UKOOA HTHP Well Planning

Model code of safe practice
Part 17 Volume 1
High pressure and high temperature well planning
Licenced to: Mr Putu Suabawa. Single user licence only.

IMPORTANT: This file is subject to a licence agreement issued by the Energy Institute, London, UK. All rights reserved. It may only be used in accordance with
the licence terms and conditions. It must not be forwarded to, or stored or accessed by, any unauthorised user. Enquiries: e: pubs@energyinst.org.uk t: +44 (0)207 467 7100
ENERGY INSTITUTE
MODEL CODE OF SAFE PRACTICE IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
PART 17: VOLUME 1

HIGH PRESSURE AND HIGH TEMPERATURE (HPHT) WELL PLANNING

ENERGY INSTITUTE
MODEL CODE OF SAFE PRACTICE IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
PART 17: VOLUME 1

HIGH PRESSURE AND HIGH TEMPERATURE (HPHT) WELL PLANNING
April 2009
Published by
ENERGY INSTITUTE, LONDON
The Energy Institute is a professional membership body incorporated by Royal Charter 2003
Registered charity number 1097899

The Energy Institute (EI) is the leading chartered professional membership body supporting individuals and organisations across the energy
industry. With a combined membership of over 13 500 individuals and 300 companies in 100 countries, it provides an independent focal point
for the energy community and a powerful voice to engage business and industry, government, academia and the public internationally.
As a Royal Charter organisation, the EI offers professional recognition and sustains personal career development through the accreditation and
delivery of training courses, conferences and publications and networking opportunities. It also runs a highly valued technical work programme,
comprising original independent research and investigations, and the provision of IP technical publications to provide the international industry
with information and guidance on key current and future issues.
The EI promotes the safe, environmentally responsible and efficient supply and use of energy in all its forms and applications. In fulfilling this
purpose the EI addresses the depth and breadth of energy and the energy system, from upstream and downstream hydrocarbons and other primary
fuels and renewables, to power generation, transmission and distribution to sustainable development, demand side management and energy
efficiency. Offering learning and networking opportunities to support career development, the EI provides a home to all those working in energy,
and a scientific and technical reservoir of knowledge for industry.
This publication has been produced as a result of work carried out within the Technical Team of the Energy Institute (EI), funded by the EI’s
Technical Partners. The EI’s Technical Work Programme provides industry with cost-effective, value-adding knowledge on key current and
future issues affecting those operating in the energy sector, both in the UK and internationally.
For further information, please visit http://www.energyinst.org
The EI gratefully acknowledges the financial contributions towards the scientific and technical programme
from the following companies
BG Group Maersk Oil North Sea UK Limited

BP Exploration Operating Co Ltd Murco Petroleum Ltd
BP Oil UK Ltd Nexen
Centrica Saudi Aramco
Chevron Shell UK Oil Products Limited
ConocoPhillips Ltd Shell U.K. Exploration and Production Ltd
ENI Statoil Hydro
E. ON UK Talisman Energy (UK) Ltd
ExxonMobil International Ltd Total E&P UK plc
Kuwait Petroleum International Ltd Total UK Limited
Copyright © 2009 by the Energy Institute, London:

The Energy Institute is a professional membership body incorporated by Royal Charter 2003.
Registered charity number 1097899, England
All rights reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced by any means, or transmitted or translated into
a machine language without the written permission of the publisher.
ISBN 978 0 85293 529 3
Published by the Energy Institute
The information contained in this publication is provided as guidance only and while every reasonable care has been taken to ensure the accuracy
of its contents, the Energy Institute cannot accept any responsibility for any action taken, or not taken, on the basis of this information. The
Energy Institute shall not be liable to any person for any loss or damage which may arise from the use of any of the information contained in any
of its publications.
Further copies can be obtained from

Portland Customer Services, Commerce Way, Whitehall Industrial Estate, Colchester CO2 8HP, UK. Tel: +44 (0) 1206 796 351
e: sales@portland-services.com
Electronic access to EI and IP publications is available via our website, www.energyinstpubs.org.uk.

Documents can be purchased online as downloadable pdfs or on an annual subscription for single users and companies.
For more information, contact the EI Publications Team.
e: pubs@energyinst.org

CONTENTS
Page
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 HPHT definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Health Safety and Environment (HS&E) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 ALARP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.4 Hazard identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.5 Risk estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.6 Risk reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.7 Risk evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.8 Demonstrating ALARP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.9 Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.10 Managing the engineering process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.11 Management of change (MOC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.12 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.13 References and further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 HPHT project risk and uncertainty management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 HPHT well planning team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 HPHT well planning team - roles and responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4 Well examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.5 HPHT well planning team - project management framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5.1 Business case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5.2 Business case deliverables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5.3 Well objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5.4 Well objectives deliverables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5.5 Project risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5.6 Project risk deliverables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5.7 Well planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5.8 Well planning deliverables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5.9 Rig selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Contents continued... Page
2.5.10 Rig selection deliverables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2.5.11 Safety planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5.12 Safety planning deliverables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.6 Quality assurance and quality control (QAQC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.7 Peer reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.8 Planning review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.9 Training and lessons learnt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.10 Suggested further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3 Well objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1 Key points summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3 Well objective assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.4 Well objectives (general) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.4.1 Health safety and environmental (HS&E) exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.4.2 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.4.3 Drillability of target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.4.4 Sand production and early water break-through . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.4.5 Production and safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.4.6 Minimise intervention while at high pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.4.7 Business objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.4.8 Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.5 Geological objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.5.1 Primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.5.2 Secondary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.6 Business objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.7 Exploration wells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.8 Development wells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.9 Data gathering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.9.1 Mud-logging requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.9.2 Coring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.9.3 Logging and sampling tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4 Project risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.3 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.4 HPHT wells carry a high probability of failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.5 Equipment (hardware) failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.6 Software failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.7 Organisational failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.8 Human failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.9 Uncertainty about subsurface and hydrocarbon properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.10 Quality assurance and quality control (QAQC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5 Well planning good practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

5.1 Key Points summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.3 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.4 Pre-completion and completion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.5 Shallow gas risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.6 Offset well data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
vi

5.7 Pore pressure prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

5.8 Fracture gradient evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.9 Seismic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.10 Deterministic and probabilistic models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.11 Temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.12 Well bore stability (geomechanical modelling) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.13 Well bore strengthening – fluids engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.14 Depletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.15 Design trajectories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.16 Drilling fluids systems and considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.16.1 Water-based mud (WBM) – advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.16.2 Water-based mud (WBM) – disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.16.3 Oil-based mud (OBM) – advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.16.4 Oil-based mud (OBM) – disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.16.5 Formates – advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.16.6 Formates – disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.17 Bit selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.18 Drill string design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.18.1 Kick assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.18.2 Safety subs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.18.3 Circulating head . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.19 Casing design considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.20 Casing: safety factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.20.1 Burst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.20.2 Collapse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.20.3 Tension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.20.4 Yield strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.20.5 Casing wear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.20.6 Wellhead and BOP loading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.20.7 Connectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.20.8 Casing weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.20.9 Casing setting depths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.20.10 External corrosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.21 Cementing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.22 Completion issues for planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6 Rig selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.3 Invitation to tender process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.4 Minimum rig requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.5 Further rig specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.6 Notes on operational safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.7 Rig safety history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.8 Crew experience and training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7 Safety planning for operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

7.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7.3 Well control planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7.4 BOP design (cf: Pt17.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7.5 Kick tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
vii

7.6 Swab, surge and their effect on BHP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

7.7 Mud behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
7.8 Stuck pipe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
7.9 Lost circulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
7.10 Hydrates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7.11 Logging and logging equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7.12 Depth error contingencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
7.13 Formation pressure error contingency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
7.14 Casing and cementing design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
7.15 Riser behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
7.16 Simultaneous operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
7.17 General alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
7.18 Provisions and contingencies while drilling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
8 Further safety related technical issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

8.2 Casing design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
8.3 Qualification of equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
8.4 Non permanent downhole equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
8.4.1 Wireline tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
8.4.2 Gauges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
8.5 Thermal effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
8.6 Annular management and trapped annular pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
8.6.1 Annular management (AM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
8.7 Material selection: forward planning for safe operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
8.7.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
8.7.2 Elastomers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
8.8 Drill string components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
8.9 Life of well issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
8.10 Corrosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
8.11 Managed pressure drilling (MPD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
8.12 Abandonment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
9 Suggested further reading and references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Annex A – Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Annex B – Managed pressure drilling and fluid engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Annex C – Glossary of terms and abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
viii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Development of this publication was undertaken by consultants from Think-Well (Scotland) Limited under the
direction of the Part 17 Volume 1 Steering Group formed from specialist representatives from the operating and
service companies serving the North Sea industry. The consultants and Steering Group members met on several
occasions to permit discussion and agreement on the direction and format of the document as it was being developed.
The group also provided written comment and feedback on the various draft versions produced outwith the meetings.
The Steering Group comprised the following principal members:
Bruce McEwan (Chairman) Shell UK Exploration & Production

Donald Dobson HSE OSD
Norman Day BP Exploration Operating Company Ltd
Ivor Palmer BG Group
Steve Mellor Rowan Drilling & IADC Liaison
Keith Hart (Secretary) Energy Institute
The Energy Institute wishes to acknowledge the expertise and work provided for the development of this publication
by the following consultants:
Steve Walters Think-Well (Scotland)

Eric Low Think-Well (Scotland)
Acknowledgement is also attributed to other personnel who provided valuable assistance to the Steering Group at
various stages in the project:
Luc Fambon Total E & P

Khalil Abederrazak Total E & P
Thomas Gautherot Total E & P
Eric Kipperman ADTI
ix

FOREWORD
Volume 1 of the Model Code of Safe Practice Part 17 has been developed as a guide for those concerned with the
planning of high pressure and high temperature offshore wells. It covers those activities associated with HPHT wells
which have an impact on safety offshore and therefore require special care and attention. The contents should be
viewed as the minimum good practice to be applied in order to achieve a safe working environment in HPHT
operations.
Production of this additional volume to Part 17 was commissioned in response to the requirements of the UK
industry for the scope of the Model Code to be expanded to include planning. Good planning is also important for
reducing commercial risk as well as being the first stage in the assurance of safety during the drilling and
completions phases.
Guidance provided in this Model Code should be considered as a starting point for the operators and drilling
contractors in developing the work programme and associated operational plans for HPHT wells. While this Model
Code provides good industry practice, each operator and drilling contractor should review and apply the guidance
to its own policies and experience for the particular area of operation.
The Model Code has been developed in a United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) context of HPHT well
operations; however, its guidance is universally applicable provided it is read, interpreted and applied in conjunction
with relevant national and local statutory legislation and publications (codes of practice, design standards,
specifications, recommended practices, guidance, etc.). Where requirements differ, the more stringent should be
adopted. In addition, readers should take account of developments in legislation and publications which have been
issued since this Model Code was published.
Although the adoption of this publication should help to promote safe well planning practice, the Energy Institute
and the technical representatives listed in the Acknowledgements cannot accept responsibility in any way for injury
to personnel or damage to equipment, installations or property which may arise from the use of any of the
information contained in this Model Code.
This Model Code forms Volume 1 of Part 17 of the Model Code of Safe Practice. It complements two further
volumes: Volume 2 Well Control During the Drilling and Testing of High Pressure High Temperature Wells and
Volume 3 High Pressure and High Temperature Well Completions and Interventions. Each volume examines safe
practice in a specific context; however, reference should be made to the other volumes for relevant information in
other contexts.

1
INTRODUCTION
This Model Code provides guidance on good practice this process should begin at the planning stage. These
for those planning high pressure high temperature risks must also be communicated to all parties involved
(HPHT) wells. High pressures and temperatures can including management, service providers, designers,
encroach on the limits of available equipment, materials safety advisors and environmental advisors.
and fluids leaving little margin for error; adhering to Compliance with international, national and
good practice will help ensure that all operations are regional laws, statutory instruments and regulations is
conducted in a safe and proper manner. However, the an imperative. Liaison with legislative, fiscal and
conditions of HPHT restrict the choice of equipment, regulatory stakeholders should be given a high priority
which in turn may place constraints on the well design from the beginning. Both company and contractor
to all but the most basic and simplest form. For safe, policies and procedures should be reviewed for their
successful planning with designs that are fit for purpose, suitability for operating within the HPHT environment.
rigorous attention to detail to every aspect of the The selection and procurement of equipment,
planning operation is essential. materials, people, products and services can prove
In general, operations involving HPHT wells carry demanding by extending lead and planning times and
much higher risk. Fundamentally the possibility of these issues should be factored into the well planning
integrity failures and the consequence of these failures process. The range of tool choice for HPHT conditions
are much greater when working in high energy is much smaller and the high specification needed for
environments. Risk factors can combine to create materials and equipment may not be readily available
complex and serious threats to well operations; these or, in some circumstances, not yet designed.
could include the erosion of HS&E margins with a In this introductory section the risk management
corresponding increase in the risk in loss of well processes and their importance to HPHT well planning
control, loss of the well itself, injuries, fatalities, are described. Risk management should be an integral
environmental damage and of damage to economics and and continuous process throughout well planning,
business reputation. design, procurement and operations. A robust,
It is a principle of Health and Safety legislation in systematic risk management system should be in place
the UK that risks relating to health and safety are with full documentation of each step in the process. This
reduced to as low as is reasonably practicable will help to demonstrate that the ALARP principle has
(ALARP). Therefore it is essential that risks relating to been achieved. It will also assist in the communication
all HPHT well operations are identified, evaluated and of HPHT risks to management and others, emphasising
reduced as required under ALARP principles and that the company’s duty of care.

MODEL CODE OF SAFE PRACTICE PART 17: VOL 1: HIGH PRESSURE AND HIGH TEMPERATURE (HPHT) WELL PLANNING
1.1 HPHT DEFINITIONS of the following methods:
High Temperature in this context can be defined as HAZID (hazard identification) is a high level
when the undisturbed bottom hole temperature is greater systematic assessment of a system using guidewords to
than 149°C (300°F). help identify potential hazards.
High Pressure can be defined as either the
maximum pore pressure of any porous formation that HAZOP (hazard and operability) takes a full
exceeds a hydrostatic gradient of 0,18 bar/m (0,8 psi/ft) description of a process system and questions every part
(representing an equivalent mud weight (EMW) of of it to discover what deviations might occur and what
1,85 SG or (15,4 ppg) or, needing deployment of the causes and consequences of these deviations might
pressure control equipment with a rated working be. [Ref: Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) –
pressure in excess of 690 bar (69 MPa, 10 000 psi). Application Guide BS IEC 61882:2001].
Note that areas of high pressure (abnormal
pressure) need not necessarily be accompanied by high FME(C)A (failure mode and effects (critical) analysis)
temperatures and vice versa. is a qualitative reliability technique for the systematic
analysis of each possible failure mode within a
hardware system. It also identifies the resulting effect
1.2 HEALTH SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT on that system, mission and personnel. Critical analysis
(HS&E) (CA) ranks failure modes according to their probability
and consequences. [Ref: Reliability of Systems
When planning an HPHT well, health, safety and Equipment and Components Part 5. Guide to Failure
environment (HS&E) should be considered the primary Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMEA and
value driver. Therefore, HS&E considerations should FMECA) BS 5760-5 1991].
have the highest priority and weighting which should be
factored into the work flow.
1.5 RISK ESTIMATION
1.3 ALARP Risk estimation entails assessing both the severity

(consequences) and frequency (likelihood) of hazardous
It is a principle of UK Health and Safety Law that risks events. The detail and effort required to perform this
to persons are reduced to as low as is reasonably increases from qualitative (Q) to semi-quantitative (SQ)
practicable. This is commonly referred to by the to quantified risk assessment (QRA). One or all of these
acronym ALARP. techniques may be applied to components within a
A demonstration of ALARP should cover all HPHT system. Selecting which technique to apply to a
projects and associated components, systems and component will depend on criticality, complexity, field
HSEMS (health, safety and environmental management proven reliability and the availability of suitable
system). All phases of the project should be assessed numerical databases.
and managed such that the residual risks can be
demonstrated as being ALARP.
The means of demonstrating ALARP is through the 1.6 RISK REDUCTION
risk assessment process. The aim is to identify and rank
the risks so that they can be adequately managed. The Risk reduction is an integral part of the process to
basic steps of the risk assessment process are: hazard determine if more needs to be done. It involves an
identification, risk estimation and ranking, risk iterative loop that re-evaluates the risk to measure the
evaluation and reduction and a continuous review improvement. A hierarchical approach to effective risk
process. Each stage of the risk assessment should be reduction is:
seen as an opportunity to identify and reduce risk.
— Elimination/minimisation through design.
— Prevention (reduce likelihood).
1.4 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION — Detection.
— Control.
Hazard identification must be a comprehensive and — Mitigation of consequences.
systematic process that is likely to involve one or more — Evacuation, escape and rescue.

INTRODUCTION
1.7 RISK EVALUATION recognised codes and standards in dealing with risk and
demonstrating ALARP. The role of risk analysis
The process of risk evaluation starts with the highest techniques can be seen as providing a contribution to
risk and proceeds down the ranked list of identified this risk picture at the appropriate level.
potential risks until it is evident that no further risk Overall risk management uses a combination of
reduction measures can be justified. tools and techniques to achieve the goal of ALARP.
There are numerous analysis and evaluation techniques
that have been developed in addition to those previously
1.8 DEMONSTRATING ALARP mentioned. These include:
Reducing risk to 'ALARP' is a sound engineering — Fault tree analysis.

principle and should be considered good engineering — Event tree analysis.
practice regardless of legislative requirement. The — What-if analysis.
reduction of risk is a necessary and vital process in all — Checklists.
engineering projects. Formalising this process can bring — Cost benefit analysis.
many benefits. The demonstration of ALARP within a — Human factor risk assessments.
risk management framework can be achieved through a — Health risk assessments.
combination of several established methods. The — Preliminary hazard assessments.
interaction between these methods is simply illustrated — Job hazard assessments.
in Figure 1. [Ref: Industry Guidelines on a Framework — Physical effects modelling.
for Risk Related Decision Support, Oil & Gas UK — Safety integrity level (SIL) evaluations.
(UKOOA)]. — Layers of protection analysis (LOPA).
Figure 1 clearly illustrates the role, for example, of
Figure 1: Criticality Awareness Framework

Expert advice should be sought in selecting the operation.

techniques to be used to ensure the most applicable — Record and evaluate the change and ensure the
technique is used for the circumstances. [Ref: evaluation includes technical, HS&E and
Recommended Practice for Design and Hazard Analysis commercial considerations such as to allow the
for Offshore Production Facilities, API RP14J; demonstration of risk reduction to ALARP.
Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries – Offshore — Ensure that the change is process executed by
Production Installations- Guidelines on Tools and suitably experienced and competent assessors.
Techniques for Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessment, BS EN ISO 17776:2002.] Changes or deviations should be assessed fully and
communicated to all stakeholders. These changes may
impact on the safety case and those that affect the
1.9 REVIEW project schedule critical path may impact on lead times
and material supply. All new components, replacements
The review process is a key component of any risk or changes in execution of the well plan should be
management system. Periodic reviews should be assessed for risk, consequences and impact on other
performed and when significant changes in the well equipment, with any resulting impact on documented
design occur that affect the risks. HS&E.
Any remedial measures adopted should and will Late changes, change encountered during
change the relative risk ranking. The review process operations for example, can be the most difficult to
ensures that the changing risk priorities are understood process given time constraints. The same rigorous
and communicated. process should be applied. Short cutting the process at
Management of change (MOC) is a relevant and this stage has led to many difficulties and failures.
important component of the review process which is Due to the complex, higher risk nature of HPHT
dealt with under a separate heading. wells a health, safety and environment impact
assessment will be needed for each change. Change can
introduce new risks and the identification, evaluation
1.10 MANAGING THE ENGINEERING and reduction process should be rigorously applied. This
PROCESS may involve additional testing, modelling and analysis
of the new component, process or procedure as an
Risk management must be an integral part of the integrated part of the system. Such activities should be
engineering process. Other key components of the thoroughly documented as part of the change
engineering process are: establishing objectives, management process including any analysis, testing,
establishing early communication with all stakeholders input from lessons learnt, implementation of good
and establishing an appropriate work group which practice, codes or standards.
should include: sub-surface, drilling, completion, It is imperative that management of change covers
production and facilities disciplines. Planning must have the approval and communication process.
input from these disciplines and influence engineering
design if completion, production and operational
compromises are to be avoided. 1.12 TRAINING
For personnel involved in HPHT planning the following

1.11 MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE should be addressed:
Management of change is a fundamental element of the — Levels of experience.

project development process and contributes to the — A formal competency system for well design
demonstration of ALARP. The change management personnel.
process should be clearly documented, understood and — Training short term staff in the prevailing company
should: management system.
— Identify triggers that initiate the management of In addition to any specialist technical training
change process. requirements, it is recommended that personnel
— Record the causes of the change during all phases involved should:
of the development of the design through to
— Be aware of the installation safety case.

INTRODUCTION
— Be familiar with company policies and procedures. Recommended Practice for Design and Hazard Analysis
— Be familiar with local legislation, regulation and for Offshore Production Facilities; API RP 14J
guidelines, including company policy and
procedure. Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries – Offshore
— Be aware of the impact that other engineering Production Installations – Guidelines on Tools and
restraints may have on their responsibilities. Techniques for Hazard Identification and Risk
— Fully understand the well control issues. Assessment; BS EN ISO 17776:2002
— Be fully conversant with the objectives of the
project. A guide to the well aspects of the Offshore Installations
— Understand the nature of the HPHT environment in and Wells (Design and Construction, etc.) Regulations
the well, its constraints and limitations on materials 1996, Second edition 2008, HSE Books
and operations.
— Understand the impact of uncertainties on well A guide to the Offshore Installations (Safety Case)
planning and design. Regulations 2005, Third edition 2006, HSE Books
In general those involved in HPHT well planning should HS&E Report (2005) High Pressure, High Temperature
be experienced and of the highest calibre. developments in the United Kingdom Continental Shelf
Websites:
1.13 REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING
www.hse.gov.uk/offshore (general)
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) – Application
Guide; BS IEC 61882:2001 http://stepchangeinsafety.net (general)
Reliability of Systems Equipment and Components Part www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarp.htm (ALARP)

5, Guide to Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality
Analysis (FMEA and FMECA); BS 5760-5: 1991 www.ptil.no (Petroleum Safety Authority, Norway)
Industry Guidelines on a Framework for Risk Related www.irfoffshoresafety.com (International Regulators

Decision Support; Oil & Gas UK (UKOOA) Forum)


2
HPHT PROJECT RISK AND

UNCERTAINTY MANAGEMENT
2.1 INTRODUCTION the general section headings in the main body of the
document.
HPHT projects are technically complex and require the This section will also illustrate the complexity of
input from more specialists compared to normal wells. the management process required. It provides guidance
Control of the project process is based on identifying on rationalising the process and on the benefits of a
and managing all the many sources of uncertainty. multi-disciplinary approach. It is assumed that there is
Although complex, a thorough and methodical approach a Safety Management System already in place and
has led to successful delivery in some of the most therefore this is not designed as a replacement for
extreme HPHT well developments. The complexity of company documentation or indeed, compliance with
operations, with the necessary documentation and statutory requirements. Its intent is also to stress the
recording of events, means that the control management importance of having a detailed communication process.
process needs to be clearly thought through. Quality It is assumed that the well planning process is
control with a documented audit trail is also essential. undertaken by a discrete team as depicted in Figure 2.1.
As a supplement to section 1, the aim of this section It is the purpose of this planning team to deliver a plan
is to describe a generic approach and provide guidance that the wells delivery team can use throughout the
for the management team or team leaders. It attempts to process from concept design to project execution and
align uncertainty management issues with operations.
Wells Team Leader
Completions Team Leader Well Planning Team Leader
Drilling Superintendent
Figure 2.1: General schematic for team reporting

2.2 HPHT WELL PLANNING TEAM — HS&E expert(s).

— Well tubular (especially including all connectors)
A core team consisting of competent personnel with specialists (materials science/metallurgy).
relevant HPHT experience should be assembled for the
project. As the team has to contend with very complex Suppliers (Vendor Alliance*)
issues, it is essential to keep the team together during — Geomechanics rock physics.
the entire project as frequent changes of personnel, — Drilling contractor – supplying fit for purpose rigs
office movements and re-structuring events will disrupt and equipment (cf. BOPs).
the focus of a team. — Mud company – vital that this vendor is an
Team cohesion has been highlighted as a major integrated team member.
factor in successful HPHT project delivery. — Well tubulars and bits.
— Cement company
Operator personnel — Other technical/equipment specialists depending on
The lists below comprise those personnel which the project.
project manager may wish to include in the team
selection process. An example of how the various team Project support, non-wells team – may be from the
members may integrate is depicted in Figure 2.2. operator or a consultant
— Well planning team leader. — Independent peer review team – all members
— Senior drilling engineer – minimum five years’ should be experienced HPHT practitioners.
HPHT experience. — Ad hoc consultants with HPHT operational and
— Drilling engineer. theoretical experience.
— Senior geologist – experienced in pore pressure — Administration support (planner, document
prediction. controller etc.)
— Senior completions engineer – minimum five
years’ HPHT experience. *Vendor Alliance assumes that there is full
— Geophysicist. co-operation and knowledge sharing between vendors
— Geomechanics. for the benefit of project success – especially for
— Reservoir engineer/petrophysics. delivery of HS&E objectives.
— Senior drilling superintendents.
Wells Team Leader
HS&E QAQC
Well Planning Team Leader

S. Completions
Engineer S. Drilling Engineer
S. Geologist Drilling Engineer
Geophysicist HPHT Well Planning Team Reservoir

Engineer/Petrophysics
Geomechanics
Drilling Contractor
Rock Physics
Mud Company Cement Company
OCTG & Bits
Peer Review Team Administration
Operator Vendor
Figure 2.2: General schematic of personnel needed for HPHT well planning - (other than team leaders, no
order or hierarchy is implied)

HPHT PROJECT RISK AND UNCERTAINTY MANAGEMENT
2.3 HPHT WELL PLANNING TEAM - ROLES — Ensure team building exercises are frequent.
AND RESPONSIBILITIES — Sponsor continual training in HPHT issues.
Continual personal development (CPD) for HPHT
The wells team leader, well planning leader, drilling should be encouraged especially for junior
superintendent, operation geologist, senior drilling personnel.
engineers and senior well engineers should have all — Ensure and instil a QAQC culture – engineers
been involved in both the planning and operational should be encouraged to have hands on knowledge
phase of at least one HPHT well and preferably have of the equipment they intend to use and be familiar
experience from the field area – this is especially true with material strengths, weaknesses and associated
for geoscientists. risks.
The drilling superintendent and all engineers
assigned to the project should as a minimum, carry a Senior drilling engineer: should be defined as fit for
valid and recognised well control certificate and have purpose for HPHT at highest level; role and
attended at least one course dedicated to HPHT well responsibilities should be in line with company
control and other related issues. Geoscientists and directives and policy.
drilling engineers should be required to have substantial
knowledge of pore pressure and fracture gradient Drilling engineer: should be defined as fit for purpose
prediction techniques and limitations. All team leaders for HPHT at the intermediate level; role and
should have a thorough grounding in project responsibilities should be in line with company
management procedures and be acquainted with the directives and policy.
operator’s standards and procedures.
HPHT competence development plans should be Senior geologist: should be defined as fit for purpose for
established and carried out for the whole team, HPHT at the highest level; role and responsibilities
including company, key contractor and service should be in line with company directives and policy.
personnel.
Competence assessments of HPHT tacit knowledge Senior completions engineer: should be defined as fit
should be a requirement for key functions; the reader is for purpose for HPHT at the highest level; role and
referred to section 4 – Project risk. responsibilities should be in line with company
Although many operators will have well defined directives and policy.
criteria for HPHT planning and operations competence,
the following is offered as guidance and can be defined, Well operations engineers: should be defined as fit for
for the purposes of this code of safe practice, as: purpose for HPHT at intermediate to the highest level;
role and responsibilities should be in line with company
High: should ideally have more than five years’ HPHT directives and policy.
experience, exposure to HPHT project components,
technical challenges and well delivery. Experience Geophysicist: should be defined as fit for purpose for
should also include pore pressure/fracture gradient and HPHT at intermediate to the highest level; role and
advanced casing design and well integrity, completions responsibilities should be in line with company
design (high end engineering), detailed sub-surface directives and policy.
issues relating to HPHT; will require an up-to-date well
control certification. Reservoir engineer/petrophysics: should be defined as
fit for purpose for HPHT at intermediate to the highest
Intermediate: should ideally have two to five years’ level; role and responsibilities should be in line with
exposure to HPHT project components, technical company directives and policy.
challenges and well delivery HPHT specific engineering
and sub-surface issues relating to HPHT. Consultants: should be defined as fit for purpose for
HPHT at the highest level; role and responsibilities
Low: should have at least one to two years’ exposure to should be in line with company directives and policy for
HPHT project components, technical challenges and independent contractors.
well delivery and sub-surface issues relating to HPHT.
Well planning team leader: should: 2.4 WELL EXAMINATION

— Foster a culture of cooperation.
This will be dependent on the existing regulations

pertinent to the area of operations. The well Verification Scheme, and managing independent
examination process should be guided by the HPHT review, examination and re-examination of maintenance
well planning team but the examiner should have policy, as required by Design and Construction
sufficient independence and authority to question and Regulation (DCR) legislation.
request changes to the well design. To be competent the They should also be responsible for ensuring all
well examiner must have relevant HPHT experience. necessary documentary records are maintained.
Well examination criteria, although driven by
regulatory requirements, are often a matter for
individual companies but in this document are offered 2.5 HPHT WELL PLANNING TEAM –
as guidance. PROJECT MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
Senior drilling engineer (SDE): must ensure compliance The following illustrates the elements and components
with the requirements of the existing examination of a typical project management process which aligns
scheme relating to well design and construction for all with the sections in this guidance. This is taken as the
rig based drilling activities. The SDE is responsible for minimum to achieve a safe design along with
ensuring all necessary documentary records are documentation and procedures process which can be
maintained. easily interrogated and modified throughout the well
programme and on into field development. It should be
Senior completions engineer (SCE): must ensure viewed in the context of general project assurance.
compliance with the requirements of the existing
examination scheme relating to well design and Generic methodology
construction for all rig based workover, re-completion,
interventions, suspensions and abandonment activities. Figure 2.3 shows a generic methodology in which each
The SCE is responsible for ensuring all necessary component operation is terminated with a 'gate'. Each
documentary records are maintained. 'gate' allows an analysis of the work so far and where,
after a peer review, the project can be allowed to
Well operations engineers (WOE): must ensure proceed to the next stage of the work. The object is to
compliance with the requirements of the existing 'design out' as many risks as possible and falls within
examination scheme relating to non-rig well the concept of ALARP. This methodology can help
intervention for wireline, coiled tubing, and well keep the business objectives and budgets in focus but
maintenance operations. The WOE are responsible for will primarily reduce HS&E risk.
incorporating well maintenance into the Well
HPHT Well Planning Operations

Well Design Assurance Operate
Execute
Scope
Select
Analyse
Assess
Well Safety Assurance
Drilling and Completion Assurance
Figure 2.3: Generalised methodology to fit within project success assurance
10

Chapters
Sections
Business 3. Well 4. Project 5. Well 6. Rig 7. Safety Planning

Case Objectives Risk Planning Selection Planning review
Planning Elements
Figure 2.4: Planning elements from development of the business case to planning review
Planning elements performance.

— Health, safety and environmental protection
The planning elements illustrated in Figure 2.4 apply to should not be compromised.
the assess, analyse, select and scope components which — Initiate technical feasibility and research studies if
if performed correctly, will reflect on the project necessary: these may be required where there is
execution and operations. There is an assumed inclusion considerable uncertainty with sub-surface
of QAQC and HAZOP/HAZID methodology as covered conditions or where the technical limit is being
in section 1. The overall objective should be to reduce reached. Forward planning for depleted HPHT
uncertainties so that few are carried into drilling and assets is also recommended. All technical
completions operations where correct assessment and feasibility should be constrained by health, safety
planning should reduce any 'operational surprises'. and environmental considerations in addition to
It is not possible to assess all the technical best and safe practice. Dispensations will be
problems until the well has been drilled. However, these required when non-standard procedures or
should be fewer if the principle of ALARP is applied to equipment are not covered by existing health safety
both HS&E and technical components of the project. and environmental, company and regulatory
directives.
2.5.1 Business case — Data model interrogation: good quality, data rich
sets are essential to reduce geological uncertainties.
This should be part of the Assess process and may cover — Assess whether the opportunities fit with company
numerous topics depending on company policy and strategy/experience especially if this is a first
statutory requirements. The following list is not HPHT project. The safety case must not be
definitive but includes the key issues: compromised.
— Identify stakeholders and team leaders with HPHT
— Identify if the business case is sound for an HPHT experience and identify if such a project has
project. What is the safety risk and what is the commitment and appropriate funding (early budget
business risk? Can the two be reconciled? estimates – HPHT may require substantial budget
— Define a budget for the project: it is entirely contingencies). Funding should include provision
possible that there will be large deviations between for HPHT safety training for ALL personnel.
actual and budgeted costs. The well planning — Assess project viability for development where
process should help shape the project costs; existing facilities will need to handle production
although capital expenditure (CAPEX) costs may from the HPHT field. If existing facilities do not
have a tighter spread, OPEX costs can vary to a currently have controls for handling production
very large degree due to Geological Uncertainty or from an HPHT field, procedures must be clarified
changes to the expected reservoir conditions. There and incorporated in the plan.
are databases such as www.rushmorereviews.com — Confirm project value drivers align with design
which provide substantial information and that are concepts, health, safety and environmental
used by operators to test or benchmark costs and objectives.
11

2.5.2 Business case deliverables — Collect knowledge and experience from previous
projects including offset well reviews.
— Feasibility studies. — Commitment to resources (project hierarchy within
— Alignment of business and safety objectives. organisation).
— Demonstration of alignment with company strategy — Confirm stakeholders and sponsor commitment
(may not have previously incorporated HPHT). (will need to be assessed as changes are made).
— Project sanction. — Define technical and operational requirements.
— Defined budget and spread costs. — Assess, document and communicate expected
technical limits.
2.5.3 Well objectives — Assess suitability and competence of personnel
against defined requirements.
These are defined in detail in section 3. The list as — Assess suppliers’ competency, this should be tested
described below refers to management processes: and documented.
— Conduct cost/benefit analysis.
— Initiate the provision of health, safety and — Financial feasibility with risk to the business if
environmental procedures and documentation safety is compromised.
processes with an easily accessible audit trail. — Confirm regulatory issues and requirement.
— The well design should minimise capital and
operational expenditure (CAPEX and OPEX) but 2.5.6 Project risk deliverables
not compromise HS&E.
— Define finder – keeper status (for further discussion — Developed business risk matrix.
please refer to section 3 Well Objectives). — Developed HS&E risk matrix (risk register).
— Confirm alignment with business objectives. — Risk assessment report which should cover health,
— Confirm alignment with safety objectives. safety and environmental and business risk.
— Identify design options depending on sub-surface — Initial-risked cost estimation report.
criteria.
— Investigate and assess application of new 2.5.7 Well planning
technology and innovation options.
— Determine regulation boundaries and fit with Well planning is described in detail in section 5 from
HS&E considerations. the technical viewpoint. However the list of subjects
below defines those issues which the project manager
2.5.4 Well objectives deliverables may wish to include in the management process. The
technical information input into the project will be far
— Clear communicable objectives for wells team greater than a standard well design and therefore the
delivery, business case, health safety and reader is also referred back to section 1 of this code for
environmental considerations should be delivered. guidance on HS&E compliance and the necessity for a
— These objectives should be clearly understood by risk register:
all personnel involved in the project and operations.
— Safety case and guidance documentation.
2.5.5 Project risk — Maintain the risk register.
— Confirmation that project value drivers and
This is described in detail in section 4. The list of planning process align with the safety case.
subjects below defines those issues which the project — Review commitment of management to resources
manager may wish to include in the management and budget: this will be of particular importance as
process: changes are made to the well plan. All changes
must be communicated.
— Review business risk (HPHT High CAPEX and — Confirm stakeholders (partners) have an
OPEX). understanding of the well plan and risk issues.
— Initiate a risk register (cf. section 1, Introduction). — Develop draft procedures and generic guidelines
— Review health, safety and environmental risk (this and control documentation.
should be understood as changes to planning are — Monitor and document vendor input into design.
made). — Communicate technical solution developments.
— Review feasibility of the project plan. — Develop well control/drilling/tripping procedures.
12

— Drilling safety critical items checklist. manual (JOM) and/or bridging documents.
— BOP testing procedures. — Vendor modifications to equipment and procedures
— Commission an independent design verification. not covered in the JOM.
— Employ other vendors, if not available within the — Develop call off contracts with vendors.
organisation, to undertake, for instance, — Budget control.
chemo-stratigraphic and bio-stratigraphic analysis
of transition zones. 2.5.10 Rig selection deliverables
— Continue risk assessments in the light of the well
planning process. — Bridging document or JOM.
— Develop detailed costs for options and — Invitation to tender document.
contingencies. — Revised and verified procedures.
— Develop training procedures and implement — Evaluate performance against expectations.
training programme. — Cost control.
— Application for regulatory consent and any — Adoption of rig modification recommendations.
dispensations.
— Continue to refine budget and reporting procedures. 2.5.11 Safety planning
2.5.8 Well planning deliverables Safety planning in operations is described in detail in

section 7. The list of subjects below defines those issues
— Draft procedures and operating documentation. which the project manager may wish to include in the
— Recorded detailed costing analysis. management process although great emphasis should be
— All necessary vendor contacts in place or under placed on these tasks given the nature of HPHT wells.
review. A positive team attitude to these will increase the
— Training procedures. success of a delivering the well 'hazard free':
— Schedule of rig modifications/recommendations.
— Basis of design (BOD). — Review well health, safety and environmental
— Tri-axial casing design including trapped annulus. deliverables.
— Long lead 'exotic' material items list. — Drilling safety critical items checklist.
— Review HAZID / HAZOP: agree and initiate
2.5.9 Rig selection procedure’s methodology and documentation.
— Confirm readiness for operations/handover to wells
Rig selection is described in detail in section 6. team.
However the list of topics below defines those issues — Define equipment and procurement improvements.
which the project manager may wish to include in order — Familiarise wells delivery team with the safety plan
to successfully assess the role of the drilling contractor and ensure dissemination of the documents.
and that their safety and technical processes conform or — Perform HS&E training and demonstrate that team
mesh with the operator’s procedures. There may be members across all planning and operation work
considerable pressure to operations lead-time – rig have reached better than minimum standards of
availability which may incur cost penalties (contractor) competency.
or standby costs (operator). It must be emphasised that
these situations should not compromise Health, Safety 2.5.12 Safety planning deliverables
and Environment (HS&E); for instance, bringing in
another rig at short notice. It is therefore vital that rig — HS&E and safe well delivery plan.
selection should be an integrated part of planning.
— Review guidelines, procedures and detailed design 2.6 QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QUALITY
– align with rig requirements. CONTROL (QAQC)
— Prepare and execute trials in operational
environment – this may involve a shake-down well QAQC aids in the management of risk, the
of non HPHT specification in order to test identification of safety critical elements and the
operator-contractor operability. management of technical integrity. QAQC should be
— Conduct joint operator-contractor training. considered an all encompassing process throughout the
— Finalise procedures and guidelines joint operations HPHT project. HPHT technical and functional
13

performance standards should be fully communicated to 2.8 PLANNING REVIEW

all critical suppliers of people, products and services,
each of which can have an impact on the well integrity — A structured approach to reviewing the well plan.
and design. — Early identification of problem areas.
HPHT well equipment requires rigour in design — Provides for stakeholders to review and add to the
review, validation and quality assurance. A statement of project value.
requirements (SOR) can provide an audit trail and — Demonstrate alignment of the well plan with
support the management of change process (MOC) in business objectives.
meeting the principle of ALARP.
2.9 TRAINING AND LESSONS LEARNT

2.7 PEER REVIEWS
Figure 2.5 represents a general schematic of the well
These should be scheduled after major decisions. They learning process and how it fits with business and
should be documented and a methodology should be HS&E objectives. Technical excellence and best in
applied which captures the outcomes and class are linked to best practice in HS&E. Good
recommendations. Peer reviews should be conducted communication is essential for project success.
with recognised industry professional-experts in HPHT
planning and operations. It is good practice to seek
advice from experts who are not directly involved in the
project which will provide a more constructive and
objective analysis.
Business
Promoting a Learning
Organisation
Well Delivery
Team
HPHT Lessons Learnt

Well Planning Team &
Training
Technical HS&E
Excellence
Figure 2.5: Promoting a learning organisation; the well design team and their place in the wells team
14

Additional to that described in section 1, a formalised 2.10 SUGGESTED FURTHER READING

system of recording lessons learnt and training should
be introduced at the earliest time. It is suggested that the Bourque, J.G 2004 Management of Change Applied to
following work flow should be implemented: Well Engineering SPE 86702
— A formal procedure for capturing and Chapman C. and Ward, S. 2007 Project Risk
communicating lessons learnt. Management, Wiley ISBN-13: 978-0-470-85355-9
— Training programme and individual CPD
(continuing professional development). Davidson S. et al, 2006 Global HSE Standards for
— Team training which may include team building Global HSE Risks: Standardise, Simplify and Share
exercises. SPE 98512
— A 'user friendly' documentation and search facility.
This becomes especially significant after the Findlay K. and Al-Hassan T. 2000 Health and Safety
successful completion of the project and the team Performance in Design Management SPE 61055
is dispersed, so it is vital to capture tacit
knowledge. Flin R, and Slaven G, OTH 92374 The Selection and
Training of Offshore Installation Managers for Crisis
The successful team is generally the one that is most Management
informed and aware of current theory and best practice.
The reader is recommended to view Model Code of Peterson S.K, et al 2005 Risk and Uncertainty
Safe Practice Part 17, Volume 2: Well control during Management – Best Practice and Misapplications for
the drilling and testing of high pressure, high Cost and Schedule Estimates SPE 97269
temperature offshore wells and also Volume 3: High
pressure and high temperature well completions and Shivers III, R.M and Brubaker J.P. 1995 Development
interventions. Planning for the HPHT Erskine Field SPE 30370
15

16

3
WELL OBJECTIVES
3.1 KEY POINTS SUMMARY — HPHT wells are by definition high energy. Health,
Safety and Environment should be the priority well
— The principle of 'keep it simple' should point the objective. A full and thorough understand of the
team towards safe design and execution. Over drillability of the target formation is necessary.
complicated design with the deployment of untried
and untested equipment will lead inevitably to — HPHT development wells introduce additional
compromised well and safety objectives. issues. For example will there be early sand
production and early water break-through?
— Produce a well objective assessment; some of the Compromised well production will ensue if the
key points will include: production rates and volumes are not accurately
– The reason for drilling the well. factored into the completion design at the well plan
– Delivering a safe well. inception. Where the well is designed from
– The design should be flexible enough to reservoir to surface based on accurate initial
accommodate well logging, coring and testing. assumptions there is a reduced risk of
– The well plan should clearly state whether the compromising the well’s economic worth.
well is for exploration, appraisal or production.
HPHT well operational success is sensitive to — Minimise well interventions while at high pressure.
engineering changes. Well objectives should include minimal well
– Whether the proposed well is to be tested. interventions whether wireline (slickline), coil
– A clear understanding of the target and the tubing or work over. Increased frequency of well
well objectives is desirable. intervention automatically increases HS&E risk.
– The expected abnormal pressures. The effect
on casing design and contingency should be — Business aspirations should not exceed safe
clearly understood. working practice or push the well design,
– Mud design and mud logging requirements. construction and materials beyond their safe limits.
— HPHT exploration wells seldom if ever make good — Achieving a successful secondary target may well
production wells. HPHT wells can be unforgiving result in the primary well objectives being
especially if tubulars and surface equipment are not compromised which may affect the business
designed to handle successive thermal cycling or objectives. Choose a secondary target or targets (if
exceed expected design loads factored from the necessary) that will not affect delivery of the prime
original well objectives. well objective. Well integrity should never
17

knowingly be compromised. — Have there been any successful wells within a

reasonable distance from the proposed well
— The duration of the well operations with the development?
attendant high costs will require cost contingencies — Will the design be fit for the expected pressure and
and estimates above those normally expected on temperature regime?
standard wells. — Will the well be able to accommodate aggressive
formation fluids?
— HPHT wells are by their nature complex and — Will the design be flexible enough to accommodate
therefore require vigorous data control. well logging, coring and testing?
— Is the well planned for Exploration, Appraisal or
— The process of coring HPHT reservoir sections Production?
introduces increased levels of risk. Open-hole — Is the proposed well to be tested?
wireline logging will increase the risk of a well — Is there a clear understanding of the target and the
control incident. If the well plan includes the well objectives?
provision for formation sampling it will be — Does the well plan allow for production problems
necessary to restrict the volume flushed into the such as scale, wax, asphaltenes, CO2 and H2S?
well bore. There is evidence that running sampling — Is there a plan for sand production over the lifetime
tools has induced well control incidents. An of the well?
annulus pressure while drilling (APWD) tool in the — Will there be depletion issues if simultaneous
logging while drilling (LWD) suite is considered drilling and production are performed?
standard for HPHT wells.
Following on from these questions, more detailed yet
vital questions should be asked of the project. These
3.2 INTRODUCTION are:
This section addresses those questions the wells team — Where does the overpressure occur in the well?
may wish to consider in the planning of the HPHT Many HPHT wells have more than one
prospect. The importance of setting realistic yet precise overpressured area.
well objectives within the prevailing HPHT conditions — What is the magnitude of overpressure and is there
becomes one of the major challenges. Keeping within a sufficient drilling window?
the constraints of achievable objectives will provide a — What is the likelihood of wellbore instability and
clear focus on safe design and will aid the economic crucially where?
delivery of the well. The principle of 'keep it simple' — What are the risked costs?
should point the team towards safe design and — What will be the mud design, casing design and
execution. Over complicated design with the mud logging requirements?
deployment of untried and untested equipment will lead — What influence will coring requirements have on
inevitably to compromised well objectives. the safety case?
Once the fundamental well objectives have been — What type of logging requirement should be
established detailed planning can begin. It is worth planned – LWD or electric wireline logs?
considering peer reviews after this phase has been — If there is a need for a well test, then how should
completed. The following lists are by no means the tests be planned and executed: what are the
comprehensive but should be considered as a starting risks?
point. These topics have been highlighted as the — Have the completion and production targets been
minimum elements for safe practice in well delivery. factored into the design: what contingencies have
been put in place? Designing the well from the
bottom up is often seen as the most risk limited
3.3 WELL OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT way of achieving some of the well objectives.
— If production is concurrent with drilling in the same
Setting and delivering realistic targets can be achieved reservoir, will there be the need for managed
by a positive clear response to the following questions: pressure drilling and/or use of 'designer muds' i.e.
creation of very narrow, zero or even 'negative'
— Why are we drilling the well? drilling windows due to depletion?
— Is the well drillable?
In recent years there has been a trend towards using
18

WELL OBJECTIVES
wells as both exploration and production. HPHT improvement of specifications above API standards
exploration wells seldom if ever make good production to ensure high burst and collapse ratings. This can
wells. The time and effort needed to retrofit completions be critical to HS&E.
to wells that have been specifically designed for — Some HPHT operations require well suspensions
exploration may reasonably be expected to exceed the that require long term monitoring of the well
time/cost to re-plan and deliver a new production well. conditions. Special gauge technology for remote
HPHT wells can be unforgiving especially if tubulars fly-by monitoring may be required; however gauge
and surface equipment are not designed to handle failure is highly probable and where data are in
successive thermal cycling or exceed expected design doubt extra safety margins may be needed.
loads factored from the original well objectives.
Geological objectives – poor definitions (large error 3.4.3 'Drillability' of target
bars) will impact on drilling, testing and production
planning. Changes in geological objectives require The 'drillability' of a target is determined by two main
revisiting the well plan and safe practice plan with factors namely, equipment performance and the drilling
respect to both company and regulatory constraints. window (often defined as kick tolerance). Casings and
Sub-surface, drilling and productions teams must wellheads may not be available to meet the
co-operate in the HPHT planning process if a safe specifications of a well. The temperature and pressure
design is to be achieved. limits of downhole tools can be quickly reached which
can restrict or prevent directional work in some
environments. Extended Reach Drilling (ERD) or
3.4 WELL OBJECTIVES (GENERAL) horizontal HPHT wells can be greatly affected by this
limitation. The drilling window or kick tolerance
3.4.1 Health Safety and Environmental (HS&E) requires adequate separation between the formation’s
exposure pore pressure and fracture gradient. Such a separation
may not always exist. Cost and final borehole size may
HPHT wells are by definition high energy. HS&E also make a target uneconomical. However, primary
should be the priority well objective. (Refer to section consideration should be given to how safely the well
1 Introduction – for more details on HS&E and the can be drilled. Economics must be subordinate to
ALARP principle demonstrating how HS&E should be HS&E.
applied in the safe design and project execution.)
3.4.4 Sand production and early water
3.4.2 General break-through
The following points should be considered since HS&E Planning for sand control measures requires careful
may be compromised if these technical challenges are consideration. Sandstone which is initially very stable
not addressed at the beginning of the design process: under high pore pressure can become mechanically
unstable with pressure depletion. HPHT wells can
— There are now greater economic requirements to deplete rapidly leaving unsupported high pressure shales
use an exploration well bore for future side track and unstable sands. The well objectives should address
options to maximise production. This option can sand control requirements, whether gravel packing or
increase the loads on casing strings and wellheads, simple slotted liner, for the initial completion or accept
especially if future fracture stimulation is required. the risk of an early workover and re-completion to
Stress changes during production may affect address sand production. Early interventions and
borehole stability while drilling any side track. workovers while the pressures and temperature remain
Thermal cycling during production may high substantially increase the risk to safety. The risk of
compromise existing well integrity and therefore water break-through will influence the choice of
safety, as can excessive casing wear. completion depending on the requirement for water
— Many HPHT prospects are found in deep water, shut-off or prevention. Issues relating to fluid chemistry
which challenges conductor and riser designs. will also need to be addressed since aggressive fluids,
These deepwater HPHT prospects challenge further exacerbated by high temperatures, can cause early
the HS&E objectives. failure of equipment through e.g. corrosion or scale
— When designing suitable casing strings for HPHT deposition. Again, future workovers and interventions
wells, some well conditions may require the increase exposure to HS&E uncertainty and increase
19

safety risk. 3.5 GEOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES
3.4.5 Production and safety 3.5.1 Primary
Compromised well production will ensue if the Care should be taken not to compromise the primary
production rates and volumes are not built into the target for the sake of a secondary target. For example
completion design at the well plan inception. If initial in the North Sea, the Palaeocene is often seen as a
production assumptions and safety considerations are secondary target. Not taking the time to fully evaluate
properly considered, there is a reduced risk of this target can, and has, resulted in hole instability
compromising the well’s economic worth when which has compromised the casing setting depth which
completed. Not addressing the completion-production in turn, compromises reaching the primary target in the
design at the start can result in possible 'slim-hole' Jurassic.
completions which will in turn add risk by making Achieving a successful secondary target may result
intervention – if necessary – difficult, expensive and in the primary well objectives being compromised
leaving rig personnel open to compromised safety. which may affect the business objectives.
3.4.6 Minimise intervention while at high 3.5.2 Secondary

pressure
It is advisable to choose a secondary target(s) that will
Well objectives should include minimising well not affect delivery of the prime well objective. Often the
interventions whether wireline (slickline), coil tubing or decision is made to drill deeper thereby deviating from
workover. Braided line, because of its construction is the original model and while this may often work in
often best avoided. (cf. Model Code of Safe Practice, conventional wells, with HPHT well targets this can
Part 17, Volume 3: High pressure and high temperature seriously affect the well integrity, thereby
well completions and interventions.) Increased compromising safety through increasing the risk of
frequency of well intervention automatically increases underground blowouts. Similarly, care should be taken
HS&E risk. if a sidetrack option is to be considered either to a
secondary target or indeed the primary target itself.
3.4.7 Business objectives Well integrity should never knowingly be compromised.
Business aspirations should not exceed safe working

practice or push the well design, construction and 3.6 BUSINESS OBJECTIVES
materials beyond their safe working limits. HPHT wells
are by their nature complex and expensive therefore In any well planning process, whether HPHT or not,
some compromise on economic goals may be necessary. weighting should be given to safe execution of the
project with an emphasis on avoiding drilling or
3.4.8 Testing operational 'surprises'. Economic goals, operating
expenditure (OPEX) and capital expenditure (CAPEX)
When planning for HPHT well testing it is vital that should be considered subordinate to HS&E targets.
clear objectives are built into a robust work flow. The The duration of the well operations (with the
Wells Team should consider the following points: associated high costs) will require provision of cost
contingencies and estimates above those normally
— Using the ALARP principle, to initiate safe and expected on standard wells. Whenever a problem occurs
environmentally acceptable production of in an HPHT well, it is likely to require a much longer
hydrocarbons to surface. time and hence, higher risked cost before it can be
— Use of good practical isolation to maintain well resolved.
integrity.
— Ensure that chosen materials have acceptable risk
failure tolerances to variations in pressure and 3.7 EXPLORATION WELLS
temperature.
— Apply a minimum intervention approach. A clear understanding of the operational and safety risks
— Apply simplicity in the design principles – 'KIS' will help set realistic and achievable targets. If the well
(keep it simple). is solely proposed for information gathering the well
20

WELL OBJECTIVES
can be designed at reduced cost yet fulfil all safety — Temperature.

critical design requirements. The following list is typical — Logging while drilling (LWD) and measurement
for these purposes: while drilling (MWD) trends.
— Mud resistivity and calibrating logging tools.
a) Logging. — Pressure while drilling (PWD).
b) Coring.
c) Testing. In operations, best practice and attention to detail are
d) Abandonment. especially needed when approaching a transition zone
where changes in gas species and formation response to
the drill bit may be signals to rapid changes in formation
3.8 DEVELOPMENT WELLS pressures. This is especially critical where there is an
uncertainty surrounding forecast depths. Therefore
The following is a list of issues that can adversely affect planning of mud logging objectives should be given
well integrity during the production life of the well. careful consideration.
These issues should be addressed within the well
objectives. 3.9.2 Coring
a) Stress changes – (including sand production). The process of coring HPHT reservoir sections
b) Early water break-through. introduces increased levels of risk. There is a high risk
c) Tubing loads, packer fluids. of taking losses while running in hole and taking a kick
d) Fluid Chemistry, CO2 and H2S. while the core barrel is located in the section. The core
e) B Annulus. barrel can become stuck especially if accompanied by
f) Depletion. lost circulation. It is recommended that care is taken in
g) Cement integrity. planning for coring and that this activity should be kept
h) Thermal cycling. to a minimum. Consideration should be given to the
i) Work-overs and Interventions. length and diameter of the barrel. For example plan to
j) Abandonment. include a venting sub above the core barrel to help
reduce gas build up inside the barrel.
In addition the following should be addressed:
3.9.3 Logging and Sampling tools
— Compliance with company and regulatory barrier
philosophy. Using LWD and MWD tools as part of the bottom-hole
— Safe tie into existing infrastructure (interface assembly is recommended in preference to wireline
issues). logging. Interventions in the high pressure section carry
— Life of well operability and safety. with them increased risk. However reservoir evaluation
in HPHT environments remains a significant challenge
[Ref: Guillory (2005)].
3.9 DATA GATHERING Open-hole logging will increase the risk of a well
control incident. Provision and procedures for
3.9.1 Mud-logging requirements monitoring trip tank volumes are essential during all
wireline operations. If the well plan includes the
HPHT wells are by their nature complex and will provision for formation sampling it will be necessary to
require vigorous data control. Where full field restrict the volume flushed into the well bore. There is
development is involved, well objectives can be helped evidence that running sampling tools has induced well
by retrieval and analysis of data which will aid in the control incidents. Pipe conveyed logging tools should be
planning of the other wells. Therefore, careful attention given careful consideration as these can compromise
to detail should be exercised. Of particular importance BOP operability. Consideration should be given to
are: including a formation pressure test tool in the LWD
suite. An annulus pressure while drilling tool in the
— Cuttings analysis and sampling rates. LWD suite is considered standard for HPHT wells.
— D exponents. Once these fundamental well objectives have been
— Gas analysis (Change from C1/C2 to C3/C4/C5). established, detailed planning can begin. Adoption of a
— Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S). 'designing the well from the bottom up' philosophy will
21

greatly aid in design and functionality. It is 3.10 Suggested further reading

recommended that a completions engineer experienced
in HPHT should be consulted and that his or her Guillory C.M. 2005 Reservoir Evaluation Program
recommendations should provide input into the well Planning in HPHT Environments SPE 97570-MS
planning process. This will be especially significant
when planning HPHT wells for production.
22

4
PROJECT RISK
4.1 KEY POINTS SUMMARY methodology and that senior, experienced HPHT
engineers verify the outputs.
— Risk: can have many components and different
levels. Generally, risks can be defined as High Risk — Organisational failures: migrating conventional
where there are no personnel within the wells team well cultures to HPHT can increase the risk of
with HPHT experience and unproven technology is failure. Recycling designs or batch design
deployed. Medium-high risk, as before, but with philosophies do not work with HPHT well design
more familiarity with HPHT. Medium risk – having and these practices should be eliminated.
qualified testing for equipment and field experience
for personnel and good HPHT experience within — Human failures: failure to understand risks,
the team. Low-medium risk – proven design engineering limitations for equipment and poor
performance with qualified testing, project leaders training will result in heightened risk of failure,
and deputies are experienced HPHT engineers and both economic and more importantly HS&E. The
geoscientists. duty of care principle should form a core practice
within the wells team.
— Design: should be robust but simple with as few
components as possible. In addition to HAZID — In general: it is the geological uncertainties that
(hazard identification) use HAZOP to check produce the greatest concern for HPHT well
components, understand how the risks relate to one planning especially the setting depth of the
another and what the potential failure modes are. production casing shoe. In addition, where
production fluid properties are unknown a greater
— Equipment failures: in standard operations degree of risk attends well testing and production
equipment failure is still high. The addition of when hot aggressive fluids are produced at very
HPHT exacerbates this. Equipment work history high pressures.
and fit-for-purpose testing should be thoroughly
investigated and the results applied to the well — QAQC: this is a proven process being critical to
design. successful HPHT well design and operations.
— Software failures: it is crucial that software

programmes employed in HPHT design are viewed 4.2 INTRODUCTION
with caution. It is recommended that 'sense'
checking is employed as part of a QAQC Reference was made to project risk in section 1
23

Introduction. This section will examine the engineering greater pressure/temperature/depth applications and
risks in more detail with particular reference to HS&E. having passed industry/code performance/
What is meant by project risk? Risk can have many qualification tests. No further qualification testing
components and different levels. For instance, risk may required. Wells team members with considerable
involve the deployment of untried and untested HPHT planning and operations experience
equipment or may simply result from the turnover of constitute more than 50% of the total.
staff within the wells team. The former case can be
mitigated by eliminating that equipment through Risk management, in general, is a systematic process for
changes in the plan or introducing competent verified identifying, assessing, responding to, and documenting
equipment. The latter case becomes more problematic the risks (or threats) associated with a given activity
since sudden departures can cause knowledge gaps at such as project execution; with HPHT planning,
one level and result in un-sequenced planning decisions managing risk becomes a considerable portion of the
on another level. It follows therefore that detailed, project task.
recordable documentation should be standard at all
levels with an established audit trail for all actions
undertaken within the wells team. The following general 4.4 HPHT WELLS CARRY A HIGH
points can be made: PROBABILITY OF FAILURE
Design should be robust but simple with as few

4.3 GENERAL components as possible. These should have a record of
success and if not should be rigorously tested before
Assessing risk can usually be performed as a first use. In addition to HAZID (hazard identification) use
approximation using a matrix format, plotting risked HAZOP to check components and how they relate to
cost of failure against uncertainty or probability of each other. Using a rigorous approach at the early stage
failure where the plot can be arranged into the following of planning will identify problem areas.
broad risk boxes:
— High risk: use of new and unproven designs and 4.5 EQUIPMENT (HARDWARE) FAILURE
materials (especially materials which have not been
used in the oil and gas sector). Limited or unproven The majority of oilfield casing and tubular equipment is
tests of standard equipment or field experience not designed for HPHT environments. In standard
and/or where research data is limited. Where there operations equipment failure is still high. The addition
are no personnel within the wells team with HPHT of higher temperature and pressures take equipment
experience therefore, specialist engineers with specifications to the near limit of their operability. It is
HPHT experience should be deployed from the essential that good communications between operator
start of the project. If this is not possible then and supplier are established from the outset and that the
project sanction should be reviewed. vendor is fully aware of the likely well plan and
equipment use. Electronic components will suffer from
— Medium-high risk: as above but more familiarity the increased temperature and are likely to experience
with the O&G industry code performance and an increase in failure rates. Therefore simplicity of
qualification procedures. Few personnel with design is essential to reduce risk. Equipment work
relevant experience. history and fit for purpose testing should be thoroughly
investigated and the results applied to the well design.
— Medium risk: have qualified testing and field Additional quality assurance and quality control
experience. Good HPHT experience within the measures may be necessary during the manufacture and
team. supply of equipment.
— Low-medium risk: proven design performance with

qualified testing, Project leaders and deputies are 4.6 SOFTWARE FAILURE
experienced HPHT engineers and geoscientists.
Good operational knowledge. It is considered good practice to test the accuracy of
algorithms used in computer software, check the history
— Low risk: those identified as meeting the design of competence and accuracy in extreme environments –
basis by proven field performance in equal or
24

PROJECT RISK
verify the output of models against actual operational reasons for this failure. One good example of this may
results, input errors etc, (use of sense checking). be to overlook regional data garnered from different
Software tools impose their own logic that is applicable wells that highlight consistent failure or difficulty in
and efficient for the programme. It is recommended that achieving total depth (TD) due to adverse subsurface
once the software has been selected then its logic is conditions. These data can indicate for instance, well
followed and understood. Provided the methodology is bore stability problems or excessive pore pressure over
logical and thorough the end result should be and above the expected regional estimates. Documented
satisfactory. However it is recommended that 'sense' cases illustrate that new wells teams have been unaware
checking is employed and that senior, experienced of, or have failed to link these failures and question the
HPHT engineers verify the outputs. Peer reviewing accepted regional prognosis. This can result in the new
work outputs should also be considered, especially for well design not capturing the real lessons from offset
safety critical areas. wells. This can result in failure being built into the new
well.
Familiarisation with equipment and its limitations
4.7 ORGANISATIONAL FAILURE is essential. Wherever possible, equipment
specifications and the physical equipment must be
Organisations new to HPHT operations may not have checked during the well design process; at the
sufficient understanding of the issues related to procurement stage, then again at the shipping to rig
marginal drilling and completion operations. HPHT well stage. Often great care is taken on complicated materials
design and operations require a step change in reporting, or tools only for the casing or tubing string to fail during
documentation and training, requiring new economic testing due to a minor component such as a cross-over
models which need to accommodate the increased risk or elastomeric materials which fail at elevated
and the associated costs. Migrating conventional well temperatures or under combined or cyclic loading.
cultures to HPHT can increase the risk of failure.
Recycling designs or batch design philosophies does not
work with HPHT well design so these practices should 4.9 UNCERTAINTY ABOUT SUBSURFACE
be eliminated. Failure to plan, inform and execute AND HYDROCARBON PROPERTIES
information flow within the organisation will increase
risk and can directly impact HS&E. The use of the Whereas organisational and human failures can be
principle of ALARP will mitigate many of the potential addressed with some degree of success, it is often the
problems and allow a culture of safe and best practice to geological uncertainties that produce the biggest
develop. Each HPHT well is best viewed as an challenge to HPHT wells teams and management. For
individual bespoke project so that, in this way, example, altering the well plan to improve the drilling
complacency can be avoided. The notable exception to window; by moving down dip from the proposed
this is a development wells programme, where the drilling target on the crest of a structure. This can
opportunity arises to build significant team competence reduce well control risk, improve drillability and present
and remarkable improvements in execution can be an altogether much more achievable objective. Although
achieved. these changes may impinge on the economic case,
HS&E must have precedence over well economics.
Generally the following geological uncertainties
4.8 HUMAN FAILURE produce the greatest concern for HPHT well planning:
Clear reporting lines and detailed documentation should — Faults – changing pressure regimes across faulted
form part of the HPHT project culture. Failure to compartments.
understand risks, engineering limitations for equipment — Formation tops depth prognosis.
and poor training will result in heightened risk of — Pressure variations within a sequence.
failure, both economic and HS&E. The duty of care — Centroid effects (tall gas columns). Centroid effects
principle should form a core practice within the wells apply when inclined water-filled sand bodies are
team. enclosed by shales; if gas and/or oil exist then
During planning, for instance while interrogating additionally buoyancy effects apply.
offset well data, warnings of impending difficulties can — Sub-seismic events (transition zones and faults).
often get ignored and risk is carried onto the next phase — Pore-pressure prediction.
of planning or even into operations. There may be many — Fracture gradient calculations.
25

— Overburden gradients – depth, density log failure can occur and these difficulties will have a direct
integration. impact on safety. QAQC is a proven process being
— Transition zones between hydrostatic and abnormal critical to successful HPHT well design and operations.
pressures at short depth intervals. The success of applied QAQC procedures will depend
— Stress fields – wellbore stability (tectonic stresses). on:
— Loss zones (especially critical in the narrow
drilling window). — The degree and commitment of operator/
— Reactive clays (although not strictly a HPHT stakeholder/vendor participation.
problem these can cause problems if in — Accurate and effective communication.
combination with high pressures and temperatures). — Accurate and effective documentation.
— Bottom hole temperatures (cooling from mud — Effective observation, analysis and clarity of
circulation inducing fracturing). purpose.
— Aggressive fluids (increased safety risk). — A determination to challenge paradigms.
— Gas migration from blown (hydraulic) seals. — An ability to overcome project inertia.
— Salt structures – imaging.
— Depletion (negative drilling windows with The Well design team will need to identify
increased safety risk). safety-critical elements ensuring engineering excellence
— Compression forces (where the maximum stress is in qualification and testing in addition to manufacturing
horizontal). and inspections. Where untried or new design
— Composition of formation fluids: equipment has to be deployed, then use of
For instance, what are the expected CO2, H2S, methodologies such as failure mode effects and
Halides and hydrocarbon composition etc? criticality (FMECA) processes are recommended.
As part of the QAQC process the following
Use of probabilistic models combined with copious processes have been proven to capture and mitigate
research with the addition of detailed studies of offset problems:
wells can mitigate some of these uncertainties.
However, there are no substitutes for 'sense checking', — Drill well on paper (DWOP).
as a minimum, predictive work against regional or basin — Complete well on paper (CWOP).
models that are based on seismic interpretation and — Test well on paper (TWOP).
available offset well data.
These methodologies form part of the planning for
success process and will aid good safe practice which in
4.10 QUALITY ASSURANCE AND turn will improve project economics
QUALITY CONTROL
The preceding sections have outlined areas where
26

5
WELL PLANNING GOOD PRACTICE
5.1 KEY POINTS SUMMARY — Although not a specific HPHT problem, shallow
gas is still a significant safety risk and must be
— Geological uncertainty will influence much of accounted for. It has been recorded that a cluster of
conventional well planning. With HPHT wells high temperature production wells can super-heat
these uncertainties become acute since the wells the shallow formations for a considerable distance
operate at their technical limit. What is meant by around a platform. This has created several
safe practice in well design? One of the most difficulties when drilling subsequent wells. The
important prerequisites in the well design process design requirements for deep, high pressure
is understanding pore pressure and fracture gradient reservoirs may limit the options for design against
convergence coupled with the marginalisation of shallow gas.
technical options in HPHT well design. Good
forecasting, planning, modelling and risk analysis — The importance of good offset well data cannot be
are fundamental to safe design practice. overstated. Offset wells included in a data set
should be constrained to those that are geologically
— Amongst the critical path components for the relevant. It is considered good practice to revisit the
project’s successful execution are the accuracy of well data and verify them, especially on key offset
the subsurface target depths with casing seat wells. Formation testing and drill stem tests, the 'D'
selection critical for an HPHT well. This is affected exponent, resistivity, ROP and sonic logs can all
by errors in formation tops especially in the provide valuable input for analysis. Close
transition zones which will severely affect the well inspection of morning reports can often yield
plan. Accurate formation pressure and maximum important operational issues.
anticipated surface pressure are vital for safe
practice. There is a need for detailed hazard — Predictions are derived from a number of data
identification. There should be a more stringent sources and it is imperative to understand the
casing/tubing design criteria. Designs should be variations and errors upon which safe well designs
verified by tri-axial loading cases. are based. Large error bars will compromise the
well design, reduce HS&E safety and increase well
— An early decision will be required for the inclusion construction costs.
of completion test equipment. Lower completion
considerations, for instance open-hole, slotted liner — The wellbore temperature varies significantly
or screens, should be included in the planning between a static (geothermal) condition and the
phase. circulating of the mud system. Temperature change
27

can be very slow to stabilise. Any HPHT design Standard casing design techniques work very well
needs to predict an accurate maximum temperature when large safety margins exist and only a few
and temperature profile for the well. Rock strength basic calculations can be sufficient to confirm a
will increase with increasing temperatures. Cooling design. Examining multiple alternative designs is
by well fluids can cause fracturing. Temperatures an integral part of safe practice in HPHT
will decline very slowly while reservoir pressures engineering planning. Temperature modelling is a
may rapidly reduce. Temperature has a greater specific requirement for HPHT designs. Casing
effect on equipment than pressure, and high connectors can become a design weakness and
temperature wells suffer from hydrate formation must be included in the casing design process.
problems due to Joule-Thompson cooling effects. HPHT casing design requires a logical, step-wise
Reverse Joule-Thompson effects during production methodology. Standard casing design calculations
can produce bottom-hole temperatures (BHT) are seldom sufficient to prove a casing design for
higher than the initial reservoir temperature. HPHT conditions therefore advanced engineering
is required.
— Close margin drilling conditions require very
precise control of mud weight as expressed by
equivalent static density (ESD) and equivalent — HPHT conditions present several cementing
circulating density (ECD). All mud systems expand challenges. Cementing has yet to achieve optimum
when heated then contract when cooled. This design criteria for HPHT wells and until the
process will directly affect mud density and so the industry resolves many of the integrity issues
equivalent density experienced by the well. attention to detail and contingency planning are
required if longevity, integrity and well operability
— Good geomechanical modelling can only be are to be achieved.
reliably done through input from drilling
experience. Using geomechanical models has — The most efficient and best practice methodology
become common in order to reduce drilling is to design the completion first and then the well –
problems and reduce exploration risk. A good effectively designing the well from inside and out
geomechanical model will help: reduce non and from the bottom up. In the main, HPHT wells
productive time (NPT) – well-bore instability can require bespoke completion designs. They have
account for 40% NPT, reduce drilling surprises, specific problems with elevated temperatures and
increase reservoir performance, reduce the this must be factored into any design.
probability of casing shear and collapse, help
reduce bore-hole ballooning and increase the
accuracy of fracture gradient prediction. 5.2 INTRODUCTION
— Design trajectories need accurate geomechanical This section will tackle the well as a concept with the
modelling, fault characterisation, pressure key issues and components of data gathering, and risk
compartment characterisation, depletion rate and mitigation analysis. The application of good practice
spatial pressure distribution models. These are will help in ensuring best HS&E practices are applied.
vitally important if drilling, completion and Geological uncertainty will influence much of
production are simultaneous (impact on the conventional well planning. With HPHT wells these
economic model for field development). uncertainties become acute since the wells operate at
their technical limit. Therefore subsurface issues will be
— In general downhole equipment and BHA dealt with in more detail, but are intended to be viewed
components must be rated for the maximum from a safe practice perspective. The reader’s attention
anticipated temperature and pressure in the is drawn to the relevant further reading references in the
appropriate hole section. Mud motors with jetted appendices.
rotors may reduce any difficulty in reading SIDPP. Conventional planning is detailed below as
The drill string should be fitted with both a float described by Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) –
valve and a drop in dart sub. Petroleum Engineering Handbook Vol. II. Chapter 11
'Introduction to well planning'. This logical sequence
— Achieving optimum value for casings to meet outlines a generic planning process:
HPHT design requirements will often involve
pushing casing specifications to their design limits. a) Prospect development.
28

b) Data collection. be viewed as critical path components for the project’s

c) Pore-pressure analysis. successful execution:
d) Fracture prediction.
e) Pipe setting-depth selection. — Subsurface targets – casing seat selection is critical
f) Hole-geometry. for HPHT wells, errors in formation tops or target
g) Completion planning. depths, especially in the transition zones will
h) Mud plan. severely affect the well plan.
i) Cement plan – (bit programme). — Accurate formation pressure and maximum
j) Casing design. anticipated surface pressure.
k) Tubing design. — Detailed hazard identification.
l) Drillstring design. — A more stringent casing / tubing design that should
m) Rig sizing and selection – drill time projections – be verified by modelling using computer
cost estimation. simulations for tri-axial loading cases.
— A good cementing programme (cf. Life of well
Variations of this will depend on company policies and issues).
methodologies. The following text and sections examine — Fit for purpose material selection (especially
those issues pertaining to HPHT and introduce thermal performance of elastomers).
variations of the above. It is suggested that these data — Detailed well control planning.
should be considered as guidance and are not intended — Fit for purpose rig selection (cf. section 6).
to convey a rigid system or process.
What is meant by safe practice in well design? This
can be defined as designing an HPHT well fit for 5.4 PRE-COMPLETION AND COMPLETION
purpose and fulfilling the well objectives using the
principle of ALARP to reduce HS&E risk to an An early decision will be required for the inclusion of
acceptable level. What is understood to be an acceptable completion test equipment. (There is an impact on
risk is discussed in the introductory section. HPHT casing, ID weights and cement) therefore it is important
wells operate at the margins of technical feasibility, that this is included during the well planning/well
therefore rigorous planning is necessary. objective stage of planning. Lower completion
One of the most important prerequisites in the well considerations, for instance open-hole, slotted liner or
design process is the understanding and application of screens, should also be included in the planning phase.
pore pressure and fracture gradients to HPHT well Onset of early sand production during depletion is a
design; it is fundamental to safe design practice. How major planning consideration for HPHT wells where
these gradients change with depth or how they deviate interventions and work-overs should be kept to a
from 'normal' trends is key to good casing design, mud minimum.
design, material selection and contingency planning.
Further, an understanding of these parameters is
essential for mitigating the economic risk of high energy 5.5 SHALLOW GAS RISK
wells.
In addition to pore and fracture gradients, Although not a specific HPHT issue, shallow gas is still
temperature gradients and temperature abnormalities a safety problem and must be accounted for. However,
will have an enormous and often detrimental effect on if the project is an HPHT development field, the
the well viability and safe project execution. Increased increased number of wells in the platform or subsea
risk of failure will work in parallel with an increase in template may concentrate heat when production takes
temperature. There must be an unequivocal place. Further drilling may encounter shallow
understanding of how elevated temperatures impinge on conditions altered by the thermal input and therefore
equipment operability, how it reduces safety margins safe practice should take into account subsurface
and increases risk, and how temperature affects safety heating and any attendant change in the stress state of
critical equipment, cementing and well head integrity. the sediments (fracture flow). One case has been
recorded where a cluster of high temperature production
wells super-heated the shallow formations for a
5.3 GENERAL considerable distance around the platform. This has
created several difficulties when drilling subsequent
The key planning issues are listed below. These should wells.
29

5.6 OFFSET WELL DATA building in misinterpretations of previous data sets–

by reinterpreting offset data with reference to the
The importance of good offset well data cannot be planned well.
overstated. Offset wells included in a data set should be — Understand risks: Carry out risk analysis.
constrained to those that are geologically relevant. Any — Carry out analysis of potential show stoppers by
existing older analysis of these data may be unreliable examining the lithology and the extent of
and should be treated with caution. It is considered good abnormally pressured zones; these can be
practice to revisit the well data and verify them, established from the regional trend analysis. When
especially on key offset wells. The data should be new seismic is not available the old data sets
re-evaluated with modern analytical techniques, a should be re-processed to reduce depth
current understanding of HPHT issues and with a focus uncertainties. Old seismic interpretations, seismic
on the new well’s objectives. For example; leak-off tests stratigraphy, subsurface mapping should be viewed
(LOTs) are often misinterpreted as are formation with caution. Safe well planning and casing seat
pressure readings (RFT/MDT etc; such errors can be location depend on good data and reduced
very misleading during analysis. This is particularly true geological uncertainty.
for older offset wells. — Formation tops.
Offset well data can reveal trends and are extremely — Overburden.
useful, but their reliability and accuracy should be — Transition zone – error bars which are sub-seismic
viewed with caution with the examination from the (where the transition zone is narrower than the
daily reports providing a useful sense check. Simple resolution of the seismic survey and thus difficult
logic states that the greater the offset the less confidence to detect). The transition zones can be very sharp
should be put in the data sets, however it has been with pore pressures increasing from 1,2 SG (10 ppg
observed in some well planning that too much equivalent mud weight) to 2,3 SG (19 ppg
dependence has been placed on well data with offsets equivalent mud weight) in 75 m of vertical hole; at
over 500 Km in extreme cases. These are best viewed greater depths seismic uncertainty increases so the
from a regional basin analysis perspective. transition zone could be sub-seismic, e.g. below
Formation testing and drill stem tests, the 'D' seismic resolution.
exponent, resistivity, rate of penetration (ROP) and — Borehole stability.
sonic logs can all provide valuable input for analysis.
There does need to be a degree of interpolation between
the fracture gradient and the pore pressure since the 5.7 PORE PRESSURE PREDICTION
measurements for these take place in different
lithologies. For example formation testing will take Accurate pore pressure prediction is vital for safe well
place in a formation expected or predicted to have planning and operations. For areas without data control,
hydrocarbons e.g. sandstone, where formation integrity seismic inversion methods are the main source of
tests (FIT) and leak off tests (LOT) are generally taken prediction but this prediction may contain substantial
in shale/mudrocks. errors depending on the quality of the data. For areas
An element of risk will attend all drilling with offset well data, drill stem tests (DST) and repeat
operations; with HPHT wells that risk is increased. To formation tests (RFT)/MDT* provide excellent control
mitigate these increased risks as many data sets and points for prediction.
analysis as possible should be employed: Much of pore pressure prediction rests on the basis
— Mitigate geological uncertainty by using of anomalous porosity i.e. higher porosity at depth than
established regional pore pressure, fracture gradient would be expected from normal compaction models.
and temperature trends. For offset wells be aware The use of seismic inversion methods coupled with the
of the decrease in certainty and accuracy with integration from well data such as sonic travel times
increasing offset. (sonic logs) can yield good results. These techniques
— There are existing pressure studies and these can be can be unreliable in formations such as evaporates or
used to establish well correlations, however it sandstone especially where overpressure is not
should be noted that much data based information porosity/compaction related; results should be treated
could contain errors but this can be cross checked with caution where these are present in significant
by careful examination of daily reports. Avoid quantities.
* Repeat formation tester (RFT) and modular formation dynamics tester (MDT) are attributed to Schlumberger.
30

However, for HPHT environments, inaccuracies exploration and since the 1990s in production for
and uncertainties in pore pressure perdition can deliver monitoring reservoir fluid and stress behaviour (4D and
onerous operational outcomes. Even small errors, 4C). It is a complex subject with new innovations
especially where the drilling window is narrowest, can adding value and accuracy for exploration and
lead to a greater risk of severe high pressure kicks. It is production. As noted above seismic data are regularly
therefore essential to plan for deploying real time used for pore pressure prediction and the planning team
pressure prediction methods during operations in order must understand the limits of these processes in order to
to mitigate these uncertainties. make safety assessments for the well objectives, well
Predictions are derived from a number of data design and casing points. In addition there needs to be
sources and it is imperative for safe operations to an understanding of reservoir depletion issues, with the
understand the variations and errors and to plan for attendant stress changes, which is required for life of
mitigation. It is not within the scope of this document to well objectives.
discuss abnormal pressure in detail. Therefore it is
recommended that the reader refers to the reference
section for works that cover this topic in detail. These 5.10 DETERMINISTIC AND PROBABILISTIC
include valuable case studies. MODELS
These models attempt to integrate the above information

5.8 FRACTURE GRADIENT EVALUATION and are reliant on empirical data which have been
derived from specific geographical areas with variable
Accurate determination of fracture gradients is as geology. Care is needed to understand how and where
essential as pore pressure prediction for good, safe and these data have been sourced and those differing from
economic well planning. The accuracy of the fracture regional analyses are input into the model: using Gulf of
gradient prediction becomes critically important through Mexico data for the North Sea for example.
the overpressure transition zone and into the reservoir Over-reliance on such data where there is an element of
section. Severe losses in this area can lead to potentially doubt concerning the input to the chosen algorithms
dangerous well control risk. Formation integrity test could have serious consequences for well design safety
(FIT) and leak off test (LOT) results from offset wells and economic performance. However, a calibrated
are excellent data sources for assessing fracture geomechanical model can provide significant input:
gradients; however they should be used with care since wellbore stability during drilling and production, solids
they only represent an approximation of the magnitude production prediction for various completion scenarios
of the least principal stress; fracture gradients are often and related casing failure, compaction/subsidence and
depicted as one continuous curve and this is misleading related casing failure, fracture/fault reactivation.
where alternating shales and sandstones are However given the constraints and uncertainties, it
encountered. FIT data are less reliable than LOT data is vital to determine as accurate a forecast as possible so
when estimating formation strengths. Care should be this can feed into surface equipment specifications
exercised when employing algorithms developed from especially safety critical equipment such as BOPs.
empirical data for geographically different areas. The These should at the very least provide a first pass
accuracy of formation integrity test, leak off tests and determination of expected maximum anticipated surface
extended leak off test may need to be investigated and pressure (MASP).
rigorous interrogation of offset data is recommended.
Because of the reduced drilling window fracture
gradient prediction becomes a matter of great 5.11 TEMPERATURE
importance for well integrity. Geomechanical modelling
can mitigate some of the uncertainties where wellbore Temperature has an important dynamic effect in the
stability problems pose a serious risk to operations. The wellbore and its role becomes very important in HPHT
cost of this should be weighed against safety risk and environments Temperature represents special
drilling difficulties in the 12¼" and 8½" sections. operational challenges. The wellbore temperature varies
significantly between a static (geothermal) condition
and the circulating of the mud system. Temperature
5.9 SEISMIC change can be very slow to stabilise. This can be
illustrated by the time taken for the well to go from
Seismic surveys play a vitally important role in circulating temperature profile back to the static profile,
31

a process that can easily take many days. However, the that if there is a necessity for more complex equipment
temperature change can initially be very rapid. Dramatic that these are rigorously tested and qualified before use.
effects can be observed within the mud system during
the first 30 minutes of stopping circulation. Temperature
change has a major impact on fluid properties such as 5.12 WELL BORE STABILITY
mud weight, PVT properties and rheologies. (GEOMECHANICAL MODELLING)
Thermal effects may also complicate kick
detection. When the mud system and any annular fluids Accurate geomechanical modelling can only be
experience heating there will be flow from the well due performed through having input from drilling
to the thermal expansion of the mud system, but any experience. In order to reduce drilling problems and
trapped annular fluids will expand causing a pressure reduce exploration risk use of geomechanical modelling
build up. In cases where there is a choke for maintaining has become commonplace. The issues are not just
a constant surface pressure, an increase in wellbore HPHT specific, but in the HPHT environment drilling
pressure may be experienced. activities work closer to the geomechanical limit of
The main sources of formation temperature data formations, usually deeper, often in tectonically stressed
are: formations. This is further complicated by large
— Basin analysis. temperature changes that have greater impacts from
— Known regional geothermal gradients. geomechanical failures.
— Offset well information (extrapolation of log data). A good geomechanical model will help to:
Any HPHT design needs to predict an accurate — Reduce non productive time (NPT) – well-bore
maximum temperature and temperature profile for the instability can account for 40% non productive time
well. Temperature forecasts often assume a linear (NPT).
gradient, this is an incorrect generalisation. A more — Reduce drilling surprises – Safety issue.
accurate profile can often easily be prepared and goes — Increase reservoir performance.
some way to reducing at least one of the inaccuracies in — Reduce the probability of casing shear and collapse
well planning: – Safety issue.
— Help reduce bore-hole ballooning – Critical safety
— Rock strength will increase with increasing issue.
temperatures. — Reduce wellbore instability, losses, sidetracks and
— Cooling by well fluids can cause fracturing. the necessity for under reaming.
— Temperatures will decline very slowly while — Increase the accuracy of fracture gradient
reservoir pressures may rapidly reduce. prediction (see 5.8 discussion on fracture
— Temperature has a greater effect on equipment than gradients).
pressure. — Increase the understanding of faults and their effect
— Thermal cycling during production can cause on drilling (see 5.15 Design trajectories).
materials to fatigue and fail.
— Elastomers can become brittle and fail as The understanding of geomechanical impacts from
temperatures increase. depleted reservoirs is in its infancy and rapidly
— High temperature wells suffer from hydrate becoming a significant issue as more HPHT fields are
formation problems due to Joule-Thompson developed. Whether this is for mitigation of sand
cooling effects. production, reservoir collapse or shale displacement or
— Rapid changes in BHT have been used to detect for infill drilling, assisting with remedial sidetracks etc,
over-pressure and warn of impending kicks. the impacts are proving to be quite severe.
— Reverse Joule-Thompson effects during production
can produce bottom-hole temperatures (BHT)
higher than the initial reservoir temperature. 5.13 WELL BORE STRENGTHENING –
FLUIDS ENGINEERING
Permanent equipment exposed to long term elevated
temperature will be at greater risk of failure, this being Advances in mud engineering have meant that the
especially true of gauges using electronic components. ability to tackle difficult drilling conditions has become
Due to the nature of these conditions it is recommended more common. There are a number of techniques to
that such equipment is kept as simple as possible and mitigate drilling problems and some of these have been
32

used on HPHT developments. Overall they have had a — Good seismic data and interpretation – 3D and 4C
positive effect on safety. For more information and if possible.
discussion see Annex B – Managed pressure drilling — Accurate formation top depths: minimising the
(MPD) and fluid engineering. error bar for successful shoe placement.
— Fault characterisation.
— Pressure compartment characterisation.
5.14 DEPLETION — Depletion rate and spatial pressure distribution
models – Important if drilling, completion and
All reservoirs will suffer from depletion at some time in production are simultaneous (Economic model for
their productive life, however with HPHT reservoirs it field development).
is the rate and magnitude of the depletion and the fact
that HPHT reservoirs start at much higher energy levels Avoid faults if at all possible; this will help avoid liner
that make exploitation so challenging. As the reservoir deformation during life of field.
fluids deplete the stresses initially carried by the There are limited possibilities to steer above certain
reservoir pore fluids are transferred to the rock matrix temperatures, although downhole tools are constantly
(grain to grain support i.e. the effective stress); [Ref: being improved. Operational risks are reduced on
Mouchet and Mitchell (1989)]. The magnitude of this several levels when the 'lowest dog leg possible'
depletion can be surprising with 100 bar (10 MPa, 1450 principle is applied.
psi) depletion per six months being noted; [Ref: Fambon Simplified S-shape/J shape trajectories will also
and Joffroy (2008)], which will depend on the number reduce risk. When high angle elaborate profile well
of wells drilled. The produced formations reduce in pore trajectories are needed, geomechanical modelling and
pressure while the cap rock and inter-bedded shales detailed hole-stability studies become an essential focus
remain at abnormal pressures. that will impact many areas of well planning.
Other formations at high virgin pressures may exist The reader is referred to Zoback (2008) and Fjaer
below the producing formation too; therefore drilling et al (2008) for further detailed information and
into this 'pressure sandwich’ requires careful planning. explanations.
These environments often prove difficult and activity is
at or near the technical limit with attendant increased
risk to well integrity. For instance early sand production 5.16 DRILLING FLUIDS SYSTEMS AND
can cause severe erosion and may compromise CONSIDERATIONS
down-hole safety valves and well-head trees during
production. In addition liners can become distorted or It is not within the scope of this document to discuss
sheared as stress changes take place in response to drilling fluids in detail; however, there are
production related settlement of the reservoir. These considerations which require careful attention for HPHT
stress changes can also cause re-activation of faulting. drilling operations such as a barite sag event and its
It is not certain as yet how far from the reservoir these effect on primary well control. Water-based, oil-based
changes may be felt; however it is worth noting that and formate muds (Formates being sodium, potassium
planned new wells in the vicinity of a producing HPHT and caesium) are in common use in HPHT wells.
field may be subject to extraneous stresses (and pore It is recommended that liaison with the Mud
pressures) which have not been allowed for in the Company should occur as early as possible in the
design: a possible source of concern for safety planning process and details of the well objectives fully
management. For more information and discussion see communicated. Where possible, an understanding of the
Annex B - MPD and fluid engineering. expected geology such as changes in lithology should
also be made known.
It is important to model mud rheologies using
5.15 DESIGN TRAJECTORIES hydraulic modelling especially in the transition zone.
Equivalent circulation density (ECD) studies and
This section follows on from 5.8 where the outputs from anticipated gas are needed as part of the well plan; in
the geomechanical models can help with planning or general terms the drilling fluids should be capable of
designing deviated well paths. handling the following:
Successful trajectory design and implementation is
dependent on: — Control reactive shales.
— Accurate geomechanical modelling. — Bore-hole cleaning.
33

— Gas cut detection and gas handling. when heated and contract when cooled. This
— Finger printing. process will directly affect mud density and so the
— Maintaining bore-hole integrity. equivalent density experienced by the well.
— Particle drop out (e.g. Barite Sag). — Different mud systems are also compressible to a
— Temperature changes. greater or lesser extent and this too, will affect the
equivalent density in the well. The viscosity of a
Where high mud weight is required to maintain mud will vary with temperature, which can have a
overbalance in overpressured zones this can be achieved significant impact on ECD. For example oil-based
by incorporating high density materials such as muds have a higher expansion factor than water-
haematite and manganese tetraoxide or by using high based muds and this can lead to pressurisation of
density brines. Addition of such additives or use of the annulus. To overcome these phenomena mud
brines must be modelled especially for casing shoe weights are expressed relative to a pre-determined
integrity where long sections are necessary or where a base line temperature using a density/temperature
bore-hole section requires conflicting mud-fluid correlation chart.
properties. Careful hydraulic modelling is also required,
especially where high temperature formations are In general, the advantages and disadvantages of the
drilled. Note should be taken of any fluid problems differing mud systems can be summarised as shown
encountered for similar wells in the offset well analysis. below:
Intrinsically, muds for HPHT need the following
considerations: 5.16.1 Water-based mud (WBM) – advantages
— Whether oil-based mud or water-based mud usage — Temperature and pressure have less effect on
is likely to be determined before other well design weight.
criteria have been formalised. There are several — Easier to detect influx and no late gas breakout.
advantages and disadvantages to both. In addition — Current legislation in the UK still allows offshore
more exotic and expensive muds are in use disposal of cutting (injection).
involving formate brines and ultra-fine
barite-polymer mixtures. 5.16.2 Water-based mud (WBM) – disadvantages
— Oil-based muds can be synthetic, oil, or invert
emulsions and can include the ultra fine — Much higher risk of differential sticking.
barite-polymer systems. Water-based muds can be — Higher risk of borehole instability.
the traditional bentonite and polymer systems and — Much more difficult to maintain.
can also include the ultra fine barite-polymer — Higher rheologies – equivalent circulating densities
systems. Both can accommodate alternative (ECD) and gel strengths.
weighting materials e.g. haematite, manganese — Higher friction co-efficient for deep and sometimes
tetraoxide, etc, principally used to reduce solids deviated wells.
content and improve mud rheology.
— As part of the selection process, due consideration Generally, water-based muds have more thermal
must be given to the temperature stability of all limitations than synthetic (SBM) or oil-based muds
components in the formulations. Operations at such (OBM). Heavy reliance is placed on bentonite for
elevated temperatures can degrade certain filtration and rheology control. At HPHT conditions,
chemicals whether in oil- or water-based mud WBM bentonite-rich slurries begin to flocculate. This
systems. These problems can be identified by coupled with temperature induced gelation and with the
carefully designed laboratory investigations. increased risk of CO2 contamination for overpressured
— Oil-based muds can pose some difficulties with gas formations, makes WBM less attractive. Gelation can
kick detection, due to the influx of gas remaining result in well control problems as gas can accumulate
below the bubble point until nearly at surface below a gelation 'plug'.
where at reduced pressure, it will undergo a rapid By eliminating additives such as lignite or lignite
expansion. These conditions can severely derivatives from WBM and reducing bentonite
compromise rig response and evacuation time. concentration some of the disadvantages of WBM can
— Close margin drilling conditions require very be overcome. These conventional additives can be
precise control of mud weight as expressed by replaced by synthetic polymers and copolymers which
equivalent static density (ESD) and equivalent are more thermally stable thereby reducing gelation.
circulating density (ECD). All mud systems expand
34

5.16.3 Oil-based mud (OBM) advantages corrosion in expensive tubulars and equipment should
also be factored into cost estimates. Note that cost
— Very inhibitive. penalties may equally apply for other mud types which
— Lower ECD. use the ultra fine barite-polymer.
— Low filtrate and minimal filter cake. Attention should also be paid to the increasing
— Chemically very stable. amount of emerging environmental regulation which
— Low maintenance. may have been brought into force during the planning of
— Good lubricity. the mud programme. Any changes could impact on the
HPHT design and even a small change may have
5.16.4 Oil-based mud (OBM) – disadvantages significant effects in operability and design criteria.
— Weight varies with temperature and pressure due to

oil compressibility. 5.17 BIT SELECTION
— Gas soluble in OBM – more difficult to detect an
influx and gas breaks out of drilling fluid very late. The type of bit selected in drilling operations will
— Requires full containment offshore, or equipment to determine the penetration rate and the life of the bit.
allow cuttings discharge at <1% oil. This is also of importance when using the 'D' exponent
as an operational predictive tool. Formations with
5.16.5 Formates – advantages HPHT environments have higher compressive strength
and shear strength in comparison with 'normal' drilling
— Ability to deliver optimised well productivity (low conditions. The degree of overbalance will affect the
formation damage in some cases). rate of penetration; however with an overpressured
— Elimination of barite sag (depending on brine type). formation a thousandth of an inch is removed per bit
— Reduced circulating pressure losses – Low rotation compared to a hundredth of an inch per bit
potential for differential sticking (very thin filter rotation under normal drilling conditions.
cakes). Optimum drilling conditions in HPHT
— Low equivalent circulating densities (ECD). environments can be achieved using PDC/TSP
— Lower swab and surge pressures. (diamond compact) bits and with the use of turbines
— Better kick detection and faster flow-checks. vibration can be reduced. It is recommended that when
— Maximum power transmission to mud motors and planning HPHT operations the bit manufacturers should
bits. be consulted and allowance made for elevated
— Inhibition of hydrate formation. temperatures and pressures as well as aggressive
— Non-hazardous. formation fluids; these conditions may impact on
— Biodegradable and posing little risk to the material selection.
environment. NB: Tripping in an HPHT environment is viewed
— High HS&E benefits. as presenting a high degree of risk. Tripping is also very
slow and expensive. For this reason, bits are generally
5.16.6 Formates – disadvantages: selected for their longevity over their pure rate of
penetration (ROP) performance.
— Use of formates incurs a cost penalty especially if
caesium formate is used.
— Some long open-hole sections with high shale 5.18 DRILL STRING DESIGN
content have been adversely affected by caesium
formate with bore-hole enlargement observed. The reader is referred to the Model code of safe
— Bore-hole enlargement has been observed in some practice, Part 17, Volume 2: Well control during
long open-hole sections with high shale content drilling and testing of high pressure, high temperature
when using caesium formate fluids. (Fluid vendors wells for a more detailed discussion.
should be consulted and given full information as In general downhole equipment and bottom-hole
to the expected sub-surface conditions.) assembly (BHA) components must be rated for the
maximum anticipated temperature and pressure in the
However the high cost may be offset against the appropriate hole section. Those items with elastomer
mitigation of non productive time (NPT) caused by components must be compatible with the mud system at
drilling problems. In addition, the reduced risk of the applicable pressure and temperature.
35

In order to reduce equivalent circulating density closed with drop balls.

(ECD), swab and surge problems, a light (short) BHA The drill string should be fitted with both a float
should be used with an emphasis on heavy weight drill valve and a drop in dart sub. The wireline retrievable
pipe (HWDP) at the expense of drill collars. This will dart should always be available for immediate
also reduce influx height and BHA handling time. Spiral deployment and rated for the maximum anticipated
groove drill collars are preferred over slick collars to down-hole pressure and temperature. If a circulating sub
reduce differential sticking risk. is used, the dart sub must be situated above.
Crossovers are weak points prone to fatigue failure
and should always be reduced to the minimum number 5.18.1 Kick assembly
required for any given drill string configuration.
Crossovers should at least match or exceed the A drilling stand should be used when drilling in
minimum material specification of the components they abnormally pressured hydrocarbon bearing formations
join. Long crossovers are preferred over short with the potential for high severity kicks. The purpose
crossovers. IDs and ODs should match, if possible or of the drilling stand is to facilitate the installation of a
long tapers used for the transition. Step changes in OD kick assembly. This should be made up and pressure
and ID are not acceptable. tested and set back in a position convenient for
Note that: installation in the drill string at any time.
The purpose of this assembly is to facilitate high
— The drilling stand (if used) should be pressure pressure pumping that may be needed during a well
tested as part of the BOP testing schedule. killing operation. If pump pressures exceed the rated
— Only premium class drill pipe should be pressure of the mud pumps, or pump rates drop below
considered. what can be sustained by the mud pumps, then the kill
assembly allows the top drive to be isolated and
Drill pipe hardbanding should be smooth, flush or pumping to continue through the side entry sub using a
nearly flush and in good repair, to minimise casing high pressure kill pump. The cement pump is normally
wear. Nearly flush hardbanding must be no more than upgraded to 1 035 bar (103,5 MPa, 15 000 psi) working
c" proud and tapered to eliminate sharp edges to reduce pressure and a high pressure line installed to the rig
annular damage during stripping. Alloy hardbanding is floor to meet this requirement.
preferred over tungsten carbide hardbanding due to the This assembly should have all internal shoulders
reduced casing wear rate. Tungsten carbide bevelled to allow free passage of the drop in dart,
hardbanding, if used, must be smooth, flush and in pressure rated to above the maximum anticipated
excellent repair. surface pressure, tensile rated to match the drill pipe and
In general, hardbanding should reduce casing wear, included in the BOP pressure testing schedule.
not damage the annular during stripping, and have The length and configuration of this assembly
sufficient coverage on the tool joint to distribute the side should be adjusted to suit the space out requirements for
loading forces to the casing. the well. In general the configuration should allow drill
Plastic coatings, although providing better pipe to be spaced out and hung off on a BOP ram, the
hydraulics and corrosion resistance, should be verified top drive made up and used for low pressure kills and
for coating stability and wear so as to avoid any easy access to the side entry sub to connect the high
plugging. Recent developments in internal pipe coating pressure line for high pressure kills.
have brought significant improvement in wear
resistance and may be worth considering. 5.18.2 Safety subs
Mud motors with jetted rotors may reduce any
difficulty in reading shut in drill pipe pressure (SIDPP). A full opening safety valve (FOSV) and an inside BOP
Bits should be run with large jet nozzles to permit the must be available on the rig floor at all times with
pumping of lost circulation material (LCM) or suitable connections or crossovers to fit every
emergency plugs. component of the drill string. Both these valves must be
The use of a circulating sub just above the BHA for pressure rated to above the maximum anticipated
the emergency pumping of high concentration LCM or surface pressure. Some prefer to use a drop in dart sub
densified cement slurries is recommended. There is a with a pre-installed dart in place rather than the inside
range of circulating subs that provide large diameter BOP. The FOSV and any crossovers must be drifted for
ports facilitating circulation between the drillpipe and the drop in dart.
the annulus. Some have ports that can be opened and
36

5.18.3 Circulating head to the surface; therefore start with the depth targets from
the well objectives.
A circulating head must be available on the drill floor Economics and deliverability for HPHT casing may
with suitable connections or crossovers to fit every prove problematical especially if compatibility with
component of the drill string. The circulating head company stocks is challenging. If specific fit for
should be rated to above the maximum anticipated purpose HPHT casing grades are needed pre-order lead
surface pressure and should be compatible with the high time on specific materials may be lengthy and therefore
pressure pumping line that is available on the rig floor. they require more time for delivery. Contingencies
should also be factored in at the design stage. Standard
casing design calculations are seldom sufficient to prove
5.19 CASING DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS a casing design for HPHT conditions therefore
advanced engineering is required. In addition vendors
Achieving optimum value for casings to meet HPHT may require more detailed input as to the use of their
design requirements will often involve pushing casing products.
specifications to their design limits. Standard casing
design techniques work very well when large safety
margins exist and only a few basic calculations can be 5.20 CASING: SAFETY FACTORS
sufficient to confirm a design. However when designing
HPHT wells tolerances are close to the limits of The following is a description of issues which need to
available oilfield tubulars with many of the load cases be addressed in casing design. Generally, casing design
requiring complex engineering calculations in order to in HPHT requires a much more vigorous procedure and
verify the design. Examining multiple alternative detailed mathematical modelling is often required.
designs is an integral part of safe practice in HPHT Safety and integrity of casing is of prime importance.
engineering planning.
Notwithstanding the considerations as outlined in 5.20.1 Burst
section 3.3, it is recommended that a proprietary casing
design computer programme is deployed. Such Casing will be subjected to burst pressure throughout
programmes ensure that a rigorous, step-wise process is the life of the well. Erosion and corrosion will degrade
followed which should highlight any specific difficulties casing strength and its ability to resist pressures;
quickly. There are several suitable design programmes therefore API (API Bulletin 5C2) recommends 90% of
in use today; many companies have their own bespoke the minimum yield as a safety factor. However with
programme and these can be further enhanced by using HPHT wells, safe practice dictates that an allowance for
quality assurance and quality control (QAQC) processes temperature should be made too. Burst rating of tubulars
linked with the design process. reduces with increasing temperature. De-rating factors
Temperature modelling is a specific requirement for vary from 5% to 10% at 149°C (300°F) for carbon steel.
HPHT designs. There should be a mandatory These de-rating factors will vary with material
requirement to evaluate the effects of temperature composition. However consultation with the
weakening on all steel tubulars in order to comply with manufacturer is recommended.
safe practice and the principle of ALARP. Modelling
should be used to assess steel expansion and contraction 5.20.2 Collapse
(tension and compression) due to temperature change.
Evaluating wellhead growth and the thermal pressure Trapped annulus pressure (TAP) is a safety related risk.
changes which act on trapped annular fluids is also TAP could result in collapsed production casing and
required. Temperature profiles can be generated from a collapsed or failed tubing. Such failures are catastrophic
number of commercially available simulators providing leading to not only loss of production but also potential
input to complex thermal calculations. Casing hydrocarbon escape and very high risk to rig personnel.
connectors can become a design weakness and must be TAP is caused by the high temperature of the
included in the casing design process. produced fluid heating the production annulus and so to
HPHT casing design requires a logical, step-wise the peripheral annuli, (production casing to intermediate
methodology. However the design process can become casing, and intermediate to surface casing). These are
compromised and therefore rigour should be employed commonly referred to as the 'B' and 'C' annuli. The
in the project management of the process. The safe temperature increase in these peripheral annuli cause the
practice approach is to work from the bottom of the well expansion of the fluid in that annulus which can lead to
37

a build up of extreme pressures which can then result in and elevated temperatures will further reduce the
collapse. This is most often a long-term production material strength.
issue but can occur in extended well tests.
Current practice is to rely on leaving the formation 5.20.5 Casing wear
exposed below the casing shoe by limiting top of
cement during the primary cement job. However, this The effect of casing wear should not be underestimated
can be difficult to achieve especially if there is mud in HPHT wells, therefore careful planning is needed to
deterioration resulting in barite drop out which can plug reduce deviations, dog legs and hang-ups. At increased
the annulus thereby preventing pressure release to the well angles hard banding on drill pipe can severely
exposed formation. In addition the heating during compromise casing strength with rapid wear thereby
production can result in an increase in the apparent reducing the yield and pressure integrity. The following
strength of the rock. points should be addressed:
Annulus pressure build up remains the cause of
several catastrophic well failures. Several wrong a) Trajectory.
assumptions can be made in the well design (for b) Hard banding (must be smooth and undamaged).
example wrong pressure, volume and temperature c) Drill pipe wear protectors.
properties, wrong temperature predictions, wrong TOC, d) Ditch magnets.
soil conductivity and proximity to nearby wells, etc), e) Wear bushing inspections.
which can cause annulus pressure build up to be higher f) Drill pipe tool joint wear.
than anticipated. g) Casing calliper logs (ultra-sonic wall thickness logs
TAP is more of a problem for sub-sea wells since are limited by high mud weights – high solid
surface wellheads can be accessed more easily for any contents).
pressure increase to be bled off. h) Tie-back requirements.
To prevent barite dropout (barite sag) and plugging,
some operators bullhead clear fluid into the annulus. Casing wear modelling is normally applied to identify
Field experience to date with this procedure has been the level of risk that casing wear might impose. The
encouraging. results are often used to confirm trajectory planning,
wear protector requirements and the allowance that
5.20.3 Tension should be included in the casing design. Wear
modelling will often be repeated several times during
There are variations, depending on source, of what the drilling of the well to confirm that the actual well
safety factor to apply. Again, API standards should be trajectory and measured dog legs do not exceed the
consulted and extra allowance made for temperature. wear allowance.
Both the intermediate and production casing on typical A single high localised dog leg (a high dog leg over
HPHT well designs are extremely heavy and often a very short distance) shallow in the well can be
approach or exceed 500 tonne (~1 000 000 lbs). When sufficient to accelerate wear sufficiently to compromise
lifting these casings off the slips and when stopping pressure integrity.
downward travel significant shock loadings can result, Wear can be increased as a result of any of the
which can exceed the casing or casing connector following: under-reaming, sidetracking, abrasive
specification. Repeating this several times during casing particles in the mud (haematite), excessive tripping and
runs could mean that fatigue will become significant excessive wireline runs. Wear modelling programmes
and therefore, an allowance should be made for this do not always factor in these wear mechanisms.
loading in the design. In addition, running speed should The well planning team need to understand:
be restricted and control exercised over the rate at which
pipe accelerations are applied. — The expected hydrocarbon chemistry.
— The sour service requirements.
5.20.4 Yield strengths — The use of NACE Guidelines – Reference NACE
– MR 01-75/ISO 15156-31:2003 Cor.2:2005 (E) 1
A super heated gas with high partial pressures of H2S – Published Sept 2005 or later as a guideline.
and CO2 will increase the rate of corrosion. Expected
well fluids, well pressures and temperatures should be 5.20.6 Wellhead and BOP loading
conveyed to the manufacturers. Temperature alone will
reduce yield strength but the combination of these gases Surface well head systems, still the most common for
38

HPHT production wells, require constant annulus or later as a guideline) requirements for sour service.
pressure management which involves both pressure The exception to this is in the deeper section of the
bleeding and top up during well cycles. Such intensive wells and some use of higher grade casings is accepted
management can pose logistical difficulties in remote at elevated temperatures. The resulting impact from
wells or on normally unmanned platforms. extremely heavy casing strings has already been
Wellhead growth, as a result of production fluid discussed under Tension (see 5.20.3). In non-sour
temperatures, must be taken into account for flow lines service environments the use of high grade casings can
and other surface interfaces. The conductor, surface, be very attractive; for instance, reducing weight,
intermediate, production and completion tubulars will increasing burst and tension. However, handling does
be exposed to different temperatures for any given become an issue. It should be understood that the higher
operation, as will the various annular fluids. This can the grade of material the more brittle the casing
produce unusual and significant differential loads on the becomes. Higher grade casings can easily be damaged
various hangers and wellhead. Only specialist modelling beyond use through rough handling (marking in the
programmes are capable of evaluating this complex slips and exposure to corrosive environments such as
array of loads and the resulting effect on the wellhead. salt water spray) and additional precautions should be
Such analysis should be considered for long term put in place for handling such casing.
production wells and safety critical wells.
Shock loads – in the event of a severe well control 5.20.9 Casing setting depths
incident during drilling or a shallow tubing leak during
production, sudden high pressure loads can be imposed Casing seat selection for HPHT wells is critical. Surface
on the BOP, wellhead and/or tubing hanger. Short time casing setting depth must be selected and set principally
duration shock loadings can impose gross loadings for structural strength to support the other casing loads,
several times greater than the actual pressure imposed. tubing loads, wellhead, BOP, riser, etc. In addition there
Such loadings can be very difficult to design for and may be shallow gas or shallow water flows to contend
should be treated with great diligence and care. with that will influence the setting depth. Deeper
casings and in particular the production casing seat will
5.20.7 Connectors be governed by formation pressure transition zones. A
few metres on the setting depth can make the difference
Connectors work better in tension than in compression. of meeting the well’s objectives or not.
Most tubing and production casings will have a The following factors will influence casing seat
compression loading imposed on them during selection:
production or during severe well control events. It is
important that compression loadings are considered — Well control.
during well design and that it is verified that connectors — Shallow gas zones.
are adequate for the well. It has been determined that — Lost circulation zones.
some connectors will fail (leak gas) when subjected to — Formation stability to exposure time.
compression/tension cyclic loads that are within — Formation stability to mud weight, static and ECD.
connector specification. This concern has been — Possible differential sticking.
addressed by connector manufacturers and specialist — Directional profile.
premium connectors have been developed. However, — Sidetrack requirements.
long term production life will involve many temperature — Aquifers to case off.
cycles as production is stopped and started for whatever — Hole cleaning.
reason. Care should be taken when specifying the — Salt sections.
connectors to ensure that they meet the temperature, — Pressure transitions.
pressure and fluids chemical composition criteria as — Competent formations.
well as standard well engineering requirements. — Uncertainty in depth and pressure estimation.
— ECD at shoe.
5.20.8 Casing weights — Completion strategy and contingencies in place.
High grade and weight casing strings – it is often Strategies should be developed for the precise selection
necessary to sacrifice high grade casing in favour of of casing setting depths during drilling. This will
high weight casing to meet NACE (MR 01-75/ISO provide flexibility to adjust for unexpected pore
15156-31:2003 Cor.2 :2005 (E) 1 – Published Sept 2005 pressure changes, variations in formation depths and/or
39

thickness and unplanned operational events, e.g. lost 5.21 CEMENTING

circulation, borehole ballooning and so forth.
The above criteria for casing design planning will HPHT conditions present several cementing challenges.
facilitate the development of contingency casing plans. The need for specialisation in the area has become very
Provision for a contingency drilling liner or expandable important in the last 10 years. Standard cementing
liner is very common in HPHT well plans and should be designs and practices have been shown to be inadequate
included whenever possible. The output from these well in these challenging environments and therefore require
design plans will impact on rig selection. The reader a significant level of expertise in order to deliver a
should refer to section 6 Rig Selection for details. successful HPHT well.
Success in elevated temperature and pressure
5.20.10 External corrosion environments can be achieved through the application
of the use of the latest materials, equipment and design
External corrosion of casing occurs in the splash zone or philosophy. Application of the learning outcomes from
where equipment such as casing, casing connectors etc. the successes and failures of operators can be applied
is exposed. There can be rapid corrosion of many steels for the benefit of future operations. Cementing has yet
caused by the combination of air, water and high to achieve optimum design criteria for HPHT wells and
temperature. In addition the high differentials of heating until the industry resolves many of the integrity issues,
and cooling will compound the effects of high loading, attention to detail and contingency planning are required
pressure differentials, shock loads and vibration. These if longevity, integrity and well operability are to be
will have a direct rate effect causing weld decay and achieved.
will increase the rate of corrosion on bolted connectors. It will be necessary to identify and allow for the
Riser disconnectors and riser tension ropes are following if the well objectives are to be achieved:
susceptible as are critical safety components such as the
BOPs (Refer also to ASTM A 193 Alloy Steel and Reduced annular space:
Stainless Steel Bolting Materials for High Temperature — No returns during the cement job.
Service). — May encounter difficulty in mud removal and
These corrosive effects will increase the rate of encounter high ECD.
deterioration of equipment integrity and may act in — There may be small cement volumes and
combination with high internal corrosion exacerbated by contamination issues. Poor sheath support or
elevated temperatures and high flow rate. Where CO2 reduced placement depth/height may compromise
and/or H2S are present in the production fluids the integrity especially for packer placement.
internal corrosion rate will be accelerated. It is
important that correct evaluation of corrosivity is Aggressive environments:
performed and that the most effective coatings or — Accurate temperature prediction is needed for a
corrosion preventative measures are applied. Guidance good cement job.
on this can be found in the NACE Standard SP0108 — Cement placement times may be extended.
Corrosion Protection of Offshore Platforms by — With elevated temperatures there may be
Protective Coatings. retrogression and instability problems.
The age of the materials is also of importance
especially where newer and therefore stronger materials Cement integrity over the lifetime of the well:
are connected to equipment which has been subjected to — Possible corrosion issues.
longer exposure times. Therefore a series of scheduled — Changing stress loads on the cement sheath.
and recorded visual checks and non destructive tests — Temperature effects.
should be undertaken in addition to those dictated by — Choice of materials and compounds.
routine standards of inspections for offshore
installations. (Cf Energy Institute 2008 – 'Guidance for Well objectives:
Corrosion Management in Oil and Gas Production and — Multiple objectives may be difficult to achieve.
Processing. Also see NACE TM0304 – 2004 'Offshore — Increased risk of losses of fluid over narrow
Platform Atmospheric and Splash Zone Maintenance drilling window.
Coating System Evaluation' and TM0404 - 2004 — Well bore stability issues.
'Offshore Platform Atmospheric and Splash Zone New
Construction Coating System Evaluation'). High temperature can adversely affect the performance
40

of cement and cement additives. Testing to determine throughout pre-cement circulation to control
cement sensitivity should form part of the planning bottom-hole temperatures (BHT). Modelling of cement
process and should be run in advance of operations. It placement, through to post cement placement and on to
therefore follows that an accurate prediction of cement set is also essential. Accurate spacer preparation
temperatures, pressures and expected well chemistry is (spacer trains) and cement mixing are also essential as
needed in order to best model the cement behaviour are HPHT rheology measurements on all fluids being
under extreme conditions. This is significant where the circulated in the well.
drilling window is narrow and hydrostatic, dynamic and Foamed cement is unique in creating an energised
circulating effects must be factored in to every stage of fluid that is inherently resistant to gas migration. It is
the proposed cementing operation. flexible and has met with considerable success in HPHT
Cementing failures in HPHT wells increase the environments. Equipment and planning requirements
exposure to integrity failures and safety risk; they can need to be very extensive. Improvements have been
result in well control problems and therefore they can made with the use of computerised control systems. A
require complex remedial work involving higher costs. number of operators have used foamed cement for 'B'
In addition, failure to correctly cement critical sections annulus pressure problems; however some have been
such as providing adequate isolation and support for the unsuccessful with this technique. Some consideration of
completion packer may result in compromised these systems for critical cement jobs may prove cost
production and the running of extra equipment. and risk effective.
To ensure success in HPHT cementing operations, Alternative HPHT cement slurries with some
the additional considerations that must be taken into inherent flexibility of the cement sheath have been
account should include: proposed by some vendors but to date their viability in
real HPHT environments remains unproven.
— Bore hole conditioning, cleaning and spacers.
— In order to maximise the bond between the casing
and the cement, all mud residue must be removed 5.22 COMPLETION ISSUES FOR PLANNING
as efficiently as possible. Spacer trains are
recommended in combination with turbulent flow Completion and well testing pressure requirements
states to achieve maximum cleaning. should be incorporated in drilling operations and
— Bottom hole static and circulating temperatures. therefore in the planning phase. Any problems with the
— Weighting materials and density – (owing to the casing design in these areas should be solved as early as
higher pressures especially in the transition zone possible, preferably while the well is still in its
and reservoir sections it is necessary to have higher conceptual stage of design. It is far better to mitigate
density slurries and these can be achieved by using any safety and engineering risks before the completion
high density materials such as haematite and or testing is performed.
manganese tetraoxide). High pressures have a great impact on engineering
— Slurry composition. requirements, but high temperatures are the most
— Rheology. difficult to address. Arguably temperature has the
— Stability. greatest impact, especially during the life of the well
— CO2 and H2S considerations. since reservoir pressures will diminish quite rapidly
— Gas migration, channelling and micro annuli. while temperatures will remain almost constant. The
following problems are all influenced by temperature
HPHT conditions will make gas migration more likely and may impact on safety:
due to the higher pore pressures and reduced margins
between the pore pressure and the hydrostatic pressure — Tubular movement and stress.
of the cement. If the cement job is not optimum (best — Buckling – influence of temperature.
practice issues) the increased pore pressure may result — Cement design and well envelope integrity.
in micro annuli between the casing and the cement and — Fluid density and viscosity.
the cement formation interface allowing further gas — Equipment limits – BOP and packer seal elements.
migration and eventual breakdown of the cement sheath — Annular pressure build up.
integrity over time. These issues are particularly critical — Packer loads.
for long term production where thermal cycling will — Wellhead loads and movement.
exacerbate existing problems. — De-ration of tubular strength.
Good modelling is essential as a basic requirement — Corrosive environments.
for successful HPHT cementing. It is required — Hydrate formation and wax deposition.
41

It is imperative that a completion engineer is involved Barriol Y, et al. 2005. 'The Pressures of Drilling and
early in the planning and well design. The most efficient Production':
and best practice methodology is to design the
completion first and then the well – designing the well Schlumberger Oilfield Review, page 22, autumn 2005.
from inside out. However this is very seldom the case as
conventional well design and operational methodologies Bland R, et al 2006 ' HPHT Drilling Fluid Challenges'
are established in company practice and procedures. SPE 103731-MS
This is especially true where companies have only
operated within the 'normal' pressure envelopes, having Chilingar C.V, 2002. 'Origin and Prediction of
little or no experience with high energy wells. The Abnormal Formation Pressures'
consequence of operating within this policy frequently
leads to compromised completion designs which in turn Developments in Petroleum Science 50. Elsevier. ISBN:
result in severe production and intervention restrictions. 0-444-51001 X
In HPHT wells these problems increase the safety and ISBN: 0376 7361
economic risk, often leading to a failure to achieve the
well objectives. Devereux S, 1998, 'Practical Well Planning and
Design work on HPHT wells is characterised by the Drilling', PennWell
constraints of minimal safety margins and the
consequence of these constraints can result in severe Energy Institute 2008 – 'Guidance for Corrosion
problems. Compromising the smaller safety margins can Management in Oil and Gas Production and Processing'
lead to catastrophic well failure and can only be
mitigated by optimum, accurate, safety first well design. Fambon L, and Joffroy G. 2008, Successful
This design philosophy should be incorporated and Development Drilling of an HPHT Infill Well in a
deployed through to the operational phase by proper Highly Depleted Reservoir: Case Study. IADC/SPE
verifications and QAQC procedures. 112708
Lake Larry W, (Editor in Chief) 2006, Petroleum

5.23 SUGGESTED FURTHER READING Engineering Handbook Volume 2 Drilling Engineering.
Society of Petroleum Engineering.
Model code of safe practice Part 17 Volume 3,
Completions and Interventions. Energy Institute Lake Larry W, (Editor in Chief) 2006, Petroleum
Engineering Handbook Volume 4 Production
Abnormal Pressures While Drilling Mouchet J.P & Operations Engineering. Society of Petroleum
Mitchell A., 1989; Elf Aquitaine, Manuels Techniques Engineering.
2. ISBN: 2-901026-28-1
Aadnoy Bernt S, 1999, 'Modern Well Design', Belkama.

ISBN 90 5410633.6
42

6
RIG SELECTION
6.1 KEY POINTS SUMMARY is an important part of the planning process to

understand the operability of the rig, this being
especially true of offshore units. In general terms,
— A detailed invitation to tender (ITT) should be HPHT (especially those conditions of temperatures and
compiled by the well planning team that details the pressures which impinge on the extremes of equipment
minimum safe requirements the rig must have to tolerances), operations require the most modern and
perform the project. This includes rig management, capable units available. However this is seldom
equipment, and competent personnel. practical and compromises may have to be made.
However, early communication of the plan and well
— In the case of a rig being already on contract to the design into the rig tendering process will help secure
operator, an audit process by the operator using an better units and therefore reduce safety risk. If it is
ITT format should be applied to the rig as a impossible, either because of logistical or economic
minimum. reasons, to secure the optimum drilling rig then
guidance should be taken on the safety critical aspects
— A joint operations and/or bridging documents of conversion and if this is not feasible then an HPHT
should be produced. These will be necessary to ready rig should be the only option.
avoid any conflict of processes and procedures.
— It is accepted good practice that well specific well 6.3 INVITATION TO TENDER PROCESS
control training is conducted for all HPHT wells.
The rig site team can be trained in well control When issuing invitations to tender, the well planning
response behaviours based on kick simulation team should be very specific about the nature of the
studies. The additional complexity of HPHT wells project. This process must include all modifications and
puts well specific training as a very high priority. specifications that are needed to meet minimum HS&E
and engineering specifications; this must include
specifications pertinent to the HPHT well conditions.
6.2 INTRODUCTION This will include crane capacity and reach, tubular
handling capacity, bulk (powder) storage capacity,
This section describes the consideration of rigs and if liquid (mud, brine, etc) storage capacity, BOP and well
they are fit for purpose for use in HPHT operations. It head system specification, deck load capacity, etc.
43

6.4 MINIMUM RIG REQUIREMENTS taking account of tortuosity and drill string design.
(47 500 Nm (~35 000 ft/lbs) is sufficient for most
The following should be taken as general guidance wells).
representing the minimum for safe operations. However, 12. Mud pump and circulating system working
well design, completion design, well and location pressure rating sufficient to meet above
conditions must be taken into account when assessing requirement of (350 bar (~5 000 psi) is sufficient
rig specifications for any given well. Higher for most wells. 517 bar (7 500 psi) systems are
specifications may be required for some wells and well available and may be preferred.)
operations. Restrictions in rig capacity and/or 13. Rotary table safe working load (SWL) sufficient
operability may impact the risk profile, the deployment for the heaviest casing string + shock loading of
of the well design and possibly compromise safety (500-750 tons (~1,2 million pounds) is sufficient
critical areas: for most wells).
14. A high pressure (HP) kill pump capable of
1. Rig must comply with all relevant legislative maximum anticipated surface pressure (MASP) +
requirements and have a current safety case for bullheading margin circa 35 bar (500 psi) at
HPHT operations. sufficient pump rates to effect a kill. (1 035 bar
2. Capable of working in the water depth of interest. (15K si) cement unit is sufficient for most wells).
3. Drill depth capability for the wells planned. (6 300 Preference for remote controls from driller’s
metres (20 000 ft) is sufficient for most wells). consol.
4. Ability to stand back in the derrick any large 15. Sufficient storage for kill weight completion fluid
diameter drill pipe that may be needed. (2 500 (brine) to meet operational requirements. (1 500
metres of 6e" drill pipe or 3 700 metres of 5½" bbls of brine is sufficient for most wells).
drill pipe is sufficient for most wells). 16. Rapid mud weight up system and ability to transfer
5. A substructure safe working load (SWL) capable of barite to weight up mud system. (A 1,25 MT
handling the heaviest casing string + casing /minute is sufficient for most wells).
handling equipment + drill pipe standing in derrick. 17. Adequate storage capacity for bulk barite and
(1,3 million pounds is sufficient for most wells). bentonite. (285 m3 (~10 000 cubic feet) is
6. Pipe deck area and load capacity that can sufficient for most wells).
accommodate the heaviest casing string planned. 18. Ability to mix and transfer sufficient mud weights
(For example: a 3 300 metre string of 14" x 93 lb/ft to meet the well requirements. (2SG (16,7 ppg)
casing or a string comprising 2 900 metres of 10¾" should be sufficient for most wells although heavier
x 86,5 lb/ft casing and 2 000 metres of 9f" x 62,8 mud weights may be needed on some wells).
lb/ft casing). 19. Adequate degasser capacity for well conditions.
7. Preference for a rotary table with a 45" opening. (2 250 litres per minute (~600 gallons per minute)
8. If coil tubing operations are planned or contingent is sufficient for most wells).
the rig cranes must be able to lift the coil tubing 20. Adequate industry recognised high performance
reel from the boat and position the reel for access to shale shakers and flow line capacity for maximum
rig floor. anticipated pump rates. (4 900 litres per minute (~1
9. BOP stack suitable for the well conditions with 300 gallons per minute) is sufficient for most
pressure and temperature ratings sufficient for the wells).
'worst case'. (For example: 1 035 bar (~15 Ksi) x 21. HPHT mud return and pit volume monitoring
18¾" BOP stack, 15 K choke manifold and system.
associated well control equipment (including 22. Ability to skip and ship drilled cuttings or
elastomers) suitable for HPHT operations with alternative bulk cuttings transfer system (if
temperature ratings of up to 120°C (250°F) required).
continuous, 175°C (350°F) for one hour and H2S 23. Stripping tank or alternative arrangement for
service. (See Model Code of Safe Practice, Part 17 stripping operations.
Volume 2 for specific details on BOP requirements 24. The facility to inject hydrate suppressant (e.g.
and equipment standards). glycol) into the choke manifold upstream of the
10. Derrick and hoisting equipment safe working load chokes. Preference for additional injection point at
(SWL) sufficient to handle the heaviest casing BOP.
string + pumping loads + drag. 500-750 ton is 25. Ability to mix and pump barite pills with cement
sufficient for most wells. unit.
11. Top Drive continuous torque sufficient to reach TD 26. Mud / Gas separator of sufficient capacity for well
44

RIG SELECTION
conditions. 3,5 x 105 m3 per day to 5,0 x 105 m3 38. 15 Ton Stevpris anchors or anchors with similar
per day ( ~of 12 MMscf per day to (5,1 x 105 m3 holding capacity.
per day (18MMscf per day)) with a minimum dip 39. Drill string motion compensator rated for maximum
tube length of 5m (~16,7 ft) should be sufficient for anticipated operational loads. (300 tonne (~600
most wells). 000) lbs and 500 tonne (~1 000 000 lbs) fully open
27. Sufficient redundancy on well control chokes. (two should be sufficient for most operations).Preference
hydraulic and two manual chokes should be is for active heave compensator system.
sufficient for most wells). Irrespective of compliance with the ITT above, it is
28. Facility to route choke manifold returns to strongly recommended that a 3rd party rig audit is
blow-down line which should have sufficient conducted to ensure equipment and work practice
pressure and gas rating for the well conditions. comply with required rig specification and
(350 bar (~5 000 psi) and capable of gas flow rate legislation requirements.
of 1,42 x 106 m3 per day (50 MMscf per day)
should be sufficient for most wells).
29. Choke manifold and mud gas separator (MGS) 6.5 FURTHER RIG SPECIFICATIONS
monitoring and overboard dump system. (Pressure
and temperature). It is not the intention in this section to reproduce an
30. Water curtain deluge capacity and burner booms to exhaustive list, but to highlight and describe the
meet regulatory requirements for well test. (Six differences and potential safety critical equipment issues
days at 1,7 x 106 m3 per day (60 MMscf per day) for HPHT operations:
should be sufficient for most operations).
31. If well testing operations are to be performed, 1. 1 035bar (15 Ksi) well control equipment, or better
suitable well test pipe-work should be available. depending on the well to be drilled.
–(6" gas line with 4" directional valve manifold, 4" 2. High-pressure kill pump and associated high-
oil line with 4" directional valve manifold and 8 - pressure kill lines. Often the cement unit can be
10" separator relief line should be sufficient for modified for high-pressure pumping, saving on rig
most well tests). space. However, the pump rate at high pressures
32. If a 6" hole is planned or is a contingency, the may be insufficient for bullhead or dynamic kills.
facility to circulate with high pump rates may be 3. Any additional equipment required for handling
needed. (45 MPa (450 bar ~6 500) psi pump riser gas on floating drilling operations.
pressure should be sufficient for most cases). 4. Due to the increased risk of taking a kick in a high
33. Sufficient accommodation for the increased number pressure zone, accommodation for large volumes of
of personnel. ( A persons on board (POB) >100 heavy weight drilling fluid – including kill mud –
persons should be sufficient for most operations). should be made. If the storing of kill mud presents
operational difficulties these can be offset with the
Additional for floating drilling operations (e.g. use of high-speed barite mixers. A particular safety
semi-submersibles): concern is the additional weight and volume of the
riser mud following its displacement prior to
34. Ability to handle and deploy sub-surface xmas tree disconnect.
(SSXT) system with BOP carrier, SSXT + 5. Larger stocks of barite and cement may be required
emergency disconnect package (EDP) + lower riser to provide adequate contingency.
package (LRP). (67 ton handling capability should 6. High-pressure casing strings often have thicker
be sufficient for most operations). walls with a corresponding increase in weight;
35. Skidding system to transfer SSXT stack up from there are three things that must not be overlooked
deck to BOP carrier. in safety planning. They can weigh 500 tonne
36. Cranes to handle sub-surface xmas tree (SSXT) and (~1 000 000 lbs) or more buoyed weight. Firstly,
shipping skid. (70 ton lift and reach capability accommodating them on the pipe deck (without
should be sufficient for most operations). damage) may be challenging. Secondly, the
37. Variable deck load (VDL) sufficient to handle extreme hook loads imposed during running must
operational loading requirements. (For example: be accounted for. Thirdly, some of these strings are
1,3 million pound casing string, 2 500 bbls 1,98 SG so heavy that even high tensile drill pipe is unable
mud, 1 000 bbls of base fluid and ancillary drilling to be used for landing them in the wellhead. In
equipment should be sufficient for most wells.) these cases full-bore casing landing strings are
necessary. This could greatly increase both the
45

deck loading and space requirements which in turn — If there is a change in target depth, especially if that
will require further safety considerations. target constitutes a change in pressure and/or
7. Temperature and pressure monitoring on choke temperature regime, such as entering a new
manifold will be required and high accuracy structure, a new well design will be needed.
pressure gauges should be used on the choke panel. Heavier and larger diameter casing may then need
8. Mud gas separator (MGS) must handle much larger to be accommodated within existing
gas volumes including bypass overboard lines. infra-structures.
9. Stripping tanks should also be considered. — Heating of shallow sub-surface formations during
10. There should be an extensive, accurate and reliable HPHT production can lead to possible soil stability
H2S detection system. problems coupled with the possibility of increased
11. Hot returning fluids may need special handling. risk of shallow gas and hole stability problems for
12. Depending on the annulus fluid selected for well future operations.
testing, it may be necessary to accommodate one — If there is likely to be a requirement for snubbing,
and a half-hole volume of kill weight fluid for well coil tubing or managed pressure drilling (MPD)
killing. This volume of fluid must be kept on board equipment etc, it is recommended that
for emergency kill purposes. accommodation for this is made at the beginning of
13. For floating drilling operations much higher riser the project since retro-flitting can cause space
top tensions may have to be held because of the problems which could compromise the free
heavy weight mud in the riser. This is likely to movement of personnel.
come out of the allowable variable deck load.
In general any HPHT operation will require units that 6.7 RIG SAFETY HISTORY
are fit for purpose with provision for extra load
handling, greater weight capacities, capable well control In addition to the invitation to tender information the
equipment, improved and max drilling depths. In following safety related points should be addressed
addition enhanced equipment handling capability is during the tender process:
required; this is especially true of crane lifting limits
due to increased casing and sub-sea xmas tree weights. 1. Campaign history – does the rig have an efficient
and safe operations history?
2. What is the history of non productive time (NPT) –
6.6 NOTES ON OPERATIONAL SAFETY technical or safety related?
3. Well control incidents – examination should be
The following safety related aspects should be noted: rigorous, e.g. were any incidents related to
equipment deficiency, failure, bad practice or non
— There must be competent rig management onshore observance of procedures?
and offshore. 4. Documented injuries – are these better or worse
— There must be high levels of competency and than benchmarked HPHT rigs?
experience amongst rig crews. 5. Age – what is the likelihood of fatigue exposure
— Faster HS&E emergency response times are during increased loading (shock loads) and is there
necessary. It is recommended that a critical review likely to be any impact on safe operation during
of HS&E plans should be undertaken to incorporate drilling, completions and intervention?
the reduced margin of safety for the HPHT 6. Modifications – last refit and schedule of repairs –
conditions on any given well. were inspections undertaken and were they
— Special care should be taken in the handling of satisfactory? Do these criteria conform to local and
casing and tubulars on HPHT wells. Any damage government regulation in the area of proposed
or marking on tubular equipment can become sites operations?
of corrosion and future weakening of the casing 7. Rig documentation e.g. HPHT well control manual,
integrity. HPHT crew training schedule, HPHT drilling
— Winter completion operations should be avoided if practices; does the current rig safety case cover
at all possible since bad weather conditions can HPHT operations?
increase the risk of handling and running damage. 8. Particular care and inspection rigour will be needed
For floating operations (e.g. semi-submersibles) rig if employing a 15K rig that has not performed in
instability can compromise well control (swab and HPHT environment in recent history.
surge) and risk running damage.
46

RIG SELECTION
6.8 CREW EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING requirements are essential. The rig site team can be
trained in well control response behaviours based on
Joint training sessions with personnel from both kick simulation studies. It is now possible to programme
operator and contractor in which both operational and rig floor simulators to emulate the well to be drilled,
safety issues can be discussed. This methodology providing a realistic, hands-on training that can
should ensure greater understanding and cohesion demonstrate any of the unusual phenomena that may be
within the wells team. These initiatives are especially present in the well. Such training has been considered to
important for HPHT operations. be of great value by many operators, with some
It is accepted good practice that well specific well claiming that it saved their well. The additional
control training is conducted for all HPHT wells. When complexity of HPHT wells puts well specific training as
drilling practices and procedures are selected or a very high priority.
developed on a well specific base, then such training
47

48

7
SAFETY PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS
7.1 KEY POINTS SUMMARY while held in the slips, continuous pumping may
lead to fracture of the exposed formation.
— Understanding BOP designs for HPHT wells is — Mud weight must be adjusted for temperature
crucial to safe well control planning. Temperatures during drilling operations. Mud weights above 1,8
and loads are far greater and require much more SG (15,0 ppg) continue to be prone to barite sag
attention. A description of the key elements is (especially in high angled wells) and a rigorous
given in the text and the reader is referred to Model programme of sag testing should be introduced.
Code of Safe Practice, Part 17, Volume 2, Well Static age testing of mud samples should also be
control during the drilling and testing of high conducted. However even with rigorous testing it is
pressure offshore wells. still difficult to predict if sag will occur, and
wherever possible well designs should try to avoid
— Kick tolerance is used as a general term with often long tangent sections at sag prone inclinations. At
misunderstood and misused meanings. In HPHT very high mud weights, when the limits of barite
wells where operating margins are small, kick systems are approached, barite sag can no longer
tolerance criteria must be carefully thought occur.
through. When drilling in small holes with heavy
mud weights, equivalent circulating density (ECD) — Wellbore instability is a known stuck pipe
can become the limiting factor and not kick mechanism. HPHT wells by their nature often
tolerance. result in the formation collapse pressure being
approached or even encroached upon. In general
— Swab, surge may have an effect on bottom hole when working close to the formation pressure
pressure (BHP). In the high density mud systems margins formation instability is a much more
required for high pressure wells, the effects of swab common occurrence in HPHT wells. This
and surge when tripping pipe will tend to be greatly automatically increases the risk of stuck pipe by
magnified. Tripping speeds should be carefully this mechanism. Mud condition is very important to
planned and kept sufficiently low to minimise the minimise filter cake thickness, another common
swab and surge effect and prevent formation fluid stuck pipe mechanism.
influx or fracture. In some instances pumping out
of hole can reduce the effects of swabbing by — Lost circulation and volumetric changes (both
balancing the pressures. However in some increase and decrease) in the mud system during
circumstances when the pipe is static, for instance drilling operations is commonly termed ballooning
49

or supercharging. Bore-hole ballooning is a HPHT environment does require extensive lab

common enough occurrence on HPHT wells; testing, hydraulics modelling and careful planning
therefore to minimise the safety risk, detailed of 'spacer' requirements. Contingency cement plans
contingency plans and procedures should be drawn should be periodically reviewed during operations
up and applied when required. Care should be and updated if BHT and/or mud weights vary
taken however not to misidentify a genuine influx significantly from planned. Stress analysis of post
of formation fluids as ballooning. cementation load condition for well life integrity
should be performed; unnecessary pressure tests
— Hydrates can cause significant HS&E risks during could jeopardise cement sheath integrity without a
HPHT operations. 'Clathrates' is the more correct great deal of benefit.
term for hydrates. Per unit volume, hydrates can
contain very large amounts of gas. This gas is — Riser behaviour – The high mud weights likely to
usually methane but may also contain carbon be required for HPHT drilling will have a direct
dioxide and hydrogen sulphide; they pose a impact on riser design, loadings, dynamic
significant safety risk. Well control risks attend behaviour, top tension requirements, wellhead/riser
hydrate formation since rapid expansion of a gas fatigue analysis etc. One of the greatest threats in
kick as it approaches surface equipment can cause any drilling operation is getting gas into the riser
rapid cooling, often well below the tolerance of the above the BOP. There is an increased risk of late
equipment. Topside equipment must be specified or detection under typical HPHT operating conditions;
designed with these potential low temperatures in this becomes a major safety concern.
mind.
— Gas volumes at surface are very much larger in
— Wireline pressure control equipment should have a HPHT wells than in normal environments. The
pressure rating that exceeds the maximum immediate reaction to indications of well flow is to
anticipated surface pressure for the well. Wireline follow procedure and shut-in the well. Detailed,
tripping speeds should be limited by the same representative riser/fatigue analysis is required to
swab/surge considerations as drilling operations. identify the minimum life usage of the
Large OD logging tools merit caution too. Pipe wellhead/riser for specific environmental/
conveyed logging is sometimes seen as a safer operational loading conditions.
alternative to wireline logging. The pressure rating
of the side entry wireline sub is often not — The longer time needed to safely secure an HPHT
considered adequate for HPHT wells. well must be taken into account and some guidance
should be provided should a well control operation
— Assuming planning has reduced the accuracy of be in progress. Guidance on making this decision
formation top error bars to as low as possible, the should be prominently stated in contingency plans.
remaining error bar will have to be covered within
well planning to accommodate possible changes in — In HPHT wells, elastomer components are
casing setting depth. For instance ensuring particularly susceptible to temperature; fishing jars
sufficient casing stocks are carried and are fit for and bumper subs will seldom work for very long if
purpose. Departures from the planned design at all in these conditions. For gas wells, elastomers
specification may impinge on safety and this may should be selected for resistance to explosive
have to be reviewed. decompression.
— Error bars, appropriately documented during

planning, should be reduced during operations. It is 7.2 INTRODUCTION
critical that departures from forecast pore pressure
are highlighted. Existing pressure test data and This section addresses safety critical aspects of HPHT
formation integrity data should be studied for planning for operations with particular emphasis on
accuracy. those conditions and situations which compromise
operational safety. These should be seen as additional to
— Remedial cementing contingency plans for the standard best practices. Using a best practice, ALARP
primary cement jobs should be prepared as a matter and critical analysis approach during the design concept
of course. Specific squeeze slurries should be will lead to a corresponding understanding of the
prepared for this contingency. Cementing in the contingencies that may be required during operations.
50

This methodology in conjunction with comprehensive techniques and procedures in current practice. These
peer reviews, should help mitigate many of the risks and studies continue to highlight and present challenges in
uncertainties. specific well environments and in combinations of
Although the following topics overlap with environments.
operational issues and are referred to in more detail in
Model Code of Safe Practice, Part 17, Volume 2, Well
control during the drilling and testing of high pressure 7.4 BOP DESIGN
offshore wells, they will need detailed consideration in
order to achieve a safe well design. As has already been This section on BOP design is extracted from Model
stated, HPHT wells operate at the margins of material Code of Safe Practice, Part 17, Volume 2, Well control
competence and safety, therefore well control planning during the drilling and testing of high pressure offshore
becomes even more critical than in conventional wells and the reader is referred to that document for
operations. guidance on well control safe practice. It is reproduced
here for the convenience of the reader.
For surface BOPs on jack-up or platform rigs, one
7.3 WELL CONTROL PLANNING 10 ksi annular and four rams should be utilised; this
allows a blind/shear (B/S) ram, a lower 'master valve'
Well control planning is a process that involves detailed ram, and two working rams, for redundancy. All ram
studies of the behaviours and the effects of well control type preventers should be equipped with ram locks.
operations on a specific well. Advanced computer There should be one kill outlet and two choke outlets
models are available which are capable of reproducing below the upper set of pipe rams with two failsafe
the effects of pressure, temperature, geometry and valves per outlet. This configuration will allow
formation parameters. Such models permit the circulation beneath the blind/shear rams.
determination of changes in the temperature profile Blind/shear rams should be verified as being
during each step in the drilling process. From this, mud capable of shearing and sealing all tubulars planned to
density variations, equivalent circulating density, be used in the well, with the exception of BHAs. High
equivalent static density, swab pressures, surge strength drill pipe, large diameter drill pipe, exotic
pressures, kick tolerance, etc. can be calculated. Kicks tubing, tubing-control line and tubing-wireline
can be modelled taking account of drilling fluid combinations can present difficulties. Blind/shear rams
behaviours. The reactions of gas, condensate and oil in with boosted closing systems are commonly used to
different drilling fluids can be examined under kick address this issue.
conditions, including oil-based mud. Where appropriate to the well properties and
The benefits from these studies include: conditions, consideration should be given to the use of
casing rams. The well must be stable before casing runs
— Confirmation of the well design and the ability to are undertaken. If casing rams are installed they must be
tolerate well control incidents. pressure tested using a suitable mandrel and closing
— Well control procedures can be verified as being pressures adjusted for the casing collapse. Proceeding
adequate for the well to be drilled. without casing rams should be a matter for detailed risk
— New drilling practices or well control procedures assessment.
can be checked and developed. The rams must be rated to something above the
— Operations that present the greatest well control maximum anticipated surface pressure, usually 1 035
risk can be identified. Risk reduction measures both bar (~15 000 psi), although 1 380 bar (20 000 psi) has
in the well design and through drilling practices can occasionally been required. The annular is commonly
be verified and developed. rated to 10 000 psi, although occasionally a 345 bar
— Significantly increases understanding with regard (~5 000 psi) rated annular has been used.
to kick detection, well control events and fluid BOP ram temperature ratings are specified in two
behaviours. parts. One is the continuous temperature rating at which
— Make a major contribution to well specific well the ram can withstand full pressure rating. The second
control training for rig crew and operators’ is the peak or excursion temperature where the ram will
personnel. withstand full pressure rating for one hour. This second
specification is intended to provide sufficient time to
Knowledge of HPHT well drilling continues to develop. evacuate the rig. In most cases this will require at least
Well specific studies continue to demonstrate the need one set of high temperature ram packer elements in
for greater understanding and for improving the addition to the sealing shear rams. This is particularly
51

relevant during well testing. Not all BOP components developed. Most drill pipe shear rams will not cut
are available with high temperature elastomers. (Note casing; they only cause it to collapse. This leaves the
that for specific well testing operations, extended well exposed. Casing shearing rams have been
temperature exposure may be required for the some of developed to address the exposure concerns during
the BOP elastomers.) Annulars and variable bore rams casing running in deepwater. This can bring us up to
are not currently available with high temperature three rams in the BOP just to meet shearing and sealing
components due to the levels of packer flexibility requirements, before pipe rams have even been
needed for these components to function. If operations considered. The shearing and sealing requirements
are required in areas which are coupled with deepwater become a matter of judgement and subject to individual
there will be a need for combined high temperature and company policy. A full risk assessment of this issue is
low temperature functionality. The range required could recommended to study the risk potential and
go from 149°C (300° F) to 4,5°C (40°F) or even lower. consequences of such events in HPHT well drilling,
At low temperatures, high temperature packers may before anything less than a three ram shearing and
have insufficient flex to provide an effective seal. It is sealing set is considered. Hi-grade and often exotic
imperative that when planning the well the BOP heavy wall casing strings are needed to meet the
temperature range for particular well operations is requirements of a HPHT well. It may be necessary to
evaluated with a proper selection of components made test casing shear rams, if they are to be used, to confirm
to cover any expected extremes. It may even be that they are actually capable of cutting these casings. It
necessary to conduct testing throughout the temperature should be noted that casing shear rams are only ever
range to confirm suitability. Combined extremes of deployed in deepwater applications and this is included
temperature can also induce the formation of hydrates here because HPHT and deepwater operations are
and these can affect lower marine riser package (LMRP) becoming more common. However, at the time of
disconnect if a well control incident is encountered. writing most UK HPHT operations are still in relatively
A second annular preventer has become common- shallow water.
place for floating drilling operations, with the second The temperature range and pressure requirements
annular being included in the lower marine riser for pipe rams must be considered along with the variety
package (LMRP), which allows it to be recovered and of drill pipe sizes being used, the hang off capacity of
replaced without removal of the BOP from the well. A each ram, the willingness to recover the stack to replace
345 bar (34,5 MPa, 5 000 psi) rated annular is normally rams and regulatory requirements in the area of
only seen on a 1 035 bar (103,5 MPa, 15 Ksi) BOP operation. A six ram BOP may be needed to meet all the
stack when there are two annulars, the second being 690 requirements if operations move to deepwater HPHT
bar (69 MPa, 10 000 psi) rated. More often than not environments.
both annulars will be rated to 690 bar (69 MPa, 10 000 Larger BOP stacks will impose greater bending
psi). loads on the wellhead, wellhead extensions, structural
There is a strong case for increasing the number of casings and BOP connectors. Structural loadings should
rams for HPHT operations. It is an absolute requirement be considered when 18¾" 1 035 bar (103,5 MPa, 15Ksi)
to have the ability to shear and seal any tubular that is BOP stacks are in use to ensure bending load
running through the BOP stack. This becomes a greater limitations, under all operational circumstances, are not
imperative on HPHT wells due to their high energy exceeded. [Ref: 7.1 Riser/fatigue analysis requirements
nature coupled with their capability for producing vast above.]
volumes of gas at surface. This is of great importance in
semi-submersibles. Drifting off, driving off or mooring
failure leaves insufficient time to run hang off tools or 7.5 KICK TOLERANCE
drop the drill pipe. To add to this difficulty the inherent
time delays in BOP control systems and the difficulty in Kick tolerance is used as a general term with often
shearing modern high strength drill pipe have led to the misunderstood and misused meanings. There is no
use of independent high pressure, fast response, stack consistent definition or methodology for calculation;
mounted shearing control systems. Even with these however, in general terms it is commonly accepted as a
systems in place, shearing and ensuring a high pressure measure of the maximum kick intensity or volume size
seal on the wide variety of drill pipes and casings used that can be taken and circulated from the well without
for modern drilling is seldom a certainty. Testing should fracturing the formation at the previous casing shoe or
be performed to confirm that critical tubular the weakest point exposed in wellbore below the
components can be sheared if there is any doubt. previous shoe.
Non-sealing casing shear rams have been Underground blowouts can be particularly
52

problematical in HPHT conditions. There are numerous of the core barrel. When planning an HPHT well these
variables and the methods used for calculating kick effects can cause serious well control problems and can
tolerance are generally a matter for individual company be a potential serious safety risk. Unplanned changes to
policy. It is a matter for operating companies (subject to bottom hole assemblies (BHA) will require additional
statutory constraints and policies within regulatory focus on safety running procedures.
areas) to determine what criteria to use and whether the It is safe practice to pump out of the open hole to
kick tolerance is sufficient for drilling operations. In reduce swab effects. However this may not be necessary
HPHT wells where operating margins are small, kick where only low permeability non-hydrocarbon bearing
tolerance criteria must be subjected to rigorous analysis. intervals are exposed. Consideration may be given to
Temperature influences on mud hydrostatic, gas pump out of hole where the incremental risk associated
behaviours, well geometry, etc. need to be integrated with the presence of permeable and/or hydrocarbon
into planning programmes in order to comply with any bearing intervals might benefit from such an approach.
reasonable criteria. In many HPHT wells chokeline It should be noted that pumping out of hole could
friction and annular friction pressure loss is sufficiently increase surge risk where operations require any
high that it should be included in the kick tolerance downward movement (e.g. setting the slips).
calculation. Once inside the previous casing swab pressures on
When drilling in small diameter holes with heavy the open hole reduce and normal tripping practice can
mud weights, equivalent circulating density (ECD) can resume. In practice however, it is often good practice to
become the limiting factor and not kick tolerance. pump out of the hole-section further than the shoe to
exercise proper control of swab pressures.
7.6 SWAB, SURGE AND THEIR EFFECT

ON BHP 7.7 MUD BEHAVIOUR
Reciprocating the drill pipe through a viscous mud HPHT (close margin drilling) conditions require very
(which can be variable due to the elevated temperature) precise control of mud weight as expressed by
will induce shearing at the boundary between the drill equivalent static density (ESD) and equivalent
pipe and the fluid and within the mud. The pressure circulating density (ECD). All mud systems expand
differential is directly proportional to the shear strain when heated and contract when cooled. This directly
which is added or taken away from the hydrostatic affects mud density and therefore the ESD experienced
pressure. When pulling out of the hole the pulling by the well. Different mud systems are also
induces a hydraulic piston effect which reduces the compressible to a greater or lesser extent. This too will
pressure in the mud column and therefore could 'swab' affect the equivalent density in the well. The viscosity
in formation fluids and hence produce a kick. When of a mud will vary with temperature, which can have a
running in-hole, the annular pressure change is added to significant impact on ECD.
the mud column hydrostatic thereby increasing the In high temperature environments a mud weight
pressure. This surging could lead to an induced fracture measurement on its own is meaningless unless the
in the formation with mud pressure exceeding the temperature at which it was measured is also recorded.
fracture gradient resulting in losses to the formation. In Mud weight must be adjusted for temperature during
HPHT (close margin) operations, these swab and surge drilling operations. It is normally convenient to report
effects can lead to severe well control risk and should mud weights at a standard temperature of approximately
be a major HS&E consideration. 50°C (122°F). Tables should be provided so that the
Tripping speeds should be reduced in order to measured mud weight at flow line temperature can be
reduce this swab and surge effect. Circulating while converted to the standard temperature for reporting. The
running in hole such as washing or reaming to bottom weight of the mud in the pits is seldom the same as the
can induce very large surge pressures and strict limits actual ESD in the well.
on pump rate and running in speeds will have to be Large temperature changes influence mud
applied. In addition, prior to pulling the drill pipe, it is behaviour. It is very important to note the net fluid
prudent to circulate bottoms up to condition the mud, expansion or contraction. When circulation is stopped,
remove cuttings and to remove any gas in the well. This for example during a flow check, rapid downhole
is especially important when using oil-based muds. temperature changes can occur. Most often the result is
When using a core barrel the swab and surge effect a net temperature increase of the mud column resulting
can be greater because of the larger outer diameter (OD) in a net expansion. The expanding fluid will flow from
the well. Fluid flow from the well during a flow check
53

can be mistaken as a positive indication of formation hydraulics software calibration later on when annulus
fluid influx. Temperature changes on stopping pressure tool inclusion may not be feasible.
circulation will lead to a change in bottom hole Barite sag is a very significant drilling problem.
equivalent static density [ESD]; this can be modelled to Barite sag can be both a static and dynamic
determine the likelihood that the net effect would be a phenomenon with problems being more severe under
reduction or increase in ESD over time. If a well is dynamic conditions – it is now accepted that dynamic
killed with a low kill rate and then drilling ahead occurs barite sag is the major contributor to drilling related
with the well apparently stable, it is possible that the problems and that static barite sag is now seen as a
change in the thermal profile can lead to underbalance lesser difficulty. [Ref: Dye and Mullen 2002.] Dynamic
conditions when circulation is stopped at the next sag is encountered in inclined wells.
occasion. Fingerprinting is a technique that accurately Sag occurs when the rheology of the mud cannot
measures the flow resulting from mud expansion and support the quantity of barite that has been added for
allows a distinction to be made between thermal weight control. Mud density first starts to vary with the
expansion of the mud and a well kick. Further details on mud appearing lighter near the surface and heavier as
fingerprinting can be found in Model Code of Safe the barite slips down the wellbore. In extreme cases the
Practice, Part 17, Volume 2, Well control during the barite can settle out of the mud and form barite plugs
drilling and testing of high pressure offshore wells. which can be as hard and as impermeable as set cement.
Contraction of the mud column can occur in some Under some circumstances this may lead to a well
sections of the well; however, the same fingerprinting control event where the net effect results in a kick. This
process can still be applied. can be mitigated with S shaped well designs but 40-60
Selecting mud that exhibits poor behaviours at degree tangents should be avoided since these present
either extreme of the pressure and temperature range, or the worst angles for barite sag. It is recommended that
indeed shows transitional behaviours at any point in the expert advice is sought for barite sag mitigation in
expected range, can be disastrous. Such failures are planning.
completely avoidable provided proper and adequate lab Mud weights above 1,8 SG (15,0 ppg) continue to
testing is carried out and the fluid behaviours verified be prone to barite sag and a rigorous programme of sag
throughout the required range. testing should be introduced. Static age testing of mud
Mud rheology must be tested throughout the range samples should also be conducted. Barite sag can occur
of pressure and temperature that it will experience in the over various time periods, all are detrimental, the
well. This must be performed by a Fann 70 or shorter the period the more serious the problem e.g.
equivalent test apparatus. Such equipment has been over a connection, over a trip, over life of well in a
installed on the rig site. However, this is fragile and static annulus. Barite will not sag during circulation but
sensitive equipment that requires specialist operators. It only during static periods of no circulation. The mud
is more common for a sampling programme to be can be treated to reduce sag tendencies and specialist
instigated that regularly ships mud samples to the additives have been developed which have had mixed
laboratory for the tests to be run. However, the delay in success. This is principally a manipulation of the low
obtaining test results can on occasion be detrimental. end rheology of the mud. This is the same area of the
The mud system selected should be tested rheology spectrum that controls cuttings build up and
throughout the anticipated pressure and temperature the build up of cuttings beds.
range to confirm that the mud remains stable and mud Borehole angle has a direct influence on barite sag.
properties stay within acceptable limits in the expected The higher the hole-angle the greater the sag problem
environment. This testing should include contamination will be. This is the result of simple geometry where the
tests with potential formation fluids where feasible. barite does not have to sag very far before it reaches the
These results are associated with hydraulic modelling low side of the hole; barite and/or cuttings can then
and should be confirmed as accurate with data gathered slide down the low side and the build up rapidly forms.
during actual operations. Significant differences have Sag testing in a vertical cylinder may show a
been observed between expected mud behaviour and satisfactory result, repeat the test in an inclined cylinder
expected ECD values with those recorded in the field. and sag rates will accelerate. Always perform the sag
Such differences can have detrimental effects on tests in a cylinder inclined at the appropriate angle to
operations and can prevent meeting well objectives. The match hole-angle. However efforts at sag prediction
incorporation of annulus pressure subs is recommended remain uncertain, with wellbore trajectory design
in order to establish a confidence level for perhaps the best way to avoid this issue and avoid
understanding mud behaviour in addition to the impact resultant well control events.
of drilling procedures and parameters. This also allows At very high mud weights, when the limits of barite
54

systems are approached, barite sag can no longer occur. 7.9 LOST CIRCULATION
With so many solids in the mud system it becomes
self-supporting and the barite cannot sag past the other Severe well control incidents can occur within a narrow
solids. The most severe barite sag normally occurs in drilling window owing to lost circulation. Volumetric
1,92 SG (16,0 ppg) and 2,04 SG (17,0 ppg) mud changes, both increase and decrease, in the mud system
systems and in hole-angles of around 45 to 60 degrees. during drilling operations are commonly termed
ballooning or supercharging. Generally this is defined
as mud losses returning to the borehole when removing
7.8 STUCK PIPE the equivalent circulating density (ECD) and returning
to static conditions. The change in volume of the mud
Stuck pipe mechanisms and prevention techniques are system, or this so called ballooning volume, can be
largely unchanged from conventional drilling practice. quite large depending on the well in question, and in
However, there are some specific areas where the risk many instances can lead to the wrong impression on the
of stuck pipe is increased as a result of the nature of surface that the well is either taking a kick influx or that
HPHT wells. lost circulation is in progress. These conditions can
Wellbore instability is a known stuck pipe happen over a relatively short hole- section.
mechanism. HPHT wells by their nature often result in Mitigating these problems, especially in HPHT
the formation collapse pressure being approached or wells where the drilling window is often very narrow
even encroached. In general when working close to the with little or no room for error often proves
formation pressure margins formation instability is a problematical; the reader’s attention is drawn to the
much more common occurrence in HPHT wells. This failure of the Ocean Odyssey (see further reading
automatically increases the risk of stuck pipe by this section – Ireland 1991). A further complication arises
mechanism. Avoiding high-hole inclinations and with ballooning effects that are masked by mud
directional work in formations that are prone to this can expansion or contraction owing to temperature and
help mitigate this risk. Simple well trajectories and pressure variations. In addition, bore-hole instability and
careful planning to avoid prone formations will pay dimensional changes will result in the loss of mud to
dividends in this area. natural fractures or induced fractures if mud weights are
Mud condition is very important to minimise too high.
excessive filter cake thickness, another common stuck Well integrity problems can occur as a result of
pipe mechanism. However differential sticking is cause and effect. Where previous losses come back into
probably the most important stuck pipe mechanism. the bore-hole section, this can be interpreted as a kick.
Some quite extreme pore pressure variations can be This situation, in turn, can result in the remedial
encountered in HPHT reservoirs. This can result in very weighting up of the mud resulting in the hydraulic
high over-balance conditions in some sands while column quickly achieving greater overbalance than
balanced conditions exist in others. This can occur as a desired. This condition in turn will cause more
result of production pressure depletion or from natural fracturing of the formation thus producing greater
leakage or migration in others (hydrodynamic flow i.e. losses. The whole cycle then achieves even greater
the Britannia Field North Sea – Ref: O’Connor and uncertainty and instability which results in a decrease in
Swarbrick 2008). This unfortunately sets up ideal well and rig safety.
conditions for differential sticking. During planning Bore-hole ballooning is a common enough
these zones should be identified so that the appropriate occurrence on HPHT wells that detailed contingency
precautions can be put in place. plans and procedures should be drawn up and applied
Areas to consider are: when required. This is discussed further in Model Code
of Safe Practice, Part 17, Volume 2, Well control during
— Optimise MW. the drilling and testing of high pressure offshore wells.
— Drilling fluid specification. However bore-hole ballooning has been cited as a factor
— Drillstring BHA considerations. in an HPHT operational unacceptable failure. (cf. Ocean
— Operational practices e.g. connection procedures. Odyssey – where 'unacceptable' involves a fatality).
— Stuck pipe contingency. Lost circulation is a serious well control problem in
HPHT wells. Loss rates are normally categorised into
In some cases quite extreme measures may be needed seepage, moderate and severe. A detailed contingency
including setting an additional liner or adjusting casing plan should be drawn up to deal with this. Sufficient
setting depths. stocks of LCM and/or wellbore strengthening materials
55

such as calcium carbonate (marble) and graphite may be 7.11 LOGGING AND LOGGING EQUIPMENT
considered, (cf. Managed pressure drilling, Annex B).
Proprietary treatments and/or cement that are included Wireline work carried out through the drill string or
in the contingency plan must be available at the rig site. tubing e.g. string shot, free point, etc. should be
It is an imperative that the acceptable seepage loss rate conducted with wireline pressure control equipment
for operations to continue is specified during planning. installed. Care should be taken to make sure the well is
The selected rate must be rigorously applied and stable. Wireline pressure control equipment should have
selected based on assessment of the following factors: a pressure rating that exceeds the maximum anticipated
surface pressure for the well. Open-hole wireline
— Impact on kick detection and volume control. logging operations result in vulnerable periods with
— Impact on well integrity and kick tolerance limits. regard to well control and care should be exercised to
ensure that nothing is swabbed into the well when
Consideration should be given to specifying in the tripping out to log.
contingency plan the duration over which acceptable While logging, the well must be monitored on the
seepage losses will be tolerated before remedial efforts trip tank with the trip tank fill-up pump operating. Tool
are made to control it. In practice the failure to respond and wire displacement must be accurately monitored
quickly to mud losses, even acceptable seepage loss, is and can be fingerprinted between one run and the next.
a false saving that often leads to complex and difficult Large OD logging tools should be pulled from the well
control operations. at reduced speed to avoid swabbing.
Formation sampling tools that flush formation
fluids into the annulus, e.g. MDT, should be used with
7.10 HYDRATES caution. Well control incidents have been initiated by
the use of such tools.
Hydrates are also known as clathrates or hydrocarbon Pipe conveyed logging is sometimes seen as a safer
ice and are formed from the combination of a light alternative to wireline logging. This is not necessarily
hydrocarbon especially methane and water generally the case and a careful examination of the risks should be
under low temperature and high pressure conditions. Per undertaken. The pressure rating of the side entry
unit volume, hydrates contain very large amounts of wireline sub is often not considered adequate for high
gas. For example, 1 m3 of hydrate disassociates at pressure wells. BOP function and pressure containment
atmospheric temperature and pressure to form 164 m3 of ability are compromised with wireline across the BOP
natural gas plus 0,8 m3 of water. It is worth noting that stack on the outside of the drill pipe. Some companies
these hydrates can also contain carbon dioxide and do not permit pipe conveyed logging on high pressure
hydrogen sulphide and they too, disassociate rapidly at wells. It is also possible to increase the risk of
surface and therefore the implications for health and differential sticking during long static periods across
safety are enormous. reservoir when acquiring pressure pre-test and fluid
In addition to gas release, hydrates can block flow sampling.
lines and reduce the operability of well control Detailed contingency plans should be prepared to
equipment. Provision should be made for dealing with deal with the possibility of a well control incident
hydrates in HPHT operations especially in testing and during wireline operations. Additional equipment will
completions. Well control risks attend hydrate be required including wireline well control lubricators,
formation since rapid expansion of a gas kick can cause wireline cutters etc. Once a well control event has
rapid cooling as it approaches surface equipment. occurred during wireline operations there is no time to
Joule-Thompson cooling through instantaneous then decide whether to 'pull out of hole', cut the wireline
expansion across the choke can drop the temperature to or attempt to close the BOPs. Plans must be prepared
as much as !150°C (!238°F) in some well conditions. ahead of time to cover a variety of circumstances for all
Note also that this can often be well below the service wireline functions. These plans should include options
tolerance of the equipment materials. for fishing in the event of a stuck tool-string (e.g.
Well plans should include the provision for hydrate whether to pull weak point or strip over). In many
suppressant injection into the choke manifold upstream instances procedures will be dictated by the prevailing
of the choke when hydrocarbons reach the surface. circumstances during operations, but it is recommended
that some thought is given to this topic beforehand.
56

7.12 DEPTH ERROR CONTINGENCIES i.e. referenced to sea level (SL) in one location and
rotary table (RT) in another. This can lead to significant
Assuming planning has reduced the accuracy of differences in expectations. This is often caused by
formation top error bars to as low as possible, the geologists referencing SL and drilling engineers
remaining error bar will have to be covered within well referencing RT. (cf. section 2 of this code, HPHT
planning to accommodate possible changes in casing Project risk and uncertainty management). Confusion is
setting depth for instance ensuring sufficient casing a serious safety issue.
stocks are carried and are fit for purpose. These depth Specifying the minimum and most likely maximum
errors can of course be improved or reduced during formation pressure at an early stage of planning is very
drilling, and they should be re-calculated at every important. This permits a clear measure of the overall
opportunity. Naturally this will be too late for risk associated with the well in question and appropriate
procurement or planning purposes. contingencies to be prepared. However an over
Every resource should be exploited to reduce error compensation of the maximum values could jeopardise
bars during drilling of HPHT prospects. It is important the well designs leading to unnecessary actions (i.e. too
to establish an integrated team decision strategy on many casing strings) which in turn may lead to
selecting critical casing points which commonly increased safety risk in other areas. A thorough analysis
involves refining depth error predictions through a of the associated risks and how they affect safety should
package of measures such as biostratigraphy and look be made. Detailed discussions on this topic are outside
ahead vertical seismic profile (VSP) to detect critical the scope of this code.
formation interfaces. Anomalous departures from the predicted pressure
Wherever possible, well trajectories should be window should be treated with great caution. A prudent
planned to avoid crossing faults, particularly at depth. operator may delay operations to understand the
This becomes even more critical under depleted variation. Evidentially this can have serious
reservoir conditions. Faults can be locations presenting implications, but is unavoidable if it is likely that HS&E
reduced fracture gradient (FG) where unexpected losses will be compromised. Existing pressure test data and
can occur. They have the potential for formation formation integrity data should be studied for accuracy.
movement and may act as conduits for unexpected
pressure transfer and display overpressures. These
issues can have serious implications for well control. 7.14 CASING AND CEMENTING DESIGN
Where crossing faults are unavoidable a detailed risk
assessment needs to be undertaken to ensure appropriate Casing contingencies should include sufficient stock
procedures and contingencies are in place. available to vary the setting depths by at least the
This is the area that causes the greatest difficulties formation depth error bars (an important safety issue for
in HPHT drilling operations. The levels of geological 'wildcat' HPHT wells) plus an excess to cover any
uncertainty can be such that in marginal conditions, the handling damage. Although this is often viewed as
well, the objectives and HS&E can be compromised at standard practice, replacement or extra equipment may
this point in operations. Such uncertainties can benefit not be readily available in some circumstances such as
from a risked based decision strategy to minimise lead times etc. HPHT specifications usually have long
exposure. lead and delivery times. A contingency drilling liner or
expandable liner may be included; however this will
depend entirely on evaluating the necessity for such a
7.13 FORMATION PRESSURE ERROR contingency. Departures from the planned design
CONTINGENCY specification may impinge on safety and this may have
to be reviewed i.e. space availability and safe storage.
It is essential that the formation pressure forecast is Remedial cementing contingency plans for the
continuously updated as drilling proceeds. This should primary cement jobs should be prepared as a matter of
be stated clearly in the well’s documentation. Error bars, course. Specific squeeze slurries should be prepared for
appropriately documented during planning, should be this contingency. Other cementing contingencies that
reduced during operations. It is critical that departures should be prepared include: emergency isolation plugs
from forecast pore pressure are highlighted. Both can (for pumping through the bit), abandonment balanced
have a major impact on operations. It should be noted plugs and for lost circulation contingency. Cementing in
that confusion can be caused by different data/document the HPHT environment does require extensive lab
sources referencing pore pressure and fracture gradients testing, hydraulics modelling and careful planning of
'spacer' requirements. Stress failure issues over well life
57

commonly require the application of non standard maintenance. Some contingency plans may have to be
cementing technology. ECD modelling requires close modified when wear protectors are in use.
attention and can be problematic requiring When excessive wear is detected or suspected, the
modifications to standard procedures. Close attention to ultimate sanction is to pressure test the casing to
detail is critical as cementing integrity is an area that demonstrate its integrity. If the casing fails under
has experienced significant issues historically with pressure testing, this could be disastrous. A tie-back
corresponding high impact. string may be needed in severe cases. However, tie-back
Having contingency plans prepared ahead of time strings introduce their own problems and risks and very
will help ensure adequate stocks of the required careful consideration should be given to their use
chemicals are available and delays are not experienced including: trapped annulus, slimhole completion,
through a lack of lab time. Contingency cement plans thermal expansion / contraction, space out and wellhead
should be periodically reviewed during operations and loading.
updated if bottom-hole temperatures (BHT) and/or mud
weights vary significantly from planned. Owing to the
criticality and high strengths of many of the HPHT 7.15 RISER BEHAVIOUR
cement additives, stringent QAQC is imperative in
controlling the offshore cementing operations e.g. batch The high mud weights likely to be required for HPHT
numbers etc. must be rigorously checked. drilling will have a direct impact on riser design,
Casing wear issues have already been discussed loadings, dynamic behaviour, top tension requirements,
elsewhere in this code, but are often a very critical item etc. This could be quite an extreme requirement
in HPHT wells. Routine wear modelling throughout the compared with normal deepwater well drilling e.g. riser
planning phase and through operations will provide very top tension requirements may exceed existing capacity.
useful information. However, prevention should be the It may be so severe as to make dual gradient drilling a
preferred method. Running a base line multi-finger viable alternative. Dual gradient drilling is normally
calliper log immediately after installation of the casing associated with fragile shallow formations and the
with follow up logs, if and when required, is a basic prevention of formation fracture or fluid loss. However,
requirement, as too are ditch magnets and accurate excessive loads from heavy mud in the riser may be an
records of steel recovered. However these methods may alternative criterion for considering its use. Dual
depend on individual well circumstance, company gradient drilling is a technique that is still in its infancy
policy and the introduction of superior technologies. with respect to HPHT operations.
This does not give a direct measurement of casing wear, One of the greatest threats in any drilling operation
since the metal can come from numerous sources, but is is getting gas into the riser above the BOP. Increasing
used to establish the wear trend and to spot any water depth will exacerbate problems due to the closer
acceleration in potential wear. Regular wear bushing proximity of the BOP to the bottom of the well. The risk
inspections and regular visual checks of drill pipe tool is even greater in HPHT wells as are the consequences
joints can also help provide an indication of levels of of such an event.
wear. Ultrasonic logs can be used to give direct wall Undetected or late detection of kicks is a frequent
thickness measurements, but their use can be limited by occurrence in HPHT wells. Kicks are all too easily
mud weight. masked by fluid behaviours in the HPHT environment.
Efforts should be made for prevention, this being The use of oil-based or oil-based derived drilling fluids
the safer and less costly option. Drill pipe wear is of particular concern with the bubble point or gas
protectors and subs have their place and can be break out point potentially being above the BOP,
effective. However they do introduce other risks e.g. get providing little opportunity for influx detection until it
lost in hole, prevent stripping, etc. Be aware of slip on is too late.
polymer type wear protectors which are extremely Gas volumes at surface are very much larger in
unreliable in high temperatures, where there is potential HPHT wells than in normal environments. 1 bbl of gas
for hydrocarbon contamination and possibly pack-off. from the reservoir can become up to 1 000 bbls at
For really critical well applications ultrasonic wall surface conditions, which is quite sufficient to unload a
thickness measurements may be performed onshore in riser and under-balance the well. The threat is
the pipe yard and then categorised according to wall significant and must have special attention.
thickness e.g. >98%, 95% to 98%, 90% to 95% etc. Although this is primarily an operational issue, it is
In general wear protectors should only be used referred to in planning to bring to the attention of the
when necessary and, when used, adequate procedures planning team that these issues will need consideration.
must be put in place for their installation, checking and The most fundamental rule of drilling is that the riser
58

must be monitored for well flow or increased return not, there will always be a need for reaction to general
flow regardless of the operation that is taking place. alarms, whether a galley fire or a ship collision. The
This fundamental rule must be rigorously applied at all longer time to safely secure an HPHT well must be
times and must be referred in the planning process if taken into account and some guidance should be
safe practice and the principles of ALARP are to be provided should a well control operation be in progress.
adhered to. The immediate reaction to indications of It is a common practice to prepare two methods for
well flow is to follow procedure and shut-in the well. securing the well; one when sufficient time is available
The riser must continue to be monitored; if well flow to circulate and hang off, a second for when there is no
continues, a second ram is shut (ram or annular leak time. Guidance on making this decision should be
assumed). If well flow continues, there must be an prominently stated in contingency plans.
immediate response to implement the gas in riser plan. Contingency planning for multiple failures can be
Time is of the essence, little time may be available fraught with difficulty. However, some thought,
before gas reaches surface. discussion and guidance are appropriate for complex
An awareness of the operations that are likely to situations. Making the correct decision may not always
produce gas in the riser can be of great assistance in be either obvious or attainable during an emergency.
preparing the crew for implementing a safe and reliable
plan.
If the well is shut-in and a well kill is in progress, 7.18 PROVISIONS AND CONTINGENCIES
the riser must be continuously monitored throughout for WHILE DRILLING
well flow. The appropriate action must be promptly
taken if gas in the riser is suspected. This could involve Provision and contingency for fishing is routinely
the simultaneous handling of two well control practised on all drilling operations and HPHT wells are
situations; one in the well below the BOP, and one in no different. Downhole fishing tools should be specified
the riser above the BOP. for the pressure and temperature conditions where
appropriate. Elastomer components are particularly
susceptible while fishing jars and bumper subs,
7.16 SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS free-point indicators, back-off equipment etc. will
seldom work for very long if at all in these conditions.
Simultaneous operations on platforms and rigs are Planning should include an assessment of equipment
commonplace and detailed procedures will routinely be reliability and limitations.
applied to control these operations and the potential If the well plan includes or provides for the
impact they might have on one another. possibility of sub 8½" hole, fishing becomes very
The key impacts that HPHT operations can have on restricted in these smaller borehole sizes. As a general
simultaneous operations is the greater reaction times rule, nothing should be run in the well that cannot be
needed. It can take longer to secure an HPHT well and fished.
put it in a safe condition. This can have an impact
during an emergency that is initiated elsewhere on the
installation. This extra time should be built into the 7.19 SUGGESTED FURTHER READING
simultaneous operations (simops) plan.
For an emergency originating from well operations Dye W. and Mullen G. 2002 'New Technology to
the reverse is true. Well control incidents can accelerate Manage Barite Sag' AADE-02-DF-HO-12 (American
rapidly; very large volumes of gas can be released at Association of Drilling Engineers)
surface very quickly. A much faster response may
therefore be required from other functions on the Ireland, Sheriff Principal 1991, 'Fatal Accident Inquiry
installation. into the death of Timothy John Williams on board the
The simultaneous operations plans should take Ocean Odyssey' Aberdeen Sheriff Court
account of these significant changes in time frames.
O’Connor S. A and Swarbrick R. E. 2008 'Pressure
regression, fluid drainage and a hydrodynamically
7.17 GENERAL ALARMS controlled fluid contact in the North Sea, Lower
Cretaceous, Britannia Sandstone Formation. Petroleum
Whether simultaneous operations are taking place or Geoscience Volume: 14, No 2 May 2008.
59

60

8
FURTHER SAFETY RELATED

TECHNICAL ISSUES
8.1 KEY POINTS SUMMARY for in the well design.
— An HPHT well design should be examined as a — Corrosion is a serious problem with HPHT wells.
whole. The shifting stresses and interactions within Many HPHT reservoirs worldwide have corrosive
the system can affect the robustness of the design. compounds such as H2S and CO2 in varying
quantities. These compounds coupled with the
— Adoption of equipment for HPHT work will require higher temperatures will have a direct impact on
rigorous testing. Tried, tested and qualified HPHT casing design and the HS&E risks
equipment should always be the first choice.
— Abandonment: Final abandonment plugs have to
— Many service companies or equipment vendors do cater for potential reservoir re-pressurisation over
not have relevant HPHT experience. Equipment time.
will need rigorous testing and qualification before
use.
8.2 CASING DESIGN
— Annular pressure management is very important for
HPHT wells and provision must be incorporated The fully installed casing and wellhead system for a
into the well planning. HPHT well is in effect a dynamic hydro-mechanical
system. Fluctuating temperature and fluid conditions
— HPHT wells will exaggerate, seek and exploit cause constant movement within the system that
weaknesses in design components. It is therefore interacts with all the casings in the design.
necessary to initiate a thorough QAQC procedure It has been suggested that an HPHT well design
especially safety critical items. should be examined as a whole and that the shifting
stresses and interactions within the system will affect
— Components for HPHT drill strings should require the robustness of the design. This multi-string design
focus on operability and risk of failure. concept may offer a higher level of integrity than the
one string at a time traditional approach.
— Life of well issues: HPHT wells impose greater This design approach has been used to examine
stresses on their components and cement sheaths. thermal annulus pressure build up and wellhead growth.
Greater thermal loads and cycles must be allowed Both of these are good examples of a multi-string or a
61

holistic approach to casing design. Software is available — Reliability and qualification testing.
to examine multi-string loads and helps to produce a — Performance tracking and analysis.
better understanding for the optimum placement of top — Supply chain management.
of cement for the production casing to limit thermal — Management of change.
pressure build up. — Reliability improvement and risk reduction.
Another approach is the probabilistic design. This
concept uses quantitative risk analysis (QRA) QAQC and thorough audit trail (logged) documentation
techniques to evaluate a design. This is based on the is vital where safety critical equipment is used.
premise that we design for worst-case occurrences that
very seldom arise and so over-design for most wells.
This technique determines the probability of failure of 8.4 NON PERMANENT DOWNHOLE
a design using statistical analysis of a large number of EQUIPMENT
casing failures. The design can then be adjusted to meet
a criterion based on an acceptable probability of failure. 8.4.1 Wireline tools
Creating a sufficiently large database of casing
related events so that casing failure rates and Wireline logging tools are normally rated for continuous
consequences can be firmly established is an obvious operation to 176/C (350/F) and 1 380 bar (138 MPa,
difficulty with this method. It certainly presents a 20 000 psi) downhole conditions. With many HPHT
completely different approach to casing design that may reservoirs exceeding these limits, the need for
have some merit. specialised, environment specific wireline tools has
Neither of these approaches is likely to fully been a requirement for some time.
replace the traditional design processes but they might Significant complications arise when both extreme
offer useful additional tools to help us understand and conditions occur together; however it is the temperature
address some of the more complex areas of design that issues that can be more difficult to overcome, especially
modern well drilling raise. given the increasing use and complexity of electronic
systems.
In HPHT reservoirs heavy muds have a tendency to
8.3 QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT gel when not circulated for extended periods. This can
lead to very high logging cable tensions. Operational
Many service companies or equipment vendors do not experience has proved that the use of a capstan unit
have relevant HPHT experience or have HPHT specific (auxiliary winch) has been instrumental in mitigating
inventory, plant or manufacturing processes. Adoption this problem.
of equipment for HPHT work will require rigorous
testing. As a general rule the simpler the equipment is 8.4.2 Gauges
the less risk will be associated with it when it is run into
an HPHT well. Tried, tested and qualified HPHT A detailed study of the reliability of gauges for high
equipment should always be the first choice. The temperatures is often needed to ensure accuracy of the
following points should be considered: readings. This is especially true where readings are
required for safety critical reasons.
— Testing and modelling.
— Fit for purpose.
— Rigour in best in class. 8.5 THERMAL EFFECTS
— Inspections and verification.
— Supply chain management. The planning and design of HPHT wells must take into
— Reliability demonstrations. account the following:
— Technical risk management achievements.
— Long term temperature effects.
The vendor will need to have the following controls in — Thermal loading and cycling.
place:
Both these effects can reduce well integrity and must be
— Reliability verification, validation and considered in relation to the longer term safety aspects
benchmarking. for operations and production.
— Project risk management.
62

FURTHER SAFETY RELATED TECHNICAL ISSUES
8.6 ANNULAR MANAGEMENT AND The most common solution applied is not to cement the
TRAPPED ANNULAR PRESSURE casing back into the previous casing string. Leaving
exposed formation in the annulus should provide a leak
8.6.1 Annular management (AM) path for the thermal pressure to dissipate. Unfortunately,
it has been found that the annulus often becomes
The reader’s attention is drawn to API Standard RP90 plugged when the drilling mud deteriorates with time
– Annular Casing Pressure Management for Offshore and barite settles with resulting plugging of the annulus.
Wells. Annular management should be considered an Work is still continuing to resolve this issue and several
integral part of well integrity management (WIM) different approaches have been used. These include:
having an important role in safety for both personnel
and the environment. Provisions for AM should be — Rupture disks in the previous casing string. These
made during the planning stage of any HPHT well can also get plugged with barite, and have been
especially where there is sustained production during known to prematurely fail.
the life of the well. API RP90 covers monitoring and — Collapsible foam sheaths that take up some of the
testing. Rigorous risk assessment should be made and annular space. They collapse under the pressure
maximum allowable wellhead operating pressures build up providing an increased volume for
should be established. expansion.
— Displacing the mud out of the well ahead of the
8.6.1.1 Sub-sea annular management cement with weighted clear brine. This is to avoid
Use of sub-sea wellheads introduces particular problems the possibility of barite bridging as well as
for annular management for obvious reasons. In attempting to provide a known density fluid in the
addition to API RP90, general guidance is given under annulus.
ISO 13628-4 Petroleum and Natural gas industries – – Removing all the old mud can be very
Design and operation of subsea production systems Part difficult. Any mixing of the brine and mud will
4: Subsea wellhead and tree equipment and related API encourage barite fall out. Brines have a higher
Spec 17D, Subsea Wellhead and Christmas Tree thermal conductivity than drilling mud and
Equipment. Subsea equipment should be capable of will become hotter. Brines are also relatively
handling annular pressure monitoring and pressure incompressible compared with an oil-based
bleed off. In addition well head movement should be mud; this produces much higher thermal
thoroughly understood, planned and allowed for in the pressures in the annulus. But solids free
well design. system should help ensure easier leak-off to
the formations.
8.6.1.2 Trapped annuli – causes and mitigation — Displace the mud with nitrogen foamed mud of the
Thermal pressure increases in un-cemented annuli is an same weight. The concept here is that as the mud
area of continuing concern, which has not yet been fully deteriorates with time it will release the nitrogen,
resolved. Temperature is transmitted through the casing which then acts as a compressible cushion to
wall to the fluid in un-cemented annuli. The annulus absorb the thermal pressure rise.
fluid expands increasing the pressure in that annulus. — Displace the production annulus (tubing/
This effect is not just restricted to the production casing production casing annulus) with nitrogen. Nitrogen
but can extend out to the intermediate casing and by is a good thermal insulator. The purpose here is to
definition any fluid filled annulus in the well including thermally insulate the production casing from the
liners. production fluid and so prevent the annulus fluids
Depending on the fluid in these annuli, the pressure from heating up.
rise can be sufficient to collapse the inner casing and/or — Use vacuum insulated production tubing. This
burst the outer casing. Such failures have occurred in tubing behaves like a vacuum flask with an inner
the field and are well documented. and outer tube and a vacuum drawn between them
Determining the significance of this problem for a during manufacture. This will thermally insulate
given well requires a great deal of complex mathematics the production fluids and limit heat transfer to the
and is more easily achieved by using modelling casings.
software. Once the expected annulus pressure rise has — Shrinking spacer fluid.
been estimated the likelihood of casing failure can be This is a method of mitigating trapped annular
determined. Mitigating measures and strategies can then pressure (TAP). The idea is based on the shrinkage
be evaluated as part of the casing design process. of 20% which results when MMA (methyl
methacrylate monomer) monomer polymerises to
63

PMMA. (Poly methyl methacrylate) [Ref: Bloys et 8.7.2 Elastomers

al (2007).]
— Ported sub-sea wellheads are not permitted under Some elastomer integrity is time dependent at elevated
API standards (Spec 17D – ISO 13628-4); however temperatures. Elastomers can become sites of an
wireless acoustic pressure and temperature gauges increased risk of failure.
have been used in HPHT conditions to monitor B Issues of importance with HPHT usage are:
and C annuli. (Sultan et al 2008). However,
re-designs in ported wellhead concepts are gaining — Temperature ranges (with safety margins) i.e. at
some acceptance. temperatures greater than 200°C for instance, there
are likely to be operability issues with Viton.
Some of these solutions are clearly very expensive and — High aromatics, hydrogen sulphide (H2S) and acids
difficult to implement. Finding an appropriate solution in combination with high temperatures will reduce
for any specific well is a matter for risk analysis. New operability.
ideas for resolving this important issue are continuously — Brines: (formates – caesium, sodium and potassium
being developed and it is worth exploring these from (cf. section 5.16.5 and 15.16.6 formates).
time to time.
Recent research has indicated the fracture gradient The most common elastomers in use with HPHT
of the formation may improve at elevated temperatures. operations are FKM (Viton, Fluorel), TFEP, (Aflas, and
This could have an adverse impact on annulus leak-off. Fluoraz), FFKM (Chemraz and Kalrez) and
thermoplastics such as PTFE (Teflon) and PEEK
(Victrex) – issues with these include:
8.7 MATERIAL SELECTION: FORWARD
PLANNING FOR SAFE OPERATION — FKM susceptible to high temperature.
— FKM susceptible to steam, amine corrosion
Modern oil and gas wells have complex components inhibitors, pH > 10 (formates).
with an increasing number of risk points. HPHT wells — Aflas is Amine resistant, but less resistant to
will exaggerate, seek and exploit weaknesses in design hydrocarbons.
components. It is therefore necessary to initiate — FFKM, PTFE, PEEK are resistant to majority of
thorough testing and QAQC procedures especially on environments but very expensive.
safety critical equipment using elastomers. It is
recommended that a final inspection of equipment is Where possible, consideration should be given to
undertaken immediately prior to shipment offshore. replacing elastomeric material with metal-to-metal seals.
(Especially pertinent to equipment exposed to elemental
attack.) The following short list contains points which
should be considered: 8.8 DRILL STRING COMPONENTS
8.7.1 General Components for HPHT drill strings should require focus
on operability and risk of failure. The following lists
— Cost versus HS&E – there should be a culture of items, issues and risks:
uncompromised safety within planning.
— Materials testing – Vendor input may be necessary — Item: Drillstring components: Issue: torque / drag
to ensure optimum material operability and and hydraulics. Risk: collapse and fatigue.
longevity. — Item: Drillstring components: Issue: strength
— Completion strategy – Assessment of the reduction due to temperature effects: Risk:
risk/failure modes of materials in use in production. increased risk of failure.
Safety objectives should be integral to material — Item: Drillstring components: Issue: H2S and CO2,
selection during planning. combination of these with elevated temperatures:
— Completion fluid chemistry (in addition to Risk: Excessive corrosion, fatigue and failure.
produced fluid chemistry) should be analysed for — Item: Drillstring components: Issue: availability of
effects on safety critical equipment. suitable materials: Risk: insufficient contingency.
— Item: Circulating subs as part of the bottom hole
assembly, DIDS, etc: Issue: cementing through the
bit: Risk: well control.
64

New materials and specifications: 8.9 LIFE OF WELL ISSUES
Item: High strength steel drill pipe (HSSDP) – The following are some of the issues which need to be
applicable to HPHT and deep wells: considered in the well planning process since these need
to be allowed for in the design since they can seriously
— HSSDP Z-140 & V-150 have improved affect the viability of production:
strength/weight ratio over S-135.
— HSSDP - UD-165 have a yield strength of 22% — Change in reservoir stress states with time.
better than S-135. Depletion of reservoir pressures while temperatures
remain near constant.
Issue: Possible handling due to hardness; in addition to — Casing – thermal cycling effects during production
BOP design criteria for shear rams. and static when shut in. Often the production
Risk: Slippage and failure to BOP resulting in well casing is anchored top and bottom with little or no
control failure. cement support between these points – well head
and cemented shoe. Thermal cycling can lead to
Item: Titanium drill pipe (TDP) and titanium tubulars fatigue failures as casing goes from tension (best
are gaining acceptance for use in more extreme HPHT case) to compression which is the worst case for
and deep wells: casing
— Casing joints during cycling – casing couplings are
— Titanium = Yield strength: 825 MPa (120 Ksi), the weakest part of the casing string.
ADP 4 755 MPa (69 Ksi), HSSDP 1 140 MPa (165 — Well head growth. The 30" casing can experience
Ksi). up to 4 inches of increase while the 20" and tree
— Titanium = Density: 56% of C-Steel – 37% can increase by 8"-10" for example. This will
improvement in strength/weight over S-135 steel depend on depth and production temperature. It
— Titanium = Resistant to H2S and CO2, H2 should be noted that pressure can drop rapidly
embrittlement, Chloride stress and stress corrosion while temperature remains constant.
cracking (SCC). — Adiabatic (Joules – Thompson) effects: This can
— TDP Modulus of elasticity (MOE) equals 1,2 x 105 cause hydrate problems with attendant HS&E risk
MPa (17 million psi). Steel MOE equals 2,1 x 105 as flow lines become blocked.
MPa (30 million psi). Titanium is subject to nearly — Cement – micro annulus, bonding. Well integrity
twice the deformation of steel. can become severely compromised if the well
cement sheath fails due to temperature and well
Issue: Possible handling problems, in addition to BOP fluid contamination. Cement/casing bonds can fail
design criteria for shear rams. due to the thermal cycling.
Risk: Slippage and failure to BOP resulting in well — Re-Completions and Interventions may be affected
control failure: by casing collapse/shear during depletion and
ovality of the casing and tubing may cause sticking
— Aluminum drill pipe – is not recommended for of intervention equipment (cf. Model Code of
HPHT wells. Practice, Part 17, Volume 3, Completions and
— Composite drill pipe – is not recommended for interventions). Such conditions pose significant
HPHT wells. HS&E risks.
Aluminium and composite drill pipe is not To the above list should also be added trapped annuli
recommended for HPHT work. Titanium, whilst strong and 'B' annulus problems.
can stretch considerably, this being especially
significant with deep drilling, deepwater operations. At
the time of writing (2008) steel drill pipe is still 8.10 CORROSION
considered to be the more viable, least risk and
economic of materials. In addition steel drill pipe has a Many HPHT reservoirs worldwide have corrosive
good service history with HPHT operations. The compounds such as H2S and CO2 in varying quantities.
logistics, availability and cost of 'exotic' materials can These compounds coupled with the higher temperatures
pose serious problems while conventional materials are will have a direct impact on casing design and the
tried and tested, are more readily available and have health, safety and environmental risks these impose
documented predictable behaviour.
65

must be mitigated. The wellhead, completion — Halides.

equipment, tubing, liners, etc. that will be exposed to — pH.
produced fluids will be the most affected. Casings — Biological activity.
which are likely to have only temporary exposure to — Condensation.
formation fluids, gas peaks, kicks, etc. may need to be — Velocity of produced fluids.
suitable for sour service. Sulphide stress corrosion — Sand production.
(SSC) cracking can occur very rapidly if exposed to
hydrogen sulphide conditions. This type of corrosion Some completion fluids, most noticeably brines, can be
can result in brittle failure of casing strings. very corrosive (chloride stress corrosion). The
The industry universally complies with standards appropriate use of oxygen scavengers and corrosion
set down in NACE MR0175/ISO 15156-31:2003 inhibitors will help to eliminate such problems. Refer to
Cor.2:2005 (E) 1 – Published September 2005 or later NACE TM0198 – 2004 'Slow Strain Rate Test Method
as a guideline – "requirements and recommendations for Screening Corrosion Resistant Alloys (CRAs) for
for the selection and qualification of carbon and Stress Corrosion Cracking in Sour Oilfield Service', and
low-alloy steels, corrosion-resistant alloys, and other NACE RP0204 – 2004 'Stress Corrosion Cracking
alloys for service in equipment used in oil and natural (SCC) Direct Assessment Methodology'.
gas production and natural gas treatment plants in The NACE standards provide guidance on material
H2S-containing environments, whose failure could pose specifications for sour service. Research in this area is
a risk to the health and safety of the public and constantly undertaken and revised: the latest version of
personnel or to the environment" (Quoted from NACE NACE standards should be referred to; accommodation
2008). It is a legal requirement to comply with NACE of changes should be made in the well plan.
in the USA. This standard specifies that a well is Where more than one corrosion process is present
considered sour if it has a partial pressure of H2S in combined corrosion analysis will be required. Where
excess of 0,003 bar (0,05 psi). For example a 965 bar corrosion inhibitors are to be used, corrosion testing
(96,5 MPa, 14 000 psi) reservoir with 5ppm of with inhibitors is recommended. Elastomer components
hydrogen sulphide has a partial pressure of 0,005 bar can be adversely affected by corrosion processes and
(0,07 psi) and would be classified as sour. corrosion inhibitors and should be included in this
NACE recognises that the likelihood of SSC evaluation.
reduces with increasing temperature. This permits the Most international standards say little about
use of higher-grade casings deeper in the well. Mixed corrosion evaluation other than to state that the
casing strings of grade, weight and size are commonly estimated effects of temperature, corrosion and wear
used to meet both design and corrosion requirements in should be included in design factors. This generally
HPHT wells. extends to CO2, H2S, wax, asphaltenes, mercury,
The NACE standards are not as rigorous or as mercaptans, scale, hydrates, etc. Reliance is therefore
thorough as is required for many extreme HPHT placed on individual company guidelines or corrosion
conditions. Most notably, NACE takes no account of experts.
pH, which is known to have a significant influence on Relevant international standards include:
sulphide stress corrosion (SSC). Steel manufacturers
have carried out in independent labs a great deal of ISO 11960 (API 5CT) – for casing and tubing
metallurgical testing. These can provide useful ASTM G111 – standard guide for corrosion tests in HT
proprietary grades of high strength steels suitable for or HP environments
sour service, which are not mentioned in the NACE
specification. Norway provides the most comprehensive guides under
Corrosion evaluation for HPHT operations should, Norsok standards; the following may be found useful:
as a minimum include the following: M-001 Materials Selection (being adapted as ISO
19910)
— Operational temperature. M-506 CO2 Corrosion Rate Calculation Model
— Operational pressure. M-701 Materials for Wells Completions Equipment
— Concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2). (draft)
— Concentration of hydrogen sulphide (H2S). M-710 Qualification of Non Metallic
— Concentration of oxidising agents including oxygen
(O2) concentrations. (cf. section 5.20.10 – External Corrosion in the splash
— Concentrations of organic acids. zone)
66

8.11 MANAGED PRESSURE DRILLING (MPD) cap rock where critical plugs are put in place for
isolating the production intervals. These thermally
MPD involves complex operations which make the well induced changes in stress can lead to a change in
planning, design and operations more complicated and wellbore shape and possible failure of the cement
prone to safety issues; however there are economic sheath.
advantages in its use. See Annex B. Any elastomeric materials or initially pre-stressed
plugs can be adapted to the downhole conditions
changes but many of these will deteriorate with time
8.12 ABANDONMENT (especially with well fluids). It may be necessary to
factor these risks as part of the plugging and
All oil and gas wells will have to be plugged and abandonment plan.
abandoned at some time. However with HPHT wells Design engineers should check the regulatory
temperatures remain near virgin at the time of requirements in their area of operation as these
abandonment although the high initial reservoir regulations will vary. Final abandonment plugs have to
pressures should have subsided to near normal cater for potential reservoir re-pressurisation over time.
hydrostatic. It is therefore important to confirm with the reservoir
The plugging and abandonment procedure must engineers what pressures are likely to be present e.g.
provide an effective isolation of the well fluids all along hydrodynamic drive and reservoir compaction
the well to reduce environmental risks of contamination (depletion).
and prevent costly remedial jobs. For safe well
abandonment that allows for cement and plug behaviour
which will prevent environmental problems it is 8.13 SUGGESTED FURTHER READING
recommended that the effect of high temperature with
possible remnant high pressures be simulated using a Sultan N et al 2008 'Real-Time Casing Annulus
geomechanical simulator. Such simulations provide an Pressure Monitoring in a Sub-sea HPHT Exploration
understanding of the pressure and thermal changes and Well' OTC 19286
the maximum effective stress changes in the reservoir
67

68

9
SUGGESTED FURTHER READING AND

REFERENCES
Aadnoy Bernt S., 1999, 'Modern Well Design', Bland R. et al 2006 ' HPHT Drilling Fluid Challenges'
Belkama. ISBN 90 5410633.6 SPE 103731-MS
Adams A, How to Design for Annulus Fluid Heat-up, Bloys et al, 2007. 'Trapped Annular Pressure – A Spacer
SPE 22871, SPE Annual Technical Conference, Dallas, Fluid That Shrinks'. SPE/IADC
Texas, October 1991. 104698
Adams AJ, MacEachran A, Impact on Casing Design of Bourque, J.G 2004 'Management of Change Applied to
Thermal Expansion of Fluids in Confined Annuli, SPE Well Engineering' SPE 86702
21911, SPE/IADC Drilling Conference, Amsterdam,
March 1991. Chapman C. and Ward, S. 2007 'Project Risk
Management' Wiley ISBN-13: 978-0-470-85355-9
Ameen et al. 2003. 'Fracture and In-Situ Stress
Characterization of Hydrocarbon Reservoirs'. Chilingar C.V., 2002. 'Origin and Prediction of
Geological Society of London Special Publication 209 Abnormal Formation Pressures':
Developments In Petroleum Science 50. Elsevier. ISBN:
Aplin et al, 1999, 'Muds and Mudstones: Physical and 0-444-51001 X ISBN: 0376 7361
Fluid-Flow Properties', Geological Society of London
Special Publication 158 Davies SN, Gunningham MM, Bittleston SH, Guillot F,
Swanson BW, Field Studies of Circulating
Aston M.S. et al 2007 'A New Treatment for Wellbore Temperatures Under Cementing Conditions, SPE/IADC
Strengthening in Shale' SPE-110713-MS-P 21973
Barriol Y., et al. 2005. 'The Pressures of Drilling and Davidson S. et al, 2006 'Global HSE Standards for
Production': Global HSE Risks: Standardise, Simplify and Share'
Schlumberger Oilfield Review, page 22, autumn 2005. SPE 98512
Biezen E, Ravi K, 1999 'Designing Effective Zonal Devereux Steve., 1998, 'Practical Well Planning and
Isolation for High-Pressure/High-Temperature and Low Drilling', PennWellDye W. and Mullen G. 2002 'New
Temperature Wells', SPE/IADC 57583, 1999 Technology to Manage Barite Sag'
SPE/IADC Middle East Drilling Technology AADE-02-DF-HO-12 (American Association of
Conference, Abu Dhabi, UAE Drilling Engineers)
69

Energy Institute 2007, 'Well Control During the Drilling Ireland R.D, Sheriff Principal 1991, 'Fatal Accident
and Testing of High Pressure High Temperature Wells, Inquiry into the death of Timothy John Williams on
Model Code of Safe Practice' – Part 17 Volume 2 board the Ocean Odyssey' Aberdeen Sheriff Court
Energy Institute 2008 – 'Guidance for Corrosion Keilty ID, Rabia H, 1996 'Applying Quantitative Risk
Management in Oil and Gas Production and Processing' Assessment to Casing Design', IADC/SPE 35038,
IADC/SPE Drilling Conference, New Orleans,
Fjaer E., Holt R.M, Horsrud P, Raaen A.M, & Risnes R, Louisiana
2nd Edition 2008 'Petroleum Related Rock Mechanics'.
Elsevier. ISBN: 978-0-444-50260-5 Lake Larry W, (Editor in Chief) 2006, Petroleum
Engineering Handbook Volume 2 Drilling Engineering.
Fambon L, and Joffroy G. 2008, Successful Society of Petroleum Engineering.
Development Drilling of an HPHT Infill Well in a
Highly Depleted Reservoir: Case Study. IADC/SPE Lake Larry W, (Editor in Chief) 2006, Petroleum
112708 Engineering Handbook Volume 4 Production
Operations Engineering. Society of Petroleum
Findlay K. and Al-Hassan T. 2000 'Health and Safety Engineering.
Performance in Design Management' SPE 61055
Law B.E., et al. 1998. 'Abnormal Pressures in
Growcock F.B. et al 2006 'Recent Advances in Aphron Hydrocarbon Environments'.
Drilling Fluids' SPE-97982-MS-P AAPG Memoir 70. ISBN: 0-89181-350-0
Guillory C.M. 2005 'Reservoir Evaluation Program Marshall DW, Robertson IR, 'The Design and
Planning in HPHT Environments' SPE 97570-MS Application of High-Yield Strength, Sour Service
Casing in High Pressure High Temperature North Sea
Hermansson. C.L., & Low, E.J. 2005, 'HPHT Wells Wells', SPE/IADC 21992, SPE/IADC Drilling
Best Practices': Conference, Amsterdam, March 1991.
Think-Well (Scotland) Ltd.
Miller R.A. et al 2005 'Designer Casing for Deepwater
HS&E Report (2005) High Pressure, High Temperature HPHT Wells' SPE 97565-MS
developments in the United Kingdom Continental Shelf
Mouchet J.P & Mitchell A., 1989. 'Abnormal Pressures
HSE Books. A guide to the well aspects of the Offshore While Drilling'. Elf Aquitaine, Manuels Techniques 2.
Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) ISBN: 2-901026-28-1
Regulations 1996. Second edition 2008.
North J, Brangetto MP, Gray E, 2000 'Central Graben
HSE Books. A guide to the Offshore Installations Extreme Offshore High-Pressure/High-Temperature
(Safety Case) Regulations 2005. Third edition 2006. Cementing Case Study', IADC/SPE 59169, 2000
IADC/SPE Drilling Conference, New Orleans,
Hong Wang et al 2008 'Investigation of Factors for Louisiana
Strengthening a Wellbore by Propping Fractures' SPE
112629-MS-P O’Brien TB, 1996 'A Case Against Cementing Casing
– Casing Annuli', IADC/SPE 35106, IADC/SPE
Huffman A. & Bowers G. Ed.2002. 'Pressure Regimes Drilling Conference, New Orleans, Louisiana, March.
in Sedimentary Basins and Their Prediction': AAPG
Memoir 76. ISBN: 0-89181-357-8 O’Connor S. A and Swarbrick R. E. 2008 'Pressure
regression, fluid drainage and a hydrodynamically
I.A.C Palmer. 2005. 'Jade North Sea HPHT controlled fluid contact in the North Sea, Lower
Development': Cretaceous, Britannia Sandstone Formation. Petroleum
Innovative Well Design Generates Best In Class Geoscience Volume: 14, No 2 May 2008.
Performance. SPE/IADC 92218
Peterson S.K, et al 2005 'Risk and Uncertainty
Industry Guidelines on a Framework for Risk Related Management – Best Practice and Misapplications for
Decision Support; Oil & Gas UK (UKOOA). Cost and Schedule Estimates' SPE 97269
70

SUGGESTED FURTHER READING AND REFERENCES
Prentice CM, 1970 'Maximum Load' Casing Design, Syltoy Svein et al 2008 'Highly Advanced
SPE 2560, Journal of Petroleum Technology Multi-technical MPD Concept Extends Achievable
HP/HT Targets in the North Sea' SPE-114484
Reliability of Systems Equipment and Components Part
5. Guide to Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Tiab D, & Donaldson E. C, 2004, 'Petrophysics'.
Analysis (FMEA and FMECA); BS 5760-5: 1991. Elsevier. ISBN : 0-7506-7711-2
Seymour KP, MacAndrew R, 1993 'The Design, Wendt A. S. et al 2007 'Enhanced Mechanical Earth
Drilling and Testing of a Deviated High-Temperature, Modelling and Wellbore Stability Calculations using
High-Pressure Exploration Well in the North Sea,' OTC advanced Sonic Measurements - A Case Study of the
7338, 25th Annual OTC Houston, Texas HP/HT Kvitebjorn Field in the Norwegian North Sea'
SPE 109662
Shivers III, R.M and Brubaker J.P. 1995 'Development
Planning for the HPHT Erskine Field' SPE 30370 Ward C.D et al 1994 'The Application of Petrophysical
Data to Improve Pore and Fracture Pressure
Solvang S.A. et al 2008 'Managed Pressure Drilling Determination in North Sea Central Graben HPHT
Resolves Pressure Depletion Related Problems in the Wells' SPE 28297-MS
Development of the HPHT Kristin Field'
SPE-113672-MS-P Wils J. and Neilson E.C. (Editors) 2007 'The Technical
and Legal Guide to the UK Oil and Gas Industry'
SPE Reprint Series No 49. 'Pore Pressures and Fracture Aberlour Press. ISBN 978-0-95562230-0-4
Gradients' 1999
Zoback Mark.D 2007 'Reservoir Geomechanics'
Sultan N et al 2008 'Real-Time Casing Annular Pressure Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 978-0-521-77069
Monitoring in a Sub-sea HPHT Exploration Well' OTC
19286
71

72

ANNEX A
SPECIFICATIONS
Recommended Practices, Specification and Standards NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CORROSION

Relevant to this Model Code: ENGINEERS (NACE)
http://www.nace.org/
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE (API) MR 01-75/ISO 15156 (2003) Petroleum and natural gas
http://www.api.org/ industries—Materials for use in H2S-containing
environments in oil and gas production
API Bulletin 5C2 21st Edition (1999) Performance
Properties of Casing, Tubing, and Drillpipe RP 01-75 Control of Internal Corrosion in Steel
Pipelines and Piping Systems
API Bulletin 5C3 6th Edition (1994) Formulas and
Calculations for Casing, Tubing, Drill Pipe and Line TM 01-77-86 Testing of Materials for Resistance to
Pipe properties Sulphide Stress Cracking at Ambient temperature
Spec 5CT/ISO 11960 8th Edition (2005) Specifications TM 02-84-87 Evaluation of Pipeline Steels for
for Casing and Tubing Resistance to Stepwise Cracking
Spec 5D 5th Edition (2001) Specifications for Drill Pipe TM0198 – 2004 Slow Strain Rate Test Method for
Screening Corrosion Resistant Alloys (CRAs) for Stress
Spec 7-1/ISO 10424-1 (2004) Specification for Rotary Corrosion Cracking in Sour Oilfield Service
and Drill Stem Elements
RP0204 – 2004 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) Direct
Spec 17D – ISO 13628-4 2nd Edition (2008) - Subsea Assessment Methodology
Wellhead and XmasTree Equipment
TM0304 – 2004 Offshore Platform Atmospheric and
API RP 14J. Recommended Practice for Design and Splash Zone Maintenance Coating System Evaluation
Hazard Analysis for Offshore Production Facilities
TM0404 - 2004 Offshore Platform Atmospheric and
RP90 First Edition August 2006 Annular Casing Splash Zone New Construction Coating System
Pressure Management for Offshore Wells Evaluation
73

SP0108 (2008) Corrosion Protection of Offshore American Society of Mechanical Engineers

Platforms by Protective Coatings Three Park Avenue
New York,
AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR TESTING AND NY 10016-5990
MATERIALS (ASTM) USA
http://www.astm.org/
British Standards Institution
ASTM A 193/A 193M REV B Standard Specification 389 Chiswick High Road,
for Alloy-Steel and Stainless Steel Bolting Materials for London,
High Temperature or High Pressure Service and Other W4 4AL
Special Purpose Applications United Kingdom
CONTACT DETAILS NACE

NACE Headquarters – Houston,
American Petroleum Institute (API) Texas
1220 L Street, 1440 South Creek Drive
NW Washington, Houston,
DC 20005-4070 Texas 77084-4906 USA
USA
American Society for Testing and Materials

100 Barr Harbor Drive,
West Conshohocken,
Pennsylvania,
USA
74

ANNEX B
MANAGED PRESSURE DRILLING AND

FLUID ENGINEERING
Managed pressure drilling (MPD) is a complex wellbore pressure profile is obtained with a fluids
technology or more correctly a collection of numerous management system where the mud weight is
interrelated and innovative techniques which are, at the marginally less than the pore pressure and balance or
time of writing, increasingly in use to ameliorate overbalance is provided by annulus friction and/or
drilling, production and economic uncertainties, backpressure. The purpose of MPD is to manage the
especially with respect to depleted reservoirs. This annular hydraulic pressure profile to fit within the
increased complexity means increased safety risk. allowed pressure window. Often conditions of losses
Drilling in depleted formations can mean and influx can occur virtually together as the window
'narrowing drilling windows' due to the presence of between pore pressure and fracture becomes very
overpressured shales and depleted sands (fracture narrow in the HPHT transition zone and reservoir. MPD
gradient reduction) or sands at lower virgin pressures in takes a different approach to well control relying on
a silisiclastic sequence – most typically environments of detection and automated controls to keep the well at or
rapid deposition and constrained dewatering. MPD slightly above balance.
carries with it inherent safety risks which require The objective of MPD planning is to understand the
detailed planning. Retro-fitting rigs and platforms to relationship between the pore pressure and fracture
accommodate these techniques require specialist gradients thereby allowing the safe predictable
procedures and risk analysis plus comprehensive management of the annular hydraulic pressure profile
training. Before MPD is deployed, sub-surface, while drilling. This can lead to the avoidance of
engineering, facilities and business objectives should be incidental losses to the formation, influxes (kick) and
examined. These techniques can however yield practical borehole collapse. Any of these conditions cause serious
and safety advantages. well control problems and have a high impact on HS&E
There are many definitions in the literature and objectives. Numerous mechanisms affect downhole
often but mistakenly MPD is used as a catch all phrase pressure in HPHT wells; these include temperature,
which includes fluids engineering but has been defined ECD, rotation, swab/surge, etc. These must be
by the International Association of Drilling Contractors accounted for and compensated through backpressure
(IADC) as "an adaptive drilling process used to more manipulations. Advanced real time hydraulics models
precisely control the annular pressure profile throughout that control the back pressure have been developed for
the wellbore." MPD can be regarded as Reactive – this purpose.
where a rotating control head (RCH) is used to provide Drilling in HPHT and depleted reservoirs may be
a dynamic annulus seal with returns diverted through a accomplished by combining MPD with fluid
choke and back pressure applied in reaction to pump engineering including combinations of backpressure,
rate changes, or Proactive – where a precisely managed circulating friction (from MPD), variable fluid density,
75

rheology, borehole geometry, and using active a compelling safety case in helping to reduce kicks; the
supplements such as calcium carbonate to prop open same can be applied to MPD. Mud loss is a well control
fractures and graphite to seal the fracture openings at risk and a safety risk therefore the application of MPD
the wellbore-fluid interface so increasing the effective and fluid engineering may help improve the safety
stress of the formation – a technique known as stress margin in difficult drilling conditions.
caging. These techniques are sometimes referred to as MPD for HPHT operations is still in its infancy,
'designer muds'. These fluids can also alter the mud further development of the tools and techniques can be
pressure gradient and dynamic pressure (managed by expected with increasing use. However fluid
the MPD 'closed system'). Other additives to the drilling engineering is rapidly becoming common practice,
mud system may include Aphrons – microscopic air especially where drilling problems are known to occur.
bubbles – which accumulate at the fracture neck
(wellbore-fluid interface), effectively plugging and Suggested further reading
thereby preventing further loss to the formation. It is
worth noting that stress cages and Aphron technology Aston M.S. et al 2007 'A New Treatment for Wellbore
are negated by under-reaming during drilling operations Strengthening in Shale' SPE-110713-MS-P
since the strengthening of the wellbore is very much a
near field effect. Growcock F.B. et al 2006 'Recent Advances in Aphron
Determining which technology or techniques or Drilling Fluids' SPE-97982-MS-P
combinations to employ during well planning will
depend on an ability to define and measure the Hong Wang et al 2008 'Investigation of Factors for
overpressure, the initial stress field and changes to the Strengthening a Wellbore by Propping Fractures' SPE
stress field from depletion. These issues will require 112629-MS-P
geomechanical studies to determine the best trajectory
for optimum wellbore stability and life of well. Field Solvang S.A. et al 2008 'Managed Pressure Drilling
wide studies are necessary to determine spatial and Resolves Pressure Depletion Related Problems in the
temporal stress changes for further drilling and Development of the HPHT Kristin Field'
production. In addition it is often necessary to determine SPE-113672-MS-P
the likelihood of any pressure-stress related fault
activation to correctly manage the field risks. Syltoy Svein et al 2008 'Highly Advanced
Utilising MPD and fluid engineering can have a Multi-technical MPD Concept Extends Achievable
positive impact on the business case and may reduce HP/HT Targets in the North Sea' SPE-114484
risk. Essentially its use can mean earlier production
whilst still in the drilling phase and this will have a Wendt A. S. et al 2007 'Enhanced Mechanical Earth
positive effect on cash flow. For these reasons the Modelling and Wellbore Stability Calculations using
business case for MPD is strong. Fluid engineering also advanced Sonic Measurements - A Case Study of the
brings with it benefits to drilling in helping to avoid HP/HT Kvitebjorn Field in the Norwegian North Sea'
costly losses even in conventional wells. They also have SPE 109662
76

ANNEX C
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND

ABBREVIATIONS
4C seismic: this is a four component seismic with three wells can also blow out due to surface equipment failure
orthogonal geophones and one hydrophone. Three or if well servicing operations get out of control.
orthogonal components representing x, y and z
Cartesian coordinates. blowout preventer (BOP): a device (blowout
preventer) used on a drilling rig which is attached
abnormal sub-surface pressure: pressure conditions immediately above the well casing head to control
in any well are said to be abnormal when the reservoir pressures and prevent escape of fluids from the annular
pressure varies from the hydrostatic pressure that would space between the drill pipe and casing with drill pipe
be exerted by a column of salt water of 1 154 specific in the well, or shut-off the well if no drill pipe is in the
gravity, i.e. exerting a pressure of 50 psi per 100 ft. hole, should a well kick occur.
(1 154 kg/cm² per 10 metres) of depth of a well.
casing: a term applied to pipe used to line any wellbore.
ALARP: as low as is reasonably practicable.
choke: an orifice or adjustable valve used in drilling,
annulus: the space surrounding pipe suspended in the testing and production operations to control the flow of
wellbore. The outer wall of the annulus may be open drilling mud, oil or gas.
hole or it may be a string of larger pipe known as
casing. choke and kill lines: lines between the choke manifold
and/or kill pump and the blowout preventer, comprising
barrel: unit of measurement in the industry which is 42 rigid steel sections and/or flexible lines.
US gallons (35 Imperial gallons) or 159 litres. It is the
common unit used to indicate output from producing oil choke manifold: a series of pipes, valves and chokes
wells. used to control the flow of fluids and/or gas at the
surface.
bentonite: a finely powdered clay based material used
in preparing drilling mud. This is usually referred to on christmas tree (xmas): a term applied to the valves and
the rig as 'gel'. fittings assembled at the top of a producing well to
control the flow of the oil or gas.
blowout: an uncontrolled and often violent escape of
reservoir fluids from a drilling well when a high depletion: a term used to describe a reduction in
pressure reservoir has been encountered and efforts to reservoir pressure due to withdrawal of reservoir fluids.
prevent or control the escape have failed. Production
77

disequilibrium compaction: sediments unable to other items which may have become stuck or
de-water during burial and therefore water is retained inadvertently dropped into the hole.
under increasing load. This results in abnormal pore
pressure. FIT: formation integrity tests – where the formation is
subjected to a pre-set pressure but does not cause
downhole shut-in valve: a valve placed in the bottom fracturing or damage to the formation. See leak off test
of the minor string of the production test string. (LOT).
drill collar: a heavy walled component of the drill FME(C)A: failure modes and effects analysis.
string placed between the bit and the drill pipe to
maintain vertical penetration of the bit and supply the FOSV: a full opening safety valve.
weight necessary for drilling. Additional drill collars
are added to increase the weight on the bit. fracturing: the process of forcing a fluid down a well
into the sub-surface strata with the purpose of opening
drilling mud: a fluid either water- or oil-based and flow passages to enhance production.
containing clay, weighting materials and/or chemicals
which is circulated through the drill pipe and wellbore HAZID: hazard identification.
during rotary drilling and workover operations.
Functions of this fluid include bringing formation HAZOP: hazard and operability.
cuttings to the surface, keeping the hole clean so that the
bit can drill, cooling and lubricating the bit, controlling Joule-Thompson effect: when a non-ideal gas suddenly
formation pressures, and obtaining information on the expands from high-pressure to lower pressure, for
formations penetrated from the cuttings recovered at the example from reservoir to well bore conditions, there is
surface. often a change in temperature. This is an adiabatic effect
and can cause the build up of hydrates. Reverse J-T
drilling plan (or drilling programme): the document effects can also be seen in HPHT wells.
which contains all the technical data required for the
drilling of a well, such as location details, geological kick: an unplanned entry of fluids into a well which
prognosis and the programmes for the mud, bit and causes the well to flow spontaneously. The main causes
bottom hole assemblies, casing, cementing, blowout of a kick are: mud density too low for the reservoir
preventer and electric logging, etc. encountered, swabbing, loss of fluid to formation, and
not maintaining fluid level in the well. Normal control
drilling rig: the complete structure and machinery procedures are to close the BOP and circulate the well
required for drilling or well workover purposes. to establish adequate density of the drilling mud after
rectifying mud losses, if any, etc.
drill pipe: the pipe with tool joints attached which is
used for drilling wells by the rotary method. lithostatic pressure: the total overburden including
pore fluids.
drillstem test (DST): a test using the drill string by
means of special testing equipment to determine lost circulation or lost returns: to encounter an
whether or not oil or gas in commercial quantities has interruption in the circulation of drilling fluid due to the
been encountered in a drilling well. fact that the fluid is being lost into a porous or fractured
formation underground rather than returning to the
drill string: the entire drilling assembly from the swivel surface.
to the bit, composed of the kelly or top drive, drill pipe
with tool joints, subs, drill collars, stabilisers, shock LOT leak off test: this is used to determine the fracture
absorbers and reamers. Used to rotate the bit and to pressure on the open formation. It is usually conducted
carry the mud or circulating fluid to the bit. after drilling 10m below the last casing shoe. The well
is shut in and pressure is applied to the mud system to
ERD: extended reach drilling. gradually increase the pressure on the formation. At the
point of leak off, fluid will enter the formation, either
fishing: operations on the rig for the purpose of exploiting existing pathways in the rock or by
retrieving from the wellbore sections of pipe, casing or fracturing. The results dictate the maximum pressure or
78

ANNEX C – GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
mud weight that may be applied to the well while set casing: to install steel pipe or casing in a wellbore.
drilling the next section. An accompanying operation is the cementing of the
casing in place by surrounding it with a wall of cement
manifold: a unit designed as a junction point for a extending for all or part of the depth of the well.
number of pipelines, usually with valves for control and
redirection of fluid flow. simop: simultaneous operations.
MASP: maximum anticipated surface pressure. SSC: sulphide stress corrosion – particularly prevalent
in HPHT completions.
MODU: see semi-submersible.
swabbing: swabbing is the operation of bringing fluids
MPD: managed pressure drilling. in a well to the surface by pulling out a plunger device
at speed on wire line through the tubing. It is used to
mud programme: a technical note which sets out the stimulate wells which do not flow naturally.
mud types and characteristics which are to be used from
surface to total depth in a well to be drilled. total depth (TD): the greatest depth reached in a well
during the drilling phase.
OCTG: oil country tubular goods.
tubing: the smallest production pipe used in a well. It
perforating: this is the method of opening a well is run inside the oil string casing to the reservoir depth
through the oil string casing to the oil bearing and the oil, water and gas are produced through it to the
formation. This is done using a perforating gun which wellhead. When a well is used for injection purposes
is lowered into the well and bullets or shaped charges the tubing is also used to inject fluid or gas from the
are fired through the casing to allow formation fluids to wellhead to the formation.
enter the wellbore.
underbalanced: wellbore condition in which the pore
permeability: a measure of a rock's ability to transmit pressure exceeds the wellbore hydrostatic pressure.
fluids. Also the characteristic of a material to allow gas
to pass through it (as in flexible lines). wear: damage to a solid surface caused by the
mechanical action of contacting solid, liquid or gas.
producing well: well from which crude oil or gas is Wear is mainly mechanical, but may combine with
being produced. (Also known as a live well.) chemical corrosion.
semi-submersible: an offshore installation vessel which well prognosis: the geological forecast for a well to be
is designed to operate in a semi-submerged state to give drilled covering formations to be drilled with estimated
it stability. Vessels of this type operate approximately depths and expected pressures, etc.
two-thirds submerged, hence the term 'semi-
submersible', and are raised to lower-hull draught level
for moving between locations. They are normally used
as drilling vessels but sometimes they are used for
production.
79

Energy Institute This publication has been produced as a result of
61 New Cavendish Street work carried out within the Technical Team of the
London W1G 7AR, UK Energy Institute (EI), funded by the EI’s Technical
Partners. The EI’s Technical Work Programme
t: +44 (0) 20 7467 7100 provides industry with cost effective, value adding
f: +44 (0) 20 7255 1472 knowledge on key current and future issues
e: pubs@energyinst.org affecting those operating in the energy sector,
www.energyinst.org both in the UK and beyond.
ISBN 978 0 85293 529 3
Registered Charity Number 1097899


UKOOA HTHP Well Planning

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

UKOOA HTHP Well Planning

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Model code of safe practice

High pressure and high temperature well planning

Licenced to: Mr Putu Suabawa. Single user licence only.

MODEL CODE OF SAFE PRACTICE IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

PART 17: VOLUME 1

Licenced to: Mr Putu Suabawa. Single user licence only.

MODEL CODE OF SAFE PRACTICE IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

PART 17: VOLUME 1

Licenced to: Mr Putu Suabawa. Single user licence only.

For further information, please visit http://www.energyinst.org

BG Group Maersk Oil North Sea UK Limited

Copyright © 2009 by the Energy Institute, London:

ISBN 978 0 85293 529 3

Published by the Energy Institute

Further copies can be obtained from

Electronic access to EI and IP publications is available via our website, www.energyinstpubs.org.uk.

Licenced to: Mr Putu Suabawa. Single user licence only.

2 HPHT project risk and uncertainty management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Licenced to: Mr Putu Suabawa. Single user licence only.

2.5.10 Rig selection deliverables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

5 Well planning good practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Licenced to: Mr Putu Suabawa. Single user licence only.

5.7 Pore pressure prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

7 Safety planning for operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Licenced to: Mr Putu Suabawa. Single user licence only.

7.6 Swab, surge and their effect on BHP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

8 Further safety related technical issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

9 Suggested further reading and references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Licenced to: Mr Putu Suabawa. Single user licence only.

Bruce McEwan (Chairman) Shell UK Exploration & Production

Steve Walters Think-Well (Scotland)

Luc Fambon Total E & P

Licenced to: Mr Putu Suabawa. Single user licence only.

Licenced to: Mr Putu Suabawa. Single user licence only.

Licenced to: Mr Putu Suabawa. Single user licence only.

1.1 HPHT DEFINITIONS of the following methods:

1.3 ALARP Risk estimation entails assessing both the severity

Licenced to: Mr Putu Suabawa. Single user licence only.

Reducing risk to 'ALARP' is a sound engineering — Fault tree analysis.

Figure 1: Criticality Awareness Framework

Licenced to: Mr Putu Suabawa. Single user licence only.

Expert advice should be sought in selecting the operation.

For personnel involved in HPHT planning the following

Management of change is a fundamental element of the — Levels of experience.

Licenced to: Mr Putu Suabawa. Single user licence only.

Reliability of Systems Equipment and Components Part www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarp.htm (ALARP)

Industry Guidelines on a Framework for Risk Related www.irfoffshoresafety.com (International Regulators

Licenced to: Mr Putu Suabawa. Single user licence only.

Licenced to: Mr Putu Suabawa. Single user licence only.

HPHT PROJECT RISK AND

Wells Team Leader

Completions Team Leader Well Planning Team Leader

Figure 2.1: General schematic for team reporting

Licenced to: Mr Putu Suabawa. Single user licence only.

2.2 HPHT WELL PLANNING TEAM — HS&E expert(s).

Well Planning Team Leader

S. Geologist Drilling Engineer

Geophysicist HPHT Well Planning Team Reservoir

Peer Review Team Administration

Licenced to: Mr Putu Suabawa. Single user licence only.

Well planning team leader: should: 2.4 WELL EXAMINATION

Licenced to: Mr Putu Suabawa. Single user licence only.

HPHT Well Planning Operations

Figure 2.3: Generalised methodology to fit within project success assurance