REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 25 OF 2021

AMAN LOHIA                 ...APPELLANT

Versus

KIRAN LOHIA       ...RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

1. The appellant1  had filed MAT Appeal (F.C.) No. 85/2020 in

the  High Court  of Delhi  at New Delhi 2, which stood withdrawn

and   transferred   to   this   Court   in   light   of   other   proceedings

pending between the parties in this Court involving overlapping

issues,   as   per   the   consent   order   passed   on   29.7.2020.     That

appeal, filed by the appellant is against the judgment and orders

dated   21.9.2019   of   the   Principal   Judge,   Family   Court,   Patiala

Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
DEEPAK SINGH
Date: 2021.03.17
14:14:30 IST
Reason:

1 husband of the respondent

2 for short, “the High Court”
1
House,   New   Delhi3,   whereby   the   application   filed   by   the

respondent4 for transposing her as petitioner in the petition filed

by   the   appellant   declaring   him   as   guardian   of   person   of   baby

Raina and appointing him as her guardian, came to be allowed

on the finding that the appellant had abandoned the petition.  On

the same day, by a separate order, the respondent was appointed

as sole, exclusive and absolute guardian and custodian of minor

child.

2. Both   the   parties   have   resorted   to   multiple   proceedings

against   each   other,   essentially   emanating   from   the   discordant

marital   relationship   between   them.     Besides   the   guardianship

petition filed by the appellant, the respondent had filed  habeas

corpus petition on two occasions and because of non­compliance

of   the   directions   issued   by   the   Court   regarding   custody   and

visitation rights, both had to file contempt petition against each

other.     The   appellant,   as   well   as,   his   parents   have   also   filed

special leave petition(s) against the judgment of the High Court in

habeas corpus petition(s) and contempt petition(s).  

3. As   aforesaid,   during   the   hearing   of   the   said   proceedings,

parties   consented   to   the   transfer   of   first   appeal   [MAT   Appeal

3 for short, “the Family Court”
4 wife of the appellant
2
(F.C.)  No.   85/2020] pending  before the  High  Court against  the

orders   of   the   Family   Court, dated  21.9.2019, which essentially

involves   issue   regarding   guardianship.     Besides,   a   divorce

petition is also pending between the parties.

4. Be that as it may, when the cases between the parties in

this   Court   were   listed   for   analogous   hearing,   it   was   deemed

appropriate   to   first   deal   with   the   question   of   guardianship,   to

which   suggestion,   the   parties   favourably   responded   and   have

addressed the Court on all aspects of that matter.   Intriguingly,

despite this Court vide order dated 29.7.2020 had withdrawn the

stated first appeal pending before the High Court and transferred

it to this Court, the High Court on 6.8.2020 in the very appeal,

even   after   taking   note   of   the  order   dated  29.7.2020  passed   by

this Court, proceeded to dispose of the appeal alongwith pending

applications therein.  That, obviously, could not have been done

by the High Court.  For, it had ceased to have jurisdiction to deal

with the appeal any further after the order of this Court dated

29.7.2020.     Nevertheless,   both   parties   advisedly   argued   the

transferred case (appeal) on merits without reference to the order

of the High Court, dated 6.8.2020.

3
5. As   aforesaid,   there   are   multiple   proceedings   pending

between the parties.   But, in this judgment, we may confine to

the   basic   facts   for   answering   the   matter   in   issue   before   us

regarding guardianship.

6. At the outset, we may note that for the nature of order that

we propose to pass in the present transferred case, it may not be

necessary for us to advert to all the factual matters pointed out

by both sides.   Suffice it to note that the guardianship petition

(G.P. No. 09/2018) was filed by the appellant under Section 7 of

the Guardians and Wards Act, 18905 read with Section 7(g) of the

Family Courts Act, 19846  on 9.2.2018 on the assertion that the

minor   child   was   in   his   custody   at   the   relevant   time.     The

appellant had prayed for following reliefs: ­

“A. To declare petitioner as guardian of person of baby
Raina.
B. Appointing   the   petitioner   as   guardian   of   person   of
baby Raina.
C. Any other relief this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and
proper.”

Notice   was   issued   on   the   said   petition   on   19.2.2018.     The

respondent   did   not   file   written   statement   until   August,   2018,

5 for short, “the 1890 Act”
6 for short, “the 1984 Act”
4
when the appellant moved a formal application for amendment of

the petition under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the

Code of Civil Procedure, 19087 and Section 10 of the 1984 Act to

bring   on   record   certain   subsequent   events   including   regarding

habeas   corpus  petition(s).     This   application   was   filed   by   the

appellant on 21.8.2018.   There is nothing on record to indicate

that the Family Court dealt with and disposed of this application

before the impugned order came to be passed on 21.9.2019.  The

appellant filed another application under Order VI Rule 17 read

with Section 151 of the CPC and Section 10 of the 1984 Act for

amendment   of   the   petition,   on   4.10.2018.     The   Family   Court

directed the respondent to file reply to this application.  However,

the respondent did not file reply even to this application.  In view

of   certain   further   developments,   the   appellant   moved   another

application   before   the   Family   Court   on   20.2.2019   to   place   on

record copy of order dated 13.2.2019 passed by the High Court in

Civil   Contempt   Petition   (CCP)   No.   116/2019   against   the

respondent and for issuing further directions that because of the

contemptuous   conduct   of   the   respondent,   she   should   not   be

heard on any application until she purges contempt.  The Family

7 for short, the “CPC”

5
Court, besides taking note of that application, also recorded in its

order dated 20.2.2019 that the application filed by the appellant

under Order VI Rule 17 was still pending and notified the same

for hearing on 8.3.2019.   When the matter was listed before the

Family   Court   on   8.3.2019,   the   respondent   without   any   prior

intimation, started arguing application under Section 26 of the

Hindu Marriage Act, 19558 filed by her, despite the fact that the

said application was not listed for argument on that date.  What

was  listed  on that day were the four applications, namely, two

applications   under   Order   VI   Rule   17   of   the   CPC   filed   by   the

appellant,  an  application to take on record copy of High Court

order dated 13.2.2019 in CCP No. 116/2019 and the fourth one ­

filed by the respondent under Order VII Rule 11 for dismissal of

the guardianship petition (G.P. No. 09/2018).   However, all the

four applications stood deferred on that day.  

7. The respondent then filed an application under Section 151

of the CPC for declaring and appointing her to be the sole and

absolute   guardian   and   custodian   of   the   minor   child.     This

application was filed by the respondent on 13.9.2019.  No notice

was given to the appellant of this application nor advance copy

8 for short, “the HMA”

6
thereof   was   supplied  to   him  personally  or  his counsel.   It had

been averred in that application, that from the proceedings before

the High Court appended to the application it was amply clear

that the appellant had proved himself to be unworthy, incapable

and incompetent to act in the welfare of child and discharge any

parenting privilege whatsoever.  In the wake of serious allegations

against the appellant, this application was ordered to be posted

for hearing before the Family Court on 16.9.2019 at 2.00 p.m., as

noted in the order dated 13.9.2019, which reads thus: ­

“GP No. 09/2018
Aman Lohia vs. Kiran Lohia
13.09.2019
Present: Ms.   Rytim   Vohra,   Ld.   Counsel   for   the
respondent/ applicant.
File taken up today on application under Section 151
CPC seeking appropriate directions filed on behalf of the
respondent/applicant.
Let   notice   of   the   application   be   issued   to   the
petitioner/non­applicant and his counsel on filing of
PF as well as through E­mail as per law.   Process be
given dasti.
Be listed on 16.09.2019 at 2.00 pm.
Ld.   Counsel   for   the   petitioner   has   filed   on   record
photocopy of the order of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi
dated 12.09.2019 vide which the application for transfer
of the case from this court to some other court has been
dismissed.  Since now there is no bar or restraint for this
court to proceed with the case notice has been issued to
the non­applicant/petitioner.”
(emphasis supplied)

7
In terms of the said order, the matter was notified on 16.9.2019

when following order came to be passed: ­

“GP No. 09/2018
Aman Lohia vs. Kiran Kaur Lohia
16.9.2019
Present: Sh. Rajat Bhalla, Ld. Counsel for the petitioner.
Ld. Proxy Counsel for the respondent.
File taken up today as Sh. Rajat Bhalla, Ld. Counsel
for   the   petitioner   has   been   served   with   notice   of   the
applications moved by ld. Counsel for the respondent for
early hearing and issuance of directions.
Sh.   Rajat   Bhalla,   Advocate   who   was   appearing   on
behalf of the petitioner in the present petition and in HMA
Bearing No. 625/18 (new No. 663/18) states that since he
has   not   received   any   instructions   from   his   client,
therefore, he seeks discharge from this case.  He has also
pointed out that he has made similar request before the
Hon’ble   High   Court   of   Delhi   in   same   cases   pending
between the same parties and he was discharged in the
same vide order dated 12.9.2019.  He also states that he
had written e­mail to his client and had tried other modes
of   service   also   to   inform   him   that   he   should   make
alternative arrangements for  a counsel as he is seeking
discharge in this case.  He states that he had sent e­mails
to the counsel for  the respondent  that he was no more
representing the petitioner Sh. Aman Lohia in any of the
matters handled by him.
Heard.
After hearing counsel for the petitioner and having
gone   through   the   e­mails   that   he   has   sent   to   the
petitioner and the copies of the orders of the Hon’ble
High Court of Delhi, he is discharged from this case.
No   one   is   present   thus   today   on   behalf   of   the
petitioner.  Notice was sent to him dasti and report on
the same is awaited.
Be listed on 19.9.2019 at 2.30 pm.
Earlier   date   given   i.e.   30.10.2019   stands
cancelled.”
(emphasis supplied)

8
In the meantime, the respondent filed another application under

Order I Rule 10 and Order XXIII Rule 1A read with Section 151 of

the CPC to transpose her as the petitioner in the guardianship

petition   (G.P.   No.   09/2018).     This   application   was   filed   on

18.9.2019.  The reliefs claimed therein read thus: ­

“PRAYER
In   the   above   stated   facts   and   circumstances,   it   is
respectfully   prayed   that   this   Hon’ble   Court   may   be
pleased to:
a. Transpose   the   Respondent   as   the   Petitioner
and the Petitioner as a Respondent in the present
case.
b. Pass such other orders or directions as it may
deem fit and proper in the interest of justice.”

8. On   19.9.2019,   the   matter   was   listed   before   the   Family

Court, when the Court passed the following order: ­

“GP No. 09/2018
Aman Lohia vs. Kiran Kaur Lohia
19.09.2019
Present: None for petitioner.
Respondent   in   person   with   Ld.   Counsel   Ms.
Malvika Rajkotia.
Ld.   Counsel   for   the   respondent   has   filed   an
application under Order 1 Rule 10 and Order 23 Rule
1 a r/w Section 151 CPC to transpose the respondent.
Be listed for consideration on 20.09.2019 at
1.00 pm.”
(emphasis supplied)

On   20.9.2019,   when   the   matter   was   taken   up,   the   Court

recorded the following order: ­

9
 “GP No. 09/2018
Aman Lohia vs. Kiran Kaur Lohia
20.09.2019
Present: None for petitioner.
Respondent   in   person   with   Ld.   Counsel   Ms.
Malvika Rajkotia.
Arguments   have   been   heard   from   2:15   to   5:00
pm   on   applications,   one   application   under   Order   1
Rule 10 and Order 23 Rule 1a r/w Section 151 CPC
and   other   application   under   Section   151   CPC   have
been filed by the Ld. Counsel.
Ld. Counsel for the respondent seeks time to file
case law.
Be listed for orders on 21.09.2019.

Sd/­
Swarna Kanta Sharma
Principal Judge, Family Court
Patiala House Court, New Delhi
20.09.2019 (R)”

Once again, the Court did not advert to the crucial aspects as to

whether   the   application   under   consideration   had   been   duly

served   upon   the   appellant   much   less   notice   relating   to

application under Section 151 of the CPC filed by the respondent,

as also, the subsequent application for transposition under Order

I Rule 10.  

9. Accordingly,   on   21.9.2019,   the   matter   was   posted   for

hearing before the Family Court when two separate orders came

to be passed.   The first order was that despite knowledge about

the   pending   proceedings,   the   appellant   had   abandoned   and

10
withdrawn from  the   case  for which reason the respondent was

entitled  to   be   transposed  as the petitioner  in  the guardianship

petition and seek declaration that she was the guardian of the

minor   child.   It   is   stated   that   no   notice   of   the   transposition

application was   ever  served on the appellant nor  was he given

notice regarding hearing of the said application before the Court,

despite the fact that his counsel had been discharged from the

case and the appellant was not represented by any other counsel.

On the same day, the Family Court then proceeded to decide the

main guardianship petition (G.P. No. 09/2018).   After recording

the material facts pointed out by the respondent, it proceeded to

hold that giving guardianship of the minor child, who was only

two and half years of age, to the appellant, was not advisable.  By

virtue of his conduct, he (appellant) had disentitled himself to be

declared   as   guardian   of   the   minor   child.     After   recording   this

finding,   the   Court   proceeded   to   hold   that   in   the   paramount

interest and welfare of the child, the respondent mother needs to

be   declared   as   the   sole,   exclusive   and   absolute   guardian   and

custodian of the minor child.

11
10. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant approached the High Court

by   way   of   MAT   Appeal   (F.C.)   No.   85/2020   to   challenge   the

aforesaid judgment and orders passed by the Family Court, dated

21.9.2019.     The   appellant   had   raised   diverse   grounds   to

challenge   the   correctness   of   the   view   expressed   by   the   Family

Court including the manner in which the impugned orders were

passed,   without   giving   fair   opportunity   to   him   and   also   about

failure   to   follow   mandatory   procedure.     The   impugned   orders

were passed by the Family Court without following due process of

law and in breach of principles of natural justice, in the matters

of   discharging   his   advocate   and   not   issuing   notice   to   the

appellant even thereafter, calling upon him to make alternative

arrangements,   and   moreso   in   allowing   transposition   of   the

respondent as petitioner and appellant as respondent and on the

same day to declare her (respondent) as the sole, exclusive and

absolute guardian and custodian of the minor child.  

11. According   to   the   appellant,   the   judgment   under   appeal   is

not a judgment in terms of Section 17 of the 1984 Act.  That the

12
record   of  the   case  makes  it amply  clear  that the Family  Court

failed to adhere to the established practice and procedure to be

followed for adjudicating the disputes brought before it under the

1984 Act.  That is evident from the order dated 13.9.2019, which

records   that   notice   be   issued   to   the   appellant   herein   and   his

counsel   returnable   on   16.9.2019.   at   2.00   p.m.     However,   on

16.9.2019, when the counsel appearing for the appellant – Mr.

Rajat   Bhalla   informed   the   Court   that   he   intended   to   take

discharge and his application came to be allowed by the Court,

no notice thereof was given to the appellant.   The order clearly

records that dasti report regarding service of notice sent to the

appellant   was   still  awaited.   As  a  matter  of  fact,  on   an  earlier

date, the Court had posted the matter for 30.10.2019, which date

stood unilaterally cancelled by the Family Court in terms of order

dated 16.9.2019, again without notice to the appellant.  Further,

no affidavit of service was filed on record indicating the factum of

service of notice on the appellant regarding the application under

Section 151 of the CPC filed by the respondent praying that she

be   declared   as   the   sole,   exclusive   and   absolute   guardian   and

custodian of the minor child.  Despite that, the Court proceeded
13
with   the   matter   on   19.9.2019,   but   before   that   date,   another

application   came   to   be   filed  by   the  respondent   for   transposing

her as petitioner in the  guardianship petition and appellant as

respondent therein, for the reasons mentioned in the application

dated 18.9.2019.  Even copy of this application was not served on

the   appellant   and   despite   that,   the   Family   Court   proceeded

therewith on 19.9.2019 without recording the fact as to whether

the appellant was duly served with the earlier application or the

earlier notice; and yet chose to list the matter on the next day

i.e., 20.9.2019 for consideration at 1.00 p.m.  In short, it is urged

that   the   record   plainly   speaks  about   the  manner  in  which   the

Family   Court  proceeded   to  pass the  orders on  21.9.2019, with

tearing hurry at the behest of the respondent whilst completely

disregarding the mandatory procedure prescribed in the 1984 Act

read   with   the   provisions   of   the   CPC.     It   was   a   clear   case   of

infraction of principles of natural justice.  It is urged that it was

not open to the Family Court to assume the factum of appellant

having   abandoned   the   proceedings   unless   he   had   appeared   in

Court   to   say   so   or   had   informed   the   Court   in   writing   in   that

regard.   It is   a  question of fact and not a matter  for deducing

14
legal presumption.  Assuming that the Court was convinced that

the appellant was not pursuing the proceedings diligently or was

creating   obstruction   in   any   manner,   the   Court,   at   best,   could

have dismissed the petition filed by the appellant on the ground

of default or non­prosecution under Order IX Rule 8 of the CPC.

In   any   case,   since   the   Court   chose   to   proceed   with   the

transposition application ex parte against the appellant, it should

have   clearly   recorded   that  fact  in  its order   and the  reasons in

support   thereof.     Besides,   after   transposition   of   respondent   as

the   petitioner   in   the   guardianship   petition   (G.P.   No.   09/2018)

filed by the appellant and appellant as respondent therein, it was

imperative for the Court to issue notice to the appellant to file his

response in the proceedings.  As a matter of fact, in guardianship

proceedings, the question of transposition does not arise.  For, it

is a substantive petition founded on cause of action personal to

the person claiming to be guardian of his own ward.   Moreover,

admittedly, the respondent had never filed written statement to

oppose the guardianship petition filed by the appellant much less

reply to the application(s) for amendment of petition, which could

be   treated   by   the   Court   as   guardianship   petition   filed   by   the

15
respondent herself.  In either case, the Court was obliged to issue

notice to the appellant and only after service of notice, could have

proceeded in the matter.  If the respondent had any difficulty in

effecting service of notice on the appellant, the Court could have

allowed   the   respondent   to   serve   the   appellant   through

substituted service under Order V of the CPC.  Even that attempt

was   not   made   by   the   Court.     Instead,   it   presumed   that   the

appellant   had   abandoned   the   proceedings.     That   approach   is

manifestly wrong.   Hence, the procedure followed by the Family

Court until culmination of proceedings into judgment and orders

dated 21.9.2019, is vitiated in law.

12. The   appellant   is   relying   on   dictum   in  Mamata   Mayee

Sahoo vs. Abinash Sahoo9, wherein the Orissa High Court took

note   of   the   procedural   compliances   to   be   made   by   the   Family

Court.   According to the appellant, the decision relied upon by

the Family Court of Delhi High Court in  Someshwar Dayal vs.

Anupama   Dayal10,   was   inapposite.     It   was   clearly

distinguishable, as there was nothing on record to indicate that

the petitioner had expressly abandoned the proceedings or after
9 2015 SCC Online Ori 167
10 2016 SCC Online Del 4585
16
due   opportunity,   had   committed   default   in   any   manner.     The

present   case   indeed,   was   one   of   counsel   appearing   for   the

appellant having withdrawn from the case.  That does not mean

that the appellant had abandoned the proceedings.   It is urged

that the application filed by the respondent under Section 151 of

the CPC, in law, could not be regarded as a substantive petition

required   to   be   filed   under   Section   25   of   the   1890   Act   for   a

declaration/appointment as guardian.   In any case, the Family

Court was under obligation to insist for the written statement to

be filed by the respondent including reply to the applications filed

by the appellant under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC and then to

frame issues on which the matter could proceed.  Not only that,

the   Family   Court   was   obliged   to   record   evidence   before

adjudicating the matters in issue and pronounce final declaration

and judgment under Section 17 of the 1984 Act, which obliges

the Family Court to record a concise statement of the case, the

point for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for

such   decision.     The   Family   Court   in   the   guise   of   entertaining

application   under   Section   151   of   the   CPC,   cannot   assume   the

plenary power of a constitutional Court, but is obliged to decide

the   case   as   per   the   mandatory   procedure   prescribed   in   the

17
concerned Act and/or the CPC, as the case may be, for conduct

of   trial   and   inquiry.     Strikingly,   the   Family   Court,   after

pronouncing the impugned judgment and orders on 21.9.2019,

upon an application filed by the respondent under Section 151 of

the CPC, despite becoming  functus officio, issued directions vide

order dated 16.10.2019 to the effect that the custody of the minor

child be handed over to the respondent mother within specified

time.   It was matter of record that the child was away from the

jurisdiction of the Family Court when the relevant orders came to

be passed.   In law, therefore, the Family Court could not have

exercised   jurisdiction   as   noted   in  Ruchi   Majoo   vs.   Sanjeev

Majoo11.

13. The appellant asserts that he is a loving, caring, concerned

and affectionate father and the minor cannot be denied of all that

merely because of events that unfolded during the pendency of

habeas corpus  petition(s) or contempt petition(s) before the High

Court.     The   central   concern   of   the   Court   should   be   the

paramount welfare and interest of the minor child.  The approach

of the Court in that regard ought to be child­centric.   The issue

11 (2011) 6 SCC 479

18
cannot be answered on the basis of claims and counter claims of

the   warring   parents,   as   to   deny   the   child   of   parentage   of   her

father because of other acts of commission and omission of the

father.   To do so would, in effect, be punishing the minor child

and depriving her of the love and affection of her father.   That

must   be   eschewed.     The   Family   Court   in   such   proceedings   is

obliged to record a clear finding about the unfitness or otherwise

of the father to be a guardian.  That must be in the context of the

child care and not other matters or worldly activities of father.

As   a   matter   of   fact,   contends   the   learned   counsel,   the   most

appropriate course would be to follow the joint shared parenting

plan, in which the child would interact with both the parents in

equal measure.   Further, the paramount interest and welfare of

the   child   is   not   limited   to   being   connected   with   father   and

mother, but even other family members from both sides for her

well­being   and   holistic   growth.     That   is   vital   in   the   context   of

child   psychology   and   upbringing.     As   a   matter   of   fact,   during

counselling, the respondent had accepted the fact that because

she   is   a   working   woman,   the   child   can   remain   with   the

grandparents,   who   were   staying   only   few   houses   away,   during

19
the   day   time   on   working   days.     The   appellant   had   highlighted

several aspects about the unfitness of the respondent to groom

the child or devote enough time and attention herself.

14. Reliance   has   been   placed   on   the   dictum   in  Savitha

Seetharam vs. Rajiv Vijayasarathy Rathnam12,  JK vs. NS13,

Tushar   Vishnu   Ubale   vs.   Archna   Tushar   Ubale 14,  Law

Commission  of  India  Report  No.  25715  and  Child Access  &

Custody Guidelines alongwith Parenting Plan16.  According to

the appellant, joint custody or shared parenting would be in the

“best interest and welfare of the child”.   That would ensure that

every decision taken regarding the child is for fulfilment of her

basic rights and needs, identity, social well­being and physical,

emotional   and   intellectual   development.     Reliance   is   placed   on

decision   in  Lahari   Sakhamuri   vs.   Sobhan   Kodali17,  Ashish

Ranjan vs. Anupma Tandon & Anr.18, Tejaswini Gaud & Ors.

12 2020 (4) AKR 372 (paragraphs 9-11, 13, 23 and 32)

13 2019 SCC Online Del 9085 (paragraphs 89 and 95-97)
14 AIR 2016 Bom 88 (paragraphs 15 and 17-20)
15 Law Commission of India Report No. 257 – Reforms in Guardianship and Custody Laws
in India (May, 2015)
16 Child Access & Custody Guidelines alongwith Parenting Plan by Child Rights Foundation
NGO, Mumbai, 2014
17 (2019) 7 SCC 311
18 (2010) 14 SCC 274
20
vs.   Shekhar   Jagdish   Prasad   Tewari   &   Ors.19,   and  Vivek

Singh vs. Romani Singh20.

15. It is urged that the respondent for reasons best known to

her,   precipitated   the   matter   despite   the   pre­emptory   directions

given by this Court in connected proceedings between the parties,

by taking U.S. nationality of the minor child and also obtained a

Consular   Report   of   Birth   Abroad   Status   (CRBA)   in   December,

2019 from the U.S. Embassy.   The respondent herself is a U.S.

citizen.  Therefore, the appellant apprehends that the respondent

has intention to remove the child away from the jurisdiction of

the Courts in India and permanently deny access to him and his

family members.  Since the respondent has secured CRBA status

on   the   basis   of   declaration   given   by   the   Family   Court   vide

impugned judgment and orders, upon setting aside of that order,

all   consequential   claims/benefits   accrued   or   derived   by   the

respondent on that basis, must also become  non­est  in the eyes

of law.  

16. As a matter of fact, in the Indian context, neither provisions

of the 1984 Act nor the 1890 Act, envisage a declaration in favour

19 (2019) 7 SCC 42
20 (2017) 3 SCC 231
21
of the parent to be the sole, exclusive and absolute guardian and

custodian   of   the   minor   child.     Such   declaration   has   been

intentionally obtained by the respondent from the Family Court

to   serve   her   ulterior   purpose.     The   appellant   has   taken   us

through   other   points   to   buttress   the   argument   that   the

respondent   is   not   a   fit   person   for   parental   custody   or

guardianship of the minor child.  The appellant has also relied on

the observations in Nithya Anand Raghavan vs. State (NCT of

Delhi)   &   Anr.21,  Prateek   Gupta   vs.   Shilpi   Gupta   &   Ors. 22,

Kanika Goel vs. State of Delhi & Anr.23  and  ABC vs. State

(NCT of Delhi)24.   According to the appellant, the father being a

natural   guardian   under   the   Hindu   Laws,   is   entitled   for

declaration of guardianship unless it is found in a given case that

he is unfit in the context of parenting of the minor child or would

act   against   the   interest   and   welfare  of  the  minor   child,   as  the

case may be.  According to the appellant, the father is a natural

guardian.  Irrespective of the mother’s custody, the guardianship

of   the   father   cannot   be   divested   in   law.     To   buttress   this

21 (2017) 8 SCC 454

22 (2018) 2 SCC 309
23 (2018) 9 SCC 578
24 (2015) 10 SCC 1
22
contention,   reliance   is   placed   on  Roxann   Sharma   vs.   Arun

Sharma25.  It is contended that unless the father is declared as

unfit,   the   relief   of   declaring  him   to  be  the  guardian   cannot  be

declined.   The fact that the appellant had taken the child away

from the jurisdiction of the Family Court, does not mean that he

was   a  kidnapper  of   the   child, as he  continues  to  be a natural

guardian.

17. It   is   also   urged   that   interparental   child   removal   is   not   a

statutory   offence.     Reliance   has   been   placed   on  the  Hague

Convention   on   the   Civil   Aspects   of   International   Child

Abduction,  dated   25.10.198026  to   contend   that   issue   of

accession   to   the   1980   Hague   Convention   is   still   under

consideration of the Government of India and interparental child

abduction has not yet found any recognition in Indian law.  

18. According   to   the   appellant,   the   impugned   judgment   and

orders cannot be sustained on any parameter and need to be set

aside and instead, the guardianship petition (G.P. No. 09/2018)

filed by the appellant be made absolute in favour of the appellant.

25 (2015) 8 SCC 318

26 for short, “the 1980 Hague Convention”
23
19. The respondent has stoutly refuted the stand taken by the

appellant.  It is urged that the Family Court had no other option,

but to proceed on the basis that the appellant had abandoned the

proceedings   before   that   Court.     Merely   because   there   is   no

express   statement   forthcoming   from   the   appellant   in   the

proceedings before the Family Court, does not mean that he had

not abandoned the proceedings before the Family Court by his

conduct   and   other   circumstances   established   from   the   record

and so noted even by the High Court.  The appellant admittedly

filed   proceedings   in   the   UAE   Court   claiming   himself   to   have

converted to Islam.  It is only when it became impossible for him

to   continue   with   those   proceedings   and   his   arrest   became

inevitable,   he   had   no   other   option,   but   to   withdraw   those

proceedings and submit to the jurisdiction of this Court.  Such a

litigant cannot be shown any indulgence nor would deserve any

sympathy.  The appellant is required to discharge high burden of

estoppel,   in   raising   procedural   deficiencies   in   the   decision­

making process by the Family Court.  In any case, the facts and

the record would reveal that the appellant had full notice about

the   progress   of   the   matter   and   the   applications   filed   by   the

respondent, as is evident from his email trail.  It is urged that the
24
appellant because of his conduct, has denied himself of raising

technical pleas about procedural lapses committed by the Family

Court.     The   procedural   justice   is   always   subservient   to   the

substantive justice.  It is urged that hyper technical argument of

the   appellant   regarding   non­compliance   of   procedure   by   the

Family Court, needs to be negatived in light of the exposition in

Sangram   Singh   vs.   Electional   Tribunal,   Kotah   &   Anr. 27,

State   of   Punjab   &   Anr.   vs.   Shamlal   Murari   &   Anr.28  and

Rosy Jacob vs. Jacob A. Chakramakkal29.  

20. In   the   alternative,   it   is   submitted   that   there   are   strong

reasons why the order passed by the Family Court needs to be

upheld.   For, the appellant not only converted himself to Islam

but also indulged in misadventure by abducting minor child and

taking her away outside India and obtained Dominica citizenship

and   Dominica   passport   for   the   minor.     The   mother   being   the

natural   guardian   and   the   appellant   having   misconducted

rendered himself to be unfit as guardian, the Family Court justly

recognised the respondent as the sole guardian of the minor.

27 AIR 1955 SC 425 (paragraph 16)

28 (1976) 1 SCC 719 (paragraph 8)
29 (1973) 1 SCC 840
25
21. As regards the U.S. citizenship taken by the respondent of

the   minor   child   and   U.S.   passport,   the   respondent   through

counsel submits that she would surrender the same.   That was

taken by the respondent in good faith and for the welfare of the

minor   child.     It   is   urged   that   the   Family   Court   has   done

independent   evaluation   of   the   relevant   factual   matrix   before

concluding that giving guardianship to the appellant father would

not be advisable and instead, the respondent was the fit person

to   be   appointed   as   sole,   exclusive   and   absolute   guardian   and

custodian of  the  minor  child.   That can be discerned from  the

discussion in paragraphs 15, 17 to 28 of the impugned judgment.

It   is   urged   that   the   minor   child   is   not   comfortable   while   in

company of the appellant or his family members, whereas, she is

being   properly   looked   after   by   the   respondent   and   her   family

members.     Even   though   the   respondent   is   a   working   woman

being a professional, she is conscious of her obligation towards

the minor child and gives her best for the welfare and upbringing

of her daughter.  The present arrangement of visitation permitted

by   this   Court   in   the   connected   proceedings   to   appellant   can

continue  on same terms without disturbing the decision of the

Family   Court  declaring   the  respondent  as  the  sole  guardian  of
26
the minor.  The respondent is willing to abide by any terms and

conditions,   as   may   be   imposed   by   this   Court   to   secure   the

welfare   and   interest   of   the   minor   child.     The   appellant   having

converted himself to Islam for reasons best known to him, has

disentitled   himself   from   acting   as   a   guardian   of   the   child   who

continues to remain Hindu.  

22. Reliance is placed on Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and

Guardianship Act, 195630.  As per the proviso therein, no person

is entitled to act as the natural guardian of a minor under the

provisions of Section 6, if he has ceased to be a Hindu.   There

being a clear embargo by statute coupled with the welfare of the

minor   child,   the   appellant   is   unfit   for   a   declaration   sought   by

him.  The appellant had indulged in abduction of the minor child

on   two   occasions,   which   has   been   frowned   upon   by   the   High

Court   in  habeas   corpus  proceedings   and   more   particularly,   in

contempt   action   initiated   against   the   appellant   and   his   family

members.   That itself is a good reason to deny any relief to the

appellant.     Rather,   the   appellant  should not  be heard until  he

purges contempt and those proceedings are still pending before

this   Court.     This   Court   ought   to   exercise  parens   patriae

30 for short, “the 1956 Act”

27
jurisdiction, keeping in mind the paramount interest of the minor

child   as   observed   in  Gaurav   Nagpal   vs.   Sumedha   Nagpal31,

especially because the appellant has acted against the welfare of

the minor.  Any other view would result in rewarding him for his

misconduct and misadventure including the disobedience of the

directions issued by the High Court, by abducting the minor on

two occasions, the first one when she was seven months old and

the second when she was only two years old.   The minor must

have undergone traumatic experience because of such abduction

and taking her away to foreign country completely blocking out

from her mother (respondent).  This is not a case of over­zealous

emotional father, who loves his child, but is a revengeful father

who hates his wife (mother of minor child), much more than his

proclaimed love for his child.   The appellant is unfit as a model

parent and does not have moral values of an upstanding citizen

who respects the law and cares about the people around him.  

23. Reliance   has   been   placed   on   the   pleadings   filed   by   the

appellant, wherein he had gone to the extent of showing distrust

in the judicial system of this country and had converted himself

to Islam only to ensure that the custody of the child remains with

31 (2009) 1 SCC 42
28
him.     He   did   not   stop   at   that,   but   also   fraudulently   obtained

passport for the minor child from the Dominica when her Indian

passport was in custody of the High Court.   He devised a legal

stratagem of using Indian legal system, as well as, the Courts in

UAE for achieving his immoral plan of retaining custody of the

minor child with him and to completely deny the respondent of

any access or interaction whatsoever with the minor child.   The

appellant   had   approached   the   Court   of   equity   and   having

misconducted   himself   and   abused   the   judicial   process,   is   not

entitled for any relief whatsoever.   It is urged that by now, it is

well   established   that   “maternal   preference   rule”   is   the   rule

codified in the form of Section 6(a) of the 1956 Act, which gives

right   to   the   mother   to   get   absolute   custody   of   the   minor

daughter.     Reliance   is   placed   on   dictum   in  ABC  (supra)   in

support of this proposition.  According to the respondent, there is

an ongoing risk of third kidnapping or attempt in that behalf by

the appellant.  The appellant is a flight risk and cannot be pinned

down in the event he manages to escape with the minor child.  To

safeguard the interest of the minor child in appropriate way and

to   ensure   that   she   is   not   denied   of   the   motherly   love   of   the

respondent and her family members as well, it will be just and
29
proper to uphold the decision of the Family Court.  Further, there

is   no   merit   in   the   argument   of   the   appellant   that   because   of

stated   procedural   lapses   committed   by   the   Family   Court,   the

matter  needs  to  proceed   afresh before the Family Court.   That

would be a futile exercise because the conduct of the appellant all

throughout has disentitled him for being declared as a fit person

for being the guardian of minor child.  

24. Our attention was drawn to various documents to support

the   argument   about   the   manner   in   which   the   appellant   had

misconducted   with   her   (respondent)   including   disobeying   the

directions   issued   by   the   High   Court   and   resultantly,   caused

immense tension and stress to the minor child of such a tender

age, because of her abduction on two occasions.  According to the

respondent,   the   appeal   filed   by   the   appellant   questioning   the

impugned judgment and orders passed by the Family Court does

not merit any interference and the same be dismissed.

25. We have heard Mr. Anil Malhotra, learned counsel for the

appellant and Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel for the

respondent.

30
26. After   cogitating   over   the   rival   submissions,   in   our

considered opinion, it may not be appropriate for us to delve into

the factual matrix of the case, especially regarding the conduct of

the parties as alleged by them against each other, for the nature

of order that we propose to pass.

27. We are more than convinced that the Family Court, in the

present   case,   exceeded   its   jurisdiction   by   hastening   the   entire

proceedings.  Indubitably, the Family Court is obliged to inquire

into the matter as per the procedure prescribed by law.   It does

not   have   plenary   powers   to   do   away   with   the   mandatory

procedural requirements in particular, which guarantee fairness

and   transparency   in   the   process   to   be   followed   and   for

adjudication of claims of both sides.  The nature of inquiry before

the Family Court is, indeed, adjudicatory.  It is obliged to resolve

the rival claims of the parties and while doing so, it must adhere

to the norms prescribed by the statue in that regard and also the

foundational   principle   of   fairness   of   procedure   and   natural

justice.

28. The Family Courts came to be established under the 1984

Act.  Section 7 specifies the jurisdiction of the Family Court and

31
about the nature of claims to be adjudicated by it in the form of

suits   and   proceedings   delineated   in   the   explanation   in   sub­

section (1).  Section 10 predicates about the procedure generally.

The provisions of the CPC are made applicable for resolution of

disputes falling under the 1984 Act.  The Family Court is deemed

to be a Civil Court having all powers of such Court.  Consequent

to bestowing such power on the Family Court, comes with it a

primary duty to make efforts for settlement, as prescribed under

Section   9.     If   that   does   not   happen,   during   the   resolution   of

disputes between the parties, the Family Court then has to bear

in   mind   the   principles   enunciated   in   the   Indian   Evidence   Act,

1872, which had been made applicable in terms of Section 14 of

the 1984 Act.  A Family Court can receive as evidence any report,

statement,   documents,   information   or   matter   that   may,   in   its

opinion, assist it to deal effectually with a dispute, whether or not

the   same   would   be   otherwise relevant or   admissible under  the

Indian   Evidence   Act,   1872.     There   is   another   provision,   which

gives insight into the working of the Family Court in the form of

Section 15.  It posits that the Family Court shall not be obliged to

record the evidence of witnesses at length, but the Judge, as the

examination of each witness proceeds, shall, record or cause to
32
be   recorded,   a   memorandum   of   the   substance   of   what   the

witness deposes, and such memorandum shall be signed by the

witness   and   the   Judge   and   shall   form   part   of   the   record.     An

incidental   provision   regarding   efficacy   of   recording   of   evidence

can be traced to Section 16 of the 1984 Act.  That envisages that

evidence   of   any   person   where   such   evidence   is   of   a   formal

character, may be given by affidavit and may, subject to all just

exceptions, be read in evidence in any suit or proceeding before a

Family Court.  

29. These   provisions   plainly   reveal   that   the   Family   Court   is

expected to follow procedure known to law, which means insist

for a formal pleading to be filed by both sides, then frame issues

for   determination,   record   evidence   of   the   parties   to   prove   the

facts   asserted   by   the   concerned   party   and   only   thereafter,   to

enter   upon   determination   and   render   decision   thereon   by

recording reasons for such decision.   For doing this, the Family

Court   is   expected   to   give   notice   to   the   respective   parties   and

provide   them   sufficient   time   and   opportunity   to   present   their

claim in the form of pleadings and evidence before determination

of the dispute.  

33
30. We may usefully refer to the provisions of the 1890 Act, as

invoked   by   the   appellant   by   filing   petition   before   the   Family

Court.   The appellant admittedly filed petition before the Family

Court under Section 7 of the 1890 Act read with Section 7(g) of

the 1984 Act.   Section 7 of the 1890 Act bestows power in the

Court to make order as to guardianship in respect of a minor.

Such prayer can be made by anyone interested in the welfare of

the   minor   and   “not   limited   to   the   father   and   mother   of   the

minor”.  In this inquiry, the Court, if so satisfied that it is for the

welfare   of   the   minor,   is   free   to   appoint   the   applicant   as   a

guardian  of  person or   property of the minor  or both or  merely

declaring a person to be such a guardian.   Section 8 of the Act

makes it amply clear as to who is entitled to apply for the order.

It   has   specified   four   categories   of   persons.     First   is   person

desirous of being the guardian of the minor.   The second is any

relative or friend of the minor.   The third is the Collector of the

district   or   other   local   area   within   which   the   minor   ordinarily

resides   and   the   fourth   is   the   Collector   having   authority   with

respect   to   the   class   to   which   the   minor   belongs.     Such

application is required to be filed before the District Court having

jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides under
34
Section   9   of   the   1890   Act.     As   regards   procedure   for   such   an

application,   it   is   delineated   by   providing   for   the   form   of

application   in   Section   10   of   the   Act,   which   must   contain

necessary information referred to therein.  Section 11 prescribes

for the procedure in the event the Court is satisfied that there is

ground   for   proceeding   on   the   application.     That   would   require

adducing of evidence before making an order in terms of Section

13  of  the  1890  Act.    The  Court is required to consider  certain

matters   as   specified   in   Section   17   of   the   1890   Act   and   while

making order, must also bear in mind the exception provided in

Section 19 as to who should not be appointed as guardian.  

31. Suffice it to observe that both the enactments (the 1984 Act

and   the   1890   Act),   provide   for   procedure   in   the   form   of

disclosures,   declarations   and   assertions   and   its   refutations   by

the   other   party   opposing   the   claim,   whereafter   the   matter

proceeds for recording of evidence followed by the declaration or

order   passed   by   the   Court.     Intrinsic   in   all   these   steps   is   to

guarantee fair opportunity to all concerned.  

32. The question, therefore, that needs to be answered in light

of   the   grievance   made   by  the  appellant   is:  whether  the   Family

35
Court in the present case had followed procedure prescribed by

the   concerned   Act,   much   less   a   fair   procedure   adhering   to

principles of natural justice?

33. It is not in dispute that the appellant had filed the petition

by   invoking   provisions   of   Section   7   of   the   1890   Act   read   with

Section 7(g) of the 1984 Act.   Admittedly, no written statement

was ever filed by the respondent to oppose the said petition.  On

the   other   hand,   the   appellant   took   out   two   applications   for

amendment of the pleadings under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC.

No reply was filed by the respondent even to these applications,

despite Court directing her to do so vide order dated 4.10.2018.

There   is   nothing   on   record   to   indicate   that   the   Family   Court

decided these two applications for amendment of pleadings taken

out by the appellant.  Although the main objection alongwith two

applications   for   amendment   filed   by   the   appellant   remained

pending   from   February,   2018,   the   respondent   never   filed

response to the main petition or the amendment applications and

instead   took   out   application  under  Section  151  of the  CPC  for

being appointed the sole and absolute guardian and custodian of

the minor child, on 13.9.2019.   This application was posted for

hearing on 13.9.2019, on which date the Court issued notice to
36
the appellant and his counsel.  As per that order, the matter was

again notified on 16.9.2019 when the counsel appearing for the

appellant –                         Mr. Rajat Bhalla requested the Court to

discharge him from the case, which request was acceded to by

the Court.   As a matter of fact, before discharging the counsel,

the Family Court should have ensured that notice was given to

the appellant about the request made by his counsel including to

make alternative arrangements, if he so desired.  Admittedly, no

such notice was issued by the Family Court.   That is reinforced

from   the   order   dated   16.9.2019   reproduced   in   paragraph   7

above.     It  has   been   plainly  noted  that   dasti  notice  sent  to  the

appellant was still awaited.

34. Assuming   that   the   Family   Court   could   have   allowed   the

request   of   the   counsel   for   the   appellant   to   unilaterally   take

discharge without giving notice to the appellant.   However, after

accepting   that   request,   it   was  obligatory  to   issue  notice  to   the

appellant to inform about the order so passed and also calling

upon the appellant to make necessary arrangements on the next

date.     The   Family   Court  instead set down  the main  matter   on

19.9.2019 at 2.30 p.m.   In terms of order dated 16.9.2019, the

Family   Court   additionally   cancelled   the   already   scheduled

37
returnable date of 30.10.2019, unilaterally.  There is nothing on

record to show that the respondent had made such a request.  

35. What   is   more   striking,   is   that,   before   19.9.2019,   the

respondent took out another application under Order I Rule 10

read with Order XXIII Rule 1A of the CPC for being transposed as

petitioner in the guardianship petition and to transpose appellant

as respondent therein, for the reasons stated in the application

dated 18.9.2019.   Admittedly, even copy of this application was

not served on the appellant nor a formal notice came to be issued

by the Family Court on this application, when it was taken up for

hearing on 19.9.2019.  The Family Court merely ordered to place

the matter on 20.9.2019 at 1.00 p.m.  The order dated 19.9.2019

(in   paragraph   8   above),   makes   no   reference   to   the   fact   as   to

whether   the   notice   sent   to   the   appellant   vide   order   dated

16.9.2019   had   been   duly   served   nor   about   the   filing   of   any

affidavit of service effected on him.  Be that as it may, when the

matter   was   listed   on   20.9.2019,   the   Court   after   hearing   the

learned   counsel   for   the   respondent   passed   the   following   order

(also reproduced in paragraph 8 above): ­

“GP No. 09/2018
Aman Lohia vs. Kiran Kaur Lohia

38
 20.09.2019
Present: None for petitioner.
Respondent   in   person   with   Ld.   Counsel   Ms.
Malvika Rajkotia.
Arguments   have   been   heard   from   2:15   to   5:00
pm   on   applications,   one   application   under   Order   1
Rule 10 and Order 23 Rule 1a r/w Section 151 CPC
and   other   application   under   Section   151   CPC   have
been filed by the Ld. Counsel.
Ld. Counsel for the respondent seeks time to file
case law.
Be listed for orders on 21.09.2019.

Sd/­
Swarna Kanta Sharma
Principal Judge, Family Court
Patiala House Court, New Delhi
20.09.2019 (R)”

Once again, there is no mention even in this order about service

of (i) the application under Section 151 of the CPC filed by the

respondent, (ii) the application under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC

read with Order XXIII Rule 1 read with Section 151 of the CPC

filed by the respondent, (iii) order dated 16.9.2019 and (iv) order

issuing   notice   on   application   under   Order   I   Rule   10   on   the

appellant.  Despite this, the Court proceeded on the assumption

that the appellant had abandoned the proceedings.  There can be

no   legal   presumption   about   the   factum   of   abandonment   of

proceedings.  The abandonment has to be express or even if it is

to   be   implied,   the   circumstances   must   be   so   strong   and

convincing that drawing such inference is inevitable.  Rather, no
39
other view is possible.  For that, the Court ought to have adverted

to the material/evidence indicating that the appellant/petitioner

was duly served with the applications filed by the respondent and

that   he   was   fully   aware   about   the   discharge   of   the   counsel

representing   him   in   the   proceedings   including   about  service  of

Court notices.   Even if the Court was to infer abandonment, it

could at best have dismissed the petition for default in exercise of

power under Order IX Rule 8 of the CPC.  

36. Further,   the   Court   could   not   have   entertained   the

transposition   application   filed   by   the   respondent  ex   parte  and

that   too   without   ensuring   that   it   was   duly   served   on   the

appellant   consequent   to   notice   issued   thereon   by   the   Court.

Admittedly, there is no official Court record to indicate that such

service   was   effected   on   the   appellant   including   that   the   Court

had   issued   notice   on   the   transposition   application.    Arguendo,

such   transposition   was   permissible   but   after   allowing   the

transposition   application  ex   parte,   unless   the   cause   title   was

amended   and   appropriate   changes/amendments   made   in   the

petition including parties producing evidence in support of their

claim,   the   matter   could   not   have   proceeded   for   final

40
determination.  After such amendment, in any case, opportunity

was required to be given to the appellant by issuing Court notice

so as to enable him to respond to the amended petition including

to contest the same.  We may not be understood to have accepted

the proposition that transposition in guardianship proceeding is

permissible, much less permissible as a matter of course at the

instance of the other parent of the minor child.   We leave that

question open.

37. In  Sangram   Singh  (supra),   this   Court   in   paragraph   16

observed   that   procedure   is   something   designed   to   facilitate

justice   and   further   its   ends   –   not   a   penal   enactment   for

punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up.

Further, too technical a construction of sections that leaves no

room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore

be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both

sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice

be used to frustrate it.   These observations are contextual and

have no application to the case where there is no semblance of

procedure followed by the Family Court and the entire matter is

disposed of in a short span of less than eight days after filing of

an application (on 13.9.2019) by the respondent under Section
41
151   of   the   CPC   for  declaring  her  to  be the  sole, exclusive and

absolute guardian and custodian of the minor child including the

transposition   application   under   Order   I   Rule   10   (filed   on

18.9.2019) and culmination of the proceedings in favour of the

respondent   on   21.9.2019   vide   impugned   judgment   and   orders,

that too without notice to the appellant nor waiting for service of

notice   already   issued   on   the   former   application.     This   is

substantial   non­compliance   of   the   prescribed   mandatory

procedure   and   infraction   of   principles   of   natural   justice,   not   a

technical irregularity to be overlooked.

38. Reliance was also placed on the dictum in Shamlal Murari

(supra).     In   paragraph   8,   while   construing  the   concerned  rule,

this   Court   opined   that   every   minor   detail   in   that   rule   cannot

carry a compulsory or imperative import.   On that finding, the

Court   construed   the   said   rule   as  directory   and   not  having   the

effect   of   vitiating   proceedings   as   in   the   present   case,   both   on

account   of   non­compliance   of   statutory   procedural   safeguards

and in violation of principles of natural justice.

39. Reliance was then placed on  Rosy Jacob  (supra).   In that

case, the Court dealt with proceedings under Section 25 of the
42
1890 Act and in the fact situation of that case, noted that the

guardian Court in case of a dispute between the mother and the

father is expected to strike a just and proper balance between the

requirements of welfare of the minor children and the rights of

their respective parents over them.   This issue may have to be

debated in the remanded proceedings.  We do not wish to dilate

on this aspect.

40.   Suffice   it   to   observe   that   the   appellant   is   justified   in

contending that the impugned judgment and orders came to be

passed by the Family Court in a tearing hurry, may be because of

the insistence of the respondent and her counsel to do so in light

of the observations made by the High Court in habeas corpus and

contempt matters against the appellant.  The impugned judgment

does make reference to those orders.  We may hasten to add that

the conduct of the appellant frowned upon by the High Court in

the habeas corpus petition or contempt petition, cannot be made

the sole basis to determine the factum of fitness or otherwise of

the appellant for being a guardian of the minor child.  That fact

has   to   be   decided   on   its   own   merits   taking   all   aspects   into

account   including   possibility   of   joint   shared   parenting

43
arrangement and more particularly, child­centric approach with

paramount welfare and interest of the minor child.  It is for that

reason, even the High Court whilst disposing the  habeas corpus

and contempt proceedings, had added a word of caution at the

end   of   its   judgment   that   guardianship   petition   or   other

proceedings   between   the   parties   must   proceed   on   their   own

merits   in   accordance   with   law,   which   observation   has   been

completely glossed over by the Family Court in the present case.

41. We have chosen not to dilate on other aspects or reported

decisions brought to our notice by both sides including about the

conduct of parties as alleged by each of them against the other.

Nor it is necessary for us to examine the necessity of exploring

the   possibility   of   joint   shared   parenting   plan,   to   assuage   the

psychological barriers likely to be encountered by the minor child

of tender age and more particularly, for her holistic development,

welfare   and   paramount   interest.     Those   are   matters  which  the

Family   Court  ought  to   examine after  giving  due opportunity  to

both sides on their own merits and in accordance with law.

44
42. A priori, we have no hesitation in setting aside the ex parte

impugned judgment and orders dated 21.9.2019 passed by the

Family   Court   on   transposition   application,   as   well   as,   on   the

application   for   declaration   that   the   respondent   is   the   sole,

exclusive   and   absolute   guardian   and   custodian   of   the   minor

child.     For   the   same   reasons,   the   purported   follow   up   order

passed   on   16.10.2019   by   the   Family   Court,   directing   handing

over custody of the minor child within the time specified therein,

is also set aside.  As these orders are set aside, any action taken

on the basis of the aforesaid orders is to be regarded as non­est in

law and is so declared hereunder.  That does not mean that the

custody   of   the   minor   child   needs   to   be   restored   to   the   father

(appellant) forthwith.  That issue will have to be decided finally by

the Family Court in the proceedings remanded in terms of this

order.

43. By   this   order,   we   direct   remand   and   revival   of   the

Guardianship   petition   (G.P.   No.   09/2018)   and   also   all

applications   filed   in   the   main   guardianship   petition   by   the

45
appellant.  In other words, the two applications for amendment of

petition filed by the appellant under Order VI Rule 17 read with

Section 151 of the CPC shall stand restored and revived and be

heard in the first place.  Similarly, the other applications filed by

the appellant to bring on record subsequent events/documents

be also decided first.  As the appellant has already withdrawn all

proceedings   between   the   parties   pending   in   UAE   Court,   as

recorded   in   connected   matters   pending   in   this   Court,   it   is

indicative of the fact that he intends to pursue the guardianship

petition to its logical end, and for that reason, the transposition

application under Order I Rule 10 read with Order XXIII Rule 1

read with Section 151 of the CPC, filed by the respondent, needs

to be dismissed.  We, however, revive the application filed by the

respondent under Section 151 of CPC for declaring her to be the

sole and absolute guardian in place of the appellant.  That shall

proceed before the Family Court on its own merits in accordance

with law.  All contentions available to both sides including about

its maintainability are left open to be decided by the Family Court

in accordance with law.

46
44. It was brought to our notice that the respondent has taken

U.S. citizenship for the minor child and also U.S. passport in her

name.   In the context of that grievance, the respondent through

counsel had assured that she will not precipitate the said claim

and is willing to surrender the same in this Court to avoid any

misapprehension entertained by the appellant.   The respondent

may do so within two weeks from today.   At the same time, we

direct the respondent not to travel with the minor child outside

Delhi   or   abroad   without   prior   permission   of   this   Court   to   be

taken in the connected matters.

45. The   appeal   is   partly   allowed   in   the   aforementioned   terms

(referred   to   in   paragraphs   42   to   44).     The   transferred   case   is

accordingly   disposed   of.     No   order   as   to   costs.     All   pending

applications in this case are disposed of.

………............................J.
  (A.M. Khanwilkar)

………............................J.
       (B.R. Gavai)

………............................J.
       (Krishna Murari)

47
New Delhi;
March 17, 2021.

48