Legal Separation (Arts. 55-67)
55)
Grounds (Art. 55)
Partosa-Jo vs CA
GR 82606, December 18, 1992
Facts:
 Petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, respondent who
admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima
filed a complaint against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal
property in addition to an earlier action for support which was
consolidated.
 RTC decision was a definite disposition of the complaint for support but
none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property.
 He then elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial
court. The complaint on the separation of property was dismissed for lack
of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not
covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code.
 Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to
temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy
and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to be separated
permanently. She even returned to him but the latter refused to accept her.
Issue: Whether there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial
separation of conjugal property.
Ruling: Supreme Court is in the position that respondent court should have made
the necessary modification instead of dismissing the case filed. For abandonment to
exist, there must be an absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with
the intention of perpetual separation. The fact that Jo did not accept her
demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. From
1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to Prima. Hence, the
physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent
to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for
the judicial separation of their conjugal property.
The petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the
conjugal property of the spouses be divided between them, share and share alike.
The division will be implemented after the determination of all the properties
pertaining to the said conjugal partnership including those that may have been
illegally registered in the name of the persons.
Grounds (Art.
Ong v. Ong, GR No. 153206, Oct. 23, 2006
Facts:
 1975, William Ong and Lucita Ong were and their union was blessed with
3 children.
 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par.
(1) of the Family Code before RTC of Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging
that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats,
intimidation and grossly abusive conduct.
 1995 when petitioner protested respondents decision to let their son go to
Bacolod and she wants to bring their son back, turned into a violent
quarrel with respondents hitting the petitioner on the head, left cheek, eye,
stomach, arms, and ultimately pointing a gun at respondent’s head asking
her to leave the conjugal house
 .RTC granted appeal for legal separation. CA upheld RTC’s decision
when herein petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not CA erred in upholding the RTC’s decision granting legal
separation to Lucita when she herself has given ground for legal separation when
abandoned her family.
Ruling: It is true that a decree of legal separation should not be granted when both
parties have given ground for legal separation (Art 56 (4) FC). However, the
abandonment referred to in the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable
cause for more than one year. Also, it was established that Lucita left William due to
his abusive conduct which does not constitute the abandonment contemplated in the
said provision. The petition was denied for lack of merit.
Grounds (Art. 55)
Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz
G.R. No. L-19565, 30 January 1968
Facts:
  Estrella and Severino was married and begotten 6 children. Estrella filed
an action against her husband for the separation of their properties. She
further alleged that her husband aside from abandoning her also
mismanaged their conjugal properties.
 Severino contended that he had always visited the conjugal home and had
provided support for the family despite his frequent absences when he was
in Manila to supervise the expansion of their business. Since 1955, he had
not slept in the conjugal dwelling instead stayed in his office at Texboard
Factory although he paid short visits in the conjugal home, which was
affirmed by Estrella.
 The latter suspected that her husband had a mistress hence, the urgency of
the separation of property for the fear that her husband might squander and
dispose the conjugal assets in favor of the concubine.
Issue: Whether or not there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and
whether or not there has been an abused of his authority as administrator of the
conjugal partnership. (No)
Ruling: The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations
and support of the family. To be legally declared as to have abandoned the conjugal
home, one must have willfully and with intention of not coming back and perpetual
separation. The law provides that there must be real abandonment and not mere
separation. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also
amount to financial and moral desertion. Therefore, physical separation alone is not
the full meaning of the term “abandonment”, if the husband, despite his voluntary
departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the
conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife.
In the case, the Court believed that the defendant did not intend to leave his
wife and children permanently. Thus, the SC held that lower court erred in holding
that mere refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal
partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the business constitutes abuse of
administration. In order for abuse to exist, there must be a willful and utter disregard
of the interest of the partnership evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts or
omissions prejudicial to the latter.
Grounds (Art. 55)
Najera v. Najera G.R. No. 164817, 3 July 2009
Facts:
 Petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal separation, with Application
for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal
Partnership of Gains. Petitioner alleged that respondent is presently living
in the US. They were married but are childless.
 Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage,
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest
only after marriage; (1) that respondent was jobless and was not exerting
effort to find a job at the time of marriage; only with the help of
petitioner’s elder brother, who was a seaman, was respondent able to land
a job as a seaman; (2) that while employed as a seaman, respondent did
not give petitioner sufficient financial support); (3) that respondent would
quarrel with petitioner and falsely accuse her of having an affair with
another man whenever he came home, and took to smoking marijuana and
drinking; (4) that on July 1, 1994, while he was quarreling with petitioner,
without provocation, he inflicted physical violence upon her and attempted
to kill her with a bolo; and (6) after the said incident respondent left the
family home, taking along all their personal belongings, and abandoned
the petitioner. Petitioner reported the incident at the police station of
Bugallon, Pangasinan.
Issue: Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 1: of the
Family Code. (No)
Ruling: The evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence or
grossly abusive conduct toward petitioner and respondent’s abandonment of
petitioner justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds for legal separation
only and not for annulment of marriage under Article 1: of the Family Code.
Grounds (Art. 55)
Gandionco vs Penaranda (CONCUBINAGE)
GR No. 72984, November 27, 1987
Facts:
 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial District, Branch
 18, in Cagayan de Oro City, presided over by respondent Judge, a
complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of
concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages.
 Respondent also filed with the Municipal Trial Court, General Santos
City, a complaint against petitioner for concubinage.
 Application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending a
decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by private respondent
in the civil case for legal separation. The respondent judge ordered The
payment of support pendente lite.
 In this recourse, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal
separation and the incidents consequent thereto, such as, application for
support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal case for
concubinage filed against him the private respondent. In support of his
contention, petitioner cites Art. III. Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure
Issue: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the
resolution of the criminal case for concubinage.
Ruling: The governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which refers to "civil actions to enforce the civil liability arising from the
offense" as contemplated in the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 111-which is a
civil action "for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged." Sec. 1,
Rule 111, (1985) is specific that it refers to civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107
simply referred to "Civil action arising from the offense." That the contentions of the
petitioner is incorrect basing on Art. III. Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be
issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation.
No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an
action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If in case, the
petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can
always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
Defenses (Art. 56.)
Condonation
People v. Schnekenburger, 73 Phil 413
Facts:
 1926, the accused, Schneckenburger married the compliant Elena
Cartagena and after seven years of martial life, they agreed, for reason of
alleged incompatibility of character, to live separately each other.“ Both
appearing to live conveniently separated from each other for the rest of
their lives and commit and bind themselves not to bother or interfere or
mix under any concept in their public or private lives, each granting
giving complete freedom of action in any event and in every respect”,
which means they are separating already”
 1935, the accused Schneckenburger, without leaving the Philippines,
secured a decree of divorce from the civil court in the State of Mexico
and contracted another marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel, in the
justice of the peace court of Malabon, Rizal, and since then they lived
together as husband and wife in the city of Manila. Because of the nullity
of the divorce decreed by the Mexico Court, complainant instituted two
actions against the accused, one for bigamy and the other for concubinage.
 The first culminated in the conviction of the accused. Whereas on the trial
for the offense of concubinage, accused interposed the plea of double
jeopardy, and the case was dismissed. However, upon appeal, the accused
was convicted of concubinagethrough reckless imprudence.
Issues: Should Mr. Schneckenberg be convicted for concubinage?
Ruling: As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its
commission, "consent" must have been intended agreeably with its ordinary
usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No logical difference can
indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both
instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her
dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the
vindication of the wrong.
For instance, a husband who believers his wife another man for adultery,
is as unworthy, if not more, as where, upon acquiring knowledge of the
adultery after its commission, he says or does nothing. We, therefore, hold that
the prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party
 from prosecuting the offense. Judgment is reversed and the accused is hereby
acquitted, without costs
Condonation
Bugayong v. Ginez G.R. No. L-10033, 28 December 1956
Facts:
 Petitioner, a US Navy serviceman, began receiving letters informing him
of the alleged acts of infidelity of his wife, the respondent. He admitted
that respondent even informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed
her.
 Petitioner, then, sought for his wife and when the two met, they both
proceeded to a certain house where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and
1 day. Then they repaired to the petitioner’s house and again passed the
night therein as husband and wife.
 On the following day, petitioner tried to verify from his wife the truth of
the information he received that she had committed adultery. But
respondent, instead of answering the query, merely packed up and left,
which the petitioner took as confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed
on his wife. Petitioner went to Ilocos “to soothe his wounded feelings.”
 Petitioner, then, filed for legal separation against his wife, who in turn
filed a motion to dismiss on ground of condonation.
Issue: Whether or not there is condonation. (Yes)
Ruling: Pursuant to previous jurisprudence, there is condonation to the alleged
adultery on the part of the husband. Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that legal
separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are
offenders, a legal separation cannot by either of them. Collusion between the parties
to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition. Further, single
voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to
constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed
that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
Moreover, pursuant to foreign jurisprudence, a divorce suit will not be granted for
adultery where the parties continue to live together after it was known or there is
sexual intercourse after knowledge of adultery or sleeping together for a single
night.
Since the parties have stayed together as husband and wife for more than two nights
after the knowledge of wife’s infidelity, condonation is established.
Condonation
Busuego v. Office of the Ombudsman Mindanao,
G.R. No. 196842, Oct. 9, 2013
Facts:
 1975, she and Alfredo, Chief of Hospital in Davao were married at the
Assumption Church, Davao City. Their union was blessed with two sons.
 1983, their marriage turned sour. At this time, Rosa unearthed
photographs of, and love letters addressed to Alfredo from, other women.
 An opportunity to work as nurse in United States opened up for Rosa.
Before leaving, Rosa took up the matter again with Alfredo, who remained
opposed to her working abroad. Furious with Rosa‘s pressing, Alfredo
took his loaded gun and pointed it at Rosa‘s right temple, threatening and
taunting Rosa to attempt to leave him and their family. Alfredo was only
staved off because Rosa‘s mother arrived at the couple‘s house. Alfredo
left the house in a rage: Rosa and her mother heard gun shots fired outside.
 Rosa acted up to her plan and left for the US. While in the US, Rosa
became homesick and was subsequently joined by her children who were
brought to the US by Alfredo.
 During that time his entire family was in the US, Alfredo never sent
financial support. In fact, it was Rosa who would remit money to Alfredo
from time to time, believing that Alfredo had stopped womanizing. Rosa
finally learned of Alfredo’s extra-marital relationships.
Issue: Whether there is condonation? (Yes)
Ruling: The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the
DOJ, over Rosa’s complaint, and after choosing to exercise such jurisdiction,
need not defer to the dictates of a respondent in a complaint, such as Alfredo.
In other words, the Ombudsman may exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of
the DOJ.
Alfredo next argues that Rosa had pardoned his concubinage, having admitted
to knowing of his womanizing and yet continuing with their relationship as
demonstrated in Rosa’s annual visits to him in Davao.
 We can find nothing in the record which can be construed as pardon or
condonation. It is true that the offended party has to a considerable extent been
patient with her husband's shortcomings, but that seems to have been due to his
promises of improvement; nowhere does it appear that she has consented to her
husband's immorality or that she has acquiesced in his relations with his
concubine.20
While such a claim is not necessarily preposterous we hold that such is a matter
of defense which Alfredo should raise in court given that Rosa s complaint and
its accompanying affidavits have created a prima facie case for Concubinage
against Alfredo and mistress. The petition was DISMISSED The Resolutions of
the Ombudsman,AFFIRMED.
Consent
People v. Sensano and Ramos, 58 Phil 73
Facts:
 Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married and had a child whom
Mariano allegedly abandoned when he went and stayed in Cagayan for
three years without letters or financial support to the former who worked
hard for herself and her son until she met the accused Marcelo Ramos
who later took care of them.
 Ventura charged Sensano and Ramos for adultery, found by the court
guilty of the crime charged and served their sentence. Sensano after
serving her sentenced and leaving her paramour made steps to reconcile
with and go back to her husband but to no avail - She and her child were
abandoned for the second time.
 So, they went back to her co-accused Ramos. Despite the knowledge that
she resumed living with her codefendant, her husband did nothing to
assert his right as her spouse.
 He went abroad for seven years and presumably had completely
abandoned them. When Ventura returned home, he charged Sensano of
adultery for the second time in order to obtain divorce under Act No.
2710.
Issue: Whether or not Ramos can file adultery against his spouse for the second time
being the offended party. (No)
Ruling: The Court concluded that the evidence in this case as well as the conduct of
Ramos showed that he consented to the adulterous relations existing between the
accused and former co-defendant. He is therefore under the law not authorized to
institute the criminal proceeding. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraphs
1 and 2, are as follows:
Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended
party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties,
if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the
offenders. The court, in reversing the decision of the court aquo found the argument
of the Solicitor General that his seven years of acquiescence in the adultery of his
wife is due to his absence in the country which made him impossible to take any
action against the accused, to be unmeritorious
Consent
Matubis v. Praxedes, G.R. No. L-11786, Oct. 25, 1960
Facts:
 In 1943, Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were legally married. In
1948, they entered into a contract wherein they agreed that they shall live
separately and that they should not prosecute each other for adultery or
concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from their separation. In
January 1955, Zoilo began cohabiting with Asuncion, who later gave birth
to their child.
 In April 1956, Socorro filed a complaint for legal Separation on the
ground of abandonment and concubinage against Zoilo. The lower court
dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription and
condonation/consent.
Issue: Whether the action prescribe? (Yes)and whether Socorro consented to the
commission of concubinage by her husband? (Yes)
Ruling: Under Art. 102 of the Code, an action for legal separation cannot be filed
except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became
cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the date when cause occurred
(now 5 years under Art. 57, FC). The complaint was filed outside the periods
provided for by the above Article. By the very admission of plaintiff, she came to
know the ground (concubinage) for the legal separation in January, 1955. She
instituted the complaint only on April 24, 1956.
The agreement gives no room for interpretation other than that given by the
trial judge. Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are necessarily the
import of paragraph 6(b) of the agreement. The condonation and consent here are
not only implied but expressed. The law specifically provides that legal separation
may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and/or
consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy.
Connivance
Arroyo, Jr. v. CA, 203 SCRA 750
Facts:
 Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, of Benguet against his wife, Ruby
Vera Neri.
 Both defendants pleaded not guilty and after trial, the RTC convicted
petitioner and Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri of adultery as defined under Article
333 of the Revised Penal Code.
 Petitioner Arroyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals' Decision. Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri also moved for
reconsideration or a new trial, contending that a pardon had been extended
by her husband, complainant Dr. Jorge B. Neri, and that her husband had
later con traded marriage with another woman with whom he is presently
co-habiting. Both motions were denied by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not Dr. Neri’s affidavit of desistance is sufficient to cast
reasonable doubts on his credibility and whether or not Dr. Neri’s alleged extra-
marital affair precludes him from filing the criminal complaint on the ground of pari
delicto;
Ruling: The case cited does not support petitioner Neri’s position. No such
acquiescence can be implied: the accused did not enter into any agreement with Dr.
Neri allowing each other to marry or cohabit with other persons; and Dr. Neri
promptly filed his complaint after discovering the illicit affair.
While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the
sense that consent is granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is given after
the illicit affair, nevertheless, for either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it
must be given prior to the filing of a criminal complaint. In the present case, the
affidavit of desistance was executed only on 23 November 1988 while the
compromise agreement was executed only on 16 February 1989, after the trial court
had already rendered its decision dated 17 December 1987 finding petitioners guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Dr. Neri’s manifestation is both dated and signed after
issuance of our Resolution in 1991.
Mutual Guilt or Recrimination, *Collusion, * Prescription
Brown v. Yambao, 102 Phil 168
Facts:
 1955, William H. Brown filed suit to obtain legal separation from his
lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned by
the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, his wife engaged in adulterous
relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl that Brown
learned of his wife’s misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from
internment and that they have lived separately thereafter.
 Brown prayed for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody
of the children issued of the marriage; that the defendant be declared
disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just
and equitable.
 The court declared Juanita Yambao in default, for failure to answer in due
time, despite service of summons and directed the City Fiscal or his
representatives to investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil
Code, if collusion exists between the parties.
 It was found out during the cross-examination of the plaintiff by Assistant
Fiscal that after the liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another
woman and had begotten children by her.
 Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal separation
asked, on the ground that, while the wife’s adultery was established,
Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barred his right
of action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for legal separation should be granted? (No)
Ruling: The court below correctly held that the appellant’s action was already
barred, because Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten
years after he learned of his wife’s adultery, which was upon his release from
internment in 1945.Appellant’s brief does not even contest the correctness of such
findings and conclusion. Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that:“The legal
separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are
offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between
the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.”
In the case at bar, it is pursuant to the second sentence of the aforementioned
law, wherein Brown and Yumbao are both offenders, hence, a legal separation
cannot be granted. Article 102 of the Civil Code provides that: “An action for legal
separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which
the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the
date when such cause occurred.” Brown did not petition for legal separation
proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife’s adultery.
Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for denying
the remedy sought (commission of similar offense by petitioner and prescription of
the action), it becomes unnecesary to delve further into the case and ascertain if
Brown’s inaction for ten years also evidences condonation or connivance on his
part. Even if it did not, his situation would not be improved. It is thus needless to
discuss the second assignment of error.The third assignment of error being a mere
consequence of the others must necessarily fail with them. The decision appealed
from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
Procedure (Art. 58-60) A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC: Rule on Legal Separation
Pacete v. Carriaga, GR No. 53880, March 17, 1994, 231 SCRA 321
Facts:
 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage between her husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la
Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete,
accounting and separation of property.
 Cited in her complaint, that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and
they had a child; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage
with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only
on August 1979.
 Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently
preferred to continue living with Clarita.
 The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension
within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to
unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the
defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the
court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the
hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court
rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17, 1980.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s
motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default
and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation
of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
Ruling: The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of
non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is collusion, the
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. ” The stated provision calling for the
intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal
separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that
marriage is more than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further
mandates that an action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six
months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to
provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should take steps
toward getting the parties to reconcile. It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact,
specifically pray for legal separation. That other remedies, whether principal or
incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse
compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted. WHEREFORE, the
petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the proceedings, including the
Decision of 17 March 1980 appealed from, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No
costs.
Effects (Art. 61-64)
Sabalones v. CA, 230 SCRA 79
Facts:
  Petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to the respondent Remedios Gaviola-
Sabalones, his wife, the administration of some of their conjugal,
properties for fifteen years as a diplomatic service assigned to different
countries.
 1985, Sabalones retired and came back to the Philippines but not to his
wife and their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial
authorization to sell a building and lot belonging to the conjugal
partnership. He claimed that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and
living alone without any income, and that his share of the proceeds of the
sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and medical
treatment.
 Respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal
separation. She alleged that the house in was being occupied by her and
their six children and that they were depending for their support on the
rentals from another conjugal property, a building and lot in Forbes Park
which was on lease .
 She also informed the court that despite her husband's retirement, he had
not returned to his legitimate family and was instead maintaining a
separate residence in Don Antonio Heights, Fairview, Quezon City, with
Thelma Cumareng and their three children.
 In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation
and order the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her
husband's share therein because of his adultery. She also prayed that it
enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of the
Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the
conjugal properties.
 Trial court found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous
marriage in 1981, with Thelma Cumareng, to whom he had returned upon
his retirement in 1985 at a separate residence.
 The court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the
forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as
well that he was not entitled to support from his respondent wife
Ruling: The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties
for almost nineteen years now, apparently without complaint on the part of the
petitioner. He has not alleged, much less shown, that her administration has caused
prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he merely suggests is that the lease of
the Forbes Park property could be renewed on better terms, or he should at least be
given his share of the rentals.
In her motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the respondent wife
alleged that the petitioner's harassment of their tenant at Forbes Park would
jeopardize the lease and deprive her and her children of the income therefrom on
which they depend for their subsistence. She also testified the numerous including
various dollar accounts, two houses in Quezon City and Cebu City, and a Mercedes
Benz. The private respondent also complained that on June 10, 1991, the petitioner
executed a quitclaim over their conjugal property in Apple Valley, San Bernardino,
California, U.S.A., in favor of Thelma Cumareng, to improve his paramour's
luxurious lifestyle to the prejudice of his legitimate family.
These allegations, none of which was refuted by the husband, show that the
injunction is necessary to protect the interests of the private respondent and her
children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets. Let it be stressed that the
injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the administrator of
the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue
administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the
petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with
Article 61 of the Family Code. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.
Basic Obligations
Azcueta v. Republic G.R. No. 180668, 26 May 2009
Facts:
 1993, petitioner Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta got married and
bore no child then separated in 1997 after four years of marriage.
 Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, claiming that her
husband Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.
 That Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually
failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the essential
responsibilities and duties of husband
 Petitioner also complained of physical violence.
Issue: Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a
finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential
marital obligations. (Yes)
Ruling: After a thorough review of the records of the case, there was sufficient
compliance with the guidelines in the Molina case to warrant the annulment of the
parties’ marriage under Article 36. The Court laid down in Republic of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina stringent guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision;
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of
the marriage;
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable;
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage;
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children;
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
The Court agrees with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code is proper under the premises.
Basic Obligations
Ilusorio v. Ilusorio, G.R. No. 139789, July 19,
2001 & G.R. No. 139808, May 12, 2000
Facts:
 Erlinda Ilusorio the petitioner, seeks to reverse the Decision of the CA
dismissing her application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her
husband, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio the respondent and enforce
consortium.
 Potenciano filed a petition to annul the portion of the Decision of the CA
giving visitation rights her wife Erlinda to her.
 Potenciano is about 86 years of age, possessed extensive properties valued
at millions of pesos. He was, for many years, the Chairman of the Board
and President of Baguio Country Club.
 Erlinda and Potenciano are married couple but they separated from bed
and board for undisclosed reasons. They have six (6) children (co-
respondents).
 1997, Potenciano arrived from USA. He stayed for five months with
Erlinda. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda, alleged that during such time,
Erlinda gave Potenciano an overdosed amount of Zoloft (instead of
100mg, she gave 200mg); thus, Potenciano’s health deteriorated.
 1998, Erlinda filed with the RTC a petition for Guardianship over the
person and property of Potenciano due to latters advanced age, frail health,
poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
 1998, Potenciano did not return to his wife but rather he went and lived at
Makati with his children.
 Because of such event, Erlinda filed a petition with the CA for habeas
corpus to have the custody of her lawyer husband, Potenciano. CA denied
such petition.
Issues: Whether habeas corpus may be availed by Erlinda to compel Potenciano to
live with her in conjugal bliss?
Decision: Marital rights including overture and living in conjugal dwelling may not
be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. No court is empowered as a
judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be
enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any
other means process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the
man and woman’s free choice.
CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for
habeas corpus because P never prayed for such right.
In this case, Potenciano was found to be of sound mind and possesses the capacity to
make own choices. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice,
Potenciano may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice.
Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy.
Basic Obligations
Tenchavez v. Escano
G.R. No. L-19671, 29 November 1965
Facts:
  In 1948, Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32, before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly
registered with the local civil registrar. However, the two were unable to
live together after the marriage and they were already estranged.
 In 1950, Vicenta left for the United Stated. On the same year she filed a
verified complaint for divorce against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada
on the ground of “Extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.” A decree
of divorce, “final and absolute” was issued in open court by the said
tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in California, had
several children with him and, on 1958, acquired American Citizenship.
 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents,
Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom he charged with having dissuaded and
discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its
Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for
legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta’s parents
denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts, and
counterclaimed for moral damages.
Issue: Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is valid and binding
upon courts of the Philippines (No)
Ruling: Their marriage remain existent and undissolved under the Philippine Law.
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code, laws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad. Escaño’s divorce and second marriage
cannot be deemed valid under the Philippine Law to which Escaño was bound since
in the time the divorce decree was issued, Escaño, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties,
deserting her husband without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in
order to secure a decree of absolute divorce, and finally getting married again are
acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the husband’s feelings in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, thus entitling Tenchavez
to a decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of adultery.
Basic Obligations
People of the Philippines vs. Edgar Jumawan G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014
Facts:
 Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four
children.
 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the
accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. in their residence and that he
boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
 As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not
really cause marital problems between her and the accused-appellant.
However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately
remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina.
His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she
would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.
 One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, expressed his desire to copulate with
her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off
his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.The accused-
appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist
by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore
on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.The
accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,41 stretched her legs apart and
rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her
hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal
desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that
to me because I’m not feeling well.”
 Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely
fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he took over the control
and management of their businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital
affairs.
Issue: Whether or not there can be a marital rape. (Yes)
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over
their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not
consensual, is rape. Violation of equal protection clause. The Court ruled that to
treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the
elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the
equal protection clause.
The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which
was raised by the accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is
presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.
According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual
violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent
or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State
Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the
act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
Common Law Spouses, Void
Arcaba v. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael, GR No. 146683, November 22, 2001;
370 SCRA 414
Facts:
 In 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the
registered owners of Lot. In 1980, Zosima died hence Francisco and his
mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of
rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of the property in
favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take care
of him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin,
Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and
took care of Francisco’s house as well as the store inside.
 According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in
the same room. On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of
Francisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress.
 Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper. She denied having
sexual intercourse with Francisco. Tabancura testified that Francisco’s
only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the public streets.
 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos” where he ceded a portion of Lot to Cirila who accepted the
same. The larger portion was left under his name. This was made in
consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty
Lacaya notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute
owner.
 Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value
of P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. The decedent’s nephews and
nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the
common-law wife of Francisco.
Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in
Cirila’s favor was valid.
Ruling: The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law
relationship wherein donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the
testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of “Cirila
Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death
certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an
indication that she was not simply a caregiver –employee. Cohabitation means more
than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no
longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of
men and women holding themselves out to the public as such. Hence, the deed of
donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
Property Exclusive Properties
Ayala Investment & Dev. Corp, et. al. v. CA, GR No. 1183305, Feb. 12, 1998
Facts:
 Philippine Blooming Mills obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner
Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC).
 Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements
on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally
answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the
loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching.
 RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally
pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the
judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed
deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses
of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982.
 Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that
subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal
partnership.
 CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving
way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal
properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder
and was registered on July 1982.
Issue: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is
considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership” and is it chargeable.
Ruling: The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of
PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore,
AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains. PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the family of
Ching despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity.
Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is
only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from jurisprudential rulings of the court, “if the money or services are
given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or
guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the
context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership”. The contract of
loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the
surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted with
AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an
industry or profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal
partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for
the benefit of PBM. The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a
benefit for the family may have resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Ching’s
employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige enhanced)
since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one directly
resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off of the loan
itself.
Liabilities of the Absolute Community
Wong v. IAC, GR No. 70082, August 19, 1991
Facts:
 1964, Romario Henson married Katrina. They had 3 children however,
even during the early years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of
the time living separately.
 1971, the husband bought a parcel of land in Angeles from his father using
the money borrowed from an officemate.
 1972, Katrina entered an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter
consigned the former pieces of jewelry. Katrina failed to return the same
within the 20 day period thus Anita demanded payment of their value.
Katrina issued a check which was dishonored due to lack of funds.
 The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the
sum of money against Katrina and her husband Romarico. The reply with
counterclaim filed was only in behalf of Katrina.
 Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of execution was
thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of
Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at
public auction to Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson.
A month before such redemption, Romarico filed an action for annulment
of the decision including the writ and levy of execution.
Issue: Whether or not debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be
satisfied through the conjugal property.
Ruling: The spouses had been separated when the wife entered into the business
deal with Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of
Katrina nor authorized her to enter into such. The properties in Angeles were
acquired during the marriage with unclear proof where the husband obtained the
money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong in the conjugal
partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the husband
and even though they had been living separately. A wife may bind the conjugal
partnership only when she purchases things necessary for support of the family.
The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the execution of
judgments extends only over properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The
conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrina’s obligations as she exclusively
incurred the latter without the consent of her husband nor they did redound to the
benefit of the family. There was also no evidence submitted that the administration
of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by Romarico before said
obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as
Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute
the debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively.
Liabilities of the Absolute Community
Carlos v. Abelardo, GR No. 146504, April 9, 2002
Facts:
 1989, respondent Manuel Abelardo and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-
Abelardo approached petitioner Honorio Carlos to borrow for purchase of
house and lot. Manuel is the son-in-law of Honorio. As a result, a check
was then issued by Honorio to Pura Vallejo, seller of the subject house and
lot, as full payment.
 1991, Honorio inquired the status of the loan he extended to the spouses.
Manuel acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they are not yet in
a position to make a definite settlement. However, Manuel showed violent
resistance to the inquiries of Honorio, even making death threats to the
latter.
  1994, Honorio made a formal demand for the payment of the loan but the
spouses failed to comply with such demand. Honorio then filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money and damages against the
spouses. This includes collection of the principal of the loan, legal
interests from the date of formal demand, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.
 Being separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the
complaint, Manuel and Maria Theresa filed separate answers to the
complaint of Honorio. Maria Theresa admitted securing the loan, but she
believed the loan was payable on a staggered basis. Manuel was asked to
sign and acknowledge.
 Manuel admitted receiving the amount but it is because of his share from
the profits earned by HL Carlos Construction, in which he works for.
Manuel also denied having made death threats to Honorio and by way of
counterclaim, he asked for moral damages from Honorio for causing the
alienation of his wife’s love and affection, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
 1996, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Carlos, ordering to pay
the amount, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and the costs
of suit. Abelardo appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court due to insufficiency of
evidence to show that the subject amount was indeed a loan made by
Manuel. Honorio filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied by
the appellate court.
Issues: Whether or not the loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be
charged against the conjugal partnership.
Ruling: Petition of Carlos was granted. The decision of the appellate court is
modified. In pursuant to Article 121 of the Family Code, the loan is the liability of
the conjugal partnership. While Abelardo did not and refused to sign the
acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded
to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot which
became the conjugal home of respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the
alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Article 21 of the Family Code, he shall
be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.
The loan Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not
deny that the same served as their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence,
the spouses are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardo’s
contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the construction firm is
untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that will
entitle him to the profits and income of the company. Hence, the petition was
granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of $25,000 plus
legal interest including moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Liabilities of the Absolute Community
Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012
Facts:
 1977, petitioner Brigido Quiao was married to respondent Rita Quiao and
got four children. They had no separate properties prior to their marriage.
 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for
cohabiting with another woman.
 Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal
separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55, thereby awarding the
custody of their three minor children in favor of Rita, who is the innocent
spouse.
 The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between
them subject to the respective legitimes of their children; however,
Brigido’s share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership shall
be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to paragraph 9 of
Article 129 of the Family Code.
 Few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was
granted by the trial court. In 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the
earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.
 After more than nine months, Brigido filed a motion for clarification
asking the RTC to define “Nets Profits Earned.” In answer, the court held
that the phrase denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after
deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.”
 Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous
decision stating that net profit earned shall be computed in accordance
with par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code. However, it later reverted to
its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the offending spouse acquired vested rights over ½ of the
properties in the conjugal partnership.
Ruling: Since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no
separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties
are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the
listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their
respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party,
his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. So, as not to be
confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the
guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property
which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.
Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment and Disposition of the Community
Property
Sabalones v. CA, 230 SCRA 79
Facts:
 Petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to the respondent Remedios Gaviola-
Sabalones, his wife, the administration of some of their conjugal,
properties for fifteen years as a diplomatic service assigned to different
countries.
 1985, Sabalones retired and came back to the Philippines but not to his
wife and their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial
authorization to sell a building and lot belonging to the conjugal
partnership. He claimed that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and
living alone without any income, and that his share of the proceeds of the
sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and medical
treatment.
 Respondent opposed and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She
alleged that the house in was being occupied by her and their six children
and that they were depending for their support on the rentals from another
conjugal property, a building and lot in Forbes Park which was on lease .
 She also informed the court that despite her husband's retirement, he had
not returned to his legitimate family and was instead maintaining a
separate residence in Don Antonio Heights, Fairview, Quezon City, with
Thelma Cumareng and their three children.
 She prayed for the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order
the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's
share therein because of his adultery. She also prayed that it enjoin the
petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of the Forbes
Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal
properties.
 Trial court found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous
marriage in 1981, with Thelma Cumareng, to whom he had returned upon
his retirement in 1985 at a separate residence. The court thus decreed the
legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in
the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to
support from his respondent wife
Ruling: Petition denied for lack of merit. The Court notes that the wife has been
administering the subject properties for almost nineteen years now, apparently
without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged, much less shown,
that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he
merely suggests is that the lease of the Forbes Park property could be renewed on
better terms, or he should at least be given his share of the rentals.
In her motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the respondent wife
alleged that the petitioner's harassment of their tenant at Forbes Park would
jeopardize the lease and deprive her and her children of the income therefrom on
which they depend for their subsistence. She also testified the numerous including
various dollar accounts, two houses in Quezon City and Cebu City, and a Mercedes
Benz. The private respondent also complained that on June 10, 1991, the petitioner
executed a quitclaim over their conjugal property in Apple Valley, San Bernardino,
California, U.S.A., in favor of Thelma Cumareng, to improve his paramour's
luxurious lifestyle to the prejudice of his legitimate family.
These allegations, none of which was refuted by the husband, show that the
injunction is necessary to protect the interests of the private respondent and her
children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets. Let it be stressed that the
injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the administrator of
the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue
administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the
petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with
Article 61 of the Family Code.
Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment and Disposition of the Community
Property
Giuang v. CA, G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998
Facts:
 Judie Corpuz and Gilda Corpuz are legally married spouses. They have 3 constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the
children. In1983, Spouses Corpuz bought a lot from Manuel Callejo who following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the last element
signed as vendor through a conditional deed of sale. being indubitably absent in the case at bar. In summation therefore, both the
 1988, the spouses Corpuz sold one-half portion of their lot to spouses Deed of Transfer of Rights and the 'amicable settlement' are null and void.
Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
 1989, Gilda left for Manila to look for work abroad. Unfortunately, she challenged Decision and Resolution. Costs against petitioners
became a victimof an illegal recruiter.
 1990, Harriet learned that her father intended to sell the remaining half
portion of the lot, including their house, to the Guiangs. She wrote a letter
to her mother. Gilda replied that she was objecting to the sale. Harriet did
not inform Judie about this but instead gave the letter to Mrs. Guiang so
that she would advise her father.
 Judie pushed through the sale of the remaining one-half portion. They
executed a document Deed of Transfer of Rights. Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment and Disposition of the Community
 Gilda returned from Manila. Her children informed her that their father Property
had a wife already. For staying in their house sold by her husband, Gilda
was complained against by Spouses Guiang before the Barangay Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa, et al. GR No. 147978, January 28, 2002
authorities.
Facts:
 Parties signed an “Amicable Settlement” to wit: That respondent, Mrs.
Gilda Corpuz and her three children, to leave voluntarily the house of Mr.  Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the properties of
and Mrs. Antonio Guiang, where they are presently boarding without any the respondents from the husband of Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa,
charge. respondent Edilberto Camaisa.
 Plaintiff went to the Barangay Captain to question her signature on the  After some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase
amicable settlement. Gilda filed for the nullification of the Deed of Sale price and terms of payment. The agreement handwritten by the petitioner
executed by Judie in favor of the Spouses Guiang. RTC rendered was signed by Edilberto, with assurance from him that he would secure his
judgment in her favor. CA affirmed the RTC ruling pursuant to Art 124 of wife’s consent.
the Family Code.
 Petitioner was later on surprised when she was informed that respondent
Issues: Whether or not the Contract of Sale was merely voidable and whether spouses were backing out of the agreement. Hence, she filed a complaint
or not the Contract of Sale was ratified by Gilda when she entered into an for specific performance and damages.
amicable settlement with the spouses Guiang.
Issue: Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property
Ruling: Petitioners contend that the absence of Gilda’s consent merely without the wife's written consent.
rendered the Deed voidable under Art 1390 of the Civil Code" ART. 1390. The
Ruling: Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: “In the event that one spouse is
following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
been no damage to the contracting parties: Those where the consent is vitiated
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. “Gilda’s consent
powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have
was not obtained thru mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud
the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence
but her consent was TOTALLY INEXISTENT. This being the case, said
of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.”
contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code,
which was correctly applied by the two lower courts. In sum, the nullity of the
contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondent's consent. To
 The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal; hence, for the
contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must be
obtained. Respondent Norma Camaisa did not give her written consent to the sale.
Even granting that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale
of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is
required by law for its validity. She may have been aware of the negotiations for the
sale of their conjugal properties, however that is not sufficient to demonstrate
consent.
Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment and Disposition of the Community
Property
Vda. De Ramones v. Agbayani, GR. No. 137808, September 30, 2005, 471
SCRA 306
Facts:
 1979, Santos Ramones, without knowledge of his wife Aldegonda
Ramones, sold part of the lot that is part of their conjugal property
to Aurora Agbayani.
 1980, Santos Ramones died and afterwards Aldegonda built a septic tank
and restroom in the land that was sold to Agbayani. Thus Agbayani
filed a complaint.
 RTC ruled that Deed of Sale is void since it was without the consent of
Aldegonda
 CA reversed RTC ruling since while Art 166 prohibits the selling of
property by the husband without the consent of his wife, the wife
may only question such transaction within 10 years and have it
annulled as found in Art 173 of CC. Aldegonda did no such action.
Issue: Whether sale of real property belonging to conjugal partnership
of husband without his wife‘s consent is void. (No)
Ruling: Petition was denied and CA decision was affirmed. There is no dispute
that the lot sold is the conjugal property of spouses Ramones. Article 166 read
with Article 173 merely makes it voidable. Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied so Civil Code is law that governs. Deed of Sale also
governed under Civil Code.
There is no proof that petitioner Aldegonda Ramones filed any
complaint to annul the Deed of Sale entered into by her husband. As held by
this Court in Villaranda,8 "her right to bring an action to invalidate the contract
has thus prescribed. Hence, the assailed Deed is still valid and enforceable.
Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment and Disposition of the
Community Property
Nobleza v. Nuega, G.R. No. 193038, March 11, 2015
Facts:
 1990, Shirley B. Nuega, respondent was married to Rogelio A. Nuega.
Shirley sent Rogelio money for the purchase of a residential lot in
Marikina where they had planned to eventually build their home.
 1989, Rogelio purchased the subject house from Rodeanna Realty
Corporation. Shirley claims that in 1989, she settled the balance for the
equity over the subject property with the developer through SSS financing.
She likewise paid for the succeeding monthly amortizations.
 1990, Shirley and Rogelio got married and lived in the subject property.
The following year, Shirley returned to Israel for work. While overseas,
she received information that Rogelio had brought home another woman,
Monica Escobar, into the family home. She also learned and was able to
confirm upon her return to the Philippines in 1992, that Rogelio had been
introducing Escobar as his wife.
 1992, Shirley filed two cases against Rogelio: one for Concubinage before
the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal, and another for Legal
Separation and Liquidation of Property before the RTC of Pasig City.
 Shirley learned that Rogelio had the intention of selling the subject
property. Shirley then advised the interested buyers one of whom was their
neighbor and petitioner Josefina V. Nobleza (petitioner) of the existence
of the cases that she had filed against Rogelio and cautioned them against
buying the subject property until the cases are closed and terminated.
 Rogelio, under a Deed of Absolute Sale sold the subject property to
petitioner without Shirley’s consent in the amount of P380,000.00,
including petitioner’s undertaking to assume the existing mortgage.
Issue: Is the Deed of Sale null and void for lack of the consent of the wife? (Yes)
Ruling: The petitioner is not a buyer in good faith. A buyer cannot claim to be
an innocent purchaser for value by merely relying on the TCT of the seller
while ignoring all the other surrounding circumstances relevant to the sale. The
nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not premised on proof of respondent’s
financial contribution in the purchase of the subject property. Actual
contribution is not relevant in determining whether a piece of property is
community property for the law itself defines what constitutes community
property.
Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides: Art. 91. Unless otherwise
provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community property
shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the
celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter. The only exceptions from the
above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute community by the Family
Code; and (2) those excluded by the marriage settlement. Under the first
exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the Family Code, which
states: Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse
and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly
provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the
community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however, jewelry
shall form part of the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any,
of such property.
Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in
Article 92, it, therefore, forms part of the absolute community property of
Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of their respective contribution to its
acquisition before their marriage, and despite the fact that only Rogelio’s name
appears in the TCT as owner, the property is owned jointly by the spouses
Shirley and Rogelio.
Simultaneous Liquidation of Community Properties of two or more
marriages
Dael v IAC, GR No. 68873, March 31, 1989, 171 SCRA 524
Facts:
 Cesario Cabutihan was married to Beinvenida Durana, whom he had
five children, upon the death of Beinvenida; He contracted a second
marriage with his former wife’s sister Victorina. Cesario later on died
in 1972.
 Respondents filed settlement over the property of their deceased
parents. Trial Court rendered a decision holding that Victorina
Durana had no paraphernal properties brought to her marriage with
Cesario.
 That the copra business was formed during the first marriage and
Victorina used the same facilities, credit and capital in managing
the business, and the main source of the income not only of
Cesario and also of Victorina during their respective lifetimes was the
copra business. Hence, the extent of the Estate of Victorina shall
consist only of her share in the inheritance of the Estate of Cesario
Cabutihan. Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the
lower court.
Issue: Is the marital community of proprietary interest continued to exist in the
second marriage, even after the Cesario-Beinvenida conjugal partnership has been
dissolved by the death of Bienvenida?
Ruling: The first conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved because of death
of Bienvenida and it was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership.
There should be liquidation of properties before contracting another marriage.
Since there was none, the total mass of the partnership property shall be divided
between the different partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to
the property belonging to the respective spouses. One-half (1/2) of the properties
that pertain to the first conjugal partnership belong to Cesario as his conjugal share
therein, while the other half shall be considered as inherited by him and his five
children as the heirs of Bienvenida. The properties pertaining to the second
partnership shall also be equally divided, one-half (1/2) to belong to Cesario and the
other to Victorina as their respective shares in their conjugal partnership
properties. The share of Cesario should then be divided among his heirs, namely,
Victorina and his five (5) children. To recapitulate, the estate of Victorina for
distribution to her heirs shall consist of her one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal
properties of the aforesaid second marriage and her one-sixth (1/6) share in the
estate of Cesario as an heir.
Simultaneous Liquidation of Community Properties of two or more marriages
Vda. De Delizo v. Delizo, 69 SCRA 216
  A partition of the conjugal partnership properties of two marriages
contracted by Nicolas Delizo. The first, was with Rosa Villasfer,. Second,
with Dorotea de Ocampo.
 The action for partition was instituted by a daughter and a son of the first
marriage and the heirs of Francisco Delizo, against their father and his
second wife, Dorotea de Ocampo, and their nine (9) children, all surnamed
Delizo.
 The defendants opposed the partition, claiming that the properties
described in the complaint were those of the second marriage. 1957,
Nicolas Delizo died and was substituted by his children in the second as
party defendants.
 The lower court rendered judgment on April 27, 1964, distributing the
aforesaid properties as follows: (a) onehalf (½) pro indiviso to the three
(3) children of the first marriage, namely, Urbana Delizo, Severino Delizo,
and the heirs of the deceased Francisco Delizo, viz.: Rancivillano
Soltrifilo Josefina, Eufrocina, Aurea, Edita, and Fe (b) one-fourth (¼) pro
indiviso to the surviving spouse, Dorotea de Ocampo; and (c) one-fourth
(¼) pro in equal shares to the children of both marriages, nine (9) of whom
were begotten during the second marriage, or into thirteen (13) parts.
 1970, Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Appellate Court
rendered judgment, affirming with modifications the trial court's decision.
 CA disagrees with lower court.
 Dorotea elevated the case to SC
Issue: To which CPG does the Caanawan lands belong to 1st or 2nd marriage?
nd
Ruling: Property belongs to CPG of the 2 marriage as land was only registered
during second marriage. Since the capital of either marriage or the contribution of
each spouse cannot be determined with mathematical precision, the total mass of
these properties should be divided between the two conjugal partnerships in
proportion to the duration of each partnership.
Under this criterion, the second conjugal partnership should be entitled to
46/64 or 23/32 of the total mass of properties, and the first conjugal partnership. to
18/64 or 9/32 thereof pro indivision. The share of the estate of Nicolas Delizo is
one-half (1/2) pro indiviso of the net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains
of the first and second marriages, which would amount to 32/64 or 1/2 of the whole
estate. This should be distributed in equal shares to his children of both marriages, 9
with the widow having the same share as that of legitimate child. 10 The widow.
Dorotea de Ocampo, is entitled to one-half (½) of the net remainder of the second
conjugal partnership and to her share as heir of her deceased husband which
amounts to 23/64 of said properties, plus 1/13 of 32/64 pro indivision. The share of
the heirs of Rosa Villasfer would be 9/64 thereof. In the partition of the properties,
the probate court should take into account the fact that the respondents-appellees are
in possession of the Muñoz lands, while the petitioners-appellants have been in
possession of the Caanawan properties as well as the house and lot in, Manila, as
directed in the trial court's order of record on Appeal. Should it be convenient for the
parties, their respective shares should be taken from the properties presently under
their custody. Having reached the foregoing conclusions. it is unnecessary to resolve
the other legal questions raised in the appeal. The appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby modified as herein indicated. The records of these cases should
be, as they are hereby, remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with this judgment.
Immutability of Matrimonial Property Regime
Matthews v. Taylor, G.R. No. 164584, June 22, 2009
Facts:
 Spouses, Benjamin (British) and Joselyn (Filipina) Taylor, bought a
lot in Boracay which was financed by Benjamin, also through the
funds of Benjamin, they managed to improve and convert the same
lot to a vacation and tourists’ resort.
 When the spouses were falling out, Joselyn executed a Special Power
of Attorney in favor of her husband and which authorized the latter to
maintain, sell, lease and sub-lease their Boracay Property.
 Joselyn and petitioner Philip Matthews had an Agreement of Lease
without the consent of Benjamin. Benjamin instituted a Declaration
of Nullity of Agreement against the two.
Issue: Whether or not Benjamin was the actual owner of the property since he
provided funds used in purchasing the same. (No)
Ruling: Benjamin has no right to nullify, which makes him not the owner. As
provided in the FC and Constitution, an alien/foreigner is prohibited to acquire
public or private property/land in the Philippines. Therefore, no declaration of can
be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of
the spouses.
Conjugal Properties
Spouses Ricky and Anita Wong, et. al. vs. IAC et.al.,
Facts:
 Romarico Henson the respondent married Katrina Pineda. They have
three children but even during the early years of their marriage they had
been most of the time living separately. The former stayed in Angeles
City while the latter lived in Manila. During the marriage, Romarico
bought parcel of land in Angeles City from his father, with money
borrowed from an office mate.
 In Hongkong, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan
whereby Anita consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale. When
Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period
agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value. Katrina
issued in favor of Anita Chan a check, however, was dishonored for lack
of funds. Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa.
 The Trial court dismissed the case on the ground that Katrina’s liability
was not criminal but civil in nature.The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky
Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money against Katrina and
her husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was only in
behalf of Katrina.
 Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of execution was
thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of
Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at
public auction to Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson.
A month before such redemption, Romarico filed an action for annulment
of the decision including the writ and levy of execution.
Issue: Whether or not debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be
satisfied through the conjugal property?
Ruling: The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the
business deal with Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business
transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to enter into such. The properties in
Angeles were acquired during the marriage with unclear proof where the husband
obtained the money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong in the
conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the
husband and even though they had been living separately. A wife may bind the
conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for support of the
family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the execution
of judgments extends only over properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The
conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrina’s obligations as she exclusively
incurred the latter without the consent of her husband nor they did redound to the
benefit of the family. There was also no evidence submitted that the administration
of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by Romarico before said
obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as
Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute
the debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively.
Conjugal Properties
Ching vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 124642, 23 February 2004
Facts:
 The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc.obtained a loan from the
Allied Banking Corporation. As an added security for the said loan,
Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Tadeo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed
a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding them to jointly and severally
guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing to the ABC.
The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans.
 ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment. Citing as one of the grounds for the writ was the
fraud defendants employed in incurring the obligations by representing
themselves as having the financial capacity to pay the loan when in fact
they did not have such capacity.
 1983, the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the 100,000
common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching.
 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching, filed
a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment. She alleged inter alia that
shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her
husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds .She, likewise,
alleged that being the wife of Alfredo Ching, she was a third-party
claimant entitled to file a motion for the release of the properties. She
attached therewith a copy of her marriage contract with Alfredo Ching.
Issue: Is the conjugal partnership liable for the payment of the liability?
Ruling: Petition granted. The evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that
the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines were issued to
and registered in its corporate books in the name of the petitioner-husband when the
said corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done during the
subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus,
presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The respondent
failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his
exclusive money. The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the
corporate books of Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the name of the
petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the petitioner-husband, not the
conjugal partnership, owned the same.
The respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners
was benefited by the petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty
and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI.
The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for
the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the
petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of
surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent
was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.
In this case, the petitioner-husband acted merely as a surety for the loan
contracted by the PBMCI from the private respondent.
Conjugal Properties
Villanueva et al. vs. Court of Appeals et al., GR No. 143286, April 14, 2004
Facts:
 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before the trial court against her
husband Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas’ son with Pacita,
Procopio Villanueva.
 Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several
properties, claiming that such are her conjugal properties with Nicolas.
Plaintiff Eusebia, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas. 
 Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot five children. During their marriage,
they acquired real properties and all improvements. Nicolas is the co-
owner of a parcel of land which he inherited from his parents Esteban
Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of
approximately eight (8) parcels of land. Some of the properties earn
income from coconuts leased to corporations.
 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited
with defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their
illegitimate son.  Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the
income of the properties. Pacita, from the time she started living in
concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation. She had no properties of her
own from which she could derive income. From the time Nicolas suffered
stroke until the present, his illegitimate son is already the one who has
been receiving the income of his properties.
 Settlement between parties was asked but not met. Trial court in favor of
Eusebia Natuya. Petitioners appealed. Eusebia died, and was then
substituted by her heirs. CA upheld trial court’s decision
Issue: Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage between
Eusebia and Procopio are conjugal. (Yes)
Ruling: The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property
relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the
effectivity of Family Code. Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that
the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family
Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or
other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the
marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the
party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the
requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the
marriage before they are presumed conjugal.
Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita
started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas
were married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152
was purchased on 4 October 1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly
during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.Since the subject properties, including
Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the
presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal
properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
Conjugal Properties
Pintiano- Anno vs. Anno, GR 163743, Jan 27, 2006
Facts:
 1963, Petitioner Dolores Pintiano-Anno and respondent Albert Anno were
married. They had no children. Petitioner contends that during their
marriage, they acquired land.
  In 1974, the land was declared for tax purposes solely in the name of her
husband. Petitioner contends that she and her spouse had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land; that they both worked on the land, and, that they also hired a
caretaker to oversee it.
 Petitioner contends that without her knowledge, respondent Albert
executed two documents of transfer covering the subject land.
 In 1996, an Affidavit of Waiver, respondent Albert waived and
quitclaimed in favor of petitioner's first cousin, respondent Patenio
Suanding, his rights over a portion of the subject land.
 1997, Respondent Albert conveyed to respondent Suanding the remainder
of the land in a Deed of Sale. In both documents, respondent Albert
declared that he is the lawful owner and possessor of the subject land.
 Petitioner filed a case against respondents Albert Anno and Suanding with
the MTC for Cancellation of the Waiver of Rights, Deed of Sale and
Transfer Tax Declarations, and Damages, with a prayer for issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction. In her complaint, petitioner alleged that the
subject land belongs to the conjugal partnership of spouses Anno, and thus
could not have been validly conveyed by respondent Albert to respondent
Suanding without her written consent as spouse.
 Respondent Albert did not file an Answer. For his part, respondent
Suanding took the stand. He testified that respondent Albert represented to
him that the land was his exclusive property as the land was part of his
inheritance and he had been in possession thereof prior to his marriage to
petitioner. He likewise presented a 1997 Certificate from the Office of the
Municipal Assessor, stating that no improvements were listed in their
records as introduced by respondent Anno on the subject land.
 MTC ruled in favor of petitioner. Respondent Suanding appealed to the
RTC and thus declared the land to be the exclusive property of the vendor,
respondent Albert Anno, which he could validly sell without the consent
of petitioner-spouse. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
RTC. It likewise found petitioner's evidence insufficient to prove that the
subject land was acquired by spouses Anno during their marriage.
Issue: Whether the subject land belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains of
spouses Anno and thus cannot be validly conveyed by one spouse without the
consent of the other.
Ruling: Court finds no merit in the petition. The petitioner failed to substantiate by
preponderance of evidence her claim that the subject land was conjugal in nature.
Petitioner did not identify when she and her husband, respondent Albert, first
occupied and possessed the land. Neither did she present any witness to prove that
they first occupied the land during their marriage and that they both worked on the
land. While petitioner claimed that they also hired a caretaker to oversee the land,
the records show that the caretaker was appointed only in 1989. Indeed, even the
documentary evidence adduced by petitioner failed to show when exactly the
spouses Anno first took possession of the land. While the initial tax declaration she
presented was dated 1974, it cannot be automatically deduced therefrom that
occupation of the subject land was likewise done in the same year. To so conclude
will amount to speculation or conjecture on the part of the court. As correctly
pointed out by the appellate court, declaration of a land for taxation purposes cannot
be equated with its acquisition for, in the ordinary course of things, occupation of a
piece of land usually comes prior to the act of declaring it for tax purposes. More
importantly, the 1974 tax declaration presented by petitioner cannot be made a basis
to prove its conjugal nature as the land was declared for tax purposes solely in the
name of her husband, respondent Albert, who sold the land as his exclusive
property. In a long line of cases, this Court has held that tax declarations, especially
of untitled lands, are credible proof of claim of ownership and are good indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner
Conjugal Properties
Go vs. Yamane, GR No. 160762, May 3, 2006
 In the civil case “Florence Pucay De Gomez, Elsie Pucay Kiwas and
Muriel Pucay Yamane v. Cypress Corporation”, Atty. Guillermo F. De
Guzman was the counsel who handled the plaintiffs in the said case.
 To satisfy the lien for attorney's fees, a parcel of land, registered in the
name of Muriel Pucay Yamane (wife of Leonardo Yamane), was
scheduled to be sold at public auction on August 11, 1981.
 Spouses Josephine and Henry Go, the petitioners, were awarded the said
land as the highest bidders in the auction.
 Respondent Leonardo Yamane filed a complaint for annulment and
cancellation of Sale to petitioners, invoking a third-party claim.
Respondent contended that the land was a conjugal property and could not
be held responsible for the personal obligations of Muriel and the two
other Pucays.
 RTC ruled against respondent, reasoning that the subject parcel of land
was the paraphernal property of the late Muriel Pucay Yamane -- spouse
of respondent -- and was not their conjugal property.
  The Court of Appeals ruled otherwise, saying that the property acquired
during marriage is presumed to be conjugal unless the exclusive funds of
one spouse are shown to have been used for the purpose. The property
was acquired by couple from a certain Eugene Pucay during their marriage
and, therefore, was a conjugal property.
Issue: Whether or not the property in Muriel Pucay’s name was a conjugal property
and should not be held responsible for the obligations of Muriel Pucay and her
sisters.
Ruling: The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decisions. Article 160 of the New
Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife."
"As a general rule, all property acquired by the spouses, regardless of in
whose name the same is registered, during the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. As to the responsibility of the then established conjugal
property, the contract or transaction between Atty. De Guzman and the Pucay sisters
appear[s] to have been incurred for the exclusive interest of the latter. Muriel was
acting privately for her exclusive interest when she joined her two sisters in hiring
the services of Atty. De Guzman to handle a case for them. Accordingly, whatever
expenses were incurred by Muriel in the litigation for her and her sisters' private and
exclusive interests, are her exclusive responsibility and certainly cannot be charged
against the contested conjugal property.
Conjugal Properties
Ferrer vs. Ferrer, GR No. 166496, Nov. 9, 2006 (Art. 120)
Facts:
 Josefa Bautista Ferrer the petitioner alleged that she is the widow of
Alfredo Ferrer, a half-brother of respondents Manuel M. Ferrer and Ismael
M. Ferrer
 Before her marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a piece of lot, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 67927. He applied for a loan
with the Social Security System to build improvements thereon, including
a residential house and a two-door apartment building. However, it was
during their marriage that payment of the loan was made using the
couple's conjugal funds. From their conjugal funds, petitioner posited,
they constructed a warehouse on the lot.
 Petitioner averred that respondent Manuel occupied one door of the
apartment building, as well as the warehouse; however, in September
1991, he stopped paying rentals thereon, alleging that he had acquired
ownership over the property by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by
Alfredo in favor of respondents, Manuel and Ismael and their spouses.
 Petitioner argued that her husband had no other property, and his only
property had been sold to the respondents; hence, she has the legal right to
claim for reimbursement from the respondents who are now the owners of
the lot and the... improvements thereon.
Issues: Whether or not petitioner’s complaint fails to state a cause of action against
the respondents.
Ruling: The subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of
Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the Family Code the respondents, despite the
allegations contained in the Complaint that they are the buyers of the subject
premises, are not petitioner's spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the owner-
spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costs rested. It is
the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or
the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise stated,
respondents do not have the obligation to respect petitioner's right to be reimbursed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
Conjugal Properties
MBTC vs. Tan, GR. No. 163712, Nov. 30, 2006
Facts:
  Upon application of the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company for extra- presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. No such proof was offered nor
judicial foreclosure of mortgage, the Office of the Provincial Sheriff presented in the case at bar.
issued a “Sheriff‘s Notice of Sale” setting on the sale at public auction of
four mortgaged parcels of land registered in the name of Jose B. Tan.
 Spouses Jose B. Tan and Eliza Go Tan filed a complaint against Conjugal Properties
Metrobank for removal of cloud on the title in question and injunction
before the Regional Trial Court before the scheduled public auction, Matthews vs. Taylor, GR. No. 164584, June 22, 2009
 Eliza Go Tan avers that she never gave her consent or conformity to
encumber the title in question. The real estate mortgages are null and void Facts:
because Jose B. Tan had already fully paid the obligations secured by the
 Spouses, Benjamin (British) and Joselyn (Filipina) Taylor, bought a lot in
mortgages. On the other hand, Metrobank alleged that the Spouses Tan,
Boracay which was financed by Benjamin, also through the funds of
together with their two sons, obtained a credit line from which they made
Benjamin, they managed to improve and convert the same lot to a vacation
availments from time to time. Consequently, the line was gradually
and tourists’ resort.
increased.
 When the spouses were falling out, Joselyn executed a Special Power of
 The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Spouses Tan. Metrobank
Attorney in favor of her husband and which authorized the latter to
appealed before the Court of Appeals. By Decision the CA affirmed the
maintain, sell, lease and sub-lease their Boracay Property.
trial court‘s decision and accordingly dismissed the appeal. A Motion for
 Joselyn and petitioner Philip Matthews had an Agreement of Lease
Reconsideration was filed but the same has been dismissed. Hence, this
without the consent of Benjamin. Benjamin instituted a Declaration of
petition.
Nullity of Agreement against the two.
Issue: Whether or not the lack of respondent Eliza Go Tan‘s consent to the
Issue: Whether or not Benjamin was the actual owner of the property since he
mortgage covering the title in question would render the encumbrance void
provided funds used in purchasing the same. (No)
Ruling: Eliza Go Tan the respondent claimed that did not give her consent to the
Ruling: Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn
mortgage of the title in question, the same is belied by her signature on Real Estate
and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring
Mortgage which is annotated as Entry No. 174644 at the back of the title. Her bare
private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be
denial that the signature was forged, without more, does not lie. In any event, lack of
the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole
respondent Eliza Go Tan‘s consent to the mortgage covering the title in question
ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin’s claim that he provided
would not render the encumbrance void under the second paragraph of Article 124
the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was
of the Family Code. For proof is wanting that the property covered by the title is
illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses
conjugal that it was acquired during respondent’s marriage which is what would
can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of
give rise to the presumption that it is conjugal property. The statement in the title
the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no
that the property is “registered in accordance with the provisions of Section 103 of
capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by
the Property Registration Decree in the name of JOSE B. TAN, of legal age, married
his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a
to Eliza Go Tan” does not prove or indicate that the property is conjugal.
husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would
The presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code that properties countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property
acquired during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal cannot apply in the instant were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial
case. Before such presumption can apply, it must first be established that the interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its
property was in fact acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to
acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the have.
Conjugal Properties
Ocampo vs. Ocampo, GR. No. 198908, August 3, 2015
Facts:
 1990, Virginia filed a petition to declare her marriage with Deogracio void
on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family
Code.
 The trial court granted the petition, but gave the parties 30 days to submit
an inventory of their conjugal partnership for liquidation. As both parties
failed to agree to a project of partition, hearing ensued where they adduced
evidence to prove their entitlement to the properties belonging to the
conjugal partnership.
 After hearing, the RTC issued an order declaring that the parties are
entitled to a 50-50 sharing of the properties. Virginia filed her notice of
appeal of the order, while Deogracio opposed it; the RTC denied
Deogracio’s motion.
 The Court of Appeals denied Virginia’s appeal and her subsequent motion
for reconsideration. Thus, Virginia elevated her case to the Supreme
Court
Issue: Whether or not Deogracio should be deprived of his share in the conjugal
partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.
Ruling: The petition lacks merit. While Virginia and Deogracio tied the marital knot
on January 16, 1978, it is still the Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships,
however, which will govern the property relations between Deogracio and Virginia
even if they were married before the effectivity of the Family Code.
The former spouses both substantially agree that they acquired the subject
properties during the subsistence of their marriage. The certificates of titles and tax
declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under Article 116
of the Family Code. All properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage,
regardless in whose name the properties are registered, are presumed conjugal unless
proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the
certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the
spouses only. Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption remains even if
the property is “registered in the name of one or both of the spouses.” Thus, the
failure of Virginia to rebut this presumption, said properties were obtained by the
spouses’ joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal
shares. Accordingly, the partition of the former spouses’ properties on the basis of
co-ownership, as ordered by the RTC and the appellate court, should be affirmed,
and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. Petition, denied. CA decision
affirmed.
Conjugal Properties
Costuna v. Domondon, GR. No. 82753, Dec. 19, 1989
Facts:
 Spouses Amadeo and Estela Costuna acquired three parcels of land and
registered in the name of Amadeo Costuna.
 1977, Amadeo sustained third degree burns on his legs which were
treated at various hospitals on different dates. At the request of his
relatives and while already being ill, Amadeo went to Samar where he
stayed with his sister to sign documents that needed his signature
pertaining to his Samar properties and never returned to Estela.
 A feud ensued among Amadeo’s relatives and Estela over his custody
prompting Estela to institute a petition for habeas corpus. Five days later,
Amadeo filed an action for partition before the Juvenile Domestic and
Relations Court.
 1978, after failing to get Estela’s consent to the desired partition, Amadeo
was constrained to execute a deed of sale over the one-half undetermined
portion of the conjugal property in favor of Laureana Domondon
(respondent) without the consent of Estela.
 Estela Costuna instituted special proceedings claiming pro indiviso one
half share over the lots after Amadeo’s death. On the other hand,
Domondon filed an action to compel Estela to give her conformity to the
deed of sale executed by Amadeo, which was granted by the trial court
and ordered Estela to affix her signature on the deed of sale. The sale of
the 1/2 of the conjugal properties to Domondon was allegedly for the
payment of Amandeo’s hospital expenses, which Estela never rebutted.
 Estela, however, avers that the sale was void because her consent was not
given and argues that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Articles 166
and 167 of the new Civil Code and related jurisprudence.
Issues: Whether or not the sale of conjugal properties by the husband may be
validly made without the consent of the wife(Yes) and whether or not the conjugal
partnership should be made liable for the payment of Amadeo’s hospital dues who
allegedly abandoned the conjugal home and his wife.( Yes)
Ruling: As a general rule, the husband may not validly sell real estates belonging to
the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. However, the New Civil Code
provides certain exceptions. In this case, Amadeo sought the petitioner’s consent but
was adamantly withheld by the latter from her belief that the deed of sale was
executed in fraud of her. What was sold by Amadeo without the petitioner’s consent
was only an undetermined one-half share in the community properties, but he left
intact the other undetermined 1/2 share which should belong to Estela Cosuna. The
Court concedes that the consent of the petitioner is essential for the validity of the
sale, however, the Court may relax the application of the law and consider the sale
as falling within the recognized exceptions if consent was unreasonably withheld.
Article 161 of the Civil Code provides that the conjugal partnership shall be
liable for all debts and obligations contracted by the husband or the wife for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. The Court states that the benefit required by this
article need not be quantified into pesos or square meters of real property. It is
enough that the well-being of both or either spouses would undeniably redound to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The decision of the Court of Appeals
appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Liabilities of Conjugal Partnership
Carlos v. Abelardo, GR. No. 146504, April 4, 2002
Facts:
 1989, respondent Manuel Abelardo and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-
Abelardo approached petitioner Honorio Carlos to borrow for purchase of
house and lot. Manuel is the son-in-law of Honorio. As a result, a check
was then issued by Honorio to Pura Vallejo, seller of the subject house and
lot, as full payment.
 1991, Honorio inquired the status of the loan he extended to the spouses.
Manuel acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they are not yet in
a position to make a definite settlement. However, Manuel showed violent
resistance to the inquiries of Honorio, even making death threats to the
latter.
 1994, Honorio made a formal demand for the payment of the loan but the
spouses failed to comply with such demand. Honorio then filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money and damages against the
spouses.
 Being separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the
complaint, Manuel and Maria Theresa filed separate answers to the
complaint of Honorio.
 Manuel admitted receiving the amount. Manuel also denied having made
death threats to Honorio and by way of counterclaim, he asked for moral
damages from Honorio for causing the alienation of his wife’s love and
affection, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
 1996, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Carlos. Abelardo
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set
aside the decision of the trial court due to insufficiency of evidence to
show that the subject amount was indeed a loan made by Manuel. Honorio
filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the appellate
court.
Issues: Whether or not the loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be
charged against the conjugal partnership.
Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition of Carlos. The decision of the
appellate court is modified. In pursuant to Article 121 of the Family Code, the loan
is the liability of the conjugal partnership. While Abelardo did not and refused to
sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan
redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and
lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his family. Hence,
notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Article 21 of the
Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.
The loan Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not
deny that the same served as their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence,
the spouses are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardo’s
contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the construction firm is
untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that will
entitle him to the profits and income of the company. Hence, the petition was
granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of $25,000 plus
legal interest including moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Liabilities of Conjugal Partnership
Carandang v. Heirs of Quirino de Guzman, GR No. 160347, Nov. 29, 2006
Facts: 
 Spouses Carandang and Quirino de Guzman were stockholders and
corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS). The
Carandangs have equities at 54 % while Quirino has 46%.
   When the capital stock of MBS was increased in 1983, the Carandangs
subscribed P345,000 from it, P293,250 from the said amount was loaned
by Quirino to the Carandangs. In the subsequent increase in MBS’ capital
stock on March 3, 1989, the Carandangs subscribed again to the increase
in the amount of P93,750. But, P43,125 out of the mentioned amount was
again loaned by Quirino.
  When Quirino sent a demand letter to the Carandangs for the payment of
the loan, the Carandangs refused to pay. They contend that a pre-
incorporation agreement was executed between Arcadio Carandang and
Quirino.
  Thereafter, Quirino filed a complaint seeking to recover the P336,375
total amount of the loan together with damages. The RTC ruled in favor of
Quirino and ordered the Carandangs to pay the loan plus interest,
attorney’s fees, and costs of suit. The Carandangs appealed the trial
court’s decision to the CA, but the CA affirmed the same. The subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Carandangs were also denied.
Hence, this appeal to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the case for failure to state a
cause of action, considering that Milagros de Guzman, allegedly an indispensable
party, was not included as a party-plaintiff. (No)
Ruling:  Although the spouses Carandang were correct in invoking the
aforementioned doctrine, the ground set forth entails an examination of “whether the
parties presently pleaded are interested in the outcome of the litigation,
and not whether all persons interested in such outcome are actually pleaded.” The
first query seeks to answer the question of whether Milagros is a real party in
interest, while the latter query is asking if she is an indispensable party. Since the
issue of this case calls for the definition of an indispensable party, invoking the
abovementioned doctrine is irrelevant to the case because the doctrine talks about a
‘real party in interest’ and not an ‘indispensable party’. Although it is important to
take note that an indispensable party is also a real party in interest.
“In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in
interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant
jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the
recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the
co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an
indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They
are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even
without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the
benefit of all co-owners.” Thus, Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable party
in the action for the recovery of the allegedly loaned money to the spouses
Carandang. As such, she need not have been impleaded in said suit, and dismissal of
the suit is not warranted by her not being a party thereto. 
Liabilities of Conjugal Partnership
SBTC v. Mar Tierra Corp., GR. No. 143382, Nov. 29, 2006
Facts:
 Mar Tierra Corporation, (respondent) through its president, Wilfrido C.
Martinez, applied for a credit accommodation with petitioner Security
Bank and Trust Company.
 Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line
agreement with respondent corporation. It was secured by an indemnity
agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez,
Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and
severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan.
 Respondent corporation was not able to pay all its debt balance as it
suffered business reversals, eventually ceasing operations. Petitioner filed
a complaint against respondent corp and individual respondents.
 RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of
respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez including the
conjugal house and lot of the spouses but it found that it did not redound
to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment
on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez.
 Petitioner appealed to CA. It affirmed RTC decision. Petitioned to SC.
Issue: Whether or not the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity
agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party. (No)
Ruling: SC upheld the CA. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal
partnership is liable for “all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.” The court ruled in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de
Garcia that, in acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a
third party.
In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we
ruled that, if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the
direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business or
profession, the transaction falls within the term “obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.” In other words, where the husband contracts an obligation on
behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation
redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity
and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself
be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is for the
benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family.
In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between
petitioner and respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The
accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent
Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was
similarly for the latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed
to discharge that burden.
Liabilities of Conjugal Partnership
Dewara v. Alvero, G.R. No. 179010, April 11, 2011
Facts:
 Eduardo Dewara and petitioner Elenita Magallanes Dewara were married
before the enactment of the Family Code. Thus, the Civil Code governed
their marital relations. Husband and wife were separated-in-fact because
Elenita went to work in US while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City.
 Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit
respondent Ronnie Lamela. Ronnie filed a criminal case for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence against Eduardo.
 Eduardo guilty of the charge and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of two months and one day to 3 months, and to pay civil
indemnity.
 Elenita, represented by her attorney Ferdinand Magallanes, filed a case
for annulment of sale.
 Petitioner claimed that the levy on execution of Lot No. 234-C was illegal
because the said property was her paraphernal or exclusive property and
could not be made to answer for the personal liability of her husband.
Furthermore, as the registered owner of the property, she received no
notice of the execution sale.
 That the jeep involved in the accident was registered in the name of
petitioner; and that Elenita did not interpose any objection pending the
levy on execution of the property.
 Aside from the assertions of Elenita that the sale of the property by her
father and her aunt was in the nature of a donation because of the alleged
gross disparity between the actual value of the property and the monetary
consideration for the sale, there is no other evidence that would convince
this Court of the paraphernal character of the property. The records are
bereft of proof that the consent of petitioner's father and her aunt were
vitiated or that, in reality, they intended the sale to be a donation or some
other contract.
Issues: The sole issue for resolution is whether the subject property is the
paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the conjugal property of spouses Elenita
and Eduardo.
Ruling: It is just and proper that Ronnie be compensated for the serious physical
injuries he suffered. It should be remembered that even though the vehicle that hit
Ronnie was registered in the name of Elenita, she was not made a party in the said
criminal case. Thus,... she may not be compelled to answer for Eduardo's liability.
Nevertheless, their conjugal partnership property may be held accountable for it
since Eduardo has no property in his name.
Art. 163. The payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife before
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership. Neither shall the fines
and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership. fines
and indemnities imposed upon them, may be enforced against the partnership assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 have been covered if the spouse
who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at
the time of the liquidation of the partnership such spouse shall be charged for what
has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.
Liabilities of Conjugal Partnership
Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Jr. , GR No. 164201, Dec 10, 2012
Facts:
 The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana, his wife Melecia, and
others of murder before the RTC.
 1997 the RTC rendered a consolidated decision acquitting Efren of the
charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia and another
person guilty as charged and sentenced them to the penalty of death. The
RTC ordered those found guilty to pay each of the heirs of the victims,
jointly and severally, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 each as
moral damages, and P150,000.00 actual damages.
 Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered
the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered
in the names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a
notice of sale on execution were issued.
 Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution,
claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets,
not paraphernal assets of Melecia.
Issue: Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be
levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the
murder case.
Ruling: No, under Article 122, the payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the
family, Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be
charged to the partnership.
Liabilities of Conjugal Partnership
Giuang v. CA, G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998
Facts:
 Judie Corpuz and Gilda Corpuz are legally married spouses. They have 3
children. In1983, Spouses Corpuz bought a lot from Manuel Callejo who
signed as vendor through a conditional deed of sale.
 1988, the spouses Corpuz sold one-half portion of their lot to spouses
Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang.
 1989, Gilda left for Manila to look for work abroad. Unfortunately, she
became a victimof an illegal recruiter.
 1990, Harriet learned that her father intended to sell the remaining half
portion of the lot, including their house, to the Guiangs. She wrote a letter
to her mother. Gilda replied that she was objecting to the sale. Harriet did
not inform Judie about this but instead gave the letter to Mrs. Guiang so
that she would advise her father.
 Judie pushed through the sale of the remaining one-half portion. They
executed a document Deed of Transfer of Rights.
 Gilda returned from Manila. Her children informed her that their father
had a wife already. For staying in their house sold by her husband, Gilda
was complained against by Spouses Guiang before the Barangay
authorities.
 Parties signed an “Amicable Settlement” to wit: That respondent, Mrs.
Gilda Corpuz and her three children, to leave voluntarily the house of Mr.
and Mrs. Antonio Guiang, where they are presently boarding without any
charge.
 Believing that she had received the shorter end of the bargain, plaintiff
went to the Barangay Captain to question her signature on the amicable
settlement. Gilda filed for the nullification of the Deed of Sale executed by
Judie in favor of the Spouses Guiang. RTC rendered judgment in her
favor. CA affirmed the RTC ruling pursuant to Art 124 of the Family
Code.
Issues: Whether or not the Contract of Sale was merely voidable and whether or not
the Contract of Sale was ratified by Gilda when she entered into an amicable
settlement with the spouses Guiang.
Ruling: Petitioners contend that the absence of Gilda’s consent merely rendered the
Deed voidable under Art 1390 of the Civil Code" ART. 1390. The following
contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to
the contracting parties: Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence or fraud. “Gilda’s consent was not obtained thru
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud but her consent was
TOTALLY INEXISTENT. This being the case, said contract properly falls within
the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly applied by the two
lower courts. In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of
private respondent's consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires
the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the
last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar. In summation therefore,
both the Deed of Transfer of Rights and the 'amicable settlement' are null and void.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
challenged Decision and Resolution. Costs against petitioners.
Administration of Conjugal Partnership Property
Roxas v. CA, 198 SCRA 543
Facts:
 Melania Roxas the petitioner is married to Antonio Roxas although they
are already estranged and living separately.
 Melania discovered that Antonio leased to Respondent Antonio Cayetano
their conjugal lot in Novaliches without her knowledge and consent.
 Melanie filed a case before the RTC praying for the annulment of the
contract of lease between Antonio and Mr. Cayetano.
 Mr. Cayetano moved to dismiss the complaint on the sole ground that the
complaint states no cause of action.
 The RTC Judge resolved said Motion by dismissing Melania's complaint.
Issue: Whether a husband may legally enter into a long-term contract of lease
involving conjugal real property without the consent of the wife. (No)
Ruling: Even if the husband is administrator of the conjugal partnership,
administration does not include acts of ownership. For while the husband can
administer the conjugal assets unhampered, he cannot alienate or encumber the
conjugal realty. As stated in Black's Law Dictionary, the word "alienation" means
"the transfer of the property and possession of lands, tenements, or other things from
one person to another. The act by which the title to real estate is voluntarily assigned
by one person to another and accepted by the latter, in the form prescribed by law."
While encumbrance "has been defined to be every right to, or interest in, the land
which may subsist in third persons, to the diminution of the value of the land, but
consistent with the passing of the fee by the conveyance; any (act) that impairs the
use or transfer of property or real estate"
Under Art. 1643 of the New Civil Code "In the lease of things, one of the
parties binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price
certain, and for a period which may be definite or indefinite." Thus, lease is a grant
of use and possession: it is not only a grant of possession. Moreover, lease is not
only an encumbrance but also a qualified alienation, with the lessee becoming, for
all legal intents and purposes, and subject to its terms, the owner of the thing
affected by the lease.
Administration of Conjugal Partnership Property
Abalos v. Macatangay, Jr., GR No. 155043, September 30, 2004; 439 SCRA 649
Facts:
 Arturo executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement in favor of
respondent, binding himself to sell the subject property and not to offer the
same to any other party within 30 days from date with a Special Power of
Attorney, purportedly issued by his wife,
 Arturo acknowledged receipt of a check from respondent in the amount of
₱5,000.00, representing earnest money for the subject property, the
amount of which would be deducted from the purchase price of
₱1,300,000.00.
 The RMOA stated that full payment would be effected as soon as
possession of the property shall have been turned over to respondent.
Subsequently, Ester, Arturo’s wife, executed a Special Power of Attorney
appointing her sister to act for and in her behalf relative to the transfer of
the property to respondent.
 Respondent sent a letter to Arturo and Esther informing them of his
readiness and willingness to pay the full amount of the purchase price. The
letter contained a demand upon the spouses to comply with their
obligation to turn over possession of the property to him.
 Respondent promised to pay the balance of the purchase price. In a letter,
respondent informed the spouses that he had set aside the amount of
₱1,290,000.00 as evidenced by a check as full payment of the purchase
price. He reiterated his demand upon them to comply with their obligation
 to turn over possession of the property. Arturo and Esther failed to deliver
the property.
Issue: Whether the RMOA is an option contract or an earnest money.
Ruling: The RMOA signifies a unilateral offer of Arturo to sell the property to
respondent for a price certain within a period of thirty days. The RMOA does not
impose upon respondent an obligation to buy petitioner’s property, as in fact it does
not even bear his signature thereon. It is quite clear that after the lapse of the 30-day
period, without respondent having exercised his option, Arturo is free to sell the
property to another. This shows that the intent of Arturo is merely to grant
respondent the privilege to buy the property within the period therein stated. There is
nothing in the RMOA which indicates that Arturo agreed therein to transfer
ownership of the land which is an essential element in a contract of sale.
Unfortunately, the option is not binding upon the promissory since it is not
supported by a consideration distinct from the price.
As a rule, the holder of the option, after accepting the promise and before he
exercises his option, is not bound to buy. He is free either to buy or not to buy later.
In Sanchez v. Rigos, in an accepted unilateral promise to sell, the promissor is not
bound by his promise and may, accordingly, withdraw it, since there may be no
valid contract without a cause or consideration. Pending notice of its withdrawal, his
accepted promise partakes of the nature of an offer to sell which, if acceded or
consented to, results in a perfected contract of sale.
 Annette now claims that the said property is the conjugal property
belonging to the second marriage due to the fact that the deed of absolute
sale was dated during the celebration of their marriage (Jan. 8, 1975).
Issue: To which marriage does the property belong to as conjugal property?
Ruling: The Court held that the said property belongs to the second marriage, but
also proclaims that reimbursements should be made to the children of the first
marriage (in line with ART 118 of the FC). The contract entered into by Daniel and
Philamlife is specifically denominated as a "Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement"
with a lease period of twenty years. During the twenty-year period, Daniel had only
the right of possession over the property. The lessor transfers merely the temporary
use and enjoyment of the thing leased. Generally, ownership is transferred upon
delivery, however, the ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of
the price is made.
Only at the time when the payments are made in full will the deed of absolute
sale be given, entitling the buyer (Daniel) as the true owner, rather than just having
inchoate rights to the property. The time when he was able to pay the remaining
balance, he was already married to his second wife, Annette, which makes the said
property as their conjugal property. ART 118: “any amount advanced by the
partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed” Depriving the children
from the first will be unfair due to the fact that the lease was contracted during the
first marriage, wherein a portion of the payment came from.

Property Bought on Installment Paid from Mixed Funds

Jovellanos v. CA GR No. 10078, June 18, 1992

Facts:

 Daniel Jovellanos contracted with Philamlife a lease and conditional sale

agreement of a property. When the agreement took place, Daniel was still
married to his first wife, Leonor, with whom he had three children. Leonor
died in 1959.  
 1967, Daniel was remarried to Annette (respondent). On December 18,
1971, Mercy (daughter from first marriage) and her husband, built an
extension at the back of the said property.
 1975, the lease was paid and Philamlife executed a deed of absolute sale to
Daniel. The following day, he then donated the said property to his
children in the first marriage (petitioners). 1985, Daniel died.