CIVPRO CASES (BATCH 1) of said people, and therefore the alms which are given it by the devotees thereof
of said people, and therefore the alms which are given it by the devotees thereof must be
#1
G.R. No. L-2352 July 26, 1910
ELADIO ALONSO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TOMAS VILLAMOR, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Ledesma, Sumulong and Quintos, for appellants.
J. C. Knudson, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an action brought to recover of the defendants the value of certain articles taken
from a Roman Catholic Church located in the municipality of Placer, and the rental value of
the church and its appurtenances, including the church cemetery, from the 11th day of
December, 1901, until the month of April, 1904. After hearing the evidence, the court below
gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P1,581, with interest at 6 per cent
from the date of the judgment. The said sum of P1,581 was made up of two items, one of
which, P741, was for the value of the articles taken from the church, and the other, P840,
the rental value of the premises during the occupations by defendants. From this judgment
the defendants appealed to this court.
It appears that the defendants were on the 11th day of December, 1901, members of the
municipal board of the municipality of Placer, and that they on that date addressed to the
plaintiff in this case, who was the priest in charge of the church, its appurtenances and
contents, the following letter:
PLACER, 11th December, 1901.
R. P. ELADIO ALONSO, Benedicto, Suriago.
ESTEEMED PADRE: After saluting you, we take the liberty of writing you that in the
municipality of which we have charged we have received an order from the provincial fiscal,
dated the 5th instant, which says: "The cemeteries, convents, and the other buildings
erected on land belonging to the town at the expense of the town and preserved by it
belong to the town, and for this reason the municipality is under the obligation of
administering them and of collecting the revenues therefrom, and for this reason we notify
you that from this date all of the revenues and products therefrom must be turned into the
treasury of the municipality in order that the people may properly preserve them.
In the same way we notify you that the image of St. Vicente which is now in the church, as
it is an image donated to the people by its owner, by virtue of said order is also the property
also turned into the municipal treasury for the proper preservation of the church and for
other necessary purposes. We hope that you will view in the proper light and that you will
deliver to the bearer of this letter the key of the alms box of the said image in order that we
may comply with our obligation in conformity with the dispositions of said order.
We beg to remain as always by your spiritual sons. Q. B. S. M.
(Signed) ANDRES OJEDA.
TOMAS VILLAMOR.
ANDRES CALINAUAN.
BERNARDINO TANDOY.
EUSEBIO LIRIO.
ELEUTERIO MONDAYA.
MAXIMO DELOLA.
SEGUNDO BECERRO.
ONOFRE ELIMANCE.
On the 13th of December, 1901, the defendants took possession of the church and its
appurtenances, and also of all of the personal property contained therein. The plaintiff, as
priest of the church and the person in charge thereof, protested against the occupation
thereof by the defendants, but his protests received no consideration, and he was
summarily removed from possession of the church, its appurtenances and contents.
The only defense presented by the defendants, except the one that the plaintiff was not the
real party in interest, was that the church and other buildings had been erected by funds
voluntarily contributed by the people of that municipality, and that the articles within the
church had been purchased with funds raised in like manner, and that, therefore, the
municipality was the owner thereof.
The question as to the ownership of the church and its appurtenances, including the convent
and cemetery, was before this court on the 23rd day of September, 1908, in an action
entitled "The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church against the municipality of
Placer."1 Substantially the same facts were presented on the part of the defendants in that
case as are presented by the defendants in this. The question there litigated was the claim
upon the part of the municipality of ownership of said church and its appurtenances on the
ground that according to Spanish law the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church was not the

owner of such property, having only the use thereof for ordinary ecclesiastical and religious
purposes, and that the true owner thereof was the municipality or the State by reason of
the contributions by them, or by the people, of the land and of the funds with which the
buildings were constructed or repaired. The court decided in that case that the claim of the
defendants was not well founded and that the property belonged to the Roman Catholic
Church. The same question was discussed and decided in the case of Barlin vs. Ramirez (7
Phil. Rep., 41), and the case of The Municipality of Ponce vs. Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church in Porto Rico (28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 737, 6 Off. Gaz., 1213).
We have made a careful examination of the record and the evidence in this case and we
have no doubt that the property sued for was, at the time it was taken by the defendants,
the property of the Roman Catholic Church, and that the seizure of the same and occupation
of the church and its appurtenances by the defendants were wrongful and illegal. We are
also convinced, from such examination, that the conclusions of the court below as to the
value of the articles taken by the defendants and of the rent of the church for the time of its
illegal occupation by the defendants were correct and proper. While some objection was
made on appeal by counsel for the defendants that the value of the articles taken and of the
rent of the church and its appurtenances had not been proved by competent evidence, no
objection to the introduction of the evidence of value was made at the trial and we can not
consider that question raised for the first time here.
We have carefully examined the assignments of error made by counsel for defendants on
this appeal. We find none of them well founded. The only one which deserves especial
attention at our hands is the one wherein the defendants assert that the court below erred
in permitting the action to be brought and continued in the name of the plaintiff instead of
in the name of the bishop of the diocese within which the church was located, or in the
name of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, as the real party in interest.
It is undoubted the bishop of the diocese or the Roman Catholic Apostic Church itself is the
real party in interest. The plaintiff personally has no interest in the cause of action. Section
114 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest. The plaintiff is not such party.
Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, however, provides:
SEC. 110. Amendments in general. — The court shall, in furtherance of justice, and on such
terms, if any, as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding and at
any stage of the action, in either the Court of First Instance or the Supreme Court, by
adding or striking out the name of any party, either plaintiff or defendant, or by correcting a
mistake in the name of a party, or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any
other respect so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined,
without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious, and inexpensive manner. The
court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be made after the
time limited by the rules of the court for filing the same. Orders of the court upon the
matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to
the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
Section 503 of the same code provides:
SEC. 503. Judgment not to be reversed on technical grounds. — No judgment shall be
reversed on formal or technical grounds, or for such error as has not prejudiced the real
rights of the excepting party.
We are confident under these provisions that this court has full power, apart from that
power and authority which is inherent, to amend the process, pleadings, proceedings, and
decision in this case by substituting, as party plaintiff, the real party in interest. Not only are
we confident that we may do so, but we are convinced that we should do so. Such an
amendment does not constitute, really a change in the identity of the parties. The plaintiff
asserts in his complaint, and maintains that assertion all through the record, that he is
engaged in the prosecution of this case, not for himself, but for the bishop of the diocese—
not by his own right, but by right of another. He seeks merely to do for the bishop what the
bishop might do for himself. His own personality is not involved. His own rights are not
presented. He claims no interest whatever in the litigation. He seeks only the welfare of the
great church whose servant he is. Gladly permits his identity to be wholly swallowed up in
that of his superior. The substitution, then, of the name of the bishop of the diocese, or the
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, for that of Padre Alonso, as party plaintiff, is not in reality
the substitution of one identity for another, of one party for another, but is simply to make
the form express the substance. The substance is there. It appears all through the
proceedings. No one is deceived for an instant as to whose interest are at stake. The form
of its expression is alone defective. The substitution, then, is not substantial but formal.
Defect in mere form can not possibly so long as the substantial is clearly evident. Form is a
method of speech used to express substance and make it clearly appear. It is the means by
which the substance reveals itself. If the form be faulty and still the substance shows plainly
through no, harm can come by making the form accurately expressive of the substance.
No one has been misled by the error in the name of the party plaintiff. If we should by
reason of this error send this back for amendment and new trial, there would be on the
retrial the same complaint, the same answer, the same defense, the same interests, the
same witnesses, and the same evidence. The name of the plaintiff would constitute the only
difference between the old trial and the new. In our judgment there is not enough in a name
to justify such action.
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole
purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties.
They were created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the administration
of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself, which courts are always striving to secure

 to litigants. They are designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other
words, they are a means to an end. When they lose the character of the one and become
the other, the administration of justice is at fault and courts are correspondingly remiss in
the performance of their obvious duty.
The error in this case is purely technical. To take advantage of it for other purposes than to
cure it, does not appeal to a fair sense of justice. Its presentation as fatal to the plaintiff's
case smacks of skill rather than right. A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which
one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps
and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly
lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and
indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done
upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality,
when it desserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and
chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no vested rights in
technicalities. No litigant should be permitted to challenge a record of a court of these
Islands for defect of form when his substantial rights have not been prejudiced thereby.
In ordering this substitution, we are in accord with the best judicial thought. (McKeighan vs.
Hopkins, 19 Neb., 33; Dixon vs. Dixon, 19 Ia., 512; Hodges vs. Kimball, 49 Ia., 577;
Sanger vs. Newton, 134 Mass., 308; George vs. Reed, 101 Mass., 378; Bowden vs.
Burnham, 59 Fed. Rep., 752; Phipps and Co. vs. Hurlburt, 70 Fed. Rep., 202; McDonal vs.
State, 101 Fed. Rep., 171; Morford vs. Diffenbocker, 20 N. W., 600; Costelo vs. Costelo vs.
Crowell, 134 Mass., 280; Whitaker vs. Pope, 2 Woods, 463, Fed. Cas. no. 17528; Miller vs.
Pollock, 99 Pa. St., 202; Wilson vs. Presbyterian Church, 56 Ga., 554; Wood vs. Circuit
Judge, 84 Mich., 521; Insurance Co, vs. Mueller, 77 Ill., 22; Farman vs. Doyle, 128 Mich.,
696; Union Bank vs. Mott, 19 How. Pr., 114; R. R. Co. vs. Gibson, 4 Ohio St., 145; Hume vs.
Kelly, 28 Oreg., 398.)
It is therefore, ordered and decreed that the process, pleadings, proceedings and decision in
this action be, and the same are hereby, amended by substituting the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church in the place and stead of Eladio Alonso as party plaintiff, that the complaint
be considered as though originally filed by the Catholic Church, the answer thereto made,
the decision rendered and all proceedings in this case had, as if the said institution which
Father Eladio Alonso undertook to represent were the party plaintiff, and that said decision
of the court below, so amended, is affirmed, without special finding as to the costs.
DIGEST
f
f
Eladio Alonso, plaintiff and appellee v. Tomas Villamor et al., defendants and
appellants.
No. 2352 July 26, 1910
FACTS:
Defendants were members of the municipal board of the municipality of Placer.
They wrote a letter addressed to the plaintiff who at that time was the priest in
charge of the church. The contents of the letter basically stated that there was an
order from the provincial iscal saying that cemeteries, convents, and other
buildings erected on land belonging to the town belong to the town. As such, they
are notifying the priest that all revenues and products of the church must be turned
over to the treasury of the municipality. All alms given by churchgoers and
devotees to the image of St. Vicente lodged in the church should also be turned into
the municipal treasury.
Two weeks later, the defendants took possession of the church and all of the
personal properties contained therein. The plaintiff, as the priest and as the person
in charge thereof, made protests that went unheeded. Hence, an action was
brought by him to recover from the defendants the value of the articles and the
rental value of the church.
The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. In the defendants’ appeal, one of the
defenses presented was that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest. The
defendants assert that the court erred in permitting the action o be brought and
continued in the name of the plaintiff, Tomas Villamor, instead of in the name of the
bishop of the diocese within which the church was located or in the name of the
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the formal/technical defect raised by the defendant constitutes
enough ground to reverse the decision of the court
RULING/RATIO:
No, the Court allowed the substitution of the plaintiff as the party in interest. Sec.
503 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that “No judgment shall be revered on
formal or technical grounds, or for such error as has not prejudiced real rights of the
excepting party.” Sec. 110 of the same code also provides that in furtherance of
justice, the court is empowered to allow a party to amend any pleading or
proceeding at any stage of the action.
In this case, it is undoubted that the bishop of the diocese or the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church itself is the real party in interest. The plaintiff asserted the same in
the complaint, and maintained that assertion all through the record. He claimed no
interest whatsoever in the litigation. The substitution, then, of the name of the
bishop of the diocese as party plaintiff, is in reality not a substation of the identity of
another but is simply to make the form express the substance that is already there.
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their
sole purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
Eladio Alonso, plaintiff and appellee v. Tomas Villamor et al., defendants and
appellants.
No. 2352 July 26, 1910
FACTS:
Defendants were members of the municipal board of the municipality of Placer.
They wrote a letter addressed to the plaintiff who at that time was the priest in
charge of the church. The contents of the letter basically stated that there was an
order from the provincial iscal saying that cemeteries, convents, and other
buildings erected on land belonging to the town belong to the town. As such, they
are notifying the priest that all revenues and products of the church must be turned
over to the treasury of the municipality. All alms given by churchgoers and
devotees to the image of St. Vicente lodged in the church should also be turned into
the municipal treasury.
Two weeks later, the defendants took possession of the church and all of the
personal properties contained therein. The plaintiff, as the priest and as the person
in charge thereof, made protests that went unheeded. Hence, an action was
brought by him to recover from the defendants the value of the articles and the

 rental value of the church.
The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. In the defendants’ appeal, one of the
defenses presented was that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest. The
defendants assert that the court erred in permitting the action o be brought and
continued in the name of the plaintiff, Tomas Villamor, instead of in the name of the
bishop of the diocese within which the church was located or in the name of the
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the formal/technical defect raised by the defendant constitutes
enough ground to reverse the decision of the court
RULING/RATIO:
No, the Court allowed the substitution of the plaintiff as the party in interest. Sec.
503 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that “No judgment shall be revered on
formal or technical grounds, or for such error as has not prejudiced real rights of the
excepting party.” Sec. 110 of the same code also provides that in furtherance of
justice, the court is empowered to allow a party to amend any pleading or
proceeding at any stage of the action.
In this case, it is undoubted that the bishop of the diocese or the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church itself is the real party in interest. The plaintiff asserted the same in
the complaint, and maintained that assertion all through the record. He claimed no
interest whatsoever in the litigation. The substitution, then, of the name of the
bishop of the diocese as party plaintiff, is in reality not a substation of the identity of
another but is simply to make the form express the substance that is already there.
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their
sole purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
Eladio Alonso, plaintiff and appellee v. Tomas Villamor et al., defendants and appellants.No.
2352 July 26, 1910
FACTS:
Defendants were members of the municipal board of the municipality of Placer. They
wrote a letter addressed to the plaintiff who at that time was the priest in charge
of the church. The contents of the letter basically stated that there was an order from the
provincial fiscal saying that cemeteries, convents, and other buildings erected on land
belonging to the town belong to the town. As such, they are notifying the priest that all
revenues and products of the church must be turned over to the treasury of the
municipality. All alms given by churchgoers and devotees to the image of St. Vicente
lodged in the church should also be turned into the municipal treasury.
Two weeks later, the defendants took possession of the church and all of the
personal properties contained therein. The plaintiff, as the priest and as the person in
charge thereof, made protests that went unheeded. Hence, an action was brought by
him to recover from the defendants the value of the articles and the rental value of the
church. The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. In the defendants’ appeal, one of
the defenses presented was that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest. The
defendants assert that the court erred in permitting the action o be brought and continued
in the name of the plaintiff, Tomas Villamor, instead of in the name of the bishop of the
diocese within which the church was located or in the name of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the formal/technical defect raised by the defendant constitutes
enough ground to reverse the decision of the court
RULING/RATIO:
No, the Court allowed the substitution of the plaintiff as the party in interest. Sec.503 of the
Code of Civil Procedure provides that “No judgment shall be revered on formal or technical
grounds, or for such error as has not prejudiced real rights of the excepting party.” Sec.
110 of the same code also provides that in furtherance of justice, the court is
empowered to allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding at any stage of the
action. In this case, it is undoubted that the bishop of the diocese or the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church itself is the real party in interest. The plaintiff asserted the same in the
complaint, and maintained that assertion all through the record. He claimed no interest
whatsoever in the litigation. The substitution, then, of the name of the bishop of the
diocese as party plaintiff, is in reality not a substation of the identity of another but is simply
to make the form express the substance that is already there. There is nothing sacred about
processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole purpose is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. They were created, not to
hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the administration of justice.
#2
G.R. No. 139596 January 24, 2006
CHARLES CU-UNJIENG, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and UNI0N BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
By this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Charles Cu-Unjieng seeks the reversal of
the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 8177-B-
UDK, entitled Charles Cu-Unjieng, plaintiff-appellant vs. Union Bank of the Philippines, et
al., defendants-appellees, to wit:
1. Resolution1 dated May 10,1999, dismissing, for non-payment of docket and other
lawful fees, petitioner’s appeal from an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court at

 Malolos, Bulacan which dismissed his complaint for specific performance and damages
against respondent Union Bank of the Philippines and others; and
2. Resolution2 dated July 30, 1999 which denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
and ordered expunged the appeal brief thereto attached.
The facts:
Respondent Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) is the owner of a parcel of agricultural land
with an area of 218,769 square meters situated in Barangay Sta. Maria, San Miguel,
Bulacan and registered in its name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. TC-1062 of
the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.
Sometime in January 1994, UBP caused the posting on the bulletin boards of its branch
offices of a three-page list of acquired realty assets available for sale to interested parties.
Included in said list was the aforementioned parcel of land, offered to be sold
for P2,200,000.00.
Petitioner, through a letter3 dated April 11, 1994 and addressed to Joselito P. Valera,
manager of UBP’s Acquired Assets Department, offered to buy the subject property for a
lesser amount of P2,078,305.50, payable as follows: 50% as down payment with the
balance to be paid in equal monthly installments over a period of two (2) years. Petitioner
explained that his offer for an amount lesser than UBP’s asking price was on account of five
(5) tenants occupying the subject land who were allegedly demanding P500,000.00 to
voluntarily vacate the same.
As proof of his interest to buy the property, petitioner tendered PCIB Check No. 565827
for P103,915.27, purportedly representing 10% of the 50% down payment as earnest
money or deposit. UBP acknowledged receipt thereof by way of Union Bank Receipt No.
495081 dated April 11, 1994.
On August 30, 1994, petitioner wrote a follow-up letter to UBP inquiring on the status of his
offer to buy the subject premises.4
Via a reply-letter dated August 31, 1994, the manager of UBP’s Acquired Assets Department
advised petitioner that his offer to purchase is yet to be acted upon because the bank was
still awaiting the opinion of its legal division regarding the sale of "CARPable" agricultural
assets acquired by the bank.5
As it turned out, UBP rejected petitioner’s offer as shown by the fact that in another
letter6 dated December 19, 1994, the bank informed petitioner that his offer could not be
favorably acted upon on account of the legal division’s opinion that sales of lands covered by
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law without prior Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) approval are considered null and void. Accordingly, UBP advised petitioner to pick up
the refund of his P103,915.27 "earnest money" at the bank’s disbursing unit.
Unable to accept UBP’s rejection of his offer, petitioner, through counsel, made a formal
demand7 for the bank to comply with its obligation to transfer and deliver the title of the
subject property to him by executing the proper deed of conveyance, under the terms and
conditions set forth in his April 11, 1994 offer.
Responding thereto, UBP, thru its counsel, Atty. Luzano, in a letter8 dated July 19, 1995,
reiterated the bank’s rejection of petitioner’s offer as "the land being carpable could only
be disposed of by the bank either thru Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) or compulsory
acquisition, the procedure of which is outlined in Sec. 16" of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657.
It was against the foregoing backdrop of events that, on February 6, 1997, in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) at Malolos, Bulacan, petitioner filed his complaint9 in this case for Specific
Performance and Damages against UBP, impleading as co-defendant in the suit the Register
of Deeds of Bulacan. Docketed as Civil Case No. 80-M-97 and raffled to Branch 9 of the
court, the complaint principally sought UBP’s compliance with an alleged perfected contract
of sale between it and petitioner relative to the parcel of land in question. More specifically,
the complaint prays for a judgment ordering UBP to:
a) accept payments from the plaintiff [petitioner] for the sale of the Property in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the letter dated 11 April 1994;
b) execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the Property covered by TCT No. TC 1062 of the
Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bulacan upon the plaintiff’s full payment of the amount
of Two Million Seventy Eight Thousand Three Hundred Five & 50/100
(P2,078,305.50), failing in which, the deputy sheriff should be ordered to execute such deed
and the Registry of Deeds to cancel the title of the Bank and issue a new one in favor of the
plaintiff;
c) pay plaintiff the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moral damages;
d) pay plaintiff the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as exemplary
damages;
e) pay plaintiff the sum of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) as attorney’s fees;
and
f) pay the costs of the suit.
Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises, are likewise respectfully prayed for.

After due proceedings, the trial court, in a decision dated September 1, 1998,10 upon a
finding that no perfected contract of sale transpired between the parties, dismissed
petitioner’s complaint for lack of sufficient cause of action, thus:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence adduced and the laws/jurisprudence applicable
thereon, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint in the above entitled case
for want of sufficient cause of action as well as the defendant’s counterclaim for damages
and attorney’s fees for lack of proof to warrant the same.
However, defendant Union Bank of the Philippines is ordered to reimburse plaintiff Charles
Cu-Unjieng the amount of P103,915.27 representing the face value of PCIBank Check No.
565827 tendered by the latter to the former as purported "earnest money", with interest
thereon at the prevailing rates of interest periodically bestowed by UBP to its savings
depositors from April 11, 1994, through the succeeding years, and until the full amount
thereof shall have been delivered to the plaintiff.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
With his motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed with the trial court
a Notice of Appeal11 therein making known that he is taking an appeal from the adverse
decision to the CA. Acting thereon, the trial court issued an Order12 directing the elevation
of the records of the case to the CA, whereat petitioner’s appeal was docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 8177-B-UDK.
As things would have it, in the herein first assailed Resolution dated May 10, 1999, the
CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal for nonpayment of the required docket and other lawful
appeal fees, to wit:
For failure of the appellant [petitioner] to pay the docket and other lawful fees (Sec. 4, Rule
41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), the Court Resolved to DISMISS the appeal pursuant to
Sec. 1(c), Rule 50 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED.13
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, attaching thereto his appellant’s brief. However,
in a subsequent Resolution dated July 30, 1999,14 the appellate court denied the motion
and even expunged from the record the appellant’s brief thereto attached:
Acting on the motion of the plaintiff-appellant [petitioner] for a reconsideration of the
Resolution of May 10, 1999, which dismissed the appeal for the reason stated therein, and
considering the opposition interposed thereto by defendant-appellee [respondent] Union
Bank of the Philippines and it appearing that the filing of the notice of appeal of November
5, 1988, was not accompanied by the full and correct payment of the corresponding
appellate court docket and other lawful fees, and for such tardiness of more than four (4)
months, the Court resolved to DENY the motion for reconsideration and the attached brief
thereto ordered EXPUNGED.
In Pedrosa vs. Hill, 257 SCRA 373, the Supreme Court, citing Rodillas vs. Commission on
Elections (245 SCRA 702 aptly said:
xxx the mere filing of the notice of appeal was not enough. It should be accompanied by the
payment of the correct amount of appeal fee. In other words, the payment of the full
amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In both
original and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fees. Well-rooted is the principle that perfection of an
appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory, and
deprives the appellate court or body of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to
entertain the appeal. This requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere technicality
of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement without which the decision appealed from
would become final and executory, as if no appeal was filed at all.
SO ORDERED.
Undaunted, petitioner is now with us via the present recourse seeking a relaxation of
procedural rules and ultimately the reversal and setting aside of the assailed twin
resolutions of the appellate court.
Petitioner would have the Court view his failure to pay the appeal docket fees on time as a
non-fatal lapse, or a non-jurisdictional defect which the CA should have ignored in order to
attain substantial justice. Further, petitioner passes the blame to the RTC clerk of court who
allegedly made the erroneous computation of docket fees.
We are not persuaded.
Doctrinally entrenched is the pronouncement that the right to appeal is merely statutory
and a party seeking to avail of that right must comply with the statute or rules.15
Rule 41, Section 4, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the period for taking an
appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with
the original record or the record on appeal.

 Well-settled is the rule that payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed days after the timely filing of the notice of appeal. Unlike in Mactan, payment of the
period is both mandatory and jurisdictional,16 noncompliance with which is fatal to an appellate docket fees in this case was effected by petitioner only after four (4) months
appeal. For, to stress, appeal is not a matter of right, but a mere statutory privilege.17 following the expiration of the reglementary period to take an appeal.

An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be made within
fifteen (15) days from notice.18 And within this period, the full amount of the appellate court
docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from.
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that full payment of docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the
appeal is not perfected and the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction to entertain the
appeal, thereby rendering the decision sought to be appealed final and executory.19
For sure, nonpayment of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period as provided under Section 4, Rule 41, supra, is a ground for the
dismissal of an appeal under Section 1(c) of Rule 50, to wit:
SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.- An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of
Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
With the reality obtaining in this case that payment of the appellate docket fees was
belatedly made four (4) months after the lapse of the period for appeal, it appears clear to
us that the CA did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioner’s appeal except to order its
dismissal,23 as it rightfully did. Thus, the September 1, 1998 decision of the RTC has passed
to the realm of finality and became executory by operation of law.
We must emphasize that invocation of substantial justice is not a magical incantation that
will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Rules of procedure are not
to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in
prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed. So
it must be here.
WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED and the assailed resolutions dated May 10,1999 and July
30, 1999 of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

xxx xxx xxx SO ORDERED.

c. Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in section 4 of
Rule 41; xxx

This Court has invariably sustained the CA’s dismissal on technical grounds under the
aforequoted provision unless considerations of equity and substantial justice present cogent
reasons to hold otherwise. True, the rules may be relaxed but only for persuasive and
weighty reasons, to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure.20 So it is that in La Salette College vs. Victor Pilotin,21 we
held:

Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate docket

fees, we also recognize that its strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to
pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic,
#3
dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise
of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a
great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances
[G.R. No. 105294. February 26, 1997.]
Then, too, in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) vs. Mangubat,22 we held
that late payment of docket fees may be admitted when the party showed willingness to PACITA DAVID-CHAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and PHIL. RABBIT BUS
abide by the Rules by immediately paying the required fees. Mactan, however, cannot be a LINES, INC., Respondents.
source of comfort for herein petitioner. For there, the appellate docket fees were paid six (6)





 Bienvenida N Carreon for Petitioner. Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. 8049. The dispositive
portion of the affirmed decision of the trial court reads: 3
Conrado C . Genilo, Jr. for Private Respondent.
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, and finding plaintiff’s petition to be
without merit, the same is, as it is hereby ordered dismissed with costs against plaintiff.
SYLLABUS
On defendant’s (Singian) counterclaim, the same is, as it is hereby dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence."cralaw virtua1aw library

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS UPHOLDING The Facts
THE TRIAL COURT, RESPECTED. — The questions raised are all issues of facts which this
Court has no authority to rule upon. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is doctrinal
that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding those of the trial court are binding
On September 29, 1987, petitioner filed with the trial court an amended petition with prayer
upon this Court. While there are exceptions to this rule, petitioner has not convinced us that
for preliminary prohibitory injunction, seeking to stop private respondent from fencing its
this case falls under one of them.
property and depriving her of access to the highway. Petitioner alleged that her property,
consisting of around 635 square meters, situated in Del Pilar, San Fernando, Pampanga and
2. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL BASED ON EQUITY; APPLICATION; NOT PROPER IN
covered by TCT No. 57596-R, was delineated on its northern and western sides by various
CASE AT BAR. — The appeal of petitioner is based on equity which has been aptly described
business establishments. Adjoining her property along its southern boundary was the land
as "justice outside legality." However, equity is applied only in the absence of, and never
of the Pineda family, while along the east-northeastern boundary, and lying between her
against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. As found by respondent Court,
property and the MacArthur Highway, was another lot with an area of approximately 161
petitioner is not legally entitled to a right of way on the property of private Respondent.
square meters owned by private Respondent. In short, petitioner’s lot was almost
Thus, such equitable arguments cannot prevail over the legal findings. There are rigorous
completely surrounded by other immovables and cut off from the highway. Her only access
standards to be complied with by owners of the dominant estate before they may be
to the highway was a very small opening measuring two feet four inches wide through the
granted with easement of right of way. These standards must be strictly complied with
aforementioned property of private Respondent. Petitioner believed she was entitled to a
because easement is a burden on the property of another. Before such inconvenience may
wider compulsory easement of right of way through the said property of
be imposed by the Court, applicants must prove that they deserve judicial intervention on
private Respondent. The prospective subservient estate was a portion of a bigger lot
the basis of law, and certainly not when their isolation is caused by their own acts. In the
consisting of 7,239 square meters and covered by TCT No. 163033-R, which was formerly
latter case, they decide their detachment and must bear the consequences of such choice.
owned by the Singian Brothers Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Singian Brothers")
DECISION and was sold to private respondent without the knowledge and consent of petitioner, who
was thereby allegedly prevented from exercising her right of pre-emption or right of
PANGANIBAN, J.: redemption. Petitioner alleged that private respondent was about to complete the
construction of its concrete fence on the said lot which would result in depriving petitioner of
In pleading for an easement of right of way, petitioner correctly cites the requirements of
the only available right of way, and that therefore, she was constrained to petition the trial
law but fails to provide factual support to show her entitlement thereto. Since findings of
court to enjoin private respondent from fencing said lot. The petition likewise prayed that
facts by the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court are binding on the Supreme
judgment be rendered ordering private respondent to sell to petitioner the subject lot and to
Court, the petition must thus fail. Even petitioner’s plea for equity becomes unavailing
pay the damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
because resort to equity is possible only in the absence, and never in contravention, of
statutory law.
Private respondent denied the allegations of petitioner. The parents and relatives of
petitioner were never tenants or lessees of the former owner, Singian Brothers; rather, they
The petition assails the Decision 1 of respondent Court 2 promulgated on April 30, 1992.
were found to be illegally occupying the property as ruled by the MTC-San Fernando,
The Decision of respondent Court affirmed the decision dated July 26, 1989, of the Regional
Pampanga, Branch 1, in Civil Case No. 4865. The dispositive portion of the judgment of


























 ejectment reads: 4
"WHEREFORE, defendants Eduardo Mangune, Pacita David-Chan and Primo David including
their agents/representatives and, any and all persons given access by them to the disputed
premises claiming any right under them, are hereby ordered to immediately vacate the area
in question, remove all the improvements that they have constructed thereon; to pay the
plaintiff corporation jointly and severally the sum of P2,000.00 pesos — as Attorney’s fees
and the costs of this suit.
The case against defendants Loida Makabali and Helen Hermidia is hereby dismissed as the
action has become moot.
The defendants’ counterclaim, Pacita David-Chan and Eduardo Mangune is hereby dismissed
for lack of merit."cralaw virtua1aw library
Hence the former owners were not obliged to inform petitioner of the sale. The land sold by
the Singian Brothers was free from all liens and encumbrances as stated in the Deed of
Absolute Sale. Private respondent was not selling the 161 square-meter lot because it
needed the property. Also, petitioner had another access to the highway without passing
through the lot in question.
The Singian Brothers were impleaded in the trial court. In their answer, they alleged that
they did not authorize anyone to receive rentals for the disputed lot. As their affirmative and
special defenses, Defendant Singian Brothers averred that the complaint of petitioner stated
no cause of action because, being apparent and discontinuous, the right of way cannot be
acquired by prescription. Petitioner was not a tenant of the Singian Brothers; therefore she
was not entitled to a right of pre-emption or right of redemption. Finally, petitioner had
another access to the National Highway which, however, she closed during the pendency of
the case at the trial court when she extended the construction of her fence. 5
The Issues
Failing to obtain relief at both the trial and respondent courts, petitioner now submits the
following issues for consideration of this Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I. In its reaffirmation of the lower court’s decision, the Court of Appeals missed to temper
with human compassion of the Art. 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code of the Phil. which
requires the presence of four requisites for a compulsory easement of way." 6
"II. (The) Court (of Appeals) had used in its decision all technical and legal niceties to favor
respondents, violating time-honored and deeply-rooted Filipino values." 7
"III. With due respect, the Court (of Appeals) erred in deciding this case in favor of the
respondent despite the facts existing at the background." 8
"IV. The Court (of Appeals) erred in stating that petitioner had an outlet measuring two (2)
feet and four (4) inches to the national highway without passing through respondent’s
property as per the commissioner’s report." 9
In her Memorandum 10 dated February 26, 1993, petitioner alleges only one
issue:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a legal easement of right of way over that portion of
the property of respondent Rabbit?"
On the other hand, private respondent raises two issues: 11
"1. Is the petitioner entitled to an easement of right of way from the private respondents?
2. Should she be granted her desire for a right of way by way of ‘ pakikisama’ and
‘’pakikipagkapwa-tao’?"
After deliberating on the various submissions of the parties, the Court holds that the issues
can be condensed into two, as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Is petitioner legally entitled to a right of way through private respondent’s property?
(2) In any event, is she entitled to such easement through the recognition and application of
the Filipino values of pakikisama and pakikipagkapwa-tao?
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue: Requisites of an Easement of Right of Way
Citing Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, 12 petitioner submits that "the owner of an
estate may claim a compulsory right of way only after he (or she) has established the
existence of four requisites, namely: (1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and
is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity is paid; (3) the
 isolation is not due to the proprietor’s own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a
point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest." 13
While petitioner may be correct in her theoretical reading of Articles 649 and 650, she
nevertheless failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy their requirements.
Evaluating her evidence, respondent Court ruled that petitioner is not "without adequate
outlet to a public highway" as follows: 14chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
"1. Let it be stressed that it was plaintiff who built a concrete fence on the southern
boundary of her property to separate it from the property of the Pineda family. Worse,
during the pendency of the case, she closed the 28-inch clearance which she could use as a
means to reach the National Highway without passing through the property of defendant. If
plaintiff wants a bigger opening, then she can always destroy a portion of the concrete fence
which she erected and pass through the property of the Pineda family which, as shown on
the attached sketch on the Commissioner’s Report, has an open space on the southern
boundary of plaintiff’s land.
2. Plaintiff maintains that once the Pineda family (fences) off their lot, plaintiff has no more
way to the National Highway.
Plaintiff’s apprehensions are without basis. The Pineda family could no longer fence off their
property because plaintiff (had) already constructed a fence to separate the two properties.
And even granting that the Pineda family would eventually fence off their land, then plaintiff
could ask for an easement of right of way from the Pineda family."cralaw virtua1aw library
The appellate court likewise found that petitioner failed to satisfy the third requirement
because she caused her own isolation by closing her access through the Pineda property,
thus: 15
"1. Worthy of note is the fact that it was plaintiff who built a fence to separate her property
from that of the Pineda family on the southern boundary. And she even closed the small
opening causing her property to be isolated and losing one access to the National Highway.
Plaintiff thus failed to meet the third requisite for the grant of an easement of right of way.
As held by the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Francisco v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
177 SCRA 527, 534-535:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘The evidence is, therefore, persuasively to the effect that the private respondent had been
granted an adequate access to the public highway (Parada Road) through the adjacent
estate of Epifania Dila even as he was trying to negotiate a satisfactory agreement with
petitioner Francisco for another passageway through the latter’s property. If at the time he
filed suit against the petitioner, such access (through the property of Epifania Dila) could no
longer be used, it was because he himself had closed it off by erecting a stone wall on his
lot at the point where the passageway began for no reason to which the record can attest
except to demonstrate the isolation of his property alleged in his complaint. But the law
makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act isolate
his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent
estate. The third of the cited requisites: that the claimant of a right of way has not himself
procured the isolation of his property had not been met-indeed the respondent had actually
brought about the contrary condition and thereby vitiated his claim to such an easement. It
will not do to assert that use of the passageway through Lot 860-B was difficult or
inconvenient, the evidence being to the contrary and that it was wide enough to be
traversable by even a truck, and also because it has been held that mere inconvenience
attending the use of an existing right of way does not justify a claim for a similar easement
in an alternative location.’ (Emphasis ours)
The Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioner failed to prove she made a valid tender of the
proper indemnity, to wit: 16
"2. The second requisite — that there was payment of the proper indemnity was likewise not
met by the plaintiff. Plaintiff’s complaint contained no averment that demand for the
easement of right of way had been made after payment of the proper indemnity. There was
no showing that plaintiff ever made a tender of payment of the proper indemnity for the
right of way. As the lower court said, ‘The fact that plaintiff prays that defendant Rabbit be
ordered to sell to her the disputed premises hardly satisfies the requisite regarding the
payment of the proper indemnity.’"
The questions of whether (1) petitioner has another adequate outlet to the public highway,
or (2) she caused her own isolation, or (3) she made, in fact, a tender of the proper
indemnity are all issues of facts which this Court has no authority to rule upon. 17 The
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. 18
It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding those of the trial court
are binding upon this Court. 19 While there are exceptions to this rule, 20 petitioner has not
convinced us that this case falls under one of them.
Second Issue: Application of Traditional Filipino Values
Perhaps sensing the inadequacy of her legal arguments, petitioner who claims to be an
"ordinary housewife (with) . . . meager resources" pleads that "those who have less in life
should have more in law" and that the Court should apply the Filipino values of pakikisama
and pakikipag-kapwa-tao in resolving the case.

Such appeal of petitioner is based on equity which has been aptly described as "justice
outside legality." However, equity is applied only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. 21 As found by respondent Court, petitioner is
not legally entitled to a right of way on the property of private Respondent. Thus, such
equitable arguments cannot prevail over the legal findings.
There are rigorous standards to be complied with by owners of the dominant estate before
they may be granted with easement of right of way. These standards must be strictly
complied with because easement is a burden on the property of another. Before such
inconvenience may be imposed by the Court, applicants must prove that they deserve
judicial intervention on the basis of law, and certainly not when their isolation is caused by
their own acts. In the latter case, they decide their detachment and must bear the
consequences of such choice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED and the Decision dated April
30, 1992, of the respondent Court is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
#4
G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005
DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO,
JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE,
CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge,
Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania
and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/
or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development,
Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely,
Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed
various motions with the trial court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners
to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development
in default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of
the Philippines, respectively.
In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge
Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners’ motion to
declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was
granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del
Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land
Bank’s motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were
hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and (3) the
motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also
denied because there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial.1
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to
dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription
from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.
In an order2 dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the
ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the
order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998,
filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order
dismissing the motion for reconsideration3 which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five
days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal4 and paid the appeal fees on
August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed
eight days late.5 This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.6
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of
Appeals.
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of
appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on

 July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying
their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998,
only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.7
On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the
15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they
received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate
court, the order was the "final order" appealable under the Rules. It held further:
Perforce the petitioners’ tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the (P)erfection of an
appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional
and non-compliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the
judgment final and executory.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was
denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.
In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe the
following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS’ PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE
ANTONIO N. ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS’ APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO.
C-36 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN
AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING AND AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT
PETITIONERS’ APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST
OR FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL
ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING THAT THE WORDS
"FINAL ORDER" IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL
REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES
DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998
COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN
THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE
THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE
FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.9
The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners should
have filed their notice of appeal.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It
is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply
with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to
appeal.10 The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129,11 as
amended, provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments,
or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice
of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided,
however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours
from the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15)
days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record
on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.
No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be
allowed. (emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes
of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on
the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically
what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that
dismisses an action.12
As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion
for reconsideration should be construed as the "final order," not the February 12, 1998 order
which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion

 for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not
yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.
What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which triggers the start of
the 15-day reglementary period to appeal ¾ the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the
complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,13 the trial court declared
petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the
order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion
was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received
another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal.
But this was likewise dismissed ― for having been filed out of time.
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the
dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the
Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it
was what ended the issues raised there.
This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et
al.14 where we again considered the order denying petitioner Apuyan’s motion for
reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.
Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners’ view that the order dated July
1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the
Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on time?
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to
appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March
18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for
reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-
day appeal period.15 It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-
day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal
upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were
entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the "final order" or the
order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of
the trial court. We ruled there that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal
period to file the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this rule in similar
cases,16 premised on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional.17 The rule is also founded on deep-seated considerations of public policy and
sound practice that, at risk of occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts must
become final at some definite time fixed by law.18
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court read:
Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. — Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse
party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or
judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The time
during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for new trial has been pending
shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37.
But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the period herein
provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day following that in which the party
appealing received notice of the denial of said motion.19 (emphasis supplied)
According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days. BP
129, however, reduced this appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations of the Committee
on Judicial Reorganization20 that drafted BP 129, the raison d’ etre behind the amendment
was to shorten the period of appeal21 and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of justice.
We have since required strict observance of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom
have we condoned late filing of notices of appeal,22 and only in very exceptional instances to
better serve the ends of justice.
In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of
Libmanan,23 however, we declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and
the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised the
lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every
party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition
of his cause, free from the constraint of technicalities.
In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,24 we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants
to do certain acts must be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the
filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we condoned
the delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness and
justice.
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we
have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal
application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our
decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law.

 But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently
applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice.
Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between
the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the
full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.25
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts.26 It has the sole
prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to
it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42,27 4328 and 45,29 the Court allows
extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their
appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. 30
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies31 to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court.32 The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period
of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion
for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the
Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.33 Hence, the use of "or" in the above
provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to
refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened
the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original
period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict
compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a
party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the
trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the
case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to
resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite
time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day
appeal period should be counted – from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or
from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from
receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the
order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise,
the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period
provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the
order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal
was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.34
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v.
IAC35 since the Court of Appeals never even referred to it in its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded
to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
#5
G.R. No. 198172
REGULUS DEVELOPMENT, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Regulus Development,
Inc. (petitioner) to challenge the November 23, 2010 Decision1 and August 10, 2011
resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105290. CA Associate Justice
Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. penned the rulings, concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato,
Jr. and Fiorito S. Macalino.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The petitioner is the owner of an apartment (San Juan Apartments) located at San Juan
Street, Pasay City. Antonio dela Cruz (respondent) leased two units (Unit 2002-A and Unit
2002-B) of the San Juan Apartments in 1993 and 1994. The contract of lease for each of the
two units similarly provides a lease period of one (1) month, subject to automatic renewals,
unless terminated by the petitioner upon written notice.
The petitioner sent the respondent a letter to terminate the lease of the two subject units.
Due to the respondent’s refusal to vacate the units, the petitioner filed a complaint3 for
ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasay City, Manila, on May 1, 2001.
The MTC resolved the case in the petitioner’s favor and ordered the respondent to vacate
the premises, and pay the rentals due until the respondent actually complies.4
The respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Pending appeal, the respondent
consigned the monthly rentals to the RTC due to the petitioner’s refusal to receive the
rentals.
The RTC affirmed5 the decision of the MTC in toto and denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondent.
CA-G.R. SP No. 69504: Dismissal of Ejectment Case
In a Petition for Review filed by the respondent, the CA reversed the lower courts’
decisions and dismissed the ejectment case.6 On March 19, 2003, the dismissal of
the case became final and executory.7
Orders dated July 25, 2003 and November 28, 2003 for payment of rentals due
under lease contracts
The petitioner filed a motion (to withdraw funds deposited by the defendant-appellant as
lessee)8 praying for the withdrawal of the rentals consigned by the respondent with the RTC.
In an order dated July 25, 2003,9 the RTC granted the petitioner’s motion. The RTC
explained that the effect of the complaint’s dismissal would mean that there was no
complaint filed at all. The petitioner, however, is entitled to the amount of rentals for the use
and occupation of the subject units, as provided in the executed contracts of lease and on
the basis of justice and equity.
The court denied the respondent’s motion for reconsideration10 in an order dated
November 28, 2003.11
On the petitioner’s motion, the RTC issued a writ of execution on December 18, 2003, to
cause the enforcement of its order dated July 25, 2003.12
CA-G.R. SP No. 81277: Affirmed RTC Orders
The respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA to assail the RTC
Orders dated July 25, 2003 and November 28, 2003 (RTC orders), which granted the
petitioner’s motion to withdraw funds.
The CA dismissed13 the petition and held that the assailed RTC Orders were issued
pursuant to its equity jurisdiction, in accordance with Section 5, Rule 39,14 and Rules
515 and 616 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. The respondent’s motion for reconsideration
was similarly denied.
G.R. SP No. 171429: Affirmed CA Ruling on RTC Orders
The respondent filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court to assail the
decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 81277. In a resolution dated June 7, 2006,17 we denied
the petition for insufficiency in form and for failure to show any reversible error committed
by the CA.
Our resolution became final and executory and an entry of judgment18 was issued.
Execution of RTC Orders
The petitioner returned to the RTC and moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to
allow it to proceed against the supersedeas bond the respondent posted, representing
rentals for the leased properties from May 2001 to October 2001, and to withdraw the lease
payments deposited by respondent from November 2001 until August 2003.19 The RTC
granted the motion.20
The RTC issued an Alias Writ of Execution21 dated April 26, 2007, allowing the withdrawal of
the rental deposits and the value of the supersedeas bond.
The petitioner claimed that the withdrawn deposits, supersedeas bond, and payments
directly made by the respondent to the petitioner, were insufficient to cover rentals due for
the period of May 2001 to May 2004. Hence, the petitioner filed a manifestation and
motion22 dated October 23, 2007, praying that the RTC levy upon the respondent’s property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 136829 to satisfy the judgment credit.

The RTC granted the petitioner’s motion in an order dated June 30, 2008.23 The
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC in an order
dated August 26, 2008.24
CA-G.R. SP No. 105290: Assailed the levy of the respondent’s property
On October 3, 2008, the respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari25 with
application for issuance of a temporary restraining order. The petition sought to nullify and
set aside the orders of the RTC directing the levy of the respondent’s real property. The CA
dismissed the petition. Thereafter, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration26 dated
November 3, 2008.
Pursuant to the order dated June 30, 2008, a public auction for the respondent’s property
covered by TCT No. 136829 was held on November 4, 2008,27 where the petitioner was
declared highest bidder. Subsequently, the Certificate of Sale28 in favor of the petitioner was
registered.
Meanwhile, on January 7, 2010, the respondent redeemed the property with the RTC Clerk
of Court, paying the equivalent of the petitioner’s bid price with legal interest. The petitioner
filed a motion to release funds29 for the release of the redemption price paid. The RTC
granted30 the motion.
On February 12, 2010, the respondent filed a manifestation and motion31 before the CA to
withdraw the petition for the reason that the redemption of the property and release of the
price paid rendered the petition moot and academic.
Thereafter, the petitioner received the CA decision dated November 23, 2010, which
reversed and set aside the orders of the RTC directing the levy of the respondent’s property.
The CA held that while the approval of the petitioner’s motion to withdraw the consigned
rentals and the posted supersedeas bond was within the RTC’s jurisdiction, the RTC had no
jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property.
The CA explained that the approval of the levy on the respondent’s real property could not
be considered as a case pending appeal, because the decision of the MTC had already
become final and executory. As such, the matter of execution of the judgment lies with the
MTC where the complaint for ejectment was originally filed and presented.
The CA ordered the RTC to remand the case to the MTC for execution. The petitioner filed its
motion for reconsideration which was denied32 by the CA.
THE PETITION
The petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA ruling
in CA-G.R. SP No. 105290 which held that the RTC had no jurisdiction to levy on the
respondent’s real property.
The petitioner argues: first, that the RTC’s release of the consigned rentals and levy were
ordered in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction; second, that the respondent’s petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 105290 was already moot and academic with the conduct of the auction sale
and redemption of the respondent’s real property; third, that the petition in CAG. R. SP No.
105290 should have been dismissed outright for lack of signature under oath on the
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping.
The respondent duly filed its comment33 and refuted the petitioner’s arguments. On
the first argument, respondent merely reiterated the CA’s conclusion that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to order the levy on respondent’s real property as it no longer falls under the
allowed execution pending appeal. On the second argument, the respondent contended that
the levy on execution and sale at public auction were null and void, hence the CA decision is
not moot and academic. On the third argument, the respondent simply argued that it was
too late to raise the alleged formal defect as an issue.
THE ISSUE
The petitioner poses the core issue of whether the RTC had jurisdiction to levy on the
respondent’s real property.
OUR RULING
We grant the petition.
Procedural issue: Lack of notarial seal on the Verification and Certification against
Forum Shopping is not fatal to the petition.
The petitioner alleged that the assailed CA petition should have been dismissed since the
notary public failed to affix his seal on the attached Verification and Certification against
Forum Shopping.
We cannot uphold the petitioner’s argument.
The lack of notarial seal in the notarial certificate34 is a defect in a document that is required
to be executed under oath.
Nevertheless, a defect in the verification does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its submission or correction, or act on the pleading if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed
with in order that the ends of justice may be served.35

 Noncompliance or a defect in a certification against forum shopping, unlike in the case of a
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction, unless the
covering Rule is relaxed on the ground of "substantial compliance" or based on the presence
of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."36 Although the submission of a certificate
against forum shopping is deemed obligatory, it is not however jurisdictional.37
Even assuming that the case has been rendered moot due to the respondent’s redemption
of the property, the CA may still entertain the jurisdictional issue since it poses a situation
capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.
Under this perspective, the CA correctly exercised its jurisdiction over the petition.

In the present case, the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping were in fact Equity jurisdiction versus appellate jurisdiction of the RTC
submitted. An examination of these documents shows that the notary public’s signature and
The appellate jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law. The appellate court acquires
stamp were duly affixed. Except for the notarial seal, all the requirements for the
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties when an appeal is perfected.42
verification and certification documents were complied with.
On the other hand, equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases where a
The rule is that courts should not be unduly strict on procedural lapses that do not really
court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because
impair the proper administration of justice. The higher objective of procedural rules is to
of a resulting legal inflexibility when the law is applied to a given situation. The purpose of
ensure that the substantive rights of the parties are protected. Litigations should, as much
the exercise of equity jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust enrichment and to
as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. Every party-litigant must be
ensure restitution.43
afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from the
unacceptable plea of technicalities.38 The RTC orders which allowed the withdrawal of the deposited funds for the use and
occupation of the subject units were issued pursuant to the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, as the
The CA correctly refused to dismiss and instead gave due course to the petition as it
CA held in the petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 81277.
substantially complied with the requirements on the Verification and Certification against
Forum Shopping. The RTC’s equity jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its appellate jurisdiction on the
ejectment case. The RTC could not have issued its orders in the exercise of its appellate
An issue on jurisdiction prevents the petition from becoming "moot and
jurisdiction since there was nothing more to execute on the dismissed ejectment case. As
academic."
the RTC orders explained, the dismissal of the ejectment case effectively and completely
The petitioner claims that the assailed CA petition should have been dismissed because the blotted out and cancelled the complaint. Hence, the RTC orders were clearly issued in the
subsequent redemption of the property by the respondent and the release of the price paid exercise of the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, not on the basis of its appellate jurisdiction.
to the petitioner rendered the case moot and academic.
This Court takes judicial notice44 that the validity of the RTC Orders has been upheld in a
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable separate petition before this Court, under G.R. SP No. 171429 entitled Antonio Dela Cruz v.
controversy because of supervening events, rendering the adjudication of the case or the Regulus Development, Inc.
resolution of the issue without any practical use or value.39 Courts generally decline
The levy of real property was ordered by the RTC in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness except when, among
jurisdiction.
others, the case is capable of repetition yet evades judicial review.40
The levy of the respondent’s property was made pursuant to the RTC orders issued in the
The CA found that there is an issue on whether the RTC had jurisdiction to issue the orders
exercise of its equity jurisdiction, independent of the ejectment case originally filed with the
directing the levy of the respondent’s property. The issue on jurisdiction is a justiciable
MTC.
controversy that prevented the assailed CA petition from becoming moot and academic.
An examination of the RTC order dated June 30, 2008, directing the levy of the respondent’s
It is well-settled in jurisprudence that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred
real property shows that it was based on the RTC order dated July 25, 2003. The levy of the
or waived by the parties. "Even on appeal and even if the reviewing parties did not raise the
respondent’s property was issued to satisfy the amounts due under the lease contracts, and
issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that the lower court
not as a result of the decision in the ejectment case.
had no jurisdiction over the case."41

 The CA erred when it concluded that the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction in the #6
ejectment case when it directed the levy of the respondent’s property.

Furthermore, the order to levy on the respondent’s real property was consistent with the
first writ of execution issued by the RTC on December 18, 2003, to implement the RTC G.R. No. 197582 June 29, 2015
orders. The writ of execution states that:
JULIE S. SUMBILLA, Petitioner,
xxx In case of [sic] sufficient personal property of the defendant cannot be found whereof to vs.
satisfy the amount of the said judgment, you are directed to levy [on] the real MATRIX FINANCE CORPORATION, Respondent.
property of said defendant and to sell the same or so much thereof in the manner
DECISION
provided by law for the satisfaction of the said judgment and to make return of your
proceedings together with this Writ within sixty (60) days from receipt hereof. (emphasis VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
supplied)
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
The subsequent order of the RTC to levy on the respondent’s property was merely a as amended, petitioner Julie S. Sumbilla seeks the liberal application of procedural rules to
reiteration and an enforcement of the original writ of execution issued.1âwphi1 correct the penalty imposed in the Decision1 dated January 14, 2009 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 67, in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 which
Since the order of levy is clearly rooted on the RTC Orders, the only question that needs to
had already attained finality in view of petitioner's failure to timely file an appeal.
be resolved is which court has jurisdiction to order the execution of the RTC orders.
The antecedent facts are not disputed.
The RTC, as the court of origin, has jurisdiction to order the levy of the
respondent's real property. Petitioner obtained a cash loan . from respondent Matrix Finance Corporation. As partial
payment for her loan, petitioner issued Philippine Business Bank Check Nos. 0032863 to
Execution shall be applied for in the court of origin, in accordance with Section 1,45 Rule 39
0032868. The six checks have a uniform face value of ₱6,667.00 each.
of the Rules of Court.
Upon maturity, the six checks were presented by respondent to the drawee bank for
The court of origin with respect to the assailed RTC orders is the court which issued these
payment. However, all the checks were dishonored on the ground that they were drawn
orders. The RTC is the court with jurisdiction to order the execution of the issued RTC
against a closed account.
orders.
Petitioner's refusal to heed the demand letter of respondent for the payment of the face
Hence, the petitioner correctly moved for the issuance of the writ of execution and levy of
value of the dishonored checks culminated in her indictment for six counts of violation of
the respondent's real property before the RTC as the court of origin.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22). The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition for review on certiorari. The decision dated 321174, and were raffled off to Branch 67, MeTC of Makati.
November 23, 2010, and the resolution dated August 10, 2011, of the Court of Appeals in
In a Decision dated January 14, 2009, the MeTC found petitioner criminally and civilly liable
CA-G.R. SP No. 105290 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders dated June 30,
for the issuance of the six rubber checks. For each count of violation of BP 22 involving a
2008, and August 26, 2008, of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, are
check with a face value of ₱6,667.00, the MeTC meted petitioner a penalty of fine
hereby REINSTATED. Costs against respondent Antonio dela Cruz.
amounting to ₱80,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment. Her civil liability for the six
SO ORDERED. consolidated cases was computed in the total amount of ₱40,002.00. The fallo of the
decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment finding accused Julie S. Sumbilla GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22. For each count, she
is sentenced to pay n. fine of ₱80,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-

payment. She is likewise ORDERED to indemnify private complainant Matrix Finance
Corporation the total amount of ₱40,002.00 plus 12% annual legal interest from September
21, 2002 until full payment.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.2 (Emphasis and underscoring added.)
Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner opted to file a Motion for
Reconsideration3 before the MeTC. The Motion was denied in the Order4 dated April 17, 2009
being a pleading barred under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. The MeTC further
noted that the prohibited motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner will not suspend
the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
Subsequently, the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner was also denied for having been filed
beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
With the denial5 of her Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying her appeal,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari6 under Rule 65 of the Rules which was docketed as
SCA No. 09-1125 and raffled off to Branch 61, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
Ruling that the MeTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the Notice of
Appeal filed by petitioner, the RTC dismissed7 the petition for certiorari. The Motion for
Reconsideration8 filed by petitioner met the same fate of dismissal.9
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for review10 under
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA, however, ruled that an ordinary appeal under Section
2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is the correct remedy under the circumstances because
the RTC rendered the decision in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.11
On July 27, 2011, after she received a copy of the June 28, 2011 Resolution12 of the CA
denying her Motion for Reconsideration,13 petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to
file the instant petition.14
On August 11, 2011, petitioner filed her Petition for Review on Certiorari15 within the period
of extension granted in our Resolution16 dated September 7, 2011. She ascribed to the CA a
sole error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
ON TECHNICALITY AND NOT EXERCISING ITS POSITIVE DUTY OF GIVING DUE
IMPORTANCE ON THE SUBSTANTIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER
DESPITE A CLEAR PRESENCE OF SUCH VIOLATION OF LAW AS DEFINED BY PETITIONER IN
HER PETITION WHICH COULD HAVE MERIT A FULL DECISION BY A HIGHER COURT.17
Petitioner acknowledged18 the procedural lapse of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal before the CA. She also fully
grasped19 the effects of her erroneous filing of the Motion for Reconsideration to challenge
the MeTC Decision finding her guilty of six counts of violation of BP 22. Knowing that her
conviction had already attained finality, petitioner seeks the relaxation of the rules of
procedure so that the alleged erroneous penalty imposed by the MeTC can be modified to
make it in accord with existing law and jurisprudence.
Respondent countered that the right to appeal being a mere statutory privilege can only be
exercised in accordance with the rules, and the lost appeal cannot be resurrected through
the present remedial recourse of a petition for review on certiorari.
The main issue to be resolved is whether the penalty imposed in the MeTC Decision dated
January 14, 2009, which is already final and executory, may still be modified.
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner does not dispute the finality of the Decision dated January 14, 2009 in Criminal
Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 rendered by the MeTC, finding her guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of six counts of violation of BP 22. For every count of violation of BP 22 involving a
check with a face value of ₱6,667.00, petitioner was meted a penalty of fine of PS0,000.00,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment. She assails the penalty for being out
of the range of the penalty prescribed in Section 1 of BP 22, and the subsidiary
imprisonment to be violative of Administrative Circular Nos. 12-2000 and 13-2001, and the
holdings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals.20 Petitioner asserted that the maximum penalty of fine
that can be imposed against her in each count of violation of BP 22 is double the amount of
the face value of the dishonored check only or ₱13,334.00. The fine of PS0,000.00 for each
count is thus excessive. She further implied that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment
contravened Section 20 of Article III of the Constitution which proscribes imprisonment as a
punishment for not paying a debt.
Section 1 of BP 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues
any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished
by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of
not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion
of the court.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The court may thus impose any of the following alternative penalties against an accused
found criminally liable for violating BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but
not more than one year; or (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the
check, and shall in no case exceed ₱200,000.00; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment.
The discretion to impose a single (imprisonment or fine) or conjunctive (fine and
imprisonment) penalty pertains to the court.
If fine alone is the penalty imposed, the maximum shall be double the amount of the face
value of the rubber check which in no case should exceed ₱200,000.00.
Here, the face value of each of the six checks that bounced is ₱6,667.00. Under Section 1 of
BP 22, the maximum penalty of fine that can be imposed on petitioner is only 1!13,334.00,
or the amount double the face value of each check. Indubitably, the MeTC meted the
petitioner a penalty of fine way beyond the maximum limits prescribed under Section 1 of
BP 22. The fine of ₱80,000.00 is more than 11 times the amount of the face value of each
check that was dishonored.
Instead of using as basis the face value of each check (₱6,667.00), the MeTC incorrectly
computed the amount of fine using the total face value of the six checks (₱40,002.00). The
same error occurred in Abarquez v. Court of Appeals,21 where we modified the penalty of
fine imposed in one of the consolidated cases therein (Criminal Case No. D-8137) to only
double the amount of the face value of the subject check.
Unfortunately, in the present case, the MeTC Decision is already final and executory after
petitioner failed to timely file a Notice of Appeal. Under the doctrine of finality and
immutability of judgments, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be made by the court
that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.22 Upon finality of the judgment, the
Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.23
Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule. The Court has
the power and prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their
operation if and when justice requires it.24 After all, procedural rules were conceived to aid
the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than
serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter,25 as specifically
mandated under Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 2. Construction. - These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding.
Consequently final and executory judgments were reversed when the interest of substantial
justice is at stake and where special and compelling reasons called for such actions.26 In
Barnes v. Judge Padilla,27 we declared as follows:
x x x a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be
modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a)
matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing
that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules
can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already
declared to be final.
The judgment of conviction was already final in Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid
Prison28 when the Court corrected the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate
sentence imposed on the accused which exceeded the period of the imposable penalty. The
correction was made in the interest of justice and only for the penalty imposed against
petitioner to be in accordance with law and nothing else.29
Both People v. Gatward,30 and People v. Barro31 cited the duty and inherent power of the
Court to correct the erroneous penalties meted on the accused in a final and executory
judgments, and make it conform to the penalty prescribed by law.
The interest of justice and the duty and inherent power of the Court were the reasons
anchored upon in Estrada v. People32 in ruling that it is befitting to modify the penalty
imposed on petitioner even though the notice of appeal was belatedly filed.
In Almuete v. People,33 the penalty imposed upon the petitioner which is outside the range
of the penalty prescribed by law was duly corrected even if it was already final on the
ground of substantial justice, thus:
In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life and liberty of
petitioner.1awp++i1 If his penalty of imprisonment remains uncorrected, it would be not
conformable with law and he would be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 18
years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 40 years of reclusion
perpetua, as maximum, which is outside the range of the penalty prescribed by law.

 Contrast this to the proper imposable penalty the minimum of which should only be within
the range of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional, while the
maximum should only be anywhere between 11 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor
to 13 years of reclusion temporal. Substantial justice demands that we suspend our Rules in
this case. "It is always within the power of the court to suspend its own [R]ules or except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require. x x x Indeed,
when there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of justice would result from the
strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of
substantial justice." Suspending the Rules is justified "where there exist strong compelling
reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a miscarriage thereof." After all,
the Court's "primordial and most important duty is to render justice x x x."34 All the accused
in Almuete v. People,35 People v. Barro,36 Estrada v. People,37 and Rigor v. The
Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison,38 failed to perfect their appeal on their respective
judgments of conviction, but the Court corrected the penalties imposed, notwithstanding the
finality of the decisions because they were outside the range of penalty prescribed by law.
There is, thus, no reason to deprive the petitioner in the present case of the relief afforded
the accused in the cited cases. Verily, a sentence which imposes upon the defendant in a
criminal prosecution a penalty in excess of the maximum which the court is authorized by
law to impose for the offense for which the defendant was convicted, is void for want or
excess of jurisdiction as to the excess.39
Here, the penalty imposed is obviously out of range of that prescribed in Section 1 of BP 22.
Moreover, since the term of the subsidiary imprisonment is based on the total amount of the
fine or one day for each amount equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in
the Philippines at the time of the rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial court,40 if
petitioner is insolvent, she will suffer a longer prison sentence. Substantial justice dictates
that the penalty of fine meted on the petitioner be accordingly corrected within the
maximum limits prescribed under Section 1 of BP 22. Hence, the penalty of fine of
₱80,000.00 meted on petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 for each count of
violation of BP 22 is corrected to double the face value of each rubber check involved or
₱13,334.00 only.
Anent the alleged violation of Vaca v. Court of Appeals,41 and Administrative Circular No.
12-200042 that supposedly limited to fine the imposable penalty for violation of BP 22, and
without any subsidiary imprisonment, suffice it to quote the clarifications in Administrative
Circular No. 13-2001, issued on February 14, 2001:
x x x queries have been made regarding the authority of Judges to
1. Impose the penalty of imprisonment for violations of Batas Pambansa Big. 22; and
2. Impose subsidiary imprisonment in the event that the accused, who is found guilty of
violating the provisions of B. P Big. 2 2, is unable to pay the fine which he is sentenced to
pay considering that Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 adopted the rulings in Eduardo
Vaca v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 131714, 16 November 1998, 298 SCRA 656) and Rosa
Lim v. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000) as a policy of the
Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for violations of B. P Big. 22,
without mentioning whether subsidiary imprisonment could be resorted to in case of the
accused's inability to pay the fine.
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the
application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Big. 22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for
violators of B.P. Big. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application
of the penal provisions of B.P. Big. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense
and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate
penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that
imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought
not be deemed a hindrance.
It is, therefore, understood that
1 . Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty
for violations of B.P Big. 22;
xxxx
3. Should only a fine be imposed and tile accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no
legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment.
x x x x43 (Italics in the original; emphasis added)
In like manner, the issue of whether BP 22 violates Section 20 of Article III of the
Constitution which proscribes imprisonment as a punishment for not paying a debt was
already settled in the negative in Lozano v. Martinez.44 Pertinent portions of the Decision in
the Lozano case read:
Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? x x x
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment.1âwphi1 It is not the

 non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed
to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
xxxx
In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.45 (Emphasis
added) WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. In the interest of justice, the Decision dated
January 14, 2009 of Branch 67, Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos.
321169 to 321174 is MODIFIED.
Accused Julie S. Sumbilla is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22, and is sentenced to pay a FINE of THIRTEEN
THOUSAND AND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR PESOS (₱13,334.00) for each count, and
to indemnify private complainant Matrix Finance Corporation the total amount of ₱40,002.00
plus 6% interest per annum from September 21, 2002 until full payment.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
#7
G.R. No. 136588 July 20, 2000
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
PILAR ESTIPULAR, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Republic Act No. 26 requires that a petition for reconstitution of a lost or destroyed
certificate of title must be published in the Official Gazette and posted at the main entrance
of the provincial and the municipal buildings of the place where the property is situated.
This requirement is mandatory; strict compliance therewith is jurisdictional. Without such
publication and posting at the main entrances of both the municipal and the provincial
edifices, the trial court Decision granting the reconstitution is void.
The Case
This is the principle used by this Court in granting the Petition for Review before us,
assailing the December 9, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
53846. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED in toto."3
The decretal part of the Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court affirmed by the CA is worded
thus:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the petition to be well-taken and supported by evidence.
Hence, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The destroyed/burned original copy of Certificate of
Title No. 154 is declared cancelled and the Register of Deeds of La Union is hereby directed
to reconstitute in lieu thereof, the Original Certificate of Title No. 154, in favor of Fermin
Estipular, which shall bear the annotation that the same is being issued in place of the
destroyed/burned original copy in exactly the same terms and conditions using as basis the
corresponding Owner’s Duplicate Certificate of Title previously issued by the Registry of
Deeds of La Union but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the
destroyed/burned original copy filed with the Registry Office, and shall thereafter be
regarded as such for all purposes of the Property Registration Decree."5
The Facts
This case is rooted in a Petition for Reconstitution of Title filed by Pilar Estipular before the
Regional Trial Court of La Union. The factual and the procedural antecedents of the case are
summarized in the assailed CA Decision as follows:
"In her Petition for Reconstitution of Title, the petitioner, Pilar Estipular, declared that she
[was] the only surviving legal heir of the late Fermin Estipular, who died intestate in Caba,
La Union. During his lifetime, Fermin was issued Certificate of Title No. 154 duly registered
in his own name by the Register of Deeds of La Union covering a parcel of land located at
Barrio Liquicia, Caba, La Union, with an area of 6.1253 hectares. The said Certificate of Title
was either destroyed or burned as a result of the burning of the Register of Deeds of La
Union during the last World War. Further, it was alleged that the aforesaid parcel of land was
declared for taxation purposes by Fermin and his heirs; that said estate is not mortgaged to
any financial institution; nor is there any document pending registration affecting the said
land. As the land was already declared and distributed to ten persons who have succeeded
him, the petitioner prayed that the said Certificate of Title be reconstituted in accordance
with law.

"On June 15, 1994, the court a quo ordered that a Notice of Hearing be published for two
successive issues of the Official Gazette and be posted at the main entrance of the Municipal
Building of Caba, La Union at least thirty (30) days from the initial hearing set for
September 8, 1994 (Records, p. 8). A Certificate of Posting was submitted by Branch Sheriff
Romeo Obiena proving that copies of the Petition and Notice of Hearing were posted at the
main entrance of Municipal Building of Caba, La Union (Records, p. 9). However, the
National Printing Office advised the lower court to reschedule its original date of hearing as
it could not meet the schedule of publication (Records, p. 11). On August 12, 1994, another
Notice of Hearing was issued by the trial court, resetting the initial hearing to December 7,
1994. (Records, p. 13). In view thereof, a second Certificate of Posting was issued by
Branch Sheriff concerning the administrative case (Records, p.16). In the same manner, the
National Printing Office issued a Certificate of Publication showing that the said petition for
reconstitution was published in the Official Gazette for two successive weeks on October 17
and 24, 1994.
"On November 2, 1994, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance as counsel
for the respondent Republic and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union to appear
[o]n its behalf in connection with the subject case (Records, p.20).
"The initial hearing materialized on December 7, 1994. The petitioner and the public
prosecutor appeared [i]n such hearing. The case was called to invite private oppositors to
come forthwith, but nobody registered his/her opposition. Due to the absence of the counsel
for the petitioner, the latter was allowed to establish jurisdictional facts at the next hearing
date, January 24, 1995. On the latter date, the petitioner presented the jurisdictional facts
with the corresponding documentary requirements prescribed by law, to wit:
"Exhibit "A".... - Petition dated June 9, 1994;
Exhibit "A-1".... - Verification of petition;
Exhibit "B".... - Certified True Copy of Certificate of Title No. 154;
Exhibit "C".... - Survey Plan for the Titles;
Exhibit "D".... - Technical Description;
Exhibit "E".... - Certification of the Provincial Assessor;
Exhibit "F".... - Notice of Hearing;
Exhibit "G".... - Certificate of Publication issued by the National Printing Office;
Exhibit "H".... - Certificate of Posting;
Exhibit "I".... - Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor General."
"When the Exhibits were offered in evidence, the Public Prosecutor never interposed any
objection, hence, all the exhibits were admitted. Petitioner Pilar Estipular’s testimony was
offered to prove that she caused the reconstitution of Certificate of Title No. 154 of the
Register of Deeds of La Union.
"Two (2) other witnesses, Davidson Estipular and Juvenal Estacio, testified for the petitioner.
The grandson of the petitioner, Davidson Estipular, stated that the land covered by the title
in question (owner’s duplicate) [was] existing and that the original title was burned in the
Register of Deeds of La Union. Mr. Juvenal Estacio, the representative of the Register of
Deeds of La Union, testified that all the pre-war records in the said office were either
burned, destroyed or stolen during the last World War.
"After the presentation of evidence, the lower court rendered the questioned decision."
The CA Ruling
Although the Notice of Hearing had not been posted at the main entrance of the provincial
building, the CA held that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of the
law. It ruled:
"It is a settled rule that proceedings for judicial reconstitution of certificates of title are
proceedings in rem. Thus, NOTICE OF HEARING BY PROPER PUBLICATION IS SUFFICIENT
TO CLOTHE THE COURT WITH JURISDICTION (Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, 231 SCRA 88, emphasis ours). The purpose of such publication is to apprise the whole
world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good
cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearing the
petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the
case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it (Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 218 SCRA 773). Since there was a valid publication of the Notice of Hearing in the
Official Gazette, then it is sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the court to hear and determine
the petition."6
xxx xxx xxx
"Viewed in proper perspective, the failure of the petitioner to post the Notice of Hearing at
the main entrance of the provincial capitol building does not detract from the fact that there
was a substantial compliance with the provisions of the law. It must be noted that the
Branch Sheriff issued two (2) Certificates of Posting (Records, pp. 9 and 16) at the main
entrance of the municipal building where the land [lay]. Coupled with the successive
publications in the Official Gazette, it was more than enough to serve the purpose of
notifying all the parties concerned that a petition ha[d] been filed and that whoever ha[d]
an interest therein to oppose it for good cause should come to court and prove his claim. As
it [was], no private parties opposed the petition. No other claimant x x x came forward. On

 the other hand, the government was ably represented by the Public Prosecutor so the
appellant Republic was not in any manner deprived of the opportunity to protect its rights or
interests over the land subject of the petition."7
Hence, this recourse by the Republic.8
The Issue
Petitioner submits this lone issue for the resolution of this Court:
"The sole issue for resolution is whether or not supposed substantial compliance with the
requirements of Republic Act No. 26 is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the trial court over
the case."9
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue: Requirements for Reconstitution of Title Are Mandatory and
Jurisdictional
Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law. It cannot be (1) granted by the agreement of the parties; (2)
acquired, waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the parties; or (3)
conferred by the acquiescence of the courts.10 Republic Act No. 2611 lays down the special
requirements and procedure that must be followed before jurisdiction may be acquired over
a petition for reconstitution of title. In Section 13 of said Act, these requirements and
procedure are provided as follows:
"Sec. 13. The Court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to
be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official
Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the
municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty
days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be
sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person
named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of the hearing.
Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate
of title if known, the name of the registered owner, the name of the occupants or persons in
possession of the property, the owner of the adjoining properties, the location, area and
boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein
must appear and file their claim or objection to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the
hearing, submit proof of publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the
court."
These requirements are mandatory and compliance with them is jurisdictional. In Republic
v. Court of Appeals,12 the Court held:
"Reconstitution of a certificate of title, in the context of Republic Act No. 26, denotes the
restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting [to]
the title of a person to a piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution is to have, after
observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it
has been when the loss or destruction occurred. Among the conditions explicitly required by
the law is publication of the petition twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and its
posting at the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the
municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of
hearing. This directive is mandatory; indeed, its compliance has been held to be
jurisdictional. x x x"
Thus, before the trial court can acquire jurisdiction to hear and decide a reconstitution case,
compliance with the following requisites is imperative:
"1. [That] the notice of the petition be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in
successive issues of the Official Gazette, and posted on the main entrance of the provincial
building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is
situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing;
"2. [That] the notice state among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed
certificates of title if known, the name of the registered owner, the name of the occupants or
persons in possession of the property, the owner of the adjoining properties and all other
interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which
all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim of objection to the
petition;
"3. [That] a copy of the notice also be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense
of the petitioner, to every person named therein (i.e. the occupants or persons in possession
of the property, the owner of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties)
whose address is known at least thirty days prior to the date of the hearing; and
"4. [That] at the hearing, petitioner submit proof of publication, posting and service of the
notice as directed by the court."13
In the present case, it is undisputed that the Notice of Hearing of respondent’s Petition for
Reconstitution was not posted at the main entrance of the provincial building. Clearly, the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
But the appellate court, citing Calalang v. Register of Deeds,14 opined that the publication of
the Notice of Hearing in the Official Gazette was "sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the
court to hear and determine the Petition."15

 We disagree. The Court in Calalang did not rule on whether the posting requirement was
mandatory. It merely held that the absence of personal notice to a person purporting to Sumabat, Ramirez & Associates for Private Respondent.
have a legitimate claim on the property was not a sufficient ground to invalidate the
proceedings.16

It must be emphasized that under the law, the publication of a notice of hearing in the
Official Gazette is not enough. The posting of said notice at the main entrances of both the
municipal and the provincial building is another equally vital requisite. The purposes of the
stringent and mandatory character of the legal requirements
of publication, posting and mailing are to safeguard against spurious and unfounded land
ownership claims, to apprise all interested parties of the existence of such action, and to
give them enough time to intervene in the proceeding.17
The publication of the Notice of Hearing in the Official Gazette does not justify the
respondent’s failure to comply with the legal requirement of posting the Notice at the main
entrance of both the municipal and the provincial buildings. The principle of substantial
compliance cannot be applied to the present case, as the trial court’s acquisition of
jurisdiction over the Petition hinged on a strict compliance with the requirements of the law.
True, the root of this failure may be traced to the June 15, 1994 Order of the trial court,
which failed to include a directive that the Notice of Hearing be posted at the main entrance
of the provincial building. However, this oversight cannot excuse noncompliance with the
requirements of RA No. 26. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case because of its own lapse, which respondent failed to cure.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; VENUE OF ACTION; MAY BE FIXED BY AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES. —
Judge Jurado’s ruling carried an overly strict and literal interpretation of the stipulation in
the sales invoice. Although it provides that the City Court of Manila shall have "jurisdiction"
over a legal action arising from the contract, the parties must have intended to fix the
venue only, for jurisdiction over an action is conferred by law, and may not be changed by
mere agreement of the parties (Calimlim, Et. Al. v. Ramirez, Et Al., 118 SCRA 399; De
Jesus, Et. Al. v. Garcia, Et Al., 19 SCRA 554).
2. ID.; ID.; CONSTRUED. — The venue of an action in the inferior court is "the place
specified by the parties by means of a written agreement, whenever the court shall have
jurisdiction to try the action by reason of its nature or the amount involved" (Sec. 1-b, Rule
4, Rules of Court).
3. ID.; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ON ACT OF 1980 (b.p 129); REGIONAL TRIAL COURT;
NO JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS NOT EXCEEDING P20,000.00. — Judge Jurado’s ruling that
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig had jurisdiction over the private respondent’s claim was
erroneous because the claim of P8,076 did not exceed P20,000, which was, and still is, the
minimum jurisdictional limit for a money claim in the Regional Trial Court.

SO ORDERED.
DECISION

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

#8 The legal issue raised in this petition for certiorari is whether the venue of the action was
properly laid in the Court of First Instance at Pasig, Metro Manila.
[G.R. No. L-64735. April 5, 1990.]

On August 25, 1982, respondent Sarmiento Enterprises, Inc. filed in the Court of First
ATLAS DEVELOPER & STEEL INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner, v. SARMIENTO
Instance of Pasig, Metro Manila, a complaint for collection of the sum of P8,076 representing
ENTERPRISES, INC., HON. CICERO C. JURADO, Regional Trial Judge, Pasig, Metro
the cost of steel bars and MS plates purchased from it by the petitioner.chanrobles virtual
Manila, Respondents.
lawlibrary
Marasigan, Flores, Lorro, Vera & Associates for Petitioner.
Instead of filing an answer, the petitioner filed on November 2, 1982, a motion to dismiss

































 the complaint on the ground of improper venue because the sales invoice, which was made personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed twenty thousand
an integral part of the complaint, provided that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph pesos exclusive of interest and costs but inclusive of damages of whatever kind, the amount
of which must be specifically alleged.
"If legal action is resorted to for enforcing collection of this account, parties expressly
submit to the jurisdiction of the Court of the City of Manila." (Annex B-2, p. 19, Rollo.) "Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioner alleged that said stipulation is valid, binding, and enforceable (Villanueva v. Judge
Mosqueda, 115 SCRA 904; Hoechst Phils., Inc. v. Torres, 83 SCRA 297; Bautista v. De Borja, x x x
124 Phil. 1056).
"(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and costs or the value of
The motion to dismiss was denied by Judge Gregorio Pineda, Presiding Judge of the Court of the property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos
First Instance in Pasig, Metro Manila. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also (P20,000)."cralaw virtua1aw library
denied on March 4, 1983 by Judge Cicero Jurado who succeeded Judge Pineda. He ruled
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph The venue of an action in the inferior court is "the place specified by the parties by means of
a written agreement, whenever the court shall have jurisdiction to try the action by reason
". . . Such stipulation, speaking as it does of jurisdiction and not venue, is void and of no of its nature or the amount involved" (Sec. 1-b, Rule 4, Rules of Court).
legal effect." (p. 14, Rollo.)
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The complaint in the Regional Trial Court
Petitioner filed a second motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. at Pasig, Metro Manila, Civil Case No. 47451, entitled "Sarmiento Enterprises, Inc. v. Atlas
Thereafter, it filed a petition for certiorari directly in this Court. Developer and Steel Industries, Inc.," is dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiffs filing it
in the proper inferior court. Costs against the private respondents.
Judge Jurado’s ruling carried an overly strict and literal interpretation of the stipulation in
the sales invoice. Although it provides that the City Court of Manila shall have "jurisdiction" SO ORDERED.
over a legal action arising from the contract, the parties must have intended to fix the
venue only, for jurisdiction over an action is conferred by law, and may not be changed by
mere agreement of the parties (Calimlim, Et. Al. v. Ramirez, Et Al., 118 SCRA 399; De
Jesus, Et. Al. v. Garcia, Et Al., 19 SCRA 554).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
#9
Judge Jurado’s ruling that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig had jurisdiction over the private
G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968
respondent’s claim was erroneous because the claim of P8,076 did not exceed P20,000,
which was, and still is, the minimum jurisdictional limit for a money claim in the Regional
Trial Court.
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
Sections 19 and 33 of B.P. 129, provide:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
vs.
"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO,
Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and defendants,
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding company and
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, estate and defendant-appellant.
intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
























































 F. S. Urot and G. A. Uriate for plaintiffs-appellees. Carlos J. Cuizon for defendants Gavino
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio. Villaluz Law Office, Velasco Law Office, Pages and Soberano
for defendant-appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.
DIZON, J.:
On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as
the Judiciary Act of 1948 — the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced
Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal
interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is
paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the
court against defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a
counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred
to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same month.
After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their answer in which, after
making some admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they
interposed a counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
and, after the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court
issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ having been returned
unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's
bond (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 46-49), against which the Surety filed a written opposition (Id.
pp. 49) upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand
upon the Surety for the payment of the amount due under the judgment. Upon these
grounds the Surety prayed the Court not only to deny the motion for execution against its
counter-bond but also the following affirmative relief : "to relieve the herein bonding
company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question" (Id. p. 54) The Court denied this
motion on the ground solely that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the
satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure
of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution
against the counterbond. On the date set for the hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of
the Surety's counsel, granted the latter a period of five days within which to answer the
motion. Upon its failure to file such answer, the Court granted the motion for execution and
the corresponding writ was issued.
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued
without the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of
Court. As the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from
such order of denial and from the one denying its motion for reconsideration (Id. p. 97). Its
record on appeal was then printed as required by the Rules, and in due time it filed its brief
raising therein no other question but the ones covered by the following assignment of
errors:
I. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in issuing its order dated November 2, 1957, by
holding the incident as submitted for resolution, without a summary hearing and compliance
with the other mandatory requirements provided for in Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of
Court.
II. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in ordering the issuance of execution against the
herein bonding company-appellant.
III. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in denying the motion to quash the writ of
execution filed by the herein bonding company-appellant as well as its subsequent motion
for reconsideration, and/or in not quashing or setting aside the writ of execution.
Not one of the assignment of errors — it is obvious — raises the question of lack of
jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly.
Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of Appeals, on December 11, 1962,
decided the case affirming the orders appealed from.
On January 8, 1963 — five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a
motion asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The
Court of Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the same year. Two
days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially
that appellees action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the
recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of

which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where
the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00,
exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction
to try and decide the case. Upon these premises the Surety's motion prayed the Court of
Appeals to set aside its decision and to dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963
the Court of Appeals required the appellees to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed
to do so. Whereupon, on May 20 of the same year, the Court resolved to set aside its
decision and to certify the case to Us. The pertinent portions of its resolution read as
follows:
It would indeed appear from the record that the action at bar, which is a suit for collection of
money in the sum of exactly P1,908.00 exclusive of interest, was originally instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. But about a month prior to the filing of the
complaint, more specifically on June 17, 1948, the Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect,
depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand,
exclusive of interest, is not more than P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. No. 296.)
We believe, therefore, that the point raised in appellant's motion is an important one which
merits serious consideration. As stated, the complaint was filed on July 19, 1948. This case
therefore has been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding
appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until after receipt of this Court's adverse
decision.
There are three cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court which may be worthy of
consideration in connection with this case, namely: Tyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compañia
de Seguros, et al., G.R. No. L-10096, March 23, 1956; Pindangan Agricultural Co., Inc. vs.
Jose P. Dans, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-14591, September 26, 1962; and Alfredo Montelibano,
et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-15092, September 29, 1962, wherein
the Honorable Supreme Court frowned upon the 'undesirable practice' of appellants
submitting their case for decision and then accepting the judgment, if favorable, but
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.
Considering, however, that the Supreme Court has the "exclusive" appellate jurisdiction over
"all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue" (See. 1, Par. 3[3],
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended), we have no choice but to certify, as we hereby do
certify, this case to the Supreme Court.1äwphï1.ñët
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended, let the
record of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court.
It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of
P1,908.00 only — an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in
accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a
month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as
the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the
objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and
circumstances of the present case — which shall forthwith be set forth — We are of the
opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for
the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.
As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July
19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on
January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.
It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was exclusively against the
Sibonghanoy spouses the Surety became a quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when it
filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court of
origin (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-19). Since then, it acquired certain rights and assumed
specific obligations in connection with the pending case, in accordance with sections 12 and
17, Rule 57, Rules of Court (Bautista vs. Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885; Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, 65
Phil. 170).
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter-bond the Surety not
only filed a written opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an additional
affirmative relief — that it be relieved of its liability under the counter-bond upon the
grounds relied upon in support of its opposition — lack of jurisdiction of the court a quo not
being one of them.

 Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the counter-bond, the
Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or
opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition, the
Surety filed the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and
of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute
of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just
cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court
had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important
in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or
order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a
practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of
the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the
"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well
as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et
al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The
Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100
Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31,
1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings
in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts
to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It
was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke
up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We
would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it
was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary
once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have
become persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on December 11, 1962 as follows:

In Civil Case No. R-660 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which was a suit for collection
of a sum of money, a writ of attachment was issued against defendants' properties. The
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
attachment, however, was subsequently discharged under Section 12 of Rule 59 upon the
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
filing by defendants of a bond subscribed by Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed.
715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton
vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and

 After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs.
The writ of execution against defendants having been returned totally unsatisfied, plaintiffs
moved, under Section 17 of Rule 59, for issuance of writ of execution against Manila Surety
& Fidelity Co., Inc. to enforce the obligation of the bond. But the motion was, upon the
surety's opposition, denied on the ground that there was "no showing that a demand had
been made, by the plaintiffs to the bonding company for payment of the amount due under
the judgment" (Record on Appeal, p. 60).
Hence, plaintiffs made the necessary demand upon the surety for satisfaction of the
judgment, and upon the latter's failure to pay the amount due, plaintiffs again filed a motion
dated October 31, 1957, for issuance of writ of execution against the surety, with notice of
hearing on November 2, 1957. On October 31, 1957, the surety received copy of said
motion and notice of hearing.
It appears that when the motion was called on November 2, 1957, the surety's counsel
asked that he be given time within which to answer the motion, and so an order was issued
in open court, as follows:1äwphï1.ñët
As prayed for, Atty. Jose P. Soberano, Jr., counsel for the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.,
Cebu Branch, is given until Wednesday, November 6, 1957, to file his answer to the motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution dated October 30, 1957 of the plaintiffs, after which
this incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution. SO ORDERED
#10
G.R. No. 191527, August 22, 2016
BALIBAGO FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. AND PHILIPPINE BAPTIST S.B.C.,
INC., Petitioners, v. FAITH IN CHRIST JESUS BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. AND
REYNALDO GALVAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the Decision1 dated March 5, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 97292.
The facts follow.
The instant petition originated from a Complaint2 for unlawful detainer and damages filed by
Balibago Faith Baptist Church, Inc. (BFBC) and Philippine Baptist S.B.C., Inc. (PBSBC)
against Faith in Christ Jesus Baptist Church, Inc. (FCJBC) and Reynaldo Galvan (Galvan)
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Branch 2, Angeles City, docketed as Civil Case No.
02-388. The complaint sought the ejectment of FCJBC from the subject parcel of land with
improvements, known as Lot 3, Blk. 35 of (LRC) PCS-2364, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 82587,3 and located at 35-3 Sarita St., Diamond Subdivision, Balibago,
Angeles City, and owned by PBSBC.
On March 7, 1990, a contract of loan was entered into between PBSBC and BFBC where the
latter borrowed money from the former to enable it to purchase the subject property.
Thereafter, respondent BFBC took possession of the subject property and held therein their
religious activities.
While BFBC was still in possession of the subject property, Galvan and his companions
began attending BFBC's religious activities at the subject property. BFBC alleged that Galvan
apparently was interested on the property because after some time Galvan formed and
incorporated FCJBC and took control of the subject property.
Galvan's actuations came to the attention of the Luzon Convention of Southern Baptist
Churches, Inc. (LCSBC). Thus, in a Letter4 dated September 5, 2001, LCSBC upheld BFBC's
right over the subject property and recognized BFBC's pastor, Rev. Rolando T. Santos, as its
legitimate pastor.
However, FCJBC continued to occupy the subject property, thus, in a Demand Letter5 dated
September 4, 2002, BFBC demanded that FCJBC vacate the property within five (5) days
from notice and to pay the amount of P10,000.00 per month beginning October 2001 as
reasonable compensation for its use.
Due to non-compliance with its demand, on September 24, 2003, BFBC and PBSBC filed a
Complaint6 for unlawful detainer and damages against FCJBC and Galvan.
In its Answer, FCJBC and Galvan contend that it has been in existence since 1984. Allegedly,
it was formerly known as "Faith Baptist Church" (FBC) and held services at the Tacipit family
residence at 31-1 Dona Maria St., Diamond Subdivision, Angeles City. FBC eventually moved
to a building along MacArthur Highway in the same subdivision. Sometime in 1990, some of
 the members of the FBC availed of the loan from the Church Loan Fund of Foreign Mission 3. To pay the costs of the suit.
Board, SBC, Philippine Baptist Mission for the purpose of purchasing the subject property.
This was embodied in a Contract of Simple Loan or Mutuum dated March 7, 1990. Defendants' counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Rolando Santos was the pastor of FBC from 1993 to 2000. Due to a misunderstanding within
the church group, Santos left FBC, together with some of its members. In February 2001,
Santos' group formed BFBC, an organization which was duly registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission.
Meanwhile, FBC continued to occupy the subject property and, on January 9, 2001,
organized themselves into FCJBC.
On May 30, 2001, FCJBC paid installments due on the subject property in the sum of
P10,000.00, leaving a balance of P240,615.53. FCJBC alleged that since June 2001, they
were willing and able to pay the installments due on the subject property, however, PBSBC
refused to accept any payment from it. By September 9, 2002, the installments due had
reached P47,232.00.
FCJBC further averred that, prior to BFBC's filing of the present complaint, a Petition for
Consignation of Payment was already filed on October 9, 2002 with the RTC, Branch 62,
Angeles City entitled "Carlos Gelacio, et al. v. Foreign Mission Board, S.B.C. Philippine
Baptist Mission, now Philippine Baptist, S.B.C, Inc." docketed as Civil Case No. 10713.
FCJBC prayed that PBSBC be required to accept the amount of P240,615.53 as full payment
of the Contract of Simple Loan or Mutuum.
SO ORDERED.8
Both parties filed their respective appeal memoranda with the RTC. On April 19, 2006, the
RTC issued the assailed Decision9 which affirmed the Decision of the MTC. FCJBC moved for
reconsideration, but was denied on November 24, 2006. Thus, FCJBC filed a petition for
review on certiorari before the appellate court.10chanrobleslaw
In the disputed Decision11 dated March 5, 2010, the appellate court granted the petition, the
dispositive portion of which reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Angeles City, dated April 19, 2006 and November 24,
2006, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for unlawful detainer is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Undaunted, BFBC and PBSBC filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court raising the following issues:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR

On October 29, 2002, FCJBC filed a Motion seeking the suspension of proceedings in Civil
UNLAWFUL DETAINER AND RULING THAT THE MTC HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
Case No. 02-388 pending resolution of the petition for consignation.
II
On February 9, 2004, the MTC rendered its Decision7 in favor of respondent BFBC in Civil
Case No. 02-388. The MTC ruled that the case was one of forcible entry and not unlawful
detainer. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RAISING ISSUES ON THE SUFFICIENCY OF
THE COMPLAINT AND THE MTC JURISDICTION WHICH WERE NOT BROUGHT OUT BY THE
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryWHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby PARTIES.
rendered in favor of plaintiff Balibago Faith Baptist Church, Inc. and against the defendants
III
Faith in Christ Jesus Baptist Church, Inc., Reynaldo Galvan and all persons claiming rights
under them, ordering the latter the following:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
1. To vacate and surrender possession of the subject property to plaintiff within
INSTEAD OF DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS IN LIGHT OF SECTION 8, RULE 140 OF
three (3) months from receipt of this Decision;
THE RULES OF COURT.
2. To pay the sum of P20,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees; and cralawlawlibrary











































 In a nutshell, the main issue before us is whether the instant case is one of unlawful
detainer or forcible entry.
In Sumulong v. Court of Appeals,,13 the Court differentiated the distinct causes of action in
forcible entry vis-a-vis unlawful detainer, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of ;. action defined in Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any
land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful
detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of
his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the
possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue is who has the prior
possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but became
unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess and the issue of rightful
possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the party in actual
possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendant's right to
continue in possession.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
From the foregoing, it is then clear that unlawful detainer and forcible entry are entirely
distinct causes of action, to wit: (a) action to recover possession founded on illegal
occupation from the beginning - forcible entry; and (b) action founded on unlawful detention
by a person who originally acquired possession lawfully - unlawful detainer.
The rule is that the allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and
the jurisdiction of the court.15 The cause of action in a complaint is not what the designation
of the complaint states, but what the allegations in the body of the complaint define and
describe. The designation or caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the
complaint themselves are, for it is not even an indispensable part of the complaint.16 The
complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer or forcible entry if
the complaint filed was for unlawful detainer, or forcible entry, respectively. It cannot be
made to depend on the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties,
jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer, in a motion
to dismiss or in a motion for reconsideration. 17chanrobleslaw
It should then be stressed that what determines the cause of action is the nature of
defendants' entry into the land. If entry is illegal, then the cause of action which may be
filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand,
entry is legal but thereafter possession became illegal, the case is one of illegal detainer
which must be filed within one year from the date of the last demand.18chanrobleslaw
Indeed, to vest the court of jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is
necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts which brings the
party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face the
court's jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.19 This is where petitioners' cause of
action fails.
In Cabrera, et al. v. Getaruela, et al. ,20 the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a
cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and cralawlawlibrary
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this case, BFBC presented the following allegations in support of its unlawful detainer
complaint:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxxx
2. Plaintiff Philippine Baptist S.B.C., Inc. is the registered owner of a parcel of land with
improvements under Lot 3 Blk. 35 of (LRC) Pcs-2364 described under Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 82587 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Angeles City, located at 35-3 Sarita
St., Diamond Subd., Balibago, Angeles City, which is the subject matter of this case and
hereinafter referred to as subject premises. A copy of the title is hereto attached as Annex
"A" and to form an integral part hereof;
3. On March 7, 1990, plaintiff PBSBC granted a contract of simple loan to plaintiff BFBC
for the latter's purchase of the subject premises and plaintiff BFBC started to possess the
same and hold their religious activities thereat;
4. While plaintiff BFBC was in possession of the subject premises, defendant
Reynaldo Galvan and his companions joined the regular religious services of
plaintiff BFBC at the subject premises;
5. It turned out that defendants have an interest in the subject premises and
defendant Reynaldo Galvan formed and incorporated the defendant FCJBC and

 took control of the subject premises;
6. The take-over of the defendants was brought to the attention of the Luzon Convention
of Southern Baptist Churches, Inc., (LCSBC) and the latter, in letter dated September 5,
2001, has affirmed the right of the plaintiff BFBC, headed by Rev. Rolando T. Santos, to
occupy the subject premises. A copy of LCSBC's letter dated September 5, 2001 is hereto
attached as Annex "B";
7. Despite [LCSBC's] letter and plaintiffs peaceful overtures for the defendants to turn
over to plaintiffs the subject premises, defendants ignored the same;
8. Due to exhaustion, expense and exasperation, plaintiffs were constrained to
refer this matter to the undersigned counsel and, accordingly, on September 4,
2002, a demand letter was sent to the defendants for them to pay the reasonable
compensation of TEN THOUSAND (PI0,000.00) PESOS per month beginning October 2001
for the use of the subject premises and to vacate the same within five (5) [days upon] their
receipt thereof. A copy of the demand letter is hereto attached as Annex "C" and to form an
integral part hereof;
9. Despite plaintiffs' lawyer's demand letter, defendants failed and refused to pay the
reasonable compensation for the subject premises and to vacate the subject premises;
x x x.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A perusal of the above-quoted allegations in the complaint would show that it contradicts
the requirements for unlawful detainer. In an unlawful detainer action, the possession of the
defendant was originally legal and its possession was tolerated or permitted by the owner
through an express or implied contract.
In this case, paragraphs 5 and 6 make it clear that FCJBC's occupancy was unlawful from
the start and was bereft of contractual or legal basis. There was, likewise, no allegation that
BFBC and PBSBC tolerated FCJBC's possession of the subject property. Neither was there
any averment in the complaint which shows any overt act on the part of BFBC and PBSBC
indicative of permission to occupy the land. In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant's
possession becomes illegal only upon the plaintiffs demand for the defendant to vacate the
property and the defendant's subsequent refusal. Here, paragraphs 7 and 8 characterize the
defendant's occupancy as unlawful even before the formal demand letters were written by
the petitioner's counsel. Given these allegations, the unlawful withholding of possession
should not be based on the date the demand letters were sent, as the alleged unlawful act
had taken place at an earlier unspecified date.
This case would have to fall under the concept of forcible entry as it has been long settled
that in forcible entry cases, no force is really necessary. The act of going on the property
and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over
the property, and this is all that is necessary.23 However, while BFBC sufficiently alleged that
they had prior physical possession of the subject property, nothing has been said on how
FCJBC's entry was effected or when dispossession started. It is in this light that we rule that
the present complaint is similarly defective even if we are to treat the same as forcible entry
as it failed to allege how and when entry was effected. The bare allegation of BFBC
that "[i]t turned out that defendants have an interest in the subject premises and
defendant Reynaldo Galvan formed and incorporated the defendant FCJBC and
took control of the subject premises," would not suffice since it only shows that FCJBC
entered the land and occupied the house thereon without BFBC and PBSBC's consent or
permission which are constitutive of forcible entry. Unfortunately, BFBC and PB SBC's failure
to allege when the dispossession took place and how it was effected leaves the complaint
wanting in jurisdictional ground.
Suffice it to say, the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is
generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land, except that when entry was
made through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned
thereof.24 If the dispossession did not occur by any of the means stated in Section 1, Rule
70, as in this case, the proper recourse is to file a plenary action to recover possession with
the Regional Trial Court.25cralawred Consequently, the MTC has no jurisdiction over the
case.
We likewise reiterate that a court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of
it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on
the action. Indeed, a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot
be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it
and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and
any writ of execution based on it is void.26chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the Decision dated March 5, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
97292 is AFFIRMED in toto.
#11
G.R. No. 139442 December 6, 2006
 LOURDES DELA CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MELBA TAN TE, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him
that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.
—Holy Bible, Matthew 25:29
The Case
This petition for review seeks to nullify the April 30, 1999 Decision and the July 16, 1999
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49097, which reversed the Decision of
the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 98-89174, and reinstated
the Decision of the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 20, which ordered
petitioner Dela Cruz to vacate the subject lot in favor of respondent Tan Te.1
The Facts
The Reyes family, represented by Mr. Lino Reyes, owned the lot located at No. 1332 Lacson
Street (formerly Gov. Forbes Street), Sampaloc, Manila. Petitioner Lourdes Dela Cruz was
one of their lessees, and she religiously paid rent over a portion of the lot for well over 40
years. Sometime in 1989, a fire struck the premises and destroyed, among others,
petitioner’s dwelling. After the fire, petitioner and some tenants returned to the said lot and
rebuilt their respective houses; simultaneously, the Reyes family made several verbal
demands on the remaining lessees, including petitioner, to vacate the lot but the latter did
not comply. On February 21, 1994, petitioner was served a written demand to vacate said
lot but refused to leave. Despite the setback, the Reyes family did not initiate court
proceedings against any of the lessees.
On November 26, 1996, the disputed lot was sold by the Reyeses to respondent Melba Tan
Te by virtue of the November 26, 1996 Deed of Absolute Sale. Respondent bought the lot in
question for residential purposes. Despite the sale, petitioner Dela Cruz did not give up the
lot.
On January 14, 1997, petitioner was sent a written demand to relinquish the premises
which she ignored, prompting respondent Tan Te to initiate conciliation proceedings at the
barangay level. While respondent attempted to settle the dispute by offering financial
assistance, petitioner countered by asking PhP 500,000.00 for her house. Respondent
rejected the counter offer which she considered unconscionable. As a result, a certificate to
file action was issued to Tan Te.
On September 8, 1997, respondent Tan Te filed an ejectment complaint with damages
before the Manila MeTC, entitled Melba Tan Te v. Lourdes Dela Cruz and docketed as Civil
Case No. 156730-CV. The complaint averred that: (1) the previous owners, the Reyeses
were in possession and control of the contested lot; (2) on November 26, 1996, the lot was
sold to Tan Te; (3) prior to the sale, Dela Cruz forcibly entered the property with strategy
and/or stealth; (4) the petitioner unlawfully deprived the respondent of physical possession
of the property and continues to do so; and, (5) the respondent sent several written
demands to petitioner to vacate the premises but refused to do so.
On October 24, 1997, petitioner filed her answer and alleged that: (1) the MeTC had no
jurisdiction over the case because it falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC as more than one
year had elapsed from petitioner’s forcible entry; (2) she was a rent-paying tenant
protected by PD 20;2 (3) her lease constituted a legal encumbrance upon the property; and
(4) the lot was subject of expropriation.
The Ruling of the Manila MeTC
On April 3, 1998, the MeTC decided as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant and all persons claiming right under her to vacate the premises
situated at 1332 Lacson Street (formerly Gov. Forbes Street), Sampaloc, Manila and
peacefully return possession thereof to plaintiff;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of P360.00 a month from
December 1996 to November 1997; P432.00 a month from December 1997 to November
1998, plus 20% for each subsequent year until the premises shall have been vacated and
turned over to the plaintiff;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
and, the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.3
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Unconvinced, petitioner Dela Cruz appealed the Decision of the MeTC in the Manila RTC and
the appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-89174. On September 1, 1998, the RTC
rendered its judgment setting aside the April 3, 1998 Decision of the Manila MeTC and
dismissed respondent Tan Te’s Complaint on the ground that it was the RTC and not the
MeTC which had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The RTC believed that since

 Tan Te’s predecessor-in-interest learned of petitioner’s intrusion into the lot as early as
February 21, 1994, the ejectment suit should have been filed within the one-year
prescriptive period which expired on February 21, 1995. Since the Reyes did not file the
ejectment suit and respondent Tan Te filed the action only on September 8, 1997, then the
suit had become an accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Disappointed at the turn of events, respondent Tan Te appealed the adverse Decision to the
Court of Appeals (CA) which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49097. This time, the CA
rendered a Decision in favor of respondent Tan Te reversing the Manila RTC September 1,
1998 Decision and reinstated the Manila MeTC April 3, 1998 Decision.
Petitioner tried to have the CA reconsider its Decision but was rebutted in its July 16, 1999
Resolution.
Unyielding to the CA Decision and the denial of her request for reconsideration, petitioner
Dela Cruz now seeks legal remedy through the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
before the Court.
The Issues
Petitioner Dela Cruz claims two (2) reversible errors on the part of the appellate court, to
wit:
A Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.—Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, WENT BEYOND THE ISSUES OF THE
CASE AND CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE TRIAL COURT.
B (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer:
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION
OF THE RTC AND IN EFFECT, REINSTATING THE DECISION OF THE [MeTC] WHICH IS
CONTRADICTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.4
The Court’s Ruling
Discussion on Rule 45
Before we dwell on the principal issues, a few procedural matters must first be resolved.
Petitioner Dela Cruz asks the Court to review the findings of facts of the CA, a course of
action proscribed by Section 1, Rule 45. Firm is the rule that findings of fact of the CA are
final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this Court provided they are
supported by evidence on record or substantial evidence. Fortunately for petitioner, we will
be liberal with her petition considering that the CA’s factual findings contradict those of the
RTC, and there was an asseveration that the court a quo went beyond the issues of the
case. Indeed, these grounds were considered exceptions to the factual issue bar rule.
Secondly, the petition unnecessarily impleaded the CA in violation of Section 4, Rule 45. We
will let this breach pass only because there is a need to entertain the petition due to the
conflicting rulings between the lower courts; however, a repetition may result to sanctions.
The actual threshold issue is which court, the Manila RTC or the Manila MeTC, has
jurisdiction over the Tan Te ejectment suit. Once the jurisdictional issue is settled, the heart
of the dispute is whether or not respondent is entitled to the ejectment of petitioner Dela
Cruz from the premises.
However, the petition is bereft of merit.
On the Issue of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is the power or capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear
and determine certain controversies.5 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by
law.
Section 33 of Chapter III -- on Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts of B. P. No. 1296 provides:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.
Thus exclusive, original jurisdiction over ejectment proceedings (accion interdictal) is lodged
with the first level courts. This is clarified in Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure that embraces an action for forcible entry (detentacion), where one is deprived of
physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy,
or stealth. In actions for forcible entry, three (3) requisites have to be met for the municipal
trial court to acquire jurisdiction. First, the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical
possession of the property. Second, they must also assert that they were deprived of
possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Third, the action must

 be filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their
deprivation of physical possession of the land or building.
The other kind of ejectment proceeding is unlawful detainer (desahucio), where one
unlawfully withholds possession of the subject property after the expiration or termination of
the right to possess. Here, the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive; for in such
action, the defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is
the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession.7 The essential requisites
of unlawful detainer are: (1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract express or implied; (2)
the expiration or termination of the possessor’s right to hold possession; (3) withholding by
the lessee of the possession of the land or building after expiration or termination of the
right to possession; (4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the
terms of the lease and vacate the premises; and (5) the action must be filed within one (1)
year from date of last demand received by the defendant.
A person who wants to recover physical possession of his real property will prefer an
ejectment suit because it is governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure which allows
immediate execution of the judgment under Section 19, Rule 70 unless the defendant
perfects an appeal in the RTC and complies with the requirements to stay execution; all of
which are nevertheless beneficial to the interests of the lot owner or the holder of the right
of possession.
On the other hand, Section 19, of Chapter II of B.P. No. 129 on Regional Trial Courts
provides:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
xxxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Two (2) kinds of action to recover possession of real property which fall under the
jurisdiction of the RTC are: (1) the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of
possession (accion publiciana) when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year or
when the action was filed more than one (1) year from date of the last demand received by
the lessee or defendant; and (2) an action for the recovery of ownership (accion
reivindicatoria) which includes the recovery of possession.
These actions are governed by the regular rules of procedure and adjudication takes a
longer period than the summary ejectment suit.
To determine whether a complaint for recovery of possession falls under the jurisdiction of
the MeTC (first level court) or the RTC (second level court), we are compelled to go over the
allegations of the complaint. The general rule is that what determines the nature of the
action and the court that has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint.
These cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed
by the defendant.8
This general rule however admits exceptions. In Ignacio v. CFI of Bulacan, it was held "that
while the allegations in the complaint make out a case for forcible entry, where tenancy is
averred by way of defense and is proved to be the real issue, the case should be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction as the case should properly be filed with the then Court of Agrarian
Relations."9
The cause of action in a complaint is not what the designation of the complaint states, but
what the allegations in the body of the complaint define and describe. The designation or
caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the complaint themselves are, for it
is not even an indispensable part of the complaint.10
Let us refer to the allegations of the complaint filed in the Manila MeTC in Civil Case No.
98-89174, which we quote verbatim:
3. That plaintiff is the absolute and registered owner of a parcel of land located at No. 1332,
Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila now being occupied by defendant;
4. That plaintiff purchased the above-said parcel of land together with its improvements
from the legal heirs of the late EMERLINDA DIMAYUGA REYES on November 26, 1996, under
and by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale x x x;
5. That pursuant to the said deed of sale, the title to the land and all its improvements was
transferred in plaintiff’s name as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 233273 issued
by the Register of Deeds of Manila on April 22, 1997 x x x;
6. That prior to said sale, the previous owners, represented by Mr. Lino Reyes, husband of
the said deceased Emerlinda D. Reyes and the administrator of her estate, was in
possession and control of the property subject of this complaint;
7. That also prior to said sale, defendant, without the knowledge and consent of Mr. Lino
Reyes, surreptitiously and by means of stealth and strategy entered, used and occupied the
said premises thus depriving the former of rightful possession thereof;
8. That on February 21, 1994, Mr. Lino Reyes, through Atty. Alejo Sedico, his lawyer,
furnished the defendants a letter formally demanding that defendant vacate the premises x
x x;

9. That, however, defendant failed and refused to vacate despite just and legal demand by
Mr. Lino Reyes;
10. That after the sale to plaintiff of said premises, plaintiff has several times demanded of
defendants to vacate the premises, the last demand having been made on them personally
and in writing on January 14, 1997 x x x;
11. That defendant failed and refused and still fails and refuses to vacate the premises
without legal cause or justifiable reason whatsoever;11
The answer of petitioner averred:
4. The Court has no jurisdiction over the case, having been filed by plaintiff more than the
reglementary one year period to commence forcible entry case, which is reckoned from the
date of the alleged unlawful entry of defendant by the use of stealth and strategy into the
premises;
5. For more than four decades now, defendant has been and still is a rent-paying tenant of
the subject land occupied by their residential house, dating back to the original owner-
lessor, the Dimayuga family. Her lease with no definite duration, commenced with a rent at
P60.00 per month until it was gradually increased in the ensuing years. As of November
1996, it stood at P300.00 a month;
6. In this circumstances [sic], defendant enjoys the protective mantle of P.D. 20 and the
subsequent rental control status against dispossession. She cannot be ejected other than for
causes prescribed under B.P. Blg. 25. Further, in case of sale of the land, she has the right
of first refusal under the express provision of P.D. 1571;
7. Throughout the years of her tenancy, defendant has been updated in her rental payment
until the collector of the original owner-lessor no longer came around as she has done
theretofore;
7.1. As a result, she was compelled to file a petition for consignation of rent before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila;
8. A bona fide tenant within the ambit if [sic] P.D. 20 and the subsequent rental control
status, including B.P. Blg. 25, under its terms, cannot be ousted on a plea of expiration of
her monthly lease;
9. Her lease constitutes a legal encumbrance upon the property of the lessor/owner and
binds the latter’s successor-in-interest who is under obligation to respect it;
10. The land at bench is the subject of a pending expropriation proceedings;
11. Plaintiff being a married woman cannot sue or be sued without being joined by her
husband;12
Undeniably, the aforequoted allegations of the complaint are vague and iffy in revealing the
nature of the action for ejectment.
The allegations in the complaint show that prior to the sale by Lino Reyes, representing the
estate of his wife Emerlinda Reyes, he was in possession and control of the subject lot but
were deprived of said possession when petitioner, by means of stealth and strategy, entered
and occupied the same lot. These circumstances imply that he had prior physical possession
of the subject lot and can make up a forcible entry complaint.
On the other hand, the allegation that petitioner Dela Cruz was served several demands to
leave the premises but refused to do so would seem to indicate an action for unlawful
detainer since a written demand is not necessary in an action for forcible entry. It is a fact
that the MeTC complaint was filed on September 8, 1997 within one (1) year from the date
of the last written demand upon petitioner Dela Cruz on January 14, 1997.
As previously discussed, the settled rule is jurisdiction is based on the allegations in the
initiatory pleading and the defenses in the answer are deemed irrelevant and immaterial in
its determination. However, we relax the rule and consider the complaint at bar as an
exception in view of the special and unique circumstances present. First, as in Ignacio v. CFI
of Bulacan,13 the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised in the answer wherein there was
an admission that petitioner Dela Cruz was a lessee of the former owners of the lot, the
Reyeses, prior to the sale to respondent Tan Te. The fact that petitioner was a tenant of the
predecessors-in-interest of respondent Tan Te is material to the determination of
jurisdiction. Since this is a judicial admission against the interest of petitioner, such
admission can be considered in determining jurisdiction. Second, the ejectment suit was
filed with the Manila MeTC on September 8, 1997 or more than nine (9) years ago. To
dismiss the complaint would be a serious blow to the effective dispensation of justice as the
parties will start anew and incur additional legal expenses after having litigated for a long
time. Equitable justice dictates that allegations in the answer should be considered to aid in
arriving at the real nature of the action. Lastly, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court
clearly empowers the Court to construe Rule 70 and other pertinent procedural issuances "in
a liberal manner to promote just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding."
Based on the complaint and the answer, it is apparent that the Tan Te ejectment complaint
is after all a complaint for unlawful detainer. It was admitted that petitioner Dela Cruz was a
lessee of the Reyeses for around four (4) decades. Thus, initially petitioner as lessee is the
legal possessor of the subject lot by virtue of a contract of lease. When fire destroyed her
house, the Reyeses considered the lease terminated; but petitioner Dela Cruz persisted in
returning to the lot and occupied it by strategy and stealth without the consent of the

 owners. The Reyeses however tolerated the continued occupancy of the lot by petitioner.
Thus, when the lot was sold to respondent Tan Te, the rights of the Reyeses, with respect to
the lot, were transferred to their subrogee, respondent Tan Te, who for a time
also tolerated the stay of petitioner until she decided to eject the latter by sending several
demands, the last being the January 14, 1997 letter of demand. Since the action was filed
with the MeTC on September 8, 1997, the action was instituted well within the one (1) year
period reckoned from January 14, 1997. Hence, the nature of the complaint is one of
unlawful detainer and the Manila MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint.
Thus, an ejectment complaint based on possession by tolerance of the owner, like the
Tan Te complaint, is a specie of unlawful detainer cases.
As early as 1913, case law introduced the concept of possession by tolerance in ejectment
cases as follows:
It is true that the landlord might, upon the failure of the tenant to pay the stipulated rents,
consider the contract broken and demand immediate possession of the rented property,
thus converting a legal possession into illegal possession. Upon the other hand, however,
the landlord might conclude to give the tenant credit for the payment of the rents and allow
him to continue indefinitely in the possession of the property. In other words, the landlord
might choose to give the tenant credit from month to month or from year to year for the
payment of their rent, relying upon his honesty of his financial ability to pay the same.
During such period the tenant would not be in illegal possession of the property and the
landlord could not maintain an action of desahucio until after he had taken steps to convert
the legal possession into illegal possession. A mere failure to pay the rent in accordance
with the contract would justify the landlord, after the legal notice, in bringing an action of
desahucio. The landlord might, however, elect to recognize the contract as still in force and
sue for the sums due under it. It would seem to be clear that the landlord might sue for the
rents due and [unpaid, without electing to terminate the contract of tenancy;] [w]hether he
can declare the contract of tenancy broken and sue in an action desahucio for the
possession of the property and in a separate actions for the rents due and damages, etc.14
The concept of possession by tolerance in unlawful detainer cases was further refined and
applied in pertinent cases submitted for decision by 1966. The rule was articulated as
follows:
Where despite the lessee’s failure to pay rent after the first demand, the lessor did not
choose to bring an action in court but suffered the lessee to continue occupying the land for
nearly two years, after which the lessor made a second demand, the one-year period for
bringing the detainer case in the justice of the peace court should be counted not from the
day the lessee refused the first demand for payment of rent but from the time the second
demand for rents and surrender of possession was not complied with.15
In Calubayan v. Pascual, a case usually cited in subsequent decisions on ejectment, the
concept of possession by tolerance was further elucidated as follows:
In allowing several years to pass without requiring the occupant to vacate the premises nor
filing an action to eject him, plaintiffs have acquiesced to defendant’s possession and
use of the premises. It has been held that a person who occupies the land of
another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
The status of the defendant is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease
has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the
demand to vacate.16 (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing jurisprudence, it is unequivocal that petitioner’s possession after she
intruded into the lot after the fire—was by tolerance or leniency of the Reyeses and hence,
the action is properly an unlawful detainer case falling under the jurisdiction of the Manila
MeTC.
Even if we concede that it is the RTC and not the MeTC that has jurisdiction over the Tan Te
complaint, following the reasoning that neither respondent nor her predecessor-in-interest
filed an ejectment suit within one (1) year from February 21, 1994 when the Reyeses knew
of the unlawful entry of petitioner, and hence, the complaint is transformed into an accion
publiciana, the Court deems it fair and just to suspend its rules in order to render efficient,
effective, and expeditious justice considering the nine (9) year pendency of the ejectment
suit. More importantly, if there was uncertainty on the issue of jurisdiction that arose from
the averments of the complaint, the same cannot be attributed to respondent Tan Te but to
her counsel who could have been confused as to the actual nature of the ejectment suit.
The lawyer’s apparent imprecise language used in the preparation of the complaint without
any participation on the part of Tan Te is sufficient special or compelling reason for the grant
of relief.
The case of Barnes v. Padilla17 elucidates the rationale behind the exercise by this Court of
the power to relax, or even suspend, the application of the rules of procedure:
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even
disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court
itself has already declared to be final x x x.

 The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be
applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.18
Moreover, Section 8, Rule 40 authorizes the RTC—in case of affirmance of an order of the
municipal trial court dismissing a case without trial on the merits and the ground of
dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter—to try the case on the merits as if
the case was originally filed with it if the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. In the same
vein, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, can suspend its rules with respect
to this particular case (pro hac vice), even if initially, the MeTC did not have jurisdiction over
the ejectment suit, and decide to assume jurisdiction over it in order to promptly resolve the
dispute.
The issue of jurisdiction settled, we now scrutinize the main issue.
Petitioner raises the ancillary issue that on March 15, 1998, the Manila City Council passed
and approved Ordinance No. 7951:
[a]uthorizing the Manila City Mayor to acquire either by negotiation or expropriation certain
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 233273, 175106 and 140471,
containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Twenty Five (1,425) square meters,
located at Maria Clara and Governor Forbes Streets, Sta. Cruz, Manila, for low cost housing
and award to actual bonafide residents thereat and further authorizing the City Mayor to
avail for that purpose any available funds of the city and other existing funding facilities
from other government agencies x x x.19
It readily appears that this issue was not presented before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 49097 despite the fact that the respondent’s petition was filed on September 25,
1998, six months after the ordinance was passed. Thus, this issue is proscribed as are all
issues raised for the first time before the Court are proscribed.

At the heart of every ejectment suit is the issue of who is entitled to physical possession of Even granting for the sake of argument that we entertain the issue, we rule that the
the lot or possession de facto. intended expropriation of respondent’s lot (TCT No. 233273) by the city government of
Manila will not affect the resolution of this petition. For one thing, the issue can be raised by
We rule in favor of respondent Tan Te for the following reasons: petitioner in the appropriate legal proceeding. Secondly, the intended expropriation might
not even be implemented since it is clear from the ordinance that the City Mayor will still
1. Petitioner admitted in her Answer that she was a rent-paying tenant of the Reyeses,
locate available funds for project, meaning the said expense is not a regular item in the
predecessors-in-interest of respondent Tan Te. As such, she recognized the ownership of the
budget.
lot by respondent, which includes the right of possession.
WHEREFORE, this petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The April 30, 1999 Decision of the
2. After the fire raged over the structures on the subject lot in late 1989 the contracts of
Court of Appeals reinstating the April 3, 1998 MeTC Decision in Civil Case No. 156730-CV
lease expired, as a result of which Lino Reyes demanded that all occupants, including
and the July 16, 1999 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 49097 are hereby AFFIRMED IN
petitioner, vacate the lot but the latter refused to abandon the premises. During the
TOTO.
duration of the lease, petitioner’s possession was legal but it became unlawful after the fire
when the lease contracts were deemed terminated and demands were made for the tenants No costs.
to return possession of the lot.
SO ORDERED.
3. Petitioner’s possession is one by the Reyeses’ tolerance and generosity and later by
respondent Tan Te’s.

Petitioner fully knows that her stay in the subject lot is at the leniency and magnanimity of
Mr. Lino Reyes and later of respondent Tan Te; and her acquiescence to such use of the lot
carries with it an implicit and assumed commitment that she would leave the premises the
moment it is needed by the owner. When respondent Tan Te made a last, written demand on
January 14, 1997 and petitioner breached her promise to leave upon demand, she lost her
right to the physical possession of the lot. Thus, respondent Tan Te should now be allowed
to occupy her lot for residential purposes, a dream that will finally be realized after nine (9)
years of litigation.