, Marawi City, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2060. July 27, 2011
Judge; gross misconduct. Judge Rabang, a judge of the MTCC in Cotabato City, left the
Philippines in May 2007 without an approved leave and has remained abroad and absent from
his court for more than four years. Such attitude betrays his lack of concern for his office. He has
abandoned his office and committed gross misconduct. The Code of Judicial Conduct decrees
that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay. A judge should likewise be
imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation
to promptly administer justice. The trial court judges being the paradigms of justice in the first
instance have been exhorted to dispose of the court’s business promptly and to decide cases
within the required period because delay results in undermining the people’s faith in the
judiciary from whom the prompt hearing of their supplications is anticipated and expected, and
reinforces in the minds of the litigants the impression that the wheels of justice grind ever so
slowly. Re: Application for indefinite leave and travel abroad of Pres. Judge Francisco P. Rabang
III, MTCC, Cotabato City. A.M. No. 07-9-214-MTCC. July 26, 2011
Judge; undue delay in rendering a decision. With respect to Judge Ayco, the Court stresses that
the propriety or impropriety of the motion for reconsideration is judicial in nature and therefore,
beyond the scope of this administrative proceedings. He however, cannot be excused for the
delay in resolving complainants’ motion for reconsideration. Failure to decide a case or resolve
a motion within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanction against the erring judge. Spouses Sur and Rita Villa, et al.
v. Presiding Judge Roberto L. Ayco, et al.A.M. No. RTJ-11-2284. July 13, 2011
Court personnel; dishonesty and gross neglect of duty. It must be stressed that sheriffs are not
allowed to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their
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duties. Corollary, a sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant
without observing the procedural steps under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court: (1)
prepare an estimate of expenses to be incurred in executing the writ, for which he must seek the
court’s approval; (2) render an accounting; and (3) issue an official receipt for the total amount
he received from the judgment debtor. Failure to observe these steps would amount to
dishonesty or extortion. Moreover, Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court clearly provides
that it is mandatory for sheriffs to execute and make a return on the writ of execution within 30
days from receipt of the writ and every 30 days thereafter until it is satisfied in full or its
effectivity expires. Even if the writs are unsatisfied or only partially satisfied, sheriffs must still
file the reports so that the court, as well as the litigants, may be informed of the proceedings
undertaken to implement the writ. Here, the long delay in the execution of the judgments and
the failure to accomplish the required periodic reports demonstrate respondent sheriff’s gross
neglect and gross inefficiency in the performance of his official duties. Likewise, respondent
sheriff’s receipt of money in his official capacity and his failure to turn over the amount to the
clerk of court is an act of misappropriation of funds amounting to dishonesty. Proserpina V.
Anico v. Emerson B. Pilipiña, Sheriff IV, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Manila. A.M. No. P-11-2896. August 2, 2011.
Court personnel; inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties. The Court
found Officer-in-Charge (OIC) Ester Asilo administratively liable for her inaccurate preparation
of monthly case reports, inept monitoring of case records, and incompetent supervision of court
personnel. A Clerk of Court is an essential officer in any judicial system, her office being the
center of activities, both adjudicative and administrative. Thus, OIC Asilo must recognize that
her administrative functions are just as vital to the prompt and proper administration of
justice. She cannot proffer as an excuse that she merely inherited and continued the procedure
followed prior to her designation. Upon acceptance of her designation, her first concern was to
know her assumed duties and responsibilities especially when administrative circulars,
issuances and manual of clerks of court are at hand. Nilda Verginesa-Suarez v. Judge Renato J.
Dilag and Court Stenographer III Concepcion A. Pascua and Office of the Court Administrator
v. Judge Renato J. Dilag. Ester A. Asilo, Officer-in-Charge, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 73, Olongapo City, Zambales and Atty. Ronald D. Gavino, Deputy Clerk of Court,
Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional trial Court, Olongapo City. A.M. No. RTJ-06-2014 and
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2293. August 16, 2011
Court personnel; simple misconduct. Giganto and Valenzuela, co-workers in the Personnel
Division of OAS-OCA, got involved in a fistfight for which they were found guilty of simple
misconduct by the Court. In computing their penalties, the Court considered their length of
service, satisfactory performance ratings, and number of previous administrative charges as
mitigating, aggravating and alternative circumstances, as the case may be. Time and again, the
Court has stressed the need for the conduct and behavior of every person connected with the
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dispensation of justice to be characterized by propriety and decorum. This standard is applied,
not only with respect to a court employee’s dealings with the public, but also with his or her co-
workers in the service. Conduct violative of this standard quickly and surely erodes respect for
the courts. Misbehavior within and around the court’s vicinity diminishes the court’s sanctity
and dignity. Any fighting or misunderstanding becomes a disgraceful sight reflecting adversely
on the good image of the Judiciary. Re: Letter-Complaint of Mr. Recarredo S. Valenzuela, Clerk
IV, Personnel Division, OAS-OCA against Mr. Ricardo R. Giganto, Utility Worker II, Personnel
Division, OAS-OCA. A.M. No. 2011-01-SC. August 23, 2011.
Attorney; filing of baseless complaint. Respondents cannot be held liable for judiciously
performing their sworn duty to observe and follow court proceedings as provided by the Rules.
Complainant apparently filed this complaint primarily to divert the attention of his client from
his shortcomings as its counsel, if not to simply harass the respondents. A lawyer who files an
unfounded complaint must be sanctioned because, as an officer of the court, he does not
discharge his duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary.
Such filing of baseless complaints is contemptuous of the courts. Complainant was ordered to
show cause why he should not be subjected to disciplinary action for filing a frivolous and
baseless complaint. Atty. Emmanuel R. Andamo v. Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr., Clerk of Court
Stanlee D. Calma and Legal Researcher Diana G. Ruiz, all of Regional Trial Court, Branch 18
Tagytay City. A.M. No. RTJ-11-2265. September 21, 2011.
Court personnel; dishonesty. The practice of respondent in offsetting her collection is not
allowed under accounting and auditing rules and regulations. By failing to properly remit the
cash collections constituting public funds, she violated the trust reposed in her as disbursement
officer of the Judiciary. Likewise, her claim that she did not know that she is the accountable
officer for the court collections does not convince the Court. Clerks of Court are presumed to
know their duty to immediately deposit with the authorized government depositories the various
funds they receive, for they are not supposed to keep funds in their personal possession. Her
failure to deposit the said amount upon collection was prejudicial to the court, which did not
earn interest income on the said amount or was not able to otherwise use the said funds. The
Court found respondent guilty of dishonesty and dismissed her from the service. Office of the
Court Administrator v. Evelyn Elumbaring, Clerk of Court II, 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Carmen-Sto. Tomas-Braulio E. Dujali, Davao del Norte. A.M. No. P-10-2765. September 13,
2011.
Court personnel; failure to perform duty. Respondent admitted that he failed to serve the Notice
of Pre-Trial Conference and Pre-Trial to complainant, upon instruction of the judge, since the
complainant was already informed of the scheduled hearing. Respondent, as process server, is
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reminded to perform his duty diligently for the orderly administration of justice. There is a need
to serve the notice on the complainant not only to make the act official but also to enable him to
make the proper return to reflect what transpired. The possibility that the complainant might
deny that he had been so informed by the Judge is not remote. Col. Mauricio A. Santiago, Jr. v.
Arthur M. Camangyan, Process Server, Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Toledo City. A.M. No.
P-11-2977. September 14, 2011.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. Upon receipt of the process server fee, respondent issued
an acknowledgment receipt instead of an official receipt. This is in violation of the Supreme
Court Circular No. 26-97 which mandates the issuance of official receipts for payments
received. Her explanation that the acknowledgment receipt was sufficient since the process
server fee she collected was not part of the Judiciary Development Fund, Special Allowance for
the Judiciary or subjected to any fund allocation was not a valid justification for her non-
compliance with the court circular. She violated the trust and confidence reposed in her as
cashier and disbursement officer of the court. The Court will not tolerate any conduct, act or
omission by any court employee violating the norm of public accountability and diminishing or
tending to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Dolores C. Seliger v. Alma P. Licay,
Clerk of Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Juan, La Union. A.M. No. P-11-
2970. September 14, 2011.
Attorney; dishonesty. It is clear from the records that respondent Atty. Ediza deceived the
Spouses Floran when he asked them to unknowingly sign a deed of sale transferring a portion of
their land to him. Respondent also made it appear that the original owner of the land conveyed
her rights therto to respondent and not to the Spouses Floran. When the sale of the Spouses
Floran’s land pushed through, respondent received half of the proceeds given by the buyer and
falsely misled the Spouses Floran into thinking that he will register the remaining portion of the
land. Lamentably, Atty. Ediza played on the naïveté of the Spouses Floran to deprive them of
their valued property. This is an unsavory behavior from a member of the legal
profession. Aside from giving adequate attention, care and time to his client’s case, a lawyer is
also expected to be truthful, fair and honest in protecting his client’s rights. Once a lawyer fails
in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Respondent lawyer violated Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
which he is suspended from the practice of law for six months. Nemesio Floran and Caridad
Floran v. Atty. Roy Prule Ediza. A.C. No. 5325. October 19, 2011.
Attorney; grave misconduct. Respondent attorney was found to have violated Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent’s actions clearly show that she
deceived complainant into lending money to her through the use of documents and false
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representations and by taking advantage of her education and complainant’s ignorance in legal
matters. As manifested by complainant, he would have never granted the loan to respondent
were it not for respondent’s misrepresentation that she was authorized to sell the property and
that complainant could register the “open” deed of sale if respondent fails to pay the loan. By
her misdeed, respondent has eroded not only complainant’s perception of the legal profession
but the public’s perception as well. Her actions constitute gross misconduct for which she may
be disciplined. Tomas P. Tan, Jr. v. Atty. Haide V. Gumba. A.C. No. 9000. October 5, 2011.
Attorney; misconduct. With his admission that he drafted and notarized another instrument that
did not state the true consideration of the sale so as to reduce the capital gains and other taxes
due on the transaction, respondent cannot escape liability for making an untruthful statement in
a public document for an unlawful purpose. As the second deed indicated an amount much
lower than the actual price paid for the property sold, respondent abetted in depriving the
Government of the right to collect the correct taxes due. Not only did respondent assist the
contracting parties in an activity aimed at defiance of the law, he likewise displayed lack of
respect for and made a mockery of the solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment. By
notarizing such illegal and fraudulent document, he is entitling it full faith and credit upon its
face, which it obviously does not deserve considering its nature and purpose. Respondent’s
actions violated not only Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Responsibility, but pertinent
sections of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice as well. Thus, respondent is meted the penalty
of revocation of notarial commission and suspension from the practice of law for a period of two
years. Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla v. Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua. A.C. No. 6655. October 11,
2011.
Attorney; notarization. The fact that the affiant previously appeared in person and signed the
Deed of Donation before the respondent notary public does not justify the respondent’s act of
notarizing the Deed of Donation, considering the affiant’s absence on the very day the
document was actually notarized. In the notarial acknowledgment of the Deed of Donation,
respondent attested that Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before him on July 30,
2003. Yet obviously, Atty. Linco could not have appeared before him on July 30, 2003,
because the latter died on July 29, 2003 – a day before the Deed of Donation was notarized,
and respondent was aware of that fact. Clearly, respondent made a false statement and violated
Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer. Faithful
observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat
is sacrosanct. Respondent should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to
the contents and truth of what are stated therein. Atty. Florita S. Linco v. Atty. Jimmy D.
Lacebal. A.C. No. 7241. October 17, 2011.
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Attorney; notarization of illegal document. A notary public should not facilitate the
disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and
extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what respondent did in this
case. In preparing and notarizing an agreement for extrajudicial dissolution of marriage — a
void document — respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.” Respondent knew fully well that the “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay” has
no legal effect and is against public policy. Therefore, respondent may be suspended from
office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Rodolfo A. Espinosa and Maximo A. Glindo v. Atty. Julieta A.
Omaña. A.C. No. 9081. October 12, 2011.
Court personnel; dishonesty. The Court deems Benedictos’s falsification of her bundy cards
tantamount to dishonesty. This Court has defined dishonesty as the “(d)isposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray.” Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and
perpetual disqualification for reemployment in government service. However, considering the
presence of a mitigating factor – this being Benedicto’s first administrative case in her nineteen
years in government service – suspension for six months is already a sufficient
penalty. Falsification of daily time records of Ma. Emcisa A. Benedictos, Administrative Officer I,
Regional Trial Court, Malolos City, Bulacan. A.M. No. P-10-2784. October 19, 2011.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. The act of the respondents in causing the removal of
several pages in a copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda of the Supreme Court’s Second Division is a
malevolent transgression of their duties as court personnel—particularly, as employees detailed
at the Office of Clerk of Court – Second Division (OCC-SD). Such act is unauthorized and a
blatant disregard of the standard operating procedures observed by the office in handling
confidential documents, such as theAgenda. It compromised the ability of the OCC-SD to
efficiently perform its functions and also imperiled the environment of confidentiality the office
is supposed to be clothed with. Respondents clearly committed a willful breach of the trust
reposed upon them by the Court. Supreme Court v. Eddie V. Delgado, Utility Worker II, Joseph
Lawrence M. Madeja, Clerk IV, and Wilfredo A. Florendo, Utility Worker II, all of the Office of
the Clerk of Court, Second Division. A.M. No. 2011-07-SC. October 4, 2011.
Judge; failure to file statement of assets and liabilities. Respondent clearly violated the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees when he failed to file his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
(SALN) for the years 2004-2008. He gave no explanation why he failed to file his SALN for five
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consecutive years. While every office in the government service is a public trust, no position
exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in
the Judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide with the law, the Code of Judicial
Conduct and with existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of our people in
the administration of justice. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Uyag P. Usman,
Presiding Judge, Shari’a Circuit Court, Pagadian City. A.M. No. SCC-08-12. October 19, 2011.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. The failure of Judge Infante to conduct a hearing prior to the
grant of bail in a criminal case involving a crime punishable by a capital offense, and his mere
reliance on the recommendation for bail by the public prosecutor, was inexcusable and
reflected gross ignorance of the law and the rules as well as a cavalier disregard of its
requirement. He well knew that the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong was a matter of judicial discretion, and that the discretion lay not in the determination of
whether or not a hearing should be held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of
the Prosecution’s evidence of guilt against the accused. His fault was made worse by his
granting bail despite the absence of a petition for bail from the accused. Consequently, any
order he issued in the absence of the requisite evidence was not a product of sound judicial
discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness. Atty. Franklin G. Gacal v. Judge
Jaime I. Infante, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in Alabel, Sarangani. A.M. No. RTJ-04-
1845. October 5, 2011.
Judge; undue delay. As early as February 27, 2002, the case had been submitted for decision,
but respondent judge had yet to render a decision by the time the administrative complaint
against him was filed on November 6, 2009. Judges should meticulously observe the periods
prescribed by the Constitution for deciding cases because failure to comply with the said period
transgresses the parties’ constitutional right to speedy disposition of their cases. Thus, failure to
decide cases within the ninety (90)-day reglementary period may warrant imposition of
administrative sanctions on the erring judge. However, the Court is not unmindful of
circumstances that justify the delay in the disposition of the cases assigned to judges. When a
judge sees such circumstances before the reglementary period ends, all that is needed is to
simply ask the Court, with the appropriate justification, for an extension of time within which to
decide the case. Evidently, respondent Judge failed to do any of these options. Antonio Y.
Cabasares v. Judge Filemon A. Tandinco, Jr. Municipal Trial Court in Cities, 8th Judicial Region,
Calbayog City, Western Samar. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1793. October 19, 2011.
Sheriff; gross neglect of duty. Respondent Sheriff was remiss in performing his mandated
duties: first,to give notice of the writ and demand that the judgment obligor and all persons
claiming under him vacate the property within three (3) days; second, to enforce the writ by
removing the judgment obligor and all persons claiming under the latter; third, to remove the
latter’s personal belongings in the property as well as destroy, demolish or remove the
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improvements constructed thereon upon special court order; and fourth, to execute and make a
return on the writ within 30 days from receipt of the writ and every 30 days thereafter until it is
satisfied in full or until its effectivity expires. The lapse of time – almost two years – it took for
the respondent to unsuccessfully execute the writ demonstrates his utter lack of diligence in
performing his duties. Teresita Guerrero-Boylon v. Aniceto Boyles, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cebu City. A.M. No. P-09-2716. October 11, 2011.
Attorney; aiding illegal practice of law. It has been established that Dela Rosa who is not a
member of the Bar misrepresented herself as respondent’s collaborating counsel. There was
also sufficient evidence to prove that respondent allowed Dela Rosa to illegally practice law,
appear in court, and give legal assistance to respondent’s client. This is in violation of Canon 9
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that “[a] lawyer shall not, directly or
indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.” The term “practice of law” implies
customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a
source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding one’s self out as a lawyer may
be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in
court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the
general practice of law. Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando F. Busmente. A.C. No.
7269. November 23, 2011.
Attorney; competence and diligence required. Respondent attorneys were engaged to represent
complainant and his son in in a civil case for forcible entry and damages. However,
respondents failed to file an answer within the 10-day period required by the summons and the
Rules of Court. Respondents claimed that, to their mind, the civil case was actually for
possession, notwithstanding that its title is for forcible entry, and that they mistakenly assumed
that the court would first issue an order stating that the case falls under the rules on summary
procedure before requiring their clients to answer. They further claimed that when no such
order was issued by the court, they again incorrectly assumed that the regular rules of procedure
will apply and that they have fifteen days to answer. All these, without seeking a clarification
from the court or ascertaining exactly when the answer should be filed and despite the
summons issued and served stating a ten day period to file an answer. The Supreme Court did
not find respondents’ defenses acceptable as it betrayed a lack of necessary competence and
diligence. The respondents had in fact been negligent, or worse, had failed to exercise the
required competence and diligence in filing the answer to the complaint. Pursuant to Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the
rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to expect
not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty
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to the client’s cause. Rogelio F. Estavillo v. Attys. Gemmo G. Guillermo and Erme S.
Labayog. A.C. No. 6899. November 16, 2011.
Attorney; conflict of interest. Respondent attorney drafted a demand letter on behalf of

complainant in connection with the dishonored checks issued by Ms. Koa. In the ensuing
criminal cases, respondent filed a Motion for Consolidation on behalf of Ms. Koa and appeared
at the preliminary investigation hearing as Ms. Koa’s counsel. Respondent argued that no
lawyer-client relationship existed between him and complainant because there was no
professional fee paid for the services he rendered. Moreover, he argued that he drafted the
demand letter only as a personal favor to complainant who is a close friend. A lawyer-client
relationship can exist notwithstanding the close friendship between complainant and
respondent. The relationship was established the moment complainant sought legal advice from
respondent regarding the dishonored checks. By drafting the demand letter respondent further
affirmed such relationship. The fact that the demand letter was not utilized in the criminal
complaint filed and that respondent was not eventually engaged by complainant to represent
her in the criminal cases is of no moment. Likewise, the non-payment of professional fee will
not exculpate respondent from liability. Absence of monetary consideration does not exempt
lawyers from complying with the prohibition against pursuing cases with conflicting
interests. The prohibition attaches from the moment the attorney-client relationship is
established and extends beyond the duration of the professional relationship. Lydia Castro-Justo
v. Atty. Rodolfo Galing. A.C. No. 6174. November 16, 2011.
Attorney; gross misconduct. Complainant engaged the legal services of respondent to assist her
and her child in pursuing and protecting their rights as heirs of her deceased husband who was
a British national, including claiming insurance proceeds due to the complainant and her child,
as well as processing visa applications for travel to England. Respondent solicited various
sums from the complainant, allegedly for purposes do defraying expenses in connection with
the engagement. Respondent admitted having received money from complainant but failed to
render an accounting or, at least, apprised the complainant of the actual expenses
incurred. Worse, respondent even inculcated in the mind of the complainant that she had to
adhere to the nefarious culture of giving “grease money” or lagay to the British Embassy
personnel, as if it was an ordinary occurrence in the normal course of conducting official
business transactions as a means to expedite the visa applications. This runs afoul the dictum in
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that “a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Respondent’s repeated
reprehensible acts of employing chicanery and unbecoming conduct to conceal her web of lies,
to the extent of milking complainant’s finances dry, and deceitfully arrogating upon herself the
insurance proceeds that should rightfully belong to complainant, in the guise of rendering
legitimate legal services, clearly transgressed the norms of honesty and integrity required in the
practice of law. This being so, respondent should be purged from the privilege of exercising the
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noble legal profession. Marites Freeman v. Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes. A.C. No. 6246. November
15, 2011.
Court personnel; grave misconduct and dishonesty. Respondent admitted receiving pay-offs
from Taguinod every time the City Star, the paper published by Taguinod, is awarded a judicial
notice from Branch 21 of the RTC of Santiago City for publication. Respondent’s defense that he
“never demanded any money or any rebate” from Taguinod does not spare him from liability.
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1079 not only prohibits local court personnel from
“demanding” pay-offs, it also bars receipt of such pay-offs. By accepting pay-offs, respondent
also violated Section 2(e), Canon III of the Code of Conduct, mandating that court personnel
shall not “[s]olicit or accept any gift, loan, gratuity,discount, favor, hospitality or service under
circumstances from which it could reasonably be inferred that a major purpose of the donor is to
influence the court personnel in performing official duties.” These violations of respondent
constitute grave misconduct or corrupt conduct in flagrant disregard of well-known legal
rules. Furthermore, by keeping the discounts or rebates for himself and thereby profiting from
them, he had committed a clear case of dishonesty. Francisco Taguinod v. Deputy Sheriff
Rolando Tomas, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Santiago City. A. M. No. P-09-
2660. November 29, 2011.
Court personnel; habitual tardiness. Under Memorandum Circular No. 23, Series of 1998, “[a]n
employee shall be considered habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of
minutes, ten (10) times a month for at least two (2) months in a semester or at least two (2)
consecutive months during the year.” It is clear from the facts that Calingasan has been
habitually tardy. Consequently, as an employee of the judiciary, she failed to live up to the
stringent standard of conduct demanded from everyone connected with the administration of
justice. The excuses offered by respondent – moral obligations, the performance of household
chores, traffic problems, health conditions, and domestic and financial concerns – are not
sufficient causes to excuse habitual tardiness. Leave Division-OAS, Office of the Court
Administrator v. Laraine I. Calingasan Stenographer II, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Sta Rosa,
Laguna. A.M. No. P-11-3010. November 23, 2011.
Court personnel; inefficiency; time for completion and submission of TSN. Respondent failed to
strictly follow Administrative Circular No. 24-90 that prescribes a 20-day period from the time
the notes are taken for the completion and submission of the transcript of stenographic
notes. Although the Court is solicitous of the plight of court stenographers, being saddled with
heavy workload is not compelling reason enough to justify respondent’s failure to faithfully
comply with the prescribed period provided in Administrative Circular No. 24-90 and, thus, she
must be faulted. Otherwise, every government employee charged with inefficiency would resort
to the same convenient excuse to evade punishment, to the great prejudice of public
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service. Concerned Citizen v. Maria Concepcion Divina, Court Stenographer, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 3, Balanga City, Bataan. A.M. No. P-07-2369. November 16, 2011.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. Simple misconduct has been defined as an unacceptable
behavior that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public officers. Respondent’s
actions transgressed the norms of civility expected of judicial officers, even in their private lives,
and constitute simple misconduct that must be squarely penalized. Although beso-beso or air
kissing may be considered a standard greeting between family members, what respondent did
was he not merely greeted his sister-in-law, but encroached into the territory of unwarranted
advances that offended acceptable standards of decency. Regardless of whether it reached the
level of criminal malice or lewdness, his conduct was unbecoming a court personnel, upon
whom is placed the heavy burden of moral uprightness. Beatriz B. Onate v. Severino G.
Imatong, Junior Process Server, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Piat, Cagayan. A.M. No. P-11-
3009. November 16, 2011.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. Respondent, a security guard at the Court of Appeals
compound in Manila, accidentally fired his service pistol while in the process of unloading it for
turnover to the guard on duty for the next shift. Respondent failed to show that his service pistol
was not mechanically sound at that time. In ruling out mechanical causes, it can only be
concluded that the undesired discharge of respondent’s service pistol was the result of his own
negligence; in the usual course of things, a firearm that is being unloaded should not discharge
if gun safety procedures had been strictly followed. However, we cannot consider the
respondent’s negligence as gross in nature because there is nothing in the records to show that
the respondent willfully and intentionally fired his service pistol. Also, at the time of the incident,
the respondent did observe most of the safety measures required in unloading his firearm. Court
of Appeals by: COC Teresita Marigomen v. Enrique Manabat Jr., Security Guard I, Court of
Appeals, Manila. A.M. No. CA-11-24-P. November 16, 2011.
Affidavit of Desistance; no effect on disciplinary proceeding. It bears to stress that a case of

suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant in a civil
case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession or its undesirable members in
order to protect the public and the courts. It is not an investigation into the acts of respondent
as a husband but on his conduct as an officer of the Court and his fitness to continue as a
member of the Bar. Hence, the Affidavit dated March 15, 1995, which is akin to an affidavit of
desistance, cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings. Elpidio P. Tiong vs. Atty.
George M. Florendo. A.C. No. 4428. December 12, 2011
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Attorney; gross immorality. Possession of good moral character is not only a condition for
admission to the Bar but is a continuing requirement to maintain one’s good standing in the
legal profession. It is the bounden duty of law practitioners to observe the highest degree of
morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar. Consequently, any errant behavior on the
part of a lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show him deficient in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant his suspension or
disbarment. Respondent’s act of having an affair with his client’s wife manifested his disrespect
for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost
moral depravity and low regard for his profession. He also violated the trust and confidence
reposed on him by the complainant, which in itself is prohibited under Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Elpidio P. Tiong vs. Atty. George M. Florendo.A.C. No. 4428.
December 12, 2011
Attorney; gross misconduct; inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedures. The

respondent, while an MTC judge, accepted a petition for declaratory relief filed by the
Municipal Council of San Fernando, Pampanga, assigned it to himself, and acted on it, all on
the same day and without issuing summons or giving notice to the complainant who was the
part adversely affected by the resolution subject of the Municipal Council’s petition. The New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only
maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality but they must also avoid any appearance
of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. Integrity and
impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are deemed essential not just in the proper
discharge of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of judges. This standard applies
not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made. As a
member of the bar and former judge, respondent is expected to be well-versed in the Rules of
Procedure. This is expected upon members of the legal profession because membership in the
bar is in the category of a mandate for public service of the highest order. Lawyers are oath-
bound servants of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law
and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for
which they have sworn to be fearless crusaders. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Atty.
Daniel B. LiangcoA.C. No. 5355. December 13, 2011
Court personnel; grave misconduct. Under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the sheriff
is required to secure the court’s prior approval of the estimated expenses and fees needed to
implement the court process. It is imperative that a sheriff shall observe the following: (1) the
sheriff must make an estimate of the expenses to be incurred by him; (2) he must obtain court
approval for such estimated expenses; (3) the approved estimated expenses shall be deposited
by the interested party with the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff; (4) the Clerk of Court shall
disburse the amount to the executing sheriff; and (5) the executing sheriff shall disburse/liquidate
his expenses within the same period for rendering a return on the writ. Any unspent amount
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shall be refunded to the party who made the deposit. Sheriffs are not authorized to receive
any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties. A sheriff
cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant without observing the
proper procedural steps; otherwise, it would amount to dishonesty or extortion.
The duty of sheriffs to promptly execute a writ is mandatory and ministerial. Sheriffs have no
discretion on whether or not to implement a writ. There is no need for the litigants to “follow-up”
its implementation. Unless restrained by a court order, they should see to it that the execution of
judgments is not unduly delayed. When respondent took it upon himself to mediate between
litigants and even provided an extension of the implementation of the writ, he appeared to be
lacking in the amount of diligence required of him in the performance of his duties. Atty. Rutillo
B. Pasok vs. Carlos P. Diaz, Sheriff IV, RTC Br 20, Tacurong City. A.M. No. P-07-2300.
December 12, 2011
Court personnel; grave misconduct. All officials and employees involved in the administration
of justice, from judges to the lowest rank and file employees, bear the heavy responsibility of
acting with strict propriety and decorum at all times in order to merit and maintain the public’s
respect for, and trust in, the Judiciary. Respondent’s use of the letterhead of the court and of her
official designation in the demand letters she prepared hardly meets the foregoing standard.
Despite her good intentions, she gave private individuals an unwarranted privilege at the
expense of the name of the court. Clerks of Court are notaries public ex officio. They may
notarize documents or administer oaths only when the matter is related to the exercise of their
official functions. Thus, in their ex-officio capacity, clerks of court should not take part in the
execution of private documents bearing no relation at all to their official functions. Arthur M.
Gabon vs. Rebecca P. Merka, Clerk of Court II, Municipal Trial Court, Liloan, Southern
Leyte. A.M. No. P-11-3000. December 14, 2011
Court personnel; gross negligence in the performance of duty. Respondent clerk of court
assigned to a cash clerk the collections, remittances, financial reports and accountable forms.
He later found out that some are already missing. The clerk of court is the court’s accountable
officer, not the cash clerk. He is the court’s chief administrative officer. No amount of good faith
can relieve him of his duty to properly administer and safeguard the court’s funds. Clerks of
court are officers of the law who perform vital functions in the prompt and sound administration
of justice. They are designated custodians of the court’s funds, revenues, records, properties and
premises. They are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and
property.Respondent is liable for gross neglect of duty. Office of the Court Administrator vs.
Clerk of Court Hermenegildo I. Marasigan, RTC Kabacan, North Cotabato A.M. No. P-05-2082.
December 12, 2011
Court personnel; immoral conduct. Respondent’s act of maintaining an illicit relationship with a
married man comes within the purview of disgraceful and immoral conduct, which is classified
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as a grave offense. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct of the official and
personnel who work thereat. Court employees have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve
the good name and integrity of courts of justice. This Court has thus consistently penalized court
personnel who had been found wanting of such standards, even if they have precipitately
resigned from their positions. Resignation should not be used either as an escape or as an easy
way out to evade an administrative liability or an administrative sanction. Evelina C. Banaag vs.
Olivia C. Espeleta, Interpreter III, Branch 82, RTC. Quezon City. A.M. No. P-11-3011.
December 16, 2011
Court personnel; leave for foreign travel without authority. The exercise of one’s right to travel
or the freedom to move from one place to another is not absolute. Section 5 (6), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution provides that the “Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision
over all courts and the personnel thereof.” This provision empowers the Court to oversee all
matters relating to the effective supervision and management of all courts and personnel under it.
Pursuant to this, the Court issued OCA Circular No. 49-2003 to regulate their foreign travel in
an unofficial capacity. Such regulation is necessary for the orderly administration of justice. If
judges and court personnel can go on leave and travel abroad at will and without restrictions or
regulations, there could be a disruption in the administration of justice. A situation where the
employees go on mass leave and travel together, despite the fact that their invaluable services
are urgently needed, could possibly arise. Thus, judges and personnel who shall leave the
country without travel authority issued by the Office of the Court Administrator shall be subject
to disciplinary action. A judge or a member of the Judiciary, who is not being restricted by a
criminal court or any other agency pursuant to any statutory limitation, can leave for abroad
without permission but he or she must be prepared to face the consequences for his or her
violation of the Court’s rules and regulations. OCA-OAS vs. Wilma Salvacion P. Heusdens,
etc. A.M. No. P-11-2927. December 13, 2011
Court personnel; unreasonable delay in remitting cash receipts. As custodian of court funds and
revenues, it is the duty of a clerk of court to immediately deposit the various funds received by
them to the authorized government depositories for they are not supposed to keep funds in their
custody. Atty. Cruz’ belated turnover of cash deposited with him is inexcusable and will not
exonerate him from liability. His failure to remit his cash collections on time is violative of
Administrative Circular No. 3-2000 which mandates that all fiduciary collections shall be
deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the Land
Bank of the Philippines, the authorized government depository bank. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Atty. Teotimo D. Cruz A.M. No. P-11-2988. December 12, 2011
Presumption of innocence in disbarment proceedings; burden of proof; quantum of proof. The

Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the
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lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or
disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are
equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent. Siao
Aba, et al. vs. Attys. Salvador De Guzman, Jr., et al. A.C. No. 7649. December 14, 2011
Attorney; accounting of funds. When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a
particular purpose, he should promptly account to the client how the money was spent. If he
does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His
failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the
money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client’s funds or
properties as they fall due or upon demand. His failure to return the client’s money upon
demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the
prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client. The issuance of checks
which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a
lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows lack of personal honesty
and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a
ground for disciplinary action. Hector Trenas vs. People of the Philippines. G.R. No. 195002.
January 25, 2012.
Attorney; mistake of counsel. The general rule is that the mistake of a counsel binds the client,
and it is only in instances wherein the negligence is so gross or palpable that courts must step in
to grant relief to the aggrieved client. It can be gleaned from the circumstances that petitioner
was given opportunities to defend his case and was granted concomitant reliefs by the court.
Thus, it cannot be said that the mistake and negligence of his former counsel were so gross and
palpable to have deprived him of due process. Cresencio C. Milla vs. People of the Philippines
and Carlo V. Lopez. G.R. No. 188726. January 25, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity,
uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty
and integrity not only in the performance of her official duties but in her personal and private
dealings with other people, to preserve the court’s good name and standing. The image of a
court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work
thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to
adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private
conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. Under Section
52(A)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty is a grave
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offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense. Under Section 58 of the same rules,
dismissal carries with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in the government service. Thus, the respondent is dismissed
for dishonesty when she made someone take the Civil Service Sub-professional Examination on
her behalf. Concerned Citizen vs. Domingo Nawen Abad, etc.A.M. No. P-11-2907. January 31,
2012.
Court personnel; grave abuse of authority. By the very nature of his duties, a sheriff performs a
very sensitive function in the dispensation of justice. He is duty-bound to know the basic rules
relative to the implementation of writs of execution, and should, at all times show a high degree
of professionalism in the performance of his duties. Administrative Circular No. 12 was
promulgated in order to streamline the service and execution of court writs and processes in
courts and to better serve the public good and facilitate the administration of justice. Paragraph
2 of Administrative Circular No. 12 provides that “All Clerks of Court of the Metropolitan Trial
Court and Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, and/or their deputy sheriffs shall serve all court
processes and execute all writs of their respective courts within their territorial
jurisdiction.” Furthermore, paragraph 5 of the same circular provides that “No sheriff or deputy
sheriff shall execute a court writ outside his territorial jurisdiction without first notifying in
writing, and seeking the assistance of, the sheriff of the place where the execution shall take
place.” It is clear that respondent’s act of implementing the subject writs in San Fernando City,
when his territorial jurisdiction is confined only to Angeles City, is a violation of the Circular
and tantamount to abuse of authority. While respondent claimed that he personally informed
the OCC of San Fernando City, he, however, failed to prove that he made written notice as
required by Administrative Circular No. 12. A mere submission of the copies of the court
processes to the OCC will not suffice as to the written notice requirement. The requirement of
notice is based on the rudiments of justice and fair play. It frowns upon arbitrariness and
oppressive conduct in the execution of an otherwise legitimate act. Luis P. Pineda vs. Neil T.
torres, sheriff II, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Angeles City. A.M. No. P-12-3027.
January 30, 2012
Court personnel; gross neglect of duty. A clerk of court performs a very delicate function as the
custodian of the funds and revenues, records, property, and premises of the court. He is liable
for any loss, shortage, destruction, or impairment of said funds and property. Even the undue
delay in the remittance of amounts collected by them at the very least constitutes
misfeasance. The safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to the goal of an orderly
administration of justice and no protestation of good faith can override the mandatory nature of
the Circulars designed to promote full accountability for government funds. Supreme Court
Circular No. 13-92 mandates that all fiduciary collections shall be deposited immediately by the
Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with an authorized government depository bank
which is the Land Bank of the Philippines. The respondents’ failure to remit their collection
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constitutes gross neglect of duty, dishonesty, and grave misconduct. Moreover, the failure of a
public officer to remit funds upon demand by an authorized officer shall be prima
facie evidence that the public officer has put such missing funds or property to personal use. Re:
Report on Financial Audit Conducted at MCTC, Santiago-San Esteban, Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. P-
11-2950. January 17, 2012
Judges; administrative liability. Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought against
any judge in relation to the performance of his official functions are neither complementary to
nor suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies. Any party
who may feel aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of resorting
to disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions. A judge’s failure to correctly interpret the law
or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily incur administrative
liability, for to hold him administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he
renders, assuming he has erred, will be nothing short of harassment and will make his position
doubly unbearable. His judicial office will then be rendered untenable, because no one called
upon to try the facts or to interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment. Administrative sanction and criminal liability should be imposed only
when the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious, or is committed with evident bad faith, or
only in clear cases of violations by him of the standards and norms of propriety and good
behavior prescribed by law and the rules of procedure, or fixed and defined by pertinent
jurisprudence. Re: Verified complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO
etc. against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., et al. A.M. No. 11-184-CA-J. January 31, 2012.
Judges; court personnel; gross misconduct; neglect of duty. Respondent Judge failed to exert due
diligence required of him to ascertain the facts of the case before he came out with the Order.
He should be reminded of his personal responsibility in the making of his decisions and
orders. He should not rely on anybody else for the examination and study of the records to
properly ascertain the facts of each case that he handles. He cannot simply pass the blame on
his staff and hide behind the incompetence of his subordinates. Moreover, respondent Judge
should have been more cautious since the case involved was an old inherited case with
voluminous records and what was sought to be executed was an order issued almost twenty (20)
years ago. It is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient court management system since he is
the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his functions. Although judges cannot be
held to account for erroneous judgments rendered in good faith, good faith in situations of
infallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply
where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and basic as to be
beyond permissible margins of error.
The records and pleadings filed have established the administrative liability of the clerk of
court. First, respondent Clerk of Court failed to inform respondent Judge of the existence of the
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court decisions. Second, he failed to inform and send the parties
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their respective notices and court orders. Third, he issued the Certificate of Finality without
verifying if indeed a motion for reconsideration was filed in connection with the case. As
custodian of judicial records, it is incumbent upon the clerk of court to ensure an orderly and
efficient court management system, and to supervise the personnel under his office to function
effectively. They must be assiduous in performing official duty and in supervising and managing
court dockets and records. It is also incumbent upon him to see to it that court orders were sent
with dispatch to the parties concerned. Thus, respondent Clerk of Court should ensure an
orderly and efficient record management system to assist all personnel, including respondent
Judge, in the performance of their respective duties. Espina and Madarang Company, et al.
vs. Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj and Abie M. Amilil, Officer-in-charge, branch Clerk of Court,
both of theRegional Trial Court, Br. 14, Cotabato City. A.M. No. RTJ-07-2069. December 14,
2011.
Administrative cases against lawyers; prescriptive period. The two-year prescriptive period for
initiating a complaint against a lawyer for disbarment or suspension provided under Section 1,
Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline should be
construed to mean two years from the date of discovery of the professional misconduct. Nesa
Isenhardt vs. Atty. Leonardo M. Real, A.C. No. 8254, February 15, 2012.
Attorney; disqualification as notary public. A notary public should not notarize a document
unless the person who signs it is the same person who executed it, personally appearing before
him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. This is to enable the notary
public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain
that the document is the party’s free act. The duties of a notary public is dictated by public
policy and impressed with public interest. It is not a meaningless ministerial act of
acknowledging documents executed by parties who are willing to pay the fees for
notarization. It is of no moment that the subject SPA was not utilized by the grantee for the
purpose it was intended because the property was allegedly transferred from complainant to her
brother by virtue of a deed of sale consummated between them. What is being penalized is
respondent’s act of notarizing a document despite the absence of one of the parties. A notarized
document is by law entitled to full credit upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries
public must observe the basic requirements in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the
confidence of the public in notarized documents will be undermined. Nesa Isenhardt vs. Atty.
Leonardo M. Real, A.C. No. 8254, February 15, 2012.
Attorney; government service; applicability of Code of Professional Responsibility. The Code of

Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the
government service. Where a lawyer’s misconduct as a government official is of such nature as
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to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined
as a member of the bar on such grounds. Martin Lahn III and James P. Concepcion vs. Labor
Arbiter Jovencio Li. Mayor, Jr., A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012.
Attorney; gross ignorance of the law. The respondent labor arbiter, being part of the quasi-
judicial system of our government, performs official functions that are akin to those of judges.
Accordingly, the present controversy may be approximated to administrative cases of judges
whose decisions, including the manner of rendering the same, were made subject of
administrative cases. While a judge may not always be held liable for ignorance of the law for
every erroneous order that he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal principle involved
is sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. The
unfounded insistence of the respondent on his supposed authority to issue writs of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order, taken together with the delay in the resolution of
the said motion for reconsideration, would clearly show that the respondent deliberately
intended to cause prejudice to the complainants. Martin Lahn III and James P. Concepcion vs.
Labor Arbiter Jovencio Li. Mayor, Jr., A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Dishonesty has been defined as the disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from
the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in government service. Given the total absence of evidence to
the contrary, the presumption that respondent clerk of court punched his DTR to make it appear
he was at the office on February 26, 2010 when he was in fact absent still prevails. Dishonesty
is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary. Public service requires utmost integrity
and discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and
integrity, for no less than the Constitution declares that a public office is a public trust, and all
public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, and serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. Leave Division, Office of the
Adrministrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator vs. Leoncio K. Gutierrez III, Clerk III,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City. A.M. No. P-11-2951, February 15, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty, misrepresentation. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 provides that court
personnel who wish to travel abroad must secure a travel authority from the Office of the Court
Administrator. Section 67 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave provides that any violation of the
leave laws, rules or regulations, or any misrepresentation or deception in connection with an
application for leave shall be a ground for disciplinary action. The respondent court
stenographer traveled without securing a travel authority and did not state her foreign travel in
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her leave application. She is guilty of violating at least two office rules and regulations. This
shows deception amounting to dishonesty.
Dishonesty means the concealment of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or
connected with the performance of his duties. It is an absence of integrity, a disposition to
betray, cheat, deceive or defraud, bad faith. The discrepancy in the respondent’s date of birth in
her records does not amount to dishonesty, as she made no false statement. No deliberate intent
to mislead, deceive or defraud appears from the cited circumstances of this case. The
respondent’s date of birth is not a fact directly relevant to her functions or qualification to office
or connected with the performance of her duties. Sheila G. Del Rosario, Court Stenographer III,
RTC, Br. 36, Santiago City, Isabela vs. Mary Anne C. Pascua, Court Stenographer III, same
court. A.M. No. P-11-2999. February 27, 2012.
Court personnel; habitual absenteeism. Administrative Circular No. 14-2002 provides that an
employee is considered habitually absent if the employee incurred unauthorized absences
exceeding the 2.5 days allowed per month for three months in a semester or at least three
consecutive months during the year. In imposing penalty of habitual absenteeism in
administrative cases, however, the court may take into consideration mitigating circumstances.
The presence of factors such as length of service in the judiciary, acknowledgment of infractions
and feeling of remorse, and family circumstances, among other things, play an important role in
the imposition of penalties. Judge Lucina Alpez Dayaon, etc. vs. Jesusa V. De Leon. A.M. No. P-
11-2926, February 1, 2012
Judge; gross ignorance of law and undue delay. Well- settled is the rule that an injunction
cannot be issued to transfer possession or control of a property to another when the legal title is
in dispute between the parties and the legal title has not been clearly established. In this case,
respondent judge evidently disregarded this established doctrine when he granted the
preliminary injunction in favor of Pagels whose legal title is disputed. When the law involved is
simple and elementary, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. When
the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a
principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of
the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately
done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. A judge may also be administratively
liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in ignoring,
contradicting or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence. Atty. Rene Medina, et al. vs.
Judge Victor Canoy, et al. A.M. RTJ-11-2298, February 22, 2012.
Judges; delay in conducting summary hearing to extend the 72-hr TRO; gross ignorance of law;
requirement of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption. Judges are not administratively
responsible for what they may do in the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within
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their legal powers and jurisdiction. Not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the
performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or
with deliberate intent to do an injustice. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office
untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. To constitute gross ignorance of the law,
it is not enough that the subject decision, order or actuation of the respondent judge in the
performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most
importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Complainants
failed to adduce proof to show that respondent judge was motivated by bad faith, ill will or
malicious motive when he granted the TRO and preliminary injunction. In addition, respondent
judge should not be penalized for failing to conduct the required summary hearing within 72
hours from the issuance of the original TRO. Though the Rules require the presiding judge to
conduct a summary hearing before the expiration of the 72 hours, it could not be complied with
because of the remoteness and inaccessibility of the trial court from the parties’ addresses. Sps.
Democrito and Olivia Lago vs. Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. RTC, Br. 43, Gingoog City. A.M. No.
RTJ-10-2255, February 8, 2012.
Judges; immorality vs. simple misconduct. The New Code of Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary provides that, as a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. In particular, judges
must conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a
high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, the judge must comport himself at all times
in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of
the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. There was no evidence
that respondent judge engaged in scandalous conduct that would warrant the imposition of
disciplinary action against him. His admission of homosexuality does not make him
automatically immoral. However, respondent judge is guilty of simple misconduct in causing
the registration of title in his son’s name with the intention of defrauding a possible judgment-
obligee. Simple misconduct is a transgression of some established rule of action, an unlawful
behavior, or negligence committed by a public officer. Aida R. Campos, et al. vs. Judge Eliseo M.
Campos, MTC, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, February 8, 2012.
Judges; undue delay in rendering a decision. Judges must resolve matters pending before them
promptly and expeditiously within the constitutionally mandated three-month period. If they
cannot comply with the same, they should ask for an extension from the Supreme Court upon
meritorious grounds. The rule is that the reglementary period for deciding cases should be
observed by all judges, unless they have been granted additional time. Judges must dispose of
the court’s business promptly. Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence
of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it to disrepute. Hence, judges are
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enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions on them.
Although there are no promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial audit, the absence of such
rules should not serve as license to recommend the imposition of penalties to retired judges who,
during their incumbency, were never given a chance to explain the circumstances behind the
results of the judicial audit. Judicial audit reports and the memoranda which follow them should
state not only recommended penalties and plans of action for the violations of audited courts,
but also give commendations when they are due. To avoid similar scenarios, manual judicial
audits may be conducted at least six months before a judge’s compulsory retirement. Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Judge Celso L. Mantua, Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Palompon,
Leyte. A.M. No. RTJ-11-2291. February 8, 2012.
Attorney; lifting of indefinite suspension. Professional misconduct involving the misuse of

constitutional provisions for the purpose of insulting Members of the Supreme Court is a serious
breach of the rigid standards that a member of good standing of the legal profession must
faithfully comply with. Thus, the penalty of indefinite suspension was imposed. However, in the
past two years during which Atty. Lozano has been suspended, he has repeatedly expressed his
willingness to admit his error, to observe the rules and standards in the practice of law, and to
serve the ends of justice if he should be reinstated. And in these two years, this Court has not
been informed of any act that would indicate that Atty. Lozano had acted in any unscrupulous
practices unsuitable to a member of the bar. While the Court will not hesitate to discipline its
erring officers, it will not prolong a penalty after it has been shown that the purpose for imposing
it had already been served. Re: subpoena Duces Tecum dated January 11, 2010 of Acting
Director Aleu A. Amante, PIAB-C, Office of the Ombudsman/Re: Order of the Office of the
Ombudsman referring the complaint of Attys. Oliver O. Lozano & Evangeline J. Lozano-Endriano
against Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno(ret.). A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC & A.M. NO. 10-9-9-SC, March
20, 2012.
Court personnel; administrative case; quantum of evidence. The Uniform Rules on

Administrative Cases in the Civil Service govern the conduct of disciplinary and non-disciplinary
proceedings in administrative cases. In Section 3, it provides that, “Administrative investigations
shall be conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and
evidence applicable to judicial proceedings.”
The weight of evidence required in administrative investigations is substantial evidence. For
these reasons, only substantial evidence is required to find Malunao guilty of the administrative
offense charged against her. In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable man might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion, is the lowest standard of proof provided under the Rules of Court. In assessing
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whether there is substantial evidence in administrative investigations such as this case, the Court
is not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence. Dela Cruz’s Sinumpaang Salaysay,
the joint affidavit of arrest executed by the NBI agents, the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report,
photocopy of the marked money, the Complaint Sheet, and the photographs of Malunao
entering Dela Cruz’s house, and the contents of Malunao’s bag after receipt of the money, all
prove by subsantial evidence the guilt of Malunao for the offense of grave misconduct. Sheryll C.
Dela Cruz vs. Pamela P. Malunao, Clerk III, RTC, Branch 28, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. A.M.
No. P-11-2019, March 20, 2012.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and

definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public
officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption,
willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules. Corruption, as an element of
grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his position or office to procure some benefit for himself or for another person,
contrary to duty and the rights of others. Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel states: “Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on
any or explicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.”
Respondent’s use of her position as Clerk III in Branch 28 to solicit money from Dela Cruz with
the promise of a favorable decision violates Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel and constitutes the offense of grave misconduct meriting the penalty of
dismissal. Sheryll C. Dela Cruz vs. Pamela P. Malunao, Clerk III, RTC, Branch 28, Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya. A.M. No. P-11-2019, March 20, 2012.
Judges; judicial clemency. In A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency), the Court laid
down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, thus:
“1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be
limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with
proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same
or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead
of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen
or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative
and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.”
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Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds merit in petitioner’s request. A
review of the records reveals that petitioner has exhibited remorse for her past misdeeds, which
occurred more than ten (10) years ago. While she was found to have belatedly filed her motions
for additional time to resolve the cases then pending in her sala, the Court noted that she had
disposed of the same within the extended period sought, except in A.M. No. 99-2-79-RTC
where she submitted her compliance beyond the approved 45-day extended
period. Nevertheless, petitioner has subsequently shown diligence in the performance of her
duties and has not committed any similar act or omission. In the Memorandum of the Office of
the Court Administrator, her prompt compliance with the judicial audit requirements of pending
cases was acknowledged and she was even commended for her good performance in the
effective management of her court and in the handling of court records.
Moreover, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Bohol Chapter has shown its high regard
for petitioner per the letter of support signed by a number of its members addressed to the IBP
dated October 15, 1999 during the pendency of her administrative cases and the IBP Resolution
No. 11, Series of 2009 endorsing her application for lateral transfer to the RTC of Tagbilaran
City. Re: Petition for judicial clemency of Judge Irma Zita V. Masamayor. A.M. No. 12-2-6-SC,
March 6, 2012.
Attorney; falsification. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be
removed or suspended on the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case without
authority so to do.
The crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals
and, therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving
moral turpitude. Re: SC Decision date May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 under Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court vs. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin. A.C. No. 7940, April 24, 2012.
Attorney; groundless imputation of bribery. As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers. They are to abstain from
offensive or menacing language or behavior before the court and must refrain from attributing to
a judge motives that are not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
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Atty. Peña cannot be excused for uttering snide and accusatory remarks at the expense of the
reputation and integrity of members of this Court, and for using those unsubstantiated claims as
basis for the subject Motion for Inhibition.
Not only has respondent Peña failed to show sincere remorse for his malicious insinuations of
bribery and wrongdoing against Justice Carpio, he in fact continually availed of such unethical
tactics in moving for the inhibition of eleven Justices of the Court. Indeed, his pattern of
behavior can no longer be seen as isolated incidents that the Court can pardon given certain
mitigating circumstances. Respondent Peña has blatantly and consistently cast unfounded
aspersions against judicial officers in utter disregard of his duties and responsibilities to the
Court.
Respondent Peña’s actions betray a similar disrespectful attitude towards the Court that cannot
be countenanced especially for those privileged enough to practice law in the country. In re:
Supreme Court Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817 and 145822. A.C. No.
6332, April 17, 2012.
Attorney; lack of diligence. When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will
exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance
and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust
reposed on him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the
legal profession, the courts and society. His workload does not justify neglect in handling one’s
case because it is settled that a lawyer must only accept cases as much as he can efficiently
handle. Suzette Del Mundo vs. Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano. A.C. No. 6903, April 16, 2012.
Attorney; obligation to hold in trust money of his client. A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust
money of his client that may come to his possession. As trustee of such funds, he is bound to
keep them separate and apart from his own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose
such as for the filing and processing of a case if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon
demand. Failure to return gives rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated it in violation
of the trust reposed on him. And the conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross
violation of professional ethics and betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Suzette
Del Mundo vs. Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano.A.C. No. 6903, April 16, 2012.
Attorney; representation of conflicting interests. “The proscription against representation of

conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the
same action or in an unrelated action.” The prohibition also applies even if the “lawyer would
not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other
client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one
to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated.” To be held
accountable under this rule, it is “enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom
would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective
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retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to
both clients.” Aniñon vs. Sabistsana. A.C. No. 5098, April 11, 2012.
Attorney; submission of falsified internal court documents. The falsification, subject of the
instant administrative case, lies in the fact that respondent Peña submitted to the Court a
document he was absolutely certain, at the time of such submission, was a copy of the Agenda
of the then ponente.
Candor and truthfulness are some of the qualities exacted and expected from members of the
legal profession. Thus, lawyers shall commit no falsehood, nor shall they mislead or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice. As disciples of truth, their lofty vocation is to correctly inform
the court of the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct
conclusions. Courts are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and
pleading before them. In the instant case, the submission of a document purporting to be a copy
of the Agenda of a member of this Court is an act of dishonesty that puts into doubt the ability of
respondent to uphold his duty as a disciple of truth.
Respondent led the Court to believe that what he submitted was a faithful reproduction of
theponente’s Agenda, just to support the subject Motion to Inhibit. The original of the purported
copy was later found to have been inexistent in the court’s records.
The Court noted that respondent Peña has not explained, to the Court’s satisfaction, how he
managed to obtain internal and confidential documents.
Respondent Peña is sanctioned for knowingly using confidential and internal court records and
documents, which he suspiciously obtained in bolstering his case. His unbridled access to
internal court documents has not been properly explained. The cavalier explanation of
respondent Peña that this Court’s confidential documents would simply find themselves
conveniently falling into respondent’s lap through registered mail and that the envelopes
containing them could no longer be traced is unworthy of belief. This gives the Court reason to
infer that laws and its own internal rules have been violated over and over again by some court
personnel, whom respondent Peña now aids and abets by feigning ignorance of how the
internal documents could have reached him. It is not unreasonable to even conclude that
criminal liabilities have been incurred in relation to the Revised Penal Code and the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, with Atty. Peña benefitting from the same. Respondent’s actions
clearly merit no other penalty than disbarment. In re: Supreme Court Resolution dated 28 April
2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817 and 145822. A.C. No. 6332, April 17, 2012.
Court personnel; conduct unbecoming of a court personnel. Respondent is liable for conduct
unbecoming a court employee for his continued refusal to coordinate with complainants in the
implementation of the writ of possession, despite numerous attempts on their part to get in touch
with him. It may be recalled that complainants endeavored, no less than four (4) times, to
communicate with respondent for the proper and expeditious execution of the writ, but each
time, respondent rebuffed their efforts. Finally, on25 April 2011, the day respondent finally
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implemented the writ, respondent refused to allow Ms. De Jesus to inform complainants of the
intended implementation and opted to be accompanied by an ordinary bank employee to
witness the enforcement of the writ.
The persistent refusal of respondent to cooperate with complainants in the implementation of
the writ runs afoul of the exacting standards required of those in the judiciary. Time and again,
the Court has emphasized the heavy burden of responsibility which court officials and
employees are mandated to perform. They are constantly reminded that any impression of
impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided.
This is so because the image of the court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct,
official or otherwise, of the men and women who work there. The conduct of even minor
employees mirrors the image of the courts they serve; thus, they are required to preserve the
judiciary’s good name and standing as a true temple of justice. Attys. Gonzalez, et al. vs.
Calo. A.M. No. P-12-3028, April 11, 2012.
Court personnel; disgraceful and immoral conduct. Immorality has been defined to include not
only sexual matters but also “conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption,
indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing
moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate
attitude toward good order and public welfare.” There is no doubt that engaging in sexual
relations with a married man is not only a violation of the moral standards expected of
employees of the judiciary, but is also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage
which this Court abhors and is, thus, punishable. Evelyn J. Jailorina vs. Richelle Taneo-Regner,
Demo II, RTC, OCC, San Mateo, Rizal. A.M. No. P-11-2948, April 23, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Falsification of daily time record constitutes dishonesty. Dishonesty
is defined as the “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.” Section 52(A), Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (MC No. 19, dated September 14,
1999) classifies dishonesty as a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for first time
offenses. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Araya. A.M. No. P-12-3053, April 11, 2012.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. The behavior of all employees and officials involved in the
administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy
responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times in
order to merit and maintain the public’s respect for and trust in the judiciary. Needless to say, all
court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty and
uprightness.
Respondent’s shouting at complainant within the court premises, reporting complainant to the
police after she was reprimanded for her solicitation, and refusing to talk with complainant
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judge are not only acts of discourtesy and disrespect but likewise an unethical conduct
sanctioned by Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
High-strung and belligerent behavior has no place in government service where the personnel
are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times even when confronted with
rudeness and insolence. Such conduct is exacted from them so that they will earn and keep the
public’s respect for and confidence in the judicial service. This standard is applied with respect
to a court employee’s dealings not only with the public but also with his or her co-workers in
the service. Conduct violative of this standard quickly and surely erodes respect for the courts
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; and the misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or
to disregard established rules. Thus, considering respondent’s transgressions, i.e., disrespectful
conduct, solicitation, and influence peddling of bail bonds, there is no question that respondent
is guilty of grave misconduct. Judge Salvador R. Santos, Jr. vs. Editha R. Mangahas. A.M. No. P-
09-2720, April 17, 2012.
Court personnel; habitual tardiness. Under Sec. 52 (C) (4), Rule VI of CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 19, Series of 1999, habitual tardiness is penalized as follows: First offense
Reprimand; Second offense Suspension for 1-30 days; Third offense Dismissal from the service.
Since it was proven that the present case is the second offense of Gareza for being habitually
tardy, the OCA correctly recommended for the penalty of suspension for 30 days with warning
that a similar offense in the future would be meted a more severe penalty. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Sheriff Gareza. A.M. No. P-12-3058, April 25, 2012.
Court personnel; official and personal conduct. Respondent took more than six years to pay
their obligation to the complainant. Also, one of the land titles that respondents gave as
collateral turned out to have been encumbered. While they have already paid their obligation,
such payment was conditioned upon the complainant’s execution of an Affidavit of Desistance.
All these facts constitute conduct that reflects badly on the judiciary, diminishing the honor and
integrity of the offices they hold. This is especially true because respondents were admittedly
given the loans because they were considered prominent persons in the community; and that
they were considered as such, presumably because they worked in the judiciary.
In Villaseñor v. De Leon, the Court emphasized that “to preserve decency within the judiciary,
court personnel must comply with just contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high
ethical standards”. In that case, the Court said that respondent was “expected to be a paragon of
uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in all her official conduct but also in her personal
actuations, including business and commercial transactions, so as to avoid becoming her court’s
albatross of infamy.” Re: Complaint filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro against Edna Magallanes and
Bonifacio Magallanes. A.M. No. P-11-3003, April 25, 2012.
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Court personnel; neglect of duty. Settled is the role of clerks of court as judicial officers
entrusted with the delicate function with regard to collection of legal fees. They are expected to
correctly and effectively implement regulations relating to proper administration of court funds.
Delay in the remittance of collection constitutes neglect of duty. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Nini. A.M. No. P-11-3002, April 11, 2012.
Court personnel; neglect of duty. The following are the duties of a sheriff: first, to give notice of
the writ and demand that the judgment obligor and all persons claiming under him vacate the
property within three (3) days; second, to enforce the writ by removing the judgment obligor
and all persons claiming under the latter; third, to remove the latter’s personal belongings in the
property as well as destroy, demolish or remove the improvements constructed thereon upon
special court order; andfourth, to execute and make a return on the writ within 30 days from
receipt of the writ and every thirty (30) days thereafter until it is satisfied in full or until its
effectivity expires.
Respondent was clearly remiss in the performance of his mandated duties: he unilaterally gave
the occupants 3 months, instead of the three (3) days provided by the Rules, to vacate the
property; when he did evict the occupants from the premises, a room containing their personal
effects was padlocked, therefore delaying the demolition of the improvements introduced on the
property; finally, respondent failed to make a return on the writ of possession after he
implemented the same. Attys. Gonzalez, et al. vs. Calo. A.M. No. P-12-3028, April 11, 2012.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is the failure to give attention to
a task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Sarmiento, et al. A.M. No. P-11-2912, April 10, 2012.
Court personnel; unauthorized absences. Under the Civil Service rules, an employee should
submit in advance, whenever possible, an application for a vacation leave of absence for action
by the proper chief of agency prior to the effective date of the leave. It is clear from the facts that
Dacsig had failed to acquire the necessary leave permits. He offers no excuse or explanation for
failing to obtain the necessary authorization for his leaves. Thus, he is guilty of taking
unauthorized absences. Rule IV, Section 52 (A) (17) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, provides that the penalty for frequent unauthorized absences of a first
offender is suspension for six months and one day to one year. Judge Andrew P. Dulnuan vs.
Esteban D. Dacsig, Clerk of Court II, MCTC, Magddela-Nagtipunan, Quirinio. A.M. No. P-11-
3004, April 18, 2012.
Judge; gross ignorance. Civil Case No. 632, a case for ejectment, is covered by the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure. It is equally undisputed that in summary procedure, a preliminary
conference should be held not later than 30 days after the last answer has been filed.
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Considering that no preliminary conference at all was held in Civil Case No. 632, Judge Literato
evidently failed to comply with a basic rule of procedure for which he should accordingly be
held accountable. Judge Literato’s inaction in Civil Case No. 632 for 322 days constitutes utter
disregard for the summary nature of an ejectment case.
Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with
the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. It is highly
imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. Basic legal
procedures must be at the palm of a judge’s hands. In sum, Judge Literato is administratively
guilty of gross ignorance of the Rule on Summary Procedure and undue delay in rendering a
decision. Dr. Ramie G. Hipe vs. Judge Rolando T. Literato, Municipal Trial Court, Mainit, Surigao
Del Norte. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1781, April 25, 2012.
Judge; gross misconduct. In Guerrero vs. Judge Deray, the Court held that a judge “who
deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the resolution of [the Supreme]
Court is guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination.”
In the present case, the Court found that Judge Go failed to heed the Court’s pronouncements.
He did not file the required comment to the Court’s show-cause resolutions despite several
opportunities granted him. His willful disobedience and disregard to the show-cause resolutions
constitutes grave and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and worthiness of the honor and
integrity attached to his office. It is noteworthy that Judge Go was afforded several opportunities
to explain his failure to decide the subject cases long pending before his court and to comply
with the directives of this Court, but he has failed, and continuously refuses to heed the same.
This continued refusal to abide by lawful directives issued by this Court is glaring proof that he
has become disinterested to remain with the judicial system to which he purports to
belong. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Go, et al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1667, April 10,
2012.
Judge; gross misconduct and dishonesty. In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous
annulment of marriage cases which do not exist in the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15
or the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to
show that (1) proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2) docket fees had been paid; (3)
the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4) hearings had been
conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for decision. Judge Indar, who had sworn to
faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on the questioned annulment of marriage cases,
without any showing that such cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and
jurisprudential requisites for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross
misconduct.
Among the questioned annulment decrees is Judge Indar’s Decision dated 23 May 2007, in Spec.
Proc. No. 06-581, entitled “Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling.” Despite the fact that no
proceedings were conducted in the case, Judge Indar declared categorically, in response to the
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Australian Embassy letter, that the Decision annulling the marriage is valid and that petitioner is
free to marry. In effect, Judge Indar confirms the truthfulness of the contents of the annulment
decree, highlighting Judge Indar’s appalling dishonesty. Office of the Court Administrator vs.
Judge Indar. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232, April 10, 2012.
Judge; performing or agreeing to perform functions or services outside of their official

functions. Judge Molato is to be reprimanded for agreeing to serve as one of Lucky Corporation’s
alternate bank signatories even if he may not have performed such service for the
corporation. He has no business agreeing to the performance of such service. His offense
constitutes a violation of Administrative Circular 5 which in essence prohibits public officials
from performing or agreeing to perform functions or services outside of their official functions
for the reason that the entire time of the officials and employees of the judiciary shall be devoted
to their official work to ensure the efficient and speedy administration of justice. Ramoncito and
Juliana Luarca vs. Judge Ireneo B. Molato, MTC, Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro/ Jeny Agbay vs.
Judge Ireneo B. Molato, MTC, Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. A.M. No. MTJ-08-1711/A.M. No.
MTJ-08-1716, April 23, 2012.
Notary public; duty to ascertain the identities of the parties executing the document. A notary
public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the
acknowledgement and affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of these
notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed on
documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a private to a public instrument, after
which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due
execution. Thus, notarization should not be treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary act.
A notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his
powers and duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. A notary
public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves
of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be
part of illegal transactions.
The Court cautioned all notaries public to be very careful and diligent in ascertaining the true
identities of the parties executing the document before them, especially when it involves
disposition of a property, as this Court will deal with such cases more severely in the
future. Maria vs. Cortez. A.C. No. 7880, April 11, 2012.
Administrative Complaint; moot and academic. The Court dismissed the complaint filed by
Inter-Petal Recreational Corporation against Chief Justice Renato Corona for being moot and
academic after considering the judgment of the Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court, which
found the Chief Justice guilty of the charge under Article II of the Articles of Impeachment, with
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the penalty of removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of
the Philippines as provided in Section 3(7), Article XI of the Constitution. Re: Complaint Against
the Honorable Chief Justice Renato C. Corona dated September 14, 2011 filed by Inter-Petal
Recreational Corporation, A.M. No. 12-6-10-SC. June 13, 2012
Attorneys; disbarment cases imprescriptible. The defense of prescription is untenable. The Court
has held that administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of considerable
time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint
will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer. Otherwise, members of the bar would
only be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact
that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of
being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer
for. Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco vs. Atty. Pablo Bernardo, A.C. No. 6368, June 13, 2012.
Attorney; False and untruthful statements in pleadings. The practice of law is a privilege
bestowed on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications
for it. Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and
morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their four-fold duty to
society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and
norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Magat’s act clearly falls short of the standards set by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Rule 10.01, which provides:
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
The Court ruled that there was a deliberate intent on the part of Atty. Magat to mislead the court
when he filed the motion to dismiss the criminal charges on the basis of double jeopardy. Atty.
Magat should not make any false and untruthful statements in his pleadings. If it were true that
there was a similar case for slight physical injuries that was really filed in court, all he had to do
was to secure a certification from that court that, indeed, a case was filed. Rodrigo Molina vs.
Atty. Ceferino Magat A.C. No. 1900. June 13, 2012.
Attorney; Neglect etc.Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client

relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Once a lawyer agrees to
handle a case, it is that lawyer’s duty to serve the client with competence and
diligence. Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty. When the RTC ruled against complainant
and her husband, they filed a Notice of Appeal. Consequently, what should apply is the rule on
ordinary appealed cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the
appellant’s brief be filed after the records of the case have been elevated to the CA. Respondent,
as a litigator, was expected to know this procedure. Canon 5 of the Code reads:
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CANON 5 — A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal
education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the
practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and
jurisprudence.
The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of the case
does not excuse his negligence. Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle
any legal matter without adequate preparation. While it is true that respondent was not
complainant’s lawyer from the trial to the appellate court stage, this fact did not excuse him
from his duty to diligently study a case he had agreed to handle. If he felt he did not have
enough time to study the pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by complainant’s
husband only two days before the expiration of the period for filing the Appellant’s Brief,
respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time to file the proper pleading instead
of whatever pleading he could come up with, just to beat the deadline set by the Court of
Appeals.
Also, as counsel, he had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their case. His failure to do
so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which reads:
18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within
a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent could have
done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He
could have thus explained why he was no longer the counsel of complainant and her husband
in the case and informed the court that he could no longer contact them. His failure to take this
measure proves his negligence.
The failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigan’s Motion to
Dismiss is negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in
handling the client’s case, viz:
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence in
fulfilling their duty would render them liable for disciplinary action. Respondent has failed to
live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates his duties to his client, he engages in
unethical and unprofessional conduct for which he should be held accountable. Emilia R.
Hernandez vs. Atty. Venancio B. Padilla, A.C. No. 9387, June 20, 2012.
Contempt; unauthorized practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court ruled that “practice
of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law
is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. The OCA was
able to establish the pattern in Karaan’s unauthorized practice of law. He would require the
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parties to execute a special power of attorney in his favor to allow him to join them as one of
the plaintiffs as their attorney-in-fact. Then, he would file the necessary complaint and other
pleadings “acting for and in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact, agent or representative” of
the parties. The fact that Karaan did not indicate in the pleadings that he was a member of the
Bar, or any PTR, Attorney’s Roll, or MCLE Compliance Number does not detract from the fact
that, by his actions, he was actually engaged in the practice of law.
Under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person assuming to be an
attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority, is liable for indirect
contempt of court. Under Section 7 of the same rules, a respondent adjudged guilty of indirect
contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank may
be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) months, or both. If a respondent is adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a lower
court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding one (1) month, or both. Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, et al., vs. Judge Antonio C. Lubao, RTC
Br. 22, General Santos City, A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ, June 20, 2012.
Court personnel; discourtesy. Unless specifically provided by the rules, clerks of court have no
authority to pass upon the substantive or formal correctness of pleadings and motions that
parties file with the court. Compliance with the rules is the responsibility of the parties and their
counsels. And whether these conform to the rules concerning substance and form is an issue
that only the judge of the court has authority to determine. The duty of clerks of courts to
receive pleadings, motions, and other court-bound papers is purely ministerial. Although they
may on inspection advise the parties or their counsels of possible defects in the documents they
want to file, which may be regarded as part of public service, they cannot upon insistence of the
filing party refuse to receive the same.
Canon IV, Section 2 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel provides that court personnel
shall carry out their responsibilities as public servants in as courteous a manner as possible. Atty.
Ramos was counsel in a case before Teves’ branch. He was an officer of the court who
expressed a desire to have the presiding judge, to whom he addressed his motion, see and
consider the same. Teves arrogated onto himself the power to decide with finality that the
presiding judge was not to be bothered with that motion. He denied Atty. Ramos the courtesy
of letting the presiding judge decide the issue between him and the lawyer. As held in Macalua
v. Tiu, Jr., an employee of the judiciary is expected to accord respect for the person and right of
others at all times, and his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
courtesy and dignity. These are absent in this case.
Civil Service Resolution 99-1936 classifies discourtesy in the course of official duties as a light
offense, the penalty for which is reprimand for the first offense, suspension of 1-30 days for the
second offense, and dismissal for the third offense. In two consolidated administrative cases,
one for grave misconduct and immorality and the other for insubordination, the Court meted out
on Teves the penalty of suspension for six months in its resolution of October 5, 2011. The
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Court of course decided these cases and warned Teves to change his ways more than a year
after the September 8, 2008 incident with Atty. Ramos. Consequently, it could not be said that
he ignored with respect to that incident the warnings given him in the subsequently decided
cases. Still those cases show Teves’ propensity for misbehavior. Thus, the Court imposed on
Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, the
penalty of 30 days suspension with warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will
be dealt with more severely. Atty. Edward Anthony B. Ramos vs. Reynaldo S. Teves, Clerk of
Court III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City. A.M. No. P-12-3061, June 27,
2012.
Court personnel; disgraceful and immoral conduct. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in
the conduct, official or otherwise, of the women and men who work in the judiciary, from the
judge to the lowest of its personnel. Like the rest of the personnel of the Court, the shuttle bus
drivers are expected to observe the norms and ethics of conduct of public officials and
employees. Judiciary employees should be circumspect in how they conduct themselves inside
and outside the office. Any scandalous behavior or any act that may erode the people’s esteem
for the judiciary is unbecoming of an employee. Court employees are supposed to be well-
mannered, civil and considerate in their actuations.
Laribo Jr.’s utterances, are by themselves, malicious and cast aspersion upon Diomampo’s
character. The Court cannot countenance such behavior. The Court sanctioned Laribo Jr. for his
disgraceful and immoral conduct. Since such conduct is classified as a grave offense, the
penalty for the first offense is suspension from 6 months and 1 day to one year. But the Court
tempered OCA’s recommended penalty and imposed a penalty of one month suspension, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely, taking into
account that this is Laribo’s Jr. first infraction. Shirley D. Diomampo, Records Officer II,
Sandiganbayan vs. Felipe C. Laribo Jr., Shuttle Bus Driver, Sandiganbayan. A.M. No. SB-12-18-
P. June 13, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees enunciates the State’s policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. And no other office in the government service exacts a
greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than the judiciary.
Persons involved in the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowest clerk, must
live up to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness and diligence in the public
service. As the assumption of public office is impressed with paramount public interest, which
requires the highest standards of ethics, persons aspiring for public office must observe honesty,
candor and faithful compliance with the law.
Respondent committed dishonesty by causing the unauthorized insertion of an additional
sentence in the trial court’s order. Dishonesty has been defined as a disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive or defraud. It implies untrustworthiness, lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or
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integrity in principle on the part of the individual who failed to exercise fairness and
straightforwardness in his or her dealings. By her act, she has compromised and undermined the
public’s faith in the records of the court below and, ultimately, the integrity of the Judiciary. To
tolerate such act would open the floodgates to fraud by court personnel.
The insertion of an additional sentence in an order of the trial court, regardless of the reason is
not among respondent’s duties. A legal researcher’s duty focuses mainly on verifying legal
authorities, drafting memoranda on evidence, outlining facts and issues in cases set for pre-trial,
and keeping track of the status of cases. In Salvador v. Serrano, the Court held that courts have
the inherent power to amend and control their process and orders to make them conformable to
law and justice. But such power rests upon the judge and not to clerks of court who only
perform adjudicative support functions and non-adjudicative functions. In the same vein, the
power to amend court orders cannot be performed by a legal researcher. It is well to remind that
court personnel are obliged to accord the integrity of court records of paramount importance, as
these are vital instruments in the dispensation of justice. Judge Amado Caguioa (ret.) vs.
Elizabeth Aucena, Court Legal Researcher II, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Baguio City. A.M.
No. P-09-2646, June 18, 2012.
Under Section 52 (A) (1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, promulgated by the Civil Service Commission through Resolution No. 99-1936 dated
August 31, 1999 and implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999, dishonesty
is a grave offense punishable by dismissal from the service for the first offense. However, the
Court, in certain instances, has not imposed the penalty of dismissal due to the presence of
mitigating factors such as the length of service, being a first-time offender, acknowledgment of
the infractions, and remorse by the respondent. The Court has also ruled that where a penalty
less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be
visited with a consequence so severe. It is not only for the law’s concern for the workingman;
there is, in addition, his family to consider. Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows
on those dependent on wage earners.
Considering that this is respondent’s first offense in her twenty-two (22) years of service in the
Judiciary, the admission of her act and her sincere apology for her mistake, her firm resolve not
to commit the same mistake in the future, and taking into account that she is a widow and the
only one supporting her five children, the recommended penalty of suspension for a period of
six (6) months is in order. Judge Amado Caguioa (ret.) vs. Elizabeth Aucena, Court Legal
Researcher II, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Baguio City. A.M. No. P-09-2646, June 18, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty.For Aguam to assert that she herself took and passed the
examination when in fact somebody else took it for her constitutes dishonesty. Every employee
of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public
servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance
of her official duties but also in her personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve
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the court’s good name and standing. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct,
official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its
personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality
and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and
integrity of the courts of justice. Here, Aguam failed to meet these stringent standards set for a
judicial employee and does not therefore deserve to remain with the Judiciary.
In Cruz v. Civil Service Commission, Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, and Concerned
Citizen v. Dominga Nawen Abad, the Court dismissed the employees found guilty of similar
offenses. In Cruz, Zenaida Paitim masqueraded as Gilda Cruz and took the Civil Service
examination in behalf of Cruz. The Court said that both Paitim and Cruz merited the penalty of
dismissal. In Sta. Ana, somebody else took the Civil Service examination for Sta. Ana. The Court
dismissed Sta. Ana for dishonesty. In Abad, the evidence disproved Abad’s claim that she
personally took the examination. The Court held that for Abad to assert that she herself took the
examination when in fact somebody else took it for her constitutes dishonesty. Thus, Abad was
for her offense. The Court found no reason to deviate from these consistent rulings. Under
Section 52(A)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty is
a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense. Under Section 58(a) of the same
rules, the penalty of dismissal carries with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service. The OCA
properly excluded forfeiture of accrued leave credits, pursuant to the Court’s ruling in Sta.
Anaand Abad. The Court also consistently held that the proper penalty to be imposed on
employees found guilty of an offense of this nature is dismissal from the service. Lourdes
Celavite-Vidal vs. Noraida A. Aguam, A.M. No. SCC-10-13-P, June 26, 2012.
Court personnel; Disrespectful behavior. Section 2, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel, requires that court personnel shall carry out their responsibilities as public servants in
as courteous a manner as possible. The image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the
conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work there. Court personnel must at
all times act with strict propriety and proper decorum so as to earn and rebuild the public’s trust
in the judiciary as an institution. The Court would never countenance any conduct, act or
omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice, which would violate
the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the
people in the judiciary.
Under Rule XIV, Section 23 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292, discourtesy in the course of official dutiesis classified as a light offense. A first-time
violation of this rule warrants the penalty of reprimand. Considering a) respondent’s apology
and admission of his mistakes; b) his retirement from service on 1 July 2011 after long years of
employment in the Judiciary; and c) this case being the first complaint against him, he should be
held liable for discourtesy and be meted out the penalty of reprimand.
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Respondent committed other lapses in the performance of his duties as Clerk of Court. Instead of
strictly observing the required number of working hours in the civil service, he left his post in
the middle of the day to attend a social event. Worse, he chose to return to the office and enter
the judge’s chambers while under the influence of alcohol. His behavior constitutes a direct
violation of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, particularly Section 1, Canon IV on the
Performance of Duties, which states: “Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties
properly and with diligence. They shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and
responsibilities of their office during working hours.” Judge Ethelwolda Jaravata vs. Precioso
Orencia, Clerk of Court, MTC, Agoo, La Union A.M. No. P-12-3035, June 13, 2012.
Court personnel; falsification. Falsification of a DTR by a court personnel is a grave offense. The
act of falsifying an official document is in itself grave because of its possible deleterious effects
on government service. At the same time, it is also an act of dishonesty, which violates
fundamental principles of public accountability and integrity. Under Civil Service regulations,
falsification of an official document and dishonesty are distinct offenses, but both may be
committed in one act.
The constitutionalization of public accountabilityshows the kind of standards of public officers
that are woven into the fabric of our legal system. Public office is a public trust, which embodies
a set of standards such as responsibility, integrity and efficiency. Reality may depart from these
standards, but our society has consciously embedded them in our laws, so that they may be
demanded and enforced as legal principles. This Court, in the exercise of its administrative
jurisdiction, should articulate and apply these principles to its own personnel, as a way of
bridging actual reality to the norms we envision for our public service.
The Supreme Court exercised its administrative jurisdiction despite respondent Kasilag’s
resignation, more than two years after he was directed to file his Comment. The resignation of a
public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she
shall still be answerable. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions— that of separation
from service — may no longer be imposed, there are other penalties which may be imposed
namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits. There
are no mitigating circumstances for respondent Kasilag. Dishonesty and the act of falsifying
detract from the notion of public accountability, as implemented by our laws. We apply the law
as it is written. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Jaime Kasilag, Sheriff IV, Regionatl Trial
Court, Branch 27, Manila. A.M. No. P-08-2573, June 19, 2012.
Court Personnel; gross insubordination. Respondent failed to explain why, despite her receipt of
the Notices, she did not comply with the directives of this Court to submit her comment. The
records show that the OCA had sent notices to her at RTC–Branch 93 of San Pedro, Laguna,
where she is the branch sheriff. While she apologized to this Court for her failure to submit her
comment, she did not explain the reasons for her non-submission thereof and only averred that
it was the first time she learned of the Complaint against her. The OCA did not find her
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explanation satisfactory, because she did submit her Comment, but only after a Show-Cause
Order had been issued to her– and almost a year after the first directive requiring her to file the
Comment. Respondent’s prolonged and repeated refusal to comply with the directives of the
Supreme Court constituted willful disrespect of its lawful orders, as well as those of the OCA.
Respondent committed the infraction twice, yet failed to fully explain the circumstances that led
to the repeated omissions. Hence, there no reason to overturn or mitigate the penalty
recommended by the OCA. Ricardo Dela Cruz et al., vs. Ma.
Gross insubordination is the indifference of a respondent to an administrative complaint and to
resolutions requiring a comment thereon. The offense is deemed punishable, because every
employee in the judiciary should not only be an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty;
more than anyone else, they are bound to manifest utmost respect and obedience to their
superiors’ orders and instructions.Ricardo Dela Cruz et al., vs. Ma. Consuelo Jole A. Fajardo,
Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 93, San Pedro, Laguna. A.M. No. P-12-3064, June 18, 2012.
Court personnel; gross misconduct and dishonesty. The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
stresses that employees of the judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety
on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s
confidence in it. No other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral
righteousness and uprightness from an employee than in the Judiciary. Thus, the failure of
judicial employees to live up to their avowed duty constitutes a transgression of the trust
reposed in them as court officers and inevitably leads to the exercise of disciplinary authority.
By these standards, respondent was found wanting, as she never denied the allegations that she
had stolen and encashed the ₱30,000 check payable to Judge Rojas. She did not even refute the
allegations of Dauz and Corpuz that she misrepresented to both of them that she had authority
to encash the check. Worse, neither did she ever deny the allegations pertaining to her previous
acts of stealing from and paying off her obligations to other trial court judges. She has virtually
admitted her wrongdoing.
Whether or not respondent has fully settled her obligation to Judge Rojas, and to the other trial
court judges for that matter, will not exonerate her from any administrative wrongdoing. This
Court inVillaseñor v. De Leon has emphasized that full payment of an obligation does not
discharge the administrative liability, because disciplinary actions involve not purely private
matters, but acts unbecoming of a public employee. The Court ruled that respondent’s admitted
acts of pocketing checks and later encashing them for her benefit constitute grave misconduct.
The Court has defined grave misconduct as follows:
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; and the misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or
to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.
Furthermore, stealing the checks and encashing them are considered acts of gross
dishonesty.Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;
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fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the personnel
who work therein. Court employees are enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality
and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and
integrity of the court of justice. Both gross misconduct and dishonesty are grave offenses that are
punishable by dismissal even for the first offense. Penalties include forfeiture of retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in
government service.
The mere expedient of resigning from the service will not extricate a court employee from the
consequences of his or her acts. The Court has often ruled that resignation should not be used
either as an escape or as an easy way out to evade an administrative liability or an
administrative sanction. Thus, respondent was still held administratively liable for gross
misconduct and dishonesty.Herresignation, however, would affect the penalties the Court may
impose. The penalty of dismissal arising from the offense was rendered moot by virtue of her
resignation. Thus, the recommendation of the OCA is appropriate under the circumstances. The
Court imposed upon respondent the penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱40,000 with forfeiture of
all benefits due her, except accrued leave credits, if any. The ₱40,000 fine shall be deducted
from any such accrued leave credits, with respondent to be personally held liable for any
deficiency that is directly payable to the Court. She was further declared disqualified from any
future government service. The Court emphasized that all court employees, being public
servants in an office dispensing justice, must always act with a high degree of professionalism
and responsibility. Their conduct must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but
must also be in accordance with the law and court regulations. To maintain the people’s respect
and faith in the judiciary, court employees should be models of uprightness, fairness and
honesty. They should avoid any act or conduct that would diminish public trust and confidence
in the courts. Executive Judge Melanio C. Rojas, Jr. RTC Branch 25, Tagudin, Ilocos Sur vs. Ana
Marivic L. Mina, Clerk III, RTC, Bracnh 25, Tagudin Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. P-10-2867, June 19,
2012
Court personnel; misconduct defined. In Arcenio v. Pagorogon, the Court defined misconduct as
a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. As differentiated from simple misconduct, in
grave misconduct the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard
of established rule, must be manifest. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which
must be established by substantial evidence. In this case, respondent was a mere Utility Worker
who had no authority to take custody of the office attendance logbook, the DTRs of his office
mates, let alone case records. Yet, respondent, taking advantage of his position as a Utility
Worker and the access to the court records and documents which such position afforded him,
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repeatedly wrought havoc on the proper administration of justice by taking case records outside
of the court’s premises and preoccupying his office mates with the time-consuming task of
locating documents. Without doubt his actions constitute grave misconduct which merits the
penalty of dismissal. However, in view of his resignation, the Court found it proper to instead
impose on respondent the penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000 with forfeiture of benefits
except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. This of course is without prejudice to any criminal liability he may have already
incurred.
As regards the 68 missing court records to date have not yet been found, the Court deemed it
proper to order complainant to explain why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with in view
of the apparent failure on her part to exercise due care in the custody of the said case
records. Our courts of justice, regarded by the public as their haven for truth and justice, cannot
afford and does not have the luxury of offering excuses to litigants for negligence in its role of
safekeeping and preserving the records of cases pending before it. The consequences of such
failure or negligence, if there be any, are simply too damaging not just for the parties involved
but worse, for our court system as a whole. Clerk of Court Arlyn A. Hermano vs. Edwin D.
Cardeno, Utility worker I, Municipal Trial Court, Cabuyao, Laguna. A.M. No. P-12-3036, June
20, 2012.
Court Personnel; Procedure in the service and execution of court writs and processes. There was
a valid substituted service of summons in this case. As a rule, personal service of summons is
preferred as against substituted service and substituted service can only be resorted to by the
process server if personal service cannot be made promptly. Most importantly, the proof of
substituted service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within
a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the
summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the
address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is
likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of
service or in the officer’s return.
Based on the records, Sheriff Villar exhausted efforts to personally serve the summons to
Spouses Tiu as indicated in his Sheriff’s Return of Summons. When it was apparent that the
summons could not be served personally on the spouses, Sheriff Villar served the summons
through Bauco, their employee, at the office address of the couple’s business. It was evident
that Bauco was competent and of sufficient age to receive the summons on their behalf as she
represented herself to be their General Manager and Caretaker.
The Sheriff also complied with the requirement of prior coordination as mandated in
Administrative Circular No. 12 which lays down the guidelines and procedure in the service
and execution of court writs and processes in the reorganized courts. Documentary evidence
indeed discloses that Sheriff Villar of Pasay City coordinated with the Sheriff of Pasig City before
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he implemented the writ of preliminary attachment. In the Certification, the Clerk of Court of
Pasig City attested to the fact that Sheriff Villar formally coordinated with their office in
connection with the implementation of the writ of attachment. Attached to said certification is a
certified true copy of Sheriff Villar’s request for coordination on which the word “received” was
stamped by the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-officio Sheriff, RTC Pasig City.
By law, sheriffs are obligated to maintain possession of the seized properties absent any
instruction to the contrary. In this case, the writ of preliminary attachment authorizing the trial
court to legally hold the attached items was set aside by the RTC Order dated July 8, 2010
specifically ordering Sheriff Villar to immediately release the seized items to Spouses Tiu. The
instruction of the trial court was clear and simple. Sheriff Villar was to return the seized
properties to Spouses Tiu. He should have followed the court’s order immediately. He had no
discretion to wait for the finality of the court’s order of dismissal before discharging the order of
attachment. Nevertheless, Sheriff Villar showed no deliberate defiance of, or disobedience to,
the court’s order of release. Records show that he took the proper step under the circumstances
and filed with the trial court his Sheriff’s Report with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a
Clarificatory Order. There was nothing amiss in consulting the judge before taking action on a
matter of which he is not an expert. Spouses Rainier Tiu and Jennifer Tiu vs. Virgilio Villar,
Sheriff IV, RTC, OCC Pasay City. A.M. No. P-11-2986, June 13, 2012
Judge; delay in rendering decisions. Judges are continuously reminded to resolve cases with
dispatch to avoid any delay in the administration of justice. Thus, under Section 9 (1), Rule 140
of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is considered a less serious
charge.
The Supreme Court ruled that the prudent course of action would have been for Judge Asis to
request an extension for acting on Civil Case No. 05-35013 instead of disposing the case only
after being prompted to file a comment on the present Complaint. The Court nevertheless
deemed it proper to reduce the fine, considering the existence of factors that mitigated the
commission of the offense, namely: (a) this is his first infraction, and (b) his delay in the
disposition of the case resulted from his serious medical conditions. Leticia Jacinto vs. Judge
Josephus Joannes H. Asis, MeTC, Br. 40, Quezon CityA.M. No. MTJ-12-1811, June 13, 2012
Judge; delay in rendering decision. Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, mandates that
cases or matters filed with the lower courts must be decided or resolved withinthree months
from the date they are submitted for decision or resolution. With respect to cases falling under
the Rule on Summary Procedure, first level courts are only allowed 30 days following the
receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the same,
within which to render judgment. As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within
which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.
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Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to promptly act upon cases and matters pending before
their courts. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, directs judges to dispose of
the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Canons 6 and 7 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics further exhort judges to be prompt and punctual in the disposition
and resolution of cases and matters pending before their courts.
In addition, Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 once more reminds all
magistrates to observe scrupulously the periods prescribed in Section 15, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters pending before their
courts. Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to
duty of judges. If they do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable
to the prejudice of litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty
and responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to promptly administer justice.
Unfortunately, respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty and responsibility
that her position requires. The case was submitted for resolution on July 19, 2006, yet it was
still pending when complainant filed the present administrative complaint on June 4, 2010, and
remained unresolved per complainant’s manifestation filed on September 8, 2010. More than
four years after being submitted for resolution, the case was still awaiting decision by
respondent. Respondent irrefragably failed to decide the case within the 30-day period
prescribed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. This action is contrary to the rationale
behind the Rule on Summary Procedure, which was precisely adopted to promote a more
expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of
litigants to the speedy disposition of cases. Indeed, respondent even failed to decide the case
within the three-month period mandated in general by the Constitution for lower courts to
decide or resolve cases. Records do not show that respondent made any previous attempt to
report and request for extension of time to resolve the case.
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies undue
delay in rendering a decision as a less serious charge for which the penalty is suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for one month to three months, or a fine of P10,000.00
to P20,000.00. Given that respondent had been previously dismissed from the service, the
penalty of suspension is already inapplicable. Instead, the Court imposed upon respondent, for
her undue delay in resolving the case, a fine in the maximum amount of P20,000.00, to be
deducted from her accrued leave credits Fe Valdez vs. Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1796, June 13, 2012.
Judge; gross abuse of authority and gross ignorance. In this case, the contempt charge was
commenced not through a verified petition, but by Judge Belen motu proprio through the
issuance of an order requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to show cause why he should not be
cited for indirect contempt. As such, the requirements of the rules that the verified petition for
contempt be docketed, heard and decided separately or consolidated with the principal action
find no application. Consequently, Judge Belen was justified in not directing the contempt
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charge against State Prosecutor Comilang to be docketed separately or consolidated with the
principal action. However, Judge Belen blatantly violated the injunctive writ issued by the CA
enjoining the implementation of his May 30, 2005 Order and December 12, 2005 Decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 94069.
As pointed out by the OCA, the CA’s disquisition is clear and categorical. In complete
disobedience to the said Resolution, however, Judge Belen proceeded to issue (1) the Order
requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his refusal to file the supersedeas bond and to
require his presence in court on September 26, 2007, as well as to explain why he should not
be cited for indirect contempt; (2) the September 26, 2007 Order seeking State Prosecutor
Comilang’s explanation for his defiance of thesubpoena requiring his presence at the hearing of
even date, and directing, once again, his attendance at the next hearing on October 1, 2007 and
to explain once more why he should not be cited for indirect contempt; and (3) the October 1,
2007 Order finding State Prosecutor Comilang guilty of indirect contempt and sentencing him to
pay a fine of P30,000.00 and to suffer two days’ imprisonment. In requiring State Prosecutor
Comilang to explain his non-filing of a supersedeas bond, in issuing subpoenas to compel his
attendance before court hearings relative to the contempt proceedings, and finally, in finding
him guilty of indirect contempt for his non-compliance with the issued subpoenas, Judge Belen
effectively defeated the status quo which the writ of preliminary injunction aimed to
preserve. State Prosecutors II Josef Albert T.
Judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith as judicial
competence requires no less. Moreover, refusal to honor an injunctive order of a higher court
constitutes contempt, as in this case, where Judge Belen, in contumaciously defying the
injunctive order issued by the CA, was found guilty of indirect contempt. Judge Belen’s
actuations cannot be considered as mere errors of judgment that can be easily brushed aside.
Obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or procedure amounts to inexcusable
abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, citing State Prosecutor Comilang for
indirect contempt notwithstanding the effectivity of the CA-issued writ of injunction
demonstrated his vexatious attitude and bad faith towards the former, for which he must be held
accountable and subjected to disciplinary action. Our conception of good judges has been, and
is, of men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in
accordance with law. Hence considering the foregoing disquisitions and Judge Belen’s previous
infractions, which are all of serious nature and for which he had been severely warned, the
Court adopted the recommendation of the OCA to mete the ultimate penalty of dismissal against
Judge Belen for grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law. The Court can no
longer afford to be lenient in this case, lest it give the public the impression that incompetence
and repeated offenders are tolerated in the judiciary. State Prosecutors II Josef Albert
T. Comilang and Ms. Victoria Sunega-Lagman vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, RTC, Branch
36, Calamba City. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216, June 26, 2012.
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Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Not all administrative complaints against judges merit a
corresponding penalty. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in
his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. The remedy of the complainants in
this case is judicial in nature. Hence, the denial of their motion for reconsideration of the
Supreme Court’s Resolution dismissing the administrative case against Judge Lubao is in order.
The records would show that Judge Lubao had been very careful in his actions on the case, as
his branch clerk of court even wrote the Post Office of General Santos City asking for
certification as to when the Order, sent under Registry Receipt, was received by the defendants.
There was no evidence that Judge Lubao acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. Further, Judge Lubao
could not be faulted for trying to give all the parties an opportunity to be heard considering that
the records of the case would show that the court a quo summarily dismissed the case without
issuing summons to the defendants. Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, et al., vs. Judge Antonio C. Lubao, RTC
Br. 22, General Santos City, A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ, June 20, 2012.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. The respondent deserves to be sanctioned for gross ignorance
of the law. With her inaction on the petition for contempt, she betrayed her unbecoming lack of
familiarity with basic procedural rules such as what was involved in the contempt proceedings
before her court. She should have known that while the petitioners have the responsibility to
move ex parteto have the case scheduled for preliminary conference, the court (through the
branch clerk of court) has the duty to schedule the case for pre-trial in the event that the
petitioners fail to file the motion. The respondent cannot pass the blame for the lack of
movement in the case to her staff who, she claims, were monitoring the case. As presiding
judge, she should account for the anomaly that since the respondents filed their answer, the
petition for contempt had been gathering dust or had not moved in the respondent’s court.
Clearly, the respondent fell short of the standards of competence and legal proficiency expected
of magistrates of the law in her handling of the petition for contempt. As in Magpali v. Pardo,
she should be fined P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. It bears stressing that when the
law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.” Eladio D.Perfecto vs. Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esideria, A.M. No.
RTJ-11-2258, June 20, 2012.
Judges; inhibition. Judicial remedies were available to complainant in the main cases. The
allegations in the instant complaint are a mere rehash of the allegations in complainant’s Urgent
Omnibus Motion to Expunge Motion for Clarification and Recall the Resolution dated
November 13, 2002 and the Urgent Motion to Inhibit and the Resolve Respondent’s Urgent
Omnibus Motion filed in the main cases. These were in fact decided already on October 19,
2011. The Complainant charges Justice Sereno of unfairly refusing to inhibit herself from taking
part in the deliberation in the main cases notwithstanding that Justice Carpio’s former law office
supposedly worked for her appointment in the Supreme Court. The charge is purely conjectural
and the Court, in its April 17, 2012 per curiam decision in A.C. No. 6332 has already ruled that
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the charge has no “extrinsic factual evidence to support it.” Re: Letter-Complaint Against Hon.
Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Loudes P.A Sereno dated September 16, 2011 filed by Atty.
Magdaleno M. Pena, A.M. No. 12-6-11-SC. June 13, 2012.
Judges; undue delay in rendering a decision or order. Delay in case disposition is a major culprit
in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judiciary and the lowering of its standards.
Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reasons,
constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanction on the
defaulting judge.
In this case, the decision was purportedly issued on 7 April 2011, or more than four months
since the last submission of the parties’ position paper. The pretrial Order was purportedly
issued on 26 January 2010, or more than three months since the pretrial. Section 8 of the Rules
on Summary Procedure provides that within five days after the termination of the preliminary
conference, the court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up therein.
Further, paragraph 8, Title I(A) of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, entitled “Guidelines to be Observed by
Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-
Discovery Measures,” mandates that a judge must issue a pretrial order within 10 days after the
termination of the pretrial. Since the ejectment case fell under the Rules on Summary Procedure,
respondent judge should have handled it with promptness and haste. The reason for the
adoption of those Rules is precisely to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases, an
offense for which respondent judge may be held administratively liable. Section 9, Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge,
which under Section 1(b) of the same Rule is punishable with suspension from office, without
salary and other benefits, for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or a fine of
more than ₱10,000, but not exceeding ₱20,000. Considering that the instant administrative
charge is only the third against respondent judge (the first has been dismissed, while the second
is still pending), and considering his relatively long tenure in the judiciary starting in 1997, he
may be reasonably meted out a penalty of ₱5,000 for being administratively liable for undue
delay in rendering a decision. Pilar S. Tanoco vs. Judge Inocencio B. Saguin, Jr. MTCC Br. 3,
Cabanatuan City. A.M. No. MTJ-12-1812. June 20, 2012.
Judge; unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases. Judges have the sworn duty to administer
justice without undue delay, for justice delayed is justice denied. They have always been
exhorted to observe strict adherence to the rule on speedy disposition of cases, as delay in case
disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judicial system.
Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated to decide and resolve cases within 90
days from submission. Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all judicial
duties efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness. In Office of the Court Administrator v.
Javellana, the Court held that a judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending
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before him. Without an extension granted by the Court, the failure to decide even a single case
within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction. If a
judge is unable to comply with the period for deciding cases or matters, he can, for good
reasons, ask for an extension.
An inexcusable failure to decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross
inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions such as suspension from
office without pay or fine on the defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in each case,
depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided within the reglementary period and other
factors, such as the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the damage suffered by
the parties as a result of the delay, the health and age of the judge, and other analogous
circumstances.
In this case, records are bereft of showing that Judge Buenavista sought for an extension of time
to decide and resolve most of the cases pending before him, save only for one instance. Having
therefore failed to decide cases and resolve incidents within the required period constituted
gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of a fine of P10,000.00 which the Court finds
reasonable under the circumstances. Re: Report of the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional
trial Court, Branches 72 and 22, Narvacan Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. 06-9-525-RTC, June 13, 2012.
Public Officials; SALNs. While no prohibition could stand against access to official records,
such as the SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation. Section 8 (c) and (d) of R.A.
No. 6713 provides for the limitation and prohibition on the regulated access to SALNs of
government officials and employees as well as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
No. 6713. The power to regulate the access by the public to these documents stems from the
inherent power of the Court, as custodian of these personal documents, to control its very office
to the end that damage to, or loss of, the records may be avoided; that undue interference with
the duties of the custodian of the books and documents and other employees may be prevented;
and that the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured. In this
connection, Section 11 of the R.A 6173 provides for the penalties in case there should be a
misuse of the SALN and the information contained therein. The Court found no reason to deny
the public access to the SALN, PDS and CV of the Justices of the Court and other magistrates of
the Judiciary subject, of course, to the limitations and prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713,
its implementing rules and regulations, and in the guidelines set forth in the decretal portion.
The Court noted the valid concerns of the other magistrates regarding the possible illicit motives
of some individuals in their requests for access to such personal information and their
publication. However, custodians of public documents must not concern themselves with the
motives, reasons and objects of the persons seeking access to the records. The moral or material
injury which their misuse might inflict on others is the requestor’s responsibility and lookout.
Any publication is made subject to the consequences of the law. While public officers in the
custody or control of public records have the discretion to regulate the manner in which records
may be inspected, examined or copied by interested persons, such discretion does not carry
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with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of the records. After
all, public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
The Supreme Court also provided the following guidelines:
1. All requests shall be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals; for the lower courts, with the
Office of the Court Administrator; and for attached agencies, with their respective heads of
offices.
2. Requests shall cover only copies of the latest SALN, PDS and CV of the members, officials
and employees of the Judiciary, and may cover only previous records if so specifically requested
and considered as justified, as determined by the officials mentioned in par. 1 above, under the
terms of these guidelines and the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6713.
3. In the case of requests for copies of SALN of the Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, the authority to disclose shall be
made by the Court En Banc.
4. Every request shall explain the requesting party’s specific purpose and their individual
interests sought to be served; shall state the commitment that the request shall only be for the
stated purpose; and shall be submitted in a duly accomplished request form secured from the SC
website. The use of the information secured shall only be for the stated purpose.
5. In the case of requesting individuals other than members of the media, their interests
should go beyond pure or mere curiosity.
6. In the case of the members of the media, the request shall additionally be supported by
proof under oath of their media affiliation and by a similar certification of the accreditation of
their respective organizations as legitimate media practitioners.
7. The requesting party, whether as individuals or as members of the media, must have no
derogatory record of having misused any requested information previously furnished to
them. Re: Request for copy of 2008 Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth [SALN] and
Personal Data Sheet or Curriculum Vitae of the Justices of the Supreme Court and Officers and
Employees of the Judiciary/ Re; Request of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism
[PCIJ] for the 2008 Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth [SALN] and Personal Data
Sheets of the Court of Appeals Justices, A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC/A.M. No. 09-8-07-CA. June 13,
2012.
Retirement under R.A 910; Retirement vs. Resignation. Resignation and retirement are two
distinct concepts carrying different meanings and legal consequences in our jurisdiction. While
an employee can resign at any time, retirement entails the compliance with certain age and
service requirements specified by law and jurisprudence. Resignation stems from the
employee’s own intent and volition to resign and relinquish his/her post. Retirement takes effect
by operation of law. In terms of severance to one’s employment, resignation absolutely cuts-off
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the employment relationship in general; in retirement, the employment relationship endures for
the purpose of the grant of retirement benefits. RA No. 910, as amended allows the grant of
retirement benefits to a justice or judge who has either retired from judicial service or resigned
from judicial office. In case of retirement, a justice or judge must show compliance with the age
and service requirements as provided in RA No. 910, as amended. The second sentence of
Section 1 imposes the following minimum requirements for optional retirement:
(a) must have attained the age of sixty (60) years old; and
(b) must have rendered at least fifteen (15) years service in the Government, the last
three (3) of which shall have been continuously rendered in the Judiciary.
Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is the rule and the grant
of exception remains to be on a case to case basis. The Court allows seeming exceptions to
these fixed rules for certain judges and justices only and whenever there are ample reasons to
grant such exception.
On the other hand, resignation under RA No. 910, as amended must be by reason of incapacity
to discharge the duties of the office. In Britanico, it was held that the resignation contemplated
under RA No. 910, as amended must have the element of involuntariness on the part of the
justice or judge. More than physical or mental disability to discharge the judicial office, the
involuntariness must spring from the intent of the justice or judge who would not have parted
with his/her judicial employment were it not for the presence of circumstances and/or factors
beyond his/her control.
In either of the two instances above-mentioned, Judge Macarambon’s case does not render him
eligible to retire under RA No. 910,as amended. First, Judge Macarambon failed to satisfy the
age requirement since he was less than 60 years of age when he resigned from his judicial office
before transferring to the COMELEC. Likewise, he failed to satisfy the service requirement not
having been in continuous service with the Judiciary for three (3) years prior to his retirement.
Second, Judge Macarambon’s resignation was not by reason of incapacity to discharge the
duties of the office. His separation from judicial employment was of his own accord and
volition. Thus, the ruling in Britanicocannot be properly applied to his case since his resignation
was voluntary. Third, there are no exceptional reasons to justify Judge Macarambon’s request.
Judge Macarambon failed to present similar circumstances, i.e., the presence of available and
sufficient accumulated leave credits which we may tack in to comply with the age requirement.
A verification from the Leave Division, OCA shows that at the time he left the Court Judge
Macarambon only had 514 vacation leaves and 79 sick leaves which are insufficient to cover
the gap in the age of retirement. Moreover, these accumulated leave credits were all forwarded
to the COMELEC upon his transfer. Finally, unlike in Britanico, the nature of his separation from
his judicial office was voluntary.
However, although Judge Macarambon is not qualified to retire under RA No. 910, as amended,
he may retire under RA No. 1616 based on the documents he had presented before the Court
which meets the age and service requirements under the said law. Re: Application for
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Retirement of Judge Moslemen Macarambon under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No. 14061-RET, June 19, 2012.
Attorney; bigamy; gross immorality. A disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the
qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural
technicalities in filing the case.Respondent’s regard for marriage contracts as ordinary
agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross
ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil
Code provisions. Respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still
subsisting. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity.His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are
grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Manuel G.
Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012.
Attorney; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral turpitude is defined as an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men,
or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.Section 27, Rule
138 provides that “a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.”
In a disbarment case, the Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction. The crime
of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. The lawyer’s final conviction of the crime
of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule
138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of the lawyer’s conviction of the crime. Atty.
Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. vs. Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa. A.C. No. 7360, July 24, 2012.
Attorney; inexcusable negligence. The failure of counsel to file the requisite appellant’s brief
amounted to inexcusable negligence in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon, it was held that an attorney is bound to
protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. On account of
respondent’s failure to protect the interest of complainant, respondent indeed violated Rule
18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
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The practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent
intellectually, academically and morally. This Court has been exacting in its expectations for the
members of the Bar to always uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain
from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence of the public. Isaac C.
Basilio, Perlita Pedrozo and Jun Basilio vs. Atty. Virgil R. Castro A.C. No. 6910. July 11, 2012
Attorney; representation of conflicting interest. Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. Rule 15.03 also
provides that “A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of facts.” in Hilado v. David, the Court held that “an
attorney is employed — that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or
counselor — when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client’s pleadings, or advocating
his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open court.” Hence the necessity of
setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and
client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not
alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the
honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles
of public policy, on good taste. The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties,
but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts
in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar’s wife, not only to keep inviolate the client’s
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice. The prohibition against representation of conflicting
interests applies although the attorney’s intentions were honest and he acted in good faith. Atty.
Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. vs. Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa. A.C. No. 7360, July 24, 2012.
Attorney; sharing of fees. A lawyer is proscribed by Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not
licensed to practice law. In Tan Tek Beng v. David , it was rule that an agreement between a
lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null
and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Manuel G.
Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012.
Attorney; solicitation of clients. Based on the facts of the case, respondent violated Rule 2.03 of
the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit. A lawyer is not
prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though,
when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent
with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is
one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or
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that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature that,
if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law
Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the
former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations
related to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations governing the
attorney-client relationship may be operative in one and not in the other. Manuel G. Villatuya vs.
Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012.
Court Personnel; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service refers to acts or omissions that violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish – or tend to diminish – the people’s faith in the Judiciary. If an
employee’s questioned conduct tarnished the image and integrity of his public office, he is
liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The basis for his liability is
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees. The Code, particularly its Section 4(c), commands that public officials and
employees shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts
contrary to public safety and public interest.
The strictest standards have always been valued in judicial service. Everyone involved in the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, is expected to live up to
the strictest norm of competence, honesty and integrity in the public service. The conduct of
every court personnel must be beyond reproach and free from suspicion that may cause to sully
the image of the Judiciary. They must totally avoid any impression of impropriety, misdeed or
misdemeanor not only in the performance of their official duties but also in conducting
themselves outside or beyond the duties and functions of their office. Court personnel are
enjoined to conduct themselves toward maintaining the prestige and integrity of the Judiciary for
the very image of the latter is necessarily mirrored in their conduct, both official and otherwise.
They must not forget that they are an integral part of that organ of the government sacredly
tasked in dispensing justice. Their conduct and behavior, therefore, should not only be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility but at all times be defined by propriety
and decorum, and above all else beyond any suspicion. The Court does not hesitate to condemn
and sanction such improper conduct, act or omission of those involved in the administration of
justice that violates the norm of public accountability and diminishes or tends to diminish the
faith of the public in the Judiciary. Filomena B. Consolacion vs. Lydia S. Gambito, Court
Stenographer, MCTC, Binalonan, Pangasinan/Judge Emma S. Ines-Parajas vs. Lydia S. Gambito,
Court Stenographer, MCTC, Binalonan, Pangasinan A.M. No. P-06-2186 & A.M. No. P-12-3026.
July 3, 2012
Court personnel; dishonesty and grave misconduct. In Alenio v. Cunting, the Court defined
dishonesty and grave misconduct as the “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of
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fairness and straightforwardness.” Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some
by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave,
serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful
intention and not a mere error of judgment. The misconduct must also have a direct relation to
and be connected with the performance of the public officer’s
official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure
to discharge the duties of the office.
Taking monetary evidence without proper authority constitutes theft. In Judge San Jose, Jr. v.
Camurongan, the Court held that, “The act of taking monetary exhibits without authority from
their custodian constitutes theft. Thievery, no matter how petty, has no place in the
judiciary.” Office of the Court Administrator vs. Ma. Irissa G. Musni, Court Legal Researcher II
RTC, Judicial Region III, Branch 36, Gapan City, Nueva Ecija A.M. No. P-11-3024, July 17, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty, gross neglect, grave misconduct. Section 1, Article XI of the
Constitution declares that a public office is a public trust, and all public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. The demand for
moral uprightness is more pronounced for the members and personnel of the judiciary who are
involved in the dispensation of justice. The conduct of court members and personnel must not
only be characterized with propriety and decorum but must also be above suspicion, for any
act of impropriety ca seriously erode or diminish the people’s confidence in the judiciary. As
frontliners in the administration of justice, they should live up to the strictest standards of
honesty and integrity in the public service.
Clerks of Court act as custodians of the court’s funds, revenues, records, property and premises
and are thus, liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and property.
In Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit of RTC-Br. 4, Panabo, Davao Del Norte, it was
held that the failure of the Clerk of Court to remit the court funds constitutes gross neglect of
duty, dishonesty, and grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. In this case,
Peradilla is guilty of dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, and grave misconduct for her: (1) non-
remittance of collections of judiciary funds; (2) non-issuance of official receipts and non
reporting in the Monthly Reports and Collections and Deposits
of some of the collections; and
(3) erroneous reporting in the Monthly Reports and Collections and Deposits of some of
the collections. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Lunalinda M. Peradilla, Clerk of Court II,
MCTC, E1 Nido-Linapacan, Palawan A.M. No. P-09-2647, July 17, 2012.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. The Sheriff disregarded the procedure for the execution of
judgments as mandated by Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. A sheriff is mandated to
make an estimate of the expenses which shall be approved by the court. It is only after the
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approval of the court that an interested party shall deposit the amount with the clerk of court.
Upon the return of the writ, the sheriff must submit a liquidation and return to the interested
party any unspent amount. The Sheriff’s act of receiving money from the party for the expenses
to be incurred in the execution of the writs, without first making an estimate and securing prior
approval from the MTCC, as well as his failure to render accounting after its execution, are clear
violations of the rule. Even if conceding that the sum demanded by Sheriff is reasonable, this
does not justify his deviation from the procedure laid down by the rule. Neither the
acquiescence nor consent of the complainant, before or after the implementation of the writ will
absolve him from liability. The mere act of receiving the money without the prior approval of
the court and without him issuing a receipt therefor is considered as a misconduct in office.
Sheriffs are reminded that they are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments from parties
in the course of the performance of their duties. Corollarily, a sheriff cannot just unilaterally
demand sums of money from a party-litigant without observing the proper procedural
steps. Even assuming that such payments were indeed given and received in good faith, such
fact alone would not dispel the suspicion that such payments were made for less than noble
purposes. Sheriffs and their deputies are the front-line representatives of the justice system, and
if, through their lack of care and diligence in the implementation of judicial writs, they lose the
trust reposed on them, they inevitably diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. The
image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel
who work there, from the judge to the lowest employee. As such, the Court will not tolerate or
condone any conduct of judicial agents or employees which would tend to or actually diminish
the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Lambayong Teachers and Employees Cooperative,
represented in this act by its Manager, Gudelio S. Valeroso vs. Carlos P. Diaz, in his capacity as
Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 20, Tacurong City A.M. No. P-06-2246, July 11, 2012.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. The manner in which a writ of execution is to be
returned to the court, as well as the requisite reports to be made by the sheriff or officer, is
explicitly outlined in Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In accordance with this rule,
periodic reporting must be done by the sheriff regularly and consistently every thirty (30) days
until the judgment is fully satisfied. It is mandatory for the sheriff to make a return of the writ of
execution, so that the court and the litigants may be apprised of the proceedings undertaken in
the enforcement of the writ. The return will enable the courts to take the necessary steps to
ensure the speedy execution of decisions. The failure of a sheriff to make periodic reports on the
status of a writ of execution warrants administrative liability.
The Court faults respondent for not submitting his periodic reports on the progress of his
implementation of the writ. He is guilty of simple neglect of duty, defined as “the failure of an
employee to give one’s attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty
resulting from carelessness or indifference.”As officers of the court, sheriffs are charged with the
knowledge of what proper action to take in case there are questions on the writ needing to be
clarified; they are charged as well with the knowledge of what they are bound to comply
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with.Sheriffs are expected to know the rules of procedure pertaining to their functions as officers
of the court,relative to the implementation of writs of execution, and should at all times show a
high degree of professionalism in the performance of their duties. Any act deviating from the
procedure laid down by the Rules of Court is misconduct that warrants disciplinary action.
Rhea Airene P. Katague, et al. vs. Jerry A. Ledesma, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 48, Bacolod City A.M.
No. P-12-3067. July 4, 2012.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. The duty of a process server is vital to the
administration of justice. A process server’s primary duty is to serve court notices which
precisely requires utmost care on his part by ensuring that all notices assigned to him are duly
served on the parties. Unjustified delay in performing this task constitutes neglect of duty and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions. All employees in the judiciary should be
examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency. It is through the process server that
defendants learn of the action brought against them by the complainant. It is also through the
service of summons by the process server that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the
defendant. It is therefore important that summonses, other writs and court processes be served
expeditiously.
Heavy workload is not an adequate excuse to be remiss in the diligent performance of one’s
public duties as a public servant. Otherwise, every government employee charged with
negligence and dereliction of duty will always use this as a convenient excuse to escape
punishment to the great prejudice of public service
The Court has defined dishonesty as the ‘disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.’ Dishonesty is not
simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the
intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts
and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state
of mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for
the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could
have had at that moment. It was never alleged, much less established, that Dela Cruz was
impelled by some evil design or corrupt motives to commit said errors or to favor any party or
litigant. Hence, he was found guilty only of negligence in the performance of his tasks, and not
of dishonesty. Simple neglect of duty is defined as “the failure of an employee to give proper
attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference.” Judge
Pelagia Dalmacio-Joaquin vs. Nicomedes Dela Cruz, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. A.M. No. P-06-2241. July 10, 2012
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Judge Clapis is also liable for gross ignorance of the law for
conducting bail hearings without a petition for bail being filed by the accused and without
affording the prosecution an opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. His
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Order granting bail indicates that he merely used as basis the affidavit of one prosecution
witness that was submitted earlier. Clearly, he failed to observe the proper procedure in
granting bail. His act is not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment but a patent
disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an
inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law.
If judges are allowed to wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by the law, there will not
only be confusion in the administration of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic
requirements of due process. Judges are reminded that having accepted the exalted position of a
judge, they owe it to the public to uphold the exacting standard of conduct demanded from
them. Criselda C. Gacad vs. Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC, Br. 3, Nabunturan, Compostela
Valley A.M. No. RJ-10-2257. July 17, 2012
Judge; gross misconduct. In Kaw v. Osorio, the Court held that while the respondent judge, in
that case, may not be held liable for extortion and corruption as it was not substantially proven,
he should be made accountable for gross misconduct. The acts of the Judge in meeting a litigant
in a case pending before his sala, and telling her, “Sige, kay ako na bahala gamuson nato ni sila”
(Okay, leave it all to me, we shall crush them) constitute gross misconduct. Misconduct means
intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior in
connection with one’s performance of official functions and duties. For grave or gross
misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by the
intention to violate the law, or a persistent disregard of well-known rules. The misconduct must
imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. The arbitrary actions of respondent
judge, taken together, give doubt as to his impartiality, integrity and propriety. His acts
amount to gross misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
particularly Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 2 and Sections 2 and 4 of Canon 3 and Section 1 of
Canon 4
It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be impartial; he must also appear to be
impartial at all times. Being in constant scrutiny by the public, his language, both written and
spoken, must be guarded and measured lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. Needless to
state, any gross misconduct seriously undermines the faith and confidence of the people in
the judiciary. Criselda C. Gacad vs. Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC, Br. 3, Nabunturan,
Compostela Valley A.M. No. RJ-10-2257. July 17, 2012
Judge; undue delay. The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure was promulgated to achieve an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases that it covers. The respondent failed to
abide by this purpose in the way that he handled and acted on the subject unlawful detainer
case. Under Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, a preliminary
conference should be held not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed. The
respondent set the case for preliminary conference at a time way beyond the required thirty
(30)-day period. Another of the respondent’s procedural lapses relates to the frequent resetting
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of the date of the preliminary conference. Clearly, the respondent failed to exert his authority in
expediting the proceedings of the unlawful detainer case. Sound practice requires a judge to
remain, at all times, in full control of the proceedings in his court and to adopt a firm policy
against unnecessary postponements.
In numerous occasions, the Court admonished judges to be prompt in the performance of their
solemn duty as dispensers of justice because undue delay in the administration of justice erodes
the people’s faith in the judicial system. Delay not only reinforces the belief of the people that
the wheels of justice in this country grind slowly, it also invites suspicion, however unfair, of
ulterior motives on the part of the Judge. Judges should always be mindful of their duty to
render justice within the periods prescribed by law. Murphy Chu, et al. vs. Hon. Mario B.
Capellan, Assisting Judge, MeTC, Br. 40, Quezon City. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1779, July 16, 2012.
Attorney; failure to account for money. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 16-A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into
his possession.
Rule 16.01-A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.
Rule 16.02-A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03-A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose, should be
immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf
of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession
and deserves punishment.Emilia O. Dhaliwal vs. Atty. Abelardo B. Dumaguing. A.C. No. 9390,
August 1, 2012.
Attorney; grave misconduct and dishonesty. The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts
and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the administration
of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent,
honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. The Court
cited the case of In Re: Sotto and ruled that “One of the qualifications required of a candidate
for admission to the bar is the possession of good moral character, and, when one who has
already been admitted to the bar clearly shows, by a series of acts, that he does not follow such
moral principles as should govern the conduct of an upright person, and that, in his dealings
with his clients and with the courts, he disregards the rule of professional ethics required to be
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observed by every attorney, it is the duty of the court, as guardian of the interests of society, as
well as of the preservation of the ideal standard of professional conduct, to make use of its
powers to deprive him of his professional attributes which he so unworthily abused.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” The Code exacts from lawyers not only a
firm respect for law, legal processes but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good
faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary
relationship.
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, respondent may either be disbarred or
suspended for committing deceitful and dishonest acts. This rule provides that in any of the
following circumstances, to wit: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct; (4) grossly
immoral conduct;(5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the
lawyer’s oath; (7) wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; or (8) corruptly or
wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so; the Court is
vested with the authority and discretion to impose either the extreme penalty of disbarment or
mere suspension. Grace M. Anacta vs. Atty. Eduardo D. Resurrecction.A.C. No. 9074, August
14, 2012.
Attorney; immorality. The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on
those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the
profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty
to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and
norms embodied in the Code. Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting
of the above standards whether in their professional or in their private capacity.
The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage
is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
Respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes
a lawyer from engaging in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Engr.Gilbert
Tumbokon vs. Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco.A.C. No. 6116, August 1, 2012
Attorney; representing conflicting interest. Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer cannot represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of their
relationship, sound public policy dictates that he be prohibited from representing conflicting
interests or discharging inconsistent duties. An attorney may not, without being guilty of
professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his
present or former client. This rule is so absolute that good faith and honest intention on the
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erring lawyer’s part does not make it inoperative. The reason for this is that a lawyer acquires
knowledge of his former client’s doings, whether documented or not, that he would ordinarily
not have acquired were it not for the trust and confidence that his client placed on him in the
light of their relationship. It would simply be impossible for the lawyer to identify and erase such
entrusted knowledge with faultless precision or lock the same into an iron box when suing the
former client on behalf of a new one. Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc., represented by
Gabriel H. Abad vs. Atty. Richard V. Funk. A.C. No. 9094, August 15, 2012
Attorney; sharing of fees with non- lawyers. Respondent’s defense that forgery had attended the
execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have
undertaken the payment of complainant’s commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps.
Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer
from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to
practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar. Engr. Gilbert
Tumbokon vs. Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco.A.C. No. 6116, August 1, 2012.
Court personnel; disgraceful and immoral conduct. Immorality has been defined to include not
only sexual matters but also conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption,
indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing
moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate
attitude toward good order and public welfare. Respondent engaged in sexual relations with a
married man which not only violate the moral standards expected of employees of the Judiciary
but is also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of court personnel must be free from any
whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his duties in the judicial branch but also to his
behavior outside the court as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a court
employee is also judged by his private morals. The exacting standards of morality and decency
have been strictly adhered to and laid down by the Court to those in the service of the
Judiciary. Respondent, as a court stenographer, did not live up to her commitment to lead a
moral life.
Public office is a public trust. The good of the service and the degree of
morality, which every official and employee in the public service must observe, if
respect and confidence are to be maintained by the Government in the enforcement of
the law, demand that no untoward conduct affecting morality, integrity, and efficiency while
holding office should be left without proper
and commensurate sanction, all attendant circumstances taken into account. Judge
Armando S. Adlawan, Presiding Judge, 6th MCTC, Bonifacio-Don Mariano Marcos, Misamis
Occidental vs. Estrella P. Capilitan, 6th MCTC, Bonifacio-Don Mariano Marcos, Misamis
Occidental. A.M. No. P-12-3080. August 29, 2012
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Court personnel; dishonesty and falsification of public document. Willful concealment of facts
in the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) constitutes mental dishonesty amounting to misconduct.
Likewise, making a false statement in one’s PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an
official document. Dishonesty has been defined as intentionally making a false statement on
any material fact. Dishonesty evinces a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
Civil service rules mandate the accomplishment of the PDS as a requirement for employment in
the government. Hence, making false statements in one’s PDS is ultimately connected with
one’s employment in the government. The employee making false statements in his or her PDS
becomes liable for falsification. Moreover, for respondent to be meted the penalty of dismissal,
her dishonesty need not be committed in the performance of official duty.
As the Court has previously ruled: “The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or
employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of
character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The
Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties
correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample
opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and
entities of the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his
office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his
grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to
counteract his evil acts and actuations.
When official documents are falsified, intent to injure a third person is irrelevant because the
principal thing punished is the violation of public faith and the destruction of the truth as
claimed in thatdocument.The act undermines the integrity of government records and therein
lies the prejudice to public service. The act need not result in disruption of service or loss to the
government. It is the act of dishonesty itself that taints the integrity of government service. A
government officer’s dishonesty affects the morale of the service, even when it stems from the
employee’s personal dealings. Such conduct should not be tolerated from government officials,
even when official duties are performed well.
Employment in the judiciary demands the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency from its personnel. All judiciary employees are expected to conduct themselves with
propriety and decorum at all times. An act that falls short of the exacting standards set for public
officers, especially those in the judiciary, shall not be countenanced. Manolito C. Villordon vs.
Marilyn C. Avila, Court Interpreter I, Municipal Trial Court in Cities. Branch 3, Cebu City. A.M.
No. P-10-2809, August 10, 2012
Court personnel; neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give attention
to a task or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. The Court ruled in
Pilipina v. Roxas: “The Court cannot countenance neglect of duty for even simple neglect of
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duty lessens the people’s confidence in the judiciary and ultimately in the administration of
justice. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, public servants must faithfully
adhere to, hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a
public trust; that all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. Memoranda of
Judge Eliza B. Yu issued to Legal Researcher Marie Joy P. Lagman and to Court Stenographer
Soledad J. Bassig, all of Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 47, Pasay City. A.M. No. P-12-3033,
August 15, 2012.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. Rule 39, Section 14 of the Rules of Court clearly
mandates the sheriff or other proper officer to file a return and when necessary, periodic reports,
with the court which issued the writ of execution. The writ of execution shall be returned to the
court immediately after the judgment had been partially or fully satisfied. In case the writ is still
unsatisfied or only partially satisfied 30 days after the officer’s receipt of the same, said officer
shall file a report with the court stating the reasons therefor. Subsequently, the officer shall
periodically file with the court a report on the proceedings taken to enforce the writ every 30
days until said writ is fully satisfied or its effectivity expires. The officer is further required to
furnish the parties with copies of the return and periodic reports.
Difficulties or obstacles in the satisfaction of a final judgment and execution of a writ do not
excuse respondent’s total inaction. Neither the Rules nor jurisprudence recognizes any
exception from the periodic filing of reports by sheriffs It is almost trite to say that execution is
the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be
nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. Therefore, sheriffs ought to know that they
have a sworn responsibility to serve writs of execution with utmost dispatch. When writs are
placed in their hands, it is their ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and
promptness to execute them in accordance with their mandate. Unless restrained by a court
order, they should see to it that the execution of judgments is not unduly delayed. Accordingly,
they must comply with their mandated ministerial duty as speedily as possible. As agents of the
law, high standards are expected of sheriffs
Canon IV, Section 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel that reads, “Court personnel
shall at all times perform official duties properly and with diligence.” Astorga and Repol Law
Offices, represented by Atty. Arnold B. Lugares vs. Leodel N. Roxas, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 66, Makati City. A.M. No. P-12-3029, August 15, 2012.
Attorney; representation of non-client. Atty. Espejo’s claim that he drafted and signed the
pleading just to extend assistance to Rodica deserves scant consideration. It is true that under
Rules 2.01and 2.02, Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed, and in such cases,
even if he does not accept a case, shall not refuse to render legal advise to the person concerned
if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latter’s right. However, in this case, Rodica
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cannot be considered as defenseless or oppressed considering that she is properly represented
by counsel in the RTC case. Needless to state, her rights are amply safeguarded. It would have
been different had Rodica not been represented by any lawyer, which, however, is not the case.
The Court wonders why Atty. Espejo, knowing fully well that Rodica is not their law firm’s client
and without the knowledge and consent of his
superiors, gave in to Rodica’s request for him to indicate in the said motion the names of his law
firm, Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle for the purpose of “giving more weight and credit to the
pleading.” As a member of the bar, Atty. Espejo ought to know that motions and pleadings filed
in courts are acted upon in accordance with their merit or lack of it, and not on the reputation of
the law firm or the lawyer filing the same. More importantly, he should have thought that in so
doing, he was actually assisting Rodica in misrepresenting before the RTC that she was being
represented by the said law firm and lawyers, when in truth she was not.
It is well to remind Atty. Espejo that before being a friend to Rodica, he is first and foremost an
officer of the court. Hence, he is expected to maintain a high standard of honesty and fair
dealings and must conduct himself beyond reproach at all times. He must likewise ensure that
he acts within the bounds of reason and common sense, always aware that he is an instrument
of truth and justice. Jasper Junno F. Rodica vs. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al. A.C. No. 9259,
August 23, 2012
Attorney; forum shopping as contempt of court. A disbarment complaint against Atty. Gonzales
was filed for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility for the forum shopping he
allegedly committed. The court held that the respondent was guilty of forum shopping. Lawyers
should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice.
Any conduct that tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes
this obligation. The Court has repeatedly warned lawyers against resorting to forum shopping
since the practice clogs the Court dockets and can lead to conflicting rulings. Willful and
deliberate forum shopping has been made punishable either as direct or indirect contempt of
court. In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. He also disregarded his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice, and the prohibition against unduly delaying a case by
misusing court processes. Thus, the court subjected Atty. Gonzales to censure. Anastacio N.
Teodoro III vs. Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales. A.C. No. 6760. January 30, 2013
Attorney; neglect. Complainant filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Gacott who allegedly
deceived the complainant and her husband into signing a “preparatory” Deed of Sale that
respondent converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his relatives.
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The respondent is reminded that his duty under Canon 16 is to “hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession.” Allowing a party to take the original
TCTs of properties owned by another – an act that could result in damage – should merit a
finding of legal malpractice. While it was his legal staff who allowed the complainant to borrow
the TCTs and it does not appear that the respondent was aware or present when the
complainant borrowed the TCTs, the court still held the respondent liable, as the TCTs were
entrusted to his care and custody; he failed to exercise due diligence in caring for his client’s
properties that were in his custody.
Moreover, Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. What amounts to
carelessness or negligence in a lawyer’s discharge of his duty to his client is incapable of an
exact formulation, but the Court has consistently held that the mere failure of a lawyer to
perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation. In Canoy v. Ortiz, the court held that
a lawyer’s failure to file a position paper was per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Similar to Canoy, the respondent clearly failed in his duty to his
client when, without any explanation, he failed to file the Motion for Leave to Intervene on
behalf of the spouses Ylaya. Fe A. Ylaya vs. Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott.A.C. No. 6475. January
30, 2013
Attorney; lack of diligence. Complainant filed a case for disbarment against Atty. Cefra for
violating Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rules 138 and139 of the
Rules of Court. The court held that Atty. Cefra was guilty of negligence in handling the
complainants’ case. His acts in the present administrative case also reveal his lack of diligence
in performing his duties as an officer of the Court. The Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that “a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.” It further states
that “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.” In addition, a lawyer has the duty to “keep the
client informed of the status of his case.” Atty. Cefra failed to live up to these standards as shown
by the following: (1) Atty. Cefra failed to submit a formal offer of documentary evidence within
the period given by the RTC; (2) He failed to comply with the two orders of the RTC directing
him to submit a formal offer of documentary evidence; (3) Atty. Cefra failed to file an
appropriate motion or appeal, or avail of any remedial measure to contest the RTC’s decision;
(4) He failed to file an appropriate motion or appeal, or avail of any remedial measure to contest
the RTC’s decision which was adverse to complainants.
Thus, the above acts showing Atty. Cefra’s lack of diligence and inattention to his duties as a
lawyer warrant disciplinary sanction. The court has repeatedly held that “[t]he practice of law is
a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the legal qualifications
for it. Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and
morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to
society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and
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norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.” Sps.
Arcing and Cresing Bautista, et al. vs. Atty. Arturo CefraA.C. No. 5530. January 28, 2013.
Attorney; reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys; guidelines in resolving requests for judicial
clemency; good moral character requirement. In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency, the Court laid
down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
(a) There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be
or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
(b) Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reform.
(c) The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead
of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
(d) There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen
or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative
and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
(e) There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other candidate
for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character.
In a previous Decision, the Court disbarred respondent from the practice of law for having
contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant Teves and a third marriage with one
Constantino while his first marriage to Esparza was still subsisting. These acts, according to the
court, constituted gross immoral conduct.
In this case, the court held that Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and
acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal profession and in his personal life. He has asked
forgiveness from his children by complainant Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with
them as shown by the herein attached pictures. After his disbarment, respondent returned to his
hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time tending an orchard and taking care of his
ailing mother until her death in 2008. In 2009, he was appointed as Private Secretary to the
Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment Operations
Officer II/Office-In-Charge in the Assessor’s Office, which office he continues to serve to date.
Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the University of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas
College during the School Year 2011-2012. Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-
civic activities by helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire need.
Certain documents also attest to Respondent’s reformed ways such as: (1) Affidavit of Candida P.
Mabborang; (2) Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez; (3) Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud; (4)
Certification from the Municipal Local Government Office.
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Furthermore, respondent’s plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the IBP- Cagayan Chapter
and by his former and present colleagues. His parish priest certified that he is faithful to and puts
to actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church. He is also observed to be a regular
churchgoer. Respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no
opposition to the instant suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends regular support to
his children in compliance with the Decision dated February 27, 2004.
The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent was
disbarred and recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product of Lemu National High
School, and his fourteen (14) years of dedicated government service from 1986 to July 2000 as
Legal Officer of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil Service
Attorney of the Civil Service Commission; Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer;
and State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. From the attestations and certifications
presented, the Court finds that respondent has sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 58
years of age, he still has productive years ahead of him that could significantly contribute to the
upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of society. While the Court is ever mindful
of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show
compassion to those who have reformed their ways as in this case.
Thus, the court reinstated respondent to the practice of law. He was, however, reminded that
such privilege is burdened with conditions whereby adherence to the rigid standards of intellect,
moral uprightness, and strict compliance with the rules and the law are continuing
requirements. Florence Teves Macarubbo vs. Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo; Re: Petition (for
Extraordinary Mercy) of Edmundo L. Macarubbo. A.C. No. 6148. January 22, 2013
Court personnel; refusal to perform duty. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel enjoins court personnel to perform their official duties properly and with diligence at
all times. Clerks of Court are primarily responsible for the speedy and efficient service of all
court processes and writs. Hence, they cannot be allowed to slacken on their work since they
are charged with the duty of keeping the records and the seal of the court, issuing processes,
entering judgments and orders, and giving certified copies of records upon request. As such,
they are expected to possess a high degree of discipline and efficiency in the performance of
their functions to help ensure that the cause of justice is done without delay.
As an officer of the court, respondent Clerk of Court was duty-bound to use reasonable skill and
diligence in the performance of her officially-designated duties as clerk of court, failing which,
warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions. In this case, respondent unjustifiably failed
to issue the alias writs of execution to implement the judgment in a Civil Case, despite orders
from the RTC. Moreover, she failed to file the required comment in disregard of the duty of
every employee in the judiciary to obey the orders and processes of the Court without delay.
Such act evinces lack of interest in clearing her name, constituting an implied admission of the
charges. Mariano T. Ong vs. Eva G. Basiya-Saratan, Clerk of Court, RTC, Br. 32, Iloilo City. A.M.
No. P-12-3090. January 7, 2013
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Judge; disciplinary proceedings against judges; presumption of regularity. Jurisprudence is

replete with cases holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the exercise of his
adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should
instead be assailed through available judicial remedies. Disciplinary proceedings against judges
do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies and, thus, cannot be pursued
simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by their erroneous
orders or judgments.
Even if the CA decision or portions thereof turn out to be erroneous, administrative liability will
only attach upon proof that the actions of the respondent CA Justices were motivated by bad
faith, dishonesty or hatred, or attended by fraud or corruption, which were not sufficiently
shown to exist in this case. Neither was bias as well as partiality established. Acts or conduct of
the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly shown before he can be
branded the stigma of being biased and partial. In the same vein, bad faith or malice cannot be
inferred simply because the judgment or order is adverse to a party. Here, other than AMALI’s
bare and self-serving claim, no act clearly indicative of bias and partiality was alleged except for
the claim that respondent CA Justices misapplied the law and jurisprudence. Thus, the
presumption that the respondent judge has regularly performed his duties shall prevail. Re:
Verified complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, et al. A.M. No. OCA IPI
No. 12-202-CA-J. January 15, 2013
Judge; gross ignorance of law. Judge Sarmiento, Jr. was charged with gross ignorance of the law,
manifest partiality and dereliction and neglect of duty. The court held that the judge did not
commit gross ignorance of the law. Gross ignorance of the law on the part of a judge
presupposes an appalling lack of familiarity with simple rules of law or procedures and well-
established jurisprudence which tends to erode the public trust in the competence and fairness
of the court which he personifies. The complaint states that respondent judge, in arbitrary
defiance of his own September 25, 2006 Decision which constitutes res judicata or a bar to him
to pass upon the issue of Geoffrey, Jr’s. custody, granted, via his March 15, 2011 Order,
provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. to Eltesa. The Decision adverted to refers to the judgment
on compromise agreement.
Respondent judge cannot be held guilty of the charges hurled by the complainant against him
since there is no finding of strong reasons to rule otherwise. The preference of a child over 7
years of age as to whom he desired to live with shall be respected. Moreover, custody, even if
previously granted by a competent court in favor of a parent, is not permanent. Geoffrey Beckett
vs. Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., RTC, Branch 24, Cebu City. A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326. January
30, 2013
Judge; misconduct. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule

of law or a standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should
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relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions of a public officer. In
grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be established.
In this case, the actions of the Sandiganbayan Justices respecting the execution of the final
judgment against accused Velasco were shown to be in respectful deference to the Court’s
action on the various petitions filed by the former. Records are bereft of evidence showing any
trace of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of the rules as to hold the
Sandiganbayan Justices administratively liable for grave misconduct. Re: Complaint of Leonardo
A. Velasco against Associate Justices Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr., et al. A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-
25-SB-J. January 15, 2013
Judge; no abuse of authority when judge did not renew a temporary appointment. Complainant,
a former Court Stenographer III at the RTC, failed to show any proof that she was entitled to a
permanent position. Other than her allegation that she was given two “very satisfactory” and
one “satisfactory” rating, there was no evidence presented that she has met the prescribed
qualification standard for the position. “Such standard is a mix of the formal education,
experience, training, civil service eligibility, physical health and attitude that the job requires.”
Respondent judge, who is the immediate supervisor of complainant, is in the best position to
observe the fitness, propriety and efficiency of the employee for the position. It should be
impressed upon complainant that her appointment in the Judiciary is not a vested right. It is not
an entitlement that she can claim simply for the reason that she had been in the service for
almost two years.
The subsequent filing of complaint against Atty. Borja (officer-in-charge of the PAO-Virac)
manifests complainant’s propensity to file complaints whenever she does not get what she wants.
Such attitude should not be tolerated. Otherwise, judges will be placed in hostage situations by
employees who will threaten to file complaints whenever they do not get their way with their
judges.
Since there is no proof that respondent judge abused her position, the case against her should be
dismissed. Respondent judge should, however, be reminded to be circumspect in her actuations
so as not to give the impression that she is guilty of favoritism. Kareen P. Magtagñob vs. Judge
Genie G. Gapas-Agbada. OCA IPI No. 11-3631-RTJ. January 16, 2013
February 2013 Philippines Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; confidentiality of proceedings against attorneys; exception. Atty. Fortun filed a petition
for contempt against respondents for publicizing the disbarment case against him in media.
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that “proceedings against attorneys shall be
private and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like
its decisions in other cases.” The purpose of the rule is not only to enable the Court to make its
investigations free from any extraneous influence or interference, but also to protect the personal
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and professional reputation of attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled,
vindictive, and irresponsible clients and litigants; it is also to deter the press from publishing
administrative cases or portions thereto without authority. Malicious and unauthorized
publication or verbatim reproduction of administrative complaints against lawyers in
newspapers by editors and/or reporters may be actionable. Such premature publication
constitutes a contempt of court, punishable by either a fine or imprisonment or both at the
discretion of the Court. However, Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is not a
restriction on the freedom of the press. If there is a legitimate public interest, media is not
prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate news report of a disbarment complaint. In the
absence of a legitimate public interest in a disbarment complaint, members of the media must
preserve the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during its pendency.
In this case, the filing of a disbarment complaint against Atty. Fortun is itself a matter of public
concern considering that it arose from the Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of the
public is not on Atty. Fortun himself but primarily on his involvement and participation as
defense counsel in the Maguindanao Massacre case. Thus, since the disbarment complaint is a
matter of public interest, media had a right to publish such fact under freedom of the
press. Philip Sigrid A. Fortun vs. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas, et al., G.R. No. 194578. February 13,
2013.
Attorney; full discharge of duties to client; limitations. Atty. Villarin is expected to champion the
cause of his client with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. This simply means that his
client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense – including the institution
of an ejectment case – that is recognized by our property laws. In Legarda v. Court of Appeals,
the court held that in the full discharge of their duties to the client, lawyers shall not be afraid of
the possibility that they may displease the general public.
Nevertheless, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the limitation that lawyers shall
perform their duty to the client within the bounds of law. They should only make such defense
when they believe it to be honestly debatable under the law. In this case, Atty. Villarin’s act of
issuing demand letters, moved by the understanding of a void HLURB Decision, is legally
sanctioned. If his theory holds water, the notice to vacate becomes necessary in order to file an
action for ejectment. Hence, he did not resort to any fraud or chicanery prohibited by the Code
just to maintain his client’s disputed ownership over the subdivision lots.
However, the facts show that Atty. Villarin brazenly typified one of the complainants as an
illegal occupant when the final and executory HLURB Decision had already recognized her as a
subdivision lot buyer. Given that he knew such falsity, he thus advances the interest of his client
through means that are not in keeping with fairness and honesty. This is proscribed by Rule
19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires that a lawyer shall employ only
fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. Lawyers must not present and offer in
evidence any document that they know is false. Verleen Trinidad, Florentina Lander, Wally
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Casubuan, Minerva Mendoza, Celedonio Alojado, et al. vs. Atty. Angelito Villarin, A.C. No.
9310. February 27, 2013.
Attorney; notarial practice; necessity of affiant’s personal appearance; nature of notarization;

penalties when a notary public fails to discharge his duties. A notary public should not notarize
a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.
Without the personal appearance of the person who actually executed the document, the notary
public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party
and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act or deed.
The notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document,
making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarized document
is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public
must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties;
otherwise, the public’s confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be
undermined
Respondent’s failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those
directly affected by the notarized document but also in undermining the integrity of a notary
public and in degrading the function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such
negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. The responsibility to faithfully
observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is more
pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn oath under the Code of
Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of
any. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties
of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.
Based on existing jurisprudence, when a lawyer commissioned as a notary public fails to
discharge his duties as such, he is meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission,
disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years, and
suspension from the practice of law for one year. Patrocinio V. Agbulos vs. Atty. Roseller A.
Viray, A.C. No. 7350. February 18, 2013.
Court personnel; discourteous acts. Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution states that a public
office is a public trust. “It enjoins public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree
of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and to, at all times, remain accountable to the
people.” As front liners of the justice system, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs must always strive to
maintain public trust in the performance of their duties. As agents of the law, they are “called
upon to discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence because in serving the court’s
writs and processes and implementing the orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without
affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient administration of justice.”
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Sheriff Gelbolingo’s failure to properly respond to the letters is tantamount to discourtesy. A
simple note as to where their personal effects were temporarily stored could have assured Sasing
that their belongings were not confiscated but merely stored for safekeeping. The Court is fully
aware that a sheriff’s schedule can be hectic, but she could have easily relayed the information
to the other court staff to address Sasing’s concerns.
The administrative offense committed by Sheriff Gelbolingo is discourtesy in the course of
official duties which, under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule
IV, Section 52(C)(1), is a light offense. The penalty imposable for such an offense is either a
reprimand for the first offense, a suspension from 1 day to 30 days for the second offense, and
dismissal from public service for the third offense. In this case, the court admonished Sheriff
Gelbolingo considering there was an effort on her part to meet with Sasing twice, but the latter
did not appear on the second scheduled meeting. Ray Antonio C. Sasing vs. Celestial Venus G.
Gelbolingo, Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, A.M. No. P-12-3032. February 20,
2013.
Court personnel; public office is a public trust; simple neglect of duty. No less than the
Constitution itself mandates that all public officers and employees should serve with
responsibility, integrity and efficiency, for public office is a public trust. The Court has
repeatedly reminded those who work in the Judiciary to be examples of responsibility,
competence and efficiency; they must discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence,
since they are officers of the Court and agents of the law. “Indeed, any conduct, act or omission
on the part of those who would violate the norm[s] of public accountability and diminish or
even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary shall not be countenanced.”
In this case, Mendoza charged Esguerra, a process server in the RTC, with Negligence and
Dereliction of Duty. The court held that Esguerra was guilty of simple neglect of duty. Esguerra
cannot blame the Civil Docket Clerk for the delay in the service of the July 7, 2008 Order. If
indeed a copy of the July 7, 2008 Order had been handed to Esguerra only on August 8, 2008, a
Friday, “he should not have proceeded to mail the same; but instead, should have served the
Order personally to the parties, particularly to the herein complainant.” Even the Notice of
Dismissal dated August 21, 2008 was mailed only on September 19, 2008, three (3) weeks after
it was endorsed to him sometime on August 22 or 25, 2008. These acts clearly demonstrate lack
of sufficient or reasonable diligence on the part of the respondent. Section 1, Canon IV of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel mandates that “Court personnel shall at all times perform
official duties properly and with diligence.” Clearly, Esguerra had been remiss in the
performance of his duties and has shown lack of dedication to the functions of his office.
Esguerra’s acts displayed a conduct falling short of the stringent standards required of court
employees. Erlinda C. Mendoza vs. Pedro S. Esguerra, Process Server, RTC, Br. 89, Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija,A.M. No. P-11-2967. February 13, 2013.
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Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA); preliminary injunction; requirement of a hearing. Section 4 of
Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA provides that “[T]he requirement of a hearing for preliminary
injunction is satisfied with the issuance of a resolution served upon the party sought to be
enjoined requiring him to comment on the said application within the period of not more than
ten (10) days from notice.”
In this case, the CA was justified in dispensing with the requisite hearing on the application for
injunctive writ, since the so-called “new and substantial matters” raised in the third urgent
motion in CA-G.R. SP No. 122784 and in the supplement thereto were in fact not previously
unknown to respondents Ricafort, and they had already been previously ordered to comment on
the said application, at the time when the said “subsequent” matters were already
obtaining. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S. Ong vs. Court of Appeals
Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February
19, 2013.
Judge; anonymous complaints against judges must be supported by public records of

indubitable integrity; unbecoming conduct. Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
anonymous complaints may be filed against judges, but they must be supported by public
records of indubitable integrity. Courts have acted in such instances needing no corroboration
by evidence to be offered by the complainant.
Thus, for anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in administrative proceedings which
usually rests with the complainant, must be buttressed by indubitable public records and by
what is sufficiently proven during the investigation. If the burden of proof is not overcome, the
respondent is under no obligation to prove his defense.
In this case, no evidence was attached to the letter-complaint. The complainant never appeared,
and no public records were brought forth during the investigation. Judge Achas denied all the
charges made against him, only admitting that he was separated de facto from his wife and that
he reared fighting cocks.
For going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas has clearly failed to abide by
Canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary. Regarding his
involvement in cockfighting, however, there is no clear evidence. Although Judge Achas denied
engaging in cockfighting and betting, he admitted rearing fighting cocks for leisure. While
rearing fighting cocks is not illegal, Judge Achas should avoid mingling with a crowd of
cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors as it undoubtedly impairs the respect due him. As a judge,
he must impose upon himself personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does
the judicial office. Judges in particular must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity,
charged as they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings. He should
behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. His
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personal behavior outside the court, and not only while in the performance of his official duties,
must be beyond reproach, for he is perceived to be the personification of law and justice. Thus,
any demeaning act of a judge degrades the institution he represents. Anonymous vs. Judge Rio C.
Achas, MTCC Branch 2, Ozamiz City, Misamis Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801. February 27,
2013.
Judge; definition of ponencia; ponente if present can act upon an urgent motion alone or with
another member present. There is nothing in the Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA) which would
have required the Division Clerk of Court to transmit the urgent motion for action only to the
two present regular members of the 14th Division, as the complainants seem to believe. The
complainants would have been correct if the absent member of the Division was not the
ponente herself but either of the other members. This implies that the ponente if present can act
upon the urgent motion alone or with another member present, provided that the action or
resolution “is submitted on the next working day to the absent member or members of the
Division for ratification, modification or recall.”
A preliminary injunction is not a ponencia but an order granted at any stage of an action prior to
final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. It is settled that as an ancillary
or preventive remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may be resorted to by a party to protect
or preserve his rights and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. Its
object is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are passed upon. It is not a cause
of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. On the other hand,
ponencia refers to the rendition of a decision in a case on the merits, which disposes of the main
controversy. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the 14th Division in CA-G.R. SP No.
122784 did not settle the controversy therein, but is a mere interlocutory order to restore the
status quo ante, that is, the state of things prior to the RTC’s Order of December 21,
2011. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S. Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso.
Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19,
2013.
Judge; government employee vis-à-vis government officer; liberal treatment upon retirement
claims of judges and justices. In a letter, former Chief Justice Panganiban requested that the
government service which he rendered from January 1962 to December 1965 in the
Department of Education, its Secretary, and the Board of National Education, be creditable so
that he can meet the present service requirement of fifteen (15) years for entitlement to
retirement benefits.
Under the old Administrative Code (Act No. 2657), a government “employee” includes any
person in the service of the Government or any branch thereof of whatever grade or class. A
government “officer,” on the other hand, refers to officials whose duties involve the exercise of
discretion in the performance of the functions of government, whether such duties are precisely
defined or not. Clearly, the law, then and now, did not require a specific job description and job
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specification. Thus, the absence of a specific position in a governmental structure is not a
hindrance for the Court to give weight to CJ Panganiban’s government service as legal counsel
and consultant.
The Supreme Court has unquestionably followed the practice of liberal treatment in passing
upon retirement claims of judges and justices, thus: (1) waiving the lack of required length of
service in cases of disability or death while in actual service19 or distinctive service; (2) adding
accumulated leave credits to the actual length of government service in order to qualify one for
retirement; (3) tacking post-retirement service in order to complete the years of government
service required; (4) extending the full benefits of retirement upon compassionate and
humanitarian considerations; and (5) considering legal counseling work for a government body
or institution as creditable government service. Re: Request of (Ret.) Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban for Re-Computation of his Creditable Service for the Purpose of Re-Computing his
Retirement Benefits, A.M. No. 10-9-15-SC. February 12, 2013.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law; mandatory inhibition; no liability for damages in the exercise
of judicial functions. The court held that Judge Dinopol is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
To be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must
not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but must have also been motivated by
bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. Gross ignorance of the law is considered as a
serious offense under Rule 140, Section 8, and is punishable under Section 11.
Moreover, one of the plaintiffs in the Civil Case assigned to the judge, is a relative by affinity
within the sixth degree, Judge Dinopol should have inhibited himself from taking cognizance of
the case as mandated by Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
However, Judge Dinopol is not liable for damages. In Alzua v. Johnson, the court explained that
in civil actions for damages, judges of superior and general jurisdiction are not liable to answer
for what they do in the exercise of their judicial functions, provided they are acting within their
legal powers and jurisdiction. Eduardo Panes, Jr. et al. vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch
24, Koronadal City/Joewe Palad vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal
City/Roque C. Facura, et al. vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Eden V.
Castro vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Rosalinda G. Farofaldane vs.
Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Engr. Roque C. Facura, et al. vs. Judge
Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City, A.M. OCA-IPI No. 07-2618-RTJ/A.M. No.
OCA-IPI No. 07-2619-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2652-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2720-
RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2721-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 08-2808-RTJ. February 12, 2013.
Judge; instituting administrative proceedings against justices. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, there are three ways by which administrative proceedings may be instituted against
justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan and judges of regular and special courts: (1) motu
proprio by the Supreme Court; (2) upon verified complaint (as in this complaint) with affidavits
of persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may
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substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous complaint supported by public records
of indubitable integrity.
In this case, complainants have no personality to assail the writ of preliminary injunction issued
by the CA’s former Special 14th Division since they were not parties in the lower court. Thus,
they are not permitted to harass the CA Justices who issued the same. For even granting that the
issuance of the writ was erroneous, as a matter of public policy a magistrate cannot be held
administratively liable for every discretionary but erroneous order he issues. The settled rule is
that “a Judge cannot be held to account civilly, criminally or administratively for an erroneous
decision rendered by him in good faith.” The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in
the consolidated CA petitions was discretionary, interlocutory and preservative in nature, and
equally importantly, it was a collective and deliberated action of the former Special 14th
Division. Moreover, as an established rule, an administrative, civil or criminal action against a
judge cannot be a substitute for an appeal. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson &
Angel S. Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M.
OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013.
Judge; judicial conduct; definition of just debts; willful failure to pay a just debt is a ground for
disciplinary action against judges. Manlapaz charged Judge Sabillo with serious and gross
misconduct for failure to return an amount arising from a transaction.
The Court has repeatedly stressed that it is not a collection agency for the unpaid debts of its
officials and employees, but has nevertheless provided for Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court that holds its officials and employees administratively liable in unpaid debt situations. This
Section provides that willful failure to pay a just debt is a ground for disciplinary action against
judges and justices. Just debts, as defined in Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, refer to (1) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (2)
claims, the existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor. Section 8, Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court classifies willful failure to pay a just debt as a serious charge.
While reference to a debt necessarily implies a transaction that is private and outside of official
transactions, the rules do not thereby intrude into public officials’ private lives; they simply look
at their actions from the prism of public service and consider these acts unbecoming of a public
official. These rules take into account that these are actions of officials who are entrusted with
public duties and who, even in their private capacities, should continually act to reflect their
status as public servants. Employees of the judiciary should be living examples of uprightness
not only in the performance of official duties but also in their personal and private dealings with
others so as to preserve at all times the good name and standing of the courts in the community.
Here, the complainant’s claim is a just debt. The willfulness of Judge Sabillo in not paying is
shown by his continuous failure to settle despite demand letters sent to him. Thus, the court
imposed the penalty of fine. Victoriano G. Manlapaz vs. Judge Manuel T. Sabillo, MCTC,
Lamitan, Basilan, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1771. February 13, 2013.
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Judge; judicial audit; court’s jurisdiction over an administrative case; presumption of
regularity. The OCA submitted its memorandum to then Acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio
on 10 July 2012 — more than two years and seven months after Judge Grageda compulsorily
retired. During his incumbency, Judge Grageda was never given the chance to explain the
alleged violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars. Up to the present, the OCA
has not commenced any formal investigation or asked Judge Grageda to comment on the matter.
Thus, the complaint against Judge Grageda must be dismissed.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Mantua, the court held that “this Court concedes that
there are no promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial audit. However, the absence of such
rules should not serve as license to recommend the imposition of penalties to retired judges who,
during their incumbency, were never given a chance to explain the circumstances behind the
results of the judicial audit. Judicial audit reports and the memoranda which follow them should
state not only recommended penalties and plans of action for the violations of audited courts,
but also give commendations when they are due. To avoid similar scenarios, manual judicial
audits may be conducted at least six months before a judge’s compulsory retirement. We
recognize that effective monitoring of a judge’s observance of the time limits required in the
disposition of cases is hampered by limited resources.
These limitations, however, should not be used to violate Judge Mantua’s right to due process.”
For the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint must be filed
during the incumbency of the respondent. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by reason
of respondent’s cessation from office. In this case, Judge Grageda’s compulsory retirement
divested the OCA of its right to institute a new administrative case against him after his
compulsory retirement. The Court can no longer acquire administrative jurisdiction over him by
filing a new administrative case against him after he has ceased to be a public official. The
remedy is to file the appropriate civil or criminal case against him for the alleged transgression.
Moreover, to hold Judge Grageda liable, there must be substantial evidence that he committed
an offense. Otherwise, the presumption is that he regularly performed his duties. In Go v. Judge
Achas, the Court held that, “In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the
respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail. Even in administrative cases, if a
court employee or magistrate is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him
should be competent.”Missing Exhibits and Court Properties in Regional Trial Court, Br. 4,
Panabo City, Davao del Norte, A.M. No. 10-2-41-RTC. February 27, 2013.
Judge; undue delay. The court held that Judge Amdengan committed undue delay in rendering a
Decision in the ejectment case. An action for ejectment is governed by the Rules of Summary
Procedure, Section 10 which provides that “within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last
affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall
render judgment.” This provision is mandatory, considering the nature of an ejectment case.
Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or an
order is classified as a less serious charge, punishable by either suspension from office without
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salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of
more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. The court considered his candid admission and
acceptance of his infraction as factors in imposing only a fine. Atty. Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. vs.
Presiding Judge Michael M. Amdengan, Municipal Trail Court, Angono Rizal, A.M. No. MTJ-12-
1818. February 13, 2013.
Attorney; a lawyer shall not assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Atty. Bancolo admitted
that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed
in his name by a secretary of his law office. He likewise categorically stated that because of
some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were
signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Clearly, he violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which provides:
CANON 9 – A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may
delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer.
Further, under the Rules of Court, a counsel’s signature serves as a certification that (1) he has
read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground
to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay. Thus, by affixing one’s signature to a pleading,
it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to
the document. For violating rule 9.01 of the CPR, Atty. Bacolo was meted with the penalty the
suspension from the practice of law for one year.Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia v. Attys.
Charlie Bancolo and Janus Jarder; A.C. No. 9604. March 20, 2013.
Attorney; disbarment complaint; outright dismissal is warranted if the complaint, on its face,
lacks merit. For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the complainant upon the
dismissal of the Complaint for disbarment he instituted against the respondent
lawyers. Complainant claims he was denied due process because (1) she was not allowed to
file a Reply and (2) the Court deviated from usual procedure when it resolved the disbarment
Complaint without first declaring the case to have been submitted for resolution.
The Supreme Court has the power to outrightly dismiss a Complaint for disbarment when on its
face, it is clearly wanting in merit. Thus, in International Militia of People against Corruption &
Terrorism v. Chief Justice Davide, Jr. (Ret.), the Court, after finding the Complaint insufficient in
form and substance, dismissed the same outright for utter lack of merit. In the instant case, the
Court did not dismiss outright the disbarment Complaint. In fact, it even required the
respondents to file their respective Answers. Then, after a judicious study of the records, it
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proceeded to resolve the same although not in complainant’s favor. Based on the Complaint and
the supporting affidavits attached thereto, and the respective Comments of the respondents, the
Court found that the presumption of innocence accorded to respondents was not overcome.
Moreover, the Court no longer required complainant to file a Reply since it has the discretion
not to require the filing of the same when it can already judiciously resolve the case based on
the pleadings thus far submitted. And contrary to complainant’s mistaken notion, not all
petitions or complaints reach the reply or memorandum stage. Depending on the merits of the
case, the Court has the discretion either to proceed with the case by first requiring the parties to
file their respective responsive pleadings or to dismiss the same outright. Likewise, the Court can
proceed to resolve the case without need of informing the parties that the case is already
submitted for resolution. Jasper Junno F. Rodica v. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al.; A.C. No.
9259. March 12, 2013.
Attorney; duty to exercise due diligence. The Court reiterated its ruling in Del Mundo v.
Capistrano that “when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due
diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and
attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed
on him by his client and makes him answerable not just to client but also to the legal profession,
the court and society.”
Respondent’s infractions were aggravated by his failure to comply with CBD’s directives for him
to file his pleadings on time and to religiously attend hearings, demonstrating not only his
irresponsibility but also his disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such conduct was
unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected
to stand foremost in complying with court directives as an officer of the court. As a member of
the bar, he ought to have known that the orders of the CBD as the investigating arm of the Court
in administrative cases against lawyers were not mere requests but directives which should have
been complied with promptly and completely. Gloria P. Jinon v. Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz; A.C. No.
9615. March 5, 2013.
Attorney; duty to hold in trust money received from client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of land title, but not used for the purpose,
should be returned to the client immediately. The Court held in Dhaliwal v. Dumaguing that a
lawyer’s failure to return the funds he holds on behalf of a client, despite latter’s demand, gives
rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use and constitutes a gross
violation of general morality and professional ethics. Gloria P. Jinon v. Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz; A.C.
No. 9615. March 5, 2013.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; failure of branch clerk of court to keep and maintain a
general docket. Branch clerk of court Mr. Teves admitted that he failed to keep and maintain a
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general docket of cases assigned to their branch. As such, he failed to comply with his duty
under Section 8, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, thus:
Sec. 8. General docket. – The clerk shall keep a general docket, each page of which shall be
numbered and prepared for receiving all the entries in a single case, and shall enter therein all
cases, numbered consecutively in the order in which they were received, and under the heading
of each case, a complete title thereof, the date of each paper filed or issued, of each order or
judgment entered, and of each other step taken in the case so that by reference a single page the
history of the case may be seen.
With this infraction, Mr. Teves was held liable for simple neglect of duty. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same
court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; failure of branch clerk of court to schedule the
promulgation of cases. In the Datan case, Mr. Teves, instead of scheduling the case for
promulgation, just gave the accused a copy of the unpromulgated decision at the time when the
presiding judge was serving her suspension. Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states that:
Sec. 6. Promulgation of judgment. – The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence
of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction
is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the clerk of court x x x.
Clearly, as found by the OCA, Mr. Teves is guilty of simple neglect of duty. It is his duty to
calendar the case for promulgation in accordance with the Rules of Court. He did not only fail
to do so. Rather, he, in fact, served copies of the decision to the accused without the judgment
having been promulgated first. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis,
Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr.
Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; imposable penalty. Simple neglect of duty is defined as
the “failure of an employee to give one’s attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a
disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.” Under the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense
penalized with suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first offense, and
dismissal for the second.
In the determination of the proper penalty, the Court looked into Mr. Teves’ past administrative
cases.
Considering his past infractions and having been warned that a repetition of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely, Mr. Teves still has not reformed. He has remained
undeterred in disregarding the law and he appears to be unfazed by the previous penalties and
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warnings he received. Mr. Teves’ repeated infractions seriously compromise efficiency and
hamper public service which the Court can no longer tolerate. As such, he was meted with the
penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued
leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same
court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; duty to adopt an efficient system to monitor the status of cases. The OCA found that the
court failed to maintain a general docket book to keep track of the cases under it. Although the
duty is vested with Mr. Teves as the Branch Clerk of Court, it is the duty of Judge Tormis to make
sure that the members of her staff perform their duties. The OCA also found that Mr. Teves
repeatedly submitted inaccurate reports as to the actual number of cases pending with their
court. This is brought about by their failure to adopt an efficient system of monitoring their cases.
Again, this is the primary responsibility of Judge Tormis. Finally, the OCA noted that Judge
Tormis failed to conduct an actual physical inventory of cases to keep abreast of the status of the
pending cases and to be informed that every case is in proper order.
Judge Tormis is guilty of violating Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars for her failure to
comply with her duty to provide an efficient court management system in her court which
includes the preparation and use of docket inventory and monthly report of cases as tools
thereof. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch
Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; gross ignorance of the law; when the law is sufficiently basic, not to be aware of it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judge Tormis issued the warrant of arrest in violation of
the Rule on Summary Procedure that the accused should first be notified of the charges against
him and given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and other countervailing evidence.
The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure has been in effect since November 15, 1991. It finds
application in a substantial number of civil and criminal cases. Judge Tormis cannot claim to be
unfamiliar with the same. Every judge is required to observe the law. When the law is
sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; and anything less than that
would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so elementary, not
to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon.
Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu
City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-
1818. March 12, 2013.
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Judges; gross inefficiency; gross ignorance of the law; imposable penalties. Under Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated September 11, 2001, violation of
Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars, and gross inefficiency are categorized as less
serious charges with the following sanctions: (a) suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00
but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Moreover, gross ignorance of the law is classified as serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of
the Revised Rules of Court, and penalized under Section 11 (a), Rule 140 of the same Rules by:
(1) Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits
shall, in no case, include accrued leave credits; (2) Suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for more than three (3), but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more
than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In determining the proper imposable penalty, we also consider Judge Tormis’ work history
which reflects how she performed her judicial functions. We find that there are several
administrative cases already filed against her, with most of these cases being decided against her.
These cases show her inability to properly discharge her judicial duties. Considering her past
infractions and taking into account the number of irregularities she committed in this present
case, Judge Tormis was meted with the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all
benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in
any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge,
Judges; motion to inhibit; grounds. As held in Sps. Hizon v. Sps. dela Fuente, “an inhibition
must be for just and valid reason.” Complainant’s mere imputation that the case was decided by
the magistrates of the Court with extreme bias and prejudice is baseless and clearly
unfounded. Jasper Junno F. Rodica v. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al.; A.C. No. 9259. March 12,
2013.
Judges; undue delay in deciding cases. The honor and integrity of the judicial system is
measured not only by the fairness and correctness of decisions rendered, but also by the
efficiency with which disputes are resolved. Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are
mandated to decide and resolve cases within 90 days from submission for decision or resolution.
Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently,
fairly, and with reasonable promptness. The mandate to promptly dispose of cases or matters
also applies to motions or interlocutory matters or incidents pending before the magistrate.
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Unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms of
judicial conduct and constitutes gross inefficiency that warrants the imposition of an
administrative sanction against the defaulting magistrate. Office of the Court Administrator v.
Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4,
Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-
1818. March 12, 2013; Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br.
49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran
City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013.
Judge Fuentes III concedes that there is no valid justification for the delay in resolving the cases
pending in his court. Indeed, his frequent travels to his residence in Ozamis City, which led to
travel fatigue and poor health, will not absolve him from liability. If a judge is unable to comply
with the period for deciding cases or matters, he can, for good reasons, ask for an extension.
Without an extension granted by the Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the
required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction. Office of the
Court Administrator v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural,
Sr. v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 / A.M.
No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013.
Judges; undue delay in deciding cases; administrative sanctions. An inexcusable failure to

decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the
imposition of administrative sanctions such as suspension from office without pay or fine on the
defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending on the following factors: (1)
the number of cases not decided within the reglamentary period; (2) the presence of aggravating
or mitigating circumstances; (3) the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay; (4)
the health and age of the judge; and (5) other analogous circumstances.
In this case, the fine was reduced considering that this was the first infraction of Judge Fuentes III
in his more than 15 years in the service. The Court likewise took into consideration the fact that
the respondent judge exerted earnest efforts to fully comply with the Court’s directives as
contained in the resolution. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes,
RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49,
Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013.
Judges; undue delay in deciding cases; suspension from office is not a justification for the
delay. Respondent judge claimed that the delay was the consequence of the three suspension
orders issued against her as she was suspended for an aggregate period of almost one year and
six months. Records reveal, however, that Judge Tormis was repeatedly suspended in cases
wherein she committed a breach of her duty as a member of the Bench. She cannot, therefore,
be allowed to use the same to justify another violation of her solemn oath to dispense justice.
Even if she was allowed to avail of this excuse, as aptly observed by the OCA, several of the
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cases that she failed to dispose of had been overdue for decision or resolution even prior to said
suspensions. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge,
Jurisdiction of the Court over administrative proceedings. An administrative matter was

instituted against Judge Grageda, based on the result of a judicial audit conducted after his
retirement. According to the Supreme Court, for it to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative
proceeding, the complaint must be filed during the incumbency of the respondent public official
or employee. This is because the filing of an administrative case is predicated on the holding of
a position or office in the government service. However, once jurisdiction has attached, the
same is not lost by the mere fact that the public official or employee was no longer in office
during the pendency of the case.
In present case, Judge Grageda’s retirement effectively barred the Court from pursuing the
instant administrative proceeding that was instituted after his tenure in office, and divested the
Court, much less the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), of any jurisdiction to still subject
him to the rules and regulations of the judiciary and/or to penalize him for the infractions
committed while he was still in the service. Accordingly, the complaint against retired Judge
Grageda was dismissed. Office of the Court Administrator v. Jesus L. Grageda; A.M. No. RTJ-10-
2235. March 11, 2013.
April 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Cases on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; practice of law; notary. The practice of law is imbued with public interest and “a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to
the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State –
the administration of justice – as an officer of the court.” Accordingly, ‘”lawyers are bound to
maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity
and fair dealing.”
Similarly, the duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest. “Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private
document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of
preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.”
In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-litigants, courts, other
lawyers and the general public to the perils of ordinary documents posing as public instruments.
Respondent committed acts of deceit and falsehood in open violation of the explicit
pronouncements of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Evidently, respondent’s conduct
falls miserably short of the high standards of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing
required from lawyers. Thus, he should be sanctioned. Efigenia M. Tenoso vs. Atty. Anselmo S.
Echanez. A.C. No. 8384. April 11, 2013
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Court personnel; dishonesty. In Civil Service Commission v. Perocho, Jr., the Court defined
dishonesty as “intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or
attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration,
appointment or promotion. Thus, dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or
negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person
accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances
which gave rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time
the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of
meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at
that moment.” Evidence showed that respondent was not the one who took the Civil Service
Sub-Professional Examinations. The Court, citing the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel,
stressed that its employees should hold the highest standard of integrity for they are a reflection
of the esteemed institution which they serve. It certainly cannot countenance any form of
dishonesty perpetrated by its employees. Civil Service Commission vs. Merle Ramoneda-
Pita. A.M. No. P-08-2531. April 11, 2013
Court Personnel; simple neglect of duty. In this case, the personnel in charge of the court
records failed to elevate the case records to the Court of Appeals within the prescribed period
due to the alleged “heavy workload.” The Court held that he was guilty of simple neglect of duty.
Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel commands court personnel to
perform their duties properly and with diligence at all times. The administration of justice is an
inviolable task and it demands the highest degree of efficiency, dedication and professionalism.
The Court is not unaware of the heavy workload of court personnel, given the number of cases
filed and pending before it. However, unless proven to exist in an insurmountable degree, this
circumstance cannot serve as an “excuse to evade administrative liability; otherwise, every
government employee faced with negligence and dereliction of duty would resort to that excuse
to evade punishment, to the detriment of the public service.”
Clearly, Salazar is guilty of simple neglect of duty, which is defined as the failure to give proper
attention to a task expected of an employee, thus signifying a disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference.
In the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and alternative
circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime shall be considered. The Court has
mitigated imposable penalties for various special reasons. It has considered length of service in
the judiciary, acknowledgement of infractions, remorse and family circumstances, among others,
in determining the applicable penalty. In this case, while Salazar is a second time offender for
simple neglect of duty, her long years of service in the judiciary and the admission of her
negligence are circumstances to mitigate her culpability. Judge Renato A. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 17,
Davao City vs. Atty. Rogelio F. Fabro, etc., et al. A.M. No. P-10-2791. April 17, 2013
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Judge; Court Personnel; Grave misconduct; Gross neglect of duty; Gross inefficiency.
In Obañana, Jr. v. Ricafort, the court held that: Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or
negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. This Court shall not
countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration
of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the faith of the
people in the Judiciary.
First, the judges involved solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by the
couples were incomplete and questionable. Their actions constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v.
Asdala, the Court held that inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and
carelessness.
Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of
solemnization fees. The Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, defined neglect of duty as the failure
to give one’s attention to a task expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the
offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to endanger or
threaten public welfare. The marriage documents show that official receipts for the
solemnization fee were missing or payment by batches was made for marriages performed on
different dates.
Third, the judges also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a foreigner who did not
submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. This irregularity
displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges.
Fourth, the judges are also guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the Family
Code with respect to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during
cohabitation such as the minority status of one party.
On the other hand, the court interpreter is guilty of grave misconduct when she said she can
facilitate the marriage and the requirements on the same day. She proposed an open-dated
marriage in exchange for a fee of P3,000. Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel prohibits court personnel from soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or benefit based on
any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official
actions.
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as “a grave offense that
carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even on a first offense. Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2,
2013
Judge; Gross ignorance of the law. The respondent judges violated Canons 21 and 6 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics which exact competence, integrity and probity in the performance of
their duties. Ignorance of the law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is
elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of integrity. In connection
with this, the administration of justice is considered a sacred task and upon assumption to office,
a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the visible representation of the law
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and more importantly of justice. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S.
Necessario, et al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013
Public officer; Presumption of regularity. In People v. Jansen, the Court held that the
solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been
duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is
that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the
issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the
contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law. However, in Sevilla v. Cardenas, the
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity
or failure to perform a duty. The visible superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have
alerted the solemnizing judges to the irregularity of the issuance. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013
Judge; Prohibition against private practice of law. Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon from engaging in the private practice of
law or giving professional advice to clients. Section 11 Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from
engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. The prohibition is
based on sound reasons of public policy, considering that the rights, duties, privileges and
functions of the office of an attorney are inherently incompatible with the high official functions,
duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give
their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending favors to their
own private interests, and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their
functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the
public interest.
Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right to
practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be
so suspended for the entire period of his incumbency as a judge. The term practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases in court or to participation in court proceedings, but extends to
the preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, the giving of legal advice to
clients or persons needing the same, the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which
legal rights are secured, and the preparation of papers incident to actions and special
proceedings.
In this case, Judge Malanyaon engaged in the private practice of law by assisting his daughter at
his wife’s administrative case, coaching his daughter in making manifestations or posing
motions to the hearing officer, and preparing the questions that he prompted to his
daughter. Sonia C. Decena and Rey C. Decena vs. Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon, RTC, Br. 32, Pili,
Camarines Sur. A.M. RTJ-10-2217. April 8, 2013
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Public Officers; public office is a public trust; public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. In this case, Gesultura, a
Cashier II in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the RTC, was dismissed for an anomaly involving
the Judiciary Development Fund and the General Fund. The Court held that public office is a
public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives. Those charged with the dispensation of justice, from justices and judges
to the lowliest clerks, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Not only
must their conduct at all times be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, it
must be beyond suspicion.
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from the occupant than does
the judicial office. The safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to the goal of an orderly
administration of justice. The act of misappropriating judiciary funds constitutes dishonesty and
grave misconduct which are grave offenses punishable by dismissal upon the commission of
even the first offense. Time and again, we have reminded court personnel tasked with
collections of court funds, such as Clerks of Courts and cash clerks, to deposit immediately with
authorized government depositories the various funds they have collected, because they are not
authorized to keep funds in their custody. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Develyn
Gesultura. A.M. No. P-04-1785. April 2, 2013
Attorney; the failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable
negligence. In Dalisay Capili v. Atty. Alfredo L. Bentulan, the Court held that the failure to file a
brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence. In this case, the
Court cannot accept as an excuse the alleged lapse committed by his client in failing to provide
him a copy of the case records.
In the first place, securing a copy of the case records was within Atty. San Juan’s control and is a
task that the lawyer undertakes.
Second, Atty. San Juan, unlike his client, knows or should have known, that filing an appellant’s
brief within the reglementary period is critical in the perfection of an appeal. The preparation
and the filing of the appellant’s brief are matters of procedure that fully fell within the exclusive
control and responsibility of Atty. San Juan. It was incumbent upon him to execute all acts and
procedures necessary and incidental to the perfection of his client’s appeal.
Third, Atty. San Juan lacked candor in dealing with his client. He omitted to inform Tomas of
the progress of his appeal with the Court of Appeals. Worse, he did not disclose to Tomas the
real reason for the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the appeal. Neither did Atty. San Juan file a
motion for reconsideration, or otherwise resort to available legal remedies that might have
protected his client’s interest.
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Atty. San Juan’s negligence undoubtedly violates the Lawyer’s Oath that requires him to
“conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of (his) knowledge and discretion, with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to (his) clients[.]” He also violated Rule 18.03 and Rule
18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rex Polinar Dagohoy v. Atty.
Artemio V. San Juan. A.C. No. 7944, June 3, 2013.
Attorney; IBP findings and recommended penalties in administrative cases against lawyers are
only recommendatory. IBP’s recommended penalty of three (3) months suspension from the
practice of law is not commensurate to the gravity of the infractions committed. These
infractions warrant the imposition of a stiffer sanction. The following acts and omissions of Atty.
San Juan were considered: first, the negligence in handling his client’s appeal; second, his
failure to act candidly and effectively in communicating information to his client; and more
importantly, third, the serious and irreparable consequence of his admitted negligence which
deprived his client of legal remedies in addressing his conviction.
In Pineda v. Atty. Macapagal, the Court imposed a one (1) year suspension from the practice of
law on a lawyer who, like Atty. San Juan, had been found guilty of gross negligence in handling
his client’s case. With this case as the norm, Atty. San Juan should be meted a suspension of one
(1) year from the practice of law for his negligence and inadequacies in handling his client’s
case.
Moreover, IBP’s findings and stated penalty are merely recommendatory; only the Supreme
Court has the power to discipline erring lawyers and to impose against them penalties for
unethical conduct. Until finally acted upon by the Supreme Court, the IBP findings and the
recommended penalty imposed cannot attain finality until adopted by the Court as its own. Thus,
the IBP findings, by themselves, cannot be a proper subject of implementation or
compliance. Rex Polinar Dagohoy v. Atty. Artemio V. San Juan. A.C. No. 7944, June 3, 2013.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Ismael Hadji Ali, a court stenographer I at the Shari’a Circuit Court,
represented that he took and passed the Civil Service Professional Examination but evidence
showed that another person took the exam for him. Per CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15,
Series of 1991, the use of spurious Civil Service eligibility constitutes dishonesty, among others.
Dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary. Hadji Ali failed to observe the
strict standards and behavior required of an employee in the judiciary. He has shown unfitness
for public office. Pursuant to the Civil Service Rules, Hadji Ali was dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. Civil Service Commission v. Ismael A. Hadji Ali,
et al., A.M. No. SCC-08-11-P, June 18, 2013.
Court personnel; dishonesty and grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some

established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior as well as gross
negligence by a public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave,
serious, important, weighty, momentous and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful
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intention and not a mere error of judgment. The misconduct must also have a direct relation to
and be connected with the performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office.
Dishonesty is the “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and
straightforwardness.”
In this case, respondent deceived complainant’s family who were led to believe that he is the
legal representative of the Hodges Estate. Boasting of his position as a court officer, a City Sheriff
at that, complainant’s family completely relied on his repeated assurance that they will not be
ejected from the premises.
In Re: Complaint Filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro Against Edna Magallanes, Court Stenographer III,
RTC Br. 28 and Bonifacio G. Magallanes, Process Server, RTC Br. 30, Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, the Court stressed that to preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel must
comply with just contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards. In that
case, the court held that court employees are expected to be paragons of uprightness, fairness
and honesty not only in their official conduct but also in their personal dealings, including
business and commercial transactions to avoid becoming the court’s albatross of infamy.
More importantly, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 671350 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees mandates that public officials and employees shall
remain true to the people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not
discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times
respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. Rodolfo C. Sabidong v.
Nicolasito S. Solas. A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25, 2013.
Court personnel; Prohibition in acquiring property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction
of their courts. Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers such as clerks
of court from acquiring property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of their
courts. The rationale is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary
relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised
by these persons. “In so providing, the Code tends to prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends not
to give occasion for fraud, which is what can and must be done.”
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the
pendency of the litigation involving the property. Where the property is acquired after the
termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
In this case, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil
Case No. 14706 which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that as it
may, it cannot be said that the property is no longer “in litigation” at that time considering that it
was part of the Hodges Estate then under settlement proceedings.
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A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but
also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. A property
forming part of the estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the
probate court issues an order declaring the estate proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is
that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the
probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated. The probate court loses
jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. Rodolfo C. Sabidong v.
Nicolasito S. Solas. A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25, 2013.
Attorney; Attorney-client relationship. Respondent Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr. was charged for
gross negligence in violation of Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The Supreme Court held him guilty of gross negligence. The
relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence.
In this light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and
accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is
expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full
attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts
it for a fee or for free. A lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely
reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel’s care or giving sound legal advice, but also
consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled
hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled
cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the
court to prod him or her to do so. While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact
formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyer’s mere failure to perform the
obligations due his client is per se a violation. Thus, the court suspended respondent for six (6)
months. Josefina Caranza Vda de Saldivar v. Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr., A.C. No. 7749, July 8,
2013
Attorney; Conflict of interest. The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent
situations wherein a lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to
any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent
a client involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the
former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in
the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the
lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client’s case, including the weak and strong points
of the case. Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the relationship must be
treated as sacred and guarded with care. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the
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client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only
then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in
the administration of justice. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.
Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson and his group,
the termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that
the client’s confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the
professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do
anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer
previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client’s
confidences acquired in the previous relation. Thus, Atty. Era was found guilty of Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and was suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years. Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty. Edgardo O. Era, A.C. No. 6664,
July 16, 2013.
Attorney; Disbarment and suspension of lawyers; Burden of proof. The burden of proof in
disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the shoulders of the complainant. The
Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the complaint
by clearly preponderant evidencethat warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. As a rule, an
attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges made against him until
the contrary is proved. An attorney is further presumed as an officer of the Court to have
performed his duties in accordance with his oath. In this case, complainants failed to discharge
their burden of proving that respondents ordered their secretary to stamp a much later date
instead of the actual date of receipt for the purpose of extending the ten-day period within
which to file a Motion for Reconsideration under the NLRC Rules of Procedure. Such claim is
merely anchored on speculation and conjecture and not backed by any clear preponderant
evidence necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a member of the
Bar. Jaime Joven and Reynaldo C. Rasing v. Atty. Pablo R. Cruz and Frankie O. Magsalin III, A.C.
No. 7686, July 31, 2013.
Attorney; Honesty; Practice of law is not a right but a privilege. Lawyers are officers of the court,
called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system,
protecting and upholding truth and the rule of law. They are expected to act with honesty in all
their dealings, especially with the court. Verily, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins
lawyers from committing or consenting to any falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to
be misled by any artifice. Moreover, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not
to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but merely
a privilege bestowed upon by the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of those
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requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all their dealings is the very
essence of a practitioner’s honorable membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required
to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation
and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts.
They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to the best
of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients. Sonic Steel
Industries, Inc. v. Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua, A.C. No. 6942, July 17, 2013.
Court personnel; Gross dishonesty; Misrepresentation of eligibility; Penalty. Respondent, a court

stenographer III, was charged with gross dishonesty in connection with her Civil Service
eligibility where she was accused of causing another person to take the Civil Service Eligibility
Examination in her stead. Before the Decision was imposed, however, respondent already
resigned. The Supreme Court held that the respondent’s resignation from the service did not
cause the Court to lose its jurisdiction to proceed against her in this administrative case. Her
cessation from office by virtue of her intervening resignation did not warrant the dismissal of the
administrative complaint against her, for the act complained of had been committed when she
was still in the service. Nor did such cessation from office render the administrative case moot
and academic. Otherwise, exacting responsibility for administrative liabilities incurred would be
easily avoided or evaded.
Respondent’s dismissal from the service is the appropriate penalty, with her eligibility to be
cancelled, her retirement benefits to be forfeited, and her disqualification from re-employment
in the government service to be perpetual. Her intervening resignation necessarily means that
the penalty of dismissal could no longer be implemented against her. Instead, fine is imposed,
the determination of the amount of which is subject to the sound discretion of the
Court. Concerned Citizen V. Nonita v. Catena, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Br. 50, Puerto
Princesa, Palawan, A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1321-P, July 16, 2013.
Court personnel; Misconduct; Penalty under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service; Effect of death in an administrative case. Misconduct is “a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful
behavior, wilful in character, improper or wrong behavior.” A misconduct is “grave” or gross” if
it is “out of all measure; beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful” or “such conduct as is not to be
excused.” Respondent Ong’s and Buencamino’s acts of using the levied car for personal errands
and losing it while under their safekeeping constitute grave misconduct and gross neglect of
duty. These are flagrant and shameful acts and should not be countenanced. Respondents’ acts
warrant the penalty of dismissal as provided in Rule 10, Section 46 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As for respondent Buencamino, his death is not a
ground for the dismissal of the Complaint against him. Respondent Buencamino’s acts take
away the public’s faith in the judiciary, and these acts should be sanctioned despite his death.
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Sheriffs are reminded that they are “repositories of public trust and are under obligation to
perform the duties of their office honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their abilities.” Being
“frontline officials of the justice system,” sheriffs and deputy sheriffs “must always strive to
maintain public trust in the performance of their duties.” Office of the Court Administrator v.
Noel R. Ong, Deputy Sheriff, Br. 49, et al., A.M. No. P-09-2690, July 9, 2013.
Court personnel; Simple neglect of duty; Penalty under the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases; Mitigating circumstances. The Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) charged
respondent Sheriff lV Famero with Gross Neglect of Duty amounting to Gross Misconduct for
refusing to implement the Writ of Execution issued in a civil case involving DBP. The Supreme
Court held that the respondent cannot fully be excused for his failure to make periodic reports in
the proceedings taken on the writ, as mandated by Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
For the respondent’s lapses in the procedures in the implementation of the writ of execution, he
was found guilty of simple neglect of duty, defined as the failure of an employee to give
attention to the task expected of him. Under Section 52(B)(1) of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave
offense punishable by suspension from office for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. In the imposition of the
appropriate penalty, Section 53 of the same Rules allows the disciplining authority to consider
mitigating circumstances in favor of the respondent. The court considered his length of service
in the Judiciary, acknowledgment of infractions, remorse and other family circumstances,
among others, in determining the proper penalty. He was also found to be entitled to the
following mitigating circumstances: (1) his more than 24 years of service in the Judiciary; (2) a
clear record other than for the present infraction which is his first offense, (3) the resistance of
the informal settlers to leave the property; (4) fear for his life; and (5) his well-grounded
recognition that he could not undertake any demolition without the appropriate court order.
After considering the attendant facts and the mitigating circumstances, the court also considered
that the efficiency of court operations may ensue if the respondent’s work were to be left
unattended by reason of his suspension. Thus, he was imposed the penalty of fine instead of
suspension from service. Development Bank of the Philippines, etc. Vs. Damvin V. Famero,
Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 43, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, A.M. No. P-0-2789, July 31, 2013.
Judge; Gross Inefficiency; Duties include prompt disposition or resolution of cases. As a frontline
official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should always act with efficiency and probity. He is duty-
bound not only to be faithful to the law, but also to maintain professional competence. The
pursuit of excellence ought always to be his guiding principle. Such dedication is the least that
he can do to sustain the trust and confidence that the public have reposed in him and the
institution he represents.
The Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases. Nonetheless,
the Court has been mindful of the plight of our judges and understanding of circumstances that
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may hinder them from promptly disposing of their businesses. Hence, the Court has allowed
extensions of time to decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge needs to do is to
request and justify an extension of time to decide the cases, and the Court has almost invariably
granted such request. Judge Carbonell’s failure to decide several cases within the reglementary
period, without justifiable and credible reasons, constituted gross inefficiency. Considering that
Judge Carbonell has retired due to disability, his poor health condition may have greatly
contributed to his inability to efficiently perform his duties as a trial judge. That mitigated his
administrative liability, for which reason the Court reduced the recommended penalty of fine
from P50,000 to P20,000. Re: Failure of Former Judge Antonio A. Carbonell to Decide Cases
Submitted for Decision and Resolve Pending Motions in the RTC, Branch 27, San Fernando, La
Union, A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC, July 9, 2013.
Attorney; Attorney’s Fees. The case initially concerned the execution of a final decision with the
Court of Appeals in a labor litigation. Petitioner Malvar, however, entered into a compromise
agreement with the respondents pending appeal without informing her counsel. Malvar’s
counsel filed a Motion to Intervene to Protect Attorney’s Rights.
The Supreme Court, on considerations of equity and fairness, disapproved of the tendencies of
clients compromising their cases behind the backs of their attorneys for the purpose of
unreasonably reducing or completely setting to naught the stipulated contingent fees. Thus, the
Court granted the Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights as a measure of protecting
the Intervenor’s right to his stipulated professional fees. The Court did so in the interest of
protecting the rights of the practicing Bar rendering professional services on contingent fee basis.
Although the compromise agreement was still approved by the Court, the payment of the
counsel’s adequate and reasonable compensation could not be annulled by the settlement of the
litigation without the counsel’s participation and conformity. He remains entitled to the
compensation, and his rights are safeguarded by the Court because its members are officers of
the Court who are as entitled to judicial protection against injustice or imposition of fraud
committed by the client as much as the client is against their abuses as her counsel. In other
words, the duty of the Court is not only to ensure that the attorney acts in a proper and lawful
manner, but also to see to it that the attorney is paid his just fees. Even if the compensation of
the attorney is dependent only on winning the litigation, the subsequent withdrawal of the case
upon the client’s initiative would not deprive the attorney of the legitimate compensation for
professional services rendered. Czarina T. Malvar v. Kraft Foods Phils., Inc., et al., G.R. No.
183952, September 9, 2013.
Attorney; Attorney-Client Relationship. A disbarment complaint was filed against respondent

Atty. Ramos for representing conflicting interests in the same case. The Supreme Court held that
Atty. Ramos violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Under
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the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose
interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the
same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public
policy and good taste. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but
also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount interest in the
administration of justice. Atty. Ramos’ justification that no confidential information was relayed
to him is not an excuse since the rule on conflict of interests provides an absolute prohibition
from representation with respect to opposing parties in the same case. Thus, a lawyer cannot
change his representation from one party to the latter’s opponent in the same case. Joseph L.
Orola, et al. v. Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos, A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Misconduct. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated Canon 18 and
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated his
oath under Canon 18 to “serve his client with competence and diligence” when he filed a
criminal case for estafa when the facts of the case would have warranted the filing of a civil case
for breach of contract. To be sure, after the complaint for estafa was dismissed, Atty. Alcid, Jr.
committed another similar blunder by filing a civil case for specific performance and damages
before the RTC, when he should have filed it with the MTC due to the amount involved. Atty.
Alcid, Jr. did not also apprise complainant of the status of the cases. Atty. Alcid, Jr. is not only
guilty of incompetence in handling the cases. His lack of professionalism in dealing with
complainant is gross and inexcusable. The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but
an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the
protection of the client’s interest. The most thorough groundwork and study must be undertaken
in order to safeguard the interest of the client. Atty. Alcid, Jr. has defied and failed to perform
such duty and his omission is tantamount to a desecration of the Lawyer’s Oath. Julian Penilla v.
Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr., A.C. No. 9149, September 4, 2013.
Attorney; Practice of Law. Petitioner Medado passed the bar examinations in 1979. He took the
Attorney’s Oath thereafter, and was scheduled to sign the Roll of Attorneys, but failed to do so
because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, he found
such Notice and realized he never signed the Roll of Attorneys. Medado filed this Petition to
allow him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. The Supreme Court held that while an honest mistake
of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts as it negates
malice or evil motive, a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because
everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences. Knowingly engaging in
unauthorized practice of law transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Such Canon also applies to law students and Bar candidates. Medado was imposed a penalty
akin to suspension by allowing him to sign one (1) year after receipt of the Court’s Resolution. In
Re: Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys, B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013.
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Court Personnel; Gross Dishonesty; Gross Misconduct. The audit team discovered cash
shortages in the books of accounts of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Lipa City. As clerk of
court, Atty. Apusen is primarily accountable for all funds collected for the court, whether
personally received by him or by a duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision and
control. As custodian of court funds, revenues, records, properties and premises, he is liable for
any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of said funds and properties. Being a cash clerk,
Savadera is an accountable officer entrusted with the great responsibility of collecting money
belonging to the funds of the court. Clearly, she miserably failed in such responsibility upon the
occurrence of the shortages. The Supreme Court held that no position demands greater moral
righteousness and uprightness from its holder than a judicial office. Those connected with the
dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowliest clerk, carry a heavy burden of
responsibility. As frontliners in the administration of justice, they should live up to the strictest
standards of honesty and integrity. They must bear in mind that the image of a court of justice is
necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work
there. Office of the Court Administrator v. Donabel M. Savadera, et al., A.M. No. P-04-1903,
September 10, 2013.
Judge; Delay in deciding cases. Judge Lazaro was accused of undue delay in the resolution of
the Motion to Dismiss a civil case considering that she had resolved the Motion to Dismiss
beyond the 90-day period prescribed for the purpose without filing any request for the extension
of the period. The Supreme Court held that the 90-day period within which a sitting trial Judge
should decide a case or resolve a pending matter is mandatory. If the Judge cannot decide or
resolve within the period, she can be allowed additional time to do so, provided she files a
written request for the extension of her time to decide the case or resolve the pending matter.
The rule, albeit mandatory, is to be implemented with an awareness of the limitations that may
prevent a Judge from being efficient. Under the circumstances specific to this case, it would be
unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the Court to disregard Judge Lazaro’s limitations and
exact a rigid and literal compliance with the rule. With her undeniably heavy inherited docket
and the large volume of her official workload, she most probably failed to note the need for her
to apply for the extension of the 90-day period to resolve the Motion to Dismiss. Danilo E.
Lubaton v. Judge Mary Josephine P. Lazaro, Regional Trial Court, Br. 74, Antipolo, Rizal,A.M.
RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013.
Judge; Delay in deciding cases. Judge Baluma was asked to explain his failure to act on the
twenty-three (23) cases submitted for decision/resolution. The Supreme Court held that it has
consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under
the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases
with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his
functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in
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the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the
reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the
imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge. Judge Baluma’s gross inefficiency,
evident in his undue delay in deciding 23 cases within the reglementary period, merits the
imposition of administrative sanctions. Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Hon. Teofilo D.
Baluma, Former Judge, Branch 1, Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, A.M. No. RTJ-13-
2355, September 2, 2013.
Judge; Gross Inefficiency. Judge Soriano failed to decide thirty-six (36) cases submitted for
decision in MTC and MTCC, which were all due for decision at the time he compulsorily retired.
The Supreme Court held that Judge Soriano has been remiss in the performance of his judicial
duties. Judge Soriano’s unreasonable delay in deciding cases and resolving incidents and
motions, and his failure to decide the remaining cases before his compulsory retirement
constitutes gross inefficiency which cannot be tolerated. Inexcusable failure to decide cases
within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of an
administrative sanction on the defaulting judge. Judge Soriano’s inefficiency in managing his
caseload was compounded by gross negligence as evinced by the loss of the records of at least
four (4) cases which could no longer be located or reconstituted despite diligent efforts by his
successor. Judge Soriano was responsible for managing his court efficiently to ensure the prompt
delivery of court services, especially the speedy disposition of cases. Thus, Judge Soriano was
found guilty of gross inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law, and fined P40,000 to be taken
from the amount withheld from his retirement benefits. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon.
Santiago E. Soriano, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1683, September 11, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Immoral Conduct. Respondent Pedreña, a Public Attorney, was charged for
sexual harassment. The Supreme Court held that the records show that the respondent rubbed
the complainant’s right leg with his hand; tried to insert his finger into her firmly closed hand;
grabbed her hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed his finger against her
private part. Given the circumstances in which he committed them, his acts were not merely
offensive and undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral. They constituted
misconduct on the part of any lawyer. In this regard, immoral conduct is gross when it is so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree,
or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community’s sense of decency. Atty. Pedreña’s misconduct was aggravated by the fact that he
was then a Public Attorney mandated to provide free legal service to indigent litigants, and by
the fact that complainant was then such a client. He also disregarded his oath as a public officer
to serve others and to be accountable at all times, because he thereby took advantage of her
vulnerability as a client then in desperate need of his legal assistance. Thus, respondent was
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meted out the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years. Jocelyn De Leon
v. Atty. Tyrone Pedrena, A.C. No. 9401, October 22, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Misconduct. A complaint for disbarment was filed against Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr. for falsifying an inexistent decision of the RTC. The Supreme
Court held that the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for having authored the
falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and
integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that
“a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.” Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Gross
immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can
justify a lawyer’s disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate
falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of
moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in
this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on
the personal status of a person. Thus, the Court disbarred the respondent. Atty. Oscar L. Embido,
etc. v. Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr., etc., A.M. No. 6732, October 22, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Negligence. Respondent Villaseca was charged for gross and inexcusable
negligence in handling a criminal case, as a consequence of which the complainants were
convicted. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Villaseca’s failure to submit a demurrer to
evidence constitutes inexcusable negligence; it showed his lack of devotion and zeal in
preserving his clients’ cause. Furthermore, Atty. Villaseca’s failure to present any testimonial,
object or documentary evidence for the defense reveals his lack of diligence in performing his
duties as an officer of the Court; it showed his indifference towards the cause of his clients.
Considering that the liberty and livelihood of his clients were at stake, Atty. Villaseca should
have exerted efforts to rebut the presented prosecution evidence. The Court emphasized that
while a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to
him, he must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law to support his
client’s cause. Mary Ann T. Mattus v. Albert T. Villaseca, A.C. No. 7922, October 1, 2013.
Attorney; Lawyer-Client Relationship. Respondent Gagate was accused of gross ignorance of the
law and unethical practice of law. The Supreme Court emphasized that the relationship between
a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients
are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the
required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill,
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and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or
for free. To this end, he is enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful
objectives. These principles are embodied in Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule
19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code. Thus, the Court found that the respondent failed to exercise the
required diligence in handling complainant’s cause since he: (1) failed to represent her
competently and diligently by acting and proffering professional advice beyond the proper
bounds of law; and, (2) abandoned his client’s cause while the grave coercion case against them
was pending. Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher v. Atty. Rustico B. Gagate, A.C. No. 9532,
October 8, 2013.
Attorney; Lawyer-Client Relationship. Respondent Obias was charged for grave misconduct
and/or gross malpractice. The Supreme Court held that since respondent publicly held herself
out as lawyer, the mere fact that she also acted as a real estate broker did not divest her of the
responsibilities attendant to the legal profession. In this regard, the legal advice and/or legal
documentation that she offered and/or rendered regarding the real estate transaction subject of
this case should not be deemed removed from the category of legal services. Case law instructs
that if a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a
view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or
acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is established.
Moreover, according to the Court, respondent grossly violated the trust and confidence reposed
in her by her clients, in contravention of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code. Records disclose that
instead of delivering the deed of sale covering the subject property to her clients, she wilfully
notarized a deed of sale over the same property in favor of another person. It is a core ethical
principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their clients’ cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in them. Thus, respondent was disbarred by the Court. Ma. Jennifer
Tria-Samonte v. Epifania “Fanny” Obias, A.C. No. 4945, October 8, 2013.
Judiciary; Accountability. Respondent Arnejo, a stenographer of the RTC, was accused of

receiving payment for the TSN on 22 July 2010 and remitting the money to the cashier of the
Clerk of Court only on 19 and 23 December 2010. The Supreme Court held that the respondent
violated the Code of Conduct of Court Personnel and Code of Ethics for Government Officials
and Employees. The Court will not tolerate the practice of asking for advance payment from
litigants, much less the unauthorized acceptance of judicial fees. Section 11, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, specifically provides that payment for requests of copies of the TSN shall be
made to the Clerk of Court. Clearly, therefore, payment cannot be made to respondent, as it is
an official transaction, and, as such, must be made to the Clerk of Court. Respondent, being a
stenographer, is not authorized to accept payment for judicial fees, even if two-thirds of those
fees would be paid to her. Moreover, the issuance of an acknowledgment receipt cannot be
construed as having been done in good faith, considering the fact that respondent only remitted
the payment for the TSN five (5) months after her receipt of the supposed judicial fee, or only
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after the instant Complaint had been filed against her. Her belated remittance was tainted with
bad faith. Joefil Baguio v. Maria Fe Arnejo, Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24,
Cebu City, A.M. No. P-13-3155, October 21, 2013.
Judiciary; Applicability of Sec. 7, Rule III, IRR of R.A. No. 10154. The issue presented in this
case is whether or not Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic
Act No. (RA) 10154 applies to the employees of the Judiciary. The Supreme Court ruled that the
subject provision which requires retiring government employees to secure a prior clearance of
pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from, among others, the CSC – should not be
made to apply to employees of the Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would disregard the Court’s
constitutionally-enshrined power of administrative supervision over its personnel. Besides,
retiring court personnel are already required to secure a prior clearance of the pendency/non-
pendency of administrative case/s from the Court which makes the CSC clearance a superfluous
and non-expeditious requirement contrary to the declared state policy of RA 10154. The Court,
however, noted that since the Constitution only accords the Judiciary administrative supervision
over its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance requirement obtains with respect to
criminal cases. As such, a clearance requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be
imposed by the appropriate government agency, i.e., the Office of the Ombudsman, on retiring
court personnel as it is a matter beyond the ambit of the Judiciary’s power of administrative
supervision. Re: Request for guidance/clarification on Section 7, Rule III of Republic Act No.
10154 Requiring Retiring Government Employees to Secure a Clearance of Pendency/Non-
Pendency of Case/s from the Civil Service Commission, A.M. No. 13-09-08-SC, October 1, 2013.
Judiciary; Duty of Sheriff to Promptly Serve Summons. Sherriff Nery was accused of failing to
serve summons to the defendant in a case where he asked for transportation expense, and
despite being given an amount. The Supreme Court found the respondent guilty. Summons to
the defendant in a case shall forthwith be issued by the clerk of court upon the filing of the
complaint and the payment of the requisite legal fees. Once issued by the clerk of court, it is the
duty of the sheriff, process server or any other person serving court processes to serve the
summons to the defendant efficiently and expeditiously. Failure to do so constitutes simple
neglect of duty, which is the failure of an employee to give one’s attention to a task expected of
him, and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. Moreover,
sheriffs are not allowed to receive any payments from the parties in the course of the
performance of their duties. They cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from the
parties without observing the proper procedural steps under Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, as amended. Atty. Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao v. Naeptali Angelo V. Nery, Sheriff III,
Branch 30, Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, A.M. No. P13-3153, October 14, 2013.
Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. Judge Clemens was charged for gross ignorance of the law
and violation of the Child Witness Examination Rule. The Supreme Court dismissed the
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complaint for lack of merit since the acts of Judge Clemens were far from being ill-motivated
and in bad faith as to justify any administrative liability on his part. A complete reading of the
TSN reveals that he was vigilant in his conduct of the proceedings. In the instances mentioned
in the Complaint-Affidavit, he had been attentive to the manifestations made by Atty. Tacorda
and had acted accordingly and with dispatch. Further, contrary to the allegations of Atty.
Tacorda, the TSN showed that the respondent Judge was very much concerned with following
the proper conduct of trial and ensuring that the One-Day Examination of Witness Rule was
followed; but at the same time, he was sensitive to the fact that the witness was already
exhausted, having testified for almost three (3) hours. Atty. Jerome Norman L. Tacorda for: Odel
L. Gedraga v. Judge Reynaldo B. Clemens, presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. 31,
Calbayog City, Western Samar, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2359, October 23, 2013.
Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. Complainant filed a case against Judge Patricio accusing him
of gross ignorance of the law, manifest bias and partiality for refusing to execute a judgment
which was already final and executory. The rule is that once a judgment attains finality, it
thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. Thus, the Supreme Court held that Judge Patricio
demonstrated ignorance of such rule by repeatedly refusing to execute the final and executory
judgment of conviction against the accused. The rules on execution are comprehensive enough
for a judge not to know how to apply them or to be confused by any auxiliary incidents. The
issuance of a writ of execution for a final and executory judgment is ministerial. In other words,
a judge is not given the discretion whether or not to implement the judgment. He is to effect
execution without delay and supervise implementation strictly in accordance with the judgment.
Judge Patricio’s acts unmistakably exhibit gross ignorance of the law.Jesus D. Carbajosa v. Judge
Hannibal R. Patricio, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, President Roxas, Capiz, A.M.
No. MTJ-13-1834, October 2, 2013.
Judge; Gross Misconduct. Judge Pardo was accused of corruption. Judge Pardo did not deny that
Rosendo, a litigant who had a pending application for probation in his sala, went to his house,
had a “drinking spree” with him and stayed there for more than two hours. The Supreme Court
held Judge Pardo liable for gross misconduct. Citing jurisprudence, the Court held that a judge’s
acts of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours and sending a
member of his staff to talk with complainant constitute gross misconduct. Moreover, a judge was
held liable for misconduct when he entertained a litigant in his home and received benefits
given by the litigant. Atty. Jessie Tuldague and Atty. Alfredo Baldajo, Jr. v. Judge Moises Pardo
and Jaime Calpatura, etc. / Atty. Jessie Tuldague and Atty. Alfredo Baldajo, Jr. v. Jaime Calpatura,
etc. / Re: Report on the Judicial Audit and Investigation Conducted in the RTC, Cabarroguis,
Quirino, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1962/ A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2243-P/ A.M. No. 05-10-661-RTC,
October 25, 2013.
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Judge; Grave Misconduct; Gross Neglect of Duty; Gross Dishonesty; Penalty. Grave misconduct,
gross neglect of duty and gross dishonesty of which Judge Salubre, Edig, Palero and Aventurado
are found guilty, even if committed for the first time, are punishable by dismissal and carries
with it the forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and the perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in the government service. As to Judge Salubre and Edig,
however, in view of their deaths, the supreme penalty of dismissal cannot be imposed on them
anymore. It is only the penalty of dismissal that is rendered futile by their passing since they are
not in the service anymore, but it is still within the Court’s power to forfeit their retirement
benefits. Report on the financial audit conducted in the MTCC, Tagum City, Davao del Norte /
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Ismael L. Salubre, et al.,A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3138-
P/A.M. No. MTJ-05-1618, October 22, 2013.
Judge; Remedy for Correcting Actions of Judge. A complaint for gross ignorance of the law,
grave misconduct, oppression, bias and partiality was filed against Judge Omelio. The Supreme
Court reiterated the rule that the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy
for correcting the actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety,
where a sufficient remedy exists. The actions against judges should not be considered as
complementary or suppletory to, or substitute for, the judicial remedies which can be availed of
by a party in a case. Moreover, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a
pending case rests on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the
assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involves findings of fact left to the said
court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in
injunctive matters must not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of
discretion. Ma. Regina S. Peralta v. Judge George E. Omelio / Romualdo G. Mendoza v. Judge
George E. Omelio / Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra v. Judge George E. Omelio, A.M. No. RTJ-11-
2259/A.M. No. RTJ-11-2264/A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273, October 22, 2013.
Attorney; Accountability for Money Received from Client. Atty. Lawsin undertook to process the
registration and eventually deliver, within a period of 6 months, the certificate of title over a
certain parcel of land (subject land) in favor of complainant acting as the representative of the
Heirs of the late Isabel Segovia. Atty. Lawsin received from complainant the amounts of P15,000
and P39,000 to cover for the litigation and land registration expenses, respectively. Atty. Lawsin,
however, failed to fulfil his undertaking and failed to return the money to complainant. The
Supreme Court held that Atty. Lawsin’s failure to properly account for and duly return his
client’s money despite due demand is tantamount to a violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.03,
Canon 16 of the Code. Complainant’s purported act of “maligning” him does not justify the
latter’s failure to properly account for and return his client’s money upon due demand. Verily, a
lawyer’s duty to his client is one essentially imbued with trust so much so that it is incumbent
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upon the former to exhaust all reasonable efforts towards its faithful compliance. Azucena
Segovia-Ribaya v. Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin, A.C. No. 7965, November 13, 2013.
Attorney; Administrative Proceedings; Sole Issue. Complainants filed a complaint for dishonesty
against respondent, a retired judge, for knowingly making untruthful statements in the complaint
he filed against them. The Supreme Court held that in administrative cases, the only issue within
the ambit of the Court’s disciplinary authority is whether a lawyer is fit to remain a member of
the Bar. Other issues are proper subjects of judicial action. On its face, the 12 September 2006
complaint filed by the Spouses Williams against Atty. Enriquez does not merit an administrative
case. In order for the Court to determine whether Atty. Enriquez is guilty of dishonesty, the issue
of ownership must first be settled. The issue of ownership of real property must be settled in a
judicial, not administrative, case.Sps. David Williams and Marissa Williams v. Atty. Rudy T.
Enriquez, A.C. No. 7329, November 27, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Neglect of Duty. A complaint was filed against Atty. Venida for serious
misconduct and gross neglect of duty. Complainant alleged that she engaged the services of
respondent to handle her case before the CA but the respondent had been remiss. Thus, her case
was dismissed. The Supreme Court held that this is a clear violation of Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to keep their clients informed of
the status of their case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients’ request for
information. Respondent’s refusal to obey the orders of the IBP is not only irresponsible, but also
constitutes utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. His conduct is unbecoming
of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes and are
expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being themselves officers of the
court. Aurora H. Cabauatan v. Atty. Freddie A. Venida, A.C. No. 10043, November 20, 2013.
Attorney; Mishandling of Client’s Case. Complainant-Spouses filed an administrative case

against Atty. Dublin for gross negligence and dereliction of duty for mishandling their case. The
Supreme Court held Atty. Dublin guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95. Records show
that the 10-day period given to him to submit his formal offer of documentary evidence pursuant
to the RTC Order lapsed without any compliance from him. Atty. Dublin violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility particularly Canon 18 and Rule 18.03. Respondent admitted that he
deliberately failed to timely file the formal offer of exhibits because he believed that the exhibits
were fabricated and the same would be refused admission by the RTC. However, if respondent
truly believed that the exhibits to be presented in evidence by his clients were fabricated, then
he had the option to withdraw from the case. Canon 22 allows a lawyer to withdraw his services
for good cause such as “[w]hen the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct with
the matter he is handling” or “[w]hen the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative
of these canons and rules.” Thus, Atty. Dublin was imposed the penalty of suspension from the
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practice of law for 6 months. Sps. George A. Warriner and Aurora R. Warriner v. Atty. Reni M.
Dublin, A.C. No. 5239, November 18, 2013.
Attorney; Notary Public; Notarial Register. Complainants filed a complaint against Atty. Kilaan
for falsification of documents, dishonesty and deceit. Complainants alleged that Atty. Kilaan
intercalated certain entries in the application for issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience
(CPC) to operate a public utility jeepney filed before the LTFRB. Complainants also alleged that
the Verification in Batingwed’s application for CPC was notarized by Atty. Kilaan as Doc. No:
253, Page No. 51, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003. However, upon verification of Atty. Kilaan’s
Notarial Registry submitted to the RTC, the said notarial entry actually refers to a Deed of Sale
and not the Verification of Batingwed’s application. It is settled that it is the notary public who is
personally accountable for the accuracy of the entries in his Notarial Register. The Court is not
persuaded by respondent’s explanation that he is burdened with cases thus he was constrained
to delegate the recording of his notarial acts in his Notarial Register to his secretary. Rule VI,
Sections I and 2 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice require a notary public to keep and
maintain a Notarial Register wherein he will record his every notarial act. His failure to make
the proper entry or entries in his notarial register concerning his notarial acts is a ground for
revocation of his notarial commission. Since Atty. Kilaan failed to make the proper entries in his
Notarial Register, his notarial commission may be properly revoked. Mariano Agadan, et al. v.
Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan, A.C. No. 9385, November 11, 2013.
Attorney; Respect to Courts. Complainant alleged that Atty. Flores failed to give due respect to
the court by failing to obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with the
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language
in his pleadings. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Flores failed to obey the court’s order to
submit proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him.
Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them should be respected,
but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of
the Government. This is absolutely essential if our Government is to be a government of laws
and not of men. Respect must be had not because of the incumbents to the positions, but
because of the authority that vests in them. Moreover, Atty. Flores employed intemperate
language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect
in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins all
attorneys to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behaviour before the
Courts. Hon. Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo,
Rizal v. Atty. Rodolfo Flores, A.C. No. 8954, November 13, 2013.
Court Personnel; Dishonesty. Complainants accused respondent sheriff of grave misconduct,

dishonesty and conduct unbecoming an officer of the court for unlawfully and forcibly acquiring
part of their lot. The Supreme Court held that respondent is guilty of simple dishonesty and
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conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but not of grave misconduct. Dishonesty is
“intentionally making a false statement on any material fact” and “a disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.”
Respondent did not have a hand in the re-survey conducted by the DAR in 2003 which resulted
in the increased land area of his lot. Nonetheless, respondent’s acts thereafter displayed his lack
of honesty, fairness, and straightforwardness, not only with his neighbors, but also with the
concerned government agencies/officials. Respondent’s deportment under the circumstances
likewise constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Respondent appears to
have illegally forced his way into the disputed area. As a Sheriff, he is expected to be familiar
with court procedure and processes, especially those concerning the execution of orders and
decisions of the courts. Heirs of Celestino Teves, represented by Paul John Teves Abad, Elsa C.
Aquino and Filimon E. Fernan v. Augusto Felicidario, A.M. No. P-12-3089, November 13, 2013.
Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty. Complainant alleged that the respondent
failed to execute the decision in a land registration case despite receiving an amount for the
implementation of the Alias Writ. The Supreme Court held that the deposit and payment of
expenses incurred in enforcing writs are governed by Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
as revised by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC. The rule clearly requires that the sheriff executing a writ
shall provide an estimate of the expenses to be incurred, and such estimated amount must be
approved by the court. Upon approval, the interested party shall then deposit the amount with
the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff. The expenses shall be disbursed to the assigned deputy
sheriff to execute the writ, subject to liquidation upon the return of the writ. In this case, the
money which respondent had demanded and received from complainant was not among those
prescribed and authorized by the Rules of Court as it was not even accounted for earlier in his
Manifestation. He merely reported his receipt of the P20,000 in his liquidation of expenses only
after complainant demanded an accounting and in compliance to Judge’s directive. The Court
has ruled that any amount received by the sheriff in excess of the lawful fees allowed by the
Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction and renders him liable for grave misconduct and gross
dishonesty. Eleanor P. Olivan v. Arnel A. Rubio, etc., A.M. No. P-13-3063, November 26, 2013.
Court Personnel; Gross Dishonesty. An administrative complaint was filed against Ibay, Clerk II
of MTCC, for stealing a check. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of substantial
defense to refute the charges against her, Ibay is liable for the loss of the check and the forgery
of De Ocampo’s signature, leading to the check’s encashment. The case against Ibay is
bolstered by the fact that Judge Eduarte found striking similarities between her handwriting in
the inventory of cases and the forged endorsement in the check. Thus, there is substantial
evidence to dismiss Ibay on the ground of dishonesty. Section 52(A) (1) of the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that dishonesty is a grave offense
punishable by dismissal from the service even when committed for the first time. Persons
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involved in the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowest clerk, must live up
to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness, honesty and diligence in the public
service. The Supreme Court will not tolerate dishonesty, for the judiciary deserves the best from
all its employees. Executive Judge Henedino P. Eduarte, RTC, Br. 20, Cauayan, Isabela v.
Elizabeth T. Ibay, Clerk II, MTCC, Cauayan, Isabela, A.C. No. P-12-3100, November 12, 2013.
Judges; Absence Without Approved Leave. Judge Villacorta III was granted authority to travel
until February 3, 2011. However, he only returned to work on February 16, without securing an
extension of his authority to travel abroad. This happened again for a second time. The Supreme
Court held that OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (Guidelines on Requests for Travel Abroad and
Extensions for Travel/Stay Abroad) requires that a request must be made for an extension of the
period to travel/stay abroad, and that the request be received by the OCA ten (10) working days
before the expiration of the original travel authority. Failure to do so would make the absences
beyond the original period unauthorized. In this case, Judge Villacorta was in a position to file
an application for leave to cover his extended stay abroad. Section 50 of Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 41, series of 1998, states that an official or an
employee who is absent without approved leave shall not be entitled to receive the salary
corresponding to the period of the unauthorized leave of absence. Re: Unauthorized Travel
Abroad of Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, A.M. No. 11-
9-167-RTC, November 11, 2013.
Judges; Judicial Clemency in Administrative Cases. Judge Pacalna was held administratively
liable for dishonesty, serious misconduct and gross ignorance of the law or procedure, and for
violation the Code of Judicial Conduct. He then filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency. The
Supreme Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency:
(1) There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be
or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation; (2) Sufficient
time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation; (3)
The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of
him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself; (4) There must be a
showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to
legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant
skills), as well as potential for public service; (5) There must be other relevant factors and
circumstances that may justify clemency. In this case, Judge Pacalna’s petition is not supported
by any single proof of his professed repentance and therefore, must be denied. Mamasaw Sultan
Ali v. Judge Baguinda-Ali Pacalna, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-03-1505, November 27, 2013.
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Judges; Retirement Benefits. The surviving spouse of Judge Gruba applied for retirement/gratuity
benefits under Republic Act No. 910. The 5-year lump sum gratuity due to Judge Gruba was
paid to his heirs. On January 13, 2010, Congress amended Republic Act No. 910 and passed
Republic Act No. 9946 which provided for more benefits, including survivorship pension
benefits, among others. On January 11, 2012, Mrs. Gruba applied for survivorship pension
benefits under Republic Act No. 9946. In a Resolution dated January 17, 2012, this Court
approved the application of Mrs. Gruba. She received ₱1,026,748.00 for survivorship pension
benefits from January 1, 2011 to April 2012. Later, however, the Supreme Court revoked the
resolution dated January 17, 2012. The Supreme Court held that the law accommodates the
heirs of Judge Gruba by entitling them to receive the improved gratuity benefits under Republic
Act No. 9946, but it is clear that Mrs. Gruba is not entitled to the survivorship pension benefits.
However, despite the fact that Mrs. Gruba is not entitled to receive survivorship pension, she no
longer needs to return the survivorship pension benefits she received from January 2011 to April
2012 amounting to ₱1,026,748.00. The Supreme Court, in the past, has decided pro hac
vice that a surviving spouse who received survivorship pension benefits in good faith no longer
needs to refund such pensions. Re: Application for Survivorship Pension Benefits Under
Republic Act 9946 of Mrs. Pacita A. Gruba, Surviving Spouse of the Late Manuel K. Gruba,
Former CTA Associate Judge, A.M. No. 14155-Ret. November 19, 2013.
Attorney; Applicability of the Code of Professional Responsibility to lawyers in government

service in the discharge of their official tasks. Private respondents were charged before the Court
of Tax Appeals for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended.
However, the CTA dismissed the case since the prosecution failed to present certified true
copies of the documentary evidence submitted contrary to Section 7, Rule 130 and Section 127,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue Collection
Monitoring Group (RCMG), as counsel for the BOC, filed a petition for certiorari but the petition
was filed beyond the reglementary period.
The Supreme Court held that the display of patent violations of even the elementary rules shows
that the case against respondents was doomed by design from the start. This stance taken by the
lawyers in government service rouses the Court’s vigilance against inefficiency in the
administration of justice. Verily, the lawyers representing the offices under the executive branch
should be reminded that they still remain as officers of the court from whom a high sense of
competence and fervor is expected. The Court will not close its eyes to this sense of apathy in
RATS lawyers, lest the government’s goal of revenue enhancement continues to suffer the blows
of smuggling and similar activities. The Court reminded the lawyers in the BOC that the canons
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility equally apply to lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, RATS lawyers should exert every effort and
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consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. People of the
Philippines v. The Hon. Juanito C. Castaneda, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 208290, December 11, 2013.
Attorney; Champertous contract. Complainants engaged the legal services of Atty. Bañez, Jr. in
connection with the recovery of their properties from Fevidal. Complainants signed a contract of
legal services, where they would not pay acceptance and appearance fees to Atty. Bañez Jr., but
that the docket fees would instead be shared by the parties. Under the contract, complainants
would pay him 50% of whatever would be recovered of the properties. Later, however,
complainants terminated his services and entered into an amicable settlement with Fevidal. Atty.
Bañez, Jr. opposed the withdrawal of their complaint in court. Thus, complainants filed a case
against him alleging that the motion of Atty. Baez, Jr. for the recording of his attorney’s charging
lien was the “legal problem” preventing them from enjoying the fruits of their property.
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in a case to protect
his rights concerning the payment of his compensation. According to the discretion of the court,
the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money rendered in a case
in which his services have been retained by the client. In this case, however, the contract for
legal services is in the nature of a champertous contract – an agreement whereby an attorney
undertakes to pay the expenses of the proceedings to enforce the client’s rights in exchange for
some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. Such contracts are contrary to public policy
and are thus void or inexistent. They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states that lawyers shall not lend money to a client, except
when in the interest of justice, they have to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter they
are handling for the client. Thus, the Court held that Atty. Bañez, Jr. violated Canon 16.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Conchita Baltazar,et al. v. Atty. Juan B. Bañez, Jr., A.C. No.
9091, December 11, 2013.
Attorney; Disbarment proceedings. A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Macapagal. He
was charged with dishonesty (1) when he stated in the defendants’ Answer in Civil Case No. A-
95-22906 that the parties therein are strangers to each other; (2) when he introduced a falsified
Certificate of Marriage as part of his evidence in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and (3) when he
knowingly filed a totally baseless pleading captioned as Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the same case. The Supreme Court held that
these issues are proper subjects of and must be threshed out in a judicial action. However, since
Atty. Macapagal failed to file a comment and his position paper despite his receipt of Notice, he
was reprimanded for failing to give due respect to the Court and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Nestor V. Felipe, et al. v. Atty. Ciriaco A. Macapagal, A.C. No. 4549, December 2,
2013.
Attorney; Disobedience to court directives. Complainant Sy charged Respondent Esponilla,

Legal Researcher and then Officer-In-Charge of Br. 54 of RTC Manila, and Atty. Buendia, clerk
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of court and ex-officio sheriff of RTC Manila with Gross Misconduct, Negligence and
Dishonesty. The complaint was in connection with the irregular withdrawal of deposits for
monthly rentals in a civil case based on a purported Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Rental
Deposits filed by Atty. Bayhon in the civil case. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Bayhon
violated the Lawyer’s Oath and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for failing to explain, in good faith the circumstances surrounding the filing of the Ex-Parte
Motion which he himself filed, for proffering misleading claims in the course of the subject
administrative investigation, and for not having shown and proved that he exerted his best
efforts to secure and submit a copy of the Ex-Parte Motion – all in violation of the resolutions
issued by the Court. Atty. Bayhon was suspended for six (6) months from the practice of
law. Elpidio Sy, President, Systems Realty Development Corporation v. Edgar Esponilla, Legal
Researcher and Officer-in-Charge, et al., A.M. No. P-06-2261, December 11, 2013.
Attorney; Due diligence in handling client’s case. Respondents were charged for gross
negligence in handling the labor complaints of complainant. The Supreme Court held that the
relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In
this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and
accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the
lawyer is required to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his
full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free. He is likewise expected to act with honesty in all his dealings,
especially with the courts. These principles are embodied in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01
of Canon 10, Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In this case, Atty. Quesada’s failure to attend the scheduled conference hearings, despite due
notice and without any proper justification, exhibits his inexcusable lack of care and diligence
in managing his client’s cause in violation of Canon 17 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
Code. Felipe C. Dagala v. Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. and Atty. Amado T. Adquilen, A.C. No.
5044, December 2, 2013.
Attorney; Duty to represent a client must be within the bounds of law. The Supreme Court
issued a Resolution dismissing the administrative complaint of Tomas Merdegia against Court of
Appeals Justice Veloso. The Resolution directed Atty. Adaza II, Merdegia’s counsel, to show
cause why he should not be cited for contempt. The Supreme Court held Atty. Adaza II guilty of
indirect contempt. Atty. Adaza prepared the administrative complaint after Justice Veloso
refused to inhibit himself from a case he was handling. The complaint and the motion for
inhibition were both based on the same main cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso
during the oral arguments of Merdegia’s case. The resolution dismissing the motion for
inhibition should have disposed of the issue of Justice Veloso’s bias. If they doubted the legality
of the Resolution, they could have filed a petition for certiorari.
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Administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other
judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling. While a lawyer has a duty to represent
his client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided by law. He is also duty-bound to
impress upon his client the propriety of the legal action the latter wants to undertake, and to
encourage compliance with the law and legal processes. Atty. Adaza failed to impress upon his
client the features of the Philippine adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and
respect for the judicial system, and his own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and
as an officer of the Court demand of him in acting for his client before the courts. Re: Verified
Complaint of Tomas S. Merdegia against Hon. Vicente S.E. Veloso, etc./Re: Resolution dated
October 8, 2013 in OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J against Atty. Homobono Adaza II, IPI No. 12-205-
CA-J/A.C. No. 10300, December 10, 2013.
Attorney; Gross misconduct. Heenan filed a complaint against Atty. Espejo for violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath due to the latter’s failure to pay a loan. The Supreme Court found Atty. Espejo
guilty of gross misconduct. The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless
checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned. Verily, lawyers must
at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients.
The prompt payment of financial obligations is one of the duties of a lawyer. The fact that Atty.
Espejo obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private capacity and not as an
attorney of Heenan is of no moment. A lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity.
While the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in his non-
professional or private capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or removing him as an
attorney where his misconduct outside of the lawyer’ professional dealings is so gross in
character as to show him morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the
law confer. Thus, Atty. Espejo was suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. Victoria
C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo, A.C. No. 10050, December 3, 2013.
Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. Complainant claimed that since Judge Cajigal’s appointment
as presiding judge of RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City, the latter has displayed gross inefficiency
by failing to resolve within the prescribed period a number of incidents. Moreover, complainant
questions the propriety of the Judge’s decision in a case he is involved in. The Supreme Court
held that the charges of ignorance of the law are bereft of merit. Judge Cajigal’s order was issued
in the proper exercise of his judicial functions, and as such, is not subject to administrative
disciplinary action; especially considering that the complainant failed to establish bad faith on
the part of the judge. Well entrenched is the rule that a judge may not be administratively
sanctioned for mere errors of judgment in the absence of showing of any bad faith, fraud,
malice, gross ignorance, corrupt purpose, or a deliberate intent to do an injustice on his or her
part. Moreover, as a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of
his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise
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would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret
the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.Narciso G.
Dulalia v. Judge Afable E. Cajigal, RTC, Br. 96, Quezon City, A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-3492-
RTJ, December 4, 2013.
Judge; Voluntary inhibition. Rallos charges Justice Hernando with bias because he voluntarily
inhibited himself in CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676 only after the promulgation of the March 28,
2012 and April 13, 2012 resolutions. The Supreme Court held that the fact that Justice
Hernando voluntarily inhibited himself after writing the assailed resolutions did not establish his
bias against Rallos and her co-heirs considering that the inhibition was for the precise objective
of eliminating suspicions of undue influence. The justification of Justice Hernando was
commendable, and should be viewed as a truly just and valid ground for his self-disqualification
as a judicial officer in a specific case. Further, Rallos insists that she was entitled to be informed
about the inhibitions of the Justices and about their reasons for the inhibitions. The Court held
that there is nothing in Rule V or in any other part of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
that specifically requires that the party-litigants be informed of the mandatory or voluntary
inhibition of a Justice. Nevertheless, a party-litigant who desires to be informed of the inhibition
of a Justice and of the reason for the inhibition must file a motion for inhibition in the manner
provided under Section 3, Rule V of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals.
However, the Court held that henceforth all the parties in any action or proceedings should be
immediately notified of any mandatory disqualification or voluntary inhibition of the Justice who
has participated in any action of the court, stating the reason for the mandatory disqualification
or voluntary inhibition. The requirement of notice is a measure to ensure that the
disqualification or inhibition has not been resorted to in order to cause injustice to or to
prejudice any party or cause. Re: Letters of Lucena B. Rallos, for alleged
acts/incidents/occurences relative to the resolutions(s) issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 06676 by
Court of Appeals Executive Justice Pampio Abarintos and Associate Justices Ramol Paul
Hernando and Victoria Isabel Paredes/Re: Complaint filed by Lucena B. Rallos against Justices
Gabriel T. Ingles, Pamela Ann Maxino, and Carmelita S. Manahan, IPI No. 12-203-CA-J/A.M. No.
12-9-08-CA, December 10, 2013.
Attorney; Contingent Fee. Spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency basis. The
Supreme Court held that spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of
₱2,000.00 and not, as asserted by the latter, one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation
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contained in the amended complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses
Cadavedo hired the former on a contingency basis; the Spouses Cadavedo undertook to pay
their lawyer ₱2,000.00 as attorney’s fees should the case be decided in their favor. Granting
arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an oral contingent
fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of the subject lot, the agreement is void. The
agreement is champertous and is contrary to public policy. Any agreement by a lawyer to
“conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client
therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the
law.” The rule of the profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of
the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting the case at the lawyer’s expense is designed to
prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and his client. The Conjugal
Partnership of the Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (both deceased),
substituted by their Heirs, namely: Herminia, Pastora, Heirs of Fructiosa, Heirs of Raquel,
Evangeline, Vicente, Jr., and Armand, all surnamed Cadavedo, G.R. No. 173188. January 15,
2014.
Attorney; Disbarment; Deceitful and Dishonest Conduct. A Complaint for Disbarment was filed
against Atty. Solidum, Jr. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Solidum, Jr. violated Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the
performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct
committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it
renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. The Supreme Court found Atty.
Solidum, Jr. guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional
capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to
complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed Atty. Solidum, Jr. to draft the terms
of the loan agreements. Atty. Solidum, Jr. drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were
exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same MOAs he
prepared. He issued checks that were drawn from his son’s account whose name was similar to
his without informing complainants. Further, there is nothing in the records that will show that
he paid or undertook to pay the loans he obtained from complainants. The fiduciary nature of
the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account
for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Atty. Solidum, Jr. failed to
fulfill this duty. Natividad P. Navarro and Hilda S. Presbitero v. Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr., A.C.
No. 9872, January 28, 2014.
Attorney; Disbarment; Gross Immoral Conduct. A Petition for Disbarment was filed against Atty.
Celera for contracting a second marriage when his first marriage with Complainant was still
subsisting. The Supreme Court held that for purposes of the disbarment proceeding, the
Marriage Certificates bearing the name of Atty. Celera are competent and convincing evidence
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to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.
Atty. Celera exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member
of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly
immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera,A.C. No. 5581, January 14,
2014.
Attorney; Disbarment; Willful Disobedience. A Petition for Disbarment was filed against Atty.
Celera for contracting a second marriage when his first marriage with Complainant was still
subsisting. Atty. Celara failed to file a Comment despite numerous Notices from the Court,
stating that he never received such Notices. When said excuse seemed no longer feasible, Atty.
Celera just disappeared. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Celera’s acts were deliberate,
maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition of the case and to evade
the consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondent’s deplorable
disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot countenance. Atty. Celera’s acts
constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment.
Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes
utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Atty. Celera’s conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is “not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be
complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively.” Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio
Juan A. Celera,A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014.
Attorney; Malpractice. A Complaint was filed against Atty. Mendoza of the Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO) for violation of the attorney’s oath, deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct
in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. One of the charges against Atty. Mendoza which she admitted is
telling her clients — “Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot
ang puso noon.” The Supreme Court held that Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her
clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is
the mandate of Rule 1.02 that “a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.” Rule 15.07 states that “a lawyer shall
impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.” However,
while her remark was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment was not disparaging and
reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary. Thus, she was only
reprimanded and sternly warned. Edgardo Areola v. Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza, A.C. No.
10135, January 15, 2014.
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Court Personnel; Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. A complaint for grave misconduct was
filed against Mylene H. Dela Cruz, Clerk III of the Regional Trial Court. The Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Republic Act 6713, enunciates the
State’s policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public
service. And no other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral
righteousness and uprightness from an employee than in the judiciary. The Supreme Court held
that in this case, Dela Cruz failed to live up to these exacting standards. The inculpatory acts
committed by Dela Cruz are so grave as to call for the most severe administrative penalty.
Dishonesty and grave misconduct, both being in the nature of a grave offense, carry the extreme
penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service. This
penalty is in accordance with Sections 52 and 58 of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Atty. Rhea R. Alcantara-Aquino v. Mylene H. Dela
Cruz, etc., A.M. No. P-13-3141. January 21, 2014.
Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct. A Complaint for Grave Misconduct and Making Untruthful
Statements was filed against Alfredo Pallanan, Sheriff IV, assigned at the Regional Trial Court.
Complainant alleged that Pallanan should not have implemented the writ of execution in the
unlawful detainer case since there was a pending motion for reconsideration with the court.
Misconduct has been defined as “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.” The misconduct is
grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law,
or to disregard established rules, all of which must be established by substantial evidence, and
must necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. The Supreme Court ruled that
Pallanan did not commit grave misconduct. In ejectment cases, the rulings of the courts are
immediately executory and can only be stayed via compliance with Section 19, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court. Such provision was not complied here.
The sheriff’s duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to execute the order of the
court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion whether to execute the judgment or not. When
the writ is placed in his hands, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to
proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to implement it in accordance with its
mandate. It is only by doing so could he ensure that the order is executed without undue delay.
This holds especially true herein where the nature of the case requires immediate execution.
Absent a TRO, an order of quashal, or compliance with Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
respondent sheriff has no alternative but to enforce the writ. Atty. Virgillo P. Alconera v. Alfredo
T. Pallanan, A.M. No. P-12-3069, January 20, 2014.
Court personnel; Simple neglect of duty. The audit of the financial transactions of Maniquis,
former Officer-in-Charge, Clerk of Court III, and that of his successor Atty. Buencamino (Atty.
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Buencamino), Clerk of Court IV uncovered shortages in the books of accounts of the
Metropolitan Trial Court. Mapue, Clerk III, admitted her fault.
The Supreme Court held that the admission of Mapue of her liability does not exculpate Atty.
Buencamino from her own negligence. A clerk of court has general administrative supervision
over all the personnel of the court. The administrative functions of a clerk of court are as vital to
the prompt and proper administration of justice as his judicial duties. As custodian of court
funds and revenues, the clerk of court is primarily accountable for all funds that are collected for
the court, whether personally received by him or by a duly appointed cashier who is under his
supervision and control. Atty. Buencamino was remiss in the performance of her duties as clerk
of court. Atty. Buencamino failed to supervise Mapue and to properly manage the court funds
entrusted to her, enabling Mapue to misappropriate part of the funds. Atty. Buencamino’s failure
to properly supervise and manage the financial transactions in her court constitutes simple
neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard
of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. It is a less grave offense punishable by suspension
for one month and one day to six months for the first offense. Office of the Court Administrator v.
Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino, etc., et al./Re: Report on the financial audit conducted in the
Metropolitan Trial Court etc., A.M. No. P-05-2051/A.M. No. 05-4-118-MeTC. January 21, 2014.
Attorney; Notarization; Importance. An administrative case was filed against Atty. Rinen for
falsification of an Extra Judicial Partition with Sale which allowed the transfer to Spouses
Durante of a parcel of land. In Bautista v. Atty. Bernabe, the Court held that “[a] notary public
should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed will enable the notary public to
verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.” Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It converts a private document into a public
one, making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notaries public
must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments would be
undermined.
In this case, Atty. Rinen did not deny his failure to personally verify the identity of all parties
who purportedly signed the subject document and whom, as he claimed, appeared before him
on April 7, 1994. Such failure was further shown by the fact that the pertinent details of the
community tax certificates of Wilberto and his sister, as proof of their identity, remained
unspecified in the deed’s acknowledgment portion. Clearly, there was a failure on the part of
Atty. Rinen to exercise the due diligence that was required of him as a notary public ex–officio.
Thus, Atty. Rinen’s notarial commission as revoked and he was disqualified from being
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commissioned as a notary public for one year. Wilberto C. Talisic v. Atty. Primo R. Rinen, A.C.
No. 8761, February 12, 2014.
Attorney; Notarization not an empty act. Complainant charged Atty. Gupana of forgeries and
falsifications in the notarization of certain documents. The Supreme Court found Atty. Gupana
administratively liable under Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial
Law, for violation of his notarial duties when he failed to require the personal presence of
Candelaria Magpayo when he notarized the Affidavit of Loss which Candelaria allegedly
executed on April 29, 1994.
Under the law, the party acknowledging must appear before the notary public or any other
person authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents. In this case, the jurat
of the Affidavit of Loss stated that Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit before Atty. Gupana on
April 29, 1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was already dead since March 26, 1991.
Hence, it is clear that the jurat was made in violation of the notarial law. The notarization of a
document is not an empty act or routine. A notary public’s function should not be trivialized
and a notary public must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public
interest, with accuracy and fidelity. As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, Atty. Gupana is
mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated
by public policy impressed with public interest. Thus, the Supreme Court held that Atty.
Gupana’s revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a
notary public for a period of two years and suspension from the practice of law for one year are
in order. Carlito Ang v. Atty. James Joseph Gupana, A.C. No. 4545. February 5, 2014.
Court Personnel; Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service. An
administrative complaint was filed against Salamanca, Clerk III of a Metropolitan Trial Court for
unauthorized/unexplained absences and other infractions: (1) failure to account for and turn
over the partial settlement amount of a civil obligation; and (2) failure to account for and turn
over the payment for legal fees she received in a case. The Supreme Court held that the acts of
Salamanca constitute dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud. It implies
untrustworthiness, lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle on the part
of the individual who failed to exercise fairness and straightforwardness in his or her dealings.
Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, on the other hand, pertains to any conduct
that is detrimental or derogatory or naturally or probably bringing about a wrong result; it refers
to acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish – or tend to
diminish – the people’s faith in the Judiciary.
However, Salamanca’s dishonesty does not consist of her failure to remit court funds because
the money she received from the litigants did not acquire the status of court funds as no official
receipt therefor was issued by her. While Salamanca’s complained acts involved technically
private money, the deceit she pulled off disrupted the public’s faith in the integrity of the
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judiciary and its personnel. Her conduct tarnished the image and integrity of her public office
and violated the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
Section 4(c) which commands that public officials and employees shall at all times respect the
rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to public safety and public
interest. Executive Judge Ma. Ofelia S. Contreras-Soriano v. Clerk III Liza D. Salamanca,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, Malabon City, A.M. No. P-13-3119. February 10, 2014.
Court Personnel; Duty to Submit Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN). Sheriff
Collado was charged with failing to disclose in her SALN for the years 2004 and 2005 certain
time deposits, among others. The Supreme Court cited Section 8 of RA 6713 which requires all
public officials and employees to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of their assets
and liabilities. The requirement of SALN submission is aimed at curtailing and minimizing the
opportunities for official corruption, as well as at maintaining a standard of honesty in the public
service. With such disclosure, the public would, to a reasonable extent, be able to monitor the
affluence of public officials, and, in such manner, provides a check and balance mechanism to
verify their undisclosed properties and/or sources of income.
The Supreme Court held that based on Section 8 of RA 6713, “all other assets such as
investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like”, should be declared by the
public official in his or her SALN. In this case, however, it was established that she only
declared the original amount of her time deposits in her SALN for the years 2004 and 2005, and
did not disclose the interests which had eventually accrued on the same. Accordingly, Collado
fell short of the legal requirement stated under Section 8 of RA 6713 and thus should be held
administratively liable for said infraction. Angelito R. Marquez, et al. v. Judge Venancio M.
Ovejera, etc., et al., A.M. No. P-11-2903, February 5, 2014.
Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct. A complaint was filed against Susbilla-De Vera for
soliciting money to supposedly facilitate a legal proceeding in court. The court held Susbilla-De
Vera guilty of the most serious administrative offense of grave misconduct. To deserve the trust
and confidence of the people, Susbilla-De Vera was expected to have her dealings with the
public to be always sincere and above board. She should not lead others to believe that despite
her status as a minor court employee she had the capacity to influence the outcomes of judicial
matters. Her acts did not live up to the expectation, for the records unquestionably showed how
she had deliberately and fraudulently misrepresented her ability to assist the complainant in the
adoption of her niece and nephew. Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel has enjoined all court personnel from soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit
based on any or explicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their
official actions. The Court thus warranted her dismissal from service.Veronica F. Galindez v.
Zosima Susbilla-De Vera, A.M. No. P-13-3126, February 4, 2014.
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Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct. An administrative case was filed against respondents who
are employees of the Court of Appeals for “transacting” with party–litigants with a pending case
before the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the court personnel’s act of soliciting
or receiving money from litigants constitutes grave misconduct. The sole act of receiving money
from litigants, whatever the reason may be, is antithesis to being a court employee. The Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel requires that court personnel avoid conflicts of interest in
performing official duties. It mandates that court personnel should not receive tips or other
remunerations for assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in actions
or proceedings with the judiciary. Further, court personnel cannot take advantage of the
vulnerability of party–litigants. In this case, respondents were found guilty of grave misconduct
and thus, dismissed from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual
disqualification from holding public office in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including government–owned or controlled corporations. Anacleto O. Villahermosa, Sr., et al. v.
Victor Sacia, Executive Assistant IV and Efren R. Rivamonte, etc., A.M. No. CA-14-28-P,
February 11, 2014.
Judge; Notarization; Prohibition. An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Rojo for
notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized, in violation of
Circular No. 1–90 dated February 26, 1990. Circular No. 1–90 allows municipal trial court
judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with their
official functions and duties.
The Supreme Court held Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and
Circular No. 1–90, and of gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of
cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the exercise of his official functions
and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying
that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his court’s territorial jurisdiction. As a
solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine
whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to
marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties’ affidavit of
cohabitation. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the
parties’ requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of
cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavit’s statements before
performing the marriage ceremony. Thus, Judge Rojo was suspended for six months from
office.Rex M. Tupal v. Judge Remegio V. Rojo, etc., A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842. February 24, 2014.
Attorney; Disbarment cases; Initiation. Complainants who are members of the Congressional
Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. filed a Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Jimenez
for violating Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the Code of
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Professional Responsibility for his negligence in handling an appeal in a case involving the
Association and willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court.
The Supreme Court held that the complainants have personality to file the disbarment case.
In Heck v. Judge Santos, the Court held that “[a]ny interested person or the court motu
proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings.” The right to institute disbarment proceedings is
not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the
alleged wrongdoing. The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that
only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases.
Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the
proof or failure of proof of the charges. Further, the Supreme Court held that a lawyer engaged
to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with
utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf of his client, Atty. Jimenez had
fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case
and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. However, the Supreme Court only suspended Atty. Jimenez from the
practice of law for one month. Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr. v. Atty. Diosdado B.
Jimenez,A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014.
Attorney; Fidelity to Client. Atty. Guaren was charged with violating the Canon of Professional
Responsibility when he accepted the titling of complainants’ lot and despite the acceptance of
P7,000, failed to perform his obligation and allowing 5 years to elapse without any progress in
the titling of complainants’ lot. The Supreme Court reiterated that the practice of law is not a
business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should
be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what
they owe to themselves. In this case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of
P7,000 as partial payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation
to file the case for the titling of complainants’ lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren
breached his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence when he neglected a legal
matter entrusted to him. Thus, Atty. Guaren violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and was suspended from the practice of law for six months.Stephan
Brunet and Virginia Romanillo Brunet v. Atty. Ronald L. Guaren,A.C. No. 10164, March 10,
2014.
Attorney; Neglect of Duty. Atty. Agleron was charged with violating Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. The Supreme
Court held that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his
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client with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion
regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
In this case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint despite the fact that it was
already prepared and signed. He attributed his non-filing of the appropriate charges on the
failure of complainant to remit the full payment of the filing fee and pay the 30% of the
attorney’s fee. Such justification, however, is not a valid excuse that would exonerate him from
liability. As stated, every case that is entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full attention whether he
accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that complainant had not remitted the full payment
of the filing fee, he should have found a way to speak to his client and inform him about the
insufficiency of the filing fee so he could file the complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked
professionalism in dealing with complainant and showed incompetence when he failed to file
the appropriate charges. A lawyer should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
otherwise his negligence renders him liable for disciplinary action such as suspension ranging
from three months to two years. In this case, Atty. Agleron was suspended from the practice of
law three months. Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact,
Vicente A. Pichon v. Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron Sr.,A.C. No. 5359, March 10, 2014.
Attorney; Notarization; Personal Appearance. A petition for disbarment was filed against Atty.
Cabucana, Jr. for falsification of public document. The requirement of personal appearance of
the affiant is required under the Notarial Law and Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules on
Notarial Practice of 2004. The Supreme Court held that as a notary public, Atty. Cabucana, Jr.
should not notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the same person executing it
and personally appearing before him to attest to the truth of its contents. This is to enable him to
verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the
document is the party’s free and voluntary act and deed. Thus, Atty. Cabucana, Jr. was found
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and suspended from the
practice of law for three months. His notarial commission was revoked and he was prohibited
from being commissioned as a notary public for two years. Licerio Dizon v. Atty. Marcelino
Cabucana, Jr.,A.C. No. 10185, March 12, 2014.
Judge; Violation of Administrative Rules; Unprofessional Conduct. Judge Larida, Jr. was charged
for committing various anomalies and irregularities. The Supreme Court held that Judge Larida,
Jr. committed several lapses, specifically the non-submission to the Court of the required
inventory of locally-funded employees, and his allowing Marticio to draft court orders. Such
lapses manifested a wrong attitude towards administrative rules and regulations issued for the
governance and administration of the lower courts, to the extent of disregarding them, as well as
a laxity in the control of his Branch and in the supervision of its functioning staff. The omission
to submit the inventory should not be blamed on Atty. Calma as the Branch Clerk of Court.
Although it was very likely that Judge Larida, Jr. had tasked Atty. Calma to do and submit the
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inventory in his behalf, Judge Larida, Jr. as the Presiding Judge himself remained to be the officer
directly burdened with the responsibility for doing so. Further, for knowingly allowing detailed
employees to solicit commissions from bonding companies, Judge Larida, Jr. contravened the
Code of Judicial Conduct, which imposed on him the duty to take or initiate appropriate
disciplinary measures against court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which he would
have become aware. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Edwin C. Larida, Jr., RTC,
Branch 18, Tagaytay City,A.M. No. RTJ-08-2151, March 11, 2014.
Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Bitas
for fixing the accused’s bail and reducing the same motu proprio. In this case, Miralles was
charged with Qualified Trafficking, which under Section 10 (C) of R.A. No. 9208 is punishable
by life imprisonment and a fine of not less than P2,000,000 but not more than
P5,000,000. Thus, by reason of the penalty prescribed by law, the grant of bail is a matter of
discretion which can be exercised only by Judge Bitas after the evidence is submitted in a
hearing. The hearing of the application for bail in capital offenses is absolutely indispensable
before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution’s evidence is weak or strong.
The Supreme Court held that not only did Judge Bitas deviate from the requirement of a hearing
where there is an application for bail, he also granted bail to Miralles without neither
conducting a hearing nor a motion for application for bail. Judge Bitas’ acts are not mere
deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on his part, but a patent disregard of well-
known rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad
faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. Ma. Liza M. Jorda, City Prosecutor’s
Office, Tacloban City v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City; Prosecutor Leo
C. Tabao v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City,A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376/A.M.
No. RTJ-14-2377. March 5, 2014.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. An administrative case was filed against Melchor Tiongson,
a Court of Appeals (CA) employee who was assigned to be the head watcher during the 2011
bar examinations. The complaint alleged that she brought a digital camera inside the bar
examination rooms, in violation of the Instructions to Head Watchers. The Court held that in
administrative proceedings, substantial evidence is the quantum of proof required for a finding
of guilt, and this requirement is satisfied if there is reasonable ground to believe that the
employee is responsible for the misconduct. Misconduct means transgression of some
by an employee. Any transgression or deviation from the established norm of conduct, work
related or not, amounts to a misconduct. In this case, there was substantial evidence to prove
that Tiongson committed a misconduct. Tiongson was held liable for simple misconduct only,
because the elements of grave misconduct were not proven with substantial evidence, and
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Tiongson admitted his infraction before the Office of the Bar Confidant. As a CA employee,
Tiongson disregarded his duty to uphold the strict standards required of every court employee,
that is, to be an example of integrity, uprightness and obedience to the judiciary. Re: Melchor
Tiongson, Head Watcher, During the 2011 Bar Examinations, B.M. No. 2482, April 1, 2014.
Judges; bias and partiality must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Court held
that the truth about Judge Austria’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply relying on
the verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a
judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to
the person, and to give equal right to the poor and rich. There should be clear and convincing
evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. In this case, aside from
being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the complainant were
grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant also failed to adduce proof
indicating the judge’s predisposition to decide the case in favor of one party. Antonio M.
Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200,
April 2, 2014.
Judges; decision-making; 90-day requirement. An administrative case was filed against Judge
Bustamante when it was found out upon judicial audit that he had a number of cases pending
for decision, some of which the reglementary period have already lapsed. The Court held that
decision-making, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a member of
the bench. The speedy disposition of cases in the courts is a primary aim of the judiciary so the
ends of justice may not be compromised and the judiciary will be true to its commitment to
provide litigants their constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of their cases.
The Constitution, Code of Judicial Conduct, and jurisprudence consistently mandate that a judge
must decide cases within 90 days from submission. A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip
service to the 90-day requirement; he/she should instead persevere in its implementation. Heavy
caseload and demanding workload are not valid reasons to fall behind the mandatory period for
disposition of cases. Having failed to decide a case within the required period, without any
order of extension granted by the Court, Judge Bustamante was held liable for undue delay that
merits administrative sanction. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Borromeo R.
Bustamante, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Alaminos City, Pangasinan,A.M. No. MTJ-12-1806,
April 7, 2014.
Judges; impropriety. An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Austria for impropriety
for posting her details as judge in Friendster and posting a picture with an indecent attire for the
public’s consumption. The Court held that she was guilty of impropriety. While judges are not
prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities,
they do not shed off their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical
responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday
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activities. Judge Austria was guilty of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner
viewable by the public. Joining Friendster per sedoes not violate the New Code of Judicial
Conduct. However, Judge Austria disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety
required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an “off-shouldered”
suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing. Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma.
Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014.
Judges; irregular or erroneous order or decision; appropriate remedy. The Court held that in
administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of his complaint
by substantial evidence. In this case, the allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in
the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection are devoid of
merit because the complainant failed to establish Judge Austria’s bad faith, malice or ill will. The
complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures and suppositions.
These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations. Even granting that
the judge erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are legal errors correctible not by
a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the complainant. An
administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or
decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal. Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2,
Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014.
Attorney; Disbarment; Effect of withdrawal. A disbarment case was filed by Quiachon against
her lawyer Atty. Ramos who represented her in a labor case before NLRC and a special
proceeding case before the RTC. During the pendency of the proceedings, complainant
withdrew the disbarment case. The Supreme Court held that the withdrawal of a disbarment
case against a lawyer does not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to
continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the
Philippine Bar. The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a
witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. In this case, Atty. Ramos violated
Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the appropriate
penalty should be imposed despite the desistance of complainant or the withdrawal of the
charges. Adelia V. Quiachon v. Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos, A.C. No. 9317, June 4, 2014.
Attorney; Quantum of proof in administrative cases. An administrative complaint for dishonesty

was filed against Atty. Molina for having advised his clients to enforce a contract on
complainant’s client who was never a party to the agreement. The Supreme Court in dismissing
the complaint held that when it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to
be considered: quantum of proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of
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proof, which is on the complainant. Here, the complaint was without factual basis. The
allegation of giving legal advice was not substantiated in this case, either in the complaint or in
the corresponding hearings. Bare allegations are not proof. Even if Atty. Molina did provide his
clients legal advice, he still cannot be held administratively liable without any showing that his
act was attended with bad faith or malice. The default rule is presumption of good faith. Atty.
Alan F. Paguia v. Atty. Manuel T. Molina, A.C. No. 9881, June 4, 2014.
Court personnel; Dishonesty. Ampong was dismissed from the Civil Service Commission for
dishonesty, however, remained employed in the RTC. The Supreme Court has already held in its
August 26, 2008 Decision that Ampong was administratively liable for dishonesty in
impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers
on behalf of one Decir. Under section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it the following administrative
disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c)
perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality,
including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution.
Ampong should be made to similarly suffer the same. Every employee of the Judiciary should be
an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty. Court personnel are enjoined to adhere to the
exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to
preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. Here, Ampong failed to meet these
stringent standards set for a judicial employee and does not, therefore, deserve to remain with
the Judiciary. Office of the Court Administrator v. Sarah P. Ampong, etc., A.M. No. P-13-3132,
June 4, 2014.
Court personnel; Simple neglect of duty. Sheriff Macusi was charged with misfeasance,
nonfeasance or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for failing to act on a writ
of execution. The Supreme Court held that the 30-day period imposed for the execution of the
writ after the judgment has been received by the sheriff, as well as the periodic report every 30
days, is mandatory. Contrary to such rule, Sheriff Macusi submitted only one return of writ of
execution in his Partial Report and did not file any other report to the court. Sheriffs play an
important part in the administration of justice because they are tasked to execute the final
judgment of courts. Thus, Sheriff Macusi was held to be remiss in his duties and thus liable for
simple neglect of duty which is the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty
due to carelessness or indifference. Alberto Valdez v. Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV, RTC,
Branch 25, Tabuk, Kalinga, A.M. No. P-13-3123, June 10, 2014.
Judge; Time within which certain acts must be done; Exception. An administrative complaint
was filed against MCTC Judge Regencia. The Supreme Court held that pursuant to Rule 3.05,
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, prompt disposition of cases is attained basically
through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If judges do not possess those traits,
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delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of the litigants. In this case, the
civil case was already submitted for resolution. Being an ejectment case, it is governed by the
Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of 30 days from the submission of the
last affidavit or position paper within which a decision must be issued. Despite this, Judge
Regencia rendered judgment only more than 2 years later. While rules prescribing the time
within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the
orderly and speedy disposition of cases and, thus, should be regarded as mandatory, the Court
has nevertheless been mindful of the plight of judges and has been understanding of
circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing of their businesses and, as such,
has allowed extensions of time due to justifiable reasons. However, Judge Regencia failed to
proffer any acceptable reason in delaying the disposition of the ejectment case, thus, making her
administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision. Gershon N. Dulang v. Judge
Mary Jocylen G. Regencia, MCTC, Asturias-Balamban, Cebu, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841, June 2,
2014.
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Legal Ethics Philippine Supreme Court Decisions

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Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Dishonesty. There is no need to stretch one’s imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion

Dishonesty. The respondent’s conduct clearly shows lack of forthrightness and

Insubordination. Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a superior

Grave misconduct. Grave Misconduct is a malevolent transgression of some established and

Grave misconduct. We do not find respondents guilty of grave misconduct. Misconduct is a

Violation of lawyer’s oath. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code

Misappropriation. We find respondent guilty of misappropriating judiciary funds – which act

Negligence. It is with respect to respondent’s receipt of the proceeds of complainant’s bonus in

Judges and court personnel

Misconduct. Compounding respondent’s acts of lasciviousness and drunkenness during office

Court personnel; administrative proceedings; desistance. Complainant Plaza manifested before

Court personnel; guilty of two or more charges; Lesser offense an aggravating

Court personnel; grave misconduct. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple

Court personnel; misconduct. As a clerk of court, Sorio is specifically mandated to safeguard

Attorney; engagement of private counsel by GOCC. In Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol

Attorney; engagement of private counsel by LGU. Pursuant to this provision [Section

Attorney; violation of attorney-client relationship. We find no merit in petitioners’ assertion that

Court personnel; misconduct; lack of evidence. We find Judge Manalastas’ recommendation to

Court personnel; dishonesty. Dishonesty is defined as “intentionally making a false statement in

Attorney; misconduct. Respondent (lawyer) was ordered to reimburse his client

Court personnel; immorality. Immoral conduct is conduct which is “willful, flagrant, or

Administrative proceedings; substantial evidence required. As correctly pointed out by the

Judge; gross misconduct. Respondent committed acts unbecoming of a judge, in particular,

Administrative proceedings; compromise agreements. The compromise agreement between

Judge; delay in disposition of cases. Complainant is the private complainant in a BP 22 case

Judge; gross misconduct. Respondent judge made or allowed many unreasonable

Court Personnel; professionalism. An administrative complaint was filed against a court

Court Personnel; temporary designation. This is an administrative complaint of first impression

Judges; administrative complaint not a substitute for judicial remedy. An administrative

Judges; conduct unbecoming of a judge. In his Comment on an administrative complaint filed

Judges; gross misconduct. When Judge Limbona was appointed as a judge,

Justice; conduct unbecoming. We point out that publicizing professional qualifications or

Administrative proceedings; quantum of evidence. It is a settled rule that in administrative

Administrative proceedings; mitigating circumstances. In several jurisprudential precedents, the

Attorney; conflict of interest. Respondent attorney drafted a demand letter on behalf of

Affidavit of Desistance; no effect on disciplinary proceeding. It bears to stress that a case of

Attorney; gross misconduct; inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedures. The

Presumption of innocence in disbarment proceedings; burden of proof; quantum of proof. The

Attorney; government service; applicability of Code of Professional Responsibility. The Code of

Attorney; lifting of indefinite suspension. Professional misconduct involving the misuse of

Court personnel; administrative case; quantum of evidence. The Uniform Rules on

Court personnel; grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and

Attorney; representation of conflicting interests. “The proscription against representation of

Judge; performing or agreeing to perform functions or services outside of their official

Attorney; Neglect etc.Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client

Judge; disciplinary proceedings against judges; presumption of regularity. Jurisprudence is

Judge; misconduct. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule

Attorney; notarial practice; necessity of affiant’s personal appearance; nature of notarization;

Judge; anonymous complaints against judges must be supported by public records of

Judges; undue delay in deciding cases; administrative sanctions. An inexcusable failure to

Jurisdiction of the Court over administrative proceedings. An administrative matter was

Court personnel; dishonesty and grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some

Court personnel; Gross dishonesty; Misrepresentation of eligibility; Penalty. Respondent, a court

Attorney; Attorney-Client Relationship. A disbarment complaint was filed against respondent

Judiciary; Accountability. Respondent Arnejo, a stenographer of the RTC, was accused of

Attorney; Mishandling of Client’s Case. Complainant-Spouses filed an administrative case

Court Personnel; Dishonesty. Complainants accused respondent sheriff of grave misconduct,

Attorney; Applicability of the Code of Professional Responsibility to lawyers in government

Attorney; Disobedience to court directives. Complainant Sy charged Respondent Esponilla,

Attorney; Quantum of proof in administrative cases. An administrative complaint for dishonesty

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