This article was downloaded by: [McMaster University]

On: 25 November 2014, At: 15:57

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,
37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Psychiatry, Psychology and Law

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tppl20

Battered women and bad science: The limited validity

and utility of battered woman syndrome
a
Marilyn McMahon
a
School of Law & Legal Studies , La Trobe University , Bundoora, VIC, 3083 E-mail:
Published online: 01 Sep 2009.

To cite this article: Marilyn McMahon (1999) Battered women and bad science: The limited validity and utility of battered
woman syndrome, Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 6:1, 23-49, DOI: 10.1080/13218719909524946

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13218719909524946

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained
in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no
representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the
Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and
are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and
should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for
any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever
or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of
the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic
reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any
form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
 Battered Women and Bad Science:
The Limited Validity and Utility
of Battered Woman Syndrome
Marilyn McMahon
School of Law & Legal Studies, La Trobe University.
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014

I
n 1991 the Supreme Court of South Australia held that evidence of battered woman syndrome had been
erroneously excluded from the trial of two female defendants. The Chief Justice commented that battered
woman syndrome appeared to be a 'recognised facet of clinical psychology' and that 'methodical studies by
trained psychologists' had revealed typical patterns of behaviour for abusive males and their female victims (R v
Runjanjic and Kontinnen. 1991, p. 118 per King CJ). This article critically examines the scientific basis and status of
battered woman syndrome with particular focus on the methodology and conclusions of Lenore Walker, the
psychologist who is generally credited with developing and promoting this syndrome. Other relevant studies that
utilise the concept of battered woman syndrome are also examined. Problems are identified in the definition,
conceptualisation and utilisation of the syndrome, and substantial methodological deficiencies are noted in the key
empirical studies upon which the syndrome is based. Additionally, it is questioned whether expert evidence by
psychologists is necessary on this issue in contemporary Australia. Hence, contrary t o the conclusions of King CJ, it
is suggested that the scientific base for battered woman syndrome is deeply flawed and that contemporary
Australian courts should be wary of accepting expert evidence concerning battered woman syndrome.

[Battered woman syndrome] now appears to be
a recognised facet of clinical psychology in the
United States and Canada. It emerges from the
literature that methodical studies by trained
psychologists of situations of domestic violence
have revealed typical patterns of behaviour on the
part of the male batterer and the female victim,
and typical responses on the part of the female
victim. It has been revealed, so it appears, that
women who have suffered habitual domestic
violence are typically affected psychologically to
the extent that their reactions and responses differ
from those which might be expected by persons
who lack the advantage of an acquaintance with
the results of those studies.
(R v Runjanjic; R v Kontinnen, 1991. p. 118
per King CJ).
Although expert testimony regarding the battered
woman syndrome has been widely endorsed by
the courts, commentators and statutes, the
battered woman syndrome lacks empirical
support as a clinical syndrome. (Schopp, Sturgis
& Sullivan, 1994, p.12).
Battered Woman Syndrome: The
Australian Forensic Context
Expert evidence concerning battered woman
syndrome has now been accepted in Australian
courts on many occasions (Rogers, 1996) and has
been the subject of extensive professional
commentary (e.g., Freckelton, 1994; Sheehy,

Correspondence to: Marilyn McMahon, School of Law & Legal Studies, La Trobe University, Bundoora VIC 3083. Email:
m.mcmahon@latrobe.edu.au

PSYCHIATRY. PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW

VOLUME 6 NUMBER I 1999 pp. 23-49 23
 MARILYN McMAHON
Stubbs & Tolmie, 1992) and discussion in the
media (e.g., Zdenkowski, 1992; Kissane, 1998).
Expert testimony on the syndrome was first
accepted at the appellate level in South Australia
in 1991 when the South Australian Court of
Criminal Appeal ruled in R v Runjanjic; R v
Kontinnen that a trial judge had erroneously
excluded expert evidence concerning battered
woman syndrome. The facts of this case disclosed
an unusual application of battered woman
syndrome: the appellants, both women, were
convicted in the Supreme Court on charges of
false imprisonment and causing grievous bodily
harm to a third woman. They raised battered
woman syndrome in the context of their defence
of duress, arguing that they had each been
psychologically and physically abused their
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
partner, Hill. They argued that their wills had
been overcome by fear of Hill's violence. Hence,
when they abducted another woman upon his
demanding that they do so, they claimed that
diey were not acting independently and volition-
ally. The trial judge excluded the evidence of a
psychologist regarding battered woman
syndrome; on appeal, the court held that the
evidence should have been admitted. Battered
woman syndrome has also been introduced as
part of the defence of duress for females charged
with fraud against the Commonwealth
Department of Social Security (Winnett v
Stephenson, 1993; cited in Easteal, Hughes and
Easter, 1993) and armed robbery (R v Lorcnz,
1998). Additionally, expert testimony relating to
battered woman syndrome recently has also been
admitted in trials in Australia in support of the
defences of self-defence (e.g., R v Hickey, 1992),
self-defence and provocation (e.g., R v Gilbert,
1993; Osland v R, 1998), in mitigation of
sentence (e.g., R v Woolsey, 1993; R v Taylor,
1994) and has influenced the exercise of prosecu-
torial discretion in relation to the prosecution of
criminal cases (Alcorn & Stenberg, 1992).
Finally, in R v Kina (1993) a battered woman's
successful appeal against conviction for murder
was based on the fact that poor communication
between the appellant and her lawyers had effec-
tively denied her satisfactory legal representation
and the capacity to make informed decisions on
the basis of proper advice (Hancock, 1997).
Battered woman syndrome was one of the factors
identified by the majority of the court as having
contributed to the poor communication.
24
Cases in which evidence of battered women
syndrome is tendered to a court usually involve
circumstances where a woman has committed a
prima facie criminal act and seeks to have expert
testimony regarding her prior history of abuse
given to the court in order to mitigate or absolve
her from legal responsibility for that act. In
Osland vR (1998) Kirby and Callinan JJ. empha-
sised that the introduction of evidence that a
defendant experienced battered woman
syndrome was not in itself conclusive but must
be linked to relevant legal principles and the
particular facts of a case. Accordingly, evidence of
battered woman syndrome is not a defence per se
to a criminal charge, and must be used in
conjunction with existing defences in the crimi-
nal law or be given as part of a presentencing plea
(/? v Lorenz, 1998).
The potential forensic application of battered
woman syndrome is considerable, with sugges-
tions that it could also be applied to smuggling,
robbery, theft, arson, and other charges that must
be coupled with intent (Walus-Wigle & Meloy,
1988). The forensic relevance and significance of
battered woman syndrome is clear, for as Walker
(1991) has stated, 'Most battered woman will
have some contact with the legal system..', (p.28).
However, considerable debate has occurred
regarding the public policy implications of accept-
ing expert evidence on battered woman syndrome
in criminal trials (Walker, 1984a; Sheehy, Stubbs
& Tolmie, 1992; Zdenkowski, 1992; Dershowitz,
1994; Easteal, 1996; Greenwood, 1996; Rogers,
1996; Faigman & Wright, 1997) and many
feminists have been critical of the syndrome
(Comack; 1987; Donovan, 1991; 1993; Dobash
& Dobash, 1992; Sheehy, Stubbs & Tolmie,
1992; Rogers, 1996).
Radier less attention has been directed to the
actual development, scientific basis (reliability
and validity) and contemporary status of the
syndrome. Most courts in the USA that have
considered this issue have concluded that contin-
uing research and recognition have made battered
woman syndrome a reliable scientific theory
(Coffee, 1986; Murphy, 1992; Blowers &
Bjerregaard, 1994; Duncan, 1996). By 1993 in
Florida the scientific status of battered woman
syndrome was accepted as a matter of law; the
court in Rogers v State (1993) holding that:
Because battered woman syndrome is now
generally accepted in the relevant scientific
 BATTERED WOMEN AND BAD SCIENCE THE UMITED VAUDITY AND UTILITY OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
community [there is no] necessity for a case-
by-case determination that the scientific
knowledge regarding the syndrome is suffi-
ciently developed to permit a reasonable
opinion to be given by an expert, (p. 1098).
The American Psychological Association has
endorsed the validity of the syndrome in amicus
briefs filed in several cases where battered women
killed their abusers (e.g., State v Kelly, Amicus
Briefs, 1986) concluding that 'The underlying
theories used by these experts are well-developed,
well-recognised theories previously applied in
other contexts and simply adapted to the study of
battered women' (p.255). Browne (1990), an early
co-worker of Walker, asserted in 1990 that contin-
uing research on the syndrome had generated a
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
considerable amount of scientific data and a large
pool of experts and predicted fewer successful legal
challenges to the admissibility of expert testimony
concerning battered woman syndrome. As previ-
ously noted, in Australia the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of South Australia held that
evidence of battered woman syndrome was admis-
sible because the syndrome was accepted as a
scientifically established facet of psychology, and
incorporated selected references on the syndrome
into his judgement (R v Runjanjic; R v Kontinnen,
1991). His views were subsequendy endorsed by
Newman J. in R v Woolsey (1993).
Nevertheless, it is also true that on several
occasions (principally in the early 1980's)
American courts have ruled that battered woman
syndrome did not constitute a scientific 'field of
expertise' and excluded expert testimony on this
issue (e.g. Buhrle v State, 1981; State v Thomas,
1981; Hawthorne v State, 1985). Reexamination
of the scientific basis of battered woman
syndrome has also followed from the develop-
ment by the United States Supreme Court of a
new federal standard for the admissibility of
scientific evidence in Daubert v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc. (1993). The Daubert case
emphasised that such evidence must be "derived
from the scientific method" (p. 2795 1 , also see
Goodman-Delahunty, 1997) and requires judges
to consider:
• The testability of the scientific theory
• The error rates associated with the theory
• Whether relevant research has been published
in peer-reviewed publications
• Whether the scientific basis of the theory has
been generally accepted.
Contemporary commentators have been divided
as to whether battered woman syndrome meets
the Daubert standard (Duncan, 1996; Faigman &
Wright, 1997; Goodyear-Smith, 1997), however
at least one court in the United States has found
that the syndrome satisfies the Daubert test
(United States v Brown, 1995). Although the
Daubert test has not thus far been adopted in
Australia2, where the Frye test of general accept-
ability within the relevant professional commu-
nity remains dominant in most jurisdictions,3 the
impact of this standard for determining the
admissibility of scientific evidence is likely to have
considerable impact. Additionally, criticism of
battered woman syndrome has come from social
commentators and theorists who have scathingly
criticised the empirical research from which the
theory was developed (Faigman, 1986; 1995;
Acker & Toch, 1985; Brown, 1997; Schopp et
al., 1994) or emphasised unresolved issues in the
application of the theory in the forensic context
(Schuller and Vidmar, 1992; Freckelton, 1994;
Schopp et al., 1994). Legal scholars have closely
examined the general (and increasing) use of
'syndrome' evidence in Australian and American
courts (Freckelton, 1994; Dershowitz, 1994;
Downs, 1997). These authors raised substantive
questions concerning the scientific validity of
battered woman syndrome.
Stubbs and Tolmie (1995) noted that discus-
sion of battered woman syndrome has tended to
fall into two broad categories, either directed at
the research and methodology underlying the
theory or the use of the syndrome as a feminist
legal defence strategy. The current paper belongs
to the first category and seeks to continue the
critical examination of the construction and valid-
ity of battered woman syndrome with particular
reference to the forensic context in Australia.
However, before proceeding to identify some of
the difficulties associated with the use of battered
woman syndrome, it is appropriate to provide a
brief outline of the elements of the syndrome
(derived from the work of Lenore Walker), and
describe related empirical investigations.
Battered Woman Syndrome
Lenore Walker conducted seminal research in
this area and has been credited with naming the
25
 MARILYN McMAHON
'battered woman syndrome', a term that has
gained acceptance among lawyers, mental health
professionals and the American Psychological
Association (Schuller & Vidmar, 1992). She uses
the term to describe both a pattern of violence
against a woman by her male partner and its
psychological impact upon her. At varying times
Walker and her colleagues defined battered
woman syndrome as 'a general pattern of reaction
to physical and psychological abuse inflicted on a
woman by her spouse' (Walker, 1984a, p. 1178),
'a collection of specific characteristics and effects
of abuse that result in a woman's decreased
ability to respond effectively to the violence
against her' (Douglas, 1987), and' a set of partic-
ular symptoms, characteristics and problems
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
experienced by a woman in an ongoing physically
abusive relationship with a man...These charac-
teristics include fear, shame, isolation, guilt,
depression, passivity, learned helplessness, tradi-
tional sex role attitudes, low self-esteem, and
dependency (Kromsky & Cutler, 1989).
Battered woman syndrome has two unusual
features. It describes:
a) the pattern of violence in the relationship as
well as the psychological and behavioural
sequelae for the female victim, and
b) the behaviour and psychological characteris-
tics of both the abusive male and the female
victim. With the exception of the disorder
folii a deux, there are few mental disorders
where the diagnosis explicitly and directly
applies to a dyad.
Battered woman syndrome is not a specific
category of mental disorder that is recognised in
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders—IV* (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994), although Walker (1984b;
1991; 1992; 1993) and Regehr (1995) suggest
that it is usually subsumed within the diagnostic
criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (see
appendix one for Walker's suggested DSM—MR
diagnosis of battered woman syndrome).
Posttraumatic stress disorder refers to a set of
symptoms that follow exposure to a traumatic
event that cause an individual to experience fear,
helplessness or horror (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994). Features of post-traumatic
stress disorder, including intense nightmares,
grief, severe panic, guilt and denial have also been
specifically identified in battered women who
killed their abusers (Levit, 1985).
26
The Empirical Research
Lenore Walker has reported two major research
studies (Walker, 1979; 1984b) which she has also
discussed in several articles and book chapters
(Walker, 1977-78; 1983; 1984a; 1989; 1991;
1993; 1995; 1996). Additionally, she sum-
marised the characteristics of a group of legal
cases involving battered woman syndrome with,
which she has been involved (Walker, 1989). Her
many publications report her research findings,
their public policy implications, forensic signifi-
cance and die outcomes of relevant legal cases in
the USA.
Walker's research occurs within the broad
framework of 'positivist psychology', modified by
her commitment to a feminist research orienta-
tion. 5 It is important to note that Walker's
theorising on battered woman syndrome is
purportedly derived from her empirical research;
hence, the strength of the syndrome rests entirely
on the adequacy of that research.
Walker's (1979) initial findings were based on
a non-random sample of'more than 120' battered
women and caseworkers who had contacted, or
were employed by, social service agencies in the
USA and England (Walker, 1983, n . l ) . She
followed this initial study with in-depth inter-
views and psychological testing on a larger sample
of American women obtained through referrals
from women's refuges, hospitals, medical centres,
lawyers, police, community groups and through
advertising (Walker, 1984b). Four hundred and
thirty five battered women from the Rocky Basin
area of the USA were interviewed. After excluding
incomplete and unusable data, a sample of 403
women remained. Demographic information,
personality profiles and details of battering
incidents were obtained from these women, who
were paid for their participation in the research
study Thus, in both research studies, the informa-
tion on battered women was obtained from 'self-
report data from a self-referred and voluntary
sample' (Walker, 1984, p. 228). Additionally, as
most of the women were not living with their
abusive partner at the time of interview, the data
were retrospective (Walker, 1983).
The Definition of 'Battered Woman*
Walker has not devoted great attention to defin-
ing 'battered woman syndrome' but has devel-
 BATTERED WOMEN AND BAD SCIENCE: THE UMITED VAUDITY AND UTIUTY OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
oped detailed definitions of the term 'battered
woman" (Walker, 1979; 1984b). For example:
a battered woman is a woman, 18 years of age
or over, who is or has been in an intimate
relationship with a man who repeatedly
subjects or subjected her to forceful physical
and/or psychological abuse
(Walker, 1984b, p. 203).
An 'intimate relationship' is a relationship having
a romantic, affectionate, or sexual component.
'Repeatedly' simply means more than once. Note
that the abuse may consist of psychological
and/or physical abuse and includes verbal harass-
ment, excessive jealousy, placing restrictions on
the woman's activities, nonverbal and verbal
threats of future punishment, sexual assault and
actual physical attack with/without injury
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
(Walker, 1983). Although none of the women in
Walker's (1984b) study were victims solely of
psychological abuse, she emphasised that a
woman could develop battered woman syndrome
subsequent to psychological abuse without physi-
cal violence6. Additionally, although the defini-
tion originally applied only to adult heterosexual
relationships in which a woman was the victim,
Walker (1992) subsequently extended the
syndrome to other types of abusive relationship
(e.g. male homosexual and lesbian relationships
and incestuous relationships).
The Cycle of Violence
Walker believed that the identification of a three-
stage 'cycle of violence" in the abuse of battered
women was a key theoretical aspect of her study;
the three stages she describes are the:
(i) tension building stage
(ii) acute battering stage
(iii) kindness and contrite, loving behaviour stage
From this 'cycle of violence' arose the psychologi-
cal sequelae that constituted a large part of
battered woman syndrome. Additionally, the
cycle is forensically significant for, in circum-
stances where there is a time gap between an
abusive partner's threat of death or serious bodily
harm and a battered woman's prima facie crimi-
nal act (e.g., killing a sleeping, abusive partner),
the cycle provides the 'psychological' link for the
battered woman between the two temporally
distinct events (Faigman & Wright, 1997).
Expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome typically repeats Walker's 'three-stage
cycle of violence' to explain the dynamics of an
abusive relationship (e.g., see the expert testi-
mony of the psychologist Fugler in R v
Kontinnen, 1992, p. 47). Walker suggested that
battered women typically experienced abuse in a
cyclical pattern involving three stages. The cycle
is repeated and over time the violence is said to
escalate both in frequency and severity (Walker,
1984b). However, she noted that over time in a
battering relationship, tension building (stage 1)
became more common and loving contrition
(stage 3) became less frequent (Walker 1984b,
1990). A woman qualified for battered woman
syndrome if she experienced the complete cycle
more than once (Walker, 1979). The 3 stages
Walker (1979; 1984b) described are:
i) The Tension Building Stage Tension begins to
build in the relationship as the woman senses that
the man is becoming "edgy' and more prone to
react negatively to frustrations. This stage includes
little episodes of violence — both physical and
verbal — which are quickly terminated. For
example, the man may become verbally abusive
then quickly apologise and become docile again.
During this stage the woman is hyper-vigilant,
attempting to avert violence by anticipating her
partner's moods and needs. In some relationships
the duration of this first stage is relatively
constant, but in most relationships it varies due to
the influence of other situational variables.
Battered women who kill their abusive partners
are most likely to kill him during the tension-
building phase (Murphy, 1992; Walker, 1979).
ii) The Acute Battering Stage This is the stage in
which acute physical violence occurs. The physi-
cal violence is accompanied by psychological
abuse in most cases (Walker, 1984b).
Anticipation of this second stage results in severe
psychological stress for the battered woman: 'she
becomes anxious, depressed and complains of
other psychophysiological symptoms' (Walker,
1979, p . 6 1 ) . T h e incident itself may last
anywhere from 2 to 24 hours, with the intensely
violent period estimated to average 15 to 30
minutes. The incident is usually initially followed
by shock and denial, followed by listlessness,
depression and helplessness (Walker, 1979).
According to Walker, most battered women do
not seek help immediately after an attack unless
medical attention is needed. Specific, practical
27
 MARILYN McMAHON
coping strategies employed by battered women
included temporarily getting away from the
abuser and contacting law enforcement agencies.
Less frequently, the woman physically retaliates
against her abusive partner.
Hi) The Kindness and Contrite Loving Behaviour
Stage The battered women reported that during
this stage the batterer realised that he has gone too
far and attempted to make it up to them. He apolo-
gised profusely, showed kindness and remorse, tried
to help and promised that the violence would not
recur (Walker, 1984b). However, in some relation-
ships this stage was simply characterised by an
absence of tension or violence without remorseful
behaviour (Walker, 1984b; 1996). During this
stage the battered woman's victimisation became
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
complete as she hoped that the violence would end,
that her partner's loving and contrite behaviour
would become the norm, and she accepted her
situation and remained in (or returned to) the
relationship. Conversely, it is during this stage that
a battered woman is most likely to leave her abuser
(Walker, 1979).
TTie Psychological Sequelae
Walker stated that the psychological impact of
battered woman syndrome began with feelings of
helplessness, guilt and lowered self-esteem. An
abused woman initially sought to control the
abusive incidents by identifying the causes of her
partner's aggression and modifying her behaviour
accordingly. However, as the abuse continues, the
woman learned that, regardless of her actions, she
could not control the beatings and she began to
assume that she had no control over her environ-
ment (Walker, 1979). As a consequence of her
constant sense of lack of control the woman
developed a 'psychological paralysis' or 'learned
helplessness', accompanied by depression.
The theoretical background of 'learned
helplessness' was derived from Martin Seligman's
laboratory experiments with animals, in which he
exposed them to random and variable aversive
stimulation from which they initially could not
escape, a process that Walker (1992) suggested
'probably produced a laboratory version of
PTSD' (p. 330). After being exposed to painful,
unavoidable stimuli, the animals in Seligman's
experiments subsequendy failed to utilise readily
available opportunities to escape the aversive
situation. Seligman theorised that his tortured
28
animals exhibited 'learned helplessness'. Learned
helplessness in humans is, according to Walker,
characterised by passive and submissive behav-
iour, the narrowing of cognitive capacity to
exercise choice, and is associated with contradic-
tory beliefs: the battered woman believes that her
male partner is loving, yet could kill her. She
becomes convinced that there is no escape.
Another important consequence of 'learned
helplessness' is changed perceptions of violence:
the battered woman, living constantly with fear,
became impervious to the seriousness of the
violence and death (Walker, 1979). Essentially,
Walker argued that battered women had child-
hood experiences and adult experiences in the
battering relationship that led them to develop
passivity, despair and hopelessness, to become
desensitised to the seriousness of the violence
which they experienced and to increasingly
perceive that they had no option other then to
remain with their abuser.
It is important to note that Walker's theoris-
ing on learned helplessness has changed during
the past two decades. In her earlier work Walker
(1979, p. 47) emphasised the passivity associated
with battered woman syndrome:
Once the women are operating from a belief
of helplessness, the perception becomes reality
and they become passive, submissive,
'helpless'. They allow things that appear to
them to be out of control to actually get out of
control.
As the cycle of violence was repeated, the
battered woman increasingly felt powerless to
control or influence what happened to her and
lived in a state of constant fear, perceiving that
there was no escape from her situation.
Subsequendy, Walker modified her use of the
concept of learned helplessness, abandoning the
notion of psychological paralysis and extreme
passivity and replacing it with a characterisation of
battered women as having a limited repertoire of
behaviours:
Learned helplessness does not mean that the
woman is helpless
(Walker, 1991, p. 24).
Walker (1996, p. 343) subsequently has referred
to the "myth" that battered women are passive
and helpless and now emphasises that learned
helplessness simply means that battered women:
lose the ability to perceive that what they do
will make a difference in protecting themselves
from the noncontingency between response
 BATTERED WOMEN AND BAD SCIENCE THE UMITED VAUDITY AND UTILITY OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
and outcome in the relationship...battered
women begin to concentrate on coping strate-
gies that have the highest prediction of being
successful; they do not use many behaviours
that have a lower probability of being protec-
tive, including terminating the relationship.
(Walker, 19%, p. 343-344).
Decoding Walker's technical language, it appears
that her current conceptualisation of learned
helplessness has four key elements:
i) learned helplessness does not mean that a
woman is helpless;
ii) learned helplessness is manifested in the
battered woman's beliefs and behaviour
iii) due to her experiences in the abusive relation-
ship, the battered woman no longer believes
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
that her actions or behaviour can alter her
experience of abuse. She believes that no
matter what she does she will still be abused,
iv) as a consequence of her beliefs about her
limited efficacy in dealing with her partner's
violence, the battered woman mainly uses
coping/protective strategies that she believes are
most likely to reduce the abuse, and abandons
coping/protective strategies where she cannot
predict the outcome (Walker, 1991, p. 24-25)
or that she perceives are less likely to reduce the
abuse (Walker, 1996, p. 344).
'Learned helplessness' is the aspect of battered
woman syndrome that is emphasised by expert
witnesses in criminal trials and has influenced
judges (see R v C, 1993; R v Bradley, 1994, per
Coldrey J.). However, many expert witnesses in
Australia have chosen to rely on Walker's earlier
work , emphasising the passivity of battered
women, and have not acknowledged the shift in
her theorising on this critical issue. Thus, a
psychologist called by the defence in R v Hickey
(quoted in Yeo, 1992) stated:
...learned helplessness relates to the woman
feeling totally unable to do anything about her
environment, cannot get away, is unable to
utilise any resources, in fact, does not have the
resources to cope with the situation. Therefore
they are stuck in the situation. They are
normally quite dependent people, people if
you like, who initially when they get into a
relationship, place a great deal of emphasis on
their mate, on the man, taking responsibility
for their lives. This is when he starts to bash
her. She can't get away. She hasn't got the
resources to cope herself. Therefore they
remain in the situation being repeatedly
bashed. That pretty well defines what the
battered wife is.
Related Empirical Work on the
Battered Woman Syndrome
There is now a voluminous literature on domes-
tic violence and the psychological and behav-
ioural consequences of abuse by a male on his
partner. Walker (1979, 1984a, 1984b, 1991)
draws on this literature to support many of her
conclusions about battered woman syndrome.
Indeed, it is the entwining offindingsfrom other
researchers working in the field of domestic
violence with her own empirical findings that
complicates a precise delineation and evaluation
of battered woman syndrome. However, insofar
as Walker purports to create a particular
syndrome, with co-occurring symptoms, under-
pinned by the concepts of learned helplessness
and the cycle of violence, she is positing a situa-
tion somewhat different from the general,
descriptive material on domestic violence
provided by other researchers. The material
considered in this section is restricted to those
studies which explicitly use the concept of
battered woman syndrome or which Walker has
cited as indicative of the syndrome.
As yet, there is no research that comprehen-
sively replicates Walker's research with battered
women. Duncan's (1996) claim that 'later studies
have confirmed much of Walker's theory'is exces-
sive.7 In relation to the psychological sequelae of
abuse, partial support for Walker's (1984b)
battered woman syndrome has come from a
number of studies. Gleason (1993) investigated
levels of psychopathology in a small sample of
battered women using a structured interview (the
Diagnostic Interview Schedule) and found
extremely high prevalence for psychosexual
dysfunction, major depression, post-traumatic
stress disorder, generalised anxiety disorder and
obsessive compulsive disorder. He concluded that
'These diagnoses appear to reflect the major
components of the battered woman syndrome...'
(Gleason, 1993, p. 53). While the high levels of
depression, anxiety, psychosexual dysfunction and
post traumatic stress disorder are consistent with
Walker's (1984b) description of battered woman
syndrome, the addition of obsessive compulsive
disorder is a new addition to the syndrome (not
29
 MARILYN McMAHON
specified by Walker in any of the three original
empirical studies, but apparendy first mentioned
in an article in 1992). Thus, Gleason's (1993)
study simultaneously supports several features of
Walker's battered woman syndrome and —
through the introduction of a new element of
psychopathology (obsessive compulsive disorder)
— demonstrates the lack of precision in die origi-
nal delineation of the syndrome.
Dutton and Painter's (1993) research with
battered women investigated three aspects of
battered woman syndrome: trauma symptoms,
self-esteem and attachment to the abusive
partner. They concluded that, as predicted,
battered women experienced high rates of trauma
symptoms, lowered self-esteem and heightened
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
'paradoxical attachment' to the batterer. These
effects were all significandy correlated, a finding
which supports the idea that they constitute a
syndrome or complex. Similarly, Anson and Sagy
(1995) believed that their investigation of
battered women in Israel provided general
support for battered woman syndrome insofar as
diey found diat battered women were more likely
than non-abused women to both tolerate and
blame themselves for violence in the marriage
and were economically, sexually and socially
dominated by their husbands. Additionally, the
unsurprising finding that the abused women
were likely to be 'more nervous and less happy'
than non-abused women was taken as support for
Walker's theory (Anson & Sagy, 1995, p. 298).
However, these authors also reported that the
battered women diat they interviewed 'were not
powerless, isolated, or traditional women' (Anson
&Sagy, 1995, p. 301).
Further support for battered woman
syndrome is claimed from a survey of American
experts in domestic violence. Responses from
forty-five expert researchers in the area of wife
abuse to a survey which investigated expert
opinions and beliefs regarding battered women
revealed a high degree of consensus on key issues
relevant to battered woman syndrome (Dodge &
Greene, 1991). The findings from this study
suggested diat, consistent with Walker's studies
and theorising, most of tKese experts believed
that battered women: blame themselves for the
violence; are not masochistic; are anxious,
depressed and dependent; would find it difficult
30
to leave die relationship; might believe diat their
husband could kill them; and might be
persuaded to stay by promises of no further
violence.8 Obviously, this consensus of opinion
does not validate Walker's theory but it does
demonstrate acceptance widiin a relevant section
of the scientific community of her findings — a
factor that is a component of the Daubert test
and central to the admissibility of scientific testi-
mony in the United States under the standard
established by Frye v United States (1923)
(Duncan, 1996), a standard which was appar-
ently adopted by King CJ in R v Runjanjic; R v
Kontinnen (1991). However, it should also be
noted that there was no consensus on two aspects
of Walker's theory that have particular forensic
significance: these experts did not believe that
battered women could predict future violence,
nor did diey believe that battered women might
provoke a violent incident to get it over with
(Dodge & Greene, 1991). Thus, while the
findings from diis study may pardy explain the
acceptance of Walker's findings within the scien-
tific community, they demonstrate neither the
validity of her research nor universal acceptance
of key aspects of her dieorising.
Unresolved Issues in the Construction
and Application of Battered
Woman Syndrome
Walker (1984b) frequently acknowledged the
limitations of her original empirical research and
called for further research; however, she did not
adequately address the problems that arose from
these limitations or appropriately limit her
conclusions. As previously noted, she blended the
results of her own empirical research with the
findings of others, thereby creating difficulties in
establishing the empirical basis for the syndrome
that she describes. While her pioneering, detailed
work with victims of domestic violence brought
considerable attention to the circumstances and
psychological difficulties confronting these
women, the precarious empirical basis of the
syndrome is inadequate to justify the elaborate
theorising and testimony on battered woman
syndrome that has occurred in the forensic
context in the past two decades (Faigman, 1995).
Revisiting the original research studies illustrates
the profound problems that weaken that research.
 BATTERED WOMEN'AND BAD SCIENCE: THE UMITED VAUDITY AND UTILITY OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
Methodological Problems in the Empirical Research
As previously noted, the key empirical basis for
battered woman syndrome is found mainly in three
studies of battered women conducted by Lenore
Walker in the late 70's and early 80's in the USA
(Walker, 1979; 1984b; 1989). This research base is
characterised by methodological flaws, conceptual
imprecision and internal inconsistency.
No Control Groups
Each of the three empirical studies conducted by
Walker lacked a control group. Walker (1984b)
justified the lack of a control group on grounds of
financial cost and time. She later also claimed that
'sophisticated statistical methodologies' used in
the 1984 (b) study 'made it unnecessary to use
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
an experimental-control group research model'
(Walker, 1989, p. 9). A strategy she devised to
overcome this considerable limitation in her
(1984b) study was to use some of the women as
their own control group by obtaining information
from them about non-battering relationships in
which they had been involved. Subsequently,
Walker compared the women's' experiences in the
battering and non-battering relationships.
The absence of control groups bedevils many
aspects of Walker's research. For example, in the
absence of a control group it is simply unknown
whether the levels of depressions and self-esteem
reported by Walker's (1984b) respondents are
significantly different to those of a comparable
sample of women in intimate, heterosexual, non-
battering relationships. Additionally, in relation
to women with battered woman syndrome who
kill their abusive partners — a group of
enormous forensic interest — it has not yet been
established whether the percentage of women
with battered woman syndrome who kill their
abusive partner is higher than the base rate in the
appropriate control population (Morse, 1990).
The Samples: Representativeness and
Inconsistent Descriptions
As previously noted, the two principal studies
upon which Walker relies for the construction of
battered woman syndrome were a preliminary
study of 'more than 120' battered women and a
subsequent research study investigating the
experiences of 403 battered woman. Many
commentators, both legal and feminist, have
been critical of the adequacy of the sample on
which Walker conducted her research. Thus,
Kirby J. believed that bias in the sample selection
of respondents to Walker's research resulted in
the overrepresentation of 'Caucasian women of a
particular social background' {Osland v R, 1998,
p. 34)' and suggested that the syndrome may
therefore 'misrepresent many women's experi-
ences of violence' (p. 34)
Like much of the empirical research in family
violence, Walker's studies were conducted primar-
ily with abused women who sought shelter or
other help (Anson & Sagy, 1995). Walker (1983,
1984b) acknowledged bias in her samples in
relation to both demographic characteristics and
experience of abuse. In relation to her larger
research study, Walker acknowledged that the
sample over-represented women in professional
occupations (Walker, 1983) and may have under-
represented women who were severely battered or
who were experiencing relatively low levels of
violence (Walker, 1984b). Thus, the sample was
skewed towards professionally employed women
who, after experiencing moderate levels of
violence, left their abusive partner: 'self-selected
survivors' (Walker, 1984b, p. 229). It is simply
unknown just how representative Walker's
samples were of the total population of battered
women in the USA and how reliable was the
information reported, a point that Walker herself
acknowledged but then dismissed by stating 'our
data are as reliable as can be expected from a
survey type of research' (p. 228). Reliance on this
data in Australia is even more risky as the similari-
ties in the population of interest (battered women
with battered woman syndrome) in the USA and
Australia is unknown.
Discrepancies in the Data Reported
Occasionally, discrepancies occur in the data
reported by Walker. For example, Walker
(1984b) reported that the number of battered
women who themselves were physically violent
towards their abusive partner was 'small' (p.
150), and stated that only '15% of those in a
violent relationship and 5% of those in a non-
battering relationship [reported] the use of
violence' (p. 150). However, inspection of Table
13 in her book reveals that nearly one quarter
(24%) of the women in a battering relationship
reported that they 'occasionally' or 'frequently'
used physical force to get something they wanted
(p. 174), a proportion that, arguably, is not
'small' and which cannot be reconciled with
31
 MARILYN McMAHON
Walker's general comments on this issue. Indeed,
Walker's reported low frequency of physical
violence by battered women is inconsistent with
the reports of other researchers. For example,
more than half the battered women recently
surveyed in Israel and the USA reported using
physical violence against their abusive partner
(Anson & Sagy, 1995; Jacobson, Gottman,
Gortner, Berns & Shorn, 1996). While the
defensive use of physical violence by battered
women should not be equated with the violence
of their partners, the relatively high level of
violence exhibited by battered women has impor-
tant implications in the forensic context and is
inconsistent with the passivity emphasised in the
concept of'learned helplessness'.
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
Secondary Sampling
King CJ stated that relevant psychological litera-
ture revealed 'typical patterns of behaviour on the
part of the male batterer' (R v Runjanjic; R v
Kontinnen, 1991, p. 118). However, it should be
noted that in Walker's (1979, 1984b) studies all
data pertaining to male batterers were derived
from information provided by their female
partners. As Walker (1979, p. xvii) stated:
I am aware that this book is written from a
feminist vision. It is a picture of what happens
in a domestic violent act from the perspective
of only one of the two parties...
Thus, the extensive information obtained on male
batterers — more than one-third of the tables
presented in Walker's (1984b) study contained
information about dieir background, personality,
attitudes and behaviour — was derived from this
'secondary sampling' approach. While such an
approach is consistent with a feminist research
orientation (McHugh, 1993) and undoubtedly
provided valuable insights from the victims'
perspective, relying solely on the womens' percep-
tions of their abusers provides a particular
perspective on intimate, dyadic violence. Hence,
it is more accurate to indicate that this literature
depicts victims' perceptions of the typical pattern
of behaviour of the male batterer.
The Interviews
The Interviewers: Experimenter expectancies
Although Walker (1984b, p. 222) acknowledged
that 'ideally, of course, those who collect data
should be unaware of the hypotheses being
tested' she contravened this principle by using
32
interviewers who were both familiar with the
broad issue of domestic violence and her previous
work. Walker prescribed her earlier book {The
Battered Woman), which outlined her theory of
learned helplessness and the cycle of violence, as
required reading for her interviewers prior to
conducting their interviews. As the interviewers
also scored and coded the interviews that they
conducted, it is possible that their prior knowl-
edge of Walker's theory of violence and use of
the concept of learned helplessness not only
biased the way in which they conducted their
interviews but also distorted the way in which
they scored them (Brown, 1997).
Scoring of the Interviews Many of the questions
used by the interviewers in Walker's (1984b)
study were open-ended. Given the interviewers'
familiarity with the research hypotheses and their
important role in rating respondents' answers to
open-ended questions, it is disconcerting to note
that interviewers scored and coded the interviews
that they conducted. 'Experimenter expectancies'
may therefore have significantly influenced the
results obtained in the study (Faigman, 1986).
Additionally, no detailed information was
provided concerning scoring instructions or
guidelines that were given to the interviewers,
thereby increasing uncertainty concerning
scoring of interviewees' responses. Finally,
although it was claimed that 'Comparison
between interviewers' responses indicated a high
level of agreement' (Walker, 1984, p. 96) there is
no reporting of any measures of interrater relia-
bility. Thus, the results reported may have been
subject to distortions resulting from interviewer
expectancies and inconsistencies.
Other significant problems occur in Walker's
(1984b) study in relation to the analysis of data.
Composite variables are created without either
theoretical or statistical justification (e.g., the
computing of combined scores for the variables
fear, anxiety and depression: Schopp et al., 1994)
and no statistical tests of significance are reported
(Faigman. 1986). Both these features signifi-
cantly weaken the strength of the study.
The Interview Schedule Walker's studies have
been criticised for using leading questions and
thereby promoting 'hypothesis guessing' by
respondents (Faigman, 1986). Additionally,
contrary to conventional practice, which requires
 BATTERED WOMEN AND BAD SCIENCE THE UMITED VAUDITY AND UTILITY OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
the use of an identical questionnaire for all
respondents, the interview schedule changed
during the course of Walker's (1984b) study. She
(1984b) noted that 'Four different forms [of die
questionnaire] were tried until a satisfactory
interview schedule was finalised. All forms except
for the pretest were used in the final analy-
s i s - W a l k e r , 1984b, p. 226). Although the
purpose of die revisions was to 'shorten the inter-
view' (p. 226), the format of important items
relating to sexual assault were varied from open-
ended questions to closed questions employing
forced-choice response categories during the
course of the research study.
Conceptual Problems in Walker's Research
The Cycle of Violence
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
Walker's (1979; 1984b) 3 stage cycle of violence
has been criticised (e.g., Faigman, 1986; Schuller
& Vidmar, 1992). Inspection of her own data
reveals that only 65% of the cases involved a
tension-building stage prior to the battering and
in only 58% of die cases did a period of loving
contrition follow die battering incident. (Walker,
1984, p. 96-97). Additionally, Walker (1984b;
1996) noted that the loving contrition phase was
absent in some relationships and, in others,
disappeared over time, causing her to modify
descriptions of the third phase of the cycle
(Walker, 1996). Faigman (1986), reanalysing the
data provided by Walker (1984b), concluded
that only about thirty-eight per cent of her
respondents actually experienced die entire cycle
of violence. Thus it is clear that the 3 stage cycli-
cal pattern of violence was not common to all the
battering relationships investigated by Walker
and may not characterise relationships of long
duration. While it is unrealistic to criticise
Walker's dieory for not providing a perfect expla-
nation for battering in intimate relationships, it is
disconcerting diat she did not adequately address
the variation in her own data nor seek to identify
factors that could have caused variation from the
predicted cyclical pattern of violence.
Additionally, it is unclear what Walker means
when she refers to a 'stage' in the cycle of
violence. While she broadly indicated the average
or expected duration of each stage in die cycle of
violence and emphasised the importance of
factors unique to die abusive couple, she has also
indicated diat a stage may last for years (Walker,
1979, n. 23 p. 58) or 'be over in a moment'
(Walker, 1979). The idea of a stage of momen-
tary duration raises considerable skepticism about
die validity of die 3 stage model and indicates die
need for greater clarity on die notion of a 'stage'
in the 3 stage cycle of violence. Furthermore,
important forensic issues remain unresolved. It is
not clear whether a battered woman must experi-
ence the full cycle of violence to qualify for
battered woman syndrome or whether partial
experience would satisfy the criteria for the
syndrome (Freckelton, 1994).
Finally, detailed, empirical research on this
issue has not supported Walker's model. Dutton
and Painter (1993) explicidy researched this aspect
of battered woman syndrome and found no
evidence of a 3 stage cycle of violence in the
abusive relationships that they investigated. They
concluded that intermittency of abuse (i.e.
extreme positive behaviour and extreme negative
behaviour occurring with temporal contiguity),
rather than a 3 stage cycle, characterised the
abusive relationships of battered women.
Additionally, diey concluded that it was intermit-
tency of abuse, rather than the predictability of
abuse per se, diat contributed to battered woman
syndrome. Longitudinal research on die frequency
and severity of abuse in battering relationships has
also not supported Walker's theorising. Walker
(1984b) predicted that both severity and
frequency of abuse would increase in battering
relationships over time10. However, Jacobson et al
(1996) reported that, in couples who were still
living together at the end of their 2 year study
investigating domestic violence, 54% of the
batterers had decreased the frequency and severity
of their abuse. Thus, rigorous empirical research
has failed to support Walker's dieorising concern-
ing the cycle of violence in abusive relationships.
This finding, combined with inadequacies in
Walker's own research, casts considerable doubt
upon the validity and utility of this aspect of
battered woman syndrome.
Learned helplessness and Agency
The applicability of the learned helplessness
paradigm to battered women has been
questioned. Faigman (1986), returning to
Seligman's original experiments, noted that
inducing learned helplessness in dogs made it
virtually impossible to retrain them to engage in
behaviour that would avoid the aversive stimulus
and/or enable diem to escape from their painful
33
 MARILYN McMAHON
environment. He queried the application of
Seligman's model to battered women who left
the abusive relationship or killed their abusive
partner (also see Schopp et al., 1994). Similarly,
some commentators simply have argued that
characterising battered women who kill their
abuser as helpless is illogical (Tomlie & Stubbs,
1992; Nicolson & Sanghvi, 1993). Feminist
commentators have objected to the representa-
tion of (battered) women as irrational beings,
psychopathologically motivated to commit their
offences (McCarthy, 1994; Hinchdiffe & Lloyd,
1996"). These theorists have been critical of
Walker's emphasis on the passivity and victimisa-
tion of battered women which they believe has
the inevitable consequence of portraying them as
"Agentless, almost somnambulistic..."
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
(Coughlin, 1994).
As previously noted, Walker's theorising in
relation to learned helplessness in battered
women has changed during the past twenty years,
with decreasing emphasis on their 'passivity'.
Indeed, Walker's (1984b) original data clearly
indicated that these battered women were not
passive and agentless — they frequently took
action in relation to their situation. At least one-
fifth of the women temporarily left their home
immediately after a battering incident, 25% of
the women reported that they had left the
batterer permanently and, in the last battering
incident prior to being interviewed, 49% of the
women reported that they immediately sought
'outside help' after the battering (Walker, 1984,
p. 170, Table ll).Thirty nine percent of the
women reported that at some point they had
obtained a restraining order against their abuser
(Table 17, p. 179) and 33 (8%) of the women
reported that they had tried to kill their abuser.
Walker (1984b, p. 150) noted that 'The proba-
bility that the woman will seek help increases
over time..', and subsequently concluded that
'the data indicate that most battered women fight
back at some time (Walker, 1992, p. 325). Other
researchers have established that many battered
women engage in diverse actions to end the abuse
(Kuhl, 1986; Hilberman & Munstrom,
1977-78; Levit, 1985; Gelles & Strauss, 1988)
and have described a diverse range of coping
skills that are used by battered women (Browne,
1987; Ewing, 1987). For example, a recent
survey of battered women in Israel, noted that
more than half the battered women reported
34
seeking help and/or using physical violence,
strategies that were relatively rare with women in
non-abusive heterosexual relationships (Anson &
Sagy, 1995). Hence, although King CJ in R v
Runjanjic; R v Kontinnen (1991) stated that 'The
battered woman rarely seeks outside help because
of fear of further violence' (p. 118), such a
conclusion is inconsistent with both Walker's
original research and subsequent relevant research
in domestic violence. Significantly, this miscon-
ception may also seriously disadvantage battered
women who do retaliate to their partner's
violence as they will not fit the profile of
Walker's 'battered woman'.12
Battered woman syndrome also cannot
explain why some women do leave the abusive
relationship while others do not (Comack,
1987). This is particularly problematic as nearly
half (46%) of the women in Walker's (1.984b)
study had left their abusive partners at some
point before they were interviewed (Walker,
1983). It might be anticipated that battered
women who exhibited higher levels of learned
helplessness would be least likely to leave the
relationship, but empirical research has failed to
support this hypothesis (McDonald, 1989).
In summary, in the forensic context, the
concept of learned helplessness and the construc-
tion of the 'agentless' women with battered
woman syndrome raise three profound,
unresolved issues:
a) It is not clear how Walker's most recent
formulation of learned helplessness (Walker,
1991) can explain the actions of a woman
who kills her abusive spouse. Walker has
emphasised that battered women progres-
sively restrict themselves to a limited reper-
toire of behaviours which have the most
highly predictable consequences within their
familiar situation (Walker, 1989). Women
with battered woman syndrome avoid novel
responses — such as leaving their abusive
partner — that would "launch them into the
unknown" (Walker. 1989, p. 51). However,
insofar as the killing of an abusive spouse
constitutes a novel action, it is not part of an
existing, restricted repertoire of responses and
hence cannot readily be explained within this
framework of 'learned helplessness.'
Additionally, Walker's theorising on this
point is fundamentally irreconcilable with
 BATTERED WOMEN AND BAD SCIENCE: THE UMITED VALIDITY AND UTIUTY OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
Seligman's work with animals, from which
her theorising is purportedly derived.
Seligman noted that, once subject to 'learned
helplessness', the animals in his experiments
displayed continuing and consistent passivity.
Yet Walker's more recent comments on
learned helplessness emphasise not passivity,
but selective behavioural responses on the
pan of the battered women, thereby demon-
strating a significant departure from
Seligman's work and constructing a complex
and confusing portrait of the battered
woman. As Blackman (1989, p. 192) has
commented:
The suggestion that battered women are
'helpless' is really a misnomer. Battered women
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
are often resourceful and active in their efforts
to avoid violence in the context of the relation-
ship... Furthermore, especially for battered
women who kill, the suggestion in Walker's
language that they must be 'helpless' if they
have been battered can function to predispose a
jury against them The jurors may believe that a
helpless woman could never pull a trigger, that
a helpless woman could only endure the abuse,
but could not respond in kind.
b) Walker (1979) stated that women with
battered woman syndrome became impervi-
ous to the seriousness of the violence and
possible death from their abuser. This finding
is hard to reconcile widi the acute apprehen-
sion of imminent death or great bodily harm
claimed by female defendants who have relied
on battered women syndrome as part of a
claim of self defence or provocation (e.g. R v
Hickey, 1992). However, Walker also argued
that battered woman syndrome invested
women with a special ability to perceive
forthcoming violence from an abusive
partner, even in the absence of overt, behav-
ioural indicators (Walker, 1993). This aspect
of Walker's theorising has been particularly
important in forensic cases. For example, in
Osland v R (1998), both Gummow and
Gaudron JJ. noted the heightened arousal or
awareness of danger which may be experi-
enced by battered women and emphasised
the relevance of this factor to the defences of
provocation and self-defence.13 Nevertheless,
on this critically important forensic issue, the
theory relating to battered woman syndrome
is internally inconsistent: on the one hand,
battered women are held to be extremely
attuned (hyper vigilant) to signs of violence
from their partner and hence able to interpret
certain conduct as indicative of imminent
attack or a more severe attack but, conversely,
the effects of the battering are said to have
dulled their perceptions of violence so that
they become impervious to the danger
confronting them. Cases in which battered
woman syndrome is used to support a claim
of self defence and/or provocation selectively
utilise one of these two inconsistent aspects of
Walker's theorising.
c) Further problems arise when battered woman
syndrome is used in conjunction with claims of
self defence or provocation. Focusing on the
battered woman's general psychological state,
especially her 'earned helplessness', is
sometimes substituted for consideration of the
reasonableness of her actions, a necessary
element of both self defence and provocation.
The effect of this emphasis is that die rational-
ity of a woman's conduct is disregarded and
her psychopathology correspondingly empha-
sised, a fact that has enraged feminist commen-
tators, been argued to be incongruent with the
reality of the battered woman's situation and
inconsistent with the legal requirements of self
defence (Schopp et al., 1994; Faigman &
Wright, 1997). As Leader-Elliot (1993) has
commented in relation to self defence, an
emphasis on the psychological incapacities
inherent in battered woman syndrome 'has the
paradoxical effect of transforming an assertive
act of self defence into a manifestation of
weakness and incapacity' (p. 411).
Conversely, some experts have sought to locate
the reasonableness of a woman's conduct within
a framework that employs battered woman
syndrome and emphasises her mental distress and
disorder. Thus, Gillespie (1989) has argued that
the central role for the expert witness giving
evidence in relation to battered woman syndrome
is to establish the reasonableness of the defendant
woman's conduct.14 However, experts who seek
to perform this role are simply "going beyond the
data". Battered woman syndrome is not well-
suited to establishing the 'reasonableness' of the
battered woman's conduct in either provocation
or self defence and cannot explain the sudden
loss of control required in provocation (Nicolson
35
 MARILYN McMAHON
& Sanghvi, 1993; Hinchcliffe & Lloyd, 1996).
As Murphy (1992, p. 282) has noted:
the feet remains that no amount of scientific
study can prove that an act is reasonable. Such
determinations arc value judgements, not
scientific conclusions.
When psychologists or psychiatrists evaluate the
actions of a defendant with battered woman
syndrome as reasonable, they are offering both a
legal conclusion and a value judgement —
neither of which is legitimately derived from
expertise in battered woman syndrome.
In summary, it appears that the two aspects of
battered woman syndrome that Walker regards as
her key theoretical contributions — the cycle of
violence and learned helplessness — are also the
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
least theoretically cohesive, internally consistent
and empirically supported aspects of her work
Syndrome
Lenore Walker's claim to have identified a
syndrome common to battered woman has
focused attention on the contemporary definition
and scope of syndromes. Surprisingly, Walker
fails to devote detailed attention to this issue.
The original use of the term 'syndrome' by
Walker (1979, p . xiv) described the entire
abusive relationship between batterer and victim,
including the cycle of violence, the characteristics
of the batterer and his victim and the behavioural
and psychological effects on the abused woman.
However, the use of battered woman syndrome
in the courts has focussed on the battered woman
and her psychological state. From this perspec-
tive, the concept of a syndrome implicit in
Walker's work seems to be of a co-occurring
group of symptoms in battered women, indica-
tive of a disturbance in functioning caused by the
abusive relationship. Indeed, her definition of
battered woman syndrome is generally imprecise.
In response to suggestions that a more rigorous
definition of the syndrome be employed so that
research can be standardised and forensic use
clarified, Walker (1995) has commented: 'The
definition is still evolving...so it may be too soon
to codify one' (p. 33). This flexibility is impossi-
ble to reconcile with the requirements of
standardisation and reliability in forensic diagno-
sis." The absence of reliable definitional criteria
is a profound handicap to systematic research and
the development of necessary reliability and
validity data for battered woman syndrome.
36
Several commentators have been critical of
the concept of a syndrome employed by Walker
and her colleagues (e.g., Freckelton, 1994). Many
feminists object to the stereotyping which they
believe is implicit in the construction of a
syndrome (Crocker, 1985; Sheehy, Stubbs &
Tolmie, 1992;Bricker, 1993; Nicolson &
Sanghvi, 1993), others object to the vague and
ill-defined manner in which the term is used
(Faigman, 1986). Although Walker claims to
have identified a syndrome, the manner in which
her results are presented (e.g. thirty six univariate
tables attached as an appendix to her 1984b
study) makes it difficult to substantiate her claim.
If, as seems implicit in her study, she employs the
concept of a syndrome to describe a co-occurring
group of symptoms, she fails to address funda-
mental aspects of this position. For example, in
the implicity polythetic format of her characteri-
sation of battered woman syndrome, she fails to
specify the symptoms that must co-occur simul-
taneously for the diagnosis of battered woman
syndrome to be applicable. It is clear that not all
symptoms must be present, as not every woman
in Walker's studies was depressed, had low
esteem, experienced the complete cycle of
violence etc. Thus, significant, unanswered
questions remain: what symptoms must be
present, at what particular time, for a woman to
satisfy the criteria for battered woman syndrome
(Faigman, 1986; Freckelton, 1994)?
Another interesting, implicit feature of
Walker's (1984b) study is that every participant
who satisfied the definition of a battered woman
thereby also met the criteria for battered woman
syndrome. Walker never explicitly stated this and
sometimes appeared confused on this point, but
it is a necessary implication of her use of the term
'battered woman syndrome' in relation to all the
participants in her study: participants were
selected solely on the basis that they met the
criteria for being a battered woman (i.e. they had
been battered at least twice by a man with whom
they had an intimate or marital relationship).16
What is implicit in Walker's (1984) study was
made explicit by subsequent researchers investi-
gating battered woman syndrome. Thus Kuhl
(1986) stated that battered woman syndrome
'delineates a population of women who are physi-
cally and psychologically battered by their
spouses' (p. 9), thereby equating the syndrome
 BATTERED WOMEN AND BAD SCIENCE THE LIMITED VALIDITY A N D UTILITY OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
with the experience of abuse by a man with
whom the woman has an intimate relationship.
Judicial skepticism concerning the use of die
term 'syndrome' is increasing, suggesting that die
courts may more rigorously examine syndrome
evidence — including battered woman syndrome
— in the future (Freckelton, 1997). The
Victorian Court of criminal Appeal in / v The
Queen (1994) was critical of die expert testimony
of a psychiatrist who gave evidence to the trial
court concerning the psychological state of the
complainant in a sexual assault case. The psychia-
trist testified that die alleged victim demonstrated
'partial [battered woman] syndrome'. The court
noted that the expert witness failed to inform the
jury about battered woman syndrome and was
critical of die 'extraordinarily wide' definition of
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
a syndrome provided by the expert psychiatrist.
The definition of a syndrome which was offered
to the court:
[A] syndrome is a collection of features in a
patient which goes together to produce a
whole. It is not an illness because nobody
knows what necessarily causes it or how it
comes about. You simply find the correlation
of factors...and you put these together and say
this is a syndrome. It is a collection, a correla-
tion of features.
]v The Queer, p. 528.
Battered Woman Syndrome: A
Diagnosis or a Description?
T h e general relationship between battered
woman syndrome and mental disorder has been
queried (Freckelton, 1994; Schidler and Vidmar,
1992). Many feminist critics object to the pathol-
ogising of battered women which they see as
inherent in the use of terms such as 'syndrome'
(e.g., Stubbs & Tolmie, ; Bricker, 1993; Brown,
1997).'7 Legoe J., in R v Kontinnen (1992), chose
to conceptualise battered woman syndrome as an
'attitude of mind', emphasising that 'It is not a
psychological illness' (p. 9) and thereby distin-
guishing it (albeit in an illusory fashion) from
mental disorders." Other commentators have
questioned whether battered woman syndrome
constitutes a diagnostic category and have argued
that it is simply a descriptive term that refers to
the effects of abuse on a woman (Schuller &
Vidmar, 1992; Freckelton, 1994). Consequently,
the reliability and utility of the diagnosis of
battered woman syndrome has been doubted
(Freckelton, 1994; Schuller and Vidmar, 1992).
Other critics have queried the relationship
between battered woman syndrome and specific
mental disorders (Freckelton, 1994). Walker
(1991) and her colleagues suggested that battered
woman syndrome is ' a subcategory of PTSD
[post traumatic stress disorder]' (Walker, 1991,
p. 28; also Walker, 1992; 1993; Douglas, 1987;
R v Johnston, 1994)). Research on post traumatic
stress disorder has been introduced into expert
testimony in criminal cases involving battered
women (Blackman, 1986; Maguigan, 1991). The
current version of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM—IV:
American Psychiatric Association, 1994) no
longer contains the restriction that the distressing
event be 'outside the range of usual human
experience' (cf DSM III—R: American
Psychiatric Association, 1987, p. 247) and hence
increases the scope for the introduction of
evidence of PTSD in cases involving battered
women (Dutton & Goodman, 1994)".The
symptomatology shared by both these disorders
includes: intrusive symptoms (e.g., revivification
nightmares, flashbacks); avoidance symptoms
(e.g., social withdrawal and general emotional
numbing); and arousal symptoms (e.g., sleep
problems, hypervigilance) (Levit, 1991). While
Walker (1992) claimed that most battered
women met the criteria for PTSD, she argued
that 'the generic criteria [of PTSD] may not be
specifically tailored to measure the entire collec-
tion of psychological symptoms that constitute
battered woman syndrome' (Walker, 1991, p.
21), but did not establish if, or to what degree,
battered woman syndrome was inadequately
subsumed within PTSD. Other researchers have
limited their diagnosis of PTSD to the subcate-
gory of battered women who committed a violent
act against their abuser (Levit, 1991).
Recognising the overlap between battered
woman syndrome and post traumatic stress disor-
der, Freckelton (1994) queried whether it was
necessary to have the specific, subordinate
category of battered woman syndrome. Similarly,
Dutton and Goodman (1994) noted that PTSD
provided 'a parsimonious frame for describing
some of the psychological sequelae of battering
because it integrates a number of disparate
symptoms and at the same time differentiates
them from other psychological difficulties.'
However, it is dear that not all women with this
syndrome satisfy the criteria for post traumatic
37
 MARILYN McMAHON
stress disorder (Walker, 1991). Research in the
USA has reponed high, but not complete levels of
PTSD in battered women: between 31-60% of
battered women living at home and seeking help
from domestic violence programs (Cimino &.
Dutton, 1991; Gleason, 1993; Houskamp & Foy,
1991) and 40-89% of battered women living in
refuges for battered women (Gleason, 1993;
Kemp, Rawlings & Green, 1991) met the criteria
for PTSD. Hence, the relationship between the
syndrome and PTSD (and other major mental
disorders) requires further explication.
Personality and Battered Woman Syndrome
Walker argued that battered woman syndrome
developed solely in response to situational
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
factors, claiming that there were no personality
traits or other factors that predisposed a woman
to enter a relationship in which she was
battered.20 Neither her research design nor her
data permitted this conclusion.
Walker strongly rejected the notion that
battered woman had masochistic personalities
that kept them in the relationship with their
partner. This issue has been controversial and
political; psychoanalytically oriented theorists,
taking their starting point from Helene Deutsch,
have emphasised the masochistic nature of the
female personality whereas feminist theorists have
emphatically rejected this view. Empirical
research has revealed a multiplicity of findings,
with battered women being described as: over-
socialised, submissive, dependent, conforming
and selfless (Ball & Wyman, 1977); cautious,
controlling, superstitious, submissive, anxious
and with poor coping skills (Kuhl, 1984). Walker
(1984, 1992) cited research with battered women
using the MMPI by Rosewater (1985) and
suggested that 'battered woman syndrome is
identifiable by the high scores on MMPI scales
measuring depression, anger, suspiciousness and
confusion' and that low ego strength was also
'typically found in repeatedly battered women'
(Walker, 1991, p. 25). She later noted that
somatic symptoms, hysteria, rumination and
obsessive-compulsive behaviours may be elevated
in battered women who have been sexually
abused (Walker, 1993).
A key problem with much of the empirical
research on this issue — including Walker's
(1979, 1984b) studies — is that subjects are
typically drawn from women who have presented
38
at refuges after being assaulted and leaving the
family home. Hence, it is not possible to deter-
mine whether the psychological characteristics
and personality profile obtained from the battered
women existed antecedent or subsequent to the
battering relationship and/or simply reflected the
characteristics of that sub-group of battered
women who had left abusive partners.. Thus,
Walker's adamant assertion that all battered
women have no pathology prior to the battering
relationship simply cannot be supported through
her ex postfacto research methodology.
Although Walker claimed that 'the data lead
me to conclude that there are no specific person-
ality traits that would suggest a victim-prone
personality for the [battered women' (Walker,
1984: p. 7), her basis for this conclusion is scanty.
She investigated the personality of her respon-
dents through the use of three standardised.
measures which explored attitudes towards
women (the attitudes towards women scale,
Spence & Helmreich, 1972), locus of control
(Levenson's (1972) locus of control scale) and
depression (the CES-D scale: Radloff, 1977). Self-
esteem was measured through the use of a non-
standardised Likert-style semantic differential
scale utilising nineteen items. It is dubious
whether it is appropriate to claim that these
combined measures provide an adequate overview
of the personalities of the women in the study.
The attitudes to women scale is convention-
ally viewed as a measure of attitudes, not person-
ality, as it explores attitudes concerning the rights
and roles of women. Contrary to Walker's expec-
tations, the battered women in her (1984b) study
presented themselves as less traditional than other
women. In relation to the self-esteem measure,
results for the 19 items were presented individu-
ally. There was no indication that the items were
presumed to constitute a scale and no justifica-
tion for the choice of the particular items, a fact
which is particularly troubling, given the poor
face validity of several of the items (e.g. warm-
cool; calm-excitable; witty-humourless; rational-
irrational). Given the plethora of instruments
available to measure self-esteem at the time of
Walker's original research, the use of non-
standardised items is perplexing. Interestingly,
the battered women in the research study actually
attributed higher self esteem to themselves than
they attributed to others: they viewed themselves
as 'stronger, more independent, and more sensi-
 BATTERED WOMEN AND BAD SCIENCE: THE UMITED VAUDITY AND UTIUTY OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
tive than other women or men' (Walker, 1984b,
p. 80). It is therefore unsurprising that Walker
referred to her own 'confusing results' (Walker,
1984b: p. 82) and recommended further study.
However, elsewhere she states that 'the battered
woman often does not have a sense of compe-
tency or self confidence in her abilities' (Walker,
1991, p. 22) a comment which does not directly
flow from her own research study but appears to
flow from her reliance on a study by Hilberman
and Munson (1978). Subsequent discussion of
battered woman syndrome (e.g. Douglas, 1987)
has chosen to follow Hilberman and Munson's
(1978) findings on self-esteem, rather then the
equivocal findings of Walker (1984b). Thus, it is
conventional for contemporary descriptions of
battered woman syndrome to include informa-
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
tion about a woman's low self-esteem (e.g. see R
v Kontinnen (1992); Gray J., quoted in Rogers,
1996), despite the fact that such findings were
not clearly established in Walker's research on
battered woman syndrome.
Why Do Some — But Not All— Battered
Women Develop Battered Woman Syndrome?
Not all women who are battered suffer from the
battered woman syndrome...
(Douglas, 1987, p. 40).
Walker (1984b), like several other researchers in
this field (Levit, 1991; Kromsky & Cutler,
1989), acknowledged that not all battered
women developed battered woman syndrome
but did not clearly identify the individual
characteristics or situational features that differ-
entiated battered women who developed
battered woman syndrome from those who did
not. However, Walker (1984b) identified several
factors that she believed were associated with
increased risk of a woman developing battered
woman syndrome once she was already in an
abusive relationship, including: early and
repeated sexual molestation and assault; large
family of origin; critical or uncontrollable events
in childhood; leaving home at an early age; tradi-
tional sex role orientation; and pre-marital
pregnancy. Interestingly, Walker's (1984) own
data do not support her posited relationship
between adult and childhood learned helpless-
ness. For the 403 women in her (1984b) study,
the relationship between childhood learned
helplessness and adult learned helpless was non-
significant, indicating that experience of learned
helplessness in childhood was not significantly
related to the degree of learned helplessness that
a woman exhibited in a later, adult abusive
relationship. Additionally, although she had no
information about the battered women who
participated in her studies before they entered
their abusive relationships (other than retrospec-
tive, self-reported data), Walker was adamant
that these factors did not predispose a woman to
enter into an abusive relationship, but simply
facilitated the development of battered woman
syndrome once the woman was in a relationship
where violence occurred.
While there is little empirical research
direcdy on this issue, a study of a forensic sample
of battered women sought to identify factors that
differentiated those with battered woman
syndrome from those who did not have the
syndrome(Levit, 1991).Battered women with
battered woman syndrome who committed a
violent act against their abuser differed from
battered women who acted for other motivations
insofar as the former group exhibited post
traumatic stress disorder after the violent act,
whereas the latter group did not (Levit, 1991).
Additionally, the women with battered woman
syndrome were characterised by: lower educa-
tional, sociocultural and socioeconomic levels;
morbid dependency on their abusive partner;
more frequent use of alcohol and other drugs;
greater anxiety and depression; were more likely
to be still living with their abusive partner at the
time of the offence; and exhibited significantly
more deficits in cognitive functioning and distur-
bance in mental state on psychological tests (see
Appendix 2 for a summary of the test perfor-
mance of these women). While these findings are
interesting, and suggest hypotheses for future
research, they are of limited utility, as they are
from an informal, anecdotal report of a number
of cases by an individual forensic psychologist.
The absence of essential information — the
numbers of women involved, their actual scores
on the psychological tests, the statistical signifi-
cance of the observed differences in performance
etc — indicates that the study is suggestive rather
than a reliable basis for distinguishing between
women with battered woman syndrome and
other battered women in the forensic context.
Additionally, the author misunderstood the
criminal law and posited an illusory antinomy
between battered women who have battered
39
 MARILYN McMAHON
woman syndrome and those who claimed that
they acted in self defence. It is possible that a
woman with battered woman syndrome could be
included in eidier of the two groups that Levit
compared (the battered woman syndrome group
and die self defence group), thereby confounding
the two groups. Finally, there is die real possibil-
ity diat die author has a biased sample of women
because contact was made widi diem after refer-
ral from their lawyer, who may have already
decided upon a defence strategy (self-defence
simpUciter or a defence involving battered woman
syndrome) before contacting the psychologist.
Thus, Levit's (1991) claim diat:
In the Battered Woman Syndrome the
homicide or assault may occur when no physi-
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
cal abuse is taking place and the abuser may
actually be sleeping or leaving the area....In
cases of self defense the abuser is always in the
process of attacking the woman, (p. 32)
may be misguided. This distinction may simply
be an artifact of die way in which Levit (1991)
obtained his sample: lawyers are less likely to
need evidence of battered woman syndrome
when die woman's violent act is an immediate
response to violence, whereas delay will usually
require reference to psychological factors (such as
battered woman syndrome) to assist die defence
(Kuhl, 1986). Thus, some of the posited differ-
ences between battered women who committed a
violent act may simply reflect legal standards and
die diagnosis of battered woman syndrome is not
itself independent of diose legal standards.
Hence, on the critically important forensic
issue of distinguishing battered women with
battered woman syndrome from the general
category of battered women, as yet no reliable
criteria have emerged which would permit such
categorisation. The Daubert federal standard for
die admissibility of scientific evidence in die USA
requires die identification of die error rate associ-
ated widi a particular scientific theory, however it
is dear that conceptual imprecision surrounding
die battered woman syndrome does not permit the
accurate diagnosis of women with this syndrome,
diereby suggesting that the (as yet unknown) error
rate associated with diagnosis of battered woman
syndrome would be unacceptably high.
Conceptual imprecision surrounding battered
women and battered woman syndrome also
undoubtedly partly explains the tendency of
Lenore Walker and others to use the terms inter-
40
changeably and diereby conflate the situational
experience of being battered with the psychologi-
cal condition of battered woman syndrome. This
inappropriate fusion of a psychological condition
with the simple experience of violence is also
inherent in the controversial remark of Justice
Bollen of the Supreme Court of South Australia
when he stated that, in his view, a battered
woman had not been sufficiendy battered to be
suffering from battered woman syndrome.
Contemporary research in the general area of
trauma suggests that whether a battered woman
develops a psychological disorder such as
posttraumatic stress disorder is not simply a
function of the level of abuse but is likely to be a
function of a complex interplay of: the type and
severity of abuse; characteristics of the recovery
environment (e.g., family and social support,
response of the police and other agencies); and
pre-existing psychological characteristics of the
woman (Dutton & Goodman, 1994).
Where Does it End? The Natural History
of Battered Woman Syndrome
Freckelton (1994) questioned whether a battered
woman had to be living with her assailant to
qualify for the diagnosis of battered woman
syndrome and queried whether a woman who
had been living apart from her abusive partner
for six months or more would satisfy the criteria
for the syndrome. It is clear both from Walker's
early research and her theorising that a battered
woman does not have to be living with her
abuser to meet the criteria for battered woman
syndrome: three-quarters of Walker's original
sample were not living with their abuser at the
time that they were interviewed (Walker, 1983).
Also, it is clear that a woman could be separated
from her abuser for a year and still have the
diagnosis of battered woman syndrome: 46% of
the women interviewed in the larger research
project had been out of the abusive relationship
for more than one year yet still had battered
woman syndrome (Walker, 1983; also Walker,
1991). A more difficult task is to determine the
point after the cessation of violence and/or the
termination of an abusive relationship at which a
battered woman would no longer be expected to
meet the criteria for battered woman syndrome.
There is scant information about the 'natural
course' of battered woman syndrome. As previ-
ously noted, Walker (1984b, 1996) assumes that
 BATTERED WOMEN AND BAD SCIENCE THE UMITED VAUDITY AND UTILITY OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
both the severity and frequency of abuse increases
in battering relationships over time. However,
there are no longitudinal studies of battered
woman syndrome and most of the data comes
from reports of younger women (19-40 years)
who sought help outside the relationship
(Gesino, Smith & Keckich, 1982). Nevertheless,
it is clear that the syndrome does not necessarily
end with the cessation of violence and/or the
termination of an abusive relationship. Walker
(1991) concluded that battered women who were
able to terminate the abuse often experienced a
post-traumatic stress reaction that was less endur-
ing than post traumatic stress disorder (Walker,
1991). Additionally, she reported that battered
women at highest risk of depression were
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
'Women out of the battering relationship for the
longest time... (Walker, 1983, p. 151) and the
women who exhibited the highest levels of
learned helplessness were those who had been out
of the abusive relationship the longest. Thus, in
relation to two key elements of battered woman
syndrome — learned helplessness and depression
— battered women who were out of the abusive
relationship for more than a year exhibited higher
levels of pathology than battered women who
were still in the abusive relationship. This
intriguing finding is neither adequately explored
nor explained by Walker21, despite the obvious
forensic significance. Thus far, most criminal
cases involving women with battered woman
syndrome have involved circumstances where the
woman was either living with her abusive partner
or had recently separated from him. However,
the previous discussion has indicated that a
woman who had been living separate and apart
from her abusive partner for more than a year —
perhaps indefinitely — could still meet the crite-
ria for battered woman syndrome, thereby
considerably expanding the scope of the
syndrome in the forensic context.
Recent Applications of Battered
Women Syndrome in
Australian Courts
As previously discussed, the application of
battered woman syndrome to abused women
who commitprima facie criminal acts is problem-
atic. However, two recent Australian cases show
an even more disturbing forensic use of battered
woman syndrome.
Going Beyond the Data: Battered Women, Abused
Children and Victimised Men
The application of battered woman syndrome to
cases distinct from the original category of adult,
heterosexual battered women is both common
and dubious but was apparently endorsed by
KirbyJ. in OslandvR (1998) who held that:
However understandable it may be, in its
provenance and typical manifestations, to
confine the notion involved in BWS to
women in general, and to wives in particular,
it is erroneous from the point of view of legal
principle. What is relevant is not the sex or
marital status of the victim of long-term abuse.
Nor whether that abuse has been physical
(battering) or otherwise. It is whether admissi-
ble evidence establishes that such a victim is
suffering from symptoms or characteristics
relevant in the particular case to the legal rules
applicable to that case.
OslandvR (1998) per KirbyJ, p. 213.
Whilst Kirby J. held that legal principle required
that 'the notion involved in BWS' should not be
limited to women, the simple extension of
battered woman syndrome that he appears to
endorse22 disregards the limited empirical base
from which the syndrome is derived and demon-
strates a willingness to generalise psychological
propositions that is, thus far, unwarranted by the
research base from which the syndrome is empiri-
cally derived Two recent Australian case illustrate
this problematic extension of the syndrome. I n / f
R (1994) the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal
queried the relevance of expert testimony
concerning battered woman syndrome in relation
to a 29 year old woman who had been sexually
abused by her father from childhood to early
adulthood, with frequent threatened or actual
violence. A psychiatrist testified that the woman
had 'partial' battered woman syndrome. The •
court queried the relevance of battered woman
syndrome and noted that insufficient attention
was directed to the effects of long-term sexual
abuse on the victim, especially the incestual
nature of the abuse and the effects arising from
early childhood.
A further dubious application of battered
woman syndrome occurred in R v McEwen
(1996) where a young homosexual man killed his
abusive partner (see State v Green, 1990 for a
similar case in the USA where a lesbian killed her
abusive partner). At the trial, evidence was given
41
 MARILYN McMAHON
to the court that the defendant and the victim
had been in a long-term relationship in which the
defendant was repeatedly sexually assaulted and
psychologically abused by his partner. Expert
testimony by a psychiatrist and psychologist
suggested that the defendant, McEwen, had
'battered person syndrome', or battered woman
syndrome applied to a non-heterosexual,
intimate, abusive partnership. Defence counsel
explicidy argued that battered woman syndrome
was not gender specific (see Simone, 1997). The
jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict. Before
the retrial, the Crown accepted McEwen's plea of
guilty to manslaughter on the basis of provoca-
tion. The characterisation of McEwen as a
'battered spouse' provided the framework for his
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
provocation defence as well as his mitigated
sentence (Simone, 1997). However, the develop-
ment of 'battered person syndrome' as a simple
extension of battered woman syndrome appears
erroneous and unwarranted, a 'hetero-relationis-
ing' of non-heterosexual relationships (Robson,
1990; Bricker, 1993). Difficulties specific to
battered gays and lesbians, such as the fear of
publicising a gay relationship in a homophobic
society, the cultural acceptance of male to male
physical aggression, exclusion from domestic
violence refuges, difficult relations with police,
and stigma from within the gay and lesbian
communities for publicising violence in these
relationships, are just some of the practical
factors that preclude the simple extension of
battered woman syndrome to non-heterosexual
relationships (Simone, 1997). More significantly,
insofar as the battered gay or lesbian individual
does not meet the criteria of battered woman
syndrome, he or she may not be regarded as a
true victim of intimate abuse. Thus, it is has been
suggested that gay and lesbian victims of intimate
abuse, when compared to female victims of abuse
by their male partners: are less likely to be
economically dependent on their partners; have
greater similarity in physical size; are more likely
to physically retaliate to abuse (Bricker, 1993)
and are probably less likely to endorse traditional
gender roles. Such factors, if present, may make
it difficult for the gay or lesbian victim of
intimate violence to meet satisfy the criteria of
the 'battered woman/battered person syndrome',
thereby making expert evidence on this issue of
dubious relevance.
42
Both the aforementioned cases illustrate a
disturbing extension of battered woman
syndrome. Lest it be thought that this was an
unwarranted development, Walker (1992; 1993)
herself had anticipated the extension of battered
woman syndrome to cover both the cases cited
here. After listing various categories of abusive
relationships, including 'battered children who
kill abusive parents, battered men who kill their
partners (usually male)...' (p. 322) Walker
stressed that 'The common thread between these
seemingly disparate cases is testimony about the
psychological knowledge concerning the dynam-
ics of an abusive relationship and its psychologi-
cal impact' (Walker, 1992, p. 323). However, the
similarity of these abusive relationships to the
relationships investigated in the battered woman
studies is simply asserted — but not established
— by Walker (1992). As previously noted,
Walker's research investigated adult females
involved in a relationship with an abusive adult
male partner and her theorising is gender specific.
The extension of her findings to incestuous or
gay and lesbian relationships is unwarranted and
reliance on expert testimony concerning battered
woman syndrome may exacerbate, rather than
alleviate, the problems confronted by these classes
of abused persons. Additionally, the obvious
point that abuse (and its psychological sequelae)
is not limited to female victims in heterosexual
relationships does not justify the simple renam-
ing and extension of battered woman syndrome
to other categories of victims in dependent
relationships but suggests the need to appropri-
ately investigate and identify the dynamics of
these other diverse abusive relationships.
Do we really need expert testimony on
battered woman syndrome?
The legal justification for the introduction of
expert testimony on battered woman syndrome
in criminal trials has been that the situation of
battered women, and the psychological effects of
the abuse, are beyond the knowledge and
ordinary experience of judges and jurors
(Thyfault, Bennett & Hirschorn, 1987). It is
believed that members of the public, who may be
called upon to act as jurors, endorse numerous
myths and misconceptions regarding the causes
and effects of domestic violence and the reasons
why women remain with abusive partners
(Walker et al., 1982; Ewing & Aubrey, 1987;
 BATTERED WOMEN AND BAD SCIENCE THE UMITED VAUDITY AND UTILITY OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
Kromsky & Cutler, 1989; R v C, 1993). Hence,
testimony on battered woman syndrome has
been deemed necessary to assist the court.
However, much of this research has been
conducted in the USA during the past fifteen
years and the similarity with attitudes and knowl-
edge in contemporary Australia is unknown.
Whether members of the jury and judges really
require expert evidence to assist them to under-
stand this form of domestic violence is has been
queried (/ v R, 1994, per Brooking J., p. 536).
Even King CJ, who regarded evidence of battered
woman syndrome as admissible in a trial in
South Australia, admitted that he had "consid-
ered anxiously" whether such evidence was neces-
sary (R v Runjanjic; R v Kontinnen, 1991, p.
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
121). Recent research, which explored commu-
nity attitudes to domestic violence in Australia,
suggests that the public do not endorse some of
the stereotypical attitudes which expert testimony
on battered woman syndrome is said to combat
(Reddy, Knowles, Mulvaney, McMahon &
Freckelton, 1997). Respondents in this study did
not believe that women were responsible for
domestic violence or that this violence was legiti-
mate, nor did they think that victims could
predict the violence or simply leave the abusive
relationship. Another recent community study
investigated the influence of information on
battered woman syndrome on attributions
regarding a battered woman who killed her
abusive partner (Ho & Venus, 1995).
Information regarding battered woman
syndrome had only a moderately positive influ-
ence on attributions concerning the battered
woman, a finding that may have been due to the
fact that the respondents' initial knowledge about
battered woman syndrome was already high (Ho
& Venus, 1995). These findings raise some
doubt as to whether expert evidence on battered
woman syndrome is really necessary to disabuse
members of a jury of myths and stereotypes
concerning domestic violence.
Conclusion
Increasing attention directed to the social and
personal circumstances of battered women has
highlighted the prevalence and extent of this form
of domestic abuse. Criminal cases in which
battered women have introduced evidence of their
prior abuse as part of a criminal defence or in
mitigation of sentence have emphasised the conse-
quences of that abuse. In seeking justice for
battered women, battered woman syndrome has
been introduced in Australian courts. Although
many have been critical of this evidence, some
commentators have pragmatically viewed this as a
positive development insofar as it has helped to
remedy the plight of battered women. However,
substantial deficiencies in the methodological basis
of relevant empirical research, poor conceptualisa-
tion of the notions of learned helplessness and the
cycle of violence, internal inconsistency in the
theory, and a confusion of findings legitimately
derived from original research with those derived
from the research of others, indicate that the scien-
tific basis of battered woman syndrome is inade-
quate. The absence of any independent
verification of Walker's (1984b) original research
and the accumulating studies that provide infor-
mation inconsistent with her theorising supports
the view that battered woman syndrome is not
sufficiently scientifically validated to be appropri-
ately employed in the forensic context in Australia.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Professors John Willis and Ian
Freckelton of La Trobe University for helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this article.
Endnotes
1 Notably absent from the U.S. Supreme Court's
criteria were: sample selection; operationalisation
of terms; generalisation of results to diverse
groups and settings; and investigator bias
(Duncan, 1996). Adequately addressing these
latter factors is generally viewed as essential for
good scientific research and they are the very
matters on which Walker's research has been most
strongly criticised.
2 However, the Daubert test has been adopted in
New Zealand; see R v Calder (1995); R v Brown
(1997).
3 E.g., S.A.: R v Runjanjic; R v Kontinnen (1991).
But see the decision of the Victorian Court of
Criminal Appeal J vR (1974) where the court
expressly rejected the admissibility criterion of the
Frye test adopted in R v Runjanjic; R v Kontinnen
(1991), holding that it was not necessary that
views put forward by experts have general accep-
tance by other experts in the field. For a general
discussion of this issue see Freckelton (1993).
43
 MARILYN McMAHON
4 However, 'battered spouse' and 'battered woman'
as categories of disorder were added to the
International Classification of Diseases: Clinical
Modified Scheme in 1979.
5 Walker (1979) stated that her research was guided
by a "feminist vision" (p. xvii). But note the criti-
cisms of Walker's research by feminist critics such
as Spiers (1998) who described Walker's position
as 'politically despicable' partly because she
adopted a positivist scientific framework that
endorsed neutrality and objectivity, which Spiers
(following Mackinnon) argued was simply a
euphemism for a masculine perspective.
6 This point is repeated in Walker's (1989) study.
7 Duncan cites a single study by Gleason (1993) to
support her assertion that later studies have
confirmed Walker's theory.
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
8 The usefulness of items such as 'might believe that
their husband could kill them' (emphasis added)
is questionable as it is possible to endorse this type
of item and simultaneously believe that, on a
probabilistic basis, it applies to a very small sub-
sample of battered women.
9 Kirby J. approvingly cited R v Malott (1998)
where the Supreme Court of Canada held that:
'It is possible that those women who are unable to
fit themselves within the stereotype of a
victimised, passive, helpless, dependent battered
woman will not have their claims to self-defence
fairly decided. For instance, women who have
demonstrated too much strength or initiative,
women of colour, women whom are professionals,
or women who have fought back against their
abusers on previous occasions, should not be
penalised for failing to accord with the stereotypi-
cal image of the archetypal battered woman' (p.
528, emphasis added). The reasoning of the 13
Supreme Court of Canada on this particular point
is unclear. Reference to 'stereotypical images' of
'archetypal' categories should warn the reader of
an excessive degree of abstraction. Indeed, it is
unclear whether the court is referring to commu-
nity stereotypes of battered woman syndrome or
the characteristics which can be legitimately
derived from Walker's research. If the latter, then
the statement of the court is muddled on at least
one point: it is not clear why professional women
should be less likely to 'fit themselves within the
stereotype' derived from Walker's studies.
Although Walker's sample was unrepresentative,
in fact it over-represented professional women, a
fact that Walker herself has acknowledged
(Walker 1983, 1984b).
10 By 1996 Walker had modified her position
somewhat and argued that: Although some
studies suggest that couples who stay together
44
may become violence-free, there is no way to
predict which relationships will escalate and
which will not. Therefore, it is wisest to assume
the most common pattern: Abuse will escalate in
families characterized by domestic violence
(Walker, 1996, p. 343).
11 After reviewing recent developments in England
in relation to the use of the defence of provoca-
tion by battered women, Hinchcliffe and Lloyd
(1996) make the interesting observation that "It is
even questionable whether the reinterpretation of
the law will benefit women. The argument that
victims of domestic violence suffer a syndrome
which causes them to be susceptible to 'loss of
control', is effectively saying that women who are
battered are permanently on the edge of insanity.
In the discussion of battered women's syndrome,
women are presented as irrational beings, driven
to unreasonable behaviour which they simply
cannot help. The law now enshrines the concept
that the period of 'loss of control', during which
people are not 'masters of their minds', is indefi-
nite for battered women.'(p. 3)
12 For example, the fact that Cheree Lorenz fought
back against her abusive partner and maintained
an 'aggressive attitude' toward him was used by
the prosecution to suggest that she 'did not fit the
pattern' of battered woman syndrome.
Interestingly, Crispin J. accepted that Ms. Lorenz
'was an assertive and at times aggressive young
woman who was able to 'hold her own' in some
conflict with [her abusive partner]' but was satis-
fied that she was unable to cope with the extrem-
ity of the violence and was gradually 'emotionally
overborne' by her partner (R v Lorenz, 1998,
p. 27-29.)
Wilson J for the majority of the Supreme Court
of Canada in R v Lavallee (1990) also emphasised
the heightened awareness of danger that she
believed characterised battered woman syndrome:
'Where evidence exists that an accused is in a
battering relationship, expert testimony can assist
the jury in determining whether the accused had a
"reasonable" apprehension of death when she
acted by explaining the heightened sensitivity of a
battered woman to her partner's acts. Without
such testimony I am skeptical that the average
fact-finder would be capable of appreciating why
her subjective fear may have been reasonable in
the context of the relationship. After all, the
hypothetical "reasonable man" observing only the
final incident may have been unlikely to recognize
the batterer's threat as potentially lethal.'
14 "It is extremely important to understand that
battered woman syndrome testimony is offered in
a self-defense trial to shed light on the reasonable-
 BATTERED WOMEN AND BAD SCIENCE THE UMITED VAUDITY AND UTILITY OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
ness of the defendant's behaviour...the reason-
ableness of the woman's perception that she was
in serious and possibly lethal d a n g e r , which
required her to resort to a deadly weapon to
defend herself, is the ultimate question in these
cases. An expert can help die jury to understand
that, given the woman's past experience with her
batterer and her knowledge of his behaviour
patterns, her perception of the danger that she
was in was in fact perfectly reasonable": Gillespie,
1989:p. 159.
15 Similar imprecision was demonstrated by the
expert psychologist in R v Lorenz (1998) who
stated that it was not possible to make a diagnosis
of battered woman syndrome on the basis of
'certain inflexible criteria' because 'people respond
in different ways'.
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
16 'A woman was considered eligible to participate if
she reported that she was battered at least two
times by a man with whom she had an intimate
relationship' (Walker, 1984b, p. 202). Walker did
not report that any of the battered women who
participated in her study did not have battered
woman syndrome.
17 Implicit in much of this criticism is a rejection of
any analyses based on the 'debilitating discourses
of psychology and psychiatry' (McCarthy, 1994
p. 142). A consequence of this approach appears
to be an a priori rejection of the possibility that
being the victim of extensive abuse — including
torture — can result in psychological disorder.
18 It is suggested that the categorisation of battered
woman syndrome as an 'attitude of mind' is
unhelpful insofar as a) the meaning of the phrase
'attitude of mind" is unclear, and b) it fails to
distinguish battered woman syndrome from
mental disorders which are characterised by
cognitive disturbances. Additionally, such a
categorisation of battered woman syndrome calls
into question the role and function of the psychi-
atrist or psychologist who provides expert testi-
mony to the court. If battered woman syndrome
is merely an 'attitude of mind' and is not a psychi-
atric or psychological illness, then the role of the
expert witness is unclear and it may be queried
why expert testimony is necessary in relation to
this issue.
19 Given the prevalence of domestic violence, it was
arguable that, under the DSM III—R definition
of PTSD, battered women could not meet the
criteria of PTSD because their experiences were
not 'outside the range of usual human experi-
ence'. The normative nature of domestic violence
has also retarded research on PTSD in battered
women (Dutton & Goodman, 1994).
20 Note that Walker (1984b) identified factors that
predisposed a woman to develop battered woman
syndrome once she was in a battering relationship,
but argued that these factors did not predispose
the woman actually to enter the relationship.
21 It may be that the women who left the abusive
relationship were still being pursued and harassed
by their abusive ex-partner, as research suggests
that women are most at risk of being killed
immediately after they leave an abusive relation-
ship. However, Walker did not explore this issue.
22 Also see Kirby J., Osland v R (1998) 159 ALR
p. 212-213: 'Some commentators have resisted a
proposition that BWS should be expressed in
terms which are neutral as to the sex of the alleged
victim. They argue that BWS is one of those
social facts which, like conception and childbear-
ing, is peculiarly specific to women and therefore
properly described in such terms...However,
unlike conception and childbirth, there is no
inherent reason why a battering relationship
should be confined to woman as victims.
Instances exist where the reverse is the case,
including in some same-sex relationships of analo-
gous dependence and prolonged abuse'...
References
American Psychiatric Association. (1994). The
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders — Fourth Edition. Washington, DC:
American Psychiatric Association.
American Psychiatric Association. (1987). The
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders — Third Edition (Revised). Washington,
DC: American Psychiatric Association.
Anson, O., and Sagy, S. (1995). Marital violence:
Comparing women in violent and nonviolent
unions. Human Relations, 48,(3), 285-305
Ball, P and Wyman, E. (1977-78). Battered wives and
powerlessness: W h a t can counsellors do?
Victimology, 2, 545-552.
Blowers, A., and Bjerregaard, B.(1996). The admissi-
bility of expert testimony on the battered woman
syndrome in homicide cases, Journal of Psychiatry
and Law, 22, (4), 527-560.
Bricker, D . (1993). Fatal defense: An analysis of
battered woman's syndrome expert testimony for
gay men and lesbians who kill abusive partners.
Brooklyn Law Review, 58, 1379-1437.
Brodie, J. (1996). 'All youse three will be dead in the
morning': The Kontinnen case. In Greenwood,
K. (Ed.). The Thing She Loves: Why Women Kill.
St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin.
45
 MARILYN McMAHON
Brown, H. (1997). Beyond Battered Woman Syndrome:
Reforming the Law of SelfDefence to Achieve Justice Psychological self defense as legal justification.
for Women Who Kill. Unpublished M.A thesis,
Monash University.
Browne, A. (1988). When Battered Women Kill. NY:
Free Press.
Buhrle v State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyoming 1981).
Coffee, C.L. (1986). Note: A trend emerges: A state
survey on the admissibility of expert testimony
concerning the battered woman syndrome.
Journal of Family Law, 25, 373-396.
Comack, E. (1987). Women defendants and the
'battered wife syndrome': A plea for the sociologi-
cal imagination. Crown Counsel's Review, 5, (12),Faigman, C.and Wright, A. (1997). The battered
6-16.
Crocker, P. (1985). The meaning of equality for
battered women who kill men in self-defense.
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
Harvard Women's Law Journal, 8, 121-153.
Coughlin, A. (1994). Excusing women, California Law Freckelton, I. (1997). Judicial pedagogy and expert
Review, 82, 1- 89.
Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 113 S.Ct.
2786 (1993)
Dershowitz, A. (1994). The Abuse Excuse: And Other
Cop-Outs, Sob Stories, and Evasions of
Responsibility. NY: Little Brown & Co.
Dobash, R.E. and Dobash, R.P. (1992). Women,
Violence and Social Change. NY: Roudedge.
Dodge, M. and Greene, E. (1991). Juror and expert
conceptions of battered women. Violence and Frye v United States 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Victims, 6, (4), 271-282.
Douglas, M. (1987). The battered woman syndrome.
In Sonkin, D.J. (Ed.) Domestic Violence On Trial
NY: Springer.
Downs, D.A. (1997). More than Victims: Battered
Women, the Syndrome Society and the Law.
Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press.
Duncan, K.L. (1996). Lies, damned lies and statistics?
Psychological syndrome evidence in the court-
room after Daubert. Indiana Law Journal 7, (3),
53.
Dutton, M.A. and Goodman, L.A. (1994).
Posttraumatic stress disorder among battered
women: Analysis of legal implications. Behavioral
Sciences and the Law, 12, 215-234.
Dutton, D., and Painter, S.(1993).The battered
woman syndrome: Effects of severity and inter-
mittency of abuse. American Journal of
Orthopsychiatry, 63, (4) 614-622.
Easteal, P. (1996). Till death us do part. . In
Greenwood, K. (Ed.). The Thing She Loves: Why Hawthorne v State (1982). 408 So.2d 801
Women Kill. St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and
Unwin.
Easteal, P., Hughes, K. and Easter, J. (1993). Battered
women and duress. Alternative Law Journal, 18,
(3), 139-140.
46
Ewing, C. (1987). Battered women who kill:
Lexington, MA: eath.
Ewing, C. And Aubry, M. (1987). Battered women
and public opinion: Some realities about the
myths. Journal of Family Violence, 2, (3),
257-264.
Faigman, C. (1986). The battered woman syndrome
and self-defense: A legal and empirical dissent.
Virginia Law Review, 72, 619-647.
Faigman, C. (1995). The labyrinth of scientific
evidence. Hastings Law Journal, 46.
woman syndrome in the age of science. Arizona
Law Review, 39, 67-115.
Freckelton, I. (1992). Battered woman syndrome.
Alternative Law Journal, 17, 39-41.
evidence on victims' responses to trauma.
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 4, (1), 79-86.
Freckelton, I. (1994). When plight makes right — the
Forensic abuse syndrome. Criminal Law Journal,
18, (1), 29-49.
Freckelton, I. (1993). Novel psychological evidence. In
Freckelton, I. And Selby, H. (Eds). Expert
Evidence. Sydney: Law Book Company, (vol.1,
part 9).
Gesino, J., Smith, H., and Keckich, W. (1982).
The battered woman grows old. Clinical
Gerontologist, 1, 59-67.
Gleason, W.J. (1993). Mental disorders in battered
women: An empirical study. Violence and Victims,
8, (1), 53-68
Goodman-Delahunty, J. (1997). Forensic psychologi-
cal expertise in the wake of Daubert. Law and
Human Behavior, 21, (2), 121-140.
Goodyear-Smith, .(1997). Re battered woman
syndrome. NZLJ, 436-438.
Greenwood, K. (Ed.). The Thing She Loves: Why
Women Kill. St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and
Unwin.
Hancock, L. (1997). Aboriginality and lawyering:
Problems for aboriginal defendants in partner
homicide cases. In Cook, S. and Bessant J. (eds.),
Women's Encounters with Violence. Thousand
Oaks, CA, USA: Sage.
Hilberman, E. and Munson, K. (1977-78). Sixty
battered women. Victimology, 2, 460-470.
Hinchcliffe, S. and Lloyd, D. (1996). Provocative
behaviour: Should battered women who kill be
given special treatment in law?
http:/www.informinc.co.uk/LM/LM86/LM86_Taboos
.html
 BATTERED WOMEN AND BAD SCIENCE THE UMITED VAUDITY AND UT1UTY OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
Ho, R. and Venus, M. (1995)- Reactions to a battered
woman who kills her abusive spouse: An attribu-
tional analysis. Australian Journal of Psychology, Osland v R (1998) 159 ALR 170-246.
47, (3), 153-159.
J v R (1994) 75 A Crim R 522-540.
Jacobson, N., Gottman, J.M., Gortner, E., Berns, S.
And Shorn, J. (1996). Psychological factors in the
longitudinal course of battering: When do couples
split up? When does the abuse decrease? Violence R v Calder (1995). Unreported judgement of the High
and Victims, 11, 371-392.
Kissane, K. (1998, September 5). Kiss or kill? The Age ( R v Gilbert (1993). Unreported judgement of the
Saturday Extra), 1, 6.
Kuhl, A. (1984). Personality traits of abused women:
Masochism myth refuted. Victimology, 9,
450-463.
Kuhl, A. (1986). Implications of justifiable homicide
verdicts for battered women. Response, 9, 6-10.
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
Leader-Elliott, I. (1993). Battered but not beaten:
Women who kill in self defence. Sydney Law
Review, 15, 403-460.
Levit, H. (1985). The battered woman. American
Journal of Forensic Psychology, 3, 9-14.
Levit, H.(1991).Battered women: Syndrome versus
self-defense. American Journal of Forensic
Psychology, 9, (1) 29-35.
Maguigan, H. (1991). Battered women and self-
defense: Myths and misconceptions in current
reform proposals. University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, 140, 379.
McCarthy, T. (1994). Battered woman syndrome.
Australian Feminist Law Journal, 4, 141-151
McDonald, P.L. (1989). Helping with the termination
of an assaultive relationship. In Pressman, B.
(Ed.) Intervening with Assulted Women. Hillsdale, Reddy, P., Knowles, A., Mulvaney, J., McMahon, M.
NJ: Erlboum.
McHugh. M.C. (1993). Studying battered women and
batterers: feminist perspectives on methodology.
In Hansen, M. and Harway, M. (Eds.) Battering
and Family Therapy. London: Sage.
Morse, S. (1990). The misbegotten marriage of soft
psychology and bad law. Law and Human
Behavior, 14, (6), 593-618.
Murphy, S. (1992). Assisting the jury in understanding Rogers, N. (1996). To save her life: Gender, justice
victimisation: Expert psychological testimony on
battered woman syndrome and rape trauma
syndrome. Columbia Journal of Law and Social
Problems, 25 276-310.
Nicolson, D. and Sanghvi, R. (1993). Battered women
and provocation: The implications of R v
Ahluwalia. Crim.L.R. 728-738.
O'Donovan, K. (1991). Defences for battered women
who kill. Journal of Law and Society, 18, (2),
219-240.
O'Donovan, K. (1993). Law's knowledge: The judge,
the expert, the battered woman and her
syndrome. Journal of Law and Society, 20, (4),
427-437.
R v Bradley (1994). Unreported judgement of the
Supreme Court of Victoria, 14.12.1994.
R v Brown (1997). Unreported judgement of the High
Court of New Zealand, 19.9.1997.
R v C (1993) 60 SASR 467-480.
Court of New Zealand, 12.4.1995.
Supreme Court of Western Australia, 4.11. 1993.
R v. Hickey (1992). Unreported judgement of the
Supreme Court of New South Wales, 14.4.1992.
R v Kina (1993). Unreported judgement of the
Supreme Court of Queensland, 29.11.1993.
R v Kontinnen (1992). Unreported judgement of the
Supreme Court of South Australia, 26.3.1992,
30.3.1992.
R v Lavalee [1990] 1 SCR 852; 55 CCC (3d) 97.
R v Lorenz (1998). Unreported judgement of the
Supreme Court of ACT 14 August 1998.
R v Malott (1998) 155 DLR (4th) 513.
R v McEwen (1996). Unreported judgement of the
Supreme Court of Western Australia,
18-25.4.1995, 18.3.1996.
Rv Runjanjic and Kontinnen (1991) 56 SASR 114; 53
A Crim R 362.
R v Taylor (1994). Unreported judgement of the
Supreme Court of South Australia, 3.2. 1994.
R v Woolsey (1993). Unreported judgement of the
Supreme Court of New South Wales, 19.8.1993.
And Freckelton, I. (1997). Attributions about
domestic violence: A study of community
attitudes. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 4, (2),
125-146.
Regeher, C. (1995). Battered woman syndrome.
Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 40, (3), 130-135.
Rittenmayer, S. (1981). Of battered wives, self-defense
and double standards of justice. Journal of
CriminalJustice, 9, (5), 389-396.
and battered women who kill.. In Greenwood, K.
(Ed.). The Thing She Loves: Why Women Kill. St.
Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin.
Rosewater, L. (1987). The clinical and courtroom
application of battered women's personality
assessments. In Sonkin, D.J. (Ed). Domestic
Violence on Trial. NY: Springer.
Schopp, R.F., Sturgis, B.J., and Sullivan, M. (1994).
Battered woman syndrome, expert testimony, and
the distinction between justification and excuse.
University of Illinois Law Review, 1994, 45-113.
47
 MARILYN McMAHON
Schuller, R. (1992).The impact of battered woman
syndrome evidence on jury decision processes.
Law and Human Behavior, 16, (6), 597-620
Schuller, R., and Hastings, P. (1996). Trials of
battered women who kill: The impact of alterna-
tive forms of expert evidence. Law and Human
Behavior, 20, (2) 167-187
Schuller, R., Smith, V., and Olson, J. (1994) Jurors'
decisions in trials of battered women who kill:
The role of prior beliefs and expert testimony.
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 24, (4)
316-337
Schuller, R. and Vidmar, N. (1992). Battered woman
syndrome evidence in the courtroom: A review of
the literature. Law and Human Behaviour, 16,
273-291.
Sheeny, E., Stubbs, J. and Tolmie, J. (1992).
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014
Defending battered women on' trial: The battered
woman syndrome and its limitations. Criminal
Law Journal, 16, 369.
Simone, C. (1997). "Killer man was a battered wife':
The application of battered woman syndrome to
homosexual defendants, The Queen v McEwen.
Sydney Law Review, 19, 230-239.
Spiers, M. (1998). Which chicks are the liars? An
undemocratic universe — chaos, lies, representa-
tion and the law. <http://www.iq.com.au/-dteblmtt
lojlojchaosll.htm>
State v Green (1990). No. 90-0039, Florida District
Court of Appeal.
State v Kelly (1984). 97 NJ 178, 478 A. 2d 364.
State v Thomas (1981). 66 Ohio St.2d 518, 423 NE
2d 137.
Stubbs, J. and Tolmie, J. (1995). Race, gender and the
battered woman syndrome: An Australia case
study. CJWL, 8, 122-158.
Thyfault, R., Bennet, C , and Hirschorn, R. (1987).
Battered women in court: Jury and trial consul-
tants and expert witnesses. In Sonkin, D. (Ed.),
Domestic Violence on Trial. N.Y.: Springer.
United States v Brown, 891 F. Supp. 1501 (D.Kan.
1995).
Walus-Wigle, J and Meloy, J. (1988). Battered woman
syndrome as a criminal defence. Journal of
Psychiatry and Law, 16,(3), 389-404.
Walker, L. (1996). Assessment of abusive spousal
relationships, in Kaslow, F.W. (Ed.) Handbook of
Relational Diagnosis and Dysfunctional Family
Patterns. NY: Wiley.
Walker, L. (1977-78). Battered women and learned
helplessness. Victimology, 2.
48
Walker, L.E. (1984a). Battered women, psychology
and public policy. American Psychologist, 39,
1178-1182.
Walker, L. (1992). Battered woman syndrome and self-
defense. Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and
Public Policy, 6, 321-334.
Walker, L. (1993). Legal self-defense for battered
women. In Hansen, M. and Harway, M. (Eds.)
Battering and Family Therapy. London: Sage.
Walker, L. (1991). Post-traumatic stress disorder in
women: Diagnosis and treatment of battered
woman syndrome. Special Issue: Psychotherapy
with victims. Psychotherapy; 28, (1) 21-29
Walker, L. (1989). Psychology and violent women.
American Psychologist, 44, (4), 695-702.
Walker, L. (1989). Terrifying Love. New York: Harper
Perennial.
Walker, L. (1984b). The Battered Woman Syndrome.
New York: Springer.
Walker, L. (1995). Understanding battered woman
syndrome. Trial 31, (2), 30.
Walker, L. (1983). Victimology and the psychological
perspectives of battered women. Victimology, 8,
82-104.
Walker, L. (1983). Who are the battered women?
Walker, L., Thyfault, R., and Browne, A. (1982).
Beyond the juror's ken: Battered women. Vermont
Law Review, 7, 1-14.
Winnett v Stephenson (ACT Magistrates Court,
unreported, 19 May 1993).
Yeo, S. (1992). Hickey: A case note. Criminal Law
Journal.
Zdenkowski, G. (1992, October 6). Killing to survive.
The Bulletin, 18.
Appendix A
Suggested D S M — M R diagnosis of Battered
woman syndrome: (Walker, 1984b)
AXIS 1: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
Acute or chronic
AXIS 2: Personality Disorder
Depression
AXIS III: Physical Disorders
AXIS IV: Life Stressors (Scale 1-7)
Repeated physical/sexual/psychologi-
cal abuse falls between 5-6.
AXIS V: Level of Functioning for Previous
Year: (Scale 1-6)
Battered women fall at different levels
of functioning
 BATTERED WOMEN AND BAD SCIENCE: THE UMITED VAUDITY AND UTILITY OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME

Appendix B
"Psychological Test Trends" for Women who Committed Violent Acts: Women with Battered Woman
Syndrome v Women Who Claimed Self-Defence (from Levit, 1991).

FEMALES WITH BATTERED FEMALES W H O CLAIMED

WOMAN SYNDROME SELF-DEFENCE

WAIS—R: Overall reduction in intellectual functioning. . Intellectual functioning influenced by

reflected in decreases of possibly 20-30 anxiety and depression, otherwise
prorated points.6-12 months after violent basically intactlmprovement noted
a c t exhibits significant improvement in all within days of the violent act
areas of functioning, particularly the intelle-
ctual. After 18 months, intellectual function-
ing returns to normal.
Digit Symbol
4- performance
Digit Span 4. performance
Similarities 4. performance Test performance not Significantly
Picture Completion 4. performance impaired
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 15:57 25 November 2014

Picture Arrangement 4- performance

Comprehension 4- performance

House-Tree-Person Indications of acute anxiety; intense inter-
Bender GestaH nalised hostility; depression; withdrawal;
and guirtGeneralised disruption in
perceptual processes. May appear like an
acute functional psychosis.
Rorschsch General responses 'sterile' 4- no. of responses
Anxiety, depression & withdrawal prominent
Signs of anxiety, related t o current .
situation (i.e. legal proceedings)
Test results similar t o normal limits.
Approximates a normal pattern.
Orientation intact
Quasi psychotic features not present

49