LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, v.

THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT

OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent.

Enrique M. Belo for petitioner.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and
permanent injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for
acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines
and Procedure Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the
same apply to herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation of the
constitutional rights of the petitioner.

As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case, is as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the
raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).

On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and
Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of
R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80).

On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations
implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms). (Rollo, p. 81).

Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business
and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the
enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of
R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines
and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated
on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as
promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared
unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining
order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made
to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers.
This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms’
prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26, and 31,
1989. (Rollo, p. 98).

Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said Motion
for Reconsideration regarding the injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by this Court of
an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 119).

The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168).

On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted his Comment to the petition as his
Memorandum (Rollo, pp. 186-187).

Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to
it:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of
"Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."cralaw virtua1aw library

(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to
commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.

(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to
summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law.

(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13 —

". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are
distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and
other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive:
Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per
annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determine a lower ceiling.

In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the net profit
after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the
end of the fiscal year . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No.
6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the
raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and
Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
The constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ARTICLE XIII

x        x       x

AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM

Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they
till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end,
the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to
such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account
ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just
compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

x       x       x"

Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety. In fact, it
acknowledges the correctness of the decision of this Court in the case of the Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989)
affirming the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It, however, argued
that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in
including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo,
p. 131). Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the
primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total
investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many owners of
residential lands all over the country who use available space in their residence for commercial
livestock and raising purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing
corporations and other commercial livestock and poultry raisers (Rollo, p. 10). Lands support the
buildings and other amenities attendant to the raising of animals and birds. The use of land is
incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in productivity in this industry.
Including backyard raisers, about 80% of those in commercial livestock and poultry production
occupy five hectares or less. The remaining 20% are mostly corporate farms (Rollo, p. 11).

On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in
the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is
proper. He cited that Webster’s International Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the
following words:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Agriculture — the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops,
often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry,
farming.

It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . .

Livestock — domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit.

Farm — a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals." (Rollo, pp.
82-83).

The petition is impressed with merit.

The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in
the adoption of the Constitution (J.M. Tuazon & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA
413 [1970]).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the language of the
document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails (J.M. Tuazon & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).

It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of

doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as
throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true that the intent of the
convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by
the people of the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the
terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way
toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 59
SCRA 183 [1974]).

The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of
the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-
mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.

The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of
R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds,
fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).

The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture."
Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of
agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands and residential properties
because all of them fall under the general classification of the word "agricultural." This proposal,
however, was not considered because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are
limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial,
industrial and residential lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 30).

In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado (now a Supreme Court Justice), posed several
questions, among others, quoted as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
 x        x       x

"Line 19 refers to genuine reform program founded on the primary right of farmers and
farmworkers. I wonder if it means that leasehold tenancy is thereby proscribed under this
provision because it speaks of the primary right of farmers and farmworkers to own directly or
collectively the lands they till. As also mentioned by Commissioner Tadeo, farmworkers include
those who work in piggeries and poultry projects.

I was wondering whether I am wrong in my appreciation that if somebody puts up a piggery or a

poultry project and for that purpose hires farmworkers therein, these farmworkers will
automatically have the right to own eventually, directly or ultimately or collectively, the land on
which the piggeries and poultry projects were constructed. (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986,
p. 618).

x        x       x

The questions were answered and explained in the statement of then Commissioner Tadeo,
quoted as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x        x       x

"Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan. Ipinaaalam ko kay
Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang
kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker
kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August 2,
1986, Vol. II, p. 621).

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private
agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition
of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are
made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to
include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. (Rollo, p. 21).

Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms’ argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A.
6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and
implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their landholdings)
whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten
percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for
being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process (Rollo, p. 21).chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only
if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first
satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely
raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the
decision of the case itself (Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary
of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744;
Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343).

However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional
issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be
done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution and God as its
conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives
and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is
as ineffectual as intimidation, for all the awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the
Court will not hesitate "to make the hammer fall heavily," where the acts of these departments,
or of any official, betray the people’s will as expressed in the Constitution (Association of Small
Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v.
Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989).

Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had
assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution" (I)n
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" (Art. VIII, Section 1
of the 1935 Constitution; Article X, Section I of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as
part of the Freedom Constitution, and Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) and
which power this Court has exercised in many instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208
[1987]).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and
32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance
therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I agree that the petition be granted.

It is my opinion however that the main issue on the validity of the assailed provisions of R.A.
6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) and its Implementing Rules and
Guidelines insofar as they include the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in their coverage
can not be simplistically reduced to a question of constitutional construction.

It is a well-settled rule that construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. A close reading
however of the constitutional text in point, specifically, Sec. 4, Art. XIII, particularly the
phrase,." . . in case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof," provides a
basis for the clear and possible coverage of livestock, poultry, and swine raising within the ambit
of the comprehensive agrarian reform program. This accords with the principle that every
presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute and the court in
considering the validity of a statute should give it such reasonable construction as can be reached
to bring it within the fundamental law. 1

The presumption against unconstitutionality, I must say, assumes greater weight when a ruling to
the contrary would, in effect, defeat the laudable and noble purpose of the law, i.e., the welfare
of the landless farmers and farmworkers in the promotion of social justice, by the expedient
conversion of agricultural lands into livestock, poultry, and swine raising by scheming
landowners, thus, rendering the comprehensive nature of the agrarian program merely illusory.

The instant controversy, I submit, boils down to the question of whether or not the assailed
provisions violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution (Article II, section 1) which
teaches simply that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. 2

There is merit in the contention of the petitioner that substantial distinctions exist between land
directed purely to cultivation and harvesting of fruits or crops and land exclusively used for
livestock, poultry and swine raising, that make real differences, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

x        x       x

No land is tilled and no crop is harvested in livestock and poultry farming. There are no tenants
nor landlords, only employers and employees.

Livestock and poultry do not sprout from land nor are they "fruits of the land."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Land is not even a primary resource in this industry. The land input is inconsequential that all the
commercial hog and poultry farms combined occupy less than one percent (1%) (0.4% for
piggery, 0.2% for poultry) of the 5.45 million hectares of land supposedly covered by the CARP.
And most farms utilize only 2 to 5 hectares of land.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In every respect livestock and poultry production is an industrial activity. Its use of an
inconsequential portion of land is a mere incident of its operation, as in any other undertaking,
business or otherwise.
The fallacy of defining livestock and poultry production as an agricultural enterprise is nowhere
more evident when one considers that at least 95% of total investment in these farms is in the
form of fixed assets which are industrial in nature.

These include (1) animal housing structures and facilities complete with drainage, waterers,
blowers, misters and in some cases even piped-in music; (2) feedmills complete with grinders,
mixers, conveyors, exhausts, generators, etc.; (3) extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and
other supplies; (4) anti-pollution equipment such as bio-gas and digester plants augmented by
lagoons and concrete ponds; (5) deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses and accessory
facilities; (6) modern equipment such as sprayers, pregnancy testers, etc.; (7) laboratory facilities
complete with expensive tools and equipment; and a myriad other such technologically advanced
appurtances.

How then can livestock and poultry farmlands be arable when such are almost totally occupied
by these structures?

The fallacy of equating the status of livestock and poultry farmworkers with that of agricultural
tenants surfaces when one considers contribution to output. Labor cost of livestock and poultry
farms is no more than 4% of total operating cost. The 98% balance represents inputs not obtained
from the land nor provided by the farmworkers — inputs such as feeds and biochemicals (80%
of the total cost), power cost, cost of money and several others.

Moreover, livestock and poultry farmworkers are covered by minimum wage law rather than by
tenancy law. They are entitled to social security benefits where tenant-farmers are not. They are
paid fixed wages rather than crop shares. And as in any other industry, they receive additional
benefits such as allowances, bonuses, and other incentives such as free housing privileges, light
and water.

Equating livestock and poultry farming with other agricultural activities is also fallacious in the
sense that like the manufacturing sector, it is a market for, rather than a source of agricultural
output. At least 60% of the entire domestic supply of corn is absorbed by livestock and poultry
farms. So are the by-products of rice (rice-bran), coconut (copra meal), banana (banana pulp
meal), and fish (fish meal). 3

x        x       x

In view of the foregoing, it is clear that both kinds of lands are not similarly situated and hence,
can not be treated alike. Therefore, the assailed provisions which allow for the inclusion of
livestock and poultry industry within the coverage of the agrarian reform program constitute
invalid classification and must accordingly be struck down as repugnant to the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1990 > December 1990 Decisions > [UDK No.
9864 : December 3, 1990.] RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE of the [CAR] RTC, Branch 4, Iligan City, and SPOUSES
DOMINGO and EUGENIA MARTIL, Respondents.:

FIRST DIVISION
[UDK No. 9864 :  December 3, 1990.]
RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE
of the [CAR] RTC, Branch 4, Iligan City, and SPOUSES DOMINGO and EUGENIA
MARTIL, Respondents.
 
DECISION
 
NARVASA, J.:
 
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, acting as a special agrarian court, in the light of
Executive Orders Numbered 129-A and 229 and Republic Act No. 6657, is what is at issue in the
proceeding at bar.
Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres, now deceased, filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Lanao del Norte in March, 1988, "an agrarian case for damages by reason of the(ir) unlawful
dispossession . . .was tenants from the landholding" owned by the Spouses Domingo and
Eugenia Martil. 1 Several persons were also impleaded as defendants, including the Philippine
National Bank, it being alleged by the plaintiff spouses that said bank, holder of a mortgage on
the land involved, had caused foreclosure thereof, resulting in the acquisition of the property by
the bank as the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, and in the sale by the latter, some time
later, of portions of the land to the other persons named as its co-defendants (all employees of the
National Steel Corporation), and it being prayed that mortgage and the transactions
thereafter made in relation thereto be annulled and voided. 2
In an Order rendered on August 24, 1988, respondent Judge Felipe G. Javier, Jr. dismissed
the complaint. 3 He opined that by virtue of Executive Order No. 229 "providing the
mechanisms for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program approved
on July 24, 1987" — Executive No. 129-A approved on July 26, 1987, as well as the Rules of the
Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform, jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court over agrarian cases had been transferred to the Department of Agrarian Reform.:-
cralaw
The Tangub Spouses filed a petition for Certiorari with this Court, docketed as UDK-8867,
assigned to the Second Division. Discerning however no special and important reason for taking
cognizance of the action, this Court referred the same to the Court of Appeals, that tribunal
having concurrent jurisdiction to act thereon.: nad
The Court of Appeals, by Decision promulgated on October 23, 1989, 4 dismissed the petition,
finding that the jurisdictional question had been correctly resolved by the Trial Court. The Court
of Appeals, adverted to a case earlier decided by it, on August 30, 1989, Estanislao Casinillo v.
Hon. Felipe G. Javier, Jr., et al., in which it was "emphatically ruled that agrarian cases no longer
fall under the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts but rather under the jurisdiction of the DAR
Adjudication Board." 5 The ruling was grounded on the provisions of Executive Orders
Numbered 229, approved on July 22, 1987, and 129-A, issued on July 26, 1987, in relation to
Republic Act No. 6657, effective on June 15, 1988. Said executive orders, it was pointed out,
were issued by President Corazon C. Aquino undoubtedly in the exercise of her revolutionary
powers in accordance with Section 6, Article XVIII [Transitory Provisions] of the 1986
Constitution providing that the "incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative
powers until the first Congress is convened."
The petitioner Rufina Vda. de Tangub, now widowed, is once again before this Court,
contending that the Trial Court's "order of dismissal of August 26, 1988, and the decision of the
Honorable Court of Appeals affirming it, are patently illegal and unconstitutional" because they
deprive "a poor tenant access to courts and directly violate R.A. 6657, PD 946, and Batas Bilang
129."
The petition is without merit.
Section 1 of Executive Order No. 229 sets out the scope of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). It states that the program —
". . . shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produce, all
public and private agricultural land as provided in Proclamation No. 131 dated July
22, 1987, including whenever applicable in accordance with law, other lands of the
public domain suitable to agriculture."
Section 17 thereof.
1) vested the Department of Agrarian Reform with "quasi-judicial powers to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters," and
2) granted it "jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR
and the Department of Agriculture [DA], as well as "powers to punish for contempt
and to issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its orders or
decisions."
Section 4 of Executive Order No. 129-A made the Department of Agrarian Reform "responsible
for implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and, for such purpose,"
authorized it, among others, to —
"(g) Provide free legal services to agrarian reform beneficiaries and resolve agrarian conflicts
and land tenure problems; . . (and)
x  x  x
(j) Approve or disapprove the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into
non-agricultural uses: . ."
And Section 5 of the same Executive Order No. 129-A specified the powers and functions of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, including the following::- nad
"(b) Implement all agrarian laws, and for this purpose, punish for contempt and issue subpoena,
subpoena duces tecum, writ of execution of its decision, and other legal processes to ensure
successful and expeditious program implementation; the decisions of the Department may in
proper cases, be appealed to the Regional Trial Courts but shall be immediately executory
notwithstanding such appeal;
x  x  x
(h) Provide free legal service to agrarian reform beneficiaries and resolve agrarian conflicts
and land tenure related problems as may be provided for by laws;
(i) Have exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for
residential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses as may be provided . . ."
The jurisdiction thus conferred on the Department of Agrarian Reform, i.e.:
(a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;
(b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and
(c) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands
into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses,
is evidently quite as extensive as that theretofore vested in the Regional Trial Court by
Presidential Decree No. 946, which extended to the rights and obligations of persons in the
cultivation and use of agricultural land, and other matters affecting tenant-farmers, agricultural
lessees, settlers, owner-cultivators, farms' cooperatives or organizations under laws, Presidential
Decrees, Orders, instructions, Rules and Regulations in relation to the agrarian reform program.
6 Clearly, the latter must be deemed to have been eliminated by its being subsumed in the broad
jurisdiction conferred on the Department of Agrarian Reform. The intention evidently was to
transfer original jurisdiction to the Department of Agrarian Reform, a proposition stressed by the
rules formulated and promulgated by the Department for the implementation of the executive
orders just quoted. 7 The rules included the creation of the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
designed to exercise the adjudicatory functions of the Department, and the allocation to it of —
". . . original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter vested upon it by law, and all
cases, disputes, controversies and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Executive Order No. 229, Executive Order No.
129-A, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6289, Presidential Decree No.
27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations."
The implementing rules also declare that "(s)pecifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but
not be limited to . . (that theretofore vested in the Regional Trial Courts, i.e.) (c)ases involving
the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the cultivation and use of agricultural land
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws . . ."
The matter has since been further and definitively clarified by Republic Act No. 6657, which
was signed into law by President Aquino on June 10, 1988 and became effective immediately
after its "publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation" on June 15, 1988.
The Act makes references to and explicitly recognizes the effectivity and applicability of
Presidential Decree No. 229. 8 More particularly, the Act echoes the provisions of Section 17 of
Presidential Decree No. 229, supra, investing the Department of Agrarian Reform with original
jurisdiction, generally, over all cases involving agrarian laws, although, as shall shortly be
pointed out, it restores to the Regional Trial Court, limited jurisdiction over two groups of cases.
Section 50 reads as follows:
"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture [DA]
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR].
It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and
decide all cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity and
the merits of the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding before it.
It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require
submission of reports, compel the production of books and documents and answers to
interrogatories and issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and to enforce its writs through
sheriffs or other duly deputized officers. It shall likewise have the power to punish direct and
indirect contempts in the same manner and subject to the same penalties as provided in the Rules
of Court.
x  x  x
Notwithstanding an appeal to the court of appeals, the decision of the DAR shall be immediately
executory." 9
The Regional Trial Courts have not, however, been completely divested of jurisdiction over
agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of RA 6657, on the other hand, confers "special jurisdiction"
on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court
— at least one (1) branch within each province — to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts
qua Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Section 57 of the same law, original and
exclusive jurisdiction over:
1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to land-owners," and
2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under . . [the] Act."
In these cases, "(t)he Rules of Court shall apply . . unless modified by . . . (the) Act."
It is relevant to mention in this connection that —
(1) appeals from decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts "may be taken by filing a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt or
notice of the decision, . ." 10 and
(2) appeals from any "decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian
dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or
 interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be brought to
the Court of Appeals by Certiorari 11 except as otherwise provided . . . within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of a copy thereof," the "findings of fact of the DAR [being] final
and conclusive if based on substantial evidence." 12
The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City was therefore correct in dismissing Agrarian Case No.
1094. It being a case concerning the rights of the plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural land, not
involving the "special jurisdiction" of said Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, it
clearly came within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform, or
more particularly, the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, established precisely to wield the
adjudicatory powers of the Department, supra.
The petitioner had not bothered to substantiate her contention that she has been denied access to
the courts, which is just as well. The contention is on its face utterly without merit. It may profit
her and her counsel to realize that apart from granting all concerned parties access to a quasi-
judicial forum (the Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform), the law strives
to make resolution of controversies therein more expeditious and inexpensive, by providing not
only that the Board "shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence," supra, but
also that, as explicitly stated by the penultimate paragraph of Section 50 of the Act::-cralaw
"Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow farmers, or
their organizations in any proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however, That when there are
two or more representatives for any individual or group, the representatives should choose only
one among themselves to represent such party or group before any DAR proceedings."
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED, and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 16725 dated October 23, 1989, AFFIRMED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.