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    Contractarianism and Scope of Justice

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    Contractarianism and Scope of Justice

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    Contractarianism and Scope of Justice

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    Contractarianism and the Scope of Justice Andreas Esheté Bowe University In his illuminating and important work, A Theory of Justice," John Rawls Provides an explication of our sense of justice in the form of an intricate tiefense of two principles and their order of ranking: the principle of greatest equal liberty and the difference principle which requires that inequalities of wealth and power be arranged so as to maximize the benefits of the least advantaged. ‘The two principles are ranked lexically such that the second is considered only after the first is satisfied. | shall address myself to single, though fundamental, poiat uf the theory: the striking contention that the two principles and their priority relationship define a conception of justice from an eternal point of view (p. 547). | shall nat be concerned! with either the first principle or the priority relationship, Instead, 1 shall attempt to show that the difference principle is ‘ot the favored distributive principle at all temporal perspectives Since the ‘ception of justice is jointly defined by the two principles, if the difference principle lacks invariance the conception as a whole fails to capture an eternal Perspective. The attraction of contractarianisin for social theory stem Part, from the elaim to eternalty; | hope to show that this souree ot loctrine’s attraction is illusory Beginning with Rawls's own reasons for thinking that the difference Principle applies at al times, I shall suggest thar the prnpased arguments arc! ‘not akogerher convincing and then go on to urge that an important reason for the failure of the eternality claim is that, at certain stages of material eviliza, tion, our choice ofa distributive principle depends on the consideration given {o social values other than justice. In this eonnection, I shall have something ‘@ say about the value of meaningful work. This basis for the rejection of the the 1, Jon Rew, Thar of Jute (Onto Clarendon Press, 1972). Il parenthetel page references ire to this lok, 2. Shepicism concerning the possibility of» conception of justice ah sp ess ia review of A Thy of fi, by Willam Metre CSc They ca Spee Actermtatis Yale Lat Jour, ol #1 (1972). While | share Meade views the pou fo ry skepticism ae, 1 thik, different than those he indicates in the review 38 invariance claim has wider, if not decper, ramifications. For, iftrue, it would show that a conception of justice depends on a prior decision on the fair ‘weight to be assigned to justice relative to other social values. I do not point to anything that Rawls has not seen but wish to make the modest claim that different conclusions can be reached by secing the same things differently. Invariance is not claimed for the two principles on the grounds that they are necessary truths. Rawls has grave doubts whether any substantive pr ciples are forthcoming on the basis of logieal truths and conceptual analysis. ‘The Rawlsian principles, then, are chosen in the light of certain faets. ‘The cternality claim is anchored in the set of constraints on the facts to be drawn ‘upon in the selection of principles. The principles are those that would be agreed to in a situation at which individuals are deprived of vast bodies of knowledge irrelevant from the moral point of view. At the original position, ‘men are denied knowledge of their particular conceptions of the good, their natural or social endowments, and their temporal location in stages of civili- zation. Principles chosen under this veil of ignorance cannot favor anyone. Nor can they favor any particular perspective. One might say, therefore, that there is a happy harmony herween the abstractions required for reaching a fair decision on the regulative principles of society and the abstractions te- quired for commanding an eternal perspective on society. Although men are forced to ignore all considerations that are arbitrary from the moral point of view, they still enjoy access to “whatever general facts affect the choice of the principles of justice” (p. 137). ‘Their knowledge includes the general laws of psychology, morality, and society. About the good, they know that it will include the primary goods of liberty, self esteem, wealth, and power—those benefits that are necessary for any system of ends. Concerning the circumstances of cooperation, they are aware that aims may eonflic, thar men are not indifferent as to whose ends are realized, and that all plans are to be pursued under conditions of moderate searcity. Te might be thought that, since the principles rest on factual assump- tions, they are infected with temporality. To see that the etern “not so‘trivially defeated it is essential to draw attention to a crucial feature of these facts: their generality. For the purposes of securing invariance, the ‘most important sense in which these facts are general is that they are not the facts of this or that conception of justice but of the concept of justice simplicitr. For, if these facts do not obtain, justice would lose its point altogether. For example, if there were such wide departures from the motiva- tional assimprion af munal disinterest that strict egoism or perfect altruism were deeply entrenched among most men, justice could not come into play. So, although the principles of justice are based on facts, this is no cause for worry or embarrassment, for the only facts invoked are the logically primitive facts of justice. The contingency attaching to the faets is no more than the contingency that we have a concept of justice at all, Principles built on this 41 Contractarianism and the Scope of Justice Is the difference principle the rational distributive principle at relative abundance? The acceptability ofthe difference principle a this perspective is open to doubt because it is, “strictly speaking, a maximizing principle” (p. 79). It is designed to maximize the benefits of the least advantaged and, subject to that constraint, the general welfare. Moreover, itis a maximizing principle ofa special sort: it calls for the maximization of material advantages. Rawls maintains that the maximization of nonmaterial, primary goods fol- lows the maximization of income and wealth, Given the homogeneity of primary goods, our expectations as a whole are governed by a distributive Principle that requires the maximization of just material benefits (pp. 204, $46). Bur there is no reason to think that maximization of material benefits is always a rational objective. ‘The material means to any rational end are determinate in the sense that they can be only of so many kinds and of so ‘much quantity, The choice of maximization at the original position is only indireetly rational to minimize the chances that we may find ourselves in situations of serious shortage. Exen if there is ignorance concerning aims as well as natural and social endowments, to belong to a world of relative abun- dance is to enjoy conditions in which material goods are adequate for all, including the least advantaged. Uncertainty over the adequacy of material benefits at relative abundance is reduced when it is noted that individuals at dis stage in history are likely to be concerned with the highest human ends. The standards of excellence in ‘the most important human endeavors are very high, so that an individual ean hope to pursue only a few, Owing to the complexity of the highest human ends and the vast requirements imposed by the standards governing their achievement, men have to cooperate through generations in the pursuit of these aims.? The uncertainty that material benefits may not be enough is, therefore, removed by the fact that not all the material means to a particular ‘good need be distributed to any single individual or, indeed, to an associa- tion, in a single generation. I conclude, therefore, that there are no compel- ling reasons for adopting a maximizing principle at relative abundance. avels might readily admit that maximization is irrational when material goods are not among the optimal means to human ends and yet deny that avoidance of this irrational course of social ation requires abandonment of a ‘maximizing prineiple of distribution, Rather, he might urge that the problem would dissolve at the practical level, for, at relative abundance, men would increasingly withdraw fom the institutions of production to turn to a corre- spondingly closer engagement in the institutions of liberty (p. 543) T have no dispute either with the suggestion that men's concern with production would be reduced or with the recommendation that their concern ‘ith political life and the engagements of free association should be enlarged. 3, Here | rely on Rawh’s discussion ofthe Aristotelian theory of the good and Mens

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