 Illegitimate Children (Arts.

175-176)
- How Filiation Established
- DNA Testing
- Rights of Illegitimate Children
o Legitime
o Surname
o R.A. 9255: Allowing illegitimate children to use the surname of their
father, amending Art. 176, Family Code
o Support
o Custody
o Illegitimate children has no middle name; exceptions

- Period to Prove Filiation

Uyguangco v. CA 178 SCRA 684 (1989)

Facts:
During the pendency of the case, the Family Code was adopted. Thus, the provisions mentioned
in the case will make use of similar articles both from the Civil Code and the Family Code.
Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate children
(her co-petitioners herein), and considerable properties which they divided among themselves.
Claiming to be an illegitimate son of the deceased Apolinario, and having been left out in the
extrajudicial settlement of his estate, Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco, herein respondent) filed a
complaint for partition against all the petitioners. Graciano alleged that he was born in 1952 to
Apolinario Uyguangco and Anastacia Bacjao and that at the age of 15 he moved to his father's
hometown. He received support from his father while he was studying and was even assigned
by his father as a storekeeper at the Uyguangco store.
In the course of his presentation of evidence at the trial, the petitioners elicited an admission
from Graciano that he had none of the documents mentioned in Article 278 (counterpart of
Art. 172 in the FC) to show that he was the illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco. These
are "the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or (in) any authentic
writing." The petitioners thereupon moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the
private respondent could no longer prove his alleged filiation under the applicable provisions of
the Civil Code. Specifically, the petitioners argued that the only evidence allowed under Article
278 to prove the private respondent's claim was not available to him as he himself had
admitted. Neither could he now resort to the provisions of Article 285 because he was already
an adult when his alleged father died in 1975, and his claim did not come under the exceptions.
While the private respondent has admitted that he has none of the documents, he insists that
he has nevertheless been "in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child," which is now also admissible as evidence of filiation under the FC.
Respondent claims that he lived with his father from 1967 until 1973, receiving support from
him during that time; that he has been using the surname Uyguangco without objection from
his father and the petitioners as shown in his high school diploma, a special power of attorney
executed in his favor by Dorotea Uyguangco, and another one by Sulpicio Uyguangco; that he
has shared in the profits of the copra business of the Uyguangcos, which is a strictly family
business; that he was a director, together with the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons
Development Corporation, a family corporation; and that in the addendum to the original
extrajudicial settlement concluded by the petitioners he was given a share in his deceased
father's estate.
Issue:
W/N the respondent should be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his claimed father,
who is already dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence? NO he cannot.

Ruling:
His action is now barred because of his alleged father's death in 1975. The second paragraph of this
Article 175 reads as follows:

“The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent”

It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence of his
open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation
through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The simple reason is that
Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of his alleged son's
illegitimate filiation.

In her book, Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy explains the rationale of the rule, thus: "It is a truism that unlike
legitimate children who are publicly recognized, illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in
secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. Who then can be sure of their
filiation but the parents themselves? But suppose the child claiming to be the illegitimate child of a
certain person is not really the child of the latter? The putative parent should thus be given the
opportunity to affirm or deny the child's filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already
dead."

Graciano's complaint is based on his contention that he is the illegitimate child of Apolinario Uyguangco,
whose estate is the subject of the partition sought. If this claim can no longer be proved in an action for
recognition, with more reason should it be rejected in the said complaint, where the issue of Graciano's
filiation is being raised only collaterally. The complaint is indeed a circumvention of Article 172, which
allows proof of the illegitimate child's filiation under the second paragraph thereof only during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.

Bernabe v. Alejo, GR No. 140500, January 21, 2002; 374 SCRA 180
Facts:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-three
(23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981
and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife
Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On May 16, 1994, Carolina, on behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying that
Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian)
be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole
surviving heir.
On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the
provisions of the Family Code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the
complaint is now barred x x x.
Orders of the Trial Court
In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted Ernestina Bernabes Motion for
Reconsideration of the trial court’s Decision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for
recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative
father had barred the action.
In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative father had not
acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have
been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm
or deny the child’s filiation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be
allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born
in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for
recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of majority. The
subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
a. Whether or not the Family Code should be applied to the case
 b. Whether or not Adrian has a right to be recognized
Ruling:
The petitioner, the natural child, persists that Adrian Bernabe does not have the right to be
recognized or to seek recognition because Article 175 of the Family Code. (the father must have
already recognized Adrian during his lifetime to give him the opportunity to either affirm or
deny his affiliation with the child.
However, the right to seek recognition was already granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate
children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect. Thus, this right cannot
be impaired or taken away. Under Article 285 of the Civil Code, the minor must be given the
chance to exercise his right to recognition for up to 4 years from attaining majority age.
Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because
the boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows
an action for recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of
majority. The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.

Alejandra Arado Heirs v. Alcoran, G.R. No. 163362, July 8, 2015

Facts:
Raymundo Alcoran was married to Joaquina Arado , and their marriage produced a son named
Nicolas Alcoran . In turn, Nicolas married Florencia Limpahan, but their union had no offspring.
During their marriage, however, Nicolas had an extramarital affair with Francisca Sarita, who
gave birth to respondent Anacleto Alcoran on July 13, 1951 during the subsistence of Nicolas'
marriage to Florencia. In 1972, Anacleto married Elenette Sonjaco.
Raymundo died in 1939, while Nicolas died in 1954. Likewise, Florencia died in 1960, and
Joaquina in 1981
Florencia had three siblings, namely: Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica Limpahan. Joaquina had
four siblings, i.e., Alejandra, Nemesio, Celedonia and Melania, all surnamed Arado. Nemesio
had six children, namely: (1) Jesusa, who was married to Victoriano Alcoriza; (2) Pedro, who
was married to Tomasa Arado; (3) Teodorico; (4) Josefina; (5) Gliceria; 11 and (6)Felicisima.
During the pendency of the case, Pedro died, and was substituted by his following heirs, to wit:
(1) Juditho and his spouse, Jennifer Ebrole; (2) Bobbie Zito and his spouse, Shirly Abad; (3)
Juvenil and his spouse, Nicetas Ventula; (4) Antonieta and her spouse, Nelson Somoza; and (5)
Nila.
Alejandra, Jesusa, Victoriano Alcoriza, Pedro and Tomasa filed a complaint for recovery of
property and damages (w/ application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction) against
Anacleto and Elenette. Such complaint involves 10 properties in which the parties later
stipulated that the first 8 of such properties belongs to Raymundo previously, and last 2 are
paraphernal properties of Joaquina.
The plaintiffs alleged they were the rightful heirs of the properties. And it was unknown if
Anacleto was the spurious son of Nicolas since Nicolas did not recognize Anacleto as his
spurious child during Nicolas' lifetime, hence, Anacleto was not entitled to inherit from Nicolas.
However, Anacleto claimed entitlement to the properties as the heir of Nicolas and by virtue of
the will executed by Joaquina but the will was void for not having been executed according to
the formalities of the law because she did not acknowledge the will which was not submitted
for probable.
The defendants however counters that Anacleto was expressly recognized by Nicolas as his son
evidenced by a birth certificate.
They also claim that he has the right to inherit Nicolas' properties but he was just too young
when Nicolas died that’s why the administration of the properties went to Joaquina, his
grandmother. Eventually, Joaquina made a will in favor of Anacleto.

RTC dismissed the complaint. CA likewise sustained the ruling of RTC to the effect that Anacleto
was an acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas based on Articles 172, 173, and 175 of the
Family Code.
The petitioners insist that Anacleto was not duly recognized as Nicolas' illegitimate son and if
there was ground for Anacleto's recognition, the period to claim recognition already prescribed.
Issue:
1. Whether Anacleto Alcoran is the illegitimate son of Nicolas Alcoran
2. Whether he is entitled to the properties in litigation
Ruling:
1. Yes. He is the illegitimate son of Nicolas Alcoran.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same
period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of
Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime
and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the
action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or
both of the parties
Considering that Nicolas, the putative father, had a direct hand in the preparation of the birth
certificate, reliance on the birth certificate of Anacleto as evidence of his paternity was fully
warranted.
The lack of probative value of the respondents' aforecited corroborative evidence
notwithstanding, Anacleto's recognition as Nicolas' illegitimate child remained beyond question
in view of the showing that Nicolas had personally and directly acknowledged Anacleto as his
illegitimate son.
2. Yes. Anacleto had an established right to inherit from Nicolas, whose estate included the
first eight of the subject properties that had previously belonged to Raymundo. Anacleto
became a co-owner of said properties, pro indiviso, when Nicolas died in 1954. But he has not
inherited Joaquina's properties because the right of representation is not available to
illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent.

 Legitimated Children (Arts. 177-182)

- Concept
- Requisites

De Santos v. Hon. Angeles, GR No. 105619, Dec. 12, 1995, 251 SCRA 206
Facts:
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, and they were blessed with a
daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their relationship
became strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with another woman,
Conchita Talag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first
marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a court in Nevada.
Obviously aware that said decree was a worthless scrap of paper in our jurisdiction which does
not recognize divorce, Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent,
with whom he had been cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This union
produced eleven children.
On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, Antonio and private
respondent contracted a marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under Philippine laws. On March
8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value of P15,000,000.00.
On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court asking for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. She
alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs,
namely, herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner. There being no opposition, her
petition was granted.
After six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner decided to intervene.
Thus, in a motion she filed sometime in November 1987, she argued inter alia that private
respondent's children were illegitimate. This was challenged by private respondent although
the latter admitted during the hearing that all her children were born prior to Sofia's death in
1967.
On November 14, 1991, after approval of private respondent's account of her administration,
the court a quo passed upon petitioner's motion. The court, citing the case of Francisco H.
Tongoy, et al. v. Court of Appeals, declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and
thereupon instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the
heirs of Antonio de Santos.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of said order but this was denied. Hence, she filed this
instant petition for certiorari on contending that since only natural children can be legitimized,
the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers and sisters.
Issue:
W/N the children of the second marriage, who are natural children by legal fiction, can be
legitimated
Ruling:
Art. 269 (Art 177 of the Family Code). Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born
outside wedlock of parents, who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural. In other words, a child's
parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception for
him to qualify as a "natural child."

In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private respondent and
deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the latter's valid marriage to
petitioner's mother was still subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were
married abroad after the latter obtained in Nevada,U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his
legitimate wife does not change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in
this jurisdiction at the time. Evidently, the decedent was aware of this fact, which is why he had
to have the marriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the Philippines. It may be added here that
he was likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate, though
estranged wife died, he hastily contracted another marriage with private respondent, this time
here in Tagaytay.
It is thus incongruous to conclude, as private respondent maintains, that petitioner's half
siblings can rise to her level by the fact of being legitimized, for two reasons: First, they failed to
meet the most important requisite of legitimation, that is, that they be natural children within
the meaning of Article 269; second, natural children by legal fiction cannot demand that they
be legitimized simply because it is one of the rights enjoyed by acknowledged natural children.

In summary, the second marriage is void, and the children born of such marriage are
illegitimate. There being a legal impediment for Dr. Santos to marry Conchita, said children
cannot be considered “natural children proper”, and therefore cannot be legitimated.

Wherefore, SC grants the petition.

(Supplementary) Through this case, Art. 89, in relation with Art. 269, creates another category
of illegitimate children (the children of the 2nd marriage in this case).The marriage under
question in this case is considered "void from the beginning" because bigamous. It follows that
the children begotten of such union cannot be considered natural children proper for at the time
of their conception, their parents were disqualified from marrying each other due to the
impediment of a prior subsisting marriage. To distinguish them from natural children proper
(those "born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former,
were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other"), a legal fiction had to be
resorted to. In this case, the term "natural children by legal fiction" was invented, thus giving
rise to another category of illegitimate children, clearly not to be confused with "natural
children" as defined under Art. 269 but by fiction of law to be equated with acknowledged
natural children and, consequently, enjoying the status, rights and obligations of the latter.
However, in this case, SC ruled that: Legitimation is not a "right" which is demandable by a
child. It is a privilege, available only to natural children proper, as defined under Art. 269.
Although natural children by legal fiction have the same rights as acknowledged natural
children, it is a quantum leap in the syllogism to conclude that, therefore, they likewise have the
right to be legitimated, which is not necessarily so, especially, as in this case, when the legally
existing marriage between the children's father and his estranged first wife effectively barred a
"subsequent marriage" between their parents.

Abadilla v. Tagbiliran, Jr. 249 SCRA 462, 65 SCAD 197, October 25, 1995
Facts:
Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against respondent, Judge Jose C.
Tabiliran, Jr., on the grounds of gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming
of a judge. With respect to the charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge
scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage
with Teresita Banzuela. Tabiliran and Priscilla contracted marriage on May 1986. Furthermore,
respondent falsely represented himself as "single" in the marriage contract and dispensed with
the requirements of a marriage contract by invoking cohabitation with Baybayan for five years.
In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that respondent caused to be
registered as "legitimate", his three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan, by falsely
executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed registration was due to inadvertence,
excusable negligence or oversight, when in truth and in fact, respondent knew that these
children cannot be legally registered as legitimate.
Respondent, in his comment, dated December 25, 1992, declared that his cohabitation with
Priscilla is not and was neither bigamous nor immoral because he started living with Priscilla
only after his first wife had already left and abandoned the family home in 1966 and, since
then, and until the present her whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of
her being alive.
Respondent cited Sec. 3(w), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code in
order to show the legality of his acts:
After the absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he is
considered dead for all purposes except for those of succession. (Rule 131, Sec. 3(w), Rules of
Court.)
He admits that he indicated in his marriage contract that he was then "single", but he denied
the charge that he acted with deceit or false misrepresentation, he preferred to choose the
word "single", it being the most appropriate. Besides, both he and Priscilla executed a joint
affidavit wherein his former marriage to Banzuela was honestly divulged.
It was also found out that Respondent's children begotten with Priscilla Q. Baybayan, namely:
Buenasol B. Tabiliran, Venus B. Tabiliran and Saturn B. Tabiliran, all of whom were born before
their marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the 3 children can be legitimated.
Ruling:
NO. The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since the
time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita.
It appears from the record that he had been scandalously and openly living with said Priscilla
Baybayan as early as 1970 as shown by the fact that he begot three children by her, namely
Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran. Buenasol was born on July 14, 1970; Venus
was born on September 7, 1971; while Saturn was born on September 20, 1975. Evidently,
therefore, respondent and Priscilla Baybayan had openly lived together even while
respondent's marriage to his first wife was still valid and subsisting. As stated in Article 269 of
the Civil Code, “Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other, are natural.”
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous
relations. The Family Code: which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-
mentioned provision thus:
Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may
be legitimated.
The reasons for this limitation are given as follows:
1. The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;
2. It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;
3. There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
4. It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will
destroy the sanctity of marriage;
5. It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of
the child.
It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision, whether old or new, can give refuge to the
deceitful actuations of the respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. guilty of gross immorality,
deceitful conduct and corruption and, consequently, orders his dismissal from the service. Such
dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement
benefits, and disqualification from re-employment in the government-service, all without
prejudice to criminal or civil liability

“BBB” v. “AAA”, G.R. No. 193225, Feb. 9, 2015

Facts:
BBB and AAA started dating in 1996. They bore two children, DDD and EEE. BBB and AAA
married in civil rights in 2002.
Due to their frequent arguments, AAA decided to leave the conjugal home with the children
and lived temporarily at a friend’s house. While living separately from [BBB], AAA discovered
that BBB was stalking her and/or their children. Thus, [AAA] filed an application for the issuance
of a Permanent Protection Order before the RTC. The trial court granted the TPO. The CA
affirmed the RTC. BBB filed a Manifestation and Motion to Render Judgment Based on a MOA.
BBB alleges that on July 29, 2013, he and AAA had entered into a compromise anent the
custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD and EEE. AAA’s counsel filed a
Comment to the MOA pointing out that AAA signed the MOA while emotionally distressed and
sans the former’s advice and guidance. BBB counters that AAA should be presumed to have
acted with due care and full knowledge of the contents of the MOA which she signed.

Issue:
Whether or not BBB’s acknowledgment of CCC as his legitimate son is binding upon him.
Ruling:
Yes. In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCC's biological father.
Such being the case, it was improper to have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and
AAA's marriage. Clearly then, the legal process of legitimation was trifled with. BBB voluntarily
but falsely acknowledged CCC as his son. Article 1431 of the New Civil Code provides:
“Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.”
The principle of estoppel finds application and it now bars BBB from making an assertion
contrary to his previous representations. He should not be allowed to evade a responsibility
arising from his own misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects of the legitimation process.
CCC remains to be BBB's son, and pursuant to Article 179 of the Family Code, the former is
entitled to the same rights as those of a legitimate child, including the receipt of his father's
support.

- Rights of Legitimated Children

- Retroactive Effect of Legitimation
- Descendants Benefited by Legitimation
- Who Can Impugn Legitimation; Grounds; Prescriptive Period
VI. Adoption
 Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (RA 8552)
- Qualifications of the Adopter
o Filipino Adopter
o Alien Adopter
- Persons Qualified to be Adopted
- Consent to Adoption

Republic v. CA, GR No. 92326, Jan. 24, 1992

Facts:
Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed before the RTC of Legaspi City a petition to adopt Jason Condat, a
6-year old who had been living with their family since he was 4 months old. Finding the petition
to be sufficient in form and substance, the court set the petition for hearing.
The order was duly published and a copy of said order was posted on the bulletin board of the
court and in the other places it had required for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the
petition. During the hearing, the jurisdictional requirements were complied and proved, and
the testimonies of the respondent (Mrs. Bobiles), her husband (Dioscoro Bobiles) and one Ma.
Luz Salameno of the Department of Social Welfare and Development were taken and admitted
in the proceedings. The trial court rendered judgement that Jason Condat be freed from all
obligations with respect to his natural parents, be the child of the spouses Dioscoro and
Zenaida Bobiles, and change his surname to Bobiles.
The petitioner (Republic of the PH) appealed to the Court of Appeals but the CA affirmed the
RTC’s decision. The petitioner contends that the petition for adoption should be dismissed as it
was filed solely by the respondent (Mrs.Bobiles) without her husband which is a violation of
Article 185 of the Family Code that requires joint adoption by the spouses. The petitioner also
argues that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by the
respondent (Mrs. Bobiles).
Issue:
WON the petition to adopt Jason should be granted considering that only the wife filed the
petition for adoption.
Ruling:
Yes. The petition for adoption was filed by the respondent (Mrs. Bobiles) when the law
applicable was PD No. 63, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. This code states that a petition for
adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial
court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the CA, the Family
Code took effect. Under the new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, respondent had the right to file a petition for
adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition,
she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof,
her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in
accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or
impaired by the enactment of a new law. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to
comply with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for
adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the
time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption
filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" and expressly
made an integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the
child. The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are
sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and
conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is
with the consent of his natural parents. The representative of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the petition for
adoption and the trial court dispensed with the trial custody for several commendatory
reasons, especially since the child had been living with the adopting parents since infancy.
Further, the said petition was with the sworn written consent of the children of the adopters.

Herbert Cang v. CA & Spouses Clavano; G.R. No. 105308, Sept. 25, 1998; 296 SCRA 128
Facts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973, begot
three (3) children, namely: Keith, Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple’s relationship was undisturbed until
Anna Marie learned of the petitioner’s extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of
the Clavanos.
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendent lite with the then
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu which rendered a decision approving the joint
manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to “live separately and apart or
from bed and board.” They further agreed:
That the children of the parties shall be entitled to a monthly support of P1,000.00 effective
from the date of the filing of the complaint.
That the plaintiff (Anna) shall be entitled to enter into any contract or agreement with any
person or persons, natural or juridical without the written consent of the husband.
Petitioner left for the US where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie and the court issued the
divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three children to Anna, reserving “rights of
visitation at all reasonable times and places” to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen.
In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.
While in the US, petitioner worked and a portion of his earnings was remitted to the Philippines
for his children’s expenses and another, deposited in the bank in the name of his children.
Meanwhile, private respondents Ronald Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively
the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, files for the adoption of the three minor Cang
children before the RTC of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14year-old Keith
signifying consent to his adoption.
Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had “evaded his legal
obligation to support” his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald Clavano, had
been helping her in taking care of the children; that because she would be going to the US to
attend to a family business, “leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally
hamper her job seeking venture abroad;” and that her husband had “long forfeited his parental
rights” over the children.
Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines
and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents were financially
capable of supporting the children while his finances were too meager compared to theirs, he
could not in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved
children.
The lower court concluded that oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children.
Abandonment of a child by its parent is commonly specified by statute as a ground for
dispensing with his consent to its adoption. In such case, adoption will be allowed not only
without the consent of the parent, but even against his opposition.
Before the CA, petitioner contended that it would not be in the best interest of the 3 children if
they were adopted by the private respondents. He asserted that the petition for adoption was
fatally defective and tailored to divest him of parental authority because he did not have a
written consent to the adoption; he never abandoned his children; Keith and Charmaine did not
properly give their written consent; and the petitioners for adoption did not present as witness
the representative of the DSWD who made the case study report required by law.
CA – affirmed the decree of adoption issued by the RTC stating that Art. 199 of the Family Code
requires the written consent of the natural parents of the child to be adopted. However, the
consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is NOT necessary. The question therefore is
whether or not oppositor may be considered as having abandoned the children. In adoption
cases, abandonment connotes any conduct on the part of the parent to forego parental duties
and relinquish parental claims to the child, OR the neglect or refusal to perform the natural and
legal obligations which parents owe their children (Santos v. Ananzanso), OR the withholding of
the parents’ presence, his care and the opportunity to display voluntary affection.
Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar remittances to the children and has in fact
even maintained bank accounts in their names. His duty to provide support comes from two
judicial pronouncements. The first, the decision in JD-707 CEB, supra, obliges him to pay the
children P1,000.00 a month. The second is mandated by the divorce decree of the Nevada,
U.S.A. Federal Court which orders him to pay monthly support of US$50.00 for each child.
Oppositor has not submitted any evidence to show compliance with the decision in JD-101 CEB,
but he has submitted 22 cancelled dollar checks (Exhs. 24 to 45) drawn in the children’s names
totalling $2,126.98. The last remittance was on October 6, 1987 (Exh. 45). His obligation to
provide support commenced under the divorce decree on May 5, 1982 so that as of October 6,
1987, oppositor should have made 53 remittances of $150.00, or a total of $7,950.00. No other
remittances were shown to have been made after October 6, 1987, so that as of this date,
oppositor was woefully in arrears under the terms of the divorce decree. And since he was
totally in default of the judgment in JD-707 CEB, the inevitable conclusion is oppositor had not
really been performing his duties as a father, contrary to his protestations.
The 3 bank accounts he opened were in his name as trustee for each of his 3 children. In other
words, the accounts are operated and the amounts withdrawable by the oppositor himself and
it cannot be said that they belong to the minors.
Petitioner is now before the SC alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it
did not have his written consent as a natural father as required by Art. 31(2) of PD No. 603, the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Art. 188(2) of the Family Code.
Issue:
1. Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent
on the ground that the latter has abandoned them?
2. Whether petitioner has abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the
adoption unnecessary.
Ruling:
First Issue:
YES. Despite the amendments to the law [Art. 31(2) of PD 603, the Child and Youth Welfare
Code as amended by EO 91 was the applicable law at the time when the private respondents
filed the petition for adoption in 1987. During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on
Aug. 3, 1988, Art. 188(2) of the Family Code amended PD 603], the written consent of the
natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Notably, such
requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court which provides that: “There shall
be filed with the petition a written consent to the adoption signed x x x by each of its known
living parents who is not insane, OR hopelessly intemperate, OR has not abandoned the child x
x x.” As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural
child is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement
of written consent can be dispensed with IF PARENT HAS ABANDONED THE CHILD or that such
parent is INSANE or HOPELESSLY INTEMPERATE. The court may acquire jurisdiction over the
case even without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents PROVIDED that the
petition for adoption ALLEGES FACTS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT EXEMPTION FROM
COMPLIANCE THEREWITH.
In the instant case, only affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the petition
for adoption. Petitioner’s consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition
SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED THE FACT OF ABANDONMENT OF THE MINORS FOR ADOPTION BY THE
NATURAL FATHER as follows:
That the children’s mother, sister of petitioner Ronald Clavano, has given her express consent
to this adoption, as shown by the Affidavit of Consent. Likewise, the written consent of Keith
Cang, now 14 years of age appears on this petition; However, the father of the children,
Herbert Cang, had already left his wife and children and had already divorced the former, as
evidenced by the copy of the Decree of Divorce issued by the County of Washoe, State of
Nevada, USA which was filed at the instance of Mr. Cang, not long after he abandoned his
family to live in the US as an illegal immigrant.
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written consent
of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the
child by his natural parents is one of the circumstances under which our statutes and
jurisprudence dispense with the requirement of written consent to the adoption of their minor
children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent
thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper
issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a
preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor
natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may
the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.
Second Issue:
NO. In its ordinary sense, the word abandon means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce
utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of putting under a ban. The emphasis is
on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another,
hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one’s rights or
interests. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment
imports any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties
and relinquish all parental claims to the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural
and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not manifest a settled purpose
to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute
abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was
then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care
and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children
through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Petitioner’s testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence consisting of the
handwritten letters to him of both his wife and children.
Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the U.S.A. showing
that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for the
benefit of his children. Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies of checks sent by petitioner to the children
from 1985 to 1989.
These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising why the courts
below simply glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence on financial support but also the
emotional exchange of sentiments between petitioner and his family. Instead, the courts below
emphasized the meagerness of the amounts he sent to his children and the fact that, as regards
the bank deposits, these were withdrawable by him alone. Simply put, the courts below
attached a high premium to the prospective adopters’ financial status but totally brushed aside
the possible repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and psychological well-being of the
children.
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted to a
person simply because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his
natural parent. Thus, in David v. Court of Appeals, the Court awarded custody of a minor
illegitimate child to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead of to his
affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child opted to go with his
mother. The Court said: “Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that
private respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is
earning a decent living and is able to support her children according to her means.”

In Celis v. Cafuir where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether to award custody of
a child to the natural mother or to a foster mother, this Court said: “We should not take away
from a mother the opportunity of bringing up her own child even at the cost of extreme
sacrifice due to poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be able to look back
with pride and a sense of satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts, however humble, to
make her dreams of her little boy come true. We should not forget that the relationship
between a foster mother and a child is not natural but artificial. If the child turns out to be a
failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had done for him, said parents might yet count
and appraise all that they have done and spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a
dead loss, and even rue the day they committed the blunder of taking the child into their hearts
and their home. Not so with a real natural mother who never counts the cost and her sacrifices,
ever treasuring memories of her associations with her child, however unpleasant and
disappointing. Flesh and blood count. x x x.”

In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that in ascertaining the welfare and best
interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. Thus, in awarding custody of the child to the father, the Court said: “A scrutiny
of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least, her counsel are more intent on
emphasizing the `torture and agony of a mother separated from her children and the
humiliation she suffered as a result of her character being made a key issue in court rather than
the feelings and future, the best interests and welfare of her children. While the bonds between
a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is
bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is
greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings
of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration.
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his
children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking into account the physical,
emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child. The conclusion of the
courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary support other than
his inability to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could
provide. There should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that his children
would not miss his guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting parents. The letters he
received from his children prove that petitioner maintained the more important emotional tie
between him and his children. The children needed him not only because he could cater to
their whims but also because he was a person they could share with their daily activities,
problems and triumphs.
Said petition must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who, by
law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.

Landigin v. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006

Facts:
Assailed in this petition is CA’s decision reversing RTC’s decision granting the Petition for
Adoption to the petitioners herein.
Diwata Ramos Landingin, petitioner, a citizen of USA, of Filipino parentage and a resident of
Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of her minor neices and nephews namely, Elaine
Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos.
She alleged in her petition that:
1. When her brother Manuel Ramos (father of the minors) died, the children were
left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos.
2. The children’s biological mother, Amelia Ramos, is already in Italy with her 2 nd
family and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-
laws.
3. The minors are being financially supported by Diwata and her children and
relatives abroad.
4. As Maria already passed away, Diwata desires to adopt the children.
5. The minors gave their written consent to the adoption.
6. She is qualified to adopt since she is a 57-year old widow, has children of her
own who are already married and gainfully employed.
7. She lives alone in her home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and
works as a restaurant server.
8. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors.
9. Her children gave their written consent to the adoption of the minors.
10. Her brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified willingness
and commitment to support minors while in petitioner’s custody.
Petitioner prayed that she would be allowed to adopt the minors and the latter would follow
her family name.
The petitioner presented the following as evidence:
1. Her testimony
2. Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the minors, to testify on the written consent
executed by her and her siblings
3. Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis, and
Ricfel Branitley, and notarized in Guam, USA
The DSWD was ordered by the court to conduct a case study. The report of DSWD
recommended that the adoption be granted considering the willingness expressed by the
minors and the voluntary consent of their mother based on the personal interview conducted
by the Social Welfare Officer, Pagbilao.
However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and any documentary evidence to
prove Amelia’s assent to the adoption.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption. However, the Office of the Solicitor General
appealed the decision to the CA, and the latter reversed RTC’s decision. Subsequent motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written
consent of their biological mother.
2. Whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-
adopter’s children sufficiently complies with the law.
3. Whether or not the petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.
Ruling:
The petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

On the lack of written consent of their biological mother

The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on the best
interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the
child.
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,
provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. — After being properly counseled and
informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written
consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required: a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years
of age or over;
b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or
the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;
c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over,
of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of
 e) the adopter, if living with said adopter and the latter's souse, if any;
f) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed
adoption. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent
must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in
adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia
Ramos to the adoption.
The SC noted that in DSWD’s report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview Amelia
Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son for a vacation. If so, it is incredible that
Pagbilao would not require Amelia to execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her
children . Neither did the petitioner presented Amelia as witness.
Petitioner argues that the written consent of Amelia is no longer necessary since she already
abandoned her children. Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition
with the RTC, RA 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written
consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal
guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of
the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of
their legal guardian.
To justify adoption of his child with his consent, abandonment by the parent should mean that
she forego all parental duties. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to
display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect,
abandons the child. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care
of others is not such an abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of consent, the
abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
However, in this case, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children,
or to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the
country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish
entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law,
for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious personal
problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to the children, though in
minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent in-laws provide.
It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over
his/her children. More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the
children, and that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an
adopting parent. Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption.
On the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopter’s children
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao's Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent
purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove.
The joint written consent of petitioner's children was notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam,
USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same way as a document notarized in this
country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103, 4466 which states:
Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign country
shall be considered authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are made in
accordance with the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before
(1) an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, chargé d affaires, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or
place to which he is accredited, or
(2) a notary public or officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him, and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be under his official
seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In case the
acknowledgment is made before a notary public or an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of
the preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation,
chargé de affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines,
acting within the country or place to which he is accredited.
The officer making the authentication shall certify under his official seal that the person who
took the acknowledgment was at the time duly authorized to act as notary public or that he
was duly exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which he assumed to act, and that as
such he had authority under the law to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in
the place where the acknowledgment was taken, and that his signature and seal, if any, are
genuine.
As the alleged written consent of petitioner's legitimate children did not comply with the
afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document whose
authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers. Since, in the
instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the written
consent of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
On Diwata’s financial capability to support the minors
Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently
handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only has a part-time job,
and she is rather of age. While petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing
of her children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the
adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the
former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor support petitioner's allegation
that her siblings and her children are financially able and that they are willing to support the
minors herein. The Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.

- Effects of Adoption

Sayson v CA, 205 SCRA 321

Facts:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and
Teodoro. Eleno died on Nov. 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married
Isabel Bautista, died on Mar. 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on Mar. 26, 1981. Their
properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who
claim to be their children.
On Apr. 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa and Remedios and Juana, Isabel’s mother, filed a
complaint for partition of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel.
Subsequently, Delia and Edmundo, both legally adopted, and Doribel as the legitimate
daughter, filed their own complaint for the partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela
claiming that they are entitled to inherit Teodoro’s share in his parents’ estate by right of
representation.
Both cases were decided by the trial court in favor of the herein private respondents on the
basis of practically the same evidence.
● Judge Rafael Santelices declared that Delia and Edmundo were legally adopted
children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson and Doribel is their legitimate daughter
evidenced by her birth certificate. Judge Santilices ruled that the 3 children were
entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation.
 ● Judge Jose Sanez held that the defendants, being legitimate heirs of Teodoro and
Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from
sharing in their estate.
The CA consolidated the cases and affirmed the lower court’s decision. However, it modified
the trial court’s decision stating that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from inheriting
from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson.
Thus, the present petition for certiorari filed by the petitioners contending that Delia and
Edmundo were not legally adopted and that Doribel is not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
and Isabl but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship
of the child that she was her natural mother.
Issue:
1. WON the petitoiners could challenge the validitiy of the adoption decree of Delia and
Edmundo. NO
2. WON Delia and Edmundo have a claim in the estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson? NO
3. WON Doribel is the legitimate daughter of of Teodoro and Isabel, thus giving her the
right to claim a share in the estate. YES
Ruling:
1. No. It is too late now to challenge the decree of adoption years after it became final and
executory.
2. No. Delia and Edmundo are total strangers in relation to Eleno and Rafaela Sayson.
● While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate
child and have the same rights as the latter, these rights do not include the right
of representation.
● The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting
parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of
either party.
3. Yes. Doribel’s legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting
but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.

Acain vs IAC, 155 SCRA 100

Facts:
Constantino Acain filed in the RTC-Cebu City Branch 13, a petition for the probate of the late
Nemesio Acain's(petitioner's uncle) will and for the issuance of the same petitioner of letters
testamentary docketed as Special Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB.
Nemesio died leaving a will in which petitioner, together with his siblings were instituted as
heirs.
The will as executed by Nemeso, was written in Bisaya with an English translation. It contained
provisions of burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio
Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament.
The testator, in his will provided:
"All my shares that I may receive from our properties, house, lands and money which I earned
jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN,
Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In
case my brother Segundo Acain predeceases me, all the money properties, lands, houses there
in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given by me to his
children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, Laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all
surnamed Acain."
However, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus, it is the children of Segundo who are claiming
to be heirs with Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court, the oppositors (respondents herein
Virginia Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased and the latter's widow Rosa
Dingson Vda. de Acain) file a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;
(2) he is merely a universal heir; and
(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.
Said motion was denied by the trial judge.
After the subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied, respondents filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was
subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered
the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present petition for the
review of respondent Court's decision
A Memorandum was raised by the petitioner with the following issues:
(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction is not the proper remedy under the premises;
(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic validity
of the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity thereof before it
is admitted to probate;
(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to probate. The
preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to preterition of "compulsory
heirs in the direct line," and does not apply to private respondents who are not compulsory
heirs in the direct line; their omission shall not annul the institution of heirs;
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET ERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the law;
(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that suggests that mere
institution of a universal heir in the will would give the heir so instituted a share in the
inheritance but there is a definite distinct intention of the testator in the case at bar, explicitly
expressed in his will. This is what matters and should be inviolable.
(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file the petition in
Sp. Proc. No. 591-A-CEB for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain; and
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore unconstitutional and
ineffectual.
Issue:
1.) W/N the private respondents, Virginia Fernandez (adopted daughter) and Rosa Diongson
(surviving spouse) have been pretirited?
2.) W/N petitioner is a party in interest to probate the will.
Ruling:
1.) As to the surviving spouse, there is no preterition. However, as to the surviving daughter,
there is preterition.
Pretirition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted
from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil Code). However, the same
thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by
the testator has not been questioned by petitioner.
Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code:
"Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate
child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter."
It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and
that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it
be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of
the legally adopted child.
2.) In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an
interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or
as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate
such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor.
Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention
in the testamentary disposition. of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he
is called upon to receive.
At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of
the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by
operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent
adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the
testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and
Special Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB must be dismissed.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the questioned
decision of respondent Court of Appeals and its Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.

Tamagro v. CA, GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992

Facts:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an
air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. The natural parents of Tamargo filed a
complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the
time of the tragic incident. In December 1981, spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition
to adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted in November 1982 that is after Adelberto had
shot and killed Jennifer. Adelberto’s parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura
were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to them from the
moment the petition for adoption was decreed. Spouses Tamargo contended that since
Adelberto was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased
by mere filing and granting of the petition for adoption. Trial court dismissed the spouses
Tamargo’s petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by
Adelberto.
Ruling:
No. Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents,
their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the
case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged
with the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for
damages. It follows in accordance with Article 221 of the Family Code which states that:
“Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries
and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their
company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defences provided by
law.” Supreme Court held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and
vested in the adopting parents, at the time the shooting happened. It do not consider that
retroactive effect may be given to the decree of the adoption so as to impose a liability upon
the adopting parents accruing at the time when adopting parents had no actual custody over
the adopted child. Retroactive affect may be essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child.

In the matters of Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, GR No. 148311, March 31,
2005
Facts:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;2that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name
Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be
changed to "Catindig," his surname.On March 23, 2001, the trial court rendered the assailed
Decision granting the adoption.
Certain issues arose considering that there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even
Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as
"An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what
middle name a child may use.
Issue:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name?
Ruling:
YES. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear surname of her father and her mother. Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s
surname as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. The Adoption Act and the
Family Code provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
Hence, Stephanie can assert her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.

The Court holds that the petitioner’s care and custody of the child since her birth up to the
present constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of
Presidential Decree No. 603. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from
all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil
purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article
189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY
CATINDIG.
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of Surnames,
they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname
of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. Prof.
Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the suggestion."

In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, G.R. No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They
were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a
certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim
registered the children to make it appear that children they were the children's parents. The
children were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle
was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner while Michael was 11 days
old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner's clinic.
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children
to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents.
Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married
Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA
8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner
filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. At the
time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married
while Michael was 18 years old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of
Consent. Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent.
Petitioner's husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of for the adoption of Michelle and
Michael. In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), Michelle and Michael were considered as abandoned children and the whereabouts of
their natural parents unknown.
However, the RTC the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court
ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with
her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was since the trial
court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III
of RA 8552. Petitioner's argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was
untenable because, under the law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and
certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in this
case, must comply.
Issue:
W/N petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
Ruling:
No she cannot. It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner
had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband
Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court's decision denying the petitions
for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 specifically
reads:
“Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however,
That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) If the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of
the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.”
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to
the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly.
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed
only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in
denying the petitions for adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the
three exceptions enumerated in Section 7.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does
not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen.
He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552. None of these qualifications
were shown and proved during the trial. These requirements on residency and certification of
the alien's qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7.
On the effects of adoption:
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been
emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable. Parental authority includes caring
for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral,
mental and physical character and well-being. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall
not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the
guardian of the children. It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation -- that is, when
he attains the age age of majority or 18 years of -- emancipation terminates parental authority over the
person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.
However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552
enumerates the effects of adoption.

Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the
adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a
legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter
to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal
and compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the
adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such
as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and
(3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall,
with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as
support and successional rights.

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the
petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner. Petitioner, in her
Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer be
possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles
Superior Court. We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there
is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still
subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our
ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to
Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.

Velasco v. career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. G.R. No. 214872, February 23, 2015
Facts:
Respondent Velasco was hired by Petitioner Career Philippines Ship Management, Inc. on behalf of its
principal, Atlantic Limited Marine, to work as Able Seaman under a nine-month contract on board the
vessel M/V Spring Dragon. Before completing the contract, however, respondent was medically
repatriated, was treated at the Seaman’s Hospital and was diagnosed to be suffering from
“Nephrolithiasis”, hence, he underwent electro shockwave lithotripsy or ESWL.

The manning agreement between Atlantic Limited Marine with petitioner ended. Petitioner later
entered into a contract with Marine Management International Philippines, Inc. Respondent
subsequently applied for and was again hired by petitioner as Able Seaman for another nine-month
period.

In POEA-approved contract, respondent did not reveal that he had suffered from kidney or bladder
trouble, and the company-designated physician declared him “fit to work.” Respondent soon boarded
the vessel Tama Star and completed his contract. Three weeks later, he reported to petitioner’s office to
claim his benefits under the contract amounting to P67,584.93, for which he signed a “Discharge Receipt
and Release of Claim.” Close to two years later, respondent filed before the Labor Arbiter a complain
claiming disability benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowance, damages and attorney’s fees against
petitioner.

Petitioner consulted for kidney ailment with Dr. Abarquez and Dr. Entero-Lim who both declared in their
respective medical certificates that he was suffering from the presence of stones in his kidney and was
not fit to work.

By Decision, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondent, holding that, inter alia, petitioner could not
disclaim knowledge of respondent’s kidney ailment when it hired him and that respondent in fact
sought medical assistance from petitioner upon his return after his contract ended.

On petitioner’s appeal, NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling by Decision. Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution, it appealed to the Court of Appeals, at the same
time applying for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).
Meanwhile, respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution.
Believing that the execution of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision was imminent as its petition for injunctive
relief was denied by the appellate court by Resolution, petitioner filed before the Labor Arbiter on a
pleading entitled “Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment Award with Urgent Motion to Cancel Appeal
Bond All Without Prejudice to the Pending Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals and accordingly
paid respondent the monetary award as stated in the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.

The Labor Arbiter later issued an Order stating that the case had been amicably settled and was thus
dismissed, without prejudice to the pending petition at the Court of Appeals.

By Decision, the appellate court dismissed petitioner’s appeal for being moot and academic, noting that
the Decision of the Labor Arbiter had attained finality with the satisfaction of the judgment award. Its
Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution, petitioner interposed the present appeal.

Issue:
WON the appellate court erred in not deciding the case on the merits and instead dismissing it on
the ground of mootness.

WON NLRC Decision had not attained finality because it was tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
hence, void; and that the express agreement between it and respondent as contained in the
“Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment” should be respected.

Ruling:
As a rule, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in labor cases. Hence,
factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the
Labor Arbiter and are supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by this
Court.

As for the “Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment,” the Court holds that it is valid, hence, the
“conditional” settlement of the judgment award insofar as it operates as a final satisfaction
thereof to render the case moot and academic.
While petitioner had the luxury of having other remedies available to it such as its petition for
certiorari pending before the appellate court, and an eventual appeal to this Court, respondent,
on the other hand, could no longer pursue other claims, including for interests that may accrue
during the pendency of the case.
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, it could not, at the time respondent moved for the execution
of the Labor Arbiter’s monetary awards, have been compelled to immediately pay the
judgment award, for it had filed with the NLRC an appeal bond, intended to assure respondent
that if he prevailed in the case, he would receive the money judgment in his favor upon the
dismissal of the employer's appeal. The Labor Arbiter and the appellate court may not thus be
faulted for interpreting petitioner’s “conditional settlement” to be tantamount to an amicable
settlement of the case resulting in the mootness of the petition for certiorari.
The petition is devoid of merit.

Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015

Facts:
Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo, the defendants, executed a document declaring themselves as
the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. Consequently, they took possession
and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their names.
Karen Santos, on the other hand, claims to be the only child of deceased Rufino and Caridad
Geronimo. She filed a complaint for the annulment of document and recovery of the possession
against the defendants, brothers of his father. She alleged that with the death of her parents,
the property belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law of intestacy.
The defendant denied the allegation that the plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their
brother stating that the deceased Rufino and Caridad were childless and took in as their ward
Karen, the child of Caridad’s sister. To strengthen their defense, they claimed that the birth
certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. The birth certificate had alterations as
confirmed by an NSO representative.
They alleged that it is impossible for Rufino and Caridad to register the plaintiff in Sta. Maria,
Ilocos Sur because they never lived or sojourned in that place. Also, Caridad, an elementary
teacher in Bulacan, never filed a maternity leave during the period of her service, as supported
by a certification from the Schools Division Superintendent.
The RTC ruled that the respondent is a legitimate child of the putative parents. The trial court
found that respondent’s filiation was duly established by the certificate of live birth which was
presented in evidence. It dismissed the petitioners’ claim that the certificate was tampered. It
further stated that even granting arguendo that the birth certificate is questionable, the filiation
of respondent has already been sufficiently proven by evidence of her open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child under Article 172 of the Family Code.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that under Article 170, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of the child must be reckoned from either of these two dates: the date the child was
born to the mother during the marriage, or the date when the birth of such child was recorded
in the civil registry. The appellate court found no evidence or admission that Caridad indeed
gave birth to respondent on a specific date.
It further resolved that the birth certificate presented in this case does not qualify as the valid
registration of birth in the civil register because it was not signed by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the child’s birth or the parents of the newborn child, contrary to what the law
required. However, the CA ultimately ruled that the respondent was able to prove her filiation
via open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child as supported by
secondary evidence presented.
The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to
bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and sent her to school paying for her
tuition and other school expenses; (3) she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad
before the GSIS; (4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was appointed legal
guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both
Caridad and the plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the
basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs of the deceased.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in allowing the introduction of secondary evidence
and rendered judgement notwithstanding the existence of primary evidence of birth certificate.
Ruling:
NEGATIVE. Secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct action under Article 172
because the said provision of law is meant to be instituted as a separate action, and proof of
filiation cannot be raised as a collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action for
annulment of document and recovery of possession. However, this rule is applicable only to
actions where the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child is at issue.
In the case at bar, filiation is not an issue. What petitioner alleges is that the respondent is not a
child of the deceased spouses at all. Thus, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly
admitted secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible under Art. 172 of the Family Code.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that the lower court’s declaration that the respondent is a
legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased spouses is based on misapprehension of facts.
The irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and the name of
the informant made the document questionable, as supported by the corroborating testimony
of the NSO representative. In addition, even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence
to explain such irregularities. These irregularities and the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of
regularity attached to the respondent’s birth.
With the declaration that the birth certificate is a nullity or falsity ruled then the respondent is
not the child of Rufino, and therefore not entitled to inherit from the estate.

- Grounds for Rescission of Adoption

- Effects of Rescission of Adoption
 - Rectification of Simulated Births

 Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 (RA 8053)

- Basic Policy
- Who May Adopt

Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Toledano, G.R. No. 94147, June 8, 1994
Facts:
On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US Citizen and Evelyn Clouse, a
former Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala, a
minor who is Evelyn's younger brother. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially
capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.
Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was
and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to
the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to
poverty and inability to support and educate her son. Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social
worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of
the petition for adoption.
The trial court granted the petition.
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed contending that the lower court
erred in granting the petition for the spouses are not qualified to adopt under Philippine Law.
Issue:
Whether or not Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt.
Ruling:
NO. Under Articles 184 and 185 of The Family Code of the Philippines, private respondents
spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt,
viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse
a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens, not included in the foregoing exceptions, may adopt Filipino children in accordance with
the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.
There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt
Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the
first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of
America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor
the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse
jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private
respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship
when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to
paragraph 3(a) of Article 184. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her
younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone
without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It
reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read
along together with Article 184.
Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the
child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
The Family Code likewise upholds that the interest and welfare of the child to be adopted
should be the paramount consideration. These considerations notwithstanding, the records of
the case do not evince any fact as would justify us in allowing the adoption of the minor,
Solomon Joseph Alcala, by private respondents who are aliens.

- Who May be Adopted

- Where to File Petition
- Supervision of Trial Custody; Time When the Decree for Adoption Could be Issued

 A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC: Rule on Adoption (Domestic and Inter-Country)

VII. Support (Arts. 194-208)
 What Support Compromises

Lam v. Chua, G.R. No. 131286, March 18, 2004

Facts:
The case commenced upon the filing of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by
Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the RTC of Pasay City. Adriana prayed that the marriage
between her and Jose be declared null and void but she failed to claim and pray for the support
of their child, John Paul.
Summons was duly served on Jose Lam. Despite the lapse of fifteen days after service of
summons, no responsive pleading was filed by him. Hence, the trial court issued an Order
directing Asst. City Prosecutor Bonifacio Barrera to conduct an investigation for determination
whether or not there was collusion between the parties and to submit his report thereon. Asst.
City Prosecutor Barrera filed his Report stating that "there seems to be no collusion between
the parties".
The trial court then set the case for hearing. The lone witness was Adriana herself. After her
testimony, counsel for Adriana formally offered the documentary evidence. No evidence was
presented regarding the amount of support needed by John Paul or the capacity of Jose to give
support.
Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to Re Open on the ground that she was able to secure additional
new evidence which were significant, material and indispensable. The trial court granted the
motion to re open the case and held a hearing for the reception of additional evidence. The
Pasay RTC admitted into evidence the Marriage Contract between Jose and one Celia Santiago,
and another Marriage Contract between Jose and one Evan Lock, showing that Jose had been
married twice before he married Adriana.
The Pasay RTC rendered its Decision declaring the marriage between petitioner Adriana Chua
and respondent Jose Lam null and void for being bigamous by nature. Likewise, respondent
Jose Lam is hereby ordered to give a monthly support to his son John Paul Chua Lam in the
amount of P20,000.00.
Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof but only insofar as the decision awarded
monthly support to his son in the amount of P20,000.00. He argued that there was already a
provision for support of the child as embodied in the decision of the Makati RTC wherein he
and Adriana agreed to contribute P250,000.00 each to a common fund for the benefit of the
child.
Pasay RTC issued an Order denying Jose Lam's motion for reconsideration. Jose then appealed
the Pasay RTC's decision to the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
affirming the Pasay RTC's decision in all respects. Jose filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Decision but in a Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the same. Hence, Jose filed the
present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
WON the honorable court of appeals erred in deciding legal questions of substance not in
accordance with law and jurisprudence in finding that the trial court's ruling that the
compromise agreement between petitioner and respondent where they bound themselves to
contribute the amount of two hundred fifty thousand pesos (p250,000.00) to a common fund
for the benefit of their child does not bar the trial court in annulment case to again award
support in favor of the child.
Ruling:
The Pasay RTC and the Court of Appeals are both correct insofar as they ruled that the amount
of support is by no means permanent.
There is no merit to the claim of Jose that the compromise agreement between him and
Adriana, as approved by the Makati RTC and embodied in its decision in the case for voluntary
dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains, is a bar to any further award of support in favor of
their child John Paul. The provision for a common fund for the benefit of their child John Paul,
as embodied in the compromise agreement between herein parties which had been approved
by the Makati RTC, cannot be considered final and res judicata since any judgment for support
is always subject to modification, depending upon the needs of the child and the capabilities of
the parents to give support.
We take note of the Compromise Agreement, approved by and embodied in the decision of the
Makati RTC. Finding the agreement to be in order, and not being contrary to law, morals or
public policy, the same is hereby APPROVED. Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains
existing between the said spouses is dissolved and a decree of complete separation is
established in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 6 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. The parties are hereby enjoined to faithfully comply with the conditions of their
Agreement as embodied in this petition and the same shall, as between the parties, be deemed
to be a decision and/or award in the matters treated in the aforesaid settlement. 

Lim-Lua v. Lua, G.R. No. 175279-80, June 5, 2013

Facts:
1. Susan Lim-Lua filed a petition against Danilo Lua for a declaration of nullity of marriage
with Cebu City RTC Branch 14, with a prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two
children amounting to P500,000 per month, citing Danilo’s huge earnings from salaries and
dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad.
2. After due hearing, RTC cited Article 203 of the Family Code, stating that support is
demandable from the time plaintiff Susan needed the said support but is payable only from the
date of judicial demand, and thus also granted support pendente lite of P250,000. Danilo is
ordered to pay P250,000 within the first five (5) days of each corresponding month pursuant to
paragraph 3 of Art. 203, Family Code. He is also made to pay P1,750,000 for retroactive support
(seven months since the petition was filed until decision).
3. The husband filed for Motion for Reconsideration asserting that Susan is not entitled to
spousal support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from
their children. Further, he said he has continued to support the family for their sustenance and
well- being in accordance with family’s social and financial standing.
4. The husband also assert that the P250,000 monthly support and the 1,750,000.00
retroactive support is unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having
considered the needs of the respondent
5. His motion for reconsideration was denied thus he appealed to the CA wherein it
reduced the monthly support to P115,000.00 which ruling was no longer questioned by both
parties.
6. The controversy between the parties resurfaced when Danilo’s compliance with the
final CA decision indicated that he deducted from the total amount in arrears (P2,645,000.00)
the sum of P2,482,348.16, (and another P946, 465.64). The appellate court said that the RTC
should have not disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase of
two cars, tuition fees, travel and house expenses, which certainly benefited not only of the two
children, but also that of their mother (petitioner), and thus ordered to deduct the amount of
P3,428, 813.80 from the current total support of Danilo to his wife and children.
Issue:
W/N certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total
support in arrears owing to the petitioner and her children.
Ruling:
The SC partly granted CA’s decision.
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family
relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and the needs of the recipient.
The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the
mother money for the support of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued
installments become judgments in her favor, he cannot, by law, claim credit on account of
payments voluntarily made directly to the children.
The SC’s decision which was party granted was first to resume payment of his monthly support
of P115,000 pesos starting from the time payment of this amount was deferred by him.
Second, that only the amount of P648,102.29 may be allowed as deductions from the accrued
support pendente lite for petitioner and her children and not PhP3,428,813.80 (rendered by the
CA).

 Persons Obliged to Support Each Other

 When Demandable; When Payable; Where Claimed; Who is Liable

Zaguirre v. Castillo, A.C. No. 4921, Aug. 3, 2005

Facts:
This is a Petition for disbarment Against Alfredo Castillo by Carmelita Zaguirre for Gross
Immoral Conduct.
Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two became officemates at the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Respondent courted complainant and promised to
marry her while representing himself to be single. Soon they had an intimate relationship that
started sometime in 1996 and lasted until 1997. During their affair, respondent was preparing
for the bar examinations which he passed. On May 10, 1997, he was admitted as a member of
the Philippine Bar. It was only around the first week of May 1997 that complainant first learned
that respondent was already married when his wife went to her office and confronted her
about her relationship with respondent.5 On September 10, 1997, respondent, who by now is a
lawyer, executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the complainant and recognizing
the unborn child she was carrying as his. On December 9, 1997, complainant gave birth to a
baby girl, Aletha Jessa. By this time however, respondent had started to refuse recognizing the
child and giving her any form of support. Respondent claims that: he never courted the
complainant; what transpired between them was nothing but mutual lust and desire; he never
represented himself as single since it was known in the NBI that he was already married and
with children;9 complainant is almost 10 years older than him and knew beforehand that he is
already married;10 the child borne by complainant it not his, because the complainant was
seeing other men at the time they were having an affair. 11 He admits that he signed the affidavit
dated September 10, 1997 but explains that he only did so to save complainant from
embarrassment. Also, he did not know at the time that complainant was seeing other men.
After due hearing, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of
gross immoral conduct and recommends that he be meted the penalty of indefinite suspension
from the practice of law.
Issue:
Whether or not IBP is correct in its findings and imposition of penalty
Ruling:
YES. The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; Canon 7 and Rule
7.03 of the same Code. The conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it
must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency. Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way
below the standards of morality required of every lawyer. Moreover, the attempt of
respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to support his
child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly
censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-stultification. The
rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.

Mangonon v. CA, GR No. 125041, June 30, 2006

Facts:
• Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for
Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC
Makati.
• In said petition, it was alleged that Mangonon and respondent Federico Delgado were
civilly married.
• At that time, Mangonon was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19
years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent, it was annulled by the
Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
• Seven months after the annulment of their marriage, Mangonon gave birth to twins Rica
and Rina. According to Mangonon, she, with the assistance of her second husband raised her
twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the
institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of
America (USA) where Mangonon, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved
to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while
Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and Western New England College. Despite
their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of
pursuing collegiate education.
Issue:
1. Whether Francisco is obliged to support Rica and Rina.
2. Whether Francisco can avail of the option under Article 204 anent his obligation.
Ruling:
Yes. Francisco is obliged to support his granddaughters Rica and Rina in default of the father.
Pursuant to Article 199 of the Family Code, whenever two or more persons are obliged to give
support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree; (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the
parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support
their children’s college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation to
furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco as the next immediate relative of
Rica and Rina.
2. No. Francisco cannot avail of the option under Article 204 anent his obligation.
Article 204 of the Family Code provides that the person obliged to give support shall have the
option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter
alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the second
option. With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the
relationships among the parties had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and
Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered and claimed as family denied having
any familial relationship with them. Given the moral obstacle, the Court could not see Rica and
Rina moving back to the Philippines in the company of those who have disowned them

Lacson v. Lacson, GR No. 150644, Aug. 28, 2006

Facts:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Moanaa Daban Lacson (respondents) are legitimate
daughters of petitioner Edward V.
Lacson (petitioner) and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Not long after the birth of their second
child, petitioner left the conjugal home. The mother and the sisters was then forced seek
financial support and shelter somewhere else. From 1976 to 19944 (18 years) they lived in one
place to another.

Apparently, respondent's mother went to their father's mother to ask for support relying on a
note by their father in 1975 containing his promise to support his daughters but he never did.
Nevertheless, Lea (mother) submits that petitioner would occasionally give money for school
expenses, as well as their grandmother.

Now, the sisters through their mother filed a complaint alleging their father's failure in giving
support to them despite being employed and owning several lands and for neglecting them and
their mother. Petitioner counters that it was not due to neglect that he has failed but rather it
was his lack of regular income and unproductivity of land he inherited.
RTC granted the sisters support pende lite and later on ordered their father to pay them
support in arrears. Edward (Father) appealed to the CA but was dismissed.

Petitioner thinks that he should not be made to pay support in arrears since no previous
extrajudicial, or judicial demand have been made by respondents. He then invoked Article 203
of the Family Code which provides that, "The obligation to give support shall be demandable
from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it
shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand." He contends that he
is obliged to pay upon the filing of Civil Case in 1995, which served as an effective demand for
him.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred when it affirmed the grant of support in arrears from 1976 to 1994
Ruling:
No. The CA was indeed correct in affirming the grant of support in arrears from 1976 to 1994 by
the RTC.
The fact that he abandoned the respondent sisters when they were really young, he cannot
expect that at that time, they can go through the motion of demanding support from him
especially when it was difficult for their mother to get in touch with him.
Also, the requisite demand for support appears to have been made sometime in 1975. It may
be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal written demand in terms and
in the imperious tenor commonly used by legal advocates in a demand letter.
In a note dated in 1975, their father promised to give support. From 1976, respondent's mother
went to their father's mother to ask for support.
Nonetheless, what would pass as a demand was, however, definitely made. Asking one to
comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of the situation is no less a demand
because it came by way of a request or a plea.

 Options Available

VIII. Parental Authority (Arts. 209-233)

 Concept

Demsey vs RTC, 164 SCRA 384

Facts:
On January 30, 1986, two separate informations were filed against respondent Joel Dempsey
before the Municipal Trial Court of Olongapo City charging him with violation of Article 59 (par.
2) of P.D. 603 and Article 46, par. 8 of P.D. 603; the former being that of abandoning his child,
and the latter for his failure and refusal to give his support to the said child.
Christina Marie, herein petitioner, was born on October 1, 1984 of her mother, Janalita Rapada,
who cohabited without the benefit of marriage with the accused. Christina’s birth certificate
bears an entry of the name of the accused as the father and the Affidavit of Acknowledgment
duly signed by him. At the present, the child receives a monthly support from the accused in
the sum of $150.00 thru the child's mother. Aside from this monthly support, Janalita Rapada
obtained a promise from the accused to declare Christina Marie as his dependent and also a
commitment to declare the child after his citizenship. This will entitle the child for all the
benefits and privileges extended to dependents of American US Navy servicemen like free
medical check-up. Efforts were made with the Naval Legal Service Office, US Naval Facilities,
Subic Bay, Philippines to compel the accused to fulfill these commitments but to no avail. To
seek redress thru the Court, she engaged the services of Atty. Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr.
Upon arraignment, accused Joel Dempsey freely and voluntarily and spontaneously entered a
plea of guilty to the offenses charged against him which was abandonment and failure to
provide adequate support for the child although he had the means to do so. Municipal Trial
Court found him to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt and ordered the payment of $150.00
monthly support to
Christina Marie until she reaches the age of majority; to recognize the child Christina Marie as
his natural child; to pay Christina Marie thru Janalita Rapada the sum of P10,000.00 as
exemplary damage; and to pay the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. He appealed for the
penalty of imprisonment be changed into a fine and not to be acquitted.
RTC reversed the earlier decision, stating that “parental authority to which certain parental
obligations are attached pertains only to legitimate and adopted children unlike petitioner who
is an acknowledged illegitimate minor child of private respondent. And a person cannot be held
criminally liable for failure to support a minor child.” Hence, this petition.
Issue:
W/N herein petitioner, being an illegitimate child, is entitled for support from her father
Ruling:
YES.
The respondent court committed reversible error.
1) Article 69 of P.D. 603 penalizes abandonment of a minor child by its parent, as provided
in Article 59, with imprisonment from two to six months or a fine not exceeding five hundred
pesos or both. Article 210 penalizes a violation of the obligation to give adequate support found
in Article 46 with imprisonment not exceeding one month or a fine not exceeding two hundred
pesos or both, unless a higher penalty is provided for in the Revised Penal Code or special laws.
2) The respondent court further ruled that Christina Dempsey is not entitled to the rights
arising from the parental responsibility of her father, she being an illegitimate child. Reliance
was made on Art. 17 of P.D. 603 which defines the joint parental authority of parents over their
legitimate or adopted children. The respondent court's observations are wrong because the
law itself protects even illegitimate children. Illegitimate children have rights of the same
nature as legitimate and adopted children. This is enunciated in Art. 3 of PD 603 which
provides that all children shall be entitled to the rights herein set forth without distinction as
to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social status, religion, political antecedents, and other
factors.
SC reverses RTC decision, MTC decision is reinstated with a modification that for his crime in
abandoning Christina, Joel Dempsey is sentenced to imprisonment of One (1) month and to pay
a fine of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) while for his crime for his failure to support Christina,
he is ACQUITTED.

- Joint exercise of parental authority

Luna v. IAC, 137 SCRA 7
Facts:
Maria Lourdes Santos, herein private respondent, is an illegitimate child of the petitioner
Horacio Luna who is married to his co-petitioner Liberty Hizon-Luna. Private respondent is
married to her co-respondent Sixto Salumbides, and are the parents of Shirley Santos
Salumbides, who is the subject of this child custody case.
It appears that two or four months after the birth of Shirley, her parents gave her to the
petitioners, a childless couple with considerable means. The couple doted on Shirley. When she
reached the age of four, she was enrolled at the Maryknoll College. A few months before
September 1980, the petitioners decided to tale Shirley abroad. Shirley looks forward to this
trip and was excited about it. However, when the petitioners asked for the respondents’
written consent for the child’s application for a US visa, the respondents refused which make
Shirley utterly disappointed. As a result the petitioners had to leave without Shirley. When the
petitioners returned, they learned that the respondents had transferred Shirley, and refused to
return Shirley to them. Neither did respondents allowed Shirley to visit the petitioners.
In view thereof, the petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus against the private
respondents to produce Shirley and deliver her to their care and custody. A decision was then
rendered declaring the petitioners entitled to the child’s custody. The private respondent
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appealed decision was reversed and set aside and
another entered, ordering petitioners, to turn over Shirley to the private respondents. The
petitioners then filed a petition for review of the decision to the Supreme Court but it was
denied for lack of merit and remanded to the court of origin and assigned to the RTC, who
issued a writ of execution to satisfy and enforce resolution and affirmed the CA’s decision.
The execution of the judgment was opposed by the petitioners who filed a motion for
reconsideration. But the respondent judge denied the motion to set aside the writ of execution.
Issue:
Whether or not procedural rules more particularly the duty of lower courts to enforce a final
decision of appellate courts in child custody cases, should prevail over and above the desire and
preference of the child.
Ruling:
NO. The manifestation of the child Shirley that she would kill herself or run away from home if
she would be taken away from the petitioners and forced to live with the private respondents,
made during the hearings on the motion to set aside the writ of execution and reiterated in her
letters to the members of the Court and during the hearing of the case before this court, is a
circumstance that would make the execution of the judgment of the Court of First Instance
inequitable, unfair and unjust, if not illegal.
Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody,
education and property of the children, the latter's welfare is paramount. This means that the
best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the
custody of their children. Since, in this case, the very life and existence of the minor is at stake
and the child is in an age when she can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less
than respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold her right to
live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral and intellectual development.
The threat may be proven empty, but Shirley has a right to a wholesome family life that will
provide her with love, care and understanding, guidance and counseling and moral and
material security. Besides, in her letters to the members of the Court, Shirley depicted her
biological parents as selfish and cruel and who beat her often; and that they do not love her.
And, as pointed out by the child psychologist, Shirley has grown more embittered cautious and
dismissing of her biological parents. To return her to the custody of the private respondents to
face the same emotional environment which she is now complaining of would be indeed
traumatic and cause irreparable damage to the child. As requested by her, let us not destroy
her future.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby GRANTED and the writ prayed for issued,
setting aside the judgment of the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court and restraining the
respondent judge and/or his successors from enforcing the judgment rendered by the Court of
Appeals. The decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal granting the herein petitioners
custody of the child Shirley Salumbides should be maintained. Without costs. SO ORDERED.

- Parental Authority when Parents are Separated

Unson III v. Navarro, 101 SCRA 183 (1980)

Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent were married on April 19, 1971 and out of that marriage the
child in question, Maria Teresa, was born.. In a decision rendered, they executed an agreement
for the separation of their properties and to live separately, as they have in fact been living
separately since June 1972. The agreement was approved by the Court. The parties are agreed
that no specific provision was contained in said agreement about the custody of the child
because the husband and wife would have their own private arrangement in that respect.
Later on, petitioner found out the following information regarding his wife:
1. that she was in a relationship with her brother-in-law and godfather of their child (a
former seminarian at that), Maria Teresa;
2. that the brother-in-law was being treated for manic depressive disorder;
3. the illicit affair produced 2 children; and
4. that Edita and her brother-in-law embraced a Protestant faith.
On the other hand, private respondent affirms in her affidavit that:
1. Since the birth of Maria Teresa, she has always lived with her, who has reared and
brought up the child to the best of her ability.
2. She was always insistent that petitioner have custody of Maria Teresa every weekend
and half of summer and Christmas vacation so that the child could establish a healthy and
viable relationship with her father.
3. From 1972 to 1978, she had always exercised full custody of Maria Teresa. It was affiant
who voluntarily gave custody of the child to petitioner on weekends and half of the summer
and Christmas vacations. In view of this amicable arrangement, no specific terms were agreed
and stipulated upon by her and petitioner regarding custody of the child in their petition for
separation of property before the lower court;
4. Even when she started living with her brother-in-law, Agustin, she and petitioner
retained a cordial relationship. In fact, petitioner would visit Maria Teresa at their home and
was always welcome to pick up Maria Teresa at any time.
5. When petitioner left for Australia, petitioner left Maria Teresa to stay with her. During
this time Maria Teresa was always allowed to visit with and to be picked up at any time by
petitioner's parents.
6. She admits that her present circumstances at first impression might seem socially if not
morally unacceptable; but in reality this is not so. Maria Teresa has been reared and brought up
in an atmosphere of Christian love, affection and honesty to the import of the situation.
Further, the quality and capacity of her of being a good mother has always remained.
In December 1979, the respondent judge ordered the petitioner to produce the child, Maria
Teresa Unson, his daughter barely eight years of age, with private respondent Edita N. Araneta
and return her to the custody of the latter, further obliging petitioner to "continue his support
of said daughter by providing for her education and medical needs," allegedly issued without a
"hearing" and the reception of testimony in violation of Section 6 of Rule 99.
Issue:
WON the custody of the child should be granted to the private respondent given the immoral
relationship the mother entered into.
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled it is in the best interest that the child Maria Teresa no longer stay with her
mother given the immoral situation the mother entered into. The Court granted that the child
stay with the petitioner.
In controversies regarding the custody of minors the sole and foremost consideration is the
physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the
respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. Never has this
Court diverted from that criterion.
With this premise in view, the Court finds no difficulty in this case in seeing that it is in the best
interest of the child Teresa to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not to say immoral
influence, that the situation in which private respondent has placed herself, as admitted by her,
might create in the moral and social outlook of Teresa who is now in her formative and most
impressionable stage in her life. The fact that petitioner might have been tolerant about her
stay with her mother in the past when she was still too young to distinguish between right and
wrong and have her own correct impressions or notions about the unusual and peculiar
relationship of her mother with her own uncle-in-law, the husband of her sister’s mother, is
hardly of any consequence now that she has reached a perilous stage in her life.

Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575

Facts:
1. Common-law spouses(respondents) Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon had a child.
2. They offered the child for adoption to Gina’s sister Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and
brother-in-law Nelson Cervantes, the herein petitioners who took care and custody of the child
when she was barely 2 weeks old.
3. An affidavit of consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners was also
executed by respondent Gina.
4. The appropriate petition for adoption was filed by herein petitioners over the child
before the RTC and it rendered a decision granting the petition.
5. The court ordered that
● From Angelie Anne Fajardo, the name of the child will be Angelie Anne Cervantes
● She will be freed from parental authority of her natural parents as well as from
legal obligation and maintenance to them
 ● A child of herein petitoners(Mr. and Mrs. Cervantes) and capable of inheriting
their estate
6. However, the adoptive parents (Mr. and Mrs. Cervantes) received a letter from the
respondents demanding to be paid Php 150, 000 otherwise, they would get their child back.
7. They refused to comply to the demand. While they were at work, respondent Gina took
the child from her yaya at the petitioners’ residence saying that she was instructed by her
sister. She brought the child to her house and sent a word to the petitioners that she will return
the child to them if they will pay Php 150,000.
8. Thus the petitioners filed before the SC a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus over the
minor Angelie Anne Cervantes.
Issue:
WON the petition for habeas corpus filed by the adoptive parents against the natural parents
of the adoptee be granted?
Ruling:
1. YES. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under 5 years
of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise.
2. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration
is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the
resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents.
3. Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina
Carreon, and his relationship with Gina is a common-law husband and wife relationship.
Their relationship will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can
grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person.
4. Respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another
married man who eventually left her. For a minor like Angelie to grow up with a sister
whose "father" is not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of
said minor.
5. Petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially,
and socially capable of supporting the minor than what the natural mother who is not
only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man,can most likely give
her.
6. Also, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge
and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of
dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child.
The Petition is GRANTED. The custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are hereby
granted to petitioners to whom they properly belong, and respondents are ordered (if they still
have not) to deliver said minor to the petitioners immediately upon notice hereof.

Santos, Sr. v. CA, GR No. 113054, March 16, 1995, 242 SCRA 407
Facts:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were
married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union begot only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born
July 18, 1987.
From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been
in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo
and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel, Jr., in the temporary custody of the latter's
parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital
bills, as well as the subsequent support of the boy because petitioner could not afford to do so.
The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988 to work. Petitioner
alleged that he is not aware of her whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the United
States proved futile. Private respondents claim that although abroad, their daughter Julia had
been sending financial support to them for her son.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household,
where three-year old Leouel, Jr., was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit
and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his
hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel
Santos, Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent.
After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day
awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992,
respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order. His motion for reconsideration
having been denied, petitioner now brings the instant petition for review for a reversal of the
appellate court's decision.
Issue:
Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr?
Ruling:
Custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr. is awarded to his legitimate father, herein petitioner
Leouel Santos, Sr.
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall
continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. The
situation obtaining in the case at bench is one where the mother of the minor Santos, Jr., is
working in the United States while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is present. Not only are
they physically apart but are also emotionally separated. There has been no decree of legal
separation and petitioner's attempt to obtain an annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity of his wife has failed.
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award custody
of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of
the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both
parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been
successfully shown by private respondents.
The Court of Appeals held that although there is no evidence to show that petitioner (Santos
Sr.) is "depraved, a habitual drunkard or poor, he may nevertheless be considered, as he is in
fact so considered, to be unsuitable to be allowed to have custody of minor
Leouel Santos, Jr."
Supreme Court finds the aforementioned considerations made by the Court of Appeals
insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody
over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable
and unfit parent. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy,
notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter's
wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time,
petitioner is in no position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial
support for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-
laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to
the child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the
severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable
decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as
serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond
between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his son and
for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give.
His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in
uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still
the natural guardians of their children. It is not just to deprive our soldiers of authority, care
and custody over their children merely because of the normal consequences of their duties and
assignments, such as temporary separation from their families.
Petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though
unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.
Private respondents' attachment to the young boy whom they have reared for the past three
years is understandable. Still and all, the law considers the natural love of a parent to outweigh
that of the grandparents, such that only when the parent present is shown to be unfit or
unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority, a fact which has not
been proven here.

Espiritu v. CA; 242 SCRA 362 , 59 SCAD 631 (March 15,1995)

Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and private respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City
and thereafter began a common law relationship of husband and wife abroad (when Teresita
was working as a nurse in California and Reynaldo was sent by his employer as liaison officer in
Pennsylvania). On August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese was born. The following
year, while on brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married. Upon their
return to US, their 2nd child, a son, Reginald Vince, was born on January 12, 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate in 1990. Teresita
blamed Reynaldo for their break-up stating that he is always nagging her about money while
Reynaldo stated that Teresita was a spendthrift, buying expensive jewelries and antique
furniture instead of attending household expenses.
It was alleged that Reynaldo pleaded second chance for their marriage; however, Teresita left
Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. She claims, however, that she spent a
lot of money for long distance calls to keep in touch with her children.
Reynaldo brought his children to the Philippines, but he had to leave his children with his sister
(co-petitioner) since his assignment at Pittsburgh was not yet completed.
Teresita claims that she did not follow her children immediately because Reynaldo flied a
criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of being arrested. (The judgement of
conviction for bigamy was actually rendered in 1994.) Meanwhile, she decided to return to the
Philippines and on December 8, 1992, she filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against
herein petitioners to gain custody over the children.
RTC dismissed the petition for habeas corpus and suspended Teresita’s parental authority over
Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but
with rights of visitation. CA reversed the decision giving the custody to Teresita and weekend
visitational rights to Reynaldo.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not custody of the minor children should be given to Teresita (mother) or Reynaldo
(father).
Ruling:
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family
Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the
law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not
conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons." If a child is over seven, his choice is
paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find
the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it
deems fit under the circumstances. While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the
custody of her child, courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all questions on
the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount."
In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of age. Rosalind celebrated
her seventh birthday on August 16, 1993 while Reginald reached the same age on January 12, 1985.
Both are studying in reputable schools and appear to be fairly intelligent children, quite capable of
thoughtfully determining the parent with whom they would want to live. Once the choice has been
made, the burden to the court to investigate if the parent thus chosen is unfit to assume parental
authority and custodial responsibility.

Herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. Instead of scrutinizing the records to discover the choice of
the children and rather than verifying whether that parent is fit or unfit, respondent court simply
followed statutory presumptions and general propositions applicable to ordinary or common situations.
The seven-year age limit was mechanically treated as an arbitrary cut off period and not a guide based
on a strong presumption.

Teresita’s emphasis on the “agony” of a mother separated from her children is not tenable. While the
bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or
mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her
suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other
feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration.

When she was a little over 5 years old, Rosalind was referred to a child psychologist, Rita Flores
Macabulos, to determine the effects of uprooting her from the Assumption College where she was
studying. Four different tests were administered. The results of the tests are quite revealing. The
responses of Rosalind about her mother were very negative, causing the psychologist to delve deeper
into the child's anxiety. Among the things revealed by Rosalind was an incident where she saw her

Mother hugging and kissing a "bad" man who lived in their house and worked for her father. Rosalind
refused to talk to her mother even on the telephone. She tended to be emotionally emblazed because
of constant fears that she may have to leave school and her aunt's family to go back to the United States
to live with her mother. The 5-1/2 page report deals at length with feelings of insecurity and anxiety
arising from strong conflict with the mother. The child tried to compensate by having fantasy activities.
All of the recommendations of the child psychologist show that Rosalind chooses petitioners over the
private respondent and that her welfare will be best served by staying with them (pp. 199-205, Rollo).

At about the same time, a social welfare case study was conducted for the purpose of securing the
travel clearance required before minors may go abroad. Social Welfare Officer Emma D. Estrada Lopez,
stated that the child Rosalind refused to go back to the United States and be reunited with her mother.
She felt unloved and uncared for. Rosalind was more attached to her Yaya who did everything for her
and Reginald. The child was found suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother's infidelity. The
application for travel clearance was recommended for denial.

Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that the 7-year age reference in the law applies to the date
when the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed, not to the date when a decision is rendered. This
argument is flawed. Considerations involving the choice made by a child must be ascertained at the time
that either parent is given custody over the child. The matter of custody is not permanent and
unalterable. If the parent who was given custody suffers a future character change and becomes unfit,
the matter of custody can always be re-examined and adjusted (Unson III v. Navarro, supra, at p. 189).
To be sure, the welfare, the best interests, the benefit, and the good of the child must be determined as
of the time that either parent is chosen to be the custodian. At the present time, both children are over
7 years of age and are thus perfectly capable of making a fairly intelligent choice.

The argument that moral laxity or the habit of fIirting from one man to another does not fall under
"compelling reasons" is neither meritorious nor applicable in this case. Not only are the children over
seven years old and their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had
already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values,
at least in Rosalind. This is not to mention her conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from the
records appears to have become final.

The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both over seven
years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all
indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found in the first paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the second paragraph of said article no longer
applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive
value for children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there
are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the mother. The children
understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional
growth by her behavior.

The petition is GRANTED and custody of the minors are awarded to Reynaldo Espiritu.
Sombong v. CA 252 SCRA 663 (1996)
Facts:
Petitioner is the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 in Signal
Village, Taguig, Metro Manila.
Some time in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six months old, was brought to the Sir John
Clinic, located at 121 First Avenue, Kaloocan City, for relief of coughing fits and for treatment of
colds. Petitioner did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the amount of P300.00.
Arabella could not be discharged, then, because of the petitioner's failure to pay the bill.
Petitioner surprisingly gave testimony to the effect that she allegedly paid the private
respondents by installments in the total amount of P1,700.00, knowing for a fact that the sum
payable was only P300.00. Despite such alleged payments, the owners of the clinic, Dra.
Carmen Ty and her husband, Mr. Vicente Ty, allegedly refused to turn over Arabella to her.
Petitioner claims that the reason for such a refusal was that she refused to go out on a date
with Mr. Ty, who had been courting her. This allegedly gave Dra. Ty a reason to be jealous of
her, making it difficult for everyone all around.
On the other hand and in contrast to her foregoing allegations, petitioner testified that she
visited Arabella at the clinic only after two years, i.e., in 1989. This time, she did not go beyond
berating the spouses Ty for their refusal to give Arabella to her. Three years thereafter, i.e., in
1992, petitioner again resurfaced to lay claim to her child. Her pleas allegedly fell on deaf ears.
Consequently, on May 21, 1992, petitioner filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty. She alleged
therein that Arabella was being unlawfully detained and imprisoned at No. 121, First Avenue,
Grace Park, Kalookan City.
The petition was denied due course and summarily dismissed,6 without prejudice, on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, the alleged detention having been perpetrated in Kalookan City.
Petitioner, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint7 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Kalookan City against the spouses Ty.
Dr. Ty, in her counter-affidavit, admitted that petitioner's child, Arabella, had for some time
been in her custody. Arabella was discharged from the clinic in April, 1989, and was, in the
presence of her clinic staff, turned over to someone who was properly identified to be the
child's guardian.
In the face of the refusal of the spouses Ty to turn over Arabella to her, she had sought the help
of Barangay Captains Alfonso and Bautista of Kalookan City, Mayor Asistio of the same city, and
even Congresswoman Hortensia L. Starke of Negros Occidental. Their efforts to help availed her
nothing.
On September 4, 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, on the basis of
petitioner's complaint, filed an information8 against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal
Detention of a Minor before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. 9 On September 16, 1992,
an order for the arrest of the spouses Ty was issued in the criminal case.
Facing arrest, Dra. Ty disclosed the possibility that the child, Arabella, may be found at No. 23
Jesus Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
The agents of the National Bureau of Investigation went to said address and there found a
female child who answered to the name of Cristina Grace Neri.
Quite significantly, the evidence disclosed that the child, Cristina, had been living with
respondent Marietta Neri Alviar since 1988.
When she was just a baby, Cristina was abandoned by her parents at the Sir John Clinic. On
April 18, 1988, Dr. Fe Mallonga, a dentist at the Sir John Clinic and niece of both Dra. Ty and
respondent Alviar, called the latter up to discuss the possibility of turning over to her care one
of the several abandoned babies at the said clinic. Respondent Alviar was told that this baby
whose name was unknown had long been abandoned by her parents and appeared to be very
small, very thin, and full of scabies. Taking pity on the baby, respondent Alviar and her mother,
Maura Salacup Neri, decided to take care of her. This baby was baptized at the Good Samaritan
Church on April 30, 1988. Her Certificate of Baptism 10 indicates her name to be Cristina Grace S.
Neri; her birthday to be April 30, 1987; her birthplace to be Quezon City; and her foster father
and foster mother to be Cicero Neri and Maura Salacup, respectively.
Respondent Alviar was invited by the National Bureau of Investigation for questioning on
September 22, 1992 in the presence of
Dra. Ty and petitioner. Cristina was also brought along by said respondent. At that
confrontation, Dra. Ty could not be sure that Cristina was indeed petitioner's child, Arabella.
Neither could petitioner with all certainty say that Cristina was her long lost daughter.
Issue:
1. WON a petition for habeas corpus in the present case should be granted.
2. WON the minor child in question is the child of the petitioner, Johanna Sombong.
3. WON petitioner has the right of custody over minor child Cristina.
Ruling:
1. No. While we sympathize with the plight of petitioner who has been separated from her
daughter for more than eight years, we cannot grant her the relief she is seeking, because the
evidence in this case does not support a finding that the child, Cristina, is in truth and in fact her
child, Arabella; neither is there sufficient evidence to support the finding that private
respondents' custody of Cristina is so illegal as to warrant the grant of a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
The grant of the writ in the instant case will all depend on the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over the minor; (2) that the rightful
custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by the respondent; and (3) that it is
to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in the custody of petitioner and not that of
the respondent.
Not all of these requisites exist in this case. The dismissal of this petition is thus warranted.
2. No. Cristina has not been shown to be petitioner’s daughter, Arabella.
In a petition for habeas corpus, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the
usual presumptions including those as to identity of persons.
In the present case, testimonial and circumstantial proof established the individual and
separate existence of petitioner’s child, Arabella, from that of respondent’s foster child,
Cristina.
Dr. Trono, the witness presented by petitioner, testified that there were several babies left in
the clinic at around the same time Arabella was confined there.
Dra. Ty, petitioner’s witness, testified that Arabella was confined in the clinic from November
1987 to April 1989. Private respondents obtained custody over Cristina in 1988. This leads to
the conclusion that Cristina is not Arabella.
CA Justice Lourdes Tayao-Jaguros also observed that there were no signs of endearment and
affection expected of a mother who had been deprived of the embrace of her little child for
many years being displayed by Johanna.
3. No. It cannot be said that private respondents are unlawfully withholding the validity of
the mode by which private respondents acquired custodial rights over the minor, Cristina.
Private respondents also have the interest of Cristina at heart. They are financially, physically,
and spiritually in a better position to take care of the child, Cristina. On the other hand, it is not
the best interest of the child to be placed in the custody of petitioner.
SC ruled that the Habeas Corpus petition does not lie to afford petitioner the relief she seeks.

Perez v. CA; 255 SCRA 661 (1996)

Facts:
On the issue of custody over the minor Ray Perez II, respondent Court of Appeals ruled in favor
of the boy’s father Ray C. Perez, reversing the trial court’s decision to grant custody to Nerissa
Z. Perez, the child’s mother.

Ray Perez, private respondent, is a doctor of medicine practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife
who is petitioner herein, is a registered nurse. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-
risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York.

Petitioner who began working in the United States, used part of her earnings to build a modest
house in Mandaue City, Cebu. She also sought medical attention for her successive miscarriages
in New York and she became a resident alien. Private respondent stayed with her in the U.S.
twice and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a
tourist visa and was not employed.

The couple and their baby arrived in Cebu and after a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the
U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they all had round-
trip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and promised
to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the
Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and continued working.
She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs there.

When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II’s first birthday, the couple was no longer on
good terms. Petitioner did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husband’s
meager income of P5,000.00. She longed to be with her only child but he was being kept away
from her by her husband. Thus, she did not want to leave RJ with her husband and in-laws.

Ray wanted to stay here, where he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession. He
maintained that it would not be difficult to live here since they have their own home and a car.
They could live comfortably on his P15,000.00 monthly income as they were not burdened with
having to pay any debts.

Nerissa Z. Perez filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent Ray C. Perez to surrender
the custody of their son, Ray Z. Perez II, to her. The court a quo issued an Order awarding
custody of the one-year old child to his mother, Nerissa Perez, citing the second paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code.

Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and awarded
custody of the boy to his father. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied,
she filed the instant petition for review where the sole issue is the custody of Ray Perez II, now
three years old.
Issue:
WON Ray Perez II will be better off with petitioner or with private Respondent.
Ruling:
When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the applicable
law. The Revised Rules of Court, Rule 99, section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) also
contains a similar provision. The provisions of law clearly mandate that a child under seven
years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons
to order otherwise. The use of the word "shall" in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99,
section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
It is not difficult to imagine how heart-rending it is for a mother whose attempts at having a
baby were frustrated several times over a period of six years to finally bear one, only for the
infant to be snatched from her before he has even reached his first year. The mother’s role in
the life of her child, such as Ray II, is well-nigh irreplaceable. In prose and poetry, the depth of a
mother’s love has been immortalized times without number, finding as it does, its justification,
not in fantasy but in reality.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated as
well as its Resolution are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the trial court dated is
hereby REINSTATED. Custody over the minor Ray Z. Perez II is awarded to his mother, herein
petitioner Nerissa Z. Perez. This decision is immediately executory.

Eslao v. CA, GR No. 116773, January 16, 1997; 266 SCRA 317
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married and stayed with
respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband, at Fabie Estate, Paco, Manila. They begot 2
children namely, Leslie Eslao and Angelica Eslao.
In the meantime, Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of petitioner’s mother in Sta.
Ana, Pampanga, while Angelica stayed with her parents at respondent’ s house. However,
petitioner's husband died then she intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but the
respondent prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her, reasoning out that her
son just died and to assuage her grief, she needed the child's company to at least compensate
for the loss of her late son.
Petitioner went back to Pampanga and stayed with her other child, Leslie while entrusting
Angelica to the respondent. Petitioner was later introduced by her auntie to Dr. James Manabu-
Ouye, a Japanese-American orthodentist practicing in the US. Their acquaintance blossomed
into a meaningful relationship and both decided to get married. Less than ten months
thereafter, petitioner migrated to San Francisco to join her new husband.
The petitioner is a trainee at the Union Bank in San Francisco, while her husband is a
progressive practitioner having his own dental clinic. 5 months later, the petitioner returned to
the Philippines to be reunited with her children and to bring them with her to the US. Upon
knowing, respondent resisted the idea by explaining that the child was entrusted to her when
she was ten days old and accused the petitioner of having abandoned Angelica. Because of the
adamant attitude of the respondent, the petitioner then sought the assistance of a lawyer, who
wrote a letter to the respondent demanding for the return of the custody of Angelica to her
natural mother and when the demand remained unheeded, the petitioner instituted the
present action.
After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision directing the custody over
Angelica to her natural mother, the petitioner.
On appeal, the respondent court affirmed in full the decision of the trial court.
Hence, the instant petition by the minor's paternal grandmother
Issue:
W/N the child’s custody should be given to Teresita, the grandmother.
Ruling:
No. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution.
When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even
in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same.
"The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-
bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company."

Lower court's decision has been affirmed, and the petition has been dismissed.

Artadi v. Bondagjy, GR No. 140817, December 7, 2001

Facts:
Respondent Fouzi and Sabrina were married on February 3,1988 under Islamic rites. four (4)
months before her marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion. However, the conversion
was not registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
Out of their union, they begot two (2) children, namely, Abdulaziz, and Amouaje, born on who
were born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
At the time of their marriage, unknown to petitioner, respondent was still married to a Saudi
Arabian woman whom he later divorced.
After their marriage, the couple moved in with respondent's family in Makati City. In 1990, the
parties migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where they lived for more than two years.
Their children lived in the house of the wifes mother. The husband alleged that he could not
see his children until he got an order from the court. Even with a court order, he could only see
his children in school
Later the wife had children baptized as Christians and their names changed from Abdulaziz
Bondagjy to Azziz Santiago Artadi and from Amouaje Bondagjy to Amouage Selina Artadi.
Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina was seen with different men at odd
hours in Manila, and that she would wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits.
Such clothing are detestable under Islamic law on customs. And the husband alleged that his
wife let their children sweep their neighbors house for a fee of P40 after the children came
home from school
The wife filed with the RTC an action for nullity of marriage, custody and support, and ordered
the parties to maintain status quo until further orders from said court. She filed another motion
to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since PD No
1083 is applicable only to Muslims. The husband filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss
and argued that at the inception of the case, both parties were Muslims
The Shar’a District Court held that PD No 1083 on Custody and Guardianship does not apply to
this case because the spouses were not yet divorced. The Shari’a District Court found the wife
unworthy to care for her children and that her husband was capable both personally and
financially to look after the best interest of his minor children.
Issue:
Whether or not a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a Muslim and
converted back to Catholicism upon their separation, still bound by the moral laws of Islam in
the determination of her fitness to be the custodian of her children?
Ruling:
The welfare of the minors is the controlling consideration on the issue
The Court also said that the factors that determine the fitness of any parent are:
1. Ability to see to the physical, educational, social, and moral welfare of the children, and
2. Ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and financial support
taking into consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the
parents
The burden is upon the husband to prove that the wife is not worthy to have custody of her
children. The Court find that the evidence presented was not sufficient to establish her
unfitness according to the Family Code or Muslim Law
Standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof however is not restricted to Muslim Laws.
Family Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether a non-Muslim is
incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code now
that she is not a Muslim
Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father and mother shall jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of their common children.
Similarly, PD No 1083 is clear that where the parents are not divorced or legally separated, the
father and mother shall jointly exercise just and reasonable parental authority and fulfil their
responsibility over their legitimate children
We do not doubt the capacity and love of both parties for their children, such that they both
want to have them in their custody.
Although, we see the need for the children to have both a mother and a father, we believe that
he wife has more capacity and time to see to the children’s needs. The husband is a
businessman whose work requires that the go aborad or be indifferent places most of the time.
Under PD No 603 the custody of the minor children absent a compelling reason to the contrary
is given to the mother
However, award of custody to the wife does not deprive husband of parental authority. Thus
we grant visitorial rights to husband as his Constitutionally protected natural and primary right

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED...Petitioner SABRINA ARTADI BONDAGJY shall

have custody over minors Abdulaziz, and Amouaje Bondagjy, until the children reach majority
age. Both spouses shall have joint responsibility over all expenses of rearing the children.
The father, FOUZI ALl BONDAGJY, shall have visitorial rights at least once a week and may take
the children out only with the written consent of the mother.

Vancil v. Belmes, GR No. 132223, June 19, 2001

Facts:
Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the USA
who died in the said country. During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children named Valerie
and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.
Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the RTC of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over the
persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent. At the time, Valerie was only 6 years old
while Vincent was a 2-year old child and have an estate consisting of proceeds from their
father’s death pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00.
Finding sufficiency in form and in substance, the case was set for hearing after a 3-consecutive-
weekly publications with the Sunstar Daily. Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and
judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.
Helen Belmes submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating
that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian City.
Thereafter, Helen Belmes followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian
and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of
and exercising parental authority over the subject minors; that the petition was filed under an
improper venue; and that at the time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of
U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.
After due proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes motion to remove and/or to
disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered petitioner
Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties as such guardian upon the posting of
a bond of P50,000.00. The subsequent attempt for a reconsideration was likewise dismissed in
an Order.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision reversing the RTC order.
Bonifacia Vancil filed with this Court the present petition
Issue:
Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian
Ruling:
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent, being the natural mother of
the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. This ruling finds
support in Article 211 of the Family Code. Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent,
respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody.
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case
of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very much
alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in
asserting her right to be the minors guardian, respondents unsuitability. Petitioner, however,
has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian
of Vincent.
Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot
qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a resident
of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations
required of a guardian.
WHEREFORE , the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification in the sense that
Valerie, who has attained the age of majority, will no longer be under the guardianship of
respondent Helen Belmes.

Laxamana v. Laxamana, G.R. No. 144763, September 3, 2002, 388 SCRA 296
Facts:
Petitioner Reymond B. Laxamana and respondent Ma. Lourdes D. Laxamana met sometime in
1983. Petitioner, who came from a well-to-do family was a graduate of Bachelor of Laws, while
respondent was a holder of a degree in banking and finance, worked in a bank. After courtship,
petitioner, 31 years old and respondent, 33, got married on June 6, 1984. Respondent quit her
job and became a full-time housewife. Petitioner, on the other hand, operated buy and sell,
fishpond, and restaurant businesses for a living. The union was blessed with three children.
All went well until petitioner became a drug dependent. He underwent psychotherapy and
psychopharmacological treatment and was discharged. Upon the petition of respondent, the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordered petitioner's confinement at the NARCOM-DRC for
treatment and rehabilitation. Again, on October 1996, the RTC granted petitioner's voluntary
confinement for treatment and rehabilitation at the National Bureau of Investigation-TRC. On
April 1997, the court issued an order declaring petitioner "already drug-free" and directing him
to report to a certain Dr. Casimiro "for out-patient counseling for 6 months to one (1) year."
Despite several confinements, respondent claimed petitioner was not fully rehabilitated.
Petitioner allegedly became violent and irritable. On some occasions, he even physically
assaulted Respondent. Thus, on June 1999, respondent and her 3 children abandoned
petitioner and transferred to the house of her relatives.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City the instant petition for habeas
corpus praying for custody of his three children. Respondent opposed the petition, citing the
drug dependence of petitioner.
After the parties reached an agreement, RTC issued an order granting visitation rights to
petitioner and directing the parties to undergo psychiatric and psychological examination by a
psychiatrist of their common choice. The parties further agreed to submit the case for
resolution after the trial court’s receipt of the results of their psychiatric examination.
The results of the psychiatric evaluation shows that he is not yet “completely cured."The trial
court rendered the assailed decision awarding the custody of the three children to respondent
and giving visitation rights to petitioner.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the trial court considered the paramount interest and welfare of the children
in awarding their custody to respondent- Yes
2. Whether or not the petitioner is estopped from questioning the absence of a trial- No
Ruling:
1. The child if over seven years of age may be permitted to choose which parent he/she prefers
to live with, but the court is not bound by such choice if the parent so chosen is unfit. In all
cases, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare
of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources as well as social and moral
situations of the opposing parents.
The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of children shall not be
disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve the family and the youth.
While petitioner may have a history of drug dependence, the records are inadequate as to his
moral, financial and social well-being. The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he
is not yet “completely cured” may render him unfit to take custody of the children, but there is
no evidence to show that respondent is unfit to provide the children with adequate support,
education, as well as moral and intellectual training and development.
2. In the case at bar, the court a quo should have conducted a trial notwithstanding the
agreement of the parties to submit the case for resolution on the basis, inter alia, of the
psychiatric report of Dr. Teresito. Thus, petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence
of a trial considering that said psychiatric report, which was the court's primary basis in
awarding custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify the decision.
The trial court was remiss in the fulfillment of its duties when it approved the agreement of the
parties to submit the case for decision on the basis of sketchy findings of facts
In the instant case, the proceedings before the trial court leave much to be desired. While a
remand of this case would mean further delay, the children's paramount interest demand that
further proceedings be conducted to determine the fitness of both petitioner and respondent
to assume custody of their minor children.

Jocelyn Pablo-Gualberto v. Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto, GR No. 154994

Facts:
The case are two consolidated petitions.
On March 12, 2002, Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto filed before the Regional Trial Court a
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn D. Pablo Gualberto, with an
ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello whom
Joycelyn allegedly took away with her from the conjugal home and his school when she decided
to abandon Crisanto sometime in early February 2002. On April 2, 2002 RTC Judge heard the
ancillary prayer of Crisanto for custody pendente lite. Joycelyn allegedly failed to appear
despite notice while Crisanto, the house helper of the spouses, and the president of a security
agency hired by Crisanto to conduct surveillance on Joycelyn provided testimonies against the
mother. Some of these testimonies recounted how the mother had a lesbian relationship with
another women and that the mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of
the house. As a result, on April 3, 2002 the Judge applied Art. 211 of the FC and awarded
custody pendente lite of the child to Crisanto.
On April 16, 2002 the hearing of Joycelyn's motion to lift the award of custody pendente lite of
the child to Crisanto was set but the former did not allegedly present any evidence to support
her motion. However, the Judge allegedly issued the assailed order reversing her Order of April
3, 2002 and this time awarding custody of the child to Joycelyn. The court decided that the child
subject of this Petition is barely four years old. Under Article 213 of the Family Code, he shall
not be separated from his mother unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. The Court finds the reason stated by Crisanto not to be compelling reasons. The
father should however be entitled to spend time with the minor. These do not appear
compelling reasons to deprive him of the company of his child.
Crisanto charged the Regional Trial with grave abuse of discretion for issuing its aforequoted
order. He alleged that this order superseded, without any factual or legal basis, the still valid
and subsisting order awarding him custody pendente lit of his minor son. Partly in Crisanto's
favor the CA ruled that grave abuse of discretion had been committed by the trial court in
reversing the latter court's previous Order.
Issue:
Who should be awarded the custody of the minor child?
Ruling:
The child should stay with his mother. The mother insists that, based on Article 213 of the
Family Code, her minor child cannot be separated from her. On the other hand, the father
argues that she is "unfit" to take care of their son; hence, for "compelling reasons," he must be
awarded custody of the child.
This Court has held that when the parents are separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing
provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from 32 Article 363 of
the Civil Code. The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated
from their mother finds its raison d'etre (most important reason) in the basic need of minor
children for their mother's loving care.
The principle of "best interest of the child" pervades Philippine cases involving adoption,
guardianship, support, personal status, minors in conflict with the law, and child custody. In
these cases, it has long been recognized that in choosing the parent to whom custody is given,
the welfare of the minors should always be the paramount consideration. Courts are mandated
to take into account all relevant circumstances that would have a bearing on the children's well-
being and development. Aside from the material resources and the moral and social situations
of each parent, other factors may also be considered to ascertain which one has the capability
to attend to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children.
As pointed out earlier, there is express statutory recognition that, as a general rule, a mother is
to be preferred in awarding custody of children under the age of seven. The caveat in Article
213 of the Family Code cannot be ignored, except when the court finds cause to otherwise. The
so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome
only by compelling evidence of the mother's unfitness. The mother has been declared
unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease. Here, Crisanto
cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of
custody. It has indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the mother's immoral
conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody. But sexual preference or
moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a
mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have
custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish
that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted
the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care.
The court made us of the rulings in previous cases such as in Unson III v. Navarro, Espiritu vs CA
to further highlight their point. Based on these jurisprudence, it is therefore not enough for
Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she carried
on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or
under circumstances not conducive to the child's proper moral development. Such a fact has
not been shown here. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mother's alleged
sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result.
Moreover, it is worthy to note that the trial court judge ruled in her May 17, 2002, Order, that
she had found the "reason stated by Crisanto not to be compelling" as to suffice as a ground for
separating the child from his mother. The judge made this conclusion after personally observing
the two of them, both in the courtroom and in her chambers on April 16, 2002, and after a
chance to talk to the boy and to observe him firsthand. This assessment, based on her unique
opportunity to witness the child's behavior in the presence of each parent, should carry more
weight than a mere reliance on the records. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to
wrench the child from the mother's custody.

Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto v. CA, et.al., GR No. 156254, June 28, 2005
Facts:
The case are two consolidated petitions.
On March 12, 2002, Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto filed before the Regional Trial Court a
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn D. Pablo Gualberto, with an
ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello whom
Joycelyn allegedly took away with her from the conjugal home and his school when she decided
to abandon Crisanto sometime in early February 2002. On April 2, 2002 RTC Judge heard the
ancillary prayer of Crisanto for custody pendente lite. Joycelyn allegedly failed to appear
despite notice while Crisanto, the house helper of the spouses, and the president of a security
agency hired by Crisanto to conduct surveillance on Joycelyn provided testimonies against the
mother. Some of these testimonies recounted how the mother had a lesbian relationship with
another women and that the mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of
the house. As a result, on April 3, 2002 the Judge applied Art. 211 of the FC and awarded
custody pendente lite of the child to Crisanto.
On April 16, 2002 the hearing of Joycelyn's motion to lift the award of custody pendente lite of
the child to Crisanto was set but the former did not allegedly present any evidence to support
her motion. However, the Judge allegedly issued the assailed order reversing her Order of April
3, 2002 and this time awarding custody of the child to Joycelyn. The court decided that the child
subject of this Petition is barely four years old. Under Article 213 of the Family Code, he shall
not be separated from his mother unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. The Court finds the reason stated by Crisanto not to be compelling reasons. The
father should however be entitled to spend time with the minor. These do not appear
compelling reasons to deprive him of the company of his child.
Crisanto charged the Regional Trial with grave abuse of discretion for issuing its aforequoted
order. He alleged that this order superseded, without any factual or legal basis, the still valid
and subsisting order awarding him custody pendente lit of his minor son. Partly in Crisanto's
favor the CA ruled that grave abuse of discretion had been committed by the trial court in
reversing the latter court's previous Order.
Issue:
Who should be awarded the custody of the minor child?
Ruling:
The child should stay with his mother. The mother insists that, based on Article 213 of the
Family Code, her minor child cannot be separated from her. On the other hand, the father
argues that she is "unfit" to take care of their son; hence, for "compelling reasons," he must be
awarded custody of the child.
This Court has held that when the parents are separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing
provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from 32 Article 363 of
the Civil Code. The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated
from their mother finds its raison d'etre (most important reason) in the basic need of minor
children for their mother's loving care.
The principle of "best interest of the child" pervades Philippine cases involving adoption,
guardianship, support, personal status, minors in conflict with the law, and child custody. In
these cases, it has long been recognized that in choosing the parent to whom custody is given,
the welfare of the minors should always be the paramount consideration. Courts are mandated
to take into account all relevant circumstances that would have a bearing on the children's well-
being and development. Aside from the material resources and the moral and social situations
of each parent, other factors may also be considered to ascertain which one has the capability
to attend to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children.
As pointed out earlier, there is express statutory recognition that, as a general rule, a mother is
to be preferred in awarding custody of children under the age of seven. The caveat in Article
213 of the Family Code cannot be ignored, except when the court finds cause to otherwise. The
so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome
only by compelling evidence of the mother's unfitness. The mother has been declared
unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease. Here, Crisanto
cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of
custody. It has indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the mother's immoral
conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody. But sexual preference or
moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a
mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have
custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish
that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted
the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care.
The court made us of the rulings in previous cases such as in Unson III v. Navarro, Espiritu vs CA
to further highlight their point. Based on these jurisprudence, it is therefore not enough for
Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she carried
on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or
under circumstances not conducive to the child's proper moral development. Such a fact has
not been shown here. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mother's alleged
sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result.
Moreover, it is worthy to note that the trial court judge ruled in her May 17, 2002, Order, that
she had found the "reason stated by Crisanto not to be compelling" as to suffice as a ground for
separating the child from his mother. The judge made this conclusion after personally observing
the two of them, both in the courtroom and in her chambers on April 16, 2002, and after a
chance to talk to the boy and to observe him firsthand. This assessment, based on her unique
opportunity to witness the child's behavior in the presence of each parent, should carry more
weight than a mere reliance on the records. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to
wrench the child from the mother's custody.

Hirsch v. CA, GR No. 174485, July 11, 2007

Facts:
Franklin and Agnes were married on December 23, 2000 in the City of Bacolod, and established
their conjugal dwelling in Diniwid, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. On December 21, 2002, a child
was born to them and was named Simone.
In 2005, the couple started to have marital problems as Agnes wanted to stay in Makati City,
while Franklin insisted that they stay in Boracay Island. On March 23, 2006, Agnes came to their
conjugal home in Boracay, and asked for money and for Franklin's permission for her to bring
their daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation. Franklin readily agreed, but soon thereafter
discovered that neither Agnes nor their daughter Simone would be coming back to Boracay.
Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for Agnes to produce Simone in
court.
On May 19, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be
issued ordering that Simone be brought before said court on May 26, 2006. After a series of
hearings and presentation of evidence, the CA, on June 8, 2006, promulgated the assailed
Decision granting Franklin joint custody with Agnes of their minor child.
Agnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision, which was denied in the CA's August
3, 2006 Resolution for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody of the
minor child to both parents.
Ruling:
YES. The court ruled in the affirmative.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that "in all actions concerning children,
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration (emphasis supplied)." The Child and Youth Welfare Code, in the same way,
unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of
the child, his/her welfare shall be the paramount consideration. The socalled "tender-age
presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling
evidence of the mother's unfitness.
The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the
following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness,
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease.
Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor
child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mother's
custody.

Dacasin v. Del Mundo-Dacasin, GR. No. 168785, Feb. 5, 2010

Facts:
Herald Dacasin (American) and Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin (Filipino) were married in Manila in
1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie.
In 1999, Herald obtained a divorce decree from Illinois. The Illinois court dissolved Herald and
Sharon’s marriage, awarded sole custody of Stephanie to Sharon, and retained jurisdiction over
the case for enforcement purposes.
In 2002, the ex-husband and wife executed in Manila an agreement for joint custody of
Stephanie. Sharon promised to obtain from Illinois an order “relinquishing” jurisdiction to
Philippine courts.
In 2004, Herald sued Sharon in Philippine court to enforce the agreement, alleging that Sharon
instead continued exercising sole custody over Stephanie.
Sharon sought for dismissal, arguing that Philippine courts don’t have jurisdiction over the case.
RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
WON the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of Herald’s suit and enforces the
Agreement on joint custody of Stephanie.
Ruling:
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement
which is void.
The trial court’s refusal to entertain the suit was grounded not on its lack of power to do so but
on its thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This is
unfounded.
What the Illinois court retained was “jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the
various provisions of its Judgement for Dissolution.” Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not
of the various provisions of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint
custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s so-call “retained
jurisdiction.”
Notwithstanding this, the trial court cannot enforces the Agreement which is contrary to law.
At the time of the Agreement, two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under 7 years old;
and (2) Herald and Sharon were no longer married under the laws of the US. The relevant
Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law (Art. 213 of the FC) is also
undisputed: “no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother.” This
awarding of sole custody sole parental custody to the mother is mandatory. Clearly, the
Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between the ex-husband
and wife over their child seven years old contravenes Philippine Law.
Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law
provides for joint parental authority.
However, upon separation, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below
seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. to the separated mother.
However, the SC remanded the case for the trial court. Stephanie is now 15 years old, thus
removing the cease outside of the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody regime under Art.
213 and bringing it within the coverage of the default standard on child custody proceedings –
the best interest of the child.
The decision of the trial court was REVERSED. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with this ruling.

David v. CA, GR No. 111180, Nov. 16, 1995; 250 SCRA 82

Facts:
1. Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon Villar, a
businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four
children, all-grown up.
2. The relationship between petitioner and private respondent grew intimate, and as a
result, Christopher J. was born on March 9, 1985. The son was followed by two more children,
both girls, namely Christine and Cathy Mae.
3. The relationship became known to private respondent’s wife when Daisie took her
eldest child, Christopher J. to Villar’s house sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar’s
wife. Since then, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were
eventually accepted by his legal family.
4. In the summer of 1991, Villar tagged along Christopher J. to go with Villar’s family to
Boracay. Daisie agreed but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had
enrolled Christopher J. to a Holy Family Academy for the next school year.
5. Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
6. After hearing, the RTC rendered a decision favouring the petitioner. The custody of the
minor Christopher J. T. David was hereby given to the natural mother, Daisie. The court ordered
the respondent to pay P3000 a month to the subject minor and two other children for
temporary support.
7. CA reversed RTC’s decision. CA held that Habeas Corpus was not proper and that the
question of custody of a minor child may be decided in a Habeas Corpus case contemplates a
situation where the parents are married to each other but are separated.
This is so because under the Family Code, the father and mother have joint parental authority
over their legitimate children and in case of separation of the parents, there is a need to
determine rightful custody of their children. The same does not hold true in an adulterous
relationship, as in the case at bar, the child born out of such a relationship is under the parental
authority of the mother by express provision of the law.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
1. W/N custody should be given to Daisie.
2. W/N the remedy of Habeas Corpus proper.
Ruling:
1. Yes. SC reversed CA’s ruling. The custody was granted to Daisie and Villar was ordered to give
temporary support in the amount of P3K, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an
appropriate action. Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his
father Villar, was married to another woman other than his mother.
As such, pursuant to Art. 176, FC, he is under the parental authority of his mother, who, as a
consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. And because she has been
deprived of her rightful custody of her child by Villar, Daisie is entitled to issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus.
Rule 102, Sec. 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her
husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child
who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her
child. The fact that Villar has recognized the Christopher may be a ground for ordering him to
give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Article 213, FC, "no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise."
2. Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the
custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each
other, are for some reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it
cannot arise in any other situation.
Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, pursuant to Art. 176 of the FC.
Under such authority, Daisie is entitled to have custody of him. Since petitioner has been
deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of
the writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, Rule 102, §1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from
her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate
child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody
of her child.

- On Legitimate Children

Silva vs. CA, 275 SCRA 604 ; G.R. No. 114742, July 17, 1997; 275 SCRA 604
Facts:
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local actress,
cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children: Ramon
Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began,
according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous
objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had
never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted
ways. The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to
allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his
company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales
who averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could
affect the moral and social values of the children. RTC granted Silva visitorial rights on Sundays
and Saturdays while the CA reversed the decision on the reason that it is for the best interest of
the children, citing Articles 3 and 8 of PD 603, to deny visitorial and/or temporary custodial
rights to the father, even at the expense of hurting said parent. After all, if indeed his love for
the children is genuine and more divine than the love for himself, a little self-sacrifice and self-
denial may bring more benefit to the children. While petitioner-appellee, as father, may not
intentionally prejudice the children by improper influence, what the children may witness and
hear while in their father's house may not be in keeping with the atmosphere of morality and
rectitude where they should be brought up.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA is right in depriving the Petitioner the visitorial rights.
Ruling:
NO. The issue before us is not really a question of child custody; instead, the case merely
concerns the visitation right of a parent over his children.
There is enough recognition on the inherent and natural right of parents over their children.
Article 150 of the Family Code expresses that "(f)amily relations include those . . . (2) (b)etween
parents and children; . . . ." Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of the Code states that it is the
natural right and duty of parents and those exercising parental authority to, among other
things, keep children in their company and to give them love and affection, advice and counsel,
companionship and understanding. The Constitution itself speaks in terms of the "natural and
primary rights" of parents in the rearing of the youth. There is nothing conclusive to indicate
that these provisions are meant to solely address themselves to legitimate relationships.
Indeed, although in varying degrees, the laws on support and successional rights, by way of
examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate members of the family and so explicitly encompass
illegitimate relationships as well. Then, too, and most importantly, in the declaration of nullity
of marriages, a situation that presupposes a void or inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the Family
Code provides for appropriate visitation rights to parents who are not given custody of their
children. The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner, even assuming as
true, cannot be taken as sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father. The fears
expressed by respondent to the effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their
children once allowed to even temporarily associate with petitioner is but the product of
respondent's unfounded imagination, for no man, bereft of all moral persuasions and goodness,
would ever take the trouble and expense in instituting a legal action for the purpose of seeing
his illegitimate children. It can just be imagined the deep sorrows of a father who is deprived of
his children of tender ages.

Tonog v. Court of Appeals & Daguimol, GR No. 122906, February 7, 2002; 376 SCRA 523
Facts:
Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith, her illegitimate daughter with Edgar. The two cohabited for a
time and lived with Edgar's parents and sister. A year after, Dinah left for the USA where she
found a work as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and paternal
grandparents.
Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin. The court granted the petition and
appointed Edgar as the legal guardian.
Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgment. The trial court set aside its original judgment and
allowed Dinah to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Meanwhile, the court issued a
resolution granting Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin. Dinah moved for the immediate
execution of the resolution.
Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA let Gardin remain in the
custody of Edgar until otherwise adjudged.
Dinah appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that she is entitled to the custody of Gardin,
as a matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon
her as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin cannot be separated from her since
she had not, as of then, attained the age of seven.
Issue:
Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the guardianship proceeding?
Ruling:
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of
the child.
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin
Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not
been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody
of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we
find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime
parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar
surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which
she had apparently formed an attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly
entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in a
petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best
position to assess the parties’ respective merits vis-à-vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet
another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded
the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in
the choice of which parent should have the custody over her person.
For the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should
remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court.

Briones v. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004; 440 SCRA 455
Facts:
Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with Loreta P. Miguel. The child is born in Japan and
Loreta is currently residing in Japan, having married to a Japanese. Petitioner caused the minor
child to be brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of him and send him to school.
In the Philippines, his parents assisted him in taking care of the child. One day, Maricel and
Francisca came to the house of the petitioner to visit the said child and asked if they can go to
SM Department store, promising that they will bring the said child in the afternoon, to which
the petitioner agreed. However, the respondents did not bring the child back as promised.
Petitioner made several efforts in finding his child by going to the respondents' houses but both
kept telling him respectively that the child is in the house of the other respondent. He asked for
asistance of the police and DSWD but it did not go well.
Joey D. Briones (petitioner) filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against Maricel Pineda Miguel
and Francisca Pineda Miguel (respondents), lateron including Loreta Miguel as respondent, to
obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda being the biological father of the latter,
demonstrating his capability to support and educate him. However, according to Loreta, it was
not the other respondents who took the child but it was her which the petitioner readily agreed
and consented. She also added that the child was entrusted to petitioner' parents while both of
them were working in Japan and that they were already living separately even before the
custody of the child to his parents because petitioner had an illicit affair with another woman.
Also, her marriage to the Japanese National is to be able to stay in Japan temporarily to work
and earn money to her son.
Applying Article 213 (paragraph 2) of the Family Code, the CA awarded the custody of Michael
Kevin Pineda Miguel to his mother. Petitioner, however, was granted visitorial rights. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not, as the natural father, the petitioner may be denied of the custody and parental
care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away
Ruling:
Yes, he may be denied custody and parental care of his natural child.
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and Respondent Loreta pursuant to Article 176 of the Family Code which provides
that, "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule
regardless of whether the father admits paternity. Obviously, Michael is a natural
("illegitimate," under the Family Code) child, as there is nothing in the records showing that his
parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry at the time of his birth. Both
acknowledge that Michael is their son.
There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole
parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep
him in her company. The Court will not deprive her of custody, absent any imperative cause
showing her unfitness to exercise such authority and care.
Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds
cause to order otherwise.
There is no showing at all that she is unfit to take charge of him, hence it is right pursuant to
Article 176 and Article 213 of Family Code that the custody over the natural/illegitimate child of
petitioner be awarded to the mother, Loreta.

- Substitute Parental Authority by Surviving Parent

Amadora v. CA, et. al., L-47745, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 327
Facts:
Anticipating the day of his high school graduation, Alfredo Amadora was hit by a gunshot 3 days
prior his awaited moment. The gun was fired by a classmate, Pablito Daffon, inside the school
auditorium. Alfredo was only 17 years old.
Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The victim's parents, herein
petitioners, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the
physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents.
The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of
Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent court,
however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved.
Respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also
held that the students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the
semester had already ended.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to finish his physics experiment as a
prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the private
respondents. The private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school
only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody
because the semester had already ended.
Issue:
1. How should Article 2180 be applied in this case
2. WON the respondents may be held liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Daffon on
Alfredo Amadora
Ruling:
1. The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all
schools, academic as well as nonacademic. Where the school is academic rather than technical
or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general
rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who
shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall
be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which
case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable.
Paragraph 7 of Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
“Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.”

2. NO. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the
authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had
formally ended.
The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none
of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. The evidence of the parties does not
disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo
Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did not necessarily
make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-incharge, there is no showing that Dicon was
negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance.
Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable
under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made
responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to
answer for the tort committed by any of the other private respondents for none of them has
been found to have been charged with the custody of the offending student or has been remiss
in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the
principles herein announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by
Pablito Daffon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. Wherefore, the petition is denied.

 Substitute and Special Parental Authority

PSBA v. CA, et. al., GR No. 84698, Feb. 4, 1992, 205 SCRA 733
Facts:
A stabbing incident which caused the death of Carlitos Baustista while on the second-floor
premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of
the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court for damages against the said PSBA and its
corporate officers. Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. His
assailants were not members of the school’s academic community but were elements from
outside of the school.
The private respondents sought to adjudge the school authorities for the victim’s untimely
demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means
and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. Petitioners sought to have the
suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them.
The respondent trial court overruled petitioners’ contention and denied their motion to
dismiss. Petitioners then assailed the trial court’s disposition before the respondent appellate
court which affirmed the trial court’s orders. The CA resolved to deny the petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
i. Whether or not the appellate court was correct in deciding the case based on Article
2180 of the Civil Code.
ii. Whether or not the application of the law on quasi-delict is proper when there is a pre-
existing contract.
Ruling:
1. NO. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in
loco parentis. It has been stressed that the law plainly provides that the damage should have
been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held
liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody.
However, this material situation does not exist in the present case, as indicated, the assailants
of Carlitos were not students of PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.
2. NO. Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between
the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern.
A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as
extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract,
whether express or implied. However, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by
contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the
same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an
extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
In the present case, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and
Bautista had been breached thru the former’s negligence in providing proper security
measures. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise to generally to
a breach of contractual obligation only. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because
of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. The negligence of the school cannot
exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set
out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Tamagro v. CA, et. al. , 209 SCRA 518 (1992)

Facts:
Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle
causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed
with the RTC, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and
petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent
spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the
time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Adelberto Bundoc.
Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the
minor Adelberto Bundoc before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for
adoption was granted, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of
the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents,
namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since
parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition
for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with
his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing
and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of
Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision. Within the 15-day reglementary period,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration followed by a supplemental motion for
reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It appearing, however, that the motions failed to comply
with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, both motions were denied by the
trial court in an Order. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In its Order, the trial court dismissed
the notice at appeal, this time ruling that the notice had been filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition
for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision and the Orders. The Court
of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.
Issue:
WON the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given
retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage
case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was
yet lodged with the biological parents.
Ruling:
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them,
may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such
parents.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when
parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the
minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of
the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a decree of adoption
was issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was
vested in the latter as adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the petition for
adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses
contend that they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly
tortious conduct.
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively
transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle
shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when
adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect
may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to
permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant
case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura
spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen
and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and
had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a
result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the
doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on
the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was
not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents, were
indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by
the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the
court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

 Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Persons of the Children

Libi v. IAC, 214 SCRA 16, GR No. 70890, September 18, 1992
Facts:
Julie Ann Gotiong, a first year commerce student of University of San Carlos, Cebu City and
Wendell Libi, both minors, were in a relationship for 2 years before Julie Ann broke up with him
after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible.
Wendell kept pestering her for reconciliation but she resisted prompting him to resort to
threats against her. In order to avoid him, she stayed in the house of her best friend.
Days after, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the
same firearm licensed in the name of Cresencio Libi (father of Wendelle) which was recovered
from the scene of the crime inside the Gotiong residence.
Due to absence of eyewitnesses, the parents, who are contending parties herein posited their
respective theories.
The parents of Julie Ann, herein private respondents, submitted that Wendell caused her death
by shooting her and thereafter turned the gun on himself to commit suicide.
The parents of Wendell, petitioners, contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell
may have displeased by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-
Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate
any witnesses.
The respondents filed a civil case against the petitioners to recover damages arising from the
latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. However, it was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the RTC’s decision and ruled that the parents of
Wendell are subsidiarily liable for the criminal act of said minor who was living in their
company.
Issue:
WON the parents should be held liable.
Ruling:
1. We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be held liable
for the civil liability based on what appears from all indications was a crime committed by their
minor son.
2. As preponderantly shown by evidence, the petitioners utterly failed to exercise all the
diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their minor son from committing this
crime by means of their gun which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi for they have not
regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from
the safety deposit box only after the crime had been committed.
3. The parents should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal
offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in
their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article
101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9
years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and,
with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or
15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2,
and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by . . . a person under nine years of age,
or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall
devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears
that there was no fault or negligence on their part."
Article 2180 of the Civil Code: The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by their minor children who live in their company.

St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpetanos, et. al., GR No. 143363, Feb. 6, 2002
Facts:
Sherwin Carpitanos, son of respondents Carpitanos, died in an accident caused by the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the Mitsubishi jeep owned by respondent
Villanueva. The vehicle was then driven by James Daniel II, a minor. Allegedly, the driver drove
the jeep in a reckless manner. The incident occurred during an enrollment drive conducted by
petitioner academy where Sherwin was a student.
Sherwin's parents filed an action for damages against petitioner and the other respondents. The
trial court ruled in favor of Sherwin's parents ordering petitioner to pay civil indemnity for the
loss of life of Sherwin, actual and moral damages, and attorney's fees under Articles 218 and
219 of the Family Code, and declared respondents Daniel subsidiarily liable. Respondent
Villanueva was absolved from any liability.
The CA affirmed the decision of the TC and held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under
Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in
allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner should be held liable for the damages pursuant to Art. 218 and
219.
Ruling:
No. Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority
over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its
administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care.
This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether
inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and
responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students
outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate
cause of the death of the victim. Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the
immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of
James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Further, there was
no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he
allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident. Considering that
the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep
owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Mary's Academy had
no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held
liable for the death resulting from such accident.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral damages in the
amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. In this case, the proximate cause
of the accident was not attributable to petitioner. For the reason that petitioner was not
directly liable for the accident, the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay
death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted. Moreover, the grant of attorney's
fees as part of damages is the exception rather than the rule. The power of the court to award
attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable
justification. Thus, the grant of attorney's fees against the petitioner is likewise deleted.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals and that
of the trial court. The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability
of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Mary's Academy, Dipolog City.

 Effect of parental Authority Upon the Property of the Children

Johanna Sombong v. CA, et. al., GR No. 111876, Jan. 31, 1996
Facts:
Johanna Sombong, petitioner, is the mother of the child Arabella O. Sombong. When Arabella
was only six months old, she was brought to Sir John Clinic for relief of coughing fits and for
treatment of colds. However, the child could not be discharged because Johanna did not have
enough money to pay the bills. Johanna gave a false testimony that she already paid the private
respondents by installments Despite the alleged payments, the owners of the clinic, Dra.
Carmen Ty and her husband Mr. Vicente Ty allegedly refused to turn over Arabella to her.
Johanna claims that such refusal was due to her refusal on Mr. Ty’s offer to go out on a date
and to the jealousy of his wife.
Johanna testified that she visited Arabella at the clinic twice (i.e., 2 years later and another 3
years later), but the spouses Ty refused to give her child. Petitioner thereafter filed a criminal
complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention of a minor against the spouses Ty. Facing arrest,
Dra. Ty disclosed where the child could possibly be located. NBI agents went to the said address
and found a female child named Christina Grace Neri.
Evidence disclosed that the child has been living with respondent Marietta Neri Alviar since
1998. When she was just a baby, Cristina was abandoned by her parents at the Sir John Clinic.
On April 18, 1988, Dr. Fe Mallonga, a dentist at the Sir John Clinic and niece of both Dra. Ty and
respondent Alviar, called the latter up to discuss the possibility of turning over to her care one
of the several abandoned babies at the said clinic. Respondent Alviar was told that this baby
whose name was unknown had long been abandoned by her parents and appeared to be very
small, very thin, and full of scabies. Taking pity on the baby, respondent Alviar and her mother,
Maura Salacup Neri, decided to take care of her.
Respondent Alviar was invited by the National Bureau of Investigation for in the presence of
Dra. Ty and petitioner. Cristina was also brought along by said respondent. At that
confrontation, Dra. Ty could not be sure that Cristina was indeed petitioner's child, Arabella,
since there were several abandoned babies in the clinic. Neither could petitioner with all
certainty say that Cristina was her long-lost daughter.
The petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus with the RTC of Quezon City, and the latter granted
the same. However, this was reversed by the CA noting that not even the petitioner could
recognize if the foster child Cristina is her lost daughter Arabella and neither there was any
similarity on her physical features with the child.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in denying the writ of habeas corpus and in not granting the
custody of the child to the alleged mother, Johanna Sombong. NO
Ruling:
The evidence in this case does not support a finding that the child, Cristina, is in truth and in
fact her child, Arabella; neither is there sufficient evidence to support the finding that private
respondents' custody of Cristina is so illegal as to warrant the grant of a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
The controversy does not involve the question of personal freedom, because an infant is
presumed to be in the custody of someone until he attains majority age. In passing on the writ
in a child custody case, the court deals with a matter of an equitable nature. Not bound by any
mere legal right of parent or guardian, the court gives his or her claim to the custody of the
child due weight as a claim founded on human nature and considered generally equitable and
just.
Therefore, these cases are decided, not on the legal right of the petitioner to be relieved from
unlawful imprisonment or detention, as in the case of adults, but on the court's view of the best
interests of those whose welfare requires that they be in custody of one person or another.
Hence, the court is not bound to deliver a child into the custody of any claimant or of any
persons, but should, in the consideration of the facts, leave it in such custody as its welfare at
the time appears to require. In short, the child's welfare is the supreme consideration.
The Family Code authorizes the courts to, if the welfare of the child so demands, deprive the
parents concerned of parental authority over the child or adopt such measures as may be
proper under the circumstances.
The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the instant case will all depend on
the concurrence of the following requisites: (Not all of these requisites exist in this case.)
1. That the petitioner has the right of custody over the minor
Petitioner does not have the right of custody over the minor Cristina because, by the evidence
disclosed before the court a quo, Cristina has not been shown to be petitioner's daughter,
Arabella. In the instant case, the testimonial and circumstantial proof establishes the individual
and separate existence of petitioner's child, Arabella, from that of private respondents' foster
child, Cristina.
2. That the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by
the respondent
Since we hold that petitioner has not been established by evidence to be entitled to the
custody of the minor Cristina on account of mistaken identity, it cannot be said that private
respondents are unlawfully withholding from petitioner the rightful custody over Cristina.
3. That it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in the custody of
petitioner and not that of the respondent
We find that private respondents are financially, physically and spiritually in a better position to
take care of the child, Cristina. They have the best interest of Cristina at heart.
On the other hand, it is not to the best interest of the minor, Cristina, to be placed in the
custody of petitioner, had the petitioner's custody rights over Cristina been established. As
reasoned by the CA, the petitioner filed a motion at the lower court to litigate as pauper as she
had no fixed income. She also admitted that she had no stable job, and she had been separated
from a man previously married to another woman. She also confessed that she planned to go
abroad and leave her other child Johannes to the care of the nuns. The child Arabella Sombong
wherever she is certainly does not face a bright prospect with petitioner-appellee.
Hence, petition is denied and the decision of CA is affirmed.

 Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority

 Republic Act No. 8972, “Solo Parents’ Welfare Act of 2000”
 Republic Act No. 7610, “Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act”

IX. Emancipation and Age of Majority (Arts. 234-237)

Elcano v Hill, 77 SCRA 100

Facts:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, Pedro Elcano et al. vs.
Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs
for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the
occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting
subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of
which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act
was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss was first denied by the trial court based on the following
grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule
III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved
as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.
It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the
above grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants and after thoroughly
examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and
well-founded. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case
wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor,
living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
Ruling:
1. No, the present civil action for damages is not barred by the acquittal of Reginald in
the criminal case. Firstly, there is a distinction as regards the proof required in a criminal
case and a civil case. To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to
make the defendant pay in damages. Furthermore, a civil case for damages on the basis of
quasi-delict does is independently instituted from a criminal act. As such the acquittal of
Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
2. Yes, the above mentioned provision may still be applied against Atty Marvin Hill. Although
parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child, emancipation by marriage is
not absolute, i.e. he can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother
or guardian. As in the present case, killing someone else contemplated judicial litigation, thus,
making Article 2180 apply to Atty. Hill.However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now
of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of
his son.

Libi v IAC, 214 SCRA 16, GR No. 70890, September 18, 1992
Facts:
Julie Ann Gotiong, a first year commerce student of University of San Carlos, Cebu City and
Wendell Libi, both minors, were in a relationship for 2 years before Julie Ann broke up with him
after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible.
Wendell kept pestering her for reconciliation but she resisted prompting him to resort to
threats against her. In order to avoid him, she stayed in the house of her best friend.
Days after, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the
same firearm licensed in the name of Cresencio Libi (father of Wendelle) which was recovered
from the scene of the crime inside the Gotiong residence.
Due to absence of eyewitnesses, the parents, who are contending parties herein posited their
respective theories.
The parents of Julie Ann, herein private respondents, submitted that Wendell caused her death
by shooting her and thereafter turned the gun on himself to commit suicide.
The parents of Wendell, petitioners, contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell
may have displeased by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-
Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate
any witnesses.
The respondents filed a civil case against the petitioners to recover damages arising from the
latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. However, it was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the RTC’s decision and ruled that the parents of
Wendell are subsidiarily liable for the criminal act of said minor who was living in their
company.
Issue:
WON the parents should be held liable.
Ruling:
YES.
1. We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be held liable
for the civil liability based on what appears from all indications was a crime committed by their
minor son.
2. As preponderantly shown by evidence, the petitioners utterly failed to exercise all the
diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their minor son from committing this
crime by means of their gun which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi for they have not
regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from
the safety deposit box only after the crime had been committed.
3. The parents should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal
offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in
their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article
101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9
years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and,
with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or
15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2,
and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by . . . a person under nine years of age,
or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall
devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears
that there was no fault or negligence on their part."
 Article 2180 of the Civil Code: The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by their minor children who live in their company.

X. Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law (Arts. 238-253)

Republic v. Court of Appeals et. al., G.R. No. 163605, May 6, 2005
Facts:
On September 29, 1999, RTC Branch 45 of Ormoc City granted the petition of Apolinaria
Malinao Jomoc on the basis of the
Commissioner’s Report and thereby declared the absentee-spouse, who left the petitioner-wife
9 years earlier as presumptively dead. The petition was filed for the purpose of her desire to
contract a valid subsequent marriage.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal.
On November 22, 1999, the RTC disapproved the Notice of Appeal stating that the case is a
special proceeding.
On January 13, 2000, the Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration was also denied by the RTC.
The Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, it contending that the
declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a
special proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal.
On May 5, 2004, 7 the Court of Appeals denied the Republic's petition on procedural and
substantive grounds.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the nature
of a special proceeding. NO
Ruling:
By the trial court's citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of
Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose
her desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Hence, the petition for that purpose is a
"summary proceeding," following Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
The petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the
Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls
for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a
Notice of Appeal from the trial court's order sufficed.
On the alleged procedural flaw in petitioner's petition before the appellate court, petitioner's
failure to attach to his petition before the appellate court a copy of the trial court's order
denying its motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is not
necessarily fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense. Given the
issue raised before it by petitioner, what the appellate court should have done was to direct
petitioner to comply with the rule.
As for petitioner's failure to submit a copy of the trial court's order granting the petition for
declaration of presumptive death, contrary to the appellate court's observation that petitioner
was also assailing it, petitioner's 8-page petition filed in said court does not so reflect, it merely
having assailed the order disapproving the Notice of Appeal.
WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to it for appropriate action in light of the foregoing
discussion.
Relevant Provisions of the Case:
Article 41, Family Code
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouses present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a
reappearance of the absent spouse.
Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court - Modes of appeal
(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof
upon the adverse party.
No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple
or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on
appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
Section 1 (m), Rule 72, Part II of the Revised Rules of Court entitled Special Proceedings provides
that rules of special proceedings are provided for the Declaration of absence and death.
Applicability of rules of civil actions. — In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided
for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. (Sec. 2,
Rule 72, Part II of the Revised Rules of Court entitled Special Proceedings)
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption of death provides:
Art. 390, Civil Code. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
Art. 238, Family Code. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title
shall apply in all cases provided for in this Codes requiring summary court proceedings. Such
cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.

Republic v. Yolan da Cadacio Granada, G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012
Facts:
Respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) at Sumida Electric
Philippines where both were then working. The two eventually got married and resulted in the
birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.
When Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment.
Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not received any communication from her
husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a
Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead.
RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead. Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, represented by OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner
argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove
her well-founded belief that he was already dead. However, in an Order, the RTC denied the
motion.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA. Yolanda filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a
summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and,
thus, not appealable.
In its Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied by the
CA in a Resolution. Hence, the present Petition.
Issue:
1. Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC
in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory
upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal

2. Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent
presented

Ruling:
1. We affirm the CA ruling.
Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition
for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court
therein shall be immediately final and executory.
But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar, let
it be stated that the RTC’s decision, was immediately final and executory upon notice to the
parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due
course thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have
dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground
that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate
the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republic’s Notice of Appeal
on the ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of
respondent’s spouse was immediately final and executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary
appeal.
2. The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her "well-founded
belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him
presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, "nothing
is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes
immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law."

XI. Final Provisions (Arts. 254-257)

  Retroactivity of the Family Code
 Concept of Vested Right

Bernabe v. Alejo, GR No. 140500, January 21, 2002

Facts:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-three
(23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981
and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife
Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On May 16, 1994, Carolina, on behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying that
Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian)
be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole
surviving heir.
On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the
provisions of the Family Code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the
complaint is now barred x x x
Orders of the Trial Court
In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted Ernestina Bernabes Motion for
Reconsideration of the trial court’s Decision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for
recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative
father had barred the action.
In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative father had not
acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have
been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm
or deny the child’s filiation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be
allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born
in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for
recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of majority. The
subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
a. Whether or not the Family Code should be applied to the case
b. Whether or not Adrian has a right to be recognized
Ruling:
The petitioner, the natural child, persists that Adrian Bernabe does not have the right to be
recognized or to seek recognition because Article 175 of the Family Code. (the father must have
already recognized Adrian during his lifetime to give him the opportunity to either affirm or
deny his affiliation with the child.
However, the right to seek recognition was already granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate
children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect. Thus, this right cannot
be impaired or taken away. Under Article 285 of the Civil Code, the minor must be given the
chance to exercise his right to recognition for up to 4 years from attaining majority age.
Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because
the boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows
an action for recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of
majority. The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.

Marquino v. IAC, 233 SCRA 349

Facts:
Respondent Bibiana Roman-Pagador filed an action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation,
Annulment of Partition, Support, and Damages against petitioner Eutiquio Marquino before the
then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Also impleaded as defendants, were Maria
Terenal-Marquino, wife of Eutiquio Marquino, and their legitimate children Luz, Ana, and Eva,
all surnamed Terenal-Marquino.

The records show that Bibiana was born on December 2, 1926 at Piapi, Dumaguete City, of
Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino. At that time, Eutiquio was still single.
Bibiana became personally known to the Marquino family when she was hired as domestic
helper in their household at Luke Wright Street, Dumaguete City. She always received financial
assistance from them. Thus, she claimed that she enjoyed continuous possession of the status
of an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of her father and his family.
The Marquinos, on the other hand, strongly denied her allegations.

During the pendency of the case and before respondent Bibiana could finish presenting her
evidence, she died. Her heirs were ordered substituted for her as parties-plaintiffs. Petitioners
filed a Motion to Dismiss. They averred that the action for recognition is intransmissible to the
heirs being a personal act. The trial court dismissed the case.

Respondents appealed to the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals).
Eutiquio Marquino died while the case was pending appeal. Respondent court invoking the case
of Banaga v. Pascacio, (No. 4848-R, July 31, 1954, 50 O. G. No. 12, p. 5908) reversed the
controverted order. The motion for Reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.
Issue:
1. WON in ruling that after the death of the natural child, the heirs of said deceased natural
child, cannot bring the action to compel recognition, but they may however, continue the
action already filed to compel recognition.
2. WON in ruling that the death of the putative parent while the case against him for
recognition of his alleged child is pending will not extinguish the action but the same can be
continued with the heirs substituted for said deceased parent.
Ruling:
1. Article 285 of the Civil Code provides that an action for recognition of natural children may
be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file
the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing
had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from discovery of the document.
The rationale for the rule is to give the alleged parents opportunity to be heard. The reason for
the exception is to protect the heirs.
In the case at bench, it is evident that Bibiana was a natural child. She was born out of wedlock
on December 2, 1926, of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino who at that time
was single. Bibiana sued for compulsory recognition while Eutiquio was still alive. Sadly, she
died on March 17, 1983 before she could present her proof of recognition. Her death tolled the
action considering its personal nature and intransmissibility.
"Granting that, after the death of Bibiano Banas Raymundo could file an action for compulsory
recognition against Bibiano’s heirs, still plaintiffs-appellants cannot invoke Raymundo’s right to
file such action, because it is not transmissible to the natural child’s heirs; the right is purely a
personal one to the natural child." 
2. We rule against its continuance. In an action for compulsory recognition, the party in the best
position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself. The need to hear the side of the
putative parent is an overwhelming consideration because of the unsettling effects of such an
action on the peace and harmonious relationship in the family of the putative parent. For this
reason, Article 285 provides only two (2) exceptions when an action for recognition transcends
the death of the putative parent. Neither of these exceptions obtains in the case at bench.
Firstly, the death of Eutiquio did not occur during the minority of Bibiana. In fact, she was
already forty-five (45) years old when the recognition case was filed on January 10, 1971.
Secondly, no document was discovered, before unknown, in which Bibiana was expressly
acknowledged as a natural child. Consequently, the respondent court erred in ruling that the
action can still be continued against the heirs of Eutiquio.
Our law providing for the intransmissibility of an action for recognition, however, has been
superseded by the Article 273 of the New Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 173 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply to the case at
bench because it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time
of the death of their father, Eutiquio Marquino. "Vested right" is a right in property which has
become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. It expresses the
concept of present fixed interest, which in right reason and natural justice should be protected
against arbitrary State action.

Becodero v. CA, 227 SCRA 303

Facts:
The husband, Alayo D. Bosing, married Juliana Oday, with whom he had three children, namely,
Flora, Teresita, and Gaido. He left the conjugal home, and he forthwith started to live instead
with Josefa Rivera with whom he later begot one child, named Josephine Bosing, now
Josephine Balcobero.
Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment basis from the Magdalena Estate, Inc. In the
deed, he indicated his civil status as, "married to Josefa R. Bosing," the common-law wife. In a
letter, which he addressed to Magdalena Estate, Inc., he authorized the latter to transfer the lot
in the name of his "wife Josefa R. Bosing." The final deed of sale was executed by Magdalena
Estate, Inc. A few days later, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 48790 was issued in the name of
"Josefa R. Bosing married to Alayo Bosing."
Alayo married Josefa even while his prior marriage with Juliana was still subsisting. Alayo died
and about three years later, Josefa and Josephine executed a document of extrajudicial
partition and sale of the lot in question, which was there described as "conjugal property" of
Josefa and deceased Alayo. The notice of extrajudicial partition was published in the Evening
Post; the inheritance and estate taxes were paid; and a new Transfer Certificate of Title No.
198840 was issued in the name of Josephine.
Juliana (deceased Alayo's real widow) and her three legitimate children filed with the court a
quo an action for reconveyance of the property. On the basis of the above facts, the trial court
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Hence, the instant petition for review
Issue:
WON the respondent court erred in not granting petitioner's motion for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence, and likewise erred in holding that even if a new trial is granted the
same would not serve a useful purpose.
Ruling:
We concur with the resolution of the appellate court below (on appellants' [petitioners herein]
motion for reconsideration thereat), thus —
Appellants' prayer for a new trial based upon what they claim is newly discovered evidence
deserves scant consideration.
Appellant proposes to prove (1) that Josefa Bosing sold certain property for P8,000.00 in 1948
and was therefore in a financial position to make the payments to Magdalena Estate Inc. and
(2) that appellee Juliana Bosing got married in 1961 to one Burayos Ballit, and thus, "forfeited"
her right to the conjugal partnership.
The first ground is not meritorious. It is not newly discovered evidence. As described in
appellants' Motion the documents were "not discovered or considered as necessary evidence
during the trial of the case below" by the former counsel; it is therefore more properly
considered as forgotten evidence, which the appellant knew or should have known during the
trial (Tesoro vs. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 296; Republic vs. Vda. de Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336).
Moreover, assuming the sale is proven, it does not follow that the proceeds were used to pay
the lot in question; the payments were made in installments, not in one lump sum.
Neither is the second ground deserving of merit. Assuming that the marriage to Ballit in 1961 is
duly proven, and that this provided a cause for legal separation and consequent disqualification
of the guilty spouse to succeed to the husband's intestate estate under Article 1002 of the Civil
Code, the fact remains that no action for legal separation was brought by the husband during
his lifetime and within the period provided by law. It is too late to raise the issue at this time.
Accordingly, assuming that the Motion for New Trial complies with the formal requisites for
such motion, a question we don't find necessary to decide, a new trial would not serve a useful
purpose in altering the result of the questioned decision.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from in the instant petition for review on certiorari is
AFFIRMED.

Tayag v. CA, 209 SCRA 665

Facts:
The instant petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 20222 and its resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Said
decision, now before us for review, dismissed petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction on the ground that the denial of the motion to dismiss Civil Case No.
7938 of the court a quo is an interlocutory order and cannot be the subject of the said special
civil action, ordinary appeal in due time being petitioner's remedy.
In said Civil Case No, 7938, herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal
guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed a complaint denominated "Claim for Inheritance"
against herein petitioner as the administratrix of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo.
Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to
render an inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo; to determine and deliver the share of the minor child Chad in the estate of the
deceased; and to give him support pendente lite.
Petitioner, as defendant therein, filed her answer with counterclaim, disputing the material
allegations in the complaint.
After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds asserted as affirmative defenses, the
trial court issued the that the resolution on the preliminary hearing which partakes of the
nature of a motion to dismiss requiring additional evidence is in the meantime held in
abeyance. The Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied and the case as set for pre-trial.
With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, which was granted by the respondent
court and enjoined respondent judge to resolve petitioner's motion praying for the dismissal of
the complaint based on the affirmative defenses within ten (10) days from notice thereof.
In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and thereafter
denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order was denied
by the trial court. As a consequence, another petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction was filed by with respondent court, praying that the orders dated of the
trial court be annulled and set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Respondent court promulgated its decision dismissing the petition, and likewise denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a resolution, hence the present petition for review
on certiorari.
Issue:
WON the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein private respondent in behalf of the
minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature and the complaint states no cause of action
Ruling:
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the
minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil
Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.  We herein adopt our ruling in the recent
case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.  where we held that the fact of
filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same
proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can
no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in question is
procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may affect
pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its
operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken
before it goes into effective, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the
time the question of procedure arises especially where vested rights may be prejudiced.
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since
it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the
mind child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in
court. The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil
Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Finally, we conform with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the questioned order of the
court below denying the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of a
petition for certiorari. The exceptions to this rule invoked by petitioner and allegedly obtaining
in the case at bar, are obviously not present and may not be relied upon.

Castro v. CA, 173 SCRA 656

Facts:
In Civil Case No. 3762, the plaintiffs filed an action for partition of properties against the
defendant alleging, among other things that they are the forced heirs of deceased Pedro
Castro. In Civil Case No. 3763 plaintiff Marcelina Bautista also filed an action for partition of
properties against defendant Benita Castro Naval alleging, among other things, that they are
also compulsory heirs of deceased Eustaquio Castro and that they are entitled to the partition
of the properties of said deceased.
The defendants in their amended answer in both cases allege that Benita Castro Naval is the
only child of the deceased Eustaquio and that said Eustaquio Castro is the son of Pedro Castro,
therefore, the complaint for partition has no cause of action.
With leave of Court, plaintiffs filed their amended complaints whereby they converted the
original action for partition into an action for quieting of title. Defendant's husband Cipriano
Naval was forthwith impleaded as party-defendant.
In the meantime, defendant Benita Naval filed a petition for appointment as receiver and for
preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 3762. The trial court, however, denied said petition for
appointment of receiver, but granted the petition for writ of preliminary injunction and also
adjudged Marcelina Bautista who is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3762 guilty of contempt and
ordering her to pay a fine of P100. 00.
During the pre-trial the parties agreed that the main issue to be resolved in this case is as to
whether or not defendant Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged natural child of Eustaquio
Castro. In view of this stipulation, defendant Benita Naval was allowed to introduce evidence to
show that she was indeed the acknowledged natural child of Eustaquio Castro.
The trial court ruled that respondent Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged and recognized
child of Eustaquio Castro and is, therefore, entitled to participate in the partition of the
properties left by him. These properties are the subject of the civil cases. As stated earlier, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged and recognized
illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro.
Ruling:
To remove any possible doubts about the correctness of the findings and conclusions of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals, we, therefore, apply the provision of the Family Code
which states that it shall have retroactive effect since the respondents have no clear vested
rights in their favor.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or
both of the parties. (268a)
There can be no dispute that Benita Castro enjoyed the open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro and that the action of Benita in defending her
status in this case is similar to an "action to claim legitimacy" brought during her lifetime.

Uyguanco v. CA 178 SCRA 684

Facts:
Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate children
(her co-petitioners herein), and considerable properties which they divided among themselves.
Claiming to be an illegitimate son of the deceased Apolinario, and having been left out in the
extrajudicial settlement of his estate, Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco filed a complaint for partition
against all the petitioners. 
In the course of his presentation of evidence at the trial, the petitioners elicited an admission
from Graciano that he had none of the documents mentioned in Article 278 to show that he
was the illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco. These are "the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing." The petitioners thereupon
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the private respondent could no longer
prove his alleged filiation under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code.
Specifically, the petitioners argued that the only evidence allowed under Article 278 to prove
the private respondent's claim was not available to him as he himself had admitted. Neither
could he now resort to the provisions of Article 285 because he was already an adult when his
alleged father died in 1975, and his claim did not come under the exceptions. In this case, the
action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.
The issue before the Court is not the status of the private respondent, who has been excluded
from the family and inheritance of the petitioners. What we are asked to decide is whether he
should be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his claimed father, who is already
dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence required by the Civil Code.
The trial court said he could and was sustained by the respondent Court of Appeals.1 The latter
court held that the trial judge had not committed any grave abuse of discretion or acted
without jurisdiction in allowing the private respondent to prove his filiation. Moreover, the
proper remedy was an ordinary appeal and not a petition for prohibition. The petitioners ask
for a reversal of these rulings on the ground that they are not in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.
Issue:
WON respondent should be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his claimed
father, who is already dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence required by the Civil
Code.
Ruling:
Graciano's complaint is based on his contention that he is the illegitimate child of Apolinario
Uyguangco, whose estate is the subject of the partition sought. If this claim can no longer be
proved in an action for recognition, with more reason should it be rejected in the said
complaint, where the issue of Graciano's filiation is being raised only collaterally. The complaint
is indeed a circumvention of Article 172, which allows proof of the illegitimate child's filiation
under the second paragraph thereof only during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Considering that the private respondent has, as we see it, established at least prima facie proof
of his alleged filiation, we find it regrettable that his action should be barred under the said
article. But that is the law and we have no choice but to apply it. Even so, the Court expresses
the hope that the parties will arrive at some kind of rapprochement, based on fraternal and
moral ties if not the strict language of the law, that will allow the private respondent an
equitable share in the disputed estate. Blood should tell.

 Date of Effectivity: August 3, 1988


Mordequillo vs Breva, 185 SCRA 766
Facts:
A judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09218 entitled "Francisco
Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.," the dispositive part of which read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal should be, as it is hereby, reversed and set aside.
Judgment is hereby rendered finding the defendants-appellees Jose Modequillo and Benito
Malubay jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants as hereinbelow set forth. All
counterclaims and other claims are hereby dismissed. 
The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the
RTC of Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose
Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Malalag, Davao del Sur.
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur
containing an area of 600 square meters with a market value of P34,550.00 and assessed value
of P7,570.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87008-01359, registered in the name of Jose Modequillo
in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur; and a parcel of agricultural land located
at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 3 hectares with a market
value of P24,130.00 and assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87-08-01848
registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del
Sur. 
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo
alleging therein that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home
is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for
liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced
against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the
Family Code.
In an order, the trial court denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration thereof was filed by
defendant and this was denied for lack of merit on. Hence, the herein petition for review
on certiorari 
Issue:
Whether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damages may be
satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code.
Ruling:
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family
home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by
operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family
home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its
publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was
occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family
Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family
residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153
of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to
have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before
the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article
162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that the levy
to be made by the sheriff shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

XII. Republic Act No. 8369, “Family Courts Act of 1997”

PART III – CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS

(Arts. 305-310; Arts. 356-396; and Arts. 407-413)

I. Funerals (Arts. 305-310, NCC)

 Order of Preference: Duty and Right to Make Funeral Arrangement
 Kind of Funeral Arrangements
 Retention, Interment, Disposal of Exhumation of Dead
 Funeral Expenses
II. Care and Education of Children (Arts. 356-363, NCC)
 P.D. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) Provisions on Rights & Duties of Children
 Duties of Parents
 Duty of the State
 Custody of Children

Cervantes v. Fajardo, G.R. No. 79955, Jan. 27, 1989; 169 SCRA
Facts:
Common-law spouses(respondents) Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon had a child. They
offered the child for adoption to Gina’s sister Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and brother-in-law
Nelson Cervantes, the herein petitioners who took care and custody of the child when she was
barely 2 weeks old. An affidavit of consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners
was also executed by respondent Gina. The appropriate petition for adoption was filed by
herein petitioners over the child before the RTC and it rendered a decision granting the
petition.
The court ordered that

 From Angelie Anne Fajardo, the name of the child will be Angelie Anne Cervantes
 She will be freed from parental authority of her natural parents as well as from legal
obligation and maintenance to them
 A child of herein petitoners(Mr. and Mrs. Cervantes) and capable of inheriting their
estate
However, the adoptive parents (Mr. and Mrs. Cervantes) received a letter from the respondents
demanding to be paid Php 150, 000 otherwise, they would get their child back. They refused to
comply to the demand. While they were at work, respondent Gina took the child from her yaya
at the petitioners’ residence saying that she was instructed by her sister. She brought the child
to her house and sent a word to the petitioners that she will return the child to them if they will
pay Php 150,000.
Thus the petitioners filed before the SC a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus over the minor
Angelie Anne Cervantes.
Issue:
WON the petition for habeas corpus filed by the adoptive parents against the natural parents
of the adoptee be granted?
Ruling:
YES. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under 5 years of age, will not
apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise.
In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral,
physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral
as well as social standing of the contending parents.
Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his
relationship with Gina is a common-law husband and wife relationship. Their relationship will
not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an
upright and moral-minded person.
Respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another married man
who eventually left her. For a minor like Angelie to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not
her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor.
Petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially
capable of supporting the minor than what the natural mother who is not only jobless but also
maintains an illicit relation with a married man,can most likely give her.
Also, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of
respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority
vested in natural parents over the adopted child.
The Petition is GRANTED. The custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are hereby
granted to petitioners to whom they properly belong, and respondents are ordered (if they still
have not) to deliver said minor to the petitioners immediately upon notice hereof.

Medina v. Macabili, 27 SCRA 502

Facts:
Petitioner Zenaida gave birth to Joseph Casero on Febuary 4, 1961. Zenaida left the child with
Dr. Macabili from his birth, and the latter reared Joseph as her son. Zenaida never visited the
child nor paid his expenses until August of 1966 where she claimed for custody of the minor in
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
Trial disclosed that Zenaida lived with Feliciano Casero with two other children, with the
tolerance of Casero’s wife who is living elsewhere. During the trial, the minor addressed the
respondent as Mommy and even chose to stay with the respondent. The minor never knew
Zenaida.
Dr. Macabili was made to promise to allow the minor the free choice of whom to live with upon
reaching the age of 14. The Court held it is for the child’s best interest to be left with the
respondent. Zenaida then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON the lower court erred in ordering the minor to stay with the respondent.
Ruling:
We see no reason to disturb the order appealed from. While our law recognizes the right of a
parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all
questions of the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be
paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 363), and that for compelling reasons, even a
child under seven may be ordered separated from the mother.
As remarked by the Court below, petitioner Zenaida Medina proved remiss in these sacred
duties; she not only failed to provide the child with love and care but actually deserted him,
with not even a visit, in his tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most. It may well
be doubted what advantage the child could derive from being coerced to abandon
respondent’s care and love to be compelled to stay with his mother and witness her irregular
menage a trois with Casero and the latter’s legitimate wife.
No abuse of discretion being shown, out on the contrary, the appealed order being justified in
fact and law, we hold that said order should be, and hereby is, affirmed.

Unson III v. Navarro, 101 SCRA 183

Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent were married on April 19, 1971 and out of that marriage the
child in question, Maria Teresa, was born.. In a decision rendered, they executed an agreement
for the separation of their properties and to live separately, as they have in fact been living
separately since June 1972. The agreement was approved by the Court. The parties are agreed
that no specific provision was contained in said agreement about the custody of the child
because the husband and wife would have their own private arrangement in that respect.
Later on, petitioner found out the following information regarding his wife:

 that she was in a relationship with her brother-in-law and godfather of their child (a
former seminarian at that), Maria Teresa;
 that the brother-in-law was being treated for manic depressive disorder;
 the illicit affair produced 2 children; and
 that Edita and her brother-in-law embraced a Protestant faith.
On the other hand, private respondent affirms in her affidavit that:
Since the birth of Maria Teresa, she has always lived with her, who has reared and brought up
the child to the best of her ability.
She was always insistent that petitioner have custody of Maria Teresa every weekend and half
of summer and Christmas vacation so that the child could establish a healthy and viable
relationship with her father.
From 1972 to 1978, she had always exercised full custody of Maria Teresa. It was affiant who
voluntarily gave custody of the child to petitioner on weekends and half of the summer and
Christmas vacations. In view of this amicable arrangement, no specific terms were agreed and
stipulated upon by her and petitioner regarding custody of the child in their petition for
separation of property before the lower court;
Even when she started living with her brother-in-law, Agustin, she and petitioner retained a
cordial relationship. In fact, petitioner would visit Maria Teresa at their home and was always
welcome to pick up Maria Teresa at any time.
When petitioner left for Australia, petitioner left Maria Teresa to stay with her. During this time
Maria Teresa was always allowed to visit with and to be picked up at any time by petitioner's
parents.
She admits that her present circumstances at first impression might seem socially if not morally
unacceptable; but in reality this is not so. Maria Teresa has been reared and brought up in an
atmosphere of Christian love, affection and honesty to the import of the situation. Further, the
quality and capacity of her of being a good mother has always remained.
In December 1979, the respondent judge ordered the petitioner to produce the child, Maria
Teresa Unson, his daughter barely eight years of age, with private respondent Edita N. Araneta
and return her to the custody of the latter, further obliging petitioner to "continue his support
of said daughter by providing for her education and medical needs," allegedly issued without a
"hearing" and the reception of testimony in violation of Section 6 of Rule 99.
Issue:
WON the custody of the child should be granted to the private respondent given the immoral
relationship the mother entered into.
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled it is in the best interest that the child Maria Teresa no longer stay with her
mother given the immoral situation the mother entered into. The Court granted that the child
stay with the petitioner.
In controversies regarding the custody of minors the sole and foremost consideration is the
physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the
respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. Never has this
Court diverted from that criterion.
 With this premise in view, the Court finds no difficulty in this case in seeing that it is in the best
interest of the child Teresa to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not to say immoral
influence, that the situation in which private respondent has placed herself, as admitted by her,
might create in the moral and social outlook of Teresa who is now in her formative and most
impressionable stage in her life. The fact that petitioner might have been tolerant about her
stay with her mother in the past when she was still too young to distinguish between right and
wrong and have her own correct impressions or notions about the unusual and peculiar
relationship of her mother with her own uncle-in-law, the husband of her sister’s mother, is
hardly of any consequence now that she has reached a perilous stage in her life.

Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, L-68374, June 18, 1985; 137 SCRA 7
Facts:
Maria Lourdes Santos, herein private respondent, is an illegitimate child of the petitioner
Horacio Luna who is married to his co-petitioner Liberty Hizon-Luna. Private respondent is
married to her co-respondent Sixto Salumbides, and are the parents of Shirley Santos
Salumbides, who is the subject of this child custody case.
It appears that two or four months after the birth of Shirley, her parents gave her to the
petitioners, a childless couple with considerable means. The couple doted on Shirley. When she
reached the age of four, she was enrolled at the Maryknoll College. A few months before
September 1980, the petitioners decided to tale Shirley abroad. Shirley looks forward to this
trip and was excited about it. However, when the petitioners asked for the respondents’
written consent for the child’s application for a US visa, the respondents refused which make
Shirley utterly disappointed. As a result the petitioners had to leave without Shirley. When the
petitioners returned, they learned that the respondents had transferred Shirley, and refused to
return Shirley to them. Neither did respondents allowed Shirley to visit the petitioners.
In view thereof, the petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus against the private
respondents to produce Shirley and deliver her to their care and custody. A decision was then
rendered declaring the petitioners entitled to the child’s custody. The private respondent
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appealed decision was reversed and set aside and
another entered, ordering petitioners, to turn over Shirley to the private respondents. The
petitioners then filed a petition for review of the decision to the Supreme Court but it was
denied for lack of merit and remanded to the court of origin and assigned to the RTC, who
issued a writ of execution to satisfy and enforce resolution and affirmed the CA’s decision.
The execution of the judgment was opposed by the petitioners who filed a motion for
reconsideration. But the respondent judge denied the motion to set aside the writ of execution.
Issue:
Whether or not procedural rules more particularly the duty of lower courts to enforce a final
decision of appellate courts in child custody cases, should prevail over and above the desire and
preference of the child.
Ruling:
NO. The manifestation of the child Shirley that she would kill herself or run away from home if
she would be taken away from the petitioners and forced to live with the private respondents,
made during the hearings on the motion to set aside the writ of execution and reiterated in her
letters to the members of the Court and during the hearing of the case before this court, is a
circumstance that would make the execution of the judgment of the Court of First Instance
inequitable, unfair and unjust, if not illegal.
Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody,
education and property of the children, the latter's welfare is paramount. This means that the
best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the
custody of their children. Since, in this case, the very life and existence of the minor is at stake
and the child is in an age when she can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less
than respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold her right to
live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral and intellectual development.
The threat may be proven empty, but Shirley has a right to a wholesome family life that will
provide her with love, care and understanding, guidance and counseling and moral and
material security. Besides, in her letters to the members of the Court, Shirley depicted her
biological parents as selfish and cruel and who beat her often; and that they do not love her.
And, as pointed out by the child psychologist, Shirley has grown more embittered cautious and
dismissing of her biological parents. To return her to the custody of the private respondents to
face the same emotional environment which she is now complaining of would be indeed
traumatic and cause irreparable damage to the child. As requested by her, let us not destroy
her future.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby GRANTED and the writ prayed for issued,
setting aside the judgment of the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court and restraining the
respondent judge and/or his successors from enforcing the judgment rendered by the Court of
Appeals. The decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal granting the herein petitioners
custody of the child Shirley Salumbides should be maintained. Without costs. SO ORDERED.

Clusa v. Cabangbang, 27 SCRA 791

Facts:
Pacita Chua, when still in the prime of youth, supported herself by working in nightclubs as a
hostess. And sexual liaison she had with man after man without benefit of marriage. She first
lived with a certain Chua Ben in 1950 by whom she had a child who died in infancy. She
afterwards cohabited with Sy Sia Lay by whom she had two children named Robert and Betty
Chua Sy. The latter child was born on December 15, 1957. Shortly after the birth of Betty, Pacita
Chua and Sy Sia Lay separated. Finding no one to fall back on after their separation, Pacita Chua
lingered in and around nightclubs and gambling joints, until she met Victor Tan Villareal. In due
time she became the latter's mistress. In 1960 another child, a girl, was born to her. In 1961
when this last child was still an infant, she and Villareal separated. Without means to support
the said child, Pacita Chua gave her away to a comadre in Cebu.
Bartolome Cabangbang and his wife, a childless couple, acquired the custody of the child Betty
who was then barely four months old. They have since brought her up as their own. They had
her christened as Grace Cabangbang.
There is some testimonial conflict on how the Cabangbang spouses acquired custody of the girl
Betty (or Grace), Pacita Chua avers that while she and Villareal were still living together, the
latter surreptitiously took the child away and gave her to the Cabangbangs, allegedly in
recompense for favors received.
At all events, it is the lower court's finding that the child was given to the Cabangbang spouses
by Villareal with the knowledge and consent of Pacita Chua.
By letter addressed to the Cabangbang spouses, with copy furnished to Villareal, Pacita Chua
thru counsel demanded the surrender to her of the custody of the child. Failing to secure such
custody, Pacita Chua (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) filed a petition for habeas
corpus with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, praying that the court grant her custody of and
recognize her parental authority over the girl.
A writ was issued commanding the provincial sheriff of Rizal or any of his deputies to produce
the body of Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang before the court a quo. However, for reasons
not stated in the record, the child was not produced before the lower court as ordered.
Villareal filed his answer to the petition. The Cabangbangs filed their answer the next day. After
due trial, the lower court promulgated its decision that it will be for the welfare of the child
Betty Chua Sy also known as Grace Cabangbang to be under the custody of respondents Mr.
and Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
1. WON the lower court erred when it awarded the custody of petitioner's daughter Betty Chua
Sy or Grace Cabangbang, who is less than seven (7) years old, in favor of respondents Mr. and
Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang,
2. WON the lower court illegally deprived petitioner of parental authority over her daughter.
Ruling:
1. We affirm the lower court's decision, not on the grounds cited by it, but upon a ground which
the court overlooked — i.e., abandonment by the petitioner of her child.
2. The absence of any kinship between the child and the Cabangbangs alone cannot serve to
bar the lower court from awarding her custody to them. Indeed, the law provides that in certain
cases the custody of a child may be awarded even to strangers, as against either the father or
the mother or against both. Thus, in proceedings involving a child whose parents are separated
— either legally or de facto — and where it appears that both parents are improper persons to
whom to entrust the care, custody and control of the child, "the court may either designate the
paternal or maternal grandparent of the child, or his oldest brother or sister, or  some reputable
and discreet person to take charge of such child, or commit it to and suitable asylum, children's
home, or benevolent society."

III. Use of Surnames (Arts. 364-380, NCC)

 Legitimate and Legitimated Children

Alfon v. Republic, G.R. No. L-51201, May 29, 1980

Facts:
This is a petition filed pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440 to review an Order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, which partially denied petitioner’s prayer for a change of name.
The notice setting the petition for hearing was published in the Times Journal in its issues and a
copy thereof together with a copy of the petition was furnished the Office of the Solicitor
General.
At the hearing of the petition, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez appeared for the petitioner and Fiscal
Donato Sor. Suyat, Jr. represented the OSG. Upon motion of counsel for the petitioner, without
objection on the part of Fiscal Suyat, the Deputy Clerk of Court was appointed commissioner to
receive the evidence and to submit the same for resolution of the Court.
From the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, it appears that petitioner Maria
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte: has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her childhood;
has been enrolled in the grade school and in college using the same name; has continuously
used the name Estrella S. Alfon since her infancy and all her friends and acquaintances know
her by his name; has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name.
In its Order, the Court of First Instance ruled that the petition insofar as the first name is
granted but denied with respect to the surname. Petitioner is authorized to change her name
from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte.
Issue:
WON petitioner is allowed to change her surname.
Ruling:
The lower court should have fully granted the petition.
The only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner’s prayer to change her surname is
that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the
surname of her father invoking Art. 364 of the Civil Code. But the word "principally" as used in
the codal-provision is not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a
legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is
equally entitled.
In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name
Estrella S. Alfon although her birth records and baptismal certificate show otherwise; she was
enrolled in the schools from the grades up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her
friends call her by this name; she finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated
and given a diploma under this name; and she exercised the right of suffrage likewise under this
name. There is therefore ample justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical
but on the contrary is based on a solid and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby modified in that the petitioner is allowed to
change not only her first name but also her surname so as to be known as ESTRELLA S. ALFON.

 Adopted Children

In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, Honorato Catindig,
Petitioner, GR No. 148311, March 31, 2005
Facts:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;2that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name
Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be
changed to "Catindig," his surname.On March 23, 2001, the trial court rendered the assailed
Decision granting the adoption.
Certain issues arose considering that there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even
Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as
"An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what
middle name a child may use.
Issue:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name?
Ruling:
YES. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear surname of her father and her mother. Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s
surname as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. The Adoption Act and the
Family Code provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
Hence, Stephanie can assert her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
The Court holds that the petitioner’s care and custody of the child since her birth up to the
present constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of
Presidential Decree No. 603. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from
all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil
purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article
189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY
CATINDIG.
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of Surnames,
they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname
of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. Prof.
Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the suggestion."

 Illegitimate Children
Mossesgeld v. CA, G.R. No. 111455, Dec. 23, 1998; 300 SCRA 464
Facts:
In 1989, Marissa Mossesgeld (single), gave birth to a baby boy at the Medical City General
Hospital, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. The father was lawyer Eleazar Calasan who was married,
signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein the child’s name as
Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan. Both Eleazar and Marissa accomplished the dorsal side of the
certificate of live birth stating that the information contained therein were true and correct. In
addition, Eleazar executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the child.
 The person in charge at the hospital refused to place Calasan as the child’s surname in the
certificate of live birth; hence, Eleazar himself submitted the certificate to the office of the local
civil registrar of Mandaluyong, for registration. The local civil registrar denied the registration
on the basis of Circular No. 4, dated October 11, 1988, of the Civil Registrar General, providing
that under Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate children born on or
after August 3, 1988, shall use the surname of their mother.
Eleazar filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a petition for mandamus to compel the Local
Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong to register the certificate of live birth of his alleged illegitimate
son using his surname. The RTC denied the petition. Eleazar filed a motion for reconsideration.
Later, he filed a motion for leave to amend petition and to admit amended petition,
substituting the child’s mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld as the petitioner. The Motion for
Reconsideration was denied. The CA affirmed the decision.
Issue:
WON mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live birth of
an illegitimate child using the alleged father's surname where the latter admitted paternity.
Ruling:
No. The Court denies the petition.
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that “illegitimate children shall use
the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code.”
This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. Consequently, the
Local Civil Registrar correctly refused to register the certificate of live birth of petitioner’s
illegitimate child using the surname of the alleged father, even with the latter’s consent. Of
course, the putative father, though a much married man, may legally adopt his own
illegitimate child. In case of adoption, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the
adopter, entitled to use his surname.
Mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil registrar to register the certificate of live birth of
an illegitimate child using the father’s surname, even with the consent of the latter. Mandamus
does not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law.

 R.A. 9255: Allowing illegitimate children to use the surname of their father, amending
Art. 176, Family Code

Republic v. Abadilla, 302 SCRA 358 (1999)

Facts:
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children,
Emerson and Rafael. In the Certificates of Birth of these two children, they were registered with
the surname "Abadilla" and the name of their father was entered as "Herson" Abadilla.
Moreover, the entry in the date and place of marriage of the children’s parents appeared as
June 19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
Thereafter, an Amended Petition for Correction/Cancellation of Entries dated February 5, 1997
was filed by Gerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Celestino and their two minor children, Emerson and
Rafael, with the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 65, seeking to have the following
corrections made in the Certificates of Birth of Emerson and Rafael:
(1) Ordering that the entries as to the date and place of marriage of petitioner GERSON R.
ABADILLA and LUZVIMINDA M. CELESTINO appearing in the certificates of birth of Emerson C.
Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla be deleted;
(2) Ordering that the entry as to the first name of petitioner Gerson C. Abadilla appearing in the
certificates of birth of (sic) Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla be corrected as "GERSON"
During the hearing of the petition, both Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino testified that
they are not yet married to each other despite bearing two children.
The trial court granted the petition and ordered the corresponding correction to be made as
follows:
(1) To issue an Amended Birth Certificate and Change an Entry therein by deleting the first
name HERSON in the column "Name of Father" and substitute it with GERSON
(2) To delete the entry appearing the column "Date of Marriage of Parents" and "Place of
Marriage of Parents and leave it blank
The Office of the Solicitor General interposed on the ground that the trial court committed a
reversible error when it allowed the deletion of the "date and place of marriage of parents"
from the birth certificates of minors Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla but failed to
order the change of the minors’ surname from "Abadilla" to "Celestino."
Issue:
WON Emerson and Rafael should use the surname of their father?
Ruling:
No. There is no dispute that Emerson and Rafael are illegitimate children and their parents were
not married to each other. During their birth the Family Code was already the governing law
and Article 176 of which explicitly provides as follows:
"ARTICLE 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
Thus, as illegitimate children they should bear the surname of their mother, Luzviminda
Celestino. The correction of the entries in their birth certificates which deleted the entry in the
date and place of marriage of parents, the corresponding correction with respect to their
surname should have also been made and changed to Celestino, their mother’s surname.
The decision of trial courtis hereby MODIFIED and the Civil Registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
is hereby ordered to change the entry in the Amended Birth Certificates of respondent-minors
Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla with respect to their surname, and enter instead
therein the surname "Celestino".

Alba vs. CA, GR No. 164041, July 29, 2005July 29, 2005
Facts:
Private respondent Rosendo C. Herrera filed a petition for cancellation of the following entries
in the birth certificate of "Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.", to wit: (1) the surname "Herrera" as
appended to the name of said child; (2) the reference to private respondent as the father of
Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.; and (3) the alleged marriage of private respondent to the child’s
mother, Armi A. Alba. He claimed that the challenged entries are false and that it was only
sometime in September 1996 that he learned of the existence of said birth certificate.
Private respondent alleged that he married only once with Ezperanza C. Santos and never
contracted marriage with Armi nor fathered Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr. In support thereof, he
presented certifications from the Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City and the National Statistics
Office, both stating that they have no record of marriage between private respondent and Armi.
Private respondent filed an amended petition, impleading Armi and "all the persons who have
or claim any interest in the petition."
The trial court issued an Order setting the petition for hearing and directed the publication and
service of said order to Armi at her address appearing in the birth certificate and to the Civil
Registrar of the City of Manila and the Solicitor General.
Berfore the scheduled hearing, the trial court issued an Amended Order with substantially the
same contents, except that the hearing was re-scheduled. At the scheduled hearing, the
counsel from the Office of the Solicitor General appeared but filed no opposition to the
petition. Armi, on the other hand was not present.
The court a quo rendered a decision which became final and executory ordering the correction
of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., in such a way that the
entry under the name of the child, the surname Herrera, Jr. is ordered deleted, and the child
shall be known as ROSENDO ALBA; and that the entry under the date and place of marriage is
likewise ordered deleted or cancelled.
Private respondent filed a motion for amendment of the decretal portion of the decision to
include the cancellation of all entries having reference to him as the father of petitioner minor.
This was granted in the order of the trial court as follows.
Armi and petitioner minor filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of
Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over their person. She
allegedly came to know of the decision of the trial court when San Beda College, where her son
was enrolled as a high school student, was furnished by private respondent with a copy of a
court order directing the change of petitioner minor’s surname from Herrera to Alba.
Armi averred that private respondent was aware of her address because such was her
residence when she and private respondent cohabited as husband and wife from 1982 to 1988;
and her abode when petitioner minor was born. Even after their separation, private respondent
continued to give support to their son until 1998.
In his answer, private respondent denied paternity of petitioner minor and his purported
cohabitation with Armi. He branded the allegations of the latter as "false statements coming
from a polluted source."
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition holding, among others, that petitioner failed to
prove that private respondent employed fraud and purposely deprived them of their day in
court. It further held that as an illegitimate child, petitioner minor should bear the surname of
his mother. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the instant
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing petitioner’s petition.
Ruling:
Petitioner failed to establish the merits of her petition to annul the trial court’s decision. In an
action for annulment of judgment, the petitioner must convince the court that something may
indeed be achieved should the assailed decision be annulled. Under Article 176 of the Family
Code as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 9255, which took effect on March 19, 2004,
illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their
filiation, in which case they may bear the father’s surname. In Wang v. Cebu Civil Registrar, it
was held that an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father, bears only a
given name and his mother’s surname. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child
identifies him as such. It is only when said child is recognized that he may use his father’s
surname, reflecting his status as an acknowledged illegitimate child.
In the present case, it is clear from the allegations of Armi that petitioner minor is an
illegitimate child because she was never married to private respondent. Considering that the
latter strongly asserts that he is not the father of petitioner minor, the latter is therefore an
unrecognized illegitimate child. As such, he must bear the surname of his mother.
In sum, the substantive and procedural aspects of the instant controversy do not warrant the
annulment of the trial court’s decision.

 Married Woman
Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was
then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the
following entries appear in her passport: "Rallonza" as her surname, "Maria Virginia" as her
given name, and "Remo" as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport,
petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the DFA
office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in
the replacement passport.
Petitioner’s request having been denied, Atty. Manuel Joseph R. Bretana III, representing
petitioner, wrote then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siason expressing a similar request.
DFA, through Assistant Secretary Belen F. Anota, denied the request. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the above-letter resolution was denied in a letter. Petitioner filed an appeal
with the Office of the President.
The Office of the President dismissed the appeal and ruled that Section 5(d) of Republic Act No.
8239 (RA 8239) or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 "offers no leeway for any other
interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment, or declaration of marriage may a
married woman revert to her maiden name for passport purposes." The Office of the President
further held that in case of conflict between a general and special law, the latter will control the
former regardless of the respective dates of passage. Since the Civil Code is a general law, it
should yield to RA 8239.
The Office of the President denied the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for review. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals denied the petition
and affirmed the ruling of the Office of the President. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether petitioner, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport, can
revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of
her marriage.
Ruling:
In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname
or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in her
new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the
marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still
do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she
may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d)
of RA 8239. These instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity
of marriage. Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her
maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to
the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.
Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a
special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title
XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames.
Moreover, petitioner’s theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an
implied repeal is disfavored. The apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should
be harmonized as much as possible, so that each shall be effective. For a law to operate to
repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so
repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act. This petitioner failed to establish.
We DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

Laperal v. Republic, 6 SCRA 357

Facts:
Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio a petition respectfully prayed that
after the necessary proceedings are had, she be allowed to resume using her maiden name of
Elisea Laperal.
The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that the same violates
the provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by
the Rules of Court.
In its decision, the court denied the petition for the reason that Article 372 of the Civil Code
requires the wife, even after she is decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue
using the name and surname she employed before the legal separation. Upon petitioner's
motion, however, the court, treating the petition as one for change of name, reconsidered its
decision and granted the petition on the ground that to allow petitioner, who is a
businesswoman decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using her married
name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal
assets. Hence, this appeal by the State.
Issue:
WON petitioner should be allowed to resume using her maiden name.
Ruling:
There seems to be no dispute that in the institution of these proceedings, the procedure
prescribed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name has been observed. But from
the petition quoted in full at the beginning of these opinion, the only reason relied upon for the
change of name is the fact that petitioner is legally separated from her husband and has, in fact,
ceased to live with him for many years. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Rule 103 which
refers to change of name in general, may prevail over the specific provisions of Article 372 of
the New Civil Code with regards to married women legally separated from their husbands.
Even, however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact of legal separation alone — which is the
only basis for the petition at bar — is, in our opinion, not a sufficient ground to justify a
change of the name of herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to provide an easy
circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Article 372.
It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated that as the
petitioner owns extensive business interests, the continued used of her husband surname may
cause undue confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. This
finding is however without basis. In the first place, these were not the causes upon which the
petition was based; hence, obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced. Secondly,
with the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, the conjugal partnership between
petitioner and her husband had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. (Art. 106[2], Civil
Cod). Consequently, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets.

 Legally Separated Wife

 Widow
 Additional Names and Surnames, when required
 Identity of Names & Surnames between Ascendants and Descendants
 Change of Name

Republic v. Vicencio, Dec. 14, 1998

Facts:
Petitioner's evidence is to the effect that she was born on 19 January 1971 to the spouses Pablo
Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres; that after a marital spat, Pablo Vicencio left
their conjugal abode; that since then Pablo Vicencio never reappeared nor sent support to his
family and it was Ernesto Yu who had come to the aid of Fe Esperanza Labres and her children;
that, Fe Esperanza Leabres filed a petition in the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila for dissolution of their conjugal partnership, which was granted in a decision; that
petitioner's mother filed another petition for change of name and after hearing a decision was
rendered of this Court approving the petition; that petitioner's mother again filed another
petition with this Court for the declaration of Pablo Vicencio as an absentee, and which petition
was granted in a decision; that petitioner's mother and Ernesto Yu were joined in matrimony in
a ceremony.
It was also established that since her childhood, petitioner had not known mush less
remembered her real father Pablo Vicencio, and her known father had been and still is Ernesto
Yu; that despite of which she had been using the family name "Vicencio", confusion arose as to
her parentage and she had been subjected to inquiries why she is using Vicencio as her family
name, causing her extreme embarrassment.
At the hearing of the petition for change of name by the trial court, the OSG manifested that it
was opposing the petition. It participated in the proceedings by cross-examining the private
respondent Cynthia Vicencio and her witnesses.
Disregarding the OSG's contention, the trial court ruled that there is no valid cause for denying
the petition. The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, an
interposed by the Republic of the Philippines as represented by the OSG, assailing the
decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
WON the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's decision allowing the change of
private respondent's surname to that of her step-father's surname.
Ruling:
Private respondent Cynthia Vicencio is the legitimate offspring of Fe Leabres and Pablo
Vicencio. As previously stated, a legitimate child generally bears the surname of his or her
father. It must be stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed
to the sound discretion of the court, which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences
of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. 
Confusion indeed might arise with regard to private respondent's parentage because of her
surname. But even, more confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if we allow
private respondent to bear her step-father's surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him.
Private respondent might sincerely wish to be in a position similar to that of her step-father's
legitimate children, a plausible reason the petition for change of name was filed in the first
place. Moreover, it is laudable that Ernesto Yu has treated Cynthia as his very own daughter,
providing for all her needs as a father would his own flesh and blood. However, legal
constraints lead us to reject private respondent's desire to use her stepfather's surname.
Further, there is no assurance the end result would not be even more detrimental to her
person, for instead of bringing a stop to questions, the very change of name, if granted, could
trigger much deeper inquiries regarding her parentage.
Lastly, when this case was decided by the appellate court, private respondent was already 18
years old but still considered a minor because Republic Act 6809, lowering the age of majority,
was then in effect. However, regardless of private respondent's age, our conclusion remains
considering the circumstances before us and the lack of any legally justifiable cause for allowing
the change of her surname.

Hatima Yasin v. Shari'a District Court, Third Shari'a Judicial District, G.R. No. 94986, Feb. 23,
1995
Facts:
Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a Petition to resume the use
of maiden name and prayed petitioner be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name
Hatima Centi y Saul. The respondent court issued an order which reads that the petition filed is
not sufficient in form and substance in accordance with Section 2(a) and 3, Rule 103, Rules of
Court.
Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed
is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of
her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1083), and after marriage of her former
husband to another woman.
The motion was denied by the respondent court in an order. Hence, this petition alleging that
respondent court erred in applying Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to the instant case.
Issue:
WON whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition
for change of name.
Ruling:
While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority, nonetheless, the only name that may be changed is the true
and official name recorded in the Civil Register.
Petitioner's registered name is Hatima Centi Y. Saul. In the instant petition, petitioner does not
seek to change her registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she be allowed to resume
the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage to Hadji Idris Yasin, by
virtue of a decree of divorce granted in accordance with Muslim law.
In view of the foregoing considerations, we find the petition to resume the use of maiden name
filed by petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since
the law requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after
obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.
While the petition filed in the instant case leaves much to be desired in matters of form and
averment of concise statements of ultimate facts constituting the petitioner's cause of action,
nevertheless, giving it a most liberal construction, the petition suffices to convey the
petitioner's desire and prayer to resume her maiden surname on grounds of her divorce from
her former husband and subsequent marriage of the latter to another woman.

Calderon v. Republic, 19 SCRA 721

Facts:
Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, a minor, through her mother and natural guardian, Corazon
Adolfo Calderdon, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying that her name
"Gertrudes Josefina del Prado" be changed to "Getrudes Josefina Calderon." It is alleged in the
petition that the petitioner is an illegitimate child born out of a bigamous marriage contracted
by Manuel del Prado with Corazon Adolfo; that the surname "Del Prado" which the petitioner
carries is a stigma of illegitimacy; and that it is the desire of the petitioner to have her surname
changed from "Del Prado" to "Calderon "which is the surname of her foster father, the husband
of her mother.
The Provincial Fiscal of Davao, representing the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the
petition upon the ground that the change of surname of the petition is unwarranted,
considering that said petitioner was born out of a bigamous marriage and as such she has the
status of an acknowledged natural child by legal fiction and under the law she should bear the
surname of her father Manuel del Prado; and that the change of the surname of the petitioner
would be prejudicial to the rights and interest which she has by virtue of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 2272 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, annulling the marriage of her mother,
Corazon Adolfo, to Manuel del Prado, and would also be prejudicial to her rights as conferred
upon her by law. Counsel for the petitioner filed in reply to the opposition, the provincial fiscal
filed a supplemental opposition, and counsel for the petitioner filed a reply to the supplemental
opposition.
After hearing the court a quo issued an order granting the petition and ordering the change of
the name of the petitioner from "Gertrudes Josefina, del Prado," to "Gertrudes Josefina
Calderon." From the above-mentioned order the provincial fiscal, representing the Solicitor
General, appealed to this Court.
Issue:
WON the lower court's order granting the petition is, based upon "proper and reasonable
cause" as required by Section 5 of Rule 103 of the new Rules of Court.
Ruling:
We agree with the court a quo. A petition to change the name of an infant, as in this case,
should be granted only where to do so is clearly for the best interest of the child. When the
mother of the petitioner filed the instant petition she had in mind what she believed was for
the best interest of her child considering that her husband Romeo C. Calderon is the one
supporting the child and that he is agreeable to the child's using his surname. The mother had
considered the generous attitude of her husband as an opportunity for her to promote the
personality, and enhance the dignity, of her daughter, by eliminating what constitutes a stigma
of illegitimacy which her child would continue to bear if her surname is that of her illegitimate
father.

 Usurpation of Name
 Unauthorized Use of Surname
 Pen Name or Stage Name
 Alias Names

Cesario Ursua vs. CA, et. al., GR No. 112170, Apr. 10, 1996, 70 SCAD 123
Facts:
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer. The
Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct
an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of
unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of the DENR.

Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao
City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones
then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman. Before
proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that
he was reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of the respondents
before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his
name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint.

When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the
security officer to register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner
wrote the name "Oscar Perez".” He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the
Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint,
receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez.

Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo,
who also worked in the same office. When Loida learned that the person who introduced
himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua,, Loida reported the matter to
the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged.

After the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence, petitioner without leave
of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove that
his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the local civil registry was fatal to
its cause.
The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142
as amended by R. A. No. 6085. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty by imposing
an indeterminate term of one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of
P5,000.00. Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction.
Issue:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that he was charged
under the wrong law.
Ruling:
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar
Perez," which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter
to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request
of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is
no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence
showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to
his real name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated
transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he
had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able
to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not
refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and
examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute
an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The
confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes
seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those
contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid
presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and
that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. Moreover,
as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of
the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of
individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would
be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the
proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act
done by him.

IV. Absence (Arts. 381-396, NCC)

 Provisional Measures in Case of Absence
 Declaration of Absence
- Periods
- Computation of Periods
- Who can ask for declaration of absence
- When judicial declaration of absence effective

 Administration of the Property of the Absentee

- Preference of Spouse Present
- Procedure in Alienation of Property
- Grounds for Cessation of Administration

 Presumption of Death
- Under Ordinary Circumstances
- Under Extraordinary Circumstances
- Computation of Period
 - Absentee's Right of Recovery
- Effect of Absence Upon the Contingent Rights of the Absentee

V. Civil Registrar (Arts. 407-413, NCC)

 Provisional Measures in Case of Absence
 Acts, Events and Matters to be Registered
 Duty of Clerks of Court
 Books of Civil Register are Public Documents
 Kinds of Errors or Mistakes Subject of Correction

In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lim Carulasan
Wang, GR No. 159966, March 30, 2005

Facts:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition for change of
name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry. He is seeking to drop his middle name
and have his registered name change to Julian Lin Wang.

His parents plan to stay in Singapore and will let his study there. Since in Singapore, middle names or
the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a person’s name, Julian’s parents anticipate that
he will be discriminated against because of his middle name. Moreover, Carusalan sounds funny in
Mandarin language since they do not have the letter “K” and would be instead pronounced as L. Julian
and his sister might also ask whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames.

The RTC denied the petition. It found that the reason given did not fall within the grounds recognized by
law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the
State has an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the
bearers.

Julian and Anna Lisa petitioned to the SC, arguing that convenience of the child is a valid reason for
changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others.

Issue:
WON the middle name of a child should be dropped because it is a common practice in Singapore to
omit said surname.

Ruling:
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A
change of name is a privilege and not a right. And so, before a person can be authorized to change the
name given him, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason to justify such
change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling
reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the
grounds for change of name which have been held valid are:

(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation

(c) when the change will avoid confusion

(d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
and was unaware of alien parentage

(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody

(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice
public interest.

In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left
to the sound discretion of the court.

Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish
him from others who may have the same given name and surname as his.

The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,
while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their
filiation, in which case they may bear the father’s surname. Applying these laws, an illegitimate child
whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother’s surname, and
does not have a middle name.

Julian’s reason for wanting to change his name is amorphous to say the least and could not warrant
favorable action.

The only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping of his middle name is convenience. However,
how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is
not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty
does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered name.

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for
change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and
discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice
him in his rights under our laws.

The petition is DENIED.

Cerila v. Delantar, GR No. 140305, Dec. 9, 2005

Facts:
Petitioners-spouses Platon Ceruila and Librada D. Ceruilas filed an action with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 97-818932, for the annulment and cancellation of the birth
certificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar (Rosilyn), the child-victim in the rape case involving Romeo
Jaloslos. The RTC granted the Ceruilas’ petition in its decision dated April 11, 1997 2 which was nullified,
however, by the Court of Appeals (CA) on June 10, 1999. The CA denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration. Hence the present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the honorable court of appeals should have exercised its peremptory power to
declare the subject birth certificate null and void ab initio.
Ruling:
This Court notes that while the petition states that it is one for review on certiorari, it claimed
at the same time that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, which is properly a ground for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and not for
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Considering however the substance of the
issues raised herein, we shall treat the present petition, as it claims, to be a petition for review
on certiorari.
The Rules do not allow the CA to resolve the merits of the petition for the amendment and
cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn or to substitute its own findings thereon.

 E. Rule 108, Rules of Court

Republic v. Carlito Kho, GR No. 170340, June 29, 2007

Facts:
Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira filed before the RTC of Butuan
City a verified petition for correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect
changes in their respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his minor
children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries in their birth certificates.
Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition in which it was additionally prayed that Carlito’s second
name of "John" be deleted from his record of birth; and that the name and citizenship of
Carlito’s father in his marriage certificate be corrected from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and
"Filipino" to "Chinese," respectively.
As required, the petition was published for three consecutive weeks in Mindanao Daily Patrol-
CARAGA, a newspaper of general circulation, after which it was set for hearing.
In a letter addressed to the trial court, the city civil registrar stated her observations and
suggestions to the proposed corrections in the birth records of Carlito and his siblings but
interposed no objections to the other amendments.
On the scheduled hearing of the petition, only the counsel for respondents appeared as the
OSG had yet to enter its appearance for the city civil registrar. The trial court thus reset the
hearing. OSG entered its appearance with an authorization to the city prosecutor of Butuan City
to appear in the case and render assistance to it.
Respondents presented documentary evidence showing compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements of the petition. During the same hearing, an additional correction in the birth
certificates of Carlito’s children was requested to the effect that the first name of their mother
be rectified from "Maribel" to "Marivel."
By Decision, the trial court directed the local civil registrar of Butuan City to correct the entries
in the record of birth of Carlito. Additionally, the trial court ordered the correction of the birth
certificates of the minor children of Carlito.
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, faulting the trial
court in granting the petition for correction of entries in the subject. Petitioner also faulted the
trial court for ordering the change of the name "Carlito John Kho" to "Carlito Kho" for non-
compliance with jurisdictional requirements for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court.
By the assailed Decision, the CA denied petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
The CA found that Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which outlines the proper procedure
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, was observed in the case. Hence,
the present petition.
Issue:
WON the jurisdictional requirements to change Carlito’s name under Section 2 of Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court were not satisfied because the Amended Petition failed to allege Carlito’s
prior three-year bona fide residence in Butuan City, and that the title of the petition did not
state Carlito’s aliases and his true name as "Carlito John I. Kho." Petitioner concludes that the
same jurisdictional defects attached to the change of name of Carlito’s father.
Ruling:
With respect to the correction in Carlito’s birth certificate of his name from "Carlito John" to
"Carlito," the same was properly granted under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As correctly
pointed out by the CA, the cancellation or correction of entries involving changes of name falls
under letter "o" of the following provision of Section 2 of Rule 108.
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs petitions for change of
name) were not complied with, observance of the provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the
correction sought for.
More importantly, Carlito’s official transcript of record from the Urious College in Butuan
City, certificate of eligibility from the Civil Service Commission, and voter registration
record satisfactorily show that he has been known by his first name only. No prejudice is thus
likely to arise from the dropping of the second name.
The correction of the mother’s citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as appearing in Carlito’s
birth record was also proper. Of note is the fact that during the cross examination by the city
prosecutor of Epifania, he did not deem fit to question her citizenship. Such failure to oppose
the correction prayed for, which certainly was not respondents’ fault, does not in any way
change the adversarial nature of the proceedings.
Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlito’s siblings uniformly stated the
citizenship of Epifania as "Filipino." To disallow the correction in Carlito’s birth record of his
mother’s citizenship would perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal circumstances of the
siblings who are unquestionably born of the same mother and father.
Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the correction of the name of Carlito’s
wife from "Maribel" to "Marivel." The mistake is clearly clerical or typographical, which is not
only visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the understanding considering that the name
reflected in the marriage certificate of Carlito and his wife is "Marivel."
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
 Republic Act No. 9048 (An Act Authorizing The City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul
General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or
Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of Judicial Order)