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DAVID WURFEL

The Philippines' precarious

democracy: coping with
foreign and domestic
pressures under Aquino
The media hype focussed on the Philippines in 1986 has now
faded. But many of the factors which produced the drama of
the 'People Power "revolution"' remain, making for consid-
erable uncertainty about the prospects for political democracy
in the coming decade. Although the international context in
which the Philippines must now operate seems on balance some-
what more favourable to the stability of democratic institutions
than that which existed when they were first threatened in the
early 197os, the domestic context is even less so. A review of
the domestic scene demands our initial attention.
After three years of decline in the gross national product
(GNP), with an expanding insurgency and an increasingly cor-
rupt president, the Philippines in 1985 was frequently called
the 'sick man of Asia.' An impending succession crisis had led
to the assassination of the leading figure in the opposition,
Senator Benigno Aquino, in 1983, which dissipated what was
left of the regime's legitimacy. President Ferdinand Marcos, in
an ill-fated attempt to recapture some of that legitimacy, bent
the constitution and called an early presidential election for 7
February 1986. Much to his amazement the opposition united
at the last minute around Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, the widow
of his long-time foe.
Mrs Aquino campaigned with increasing success as the 'very
opposite' of Mr Marcos. In anticipation of Marcos-orchestrated

Professor of Political Science, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario; author

of Filipino Politics: Development and Decay (1988).

InternationalJournal XLIV summer 1989

 THE PHILIPPINES: PRECARIOUS DEMOCRACY 677

fraud, the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel),

staffed by activists mobilized largely by the Roman Catholic
Church and with the help of American money - both public
and private, covert and overt - prepared to watch the polls and
to undertake their own count. But Marcos was so desperate for
a 'win' that his minions beat up poll watchers and grabbed ballot
boxes even in front of hundreds of foreign journalists and a
prestigious American observer team. Thus, though ,the legis-
lature he controlled officially declared him the 'winner,' neither
the Filipino opposition nor commentators around the world
accepted the decision as valid. Mrs Aquino quickly launched a
civil disobedience campaign which was designed to drive Marcos
out of office.
Meanwhile, there was considerable unrest in the armed forces.
The chief of staff, Fabian Ver, had been accused of plotting to
kill Senator Aquino, but had been acquitted and returned to
command. He was deeply enmeshed in the corruption of the
Marcos regime. Grouped around the defence minister, Juan
Ponce Enrile, was an increasing number of younger officers
(the Reform the Armed Forces Movement or RAM) calling pub-
licly for reform and secretly planning a coup which centred on
the seizure of the presidential palace. In fact, they had set a
date for late January 1986 but were apparently persuaded to
wait until after the elections. (They were in close consultation
with military attaches at the United States embassy, the arch-
bishop of Manila, Jaime Cardinal Sin, and Mrs Aquino's advisers.')
But on 22 February their plot was discovered. Fearing im-
minent arrest, Enrile, joined by the vice chief of staff, Fidel
Ramos, took a few hundred men to armed forces headquarters.
There they declared themselves in rebellion against Marcos and
stated that they recognized the validity of Mrs Aquino's election
as president in line with the Namfrel projection. Then followed
the 'Four Days of Courage' viewed on televisions around the

1 Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of Ameri-
can Policy (New York: Random House 1987), 434.
678 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

world.2 Nuns with flowers stopped tanks while other devout

carried Marian figures in procession before ranks of Marcos
troops. Cardinal Sin was primarily responsible for mobilizing
hundreds of thousands of Manila residents as a buffer between
government and rebel soldiers, just as he had promised the
coup plotters weeks earlier.3 Unable to get his commanders to
fire on massed civilians, and finally advised by a vacillating United
States administration that it was time to go, Marcos and his
entourage were lifted out of the palace in American helicopters
on 25 February, only minutes before looters entered. Corazon
Aquino had already been inaugurated president by a defiant
Supreme Court justice before Marcos left. It was an ignomi-
nious end to twenty years of rule, but the Filipino people had
suffered much more than Marcos.
Most Filipinos were ecstatic. They had ended a dictatorship
with very little bloodshed and had gained the world's respect
in the process. Mrs Aquino took office with a national surge of
support greater than that enjoyed by any previous Philippines
president. 'People power' had put her in charge. She called it
a 'miracle'; everyone was surprised. Now, more than three years
later, the euphoria has passed. While public criticism of the
president was widely frowned upon throughout 1986, it is now
rampant. Let us examine how she has used her power, how she
has dealt with the nation's problems, and whether the current
criticism in the media and political circles is justified.
Corazon Aquino took office with a vision. She wanted to
restore political democracy and to clean up the mess left by
Marcos - especially the corruption, the insurgency, and the
economic stagnation. She has achieved much of the first objec-
tive but is much further from reaching the second. The need
to consolidate regime legitimacy through social reform, partic-
ularly the redistribution of land, was understood by some of
those around her, but was never very high on her agenda as

2 See Bryan Johnson, FourDays of Courage (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart

1987).
3 Lewis Simons, Worth Dying For (New York: William Morrow 1987), 269.
 THE PHILIPPINES: PRECARIOUS DEMOCRACY 679

the results of the past three years reveal. National autonomy,

another announced goal, has been unevenly pursued.
What President Aquino has and has not accomplished is in
large part attributable to the nature of her regime. And that,
in turn, was affected by the way she came to power. The best
evidence is that she did win a genuine electoral victory against
overwhelming odds (although Namfrel was not allowed to com-
plete its count). But that victory would not have been possible
without the support of the church and the Americans. The
withdrawal of American backing for Marcos set the stage for
the events of February. It was most effective in the decisions
of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and pri-
vate banks to cut back on credit for the Marcos-dominated
economy. That halted production in many industries and threw
thousands out of work. The consequent unrest was an impor-
tant basis for the upsurge of opposition in 1985 across the whole
spectrum from the economic 6lite to the working class. Amer-
ican financing of Namfrel, although essential, was less impor-
tant than the mobilization of volunteers by the Catholic hierarchy.
It was Cardinal Sin who persuaded Salvador Laurel, the leader
of a coalition of opposition groups, to run for vice-president,
thus assuring a single opposition ticket, and who then mobilized
support for Aquino at crucial times.
A majority of valid votes could not, however, have been
translated into presidential power without the intervention of
the military. Positive American signals to coup plotters were
critical to the RAM initiatives, even though open United States
support for the rebels did not materialize until two days before
Marcos left, when victory was already in sight. The RAM saw
itself as having made 'people power' possible and thus having
gained a right to a powerful voice in the new regime.
Co-ordination among the church leaders, the economic 6lite,
the military 'reformers,' and United States officials to back Aquino

4 Alfred McCoy, Marian Wilkinson, and Gwen Robinson, 'The plot to topple Fer-
dinand Marcos,' Veritas (October 1986).
68o INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

was stimulated by another major political force that had no

direct role in the transition, the outlawed Communist party of
the Philippines. Fear of the expanding insurgency of the New
People's Army (NPA) facilitated 6lite co-operation to support
the most popular non-communist alternative. The communists
and their allies misjudged the situation and declared a boycott
of the February election, thereby forfeiting any prospect of
influence in the new regime.
With this array of backers it is understandable that Aquino's
success has been less a revolution than a restoration.5 To be
sure it had some of the characteristics of a political revolution
in the extralegal change of leadership followed by the creation
of new institutions. But, despite a certain continuity in person-
nel, structure, and policy with the Marcos era, it was most no-
tably a restoration of the values, lites, and institutions of the
195os and 196os, distorted, to be sure, by the intrusion of a
politically assertive military. The ethos of Aquino's political
movement has sometimes been compared with that of Ramon
Magsaysay in 1953, though Aquino's was certainly more na-
tionalist. The people on government rosters, and most partic-
ularly in the halls of Congress after May 1987, recalled the ,lite
families that had dominated politics before the declaration of
martial law in 1972. (The Aquino and Cojuangco clans were
not the least of these.) And the new constitution ratified in
February 1987 was largely a revival of the 1935 charter which
had been discarded by Marcos in 1973. A lower house of Con-
gress based on single-member districts reinvigorated patronage
politics, so that the constitutional provision for an extra fifty
seats to be elected by proportional representation (a provision
designed to strengthen political parties and issue-oriented pol-
itics) has not been and probably will not be implemented by
legislation. Mrs Aquino's electoral support in February 1986
was based more on her charisma and on disgust with Marcos

5 David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay (Ithaca NY: Cornell Univer-
sity Press 1988), 323.
 THE PHILIPPINES: PRECARIOUS DEMOCRACY 681

than on patron-client networks. But those networks, now nur-

tured by the president's brother, Congressman Jos6 Cojuangco,
have revived and are flourishing. The linkage between patron
and client is the mechanism by which wealth is transformed
into power, sustaining an dite which Marcos himself often called
an oligarchy. In fact, the wealthiest of the oligarchs have re-
gained control of some of their pre-martial law corporations
with the help of the Aquino administration. 6 The economic
interests of the military high command seemed to be compatible
with those of the 6lite.
The restoration of political democracy - usually meaning
constitutional rule through honest elections with freedom of
expression - was widely welcomed by Filipinos who have reg-
ularly participated in free competitive elections since 1907 -
except during World War II and the martial law era. Mrs Aquino
was uncomfortable with the fact that she had to use her decree
powers to inaugurate that restoration, but within a month of
attaining office she promulgated a provisional constitution which
retained much of the 1973 Marcos document, while granting
all legislative power to the presidency until a newly drafted
constitution could be implemented.7 The pro-Marcos National
Assembly, which had been elected in 1984, was disbanded. She
then decreed the establishment of a constitutional commission,
which she appointed, to draft the new basic law. Despite con-
siderable criticism of an appointed, rather than an elected com-
mission - which was unprecedented - Aquino consulted widely
and created a body that was accepted by most Filipinos as gen-
erally representative, and thus legitimate.
A need for speed had been the major argument for ap-
pointed rather than elected commissioners, and this decision
proved a valid one. By October 1986 the draft had been com-
pleted and in February 1987 with President Aquino's endorse-
ment it was ratified overwhelmingly in a nation-wide plebescite.
6 See, for instance, Manila Chronicle, 14 March 1987.
7 Carl Landh and Richard Hooley, 'Aquino takes charge,' Foreign Affairs
64(summer 1986), 1o87-107.
682 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

As noted, almost all the governmental institutions provided for

in the 1935 constitution were revived - with the addition of a
human rights commission. However, the presidential term was
set at six years without re-election, instead of the previous max-
imum of two four-year terms. With recent memories of an all-
powerful executive, presidential prerogatives were somewhat
more limited than before 1972. Implementation of the new
constitution proceeded on schedule, with elections for Congress
in May 1987 and for local officials in November. These elections
were seen by both observers and participants as freer and more
honest than any since 197 1, though some legacies of the Marcos
era could not be wiped out overnight.
Unfortunately, restoring democratic institutions turned out
to be much easier than repairing the damage to society inflicted
by Marcos' misrule. That aspect of the Marcos regime which
received most attention in the world's media was the massive
unprecedented corruption. Whereas the worst of previous Third
World leaders had usually measured their loot in millions, that
of Marcos had to be calculated in billions of United States dol-
lars. It was quite appropriate, therefore, that one of Aquino's
first decrees created the Presidential Commission on Good Gov-
ernment (PCGG) to recover 'stolen wealth.'8 The corporate shells,
equipment, and real property of Marcos' 'cronies' who had re-
ceived huge loans from government banks - and then defaulted
- were also to be sold to the private sector. As well as action to
recover the costs of past corruption, there was talk of removing
the remaining corrupt officials from office. But the impact of
both these policies was undermined by structural dilemmas and
a lack of political will.
Even though the PCGG had been given sweeping rights to
sequester ill-gotten gains - in one of the few instances where

8 See Belinda Aquino, The Politics of Plunder: The Philippines under Marcos (Manila:
College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1987); Francisco
Nemenzo, 'From autocracy to elite democracy,' in Aurora Javate-de Dios et al,
eds, Dictatorshipand Revolution: Roots of People's Power (Manila: Conspectus
1988), 223-5.
 THE PHILIPPINES: PRECARIOUS DEMOCRACY 683

the powers of presidential decree were used effectively - legal

challenges mounted quickly. The restoration of constitutional
government had, of course, meant restoring the rule of law and
the majesty of the courts. The cronies were in deep political
disgrace, but they could afford to hire the most skilled lawyers.
Thus, in September 1988, the PCGG, under criticism from Con-
gress, could only claim that it had recovered US$6 5 million
from the holdings of Marcos and his cronies when estimates of
Marcos' wealth alone had gone as high as US$io billion.9 The
PCGG faced another dilemma as well. Although a large segment
of the old economic 6lite had had little to do with the empire-
building of the Marcos cronies, a number of 6lite families had
been either tempted or pressured into various dealings with
what was the fastest growing sector of the Philippine economy
in the 1970s. Yet in the last days of Marcos many of these same
6lite families were enthusiastic supporters of Aquino and thus
gained influence in the new administration. When sequestration
by the PCGG began to hit corporations in which the old elite
shared interests with the cronies, there was political as well as
legal opposition, expressed through Congress or directly to the
president. The same tangled skein produced pressure from the
old 6lite to stop some sales of the remnants of crony corporations.
Cleaning up corruption is a daunting task for any regime,
even more so when it has become embedded in the way of life
as it had under Marcos. A similar task had confronted Ramon
Magsaysay when he was elected president in 1953, but in 1986
the Augean stables were piled much higher. And while her
personal probity was beyond assail, it is not clear that President
Aquino was as deeply committed to making it the standard of
her whole administration as Magsaysay had been. In any case,
with the restoration of the rule of law, officials charged with
corruption could not be removed without due process, and the
most successful thieves acquired the most expensive solicitors.
Those removed legally were at best a handful. Aquino therefore

9 Manila Chronicle, 1 September 1988.

684 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

fell back on the trusted technique of 'reorganization.' With im-

pressive rhetoric about the need to restructure to increase ef-
ficiency, whole offices and sections of bureaux were abolished,
and new ones put in their places. This not only allowed the
dismissal of incumbents but provided patronage rewards for
demanding new allies. Those fired were not necessarily the most
corrupt, however, but were simply those with the weakest con-
nections to the new authorities.
In 1987 those who regularly dealt with the bureaucracy were
reporting that the under-the-table price of services was no longer
certain and that with the confusion of reorganization the hap-
less citizen often did not know whom to pay. But by 1988 that
problem was being solved - the 'right' recipient was increasingly
the president's brother, Jos6 'Peping' Cojuangco or his desig-
nates. By 1989 the trend was even more clearly established: the
PCGG, once headed by a brilliant and incorruptible former sen-
ator, Jovito Salonga, was now chaired by a new appointee, the
personal attorney of Cojuangco. The sale of sequestered cor-
porations is now not necessarily for the primary benefit of the
Philippines government.
Despite the importance of the fight against corruption to
Aquino's legitimacy, the attempt to halt the insurgency was
given higher priority and had more immediate political rami-
fications. The communist-led insurgency, which was eighteen
years old in 1986, is a major national tragedy. Thousands on
both sides have been killed and hundreds of thousands are
refugees from the fighting. When Aquino promised during her
campaign to seek a ceasefire, it was a very popular move. But
in 1986 when she tried to make good on that promise, she was
caught between hard-line revolutionaries and the short-sighted
intransigence of powerful factions in the Philippines military
and their Pentagon backers.o°
In her commitment to correct human rights abuses and as
a step towards building the trust necessary for ceasefire nego-

1o Gareth Porter, 'Philippine communism after Marcos,' Problems of Communism

36(September-October 1987), 14-35.
 THE PHILIPPINES: PRECARIOUS DEMOCRACY 685

tiations, she quickly announced her intention to release all po-

litical prisoners; even Jos6 Maria Sison, founding chairman of
the Communist party, was let go. Formal negotiations got under
way in August 1986 with an all-civilian panel representing the
government. Meanwhile Enrile, now the minister of defence,
escalated his charges that Aquino was 'soft on communism' and
finally in November was caught in a coup plot; his dismissal
strengthened Aquino's hand, even though he was not prose-
cuted. This helped speed negotiations, and an agreement on a
6o-day ceasefire was signed in November. Although talks then
began for a longer term settlement, neither the military brass
nor the NPA'S leaders found a prolongation of the ceasefire to
be in their institutional self-interest, and full-scale fighting re-
sumed in late January 1987."
Ironically, the mere commencement of ceasefire negotia-
tions, which so frightened the Pentagon, contributed more to
undermining the revolutionary movement than all the military
efforts of the previous decade. Just as President Aquino and
some of her advisers had hoped, the hard line taken in the
negotiations by the NPA leaders, which helped prevent a re-
newal of the ceasefire, caused some of their political support
to evaporate; they had underestimated the national longing for
peace. Mrs Aquino's miscalculation was her judgment of the
reaction of the armed forces. Enrile was not the only problem.
Her attempt to bypass the military in the 1986 negotiations and
other perceived slights stirred resentment among younger of-
ficers, and in August 1987 she was very nearly overthrown by
the RAM under the leadership of Colonel Gregorio Honasan -
in a country which had never seen a serious coup plot before
1986.12
The absence of any credible coup attempt since then is largely

i See A Record of the Peace Initiatives Offered by the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines to the NDF (Manila: Information Division, GRP Negotiating Panel for
Peace, 1987); Nemenzo, 'From autocracy to elite democracy,' 155-61.
12 Alfred McCoy, 'RAM boys: reformist officers and the romance of violence,' Mid-
week (Manila), 21 September 1988, 29-33, 28 September 1988, 30-4, 12 October
1988, 29-32.
686 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

a result of the fact that the president has gone a long way to
accommodate military demands. She has increased the deficit
to raise their pay and has otherwise expanded the defence budget
to a level much higher than it was under Marcos, and she ap-
pears to have abandoned her earlier policy of protecting human
rights. No military officers have been punished for their part
in torture or disappearances, and no effective steps have been
taken against the increasing number of assassinations by vigi-
lante groups trained and funded by the military. Nor has she
dared to go after corruption in the armed forces, although she
certainly does not promote it, as Marcos did.
In sum, the politicization of the military first by Marcos and
then against him, which proved essential for toppling the au-
tocrat, produced the primary threat to the consolidation of
democracy since 1986. The double irony is that the laudable
attempt to end the insurgency peacefully stimulated a greater
political assertiveness by the military which not only threatens
central democratic institutions in the short run but has led to
military behaviour that, whatever its present success in fright-
ening rebel supporters, must ensure the survival of the insur-
gency in the long run. In 1988 the church and the non-communist
left both promoted the idea of regional ceasefires and of lo-
calized zones of peace. There were reasonably successful two-
day ceasefires at Christmas and the New Year, but neither side
has shown a willingness to support broader restraint. In any
case, President Aquino herself no longer appears to be provid-
ing leadership towards peace.
For most of Mrs Aquino's 6lite and urban middle class sup-
porters, the revival of the economy was undoubtedly the first
priority, because the GNP had plunged more than lo per cent
since 1984. In a distinctly unrevolutionary fashion, the new
administration chose to retain the nation's top economic policy-
maker, Governor Jos6 Fernandez of the Central Bank, even
though he was a Marcos appointee. The sense of continuity was
reinforced by the first plan of the Aquino administration's Na-
tional Economic and Development Authority which appeared
 THE PHILIPPINES: PRECARIOUS DEMOCRACY 687

in late 1986; the economist who had directed the authority in

the 197os found no basic change from objectives or strategies
he had set.
The improvement in the economy which did, in fact, take
place in the next three years was more a result of Aquino's luck
than of her administration's policy, though 'pump-priming' public
works expenditures did contribute. World commodity prices,
which had penalized the Philippines in the last years under
Marcos, rose during 1986-7. The prices of coconut products,
the country's largest export, rose more than 1oo per cent from
third quarter of 1985 to third quarter of 1988.'a The sugar
price index went from 362 to 520 in the same period. Copper
and lumber prices increased somewhat less dramatically. Fur-
thermore, the overthrow of Marcos unleashed foreign credits
and a renewed flow of investment: direct foreign investment,
which had been negative in three quarters of 1985, jumped to
US$ 3 4 3 million in the first half of 1988. A key stimulus of
economic expansion was a change in bank lending rates, which
fell from 35 per cent in early 1985 to 13 per cent by mid-1 9 87.
At the same time the rate of inflation dropped dramatically,
less than 5 per cent for the two-year period. Prices levelled off,
and with the easing of credit factories reopened and many
former employees returned to work. By 1987 the GNP was
growing by nearly 7 per cent. It is not surprising that Mrs
Aquino's popularity remained very high. (Real per-capita in-
come is not expected to match 1981 levels until 1991, however.)
Favourable growth figures were primarily the result of an
expansion of industrial production; even in 1987 agricultural
production grew at less than half the rate of population. The
awareness of gross inequities was thus most intense in rural
society. That awareness led to increasing support for sweeping
land reform. After being attacked by Marcos in the 1986 pres-
idential campaign for coming from a great landowning family,
Mrs Aquino had been pressed into making her own promises

13 United Nations, InternationalFinancial Statistics, 1989, 428-29.

688 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

about land reform. But she did nothing for nearly a year after
taking office, even though some of her key advisers were ar-
guing that land reform was the best way to win over the peas-
ants. Only after troops surrounding the presidential palace fired
on peasants demonstrating for land reform in January 1987,
killing more than a dozen, did the president appoint a cabinet
action committee to draft an agrarian reform decree.'4
Landlords countered with their own crescendo of protest -
obviously with more success than the peasants. In July a pres-
idential decree declared the principle of land reform in all crops
but left decisions on the most important provisions to Congress.
In the lower house, where members were elected almost entirely
by patronage politics, landlords were amply represented, and
their most effective spokesman was the president's powerful
brother. Despite extensive lobbying by a newly formed coalition
of radical and moderate peasant organizations, which had strong
support from the president's brother-in-law, Senator Agapito
Aquino, the bill finally passed by Congress and signed by the
president in June 1988 was, in the eyes of its opponents, 'a
landlords' law.' Extension of land reform beyond rice and corn
was entirely ineffective. Provisions for enforcement were so
weak that most landholdings covered by the legislation will never
even become known to the Department of Agrarian Reform,
and any moves by the department which displease landlords
can be blocked in the courts. Finally, even if landlord evasion
severely limited the area to be transferred to the cultivators,
the act required compensation of owners at market price, for
which available government funds are completely inadequate.
Landlord attachment to their estates is very emotional; they
feel they are protecting their way of life - as part of which farm
workers are paid less than US$i per day. They perceived that

14 See D. Wurfel, 'Land reform under Marcos and Aquino: contexts, accomplish-
ments and prospects,' Pilipinas 12(spring 1989); James Putzel and John Cun-
nington, Gaining Ground: Agrarian Reform in the Philippines(London: War on
Want Campaigns Ltd 1989).
 THE PHILIPPINES: PRECARIOUS DEMOCRACY 689

the communist threat was passing, given the popularity of Aquino,

the capture of several top party officials, and the establishment
of pro-landlord anti-communist vigilantes with military backing
in hundreds of towns. Thus there was no need to sacrifice.
Impatient cultivators who seized idle lands to plant food for
their families were often removed by force with the co-opera-
tion of absentee owners and the military. Except in areas con-
trolled or influenced by the guerrillas, perhaps some io per
cent of all villages, the rural power structure was as firmly based
on wealth as it had been two generations ago. Agrarian 'reform'
under Aquino was in some respects a step backward from the
policies of Marcos, providing a severe restraint on the prolon-
gation of her r6gime's legitimacy.
There seems little doubt that the dominant 61ite hoped that
the experience of the 1950S would be repeated. Then the Huk-
balahap rebels, concentrated in central Luzon, were roundly
defeated by a reformed military. At the same time the guerrillas'
erstwhile peasant supporters were charmed by the charismatic
Ramon Magsaysay, first as secretary of defence and then as
president. After Magsaysay's death peasant participation in pol-
itics was largely rechannelled into the traditional patron-client
relationship. Since the election of Aquino in 1986 and the brief
ceasefire which her representatives signed with the NPA, there
has been a repetition of that earlier process to some extent. But
taming the current revolt is not nearly as easy as dealing with
the Huks in the 1950S. First, the revolutionary movement of
the 198os is much broader. It is spread over nearly all the
provinces and is based on a much more intense and extensive
political education of peasant supporters. Even if those who
have been co-opted by the president's popularity and patronage
politics should number in the millions, there is probably still a
critical revolutionary mass in the countryside. Furthermore, the
wooing of the Huks in the 1950S was based in part on the
promise of free land in Mindanao and other frontier areas.
This option is no longer available - in fact average farm size
690 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

has been declining since the 196os. Finally, the military has not
been reformed into an effective fighting force; corruption is
again on the rise, factionalism is deep, and human rights vio-
lations are often an integral part of tactics. Most military units
create more enemies of the government than they destroy.
It is probably fair to say that all domestic policy, even the
negotiations with the Muslim rebels, has been pursued with less
vigour under Aquino than under Marcos, partly because there
is less cohesion in policy-making circles and partly because there
is less sense of urgency. The personal popularity which Corazon
Aquino enjoys and the legitimacy lent her regime by free elec-
tions have placed less emphasis on policy output as a means of
gaining support for the government.
This confidence in r6gime legitimacy has even coloured for-
eign policy, which under Marcos was primarily a 'tool for regime
survival."5 Of course, Mrs Aquino faced many urgent domestic
tasks in her first year and deliberately delayed giving attention
to the most compelling foreign policy question - the future of
the United States military bases of Subic Bay and Clark Field
- with the formula, 'I am keeping my options open.' Further-
more, decisive action in foreign affairs was difficult while the
political divide between the president and Vice-President Lau-
rel, who also served as foreign minister, grew ever wider. At-
tention to foreign policy quickened after Laurel was eased out
in late 1987 and replaced by Raul Manglapus, who had been
foreign secretary for a time under Magsaysay.' 6 (Manglapus
took the unprecedented step of resigning his elected Senate
seat to accept a cabinet appointment, which surely must have
required some assurances from the president about future policy.)
Soon after taking office Manglapus was faced with the five-

15 D. Wurfel, Philippine Foreign Policy: Strategiesfor Regime Survival, Canada and

the Pacific: Agenda for the Eighties, Working Paper 15 (Toronto: Joint Centre
on Modern East Asia, University of Toronto/York University, 1983).
16 See Raul Manglapus, 'R.P.'s foreign policy thrust: development diplomacy,' Phil-
ippines Free Press, 28 January 1989, 10-13, 38.
 THE PHILIPPINES: PRECARIOUS DEMOCRACY 691

year review of the current bases agreement with the United

States, which would focus primarily on the question which the
Filipino side called 'compensation.' To justify his initial demand
for US$i billion per year, Manglapus stressed the dangers for
the Philippines inherent in serving as a base location and as-
serted that the bases were primarily for the defence of the
United States, not the Philippines. These arguments taken from
the nationalists' quiver gave new legitimacy to the anti-bases
movement, which the government had hitherto described as
'leftist.' The Americans were unaccustomed to such feisty and
sophisticated negotiating tactics from the Filipinos; some offi-
cials said that they would not again deal with Manglapus on the
bases question - but American unhappiness, which was widely
reported in the press, seems to have served to prolong rather
than shorten his tenure. The executive agreement finally signed
in October 1988 provided the Philippines with US$48o million
per year - according to American reckoning - nearly three
times the previous level of grants and loans primarily for mil-
itary purposes.' 7 (Manglapus claimed that ancillary sources of
aid were also mentioned which brought the yearly package to
nearly a billion dollars.)
Many of the issues raised during this negotiation were, of
course, relevant to the discussions that will begin in 1989 on a
new agreement to replace the present one which expires in
1991. The Philippines constitution of 1987 provides that any
extension of the United States use of these bases beyond that
date must be governed by a treaty ratified by two-thirds of the
Senate. In fact, much of what goes on in the Senate these days
is designed to influence the question of ratification. Like their
American counterparts, Filipino senators sometimes try to take
foreign policy initiatives away from the president. The issue of
nuclear weapons is a case in point.

17 D. Wurfel, 'Philippine foreign policy and neo-patrimonial dependency,' in D.

Wurfel and Bruce Burton, eds, The PoliticalEconomy of Foreign Policy in Southeast
Asia (London: Macmillan, forthcoming).
692 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

The Philippines constitution includes a 'declaration of prin-

ciples' which, among other things, states that 'the Philippines,
consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy
of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.' Even though
the United States refuses to confirm or deny the presence of
nuclear devices at its bases, the belief that they are there is almost
universal in well-informed circles. Thus the utility of the bases
for the United States, if this provision were fully implemented,
would be severely restricted. In August 1987, without consult-
ing the president, ten members of her party out of the twenty-
four newly elected senators sponsored a bill that would outlaw
'possession, storage or transport' of nuclear weapons on Phil-
ippines territory.' 8 In June 1988 it passed the Senate over-
whelmingly. But the bill remains stalled in the House of
Representatives and the secretary of justice has ruled that the
regulation of nuclear weapons is a presidential prerogative. In
November 1988 the Senate's frustration was expressed in a
resolution, passed overwhelmingly, which declared the bases
agreement amendment of the month before in violation of
constitutional provisions on nuclear weapons. The Senate
also attempted to legislate a partial repudiation of the Philip-
pines' massive foreign debt - whose interest and principal pay-
ments now take more than 40 per cent of the export of goods
and services - but was again blocked by the house, which is
both less nationalist and more effectively controlled by the
administration.
The overweening importance of the bases issue is confirmed
by the connection to it of so much of the other activity of the
Department of Foreign Affairs. Manglapus' tour of the other
countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations in 1988
was designed to get from their governments either open sup-
port for the maintenance of the bases as essential to the security
of the whole region, or quiet agreement to their removal. (He

18 Washington Post, 21 August 1987.

 THE PHILIPPINES: PRECARIOUS DEMOCRACY 693

was not successful.) He improved relations with Hanoi and Mos-

cow to signify a reduction of external threat to the Philippines.
In December 1988 the first ever visit to the Philippines by a
Soviet foreign minister won Filipino approbation when Mr
Shevardnadze hinted that the Soviet Union might dismantle its
bases in Vietnam even before Washington made a decision on
whether to withdraw from its bases in the Philippines. The
strengthening of relations with communist countries was also
related to the government's desire for frequent reassurances
that neither China, nor the Soviet Union, nor Vietnam had any
intention of supporting the NPA. (Despite claims in Heritage
Foundation publications and the Washington Times, there is no
solid indication that the assurances given have been violated.'0)
Mrs Aquino's trip to China in 1988, after a meeting with Deng
Xiaoping, also included a nostalgic visit to the village of her
ancestors, thus putting Sino-Philippines relations on a new level.
Even the Philippines need for foreign economic assistance
has been linked - by the United States - to the extension of
the bases agreement. The Multilateral Aid Initiative (MAI),
sometimes called the 'mini-Marshall Plan,' which originally called
for US$io billion in grants and loans over five years but has
now been greatly scaled down, was seen as an American tech-
nique to encourage the Philippines to extend the bases agree-
ment, even though half or more of the funds would come from
other countries.20 (Indeed, members of the United States Con-
gress are quite open in their warnings of 'no bases, no aid.')
The initiative's prospects are now endangered by new con-
straints on the United States budget - administration requests
have already been cut in the House Appropriations Committee21

19 See, for example, Richard D. Fisher, 'The international anti-Aquino network:

threat to Philippine democracy,' Asian Studies Backgrounder, 4 May 1987, 9;
Washington Times, 24 March 1987.
20 'Not in the bank,' Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 March 1989, 75.
21 Jon Melegrito, 'Maxi-rough road for mini-Marshall Plan?' Katipunan 2(April
1989), 7-8.
694 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

- and by severe clogging in the Philippines aid pipeline which

raises doubts among donors about the capacity of the Philip-
pines to absorb a larger flow of foreign assistance.
An increasing number of Filipino leaders counter that the
best way for friendly countries to help is to forgive the debt,
which is nearly US$ 3 o billion - by far the largest as a percentage
of GNP in Southeast Asia- and rising at more than US$i billion
per year. Debt servicing now requires a net outflow of US$2.2
billion per year.2 2 It is not likely to be matched by new credits;
nor is that necessarily a desirable solution. The Aquino admin-
istration, despite initial reluctance, seems to have revived the
frantic search for foreign loans pursued under Marcos and has
thus come under increased pressure from the International
Monetary Fund to adopt the same budget-cutting, deflationary
policies that helped topple that r6gime.23 The debt crisis sharp-
ens both domestic and foreign constraints on the search for
solutions to the Philippines' many problems, most especially the
maintenance of democratic stability.
Without minimizing the seriousness of this constraint, it should
be noted that there are four developments on the world scene
that may facilitate the Philippines quest for autonomy, eco-
nomic development, and stable democracy. First of all, eco-
nomic problems in the communist world have caused interest
in or support for revolutionary movements abroad to wane or,
more precisely, to collapse. Neither Soviet nor Chinese support
for the Huks or the NPA was ever very significant, but Filipino
revolutionaries have even less ground now to hope for assist-
ance. Second, economic pressures in the United States are forc-
ing some constraints on Washington's imperial reach. Although
the Central Intelligence Agency still spends millions on the anti-
insurgency campaign,2 4 Filipino demands for compensation for

22 Augusto Cesar Espiritu, 'The debt trap: how do we get out of it?' Manila Chron-
icle, 21 September 1988.
23 Rigoberto D. Tiglau, 'Manila tests its credit,' Far Eastern Economic Review, 23
March 1989, 74-5-
24 New York Times, 18 February 1987; PhiladelphiaInquirer, 15 February 1987.
 THE PHILIPPINES: PRECARIOUS DEMOCRACY 695

base use may have hit the fiscal ceiling. Thus the prospects for
destabilizing Filipino-American conflict over the extension of
the lease on the bases have been reduced. Washington is also
worried about long-term instability in the Philippines and is
thus less likely to try to impose an extension of the lease at all
costs - for example, by supporting a military coup to remove
an intransigent nationalist Senate, a scenario which some Fili-
pino observers feared until last year. Both governments seem
to view a phase-out as the most cost-effective alternative. Third,
these two developments have, in any case, contributed to the
reduction of Soviet-American tensions and even given rise to
the possibility of disarmament within the region. The strategic
rationale for the bases has been correspondingly reduced. While
the eventual phase-out of the bases may well undermine the
justification Washington relies upon for appropriating high lev-
els of military and economic 'aid' for the Philippines, there are
many analysts who suggest that forgoing reliance on these funds
would not only bolster Philippines autonomy but enhance dem-
ocratic processes. Finally, as the United States and the Soviet
Union experience relative decline, Japan and the newly indus-
trializing countries of Asia continue to grow at a rapid rate,
which provides new opportunities for the Philippines to diver-
sify its sources of aid, trade, and investment, and to gain ad-
ditional room for manoeuvre in the process. The Japanese
opposition to the use of the MAI as a lever for extension of the
bases lease is a case in point. The new danger, of course, could
be over-reliance on Japan, which may perhaps help to explain
Filipino overtures to China.
In sum, while the Philippines faces severe restraints, both
at home and abroad, in its efforts to pursue autonomous dem-
ocratic development, there are also opportunities. A popular
president who has so far not been blamed by the public for
government mistakes and failures, an energetic and resourceful
private sector, recently restored constitutional processes, and a
people showing signs of weariness of armed struggle even to
achieve laudable goals - these are assets not to be squandered.
696 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

But whether the leadership has the vision to build on these

assets or the unity to implement goals once identified is in grave
doubt. Politicians and military officers, businessmen and bu-
reaucrats alike tend to have very limited horizons. Thus atten-
tion seems to be riveted on short-term prospects, such as who
is going to win the 1992 presidential election.
If Corazon Aquino really does not run (and she has so far
said she will not), there will be a scramble for her mantle among
at least three major contenders: Fidel Ramos, the present sec-
retary of defence is the most popular, seems to have the strong-
est American backing, and, of course, works most smoothly with
the military. The speaker of the house, Ramon Mitra, is a master
of patronage politics and has the backing of the president's
brother - and the money to go with it. The Senate's president,
Jovito Salonga, was a close friend and ally of Benigno Aquino
and is the only one of the three who fought Marcos from the
beginning; he has his own set of clients in various provinces
but is also backed by the more progressive elements in the
original Aquino coalition. (Unless massive Marcos funds are
made available, no legate of the 'New Society' is likely to be a
major contender.) If Mrs Aquino does not wield her endorse-
ment forcefully, the outcome could be close, perhaps producing
a president with only minority support - a somewhat danger-
ous, because unknown, outcome in the Philippines.
But even if Aquino herself, or an anointed successor, is easily
elected, there is still a great danger of governmental immobilism
and increased domestic strife in the 199os. The collapse of any
coherent population planning has caused a new surge in the
birth rate, and no new efforts to control it are in sight. This
will probably mean even higher unemployment. Land hunger
and destruction of the environment will also be accelerated.
Despite benign pronouncements, government is unable to stop
- in truth many officials are among the guilty parties - the
destruction of the forests, once one of the Philippines' great
natural resources. Most of the political 61ite are blind to the
consequences of the failure of reform, and even if a bold policy
 THE PHILIPPINES: PRECARIOUS DEMOCRACY 697

were enacted, the bureaucracy - thanks to early politicization

in the American period and the ravages of postwar inflation
even before Marcos - is so riddled with corruption as to be an
ineffective instrument of state policy.
Thus partly for international and partly for domestic rea-
sons, the situation in the Philippines is one of unstable stalemate.
Although a highly politicized population (by Southeast Asian
standards) demands reform, reform is unlikely to be imple-
mented so as to reduce unrest. On the contrary, incomplete,
uneven reform, as in the past, is much more likely - and such
a policy creates rather than reduces social conflict. Thus the
insurgency is likely to regain momentum, but without major
foreign support it cannot seize power. The revolutionary move-
ment can, however, sustain conflict at a level which inhibits
economic growth. It might also gain sufficient strength to frighten
an intransigent 6lite into the reimposition of authoritarian rule,
as in 1972, thus intensifying conflict. Declining world prices for
Philippine exports and rising interest rates would speed the
spiral of decline.
The marvellously non-violent way in which 'people power'
won restoration of constitutional government in February 1986
may someday be recognized as a fleeting moment in Philippines
history, an opportunity with great potential, which was lost.