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David, Goliath and Modern Warfare


by Jacek Bartosiak - July 20, 2021

Most of us know the story of David and Goliath, but few know what the story can teach us about
modern warfare.

The Philistines’ strategy was to disarm the Hebrews by destroying their metallurgical works. This
prevented the Hebrews from producing their own modern weapons and made them dependent on
the Philistines for civilian production, such as in agriculture. Thus, the key to the power of the
Philistines was their industrial power, which of course gave them serious economic power. This is a
characteristic example of a military-industrial complex in ancient times.

The two main offensive weapons in those days were a heavy iron spear, well suited for close
combat, and a light throwing spear. Both weapons were only as effective as the user. Targeting and
missile control required a combination of a good eye and skilled hands. These constraints limited the
weapons’ innovative potential.

The task of Goliath and his offensive mission was to throw the javelin and attack with the spear.
When Goliath went into battle, “He had a helmet of brass upon his head, and he was armed with a
coat of mail.” Goliath was therefore burdened with a fundamental weakness: a defensive weapon
system that protected against the enemy but limited his mobility. The weight of the armor meant that
the fighter could not move with the agility and speed required on the battlefield. This would not be a
problem if his enemy were also burdened with such weight, but he wasn’t.

David was not a professional fighter, so he was not weighed down with established beliefs about
weapons or tactics. He was free to choose the technology and tactics best to defeat the enemy.

David was mobile. He could easily have been killed if he had entered Goliath’s firing zone. But
Goliath, laden with armor, moved very slowly. He couldn’t move forward fast enough to catch David
within his blast radius. It was an unequal fight. David was perfectly safe as long as he could maintain
discipline and follow his plan. In such a fight, only Goliath took the risk. One of them would go on to
be king, and the other died.

The Life Cycle of Weapons Systems

The biblical story of David leads to several conclusions about the development of weapons and the

David, Goliath and Modern Warfare


by Jacek Bartosiak - July 20, 2021 | Copyright © Geopolitical Futures. All rights reserved. Page 1
Keeping the future in focus
https://geopoliticalfutures.com

nature of warfare. Breakthrough technologies often feel less advanced than the old ones. For
example, in the 14th century, firearms seemed completely ineffective against fortifications. In the
20th century, battleships seemed to be the pinnacle of technology, while the planes that flew in front
of them were considered a primitive weapon against such powerful ships.

It should be remembered that each weapons system (and its entire family) has a life cycle. A
weapon appears when an offensive weapon is required, and ends its life when it has become so
complex that it needs to be defended rather than used for an attack. Thus, the whole cycle has
taken place when the cost of defending the weapon eclipses its offensive capabilities and makes it
impossible to buy other necessary weapons or disrupts the civilian economy. Such was the result of
Goliath’s defensive armor. And this may be the result of the end of the stealth technology cycle (and
of the controversial F-35 aircraft, for example), which is the very expensive armor of modern aircraft.

Armed forces that have not had significant military successes in the past are less likely to miss the
moment when the end-of-life process of a given type of weapon begins. Winning wars creates the
illusion that certain technologies will always be effective. This illusion is mixed with the interests of
the military, political and industrial leadership and of specific politicians and interest groups in the
political and social system. All these subconsciously allied forces create a sense of technical
greatness by focusing on technology as a “miracle.”

There is even a feeling of invincibility within an army or armed forces. The French victory in World
War I led to a technological, organizational and leadership defeat in 1940. History shows that losing
a war – ideally, of course, without complete destruction of the country’s potential or being occupied –
is the best impulse for change.

U.S. ground forces after their defeat in Vietnam showed all the symptoms of a defeated army, and
the Israeli army in October 1973 showed the damage caused by the too-easy victory of 1967.
Today, one wonders where the American campaigns of recent years and the technological
domination in the fields of asymmetric war might have led the U.S. in terms of a future in which
systematic warfare breaks out between the great powers.

David, Goliath and Modern Warfare


by Jacek Bartosiak - July 20, 2021 | Copyright © Geopolitical Futures. All rights reserved. Page 2
Keeping the future in focus
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At the peak moment for ancient weapons, just before their defeat, the latest generation of war
technology appears invincible. Knights in full armor, fortifications with massive artillery power,
battleships, intercontinental ballistic missiles – all of these weapons came and went as the last word
of technology. And it remained so until events on the battlefield made them a mere burden. The
technologies that replace them have one thing in common: They simplify the battlefield and allow for
a return to the heart of war – passionate offensive action.

The length of the weapon’s cycle is determined by the rate at which the opponent takes
countermeasures against it and the ability of the user to design methods of defense against these
countermeasures. An effective military is a military that constantly rejects aging systems and
outdated operational concepts, integrating new ideas and personnel without the simultaneous social
upheaval resulting from the shift in the balance of power brought about by the reform. All powers in
the past with an effective military have dealt with this phenomenon for a while. None has been able
to do so permanently. The lesson from the wars between the Hebrews and the Philistines is still
valid and will continue to have educational value in the future.

Protecting White Elephants

In the short run, the state may bear the cost of defending increasingly expensive systems that are
moving toward obsolescence. It can also do this in asymmetric conflicts (as has often been the case
in the past 30 years), when a much weaker opponent (technologically and organizationally) wants to
inflict losses on “white elephants,” i.e., very expensive hardware units, in an effort to cause a political
(not military) effect in a society unfriendly to war. Then, states defend their systems as much as they
can so as not to lose on this “distorted” or “atypical” asymmetric pitch, where information perception
rules. But in the long run it is unsustainable anyway, so asymmetric wars are often won by the
weaker side.

In any case, looking at this phenomenon in the long term, the power that wins is the one that is able
to redefine its strategic interests and introduce the weapons it can afford.

The costs of designing, developing and manufacturing weapons are increasing with the growing
need for the enemy to find a remedy to our weapons. And so the race between defense and attack
is in full swing. The complexity, sophistication and even rising costs of defending a weapon system
give the illusion that a weapon so advanced, so demanding in terms of requiring expenditure,
knowledge, personnel, energy, man-hours and so on, must be the best of the best. In fact, most
often it is otherwise, and this phenomenon is a symptom of the increasing weakness and sensitivity

David, Goliath and Modern Warfare


by Jacek Bartosiak - July 20, 2021 | Copyright © Geopolitical Futures. All rights reserved. Page 3
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https://geopoliticalfutures.com

of the weapon to the enemy’s influence.

Here is an example: The presence of the Aegis air defense system in an aircraft carrier’s combat
group is less a symptom of aircraft carrier advancement and more a sign of the times that an aircraft
carrier today is a fairly easy (and tempting) target. When a given type of weapon is heading toward
obsolescence, it is still used (as was the case with cavalry for a long time in the 20th century), while
its combat effectiveness and maintenance costs soar until the point where maintenance becomes an
impossible burden.

Goliath was equipped with so much armor that he could not throw his spear the several dozen
meters required for the battlefield; cavalry became so heavy with armor and guns that the horses
could not run; a lot of money was spent on battleships so that six or nine large guns from these
ships could fire several hundred kilograms of explosives for several kilometers. In all these cases,
we have certainly already dealt with the phenomenon of obsolescence, when the weapon is still able
to survive on the battlefield but no longer makes sense and costs too much. And it even becomes
dangerous to other units or formations useful in combat that, instead of fighting, have to protect the
white elephant.

Weapons do not want to leave the arena of history, just as people do not want to die. Weapons
affected by the phenomenon of obsolescence are able to survive on the stage of history, exposing
those who continue to force them in their service to great damage.

The story of David and Goliath therefore has a very important lesson to teach us, both about the
fight against Goliath and Saul’s attitude to David’s innovation. This is a difficult lesson for people
who are aware of the constraints that restrict the playing field.

To learn more, please visit strategyandfuture.org.

Author: Jacek Bartosiak


Read more from this author on geopoliticalfutures.com

David, Goliath and Modern Warfare


by Jacek Bartosiak - July 20, 2021 | Copyright © Geopolitical Futures. All rights reserved. Page 4

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