CONDONATION / AGUINALDO DOCTRINE

CONANT VS BROGAN 1887

AGUINALDO VS SANTOS 1992

JEJOMAR ERWIN BINAY JR. / MORALES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November
10, 2015, 774 SCRA 431
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN,
Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S.
BINAY, JR., Respondents.

[ G.R. No. 232806, January 21, 2019 ]

EDGARDO M. AGUILAR, PETITIONER, V. ELVIRA J. BENLOT AND SAMUEL L.
CUICO, RESPONDENTS.
This Court had already clarified that the doctrine can be applied to a public officer who was elected to a different
position provided that it is shown that the body politic electing the person to another office is the same.[36] It is not
necessary for the official to have been re-elected to exactly the same position; what is material is that he was re-
elected by the same electorate.

G.R. No. 232325, April 10, 2019

DOMINGO CREBELLO, PETITIONER, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND
TIMOTEO T. CAPOQUIAN, JR., RESPONDENTS.
The ruling promulgated in Morales v. Court of Appeals on the abandonment of the
doctrine of condonation had, indeed, become final only on April 12, 2016, and thus the
abandonment should be reckoned from April 12, 2016.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11959 October 31, 1959
ARTURO B. PASCUAL, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA,
respondent-appellee.

In the absence of any precedent in this jurisdiction, we have resorted to American authorities. We
found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and
constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views with respect to the question of
whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct. The weight of
authorities, however, seems to incline to the rule denying the right to remove one from office
because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.

Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish
cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty
in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and
disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected or appointed.
 (67 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 S.W.
2d. 418; People ex rel. Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of Com'rs of
Kingfisher County vs. Shutler, 281 P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fudula, 147 A.
67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).

The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office
operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50
L.R.A. (NS) 553. As held in Conant vs. Brogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 332, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63 So.
559, 50 LRA (NS) 553 —

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of
office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers.
When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or
misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people.

Other cases applying the doctrine include the following:

Lizares v. Hechanova, et al., (G.R. No. L-22059, May 17, 1966) involving a Mayor
facing administrative charges for corruption and maladministration of public funds.

Salalima vs. Guingona, G.R. Nos. 117589-92 May 22, 1996 involving a Governor and
questionable contracts entered into by him, for which administrative liability was
deemed extinguished by reason of re-election, but without prejudice to the filing of
appropriate civil and criminal cases as may be warranted.
 In the analysis of how the Supreme Court abandons an established doctrine –
based on principle of logic – a popular subject would be the abandonment of the
condonation doctrine or what is also known as the Aguinaldo doctrine in political law.

The doctrine was established in the case of ARTURO B. PASCUAL vs. HON.
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA, G.R. No. L-11959, October 31, 1959.

Petitioner-appellant Arturo B. Pascual had been elected mayor of San Jose,

Nueva Ecija, in November 1951 and reelected in 1955. In October 6, 1956, the Acting
Provincial Governor of that province filed with the Provincial Board three administrative
charges against the said appellant. Charge III was for "Maladministrative, Abuse of
Authority, and Usurpation of Judicial Functions," x x x

After the presentation of evidence regarding the first two charges, petitioner-
appellant filed with the respondent-appellee, the Provincial Board, a motion to dismiss
the third charge above referred to, on the main ground that the wrongful acts therein
alleged had been committed during his previous term of office and could not constitute a
ground for disciplining him during his second term. Upon opposition filed by a special
counsel for the respondent-appellee, the motion to dismiss was denied by resolution of
the Board.

X x x Accordingly, the petitioner-appellant filed with the Court of First Instance of

Nueva Ecija a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking to inhibit the
said Provincial Board from proceeding with the hearing of Charge No. III, for lack of
jurisdiction.

Instead of filing an answer, the respondent-appellee moved for the dismissal of

the case on the ground that it states no cause of action because the petitioner-appellant
had not complied with the cardinal principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
before he could appeal to the courts, and because the Provincial Board had jurisdiction
over Charge No. III. After responsive pleadings had been filed by both parties, the court
below issued an order dismissing the petition "for being premature," for the reason that
the petitioner had not first appealed to the Executive Secretary. From that order, the
case was brought before us on appeal. X x x

On the main issue of the controversy — the legality of disciplining an elective

municipal official for a wrongful act committed by him during his immediately preceding
term of office – the Supreme Court ruled as follows:

In the absence of any precedent in this jurisdiction, we have resorted to

American authorities. We found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part,
probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a
divergence of views with respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or
appointment condones the prior misconduct. The weight of authorities, however, seems
to incline to the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of misconduct
during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.
 Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to
furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution
provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend
beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for
the term for which the officer was elected or appointed. (67 C.J.S. p. 248,
citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d.
418; People ex rel. Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of Com'rs of
Kingfisher County vs. Shutler, 281 P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re
Fudula, 147 A. 67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217). [Emphasis supplied]

The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the
reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen.
vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS) 553. As held in Conant vs. Brogan
(1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 332, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63 So. 559, 50 LRA (NS) 553 —

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present
term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to
elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is
not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule
the will of the people.

Even in the citation made by the Supreme Court, there is already a caveat
indicated, as shown by the emphasized portion. Apparently, the doctrine was more
suitable where the penalty imposable on the charge for previous misconduct was only
removal from office.

Subsequently, however, the ruling was adopted in other cases, and oft-cited
among them is the case of RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO vs. HON. LUIS SANTOS, as
Secretary of the Department of Local Government, and MELVIN VARGAS, as
Acting Governor of Cagayan, G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992.

Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan, having
been elected to said position during the local elections held on January 17, 1988, to
serve a term of four (4) years therefrom.

Shortly after the December 1989 coup d'etat was crushed, the Secretary of Local
Government sent a telegram and a letter, both dated December 4, 1989, to petitioner
requiring him to show cause why should not be suspended or remove from office for
disloyalty to the Republic. On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for disloyalty to the
Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed against petitioner for acts
the latter committed during the coup.
 During the hearing conducted on the charges against petitioner, complainants
presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the charges. Petitioner
neither presented evidence nor even cross-examined the complainant's witnesses,
choosing instead to move that respondent Secretary inhibit himself from deciding the
case, which motion was denied. Thereafter, respondent Secretary rendered the
questioned decision finding petitioner guilty as charged and ordering his removal from
office. Installed as Governor of Cagayan in the process was respondent Melvin Vargas,
who was then the Vice-Governor of Cagayan.

Petitioner then filed the instant petition with the Supreme Court.

While the case was pending before the Supreme Court, petitioner filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992
elections. Petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections and was proclaimed as
Governor of Cagayan.

The Supreme Court ruled that Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor
of Cagayan has rendered the pending administration case moot and academic. It
appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of
votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province.

Clearly, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases
pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.

However, in the case of CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY

AS THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND
JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, the
Supreme Court abandoned the doctrine.

On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and
Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and
other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al),
accusing them of Plunder and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known
as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of
the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati
Parking Building). Most of the acts alleged to constitute the offense occurred during the
first term of Mayor Binay from 2010 to 2013. He was re-elected for another term from
2013 to 2016.

Condonation as a defense became an issue and the Supreme Court dissected

the doctrine. It began by tracing its origins in this jurisdiction.
 As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Supreme Court,
in Pascual, resorted to American authorities and "found that cases on the matter are
conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions,
and also, in part, to a divergence of views with respect to the question of whether the
subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct." Without going
into the variables of these conflicting views and cases, it proceeded to state that:

The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the
right to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term,
to which we fully subscribe. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now uncovered that
there is really no established weight of authority in the United States (US) favoring the
doctrine of condonation, which, in the words of Pascual, theorizes that an official's re-
election denies the right to remove him from office due to a misconduct during a prior
term. In fact, as pointed out during the oral arguments of this case, at least seventeen
(17) states in the US have abandoned the condonation doctrine. The Ombudsman aptly
cites several rulings of various US State courts, as well as literature published on the
matter, to demonstrate the fact that the doctrine is not uniformly applied across all state
jurisdictions.

At any rate, the US cases are only of persuasive value in the process of the
Court's decision-making. "[They] are not relied upon as precedents, but as guides of
interpretation." Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation
doctrine, as espoused in Pascual, and carried over in numerous cases after, can be
held up against prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare decisis does not
preclude this Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica,
the stare decisis rule should not operate when there are powerful countervailing
considerations against its application. In other words, stare decisis becomes an
intractable rule only when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of standing
precedent. As the Ombudsman correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a
rigid, atemporal abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and devolves along
with the society within which it thrives. In the words of a recent US Supreme Court
Decision, "[w]hat we can decide, we can undecide."

Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:

First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the
public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct:

Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held
not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the
constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend
beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for
the term for which the officer was elected or appointed. (67 C.J.S. p. 248,
citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d.
418; People ex rel. Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of Com'rs of
 Kingfisher County vs. Shutter, 281 P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re
Fudula, 147 A. 67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).

The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x x.

Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous

misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and

[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous

misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. (43 Am.
Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS)
553. (emphasis supplied)

Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known
the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers:

As held in Conant vs. Grogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 322, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63
So. 559, 50 LRA (NS) 553 —

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present
term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to
elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and
that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been
guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to
practically overrule the will of the people.

The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the supreme
law of the land; thus, the unbending rule is that every statute should be read in light of
the Constitution. Likewise, the Constitution is a framework of a workable government;
hence, its interpretation must take into account the complexities, realities, and politics
attendant to the operation of the political branches of government.

Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was decided within

the context of the 1935 Constitution which was silent with respect to public
accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public trust.

With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public
officers underwent a significant change. The new charter introduced an entire article on
accountability of public officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof positively
recognized, acknowledged, and declared that "[p]ublic office is a public trust."
Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree
of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to
the people."

The 1987 Constitution sets forth in the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies in Article II that "[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the
public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption." Learning how unbridled power could corrupt public servants under the
regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the integrity of the public service by
declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy. More significantly, the 1987
Constitution strengthened and solidified what has been first proclaimed in the 1973
Constitution by commanding public officers to be accountable to the people at all times:

The Supreme Court thus found no legal authority to sustain the condonation
doctrine in this jurisdiction. It was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way
back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now rendered obsolete by - the current
legal regime. In consequence, the Supreme Court found it to be high time to abandon
the condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases
following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia,
Jr.