IV. The Family (Arts.

149-162)

 The Family as an Institution

 Earnest Efforts at Compromise

April Martinez, et. al. v. Rodolfo Martinez, GR No. 162084, June 28, 2005

Facts:

The spouses Daniel P. Martinez, Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of
land identified as Lot 18-B-2, as well as the house constructed thereon. Daniel, Sr. executed a Last Will
and Testament directing the subdivision of the property into three lots and bequeathed the three lots to
each of his sons, namely, Rodolfo, Manolo and Daniel, Jr.; Manolo was designated as the administrator
of the estate.

Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father, where the latter appears to have sold Lot
18-B-2 to Manolo and his wife Lucila. Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale and
cancellation of TCT No. 237936 against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC.
He also filed a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of a public document in the Office of
the City Prosecutor against Manolo, which was elevated to the Department of Justice.

On motion of the defendants, the RTC issued an Order, dismissing the complaint for annulment of deed
of sale on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action since there was no
allegation in the complaint that the last will of Daniel Martinez, Sr. had been admitted to probate.
Rodolfo appealed the order to the CA.

Rodolfo filed a Petition with the RTC of Manila for the probate of the last will of the deceased Daniel
Martinez, Sr. In the meantime, the spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that
he vacate the property. Rodolfo ignored the letter and refused to do so. This prompted the said spouses
to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila.In his Answerto the
complaint filed, Rodolfo alleged, inter alia, that the complaint failed to state a condition precedent,
namely, that earnest efforts for an amicable settlement of the matter between the parties had been
exerted, but that none was reached.

Spouses Martinez filed an Amended Complaint in which they alleged that earnest efforts toward a
settlement had been made, but that the same proved futile. Rodolfo filed his opposition thereto, on the
ground that there was no motion for the admission of the amended complaint. The trial court failed to
act on the matter.

The spouses Martinez alleged in their position paper that earnest efforts toward a compromise had
been made and/or exerted by them, but that the same proved futile. No amicable settlement was,
likewise, reached by the parties during the preliminary conference because of irreconcilable differences.
The MTC was, thus, impelled to terminate the conference. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
the spouses Martinez.

Rodolfo appealed the decision to the RTC. The RTC rendered judgment affirming the appealed decision.
He then filed a Petition for Review of the decision with the CA. CA rendered judgment granting the
petition and reversing the decision of the RTC. Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration of
the said decision, the spouses Martinez filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the certification to file action and the allegations in the complaint that the case
passed through the barangay but no settlement was reached, are sufficient compliance to prove that,
indeed, earnest efforts were, in fact, made but the same have failed prior to the filing of the complaint.

2. Whether or not the court of appeals gravely and seriously erred in finding that there was non-
compliance with the requirement provided for under article 151 of the family code, considering that one
of the parties to a suit in this case is not a member of the same family.

Ruling:

The petition is meritorious. Article 151 of the Family Code shall not apply to cases which may not be the
subject of compromise under the Civil Code.

Thus, a party's failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code before filing a complaint against a
family member would render such complaint premature.

In this case, the decision of the CA that the petitioners were mandated to comply with Article 151 of the
Family code and that they failed to do so is erroneous.

First. Petitioner Lucila Martinez, the respondent's sister-in-law, was one of the plaintiffs in the MTC. Mrs.
Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as none
of them is included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 - which should be construed strictly, it
being an exception to the general rule - and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the
case at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's failure
to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same.

Second. The petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 of the Family Code
because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against the respondent for
unlawful detainer in the Katarungang Pambarangay, in compliance with P.D. No. 1508; and that, after
due proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at, resulting in the barangay chairman's issuance
of a certificate to file action. The Court rules that such allegation in the complaint, as well as the
certification to file action by the barangay chairman, is sufficient compliance with article 151 of the
Family Code. It bears stressing that under Section 412(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, no complaint
involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon shall be instituted or filed directly in court for
adjudication unless there has been a confrontation between the parties and no settlement was reached.

Petition is granted. The Decision of CA is reversed and set aside. The Decision of the MeTC of Manila, as
affirmed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court of Manila is REINSTATED.

 Tribiana v. Tribiana, GR No. 137359, Sept. 13, 2004

Facts:
Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived together since 1996 but formalized their union
only on 28 October 1997. Lourdes filed a petition for habeas corpus  before the RTC claiming that Edwin
left their conjugal home with their daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana. Edwin has since deprived Lourdes of
lawful custody of Khriza who was then only one (1) year and four (4) months of age. Later, it turned out
that Khriza was being held by Edwin’s mother, Rosalina Tribiana. Edwin moved to dismiss Lourdes’
petition on the ground that the petition failed to allege that earnest efforts at a compromise were made
before its filing as required by Article 151 of the Family Code.

Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwin’s motion to dismiss claiming that there were prior efforts at a
compromise, which failed. Lourdes attached to her opposition a copy of the Certification to File Action
from their Barangay dated 1 May 1998.

The RTC denied Edwin’s motion to dismiss and reiterated a previous order requiring Edwin and his
mother, Rosalina to bring Khriza before the RTC. Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration, Edwin
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The appellate court denied Edwin’s petition. The appellate court also denied Edwin’s motion
for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

WON trial and appellate courts should have dismissed the petition for habeas corpus on the ground of
failure to comply with the condition precedent under article 151 of the family code.

Ruling:

The petition lacks merit.

It is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes failed to allege that she resorted to
compromise proceedings before filing the petition. However, in her opposition to Edwin’s motion to
dismiss, Lourdes attached a Barangay Certification to File Action dated 1 May 1998. Evidently, Lourdes
has complied with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the Family Code.

In addition, the failure of a party to comply with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect. Such
defect does not place the controversy beyond the court’s power to resolve. If a party fails to raise such
defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived. Such defect is curable by amendment as a
matter of right without leave of court, if made before the filing of a responsive pleading. Moreover, in
a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a child of tender age, the paramount
concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who has legal custody of the child. Technicalities should
not stand in the way of giving such child of tender age full protection. This rule has sound statutory basis
in Article 213 of the Family Code, which states, "No child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." In this case, the child
was only one year and four months when taken away from the mother.

The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 2 July 1998 and 18 January 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48049
are affirmed. The Regional Trial Court, Bacoor, Cavite is ordered to act with dispatch in resolving the
petition for habeas corpus pending before it. This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
  Pilar Vda de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 129242, Jan. 16, 2001

Facts:

The decedent Troadic Manila died intestate and was survived by his wife Pilar and eleven (11) children.
He left several heirs and several real properties in Manila and a business (Machine shop) in Tarlac. After
his death, eight (8) of his children (respondents) filed a petition for the judicial settlement of his estate
and for appointment of their brother Romeo Manalo as administrator

On the date set for hearing of the petition the trial court issued an order “declaring the whole world in
default, except the government”. However, the trial court set aside the order of general default of the
petitioners (the remaining children of Troadic who did not join the 8) and they were granted 10 days
within which to file their opposition to the position The petitioners then filed an Omnibus Motion

Some of the heirs including his surviving spouse moved to dismiss the petition contending that there
was failure to comply with a condition precedent due to the absence of an allegation of earnest efforts
toward a compromise among members of the same family.

The motion was denied, hence, they raised before the Supreme Court in a Petition for Certiorari the
denial of the said motion. They claimed that the petition for judicial settlement was actually an ordinary
civil action involving members of the same family, which requires an allegation of earnest efforts to
compromise.

Issue:

WON the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward compromise should first
be made prior the filing of the petition.

Ruling:

No. Art 151 of FC which prohibits suit between members of the family absent a compromise, is not
applicable in the case at bar for such is only a special proceeding and not an ordinary civil action.

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments and the character of the relief were sought in the complaint or petition, shall be controlling.
The careful scrutiny of the petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement and
distribution of the estate belies herein petitioners’ claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary
civil action. The provision of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions.

It is clear from the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or
other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the
redress of an injury or enforcement of a right. It is also the intention of the Code Commission as
revealed in the Report of the Code Commission to make the provision be applicable only to civil actions.

The petition for issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate is a
special proceeding and as such a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact. Hence, it must be emphasized that herein petitioners are not being sued in
such case for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was pronounced therein.
 Private respondents herein merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently
to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their
right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the
limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.

 Hiyas Savings and Loans v. Acua, G.R. No. 154132, Aug. 31, 2006

Facts:

Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the RTC of Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas
Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not secure any
loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife,
acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the loan,
made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that he could not have executed the said
contract because he was then working abroad. 

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private respondent failed to comply with Article
151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the same family shall
prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed.

Private respondent filed his Comment on the Motion to Dismiss with Motion to Strike Out and to
Declare Defendants in Default. He argues that in cases where one of the parties is not a member of the
same family as contemplated under Article 150 of the Family Code, failure to allege in the complaint
that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made by the plaintiff before filing the complaint is
not a ground for a motion to dismiss.

Petitioner filed its Reply to the Comment with Opposition to the Motion to Strike and to Declare
Defendants in Default.  Private respondent, in turn, filed his Rejoinder. The RTC issued the first of its
assailed Orders denying the Motion to Dismiss.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.  Private respondent filed his Comment, after which
petitioner filed its Reply. Thereafter, private respondent filed his Rejoinder. RTC issued the second
assailed Order denying petitioner’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Hence, the instant Petition
for Certiorari 

Issue:

WON Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when he ruled that a party who is a stranger to the family of the litigants could not invoke
lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint. 

Ruling:

In the present case, petitioner failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to its failure to comply
with the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why the instant petition could not have been
brought before the CA. On this basis, the instant petition should be dismissed.
And even if this Court passes upon the substantial issues raised by petitioner, the instant petition
likewise fails for lack of merit.

Suffice it to say that since the Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code
is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or among members of the same family, it
necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by a party who is a member of that same family.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 185922, Jan. 15, 2015

Facts:

Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. was married to Capitolian Aguilar with whom he had seven children (the
petitioners herein). When

Capitolina died in March 1944, Dr. Favis took Juana Gonzalez as his common-law wife with whom he
sired one child, Mariano Favis. When Dr. Favis and Juana eventually married in 1974, he executed an
affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children. Mariano is married to Larcelita Favis,
with whom he has four children.

Dr. Favis died intestate in 1995, but prior to his death, he executed a Deed of Donation transferring and
conveying properties in favor of his grandchildren with Juana.

Dr. Favis' children with his first marriage filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation,
inventory, liquidation, and partition of property before the RTC against Juana, Sps Mariano and Larcelita,
and their children. They were claiming that the donation prejudiced their legitime.

The RTC ruled for the children of Dr. Favis from his first marriage, nullifying the Deed of Donation. It
found that Dr. Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued with illness (Parkinson's disease and Hiatal Hernia
among other things), could not have full control of his mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of
Donation. However, it also declared that Juana and Mariano are also compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis,
owing to Dr. Favis and Juana's subsequent marriage that legitimated the status of Mariano. Juana,
Mariano, and Dr. Favis' heirs by his 1st marriage shall inherit equal shares in Dr. Favis' estate as his
compulsory heirs.

CA, on the other hand, ordered the dismissal of the nullification case brought by the children of the first
marriage. It motu proprio ordered its dismissal for their failure to make an averment that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been made, as mandated by Art. 152 of the Family Code.

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.

Spouses Mariano and Larcelita filed an instant petition to the SC.

Issue:
WON the CA may dismiss the order of dismissal of the complaint for failure to allege that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been made.

Ruling:

The CA committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint.

The appellate court hinged its decision on Art. 151 of the Family Code and correlated it with Rule 16 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, saying that failure to allege earnest effort is a ground for a motion to
dismiss.

Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filling the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:

xxx xxx xxx

(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.

The CA erred in ruling that may moto proprio dismiss the complaint, as among 10 grounds provided
under Rule 16, there are only 4 instances when the court can moto proprio dismiss the case. As provided
for under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, they are: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) litis
pendentia, (3) res judicata, and (4) prescription of action.

Rule 16 itself requires that a motion to dismiss should be filed before the filing of an answer or a
pleading in the trial court. Upon failure to do such, the defense is deemed waived.

In the case at hand, no motion to dismiss based on failure to comply with a condition precedent as filed
in the trial court; neither was such assigned as an error in the appeal brought before the RTC.

Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly applicable
to the respondents. The CA thus did not have any authority or basis to motu proprio order the dismissal
of the complaint filed by the children of the first marriage.

CA's decision was reversed and the RTC decision is affirmed.

Romero v. Singson, G.R. No. 200969, Aug. 3, 2015

Facts:

The parties herein - petitioners Consolacion Domingo Romero and Rosario S.D. Domingo and respondent
Engracia Domingo Singson - are siblings. Their parents, Macario and Felicidad Domingo, own a 223-
square meter piece of property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (32600) (23937) 845-R 5 (TCT
845-R) which was issued in 1953. On February 22, 1981, Macario passed away, while Felicidad died on
September 14, 1997.6

TCT 845-R was cancelled and a new certificate of title - TCT 12575 - was issued in respondent's name, by
virtue of a notarized "Absolute Deed of Sale" executed by and between Macario and Felicidad - as
sellers, and respondent - as buyer. And this despite the fact that Macario and Felicidad were then
already deceased.
Soon thereafter, respondent sent letters to her siblings demanding that they vacate the subject
property, under pain of litigation.

Petitioners and their other siblings just as soon filed a Complaint against respondent and the Register of
Deeds of San Juan City for annulment and cancellation of TCT 12575 and the June 6, 2006 deed of sale,
reconveyance, and damages, on the claim that the deed of sale is a forgery and that as heirs of Macario
and Felicidad, the true owners of the subject property, they were entitled to a reconveyance of the
same.

The MeTC rendered a Decision, decreeing as follows:

1. Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the subject property
known as No. 127 F. Sevilla St., San Juan, Metro Manila and to surrender peaceful possession thereof to
the plaintiff in this case;

2. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P2,000.00 per month for the actual use and
occupation of the subject property reckoned from date of extrajudicial demand which is August 7, 2006,
until defendants shall have finally vacated the premises;

3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees;
and
4. The costs of suit.

In an appeal before the RTC, the RTC rendered decision affirming in toto in [sic] the decision of the lower
court dated September 17, 2007. On motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC reversed itself.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied in a subsequent Order dated May
17, 2010. Respondent filed a Petition for Review with the CA. The CA held that the petition is GRANTED.
The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Its Decision dated April 29,
2009 affirming the Decision dated September 17, 2007 of the Metropolitan Trial Court is REINSTATED.
Hence, this instant petition.

Issue:

WON the court of appeals obviously erred in failing to dismiss the complaint because it did not comply
with the jurisdictional element required by law.

Ruling:

The Court grants the Petition.

This Court has always recognized the general rule that in appellate proceedings, the reversal of the
judgment on appeal is binding only on the parties in the appealed case and does not affect or inure to
the benefit of those who did not join or were not made parties to the appeal. An exception to the rule
exists, however, where a judgment cannot be reversed as to the party appealing without affecting the
rights of his co-debtor, or where the rights and liabilities of the parties are so interwoven and dependent
on each other as to be inseparable, in which case a reversal as to one operates as a reversal as to all.
This exception, which is based on a communality of interest of said parties, is recognized in this
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

 The Family Home

- Concept and Applicability

Gomez v. Sta. Ines, GR No. 132537, Oct. 14, 2005

Facts:

On 17 June 1986, Mary Josephine C. Gomez (Mary Josephine) and Eugenia Socorro C. Gomez-Salcedo
(Socorro) led a complaint for damages before the RTC of Pasig against Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines
(Marietta) alleging that they are the children of the deceased Puricacion dela Cruz Gomez who, during
her lifetime, entrusted Marietta with her rice land to manage and supervise. Mary Josephine and
Socorro further alleged that they have demanded for an accounting of the produce of said rice land
while under the management of Marietta, and for the return of the TCT to the property, but the latter
refused, thus compelling the sisters to file a civil case 3 before the Pasig RTC.

On 24 January 1989, the trial court rendered judgment against Marietta ordering her to deliver to Mary
Josephine and Socorro the owner's copy of TCT and to pay moral damages, actual or compensatory
damages exemplar damages, and attorney's fees. After said judgment became final and executory, a
writ of execution was issued by the Pasig RTC, by virtue of which, a parcel of land (with improvements)
located in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya registered in the name of Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines, was levied
upon by the Sheriff to satisfy the damages awarded in the civil case. Said property was sold at a public
auction on 25 August 1992 to Mary Josephine as the highest bidder.

Shortly after, a complaint for annulment of said sale was led before the RTC by Hinahon Sta. Ines
together with Noel, Roel, and Jannette, all named Sta. Ines, husband and children of Marietta,
respectively, against Mary Josephine (petitioner) and the sheriff on the ground that said house and lot
sold during the public auction is their family residence, and is thus exempt from execution under
Section 12(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and under Article 155 of the Family Code.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint but the RTC denied the motion stating that under Article 154
of the Family Code of the Philippines, the petitioner Hinahon Sta. Ines and the other petitioners are
beneficiaries of the Family home. Any one or all of them can, therefore, legally question the execution,
forced sale or attachment which is prohibited under Article 155 thereof. It should be noted that, as
already pointed out, the right of the petitioners as beneficiaries of the family home has been violated
when the said family home was levied upon on execution and sold in violation of the law.

Issue:

W/N the levied property of the respondent is considered a family home, and as such, is exempt from
from execution, forced sale, or attachment. At the time, the case was instituted and when Marietta
incurred her debts, it was not considered a family home.

Ruling:
The levied property is deemed constituted as the family home only upon the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988. The complaint against the 3rd party or the respondent herein was instituted
in 1986 for acts committed as early as 1977, thus, her liability arose years before the levied property
was constituted as the family home in 1988.

According to respondents, the house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their
family home from the time they occupied the same as a family residence in 1972 and that under Section
153 of the Family Code, there is no longer any need to constitute the said property as family home,
whether judicially or extrajudicially, because it became such by operation of law. Furthermore,
respondents assert that the money judgment against Marietta was rendered by the trial court in January
1989 long after the constitution of the said family home.

Such contentions are erroneous. Under Article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be
exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment except for, among other things, debts incurred
prior to the constitution of the family home. In the case at bar, the house and lot of respondents was
not constituted as a family home, whether judicially or extrajudicially, at the time Marietta incurred
her debts. Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as such only upon the effectivity of
the Family Code on 03 August 1988, thus, the debts were incurred before the constitution of the family
home.

Neither is it correct to say that the obligation sought to be satisfied by the levy of the property was
incurred only upon the issuance of the judgment in the original case in January of 1989. As stated by
herein petitioners, the complaint against Marietta was instituted on 17 June 1986 to seek redress for
damages suffered by them due to acts and omissions committed by Marietta as early as 1977 when
she assumed management and supervision of their deceased mother's rice land. This means to say
that Marietta's liability, which was the basis of the judgment, arose long before the levied property
was constituted as a family home by operation of law in August 1988. Under the circumstances, it is
clear that the liability incurred by Marietta falls squarely under one of the instances when a family
home may be the subject of execution, forced sale, or attachment, as provided for by Article 155 of
the Family Code, particularly, to answer for debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family
home.

Versola v. CA, GR No. 164740, July 31, 2006

Facts:

 Dolores Ledesma secured a Php1,000,000 loan from Dra Oh

 Ledesma sold the house and lot to petitioners Eduardo and Elsa Versola for Php2.5M with a
Php1M downpayment.

 Ledesma followed up the remaining balance but the petitioners were only able to give Php 50K

 Petitioners then got a loan from Asiatrust Bank to pay for their remaining balance.

 The bank settled an agreement between the parties that Dr. Oh will give another 450k to
Ledesma making her debt up to Php 1.45M.
  The spouses Versola need to execute a mortgage to secure the Php2M loan. When Asiatrust
tried to register the mortgage of the spouses, however, they discovered that a notice of levy of
execution on the title in connection with another of Ledesma’s to Miladay’s Jewels Inc.

 Asiatrust denied the Php2M loan to the spouses.

 Dra. Oh filed a case against Asiatrust, petitioners, and Ledesma. RTC ruled in favor of Dra. Oh
and the sheriff auctioned the house.

 Petitioners objected to this auction saying that the house is their family home and should not be
subject to execution.

Issue:

WON the house is exempt from execution?

Ruling:

 NO, the house is not exempt from execution.

 It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a
family home. The claim must be proved to the Sheriff.

 The records in this case do not disclose that petitioners proved that the property to be sold was
the Family HOme. They simply alleged it and presupposed that the sheriff knew of this.

 They only asserted that said lot is exempted from execution 2 years after the date of the auction
sale.

 Therefore, their assertion is a mere afterthought, a sheer artifice to deprive private respondents
of the fruits of the verdict of her case.

Patricio v. Dario III, GR No. 170829, Nov. 30, 2006

Facts:

Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two
sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III.

Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a... pre-school building
built thereon petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of
Marcelino V. Dario.

Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to
partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership.

Private respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an
action for... partition before the Regional Trial Court the trial court ordered the partition of the subject
property in the following manner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino G.
Dario III, 1/6.
The trial court also ordered the sale of the property by public auction wherein all parties concerned may
put up their bids. In case of failure, the subject property should be distributed accordingly in the
aforestated manner upon a motion for reconsideration filed by... private respondent... the appellate
court partially reconsidered the October 19, 2005 Decision.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for
lack of merit. It held that the family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as
long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof.

The heirs could not partition the property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise.
The appellate court also held that the minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses
Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home.

Issue:

The sole issue is whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to
accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.

(Notable Issue) Whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private respondent, can be
considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family Code.

Ruling:

The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by "any of
its beneficiaries" must be actual, something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely
possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive.

the property may be occupied by the "beneficiaries" enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code,
which may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife.

Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband
and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants,
descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living
in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.

To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the
relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they
are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

If there is no more beneficiary left at the time of death, we believe the family home will be dissolved or
cease, because there is no more reason for its existence. If there are beneficiaries who survive living in
the family home,it will continue for ten years, unless at the expiration of the ten years, there is still a
minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.

The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be expressed in this wise: If there are beneficiaries
who survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10
years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary
becomes of age.
The term "descendants" contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the
family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great
grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home.

Thus, private respondent's minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario
satisfies the first requisite.

the son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the
family home within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.

However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his
paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support
falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV's parents, especially his father, herein private
respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal
support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the
obligation imposed on the grandparents.

Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his
father.

Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino
Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154

Ramos v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 185920, July 20, 2010

Facts:

Respondents filed in 2003 a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company
owned by Ernesto M.

Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners. By Decision of April 15, 2005, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor
of respondents and ordered Ramos and the company to pay the aggregate amount of ₱1,661,490.30
representing their backwages, separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay. The
Decision having become final and executory and no settlement having been forged by the parties, the
Labor Arbiter issued on September 8, 2005 a writ of execution which the Deputy Sheriff of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos’ name covered by TCT
No. 38978, situated in Pandacan, Manila (Pandacan property). Alleging that the Pandacan property was
the family home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company
moved to quash the writ of execution. The Labor Arbiter denied the motion to quash, hence, Ramos and
the company appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s Order. The Ramos husband died
during the appeal in CA and is replaced by the Petitioners. The CA then held that the Pandacan property
was not exempted from execution hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the levy on the property is valid.

Ruling:
YES.

The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long
as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the family home is
made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred
prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted either
judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.

Indeed, the general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free
from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers
upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person
constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. But, for the
family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on
when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.

If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988
which is the case herein, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as
provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family home
requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the court’s order with
the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is
governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public instrument
which must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with either one of these
two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the privilege. It is not sufficient
that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for
exemption must be set up and proved.

In the present case, there being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or
extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos’ family home, the law’s protective mantle cannot be availed of
by petitioners. Parenthetically, the records show that the sheriff exhausted all means to execute the
judgment but failed because Ramos’ bank accounts were already closed while other properties in his or
the company’s name had already been transferred, and the only property left was the Pandacan
property.

 When Deemed Constituted

Modequillo v. Breva, 185 SCRA 766

Facts:

A judgement by the CA was rendered against Jose Modequillo. The judgement being final and executory,
a writ of execution was issued by the RTC of Davao City.
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land and a parcel of agricultural land registered in the name
of Jose Modequillo.

A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by Modequillo alleging that:

 The residential land located is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the
commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities
mentioned in Article 155 thereof;

 That the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is
not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code.
 As to the agricultural land although it is declared in the name of defendant it is alleged
to be still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor
and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority was not approved by the proper
government agency.
 The trial court denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration was filed but this was
denied.

Issue:

1. WON the subject property is deemed to be a Family Home. YES.

2. WON it falls from the exemption of the execution. NO.

Ruling:

In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home
whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code so it became a family home by operation of law
only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.

The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied
by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided
that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions
are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such
that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of
their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that
all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.

The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the
vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the
appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be
made by the sheriff shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.

De Mesa v. Acer, Jr., G.R. No. 185064, Jan. 16, 2012

Facts:

 Husband and Wife jointly purchased a subject lot prior to their marriage. A house was then later
constructed in the subject lot which they later occupied as their family home after they got married.

 The wife obtained a loan from Acero Jr. which was secured by a mortgage over the property. As
payment, the wife issued a check in which it was later dishonored as the account from which it was
drawn had already been closed.
 Acero Jr. filed a complaint against the spouses for violation of B.P 22
 RTC rendered a Decision acquitting the spouses but ordering them to pay Acero Jr. the amount of
₱100,000.00 with legal interest from date of demand until fully paid.
 Thereafter a writ of execution was issued and levied upon the subject property. It was eventually
sold to Acero Jr. as he was the highest bidder. The subject property was later leased to the spouses
and a certain Oliva.
 However the spouses failed to pay the rentals so they were sued for ejectment in which a decision
was rendered in favor of Acero Jr. ordering the spouses to vacate the premises.
 In the execution, the spouses invoked the exemption of the family home from levy but Acero Jr.
contended that the spouses did not assert and prove that their house and lot was a family home
prior to the public auction conducted by the sheriff.

Issue:

What is the effect of the spouses' failure to assert and prove that their house and lot was a family home
prior to the public auction conducted by the sheriff?

Ruling:

Their failure to invoke and prove that the house and lot was a family home is a waiver of such defense or
right. In once case decided by the Supreme Court, it was held that at no other time can the status of a
residential house as a family home can be set up and proved and its exemption from execution be
claimed but before the sale thereof at public auction. The Court further explained:

While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such
claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public
auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption.

The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a
personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but
by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person
claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must
be set up and proved to the Sheriff.
 Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject property before
the sale thereof at public action, they now are barred from raising the same. Failure to do so estops
them from later claiming the said exemption.

 No retroactive effect for Art. 153

Manacop vs CA,GR No. 97898, Aug. 11, 1997, 277 SCRA 57

Facts:

Husband and Wife purchased a residential lot with a Bungalow.

Respondents filed a complaint against the spouses before the RTC to collect an amount of indebtedness
amounting to P3,359,218.45.

Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a compromise agreement with
private respondent in which the trial court granted.

Respondents filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted. However the execution of the
judgment was delayed. Eventually the sheriff levied on the properties of the spouses in which were sold
at the public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff.

The spouses filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff from enforcing
them saying that the judgment was not yet executory.

Respondents opposed the motion saying that it was too late to question the order since 2 years have
already elapsed.

The lower court denied the motion to quash the writ of execution finding that the spouses had not paid
their indebtedness even though they collected receivables amounting to P57,224,319.75, the lower
court held that the case had become final and executory. It also ruled that spouses residence was not
exempt from execution as it was not duly constituted as a family home, pursuant to the Civil Code.

CA affirmed the decision of the lower court, hence this petition.

Issue:

W/N Article 153 has retroactive effects

Ruling:

Article 153 has no retroactive effect. Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in holding that his
residence was not exempt from execution in view of his failure to show that the property involved "has
been duly constituted as a family home in accordance with law." He asserts that the Family Code and
Modequillo require simply the occupancy of the property by the petitioner, without need for its judicial
or extrajudicial constitution as a family home. 7

Petitioner is only partly correct. True, under the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988, 8 the
subject property became his family home under the simplified process embodied in Article 153 of said
code. However, Modequillo explicitly ruled that said provision of the Family Code does not have
retroactive effect. In other words, prior to August 3, 1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil Code 9
had to be followed for a family home to be constituted as such. There being absolutely no proof that the
subject property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home, it follows that the law's
protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioner. Since the debt involved herein was incurred and
the assailed orders of the trial court issued prior to August 3, 1988, the petitioner cannot be shielded by
the benevolent provisions of the Family Code.

V. Paternity and Filiation (Arts. 163-182)

 Legitimate Children (Arts. 163-182)

- Presumption of Legitimacy

Tan v. Trocio, 191 SCRA 764

Facts:

Tan who was an owner and directress of a vocational school was allegedly overpowered by Trocio one
night and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her the result of which Tan had a child with Trocio.

8 years after the incident, Tan filed a complaint that seeks for the disbarment of Trocio for immorality.

Issue:

W/N Jewel is the legitimate child of Trocio

W/N Trocio should be disbarred

Ruling:

The court found insufficient basis to sustain Tan’s claims

Because after the incident she continued to have dealings with Trocio.

And her claim that the reason why she desisted from filing the complaint for such a long time because
Trocio allegedly threatened her that, should she report the incident he would make her Alien husband
deported, cannot also be sustained because at that time when Trocio’s transgression to her took place,
it was admitted by her that she no longer have contact with her lawful husband. The fear that she
speaks of, therefore, became inexistent.

The testimonies of Complainant and witness Marilou Pangandaman, another maid, to show unusual
closeness between Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him and giving him toys, are not convincing
enough to prove paternity, as Complainant would want us to believe. The same must be said of Exhibits
A, A1, B and B1, which are pictures of Jewel and the Respondent showing allegedly their physical
likeness to each other. Such evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity, and much less would it prove
violation of Complainant’s person and honor.
More importantly, Jewel Tan was born in 1972, during wedlock of Complainant and her husband and the
presumption should be in favor of legitimacy unless physical access between the couple was impossible.
From the evidence on hand, the presumption has not been overcome by adequate and convincing
proof. In fact, Jewel was registered in his birth certificate the legitimate child of the Complainant and her
husband, Tan Le Pok.

WHEREFORE, this Complaint for disbarment must be, and is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of convincing
substantiation

Arbolario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129163, April 22, 2003

Facts:

The original owners of the controverted lot, spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, had 5
children. Everyone mentioned is dead. The first child, Agueda Colinco, was survived by her two children,
namely, Antonio Colinco and Irene Colinco (respondent); Antonio Colinco predeceased his three
daughters, respondents Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco. The second child, Catalina
Baloyo, was married to Juan Arbolario and their union was blessed with the birth of only one child,
Purificacion Arbolario, who, in 1985, died a spinster and without issue. Juan Arbolario, consorted with
another woman by the name of Francisca Malvas and from this cohabitation petitioners Voltaire
Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Taala, Fe Arbolario, Exaltacion Arbolario, and Carlos Arbolario (referred to
hereinafter as ‘Arbolarios’) were born. All the foregoing petitioners were born well before the year
1951.

In 1946, the third child, Eduardo Baloyo, sold his entire interest in the lot to his sister, Agueda (first
child), by virtue of a notarized document. In 1951, a notarized declaration of heirship was executed by
and between Agueda, Catalina, Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo and Julian, who extrajudicially
declared themselves to be the only heirs of the late spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan. The
fourth child, Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her interest in the said lot in favor of her two nieces, Irene
Colinco to one-half (1/2) and Purificacion Arbolario to the other half. Purificacion Arbolario was then
allowed to take possession of a portion of the disputed parcel until her death sometime in 1984 or 1985.

Respondents Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco, Orpha Colinco, and Goldelina Colinco, believing themselves to
be the only surviving heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, executed a ‘Declaration of Heirship
and Partition Agreement’, dated May 8, 1987 where they adjudicated upon themselves their
proportionate or ideal shares: Irene Colinco, to one-half (1/2); while the surviving daughters of her
(Irene’s) late brother Antonio, namely Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina Colinco, to share in equal, ideal
proportions to the remaining half (1/2).

On October 2, 1987, the Colincos filed a case against Spouses Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay and Carlito
Salhay, seeking to recover possession of a portion of the aforesaid lot occupied by respondent spouses
(‘Salhays’ hereinafter) since 1970. The Salhays alleged in their defense that they have been the lawful
lessees of the late Purificacion Arbolario since 1971 up to 1978; and that said spouses allegedly
purchased the disputed portion of Lot from the deceased lessor sometime in September 1978.
On May 9, 1988 before the case was tried the Arbolarios and spouses Carlito Salhay and Rosalita
Rodriguez Salhay (all respondents in the case) filed another case ‘[f]or Cancellation of Title with
Damages’. The Arbolarios, joined by the Salhays, contend that the ‘Declaration of Heirship and Partition
Agreement’ executed by the Colincos was defective and thus voidable as they (Arbolarios) were
excluded therein. The Arbolarios claim that they succeeded intestate to the inheritance of their alleged
halfsister, Purificacion Arbolario; and, as forced heirs, they should be included in the distribution of the
aforesaid lot.

The RTC rendered judgment in the consolidated cases in favor of the Arbolarios and against the
Colincos. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

WON Arbolarios are illegitimate children

Ruling:

YES, they are illegitimate. There is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners that Juan Arbolario’s
marriage to Francisca Malvas was valid. It does not follow that just because his first wife has died, a man
is already conclusively married to the woman who bore his children. A marriage certificate or other
generally accepted proof is necessary to establish the marriage as an undisputable fact. Since they failed
to prove the fact (or even the presumption) of marriage between their parents, Juan Arbolario and
Francisca Malvas; hence, they cannot invoke a presumption of legitimacy in their favor. Paternity or
filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be judicially established.

Whether the Salhays had purchased the portion of land in issue, the Court also ruled that there was no
sufficient evidence to prove the same. Finally, on the issue of partition, the Court ruled that petitioners
were not able to establish any right thereto. The Petition for Review was denied.

Cabatania v. CA, G.R. No. 124814, Oct. 21, 2004

Facts:

This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia Regodos in
behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos.

During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on
September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her husband
left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for work and was
eventually hired as petitioner's household help. It was while working there as a maid that, on January 2,
1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual
intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got pregnant.

Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner's child 27 days after their sexual encounter.
The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later, on suspicion that Florencia
was pregnant, petitioner's wife sent her home. But petitioner instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod
City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her aunt's house in
Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo Regodos.
Petitioner Camelo Cabatania's version was different. He testified that sometime in December, 1981, he
hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the course of her employment, she would often go home to
her husband in the afternoon and return to work the following morning. This displeased petitioner's
wife, hence she was told to look for another job.

In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend New Year's Eve in
Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and invited her to
dinner. While they were eating, she confided that she was hard up and petitioner offered to lend her
some money. Later, they spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual intercourse. While doing it, he
felt something jerking and when he asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant with the child of
her husband. They went home the following day.

In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to petitioner's house hoping
to be re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioner's wife was in need of one, she was re-hired.
However petitioner's wife noticed that her stomach was bulging and inquired about the father of the
unborn child. She told petitioner's wife that the baby was by her husband. Because of her condition, she
was again told to go home and they did not see each other anymore.

Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencia's counsel. She was
demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying the alleged
paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when they had sex. He denied going to Bacolod City
with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2,
1982 and renting a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City.

After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its
discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband was alive. Deciding
in favor of private respondent, the trial court declared: :The child was presented before the Court, and if
the Court is to decide this case, based on the personal appearance of the child then there can never be a
doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the child of the defendant with plaintiff-minor's mother, Florencia
Regodos.” The CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

WON the court can compel petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge Regodos as his illegitimate son
and to give support to the latter.

Ruling:

NO. The trial court's finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private respondent was
based on the testimony of the child's mother and "the personal appearance of the child. Time and again,
this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order
for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or
the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.

Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation of which
was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying
the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record
the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person.

Further, the fact that Florencia's husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between
them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the
broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded
on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.

In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of
physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation
before the courts of law.

The petition is GRANTED. The decision of CA is reversed and set aside. Private respondent's petition for
recognition and support is dismissed.

Gerardo Concepcion v. CA, GR No. 123450, Aug. 31, 2005

Facts:

Petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almonte were married on December 29, 1989. They
lived in Fairview, Quezon City and a year later on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose
Gerardo. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled
on the ground of bigamy, alleging that her marriage with Mario Gopiao on December 10, 1980 was
never annulled. Although Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario, she averred that the marriage was
a sham and that she have never lived with Mario at all.

The trial court said otherwise, and ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting,
thus declaring her marriage to Gerardo as void ab initio. It deemed Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate
child and the custody was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Also, it
allowed the child to use the surname of his father.

Ma. Theresa appealed and pleaded for the reversal of the court’s decisions. The Court of Appeals ruled
that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage
considering the fact that the second marriage was void from the beginning. Therefore, the child Jose
Gerardo – under the law – is the child of the legal and subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and
Mario Gopiao.

Gerardo Concepcion moved for the reconsideration of the decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child of Mario and
not petitioner Gerardo.

Ruling:
YES. Gerardo's insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in the trial court and
in the appellate court does not hold water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo admitted and
agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was immaterial.

The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child
who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the
child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:

Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. Gerardo has no
standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper
case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the
legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the
marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning; he never became her husband
and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

During the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario
was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant
four kilometres apart.

Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario,
was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act. Sexual
union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be presented
by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in
favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.

First, the import of Ma. Theres as statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario
but her illegitimate son with

Gerardo. This declaration ― an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate ― is the very
declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable.
An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child
born or conceived within a valid marriage.

Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an instance
where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no
intercourse between them. All she said was that she never lived with Mario. She never claimed that
nothing ever happened between them. Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City
during the time material to Jose Gerardos conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of
marital intimacy, their proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the
impossibility of physical access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.

Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresa’s statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right
exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs. A mother has no right to disavow a child
because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose
Gerardos legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no
intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. The proscription is in consonance
with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law to lean
toward the legitimacy of children.

The Court upholds the presumption of his legitimacy. As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the
right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the
provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. A persons surname or family name identifies the family to
which he belongs and is passed on from parent to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on
Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.

The petition was denied. CA decision is affirmed.

Angeles v. Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798, September 2, 2005, 469 SCRA 363

Facts:

The legal dispute between the parties started when in the RTC at Caloocan City, respondent filed a
petition for letters of administration and her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of
Francisco M. Angeles.

Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of respondent, be made the
administratrix of Francisco's estate. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving spouse of
Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to the administration of his estate.

In her reply to opposition, respondent alleged, inter alia, that per certification of the appropriate offices,
the January to December 1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where
the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. In the same reply,
respondent dismissed as of little consequence the adoption adverted to owing to her having interposed
with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan.

Issues having been joined, trial ensued. Respondent, as petitioner a quo, commenced the presentation
of her evidence by taking the witness stand. After respondent rested her case following her formal offer
of exhibits, petitioner filed a 'Motion to Dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. In it,
she prayed for the dismissal of the petition for letters of administration. 

To the motion to dismiss, respondent interposed an opposition, followed by petitioner's reply, to which
respondent countered with a rejoinder. Eventually, in an Order, the trial court, on its finding that
respondent failed to prove her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco, dismissed the petition.

Respondent then moved for reconsideration, which motion was denied by the trial court in its Order.
Therefrom, respondent went on appeal to the Court of Appeals. As stated at the threshold hereof, the
Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, reversed and set aside the trial court's order of dismissal and
directed it to appoint respondent as administratrix of the estate of Francisco. Hence, petitioner’s instant
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:

WON respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado.

Ruling:

In the case at bench, other than the self-serving declaration of the petitioner, there is nothing in the
record to support petitioner's claim that she is indeed a legitimate child of the late Francisco M. Angeles
and Genoveva Y. Mercado. In other words, Francisco M. Angeles was never married before or at
anytime prior to his marriage to Belen Sagad, contrary to the claim of petitioner that Francisco M.
Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado were married in 1938.

Having failed to prove that she is the legitimate daughter or acknowledged natural child of the late
Francisco M. Angeles, petitioner cannot be a real party in interest in the adoption proceedings, as her
consent thereto is not essential or required.

Further, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks
of 'next of kin', the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the
decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as
distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of
administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine
and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this
consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and pass upon the claimed
relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.

WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED 'and SET ASIDE,
and the order of the trial court dismissing Special Proceedings No. C-2140 REINSTATED.

Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Diaz, G.R. No. 171713, Dec. 17, 2007

Facts:

Jinky Diaz, while married to a Japanese national--Hasegawa Katsuo, had an affair with Rogelio Ong and
lived together from January 1994- September 1998 at Tarlac City.

From their live-in relationship, Joan Diaz was conceived and born on February 1998.

Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took Joanne and Jinky home after delivery. He also paid all the
hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of Joanne's needs — recognizing the child
as his.

However, months after, he stopped supporting them and alleged that he is not the father of the child.
Jinky then filed an Action for support in behalf of the minor child.

The RTC ruled in favor of Jinkee because it was established by evidence that Katsuo—the husband, was
outside the country in the year 1997 preceding the birth of Joanne. Also, Rogelio himself admitted that
he shouldered the hospital bills, he fetched Jinky after giving birth and that he still used to see Jinky even
after the birth of Joanne.
Rogelio appealed to the CA but during the pendency of the case, he died and was substituted by the
Estate of Rogelio Ong.

The CA remanded the case to the RTC, ordering the parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis to
determine the paternity of Joanne. The Estate of Rogelio Ong questioned the appropriateness of the
order given that Rogelio is already dead.

Issue:

WON the CA erred when it remanded the case to the RTC for DNA Analysis despite the fact that the
person (Rogelio) subject to the DNA is already dead. NO.

Ruling:

The CA’s decision is affirmed.

The Court held that the death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as
long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA such as blood, saliva, and other body fluids,
tissues, hairs and bones.

Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be
available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of
obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.

- Who Can Impugn Legitimacy

De Jesus v. Dizon, GR No. 142877, October 2, 2001

Facts:

Danilo and Carolina de Jesus got married and had 2 children Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus.

Upon the death of a Juan Dizon, Jacqueline and Jinkie were recognized in a notarized document as being
his own illegitimate children by Carolina de Jesus.

Juan Dizon died intestate and left behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various
corporations and some real property.

It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment that Jacqueline and Jinkie led a complaint for
"Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Quezon City RTC.

However, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations
where he was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while
denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners
from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the
illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.

The RTC denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for
reconsideration and the CA upheld the decision of the RTC and remanded the case back to the RTC for
further proceedings.
The trial court dismissed the complaint of the two sisters for lack of cause of action and for being
improper. It decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding
inasmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or right.

Issue:

WON Jacqueline and Jinkie are illegitimate children of decedent Juan Dizon entitled to inherit from him.

Ruling:

A scrutiny of the records showed that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The
certificates of live birth also identified Danilo de Jesus as being their father.

There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality
and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the
birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is
not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.

In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan, the sisters, in effect, would impugn
their legitimate status as being children of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done
because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the
father, or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy
of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned
that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.

Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be
aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being
the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is
strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one
that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a
child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.

The instant petition is denied.

Liyao v. Liyao, GR No. 138961, March 7, 2002

Facts:

William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia filed an action for compulsory
recognition as "the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao.

Corazon G. Garcia stated that is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more
than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late
William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William's death. They lived together in the company of
Corazon's two (2) children from her subsisting marriage, namely: Enrique and Bernadette.

Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr and during her three day stay at the hospital, William Liyao
visited and stayed with her and the new born baby, paid all the medical, hospital expenses, food and
clothing, asked his secretary to secure a copy of Billy's birth certificate and instructed Corazon to open a
bank account for Billy and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein. William Liyao would also bring
Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together.

However, Linda Liyao-Ortiga stated that her dad William Liyao and mom were legally married and that
her parents were not separated legally or in fact. Also, she testified that Corazon Garcia is still married
Ramon Yulo and the records from the Local Civil Registrar do not indicate that they obtained annulment.

The RTC favored the son, William Liyao Jr., but the CA reversed this ruling.

Issue:

May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father,
William Liyao?

Ruling:

The SC affirms the CA.

It is clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of William Liyao
Jr., to compel recognition by William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot
prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

It is mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn
the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own
filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the
status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother's alleged paramour.

Also, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the
petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

 Periods

Babiero vs. Catotal, G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000

Facts:

Presentacion (respondent) led with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte a petition for the
cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. Respondent
asserted that she was the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Carinosa who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively. She asserted that the birth certificate
of Teofista is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, the signature of informant forged, and
contained false entries;
(1) That Teofista is the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Cariñosa ( born on September 20, 1996 and was delivered by 'hilot')

(2) Hermogena’s signature is falsified

(3) Teofista's correct family name is Guinto

(4) Teofista’s real mother was Flora Guinto ( housemaid of the Spouses Babiera), and her status is
an illegitimate child - her father, a Carpenter did not sign the birth certificate

(5) That it was clinically and medically impossible for Hermogena to bore a child at 54 years of age;
her last child birth was when Presentacion was born (1941)

(6) That Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the void and simulated birth certificate of Teofista
Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited the estate of cancelled and
declared void

Teofista countered that she and Presentacion are full-blooded sisters, as showed therein her certificate
of birth, Certificate of Baptism, and her School Report Card. She also filed a motion on the grounds that;

(1)The petition states no cause of action, being an attack on her legitimacy as the child of
Hermogena and Eugenio

(2)Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the petition pursuant to Art. 171 of the Family
Code

(3)The petition was barred from prescription in accordance with Art. 170 of the Family
Code.

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the birth certificate of petitioner
null and void and ordering the local civil registrar to cancel from the registry the questioned birth
certificate. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Presentacion ask the court to declare Teofista's certificate of birth void and ineffective, and to order the
City Civil Registrar to cancel the same as it affect the hereditary rights of Presentacion who inherited the
estate.

Issue:

1. WON Presentacion has legal capacity to file the special proceedings pursuant to Art. 171

2. WON the special proceeding is improper and barred by the statute of limitation

3. WON the public record of Teofista's birth is superior to the oral testimony of Presentacion.

Ruling:

Petition is not meritorious.

1. Article 171 is not applicable in this case. Article 171 of the Family Code shows that it applies to
instances which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however,
presupposes that the child was the undisputed child of the mother. Present case alleges and shows that
Hermogena did not give birth to Teofista. The present action does not impugn Teofista's filiation to
Eugenio and Hermogeno, be there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. The reason why
Presentacion took interest on Teofista's status is to protect the former's successional rights.

2. Article 170 of the FC does not apply. The provision provides a prescriptive period for action to impugn
the legitimacy of the child. The present action involves the cancellation of Teofista's Birth Certificate, it
does not impugn her legitimacy. The action to nullify the birth certificate does not prescribe because it
was allegedly declared void ab initio.

3. The specific attendant in the case at bar and the totality of the evidence presented during trial,
sufficiently negates the presumption of regularity in the issuance of birth certificate. First, the birth
certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the mother's signature was different from other
signatures. Second, no medical records or doctor's prescription that provide as evidence of
Hermogena's pregnancy. It was impossible for her to have given birth at 54 years of age. Third, the
disposition of Hermogena which states that she did not give birth to Teofista and that the latter was not
hers of Eugenio.

 Legitimacy Assailable Only in Direct Action

Tison v. CA, GR No. 121027, July 31, 1997

Facts:

The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are niece and nephew of the deceased Tedora Dezoller
Guerrero, who appears to be the sister of their father Hermogenes Dezoller . The present action for
reconveyance involves a parcel of land with a house and apartment which was originally owned by the
spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5,
1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and
herein petitioners. Petitioners’ father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit
from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.

The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse Martin,
executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the
land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter.
Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that
they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation.

During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Tison was presented as the lone witness, with the following
documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners's filiation to their father and their aunt, to wit: a
family picture; baptismal certicates of Teodora and Hermogenes ; certificates of destroyed records of
birth of Teodora and Hermogenes ; death certificates of Hermogenes and

Teodora ; certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of
Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of Corazon and Rene
Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage between
Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero.
Subsequently, private respondent led a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the ground that petitioners
failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in accordance with Article
172 of the Family Code. It is further averred that the testimony of petitioner Corazon Tison regarding her
relationship with her alleged father and aunt is self-serving, uncorroborated and incompetent, and that
it falls short of the quantum of proof required under Article 172 of the Family Code to establish filiation.
The respondent contended that the documents/evidence presented is inadmissible for being hearsay
since the affiants were never presented for cross-examination.

The trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the complaint for
reconveyance. In upholding the dismissal, Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence
presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are
all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

WON herein petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof required by Article 172 of the Family Code
to establish legitimacy and filiation?

Ruling:

No. The primary proof that was considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties
concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her
lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a
statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the
hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court

The private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. There is
no presumption of

the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the issue of
legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to
his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and
economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heir are allowed to contest such
legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none — even his heirs — can impugn legitimacy; that would amount
to an insult to his memory.

The questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
herein petitioners and private respondent are declared co-owners of the subject property with an
undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourth (3/4) share therein, respectively.

De Jesus and De Jesus v. Dizon, G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001

Facts:

Danilo and Carolina de Jesus got married and had 2 children Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus.
Upon the death of a Juan Dizon, Jacqueline and Jinkie were recognized in a notarized document as being
his own illegitimate children by Carolina de Jesus.

Juan Dizon died intestate and left behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various
corporations and some real property.

It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment that Jacqueline and Jinkie led a complaint for
"Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Quezon City RTC.

However, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations
where he was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while
denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners
from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the
illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.

The RTC denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for
reconsideration and the CA upheld the decision of the RTC and remanded the case back to the RTC for
further proceedings.

The trial court dismissed the complaint of the two sisters for lack of cause of action and for being
improper. It decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding
inasmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or right.

Issue:

WON Jacqueline and Jinkie are illegitimate children of decedent Juan Dizon entitled to inherit from him.

Ruling:

A scrutiny of the records showed that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The
certificates of live birth also identified Danilo de Jesus as being their father.

There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality
and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the
birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is
not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.

In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan, the sisters, in effect, would impugn
their legitimate status as being children of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done
because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the
father, or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy
of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned
that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.

Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be
aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being
the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is
strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one
that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a
child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.

The instant petition is denied.

Spouses Fidel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168263, July 21, 2008

Facts:

1. Respondents (all surnamed Espineli) filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the
abovementioned parcel of land against petitioners Edgardo and Natividad Fidel and Guadalupe
Espineli – Cruz.
- Respondents alleged they are the compulsory heirs of Primitivo Espineli, the only child
of Vicente Espineli (owner of the land) and his first wife, Juliana Asas.
- Respondents further alleged that the parcel of land owned by Vicente was sold on
October 1994 to the petitioners despite the fact that Vicente died intestate. Even
argued the sale is void because Vicente’s signature appearing on the deed of sale is a
forgery.
2. In her answer, Guadalupe, the only surviving child of Vicente and his second wife Pacencia,
denied any knowledge of the deed of sale allegedly signed by her father. She admitted selling
the property by another deed of sale signed by her as heir of Vicente.
- Guadalupe denied knowledge of Vicente’s alleged first marriage with Juliana and argued
further that the heirs of Primitivo must first establish filiation from Vicente, prior to instituting
the complaint for annulment of sale.
- Guadalupe stresses that petitioners Fidel have been able to register the sale of the
property.
3. RTC ruled in respondents’ (first family) favour. CA affirmed with modification following that the
subject property should be reconveyed to the estate of the late Vicente Espineli but the proper
proceedings should be instituted to determine the latter’s heirs.
4. Hence, the instant petition of petitioners Fidel. Issues raised were the private respondents’ legal
personality to institute the action, the validity of the baptismal certificate of Primitivo as proof
of filiation that Vicente is his father, among others.

Issue:

1. W/N the respondents have legal personality to file the complaint for annulment of title?

2. W/N the baptismal certificate of Primitivo is valid and competent to prove his filiation by
Vicente?

3. W/N the petitioners / buyers are in good faith?

Ruling:
. Yes.

Initially, there are two deeds of sale. The first deed of sale, allegedly signed by Vicente, is void because
his signature therein is a patent forgery. Records show he died in 1941; the deed of sale was allegedly
signed in October 7, 1994. (Void as stated in Article

1409, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code.)

The second deed of sale, signed by Guadalupe as heir of Vicente and in representation of her nephews
and nieces, petitioners insist that the sale is valid because respondents have no legal personality to file
the complaint, the latter not having established their filiation by Vicente. Petitioners argue that
respondents first need to establish their filiation by Vicente prior to instituting a complaint in a separate
action, and not in the present action.

On the other hand, respondents contend that their filiation was established by the baptismal certificate
of their father, Primitivo, showing that Primitivo is the son of Vicente. On this point, SC ruled in favor of
respondents (first family – compulsory heirs).

Ratio: While respondents’ principal action was for the annulment of the sale and not an action to
impugn one’s legitimacy and that one’s legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of respondents to the deceased
Vicente for the purpose of determining what legal rights respondents have in the property.

2. Yes. The baptismal certificate of Primitivo is valid and competent evidence to prove his filiation
by Vicente.

Records show that Primitivo (the only son of Vicente with first wife) was born in 1895. At that time, the
only records of birth are those which appear in parochial records. This Court has held that as to the
nature and character of the entries contained in the parochial books and the certificates thereof issued
by a parish priest, the same have not lost their character of being public documents for the purpose of
proving acts referred to therein. To the present day, no law has been enacted abolishing the official and
public character of parochial books and entries made therein.

3. No. SC ruled that the petitioners cannot be considered buyers in good faith.

For SC has found that petitioners were only able to register the sale of the property and Tax Declaration
No. 16304 in their name; they did not have a Torrens title. Unlike a title registered under the Torrens
System, a tax declaration does not constitute constructive notice to the whole world. The issue of good
faith or bad faith of a buyer is relevant only where the subject of the sale is a registered land but not
where the property is an unregistered land.

Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himaymaylan City, Negros, G.R. No. 181174, Dec. 4, 2009

Facts:

1. Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres Abraza married Pablo Braza Jr. on January 4, 1978. The union bore 3
children (co-petitioners). Pablo died in a vehicular accident in Indonesia.
2. During the wake, following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille
Titular began introducing her corespondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's
son.

3. The legal wife, Ma. Cristina, then inquired with the local civil registrar of Negros Occidental on the
status of the child with the following entries: (1) Pablo is the father of Patrick having acknowledged by
the father on January 13, 1997; and, (2) Patrick was legitimated by virtue of the subsequent marriage of
his parents; hence, his name was changed to Patrick Alvin Titular Braza. Cristina likewise obtained a copy
of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married in 1998.

4. Ma. Cristina and her children (co-petitioners) filed before the RTC of Negros a petition to correct the
entries in the birth certificate record of Patrick in the civil registry. They contended that Patrick could not
have been legitimated by the supposed subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because said
marriage is bigamous on account of a valid and subsisting marriage between her (Ma. Cristina) and
Pablo.

Petitioner prayed for the: (1) correction of the entries in Patrick’s birth record with respect to his
legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment and the use of the last name “Braza;” (2) a
directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit
Patrick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and (3) the declaration of nullity of the
legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, (4) the declaration of the marriage between
Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.

5. RTC dismissed the petition, holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court,
which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul
the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to
a DNA test, and that the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

Issue:

W/N the court may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy in an action to
correct entries in the civil registrar?

Ruling:

No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and
filiations. [Even if petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and
questions on legitimacy even in action to correct entries in the civil registrar, while citing Cariño v.
Cariño, Lee v. CA, and Republic v. Kho.]

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an
entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may
generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
registry. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which
all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.

Although the petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s
marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are
governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art.
171 of the Family Code, respectively; hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly
provided in said Code.

It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack
such as the petition filed before the court a quo.

 Proof of Filiation

- Proofs
o Record of Birth

People v Tumimpad, 235 SCRA 483

Facts:

1. Accused-appellant Constable Moreno L. Tumimpad and co-accused Constable Ruel C. Prieto were
charged with the crime of rape committed against a 15-year old Mongoloid child in a complaint dated on
May 24, 1991, signed by her mother. Accusedappellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Due
trial ensued.

2. At the time of the incident, the victim Sandra Salcedo was 15 years old but has a mind of a 5-year old
child. She was the daufhter of Lt. Col. Teofisto Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo. Col. Salcedo was then
Provincial Commander of Misamis Oriental. He had four security men assigned to him, two of whom
were accused Constable Prieto and accused-appellant Tumimpad. In the two-storey officer’s quarters
the Salcedo family resides, the upper storey was occupied by the family while the lower storey was
occupied by the security men.

3. On August 7, 1989, Sandra complained of constipation to which her mother brought her to a doctor
for a check-up. The minor was given medication but she only became irritable and moody in the next
few days. The next day, she saw Tumimpad coming out of the kitchen. Sandra told her mother, “Mama,
patayin mo ‘yan, bastos.”

4. Sandra was brought to a doctor for a second check-up. The urinalysis result revealed she was
pregnant. Further examinations in different hospitals were done, all confirming Sandra’s pregnancy. The
fetus gestational age was equivalent to 17.1 week. Sandra gave birth to a baby boy named Jacob Salcedo
on January 11, 1990.

5. During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test, both "Major Blood Grouping Test" and "Pheno
Blood Typing" be conducted on the offended party, Sandra’s child Jacob and the two accused. The result
of the test conducted by the Makati Medical Center showed that the baby, Jacob Salcedo, has a type "O"
blood, Sandra Salcedo type "B," accused Ruel Prieto type "A" and accusedappellant type "O.” Mrs.
Salcedo then filed the complaint. Testimonies of the victim, the mother and relatives were brought
about.
6. Trial court convicted Moreno Tumimpad of the crime charged but acquitted the other accused, Ruel
Prieto, on reasonable doubt, stating he has a different blood type from that of the child.

7. Tumimpad contended that the court erred in convicting the accused-appellant based on major blood
grouping test known as ABO and RHS test, not a paternal test known as chromosomes or HLA test.

Issue:

W/N the lower court erred in convicting Tumimpad based on the result of the blood test.

Ruling:

Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly by testimonial evidence given by the victim
herself and her relatives. The blood test was adduced as evidence only to show that the alleged father
or any one of many others of the same blood type may have been the father of the child. As held by this
Court in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals:

Paternity — Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother, the child,
and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the father of a particular
child. But group blood testing cannot show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in many states, and
courts in others, have recognized the value and the limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions have
recognized the conclusive presumption of nonpaternity where the results of the test, made in the
prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in which
the judgment of the Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and intolerable results avoided,
such as have occurred where the finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the results
of the test. The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of paternity as they show
only a possibility that the alleged father or any one of many others with the same blood type may have
been the father of the child.

Whereby, the accused-appellant’s guilt of the crime of rape having been proven beyond reasonable
doubt, and the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.

Mariategui v. CA, 205 SCRA 337

Facts:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will. During his lifetime he contracted 3 marriages: With Eusebia
Montellano (1st wife) who eventually died, with whom he begot 4 children with. 2 of the children from
the 1st wife died and survived by their children; For Flaviana Montellano (2nd wife), he begot 1
daughter; Lastly, he got married with Felipa Velasco (Lupo's Third Wife) and had 3 children (private
respondents, Jacinto, Julian, and Paulina Mariategui)

At the time of his death, Lupo left certain properties (Muntinglupa Estate) which he acquired when he
was still unmarried. Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate.
Thereafter, registration of the lot was issued in the name of the heirs of the 1st and 2nd marriage. The
registered owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which
separate transfer certificates of title were issued to the respective parties
Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and Paulina filed with the lower
court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 164 were
owned by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their
co-heirs, they (children of the third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots.

Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of
extrajudicial partition. The heirs of the 1st and 2nd marriage was against this and contended that the
complaint was one for recognition of natural children.

The 1st and 2nd marriage heirs filed a motion to dismiss and eventually a complaint but the RTC
dismissed it for lack of evidence. They elevated it to the CA, but it declared all the children including the
ones in the 3rd marriage entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo.

Issue:

1. Whether or not prescription barred private respondents' right to demand the partition of the
estate of Lupo Mariategui,

2. Whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition, were
able to prove their successional rights over said estate.

Ruling:

Yes. The Private respondents (children of the 3rd marriage) were able to prove their successional rights
over said estate. They are to be considered legitimate children based on the evidences established and
the fact that they were de-fraud by the registration of names by the heirs of the 1st and 2nd marriage, in
deprivation of their share, they are not barred by prescription to file such action for recognition.

Article 172 of the Family Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established by
the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child.

Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate
is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts
contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other private
respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the documents
required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the
same manner as their brother Jacinto.

The nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time and despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the
private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's death in 1953. Even the trial court mentioned
in its decision the admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners
herein, that ". . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay pawang mga kapatid ko sa ama.

Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co heirs, prescription
can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents discovered the petitioners'
act of defraudation. Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private
respondents commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that petitioners had
registered in their names the lots involved.
Petition DENIED; CA decision AFFIRMED

Rosalina P. Eceta v. Ma. Theresa Vell Lagura Eceta, GR No. 157037, May 20, 2004

Facts:

Petitioner Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta sometime in 1926. During the
subsistence of their marriage, they begot a son, Vicente, and acquired several properties, among which
is the disputed property located in Stanford, Cubao, Quezon City. Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind
Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory heirs. Vicente sired and illegitimate daughter named Maria
Theresa, herein respondent. In 1977, Vicente died and his compulsory heirs were his mother, Rosalina
and illegitimate child, Maria Theresa.

Maria Theresa then filed a case before the RTC of Quezon City for “Partition and Accounting with
Damages” against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her father’s death, she became Rosalina’s co-heir
and co-owner of the Cubao property. In her answer, Rosalina alleged that the property is paraphernal in
nature and thus belonged to her exclusively.

During the pre-trial, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts wherein they both admitted their
relationship to one another. After the trial on merits, the RTC rendered a decision. Rosalina appealed
the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the RTC’s decision. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not a mere certificate of birth is competent evidence to prove the alleged filiation of the
respondent as an “illegitimate daughter” of her alleged father Vicente Eceta.

Ruling:

Yes. The respondent, successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly
authenticated birth certificate, signed by him, thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter.

By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity, thus:

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence
thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and
no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

 o Open and Continuous Possession and Status of a Child

Quismundo v. WCC, 132 SCRA 590

Facts:

Paciencia and Virginia Venta were minors when their mother, Jovita Quismundo, filed on their behalf a
claim for benefits due to the death of Francisco Venta. They alleged that the deceased was their natural
father.

Francisco Venta was employed by the private respondent Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., Inc. On May 17,
1967, Francisco died due to chronic hemorrhagic ulcerative enteritis.

Paciencia and Virginia, represented by their mother, entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement and
Release with AG&P on October 17, 1967, wherein they received the sum of P1,500.00 as death benefits
presumably on account of the Disability, Death and Retirement Plan of said entity.

Earlier, on August 15, 1967, Paciencia and Virginia filed a claim for death benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Law. However, the Workmen's Compensation Commission denied the claim based on the
ground that although Paciencia and Virginia were dependent on the deceased, they failed to show that
they had been acknowledged by him as his illegitimate children. The petition prays that Paciencia and
Virginia be adjudged as having been acknowledged and, therefore, entitled to be paid benefits under
the Workmen's Compensation Law.

Citing Article 278 of the Civil Code, the Workmen's Compensation Commission held that the deceased
had not recognized the two claimants absent recognition in a record of birth, in a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic document. The petitioners agree but cite instead Art. 283 of
the same Code which provides, inter alia that:

Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts
of the latter or of his family xxx xxx xxx

Issue:

W/N the deceased acknowledged the petitioners as his children, in accordance with the law.

Ruling:

The decision is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. The reliance by the petitioners on Art. 283 of the Civil
Code is misplaced. This provision contemplates compulsory recognition as distinguished from voluntary
recognition provided in Art. 278. The possession of status of a child does not in itself constitute an
acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to compel recognition by his assumed parent. The
provision provides the grounds for compulsory recognition in an action which may be brought by the
child. Neither the proceedings before the Commission nor in this Court can be regarded as the
appropriate action to compel recognition.

o Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Law

Constantino v. Mendez, 209 SCRA 18

Facts:

Petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment, support and damages against
private respondent Ivan Mendez. In her complaint, Amelita alleges that sometime in the month of
August 1974 she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant located at Sta. Cruz, Manila, where she worked
as a waitress; that the day following their first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel
Enrico where he was billeted; that while dining, Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita; that
Amelita asked for time to think about Ivan's proposal; that at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Amelita
asked Ivan to bring her home to which the latter agreed, that on the pretext of getting something, Ivan
brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with the latter; that after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married
man; that they repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November, 1974
whenever Ivan is in Manila. As a result of which Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas for help and
support fell on deaf ears; that Amelita had no sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who is
the father of the child yet to be born at the time of the filing of the complaint; that because of her
pregnancy, Amelita was forced to leave her work as a waitress; that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of
Davao City. As relief, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn child, the payment of actual,
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus costs.

Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony's Cocktail Lounge but denied having sexual knowledge or
illicit relations with her. He prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action.

The trial court ruled in favor of Amelita. Both parties filed their separate motion for reconsideration.
Ivan Mendez anchored his motion on the ground that the award of damages was not supported by
evidence. Amelita Constantino, on the other hand, sought the recognition and support of her son
Michael Constantino as the illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez. The trial court favored again Amelita.

CA reversed the previous decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

1. WON the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial court
and in dismissing the complaint.

2. WON Amelita’s claim for damages based in Article 19 and 21 should be granted.

Ruling:

1. NO. It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, based on the evidence on record, that Amelita
Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of
her son Michael Constantino. Such conclusion based on the evaluation of the evidence on record is
controlling on this Court as the same is supported by the evidence on record.

Amelita's testimony on cross-examination that she had sexual contact with Ivan in Manila in the first or
second week of

November, 1974 is inconsistent with her response that she could not remember the date of their last
sexual intercourse in November, 1974. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of
November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely
testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November,
1974.

As correctly pointed out by private respondent's counsel, to the effect that "the mean duration of actual
pregnancy, counting from the day of conception must be close to 267 days", the conception of the child
(Michael) must have taken place about 267 days before August 3, 1375 or sometime in the second week
of November, 1974. While Amelita testified that she had sexual contact with Ivan in November, 1974,
nevertheless said testimony is contradicted by her own evidence.

Petitioner's assertion that Ivan is her first and only boyfriend is belied, her own letter addressed to Mrs.
Mendez where she revealed the reason for her attachment to Ivan who possessed certain traits not
possessed by her boyfriend. She also confided that she had a quarrel with her boyfriend because of
gossips so she left her work.

An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in
the family or lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by
clear and convincing evidence.

2. NO. As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 & 21 of the Civil Code on the
theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, the Court cannot but
agree with the Court of Appeals that mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery.
Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual
desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she
admitted that she was attracted to Ivan. Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her
womanhood.

- Filiation not established

Labangala v. Santiago, GR No. 132305, December 4, 2001

Facts:

Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land. Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered it in his name
alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now respondents herein), sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of
the property. The trial court decided in favor of the sisters. Later on, Jose died intestate. Respondents
filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and possession against herein petitioner, Labagala to
recover from her the 1/3 portion of said property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner's
sole possession upon Jose's death. Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property belongs to
them by operation of law, because they are the only legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate and
without issue. They claimed that the purported sale of the property made by their brother to petitioner
sometime in March 1979 5 was executed through petitioner's machinations and with malicious intent,
to enable her to secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title in petitioner's name alone.

Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery. The deed showed that Jose affixed his
thumbmark thereon but respondents averred that, having been able to graduate from college, Jose
never put his thumbmark on documents he executed but always signed his name in full. They claimed
that Jose could not have sold the property belonging to his "poor and unschooled sisters who sacrificed
for his studies and personal welfare." Respondents also pointed out that it is highly improbable for
petitioner to have paid the supposed consideration of P150,000 for the sale of the subject property
because petitioner was unemployed and without any visible means of livelihood at the time of the
alleged sale. They also stressed that it was quite unusual and questionable that petitioner registered the
deed of sale only on January 26, 1987, or almost eight years after the execution of the sale.

On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C. Labagala as claimed by
respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed to be the daughter of Jose and thus entitled to his share in
the subject property. She maintained that she had always stayed on the property, ever since she was a
child. She argued that the purported sale of the property was in fact a donation to her, and that nothing
could have precluded Jose from putting his thumbmark on the deed of sale instead of his signature. She
pointed out that during his lifetime, Jose never acknowledged respondents' claim over the property such
that respondents had to sue to claim portions thereof.

The trial court decided in favor of the petitioner and ruled that, while there was indeed no consideration
for the deed of sale executed by Jose in favor of petitioner, said deed constitutes a valid donation. Even
if it were not, petitioner would still be entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property as Jose's daughter.

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the trial court. Apart
from respondents' testimonies, the appellate court noted that the birth certificate of Ida Labagala
presented by respondents showed that Ida was born of different parents, not Jose and his wife. It also
took into account the statement made by Jose in a previous civil case that he did not have any child.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

1. WON the respondents may impugn petitioner's fililiation in this action for recovery of title and
possession.

2. WON petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property he co-owned with respondents,
through succession, sale, or donation.

Ruling:

1. YES. Petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code is of no merit. It contemplates situations
where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man's child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper
cases, his heirs) denies the child's filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to
be the child at all of a particular couple. Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife. However, the present case is not
one impugning petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a
legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. Moreover, the present action is one for
recovery of title and possession, and thus outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive periods.

In this case, respondents are not assailing petitioner's legitimate status but are, instead, asserting that
she is not at all their brother's child. The birth certificate presented by respondents support this
allegation. At the pre-trial, petitioner's counsel admitted that petitioner did not have a birth certificate
indicating that she is Ida Santiago, though she had been using this name all her life. Petitioner opted not
to present her birth certificate to prove her relationship with Jose and instead offered in evidence her
baptismal certificate. However, a baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of
filiation. It is conclusive only of the baptism administered, according to the rites of the Catholic Church,
by the priest who baptized subject child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and
statements contained in the certificate concerning the relationship of the person baptized.

2. NO. Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not have the right to transfer ownership of the
entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters. Petitioner could not have given
her consent to the contract, being a minor at the time. Consent of the contracting parties is among the
essential requisites of a contract, including one of sale, absent which there can be no valid contract.
Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not pay any centavo for the property, which makes the sale void.

Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation. Even assuming that the deed is
genuine, it cannot be a valid donation.

It lacks the acceptance of the donee required by Art. 725 of the Civil Code. Being a minor in 1979, the
acceptance of the donation should have been made by her father or mother, or any legal
representative.

Fernandez v. Fernandez, GR No. 143256, August 28, 2001

Facts:

The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia were the registered owners of a
parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-9267 (525) consisting of 194 sq. meters, and the two-storey building
constructed thereon covered by Tax Declaration 22-592-1. It is undisputed that Generosa gave birth to a
baby boy named Rogelio who died when he was only twelve (12) years old as paralytic. In the testimony
of Romeo Fernandez, it was revealed that the late Spouses being childless by the death of their son,
purchased from a certain Miliang for P20.00 a one (1) month baby boy. The boy being referred to was
later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein appellant. Appellant was taken care of by the couple
and was sent to school and became a dental technician. He lived with the couple until they became old
and disabled.

Jose K. Fernandez died thereby leaving his wife Generosa A. de Venecia and Rodolfo Fernandez and an
estate. Appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition dividing and
allocating to themselves the following:
To: Generosa de Venecia Vda. De Fernandez

(a) 119.5 sq. m. located on the southwestern portion of the land;

(b) Whole residential house above-mentioned;

To: Rodolfo V. Fernandez

74.5 square meters to be taken on the northeastern portion of the land.

On the same day, Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Eddie Fernandez,
appellant's son.

After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco, Julita, William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo,
Rodolfo and Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez, being nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K.
Fernandez, filed an action to declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio.

Significantly, in their answer, defendants alleged that the deceased Sps. Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa
were husband and wife blessed with one child the herein defendant Rodolfo V. Fernandez whom they
acknowledged during their lifetime. Further, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by the late Generosa de Venecia and defendant Rodolfo V. Fernandez which are now in
question were all made with the full knowledge, consent and approval of the parties thereto and for
value.

The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs. Defendants Rodolfo Fernandez et.
al appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's judgment in its assailed
decision. Appellants Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied in
a resolution. Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed the instant petition for review.

Issue:

The principal issue for resolution in this case concerns the rights of the parties to the conjugal property
of the deceased spouses Fernandez.

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed judgment of Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed with
modification, as follows:

1. Respondents as legitimate heirs of Dr. Jose Fernandez are entitled to the ¼ share of the conjugal lot
and building of the deceased spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez who died childless and intestate;

2. The deed of extra-judicial partition is nullified insofar as the share of petitioner Rodolfo in the
conjugal lot is concerned and the title issued pursuant thereto in the name of Rodolfo Fernandez;

3. Considering that the deed of sale is valid insofar as the ¾ share of Generosa sold to petitioner Eddie
Fernandez, TCT No. 54693 is cancelled and a new title should be issued in the names of petitioner Eddie
Fernandez and respondents as co-owners of the ¾ and ¼ shares respectively in the conjugal building.

4. The awards of actual and moral damages and attorney's fees are deleted.
Locsin v. Locsin, GR No. 146737, December 10, 2001

Facts:

November 11, 1991 – 11 months after Juan “Johnny” Locsin, Sr. died intestate, respondent Juan Locsin,
Jr. filed with the RTC of Iloilo City a Petition for Letters of Administration praying that he be appointed
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased.

He alleged, among others:

1. That he is an acknowledged natural born child of the Late Juan C. Locsin (implying that he is an
interested person in the estate and is considered as next of kin entitled to letters of administration)

2. That during his lifetime, the deceased owned personal properties which include undetermined
savings, current and time deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion of the undivided mass of real
properties owned by him and his 5 siblings (petitioners herein)

3. That he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent

The 5 siblings of the late Juan Locsin, Sr. (some represented through their heirs) opposed the
respondent’s petition contending that:

1. Respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his
lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name.

2. Respondent’s claim as a natural child is barred by prescription or the statute of limitations.

3. There is no filial relationship between herein respondent and the deceased.

To support his claim, respondent submitted the following:

1. Machine copy of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of birth records in
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (Exhibit D) This contains the information that
respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the facts stated therein, as
evidenced by his signatures (Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3").

2. Testimony of Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City who produced and identified in
court the bound volume of 1957 records of birth where the alleged original of Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 is included.

A photograph showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C.
Locsin’s dead body. (Exhibit C) He claims that the photograph shows that he and his mother have been
recognized as family members of the deceased.

In their oppositions, petitioners claim that Exhibit D is falsified and spurious, submitting the following:

1. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar
General, Metro Manila (Exhibit 8) indicating that the birth of respondent was reported by his mother,
Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin.
2. They observed as anomalous the fact that while respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his
birth was recorded on January 30, 1957, however, his Certificate of Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit D) was
recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form.

3. On the other hand, Exhibit 8 appears on a July,1956 form, already used before respondent's birth.

4. They presented the testimony of Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a handwriting expert. He testified that the
signatures of Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of Iloilo City) appearing in
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit D) are forgeries.

September 13, 1996 – The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Juan C. Locsin, Jr and appointed him as
sole administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased, finding Exhibit D and C as sufficient proofs of
respondent’s illegitimate filiation with the deceased.

The Court of Appeals affirmed RTC’s decision and denied petitioners’ subsequent motion for
reconsideration and respondent’s motion for execution pending appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not Juan Locsin, Jr. has established his filiation (i.e., as an acknowledged natural son) with
the deceased Juan Locsin, Sr. NO

Ruling:

The focal issue of the resolution of this case is which of the two documents – Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 (Exhibit D) and Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit 8) is genuine.

On the Establishment of Filiation

The Court, through Justice Vitug, previously held:

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by:

1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and

signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by:

1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or 2. any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and
no further court action is required.

In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a
voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic
writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the
child's acknowledgment

The records of births from all cities and municipalities in the Philippines are officially and regularly
forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars. Since the records
of births cover several decades and come from all parts of the country, to merely access them in the
Civil Registry General requires expertise. To locate one single birth record from the mass, a regular
employee, if not more, has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of these employees in Metro
Manila would have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record originating from the Local Civil
Registry of Iloilo City. Access to Local Civil Registries is easier.

The trial court held that doubts to the genuine nature of Exhibit D are dispelled by the testimonies of
Rosita Vencer, Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. The event which she testified was the birth of the
respondent on October 22, 1956 (37-38 years ago) when the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City was Emilio
G. Tomesa. Necessarily, her knowledge of respondent’s birth was based merely on her general
impressions of the existing records of that Office.

When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary from those
appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the
variance has to be clarified in more persuasive and rational manner. The SC does not find Vencer’s
explanations convincing since the same if full of infirmities which highlighted the suspicious
circumstances surrounding the existence of Exhibit D.

Several irregularities were found in Exhibit D:

1. Respondent’s Certificate of Live Birth (Exhibit D) was recorded using a December 1, 1958 form but
was entered into the records on January 30, 1957 (almost 2 years earlier).

Vencer answered that during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were already exhausted so the new
form were requested by the former civil registrar. Vencer’s answer was merely a supposition (maybe)
and does not satisfactorily explain the use of such forms almost 2 years earlier than its date.

On the other hand, Exhibit 8 of the petitioners found in the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila is on
Municipal Form No. 102, revised in July, 1956. We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to
assume that the 1956 forms would continue to be used several years thereafter. But for a 1958 form to
be used in 1957 is unlikely.

1, The back cover of 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Vencer merely
stated that she is not aware of this since she is not a bookbinder.

2. Exhibit D is merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the other entries. Vencer
answered that they sometimes paste some of the leaves to replace the record when the leaves are taken
or detached.

There is no explanation why out of so many certificates, this vital document, Exhibit "D", was merely
pasted with the volume.
1. The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon copy of the
alleged original and the entries therein are typewritten, while the records of all other certificates are
handwritten.

2. Unlike the contents of those other certificates, Exhibit "D" does not indicate important particulars,
such as the alleged father's religion, race, occupation, address and business.

The space which calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is blank.

On the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a purported signature of the alleged father, but the blanks
calling for the date and other details of his Residence Certificate were not filled up.

The SC supports a finding that Exhibit 8 of the petitioners, NOT respondent’s Exhibit D, should be given
more faith and credence.

The Civil Registry Law requires the Local Civil Registrar to send copies of registrable certificates and
documents presented to them for entry to the Civil Registrar General, during the first 10 days of each
month, a copy of the entries made during the preceding month.

In light of the above provisions, a copy of the document sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the Civil
Registrar General should be identical in form and in substance with the copy being kept by the latter.
In the instant case, Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil Registrar General is not identical with Exhibit
"D" as appearing in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Such circumstance should have
aroused the suspicion of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals and should have impelled them to
declare Exhibit "D" a spurious document.

Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by his mother. In the same Exhibit "8",
the signature and name of Juan C. Locsin listed as respondent's father and the entry that he and Amparo
Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28, 1954 do not appear.

In Roces vs Local Civil Registrar, it was held that Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil
Code explicitly prohibits, the naming of the father and statement of any information or circumstances
which could identify him when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him.

..xxx… The certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother, is incompetent
evidence of fathership of the said child.

In Fernandez vs CA, it was held that a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father (who had no
hand in the preparation)is not competent evidence of paternity.

Birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. Its
evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its
falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the
Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges of nullity. Without
doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate
of Live Birth. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil Registry General.

Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot
and will not constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would
encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before a
coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.

Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the late Juan C. Locsin, Sr. since his
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. As such, he is not an interested person and is
not entitled to letters of administration.

Petition is GRANTED and CA’s decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

OTHER RELEVANT MATTERS:

On the rules of evidence

General Rule: Factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.

EXC: When there appears in the record of the case some facts or circumstances of weight and influence
which have been overlooked, or the significance of which have been misinterpreted, that if considered,
would affect the result of the case.

The exception applies in the case at bar where, the trial court failed to appreciate facts and
circumstances that would have altered its conclusion.

On the persons preferred to be entitled to the issuance of letters of administration:

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that if no executor is named in the will,
administration shall be granted to the surviving husband or wife, as applicable, or the next of kin, or
both, among others.

Section 2 of the same Rule provides that a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner.

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.

In estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is
such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.

In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, it was held that in the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a
deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to
be appointed administrator.

It is an undisputed fact that the deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was not survived by a spouse. In his petition
for issuance of letters of administration, respondent alleged that he is an acknowledged natural son of
the deceased, implying that he is an interested person in the estate and is considered as next of kin.

Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, Sept. 28, 2015

Facts:
Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo, the defendants, executed a document declaring themselves as the only
heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. Consequently, they took possession and were able to
transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their names.

Karen Santos, on the other hand, claims to be the only child of deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo.
She filed a complaint for the annulment of document and recovery of the possession against the
defendants, brothers of his father. She alleged that with the death of her parents, the property
belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law of intestacy.

The defendant denied the allegation that the plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their brother
stating that the deceased Rufino and Caridad were childless and took in as their ward Karen, the child of
Caridad’s sister. To strengthen their defense, they claimed that the birth certificate of the plaintiff was a
simulated document. The birth certificate had alterations as confirmed by an NSO representative.

They alleged that it is impossible for Rufino and Caridad to register the plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur
because they never lived or sojourned in that place. Also, Caridad, an elementary teacher in Bulacan,
never filed a maternity leave during the period of her service, as supported y a certification from the
Schools Division Superintendent.

The RTC ruled that the respondent is a legitimate child of the putative parents. The trial court found that
respondent’s filiation was duly established by the certificate of live birth which was presented in
evidence. It dismissed the petitioners’ claim that the certificate was tampered. It further stated that
even granting arguendo that the birth certificate is questionable, the filiation of respondent has already
been sufficiently proven by evidence of her open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child under Article 172 of the Family Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that under Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of the
child must be reckoned from either of these two dates: the date the child was born to the mother during
the marriage, or the date when the birth of such child was recorded in the civil registry. The appellate
court found no evidence or admission that Caridad indeed gave birth to respondent on a specific date.

It further resolved that the birth certificate presented in this case does not qualify as the valid
registration of birth in the civil register because it was not signed by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the child’s birth or the parents of the newborn child, contrary to what the law required.
However, the CA ultimately ruled that the respondent was able to prove her filiation via open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child as supported by secondary evidence presented.

The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to bear their
family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and sent her to school paying for her tuition and other
school expenses; (3) she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after
the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was appointed legal guardian of the person and property of
the plaintiff from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs
of the deceased.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in allowing the introduction of secondary evidence and
rendered judgement notwithstanding the existence of primary evidence of birth certificate.

Ruling:

NEGATIVE. Secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct action under Article 172 because the
said provision of law is meant to be instituted as a separate action, and proof of filiation cannot be
raised as a collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action for annulment of document and
recovery of possession. However, this rule is applicable only to actions where the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child is at issue.

In the case at bar, filiation is not an issue. What petitioner alleges is that the respondent is not a child of
the deceased spouses at all. Thus, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly admitted secondary
evidence similar to the proof admissible under Art. 172 of the Family Code.

However, the Supreme Court ruled that the lower court’s declaration that the respondent is a legitimate
child and sole heir of the deceased spouses is based on misapprehension of facts. The irregularities
consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and the name of the informant made the
document questionable, as supported by the corroborating testimony of the NSO representative. In
addition, even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to explain such irregularities. These
irregularities and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are
sufficient to overthrow the presumption of regularity attached to the respondent’s birth.

With the declaration that the birth certificate is a nullity or falsity ruled then the respondent is not the
child of Rufino, and therefore not entitled to inherit from the estate.

- Imprescriptibility of Action to claim Legitimacy

Dela Rosa v. CA, 280 SCRA 444

Facts:

On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, Vda. de Danao filed a Petition for Letters of Administration of the
intestate estate of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Dr. Guillermo Rustia. The petition was filed
by Luisa Delgado on behalf of the surviving sisters, brothers, nephews, nieces and grand-nephews and
grand-nieces of Josefa Delgado. In due course, the petition was opposed by Marciana Rustia Vda. de
Damian, Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, (sisters of the deceased Dr. Guillermo Rustia); Josefina Albano, Virginia
Rustia-Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia, Leticia Rustia Miranda, (children of the
late Roman Rustia, brother of the deceased Dr. Guillermo Rustia); and Guillermina Rustia Rustia (de
facto adopted daughter of Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia).

With the permission of the trial court, Guillerma S. Rustia-(Alaras) was allowed to intervene in the
proceedings upon her assertion of the status of an acknowledged natural child, and thus, the only
surviving child and sole heir, of Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia.

Luisa Delgado filed an Amended Petition for Letters of Administration, this time alleging that the
deceased Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had been living continuously as husband and wife, but
without the benefit of marriage.
RTC- Manila Branch 55 rendered its decision appointing petitioner Carlota Vda. De Dela Rosa as
administrator of the estates of the two deceased;

Private respondents filed a notice of appeal notifying the court of their intention to appeal the decision.
The Record on Appeal was filed 31 days from the time private respondents received the court's decision.
It was then denied and dismissed on the ground that the Record on Appeal was filed a day late, pursuant
to Batas Pambansa 129 and the Interim Rules. (30 days)

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the private respondents, where the appellate court reversed
itself, and ruled that the latters' appeal should be given due course.

CA, through its resolution, held that the trial court should have proceeded with caution in considering
the private respondents' appeal, as every party-litigant should be afforded ample opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.

Thus, the decision by the Trial Court was reconsidered. Private respondents' petition for certiorari and
mandamus is granted.

Hence, petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de Dela Rosa is now before us

Issue:

1. Whether or not the deceased Josefa Delgado was legally married to Dr. Guillermo Rustia.

2. Whether or not the petitioner and the other claimants to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado are
entitled to her estate, if any.

3. Whether or not the intervenor was acknowledged as a natural or illegitimate child by the deceased
Dr. Guillerma Rustia in his lifetime.

Ruling:

In the inception of this action for issuance of letters of administration, petitioner's predecessor alleged
that Josefa Delgado and Dr. Guillermo Rustia were legally married, only to withdraw such submission
later by a belated amended petition, advancing that the two were never actually married, but were only
living together as husband and wife. Such change of stance was accepted by the trial court, upon the
justification that no record of marriage of Josefa Delgado and Dr. Guillermo Rustia could be found, and
that it was highly irregular that the two could celebrate important occasions in grand fashion, when no
whiff was made of their own marriage. In corroboration, the testimonies of certain "close friends" of
Josefa Delgado disclose that the marriage between Josefa and Guillermo, allegedly, never occurred.

It bears mentioning that the records likewise disclose testimonies pointing out the existence of
marriage between the decedents. Needless to state, it is presumed in our jurisdiction that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. This
is the common order of society, and can only be rebutted by sufficient contrary evidence.

2.) The propriety of the appointment of Carlota Vda. de Damian as sole administrator of the estates of
the decedents is put to question, especially in light of the trial court's finding that Josefa Delgado and
Dr. Guillermo Rustia were not married to each other. It has been observed that the estates of deceased
spouses may be settled in a single proceeding,11 but in all other instances, even if the deceased persons
are related as ascendants and descendants, their separate estates must be settled in different
proceedings.12 The reason for this is the avoidance of opportunity of encroachment into the estate left
by one decedent by the heirs of another, especially in instances, such as this petition, were different
heirs are determined for different decedents.

3.) As for the status of Guillerma Rustia-Alaras as an acknowledged child of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Article
175, in conjunction with Article 173 and 172 of the Family Code provides for the means for proving
filiation:

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same,
evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of
the alleged parent. (289a) (Emphasis Ours)

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation is a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall
be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases,
the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of
the parties.

The cases relied upon in the trial court's decision, pointing to a child's action for establishing filiation
even beyond the putative parent's death are modified by the enactment of the above-cited provisions
of the Family Code, which cite definite periods within which such actions must be interposed. The
acknowledgment of Guillerma Alaras as an acknowledged (illegitimate) child of Dr. Guillermo Rustia,
represents a crucial bar in the claim of the private respondents, as under Articles 988 and 1003 of the
Civil Code.

A review of the trial court's decision is needed, in view of the above-demonstrated divergence of the
evidence and arguments presented.
 - Rights of Legitimate Children

Tolentino v. CA, 162 SCRA 66

Facts:

Private respondent Consuelo David (1st wife) married Arturo Tolentino married in 1931. Their marriage
was dissolved and terminated in 1943 pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation by a decree
of absolute divorce on the grounds of desertion and abandonment by the wife for at least 3 continuous
years.

Arturo then married another woman (Pilar Adorable) but she died soon after the marriage after that he
then married for a 3rd time (with Constancia) and they had 3 children. Constancia is the present legal
wife of Arturo

Consuelo continued using the husband’s surname after the divorce. Her usage of the surname was
authorized by the family of the husband (brothers and sisters).

The current wife filed a case against the 1st wife’s continued use of her husband’s last name.

The RTC ruled that the 1st wife should discontinue her usage of the husband’s surname. The CA decision
reversed that of the RTC’s.

Issue:

1. WON the petitioners cause of action has already prescribed (Yes)

2. WON the petitioner can exclude by injuction Consuelo David from using the surname of her former
husband from who she was divorced (No)

Ruling:

1. In Art 1150 Civil Code the time of prescription of all kinds of actions, when there in no special
provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought. Art 1149 Civil
Code period of prescription is 5years from the right of action accrues. The action has long prescribed
because she married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945 while the Civil Code took effect on August 30,
1950

She acquired knowledge that Consuelo was still using the surname Tolentino in 1951. Hence, the current
wife’s action has already prescribed. She should have filed the case after she obtained knowledge that
the 1st wife was still using the surname Tolentino, not 20 years later.

2. Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced woman may continue to use the surname of her
husband because there are no provisions for divorce under Philippine law.

On the Commentary of Tolentino as regards Art 370 of the Civil Code. The wife cannot claim an exclusive
right to use the husband’s surname. She cannot be prevented from using it, but neither can she restrain
others from using it.

Art 371 is not applicable because it contemplates annulment while the present case refers to absolute
divorce where there is severance of valid marriage ties. Effect of divorce was more akin to death of the
spouse where the deceased woman is continued to be referred to as “Mrs. of the husband” even if he
has remarried.

If the appeal would be granted the respondent would encounter problems because she was able to
prove that she entered into contracts with third persons, acquired properties and entered into other
legal relations using the surname Tolentino. Petitioner failed to show the she would suffer any legal
injury or deprivation of right.

There was no usurpation of the petitioner’s name and surname. Usurpation implies injury to the
interests of the owner of the name. It consists with the possibility of confusion of identity. The elements
of usurpation were 1. Actual use of another’s name, 2. Use is unauthorized, 3. Use of another’s name is
to designate personality or identity of a person. None of these elements were present in the case
because public knowledge referred to the 3rd wife as the legal wife, and the 1st wife did not represent
herself as the legal wife.

The Supreme Court find it just and equitable to leave things as they are, there being no actual legal
injury to the petitioner save a deep hurt to her feelings which is not a basis for injunctive relief.

Alfon vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-51201, May 29, 1980

Facts:

This is a petition filed pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440 to review an Order of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch XXIII, dated December 29, 1978, which partially denied petitioner’s prayer for a change
of name. Only a question of law is involved and there is no controversy over the facts which are well-
stated in the questioned Order as follows:

Petitioner has advanced the following reasons for filing the petition:

1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her childhood;

2. She has been enrolled in the grade school and in college using the same name;

3. She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since her infancy and all her friends and
acquaintances know her by his name;

4. She has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name.

If another purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname of Alfon because her uncle who reared her
since childhood has the surname "Alfon" then the remedy is not a petition for change of name.

WHEREFORE, the petition insofar as the first name is granted but denied with respect to the surname.
Petitioner is authorized to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella
Alfon Duterte.

Issue:
WON the Court of First Instance erred in its decision for denying the petition.

Ruling:

The lower court should have fully granted the petition.

The only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner’s prayer to change her surname is that as
legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname of her
father invoking Art. 364 of the Civil Code. But the word "principally" as used in the codal-provision is not
equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should
choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled.

In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella S.
Alfon although her birth records and baptismal certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in the
schools from the grades up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her by this
name; she finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and given a diploma under this
name; and she exercised the right of suffrage likewise under this name. There is therefore ample
justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and
reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.

WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby modified in that the petitioner is allowed to change not
only her first name but also her surname so as to be known as ESTRELLA S. ALFON.

Illegitimate Children (Arts. 175-176)

- How Filiation Established

Tayag v. CA, GR No. 95229, June 9, 1992, 209 SCRA 730

Facts:

Private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed a
complaint denominated “Claim for Inheritance” against herein petitioner as the administratix of the
estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo who died intestate. Private respond alleged that:

1. Plaintiff is the mother of Chad Cuyugan.

2. Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for years, plaintiff and Atty. Ocampo
had illicit amorous relationship with each other and as a consequence, begot a chill named Chad
Cuyugan.

3. Chad Cuyugan was loved by his father, Atty. Ocampo as evidenced by the letters Atty. Ocampo has
been sending to plaintiff.

4. The minor, although illegitimate is entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by Atty. Ocampo as
one of his surviving heirs
5. The deceased owns a property in Baguio which worth millions of pesos.

6. The estate of the deceased has not yet been inventoried.

7. The only known heirs of Atty. Ocampo are his children namely: Corito Tayag, Rivina Tayag, Evita
Florendo, Felina Ocampo and said minor, Chad.

8. Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and only depends on the charity of friends and relatives.

9. Several demands have been made for defendant to grant Chad’s lawful inheritance but defendant
failed and refused to satisfy the claim.

Private respondent prays, among other, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to render an
inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by Atty. Ocampo; to determine and
deliver the share of the minor; and to give him support pendente lite.

Petitioner filed an answer stating that the complaint has no cause of action that the action is premature;
that the suit is barred by prescription; that respondent Cuyugan has no legal and judicial personality to
bring the suit; that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action and there is
improper joinder of causes of action.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint merely alleged that the minor is an
illegitimate child of the deceased and actually asking for the claim of inheritance. Also, the letters and
documents are not sufficient evidence, the father can no longer testify that he really made it and to
establish such filiation child must brought the action during the lifetime of the father. RTC denied the
motion to dismiss which was then affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether or not Chad has the right to claim over his share of inheritance in the estate of the deceased?

Ruling:

Yes. According to the SC, if the action is based on the record of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an
admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public document or in a private handwritten signed
instrument, then the action may be brought during the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is
based on the open and continuous possession by the child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on
other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, the view has been expressed that the
action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the alleged parent died during the minority of the
child, the action for filiation may be filed within four years from the attainment of majority of the minor
child. The TC is therefore correct in applying the provision of Art. 285 of the Civil Code and in holding the
private respondent’s cause of action has not prescribed

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor child
has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code.

Art. 285 of the Civil Code. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during
the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;

Art. 175 of the Family Code. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent."

Uyguanco v. CA, GR No. 76873, October 26, 1989 178 SCRA 684

Facts:

During the pendency of the case, the FC was adopted. Thus, the provisions mentioned in the case will
make use of similar articles both from the Civil Code and the FC.

Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate children (her co-
petitioners herein), and considerable properties which they divided among themselves. Claiming to be
an illegitimate son of the deceased Apolinario, and having been left out in the extrajudicial settlement of
his estate, Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco, herein respondent) filed a complaint for partition against all the
petitioners. Graciano alleged that he was born in 1952 to Apolinario Uyguangco and Anastacia Bacjao
and that at the age of 15 he moved to his father's hometown. He received support from his father while
he was studying and was even assigned by his father as a storekeeper at the Uyguangco store.

In the course of his presentation of evidence at the trial, the petitioners elicited an admission from
Graciano that he had none of the documents mentioned in Article 278 (counterpart of Art. 172 in the
FC) to show that he was the illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco. These are "the record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or (in) any authentic writing." The petitioners thereupon
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the private respondent could no longer prove his
alleged filiation under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code. Specifically, the petitioners argued that
the only evidence allowed under Article 278 to prove the private respondent's claim was not available to
him as he himself had admitted. Neither could he now resort to the provisions of Article 285 because he
was already an adult when his alleged father died in 1975, and his claim did not come under the
exceptions.

While the private respondent has admitted that he has none of the documents, he insists that he has
nevertheless been "in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," which is
now also admissible as evidence of filiation under the FC.

Respondent claims that he lived with his father from 1967 until 1973, receiving support from him during
that time; that he has been using the surname Uyguangco without objection from his father and the
petitioners as shown in his high school diploma, a special power of attorney executed in his favor by
Dorotea Uyguangco, and another one by Sulpicio Uyguangco; that he has shared in the profits of the
copra business of the Uyguangcos, which is a strictly family business; that he was a director, together
with the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons Development Corporation, a family corporation; and that in the
addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded by the petitioners he was given a share in
his deceased father's estate.

Issue:

W/N the respondent should be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his claimed father,
who is already dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence? NO he cannot.

Ruling:

His action is now barred because of his alleged father's death in 1975. The second paragraph of this
Article 175 reads as follows:

“The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent”

It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence of his
open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation
through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The simple reason is that
Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of his alleged son's
illegitimate filiation.

In her book, Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy explains the rationale of the rule, thus: "It is a truism that unlike
legitimate children who are publicly recognized, illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in
secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. Who then can be sure of their
filiation but the parents themselves? But suppose the child claiming to be the illegitimate child of a
certain person is not really the child of the latter? The putative parent should thus be given the
opportunity to affirm or deny the child's filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already
dead."

Graciano's complaint is based on his contention that he is the illegitimate child of Apolinario Uyguangco,
whose estate is the subject of the partition sought. If this claim can no longer be proved in an action for
recognition, with more reason should it be rejected in the said complaint, where the issue of Graciano's
filiation is being raised only collaterally. The complaint is indeed a circumvention of Article 172, which
allows proof of the illegitimate child's filiation under the second paragraph thereof only during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.

Pe Lim v. CA, GR No. 112229, March 18, 1997

Facts:

This petition for review on certiorari sprang from a complaint filed by Maribel Cruz for child support on
behalf of her daughter, private respondent Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim, against petitioner Raymond Pe Lim
who, Maribel claims, is Joanna’s father.
MARIBEL’S STORY: Maribel was sixteen years old in 1978 and a part-time student. She also worked as a
receptionist at Tonight’s Club and Resthouse along. She met petitioner during her first night on the job.
Petitioner wooed her and Maribel reciprocated his love. They soon lived together with petitioner paying
the rentals in succession of apartments.

Maribel left for Japan in July 1981, already pregnant, and returned to Manila in October of the same
year.

The couple never married because petitioner claimed that he was not financially stable. On January 17,
1982, Maribel gave birth to their daughter at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. The bills for
Maribel’s three-day confinement at the hospital were paid for by Raymond and he also caused the
registration of the name Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim on the child’s birth certificate. After Joanna Rose’s birth,
the love affair between Maribel and petitioner continued.

Towards the latter part of 1983, Maribel noted that petitioner’s feelings toward her started to wane. He
subsequently abandoned her and Joanna Rose. Maribel tried to support herself by accepting various
jobs and with occasional help from relatives. She asked petitioner for support but, despite promises to
do so, it was never given. Maribel then filed a complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila for support.

RAYMOND LIM’S STORY: He claims that in 1978, he went to Tonight’s Club and Resthouse along Roxas
Boulevard, Manila to relax after a hard day’s work. There he met Maribel. Raymond observed that while
she had a pleasing personality, she seemed to be quite experienced because she started to kiss him on
the cheeks and neck, whispering to him that they could go anywhere and rest. Raymond declined to
take Maribel up on her offer saying that he only wanted someone to talk to. They became friends after
that first meeting, and while he often saw her, there was no intimacy between them.

Raymond alleged that he was not Maribel’s only customer at the club. In 1980, she left for Japan to work
as an entertainer.

In 1981, she returned to Manila pregnant, and appealed to Raymond for help because she claimed that
she could not face her relatives in her condition. Raymond got her an apartment and paid its rentals
until she gave birth to a baby girl on January 17, 1982. Raymond admits paying the hospital bills but
claims that Maribel was supposed to pay him back for it. When she failed to do so, Raymond stopped
seeing her.

Raymond denies being the father of Maribel’s child, claiming that they were only friends and nothing
more.

RTC – Raymond Pe Lim to give support to his natural daughter, Joanna Rose Pe Lim in the amount of ten
thousand pesos, ph currency per month for support.

CA – affirmed the trial court’s findings

Issue:

WON there is clear and convincing evidence on record to show that there was actual cohabitation and
that Joanna is his child.
Ruling:

YES. The evidence in the instant case shows that petitioner considered himself to be the father of
Joanna Rose as shown by the handwritten letter he wrote to Maribel. (THE LETTERS ARE IN THE FULL
TEXT)

In the letter, Raymond is explaining why he cannot marry Maribel. Raymond also stated in the later that
he promises to be a loving and caring husband and father to both Maribel and Joanna.

In another letter sent by Raymond to Maribel while she is in Japan, Raymond told her to take care of
herself because of her situation, obviously referring to the state of pregnancy of Maribel.

It was only after petitioner separated from Maribel that he started to deny paternity of Joanna Rose.
Until he got married to another woman, he did not object to being identified as Joanna Rose’s father as
disclosed in the Certificate of Live Birth. The evidence on record reveals that he even got a copy of the
said Certificate when Joanna Rose started schooling, as shown by a receipt in his name from the San
Juan Municipal Office. His belated denial cannot outweigh the totality of the cogent evidence which
establishes beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner is indeed the father of Joanna Rose.

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.

Article 172 of the Family Code states:

"The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument

and signed by the parent concerned.’

"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a).

This article adopts the rule in Article 283 of the Civil Code that filiation may be proven by "any evidence
or proof that the defendant is his father."

Petitioner has never controverted the evidence on record. His love letters to Maribel vowing to be a
good father to Joanna Rose; pictures of himself on various occasions cuddling Joanna Rose and the
Certificate of Live Birth say it all. Accordingly, his suit must fail.

Jison v. CA, GR No. 124853, February 24, 1998

Facts:

In her complaint filed with the RTC, MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia
Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated
Esperanza F. Amolar. As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, and since childhood, had enjoyed
the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his
family. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial
declaration of her illegitimate status and that FRANCISCO support and treat her as such.

In his answer, FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar
during the period specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944;
further, he never recognized MONINA, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and
special defenses, FRANCISCO contended that MONINA had no right or cause of action against him and
that her action was barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of the
complaint and an award of damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint.

After MONINA filed her reply, pre-trial was conducted. At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total
of eleven (11) witnesses. On 21 October 1986, MONINA herself took the witness stand. At that time, she
was 40 years old and a Central Bank Examiner. She affirmed that as evidenced by certifications from the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar and baptismal certificates, she was born on 6 August 1946 in Barangay
Tabugon, Dingle, Iloilo, to Esperanza Amolar and FRANCISCO. MONINA claimed that she knew the three
(3) children of FRANCISCO by wife, namely, Lourdes, Francisco, Jr., and Elena, but MONINA had met only
Lourdes and Junior. MONINA's testimony dealt lengthily on her dealings with Junior and the two (2)
occasions when she met with Lourdes. The last time MONINA saw FRANCISCO was in March 1979, when
she sought his blessings to get married.

In his defense, FRANCISCO offered his deposition taken before then Judge Romeo Callejo of the RTC of
Manila. As additional witnesses, FRANCISCO presented Nonito Jalandoni, Teodoro Zulla, Iigo
Supertisioso, Lourdes Ledesma, Jose Cruz and Dolores Argenal.

The reception of evidence having been concluded, the parties filed their respective memoranda. In its
decision, the trial court, through Judge Devera, dismissed the complaint with costs against MONINA. The
RTC denied FRANCISCOs claim for damages, finding that MONINA did not file the complaint with malice,
she having been propelled by an honest belief, founded on probable cause.

MONINA seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals and sought reversal of the trial court’s decision.
In its decision, Court of Appeals then decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and another one is
hereby entered for appellant Monina Jison, declaring her as the illegitimate daughter of appellee
Francisco Jison, and entitled to all rights and privileges granted by law.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution, FRANCISCO
filed the instant petition. He urges us to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, alleging that said
court committed errors of law.

Issue:

WON MONINA should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.

Ruling:

A painstaking review of the evidence and arguments fails to support petitioner.

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be established in the
same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the
various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.

For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph, which
MONINA relies upon given that she has none of the evidence mentioned in the first paragraph, a high
standard of proof is required. Specifically, to prove open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental
affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that
they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child
as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.

The following facts was established based on the testimonial evidences offered by Monina:

1.     That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was employed
by the former;

2.     That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct.

SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competence
evidence as to the issue of paternity.  Francisco’s lack of participation in the preparation of baptismal
certificates and school records render the documents showed as incompetent to prove paternity.  With
regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age attesting that Francisco was not
her father, SC was in the position that if Monina were truly not Francisco’s illegitimate child, it would be
unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation. 
Monina’s evidence hurdles the “high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish
one’s illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on “open and continuous possession”.  Hence,
Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her action well
within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of
laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust.  Petition was denied.

Baluyot v. Baluyot, 186 SCRA 506

Facts:

Petitioners Victoria, Ma. Theresa, and Ma Flordeliza Baluyot filed a petition for intervention in Special
Proceedings No. entitled “Intestate Estate of Deceased Enrique Baluyut,.’ The petition alleged that
petitioners have a legal interest in the estate of the deceased Enrique M. Baluyut being the illegitimate
children of the deceased, begotten out of wedlock by said deceased and petitioners’ mother and
guardian ad litem Norma Urbano.

They were conceived and born at the time when Norma Urbano cohabited with the deceased while the
latter was already married to Felicidad S. Baluyut and that they were in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of children of the deceased during his lifetime by having supported and
maintained them.

Felicidad S. Baluyut, widow of Enrique and appointed administratrix of his estate, opposed the petition
for intervention

The Trial Court declared Victoria, Ma Theresa and Ma Flordeliza Baluyot as forced heirs of the deceased
Enrique Balutur and ordered administratix Felicidad Vda. de Baluyut to pay 150php monthly support to
Norma Urbano, guardian ad litem for the three minor children.

CA reversed the trial court’s decision and dismissed the petition in intervention.

Issue:

Were the petitioners voluntarily recognized by the late Enrique M. Baluyut as his illegitimate spurious
children?

Ruling:

There are two modes of acknowledgment provided in the New Civil Code; one, by the voluntary
recognition by the putative parent made in the record of birth, a statement before the court of record,
or in any authentic writing (Art. 278, New Civil Code) and two, by compulsory recognition under Article
283 of the same law.

There is no evidence as required by Article 278 which proves that the petitioners were recognized by the
deceased during his lifetime as his spurious children. The petitioners’ records of birth, although in the
name of Enrique Baluyut, were not signed by the latter. There was neither authentic writing presented
nor any statement in a court of record which would prove that the petitioners were recognized by the
deceased.

In order to prove the continuous possession of the status of a natural child, the acts must be of such a
nature that they reveal, not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and
treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously’

The grounds relied upon by petitioners were the alleged possession by the petitioners of the status of
recognized illegitimate spurious children and that they were conceived at the time when their mother
cohabited with the deceased. The evidence presented by petitioners failed to satisfy the high standard
of proof required for the success of their action for compulsory recognition.

CA’s decision is affirmed.

Ilano v. CA, GR No. 104376, February 23, 1994

Facts:

1. Leoncia de los Santos first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while the former was working as a
secretary to Atty. Mariano Virata. Petitioner was one of the clients of Atty. Virata.
2. Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco distributor, met petitioner again who was
engaged in the same business. Later, Artemio courted Leoncia for more than four (4) years, became
intimate, and with Artemio’s promise of marriage, they eloped to Pampanga in April 1962. They stayed
at an apartment to which Artemio comes home to Leoncia three to four times a week.

3. In October 1962, Leoncia delivered a still-born female child. It was unfortunate. The death certificate
was signed by petitioner. However, after a year, while living in Makati, Leoncia gave birth to another
baby, private respondent Merciditas S. Ilano on December 30, 1963. Her birth was recorded as
Merciditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano.

During the day of the birth, December 30, 1963, petitioner arrived after five o'clock in the afternoon.
When the nurse came to inquire about the child, Leoncia was still unconscious so it was from petitioner
that the nurse sought the information. Inasmuch as it was already past seven o'clock in the evening, the
nurse promised to return the following morning for his signature. However, he left an instruction to give
the birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early the following morning.

4. The support given by petitioner Artemio for both mother and child was sometimes in the form of cash
personally delivered or through checks. During the time petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband
and wife, he showed concern as the father of Merciditas (signing the child’s report cards, taking her for a
drive, cuddle her to sleep, etc.).

5. Artemio’s defense was a total and complete denial of any relationship with Leoncia and Merciditas.
He disowned the handwritten answers and signatures opposite the death certificate of a female child
surnamed Ilano, the notes, the signing of Merciditas report cards, etc. He contended he was sick on
December 30, 1963 (on the day of Merciditas’ birth) and was hospitalized on January 7, 1964. He does
not understand why this case is filed against him.

6. Testimonies were brought about. Melencio (officer-in-charge where Artemio worked) admitted he
procured the apartment for Leoncia, paid the rentals, etc. He said he lived together with Leoncia and
shared the same bed, etc. Nida Ilano Ramos, daughter of petitioner alleged she does know Leoncia and
said her father was at home on December 30, 1963 because he got sick and was advised to have bed
rest. Victoria J. Ilano, petitioner’s wife, further corroborated the previous testimonies regarding the
petitioner’s sickness.

7. Trial court dismissed the complaint as it was not fully satisfied that petitioner is the father of
Merciditas on the basis of the following: (1) petitioner and Leoncia were not in cohabitation during the
period of Merciditas' conception, (2) testimony of Melencio that he frequented the apartment where
Leoncia was living, took care of all the bills and shared the same bed with her, (3) the birth certificate of
Merciditas was not signed by petitioner, (4) petitioner denied his signature in the monthly report card of
Merciditas, (5) there is no clear and sufficient in showing that support was given by petitioner to
Merciditas.

CA did not share the same view as the trial court. A review of the testimonial and documentary evidence
adduced by private respondent led respondent court to the conclusion that petitioner is her father,
entitling her to support.

Issue:
1. W/N Merciditas Ilano is an acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child.

2. W/N an adulterous child can file an action for recognition and support.

Ruling:

1. YES. Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are
conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether
actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception
of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (Article 119, old Civil Code;
Article 269, new Civil Code) and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit.

Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merciditas was conceived, she is a
spurious child.

The court a quo did not likewise consider the evidence as sufficient to establish that plaintiff was in
continuous possession of status of a child in view of the denial by appellee of his paternity, and there is
no clear and sufficient evidence that the support was really given to plaintiff's mother. The belated
denial of paternity after the action has been filed against the putative father is not the denial that would
destroy the paternity of the child which had already been recognized by defendant by various positive
acts clearly evidencing that he is plaintiff's father. A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It
cannot be withdrawn. A mere change of mind would be incompatible with the stability of the civil status
of person, the permanence of which affects public interest. Even when the act in which it is made should
be revocable, the revocation of such act will not revoke the recognition itself (1 Tolentino, pp. 579-580,
1983 Ed.)

The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence
indubitably showing that the signature belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live Birth that
Leonica and Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not mean that Merciditas is not
appellee’s daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid
embarrassment. Also, Merciditas bore the surname of 'Ilano' since birth without any objection of the
part of Artemio, the fact that since Merciditas had her discernment she had always known and called
Artemio as her 'Daddy'.

The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the relationship between
Leoncia and appellee, their living together as husband and wife in several places, the birth of the first
still-born child, the circumstances of plaintiff's birth, the acts of appellee in recognizing and supporting
plaintiff, find ample support from the testimonial and documentary evidence which leaves no room to
reasonably doubt his paternity which may not be infirmed by his belated denials.

2. YES. It is now commonplace for an abandoned illegitimate offspring to sue his father for recognition
and support. Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merciditas was
conceived, she is a spurious child.

In this regard, Article 287 of the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children other than natural in
accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to support and
such successional rights as are granted in the Civil Code. The Civil Code has given these rights to them
because the transgressions of social conventions committed by the parents should not be visited upon
them.

However, before Article 287 can be availed of, there must first be a recognition of paternity either
voluntarily or by court action. This arises from the legal principle that an unrecognized spurious child like
a natural child has no rights from his parents or to their estate because his rights spring not from the
filiation or blood relationship but from his acknowledgment by the parent. In other words, the rights of
an illegitimate child arose not because he was the true or real child of his parents but because under the
law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child.

Private respondent’s evidence to establish her filiation with and the paternity of petitioner is too
overwhelming to be ignored or brushed aside by the highly improbable and fatally flawed testimony of
Melencio and the inherently weak denials of petitioner.

Trinidad v. CA, GR No. 118904, April 20, 1998; 289 SCRA 188

Facts:

Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones are parents to Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. It is stated that
Patricio died and was survived by his 3 children. Upon his death were 4 parcels of land which was
qualified as usufruct. Years passed and the children grew old in which that Inocentes the oldest died.

Now, Arturio claiming to be the real and only legitimate child of Inocentes is claiming for the ⅓ of the
estate. The same was contradicted by his alleged uncle Felix and aunt Lourdes saying that he is not a
child of their late brother and that their brother was never married.

Upon trial of the case filed by the plaintiff-petitioner evidence were admitted by him Exhibits A, B and C.
That first evidence are pictures of him with the defendants-private respondents and Exhibit C was his
baptismal certificate indicating that his parents are Inocente and Felicidad Trinidad. It was also
supported by testimonies.

The defendants countered the case filed only with testimonies.

RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff-petitioner which grants his right for the ⅓ of the estate of his
grandfather as legal heir of his father. CA, reversed the decision dismissing the case and said that no
concrete evidence was admitted and declared that although demand to partition does not prescribe but
as to the fact that the defendants had lived within the property for more than 10 years they already
acquired ownership of the same by acquisitive prescription. Hence this petition for certiorari.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents’ marriage and of his filiation?
Note: It is necessary for his claim

2. Whether or not was his claim time barred under rules on acquisitive prescription.

Ruling:
1. Yes. Despite the fact that no concrete evidence was presented by the petitioner he obtained from the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were either lost,
burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation which is the reason for failing to provide concrete
evidence, the absence of marriage contract does not mean that there was no marriage. It further gives
rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. As to his filiation,Art. 267. In the absence of a record of
birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by
any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws in which it supports the baptismal
certificate as one of those others means allowed as evidence.

2. No, Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the property in question by acquisitive
prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former
repudiates the co-ownership.Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his or
her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership.

In light of the case, preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side
outweighs that of the adverse party. Compared to the detailed (even if awkwardly written) ruling of the
trial court, Respondent Court's holding that petitioner failed to prove his legitimate filiation to Inocentes
is unconvincing.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The trial court's decision is REINSTATED. No costs.

Rodriguez v. CA 245 SCRA 150, 61 SCAD 896

Facts:

On October 15, 1986, an action for compulsory recognition and support was brought before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Baguio-Benguet, by respondent Alarito (Clarito) Agbulos against
Bienvenido Rodriguez, petitioner herein. At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother, Felicitas Agbulos
Haber, as first witness. In the course of her direct examination, she was asked by counsel to reveal the
identity of the plaintiff's father but the defendant's counsel raised a timely objection which the court
sustained.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s order and allowing the admission of
said testimony.

Ruling:

We find that had the appellate court sanctioned the trial court's disallowance of the testimony of
plaintiff's mother, private respondent would have been deprived of a speedy and adequate remedy
considering the importance of said testimony and the erroneous resolution of the trial court.

On the merits of his petition, petitioner contended that Felicitas Agbulos Haber should not be allowed to
reveal the name of the father of private respondent because such revelation was prohibited by Article
280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Said Article provided:
When the father or the mother makes the recognition separately, he or she shall not reveal the name of
the person with whom he or she had the child; neither shall he or she state any circumstance whereby
the other party may be identified.

On the other hand, private respondent argued that his mother should be allowed to testify on the
identity of his father, pursuant to paragraph 4, Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provided:

In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child:

(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less
with that of the conception;

(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct
acts of the latter or of his family;

(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed
father;

(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.

Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his own knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception,
except as otherwise provided in these rules.

The prohibition in Article 280 against the identification of the father or mother of a child applied only in
voluntary and not in compulsory recognition.

This conclusion becomes abundantly clear if we consider the relative position of the progenitor of Article
280, which was Article 132 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, with the other provisions on the
acknowledgement of natural children of the same Code.

Senator Arturo M. Tolentino is of the view that the prohibition in Article 280 does not apply in an action
for compulsory recognition. According to him:

The prohibition to reveal the name or circumstance of the parent who does not intervene in the
separate recognition is limited only to the very act of making such separate recognition. It does not
extend to any other act or to cases allowed by law. Thus, when a recognition has been made by one
parent, the name of the other parent may be revealed in an action by the child to compel such other
parent to recognize him also (I Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 590
[1985]).

Justice Eduardo Caguioa also opines that the said prohibition refers merely to the act of recognition. "It
does prevent inquiry into the identity of the other party in case an action is brought in court to contest
recognition on the ground that the child is not really natural because the other parent had no legal
capacity to contract marriage" (I Comments and Cases on Civil Law 380 [1967] citing In re Estate of
Enriquez, 29 Phil. 167 [1915]).
The action filed by private respondent herein was brought under Article 283 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which added new grounds for filing an action for recognition: namely, xxx xxx xxx

3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed
father;

4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.

Worth noting is the fact that no similar prohibition found in Article 280 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines has been replicated in the present Family Code. This undoubtedly discloses the intention of
the legislative authority to uphold the Code Commission's stand to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity of illegitimate children.

Articles 276, 277, 278, 279 and 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines were repealed by the Family
Code, which now allows the establishment of illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children (Art. 175).

Under Article 172 of the Family Code, filiation of legitimate children is by any of the following:

The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument

and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)

Of interest is that Article 172 of the Family Code adopts the rule in Article 283 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, that filiation may be proven by "any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father."

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court is DIRECTED to PROCEED
with dispatch in the disposition of the action for compulsory recognition.

Potenciano v. Reynoso, G.R. No. 140707. April 22, 2003; 401SCRA391

Facts:

The former Cebu City Treasurer, Felipe Pareja was convicted of the crime of murder and sentenced to
life imprisonment with the accessory penalties attendant thereto including civil interdiction. Felipe
Pareja was granted a conditional pardon by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on. In 1979, the late
Felipe Pareja, allegedly executed a Deed of Absolute Sale covering a certain parcel of land in favor of his
illegitimate son, appellant Manuel Jayme who later claimed that the said sale was made to cover the
payments he had made for the hospitalization expenses of his father, he having been constrained to
borrow money from several people for the purpose. Before Felipe died, he executed a Last Will and
Testament wherein he bequeathed to herein appellees (Reynosos) and appellant Manuel Jayme the lot
in question while at the same time recognizing them as his illegitimate children. Thereafter, The Jayme
and his spouse sold the land to Potenciano, who then filed an ejectment case against appellees
Reynosos.

The Reynosos, who claim that they are likewise illegitimate children of Felipe, they also raised that
assailed the sale made by their father contending that the latter was already senile and still suffering
from the accessory penalty of civil interdiction at the time of the sale and forgery of Felipe's signature in
the Deed of Sale.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC that the signature of Felipe on the Deed of Sale
had been forged. Both courts gave more weight to the scientific examination of the expert witness as
opposed to the testimony of the Deed's notary public who is counsel to petitioner Potenciano and was
an interested party. The CA also agreed with the RTC that Potenciano was a buyer in bad faith for not
having sufficiently investigated the property at the time he bought it, when it was then in the possession
of people other than the seller. Accepted by the appellate court as sufficient proof of filiation was the
will, in which respondents were recognized by their father, even if it had not yet been probated. The CA
also ruled that petitioners were bound by a Joint Affidavit executed by Manuel Jayme and Dwight
Reynoso (one of illeg. Children) declaring that, together with the other parties, they were recognized
illegitimate children of Pareja.

Issue:

WON private respondents have the personality to demand the reconveyance of the property in
question;

Ruling:

Yes. They have the personality to demand reconveyance of the property in question.

Petitioners argue that the suit against them cannot be maintained by privaterespondents, because the
latter have not established their filiation to Pareja as their father. Petitioners further contend that Felipe
B. Pareja's unprobated Last Will and Testament cannot be used to establish respondents' filiation. The
court disagrees.

The way to prove the filiation of illegitimate children is provided by the Family Code thus:

"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.

In turn, Article 172 of the Family Code states:

"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
 (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws."

Justice Jose C. Vitug clarifies in unequivocal terms the process of proving filiation: "under this Family
Code, filiation may likewise be established by holographic as well as notarial wills, except that they no
longer need to be probated or to be strictly in conformity with the formalities thereof for purposes of
establishing filiation.

In probate proceedings, all that the law requires is the court's declaration that the external formalities
have been complied with. The will is then deemed valid and effective in the eyes of the law. Thus,
probate proceedings merely determine the extrinsic validity of the will and do not affect its contents.

Petitioners are mistaken in assuming that this Joint Affidavit is being used by private respondents to
prove the latter's filiation as illegitimate children of Pareja. The document cannot be used for that
purpose, because the children were the ones who recognized their father and not the other way around.
However, its importance lies in the fact that it prevents petitioners from denying private respondents'
standing to institute the case against them. Having admitted that Private Respondent Reynoso was
indeed an illegitimate son of Pareja just like him, Manuel Jayme cannot now claim otherwise

This Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the two lower courts' finding of fact.

De Jesus v. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001; 366 SCRA 499

Facts:

Danilo and Carolina de Jesus got married and had 2 children Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus.

Upon the death of a Juan Dizon, Jacqueline and Jinkie were recognized in a notarized document as being
his own illegitimate children by Carolina de Jesus.

Juan Dizon died intestate and left behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various
corporations and some real property.

It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment that Jacqueline and Jinkie led a complaint for
"Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Quezon City RTC.

However, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations
where he was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while
denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners
from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the
illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.

The RTC denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for
reconsideration and the CA upheld the decision of the RTC and remanded the case back to the RTC for
further proceedings.
The trial court dismissed the complaint of the two sisters for lack of cause of action and for being
improper. It decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding
inasmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or right.

Issue:

WON Jacqueline and Jinkie are illegitimate children of decedent Juan Dizon entitled to inherit from him.

Ruling:

A scrutiny of the records showed that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The
certificates of live birth also identified Danilo de Jesus as being their father.

There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality
and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the
birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is
not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.

In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan, the sisters, in effect, would impugn
their legitimate status as being children of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done
because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the
father, or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy
of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned
that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.

Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be
aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being
the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is
strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one
that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a
child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.

The instant petition is denied.

Solinap v. Locsin, 371 SCRA 711

Facts:

Eleven (11) months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with
the RTC of Iloilo City a "Petition for Letters of Administration" praying that he be appointed
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged, among others, (a) that he is an
acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin; (b) that during his lifetime, the deceased owned
personal properties which include undetermined savings, current and time deposits with various banks,
and 1/6 portion of the undivided mass of real properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose
Locsin, Jr., Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester Locsin; and (c) that he is the only
surviving legal heir of the decedent.

The trial court issued an order setting the petition for hearing, which order was duly published, thereby
giving notice to all persons who may have opposition to the said petition.

Before the scheduled hearing, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and
Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to respondent's
petition for letters of administration. They averred that respondent is not a child or an acknowledged
natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name.

Another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop, Manuel Locsin and the successors of the
late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondent's claim as a natural child is barred by prescription or the
statute of limitations.

The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. also entered its appearance in the estate proceedings,
joining the earlier oppositors. This was followed by an appearance and opposition of Ester Locsin
Jarantilla, likewise stating that there is no filial relationship between herein respondent and the
deceased.

Thereupon, the trial court conducted hearings.

To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased and, therefore, entitled to
be appointed administrator of the intestate estate, respondent submitted a machine copy of his
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local
Clerk Registrar of Iloilo City.

In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is spurious. They
submitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar General,
Metro Manila, indicating that the birth of respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla,
and that the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin.

After hearing, the trial court, finding that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 and the photograph are
sufficient proofs of respondent's illegitimate filiation with the deceased, issued the dispositive portion of
which reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this PETITION is hereby GRANTED and the petitioner Juan E. Locsin,
Jr. is hereby appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late Juan "Johnny" Locsin, Sr.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged Decision affirming in toto the order of the trial
court. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration, while respondent filed a motion for execution pending
appeal. Both motions were, however, denied by the Appellate Court in its Resolution. Hence, the instant
petition for review on certiorari by petitioners.

Issue:

WON the certificate of live birth (Exhibit D) as presented by the respondent, including the photograph
showing that he and his mother attended the deceased funeral, is sufficient to proof filiation of
petitioner to the deceased.
Ruling:

The records of the instant case adequately support a finding that Exhibit "8" for the petitioners, not
respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been given more faith and credence by the courts below.

Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by his mother. In the same Exhibit "8", the
signature and name of Juan C. Locsin listed as respondent's father and the entry that he and Amparo
Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28, 1954 do not appear.

At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that
"documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In this case, the glaring discrepancies between the
two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D"
entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil Registry General.

Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot
and will not constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would
encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before a
coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.

Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the late Juan C. Locsin, Sr.. His Certificate
of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. Indeed, respondent is not an interested person within the
meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration.

Arbolario v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 129163, April 22, 2003; 401 SCRA 360

Facts:

The original owners of the controverted lot, spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, had 5
children. Everyone mentioned is dead. The first child, Agueda Colinco, was survived by her two children,
namely, Antonio Colinco and Irene Colinco (respondent); Antonio Colinco predeceased his three
daughters, respondents Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco. The second child, Catalina
Baloyo, was married to Juan Arbolario and their union was blessed with the birth of only one child,
Purificacion Arbolario, who, in 1985, died a spinster and without issue. Juan Arbolario, consorted with
another woman by the name of Francisca Malvas and from this cohabitation petitioners Voltaire
Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Taala, Fe Arbolario, Exaltacion Arbolario, and Carlos Arbolario (referred to
hereinafter as ‘Arbolarios’) were born. All the foregoing petitioners were born well before the year
1951.

In 1946, the third child, Eduardo Baloyo, sold his entire interest in the lot to his sister, Agueda (first
child), by virtue of a notarized document. In 1951, a notarized declaration of heirship was executed by
and between Agueda, Catalina, Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo and Julian, who extrajudicially
declared themselves to be the only heirs of the late spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan. The
fourth child, Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her interest in the said lot in favor of her two nieces, Irene
Colinco to one-half (1/2) and Purificacion Arbolario to the other half. Purificacion Arbolario was then
allowed to take possession of a portion of the disputed parcel until her death sometime in 1984 or 1985.
Respondents Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco, Orpha Colinco, and Goldelina Colinco, believing themselves to
be the only surviving heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, executed a ‘Declaration of Heirship
and Partition Agreement’, dated May 8, 1987 where they adjudicated upon themselves their
proportionate or ideal shares: Irene Colinco, to one-half (1/2); while the surviving daughters of her
(Irene’s) late brother Antonio, namely Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina Colinco, to share in equal, ideal
proportions to the remaining half (1/2).

On October 2, 1987, the Colincos filed a case against Spouses Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay and Carlito
Salhay, seeking to recover possession of a portion of the aforesaid lot occupied by respondent spouses
(‘Salhays’ hereinafter) since 1970. The Salhays alleged in their defense that they have been the lawful
lessees of the late Purificacion Arbolario since 1971 up to 1978; and that said spouses allegedly
purchased the disputed portion of Lot from the deceased lessor sometime in September 1978.

On May 9, 1988 before the case was tried the Arbolarios and spouses Carlito Salhay and Rosalita
Rodriguez Salhay (all respondents in the case) filed another case ‘[f]or Cancellation of Title with
Damages’. The Arbolarios, joined by the Salhays, contend that the ‘Declaration of Heirship and Partition
Agreement’ executed by the Colincos was defective and thus voidable as they (Arbolarios) were
excluded therein. The Arbolarios claim that they succeeded intestate to the inheritance of their alleged
halfsister, Purificacion Arbolario; and, as forced heirs, they should be included in the distribution of the
aforesaid lot.

The RTC rendered judgment in the consolidated cases in favor of the Arbolarios and against the
Colincos. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

WON Arbolarios are illegitimate children

Ruling:

YES, they are illegitimate. There is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners that Juan Arbolario’s
marriage to Francisca Malvas was valid. It does not follow that just because his first wife has died, a man
is already conclusively married to the woman who bore his children. A marriage certificate or other
generally accepted proof is necessary to establish the marriage as an undisputable fact. Since they failed
to prove the fact (or even the presumption) of marriage between their parents, Juan Arbolario and
Francisca Malvas; hence, they cannot invoke a presumption of legitimacy in their favor. Paternity or
filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be judicially established.

Whether the Salhays had purchased the portion of land in issue, the Court also ruled that there was no
sufficient evidence to prove the same. Finally, on the issue of partition, the Court ruled that petitioners
were not able to establish any right thereto. The Petition for Review was denied.

Carmelo Cabatana v. CA, et. al., GR No. 124814, October 21, 2004

Facts:

This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia Regodos in
behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos.
During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on
September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her husband
left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for work and was
eventually hired as petitioner's household help. It was while working there as a maid that, on January 2,
1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual
intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got pregnant.

Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner's child 27 days after their sexual encounter.
The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later, on suspicion that Florencia
was pregnant, petitioner's wife sent her home. But petitioner instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod
City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her aunt's house in
Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo Regodos.

Petitioner Camelo Cabatania's version was different. He testified that sometime in December, 1981, he
hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the course of her employment, she would often go home to
her husband in the afternoon and return to work the following morning. This displeased petitioner's
wife, hence she was told to look for another job.

In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend New Year's Eve in
Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and invited her to
dinner. While they were eating, she confided that she was hard up and petitioner offered to lend her
some money. Later, they spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual intercourse. While doing it, he
felt something jerking and when he asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant with the child of
her husband. They went home the following day.

In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to petitioner's house hoping
to be re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioner's wife was in need of one, she was re-hired.
However petitioner's wife noticed that her stomach was bulging and inquired about the father of the
unborn child. She told petitioner's wife that the baby was by her husband. Because of her condition, she
was again told to go home and they did not see each other anymore.

Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencia's counsel. She was
demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying the alleged
paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when they had sex. He denied going to Bacolod City
with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2,
1982 and renting a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City.

After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its
discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband was alive. Deciding
in favor of private respondent, the trial court declared: :The child was presented before the Court, and if
the Court is to decide this case, based on the personal appearance of the child then there can never be a
doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the child of the defendant with plaintiff-minor's mother, Florencia
Regodos.” The CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

WON the court can compel petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge Regodos as his illegitimate son
and to give support to the latter.
Ruling:

NO. The trial court's finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private respondent was
based on the testimony of the child's mother and "the personal appearance of the child. Time and again,
this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order
for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or
the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.

Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation of which
was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying
the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record
the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person.

Further, the fact that Florencia's husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between
them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the
broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded
on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.

In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of
physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation
before the courts of law.

The petition is GRANTED. The decision of CA is reversed and set aside. Private respondent's petition for
recognition and support is dismissed.

Aguilar v. Siasat, G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015

Facts:

Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (Aguilar spouses) died intestate and without
debts. Included in their estate are two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Titles.

Petitioner filed with RTC a civil case for mandatory injunction with damages against respondent alleging
that he is the only son and sole surviving her of the Aguilar spouses, that he discovered that the TCTs
were missing, and thus he suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen it.

Respondent claimed that petitioner is not the sole surviving heir nor the son of the Aguilar spouses but a
mere stranger who was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart, that the
petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses, and that the subject titles were not
stolen but entrusted to her for safekeeping.

During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar spouses as their son. To
prove filiation, he presented his school records showing Alfred as his father, his ITR which indicated
Candelaria as his mother, Alfredo’s SSS form E-1 with signature and thumbmark showing petitioner as
his son and dependent, Alfredo’s information sheet of employment indicating petitioner as his son,
petitioner’s certificate of marriage indicating Aguilar Spouses as his parents, a letter from BMMC
introducing petitioner as Alfredo’s husband, and a certification indicating petitioner’s birth certificate
could not be found as they were destroyed by nature. Petitioner also offered testimonies from his wife
and aunt (Alfredo’s sister) that he is indeed the only son of the Aguilar Spouses.

Respondent testified that she does not know the petitioner and doesn’t know him to be the son of the
Aguilar Spouses, that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar executed an affidavit to the effect that she had no issue
and that she is the sole heir to her husband Alfredo Aguilar's estate; that she did not steal the subject
titles, but that the same were entrusted to her by Candelaria SiasatAguilar. She also offered the
testimony of Candelaria’s sister claiming that petitioner is not the son of the Aguilar Spouses.

RTC ruled in favor of respondent Siasat stating that the evidence presented by petitioner was not solid
enough. CA later affirmed ruling of RTC stating that the documents presented were not strong evidence
to prove filiation with the Aguilar Spouses, sighting Reyes vs CA that student records not signed by the
father do not constitute evidence of filiation, and Labagala vs Santiago that the ITR only shows that
income tax has been paid.

Issue:

Whether or not Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship to the Aguilar Spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Petitioner Rodolfo Aguilar.

Sighting De Jesus vs. Estate of Dizon, the filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.

Thus, it must be concluded that petitioner — who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage of
Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar and before their respective deaths — has sufficiently
proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses. As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo
Aguilar's SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar
spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an "admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.

- DNA Testing

Arnel Agustin vs. CA, GR No. 162571, June 15, 2005

Facts:
It was alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992 which resulted to an intimate relationship. Consequently,
Arnel impregnated Fe. Despite Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child,
Martin, out of wedlock on August 11, 2000.

Martin’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. He also shouldered pre-natal
and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his
adequate financial capacity and instead suggested to have the child adopted.

While Fe was carrying the 5-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot,
Arnel sped off his van with the open car door hitting Fe’s leg. Fe was later on diagnosed with leukemia in
July 2001 and has since then, been undergoing chemotherapy.

On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for support. In his amended answer, Arnel denied being the
father of Martin because according to him, his intimate relationship with Fe had ended in 1998, long
before Martin’s conception. He claimed that Fe had at least one another secret lover. He stated that he
never fell in love with Fe and he ended their relationship because the latter was overly demanding and
possessive which resulted to Fe’s obsession to him to the point that she wanted to alienate him from his
wife and children so he could marry her. He alleged that on May 2000, his entire family went to US for a
vacation. Upon their return in June 2000, he learned that Fe was telling people that he had impregnated
her. He refused to acknowledge that child because their last intimacy was in 1998. He also alleged that
Fe followed him to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot demanding him to acknowledge
Martin and that due to the heated discussion, he had no alternative but to move on, but without hitting
any part of her body. He further alleged that the signature and community tax certificate (CTC)
attributed to him in the acknowledgement in Martin’s birth certificate were falsified. His marital status
was erroneously stated as “single” while he was married and his birth year was erroneously indicated as
“1965” instead of 1964.

On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.

Arnel opposed the motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. He also moved
to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate
was a forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by
the putative father. In his motion, Arnel manifested that he had filed criminal charges for falsification of
documents against Fe and a petition for cancellation of his name appearing in Martin's birth certificate.
He attached the certification of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory that his signature in the
birth certificate was forged.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit themselves
to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s
decision.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in upholding RTC’s order which denied Arnel Agustin’s motion to
dismiss private respondent’s complaint for support and directed the parties to submit themselves to
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity testing. NO
2. Whether or not DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity. YES

Ruling:

It is undisputed and even admitted by the parties that there existed a sexual relationship between Arnel
and Fe. The only remaining question is whether such sexual relationship produced the child, Martin. If it
did, as respondents have alleged, then Martin should be supported by his father Arnel. If not, petitioner
and Martin are strangers to each other and Martin has no right to demand and petitioner has no
obligation to give support.

On whether or not RTC’s order to submit petitioner to DNA testing violates his constitutional right
against selfincrimination and whether the same is an admissible evidence to establish paternity

With reference to American jurisprudence, several states in the US (e.g., New York, North and South
Dakota, Mississippi, Michigan) has recognized and accepted DNA testing as a means of establishing
paternity and filiation and has been used to resolve various cases involving support. (please see full text
for the US cases mentioned but the theme of said cases involves establishment of paternity filiation
through DNA testing).

In Philippine jurisprudence, DNA testing had also been admitted as evidence in certain cases, such as,
among others:

1. Tijing vs CA – possibility of DNA testing was first introduced:

The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP- NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory
has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is
based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and
the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to
establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result into deny progress.

2. People vs Vallejo - The rape and murder victim's DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the
accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that "the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain
whether an association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The
samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile."

3. In an en banc decision in People v. Yatar – The SC affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with
homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA test results. We did a lengthy discussion of
DNA, the process of DNA testing and the reasons for its admissibility in the context of our own Rules
of Evidence:

Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living
organisms. A person's DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person's
lifetime; the DNA in a person's blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root
and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly,
because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with
the notable exception of identical twins.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following
factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted
the tests.

Moreover, the SC upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the
results thereof as evidence. In a decided case involving rape, the accused Joel “Kawit” Yatar claimed that
the compulsory extraction of his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his
right against self-incrimination. However, the SC held that the kernel of the right is not against all
compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against
the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply
where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. Per
ruling in the Yatar case, and as applied in some other cases, DNA testing and its results are now
similarly acceptable.

Petitioner’s argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow
invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not in
any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to
submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such
dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.

In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or personal
hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. The
respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its decision and resolution, and
any error made would have only been an error in judgment. As we have discussed, however, the
decision of the respondent court, being firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence, was correct.

Rosendo Herrera vs. Alba, GR No. 148220, June 15, 2005

Facts:

13 year old Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother, Armi Alba, filed for a petition for compulsory
recognition, support, and damages against Rosendo Herrera, the petitioner.

Petitioner denied having physical contact with Armi Alba and he also denied that he is the biological
father of respondent.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings.
Respondent presented the testimony of Dr. Saturnina Halos, an Associate Professor teaching Cell Biology
at DLSU.

Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy
rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.
Petitioner strongly opposed the DNA testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. He also
contends that directing him to submit to DNA testing would violate his constitutional right against self-
incrimination.

RTC and CA ruled in favor of petitioner submitting himself to DNA testing.

Issue:

1. WON a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation. YES

2. WON DNA paternity testing violates the right against self-incrimination. NO

Ruling:

Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right
associated with paternity such as citizenship, support, or inheritance.

Burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father
of the child.

There are 4 significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action:

1. Prima facie case = exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative father.

2. Affirmative defenses

1. Putative father may show incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of
either physical absence or impotency.

2. Show that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.

3. Pres Presumption of legitimacy = child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is
presumed legitimate.

4. Physical resemblance between putative father and child may be offered as part of evidence of
paternity.

 1, 2, and 4 are present in this case.

1. YES, DNA testing is a valid tool to prove filiation.

○ There is almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive on non-
paternity, although inconclusive on paternity.

○ The 2002 case of People v Vallejo discussed DNA analysis as evidence. It discussed the probative value,
not admissibility, of DNA evidence.

In accessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, among other things, the ff
data:

 How the samples were collected

 How they were handled
 Possibility of contamination of the samples
  Procedure followed in analyzing the samples
 Whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in the conducting the
tests

○ The court ruled that it is not enough to state that the child's DNA profile matches that of the putative
father. A complete match does not necessarily establish paternity.

2. No, it does not violate petitioner's right against self-incrimination.

○ The privilege is applicable only to testimonial evidence.

○ The policy of the FC to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children,
especially of illegitimate children, is w/o prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her
own defense.

○ Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and
technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and
jurisprudence.

Petition is dismissed.

Estate of Ong vs. Diaz, GR No. 171713, Dec. 17, 2007, 540 SCRA 480

Facts:

A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by minor
Joanne Rodjin Diaz, represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, against Rogelio G. Ong
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City. In her Complaint, Jinky prayed that judgment be
rendered:

(a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz as his daughter.

(b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support of P20,000.00 pendente lite and thereafter to
fix monthly support.

(c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorney’s fees in the sum of P100,000.00.

(d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as maybe just and equitable in the premises. 4

After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the latter failed to file any responsive pleading
despite repeated motions for extension, prompting the trial court to declare him in default in its Order.
Rogelio’s Answer with Counterclaim and Special and Affirmative Defenses was received by the trial court
only on 15 April 1999. Jinky was allowed to present her evidence ex parte on the basis of which the trial
court rendered a decision granting the reliefs prayed for in the complaint.

Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion for reconsideration seeking the court’s
understanding, as he was then in a quandary on what to do to find a solution to a very difficult problem
of his life. Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with prayer that the decision of the trial court dated 23
April 1999 be vacated and the case be considered for trial de novo pursuant to the provisions of Section
6, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

RTC issued an Order granting Rogelio’s Motion for New Trial. On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a
decision and disposed:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the illegitimate child of
defendant Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz. The Order of this Court awarding support pendente lite
dated June 15, 1999, is hereby affirmed and that the support should continue until Joanne Rodjin Diaz
shall have reached majority age.

Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit in an Order of the trial
court dated 19 January 2001. From the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Rogelio appealed to the
Court of Appeals. After all the responsive pleadings had been filed, the case was submitted for decision
and ordered re-raffled to another Justice for study and report as early as 12 July 2002.

During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, Rogelio’s counsel filed a manifestation
informing the Court that Rogelio died; hence, a Notice of Substitution was filed by said counsel praying
that Rogelio be substituted in the case by the Estate of Rogelio Ong, which motion was accordingly
granted by the Court of Appeals.

In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of Appeals held that the present appeal is hereby
GRANTED. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated 1 March 2006. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

WON the court of appeals erred when it remanded the case to the court a quo for dna analysis despite
the fact that it is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio G. Ong.

Ruling:

As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor Joanne for purposes of
support in favor of the said minor.

There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied about by the parties to
the present petition. But with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new
technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father
of the minor, through DNA testing.

Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court, petitioner questions the
appropriateness of the order by the Court of Appeals directing the remand of the case to the RTC for
DNA testing given that petitioner has already died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the
RTC for DNA analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged
impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible than
real. Petitioner’s argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the
conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation.
It can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing
for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. The term "biological sample" means
any organic material originating from a person’s body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is
susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.

Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be
available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of
obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.

We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of
determining paternity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals and
its Resolution are AFFIRMED.

- Rights of Illegitimate Children

o R.A. 9255: Allowing illegitimate children to use the surname of their father,
amending Art. 176, Family Code

Mossessgeld v. CA, G.R. No. 111455, Dec. 23, 1998;

Republic v. Abadilla, 302 SCRA 358 (1999)

Facts:

In 1989, Marissa Mossesgeld (single), gave birth to a baby boy at the Medical City General Hospital,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. The father was lawyer Eleazar Calasan who was married, signed the birth
certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein the child’s name as Jonathan Mossesgeld
Calasan. Both Eleazar and Marissa accomplished the dorsal side of the certificate of live birth stating that
the information contained therein were true and correct. In addition, Eleazar executed an affidavit
admitting paternity of the child.

The person in charge at the hospital refused to place Calasan as the child’s surname in the certificate of
live birth; hence, Eleazar himself submitted the certificate to the office of the local civil registrar of
Mandaluyong, for registration. The local civil registrar denied the registration on the basis of Circular No.
4, dated October 11, 1988, of the Civil Registrar General, providing that under Article 176 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988, shall use the surname of
their mother.

Eleazar filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a petition for mandamus to compel the Local Civil
Registrar of Mandaluyong to register the certificate of live birth of his alleged illegitimate son using his
surname. The RTC denied the petition. Eleazar filed a motion for reconsideration. Later, he filed a
motion for leave to amend petition and to admit amended petition, substituting the child’s mother
Marissa A. Mossesgeld as the petitioner. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The CA affirmed
the decision.

Issue:
WON mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live birth of an
illegitimate child using the alleged father's surname where the latter admitted paternity.

Ruling:

No. The Court denies the petition.

Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that “illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code.”

This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. Consequently, the Local Civil
Registrar correctly refused to register the certificate of live birth of petitioner’s illegitimate child using
the surname of the alleged father, even with the latter’s consent. Of course, the putative father, though
a much married man, may legally adopt his own illegitimate child. In case of adoption, the child shall be
considered a legitimate child of the adopter, entitled to use his surname.

Mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil registrar to register the certificate of live birth of an
illegitimate child using the father’s surname, even with the consent of the latter. Mandamus does not lie
to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law.

Leonardo v. CA, GR No. 125329, September 10, 2003

Facts:

Petitioner Ann Brigitt Leonardo was born on July 14, 1993 to common-law-spouses Eddie B. Fernandez
and Gloria C. Leonardo. In her birth certificate, her given surname is that of her mother Leonardo. As
petitioner's parents later wanted her to carry the surname of her father, the latter affidavit and wrote a
letter on August 1, 1994 to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila requesting for the change of petitioner's
registered surname. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila Lucena D. Dacuan denied the request of
petitioner's parents on the ground that petitioner, being illegitimate, should carry her mother's surname
as provided under Article 176 of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. Dacuan also cited
Article 412 of the New Civil Code which provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.

Petitioner's parents appealed the denial of their request for change of petitioner's surname to the Civil
Registrar General, they citing, among others, the following provision of Title XIII (Use of Surnames), Book
I of the New Civil Code:

“Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the
father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the
recognizing parent.”

Though conceding that the appeal had valid arguments, the Civil Registrar General by letter on 1994,
denied the appeal on the ground that neither the Office of the Civil Registrar General nor any of the Civil
Registry Offices in the country is given the power or discretion to effect an administrative change of
entry in the civil register.
Petitioner's parents thus sought before the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) the
review of the Civil Registrar

General's decision denying their appeal. However, NEDA had no power or authority to review the
decision of the Civil Registrar General on matters pertaining to a local Civil Registry. Undaunted,
petitioner's parents appealed to the Office of the President which, by of May 11, 1995, upheld the
decision of the Civil Registrar General and the Local Civil Registrar of Manila that the cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry must be brought directly before courts of law.

Petitioner, represented by her parents, thereupon filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition
Review[ 10] for under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals held that Title XIII,
Book I of the New Civil Code on the Use of Surnames was not repealed by the Family Code, citing its
repealing clause or Article 254. It held, however, that the Local Civil Registrar of Manila is not allowed to
administratively correct the entry in the Civil Registry of the City by deleting and changing petitioner's
family name from LEONARDO to FERNANDEZ upon the submission of an affidavit of her father
recognizing her. It went on to declare that petitioner could change her surname by judicial action
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

W/N an illegitimate child born after the effectivity of the Family Code has the right to use her father's
surname.

Ruling:

No, the child may not. Article 176 of the Family Code reads:

“Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother,
and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall
consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.”

The rule applies even if petitioner's father admits paternity. So Mossesgeld v. Court of Appeals holds:

“This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. Consequently, the Local Civil
Registrar correctly refused to register the certificate of live birth of petitioner's illegitimate child using
the surname of the alleged father, even with the latter's consent.”

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Article 176 of the Family Code repealed Title XIII, Book I of
the New Civil Code regarding the Use of Surnames as stated in article 254 of the Family Code.

Thus this Court declared in Mossesgeld:

“The Family Code has effectively repealed the provisions of Article 366 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines giving a natural child acknowledged by both parents the right to use the surname of the
father. The Family Code has limited the classification of children to legitimate and illegitimate, thereby
eliminating the category of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction.”

Since petitioner was born an illegitimate child after the Family Code took effect, she has no right to use
her father's surname.
 - Custody

Grace M. Grande v. Patricio T. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014

Facts:

Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived
together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. Out
of this illicit relationship, two sons were born.

The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the
children in the Civil Registry. The parties’ relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left
for the United States with her two children in May 2007.

This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to
take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan
(RTC), appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.

On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio, ruling that
"[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that the best interest of the children can be promoted if they
are under the sole parental authority and physical custody of [respondent Antonio]."

a. Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to cause the entry of the name of
[Antonio] as the father of the aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth and
causing the correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of
Live Birth from Grande to Antonio;

b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental Authority with [Grande] over the persons of
their minor children, Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande;

c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over the parties’ minor children Andre Lewis
Grandre and Jerard Patrick Grande who shall stay with [Antonio’s] residence in the Philippines from
Monday until Friday evening and to [Grande’s] custody from Saturday to Sunday evening;

d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and custody of minors Andre Lewis Grande
and Jerard Patrick Grande unto [Antonio] for the days covered by the Order;

e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the aforenamed minors outside of the country,
without the written consent of the other and permission from the court.

f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor children Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard
Patrick Grande in the amount of ₱30,000 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for
[Grande].7 (Emphasis supplied.)

Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the trial
court in its Resolution dated November 22, 2010 for being pro forma and for lack of merit.

Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC for
allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother
over her illegitimate children. In resolving the appeal, the appellate court modified in part the Decision
of the RTC. In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the father’s recognition
of his children, the mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over them absent the most
compelling of reasons.

Since respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely
affected the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors, she cannot be
deprived of her sole parental custody over their children.

The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by
respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally
protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the children of the surname
"ANTONIO."

As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order considering that not only did
Antonio express his willingness to give support, it is also a consequence of his acknowledging the
paternity of the minor children. Lastly, the CA ruled that there is no reason to deprive respondent
Antonio of his visitorial right especially in view of the constitutionally inherent and natural right of
parents over their children.

Not satisfied with the CA’s Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration,
particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors’ surname to
"Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition.

In it, she posits that Article 176 of the Family Code––as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255,
couched as it is in permissive language––may not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his
illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their mother.

Issue:

WON it is legal to let the illegitimate children use Antonio’s surname even when they were not expressly
recognized by the father.

Ruling:

YES. We find the present petition impressed with merit.

The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
children upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of
the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:

In conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing
successional rights shall remain in force.

From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the
surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is
expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a
situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the
two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to
Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more:

A judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children’s
surname as Antonio.

Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondent’s prayer
has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor
children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or
not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the
right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal
basis.

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must
abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged
illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.

It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children are to be
measured is their best interest. On the matter of children’s surnames, this Court has, time and again,
rebuffed the idea that the use of the father’s surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In
Alfon v. Republic, for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to continue using the surname
of her mother rather than that of her legitimate father as it serves her best interest and there is no legal
obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in
Calderon v. Republic, this Court, upholding the best interest of the child concerned, even allowed the
use of a surname different from the surnames of the child’s father or mother.

Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a child’s surname is second only to the rule requiring that the child
be placed in the best possible situation considering his circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24, 2012 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406 is MODIFIED. Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar
General Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL and
VOID.

- Illegitimate children has no middle name; exceptions

In Re Petition for Change of Name of Julian Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, GR No. 155966, March
30, 2005

Facts:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition for change of
name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry. He is seeking to drop his middle name
and have his registered name change to Julian Lin Wang.

His parents plan to stay in Singapore and will let his study there. Since in Singapore, middle names or the
maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a person’s name, Julian’s parents anticipate that he
will be discriminated against because of his middle name. Moreover, Carusalan sounds funny in
Mandarin language since they do not have the letter “K” and would be instead pronounced as L. Julian
and his sister might also ask whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames.

The RTC denied the petition. It found that the reason given did not fall within the grounds recognized by
law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the
State has an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the
bearers.

Julian and Anna Lisa petitioned to the SC, arguing that convenience of the child is a valid reason for
changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others.

Issue:

WON the middle name of a child should be dropped because it is a common practice in Singapore to
omit said surname.

Ruling:

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A
change of name is a privilege and not a right. And so, before a person can be authorized to change the
name given him, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason to justify such
change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.

To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling
reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the
grounds for change of name which have been held valid are:

(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation

(c) when the change will avoid confusion

(d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage

(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody

(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left
to the sound discretion of the court.
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish
him from others who may have the same given name and surname as his.

The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,
while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their
filiation, in which case they may bear the father’s surname. Applying these laws, an illegitimate child
whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother’s surname, and
does not have a middle name.

Julian’s reason for wanting to change his name is amorphous to say the least and could not warrant
favorable action.

The only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping of his middle name is convenience. However,
how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is
not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty
does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered name.

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for
change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and
discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice
him in his rights under our laws.

The petition is DENIED.

In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, Honorato Catindig, Petitioner, GR
No. 148311, March 31, 2005

Facts:

1. On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was
born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia.

2. He prayed that Stephanie's middle name Astorga be changed to 'Garcia, her mother's surname, and
that her surname 'Garcia be changed to 'Catindig, his surname.

3. The court granted the petition for adoption but the court fixed the name of the child to be Stephanie
Nathy Catindig.

4. On April 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie
should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.

5. On May 28, 2001, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is
no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his
middle name.

Issue:
W/N an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.

Ruling:

Yes. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 10 of the
New Civil Code provides that: In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

The purpose of adoption is the benefit of the adopted child, to elevate the status of an illegitimate child
to that of an illegitimate child. If a child is adopted, he now possesses all the rights and privileges being
enjoyed by legitimate children.

Under the law, legitimate children use the surname of their biological mother as their middle name.

It would be unjust that an adopted child who is supposed to enjoy the same rights and privileges being
enjoyed by legitimate children to be discriminated by disallowing her to use the surname of her
biological mother as her middle name.

If the law does not prohibit, it allows.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that
Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother's surname 'GARCIA as her middle name.