TITLE G. R. No.

177026

Lansangan v. Amkor Technology

Philippines

PONENTE: DATE: January 30, 2009

Carpio-Morales, J.

DOCTRINE:

Roquero vs. PAL and Article 223 of LC do not apply where there is no finding of illegal dismissal, as in the
present case. Article 223 concerns itself with an interim relief, granted to a dismissed or separated
employee while the case for illegal dismissal is pending appeal, as what happened in Roquero.

FACTS:

Petitioners Lansangan and Cendaña are supervisory employees of respondent Amkor Technology
Philippines. An anonymous e-mail was sent to the respondent’s General Manager detailing allegations
of malfeasance on the part of petitioners for stealing company time. Upon investigation, petitioners
admitted in handwritten letters their wrongdoing that they were swiping another employees ID card or
requesting another employee to swipe ones ID card to gain personal advantage and/or in the interest of
cheating. Respondent terminated petitioners for extremely serious offenses as defined in its Code of
Discipline. Hence, the petitioners to filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the LA.

LA RULING rule that: a) Dismissal for a valid cause under Article 282 of LC - offense of dishonesty
punishable as a serious form of misconduct and fraud or breach of trust. b) Ordered petitioners’
reinstatement to their former positions without backwages - as a measure of equitable and
compassionate relief due to their prior unblemished employment records, show of remorse, harshness of
the penalty and respondent’s defective attendance monitoring system. Petitioners, without appealing LA’
s ruling, filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of reinstatement. After a series of oppositions, motions
and orders, the LA issued an alias writ of execution garnishing respondent’s bank account. Respondent
filed a motion for the quashal of the alias writ of execution and lifting of the notice of garnishment.

NLRC ruled that a) Deleted the reinstatement portion on the LA’s decision. b) Set aside the Alias Writ of
Execution and Notice of Garnishment.

CA RULING: a) Affirmed that petitioners were guilty of misconduct and the like. b) Ordered to pay
petitioners backwages without qualification and deduction from date of *LA’s decision up to the date of
the **NLRC’s Decision citing Article 223 of LC and Roquero v. PAL.

Petitioner contends that: CA’s Order limiting the payment of backwages from the date of LA’s decision up
to the date of the NLRC’s Decision is contrary to the case of Roquero v. PAL – “where the employer
was ordered to pay the wages to the employee from the time the reinstatement order was issued until the
finality SC’ decision in favor of the latter.” The payment of backwages should not be computed only up
to the promulgation by the NLRC of its decision. Respondent Contends that: Reliance on Roquero v.
PAL is misplaced in view of the glaring factual differences between said case and the present case.

ISSUE/S

Whether the petitioners can avail of the interim relief granted under Art. 223 of LC in the absence of any
finding of illegal dismissal?

RULING

NO. Roquero, as well as Article 223 of the Labor Code which the CA also relied, finds no application in
the present case. Article 223 concerns itself with an interim relief, granted to a dismissed or separated
employee while the case for illegal dismissal is pending appeal, as what happened in Roquero. It does
not apply where there is no finding of illegal dismissal, as in the present case.

Article 223 of the LC –

“In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as
the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, pending appeal. The employee
shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a
bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.”

LA decision finding that the petitioners ’ dismissal was valid because they committed dishonesty as a
form of serious misconduct and fraud, or breach of trust had become final. Petitioners not having
appealed the same before the NLRC as in fact they even moved for the execution of the reinstatement
aspect of the decision. It bears recalling that it was only respondent which assailed the LA decision to the
NLRC to solely question the propriety of the order for reinstatement, and it succeeded.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.|||

ROCHELLE