CASE NO.

FACTS:

When a law is sufficiently basic, a Judge owes to his office to simply apply it; anything
less than that would constitute ignorance of the law. This is the rule applied in the case of
Regional Trial Court JUDGE ARCAYA –CHUA. One of the cases assigned to JUDGE AC involves
RA 9262 also known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004
particularly about the issuance of Temporary Protective Order (TPO) . The case is between
husband and wife , Al and ana and their daughter Rina who is in the custody of Ana.

ISSUES:

On May 7, 2007, upon the complaint filed by Al against Ana, Judge AC issued a TPO
against Ana granting the temporary custody of Rina to Al after considering the psychological
evaluation report of the doctor , the statement of Rinas yaya and of Rina herself showing that
Ana was not the ideal person to whom custody of Rina should be awarded. The same TPO
issued against Ana also directed her to stay away from the home and office of Al , to cease and
desist from harassing , intimidating or threatening Al and to refrain from acts or omissions
that create an unreasonable risk to the health, safety or welfare of Al .

Per the Sheriffs return on May 8, 2007 however, the TPO was not fully implemented in
so far as the turning over of Rina”s custody to Al . This irked Al resulting in a heated argument
between him and the Clerk of Court. Al insisted that a break open order be issued or that the
Sheriff be permitted to enter the premises of Ana to search for the child then bring her to the
court. On the same day, Judge AC issued an order authorizing the sheriff granting Al”s demand.

The Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge AC “ speedy iss uance of orders
dated May 7 and May 8, 2007 not only showed her unusual interest in the case but it also
appeared to be tailor fitted to suit Al “s wishes as expressed in the latter”s heated argument
with Branch Clerk of Court. And because of reports rampant selling of TPO’s at that time, the
OCA recommended that Judge AC be administratively charged, among others, for Gross
Ignorance of the Law because under RA 9262, the TPO is issued only if the applicant is a
woman and not a man like Al.

APPLICABLE LAWS:

Under RA 9262, a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife. It is
specifically applicable “to women and their children” not to men. As a family court judge,
Judge Aracaya-Chua is expected to know the correct implementation of said law. She should be
the last person to err in the application of RA 9262 by issuing a TPO in favor of a man
purportedly to protect him against his wife. Certainly such TPO is absurd and anomalous. Thus
while the TPO maybe justified with respect to the protection accorded to their minor daughter
Rina, the same ,is not legally feasible with respect to Al.

When the efficiency in the discharge of a duty springs from a failure to consider the
rule, a law or a principle that is so basic and elementary, a judge is either too incompetent and
undeserving of the position or title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission can
be considered as deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.

Hence Judge AC’s error in this regard is Gross Ignorance of the law for which she should
be punished with suspension from office for six months without salary and other benefits ( OCA
vs ARCAYA-CHUA, A.M. OCA I.PI. 07-2630-RTJ, 619 SCRA, 59, 69,93)
CASE NO. 2 - (MACIAS vs. MACIAS, A.M RTJ- 01-1650, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009. 601 SCRA 203)

FACTS:

This is an administrative complaint filed against a Judge (Judge J Matias) by his own
wife (Gina ) for Immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service because
of his illicit and immoral relationship with a certain 20-year old single woman (Lani) and of using
court personnel as contact person and escort of her paramour as well as failing to hold court
sessions because of his extended date with his paramour.

Complainant attached to her complaint , affidavits of nine witnesses but five of them
recanted their affidavit. The hearing of the complaint was set for more than ten times but was
postponed because the parties was supposedly exerting all efforts for a possible reconciliation.
On March 11, 2002, the hearing was again postponed after the parties informed the
Investigating Justice of the last ditch effort to settle. But since no settlement was reached, the
hearing proceeded the following day, March 121, 2002.

From a list of seven witnesses, Gina manifested that only four would testify.

a. The first witness(Rudy ) testified that he saw Judge JM and Lani enter a house in the
afternoon ofOctober 17, 1999 after being hired by Gina”s son to tail Judge JM; and that
both dined and spent the night inside one bedroom. He said he accompanied Gina and
her son the next day and he saw Gina pull Lani outside the house creating commotion
within the neighborhood. On cross-examination, Rudy admitted that he was not sure if
Lani spent the night in the house or whether she left that night and returned the
following ; and that the spot where he positioned himself while observing Judge JM was
blocked by leaves and tall trees.
b. The next witness (Tony) testified that he was hired by Lani to drive a motorcycle that
was given by Judge JM to ran errands for both her and Judge JM. He said he saw Judge
JM visit Lani on three occasions and that he was once slapped by the judge for allegedly
peeping at Lani. On cross-examination , /tony admnitted that he was not sure if the
motorcycle was actually owned by Lani and that he just presumed it. He also admitted
that he had been residing with Gina’s counsel since the day he executed the affidavit.
c. The third witness (Dencio) was not presented because the intended testimony would
cover an event that took place after the filling of the complaint and did not covers the
matter alleged therein. Gina manifested her intention to amend the same so Dencio can
testify. Nevertheless the investigator required here to testify first in the direct
examination without prejudice to Dencio testifying later on. Gina however refused to
proceed with her direct testimony and insisted that she would testify only after Dencio
had testified. Despite the investigator’s warning, that refusal might be considered as
waiver for her right to present further witnesses, Gina refused. So the investigator
ordered her to rest her case but she again refused.
Judge JM himself testified in his defense. He denied the allegations of both
Rudy and Tony . He said that Gina also filed also filed a complaint for
concubinage against him but the same was dismissed by the Prosecutor for lack
of sufficient evidence. He believed that Gina’s accusations were brought about
by her psychiatric condition characterized as severe paronia.

However, in this case, Gina was not able to prove by substantial evidence
that Judge JM committed the acts complained of. If a judged is to be disciplined
for a grave offense like immorality which is punishable by dismissal, the evidence
against him must be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The
testimonies of Rudy and Tony are specious and insufficient to convincingly prove
that Judge JM commited disreputable conduct. Gina should not have refused to
testify. More than any one else, she has direct interest in making sure that the
evidence adduced met the necessary burden of proof. She should have been
more zealous in prosecuting her complaint.

Nevertheless, although the charges against Judge JM were not

satisfactorily proven, he cannot be completely exonerated. Rudy’s testimony
that he saw him having dinner with Lani and entering a bedroom with her may
not satisfactory prove the charge of immorality, but the act certainly suggested
the appearance of impropriety, he being a married man. Such behavior
undeniably constituted unbecoming conduct, a light offense punishable by a
fine. So Judge JM should be fined P10,000.00.
CASE NO. 3 - ARAGONES vs. BARILLO, A. M MTJ -10-1752, March 10, 2010)

FACTS:

A Judge may have committed several blunders in manners which are examples of poor
judgment and negligence. But before he could be held liable for gross misconduct it must be
alleged and shown that he was impelled by bad faith, dishonesty hatred or some corrupt
motive. Otherwise he is guilty of simple misconduct. This is illustrated in this case of Municipal
Trial Court Judge (Judge HB).

The administrative case against Judge HB arose from an election protest filed before
his court by Cario who lost to Tacio in the 2002 election for Punong Barangay in their village .
After the filing of the case, Tacio filed a Motion to disqualify the lawyer of Cario, Atty. Tirso,
because the latter has been suspended for one year and six months and the suspension order
has not yet been lifted. Jude HB disregarded the motion and ordered Atty. Tirso to still appear
in the subsequent hearings of the case because according to him the period of suspension had
already lapsed.

Tacio questioned this order of Judge HB before the Regional Trial Court in a petition of
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. Carlo asked for the dismissal of this petition on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC. Judge HB also filed his comment supporting Cario’s
position that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the election case. Then before the RTC could
resolve the petition, Judge HB already rendered decision in the election case declaring Cario the
winner over Tacio by 54 votes. Subsequently after supposedly receiving the RTC decision
dismissing Tacio’s petition he set the promulgation of his decision in the election case. But a day
after the decision, in the election case was promulgated Judge HB received a second decision of
the RTC this time granting Tacio’s petition ane election case declaring the proceedings in the
election case null and void.

Nevertheless, posted that whichever is the genuine RTC decision, whether for or
against Tacio, is null and void because the jurisdiction in election case belongs to the MTC and
COMELEC. Besides he said that it is already moot and academic because of his decision in the
election case in favor of Cario.

On the other hand, when his ruling in favor of Cario was reversed by the COMELEC on
appeal of Tacio, he himself filed a petition for certiorari even ahead of the petition filed by Cario
who was the real party aggrieved by such resolution.

These actuations of Judge HB thus prompted Tacio to file administrative case against
him. Tacio alleged that Judge HB has violated his constitutional rights and the Code of Judicial
Conduct and is guilty of bias , partiality Gross Ignorance of the law and abuse of authority.
 Judge HB’s deportment fell below the level required of the members of the bench.
When he allowed Atty. Tirso to appear and represent Cario despite the latters suspension
simply because the period of suspension had already lapsed, is not proper. He should know
that the lifting of the order of suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period stated in
the order. There must be an order from the Court lifting such suspension in order for a
suspended lawyer to be able to resume practice of law. He did not even exert efforts to
ascertain the correct rule or procedure regarding the lifting of the suspension or to determine
whether the suspension of Atty. Tirso had already been lifted. In fact, there is really no order
yet lifting Atty. Tirso’s suspension.

Judge HB’s behavior in connection with the two apparently conflicting decisions of the
RTC was highly dissatisfactory. The first decision was personally received and then delivered to
him by the MTC clerk of court but he did not even inquire who was the RTC personnel who
purportedly delivered it personally. His curiosity was already piqued when he received the
decision one month later yet he still did not verify its authenticity but instead immediately set
the promulgation of his own decision in the election case. Thereafter the said decision got lost
and he did not get another certified true copy. Then when he received the second decision , he
did not even verify which one was the correct decision . he could have been easily done this
because the RTC and his office were housed in the same building.

His filing of the petition for certiorari questioning the COMELEC ruling reversing his
own even ahead of the Petition of Cario who was the real party aggrieved is also highly
irregular. He is merely a nominal party where his decisions or orders are assailed. In so doing
Judge HB gave the impression of manifest bias and partiality.

APPLICABLE LAWS

Nevertheless , Judge HB should not be held liable for Gross Misconduct or Gross
ignorance of the Law. His errors are not as gross and patent as to produce and inference of
bad faith. They are not flagrant enough or done with ill motives so as to be classified as Gross
Misconduct or to warrant a finding of gross ignorance of the law. He is only guilty of simple
misconduct which subjected the MTC to distrust and accusations of partiality. He should be
Suspended for three months with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar act
will be dealt more severely.
Case no. 4

FACTS:

The case at bar involves a sworn complaint filed by spouses ALFREDO and FELINA BIO
charging respondent JUDGE REDENTOR VALERA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE Municipal Trial
Court of Bangued , Abra with violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
relative to Criminal Case No. 5853.

The record show that complainant –spouses were charged with Qualified Theft in
Criminal Case No. 5853 which was filed in the sala of respondent judge. It appears that since
1979, complainant-spouses have been a tenant of an agricultural land owned by Nenita
Vasquez. In June 1994, Victorino Valera , a second cousin of respondent judge and a brother of
landowner Nenita Vasquez , sold portions of subject land to Silvestre Castillo and Nida Enrile.
Complainant spouses questioned the transfer of ownership of said land and filed a case at the
Agrarian Office for legal redemption.

On September 16, 1994, while the agrarian case was still pending, the new landowner
SILVESTRE CASTILLO executed an affidavit alleging that complainant spouses and their 14 year
old son, Fred Bio , cut trees and shrubs on his land without his knowledge or permission. The
trees and shrubs , approximately worth P2,000.00, were used by the Bio Family for their
personal consumption. The affidavit supported Castillo’s complaint for Qualified Theft against
the Bio Fmily. It was subscribed before respondent judge.

On September 19, 1994, a complaint was filed by Castillo before the sala of respondent
judge. On September 22, 1994, respondent judge took the statement of Castillo and examined
his witness. Respondent judge then issued an order finding probable cause he hold the Bio
Family liable for qualified theft. He likewise issued a warrant of arrest against the Bio spouses
and their son fixed their bail at P5,000.00 each. They were arrested on the same day, at 2:35 in
the afternoon.

Complainant spouses charge that respondent judge gave undue benefit to Silvestre
Castillo. They alleged that the complaint for qualified theft was filed by Castillo himself and not
by a police officer, and that the order for their arrest was issued precipitately for they were
denied their right to file their Counter-Affidavit by the respondent judge.

On May 10, 1995, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), this court received the
comment of respondent judge. Respondent judge admits the Criminal Case No. 5853 for
Qualified Theft against the Bio spouses and their son was filed in his sala.he conducted a
preliminary investigation and examined complainant Castillo and his witness. He found
probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest pursuant to section 6, paragraph B of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure. Accused were forthwith apprehended but filed their bond. They
pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. At the trial, he discovered that the acts of accused fell
under a more serious offense, Violation of Section 68 of PD 705. Thus, he forwarded the case
to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. After a preliminary investigation, the Provincial
Prosecutor filed a criminal case against the Bio Family for Violation of Section 68 of PD 705
before the Regional Trial Court.

On February 14, 1996, Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez submitted his
evaluation and recommendation. He found that respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction
when he took cognizance of the case for qualified theft. He recommended that respondent
judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he took cognizance of the case for qualified theft. He
recommended that respondent judge be penalized for gross ignorance of the law and grave
abuse of discretion.

We affirm the findings of the Deputy Court Administrator.

Section 32 (2) of B.P 129 as amended by RA 7691, provides that Municipal Trial Courts,
inter alia, shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases where the offense is punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years, irrespective of the amount of the fine.

The penalty for qualified theft, as provided under Article 310, in relation to Article 309,
of the Revised Penal code is the penalty next higher by two (2) degrees than prision correctional
in its medium and maximum periods.

Clearly then, respondent judge, as presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Bangued, Abra, has no jurisdiction to try the complaint for qualified theft (Criminal Case no.
5853) filed by Silvestre Castillo in his sala. He should have conducted its preliminary
investigation in accordance with the procedure provided in Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure. This procedure was not followed by the respondent judge.

To cap it all, respondent judge did not draft a resolution of the preliminary investigation
for transmission to the provincial fiscal. Instead, respondent judge assumed jurisdiction over
the case and proceeded with the arraignment of the three (3) accused. The case was referred
to the provincial fiscal only after respondent discovered during the trial that a more serious
crime , violation of Section 68, PD 705, has been committed.

These acts of respondent judge betray his ignorance of the law governing the scope of
his courts jurisdiction and the proper procedure for the conduct of preliminary investigation.
His precipitate acts and orders in conducting preliminary investigation of the Bio Family also
constitute a great abuse of discretion. Justice Malcolm aptly described ideal judges as “men
who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with the
law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office undettered by outside influence ,
and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and
coordinate to the other two departments of the government.”

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent JUDGE REDENTOR B. VALERA, presiding judge,

Municipal Trial Court of Banqued, Abra is hereby found guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION and is hereby meted of fine of ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00), with a stern warning that repetition of same similar acts/omissions shall be
dealt with more severely.
CASE NO. 5

PROS. LEO C. TABAO, complainant, vs. JUDGE PEDRO S. ESPINA, respondent, RTJ 96-
1347.

REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR. FRANCISCO Q. AURILLO, JR. complainant, vs. JUDGE

PEDRO S. ESPINA, respondent, RTJ-96 1348, June 1r. manife4, 1996. En Banc.

FACTS:

In a sworn complaint dated 4 July 1995, First Assistant City Prosecutor for Tacloban City,
Leo C. Tabao, accused Judghe Pedro S. Espina then presiding judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
7, Tacloban City of: (a) Gross Irregularity, (b) Abuse of Authority and (c) Bias in favor of the
Accused in handling and deciding Criminal Case No. 93-04-197 entitled “People of the
Philippines vs. Salvador Padernal” a case for violation of Republic Act No. 6425 (Drug Pushing)

In another sworn complaint dated 21 July 1995, Regional state Prosecutor Francisco Q.
Aurillo Jr. manifested his desire to be a co-complainant against Judge Espina for his handling of
the above-mentioned criminal case.

Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao narrated Judge Espina’s acts which are allegedly merit
disciplinary sanction as follows;

1. On 19 April 1995, when accused Salvador Padernal finished testifying as the third
and last witness for the defense in the said Criminal Case No. 93-04-197, defense
counsel Atty. Lauro G. Noel made a reservation to submit within five (5) days ,
documentary evidence consisting of the accused alleged business licenses and
permits and the defense formal offer exhibits , after which the defense would rest its
case.
2. On 22 June 1995, the prosecution received a notice of promulgation of judgment in
the said criminal case which was set on 27 June 1995;
3. On the same day, 22 June 1995, the prosecution filed an urgent manifestation
seeking to postpone promulgation of judgment since the defense had not submitted
its documentary evidence, formal offer of exhibits and rested its case. The
prosecution also manifested its intention of adducing rebuttal evidence to the
documentary exhibits to be submitted.
4. On 23 June 1995, Judge Espina nonetheless issued an order reiterating the notice
setting the date of promulgation of judgment on 27 June 1995.
5. On 27 June 1995, Judge Espina promulgated a judgment in the said Criminal Case
No. 93-04-197 entitled “People vs. Salvador Padernal” acquitting the accused. The
decision was dated 1 June 1995.

Prosecutor Aurillo, aside from reiterating the grounds relied upon by Prosecutor Tabao
for holding Judge Espino administratively liable , adds that he (Aurillo) had earlier
assailed before the Court of Appeals an Order dated 22 April 1993, issued by respondent
Judge granting bail to the accused in the same above-mentioned criminal case without
giving the prosecution a chance to present the evidence to oppose the grant of bail. The
Court of Appeals in a decision dated 30 August 1994 annulled Judge Espina’s orders
granting bail to the accused and denying the prosecutions motion for reconsideration of
the order which granted bail. The dispositive part of the Court of Appeals decision which
became final and executory on 1994 reads:

“Wherefore for having issued with grave abuse of discretion , and for lack or in
excess of jurisdiction, the orders dated April 22, 1993 issued in Crim. Case No. 93-04-
197, are declared null and void and set aside. Consequently, the bail bond posted by
accused private respondent court is order to issue a warrant of arrest for the accused.

We leave to the sound discretion of respondent Judge , the herein petitioners

prayer for inhibition as he has not been given the opportunity to rule on said motion.

SO ORDERED.”

On 22 September 1995, respondent Judge Pedro S. Espina filed comment on the

first complaint, arguing that:

1. He preceeded to decide the case without the documentary evidence of the

defense since such documents were not submitted within the period
allowed;
2. He is of the opinion that the documentary evidence consisting of business
licenses and permits, even if offered to show that accused is gainfully
employed, is immaterial to the innocence or guilt of the accused;
3. Respondent judge invokes Section 3 and 4 of Rule 128 on the admissibility of
only evidence relevant to the issue;
4. Finally, respondent judge invokes Section 3(m)of Rule 131 (Not Sec 5(m)) of
Rule 128 as erroneously referred to in the comment) that presumes that
official duty was regularly performed unless the contrary is shown.
 On 19 December 1995, respondent Judge Espina filed a pleading entitled
“Consolidated Comments” alleging:

1. He granted bail to the accused (Padernal) after the Prosecuting Fiscal in Criminal
Case No. 93-04-197 agreed to submit the issue of bail for resolution after the
prosecution filed an opposition to the petition for bail;
2. He granted bail in the amount of P200,000.00 a day after the prosecution filed said
opposition;
3. He denied the prosecutors motion for reconsideration of the order granting bail on
the ground that the order had become final;
4. The enactment into law of Republic Act No. 7659 on 31 December 1993 and the
ruling of the Supreme Court giving the law (RA 7659) retroactive effect in so far as it
is beneficial to the accused, now entitles the accused in the subject criminal case to
bail as a matter of right;
5. It is an undue interference with the prerogative of the trial court in the exercise of
its authority to appreciate the evidence, to decide the relevance or irrelevance of
evidence.

On 6 February 1996, Office of the Court Administrator submitted to the court a

recommendation to absolve respondent Judge Espina from any administrative
liability, based on the opinion that the respondent acts constitute an exercise of
judicial prerogative.
We are not persuaded by the recommendation.
The court has repeatedly stressed the ruling that a hearing is absolutely
indespensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecutors
evidence is weak or strong on the issue of whether or not to grant bail to an
accused charged with heinous crimes where the impossible penalty is death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Hence, a denial of the prosecutors
request to adduce evidence, deprives it of procedural due process, a right to
which it is entitled equally as the defense.
In that case, as in the present case, respondent judge did not comment
on the averment that he had granted bail to the accused without hearing to
the prosecutors evidence . The reason for respondent judge “s failure to
comment on accusations reflecting on his competence and integrity can only be
surmised , but it is apparent that respondent either ignored this court’s
resolution ordering him to comment on all charges in the complaints or
respondent judge does not realize the gravity of the accusation that he had
granted bail without the required hearing.
In the former case, it is a gross misconduct, even outright disrespect to
the court, while in the latter case, not realizing the importance of
indispensability of a bail hearing is, to be sure, gross ignorance of the law.

For these two (2) acts constituting Grave misconduct, ignorance of the
law and gtross incompetence, respondent Judge Pedro S. Espina, now Actg.
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Malolos ,Bulacan is
hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
and accrued leave credits and with prejudice to re employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.