Professional Documents
Culture Documents
B. FIG Analyst Training - Partie I
B. FIG Analyst Training - Partie I
B. FIG Analyst Training - Partie I
Material
December 2007
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Table of contents
SECTION 1
Banking
1
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SECTION 1.A
Banking
Accounting
2
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
26 November 2007
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
Table of contents
1
SECTION 1
3
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
Capital intermediation
A business centred
on intermediation Investment Bank Investment
Capital Capital
needs resources
A bank acts as a link Yield Yield
between available capital ♦ Customer loans ♦ Deposit from
(asking for a yield) and (mortgage, auto, retail customers
capital needs consumer finance)
♦ Bonds subscribed by
♦ Corporations funding institutional investors
A bank also provides
♦ Leverage in
advice and act on behalf of investment funds
its customers, on the basis
of its knowledge of
financial markets and its Intermediation with financial markets
capacity to act on them ♦ Provide financial advice
♦ Execute trades
♦ Manage assets
Knowledge of
the market ♦ Safekeep assets
Bank
Financial markets
♦ Investment Clients
opportunities
♦ Retail
♦ Sector trends and
outlook for specific ♦ Corporates
companies
A simplified “Spread”
balance sheet
Interest income Interest expense
A bank’s balance sheet
reflects its capital
intermediation role.
Important volumes of
financial instruments and
loans on the assets side,
and deposits and debt on Interest bearing
the liabilities side, mean liabilities
that banking balance sheet Interest yielding assets
can reach very high sizes Deposits from
customers,
The overall volume and funding of the
risk profile of this activity Other liabilities banking assets,
will determine the level of short positions
capital the bank will need on securities
to hold Other assets Equity (driven by
regulatory capital)
Loans to
customers, Regulatory need
investments in to hold capital
securities, above a
inventories of minimum level
securities determined by
risk exposure
5
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
6
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
A representative example
7
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
8
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Customer deposits Trading liabilities
Other interest bearing liabilities Other liabilities
Equity
% of total revenues
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Net interest income Net fee and commission income
Trading income Other revenues¹
Source: 2006 company financials
Notes:
1 Includes insurance net income and income from property development for BNP Paribas
2 Excluding D&A
9
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
Average Tier I
ratio (%)
Adjusted
7.7% +
equity/RWA (%)
Other adjusted 8.1%
equity/RWA (%)
0.4%
Note: In italics: Société Générale 2006 figures, based on average RWA of €270,139 million
10
SECTION 2
Net interest income Net interest margin (NIM) Net interest margin/spread benchmarking 2006
analysis highlights Net interest income/average interest earning assets
differences in business 1.10
3,112 SG
= 0.60% 0.60
models or economic
Avg (552,170; 482,716) Northern 0.75
environment
♦ Measures the efficiency of the bank’s capital Rock 0.93
intermediation activity
3.39
BNP Paribas
♦ A low number can reflect: 1.58
– Adverse funding rates, or low interest yield on loan 3.47
portfolio; or Santander
2.42
– High ratio of interest bearing liabilities/interest
Bank of 2.36
earning assets (as is the case for SG)
America 2.83
♦ Need to exclude from financial assets equity securities,
leasing arrangements (usually income on leasing is 3.39
Citi
accounted in other income), trading derivatives 2.99
3.73
HSBC
Net interest spread 3.10
12
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
13
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
Operating efficiency
The cost income ratio is a Cost—income ratio Cost income ratio benchmarking 1
key measure to assess Operating expenses (including or excluding
the profitability of a depreciation)/net banking income
ABN Amro 76.3
bank’s revenue 12,985
generation = 57.9% (excluding D&A)
22,417 Citi 58.0
Santander 44.6
0 25 50 75 100
(%)
Note:
1 Excluding depreciation and amortisation
14
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
Credit quality
♦ Nonperforming asset trends
♦ Reserve adequacy
Growth rates
♦ Outsized growth in loan type, relative to peers
♦ Lack of loan growth
Loan yields
♦ Loan portfolio yields by product compared to peers
♦ Risk versus return
15
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
Cost of risk is an indictor Cost of risk (or loan loss ratio) European markets cost of risk (bps)
of the P&L impact of Bad and doubtful debt (loan loss) provisions/
quality of the loan average customer loans (gross) Benelux 38
portfolio
679
The coverage ratio = 0.29% = 29bp Switzerland 38
measures the level of Average (253,272; 222,655)
prudence UK 56
♦ Should be interpreted in conjunction with
the business mix and provisioning policy of
the bank France 63
16
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
The bank’s operational Loans/deposits ratio (transformational ratio) Loans/deposits ratio benchmarking
performance will be Customer loans/customer deposits
impacted by its funding 263,547 ICBC 55.6
model, which is reflected = 98.6%
267,397
by the loans/deposits Citi 72.0
ratio ♦ Interpretation
– too high funding cost may be too SG 98.6
high with low reliance on deposits (since
deposits are typically a low cost Sberbank 124.2
funding instrument); may also reflect a too
high reliance on financial markets which are BNPP 131.6
considered as a less stable source of
funding deposits Santander 146.4
– too low balance sheet may be yielding
relatively low level of interest income (since HBOS 177.9
loans typically generate higher gross returns
than most other assets) Northern Rock 322.6
– either way, net interest margin will be
impacted adversely 0 100 200 300 400
(%)
17
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
18
SECTION 3
Accounting issues
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
♦ Derivatives hedging fair value, cash ♦ Fair value hedge: gains & losses in P&L
Hedging
flows, or the investment in a foreign ♦ Cash flow hedge: gains & losses in equity
instruments
operation, with appropriate ♦ Hedge foreign investment: gains & losses
documentation on the hedging in equity
relationship ♦ Ineffective portion of hedges: gains &
losses in P&L
20
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
Purchase of Asset for 100 Asset gains 20 in value Sale of Asset for 115
21
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
Loan portfolio
The loan book Specific provisions for credit Risks An illustrative internal classification:
RBS rating category
Annual
♦ Non performing ("non-accrual", "doubtful", profitability of
default (%)
etc) loans & advances to customers can
Asset quality S&P RBS 2006
be either grade Min Mid Max equivalent exposure
– un-secured or
AQ1 0.0 0.1 0.2 AAA to BBB-
– secured by collateral (security/asset)
♦ Loan loss provisions are taken (via the P&L) to AQ2 0.2 0.4 0.6 BB+ to BB
♦ Therefore, total allowances (stock of provisions) Illustration of NPL coverage: HVB’s doubtful
are supposed to cover estimated loss on NPL loans portfolio (€m)
not covered by collaterals
– these provisions and allowances will be 16,000
Estimated
subject to market scrutiny and can 14,000 value of
be criticised 12,000 collateral
Loan portfolio
3,000 215
2,000
1,000
0
Balance Currency Amounts Recoveries of New Discount Balance
1-Jan-06 translation written off amounts provisions unwind 31-Dec-06
and other previously income
adjustments written off statement
change
24
SECTION 4
Risk management
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
A deeper look into the Banks are typically working the yield curve ♦ “Credit risk”
black box – the credit risk determines the level of
Interest remuneration embedded in the lending
rate risk curve
“Lending
9 curve” – the bank’s funding rates depend on its
spread over base rates, which depends on
“Funding its own credit quality
curve”
8 Credit ♦ “Interest rate risk” = mismatch in assets
risk and liability maturities
“Base
7 Funding curve” – exposure to changes in the shape of the
Interest rate (%)
26
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
Banks use various Maturity gap analysis: Fortis Duration of equity: Fortis
metrics to assess their 36
36 26.3 ♦ ∆ Value
exposure to 26 26.3 = – Duration · ∆ i
26 Value
interest rates 16 9.7 10.2 11.8
11.8
16 9.7 10.2 4.3
(€bn)
6 4.3
(€bn)
6 ♦ Fortis 2006 Duration of equity = 5 years
(4) (0.7)
(4)
(60) (0.7) ♦ Duration >0 means that an increase in interest rates has an
(14)
(60)
(14)
(80) (61.0) overall negative impact on Fortis’ value of equity
(24)
(80) (61.0)
(24)
<1m 1–3m 3–12m 1–3y 3–5y 5–10y >10y
<1m 1–3m 3–12m 1–3y 3–5y 5–10y >10y
50 20
(50) (19)
(150) (107)
(€m)
(250)
(260)
(350)
(364)
(450)
ING Retail ING ING Total
wholesale banking Direct Bank
banking corporate line
27
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
Value at Risk
Trading risk assessment: ♦ Definition: amount (e, £, etc.) such that there is a given probability (called the confidence
Value at Risk (VaR) level) of not losing more than this amount in a given time period of trading activity
♦ Time period is generally 1 day (alternatively 10 day), confidence level 99% (95%)
♦ Other differences: calculation method (variance/covariance, historical simulation, Monte Carlo),
reporting method (end-of-period VaR or average VaR)
♦ Allows to calculate risk-adjusted return
♦ Allows to calculate capital requirement: expected default frequency (EDF) is the annualised probability
of default. An EDF of 2.5bp translates to an S&P rating of AA+; the Basle Committee requires banks to
hold a minimum 4x VaR as reserve capital against trading losses
♦ Allows regulator to supervise risk policy: A bank expects to lose more than the VaR (1-confidence
level)% of the time. Losses exceeding VaR are called “exceptions”
– These adjustment factors are for quick illustrative comparison, as they are based on simplified
models. The true conversion rates are neither constant over time nor easy to determine from an
external point of view
28
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
Value at Risk
VaR is an indication of Société Générale’s historical daily trading P&L and VaR (99%, 1 day)
risk appetite
However it needs to be
put in perspective with
capital employed
140 127
120
100 91
74
80
(€m)
58 56
60
40 33 31
22 20
20
0
Goldman Morgan Citi Lehman Merrill RBS Bank of Société BNP Paribas
Sachs Stanley Brothers Lynch America² Générale
Further reference
♦ The first notes to financial statements in a bank’s annual report always detail accounting principles for the main lines
♦ Central banks websites: for statistics, sizes of market for different products (loans, deposits, funds) and market shares
30
APPENDIX A
Retail banks Main products/business lines Largest European retail banks (m. cap in €bn)
♦ Personal banking (current accounts, savings,
HSBC 142
overdrafts, etc)
Santander 93
♦ Consumer finance (revolving loans, credit
cards, etc) UniCredit 73
Sberbank 66
Crédit Suisse 48
♦ Distribution channels
SocGen 48
♦ Status: State-owned, listed, private,
co-operative, mutual, savings banks, etc Deutsche Bank 44
HBOS 42
Crédit Agricole 40
Lloyds TSB 39
Fortis 39
Standard Chartered 34
KBC 32
32
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
Asset gatherers Main business lines Largest European asset gatherers (m. cap in €bn)
♦ Asset management (mutual funds, wholesale) HSBC 142
UBS 67
Crédit Suisse 48
SocGen 48
Deutsche Bank 44
HBOS 42
Crédit Agricole 40
Lloyds TSB 39
Fortis 39
Standard Chartered 34
KBC 32
33
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
Corporate and Main business lines Largest European C&I banks (m. cap in €bn)
Investment Banking ♦ Corporate banking (cash management, HSBC 142
custody etc)
Santander 93
♦ Wholesale lending (plain vanilla)
UniCredit 73
♦ Structured lending
UBS 67
♦ Corporate Finance/Advisory
Intesa Sanpaolo 66
♦ Capital Markets
Sberbank 66
♦ Trading (equity, FI, FX, derivatives, swaps, other)
BNP Paribas 65
♦ Brokerage (incl. prime)
RBS 62
BBVA 62
Key differentiating factors
ING 61
♦ Revenues
Barclays 48
♦ Cost-income
Crédit Suisse 48
♦ VaR
SocGen 48
♦ Relationships and brand name
Deutsche Bank 44
HBOS 42
Crédit Agricole 40
Lloyds TSB 39
Fortis 39
Standard Chartered 34
KBC 32
34
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
Mixed models
♦ Bancassurance
♦ Allianz
♦ UBS
35
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
A mixed model—UBS
Wealth management
Client needs
and investment banking
support each other
Wealth UBS Global
Management Asset
US 1 Management
Wealthy
clients Corporate
Wealth globally &
Management Corporate & institutional
Advice & institutional Advice &
tailored tailored clients 2
clients
products Retail & products
globally
affluent
Private clients in
& Switzerland Third party
Corporate products
Clients
Client-
World class
centred
content
advice
Products
Notes:
1 Ex-PaineWebber
2 UBS Investment Bank, ex- UBS Warburg
36
06060H227_Banking accounting.ppt
A mixed model—Allianz
Protection products
♦ P&C
♦ Health
♦ Term life
Allianz
Credit/financing Dresdner
♦ Mortgages
♦ Loans Bank
Dresdner
♦ Consumer credit Vermögens-
beratung
Transaction/services
♦ Brokerage Advance
♦ Credit cards Bank
♦ Current account
37
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SECTION 1.B
Banking
Capital
3
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Bank capital
FIG EMEA training
26 November 2007
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
Table of contents
1
SECTION 1
Bank capital
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
“ Bank capital is precious again. Expect an unusual amount of investor attention to be lavished on
balance sheet measures, such as capital ratios, as the markets assimilate the knock-on effects of the
credit crisis
November 20, 2007
Investors are worried about RBS's capital position. The bank's core Tier 1 ratio, by its own estimate,
has dropped to 4.25 per cent following its acquisition of ABN Amro's wholesale division
,
Unfortunately, if the CDO warehouse and SIV issues are even bigger than we’re anticipating, Citi could
find itself in a situation where a capital raise would be its best alternative
November 5, 2007 ”
“ We believe there is another leg down for bank stocks as investors shift their focus from the massive write-
downs due to credit-related exposure to the severe impact that these write-downs and securities-related
downgrades will have on many of the banks' risk-weighted assets and capital ratios. The optics for the
group are not good at the moment, but they are poised to get worse because of the interconnectivity of
the rating agencies, RWAs, and regulatory capital ratios.
We expect Tier 1 ratios to drop materially in the fourth quarter. We continue to believe that C is at
precariously low capital levels that will force the company to sell assets, raise capital, and cut its
dividend. Our concern over C and the probability of its stock falling below $30 a share mounts by the day
November 11, 2007
3
”
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
Bank capital
Introduction ♦ Banks are heavily regulated entities – from a supervisory perspective, capital requirements
attempt to ensure that the assets of the depositors are protected (i.e., that their assets will be
returned despite any financial hardships that may arise)
– from a bank’s perspective, capital requirements need to be met while maximising returns
to shareholders (by minimising the equity base) and retaining a flexible funding approach
♦ The regulatory picture is complicated: capital adequacy guidelines are set forth from a number
of bodies
– domestic national regulators
– European Union (by way of EU Directives)
– the Bank for International Settlements/BASEL Committee (by way of the Basel Capital
Accord)
4
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
In the U.S., the Fed has ♦ Unification of ♦ Inclusion of ♦ Harmonisation ♦ Improvement of ♦ In the EU, it will
Comment
approved final rules to regulation and market risk and of Hybrid T1 measurement be implemented
implement Basel II “for avoidance of introduction of instruments of credit risks via the Risk
arbitrage Tier 3 and disclosure, Based Capital
large, internationally inclusion of Directive
active banking operational risk
organizations” this
month. Implementation
is expected in 2009
Credit risk
Market risk
Operational risk
5
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
Tier 1 and total ♦ The Basel Committee decided in 1988 to submit all banks to minimum capital adequacy constraints,
capital ratio with the objectives of:
– raising overall capital levels in the banking system
– creating a level playing field for banks competing internationally (although this is difficult given that
a) implementation varies across markets and b) capital securities markets price capital inconsistently
♦ These constraints are expressed in terms of ratios of capital to a measure of risk undertaken by
the bank
6
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
7
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
Innovative
Lower Tier 2, and Non-innovative
preferred
Tier 3 (but of Upper Tier 2 non-equity Core Tier 1
securities (tax
limited use) securities
deductible)
Spreads have widened Trading performance of Euro bank capital by type vs. benchmark
massively in the wake of
300
the sub prime fallout
250
200
(bps)
150
100
50
0
24-May-07 18-Jun-07 14-Jul-07 9-Aug-07 4-Sep-07 30-Sep-07 26-Oct-07 21-Nov-07
Lower Tier 2 Upper Tier 2 Tier 1
Source: Bloomberg
9
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
Limit
10
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
Limit
Note:
1 Gradually reduced during the last five years before repayment date (20% annual reduction)
11
SECTION 2
Basel II
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
”
Ben S. Bernanke, Federal Reserve Board Chairman, November 2, 2007
“ Transparency should undeniably be heightened“. She also said a review of the new Basel II capital
reserve requirements for banks needs to be conducted in relation to liquidity at financial institutions,
considering Northern Rock, the U.K. bank that had to be rescued by financing from the Bank of
England, was Basel II compliant
Christine Lagarde, Minister of Finance, French Republic, October 22, 2007, quoted in Dow Jones
”
“ Basel is the root of the banking crisis
It was the 1988 Basel Accord that first created the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage whereby banks
could shunt loans off the balance sheet. In effect, a new capital discipline designed to improve risk
management had the unintended consequence of creating a parallel banking system whose lack of
transparency explains the market seize-up since August
[…] The Basel II regime, which takes effect in January, makes securitisation less attractive to banks and
seeks to address contingent risk. Yet it is hard to believe it would have prevented the current mess. Basel
II relies on the modelling techniques that led to the sub prime disaster. The new rulebook also depends
heavily on the credit rating agencies in whom investors have lost confidence.
Basel II?
14
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
♦ The implementation of Basel II over the next few years will have significant implications for the
banking sector
– retail-oriented franchises will benefit in terms of lower capital requirements;
– low-quality corporate lenders may need to hold more capital (Pillar 1)
– today’s landscape of “winners and losers” will be altered by implementation date
– additional capital requirements under Pillar 2 set by domestic regulators will be an
important determinant of final Basel II capital levels
♦ Basel II is already happening: banks have set up project teams to implement Basel II to improve
credit and operational risk management
– banks are only now beginning to evaluate Basel II on a strategic basis
15
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
♦ Retail focused banks ♦ Potential shift of focus on products experiencing a reduction in capital requirements, such as residential
♦ Wholesale focused banks (with mortgages
significant retail business lines) ♦ Potential reconsideration of products experiencing an increase in capital requirements, such as sub-
♦ Bancassurance models (with prime lending
grandfathered insurance
Differentiation of players and consolidation
business)
♦ Depending on business models and risk appetite, banks could either come out as winners or losers
during the Basel II implementation
Likely neutral: ♦ This increased differentiation could serve as a catalyst for continued consolidation of the financial
markets
♦ Retail focused banks with a
below-average credit history Non-bank competitors
♦ Some non-Basel regulated firms will have a relative advantage compared to banks due to lower capital
constraints
Likely to be disadvantaged ♦ Banking-like activities by non-bank competitors might increase (such as direct commercial property
♦ Wholesale focused banks (with lending)
focus on corporate lending) Importance of insurance players
♦ Bancassurance franchises (if ♦ High-quality insurance companies benefit from lower risk weight as counterparties
double leverage from wholly
owned insurance business is ♦ Potential sale of insurance policies to mitigate operational risk charge
not being grandfathered by Profitability
local regulators)
♦ If many banks in the same market become risk aware (bias toward mortgage and retail lending),
♦ Asset managers
margins could collapse
– returns could fall faster than capital requirements
♦ Banks who are willing and able to take on more and adequately priced risk in the primary and/or
secondary credit markets could raise their return on capital
16
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
17
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
Application
approach (“Advanced IRB”)
from January 1st 2008
The capital usage calculation using
either IRB approach is subject to a
Basel I capital floor for the first three
years of usage:
♦ 2007: 95% of the capital using
Basel I
♦ 2008: 90%
♦ 2009: 80%
♦ Risk weighting not consistent ♦ Basel I floor effects delay ♦ Impact of rating agencies on
with economic risk for convergence between capital requirements
Issues
♦ Risk transfer mechanisms that ♦ Combination of Basel I solutions ♦ Re-tranching existing assets to
are capital efficient: to lower impact of capital floors reduce rating downgrade
– liquidity facility and Basel II solutions to impact
Solutions
18
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
RWA
Capital
♦ Cash
♦ Cash
♦ Claims on OECD/other developed 0% ♦ Sovereign debt (AAA to AA-)
Sub-optimal reflection countries’ governments and
central banks
of true underlying risk
in some cases: a bank
♦ Corporate & bank debt (AAA to AA-)
in OECD Turkey with ♦ Bank loans 20%
♦ Sovereign debt (A+ to A-)
lower risk weighting
than AAA-rated
corporate such as GE / 35% ♦ Loans secured by residential property (mortgages)
20
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
Standardised Approach Credit risk weighting requirements under standardised and Internal Ratings based
is ratings-driven approaches to Basel II
21
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
Internal Ratings Based IRB is based on measures of … … and on classification of assets into
Approach is loss-driven five categories
and ratings-driven
To use the Internal Rating ♦ Probability of default (PD) ♦ Sovereign
Based (“IRB”) requires ♦ Loss given default (LGD) ♦ Bank
approval from the bank’s
regulator ♦ Exposure at default (EAD) ♦ Corporate
This usually involves one ♦ Effective maturity (M) ♦ Retail
year of model testing
reviewed by the regulator ♦ Unexpected losses (UL) ♦ Equity (treatment same as standardised
prior to implementation approach for EU countries risk weighting is
♦ Expected losses (EL) 290% listed/370% unlisted)
In addition to the above, securitisations have a specific treatment. If an asset is rated the Ratings-Based
Approach (“RBA”) must be used. If a rating (external or inferred) is not available the Supervisory Formula
or the Internal Assessment Approach (for exposures to ABCP conduits only) must be used
22
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
♦ Use of insurance against operational risk will be permitted for advanced measurement approach, but
not to exceed 20% reduction in overall operational risk capital charge
♦ Basel Committee will provide for partial adoption of AMA
23
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
24
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
25
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
The Capital ♦ Basel I allows double counting of capital through funding of insurance operations through banks’ tier II
Requirements Directive – applies to most European banking regulations (e.g. not Switzerland; France, Germany, Italy,
will require 50% of the Portugal and Spain have no regulatory
deduction to be made capital deduction)
from Tier 1 capital, but ♦ Basel II proposal to require 50% tier I funding implemented in some countries only
e.g. the FSA has chosen – technically this stems from an increase in risk weights from 100% to 1250% of stakes in
to delay implementation insurance companies
of this change until at ?
least 2012
50%
26
SECTION 3
Adjusted Common
equity (ACE) is S&P’s Reported shareholders'equity
equity
Reported shareholders’
measure of core capital
Minorities
Adjusted Total Capital
Dividends
(ATE) includes some
components of the Goodwill and nonservicing intangibles
capital structure with
Retirement benefit adjustments
features that make them
weaker than common TLCF
equity Other
Adjusted
Adjustedcommon
commonequity
equity
Adjustedtotal
Adjusted totalequity
equity
0 5 10 15
28
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
Moody’s classifies
hybrids in a basket from
A to E on the debt— Reported
Reported shareholders'equity
shareholders’ equity
equity continuum
The basket assignments Minorities
capture how closely the
hybrid replicates the key
Preferred stock
features of common equity
– no maturity
– non-payment of Unrealised gains or losses from AFS securities
dividend/interest
does not trigger Adjustment for cash flow hedges
default
– loss absorption
Goodwill and all other intangibles Basket
A
B
Moody's equity credit for hybrid and preferred C
D
E
TangibleTangible
common common
equityequity
(TCE)
0 5 10 15 20
29
APPENDIX A
Further reading
06060H227_Bank capital.ppt
Further reading
Author Title Date
Financial Institutions Group 26 April 2007
Provides More Transparency Into
Adjustments Made To Bank Data
Managing Capital under Basel 2 4 July 2007
31
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SECTION 1.C
Banking
Valuation
4
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Bank valuation
FIG EMEA training
26 November 2007
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
Table of contents
1
SECTION 1
Bank valuation
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
Valuing a bank
♦ Market advisory
3
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
... the specific features of ♦ A regulated industry (capital requirements, loan provisions)
the banking sector
♦ Financing is at the core of the business
4
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
♦ Revenue mix
♦ Margins
♦ Efficiency
♦ Asset quality
♦ Profitability
♦ Solvency/capital ratios
♦ Asset/liability mix
5
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
6
SECTION 2
Multiples
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
General methodology
8
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
– business mix
– geographical presence
– profitability
♦ Be consistent
9
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
Why do multiples There are good reasons why valuation multiples vary it is not enough to say
vary?—four factors that the value of a business should be automatically based upon the “sector”
average multiple
1 The quality of the business
♦ High quality businesses deserve higher valuation multiples
♦ Consider differences in value drivers
– growth
– quality of management
– new investment opportunities
– quality of franchise
– etc. …
♦ The problem is how to allow for those differences
– how much is growth worth?
– what is the impact of a higher return on capital?
2 Accounting differences
♦ IFRS vs. US GAAP vs. local GAAP
♦ Different application of optionalities
3 Fluctuations in profits
♦ Multiples are only meaningful if the profit used is representative of that “maintainable” in the future—
multiples vary if there are one-off profit fluctuations
♦ A multiple is only meaningful if the profit on which it is based is indicative of future profit potential
– exclude exceptional items
– use forecast rather than historical profits
♦ Where the current or subsequent years profits are still not representative of the longer term …
– consider using forward priced multiples
4 Mis-pricing
♦ A low multiple could indicate that the stock is simply underpriced rather than just poor quality
♦ If deserved differences in multiples are not fully explained by differences in
– business quality
– accounting policies
– fluctuations in profits
10
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
Multiples—trading comparables
Summary overview ♦ Apply selected valuation statistics of comparable companies to the relevant financial data of the bank
– P/E ratios
– P/BV ratios
Benefits Limits
11
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
Price/earnings multiples
EPS calculation
Stated EPS: (Net attributable income including extraordinary items (net of tax))/weighted average
number of shares
Adjusted EPS: Stated EPS adjusted for extraordinary item, general provisions, other country
specific items
Price/book multiples
Calculating P/BV
multiples Share price Market capitalisation
♦ P/E = or
BVPS Book value
BVPS calculation
Stated BVPS: Shareholder funds net of treasury shares and excluding minority interest)/Number
of shares
Adjusted BVPS: Stated BVPS adjusted for various items (see next page)
- Other intangibles
± Other items ?
14
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
♦ Zero earnings mean actual RoE=0 and hence the regression line should on the face of it cross the origin
♦ We typically take into account a longer-term expectation of reversion to CoE and also increase the fit
(R²) of the regression by allowing b 0
P/B E
= = RoE
P/E B
(if you disregard averaging equity and assume consistent adjustments)
– use this relationship to sense check your comps tables or precedents (keep practical complications
from adjustments in mind though)
♦ Be careful with conclusions of companies above the regression line being overvalued. This is a simple
model and many factors are at play
15
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
Correlation analysis
Correlation or regression
analysis (also called the 3.50 y = 0.0925x + 0.7326 Santander
value map approach) is a R2 = 0.894
BBVA
useful and visual tool for 3.00
BPI
justifying and
♦ Occasionally used for EPS CAGR and P/E with a similar rationale
16
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
a cross section of BNP Paribas France 70.86 62.2 (14.3) 75.2 8.0 8.1 7.5 1.51 1.36 1.23 19.9 17.7 17.3 3.5
European banks Société Générale France 100.58 44.1 (21.8) 63.5 8.3 8.1 7.5 1.63 1.46 1.31 21.1 19.0 18.5 5.3
Crédit Agricole France 22.21 35.0 (29.2) 64.8 7.0 6.9 6.3 1.77 1.53 1.34 27.5 23.7 22.7 5.2
NatIxis France 11.79 13.8 (44.6) 51.8 6.6 6.5 5.8 0.91 0.85 0.80 14.2 13.6 14.1 6.5
Mean (27.5) 63.8 7.5 7.4 6.8 1.45 1.30 1.17 20.7 18.5 18.2 5.1
Median (25.5) 64.1 7.5 7.5 6.9 1.57 1.41 1.27 20.5 18.3 17.9 5.3
Deutsche Bank Germany 83.57 43.3 (17.5) 70.8 6.9 7.8 7.2 1.48 1.41 1.32 23.4 18.5 19.0 (1.6)
Commerzbank Germany 25.12 16.2 (12.9) 66.9 9.0 8.4 7.9 1.20 1.11 1.02 13.8 13.7 13.5 6.7
Deutsche Postbank Germany 54.72 9.2 (14.5) 76.1 12.4 10.8 9.7 2.41 2.05 1.75 19.8 20.5 19.6 13.5
Hypo Real Estate Germany 35.30 7.0 (26.1) 66.9 8.8 7.5 6.5 1.15 1.05 0.95 12.0 14.7 15.5 16.8
Aareal Germany 26.00 1.2 (26.3) 65.2 9.4 7.4 6.4 0.81 0.75 0.69 8.9 10.6 11.1 21.0
Mean (19.5) 69.2 9.3 8.4 7.5 1.41 1.27 1.15 15.6 15.6 15.7 11.3
Median (17.5) 66.9 9.0 7.8 7.2 1.20 1.11 1.02 13.8 14.7 15.5 13.5
Bank of Georgia Georgia 33.15 0.5 47.3 75.3 18.4 11.9 9.0 3.40 2.64 2.04 20.4 25.0 25.6 42.8
Sberbank Russia 4.17 61.7 21.5 0.1 20.9 16.7 13.1 3.47 2.93 2.45 17.9 19.0 20.4 26.5
Kazkommertsbank Kazakhstan 10.65 2.1 (53.9) 44.4 8.5 7.0 5.2 1.28 1.08 0.90 16.3 16.6 18.8 27.6
PKO Poland 52.20 14.0 11.1 88.5 20.0 16.9 14.6 4.86 4.19 3.63 26.1 26.6 26.7 17.2
Pekao Poland 254.80 11.5 12.3 93.8 20.1 17.3 14.9 4.90 4.60 4.28 25.0 27.4 29.7 16.0
OTP Hungary 8,580.00 9.1 (1.9) 78.4 11.3 9.9 8.5 3.55 2.81 2.28 35.6 31.8 29.6 15.1
Komercni Czech Rep. 4,133.00 5.7 33.4 91.7 15.4 13.9 12.8 2.89 2.63 2.37 19.6 19.8 19.5 9.6
Mean 10.0 67.5 16.4 13.4 11.2 3.48 2.99 2.57 23.0 23.7 24.3 22.1
Median 12.3 78.4 18.4 13.9 12.8 3.47 2.81 2.37 20.4 25.0 25.6 17.2
Note:
1 Share prices are closing prices as at 20 Nov 07
17
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
Multiples—precedent transactions
Summary overview
♦ Apply selected valuation statistics of comparable precedent transactions to the relevant financial data of
the bank
– P/E ratios
– P/BV ratios
Benefits Limits
♦ Realistic approach (includes ♦ Ability to find truly comparable transactions
M&A-related items) – geographical presence
♦ Control premium take into consideration – business mix
♦ Relative valuation tool – transaction-specific items
♦ Accepted and common measure ♦ Subject to market fluctuations
♦ Lack of disclosure limits visibility over key
features of any transaction
Summary
Multiples are a critical ♦ Trading multiples are equity market’s primary calculation measure
part of valuation— ♦ M&A market tries to reconcile transaction multiples with control premiums to determine
great care necessary transaction value
for robust result ♦ Multiple analysis should be conducted rigorously, like DDM
♦ Expert guidance should be sought on selection of comps, multiples and multiples ranges
Thorough use of multiples ♦ Must understand drivers of comps’ multiples and relative rankings
analysis should achieve ♦ Always check results against equivalent DDM—if done
virtually everything DDM
can do
19
SECTION 3
Gordon Growth
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
21
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
Derivation of the D1
formula from a P0 = one-stage dividend discount valuation
one-stage dividend CoE – g
discounting approach
D0
E0 x x (1 + g) BV0 x RoE x payout ratio
Key things to remember E0
P0 = =
♦ Discounting dividends, CoE – g CoE – g
not earnings
♦ Relationship between RoE,
E1 E0 (1 + g)
payout ratio and growth: in with D1 = D0 (1 + g) and RoE = =
a steady state the business
must grow in line with the BV0 BV0
“retained part of RoE”
P0 RoE – g
=
BV0 CoE – g
g
with g = RoE (1 – payout ratio) or payout ratio = 1 –
RoE
P0 Payout ratio
=
E0 CoE – g
22
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
Cost of equity 9%
(CoE)
Perpetual growth 2%
(g)
10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 20.0 22.5 25.0 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 20.0 22.5 25.0
7.5 1.45 1.91 2.36 2.82 3.27 3.73 4.18 7.5 1.56 2.11 2.67 3.22 3.78 4.33 4.89
8.0 1.33 1.75 2.17 2.58 3.00 3.42 3.83 8.0 1.40 1.90 2.40 2.90 3.40 3.90 4.40
8.5 1.23 1.62 2.00 2.38 2.77 3.15 3.54 8.5 1.27 1.73 2.18 2.64 3.09 3.55 4.00
CoE (%)
CoE (%)
9.0 1.14 1.50 1.86 2.21 2.57 2.93 3.29 9.0 1.17 1.58 2.00 2.42 2.83 3.25 3.67
9.5 1.07 1.40 1.73 2.07 2.40 2.73 3.07 9.5 1.08 1.46 1.85 2.23 2.62 3.00 3.38
10.0 1.00 1.31 1.63 1.94 2.25 2.56 2.88 10.0 1.00 1.36 1.71 2.07 2.43 2.79 3.14
10.5 0.94 1.24 1.53 1.82 2.12 2.41 2.71 10.5 0.93 1.27 1.60 1.93 2.27 2.60 2.93
11.0 0.89 1.17 1.44 1.72 2.00 2.28 2.56 11.0 0.88 1.19 1.50 1.81 2.13 2.44 2.75
23
SECTION 4
Sum-of-the-parts valuation
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
Sum-of-the-parts valuation
Summary overview ♦ Valuing each business activity separately according to its own business dynamics
♦ Strictly speaking, SOTP is not the actual valuation methodology but rather a way of organising
an approach
– still requires fundamental methodologies, usually multiples or Gordon growth models
Benefits Limits
♦ Detailed analysis of key business areas ♦ Limited information available
♦ Assists identification of hidden value (holding ♦ Static information analysis
company structures)
♦ Relies on market/precedent
♦ Provides insight into valuation weight of transaction multiples
various business areas
♦ Lack of real comparables
25
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
Sum-of-the-parts valuation
Capital allocation
♦ The capital allocation to the business divisions should reflect the risk the segment is exposed
e.g. retail-low, wholesale-high (regulatory capital vs. economic capital)
♦ In most cases the allocation is disclosed by the company as part of the segmental disclosure but
analysts will do their own allocation so as to harmonise between peers
26
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
Sum-of-the-parts valuation
Estimated EV 184
Sum-of-the-parts valuation
P / EV (x) 1.5
Share price 43
Note:
1 Valued at par, or even sometimes below par if assumed to be excess capital
27
SECTION 5
Summary overview ♦ Calculate the net present value of a bank based on a series of estimated cash flows and a
terminal value
Benefits Limits
♦ Identifies key valuation drivers and ♦ Significant sensitivity to a very limited number
sensitivity of the result of parameters
29
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
Financial
Institutions Shareholders Debtholders
analysis
“Corporate
world” Company
analysis
Operating assets
30
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
Forecasting cashflows
31
06060h227_Bank valuation.ppt
Assumptions
Tax rate 35.00% (€m) 2006 2007E 2008E 2009E 2010E 2011E
Interest forgone 5.000% Net income 300 250 325 420 500 540
on cash EURIBOR 3M
Adjustment for incremental dividends (26) (25) (24) (26)
Target Tier I 5.5%
Adjusted net income 250 299 395 476 514
ratio
Standalone 50% Core Tier I 2,500 2,700 2,000 2,200 2,500 2,700
payout ratio
RWA 32,600 32,000 34,100 36,900 39,700 42,000
LT growth rate 2.0% Core Tier I ratio (%) 7.7 8.4 5.9 6.0 6.3 6.4
Beta ♦ CAPM requires forward looking beta, historical betas can be guidance but should not be
used blindly
♦ Leverage theoretically is an issue (levered/unlevered betas!) but is heavily regulated in FIG
and so often disregarded
♦ There is always a strong case for a bank beta of 1, given the fundamental exposure to the
entire economy
33
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SECTION 1.D
Banking
Financial effects
5
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
26 November 2007
06060h227_Financial effects.ppt
Table of contents
SECTION 1 Introduction 2
SECTION 2 Bank specifics 7
1
SECTION 1
Introduction
06060h227_Financial effects.ppt
3
06060h227_Financial effects.ppt
4
06060h227_Financial effects.ppt
Funding mix
5
06060h227_Financial effects.ppt
Example 1 Example 2
Number of shares outstanding (#) 100 Same situation, but offer price raised to €20
Options (#) 5
Weighted average strike price (€) 10
Offer price (€) 15
How many shares are acquired? How many shares are acquired?
“Value” of one option (€) 15-10=5 “Value” of one option (€) 20-10=10
Number of options (#) 5 Number of options (#) 5
Total option value (€) 25 Total option value (€) 50
Deal price (€) 15 Deal price (€) 20
Common share equivalents (#) 1.67 Common share equivalents (#) 2.5
TOTAL DILUTED NUMBER OF SHARES 101.67 TOTAL DILUTED NUMBER OF SHARES 102.5
6
SECTION 2
Bank specifics
06060h227_Financial effects.ppt
Earnings effects
Setting out a simple Input assumptions Funding mix and funding costs
Mix
numerical example
Buyer Target Costs 1 2 3 4
Forward earnings (€m) 150 40 Cash/debt (%) 5 0 20 70 100
NOSH (#) 120 80 Hybrid (%) 7 0 30 30 0
Share price 15 6 Equity (%) 100 50 0 0
Sum (%) 100 100 100 100
Offer price (€) 7.5
Share acquired (%) 100
Implications
Buyer Target
Forward EPS (€) 1.25 0.50
P/E (x) 12.0 12.0
Market cap (€m) 1,800 480
Purchase price (€m) 600
Premium to share price (%) 25.0
Note:
1 Assuming a valuation of 10x and implementation
costs of 150% of annual synergies
8
06060h227_Financial effects.ppt
Earnings effects
Step 1 Step 2
Calculating pro forma Buyer's original EPS as benchmark + / - Earnings consolidation and adjustments for transaction
EPS
Forward earnings—buyer (€m) 150
Funding mix assumed to + Forward earnings—target (€m) 40
Forward earnings (€m) 150
be 100% equity NOSH (#) 120 + Post-tax synergies (€m) 7
- Funding costs—cash/debt (€m) 0.00
Forward EPS—buyer (€) 1.25
- Funding costs—hybrid (€m) 0.00
Forward earnings—pro forma (€m) 197
Step 4 Step 3
Buyer's pro forma EPS New shares issued in the transaction
Step 5
EPS comparison
9
06060h227_Financial effects.ppt
Earnings effects
Key areas for ♦ IFRS has discontinued goodwill amortisation with an impairment test
consideration – cash vs stated distinction now obsolete
– some jurisdictions allow tax deductibility irrespective of accounting treatment
♦ Transaction costs and restructuring charges are usually excluded from calculations
– “one-off” costs
– accretion / dilution analysis looks at sustainable / run-rate earnings
– if equity raise through separate rights issue in cash offer, may need to consider underwriting
expenses
10
06060h227_Financial effects.ppt
Capital effects
Implications
Buyer Target
Tier 1 880 300
Core Tier 1 ratio (%) 10.0 12.5
Tier 1 ratio (%) 11.0 15.0
11
06060h227_Financial effects.ppt
Capital effects
Ratio (%)
0.0
illustrative purposes (1.3)
8
10.0 10.5
4
0
Core Tier 1—buyer Hybrid Tier Equity issued in Consolidation of Deduction of Consolidation of Hybrid Tier 1 issued Hybrid Tier 1—pro Core Tier 1—pro
1—buyer connection with target RWA goodwill generated target hybrid as part of funding forma forma
the transaction mix (€m)
16
Ratio (%)
12
1.0 0.0
(2.2)
8 0.5
(3.5)
0.0 (1.3)
10.0
4
4.5
0
Core Tier 1—buyer Hybrid Tier Equity issued in Consolidation of Deduction of Consolidation of Hybrid Tier 1 issued Hybrid Tier 1—pro Core Tier 1—pro
1—buyer connection with target RWA goodwill generated target hybrid as part of funding forma forma
the transaction mix (€m)
12
06060h227_Financial effects.ppt
Capital effects
♦ Goodwill calculation
– generally purchase price minus tangible book value of target (after assets and liabilities have been
revalued from carrying value to fair value)
♦ Must consider securities (other than common equity) on target’s balance sheet
– preferred securities
– other capital instruments
♦ There may be additional subtractions from Tier 1 or total capital (e.g. insurance holdings)
13
06060h227_Financial effects.ppt
Synergies
♦ Synergies are usually discussed in terms of pre-tax bottom line. You must “tax-effect” to use in
calculating pro forma EPS
♦ “Synergies to breakeven” (or “synergies for nil dilution”) is an important data point in many analyses. It
measures the synergies required for a given merger to be neither EPS accretive or dilutive
Dilution x
€10/(1–30%) = €14.3 of €10 more net income
New Shares
pre-tax earnings to breakeven/nil
Outstanding–pro forma =
needed to breakeven dilution needed
€(0.06) x 160 = €10
14
06060h227_Financial effects.ppt
Return on investment
Core Tier 1 ratio impact (%-pts) ♦ Core Tier 1 impacts are worse than stated
Tier 1
Funding mix
1 2 3 4
6.00 0.5 (1.9) (4.3) (4.3)
Offer price (€)
1 2 3 4
6.00 0.8 (0.2) (2.6) (4.0)
Offer price (€)
16
06060h227_Financial effects.ppt
♦ Final tip: the best way to learn is to build from scratch a merger plan at least once
– some examples are saved in N:\FIG\models
– during the course of a deal these models get heavily customised
17
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SECTION 2
Insurance
6
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SECTION 2.A
Insurance
Insurance capital
7
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Insurance capital
FIG EMEA training
3 December 2007
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Table of contents
SECTION 1 Introduction 2
SECTION 2 Regulatory requirements 5
SECTION 3 Rating agency requirements 15
SECTION 4 Internal models 30
SECTION 5 Capital structure considerations 34
1
SECTION 1
Introduction
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Capital buffer
3
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
4
SECTION 2
Regulatory requirements
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
… with additional
restrictions applying to the
composition of capital
Paid-up Reserves and Minority Intangibles Stakes in Dated Perpetual Free bonus Life items Available Non-life Life Required
share retained interest subsidiary subordinated subordinated reserves (acquisition solvency requirement requirement solvency
capital earnings post financial debt debt costs, future margin margin
dividends institutions profits) (RMM)
♦ Failure to meet the regulatory solvency margin will result in the regulator imposing additional reporting
requirements and ultimately taking management control in the interest of policyholders
♦ Emerging innovative Tier 1-style instruments currently count within the subordinated allowance, but
French insurers propose a new category of deeply subordinated debt subject to a maximum of 15% of
Tier 1 capital that would receive eligible capital treatment under Solvency I
6
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Solvency I requirements—non-life
Maximum of the
two approaches
♦ Required margin can be increased by 50% for volatile lines (marine, aviation, general liability etc.)
♦ As a rule of thumb, the premium based approach will drive requirements for claims rations below 70% (assuming
no growth over the past three years)
♦ Also applies to non-life risks covered in life contracts and health insurance
♦ Life reinsurance is now also subject to the non-life (!) rules, such that capital arbitrage will remain a driver for the
use of life reinsurance
7
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Solvency I requirements—life
Less: up to 50%
Less: up to 15% reinsurance haircut
reinsurance haircut
8
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Single entity-based ♦ Pure use of “solo” solvency has pitfalls ♦ Group solvency calculations required following implementation
– structural leverage ( 1 ) in national law in 2000
requirements are
– multiple gearing ( 2 ) ♦ Group deduction larger than scope of consolidation (includes
insufficient from an – potential misuse of internal indirect participations of 20%+)
economic perspective … reinsurance ( 3 )
♦ Two main approaches
– based on consolidated accounts, or
– aggregation and deduction of single entity solvency filings
… hence, the EU requires A simplified example ¹
a group solvency
statement to be prepared “Solo” solvency Group solvency
1 Structural leverage
Notes:
1 Assumes pure non-life group, using 16% requirement for simplicity
2 Pre introduction of the reinsurance directive (RID)
♦ The European Financial Groups Directive (FGD) effective from 2005 adds additional rules regarding
non-insurance businesses
9
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
The directive was Definition criteria for a financial conglomerate Allianz example
introduced in 2005 ♦ A group … 350
>300%
in order to – parent-subsidiary relationships or holding 300
improve supervision company models
250
– horizontal group structures without capital links >170%
200 >150%
♦ … with at least one regulated entity, …
150
♦ mainly financial activities …
100
♦ Improve solvency – >40% of group’s total assets in financial
50
calculation methods by sector entities
0
introducing a group-wide ♦ … and significant involvement in both the
meet-or-fail criterion IGD FGD Economic
banking & investment services sector and the
solvency¹
♦ Prevent double gearing insurance sector
Source: Roadshow presentation
and excessive leverage
Note:
♦ Include intra-group 1 According to internal risk capital model
transactions under An example
supervision
Parent holding
♦ Focus on group risk company
exposure
♦ Supervision of internal risk
management and Banking/
measurement systems Investment Insurance Non-financial
10
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Solvency II
A three pillar approach Pillar I—Quantitative Pillar II—Supervisory review Pillar III—Market discipline
similar to Basel II requirements
11
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Solvency II
Solvency I Solvency II
Inadmissible
assets/
Implicit and ineligible Free
intransparent capital Capital
degree of
conservation Pillar2 MCEV
Adjusted SCR
SCR
95% VAR
MCR
MV of assets 90% VAR
Risk
Market margin
MV of liabilities
value of
liabilities
Technical
BEL provisions
Timescale
Draft
Framework Full
directive implementation
(July 2007)
12
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Solvency II
Capital components ♦ More consistent classification of capital ♦ Likely to allow greater use of non-equity
(Pillar I) components across countries capital but with significant focus on
– alignment with banking capital; see qualitative aspects
UK interim capital rules
“Winners” and ♦ Key factors impacting insurers’ competitive ♦ Solvency II should favour:
“losers” position post Solvency II: – multinationals over single country
– captures all quantifiable risks insurers
– recognition of diversification benefits (or – insurers with sophisticated systems
absence thereof) and good databases
– heavy reliance on management systems – larger insurers given ability to spread
and risk modelling cost of implementation
– focus on expected loss anticipates trends – diversified business models
(traditional vs. unit-linked, composites)
13
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
♦ Anticipation of Solvency II features ♦ ‘Twin peaks’ approach: life insurers ♦ Early implementation of the EU
without delay are required to hold capital to cover Financial Groups Directive
the higher of two calculations
♦ Introduction of an ‘Enhanced ♦ Covering mixed financial holding
Capital Requirement’ (ECR) to apply ♦ Regulatory peak: essentially companies that are neither banking
for most insurers instead of the identical with the previous nor insurance group, e.g.
‘Solvency I’ rules (MCR) regulations (some relaxations as to
interest rate, expense and lapse
♦ Basic approach assumptions) Parent
14
SECTION 3
The exact terminology AAA Extremely strong Aaa Exceptional A++, A+ Superior AAA Exceptionally strong
is very helpful in
Investment
AA Very strong Aa Excellent A, A- Excellent AA Very strong
grade
translating qualitative
agency statements A Strong A Good B++, B+ Very good A Strong
CCC Very weak Caa Very Poor C, C- Weak CCC, CC, C Very weak
F In liquidation
S Rating suspended
+, - 1 High
Modifiers
2 Medium
“moderate” used to denote (see above) +, -
3 Low
“below expectations”, or
“below requirements”
16
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
1–2 notches
policyholder’s claims Holding
2–3 notches
company
There are many other Subordinated rating
ratings assigned to
different obligations
of different group
companies and Insurance Financial
it is important to Strength Rating
1 notch
distinguish these
Insurance
companies
Senior rating
1–2 notches
Subordinated rating
Other/
non-core
subsidiaries Stand-alone FSR
17
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
S&P—general methodology
Enterprise risk
Investments
management
18
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
S&P—group methodology
Only core subsidiaries or ♦ S&P generally consider the group’s position through a consolidated model
those with explicit – subsidiaries also considered, but do not drive group rating
guarantees are assigned ♦ Notching of subsidiaries
the group rating
Core Strategically important Non-strategic
♦ Integral business ♦ Most “core” characteristics ♦ Criteria for core or
♦ Usually group brand met, but strategically important not
– insufficient relative size met
♦ Significant (>5–10% of – insufficient capitalisation
capital) ♦ In particular
vs. group (but still BBB) – start-ups
♦ Strong commitment – operated more on a – run-offs
demonstrated stand-alone basis – undercapitalised
♦ Capital levels commensurate ♦ Sale unlikely – sale announced (!)
with group capitalisation
♦ Sale inconceivable
♦ >51% share of votes
19
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
♦ Model initially introduced in October 1998 and substantially revised in April 2003
– modification of investment charges (“Nokia discount”, bond volatility)
CAR translated into rating categories
– introduction of “hard CAR” (removing soft capital components)
Rating CAR (%)
– refinement of VIF credit to avoid double-counting
AAA Extremely strong > 175
AA Very strong 150–175
– incorporation of life reinsurance methodology
A Strong 125–150 – life asset risk to be covered at multiple (rather than being a deduction from capital)
BBB Good 100–125 – goodwill credit removed, non-life DAC allowed
BB Marginal 75–100
B Weak 50–75
♦ Significant but evolutionary revision introduced in May 2007
<B Very weak, regulatory action etc. na
Model overview and terminology—available capital compared to required capital
Gross Net total C1: C2: C3: Risk- Soft Hard C4: C5: C6: C7: C8: Total
total adjusted Investment Other Non- adjusted capital risk- Non-life Non- Life Life Life capital
adjusted capital risk (non- credit insurance capital items1 adjusted premium life reinsurance reserve asset required
capital (Net life & risk risk (RAC) capital risk reserve risk risk risk (TCR)
(Gross TAC) shareholder) (Hard risk
TAC) RAC)
Non-life Life
Note:
1 Comprises hybrid capital, any remaining credit for loss reserve discounts or PVFP and 50% of non-life DAC as well as 50% of unpaid capital
20
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
However, the structure has ♦ Still a deterministic factor-based approach with no explicit credit for geographic diversification, but
changed such that the some consideration for diversification of risks
widely used capital ♦ Calculate the company specific redundancy or deficiency of target capital at varying confidence
adequacy ratio is replaced intervals—output is a figure, rather than a capital adequacy ratio and will not be disclosed—as before
with less comparable
absolute capital deficits to Leverage and coverage
the next voting level ♦ Under the proposed new criteria the amount of tolerated leverage will increase, because the new
broader economic capital available (ECA) will be used to calculate leverage. As a result S&P expects
Quantitative analysis in the fixed-change coverage to become the major limiting factor to issuance. The required levels of
context of M&A will be fixed-charge coverage will be in line with the current coverage requirements
significantly more cumbersome
but can probably be done using
the previous model while they Potential impact
run in parallel ♦ Higher capital requirements anticipated for ♦ Lower capital requirements anticipated for
– long-tail liability reserves – short-tail non-life reserves and non-life
– equity holdings premium risks
– large asset liability duration mismatch – property holdings
– longevity exposures – short term non-life bond investments
– natural peril catastrophic risks – life reserve-based charges in
certain markets
21
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Capital definitions have Economic Capital Available (ECA) Total Adjusted Capital (TAC)
been slightly amended Reported shareholders equity/policyholder surplus ECA
and former “Gross TAC” + Equity minority interests – Remaining goodwill after S&P impairment
has been renamed
+ Equalisation/Catastrophe reserves – Investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, associates
“Economic Capital and other affiliates
+ Prudential margins included in reserves
Available (ECA)”
– Investments in own shares/treasury shares
– Proposed shareholder dividends not accrued
– 50% haircut of VIF (post tax)
– S&P impairment of goodwill
– 50% haircut of life deferred acquisition costs (post tax)
– Other intangible assets
– 100% haircut of property/casualty deferred
– On-balance sheet unrealised gains/(losses) on life
acquisition costs
bonds (post tax)
– 50% haircut of property/casualty loss reserve surpluses
+ Off-balance sheet unrealised gains/(losses) on
investments other than life bonds (post tax) – 33% haircut of property/casualty loss reserve discount
– Off-balance sheet pension deficits (post tax) + Policyholder capital available to absorb losses
22
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
23
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Real life example Available capital and required capital—based on old model
showing a composite Pre-transaction Acquisition adjustments Post-transaction
group acquiring a life Gross Total Adjusted Capital
insurance business at (Gross TAC)
a significant premium Net Total Adjusted Capital
(Net TAC)
to EV
C1—Investment risk
(non-life & shareholder)
25
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Capital requirements (%) Health Property A&H Motor Marine Liability Aviation Credit
vary by line European primary charges
of business Premium charge 1 16 24 20 13 29 30 42 99
Reserve charge 6 9 26 15 21 20 21 33
Reserve ratio (assumption) 2 60 100 60 150 100 300 230 60
It is easy to see that the
business mix is a
fundamental driver of the Simple solvency requirement for a rating of “A” 3
solvency ratio target
Nonetheless, as a practical 119
rule of thumb, solvency
ratios tend to be in a range
of 35% to 60%, depending 90 90
on mix and target rating
Capital/NPW (%)
50
33 36 36
20
Source: S&P, UBS investment Bank assumptions based upon ABI data
Notes:
1 On net premiums written
2 Net reserves over net premiums written
3 Expressed relative to net premiums written and calculated as premium charge + reserve charge x reserve ratio; this simple approach disregards
other requirements such as credit risk and capital components such as reserve discounting or any hybrid leverage
26
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Moody’s—overview
Measurement
♦ Primarily uses regulatory capital ratios—no specific insurance capital model, but has introduced a
quantitative scorecard model in September 2006 in response to market criticism of lack of
transparency of their approach (see Appendix)
♦ Also uses basic analytical ratios, e.g. shareholders’ funds/net written premiums for P&C business and
debt/(debt + capital)
27
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
A.M. Best
♦ Sophisticated P&C model similar to, but more onerous than the NAIC approach
Adjusted surplus
BCAR = (“Best’s Capital Adequacy Ratio”)
Net required capital
♦ Net Required Capital (NRC) components
– B1 fixed-income securities
– B2 equity securities
– B3 interest rate
– B4 credit
– B5 loss and LAE reserves
– B6 net written premium
– B7 off balance sheet
♦ Covariance benefit means A.M. Best is the only agency giving a diversification credit:
– NRC = (B1)2 + (B2)2 + (B3)2 + (1/2 B4)2 + [(1/2 B4) + B5]2 + (B6)2 + (B7)
28
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Fitch
Conditional
expected value
for tail
5%
29
SECTION 4
Internal models
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
31
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Diversification benefits
… but increasingly risk-adjusted solvency capital, APRA Yes Yes Yes Yes
”
K 30
Standard & Poor’s
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 “Evaluating The Enterprise Risk Management Practices of Insurance
(%) of risk-adjusted solvency capital Companies”, 17 October 2005
Source: Cerulli Global Update, 2005
32
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Diversification benefits
21.9
19.1
Life 15.5
♦ Required economic capital for the AXA Group was €19 billion at year-end 2004 (for a risk of default
equivalent to a AA company)
♦ The total diversification benefits (excluding diversification benefits within each local operation, which
are not measured) amounted to €16 billion), or 46%
♦ The geographic diversification benefit was high in life (30%) but particularly high in non-life (49%)
– additional benefits in no/low correlation of weather patterns, frequency, proportionately lower
sensitivity to capital markets
33
SECTION 5
Perpetual
Perpetual
Preference
non-cumulative 17.5%
share Non-cumulative
preference shares
25% Ordinary
Equity
(minimum) share
Note:
1 Composition of regulatory capital base assuming maximum leverage
35
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Dated preferreds
A Perpetual preferreds, no 0%
replacement capital
37
APPENDIX A
♦ Equity credit for Bank and Insurance Hybrid Capital, 16 February 2006
♦ Insurance criteria update: What makes an insurance or reinsurance subsidiary ’core’ under group rating
methodology?, 31 March 2005
♦ Property/casualty insurance criteria: Holding company analysis, 24 September 2004
♦ Capital adequacy at European bancassurers: The need to look beyond regulatory ratios, 23 July 2004
♦ Research: Evaluation European insurers’ capital adequacy, 24 April 2003 (accompanying the release of
the new capital model)
♦ Mandatory convertibles: New hybrid capital criteria for banks and insurers, 7 August 2002
♦ Revised financial services group methodology addresses increased willingness to sell underperforming
subsidiaries, 23 April 2002
♦ Insurance criteria update: Holding company analysis and consolidated groups, 13 November 2002
♦ The analysis of capital adequacy in the European and international insurance markets (unpublished
draft manuscript), January 1999
♦ Financial institution criteria (200 page handbook), January 1999
♦ Moody’s Global Rating Methodology for Life/Property and Casualty Insurers, September 2006
♦ Refinements to Moody’s tool kit: Evolutionary, not revolutionary!, February 2005
♦ Characteristics of a basket E mandatorily convertible security: For financial institutions and corporates,
November 2004
♦ Hybrid securities analysis: New criteria for adjustment of financial ratios to reflect the issuance for
hybrid securities, November 2003
♦ Moody’s tool kit: A framework for assessing hybrid securities, December 1999
Server location—
N:\FIG\German
desk\Insurance\Rating
agencies\S&P’s \Models\
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09-30 (unlocked).xls
41
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
S&P—gross TAC
Unless included in
equity, net of
deferred tax
possible at 10%
Resulting credit:
♦ Unconsolidated subsidiaries 0%
Limited to 25% of Net TAC ♦ Non-strategic affiliates at 85% of excess
excluding the allowable share of market value (i.e. net of a 15%
unallocated life funds for groups, volatility charge)
higher limits ♦ Core/strategically important affiliates at
stand-alone depend on rating 25% of excess market value
Reported Dividends and Equalisation Minorities Financial Deferred tax Hybrid equity Excess market Stakes in Goodwill and Non-life loss Life embedded Gross TAC
stakeholders' other proposed reserves reinsurance asset capital credit values (URCG) subsidiaries other reserve value
equity/ allocations (surplus relief) intangibles adjustments adjustments
policyholders' not accrued in
surplus balance sheet
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06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
S&P—net TAC
Gross TAC 50% of non-life 50% of non-life 33% of non-life 50% of present Capital in banking Modified net TAC Allowable share of Net TAC
DAC reserve redundancy computed reserve value of future subsidiaries unallocated life
discount profits (PVFP) funds
Note:
1 Applies to holding company analysis, can be higher for operating companies, additional 10% allowed for mandatory convertible securities
43
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
For shareholder
business only,
i.e. excluding C1 = Size factor
Default risk + Volatility risk + Concentration risk x adjustment
participating life
♦ For bond ♦ For all invested ♦ Investment in own ♦ “Penalty” for lack of
investments assets excluding shares diversification in
cash, unless hedged + small businesses
(<€1.2 billion
♦ Deduction for risk
invested assets)
concentrations in
one entity
Charge Charge Charge Size factor
Category (%) Category (%) % of TAC (%)
“A” or better 0.4 Bonds <10 0 2.5x
<1yr 1 2.5
“BBB” 3.3 10–25 20
1–2 yrs 2 1.5x
“BB” 7.5 25–50 40
Factor (×)
“B” 13.7 2–5 yrs 4 50–75 60 2.0
0.8x
“CCC” 20.2 5–10 yrs 6 75–100 80
>10 yrs 8 1.0
Other rated bonds 30.0 >100 100
Mortgages— Preference shares 6
performing 2.0 Property 1 18
0.1 0.2 1.2
Mortgages—
Equities Total invested assets (€bn)
nonperforming 14.0
15
20
25
30
40
55
Note:
1 Excluding property used by the group
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06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Essentially reinsurer
default risk
Reinsurance recoverable
C2 = default risk
+ Other asset risk
45
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Mainly related to
asset management
Asset
operations … C3 = management charge
+ Other off balance items
70
65
Capital required (€m)
35
12.5
2.5 10 25 30
FuM (€bn)
e.g. 0.26%
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06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Based on a bottom-up
approach by line
Proportional Non-proportional
of business C4 = Direct business + reinsurance
+ reinsurance
♦ Charge based on net premiums written, i.e. giving ♦ Property catastrophe charge
unlimited credit for reinsurance cover – in reinsurance
– premiums are often disclosed on different – net capital cost
bases (e.g. gross or earned) requiring a (including reinstatement
top-down adjustment premiums) of a 1 in 100
year loss event
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06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
♦ Charges vary according to the perceived risk of deviations of ultimate losses from the
initial reserve estimates, but take into account the tails of the business, i.e. the period
over which investment return can be earned
♦ Charge based on net loss reserves, i.e. again giving credit for reinsurance
– unearned premium reserves do not yet represent insurance risk and are thus excluded
♦ Public disclosure is usually very limited which means top-down assumptions (e.g. reserve
rates are required)
♦ There can be some inconsistencies between countries from different treatment of claims
handling costs (reserving vs charge through P&L)
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06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Proportional business
calculated as matched bonds do
Annuities and pensions 3% not carry a
5% of net non-linked reserves volatility charge
Linked business
(positive/zero – duration matching of
+
EU RMM) 1.25%/0.5% assets and liabilities
1.25% of net linked reserves removes interest rate
Other proportional risk on that part of
business 0.5% +
the portfolio, hence
+ 0.375% of net sums at risk no capital charge
– you can usually
Premium-based charge assume that at least
♦ Adjustment for linked
(2% of net premiums written) the component of
business with zero RMM
+ of 0.5% bonds that is
designated as ‘held
Non-proportional business
to maturity’ (HTM)
(52% of net premiums written)
for accounting
+ purposes is regarded
Financial reinsurance business as matched bonds
(individual assessment) ♦ Unlike C1, life asset risk
needs to be covered at a
multiple corresponding
to the target rating
49
APPENDIX C
Moody’s—scorecards details
06060H227_Insurance capital.ppt
Moody’s—rating scorecards
Generic Moody’s scorecard for the rating of insurance companies
Life (8 factors) P&C (7 factors)
Factor score (%) Metric score (%) Factor score (%) Metric score (%)
Factor 1: Market position and brand 15 25
Market share ratio 30 25
Relative market share ratio 70 50
Distribution efficiency 0 25
Business profile
Factor 2: Distribution 10 na
Distribution control 50
Diversity of distribution 50
Factor 3: Product focus and diversification 15 10
Product risk 60 40
Life insurance product diversification 40 0
P&C product diversification 0 40
Regulatory diversification 0 20
Factor 4: Asset quality 5 5
High risk assets % of invested assets 75 20
Reinsurance recoverables % equity 0 60
Goodwill % equity 25 20
Factor 5: Capital adequacy 10 15
Capital as % total assets 100 0
Gross underwriting leverage 0 100
Financial profile
Factor 6: Profitability 15 15
Return on equity 50 50
Sharpe ratio of growth in net income 50 50
Factor 7: Liquidity and asset/liability management 10 na
Liquid assets divided by policyholder reserves 100 0
Factor 8: Reserve adequacy na 10
Loss reserve developments % reserves 60
A&E funding ratio 40
Factor 9: Financial flexibility 20 20
Financial leverage 40 40
Cash flow coverage 30 30
Earnings coverage 30 30
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Notes:
1 Premiums & deposits as % of industry’s premiums & deposits
2 Premiums & deposits relative to the average industry premiums & deposits by country
3 Absolute value of the mean of the company’s growth in net income divided by the standard deviation of growth in net income over a 5-year period (Ba in case of any loss)
4 Adjusted debt divided by (adjusted debt + adjusted equity)
5 Dividend capacity from subsidiaries divided by interest expense and preferred dividends (5-year average)
6 Adjusted earnings before interest and taxes divided by interest expense and preferred dividends (5-year average)
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Notes:
1 Premiums & deposits as % of industry’s premiums & deposits
2 Premiums & deposits relative to the average industry premiums & deposits by country
3 Underwriting expenses as % of net premiums written
4 A&E net reserves over average payments payments (5-year average)
5 Adjusted debt divided by (adjusted debt + adjusted equity)
6 Dividend capacity from subsidiaries divided by interest expense and preferred dividends (5-year average)
7 Adjusted earnings before interest and taxes divided by interest expense and preferred dividends (5-year average)
53
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SECTION 2.B
Insurance