CRIMINAL LAW – MODULE 2

I. Felony, defined
II. Elements of criminal liability
A. Physical element
a. Act
b. Omission

1. People v. Sylvestre

G.R. No. L-35748         December 14, 1931

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROMANA SILVESTRE and MARTIN ATIENZA, defendants-appellants.

Teofilo Mendoza for appellants.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

Martin Atienza and Romana Silvestre appeal to this court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
convicting them upon the information of the crime of arson as follows: The former as principal by direct participation,
sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of cadena temporal, in accordance with paragraph 2 of article
550, Penal Code; and the latter as accomplice, sentenced to six years and one day of presidio mayor; and both are
further sentenced to the accessories of the law, and to pay each of the persons whose houses were destroyed by the
fire, jointly and severally, the amount set forth in the information, with costs.

Counsel appointed by the court to defend the accused- appellants de oficio, after delivering his argument, prayed for
the affirmance of the judgment with reference to the appellant Martin Atienza, and makes the following assignments of
error with reference to Romana Silvestre, to wit:

1. The lower court erred in convincing Romana Silvestre as accomplice of the crime charged in the information.

2. Finally, the court erred in not acquitting said defendant from the information upon the ground of insufficient
evidence, or at the least, of reasonable doubt.

The following facts were proved at the hearing beyond a reasonable doubt:

Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her second marriage, cohabited with her codefendant Martin Atienza
from the month of March, 1930, in the barrio of Masocol, municipality of Paombong, Province of Bulacan. On May 16,
1930, the complaining husband, Domingo Joaquin, filed with the justice of the peace for that municipality, a sworn
complaint for adultery, supported by affidavits of Gerardo Cabigao and Castor de la Cruz (Exhibit B). On the same
date, May 16, 1930, the said accused were arrested on a warrant issued by said justice of the peace. On the 20th of
the month, they were released on bail, each giving a personal bond of P6,000. Pending the preliminary investigation of
the case, the two defendants begged the municipal president of Paombong, Francisco Suerte Felipe, to speak to the
complaint, Domingo Joaquin, urging him to withdraw the complaint, the two accused binding themselves to discontinue
cohabitation, and promising not to live again in the barrio of Masocol; Martin Atienza voluntarily signed the promise
(Exhibit A). The municipal president transmitted the defendants' petition to the complaining husband, lending it his
support. Domingo Joaquin acceded to it, and on May 20, 1930, filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint. In
consideration of this petition, the justice of the peace of Paombong dismissed the adultery case commenced against
the accused, and cancelled the bonds given by them, with the costs against the complainant.

The accused then left the barrio of Masocol and went to live in that of Santo Niño, in the same municipality of
Paombong.

About November 20, 1930, the accused Romana Silvestre met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in
the barrio of Santo Niño, and under pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves, followed him home to the village of
Masocol, and remained there. The accused, Martin Atienza, who had continued to cohabit with said Romana Silvestre,
followed her and lived in the home of Nicolas de la Cruz. On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas de la Cruz
and his wife, Antonia de la Cruz, were gathered together with the appellants herein after supper, Martin Atienza told
said couple to take their furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire to it. Upon being asked by Nicolas
and Antonia why he wanted to set fire to the house, he answered that that was the only way he could be revenged
upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him and his codefendant,
Romana Silvestre. As Martin Atienza was at that time armed with a pistol, no one dared say anything to him, not even
Romana Silvestre, who was about a meter away from her codefendant. Alarmed at what Martin Atienza had said, the
couple left the house at once to communicate with the barrio lieutenant, Buenaventura Ania, as to what they had just
heard Martin Atienza say; but they had hardly gone a hundred arms' length when they heard cries of "Fire! Fire!"
Turning back they saw their home in flames, and ran back to it; but seeing that the fire had assumed considerable
proportions, Antonia took refuge in the schoolhouse with her 1 year old babe in her arms, while Nicolas went to the
home of his parents-in-law, took up the furniture he had deposited there, and carried it to the schoolhouse. The fire
destroyed about forty-eight houses. Tomas Santiago coming from the barrio artesian well, and Tomas Gonzalez,
teacher at the barrio school of Masocol, and Felipe Clemente, an old man 61 years of age, coming from their homes, to
the house on fire, saw Martin Atienza going away from the house where the fire started, and Romana Silvestre leaving
it.lawphil.net

As stated in the beginning, counsel appointed by this court to defend the accused-appellant de oficio, prays for the
affirmance of the judgment appealed from with reference to defendant Martin Atienza. The facts related heretofore,
proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the hearing, justify this petition of the de oficio counsel, and establish beyond a
reasonable doubt said defendant's guilt of arson as charged, as principal by direct participation.

With respect to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, the only evidence of record against her are: That, being
married, she lived adulterously with her codefendant Martin Atienza, a married man; that both were denounced for
adultery by Domingo Joaquin, Romana Silvestre's second husband; that in view of the petition of the accused, who
promised to discontinue their life together, and to leave the barrio of Masocol, and through the good offices of the
municipal president of Paombong, the complaining husband asked for the dismissal of the complaint; that in pursuance
of their promise, both of the accused went to lived in the barrio of Santo Niño, in the same municipality; that under
pretext for some nipa leaves from her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, who had gone to the barrio of
Santo Niño, Romana Silvestre followed him to his house in the barrio of Masocol on November 23, 1930, and remained
there; that her codefendant, Martin Atienza followed her, and stayed with his coaccused in the same house; that on the
night of November 25, 1930, at about 8 o'clock, while all were gathered together at home after supper, Martin Atienza
expressed his intention of burning the house as the only means of taking his revenge on the Masocol resident, who
had instigated Domingo Joaquin to file the complaint for adultery against them, which compelled them to leave the
barrio of Masocol; that Romana Silvestre listened to her codefendant's threat without raising a protest, and did not give
the alarm when the latter set fire to the house. Upon the strength of these facts, the court below found her guilty of
arson as accomplice.

Article 14 of the Penal Code, considered in connection with article 13, defines an accomplice to be one who does not
take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to commit it, nor cooperates in the
commission of the act by another act without which it would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the
execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions.

Now then, which previous or simultaneous acts complicate Romana Silvestre in the crime of arson committed by her
codefendant Martin Atienza? Is it her silence when he told the spouses, Nicolas de la Cruz and Antonia de la Cruz, to
take away their furniture because he was going to set fire to their house as the only means of revenging himself on the
barrio residents, her passive presence when Martin Atienza set fire to the house, where there is no evidence of
conspiracy or cooperation, and her failure to give the alarm when the house was already on fire?

The complicity which is penalized requires a certain degree of cooperation, whether moral, through advice,
encouragement, or agreement, or material, through external acts. In the case of the accused-appellant Romana
Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation, and none of an agreement to commit the crime in
question. Her mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does
not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give
the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice.

The trial court found the accused-appellant Martin Atienza guilty of arson, defined and penalized in article 550,
paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, which reads as follows:

ART. 550. The penalty of cadena temporal shall be imposed upon:

x x x           x x x          x x x

2. Any person who shall set fire to any inhabited house or any building in which people are accustomed to
meet together, without knowing whether or not such building or house was occupied at the time, or any freight
train in motion, if the damage caused in such cases shall exceed six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.

While the defendant indeed knew that besides himself and his codefendant, Romana Silvestre, there was nobody in De
la Cruz's house at the moment of setting fire to it, he cannot be convicted merely arson less serious than what the trial
court sentenced him for, inasmuch as that house was the means of destroying the others, and he did not know whether
these were occupied at the time or not. If the greater seriousness of setting fire to an inhabited house, when the
incendiary does not know whether there are people in it at the time, depends upon the danger to which the inmates are
exposed, not less serious is the arson committed by setting fire to inhabited houses by means of another inhabited
house which the firebrand knew to be empty at the moment of committing the act, if he did not know whether there
were people or not in the others, inasmuch as the same danger exists.

With the evidence produced at the trial, the accused-appellant Martin Atienza might have been convicted of the crime
of arson in the most serious degree provided for in article 549 of the Penal Code, if the information had alleged that at
the time of setting fire to the house, the defendant knew that the other houses were occupied, taking into account that
barrio residents are accustomed to retire at the tolling of the bell for the souls in purgatory, i.e., at 8 o'clock at night.

For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold, that: (1) Mere passive presence at the scene of
another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not
constitute the cooperation required by article 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime
witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent; and (2) he who desiring to burn the houses in a barrio,
without knowing whether there are people in them or not, sets fire to one known to be vacant at the time, which results
in destroying the rest, commits the crime of arson, defined and penalized in article 550, paragraph 2, Penal Code.

By virtue wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified as follows: It is affirmed with reference to the accused-
appellant Martin Atienza, and reversed with reference to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, who is hereby
acquitted with
one-half of the costs de oficio. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

2. People v. Talingdan

G.R. No. L-32126 July 6, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NEMESIO TALINGDAN, MAGELLAN TOBIAS, AUGUSTO BERRAS, PEDRO BIDES and TERESA
DOMOGMA, accused-appellants.

PER CURIAM:

Appeal from the conviction for the crime of murder and the sentence of life imprisonment, with indemnity to the
offended party, the heirs of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag, in the amount of P12,000, rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Abra in its Criminal Case No. 686, of all the accused the namely, Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias,
Augusta Berras, Pedro Bides and Teresa Domogma, the last being the supposed wife of the deceased, who, because
no certificate nor any other proof of their marriage could be presented by the prosecution, could not be charged with
parricide.

Prior to the violent death of Bernardo Bagabag on the night of June 24, 1967, he and appellant Teresa Domogma and
their children, arrived together in their house at Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra, some 100 meters distant from the
municipal building of the place. For sometime, however, their relationship had been strained and beset with troubles,
for Teresa had deserted their family home a couple of times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her. On
two (2) different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan had visited Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at
work, and during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter living with them, go down the
house and leave them. Somehow, Bernardo had gotten wind that illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan
and Teresa, and during a quarrel between him and Teresa, he directly charged the latter that should she get pregnant,
the child would not be his. About a month or so before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did
not come back for a period of more than three (3) weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan
were seen together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time; then on Thursday night, just two (2) days before he
was gunned down, Bernardo and Teresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Teresa several times; the latter went
down the house and sought the help of the police, and shortly thereafter, accused Talingdan came to the vicinity of
Bernardo's house and called him to come down; but Bernardo ignored him, for accused Talingdan was a policeman at
the time and was armed, so the latter left the place, but not without warning Bernardo that someday he would kin him.
Between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock the following Friday morning, Bernardo's daughter, Corazon, who was then in a creek
to wash clothes saw her mother, Teresa, meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto
Berras and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned by Bernardo, some 300 to 400 meters away from the latter's house; as
she approached them, she heard one of them say "Could he elude a bullet"; and when accused Teresa Domogma
noticed the presence of her daughter, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him".

Shortly after the sun had set on the following day, a Saturday, June 24, 1967, while the same 12-year old daughter of
Bernardo was cooking food for supper in the kitchen of their house, she saw her mother go down the house through
the stairs and go to the yard where she again met with the other appellants. As they were barely 3-4 meters from the
place where the child was in the "batalan", she heard them conversing in subdued tones, although she could not
discern what they were saying. She was able to recognize all of them through the light coming from the lamp in the
kitchen through the open "batalan" and she knows them well for they are all residents of Sobosob and she used to see
them almost everytime. She noted that the appellants had long guns at the time. Their meeting did not last long, after
about two (2) minutes Teresa came up the house and proceeded to her room, while the other appellants went under an
avocado tree nearby. As supper was then ready, the child caged her parents to eat, Bernardo who was in the room
adjoining the kitchen did not heed his daughter's call to supper but continued working on a plow, while Teresa also
excused herself by saying she would first put her small baby to sleep. So Corazon ate supper alone, and as soon as
she was through she again called her parents to eat. This time, she informed her father about the presence of persons
downstairs, but Bernardo paid no heed to what she said. He proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the floor near
the door. Corazon stayed nearby watching him. At that moment, he was suddenly fired upon from below the stairs of
the "batalan". The four accused then climbed the stairs of the "batalan" carrying their long guns and seeing that
Bernardo was still alive, Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again. Bides and Berras did not fire their guns at that
precise time, but when Corazon tried to call for help Bides warned her, saying "You call for help and I will kill you", so
she kept silent. The assailants then fled from the scene, going towards the east.

The first to come to the aid of the family was Corazon's male teacher who lived nearby. Teresa came out of her "silid"
later; she pulled Corazon aside and questioned her, and when Corazon informed her that she recognized the killers of
her father to be her co-appellants herein, she warned her not to reveal the matter to anyone, threatening to kill her if
she ever did so. Still later on, other persons arrived and helped fix and dress the lifeless body of the victim, Bernardo,
autopsy on which was performed in his own house by the Municipal Health Officer of the place on June 26, 1967,
about 36 hours after death; burial took place on the same day. The victim's brother who came from Manila arrived one
day after the burial followed by their mother who came from La Paz, Abra where she resides. Corazon, who had not
earlier revealed the Identities of the killers of her father because she was afraid of her own mother, was somehow able
to reveal the circumstances surrounding his killing to these immediate relatives of hers, and the sworn statement she
thereafter executed on August 5, 1967 (Exh. B) finally led to the filing of the information for murder against the herein
five (5) appellants.

On the other hand, according to the evidence for the defense: Teresa prior to her marriage with Bernardo, was a
resident of the town of Manabo, Abra. She has a sister in Manila and two (2) brothers in America who love her dearly,
that is why said brothers of hers had been continuously and regularly sending her monthly $100.00 in checks, starting
from the time she was still single up to the time of her husband's violent death on June 24, 1967, and thereafter. After
their marriage, they moved to and resided in her husband's place in Sallapadan, Abra, bringing with them three (3)
carabaos and two (2) horses, which Bernardo and she used in tilling a parcel of land in said place, separate and
distinct from the parcel of land worked on by Bernardo's parents and their other children. She and Bernardo lived in
their own house which was about 4-5 meters away from the house of her parents-in-law. She loved Bernardo dearly,
they never quarreled, and her husband never maltreated her; although sometimes she had to talk to Bernardo when he
quarrels with his own mother who wanted that Bernardo's earnings be given to her, (the mother) which Bernardo never
did, and at those times, Bernardo would admonish Teresa "You leave me alone". Her in-laws also hated her because
her mother-in-law could not get the earnings of Bernardo for the support of her other son, Juanito, in his schooling. On
his part, Juanito also disliked her because she did not give him any of the carpentry tools which her brothers in
America were sending over to her. She never left their conjugal home for any long period of time as charged by her
mother-in-law, and if she ever did leave the house to go to other places they were only during those times when she
had to go to Bangued to cash her dollar checks with the PNB branch there, and even on said trips, she was sometimes
accompanied by Bernardo, or if she had to go alone and leaves Sallapadan in the morning, she rode in a weapons
carrier along with merchants going to Bangued in the morning and always rode back with them to Sallapadan in the
afternoon of the same day because the weapons carrier is owned by a resident of Sallapadan who waits for them.
Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the latter became a policeman in Sallapadan, as whenever any of the
carabaos and horses they brought from Manabo to Sallapadan got lost, she and Bernardo would go and report the
matter to the Mayor who would then refer the matter to his policemen, one of whom is Talingdan, so that they may help
locate the lost animals; Teresa knew Talingdan well because they are neighbors, the latter's home being only about
250-300 meters away from theirs. But illicit relationship had never existed between them.

Early in the evening of June 24, 1967, Teresa was in the kitchen of their house cooking their food for supper. Two of
the children, Corazon and Judit, were with her. Her husband, Bernardo, was then in the adjoining room making a plow.
He had to make the plow at that time of the night because at daytime he worked as a carpenter in the convent. As soon
as the food was ready, she and the children moved over to the adjoining room where Bernardo was to call him for
supper, and he then proceeded to the kitchen to eat. Teresa and the two children were about to follow him to the
kitchen when suddenly they heard more than five (5) or six (6) successive gun shots coming from near their "batalan".
They were all so terrified that they immediately cried for help, albeit she did not know yet at that precise time that her
husband was shot, as she and the children were still in the other room on their way to the kitchen, about three (3)
meters away from Bernardo. But soon Teresa heard her husband crying in pain, and as soon as she reached him, she
took Bernardo into her arms. She did not see the killers of her husband, as the night was then very dark and it was
raining. Bernardo was in her arms when the first group of people who responded to their cry for help arrived. Among
them were the chief of police, some members of the municipal council and appellant Tobias who even advised Teresa
not to carry the lifeless body of Bernardo to avoid abortion as she was then six (6) months pregnant. The chief of police
then conducted an investigation of the surroundings and he found some empty shells and foot prints on the ground
some meters away from the "batalan". He also found some bullet holes on the southern walls of said "batalan" and on
the nothern wallings of the kitchen. Later, Teresa requested some persons to relay the information about the death of
her husband to her relatives in Manabo, Abra, and they in turn passed on the news to Bernardo's mother and her
family in La Paz, Abra, where they were then residing, as they have left their house in Sallapadan about two (2) months
previous after they lost the land they used to till there in a case with the natives called Tingians. Two (2) PC soldiers
arrived in the afternoon of June 26, 1967, and after Bernardo's remains was autopsied and he was buried under their
house, they conducted an investigation, but she did not give them any information relative to the Identity of the persons
who shot her husband because she did not really see them. Her mother-in-law and a brother-in-law, Juanita Bagabag,
arrived later, the former from the town of La Paz, Abra, and the latter from Manila, and after the usual nine (9) days
mourning was over, they left Sallapadan, taking Teresa's children under their custody. Teresa suspects that since her
mother-in-law and her brother-in-law have axes to grind against her and they have her daughter, Corazon, under their
custody, they had forced the said child to testify against her. She further declared that her late husband, Bernardo, had
enemies during his lifetime, as he had quarrels with some people over the land they work on.

Furthermore, the defense presented evidence to the effect that: Talingdan was not in Sallapadan at the time of the
killing of Bernardo on June 24, 1967; being a policeman of the place at the time, he was one of the two (2) policemen
who escorted and acted as bodyguard of the Mayor, when the latter attended the cursillo in Bangued, all of them
leaving Sallapadan on June 22 and returning thereto four (4) days later on June 26, hence, he could not have anything
to do with the said killing. On the other hand, Tobias claimed to be in the house of one Mrs. Bayongan in Sallapadan
on the date of said killing, but he was one of the persons who was called upon by the chief of police of the place to
accompany him in answer to the call for help of the wife of the victim. The other two appellants Bides and Berras also
alleged that they were in the same house of Mrs. Bayongan on that date; they are tillers of the land of said Mrs.
Bayongan and had been staying in her house for a long time. They were sleeping when the chief of police came that
evening and asked Tobias, who was then municipal secretary, to accompany him to the place of the shooting. They did
not join them, but continued sleeping. They never left the said house of Mrs. Bayongan, which is about 250-300 meters
away from the place of the killing, that evening of June 24, 1967.

After carefully weighing the foregoing conflicting evidence of the prosecution and defense, We have no doubt in Our
mind that in that fatal evening of June 24, 1967, appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and
Pedro Bides, all armed with long firearms and acting inconspiracy with each other gunned down Bernardo as the latter
was sitting by the supper table in their house at Sobosob, Sallapadan, Abra. They were actually seen committing the
offense by the witness Corazon. She was the one who prepared the food and was watching her father nearby. They
were all known to her, for they were all residents of Sobosob and she used to see them often before that night.
Although only Talingdan and Tobias continued firing at her father after they had climbed the stairs of the "batalan", it
was Bides who threatened her that he would kill her if she called for help. Berras did not fire any shot then. But even
before the four appellants went up the "batalan", they already fired shots from downstairs.

We also fully believe Corazon's testimony that two nights before, or on Thursday, June 22, 1967, the deceased
Bernardo and appellant Teresa had a violent quarrel during which he slapped her several times. She went to seek the
help of the police, and it was appellant Talingdan, a policeman of their town, who went to the vicinity of their house and
challenged her father to come down, but the latter refused because the former was a policeman and was armed. And
so, Talingdan left after shouting to her father that "If I will find you someday, I will kill you."

We likewise accept as truthful, Corazon's declaration regarding the amorous relationship between her mother and
appellant Talingdan, as already related earlier above. So also her testimony that in the morning following the quarrel
between her father and her mother and the threat made by Talingdan to the former, between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock,
she saw all the herein four male accused-appellants meeting with her mother in a small hut some 300 or 400 meters
away from their house, near where she was then washing clothes, and that on said occasion she overheard one of
them ask "Could (sic) he elude a bullet?", We have our doubts, however, as to whether or not her mother did say to her
in shoving her away upon seeing her approach, "You tell your father we will kill him." If it were true that there was really
such a message, it is to be wondered why she never relayed the same to her father, specially when she again saw the
said appellants on the very night in question shortly before the shooting talking together in subdued tones with her
mother and holding long arms. Moreover, it is quite unnatural that such a warning could have been done in such a
manner.

Accordingly, it is Our conclusion from the evidence related above and which We have carefully reviewed that
appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides are guilty of murder qualified by
treachery, as charged, and that they committed the said offense in conspiracy with each other, with evident
premeditation and in the dwelling of the offended party. In other words, two aggravating circumstances attended the
commission of the offense, namely, evident premeditation and that it was committed in the dwelling of the victim. No
mitigating circumstance has been proven.

Appellants insist in their brief that the lone testimony of Corazon suffered from vital contradictions and inconsistencies
and badges of falsehood because of patently unnatural circumstances alleged by her. We do not agree. As the
Solicitor General has well pointed out, the fact that the witness varied on cross-examination the exact time of some of
the occurrences she witnessed, such as, (1) whether it was before or after Bernardo had began eating when he was
shot; (2) whether it was before or after seeing her mother's meeting with her co-accused in the morning of Friday, June
23, 1967, that she went to wash clothes; and (3) whether or not the accused were already upstairs or still downstairs
when they first fired their guns, cannot alter the veracity of her having seen appellants in the act of mercilessly and
cold-bloodedly shooting her father to death.

Contrary to the contention of appellants, there was nothing inherently unnatural in the circumstances related by her.
We agree with the following rebuttal of the Solicitor General:

Appellants also attempt to buttress their attack against the credibility of Corazon Bagabag by pointing
out five supposed unnatural declarations in her testimony; First, she said that her father, appeared
unconcerned when she informed him of the presence of people downstairs. But as correctly observed
by the prosecuting fiscal the witness does not know then "the mentality of her father" (p. 62, t.s.n.,
hearing of March 29, 1968). Second, Corazon also declared that the accused conversed that Saturday
night preceding the day the crime charged was committed in a lighted place although there was a
place which was unlighted in the same premises. But this only proves that the accused were too
engrossed in their conversation, unmindful of whether the place where they were talking was lighted or
not, and unmindful even of the risk of recognition. Third, witness declared that Pedro Bides and
Augusto Berras did not fire their guns. Even if these accused did withhold their fire, however, since
they were privies to the same criminal design, would this alter their culpability? Should the witness
Corazon Bagabag be discredited for merely stating an observation on her part which is not inherently
unnatural? Fourth, Corazon also declared that only three bullets from the guns of the four male
accused found their mark on the body of her father. But would this not merely prove that not all the
accused were good shots? And fifth, the witness declared that her father was still able to talk after he
was shot yet Dr. Jose Dalisan declared that his death was instantaneous It is respectfully submitted,
however, that the doctor's opinion could yield to the positive testimony of Corazon Bagabag in this
regard without in the least affecting the findings of said doctor as regards the cause of the death of the
deceased. As thus viewed, there are no evident badges of falsehood in the whole breadth and length
of Corazon Bagabag's testimony. (Pp. 9-10, People's Brief.)

Why and how Corazon could have concocted her version of the killing of her father, if it were not basically true, is
hardly conceivable, considering she was hardly thirteen (13) years old when she testified, an age when according to
Moore, a child , is, as a rule, but little influenced by the suggestion of others" because "he has already got some
principles, lying is distasteful to him, because he thinks it is mean, he is no stranger to the sentiment of self- respect,
and he never loses an opportunity of being right in what he affirms." (II Moore on Facts, pp. 1055-1056.) No cogent
explanation has been offered why she would attribute the assault on her father to three other men, aside from
Talingdan whom she knew had relations with her mother, were she merely making-up her account of how he was shot,
no motive for her to do so having been shown.
Demolishing the theory of the accused that such testimony was taught to her by her uncle, His Honor pointed out that
said "testimony, both direct and cross, would show that she was constant, firm and steady in her answers to questions
directed to her." We have Ourselves read said testimony and We are convinced of the sincerity and truthfulness of the
witness. We cannot, therefore, share appellants' apprehension in their Seventh Assignment of Error that the grave
imputation of a mother's infidelity and her suggested participation in the killing of her husband, would if consistently
impressed in the mind of their child, constitute a vicious poison enough to make the child, right or wrong, a willing
instrument in any scheme to get even with her wicked mother. We feel Corazon was too young to he affected by the
infidelity of her mother in the manner the defense suggests. We are convinced from a reading of her whole testimony
that it could not have been a fabrication. On the whole, it is too consistent for a child of thirteen years to be able to
substantially maintain throughout her stay on the witness stand without any fatal flaw, in the face of severe and long
cross-interrogations, if she had not actually witnessed the event she had described. We reject the possibility of her
having been "brainwashed or coached" to testify as she did.

The second to the sixth assignments of error in the appeal brief do not merit serious consideration. Anent these alleged
errors, suffice it to say that the following refutations of the Solicitor General are well taken:

Appellants also decry that the trial court allegedly failed to consider the testimony of Dr. Dalisan that
the distance between the assailants and the deceased could have been 4 to 5 meters when the shots
were fired. But the appellants overlook the testimony of Corazon Bagabag that when the first shot was
fired, the gunman was about 3-½ meters from her father (p. 60, t.s.n., hearing of March 29, 1968),
which disproves the theory of the defense that the killers fired from a stonepile under an avocado tree
some 4 to 5 meters away from the deceased's house. Appellants also insist that the Court a
quo ignored the testimonies of defense witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall and Chief of Police Rafael Berras
on their having found bullet marks on the southern walling of the house of the deceased, as well as
empty cal. 30 carbine shells under the aforementioned avocado tree. The trial court, however, made
the following apt observations on the testimony of defense witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall:

This witness stated that we went to the house of the deceased to investigate the crime after the
deceased had already been buried; that he investigated the widow as well as the surroundings of the
house where the deceased was shot. He found empty shells of carbine under the avocado tree. He
stated that the 'batalan' of the house of the deceased has a siding of about 1-½ meters high and that
he saw bullet holes on the top portion of the wall directly pointing to the open door of the 'batalan' of
the house of the deceased. When the court asked the witness what could have been the position of
the assailant in shooting the deceased, he stated that the assailant might have been standing. The
assailant could not have made a bullet hole on the top portion of the sidings of the 'batalan' because
the 'batalan' is only 1-½ meters high, and further, when asked as to the level of the ground in relation
to the top sidings of the 'batalan,' he answered that it is in the same level with the ground. If this is true,
it is impossible for the assailant to make a bullet hole at the top portion sidings of the 'batalan,' hence,
the testimony of this witness who is a PC corporal is of no consequence and without merit. The court is
puzzled to find a PC corporal testifying for the defense in this case, which case was filed by another
PC sergeant belonging to the same unit and assigned in the same province of Abra (pp. 324- 325,
rec.).

As regards the empty shells also found in the vicinity of the shooting, suffice it to state that no
testimony has been presented, expert or otherwise, linking said shells to the bullets that were fired
during the shooting incident. Surmises in this respect surely would not overcome the positive testimony
of Corazon Bagabag that the accused shot her father as they came up the 'batalan' of their house. (Pp.
11-12, People's Brief.)

At the trial, the four male appellants tried to prove that they were not at the scene of the crime when it happened. This
defense of alibi was duly considered by the trial court, but it was properly brushed aside as untenable. In their brief, no
mention thereof is made, which goes to show that in the mind of the defense itself,. it cannot be successfully
maintained and they do not, therefore, insist on it. Nonetheless, it would do well for this Court to specifically affirm the
apt pertinent ratiocination of His Honor in reference thereto thus:

This defense, therefore, is alibi which, in the opinion of the court, can not stand firmly in the face of a
positive and unwavering testimony of the prosecution witness who pointed out to the accused as the
authors of the crime. This is so because, first, according to the three accused — Bides, Tobias and
Berras — they were sleeping at 8:00 o'clock that night in the house of Mrs. Bayongan which is only
250 meters away from the scene of the crime. Granting, for the sake of argument, but without
admitting, that they were already sleeping at 8:00 o'clock in the house of Mrs. Bayongan, Corazon
Bagabag clearly stated that her father was gunned down at sunset which is approximately between
6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, hence, the accused Tobias, Berras and Bides could have committed the
crime and went home to sleep in the house of Mrs. Bayongan after the commission of the crime.
According to Pedro Bides, the house of Mrs. Bayongan is only 250 meters away from the house of the
victim. Second, the three accused have failed miserably to present the testimony of Mrs. Bayongan,
the owner of the house where they slept that night to corroborate or bolster their defense of alibi. (Pp.
27A-28A, Annex of Appellants' Brief.)

xxx xxx xxx

Nemesio Talingdan, alias Oming, the last of the accused, also in his defense of alibi, stated that on
June 22, 1967, he accompanied Mayor Gregorio Banawa of Sallapadan to Bangued, together with
policeman Cresencio Martinez for the purpose of attending a cursillo in Bangued They started in
 Sallapadan in the early morning of June 22, 1967 and arrived in Bangued the same day. According to
him, he went to accompany the mayor to the cursillo house near the Bangued Cathedral and after
conducting the mayor to the cursillo house, he went to board in the house of the cousin of Mayor
Banawa near the Filoil Station at Bangued, Abra. From that time, he never saw the mayor until after
they went home to Sallapadan on June 26th.

This kind of alibi could not gain much weight because he could have returned anytime on the evening
of June 22 or anytime before the commission of the offense to Sallapadan and commit the crime on
the 24th at sunset, then returned to Bangued, Abra to fetch the mayor and bring him back to
Sallapadan on the 26th.

The irony of this defense of alibi is that the mayor who was alleged to have been accompanied by
witness-accused is still living and very much alive. As a matter of fact, Mayor Gregorio Banawa is still
the mayor of Sallapadan, Abra, and also policeman Cresencio Martinez, another policeman who
accompanied the mayor to Bangued, is also still living and still a policeman of Sallapadan. Why were
not the mayor and the policeman presented to corroborate or deny the testimony of Nemesio
Talingdan?

Conrado B. Venus, Municipal Judge of Penarrubia Abra, and a member of the Cursillo Movement, was
presented as rebuttal witness for the prosecution. On the witness stand, he stated that he belongs to
Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of Bangued, Abra, and said cursillo was held on October 20 to 23, 1966, at
the St. Joseph Seminary in Galicia, Pidigan Abra, and not on June 23 to 26, 1967. As a matter of fact,
Mayor Banawa of Sallapadan also attended the cursillo held on October 20 to 23, 1966, as could be
seen in his 'Guide Book' where the signature of Gregorio Banawa appears because they both attended
Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of Bangued.

(To) this testimony of the rebuttal witness belies partly, if not in full, the testimony of accused Nemesio
Talingdan. (Pp. 29A-30A, Annex of Appellants' Brief.)

Coming now to the particular case of appellant Teresa Domogma, as to whom the Solicitor General has submitted a
recommendation of acquittal, We find that she is not as wholly innocent in law as she appears to the Counsel of the
People. It is contended that there is no evidence proving that she actually joined in the conspiracy to kill her husband
because there is no showing of 'actual cooperation" on her part with her co-appellants in their culpable acts that led to
his death. If at all, what is apparent, it is claimed, is "mere cognizance, acquiescence or approval" thereof on her part,
which it is argued is less than what is required for her conviction as a conspirator per People vs. Mahlon, 99 Phil. 1068.
We do not see it exactly that way.

True it is that the proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt, for which reason,
sue cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants. Indeed, she had no hand at all in the actual shooting of her
husband. Neither is it clear that she helped directly in the planning and preparation thereof, albeit We are convinced
that she knew it was going to be done and did not object. (U.S. vs. Romulo, 15 Phil. 408, 411-414.) It is not definitely
shown that she masterminded it either by herself alone or together with her co-appellant Talingdan. At best, such
conclusion could be plain surmise, suspicion and conjecture, not really includible. After all, she had been having her
own unworthy ways with him for quite a long time, seemingly without any need of his complete elimination. Why go to
so much trouble for something she was already enjoying, and not even very surreptitiously? In fact, the only remark
Bernardo had occasion to make to Teresa one time was "If you become pregnant, the one in your womb is not my
child." The worst he did to her for all her faults was just to slap her.

But this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in the record morally convincing proof that
she is at the very least an accessory to the offense committed by her co-accused. She was inside the room when her
husband was shot. As she came out after the shooting, she inquired from Corazon if she was able to recognize the
assailants of her father. When Corazon Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits,
Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she went to the extent of warning her,
"Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody." Later, when the peace officers who repaired to their
house to investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the information given to her by Corazon, she claimed
she had no suspects in mind. In other words, whereas, before the actual shooting of her husband, she was more or
less passive in her attitude regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after Bernardo
was killed, she became active in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or
assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an accessory after the fact under
paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.

As already indicated earlier, the offense committed by appellants was murder qualified by treachery. It being obvious
that appellants deliberately chose nighttime to suddenly and without warning assault their victim, taking advantage of
their number and arms, it is manifest that they employed treachery to insure success in attaining their malevolent
objective. In addition, it is indisputable that appellants acted with evident premeditation. Talingdan made the threat to
kill Bernardo Thursday night, then he met with his co-accused to work out their conspiracy Friday and again on
Saturday evening just before the actual shooting. In other words, they had motive Talingdan's taking up the cudgels for
his paramour, Teresa and enough time to meditate, and desist, if they were not resolved to proceed with their
objective. Finally, they committed the offense in the dwelling of the offended party.

In these premises, the crime committed by the male appellants being murder, qualified by treachery, and attended by
the generic aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and that the offense was committed in the dwelling of
the offended party, the Court has no alternative under the law but to impose upon them the capital penalty. However,
as to appellant Teresa, she is hereby found guilty only as an accessory to the same murder.
WHEREFORE, with the above finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan
Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides of the crime of murder with two aggravating circumstances, without any
mitigating circumstance to offset them, they are each hereby sentenced to DEATH to be executed in accordance with
law. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the same murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional  as minimum to eight (8) years
of prision mayor  as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Barredo, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Antonio, Fernando, JJ., took no part.

B. Mental Element (Mens rea)

a. Deliberate intent (Dolo)

3. Manuel v. People

G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877,
affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of
bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.

Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to
RUBYLUS [GAÑA] and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not
know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaña].

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña before Msgr.
Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.4 He met the private complainant
Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days
looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards,
Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite
Tina’s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions,
assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was
assured by them that their son was still single.

Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996
before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.5 It appeared in their
marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."

The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they were able to build
their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and
went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he
would slap her.6 Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped
giving financial support.

Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila
where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage
contract.7 She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when
they exchanged their own vows.8

For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a Guest Relations
Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña, but
she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed that
she had a "love-bite" on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was "single" in
his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know
that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.

Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit suicide
unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three
months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid
because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.

After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. He
was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years,
as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of ₱200,000.00 by way of
moral damages, plus costs of suit.9

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardo’s belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved
because of his first wife’s 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling
of this Court in People v. Bitdu,10 the trial court further ruled that even if the private complainant had known that
Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he
married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time
that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He
insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for
a felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his
overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court should have taken into account Article
390 of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v.
Peñalosa11  and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.12

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardo’s defense of good faith and reliance on the Court’s
ruling in United States v. Enriquez13  were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which
amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco,14 the OSG further posited
that as provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties
thereto should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the private
complainant’s knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against the State
and not just against the private complainant.

However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court was erroneous and sought the
affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty of
the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of
the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant,
there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaña’s presumptive death as the absent spouse. The appellate court
cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v. Tan15  and Domingo v. Court of Appeals16  to support its ruling. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect,
as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision
is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.17

Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER’S
FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE
WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE
FAMILY CODE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF
PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.18

The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the felony, i.e., that the marriage
has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaña had been "absent" for 21 years since
1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out that, under the first
paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still
alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on
legal presumption of death with respect to succession.

The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by operation of law upon the satisfaction
of two requirements: the specified period and the present spouse’s reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He
insists that he was able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of
her whereabouts or whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death of
Gaña had arisen by operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The
petitioner concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.

The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390 of the Civil Code, the rule therein
on legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that
there must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death would apply. He further asserts
that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a judicial declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.

The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral damages in favor of the private
complainant. The private complainant was a "GRO" before he married her, and even knew that he was already
married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her financial support. He also pointed out that she had an
illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house.

In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA affirming the petitioner’s conviction is in
accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this
Court in Republic v. Nolasco.19

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:

Art. 349. Bigamy. –  The penalty of prision mayor  shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:

El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legítimamente disuelto el anterior, será castigado con la
pena de prision mayor. xxx

The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by
law.20 The phrase "or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were
of the impression that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death after an absence of
a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification
for bigamy."21

For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been
legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully
dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.22 It is
essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would
be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.23 Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the
second marriage must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element of a
felony by dolo.24 On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the
existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not
matter whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects until lawfully
dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.25 As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of Appeals26  and Mercado v.
Tan,27 under the Family Code of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.

In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and declared that there are three
(3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention constituting the
felony of the act.28 He explained that:

… This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in the principle antedating all
codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no willfulness there is no crime.
There is no willfulness if the subject believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported
by very strong evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person who
contracts a second marriage in the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many
years that have elapsed since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her, cannot
be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent intent which is one of the essential elements of
the crime.29

As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent.
Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed
voluntary.30 Although the words "with malice" do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is
included in the word "voluntary."31

Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or justification from which
another suffers injury.32 When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed
by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional.33 Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man
intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and such
presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence.34

For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil
intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.35

In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975, and such marriage was
not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.36 The prosecution also proved that the
petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a
general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such
defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is
presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was
of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have
adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also
constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married
the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner,
however, failed to discharge his burden.

The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on
the proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The
requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as
protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged
and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.

The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, the "State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a
social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the marital
relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes
specified by law.37 The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort
or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A
civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the
welfare of the community.

In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving State. On
marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life and
death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious that
the law may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first
spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent spouse38 after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One
such means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse
as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of the first
spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what they wish to be true," is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second
marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the existence of
the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but
by the subjective condition of individuals.39 Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit
second marriages.40 Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not
only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial
cognizance,41 namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.

The petitioner’s sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.

Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide –

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the absentee still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years.
If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of
for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for
four years.

The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of judicial declaration.42 However, Article 41 of
the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years  and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the
Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.43

With the effectivity of the Family Code,44 the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil
Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage,
he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee
spouse,45 without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As explained by this Court
in Armas v. Calisterio:46

In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be
considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have
been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in
Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration.
The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent
marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.

The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second
marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize civil law and
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court and
comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.

As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela47 that, for purposes of the marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code
has for its sole purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For
the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse
to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of
the celebration of the marriage.48 In In Re Szatraw,49 the Court declared that a judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead, because he or she had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum  only,
subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final; and that proof of actual death of the person
presumed dead being unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such
particular fact finally determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead
because he or she had not been heard from in seven years cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of
the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains
subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit
to the petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and
meaningless act.50 The Court also took note that a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent
spouse may even be made in collusion with the other spouse.

In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,51 the Court declared that the words "proper proceedings" in Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which
refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person. In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines,52 the
Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil Code, the courts are authorized
to declare the presumptive death of a person after an absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings
in Szatraw, Lukban  and Jones.

Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that "the provision of Article 349 or "before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in the proper proceedings" is erroneous and
should be considered as not written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not been
legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been declared presumptively dead in a proper court proceedings,
the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is not true.53 A second marriage is bigamous
only when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not present.54 Former Senator
Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of dissolution or judicial
declaration of absence but even with such decree, a second marriage in good faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits
that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give rise to bigamy.55 Former Justice Luis B.
Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a
second marriage.56

The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for the requisite
period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the
presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have
to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.57 Such judgment is
proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse
is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by
former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:

… Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing that the present spouse must first
ask for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she
marries again.

The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the present spouse contracting a
second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latter’s reappearance. This provision is intended to protect
the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code because with the
judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a
second marriage is already established.58

Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that things are now
clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible
clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The judgment declaring
an absentee as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absentee.

Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause "before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead x x x" should be disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With
the new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.59

According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on Criminal Law, in some
cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death,
which could then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate.60 Before such declaration, it was
held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in good faith.61 Justice Regalado opined that
there were contrary views because of the ruling in Jones  and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which,
however, appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, "which requires a summary hearing for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse before the other spouse can remarry."

Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.62

On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for awarding moral damages in favor of
the private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in any of the cases
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate court
failed to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc,63 where an award of moral damages for bigamy was disallowed. In any
case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.

The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding that she adduced evidence to
prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not included in those cases enumerated in Article 2219
of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages against the petitioner. The appellate court ruled
that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:

... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daños, ello se debió indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del Código
Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicación de daños morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto, violación, adulterio o
concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeración el delito de bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente,
base legal para adjudicar aquí los daños de ₱5,000.00 arriba mencionados. 64

The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and the law. The OSG, likewise,
avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.

The Court rules against the petitioner.

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.65 An award for
moral damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical,
mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually
established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of
the Civil Code.66

Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases enumerated in Article 2219,
paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover
moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article
in the order named.

Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party has
suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would not have been any
reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 221967 and analogous cases (which refer to those cases bearing
analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling, in other respects, as in form, proportion, relation,
etc.)68

Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender may be
ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the
private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.

According to Article 19, "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." This provision contains what is commonly referred to as
the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s
rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. The standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone his
due; and observe honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b)
exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.69

Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own
sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.70 If
the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of
the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." On the other hand, Article 21 provides that "any
person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for damages." The latter provision
is adopted to remedy "the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold
number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes." Whether or
not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil
Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the circumstances of each case.71
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured her that he
was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and his parents made the
same assurance – that he was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in
the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her duties as his wife,
believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned
her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another before they  were married.

Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud
consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of
being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single
man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out
was not her lawful husband.72

The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the
private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any
physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,73 the New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled:

xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries, damages for shame, humiliation, and
mental anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper &
James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all recognize that where the wrong is willful rather than negligent,
recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences though they consist of shame, humiliation,
and mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma v.
Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here
the defendant’s conduct was not merely negligent, but was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in
shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did ensue the plaintiff became entitled
not only to compensatory but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v
Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, "Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517
(1957). The plaintiff testified that because of the defendant’s bigamous marriage to her and the attendant publicity she
not only was embarrassed and "ashamed to go out" but "couldn’t sleep" but "couldn’t eat," had terrific headaches" and
"lost quite a lot of weight." No just basis appears for judicial interference with the jury’s reasonable allowance of $1,000
punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App. Div.74 1955).

The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as
a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.

Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from claiming
moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would not prevent her from recovery. As held
in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:75

Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in consequence of such
misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right of
action against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by him in consequence of his having done such act.
Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the
court said that a false representation by the defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff
was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed that the fact that she
had unintentionally violated the law or innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be no bar to the
action, but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her
being led by the promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband and to
assume and act in a relation and condition that proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for such an injury were
held to be recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep.
336.

Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of the law by
herself but upon the defendant’s misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed, innocently on her part, were
but one of the incidental results of the defendant’s fraud for which damages may be assessed.

[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage relation have been maintained in
other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99
Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33
L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery where the circumstances are such that the
plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal action was induced solely by the defendant’s
misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of the law by herself. Such
considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the enforcement of a contract illegal on
its face or to one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958.76

Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of ₱200,000.00 for moral damages to
be just and reasonable.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

i. Elements of dolo

ii. General and specific intent

4. People v. Puno

G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias  "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias "Enry," accused-
appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Edward C. Castañeda for accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J.:

The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants committed the felony of kidnapping for
ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information; or a violation of Presidential
Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), as contended by the Solicitor General and found
by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
claimed by the defense.

In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, as Criminal
Case No. Q-57404 thereof, appellants were charged with kidnapping for ransom allegedly committed in the following
manner:

That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then private individuals, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap and carry away one MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the
purpose of extorting ransom, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in such amount
as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code.1

On a plea of not guilty when arraigned,2 appellants went to trial which ultimately resulted in a judgment promulgated on
September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a highway, punishable under
Presidential Decree No. 532, with this disposition in the  fallo thereof:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO PUNO and ENRIQUE
AMURAO GUILTY as principals of robbery with extortion committed on a highway and, in accordance
with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail term of reclusion perpetua.

The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the offended private victim Ma.
Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P3,000.00 as temperate
damages.3

Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in convicting them under Presidential
Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly charged with a crime therein; (2) in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120
of the Rules of Court since the charge under said presidential decree is not the offense proved and cannot rightly be
used as the offense proved which is necessarily included in the offense charged.4

For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following counter-statement of facts in the
People's brief5 which adopted the established findings of the court a quo, documenting the same with page references
to the transcripts of the proceedings, and which we note are without any substantial divergence in the version proffered
by the defense.

This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on January 13, 1988 by the two
accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).

Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called Nika
Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her husband does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).

At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal
driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local
election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to
 Pampanga on an emergency (something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic) take his
place (Id., pp. 8-9).

Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the Mercedes Benz
of her husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After the car turned right in (sic) a corner of Araneta
Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver (Id., pp.
9-10).

Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went onto where Ma.
Socorro was seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a gun at her (Id., p. 10).

Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you know, I want to get
money from you." She said she has money inside her bag and they may get it just so they will let her
go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and was taken (Id., pp. 11-14).

Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to give them that but
would they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati where the money is? The car went
about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun
was menacingly storing (sic) at her soft bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA and
threatened her (Id., p.15).

The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he is called, asked
Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in
denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to swallow a
pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-23).

Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and turned the car
again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out of the car then, crossed to the
other side of the superhighway and, after some vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag down
a fish vendors van. Her dress had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the
ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).

On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM (Id., p. 27).

Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma. Socorro's
P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-13)6

As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of complainant, except that, according to
appellant Puno, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step out of the car. He even
slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride, and he claimed that she fell
down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway.7

Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga and parked
it near a barangay or police outpost. They thereafter ate at a restaurant and divided their loot.8 Much later, when he
took the stand at the trial of this case, appellant Puno tried to mitigate his liability by explaining that he was in dire need
of money for the medication of his ulcers.9

On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three theories have been advanced as to what
crime was committed by appellants. The trial court cohered with the submission of the defense that the crime could not
be kidnapping for ransom as charged in the information. We likewise agree.

Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the crime for which the
accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant offenses, and the same
holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and specific intent in perpetrating
the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.

Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential to determine the specific nature
of the crime as, for instance, whether a murder was committed in the furtherance of rebellion in which case the latter
absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his own personal motives for committing the murder independent of
his membership in the rebellious movement in which case rebellion and murder would constitute separate
offenses. 10 Also, where injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who was not then in the actual performance of
his official duties, the motive of the offender assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of the previous
performance of official duties by the person in authority, the crime would be direct assault; otherwise, it would only be
physical injuries. 11

In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they
committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of
threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants, without any other esoteric qualification or dubious
justification. Appellant Puno, as already stated, candidly laid the blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in
his own testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam (sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I know your family very well
and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you doing this?" I told her "Mam, (sic), because I need money
and I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic) advances from our office but they refused to give me any bale
(sic). . . ." 12
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the victim, we can rely on
the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty, 13 and not where such restraint of
her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders.
Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, 14 and consistently reiterated thereafter, 15 it has been held that the
detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the
primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they
committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or
serious illegal detention.

That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her personal liberty is
clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional testimony of appellant Puno:

Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag containing the P7,000.00 to
your nephew?

A Santo Domingo Exit.

Q And how about the checks, where were you already when the checks was (sic)
being handed to you?

A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the checks.

Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it that you still did not allow her
to stay at Sto. Domingo, after all you already received the money and the checks?

A Because we had an agreement with her that when she signed the checks we will
take her to her house at Villa (sic) Verde.

Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at Valle Verde when she is (sic)
already given you the checks?

A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to my mind that if we reach
Balintawak or some other place along the way we might be apprehended by the
police. So when we reached Santa Rita exit I told her "Mam (sic) we will already stop
and allow you to get out of the car." 16

Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the nature of ransom, considering the
immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money,
price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from
captivity. 17 It can hardly be assumed that when complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from her at
gun point, what she gave under the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in the concept of ransom in
the law of kidnapping. These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a
robbery or of which she was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the crime committed is
robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes
the highway robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.

The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:

The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the allegation in the information that
the victim was carried away and extorted for more money. The accused admitted that the robbery was
carried on from Araneta Avenue up to the North Superhighway. They likewise admitted that along the
way they intimidated Ma. Socorro to produce more money that she had with her at the time for which
reason Ma. Socorro, not having more cash, drew out three checks. . . .

In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes committed is that punishable under
P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) under which where robbery on the
highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty is reclusion perpetua.18

The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing clause in Section 5 of said decree,
"P.D. No- 532 is a modification of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission consequently necessitate an evaluation of the
correct interplay between and the legal effects of Presidential Decree No. 532 on the pertinent Provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, on which matter we are not aware that any definitive pronouncement has as yet been made.

Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification of Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is
evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery" invariably uses this term in the
alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that is, as "highway robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our
previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law, that highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are
synonymous. 20
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to put our discussion thereon in the proper
context and perspective, we find that a band of brigands, also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a
gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of
our country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was
inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed. 21

The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on the subject
and are of continuing validity:

The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The heart of
the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three armed persons for the purpose
indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be
necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually
committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is
proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated by
art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily
organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be
brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by a band of more than three
armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of
art. 306, it is required that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar." 22 (Emphasis
supplied).

In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular
robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants. 23 The martial law
legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives announced therein, could not
have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted the same, there being no indication to the
contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the
time when and the circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous exposition or
construction is the best and strongest in the law. 24

Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated
by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of
robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the preambular clauses thereof, to
wit:

WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still committing
acts of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who
travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation
and stunting the economic and social progress of the people:

WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage which are among

the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts of
depredaions by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all
obstacles to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people. (Emphasis
supplied).

Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by the accused as their
specific victim could be considered as committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one
place to another," and which single act of depredation would be capable of "stunting the economic and social progress
of the people" as to be considered "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all
countries," and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and community progress
of the people, " such that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and
punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.

True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised Penal Code by
increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses stated therein when committed on the highways
and without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the decree does not require that there be
at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers; and the presumption in the Code that said accused are
brigands if they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree. But, and this we broadly underline, the
essence of brigandage under the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only
against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims anywhere on the
highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as the concept of brigandage which is maintained in
Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it was under its aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for
that matter, under the old Brigandage Law. 25

Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the crime of robbery committed by
appellants should be covered by the said amendatory decree just because it was committed on a highway. Aside from
what has already been stressed regarding the absence of the requisite elements which thereby necessarily puts the
offense charged outside the purview and intendment of that presidential issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a literal
interpretation that any unlawful taking of property committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an
elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not be subordinated to the letter
thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary caveat that he who considers merely the
letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning, 26 and the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in
favor of the milder form of liability in case of doubt.

If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the determinant for the application of
Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be farfetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of
our substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning, we apprehend that
the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to
avoid absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at gun
point by the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle at the time of the unlawful
taking necessarily put the offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the
categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? 27 And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter of the
unlawful asportation is large cattle which are incidentally being herded along and traversing the same highway and are
impulsively set upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely disregard the
explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28

We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in the present case was committed
inside a car which, in the natural course of things, was casually operating on a highway, is not within the situation
envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that particular provision precisely defines
"highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived and
committed by appellants in this case does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage.

Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined in Article 293 and punished
under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with  prision correccional  in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period. Appellants have indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their concerted acts
evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose. In the determination of their respective liabilities, the
aggravating circumstances of craft 29 shall be appreciated against both appellants and that of abuse of confidence shall
be further applied against appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor of either of them. At any rate, the
intimidation having been made with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period as
decreed by Article 295 of the Code.

We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the crime of simple robbery upon
an information charging them with kidnapping for ransom, since the former offense which has been proved is
necessarily included in the latter offense with which they are charged. 30 For the former offense, it is sufficient that the
elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal property through intimidation of the owner or possessor
thereof shall be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in
an information where it is charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of
the things subject of the robbery. 31

These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed against appellants which, as formulated,
allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped and extorted ransom from the complainant. Such
allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by necessary implication, clearly convey that the taking of
complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed as ransom) was unlawful, with intent to gain, and through
intimidation. It cannot be logically argued that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does not include but could
negate the presence of any of the elements of robbery through intimidation of persons. 32

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is rendered
CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno of robbery as Punished in
Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING on each of them an
indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years
of  prision mayor, as maximum, and jointly and severally pay the offended party, Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the
amounts of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages, with costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

5. People v. Delim

G.R. No. 142773             January 28, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM, MANUEL DELIM alias "BONG" (At Large), ROBERT DELIM (At Large), and
RONALD DELIM alias "BONG", accused-appellants.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision,1 dated January 14, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46,
Urdaneta City, finding accused appellants Marlon Delim, Leon Delim and Ronald Delim guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The court also ordered accused-
appellants to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim the sums of P75,000.00 as moral damages and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Accused-appellants Marlon, Ronald and Leon, together with Manuel alias "Bong" and Robert, all surnamed Delim,
were indicted for murder under an Information dated May 4, 1999 which reads:

"That on or about January 23, 1999, in the evening at Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with short firearms barged-in and entered the
house of Modesto Delim and once inside with intent to kill, treachery, evident premedidation (sic), conspiring
with one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold, hogtie, gag with a piece of
cloth, brought out and abduct Modesto Delim, accused Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house
guarded and prevented the wife and son of Modesto Delim from helping the latter, thereafter with abuse of
superior strength stabbed and killed said Modesto Delim, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659."2

Only accused-appellants Marlon (Bongbong), Leon and Ronald, all surnamed Delim, were apprehended. Accused
Robert and Manuel remain at-large.

At their arraignment, Marlon, Ronald and Leon, with the assistance of their counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.

At the trial, the prosecution established the following relevant facts3 —

Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers. They are the uncles of Leon Delim and Ronald Delim. Modesto Manalo
Bantas, the victim, was an Igorot and a carpenter. He took the surname Delim after he was "adopted" by the father of
Marlon, Manuel and Robert. However, Modesto's wife, Rita, an illiterate, and their 16-year old son, Randy, continued
using Manalo Bantas as their surname. Modesto, Rita and Randy considered Marlon, Robert, Ronald, Manuel and
Leon as their relatives. Manuel and Leon were the neighbors of Modesto. Marlon, Robert and Ronald used to visit
Modesto and his family. Modesto and his family and the Delim kins resided in Barangay Bila, Sison, Pangasinan.

On January 23, 1999, at around 6:30 in the evening, Modesto, Rita and Randy were preparing to have their supper in
their home. Joining them were Modesto and Rita's two young grandchildren, aged 5 and 7 years old. They were about
to eat their dinner when Marlon, Robert and Ronald suddenly barged into the house and closed the door. Each of the
three intruders was armed with a short handgun. Marlon poked his gun at Modesto while Robert and Ronald
simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was placed in the mouth of Modesto.4 Marlon, Robert
and Ronald herded Modesto out of the house on their way towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Rita and
Randy were warned by the intruders not to leave the house. Leon and Manuel, who were also armed with short
handguns, stayed put by the door to the house of Modesto and ordered Rita and Randy to stay where they were. Leon
and Manuel left the house of Modesto only at around 7:00 a.m. the following day, January 24, 1999.

As soon as Leon and Manuel had left, Randy rushed to the house of his uncle, Darwin Niño, at Sitio Labayog, informed
the latter of the incident the night before and sought his help for the retrieval of Modesto. Randy was advised to report
the matter to the police authorities. However, Randy opted to first look for his father. He and his other relatives scoured
the vicinity to locate Modesto to no avail. They proceeded to Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan, around 200 meters away from
Modesto's house, to locate Modesto but failed to find him there. On January 25, 1999, Randy and his relatives returned
to the housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan to locate Modesto but again failed to find him there. On January 26,
1999, Randy reported the incident to the police authorities.

At around 3:00 in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, Randy, in the company of his relatives, Nida Pucal, Pepito Pucal,
Bernard Osias and Daniel Delim, returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan and this time they found
Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy area. He was already dead. The cadaver was bloated and in the state of
decomposition. It exuded a bad odor. Tiny white worms swarmed over and feasted on the cadaver. Randy and his
relatives immediately rushed to the police station to report the incident and to seek assistance.

When informed of the discovery of Modesto's cadaver, the local chief of police and SPO2 Jovencio Fajarito and other
policemen rushed to the scene and saw the cadaver under the thick bushes. Pictures were taken of the cadaver.5 Rita
and Randy divulged to the police investigators the names and addresses of Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel,
whom they claimed were responsible for the death of Modesto. Rita and Randy were at a loss why the five malefactors
seized Modesto and killed him. Rita and Randy gave their respective sworn statements to the police
investigators.6 Police authorities proceeded to arrest Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Manuel and Leon but failed to find them
in their respective houses. The police officers scoured the mountainous parts of Barangays Immalog and Labayog to
no avail.

The cadaver was autopsied by Dr. Maria Fe L. De Guzman who prepared her autopsy report, which reads:

"SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL FINDINGS:

- Body - both upper extremities are flexed
- both lower extremities are flexed
- (+) body decomposition
- (+) worms coming out from injuries
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, pre-auricular area, right
- 20 x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular areas, right
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, below middle nose, directed upward (POE)
- 30 x 40 ml. GSW, mid parieto — occipital area (POEx)
 - 2 x 1 cms. lacerated wound, right cheek
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, axillary area, left
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect M/3rd left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect D/3rd, left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect M/3rd, left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound medial aspect D/3rd, left arm
- #3; 1 x 1 cm. in line with each other, stabbed would, medial aspect, M/3rd, left
forearm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect, D/3rd, left forearm
- 10 x 6 cms. Inflamed scrotum
- penis inflamed
SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:
- no significant internal findings
CAUSE OF DEATH:
- GUN SHOT WOUND, HEAD."7

The stab wounds sustained by Modesto on his left arm and forearm were defensive wounds. The police investigators
were able to confirm that Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel had no licenses for their firearms.8

Records of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Baguio City show that Marlon had pending cases for
robbery in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in Criminal Case No. 16193-R, and for robbery in band in Criminal
Cases Nos. 9801 and 9802 pending with the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.9

To exculpate themselves, Marlon, Ronald and Leon interposed denial and alibi.10

Ronald claimed that on January 23, 1999, he, his wife and children, his mother, his brothers and sisters were in their
house at Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan about two kilometers away from Modesto's house.

He denied having been in the house of Modesto on January 23, 1999 and of abducting and killing him. He theorized
that Rita and Randy falsely implicated him upon the coaching of Melchor Javier who allegedly had a quarrel with him
concerning politics.

Leon for his part averred that on January 23, 1999, he was in the house of his sister, Hermelita Estabillo at No. 55-B,
Salet, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte where he had been living since 1997 after leaving Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan.
Since then, he had been working for Sally Asuncion at a hollow-block factory in that city where he was a stay-in worker.

Sally Asuncion corroborated Leon's alibi. She testified that Leon Delim never went home to his hometown in
Pangasinan during his employment. His sister, Hermelita Estabillo, likewise averred that on January 23, 1999, his
brother was at her house to give her his laundry. She claimed that the distance between Laoag City and Bila, Sison,
Pangasinan can be traversed in six hours by bus. Leon presented a Barangay Certificate to prove that he was a
resident of Laoag City from January 1998 up to February 1999.11

Marlon asserted that he was on vacation in Dumaguete City from December 26, 1998 up to January 29, 1999. During
his stay there, he lived with his sister, Francisca Delim. Upon his return to Manila on January 29, 1999, he immediately
proceeded to Baguio to visit his cousin. Marlon denied setting foot in Bila, Sison, Pangasinan after his sojourn in
Dumaguete City.

The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellants guilty of murder. The dispositive portion of the trial court's
decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION beyond reasonable doubt is hereby rendered against Ronald
Delim, Marlon Delim and Leon Delim (for) the commission of Aggravated Murder, an offense defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659 and the Court sentences
Marlon Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon Delim to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to be implemented in the manner
as provided for by law; the Court likewise orders the accused, jointly and solidarily, to indemnify the heirs of
Modesto Delim the sum of P75,000.00 as moral damages, plus the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit the entire records of this case to the Honorable
Supreme Court, and to prepare the mittimus fifteen (15) days from date of promulgation.

The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Urdaneta District Jail, Urdaneta City is hereby
ordered to transmit the persons of Marlon, Ronald and Leon, all surnamed Delim to the New Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa City, fifteen days from receipt of this decision.

SO ORDERED."12

The trial court appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance and of taking advantage of superior strength,
nighttime and use of unlicensed firearms as separate of aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime.
Marlon, Ronald and Leon, in their appeal brief, assail the decision alleging that:
"I

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANTS'
DEFENSE OF ALIBI."13

Before resolving the merits of the case at bar, we first resolve the matter of whether the crime charged in the
Information is murder or kidnapping. During the deliberation, some distinguished members of the Court opined that
under the Information, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are charged with kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code and not with murder in its aggravated form in light of the allegation therein that the accused "willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously grab(bed), h(e)ld, hog-tie(d), gag(ged), with a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct(ed) Modesto
Delim (while) Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house (and) guarded and prevented the wife and son of
Modesto Delim from helping the latter." They submit that the foregoing allegation constitutes the act of deprivation of
liberty of the victim, the gravamen in the crime of kidnapping. They contend that the fact that the Information went
further to charge accused with the killing of the victim should be of no moment, the real nature of the criminal charge
being determined not from the caption or the preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the law alleged
to have been violated — these being conclusions of law — but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information. They further submit that since the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of Marlon, Ronald and
Leon to kill Modesto, they are not criminally liable for the death of the victim but only for kidnapping the victim.

It bears stressing that in determining what crime is charged in an information, the material inculpatory facts recited
therein describing the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated are controlling. Where the specific intent of
the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged such specific intent must be alleged in the information and proved
by the prosecution. A decade ago, this Court held in People v. Isabelo Puno, et al.,14 that for kidnapping to exist, there
must be indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the malefactor is to deprive the offended party of his liberty
and not where such restraint of his freedom of action is merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the malefactor. This Court further held:

"x x x Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, and consistently reiterated thereafter, it has been held that
the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time
but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such
other offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not
constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention."15

If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation of the victim's liberty
does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act to the killing, and hence, is merged into, or
absorbed by, the killing of the victim.16 The crime committed would either be homicide or murder.

What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the information or criminal complaint that
is determinative of what crime the accused is charged with — that of murder or kidnapping.

Philippine and American penal laws have a common thread on the concept of specific intent as an essential element of
specific intent crimes. Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances indicate that
an offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or
failure to act.17 Specific intent involves a state of the mind. It is the particular purpose or specific intention in doing the
prohibited act. Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for a crime
requiring specific intent.18 Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes.

Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred from the
circumstances of the actions of the accused as established by the evidence on record.19

Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which prompts the accused
to engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution need
not prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt
and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the crime charged such as
murder.20 The history of crimes shows that murders are generally committed from motives comparatively trivial.21 Crime
is rarely rational. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the
victim of his/her liberty. If there is no motive for the crime, the accused cannot be convicted for kidnapping.22 In
kidnapping for ransom, the motive is ransom. Where accused kills the victim to avenge the death of a loved one, the
motive is revenge.

In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the malefactors in barging into the
house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was seized precisely to kill him with the attendant modifying
circumstances. The act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto was merely incidental to their primary purpose of
killing him. Moreover, there is no specific allegation in the information that the primary intent of the malefactors was to
deprive Modesto of his freedom or liberty and that killing him was merely incidental to kidnapping.23 Irrefragably then,
the crime charged in the Information is Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and not Kidnapping under
Article 268 thereof.

The threshold issue that now comes to fore is whether or not the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder.

In criminal prosecutions, the prosecution is burdened to prove the guilt of the accused beyond cavil of doubt. The
prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the accused.
The proof against the accused must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment.24

In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things: first, the
criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the commission of the act.25 Wharton says that corpus delicti includes
two things: first, the objective; second, the subjective element of crimes.26 In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases,
the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by
the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c)
that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the
death.27 To prove the felony of homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial,
that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may
consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the
victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the
victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.

The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by
circumstantial or presumptive evidence.28

In the case at bar, the prosecution adduced the requisite quantum of proof of corpus delicti. Modesto sustained five (5)
gunshot wounds. He also sustained seven (7) stab wounds,29 defensive in nature. The use by the malefactors of
deadly weapons, more specifically handguns and knives, in the killing of the victim as well as the nature, number and
location of the wounds sustained by said victim are evidence of the intent by the malefactors to kill the victim with all
the consequences flowing therefrom.30 As the State Supreme Court of Wisconsin held in Cupps v. State:31

"This rule, that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural consequences of his own
acts, is applied even in capital cases. Because men generally act deliberately and by the determination of their
own will, and not from the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes that every man always thus acts, until
the contrary appears. Therefore, when one man is found to have killed another, if the circumstances of the
homicide do not of themselves show that it was not intended, but was accidental, it is presumed that the death
of the deceased was designed by the slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise."

The prosecution did not present direct evidence to prove the authors of the killing of Modesto. It relied on circumstantial
evidence to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of accused-appellants of murder. Circumstantial evidence consists
of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to
reason and common experience.32 What was once a rule of account respectability is now entombed in Section 4, Rule
133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which states that circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or
presumptive evidence, is sufficient as anchor for a judgment of conviction if the following requisites concur:

"x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been
established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt."33

The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of circumstantial evidence,
and the proof of each being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to
but one conclusion: the guilt of accused for the offense charged.34 For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to
support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.35 If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the
guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of
the prosecution.

In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of circumstantial evidence to prove that accused-
appellants, in confabulation with their co-accused, conspired to kill and did kill Modesto:

1. Randy Bantas testified that Marlon and Ronald barged into the house of Modesto, each armed with a handgun.
Marlon poked his gun on Modesto while Ronald hog-tied Modesto. They then seized Modesto and herded him out of
his house:

"FISCAL TOMBOC: What were you doing then at that time in your house?

A         We were eating, sir.

Q         You said we, who were your companions eating then at that time?
A         My father, my mother and the two children and myself, sir.

Q         While taking your supper that time, do you recall if there was anything unusual that happened at that
time?

A         When we were about to start to eat three armed men entered our house.

Q         Do you know these three armed men who entered your house?

A         Yes, sir.

Q         Who are they, name them one by one?

A         Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim.

Q         Are these three persons inside the courtroom now?

A         Two of them, sir.

Q         Who are these two who are inside the courtroom?

A         Marlon and Ronald, sir.

Q         Will you please stand up and point to them?

A         (Witness is pointing to a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who, when his name was
asked answered Marlon Delim. Likewise, witness is pointing unto a person seated on the bench inside the
courtroom, who, when his name was asked he answered Ronald Delim).

Q         You said that these two armed persons entered your house, what kind of arm were they carrying at that
time?

A         Short handgun, sir.

Q         When these three armed persons whom you have mentioned, armed with short firearms, what did they
do then when they entered your house?

A         They took my father, sir.

Q         Who took your father?

A         Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim, sir.

Q         When these three persons took your father, what did you do then?

A         None, sir.

COURT: How did they get your father?

A         They poked a gun and brought him outside the house, sir.

FISCAL TOMBOC: Who poked a gun?

A         Marlon Delim, sir.

Q         Again, Mr. Witness, will you point to the person who poked a gun?

A         (Witness is pointing to Malon (sic) Delim, one of the accused).

Q         After bringing your father out from your house, what transpired next?

A         Manuel Delim and Leon Delim said, 'Stay in your house,' and guarded us.

COURT: You said your father was taken out, who?

A         Marlon, Robert and Ronald, sir.

FISCAL TOMBOC: Where did these three persons bring your father?
 A         I do not know where they brought my father, sir.

COURT: Was your father taken inside your house or outside?

A         Inside our house, sir.

Q         You said that Marlon poked a gun at your father, is that correct?

A         Yes, sir.

Q         What did Ronald and Robert do while Marlon was poking his gun to your father?

A         Ronald and Robert were the ones who pulled my father out, sir."36

Randy's account of the incident was corroborated by his mother, Rita, who testified:

"PROSECUTION TOMBOC: You said during the last hearing that on January 23, 1999 at around 6:30 in the
evening while preparing for your supper three (3) armed men entered inside your house, who were these three
(3) men who entered your house?

A         I know, Marlon, Bongbong and Robert, sir.

ATTY. FLORENDO: We just make of record that the witness is taking her time to answer, Your Honor.

PROSECUTOR TOMBOC: You said that Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Bongbong entered your house, are
these three (3) persons who entered your house in Court now?

A         They are here except the other one, sir.

Q         Will you please step down and point to the persons who entered your house?

A         Witness is pointing to Marlon Delim, Robert Delim is not in Court and Bongbong is Ronald Delim.

Q         After these three (3) armed men entered your house, what happened then?

A         My husband was brought out, sir.

Q         What is the name of your husband?

A         Modesto Delim, sir."37

2. Randy said that when Marlon and Ronald barged into their house, Leon, armed with a handgun, acted as a lookout
when he stood guard by the door of the house of Modesto and remained thereat until 7:00 a.m. of the next day:

"FISCAL TOMBOC: When your father was pulled out from your house by these three persons, what did you
and your mother do while these three persons were taking out of your house?

A         We did not do anything because Manuel and Leon Delim guarded us.

COURT: Where, in your house?

A         Yes, sir.

FISCAL TOMBOC: From that very time that your father was pulled out by these three persons Marlon, Robert
and Ronal (sic), where were Leon and Manuel then?

A         They were at the door, sir.

COURT: Why do you know that they were guarding you?

A         Because they were at the door, sir.

FISCAL TOMBOC: What was their appearance that time when these two persons were guarding you, these
Leon and Manuel?

A         They were armed, sir.

Q         What do you mean by armed?

 A         They have gun, sir.

Q         What kind of firearm?

A         Short firearm, sir.

Q         By the way, where are these Leon and Manuel now, if you know?

A         Leon is here, sir.

Q         About Manuel?

A         None, sir.

Q         Will you please stand up and point at Leon, Mr. Witness?

A         (Witness pointed to a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who when his name was
asked, answered, Leon Delim)."38

3. Rita and Randy were ordered by Leon not to leave the house as Ronald and Marlon left the house with Modesto in
tow. Rita and Randy were detained in their house up to 7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 to prevent them from seeking
help from their relatives and police authorities.

4. Randy likewise testified that on January 27, 1999, at about 3:00 p.m., the cadaver of Modesto was found under the
thick bushes in a grassy area in the housing project located about 200 meters away from the house of Modesto. The
cadaver exuded bad odor and was already in the state of decomposition:

"Q         So what did you do then on January 27, where did you look for your father?

A         The same place and at 3:00 o'clock P.M., we were able to find my father.

COURT: Where?

A         At the housing project at Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan, sir.

FISCAL TOMBOC: Do you have companions at that time when you were able to look for your father on
January 27, 1999 at 3:00 o'clock P.M.?

A         Yes, sir.

Q         Who?

A         My Aunt, sir.

Q         What is the name of your Aunt?

A         Nida Pucal, sir.

Q         Who else?

A         Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel Delim, sir.

COURT: When you found your father, what was his condition?

A         He was dead, sir.

COURT: Go ahead.

FISCAL TOMBOC: You said that he was already dead, what was his appearance then when you saw him
dead?

A         He has bad odor, sir, in the state of decompsition (sic)."39

The testimony of Randy was corroborated by Dr. de Guzman who testified that the cadaver of Modesto was in a state
of decomposition, with tiny white worms crawling from his wounds, and that his penis and scrotum were inflamed. The
victim sustained five gunshot wounds and defensive wounds on the left arm and forearm:

"PROS. TOMBOC:

Q         Will you please tell the Honorable Court your findings, Doctora?
 WITNESS:

A         First finding: Upon seeing the cadaver, this is the position of the body, both upper extremities are flexed
and both lower extremities are flexed (Nakakukot).

Q         How many days had already elapsed when you autopsied the cadaver of the victim, Doctora?

A         Four (4) days upon the recovery of the body, sir.

Q         And what was your findings Doctora?

A         The body was already under the state of decomposition, sir, with foul odor and there were so many
worms coming out from the injuries, there were tiny white worms, sir.

Q         What else did you observe Doctora?

A         Upon seeing the cadaver I asked the relative to refer it to the NBI sir. Actually the victim was an igorot
(sic) and they have tradition that they will bury immediately. Whether they like it or not I should do it, sir.

Q         What else Doctora?

A         And the penis was inflammed (sic), the scrotum was also inflammed (sic), sir.

And for the head injuries there was 10 x 10 ml. GSW pre-auricular area, right; there was also 20 ml x 20 ml.
GSW, mandibular area, right; I cannot also determine the exit.

Q         So there were two (2) gunshot wounds (GSW) Doctora?

A         Yes sir.

And there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right; there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW, below middle
nose, directed upward (POE); and there was also 30 x 40 ml. GSW, mid parieto-occipital area (POEx).

Q         How many all in all are the gunshot wound?

A         Five (5) sir.

And also there was 2 x 1 cms. Lacerated wound, right cheek; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, axillary area,
left; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound lateral aspect
D/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound,
medial aspect D/3rd, left arm; and #3; 1 x 1 cm. in line with each other, stabbed wound, medial aspect,
M/3rd, left forearm.

Q         How many stabbed wound are there Doctora?

A         There were seven (7) stabbed wounds, sir.

Q         Those stabbed wounds were defensive wounds, Doctora?

A         Yes sir."40

The state of decomposition of the cadaver, with tiny white worms swarming and feasting on it and the distention of his
scrotum and penis are evidence that the cadaver was in the stage of putrefaction and that the victim had been dead for
a period ranging from three to six days.41 Admittedly, there are variant factors determinative of the exact death of the
victim. An equally persuasive authority states:

"Chronological Sequence of Putrefactive Changes Occurring in Tropical Region:

Time Since Death Condition of the Body
48 hours Ova of flies seen. Trunk bloated. Face discolored and swollen.
Blisters present. Moving maggots seen
72 hours Whole body grossly swollen and disfigured. Hair and nails loose.
Tissues soft and discolored."42

The lapse of two or three to four days from the seizure of the victim in the evening of January 23, 1999 to the discovery
of his cadaver which was already in the state of putrefaction in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, about 200 meters
away from his house, is consistent with and confirmatory of the contention of the prosecution that the victim was killed
precisely by the very malefactors who seized him on January 23, 1999.

5. When police authorities went to the residences of all the malefactors, the latter had flown the coop and were
nowhere to be found:
 "COURT: In connection with this case, you investigated the wife and son of Modesto Delim?

A         Yes, sir.

Q         In the course of the investigation did you come to know who were the suspects?

A         Yes, sir, she elaborated that the suspects were their neighbors, Marlon Delim and his brothers, sir.

Q         What are the names of the brothers?

A         Manuel Delim, Leon Delim I cannot remember the others, sir.

Q         By reason of that information were you able to apprehend any of them for investigation?

A         No, sir.

Q         Why?

A         Because when we were dispatched by the Chief of Police no Delim brothers could be found, they all left
the place, sir.

Q         In what place did you look for the brothers Delim?

A         Within the vicinity, sir.

Q         In what place?

A         Brgy. Bila and the place where the crime was committed in Brgy. Bila and the place where the cadaver
was found in Paldit, sir.

Q         Where did you look for the Delim brothers?

A         Nearby barangays, Immalog, sir.

Q         Wherelse (sic)?

A         Labayog, Sison, sir.

Q         Wherelse?

A         In mountainous part of Immalog, part of Tuba Benguet, sir.

Q         What was the result?

A         Negative result, sir."43

6. Leon was the neighbor of Modesto and Rita while Marlon and Ronald used to go to the house of Modesto and Rita:

"COURT: These Leon and Manuel Delim are they known to you prior to that day, January 23, 1999?

A         Yes, sir, I know them.

Q         Why do you know Manuel and Leon prior to January 23, 1999?

A         They are my neighbors, sir.

Q         How about Marlon, Robert and Bongbong do you know them before January 23, 1999?

A         I know them, sir.

Q         Why do you know them?

A         They used to go to our house, sir.

Q         I noticed that Marlon, Bongbong, Robert, Manuel and Leon are all Delims and your husband's name is
Modesto Delim are they related with each other?

A         Yes, sir."44
The sudden disappearance of Marlon, Ronald and Leon from their houses in Barangay Bila, Sison is strong
circumstantial evidence of their guilt for the death of Modesto. Although flight after the commission of an offense does
not create a legal presumption of guilt, nevertheless, the same is admissible in evidence against them and if not
satisfactorily explained in a manner consistent with their innocence, will tend to show that they, in fact, killed Modesto.45

It is true that the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of the malefactors to abduct and kill Modesto. Indeed,
Randy and Rita testified that they were not aware of any misunderstanding or grudge between Modesto on the one
hand and Marlon, Ronald and Leon and their co-accused on the other before the incident, or any motivation on the part
of the three malefactors to cause harm to Modesto. Nonetheless, it cannot thereby be concluded that a person or
persons other than Marlon, Ronald and Leon were criminally responsible for the death of the victim. It is a matter of
judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes for no reason at all.46 In this case, the
inscrutable facts are that Marlon and Ronald, each of whom was armed with a handgun, forcibly took Modesto from his
house at the gunpoint, hog-tied, put a piece of cloth in his mouth and after Ronald and Marlon had left the house with
Modesto in tow, Rita heard three gunshots or so and the cadaver of Modesto was found concealed under the bushes
and already in a state of putrefaction in the afternoon of January 27, 1999. Modesto sustained several gunshot wounds
and died because of a gunshot wound on the head. The criminal acts and the connection of Marlon, Ronald and Leon
with said acts having been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the act itself furnishes the evidence,
that to its perpetration there was some causes or influences moving the mind.47 The remarkable tapestry intricately
woven by the prosecution should not be trashed simply because the malefactors had no motive to kill Modesto.

Ranged against the evidence of the prosecution, the burden of evidence shifted on Marlon, Ronald and Leon to rebut
the same and explain what happened to the victim after taking him from his house in the evening of January 23, 1999.
They may have freed the victim shortly after taking him, or the victim may have been able to escape and that thereafter
a person or some other persons may have killed him. However, Marlon, Ronald and Leon failed to give any
explanation. Instead, they merely denied having seized and killed the victim and interposed alibi as their defense.

Leon is equally guilty for the death of Modesto because the evidence on record shows that he conspired with accused-
appellants Marlon and Ronald and accused Robert and Manuel in killing the victim.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.48 Conspiracy must be
proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Conspiracy is not presumed. It may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy is
deducible from the acts of the malefactors before, during and after the commission of the crime which are indicative of
a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiment.49 To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there
be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime.50 It is sufficient if, at the time of the
commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. If conspiracy is
established, the act of one is deemed the act of all. It matters not who among the accused actually shot and killed the
victim.51 This is based on the theory of a joint or mutual agency ad hoc for the prosecution of the common plan:

"x x x The acts and declarations of an agent, within the scope of his authority, are considered and treated as
the acts and declarations of his principal. 'What is so done by an agent, is done by the principal, through him,
as his mere instrument.' Franklin Bank of Baltimore v. Pennsylvania D. & M. Steam Navigation Co., 11 G. & J.
28, 33 (1839). 'If the conspiracy be proved to have existed, or rather if evidence be given to the jury of its
existence, the acts of one in furtherance of the common design are the acts of all; and whatever one does in
furtherance of the common design, he does as the agent of the co-conspirators.' R. v. O'Connell, 5 St.Tr.
(N.S.) 1, 710."52

In the eyes of the law, conspirators are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak one voice, they wield one arm
and the law says that the acts, words and declaration of each, while in the pursuit of the common design, are the acts,
words and declarations of all.53

In the case at bar, Marlon, Ronald and Leon arrived together in the house of Modesto, each armed with a handgun.
Marlon and Ronald barged into said house while Leon stood guard by the door thereof. After Marlon and Ronald had
left with Modesto in tow, Leon stood by the door and warned Randy and Rita not to leave the house. Leon stood guard
by the door of the house until 7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 when he left the house. The overt acts of all the
malefactors were so synchronized and executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan or design of all the
malefactors to achieve a common purpose, namely the killing of Modesto. Irrefragably, the tasks assigned to Leon in
the commission of the crime were — (a) to act as a lookout; (b) to ensure that Rita and Randy remain in their house to
prevent them from seeking assistance from police authorities and their relatives before their mission to kill Modesto
shall have been a fait accompli as well as the escape of Marlon and Ronald.54 Patently, Leon, a lookout for the group,
is guilty of the killing of Modesto.55 Leon may not have been at the situs criminis when Modesto was killed by Marlon
and Ronald nevertheless he is a principal by direct participation.56 If part of a crime has been committed in one place
and part in another, each person concerned in the commission of either part is liable as principal. No matter how wide
may be the separation of the conspirators, if they are all engaged in a common plan for the execution of a felony and
all take their part in furtherance of the common design, all are liable as principals. Actual presence is not necessary if
there is a direct connection between the actor and the crime.57

Ronald, Marlon and Leon, however, assail the testimonies of Randy and Rita alleging that the same were marred by
inconsistencies.

1. Randy initially stated that he did not know where the assailants brought his father. Later however, Randy
claimed that the malefactors proceeded to the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan;
 2. Rita on the other hand identified Leon, Marlon and Ronald as those who barged into their house. She later
changed her testimony and declared that it was Robert, together with Marlon and Ronald who barged into the
house;

3. Rita likewise testified that two men stood outside the house guarding them. Later, she testified that after the
three men brought out the victim, the two other accused entered the house and guarded them there;

4. Rita claimed that she went out to look for her husband the next day, or on January 25, 1999, and she was
accompanied by her son Randy. However, Randy testified that he was alone when he looked for his father
from January 24 to 26, 1999.58

We do not agree with Marlon, Ronald and Leon. Case law has it that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration
of the collective testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled
from its findings are accorded by the appellate court great respect, if not conclusive effect, because of its unique
advantage of observing at close range the demeanor, deportment and conduct of the witnesses as they give their
testimonies before the court.

In the present case, the trial court gave credence and full probative weight to the testimonies of the witnesses of the
prosecution. Moreover, there is no evidence on record that Randy and Rita were moved by any improper or ill motive in
testifying against the malefactors and the other accused; hence, their testimonies must be given full credit and
probative weight.59 The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Rita and Randy do not render them incredible or their
testimonies barren of probative weight. It must be borne in mind that human memory is not as unerring as a
photograph and a person's sense of observation is impaired by many factors including the shocking effect of a crime. A
truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free testimony considering the lapse of time and the
treachery of human memory. What is primordial is that the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight
clashing of statements dilute neither the witnesses' credibility nor the veracity of his testimony.60 Variations on the
testimony of witnesses on the same side with respect to minor, collateral or incidental matters do not impair the weight
of their united testimony to the prominent facts.61 Inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to strengthen
rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 62

Moreover, the testimony of a witness should be construed in its entirety and not in truncated terms and the true
meaning of answers to isolated questions propounded to a witness is to be ascertained by due consideration of all the
questions propounded to the witness and his answers thereto.63

Randy's testimony that he did know where the malefactors brought his father is not inconsistent with his testimony that
Ronald and Marlon brought his father towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Randy may not have known
the destination of accused-appellants but he saw the direction to which they went. While it may be true that when
asked to identify the three who barged into their house, Rita pointed to Leon as one of them, however, Rita had been
consistent throughout her testimony that those who barged into their house were Ronald and Marlon. Leon's counsel
never cross-examined Rita and impeached her testimony on her identification of Leon as one of those who barged into
their house to give her an opportunity to explain her perceived inconsistency conformably with Rule 132, Section 13, of
the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads:

"Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with
his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places
and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to
explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to
him concerning them."64

Hence, the presentation of the inconsistent statements made by Rita is insufficient for the desired impeachment of
her.65 As to whether Rita and Randy were together in looking for Modesto or Leon merely stood guard by the door of
the house or entered the house are inconsequential. The fact is that Leon stood guard throughout the night to prevent
Rita and Randy from seeking assistance for the seizure and killing of Modesto.

This Court is convinced, as the trial court was, that the respective testimonies of Randy and Rita bear the earmarks of
truth and sincerity. Despite intense and grueling cross-examination, they responded with consistency upon material
details that could only come from a firsthand knowledge of the shocking events which unfolded before their eyes. The
Court thus finds no cogent reason to disregard the findings of the trial court regarding their credibility.

Marlon, Ronald and Leon contend that the trial court committed a reversible error in not giving credence and probative
weight to their evidence to prove their defense of alibi. They aver that their collective evidence to prove their defense is
strong.

We do not agree. Case law has it that the defense of alibi is one of the weakest of defenses in criminal prosecution
because the same is easy to concoct between relatives, friends and even those not related to the offender.66 It is hard
for the prosecution to disprove. For alibi to merit approbation by the trial court and this Court, Marlon, Ronald and Leon
are burdened to prove with clear and convincing evidence that they were in a place other than the situs criminis at the
time of the commission of the crime; that it was physically impossible for them to have committed the said
crime.67 They failed to discharge their burden. Moreover, Rita and Randy positively and spontaneously identified
Marlon, Ronald and Leon as the culprits. The house of Ronald, where he claimed he was when the crime was
committed, was only two kilometers away from the house of Modesto and can be negotiated by a tricycle. Leon failed
to adduce any documentary evidence to prove his employment by Sally Asuncion. The barefaced fact that he was a
resident of Laoag City does not constitute proof that he was in Laoag City on the day of the commission of the crime.
With respect to Marlon, he failed to adduce evidence aside from his self-serving testimony that he resided in, left
Dumaguete City and arrived in Manila on January 29, 1999.

The trial court convicted Marlon, Ronald and Leon of murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the killing
of Modesto. The trial court likewise appreciated nighttime and abuse of superior strength and the use of unlicensed
firearms as separate aggravating circumstances. The Office of the Solicitor General contends that indeed treachery
was attendant in the killing of Modesto. Hence, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder defined in and penalized
by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court however finds that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of homicide defined in and penalized by Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Qualifying circumstances such as treachery and abuse of superior strength must be alleged and proved clearly and
conclusively as the crime itself. Mere conjectures, suppositions or presumptions are utterly insufficient and cannot
produce the effect of qualifying the crime.68 As this Court held: "No matter how truthful these suppositions or
presumptions may seem, they must not and cannot produce the effect of aggravating the condition of
defendant."69 Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. For treachery to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
following elements: (a) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or retaliate; (b) the means of execution is deliberately or consciously adopted.70 Although the victim may
have been defenseless at the time he was seized but there is no evidence as to the particulars of how he was
assaulted and killed, treachery cannot be appreciated against the accused.71 In this case, the victim was defenseless
when seized by Marlon and Ronald. However, the prosecution failed to present any witness or conclusive evidence
that Modesto was defenseless immediately before and when he was attacked and killed. It cannot be presumed that
although he was defenseless when he was seized the victim was in the same situation when he was attacked, shot
and stabbed by the malefactors. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use force that is out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.72 What is primordial, this Court held in People v.
Rogelio Francisco73 is that the assailants deliberately took advantage of their combined strength in order to
consummate the crime. It is necessary to show that the malefactors cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage
from their superiority in strength.74 In this case, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that Marlon and Ronald
deliberately took advantage of their numerical superiority when Modesto was killed. The barefaced facts that the
malefactors outnumbered Modesto and were armed while Modesto was not does not constitute proof that the three
took advantage of their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.75

In sum then, we believe that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of Homicide defined in and penalized by Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal in its full period.

Although the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearms was proven during the trial, there is no
allegation in the Information that Marlon, Ronald and Leon had no license to possess the firearm. Lack of license to
possess a firearm is an essential element of the crime of violation of PD 1866 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294,
or as a special aggravating circumstance in the felony of homicide or murder.76 Neither can dwelling, although proven,
aggravate the crime because said circumstance was not alleged in the Information as required by Rule 110, Section 8,
of the Revised Rules of Court.77 Although this rule took effect on December 1, 2000, after the commission of the
offense in this case, nonetheless it had been given retroactive effect considering that the rule is favorable to the
accused.78

There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of homicide, Marlon, Ronald and Leon should be meted an
indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which shall be taken from the entirety of prision mayor, ranging from 6 years
and one day to 12 years and the maximum period of which shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion
temporal, ranging from 14 years, 8 months and one day to 17 years and 4 months.

Consequently, the award for damages in favor of the heirs of the victim should be modified. The sum of P75,000.00
awarded as moral damages should be reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.79 The
amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is in order.80 In addition, civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00
should be awarded without need of proof, likewise in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence.81

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellants Marlon Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon Delim are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony
of Homicide defined in and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying
circumstances in the commission of the crime, each of accused-appellants is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of
from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its maximum period as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum. Accused-appellants are hereby
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity, the
amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages and the amount of P25,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

iii. Intent distinguished from motive

iv. Mistake of Fact

6. US v. Ah Chong

G.R. No. L-5272             March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

Gibb & Gale, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the accused himself,
because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these
proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We
think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details
of the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by
the record may be taken to be substantially correct:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and
at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No.
27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied
solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small
room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the
building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth
of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and
occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the
habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there
was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no
other openings of any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly
awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He
heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon
forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark,
and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the
room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed
against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person
who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that
the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a
common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards
turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately
wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual
was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure
bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of which
took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of
these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.

The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable terms prior to
the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant
his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends,
Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the
mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at
No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano
heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the
stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went
to the aid of the wounded man.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression
that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.

No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the boy
in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into
the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked
by a robber.

Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from
the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide,
with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day  presidio mayor, the minimum penalty
prescribed by law.

At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that
he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:

xxx             xxx             xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances:

(1) Illegal aggression.

(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception from
criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had
been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances,
would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door
notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he
persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of
escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using
any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to
discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.

But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his
property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That
there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and
resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the
property under his charge.

The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by
reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as
he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the
true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer,
and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or
mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular
intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in
murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases
where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases
where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs
criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to
commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited;
Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State,
38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)

The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration is
whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as
defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given of these as well as
most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the
crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally
liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein,
unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code,
which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in the United
States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring
that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of
the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense
therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability
resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that
even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do
a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies
the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little
difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be
looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm,
which the criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is
done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less
according as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been
otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the
corruption was of one particular form or another.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.

Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.

An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the wrongful
act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.

The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article, say that
a voluntary act is a  free, intelligent, and intentional  act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong
or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia,"
which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of
1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word
"voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)

Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal
responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of
negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the
code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the
exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.

Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no intention there is no
crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no act,
an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)

And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of May 31,
1882, in which it made use of the following language:

It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from the
operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.

And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the civil effects of
the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can be no
crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or
ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."

And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:

. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the commission
of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the
exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.

That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various crimes
and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which are
as follows:

He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave
crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor  in its maximum degree, to  prision correccional  in its
minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.

He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or negligence shall
incur the penalty of arresto mayor  in its medium and maximum degrees.

In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being subject
to the rules prescribed in article 81.

The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or less
than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in
the degree which they may consider proper.

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct
inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal
intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the word "willful" as
used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful"
sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little
further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable
excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in
another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute
it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the American
statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more
purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often
being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our
legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)

But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime that it be
committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally
construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with the
rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who
supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:

In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In
controversies between private parties the quo animo  with which a thing was done is sometimes important, not
always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —

There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence of
wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal
sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is
therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the
wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —

Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It
consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not
make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me
against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from
civil. So also —

Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we inculpate or
exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result
of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we
hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of
excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with
the return of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his
neighbors does not offend. And —

In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems another to
deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a
person is made to suffer a punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil
mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of
bad intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its
truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her
immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because first in nature from
which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)

Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice
result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"),
without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity,
the courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts,
and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these exceptional
cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to
make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the
statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of
the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists
only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to
do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)

But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be
dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here
is Ignorantia facti excusat  ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient
excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act
committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability
provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused
must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs.  Anderson, 44
Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs.  P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8
Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to
whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the
circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding
circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon
which he acted.

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which
will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if
without fault or carelessness he does believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook
the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference
to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently
sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man
undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or
carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus
supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no
occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there
cited.)

The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case where a man,
masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with
leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real
one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of
the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of
the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts
when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such
circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and
(since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or
assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the "act punished
by law" was committed "voluntarily."

Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:

If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious design against
him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such design,
it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of
caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart,
Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)

In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:

A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms and a
pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near enough
in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is
discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with  powder only, and that the real
design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would have been
if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked
must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would
entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause,
and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be
supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)

To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here set out
in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.

QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of his
wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was attending to
the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows,
producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the
stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the
floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left the
house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he
learned his identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the
blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law,
whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered
free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in
paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was
an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the
employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him
to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was
acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the
sentence to have been proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his
wife who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which
they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the room,
and considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger
 his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his assailant was unknown, he
should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he did not
exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly
because the instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of
producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such
strong aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor
the arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower court did
not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did
not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain,
February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .

QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of the city, upon
arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying:
"Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from
his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different
voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the
ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim
of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall
he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted in just self-
defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said
article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore,
condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the
accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and
excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the
darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence
supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)

QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown
against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered
"the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be burned" — because of which, and observing in
an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at
one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt
from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of law? The criminal
branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in
favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of
reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision
correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding
that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening
robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May
23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the
fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room
was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property
committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the
defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more
than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have
been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of
negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by
him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the
property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant
acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio.
So ordered.

Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.

7. People v. Oanis

G.R. No. L-47722             July 27, 1943

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.

Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.

Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee.
MORAN, J.:

Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of
police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the
lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from
one year and six months to two years and two months of  prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the
heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.

In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan,
Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict
Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called
for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates
Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the
Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing
a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in
the telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial
Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one
of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some of
his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he
volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants Oanis and
Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living.
When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping banana
stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene
was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was very near that
occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a
man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32
and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the
door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it
turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and
innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to
the scene and when he asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered:
"We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro,
multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused his
death.

These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the testimony of Irene
Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta, when he and
chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place,
and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same
room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are
Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was about to sit up in bed.
Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas."
Galanta then fired at Tecson.

On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after having said, "if you
are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still lying on bed,
and continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and
upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and picking up something from the floor, he
fired at him.

The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only because they are
vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are materially contradictory.
Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently watching somebody in an attitudes of picking up
something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit
up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed
Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still
lying on bed. It is apparent from these contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of the
crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their mutual incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate
substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to Requinea, Tecson was still
sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is confirmed by both appellants
themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was still in bed
about to sit up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter
was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that the trial court had the opportunity to observe her
demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold that no error was committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting
the exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony will show not
only that her version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity. In her cross-examination,
even misleading questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in every detail
of the occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in disturbing the findings of fact made
by the trial court.

The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards the door,
Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but
without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the question is whether or not they may,
upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in
innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was
Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared them guilty
of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances
of the case, the crime committed by appellants is murder through specially mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned
below.

In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah
Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed
without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was awakened by
someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder
was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise
moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door and believing that he was then being
attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A
common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a footpad at night and in a
lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by
his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his
life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent
mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to
make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts
as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the
accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The
person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without
hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as
the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for
appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to
arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.

Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and
detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself
from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating
him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S.,
par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall
be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for
his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses
unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that
Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace of the
community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no
resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down,
although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).

It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to life which he
has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers
resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as
in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of
the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate
action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and
there exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man,
condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in the shelter of
official actuation.

The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In
criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de
imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion,
debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un
mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as
once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless
imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully
done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona,
54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.

As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia.
There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in
article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability
when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order
that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is
present — appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them
committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or
to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-
anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person
whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his
identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating
circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision
correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the
deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.

Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.

v. Malum Prohibitum as exception to the requirement of mens rea

8. Padilla v. Dizon

Adm. Case No. 3086 February 23, 1988

ALEXANDER PADILLA, complainant,
vs.
THE HON. BALTAZAR R. DIZON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City Branch
113, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative complaint, dated August 6, 1987, filed by the then Commissioner of Customs, Alexander
Padilla, against respondent Baltazar R. Dizon, RTC Judge, Branch 115, Pasay City, for rendering a manifestly
erroneous decision due, at the very least, to gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law, in Criminal Case No.
86- 10126-P, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Lo Chi Fai", acquitting said accused of the offense charged, i.e.,
smuggling of foreign currency out of the country.

Required by the Court to answer the complaint, the respondent judge filed an Answer, dated October 6, 1987, reciting
his "commendable record as a fearless prosecutor" since his appointment as Assistant City Fiscal of Manila on
December 4, 1962, until his appointment eventually as RTC Judge on February 18, 1983; that at in the reorganization
of the judiciary after the February 26, 1986 revolution, he was reappointed to his present position; that his length of
service as prosecutor and judge is "tangible proof that would negate the allegations of the petitioner" (should be
complainant), whereas the latter did not last long in the service for reasons only known to him; that the decision
involved in the complaint was promulgated by respondent on September 29, 1986, but the complaint against him was
filed only on August 6, 1987, a clear indication of malice and ill-will of the complainant to subject respondent to
harassment, humiliation and vindictiveness; that his decision, of which he submits a copy (Annex A) as part of his
Answer, is based on "fundamental principles and the foundation of rights and justice" and that if there are mistakes or
errors in the questioned decision, they are committed in good faith. Accordingly, respondent prays for the dismissal of
the petition (should be complaint).

The issue before the Court is whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance
of the law in rendering the decision in question. A judge can not be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly or
administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith.

The case in which the respondent rendered a decision of acquittal involved a tourist, Lo Chi Fai, who was caught by a
Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange
instruments out of the country. Lo Chi Fai, was apprehended by a customs guard and two PAFSECOM officers on July
9, 1986, while on board Flight PR 300 of the Philippine Air Lines bound for Hongkong. At the time of his apprehension,
he was found carrying with him foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces) amounting to US$
355,349.57, in various currency denominations, to wit: Japanese Yen, Swiss Franc, Australian Dollar, Singapore
Dollar, HFL Guilder, French Franc, U.S. Dollar, English Pound, Malaysian Dollar, Deutsche Mark, Canadian Dollar and
Hongkong Dollar, without any authority as provided by law. At the time the accused was apprehended, he was able to
exhibit two currency declarations which he was supposed to have accomplished upon his arrival in Manila in previous
trips, namely, CB Currency Declaration No. 05048, dated May 4, 1986 for US$39,600.00 and Japanese Yen
4,000,000.00, and CB Currency Declaration No. 06346, dated June 29, 1986 for Japanese Yen 6,600,000.00.

An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai, with the RTC of Pasay City for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular
No. 960, as follows:

That on or about the 9th day of July, 1986, in the City of Pasay, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Mr. LO CHI FAI, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to take out of the Philippines through the Manila
International Airport the following foreign currencies in cash and in checks:

Japanese Yen Y 32,800,000.00

Swiss Franc SW. FR 6,9000.00
Australian Dollar A$ 17,425.00
Singapore Dollar S$ 9,945.00
Deutsche Marck DM 18,595.00
Canadian Dollar CS 13,330.00
 Hongkong Dollar HK$ 15,630.00
HFL Guilder HFL 430.00
French Franc F/6,860.00
US Dollar US$ 73,950.00
English Pound 5,318.00
Malaysian Dollar M$. 14,760.00
(in checks)  
Australian Dollar A$ 7,750.00
British Pound 700.00
US Dollar US$ 17,630.00
Canadian Dollar C$ 990.00

without authority from the Central Bank.

Contrary to Law.

The case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 86-10126-P, was subsequently raffled to Branch 113, presided by
herein respondent Judge Baltazar A. Dizon.

Section 6 of Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank provides as follows:

Sec. 6. Export, import of foreign exchange; exceptions. — No person shall take out or transmit or
attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form, out of the Philippines directly, through
other persons, through the mails or through international carriers except when specifically authorized
by the Central Bank or allowed under existing international agreements or Central Bank regulations.

Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign exchange in
amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them. For purposes of
establishing the amount of foreign exchange brought in or out of the Philippines, tourists and non-
resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign
currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at points of
entries upon arrival in the Philippines.

The penal sanction is provided by Section 1, P.D. No. 1883, which reads as follows:

Section 1. Blackmarketing of Foreign Exchange .— That any person who shall engage in the trading
or purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of the
Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion temporal, (minimum of 12 years and I day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of
no less than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.

At the trial, the accused tried to establish that he was a businessman from Kowloon, Hongkong, engaged in the
garment business, in which he had invested 4 to 5 million Hongkong Dollars; that he had come to the Philippines 9 to 1
0 times, although the only dates he could remember were April 2, 1986, May 4, 1986, June 28,1986, and July 8, 1986;
that the reason for his coming to the Philippines was to invest in business in the Philippines and also to play in the
casino; that he had a group of business associates who decided to invest in business with him, namely: Wakita
Noboyuki, Kobayashi Nabuo, Lee Shiang Pin, Lee Chin and Cze Kai Kwan, who had their own businesses in Japan
and Hongkong; that when he came to the Philippines on April 2,1986, he brought US$50,000.00 and 8,500,000.00
Japanese Yen which he tried to declare but the Central Bank representative refused to accept his declaration, until he
could get a confirmation as to the source of the money, for which reason he contacted his bank in Hongkong and a
telex was sent to him on April 3,1986 (Exh. 4). He also brought in with him US$39,000.00 and 4,000,000.00 Japanese
Yen when he arrived on May 4,1986 which he declared (Exh. 1). Again, he declared 8,600,000.00 Japanese Yen when
he arrived on June 28, 1986 (Exh. 2). He also testified that his business associates, as per their agreement to invest in
some business with him in the Philippines, started putting their money for this purpose in a common fund, hence, every
time anyone of them came to the Philippines, they would declare the money they were bringing in, and all declarations
were handed to and kept by him; these currency declarations were presented at the trial as exhibits for the defense.
When asked by the court why he did not present all of these declarations when he was apprehended at the airport, his
answer was that he was not asked to present the declaration papers of his associates, and besides, he does not
understand English and he was not told to do so. He also testified on cross-examination that the reason he was going
back to Hongkong bringing with him all the money intended to be invested in the Philippines was because of the fear of
his group that the "revolution" taking place in Manila might become widespread. It was because of this fear that he was
urged by his associates to come to Manila on July 8, 1986 to bring the money out of the Philippines.

The respondent judge, in his decision acquitting the accused, stated:

The factual issue for this Court to determine is whether or not the accused wilfully violated Section 6 of
Circular No. 960. The fact that the accused had in his possession the foreign currencies when he was
about to depart from the Philippines did not by that act alone make him liable for Violation of Section 6.
 What is imperative is the purpose for which the act of bringing foreign currencies out of the country
was done the very intention. It is that which qualifies the act as criminal or not. There must be that
clear intention to violate and benefit from the act done. Intent is a mental state, the existence of which
is shown by overt acts of a person.

The respondent proceeded to analyze the evidence which, according to him, tended to show that the accused had no
wilfull intention to violate the law. According to the respondent in his decision:

... this Court is persuaded to accept the explanation of the defense that the currencies confiscated
and/or seized from the accused belong to him and his business associates abovenamed. And from the
unwavering and unequivocal testimonies of Mr. Templo and all of currencies in question came from
abroad and not from the local source which is what is being prohibited by the government. Yes, simply
reading the provisions of said circular will, readily show that the currency declaration is required for the
purpose of establishing the amount of currency being brought by tourist or temporary non-resident
visitors into the country. The currency declarations, therefore, is already (sic) intended to serve as a
guideline for the Customs authorities to determine the amounts actually brought in by them to
correspond to the amounts that could be allowed to be taken out. Indeed, this Court is amazed and
really has its misgivings in the manner currency declarations were made as testified to by the Central
Bank employees. Why the Bureau of Customs representative never took part in all these declarations
testified to by no less than five (5) Central Bank employees? Seemingly, these employees are the
favorites of these travellers. It is the hope of this Court that the authorities must do something to
remedy the evident flaw in the system for effective implementation of the questioned Central Bank
Circular No. 960.

But even with a doubtful mind this Court would not be able to pin criminal responsibility on the
accused. This is due to its steadfast adherence and devotion to the rule of law-a factor in restoring the
almost lost faith and erosion of confidence of the people in the administration of justice. Courts of
Justice are guided only by the rule of evidence.

The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in holding that to convict the
accused for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the accused had the
criminal intent to violate the law. The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is
not essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are mala prohibita. In requiring proof of malice, the
respondent has by his gross ignorance allowed the accused to go scot free. The accused at the time of his
apprehension at the Manila International Airport had in his possession the amount of US$355,349.57 in assorted
foreign currencies and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces), without any specific authority from the Central Bank
as required by law. At the time of his apprehension, he was able to exhibit only two foreign currency declarations in his
possession. These were old declarations made by him on the occasion of his previous trips to the Philippines.

Although lack of malice or wilfull intent is not a valid defense in a case for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960,
the respondent nonetheless chose to exonerate the accused based on his defense that the foreign currency he was
bringing out of the country at the time he was apprehended by the customs authorities were brought into the
Philippines by him and his alleged business associates on several previous occasions when they came to the
Philippines, supposedly to be used for the purpose of investing in some unspecified or undetermined business
ventures; that this money was kept in the Philippines and he precisely came to the Philippines to take the money out as
he and his alleged business associates were afraid that the "attempted revolution" which occurred on July 6,1986
might spread. Such fantastic tale, although totally irrelevant to the matter of the criminal liability of the accused under
the information, was swallowed by the respondent-judge "hook, line and sinker." It did not matter to the respondent that
the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments found in the possession of the accused when he was
apprehended at the airport-380 pieces in all-and the amounts of such foreign exchange did not correspond to the
foreign currency declarations presented by the accused at the trial. It did not matter to the respondent that the accused
by his own story admitted, in effect, that he was a carrier" of foreign currency for other people. The respondent closed
his eyes to the fact that the very substantial amounts of foreign exchange found in the possession of the accused at the
time of his apprehension consisted of personal checks of other people, as well as cash in various currency
denominations (12 kinds of currency in all), which clearly belied the claim of the accused that they were part of the
funds which he and his supposed associates had brought in and kept in the Philippines for the purpose of investing in
some business ventures. The respondent ignored the fact that most of the CB Currency declarations presented by the
defense at the trial were declarations belonging to other people which could not be utilized by the accused to justify his
having the foreign exchange in his possession. Although contrary to ordinary human experience and behavior, the
respondent judge chose to give credence to the fantastic tale of the accused that he and his alleged business
associates had brought in from time to time and accumulated and kept in the Philippines foreign exchange (of very
substantial amounts in cash and checks in various foreign currency denominations) for the purpose of investing in
business even before they knew and had come to an agreement as to the specific business venture in which they were
going to invest. These and other circumstances which make the story concocted by the accused so palpably
unbelievable as to render the findings of the respondent judge obviously contrived to favor the acquittal of the accused,
thereby clearly negating his claim that he rendered the decision "in good faith." His actuations in this case amount to
grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of sound and fair administration of justice.

He not only acquitted the accused Lo Chi Fai, but directed in his decision the release to the accused of at least the
amount of US$3,000.00, allowed, according to respondent, under Central Bank Circular No. 960. This, in spite of the
fact that forfeiture proceedings had already been instituted by the Bureau of Customs over the currency listed in the
information, which according to the respondent should be respected since the Bureau of Customs "has the exclusive
jurisdiction in the matter of seizure and forfeiture of the property involved in the alleged infringements of the aforesaid
Central Bank Circular." In invoking the provisions of CB Circular No. 960 to justify the release of US$ 3,000.00 to the
accused, the respondent judge again displayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. There is nothing
in the said CB Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court to release the said amount of U.S. Currency
to the accused. According to the above-cited CB Circular, tourists may take out or send out from the Philippines foreign
exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them; for the purpose of
establishing such amount, tourists or non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its
equivalent in other foreign currencies must declare their foreign exchange at points of entries upon arrival in the
Philippines. In other words, CB Circular No. 960 merely provides that for the purpose of establishing the amount of
foreign currency brought in or out of the Philippines, a tourist upon arrival is required to declare any foreign exchange
he is bringing in at the time of his arrival, if the same exceeds the amount of US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other
foreign currencies. There is nothing in said circular that would justify returning to him the amount of at least
US$3,000.00, if he is caught attempting to bring out foreign exchange in excess of said amount without specific
authority from the Central Bank.

Accordingly, the Court finds the respondent Regional Trial Court Judge, Baltazar R. Dizon, guilty of gross
incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and
consistent with the responsibility of this Court for the just and proper administration of justice and for the attainment of
the objective of maintaining the people's faith in the judiciary (People vs. Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712), it is hereby
ordered that the Respondent Judge be DISMISSED from the service. All leave and retirement benefits and privileges to
which he may be entitled are hereby forfeited with prejudice to his being reinstated in any branch of government
service, including government-owned and/or controlled agencies or corporations.

This resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

9. Magno v. CA

G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992

ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, from the decision* of the respondent Court
of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 finding the
accused petitioner, guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, in Criminal Cases Q-35693 to 35696 before they
were elevated on appeal to the respondent appellate Court under CA-G.R. CR No. 04889.

The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts of the offense charged, have been clearly illustrated, in
the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General as official counsel for the public respondent, thus:

Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but a did not have complete
equipment that could make his venture workable. He also had another problem, and that while he was going into this
entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to purchase the necessary equipment to make such business
operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private
complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed car repair service
equipment of which Mancor was a distributor, (Rollo, pp. 40-41)

Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he had no sufficient funds to buy the
equipment needed, the former (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation (LB
Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of
equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities. (Ibid., P. 41)

The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit equivalent to thirty  per
centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitioner
could not come up with such amount, he requested Joey Gomez on a personal level to look for a third party who could
lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit, however, unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who
advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest (Ibid.,
P. 41)

The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads:

1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT — Before or upon delivery of each item of Equipment, the Lessee shall
deposit with the Lessor such sum or sums specified in Schedule A to serve as security for the faithful
performance of its obligations.

This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the satisfactory completion of the entire period of
Lease, subject to the conditions of clause 1.12 of this Article. (Ibid., p. 17)

As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement whereby LS Finance would
lease the garage equipments and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with the option to buy the same. After
the documentation was completed, the equipment were delivered to petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check
and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check
matured, Petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer banking with
Pacific Bank.

To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks. Two (2) checks dated July
29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which were the subject of the four counts of the
aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held momentarily by Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as they
were not covered with sufficient funds. These checks were a) Piso Bank Check Nos. 006858, dated August 15, 1983,
006859 dated August 28, 1983 and 006860 dated September 15, 1983, all in the amount of P5,038.43 and No. 006861
dated September 28, 1983, in the amount of P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43).

Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage equipments. It was
then on this occasion that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the one who advanced the warranty
deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see Corazon Teng and promised to pay the latter but the payment never came
and when the four (4) checks were deposited they were returned for the reason "account closed." (Ibid., p. 43)

After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the accused-petitioner was convicted for
violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4) cases, as follows:

. . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violations of B.P.
Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case Nos. Q-
35693, Q-35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant the respective amounts reflected in subject
checks. (Ibid., pp. 25, 27)

Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated decision of the court a quo, this Court is intrigued about
the outcome of the checks subject of the cases which were intended by the parties, the petitioner on the one hand and
the private complainant on the other, to cover the "warranty deposit" equivalent to the 30% requirement of the financing
company. Corazon Teng is one of the officers of Mancor, the supplier of the equipment subject of the Leasing
Agreement subject of the high financing scheme undertaken by the petitioner as lessee of the repair service
equipment, which was arranged at the instance of Mrs. Teng from the very beginning of the transaction.

By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding to 30% of the "purchase/lease" value
of the equipments subject of the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used by
petitioner who was just paying rentals for the equipment. It would have been different if petitioner opted to purchase the
pieces of equipment on or about the termination of the lease-purchase agreement in which case he had to pay the
additional amount of the warranty deposit which should have formed part of the purchase price. As the transaction did
not ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment, which were pulled out
by the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue paying possibly due to economic constraints or business
failure, then it is lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not be charged against the petitioner.

To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not withdraw as it was not his own account,
it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the least, since petitioner did not
receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing company, which is
managed, supervised and operated by the corporation officials and employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did not even
know that the checks he issued were turned over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. Teng, whose operation was kept from his
knowledge on her instruction. This fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction is irregular and immoral  per se,
hence, she specifically requested Gomez not to divulge the source of the "warranty deposit".

It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it was she who "accommodated"
petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source out the needed funds for the "warranty deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind
of transaction that is shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and doubtful legality. It is in simple language, a scheme
whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the equipment in the name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or
lease" its goods as in this case, and at the same time, privately financing those who desperately need petty
accommodations as this one. This modus operandi has in so many instances victimized unsuspecting businessmen,
who likewise need protection from the law, by availing of the deceptively called "warranty deposit" not realizing that
they also fall prey to leasing equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme designed
to skim off business clients.

This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the penal sanction of the law in
issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court system to apply the full harshness of the special law in question, using
the "mala prohibitia" doctrine, the noble objective of the law is tainted with materialism and opportunism in the highest,
degree.

This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or lessee referred to above in the lease agreement knew
that the amount of P29,790.00 subject of the cases, were mere accommodation-arrangements with somebody thru
Joey Gomez, petitioner did not even attempt to secure the refund of said amount from LS Finance, notwithstanding the
agreement provision to the contrary. To argue that after the termination of the lease agreement, the warranty deposit
should be refundable in full to Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out the "warranty deposit" for his official or
personal use, is to stretch the nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No, 22) violated.

For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate
public checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or favor nor encourage users of the system to enrich
themselves through manipulations and circumvention of the noble purpose and objective of the law. Least should it be
used also as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness transactions with some color of "get-rich" scheme to the
prejudice of well-meaning businessmen who are the pillars of society.

Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function of punishment is
the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be
considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the other
hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose
operations should also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to such a
vicious transaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)

Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon that moral disapprobation
. . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the
existence and progress of human society. This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally
founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an
external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the amount of
punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice Pablo's view in
People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).

Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused, the objective of
retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the "actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case,
there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the
receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for
mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential
wrongdoer", whose operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.

While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in favor of the accused, however, by the open admission
of the appellate court below, oven when the ultimate beneficiary of the "warranty deposit" is of doubtful certainty, the
accused was convicted, as shown below:

Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that the obligation of the accused to complainant had
been extinguished by the termination of the leasing agreement — by the terms of which the warranty
deposit advanced by complainant was refundable to the accused as lessee — and that as the lessor
L.S. Finance neither made any liquidation of said amount nor returned the same to the accused,  it
may he assumed that the amount was already returned to the complainant. For these allegations,
even if true, do not change the fact, admitted by appellant and established by the evidence, that the
four checks were originally issued on account or for value. And as We have already observed, in order
that there may be a conviction under the from paragraph of Section 2 of B.P. Blg 22 — with respect to
the element of said offense that the check should have been made and issued on account or for value
— it is sufficient, all the other elements of the offense being present, that the check must have been
drawn and issued in payment of an obligation.

Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishment, after the issuance of the checks, of the
obligation in consideration of which the checks were issued, would have resulted in placing the case at
bar beyond the purview of the prohibition in Section 1 of BP Blg. 22, there is no satisfactory proof that
there was such an extinguishment in the present case. Appellee aptly points out that appellant had not
adduced any direct evidence to prove that the amount advanced by the complainant to cover the
warranty deposit must already have been returned to her. (Rollo, p. 30)

It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even disregarded the cardinal rule that the accused is presumed
innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the same court even expected the petitioner-
appellant to adduce evidence to show that he was not guilty of the crime charged. But how can be produce documents
showing that the warranty deposit has already been taken back by Mrs. Teng when she is an officer of Mancor which
has interest in the transaction, besides being personally interested in the profit of her side-line. Thus, even if she may
have gotten back the value of the accommodation, she would still pursue collecting from the petitioner since she had in
her possession the checks that "bounced".

That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking into the real nature of the warranty deposit is evident
from the following pronouncement:

And the trail court concluded that there is no question that the accused violated BP Blg. 22, which is a
special statutory law, violations of which are mala prohibita. The court relied on the rule that in cases
of  mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law had been violated, proof of criminal intent
not being necessary for the conviction of the accused, the acts being prohibited for reasons of public
policy and the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent being unavailing in prosecutions
for said offenses." (Ibid., p. 26)

The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of the postdated checks by the petitioner, i.e., whether
they were drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value", as required under Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22. When viewed
against the following definitions of the catch-terms "warranty" and "deposit", for which the postdated checks were
issued or drawn, all the more, the alleged crime could not have been committed by petitioner:

a) Warranty — A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A promise that certain facts are truly as they
are represented to be and that they will remain so: . . . (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, (1979) p.
1423)
A cross-reference to the following term shows:

Fitness for Particular Purpose: —

Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the
goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods, there is, unless excluded or modified, an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose, (Ibid., p. 573)

b) Deposit: — Money lodged with a person as an earnest or security for the performance of some
contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his undertaking. It may be deemed to be part payment
and to that extent may constitute the purchaser the actual owner of the estate.

To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put. To lodge for safe- keeping or as a pledge to
intrust to the care of another.

The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker, for safety or convenience, to be
withdrawn at the will of the depositor or under rules and regulations agreed on. Also, the money so
deposited, or the credit which the depositor receives for it. Deposit, according to its commonly
accepted and generally understood among bankers and by the public, includes not only deposits
payable on demand and for which certificates, whether interest-bearing or not, may be issued, payable
on demand, or on certain notice or at a fixed future time. (Ibid., pp. 394-395)

Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason . . . is inversely
applied in this case. From the very beginning, petitioner never hid the fact that he did not have the funds with which to
put up the warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey
Gomez, to whom petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this predicament was not
communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which was covered by
L.S. Finance Management.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.

SO ORDERED.

10. Garcia v. CA 

G.R. No. 157171             March 14, 2006

ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24547 1that affirmed the
conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court2of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 54, for violation of Section
27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646.3

Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial elections, an information
dated March 30, 1998, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, charging Herminio R. Romero, Renato R.
Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and petitioner, with violation of Section 27(b). The information reads:

That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during the May 8, 1995 elections, in the
Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School
District Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, conspiring with,
confederating together and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the
votes received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine hundred ninety-eight (6,998)
votes, as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in the one hundred fifty-nine (159) precincts of the Statement of
Votes by Precincts of said municipality, with Serial Nos. 008417, 008418, 008419, 008420, 008421, 008422 and
008423 to one thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes by Precincts
with Serial No. 008423 and Certificate of Canvass with Serial No. 436156 with a difference of five thousand seventy-
seven (5,077) votes.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4
In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of evidence, except
petitioner who was convicted as follows:

xxx

5. And finally, on the person of Arsenia B. Garcia, the Court pronounces her GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of the
crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in the total of
5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881, considering that this finding is a violation of Election Offense, she is thus
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
LAW, the minimum penalty is the next degree lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however, accused Arsenia B. Garcia is
not entitled to probation; further, she is sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and she is also deprived
of her right of suffrage.

The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the Provincial Warden is ordered to commit her person to
the Bureau of Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro Manila, until further orders from the court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.5

Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision, thus,

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with modification, increasing the
minimum penalty imposed by the trial court from six (6) months to one (1) year.

SO ORDERED.6

The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal assigning the following as
errors of the appellate court:

ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE RESPONDENT COURT, NAMELY, THAT IT
COULD NOT HAVE BEEN SECRETARY VIRAY WHO DECREASED THE VOTES OF COMPLAINANT PIMENTEL
SINCE HE MERELY RELIED ON WHAT THE PETITIONER DICTATED, AND THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE ALSO
BEEN THE TABULATORS BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO READ THE ADDING [MACHINE] TAPE.

II

ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT PRODUCE THE TAPES DURING THE TRIAL
BECAUSE IF PRODUCED, IT IS GOING TO BE ADVERSE TO HER.

III

ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO ENTERED THE REDUCED
FIGURE OF 1,921 IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS (COC), Exh. "7", WHEN THE DUTY WAS THAT OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE BOARD.

IV

THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE PIMENTEL WAS CLEARLY NOT WILLFUL OR INTENTIONAL.7

Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals’ judgment is erroneous, based on speculations, surmises and
conjectures, instead of substantial evidence; and (2) there was no motive on her part to reduce the votes of private
complainant.

Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an election law, which falls
under the class of mala prohibita.

The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se or mala prohibita?
Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?

Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of are
inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law.8Accordingly, criminal intent
must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand,
in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the
law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated.9Criminal intent is
not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.10

Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 664611provides:

SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated in Sections 261 and
262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an election offense:

xxx

(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the
votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after proper verification and
hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.

xxx

Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.12For otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to
overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited
amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish
unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by
a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.

Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the
contrary shall appear.13Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the burden of proving its existence.

Records show that the canvassing of votes on May 11, 1995 before the Board of Canvassers of the Municipality of
Alaminos, Pangasinan was conducted as follows:

1. After the votes in the 159 precincts of the municipality of Alaminos were tallied, the results thereof were
sealed and forwarded to the Municipal Board of Canvassers for canvassing;

2. The number of votes received by each candidate in each precinct was then recorded in the Statement of
Votes with appellant, in her capacity as Chairman, reading the figures appearing in the results from the
precincts and accused Viray, in his capacity as secretary of the Board, entering the number in the Statements
of Votes as read by the appellant. Six Statements of Votes were filled up to reflect the votes received by each
candidate in the 159 precincts of the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan.

3. After the number of votes received by each candidate for each precincts were entered by accused Viray in
the Statements of Votes, these votes were added by the accused Palisoc and de Vera with the use of electrical
adding machines.

4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de Vera, the corresponding machine tapes were handed to
appellant who reads the subtotal of votes received by each candidate in the precincts listed in each Statement
of Votes. Accused Viray [then] records the subtotal in the proper column in the Statement of Votes.

5. After the subtotals had been entered by accused Viray, tabulators accused Palisoc and de Vera added all
the subtotals appearing in all Statement of Votes.

6. After the computation, the corresponding machine tape on which the grand total was reflected was handed
to appellant who reads the same and accused Viray enters the figure read by appellant in the column for grand
total in the Statement of Votes.14

Neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the Statement of Votes (SOV) for each precinct, nor of the
number of votes entered as subtotals of votes received in the precincts listed in SOV Nos. 008417 to 008422 was
raised as an issue.

At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the addition of the subtotals to arrive at the grand total of
votes received by each candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No. 008423.15The grand total of the votes for private
complainant, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, was only 1,921 instead of 6,921, or 5,000 votes less than the number of votes
private complainant actually received. This error is also evident in the Certificate of Canvass (COC) No. 436156 signed
by petitioner, Viray and Romero.16

During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who announced the figure of 1,921, which was
subsequently entered by then accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the board. 17Petitioner likewise admitted that
she was the one who prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7), though it was not her duty. To our mind, preparing the COC
even if it was not her task, manifests an intention to perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC.18

Neither can this Court accept petitioner’s explanation that the Board of Canvassers had no idea how the SOV (Exhibit
"6") and the COC reflected that private complainant had only 1,921 votes instead of 6,921 votes. As chairman of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner’s concern was to assure accurate, correct and authentic entry of the votes.
Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and fidelity to her trust deserves not only censure but also the concomitant
sanctions as a matter of criminal responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law.19

The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by private complainant, Sen. Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner of liability under Section 27(b) of
Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere decreasing of the votes received by a candidate in an election is already punishable
under the said provision.20
At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual conclusions of the appellate court. The Court has
consistently held that factual findings of the trial court, as well as of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and
may not be reviewed on appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the
matter coincide.21

Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the board of canvassers in
canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The
Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board
of canvassers are sensitive election documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.22

In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998.23

As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private complainant of 6,921 votes and
statement of his actual votes received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy may be validly attributed to
mistake or error due to fatigue. However, a decrease of 5,000 votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes and
Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot be allowed to remain on record unchallenged, especially when the error
results from the mere transfer of totals from one document to another.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner’s
conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six months is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

b. Constructive Intent (Culpa) (Art. 3 and 365, RPC)

i. Elements

ii. Imprudence

iii. Negligence or lack foresight

11. People v. Pugay

G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN SAMSON y
MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No. L-175-82 of the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Cavite, under an information which reads as follows:

That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping and assisting one another, with treachery and evident
premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength, and with the decided purpose to kill, poured
gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani Miranda which caused
his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda.

That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength, and the means employed was to
weaken the defense; that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented
by causing another wrong, that is the burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.

CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).

Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the trial court rendered a
decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
 WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin Samson y Magdalena are
pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct participation of the crime of murder
for the death of Bayani Miranda, and appreciating the aforestated mitigating circumstance in favor of
Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison term ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum,
to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and Samson to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua  together with the accessories of the law for both of them. The accused are solidarily held
liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P13,940.00 plus moral damages of
P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of P5,000.00.

Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal penalty.

Cost against both accused.

SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).

Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and assigned the following errors
committed by the court a quo:

1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN

ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.

2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY THE

PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO ITS CASE.

3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF

EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF THE MANY SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE
(Accused-appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).

The antecedent facts are as follows:

The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run errands for
Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza
of Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel.

Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book
with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. These persons
appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started
making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.

Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from
under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so
while the latter was already in the process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire
making a human torch out of him.

The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased. Some people around
also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with rags to extinguish the flame.

The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other police officers of the
Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring as to who were responsible for the dastardly
act, the persons around spontaneously pointed to Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof.

The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the police officers brought
Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the Rosario municipal building for interrogation. Police officer
Reynaldo Canlas took the written statements of Gabion and the two accused, after which Gabion was released. The
two accused remained in custody.

After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants for the reversal of the
decision of the court a quo to be without merit.

It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave their written statements to the
police. The accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased
believing that the contents thereof was water and then the accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused
Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the
person who set him on fire. Worthy of note is the fact that both statements did not impute any participation of
eyewitness Gabion in the commission of the offense.

While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written statements alleging that they were
extracted by force. They claimed that the police maltreated them into admitting authorship of the crime. They also
engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame on Gabion for the commission of the offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were mentioned and discussed in the
decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as the sole basis for the findings of facts in the
decision rendered. The said court categorically stated that "even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's
straightforward, positive and convincing testimony which remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and
unrealiable testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p. 247, Records).

Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other eyewitnesses to the incident.
They claim that despite the fact that there were other persons investigated by the police, only Gabion was presented as
an eyewitness during the trial of the case. They argue that the deliberate non- presentation of these persons raises the
presumption that their testimonies would be adverse to the prosecution.

There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the crime. In fact there appears on
record (pp. 16-17, Records) the written statements of one Abelardo Reyes and one Monico Alimorong alleging the
same facts and imputing the respective acts of pouring of gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the accused-
appellants as testified to by Gabion in open court. They were listed as prosecution witnesses in the information filed.
Considering that their testimonies would be merely corroborative, their non-presentation does not give rise to the
presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. This presumption does not apply to the
suppression of merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil. 797).<äre||anº•1àw>  Besides, the matter as to
whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution to decide.

Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only was the latter requested
by the mother of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in exchange for his absolution from liability but also
because his testimony that he was reading a comic book during an unusual event is contrary to human behavior and
experience.

Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him to testify and state the truth
about the incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified that she never talked to Gabion and that she saw the
latter for the first time when the instant case was tried. Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his
friend and both Pugay and the other accused Samson testified that they had no previous misunderstanding with
Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had no reason to testify falsely against them.

In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on the deceased
and then Samson set him on fire is incredible, the accused-appellants quote Gabion's testimony on cross-examination
that, after telling Pugay not to pour gasoline on the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and that it was
only when the victim's body was on fire that he noticed a commotion.

However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:

Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that you were reading comics
when you saw Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani Miranda and lighted by Samson.
How could you possibly see that incident while you were reading comics?

A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what they were doing.

Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with gasoline and lighted and
burned later you had a talk with Pugay, is that correct?

A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was trying to prevent him from
doing so.

Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had a talk with Pugay and as
a matter of fact, you told him not to pour gasoline. That is what I want to know from
you, if that is true?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass, do you mean to say you
come to know that Pugay will pour gasoline unto him?

A. I do not know that would be that incident.

Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour gasoline before he did that
actually?

A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.

Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass you tried according to
you to ask him not to and then later you said you asked not to pour gasoline. Did
Pugay tell you he was going to pour gasoline on Bayani?

A. I was not told, sir.

 Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know he was going to pour gasoline
that is why you prevent him?

A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I thought it was water but it was
gasoline.

Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass, he later got
hold of a can of gasoline, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the time you told him not to pour
gasoline when he merely pick up the can of gasoline.

A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.

Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline he was already in the
process of pouring gasoline on the body of Bayani?

A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).

It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that Gabion stopped reading
when the group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from
under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it was while Pugay was in the process of pouring the gasoline on the body of
the deceased when Gabion warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased on fire.

However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and
intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the crime. There was no
animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was
accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence,
the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is
individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al.
13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).

The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having taken the can from
under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this
accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his
notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every
undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time were making
fun of the deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless
imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468,
470, this Court ruled as follows:

A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious,
careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible
for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except
through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-
beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.

The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. With respect to the
accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his brief contends that "his conviction of murder, is proper considering that
his act in setting the deceased on fire knowing that gasoline had just been poured on him is characterized by treachery
as the victim was left completely helpless to defend and protect himself against such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do
not agree.

There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill the deceased before
the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun-making
that evening. For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.

There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the deceased
was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were
otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set
the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of
the victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised
Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held
responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the accused Samson is only
guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are
disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed as there is evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified
that the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp.
16-17).<äre||anº•1àw>

The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from eight (8) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by Miranda's parents for his
hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for death is P30,000.00. Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the
deceased Miranda is increased to P43,940.00.

Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00 as moral damages and
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the court a quo.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs against the accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

12. Ivler v. San Pedro

G.R. No. 172716               November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City,
and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower
court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.

The Facts

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent
Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for
the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner
posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the
suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A.
No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment
and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. 4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a
resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his
arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.

Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803
for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s
forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-
appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the
RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.

Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego participation in
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence
sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil
action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7

Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner
argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his
prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same
offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple
consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing to
maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence
holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to
property.

In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to file a comment to the
petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.

The Issues

Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803
when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and
(2) if in the negative, whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

The Ruling of the Court

We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of
personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding
petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are
governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, 8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio,
dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during
the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of
convictions.

The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on
the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under
procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling
because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by
an accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and
was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences under
Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.10

The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as
proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant
who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation
should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail
to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the
bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the
accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled
proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of
the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following
the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s
arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.

Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367

Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense"13 protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. 14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in
Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns
on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner
adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The
MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate
offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not."15

We find for petitioner.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,

its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the
provision reads:

Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor
in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the
offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such
value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two
paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which
should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be
caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform
such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be
caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to
lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.

Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the
quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both
quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4)
the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses
penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual
features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and
penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already
sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that
"reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x" 17 on three points of analysis: (1) the
object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes
as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the
different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve
unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason,
robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi
offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In
intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x
xx

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor,
then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be
fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful
offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code
(Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the
willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from
prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no
relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in damage,
either to person or property.19

Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to Property
through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional
crime conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.

Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly
reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller22 that
"[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x," 23 has long been abandoned
when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939.
Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct
species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon
jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules
defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which,
as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-
crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring
second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense
alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution
was based.

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of

Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to
commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on
double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence"
because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first
prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before
the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the
same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently
answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v.
Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas 28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court
en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v.
Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by
the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals 32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en
banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila 33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.).
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to
quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution
for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused’s prior
acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court
explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the
offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of
Quizon.

There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than
a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the
subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous
conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the
second prosecution was based. Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to
impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano. 37 There, we reviewed
the Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior
conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon which
the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan:38

Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona
decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this
Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the
offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

xxxx

. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto,
Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges
are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places
the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.

It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the
accused, a fact which did not escape the Court’s attention:

Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of
the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy and submits that
"its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to
property through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists
where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow
where the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a
human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors
vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle
of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s
case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was
charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with
Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the
quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration,
found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval
its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding: —

[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x
x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay,
with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles
driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of,
two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision
one for damage to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the
vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case
No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga
only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his
acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed
against him by the injured passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of
Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted,
whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property
through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to
the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After
such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless imprudence. Both
cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double
jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme
Court in the following language: .

The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of police constitutes
a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence.

In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in the municipal
court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an
automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident.’ After the accused had pleaded not guilty the
case was dismissed in that court ῾for failure of the Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney
filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to property thru
reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be ₱249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused
filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr.
Justice Montemayor —

The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law
prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence
charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense
charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information
(Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether
the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa;
or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x

xxxx

The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting attorney that the
charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged
to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious
charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant
for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the
prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the
defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court.43

Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of
delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:

The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon
the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the
same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of
the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General,
however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its
application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of
which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the government. On
one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It
was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v.
Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but
awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely,
Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised
Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two
categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation
light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this
procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the
penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the
resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple
intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the
prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a
hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models – that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime
damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The
ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s
framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those
amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge,
collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of
penalties under Article 365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy)
applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences 48 unless one consequence amounts
to a light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or
less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting
to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly
sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive
original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium
period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365
involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all
the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the
other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act
penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime
collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately.
Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:

[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the
offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such
value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be
imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information
cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x. 53 (Emphasis
supplied)

By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.

Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing one
framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into
separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under
Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a
quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid
the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the
resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus
maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double
jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1

A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws constrains us
to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article
48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to
stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary
means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General’s argument
that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could
not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered
and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not
now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been
previously cleared by the inferior court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second
jeopardy for the same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective
of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second
prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or
severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article
365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and
only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.55

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the
favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the
certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious
consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes
the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution
of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct
concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a
lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against
petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of
double jeopardy.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.

c. Transferred intent (Art. 4, par. 1, RPC)

i. Aberratio ictus

13. People v. Guillen

G.R. No. L-1477             January 18, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.

Mariano A. Albert for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Francisco A. Carreon for appellee.

PER CURIAM, J.:

This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance
of Manila in case No. 2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C. Guillen, is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder, as charged in the information, and is sentenced to the
penalty of death, to indemnify the of the deceased Simeon Valera (or Barrela) in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the
costs.

Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charges contained in the information.

Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by the honorable
Buenaventura Ocampo who, after the submission of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, rendered
judgment as above stated.

In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial and before arraignment, counsel de oficio for the
accused moved that the mental condition of Guillen be examined. The court, notwithstanding that it had found out from
the answers of the accused to questions propounded to him in order to test the soundness of his mind, that he was not
suffering from any mental derangement, ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for Hospital, there to be examined by
medical experts who should report their findings accordingly. This was done, and, according to the report of the board
of medical experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of the National Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen was not
insane. Said report (Exhibit L), under the heading "Formulation and Diagnosis," at pages 13 and 14, reads:

FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS

Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since admission. There was not a single moment
during his whole 24 hours daily, that he was not under observation.

The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated above. The veracity of this motivation was determined
in the Narcosynthesis. That the narco-synthesis was successful was checked up the day after the test. The
narco-synthesis proved not only reveal any conflict or complex that may explain a delusional or hallucinatory
motive behind the act.

Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or symptom of insanity in Mr. Julio C. Guillen. He was
found to be intelligent, always able to differentiate right from wrong, fully aware of the nature of the crime he
committed and is equally decided to suffer for it in any manner or form.

His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and conversation relative thereto, the motives,
temptations and provocations that preceded the act, were all those of an individual with a sound mind.

On the other hand he is an man of strong will and conviction and once arriving at a decision he executes,
irrespective of consequences and as in this case, the commission of the act at Plaza Miranda.

What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen is his commission of some overt acts. This is
seen not only in the present instance, but sometime when an employee in la Clementina Cigar Factory he
engaged in a boxing bout Mr. Manzano, a Span-wanted to abuse the women cigar makers, and felt it his duty
to defend them. One time he ran after a policeman with a knife in hand after being provoked to a fight several
times. He even challenged Congressman Nueno to a fight sometime before when Mr. Nueno was running for a
seat in the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, after hearing him deliver one of his apparently outspoken
speeches.

All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a weakness of censorship especially in relation to
rationalization about the consequences of his acts.

In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that Julio C. Guillen is not insane but is an individual
with a personality defect which in Psychiatry is termed, Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority.

Final Diagnosis

Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without psychosis.

In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and notwithstanding the contrary opinion of one Dr. Alvarez,
who was asked by the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the court ruled that Guillen, not being insane, could be
tired, as he was tired, for the offenses he committed on the date in question.

THE FACTS

Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by counsel for the accused, the Solicitor General and
their respective memoranda, we find that there is no disagreement between the prosecution and the defense, as to the
essential facts which caused the filing of the present criminal case against this accused. Those facts may be stated as
follows:

On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affirmed with any particular political
group, has voted for the defeated candidate in the presidential elections held in 1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the successful
candidate, assumed the office of President of the Commonwealth and subsequently President of the President of the
Philippine Republic. According to Guillen, he became disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged failure to redeem
the pledges and fulfill the promises made by him during the presidential election campaign; and his disappointment
was aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas, instead of looking after the interest of his country,
sponsored and campaigned for the approval of the so-called "parity" measure. Hence he determined to assassinate the
President.

After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President Roxas, the opportunity
presented itself on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by the Liberal Party at Plaza de
Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a big crowd, President Roxas, accompanied by his wife and daughter and
surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen prominent in government and politics, stood on a platform erected for
that purpose and delivered his speech expounding and trying to convince his thousand of listeners of the advantages
to be gained by the Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting American citizens the same rights
granted to Filipino nationals be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his purpose, but having lost said firearm, which
was duly licensed, he thought of two hand grenades which were given him by an American soldier in the early days of
the liberation of Manila in exchange for two bottles of whisky. He had likewise been weighing the chances of killing
President Roxas, either by going to Malacañan, or following his intended victim in the latter's trips to provinces, for
instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon) where the President was scheduled to speak, but having encountered many
difficulties, he decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de Miranda on the night of March 10,
1947.

On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando Hernandez whom he requested to prepare for him a document
(Exhibit B), in accordance with their pervious understanding in the preceding afternoon, when they met at the premises
of the Manila Jockey Club on the occasion of an "anti-parity" meeting held there. On account of its materially in this
case, we deem it proper to quote hereunder the contents of said document. An English translation (Exhibit B-2) from its
original Tagalog reads:

FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES

I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived it, I planned it, and I carried it out all by myself
alone. It took me many days and nights pondering over this act, talking to my own conscience, to my God, until
I reached my conclusion. It was my duty.

I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare. And had I expected to lives to spare, I would not have
hesitated either ton sacrifice it for the sake of a principle which was the welfare of the people.

Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the loss of their husbands, of their sons, and there
are millions now suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their hopes were frustrated.

I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a man to be blamed for all this: he had deceived
the people, he had astounded them with no other purpose than to entice them; he even went to the extent of
risking the heritage of our future generations. For these reasons he should not continue any longer. His life
would mean nothing as compared with the welfare of eighteen million souls. And why should I not give up my
life too if only the good of those eighteen million souls.

These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and I am willing to bear up the consequences of my
act. I t matters not if others will curse me. Time and history will show, I am sure, that I have only displayed a
high degree of patriotism in my performance of my said act.

Hurrah for a free Philippines.

Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.

May God pity on me.

Amen.

JULIO C. GUILLEN

A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at the request of Guillen by his nephew, was handed to
him only at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for which reason said Exhibit B-1 appears unsigned,
because he was in a hurry for that meeting at Plaza de Miranda.

When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand grenades concealed in a paper bag which also
contained peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant pot located close to the platform, and
when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he stood on the chair on which he had been sitting and, from a distance
of about seven meters, he hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had just closed his speech, was being
congratulated by Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave the platform.

General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and without losing his presence of
mind, kicked it away from the platform, along the stairway, and towards an open space where the general thought the
grenade was likely to do the least harm; and, covering the President with his body, shouted to the crowd that
everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to the ground and exploded in the middle of a group of persons who were
standing close to the platform. Confusion ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a panic. It was found that the fragments
of the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) — who died on the following day as the result of
mortal wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade (Exhibits F and F-1) — Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo
and Emilio Maglalang.

Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about two hours after the occurrence. It appears that one
Angel Garcia, who was one spectators at that meeting, saw how a person who was standing next to him hurled an
object at the platform and, after the explosion, ran away towards a barber shop located near the platform at Plaza de
Miranda. Suspecting that person was the thrower of the object that exploded, Garcia went after him and had almost
succeeded in holding him, but Guillen offered stiff resistance, got loose from Garcia and managed to escape. Garcia
pursued him, but some detectives, mistaking the former for the real criminal and the author of the explosion, placed
him under arrest. In the meantime, while the City Mayor and some agents of the Manila Police Department were
investigating the affair, one Manuel Robles volunteered the information that the person with whom Angel Garcia was
wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he (Manuel Robles) was acquainted with Julio Guillen for the previous ten years and
had seen each other in the plaza a few moments previous to the explosion.

The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio Guillen was, within two hours after the occurrence,
found in his home at 1724 Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police headquarters and identified by Angel Garcia,
as the same person who hurled towards the platform the object which exploded and whom Garcia tried to hold when
he was running away.

During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his responsibility, although at the same time he
tried to justify his action in throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also indicated to his captors the place where he
had hidden his so called last will quoted above and marked Exhibit B, which was then unsigned by him and
subsequently signed at the police headquarters.

Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where he had buried (Exhibit C-1) the other hand
grenade (Exhibit D), and, in the presence of witnesses he signed a statement which contained his answers to question
propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of the Manila Police, who investigated him soon after his arrest (Exhibit E).
From a perusal of his voluntary statement, we are satisfied that it tallies exactly with the declarations and made by him
on the witness stand during the trial of this case.

THE ISSUES

In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several errors are assigned allegedly committed by the trial
court, namely: first, "in finding the appellant guilty of murder for the death of Simeon Varela"; second, "in declaring the
appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1 of
article 49 of the Revised Penal Code in determining the penalty to be imposed upon the accused"; and  fourth, "in
considering the concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of public authorities in the
commission of crime."

The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements made by the accused, shows beyond any
shadow of doubt that, when Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him two hand grenades, to put into execution
his preconceived plan to assassinate President Roxas, he knew fully well that, by throwing one of those two hand
grenades in his possession at President Roxas, and causing it to explode, he could not prevent the persons who were
around his main and intended victim from being killed or at least injured, due to the highly explosive nature of the bomb
employed by him to carry out his evil purpose.

Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions propounded by the trial judge (page 96 of transcript)
supports our conclusion. He stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill the President, but
that it did not make any difference to him if there were some people around the President when he hurled that bomb,
because the killing of those who surrounded the President was tantamount to killing the President, in view of the fact
that those persons, being loyal to the President being loyal to the President, were identified with the latter. In other
word, although it was not his main intention to kill the persons surrounding the President, he felt no conjunction in
killing them also in order to attain his main purpose of killing the President.

The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the latter is guilty only of homicide through
reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard to Alfredo
Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang, and that he should be sentenced to the corresponding penalties
for the different felonies committed, the sum total of which shall not exceed three times the penalty to be imposed for
the most serious crime in accordance with article 70 in relation to article 74 of the Revised Penal Code.

In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with malice. He is
therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
criminal liability is incurred by any person committing felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "in order that
an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either malice nor intention to cause injury should intervene;
where such intention exists, the act should qualified by the felony it has produced even though it may not have been
the intention of the actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that produced.' (Viada's Comments on the Penal Code, vol.
7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the
idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232.) Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in
the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)

Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of the Supreme Court of Spain:

Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el estanco de B a comprar tabaco, y habiendose

negado este a darselo al fiado, se retira a quel sin mediar entre ambos disputa alguna; pero; trnscurrido un
cuarto de hora, hallandose el estanquero despachando a C, se oye la detonacion de un arma de fuego
disparada por A desde la calle, quedando muertos en el acto C y el estanquero; supuesta la no intencion en A
de matar a C y si solo al estanquero, cabe calificar la muerte de este de homicidio y la de c de imprudencia
temeraria? — La Sala de lo Criminal de la Auudiencia de Granada lo estimo asi, y condeno al procesado a
catorse anos de reclusion por el homivcidio y a un año de prision correctional por la imprudencia. Aparte de
que la muerte del estanquero debio calificarse de assesinato y no de homicidio, por haberse ejecutado con
aleviosa. es evidente que la muerte de C, suponiendo que no se propusiera ejecutaria el procesado, no pudo
calificarse de imprudencia teme raria, sino que tambien debio declararsele responsable de la misma, a tenor
 de lo puesto en este apartado ultimo del articulo; y que siendo ambas muertes producidas por un solo hecho,
o sea por un solo disparo, debio imponerse al reo la pena del delito de asesinato en el grado maximo, a tenor
de lo dispuesto en el art. 90 del Codigo, o sea la pena de muerte. Se ve, pues, claramente que en el antedicha
sentencia, aparte de otros articulos del Codigo, se infringio por la Sala la disposicion de este apartado ultimo
del articulo muy principalmente, y asi lo declaro el Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18 junio de 1872. (Gaceta de
1,0 de agosto.) (I Viada, 5th Ed., p. 42.)

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:

Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49 that is applicable. The case before us is clearly
governed by the first clause of article 48 because by a single act, that a throwing highly explosive hand grenade at
President Roxas, the accused committed two grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the
victim; and (2) multiple attempted murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and
Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties.

The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In the case of People vs.
Mabug-at, supra, this court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly considered, even when
the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither
of the two persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack, or become aware of it. In the same case it
was held that the qualifying circumstance of premeditation may not be properly taken into the account when the person
whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who became his victim.

There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a hand grenade at him with
the intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of a felony by over acts, but he did not succeed in
assassinating him "by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance." For the same
reason we qualify the injuries caused on the four other persons already named as merely attempted and not frustrated
murder.

In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is abundant proof that , in violation of the provisions of
article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused Guillen has committed among others the offense of assault upon a
person in authority, for in fact his efforts were directed towards the execution of his main purpose of eliminating
President Roxas for his failure to redeem his electoral campaign promises, by throwing at him in his official capacity as
the Chief Executive of the nation the hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the appropriate allegation charging
Guillen with the commission of said offense, we shall refrain making a finding to that effect.

The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed by the accused with the single act of throwing
a hand grenade at the President, was attended by the various aggravating circumstances alleged in the information,
without any mitigating circumstance. But we do not deem it necessary to consider said aggravating circumstances
because in any event article 48 of the Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires that the penalty for the most serious
of said crimes be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. (Art. 248.)

It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the extreme penalty provided by it upon the facts and
circumstances hereinabove narrated.

The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to affirm it, and we hereby do so by a
unanimous vote. The death sentence shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, under
authority of the Director of Prisons, on such working day as the trial court may fix within 30 days from the date the
record shall have been remanded. It is so ordered.

14. People v. Adriano

G.R. No. 205228               July 15, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee,

vs.
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, LEAN ADRIANO @ DENDEN, ABBA SANTIAGO y ADRIANO, JOHN DOE AND
PETER DOE, Accused,
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is an appeal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 30 May 2011 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04028, which
affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court dated 7 April 2009, convicting accused-appellant Rolly Adriano y
Santos (Adriano) for the crime of Homicide (Crim. Case No. 13159-07) for the killing of Ofelia Bulanan (Bulanan) and
for the crime of Murder (Crim. Case No. 13160-07) for the killing of Danilo Cabiedes (Cabiedes) in "People of the
Philippines v. Rolly Adriano y Sales."
Adriano was charged with two (2) counts of Murder. The two (2) sets of Information read:

Crim. Case No. 13159-07

On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conniving together, with intent to kill, treachery and
abuse of superior strength, willfully shot several times with assorted firearms Ofelia Bulanan, hitting her on the different
parts of her body, resulting in her death to the damage of her heirs.3

Crim. Case No. 13160-07

On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conniving together, with intent to kill, treachery and
abuse of superior strength, willfully shot several times with assorted firearms Danilo Cabiedes, hitting him on the
different parts of his body, resulting in his death to the damage of his heirs.4

Version of the Prosecution:

On 13 March 2007, at around 8:00 a.m., Police Officer 1 Matthew Garabiles (POI Garabiles) and P02 Alejandro Santos
(P02 Santos), in civilian clothes, were on their way to Camp Olivas, Pampanga, riding a motorcycle along Olongapo-
Gapan National Road.5

While they were at Barangay Malapit San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, a speeding blue Toyota Corolla (Corolla) with plate no.
WHK 635, heading towards the same direction, overtook them and the car in front of them, a maroon Honda CRV
(CRY) with plate no. CTL 957.6

When the Corolla reached alongside the CRV, the passenger on the front seat of the Corolla shot the CRV and caused
the CRV to swerve and fall in the canal in the road embankment. Four (4) armed men then suddenly alighted the
Corolla and started shooting at the driver of the CRV, who was later identified as Cabiedes. During the shooting, a
bystander, Bulanan, who was standing near the road embankment, was hit by a stray bullet. The four armed men
hurried back to the Corolla and immediately left the crime scene. PO 1 Garabiles and P02 Santos followed the Corolla
but lost track of the latter.7

Later, both Cabiedes and Bulanan died from fatal gunshot wounds: Cabiedes was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA)
at the Good Samaritan General Hospital due to three (3) gunshot wounds on the left side of his chest while Bulanan
died on the spot after being shot in the head.

During the investigation, the police learned that the Corolla was registered under the name of Antonio V. Rivera
(Rivera). Upon inquiry, Rivera admitted that he is the owner of the Corolla but clarified that the Corolla is one of the
several cars he owns in his car rental business, which he leased to Adriano. Later that day, Adriano arrived at Rivera's
shop with the Corolla, where he was identified by P02 Santos and PO 1 Garabiles as one of the four assailants who
alighted from the passenger's seat beside the driver of the Corolla and shot Cabiedes. He was immediately arrested
and brought to the Provincial Special Operations Group (PSOG) headquarters in Cabanatuan City.8

In examining the crime scene, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office recovered one (1) deformed fired
bullet from a .45 caliber firearm and five (5) cartridges from a .45 caliber firearm.9

Version of the Defense

Adriano testified that on 13 March 2007, at about 6:00 a.m., at the time of the incident, he was at his house in Dolores,
Magalang, Pampanga, washing the clothes of his child. After doing the laundry, he took his motorcycle to a repair shop
and left it there.10

At about 8:00 a.m., Adriano went to the house of his friend, Ruben Mallari (Mallari), to ask for a lighter spring needed to
repair his motorcycle. After having coffee in Mallari' s house, Adriano went home and brought his child to his mother.
On his way to his mother's house, he met his brother-in-law, Felix Aguilar Sunga (Sunga). After leaving his child at his
mother's house, Adriano went to the cockpit arena to watch cockfights, where he saw his friend, Danilo Dizon (Dizon).
After the fights, he left the cockpit at about 2:00 p.m. and went home and took a rest.11

After resting, Adriano picked-up his motorcycle and proceeded to a store and stayed there. At around 5 :00 p.m., he
went back home. After a while, he received a call from a certain Boyet Garcia (Garcia), who borrowed the Corolla from
him, which he rented from Rivera.12

At 8:00 p.m., he met with Garcia to get the Corolla back. After dropping Garcia off, Adriano went to Rivera to return the
Corolla, where he was arrested by police officers, thrown inside the Corolla's trunk, and brought to a place where he
was tortured.13

The other defense's witnesses, Lucita Tapnio (Tapnio), Mallari, Sunga, and Dizon corroborated Adriano's testimony.14

When arraigned, Adriano pleaded not guilty. The other accused, Lean Adriano alias "Denden," Abba Santiago y
Adriano, John Doe, and Peter Doe remained at large.
During trial, the prosecution presented eight (8) witnesses: (1) PO1 Garabiles, (2) P02 Santos, (3) Police Senior
Inspector Roger V. Sebastian, (4) SP02 Alejandro Eduardo, (5) P02 Jay Cabrera, (6) P03 Antonio dela Cruz, (7)
Adelaida Cabiedes, widow of Cabiedes, and (8) Ricky Flores.

On the other hand, the defense presented Adriano, Tapnio, Sunga, Mallari, and Dizon as witnesses.

Ruling of the Lower Courts

After trial, the RTC convicted Adriano. The RTC rejected Adriano's defense of alibi on the ground that it was not
supported by clear and convincing evidence. According to the RTC, Adriano's alibi cannot prevail over the testimonies
of credible witnesses, who positively identified Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Also, contrary to the
allegations of the defense, the RTC gave full credence to the testimony of prosecution witnesses, POI Garabiles and
P02 Santos. The RTC determined that the defense failed to show proof that will show or indicate that PO1 Garabiles
and P02 Santos were impelled by improper motives to testify against Adriano. The RTC found as proven the
assessment of damages against the accused. Thus did the RTC order Adriano to pay the heirs of Cabiedes the
amount of ₱222,482.00 based on the following: (1) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Pl00,000.00) as funeral expenses;
(2) Sixty Thousand Pesos (₱60,000.00) as expenses for the food served during the burial; (3) Twelve Thousand Four
Hundred Eighty Two Pesos (1!12,482.00) as groceries used and served during the wake; and Sixty Thousand Pesos
(₱60,000.00) for the parts and service repair of the CRV.15

The dispositive portion of the R TC Decision dated 7 April 2009 reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, as charged, for the
death of Danilo Cabiedes, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the
crime, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused Rolly Adriano is also ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes in the amount of Php 50,000.00 and to pay the sum of Php 222,482.00 as
actual damages.

And finding ROLLY ADRIANO also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, as charged, for the death of Ofelia
Bulanan, likewise, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the offense,
he is further sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of
prision mayor medium, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Ofelia Bulanan in the amount of Php 50,000.00.16

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Adriano alleged that the R TC erred when it failed to appreciate his defense of alibi,
as well as the testimonies of the other defense's witnesses. Adriano contended that the RTC erred when it gave
credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses which are inconsistent and contradictory. In detail, Adriano
referred to the following particulars: 1) whether the culprits started shooting when the victim's vehicle was still in
motion; 2) which side of the vehicle did the shooters alight from; 3) the identity of the culprit who triggered the fatal
shot; 4) whether the trip of PO1 Garabiles and P02 Santos going to Camp Olivas, Pampanga was official business; 5)
the precise distance of the assailants' vehicle from that of the two (2) eyewitnesses; and 6) the precise minutes of the
shooting incident.

The Court of Appeals rejected Adriano's attempt to becloud the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. According to
the Court of Appeals, the prosecution witnesses' positive identification of Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the
crime cannot be overcome by minor inconsistencies in their testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that these trivial
differences in fact constitute signs of veracity.

On the defense of alibi, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the R TC that Adriano's claim that he was in
Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at the time of the incident does not convince because it was not impossible for Adriano
to be physically present at the crime scene, in Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, which can be reached by car
in less than an hour.17 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, Br. 36, in
Crim. Case Nos. 13159-07 and 13160-07 is AFFIRMED subject to the Modification that the award of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (Php50,000.00) as civil indemnity to the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes is INCREASED to Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (Php75,000.00). In addition, the Accused-Appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes the
amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00) as moral damages; and the heirs of Ofelia Bulanan the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.18

Our Ruling

In cases of murder, the prosecution must establish the presence of the following elements:

1. That a person was killed.

2. That the accused killed him.

3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248.
 4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.

In the case at bar, the prosecution has established the concurrence of the elements of murder: (1) the fact of death of
Cabiedes and Bulanan; (2) the positive identification of Adriano as one of perpetrators of the crime; and (3) the
attendance of treachery as a qualifying aggravating circumstance and use of firearms and abuse of superior strength
as generic aggravating circumstances.

Death of Cabiedes

The present case is a case of murder by ambush. In ambush, the crime is carried out to ensure that the victim is killed
and at the same time, to eliminate any risk from any possible defenses or retaliation from the victim—19 ambush
exemplifies the nature of treachery.

Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines treachery as the direct employment of means,
methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In order for
treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in
a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods
or forms of attack employed by him.20 The "essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor
on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission
without risk of himself."21

Clearly, treachery is present in the case at bar as the victims were indeed defenseless at the time of the attack.
Adriano, together with the other accused, ambushed Cabiedes by following the unsuspecting victim along the national
highway and by surprise, fired multiple shots at Cabiedes and then immediately fled the crime scene, causing
Cabiedes to die of multiple gunshot wounds. When the Corolla swerved into the CRV's lane, Cabiedes was forced to
swiftly turn to the right and on to the road embankment, finally falling into the canal where his CRY was trapped,
precluding all possible means of defense. There is no other logical conclusion, but that the orchestrated ambush
committed by Adriano, together with his co-accused, who are still on the loose, was in conspiracy with each other to
ensure the death of Cabiedes and their safety. The means of execution employed was deliberately and consciously
adopted by Adriano so as to give Cabiedes no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.22

All these circumstances indicate that the orchestrated crime was committed with the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, which absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, and use of
firearms. Indeed, Cabiedes had no way of escaping or defending himself.

Death of Bulanan

We refer back to the settled facts of the case. Bulanan, who was merely a bystander, was killed by a stray bullet. He
was at the wrong place at the wrong time.

Stray bullets, obviously, kill indiscriminately and often without warning, precluding the unknowing victim from repelling
the attack or defending himself. At the outset, Adriano had no intention to kill Bulanan, much less, employ any
particular means of attack. Logically, Bulanan's death was random and unintentional and the method used to kill her,
as she was killed by a stray a bullet, was, by no means, deliberate. Nonetheless, Adriano is guilty of the death of
Bulanan under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,23 pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which imposes
criminal liability for the acts committed in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom. While it may not have been Adriano's intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not exculpate him. Bulanan' s
death caused by the bullet fired by Adriano was the natural and direct consequence of Adriano's felonious deadly
assault against Cabiedes.

As we already held in People v. Herrera24 citing People v. Hilario,25 "[t]he fact that accused killed a person other than
their intended victim is of no moment." Evidently, Adriano's original intent was to kill Cabiedes. However, during the
commission of the crime of murder, a stray bullet hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the consequences of
his act of shooting Cabiedes. This is the import of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. As held in People v. Herrera
citing People v. Ural:

Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different from that which is
intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or
logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, 'el que
es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado ', or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.26

As regards the crime(s) committed, we reiterate our ruling in People v. Nelmida. 27 In the aforesaid case, we ruled that
accused-appellants should be convicted not of a complex crime but of separate crimes of two counts of murder and
seven counts of attempted murder as the killing and wounding of the victims were not the result of a single act but of
several acts.28 The doctrine in Nelmida here is apt and applicable.

In Nelmida, we distinguished the two kinds of complex crime: compound crime, when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, and complex crime proper, when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other. Moreover, we also made a distinction that "when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes,"29 not a complex crime.
As borne by the records, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office recovered six (6) cartridges of bullets from
a .45 caliber firearm. This does not indicate discharge by a single burst. Rather, separate shots are evidenced. One or
more of which, though fired to kill Cabiedes, killed Bulanan instead. There is thus no complex crime. The felonious acts
resulted in two separate and distinct crimes.

Finally, we ask, may treachery be appreciated in aberratio ictus?

Although Bulanan's death was by no means deliberate, we shall adhere to the prevailing jurisprudence pronounced in
People v. Flora,30 where the Court ruled that treachery may be appreciated in aberratio ictus. In Flora, the accused was
convicted of two separate counts of murder: for the killing of two victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the
victim killed by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, qualified
both killings to murder. The material facts in Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus, we follow the Flora doctrine.

Also, contrary to the defense's allegation that Bulanan' s death was not established, a perusal of the records would
reveal that Bulanan's fact of death was duly established as the prosecution offered in evidence Bulanan's death
certificate.31

On the alibi as defense, time and again, we have ruled alibis like denials, are inherently weak and unreliable because
they can easily be fabricated.32 For alibi to prosper, the accused must convincingly prove that he was somewhere else
at the time when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene.33 In
the case at bar, Adriano claimed he was in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at the time of incident. Adriano's claim failed
to persuade. As admitted, Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga was only less than an hour away from the crime scene,
Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Hence, it was not physically impossible for Adriano to be at the crime scene
at the time of the incident.

It is likewise uniform holding that denial and alibi will not prevail when corroborated not by credible witnesses but by the
accused's relatives and friends.1âwphi1 Therefore, the defense's evidence which is composed of Adriano's relatives
and friends cannot prevail over the prosecution's positive identification of Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the
crime.

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. In the case at bar,
as the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. There
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present, the lower penalty should be imposed, which is reclusion
perpetua, in accordance with Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

To recover actual or compensatory damages, basic is the rule that the claimant must establish with a reasonable
degree of certainty, the actual amount of loss by means of competent proof or the best evidence
obtainable.34 Documentary evidence support the award of actual damages in this case. The RTC computed the amount
of actual damages as ₱222,482.00. However, a perusal of the records reveals that the amount of award of actual
damages should be ₱232,482.00 as duly supported by official receipts.35 Therefore, we hereby increase the award of
actual damages from ₱222,482.00 to ₱232,482.00.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
04028 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant-appellant ROLL Y ADRIANO y SAMSON is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER (Criminal Case No. 13160-07) for the killing of DANILO CABIEDES and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is
ordered to pay the heirs of DANILO CABIEDES the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as civil
indemnity, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as
exemplary damages, and Two Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Two Pesos {₱232,482.00) as
actual damages.

Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER (Criminal Case No. 13159-07) for the killing of OFELIA BULANAN and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to pay the heirs of OFELIA
BULANAN in the amount of the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and
Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.

All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6o/o per annum from the date of finality until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ii. Error in personae

People v. Sabalones

G.R. No. 123485 August 31, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias "Roling," ARTEMIO TIMOTEO BERONGA, TEODULO ALEGARBES and
EUFEMIO CABANERO, accused, ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias "Roling" and ARTEMIO TIMOTEO
BERONGA, accused-appellants.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Factual findings of trial courts which are affirmed by the Court of Appeals are, as a general rule, binding and conclusive
upon the Supreme Court. Alibi, on the other hand, cannot prevail over positive identification by credible witnesses.
Furthermore, alleged violations of constitutional rights during custodial investigation are relevant only when the
conviction of the accused by the trial court is based on the evidence obtained during such investigation.

The Case

These are the principles relied upon by the Court in resolving this appeal from the Court of Appeals
(CA)1 Decision 2 dated September 28, 1995, convicting Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga of murder and
frustrated murder. The convictions arose from a shooting incident on June 1, 1985 in Talisay, Cebu, which resulted in
the killing of two persons and the wounding of three others, who were all riding in two vehicles which were allegedly
ambushed by appellants.

After conducting a preliminary investigation, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Juanito M. Gabiana Sr. filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 7, 3 five amended Informations charging four "John Does,"
who were later identified as Rolusape Sabalones, Artemio Timoteo Beronga, Teodulo Alegarbes and Eufemio
Cabanero, with two counts of murder and three counts of frustrated murder. The Informations are quoted hereunder.

1) Crim Case No. CBU-9257 for murder:

That on the 1st day of June, 1985, at 11:45 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at Mansueto Village,
Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, armed with high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and treachery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot GLENN TIEMPO, who was riding [i]n a jeep and
who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the latter several gunshot wounds, thereby causing
his instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

2) Criminal Case No. 9258 for murder:

That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 o'clock in the evening, more or less at Mansueto Village,
Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, armed with high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and treachery, did [then] and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot ALFREDO NARDO, who was riding on a
jeep and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the latter several gunshot wounds, thereby
causing his instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

3) Crim Case No. CBU-9259 for frustrated murder:

That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at Mansueto Village,
Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, armed with high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and treachery, did and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot REY BOLO who was riding in a car and who gave
no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following injuries to wit:

laceration, mouth due to gunshot wound, gunshot wound (L) shoulder penetrating (L) chest; gunshot
wound (R) hand (palm); open fracture (L) clavicle (L) scapula; contusion (L) lung;

thereby performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of [m]urder as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of
the perpetrator, i.e. the timely medical attendance.

IN VIOLATION of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

4) Criminal Case No. 9260 for frustrated murder:

 That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at Mansueto Village,
Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, armed with high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and treachery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot ROGELIO PRESORES, who was riding in a car
and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following injuries, to wit:

gunshot wound, thru and thru right chest

thereby performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of [m]urder as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of
the perpetrator, i.e. the timely medical attendance.

IN VIOLATION of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

5) Criminal Case No. 9261 for frustrated murder:

That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at Mansueto Village,
Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, armed with high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and treachery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot NELSON TIEMPO, who was riding in a car and
who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following injuries, to wit:

Gunshot wound neck penetrating wound perforating trachea (cricoid) thereby performing all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of [m]urder as a consequence but which nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, i.e. the timely medical
attendance.

IN VIOLATION of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Of the four indictees in the five Informations, Teodulo Alegarbes and Artemio Timoteo Beronga were the first to be
arraigned. Upon the arrest of the two, the Informations were amended by the public prosecutor, with the conformity of
the defense counsel, by substituting the names of the two accused for the "John Does" appearing in the original
Informations. When arraigned, said accused, assisted by their respective lawyers, pleaded not guilty to the five
Informations.

Alegarbes died in the course of trial; thus, the cases against him were dismissed. Accused Cabanero remained at
large. Sabalones, on the other hand, was eventually arrested. Subsequently, he jumped bail but was recaptured in
1988 and thereafter pleaded not guilty during his arraignment.

The cases against Sabalones and Beronga were jointly tried. Thereafter, the lower court found them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The RTC disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises above-set forth, the Court finds accused ROLUSAPE SABALONES and
(ARTEMIO) TIMOTEO BERONGA, [g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals:

In Crim. Case No. CBU-9257, for MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of [f]ourteen (14) years, [e]ight (8)
months and [o]ne (1) day, as minimum, to [s]eventeen (17) years, [f]our (4) months and [o]ne (1) day,
of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of deceased, Glenn Tiempo, the sum of
P50,000.00;

In Crim. Case No. CBU-9258, for MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of [f]ourteen (14) years, [e]ight (8)
months and [o]ne (1) day, as minimum, to [s]eventeen (17) years, [f]our (4) months and [o]ne (1) day,
of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of deceased, Alfredo Nardo, the sum of
P50,000.00;

In Crim. Case No. CBU-9259, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 in
relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer the
penalty of [e]ight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight (8)
months of [re]clusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Rey Bolo, the sum of
P20,000.00;

In Crim. Case No. CBU-9260, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 in
relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer the
penalty of [e]ight (8) years of  prision mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight months
of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Rogelio Presores, the sum of
P20,000.00;

In Crim. Case No. CBU-9261, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 in
relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer the
 penalty of [e]ight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight (8)
months of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Nelson Tiempo, the sum of
P20,000.00; and

To pay the costs in all instances. The period of their preventive imprisonment shall be credited to each
accused in full.

SO ORDERED. 4

Appellants filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the CA affirmed their conviction but sentenced
them to reclusion perpetua for the murders they were found guilty of. Accordingly, the appellate court, without entering
judgment, certified the case to the Supreme Court in accordance with Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court. The
dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court convicting accused-appellants Rolusa[p]e Sabalones and
Artemio Timoteo Beronga for murder in Crim. Cases Nos. CBU-9257 and CBU-9258, and [f]rustrated
[m]urder in Crim. Cases Nos. CBU-9259, CBU-9260, and CBU-9261 is hereby AFFIRMED; however,
the penalties in the [f]rustrated [m]urder and [m]urder cases are hereby MODIFIED, such that both
accused-appellants are each sentenced to imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS of [p]rision
[m]ayor medium as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of [r]eclusion
[t]emporal medium as maximum in each of the three [f]rustrated [m]urder cases (Crim. Cases Nos.
CBU-9259, CBU-9260 and CBU-9261); and are each sentenced to [r]eclusion [p]erpetua in each of the
two [m]urder cases (Crim. Cases Nos. CBU-9257 and CBU-9258). The indemnity to the victim in each
[f]rustrated [m]urder case shall remain. In conformity with Rule 124, Section 13 of the Rules of Court,
however, this Court refrains from entering judgment, and hereby certifies the case and orders that the
entire record hereof be elevated to the Supreme Court for review. 5

After the Court of Appeals certified the case to this Court, we required appellants to file supplemental briefs. Appellants
failed to comply within the prescribed period and were deemed to have waived their right to do so. 6 Thus, in resolving
this case, this Court will address primarily the arguments raised by the appellants in their Brief before the Court of
Appeals, which assailed the RTC Decision.

iii. Praeter intentionem

15. People v. Albuquerque

G.R. No. L-38773         December 19, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GINES ALBURQUERQUE Y SANCHEZ, defendant-appellant.

Gibbs and McDonough and Roman Ozaeta, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

AVANCEÑA, C.J.:

The judgment appealed from finds the appellants Gines Alburquerque guilty of the crime of homicide committed on the
person of Manuel Osma and sentences him to eight years and one day of prision mayor, and to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the sum of P1,000, with costs.

The appellant herein, who is a widower of fifty-five years of age and father of nine living children, has been suffering
from partial paralysis for some time, walks dragging one leg and has lost control of the movement of his right arm. He
has been unable to work since he suffered the stroke of paralysis. One of his daughters was named Maria and another,
are married, while still another one is a nun. With the exemption of the other married daughter and the nun, of all of
them, including the appellant, live with Maria upon whom they depend for support.

Among the daughters living with Maria, one named Pilar became acquainted and had intimate relations later with the
deceased Manuel Osma about the end of the year 1928. It was then that the appellant became acquainted with the
deceased who frequently visited Pilar in his house. The relations between Pilar and the deceased culminated in Pilar's
giving birth to a child. The appellant did not know that his daughter's relations with the deceased had gone to such
extremes, that he had to be deceived with the information that she had gone to her godfather's house in Singalong,
when in fact she had been taken to the Chinese Hospital for delivery. The appellant learned the truth only when Pilar
returned home with her child.

Naturally the appellant was deeply affected by this incident, since which time he has appeared sad and worried not
only because of the dishonor it brought upon his family but also because the child meant an added burden to Maria
upon whom they all depended for support. For some time the appellant wrote letters, that at times were hostile and
threatening and at other times entreating the deceased to legitimize his union with Pilar by marrying her, or at least, to
support her and his child. Although the deceased agreed to give the child a monthly allowance by way of support, he
never complied with his promise.

The appellant was in such a mood when he presented himself one day at the office where the deceased worked and
asked leave of the manager thereof to speak to Osma. They both went downstairs. What happened later, nobody
witnessed. But the undisputed fact is that on that occasion the appellant inflicted a wound at the base of the neck of the
deceased, causing his death.

After excluding the improbable portions thereof, the court infers from the testimony of the appellant that he proposed to
said deceased to marry his daughter and that, upon hearing that the latter refused to do so, he whipped out his
penknife. Upon seeing the appellant's attitude, the deceased tried to seize him by the neck whereupon the said
appellant stabbed him on the face with the said penknife. Due to his lack of control of the movement of his arm, the
weapon landed on the base of the neck of the deceased.

The trial court found that the appellant did not intend to cause so grave an injury as the death of the deceased. We find
that his conclusion is supported by the evidence. In his testimony the appellant emphatically affirmed that he only
wanted to inflict a wound that would leave a permanent scar on the face of the deceased, or one that would compel
him to remain in the hospital for a week or two but never intended to kill him, because then it would frustrate his plan of
compelling him to marry or, at least, support his daughter. The appellant had stated this intention in some of his letters
to the deceased by way of a threat to induce him to accept his proposal for the benefit of his daughter. That the act of
the appellant in stabbing the deceased resulted in the fatal wound at the base of his neck, was due solely to the fact
hereinbefore mentioned that appellant did not have control of his right arm on account of paralysis and the blow,
although intended for the face, landed at the base of the neck.

Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause so grave an injury as the death of the deceased as
well as those of his having voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities, and acted under the influence of passion
and obfuscation, should be taken into consideration in favor of the appellant.

Under the facts above stated, we cannot entertain the appellant's contention that he acted in legitimate self-defense
inasmuch as he provoked and commenced the aggression by whipping out and brandishing his penknife.

The defense likewise claims that, at all events, article 49 of the Revised Penal Code, which refers to cases where the
crime committed is different from that intended by the accused, should be applied herein. This article is a reproduction
of article 64 of the old Code and has been interpreted as applicable only in cases where the crime befalls a different
person (decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of October 20, 1897, and June 28,1899), which is not the case
herein.

The facts as herein proven constitute the crime of homicide defined and penalized in article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code with reclusion temporal. In view of the concurrence therein of three mitigating circumstances without any
aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower in degree, that is prision mayor, should be imposed.

Wherefore, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 4103, the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of from one (1) year of prision correccional to eight (8) years and (1) day of  prision mayor, affirming the
judgment appealed from in all other respects, with the costs. So ordered.

d. Concurrence
e. Resulting Harm
f. Causation

16. Bataclan v. Medina

G.R. No. L-10126           October 22, 1957

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR and
ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.

Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R. Francisco for plaintiffs-appellants.

Fortunato Jose for defendant and appellant.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner
defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to
Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen passengers, including the
driver and conductor. Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe
Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan, another passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just
called Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left side of the driver, and a woman named Natalia
Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was
running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell
into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus
the best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver,
named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the
overturned bus. Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans from
inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said they could not get out of the bus. There is
nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers already free from the wreck, including the driver and
the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but
calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of
them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men
presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming
the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to
leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus
and the ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for
help set it on fire.

That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were removed and duly identified
that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor
children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the
plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City
for sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals,
but the latter endorsed the appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim in the complaint.

Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and their goods. For
purposes of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal provisions:

ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and
1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra ordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in
articles 1755 and 1756.

ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in
articles 1733 and 1755

ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or
willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their
authority or in violation of the order of the common carriers.

This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.

ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina
Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the trial
court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to
show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by
the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the
front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters.
The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at
which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the
canal and turned turtle.

There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree.
The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus,
but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the
time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so
damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him. We disagree. A satisfactory
definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-
appellants in their brief. It is as follows:

. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events
in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with
 its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing him physical
injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if
some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend
that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case under
the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of
the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of
the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in
response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor
themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and
coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than
that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them.
In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning
of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus
can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the
witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and
must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the
gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially
over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would
appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said
negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly,
Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning capacity of the deceased, as well as the
other elements entering into a damage award, we are satisfied that the amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS
would constitute satisfactory compensation, this to include compensatory, moral, and other damages. We also believe
that plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees, and assessing the legal services rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys not only in
the trial court, but also in the course of the appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs prepared by them, the
attorney's fees may well be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS for the loss of merchandise carried by the
deceased in the bus, is adequate and will not be disturbed.

There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us. According to the evidence, one of the
passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she was visited by
the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his visit, she overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors,
telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they were already old, and that as a
matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his instructions. If
this be true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure
the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in front, with new ones, as he had been
instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, as we have already stated, the blow out would not have occurred. All
in all, there is reason to believe that the driver operated and drove his vehicle negligently, resulting in the death of four
of his passengers, physical injuries to others, and the complete loss and destruction of their goods, and yet the criminal
case against him, on motion of the fiscal and with his consent, was provisionally dismissed, because according to the
fiscal, the witnesses on whose testimony he was banking to support the complaint, either failed or appear or were
reluctant to testify. But the record of the case before us shows the several witnesses, passengers, in that bus, willingly
and unhesitatingly testified in court to the effect of the said driver was negligent. In the public interest the prosecution of
said erring driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but for the promotion of the safety of
passengers on public utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Department of Justice and the Provincial
Fiscal of Cavite.

In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are increased from ONE
THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT
HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney's fees, respectively, the decision appealed is
from hereby affirmed, with costs.

17. People v. Ilagan

G.R. No. 144595            August 6, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
DANTE ILAGAN, appellant.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

For automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No.
1246-M-99, convicting appellant Dante Ilagan of Qualified Rape and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of
death and to pay the offended party, Mylene Ilagan, the sums of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P100,000.00 as
moral damages.1
The information for Rape against appellant reads:

That on or about the 19th day of May, 1998, in the municipality of Norzagaray, province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs, by means of force and intimidation, have carnal knowledge of his
daughter Mylene Ilagan, 16 years old, against her will and consent.

Contrary to law.2

During the arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.3 Thereafter, the trial of the case ensued.

The facts of the case as established by the prosecution are as follows:

The offended party, Mylene Ilagan, lived with her father, appellant Dante Ilagan, and her siblings at Barangay Bulalo,
Norzagaray, Bulacan. Her mother, Marietta, had gone off to live with another man.4

On May 18, 1998, Mylene's elder sister went with her paternal grandmother, Nenita Ilagan, to Meycauayan to attend
the birthday celebration of their eldest sister. Later that evening, while Mylene was asleep beside her other siblings,
accused woke her up and told her that they would sleep in her grandmother Nenita's house, located some fifteen
meters away,5 leaving behind her other siblings in their own house.

At 3:00 in the morning of the following day, while Mylene was asleep, she was awakened by someone taking off her
shorts and panties. She saw appellant, naked from the waist down, lying on top of her. Appellant inserted his penis into
her vagina, causing her pain. She was unable to cry for fear that appellant might kill her since he had threatened to kill
her before. Appellant stopped the sexual intrusion when a substance, which looked like phlegm, came out of his penis.
He then got up and went to the kitchen to boil some water. He told Mylene to watch the pot and left the house.6

On December 10, 1998, while appellant was in Quezon Province, Mylene mustered the courage to tell her friend,
Jocelyn, about the sexual assault by her father. They went to the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), which brought Mylene to the Norzagaray Police where she gave her sworn statement. Thereafter, she was
brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Provincial Crime Laboratory in Malolos, Bulacan for physical
examination.7

Dr. Manuel Aves, the PNP Medico-Legal Officer who examined Mylene, found multiple healed deep lacerations on her
hymen. He concluded that Mylene was a non-virgin at the time of the examination on December 15, 1998.8

On the same date, Mylene filed a complaint for Rape against appellant before the Norzagaray Municipal Trial Court.9

In his defense, appellant denied the charges and claimed that he was in Alabang, Muntinlupa City on the date that the
alleged rape was committed, working at a project for Nipponville Home Gallery. Moreover, as a furniture worker, he
stayed in Manila for several days and went home to Bulacan only on weekends. 10 He alleged that Mylene had several
boyfriends, and presented in court purported love letters sent by Mylene to Larry and Rudy, as well as letters she
received from her male suitors, namely, Boy Bicol, Dondon Hernandez, Rab and Orly.11 Her grandmother, Nenita
Ilagan, and sister, Judith, corroborated appellant's testimony. They alleged that appellant frequently scolded Mylene for
coming home late, and surmised that this may be the reason why she filed charges against her father.12

On June 9, 2000, the trial court rendered the appealed judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, ALL PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court resolves that the prosecution has successfully
undertaken his burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, accused Dante
Ilagan is hereby found GUILTY of the crime of RAPE from having violated the provisions of Article 266-B in
relation to Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Considering the presence of aggravating
circumstances that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent of the victim in
this case, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the Supreme Penalty of DEATH by lethal injection.

One final word. The Court treats the imposition of the capital punishment upon the hereby accused as an
unpleasant, if not an unenviable task. Nonetheless, the burden becomes lighter as we ponder on what the
Supreme Court stated with regard to a case of Rape of this nature. Thus: "incestuous relations are abhorrent to
the nature of man, not only to civilized men, but also to semi-civilized and barbarous people x x x and when a
man perpetrates his lascivious desires on his own direct relative, he descends to a level lower than that of a
beast. (People vs. Mandap, 244 SCRA 457)

Lastly, the accused is also ordered to indemnify Mylene Ilagan the sum of P75,000.00 and further amount of
P100,000.00 as moral damages.

With costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.13

In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors:

I
 THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE DEATH
PENALTY.

II

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY
OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MYLENE ILAGAN.14

Well-entrenched is the rule that a conviction for rape may be made even on the testimony of the victim herself, as long
as such testimony is credible.15 It is likewise settled that when a woman says that she had been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that she had been raped, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the
accused may be convicted on the basis of the victim's testimony. A rape victim would not publicly disclose that she had
been raped and undergo the troubles and humiliation of a public trial if her motive was not to bring to justice the person
who abused her.16

Consequently, the issues in a rape case boil down to the credibility of the victim. In assessing her credibility, courts are
guided by the following principles:

(1) As accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove;

(2) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution, and;

(3) The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and can not be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the defense.17

In the case at bar, complainant recounted her harrowing experience in the hands of appellant in this wise:

Q:         My question is, where were you on May 1998 at around 3 o'clock early in the morning?

A:         I was in the house of my grandmother, sir. My father asked me to undress and remove my panty.

Q:         You said that you were then at the house of your grandmother, what is the name of your grandmother?

A:         Her name is Aida Ilagan, sir.

Q:         Where is this house located?

A:         Near our house in Norzagaray, Bulacan, sir.

Q:         What is the exact place in Norzagay where your lola's house is located?

A:         Bulalo, Norzagaray, sir.

Q:         Who were with you in the house of your lola at that time?

A:         My father, sir.

Q:         What about your lola?

A:         She was in Meycauayan, Bulacan, sir together with my ate.

Q:         How about your other siblings? Where were they at that time?

A:         They were in our house, sir.

Q:         Why did you decide to sleep at the house of your lola?

A:         I was sleeping there in our house, but my father asked me to go with him and sleep at the house of my
lola because nobody was there, sir.

Q:         After your panty was removed by your father, what happened next?

A:         I was molested (ginalaw), sir.

Q:         Tell me exactly what do you mean by "ginalaw"?

A:         He placed his body on top of me and inserted his private organ on my private organ, sir.
 Q:         You said your clothes and panty were removed by your father. Are you saying that you were totally
naked when your father placed on top of you?

Court:

By the way, did the witness say that it was not only her panty but also her clothes were removed?

Q:         Just to clarify this, your honor. What was removed by your father from your body?

A:         My shorts and panty, sir.

Court:

Was it your father or yourself who removed your shorts and panty?

A:         My father, your honor.

Court: Proceed.

Q:         What were you wearing on your upper apparel?

A:         T-shirt, sir.

Q:         What did you feel when your father inserted his private organ into yours?

A:         It was painful, sir.

Q:         How long did your father placed himself on top of you?

A:         Half an hour, sir.

Q:         While your father was on top of you, what was he doing?

A:         He forcibly inserted his penis into my private organ, sir.

Q:         Did you feel anything from the private organ of your father?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         What was that, that you felt came out from the private organ if your father?

A:         As if phlegm (sipon), sir.18

The aforequoted testimony of the victim is marked by spontaneity, honesty, and sincerity. When the testimony of the
victim is simple and straightforward, the same must be given full faith and credit.19 A young girl's revelation that she had
been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and her willingness to undergo public trial
where she could be compelled to give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be easily dismissed as mere
concoction. It is highly inconceivable for a daughter to publicly accuse her father of rape if it were not true. Indeed, it is
highly against human nature to fabricate a story that would expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime of
dishonor, especially when her charge could mean the death of her own father.20

Appellant claims that the victim's failure to resist the assault and the delay in reporting the case to the authorities are
sufficient to impair her credibility. We disagree. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation
is exercised upon the victim herself. As held in People v. Las Pinas, Jr.,21 the test is whether the intimidation produces
a reasonable fear in the mind of the victim that if she resists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat
would be carried out. When resistance would be futile, offering none at all does not amount to consent to sexual
assault. The law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance.

Anent the delay in reporting the case to the authorities, suffice it to state that delay and the initial reluctance of a rape
victim to make public the assault on her virtue is neither unknown or uncommon. 22 Rape is a traumatic experience, and
the shock concomitant with it may linger for a while. Oftentimes, the victim would rather bear the ignominy and the pain
in private, rather than reveal her shame to the world or risk the rapist's carrying out his threat to harm her.23

We find no sufficient basis for disregarding, let alone overturning, the factual assessment made by the court a quo.
Once again, we must reiterate the familiar rule that the task of taking on the issue of credibility is a function properly
lodged with the trial court, whose findings are entitled to great weight and accorded the highest respect by the
reviewing courts, unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked or misappreciated such as would alter
the conviction of the appellant.24 There is no such fact of substance and value in this case.

Premised on the complainant's testimony, there is sufficient foundation to conclude that appellant succeeded by force
in having carnal knowledge of her own daughter on May 19, 1998. Against this backdrop of evidence and in stark
contrast to complainant's convincing recital of facts is appellant's defense of denial and alibi. An intrinsically weak
defense, denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability in order to merit credibility. It is a negative
self-serving assertion that has no weight in law if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. 25 Since denial and
alibi are so easy to concoct and fabricate, the same cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the
prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime.26

The rule is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirement of time and place must be strictly met. 27 It is,
therefore, incumbent upon appellant to prove with clear and convincing evidence that at the time of the commission of
the offense charged, he was in a place other than the situs criminis or immediate vicinity thereof, such that it was
physically impossible for him to have committed the crime charged.28

Thus, appellant's alibi and denial must necessarily fail. The defense of denial and alibi per se, if not substantiated by
sufficient evidence, can not in any way diminish the credibility of the complainant or the weight of her testimony.

The pertinent provisions of Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
8353, otherwise known as The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, state:

ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.

xxx           xxx           xxx.

ART. 266-B. Penalties. –

xxx           xxx           xxx.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascezndant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim;
xxx           xxx           xxx.
The qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship must concur. More importantly, they must be both
alleged and proved, in order to qualify the crime of Rape and warrant the imposition of the death penalty.29
Hence, in addition to the requirement that the qualifying and aggravating circumstance must be specifically alleged in
the information, it must be established with certainty that the victim was below eighteen (18) years of age or that she
was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime. It must be stressed that the severity of the death penalty,
especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital offense aptly
subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence.30

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to present the birth certificate or similar authentic document, such as the
school records or baptismal certificate of the victim to prove her age. Thus, the age of the victim cannot be determined
with utmost certainty. In People v. Pruna,31 it was held:

In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we hereby set the following
guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate
of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date
of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient
under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 7 years old;
 b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or
relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused
to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

Hence, for failure of the prosecution to prove the age of the victim by any of the means set forth above, appellant can
only be found guilty of Simple Rape and the death penalty imposed on him by the trial court shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua.

Consequently, the amount of civil indemnity awarded by the trial court should accordingly be reduced to P50,000.00.
The amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is mandatory only in cases involving qualified rape where the death
penalty is imposed. In cases of simple rape, the amount of civil indemnity shall be P50,000.00. 32 As regards the award
of moral damages, the same should likewise be reduced to P50,000.00, consistently with controlling jurisprudence.
Moral damages are awarded in rape cases without need of pleading or proof.33

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21, in
Criminal Case No. 1246-M-99, finding appellant Dante Ilagan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and is ordered to
pay the private offended party, Mylene Ilagan, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

18. Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate

G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988

FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the then
Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide.

The records disclose the following facts of the case.

At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay
Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found
the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed.
Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio
Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that
he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them
ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier
hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran
away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back
portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter
embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.

Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50 meters away
from where the incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding
him there, Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with
Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was
brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not
attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine.

After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a
medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) which
reads:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20 years of age, married, residing
at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the following:

1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar prominence, right.

As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This wound was presented to me
only for medico-legal examination, as it was already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original
Records)

Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to
pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared
before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police
blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties appeared before this
Station accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably, for they are
neighbors and close relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to
Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and promising to him
and to this Office that this will never be repeated anymore and not to harbour any grudge against each
other. (p. 87, Original Records.)

Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the additional P300.00 was given to
Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious
condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who
personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the
presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.

On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical findings of Dr. Exconde are as
follows:

Date Diagnosis

11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus

adm. at DX TETANUS

1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-

#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile

11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-

tion of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.

02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscita-

tion and cardiac massage done but to no avail.

Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.

PMC done and cadaver brought home by rela-

tives. (p. 100, Original Records)

In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before the then
Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. He was
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to
SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the
accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid
Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his penalty.

The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised the award of indemnity to
the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.

The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial was based on an affidavit of
Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:

That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to the
present having been re-elected to such position in the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;

That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that swept Pangasinan and
other places of Central Luzon including San Fabian, a town of said province;

That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation dam which irrigates the
ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much so that water and its flow to the canals
and ditches were regulated and reduced;

That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the canals and ditches
which will bring water to the ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches became shallow which was
suitable for catching mudfishes;

That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with my secretary Perfecto
Jaravata;

That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late Marcelo Javier catching fish
in the shallow irrigation canals with some companions;

That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that said Marcelo Javier died of
tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)

The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.

The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be
incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of
law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).

The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a result of which Javier
suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after the
incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition and that on the following day, November 15,
1981, he died from tetanus.

Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of
Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:

The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased
was wounded to the time of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not deserve serious
consideration. True, that the deceased did not die right away from his wound, but the cause of his
death was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was in the
process of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused his death.

Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim suffered lockjaw
because of the infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is no other way by which he could be
infected with tetanus except through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently,
the proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound which got infected with tetanus. And the
settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act.
(Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418).

Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in
going back to work without his wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in
dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a desperate attempt
by appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is
impossible to conceive that the deceased would be reckless enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp.
20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own
negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after
two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful
elements like tetanus germs.

The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time
of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time
Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound
was infected is not clear from the record.

In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition of proximate cause:

xxx xxx xxx

... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American
Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:

... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was
wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.

We look into the nature of tetanus-

The  incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable
symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic
within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2
or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.

Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are encountered
occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or
back and difficulty swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often
complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus
and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity
becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence
of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs and
symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved
to some degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups
affected.

Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an interval referred to as the
onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor
prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery,
which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their
antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or
inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency.
Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which
prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage
and death.

Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more
than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and
mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is
marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate even during
spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or
less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms.
(Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of
the disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano
used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he
suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more
medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of
tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days  after the infliction of the wound.
Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from
the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the
severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with
tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have
been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted
upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof
that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening
cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and
foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for
failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the  proximate cause of Javier's death with which
the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more
than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition
or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets
into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)

It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the very least, the records
show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped
out by the victim's own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to
effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier.
This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508,
Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).

We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of
this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled
doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v.
Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:

xxx xxx xxx

... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil
Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).

The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the
accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the
Code Commission as follows:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from
civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given
use to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to
a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the
criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation
between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of
the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or
correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article
1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise
upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the
legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the
purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnity the complaining
party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the
 invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of
evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful
act is also punishable by the criminal law?

"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under
discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible
source of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons
injured or wronged."

The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to P30,000.00. However,
since the indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the
civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the
heirs of the victim are so minded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide.
Costs  de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

III. Impossible Crimes ( Art. 4, Par. 2, RPC)

19. Intod v. CA

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming in toto the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.

From the records, we gathered the following facts.

In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to
Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the
house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting
with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute
between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed
with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his
companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then
occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit
by the gun fire.

Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men left
the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come
back if (sic) you were not injured". 2

After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC), as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the
judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:

Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:

xxx xxx xxx

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not
for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.

Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it
with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible. Instead, the facts
were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was
intent. Further, in its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that:

. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's
and his accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her
house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible. 3

Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal
Code where:

. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the person conceiving
the idea should have set about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in order that his intent
might become a reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been physically
possible. So long as these conditions were not present, the law and the courts did not hold him
criminally liable. 5

This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist
School, recognizes in the offender his formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something
quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against
property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. 9

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because:
(1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a)
inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must
be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the
intended act 12 in order to qualify the act an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. 13 Thus:

Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is
to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a
performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act
does not amount to a crime. 14

The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. 16 One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat
pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in
reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee Kong, 18 the accused, with intent
to kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he thought the police officer would be. It turned out, however, that the latter
was in a different place. The accused failed to hit him and to achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an
attempt to kill. It held that:

The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined where he was, and
where the bullet pierced the roof, renders it no less an attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of
criminal law in this country that where the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply
because of an obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated upon, and these facts are unknown to
the aggressor at the time, the criminal attempt is committed.

In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the victim because the
latter did not pass by the place where he was lying-in wait, the court held him liable for attempted murder. The court
explained that:

It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only became impossible by reason of
the extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that way; and further, that he was arrested and
prevented from committing the murder. This rule of the law has application only where it is inherently
impossible to commit the crime. It has no application to a case where it becomes impossible for the
crime to be committed, either by outside interference or because of miscalculation as to a supposed
opportunity to commit the crime which fails to materialize; in short it has no application to the case
when the impossibility grows out of extraneous acts not within the control of the party.

In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if there was nothing to rob.
In disposing of the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:
 It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his criminal intent, no one
can seriously doubt that the protection of the public requires the punishment to be administered,
equally whether in the unseen depths of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really
present or not. The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended
(attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension
that the evil; intention will be carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of
is in reason committed.

In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking that the latter was
inside. However, at that moment, the victim was in another part of the house. The court convicted the accused of
attempted murder.

The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make this Court sustain the
judgment of attempted murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at
hand. There is a difference between the Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of
impossible crimes.

In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and made the
punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter.
What it provided for were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the
impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and the
cases generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual impossibility. 22 In U.S.
vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:

. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been
committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in
reality the crime was impossible of commission.

Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt.
In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law
governing the matter made the act criminal if done without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the
offender intended to send a letter without the latter's knowledge and consent and the act was performed. However,
unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The lower court held the
accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held unacceptable the contention of the state that
"elimination of impossibility as a defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and
the proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this contention, the
Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus, following the principle of legality, no
person could be criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:

Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct constitutes the
offense of attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until such time as such legislative changes in the
law take place, this court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.

To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment,
the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where
the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as
an attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor
cannot be held liable for any crime — neither for an attempt not for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that
in American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to
a crime charge — that is, attempt.

This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of
accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase
"inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or
physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of
accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an
impossible crime.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan
was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a
person criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the
offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated
felonies.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an
impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively.
Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.

20. People v. Saladino

21. Jacinto v. People

G.R. No. 162540               July 13, 2009

GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23761 dated December 16, 2003, affirming petitioner's
conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution2 dated March 5, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle, was
charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131, with the crime of Qualified Theft,
allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then all
employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., herein represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such
had free access inside the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon them with
intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own account, Banco De Oro Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in
the sum of ₱10,000.00, representing payment made by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the
damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid stated amount of ₱10,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found to be more credible, reveals the events that
transpired to be as follows.

In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed petitioner Banco De Oro
(BDO) Check Number 0132649 postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount of ₱10,000.00. The check was payment for
Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow,
the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter
is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.

Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call sometime in the middle of
July from one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer wanted to know if she could issue checks payable to
the account of Mega Foam, instead of issuing the checks payable to CASH. Said customer had apparently been
instructed by Jacqueline Capitle to make check payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH. Around that time,
Ricablanca also received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was looking for
Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account
had been dishonored.

Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the latter to
inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding the bounced check. Ricablanca explained
that she had to call and relay the message through Valencia, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they
could be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.

Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to
replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for
herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's
accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.

Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed handed petitioner a
BDO check for ₱10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment for her purchases from Mega Foam.4 Baby Aquino
further testified that, sometime in July 1997, petitioner also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check
bounced.5 Verification from company records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam.
However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam ₱10,000.00 cash in August 1997 as replacement for
the dishonored check.6

Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject BDO check in his bank account, but
explained that the check came into his possession when some unknown woman arrived at his house around the first
week of July 1997 to have the check rediscounted. He parted with his cash in exchange for the check without even
bothering to inquire into the identity of the woman or her address. When he was informed by the bank that the check
bounced, he merely disregarded it as he didn’t know where to find the woman who rediscounted the check.

Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment
operation with its agents. Ten pieces of ₱1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and dusted with
fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that she was
going along with Valencia's plan.

On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house. Petitioner, who was then holding the bounced
BDO check, handed over said check to Ricablanca. They originally intended to proceed to Baby Aquino's place to have
the check replaced with cash, but the plan did not push through. However, they agreed to meet again on August 21,
2007.

On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioner’s house, where she met petitioner and Jacqueline Capitle.
Petitioner, her husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia; Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with
the group because she decided to go shopping. It was only petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca and Valencia who then
boarded petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the
premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually
brought out from the premises was the ₱10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca
divided the money and upon returning to the jeep, gave ₱5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter,
petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole time.

Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist found fluorescent powder on the
palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed that petitioner and Valencia handled the marked money.
The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the two and one Jane Doe who was later identified as
Jacqueline Capitle, the wife of Generoso Capitle.

The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check and presented the following scenario.

Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997, but claimed that she
had stopped collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite some time before her resignation from the company. She
further testified that, on the day of the arrest, Ricablanca came to her mother’s house, where she was staying at that
time, and asked that she accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house. Since petitioner was going for a pre-
natal check-up at the Chinese General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with the former and her husband in
their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place in Caloocan City. She allegedly had no idea why Ricablanca asked them to
wait in their jeep, which they parked outside the house of Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when Ricablanca
placed the money on her lap and the NBI agents arrested them.

Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997. It was never
part of her job to collect payments from customers. According to her, on the morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca
called her up on the phone, asking if she (Valencia) could accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of Baby Aquino.
Valencia claims that she agreed to do so, despite her admission during cross-examination that she did not know where
Baby Aquino resided, as she had never been to said house. They then met at the house of petitioner's mother, rode
the jeep of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded to Baby Aquino's place. When they arrived at said place,
Ricablanca alighted, but requested them to wait for her in the jeep. After ten minutes, Ricablanca came out and, to her
surprise, Ricablanca gave her money and so she even asked, "What is this?" Then, the NBI agents arrested them.

The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on October 4, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita Busog
De Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED
THEFT and each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND
ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.7