AGNI - Jan-Apr 2021

VOL. XXIV, No.
I JANUARY 2021 - APRIL 2021

AGNI
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ISSUES
VOL. XXIV, NO. I JANUARY 2021 - APRIL 2021
GOVERNING BODY
AMB KANWAL SIBAL

CHAIRMAN
MR SESHADRI CHARI
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MR DEEPAK VASDEV
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VOL. XXIV, NO. I JANUARY 2021 - APRIL 2021
CONTENTS
EDITOR’S PAGE............................................................................................................i-v
INDIA EMERGES AS A ROADBLOCK IN CHINA’S

MARCH TO THE PERSIAN GULF
RAMTANU MAITRA.................................................................................................1-17
INDIA’S FAILED DIPLOMATIC AND STRATEGIC

EXPERIMENTS AND A PATH FORWARD
ASHOK KAPUR........................................................................................................18-45
THE IMPORTANCE OF LEARNING TIBETAN CIVILIZATION AND HISTORY

CLAUDE ARPI.........................................................................................................46-59
TURKEY – THE TEMPESTS AHEAD

SANU KAINIKARA..................................................................................................60-78
SECURITY CHALLENGES AND MANAGEMENT OF

INDIA’S INTERNATIONAL BORDERS
JK VERMA............................................................................................................79-106
THE SECOND NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR:

IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIAN SUBCONTINENT
MANBHANJAN MEHER......................................................................................107-121
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF HOME-GROWN TERRORISM

SHUBHRA SANYAL.............................................................................................122-137
AGNI
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
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ISBN 978-81-7593-139-8 [AGNI Volume XXIV. Number I]
ISSN 0971-7862 AGNI
AGNI pp. i -v
Studies in International Strategic Issues Printed in INDIA. All rights reserved
Vol. XXIV No. I January 2021- April 2021
EDITOR’S PAGE
The year 2021 ushered in a ray of hope on multiple fronts – the “Wuhan” virus vaccines
were finally ready for being rolled out across many countries, the economic forecast for
the Indian economy was heartening despite the present scenario and the border
disengagement talks with China seemed to be making some headway.
The controversies regarding the US Presidential Elections made headlines at the start of
the year, till the inauguration of Joe Biden finally settled the issue. As remarked by Eric
Bjornlund, an American expert in election observation and co-founder and president of
Democracy International, “With an incumbent president attacking the electoral process
as rigged and refusing to commit to accepting the results, the Nov 3 US elections increasingly
resemble those in struggling democracies and autocratic countries.” Further, the partisan
role played by the Big Tech in controlling social media left a bitter aftertaste and resulted
in many countries waking up to the reality of this new threat to their sovereignty.
In the first week of April 2021, the nation woke up to the news on one of the bloodiest
Maoist attacks which left 22 members of the Indian security forces dead. Around 2,000
security personnel had launched a planned operation in Maoist-hit Bijapur and Sukma
districts after learning that rebels had gathered in the forests. Such large losses occur
frequently, and we hardly seem to learn lessons from past failures. The US State Department’s
‘Country Report on Terrorism 2018’ had termed the banned CPI (Maoist) outfit as the
“sixth deadliest terror group in the world.”
The disengagement process along the India-China border in eastern Ladakh started on
February 10, 2021 and was completed smoothly. However, the withdrawal of Indian troops
from the strategic Kailash Ranges, which are within Indian territory, became a debated
move and drew mixed reactions from the security community. The next phase of the talks
on disengagement in other areas has presently drawn a blank, allowing the naysayers to
question the earlier agreement not being linked to the overall process. Lt Gen DS Hooda
(Retd) remarked, “I don’t see an early resolution to the standoff because the kind of
messaging from the Chinese side doesn’t seem to indicate that they are in hurry.”
After the fiasco in Ladakh in 2020, where the Chinese soldiers did not fare well compared
to the Indian soldiers, Beijing has started reforms and enrolment of minorities like the
i
Tibetans in the PLA. Already this year, nearly 4,000 Tibetans have cleared the first round
in a recruitment drive. However, ‘ideology’ remains the crucial criteria for final selection,
with most Tibetans having relatives, and their spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama in exile in
India.
The recent US’ proposed withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan by September 11 hands
the Taliban a major victory, as it is unconditional. Bertrand Russell had once described the
nature of war as one that determines not who is right but who is left. Nowhere in the world
is this description more applicable than the US’ war in Afghanistan. After two decades of
conflict, what is left is a bruised and battered Afghanistan whose future now lies as uncertain
as it was 20 years ago. The US spent more than $2 trillion and lost over 2,400 soldiers in
the war, with little to show for it in terms of any achievement. Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain
expressed the view that “Afghanistan, the Middle East and the danger from extremist Islam
are all secondary in comparison to the threat from China towards US interests in the Indo-
Pacific” as a reason for the decision.
Much to the surprise of many people was the announcement of the re-implementation of
the Ceasefire Agreement of 2003 on the LoC, by both DGMOs in February 2021. Economic
stress faced by Pakistan seems to be the reason for Pakistan to seek peace. Pakistan’s total
external debt and liabilities rose to $113.8 billion in the fiscal year 2020. However, this
appears another propaganda measure by Pakistan as it continues to link the peace initiative
with discussion on Kashmir.
At the plenary meetings of the FATF held on February 22-25, 2021 it was decided that
Pakistan would remain on the FATF “grey list”. In an excellent paper recently published
‘Bearing the Cost of Global Politics: The Impact of FATF Grey-Listing on Pakistan’s Economy’
by Dr Naafey Sardar, a faculty member at Texas A&M University-San Antonio, suggests
that FATF grey-listing from 2008 to 2019 had caused cumulative real gross domestic
product (GDP) losses of over $38 billion to Pakistan, the worst hit being household and
government consumption expenditures, which experienced a drop of 58 per cent. The
long-term actions by the military, undoubtedly, are endured by the people of Pakistan.
The Myanmar Army coup of February 1 was unexpected and caught the world by surprise.
Equally unforeseen has been the rapid and sustained upsurge in country-wide protests.
The protestors’ actions against Chinese assets have exposed the depth of historical anti-
China sentiment embedded in Myanmar’s society. For India, Myanmar is a strategic
neighbour with whom it has close relations. India’s approach to the current situation was
expressed by the Indian Foreign Secretary on March 16, when he announced that India is
working constructively in the UN Security Council to facilitate a balanced outcome to the
crisis.
ii
Two major events occurred during the first quarter of the year, affecting the geopolitics of
the region. China and Iran signed a 25-year strategic agreement on March 27, 2021 under
which China will invest $400 billion in exchange for oil supply at a preferential price. This
follows a 10-year Iranian-Russia Agreement. This highlights the failing US policy of isolating
Iran and displays growing political, economic and military integration between Asian
countries. It also places a cloud on the Indian investment at Chahbahar port.
The second event was the visit of Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov to India in the
first week of April 2021. His subsequent visit to Pakistan, the first by a Russian foreign
minister since 2012 led to many questions. Both visits hold significance, the first over the
apparent unease in Moscow over the proactive approach of the Quad member nations in
dealing with the geopolitical developments in the Indo-Pacific region. In Pakistan, Lavrov
said Russia was ready to provide military equipment and both have agreed to further
conduct military exercises and drills. “Russia’s ties with Pakistan is independent in nature
similar to our ties with India. We are going to develop this relationship (with Pakistan)
further. It is based on the same values based on which we have ties with India,” Russian
Ambassador Nikolay Kudashev was quoted as saying at a press conference in December
2020.
In the recently held Quad virtual summit on March 12, 2021, with participation by the
Head of the States for the first time, the contours of future cooperation were given out in a
joint statement to “Strive for a region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by
democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion.” Chinese strategists see the group
transitioning from a loose diplomatic configuration with little impact into a more
institutionalized and worrisome arrangement.
The year witnessed a major boost to the Prime Minister’s ‘Atmanirbharta’ drive in defence
hardware. The Navy commissioned the third stealth Scorpene-class Submarine INS Karanj
on March 10. In February, the 100th K9 VAJRA 155mm/52 caliber Tracked Self-Propelled
Howitzer rolled out of the L&T’s Armoured System Complex (ASC). Kalyani Rafael Advanced
Systems Pvt Ltd (KRAS) MSME – a joint venture between two global giants – India’s Kalyani
Group, and Rafael Advanced Defence Systems of Israel – rolled out the first batch of Medium
Range Surface to Air Missile (MRSAM) in March 2021. In February, Hindustan Aerospace
Limited signed a $6.58 billion agreement to deliver 83 new Tejas jets to the Indian Air
Force, which will involve about 500 Indian companies including MSMEs.
The conduct of social media during the US presidential elections and subsequently during
the farmer protests apparently hastened the rollout of regulations for social media
companies and digital streaming websites to make them more accountable, in February
2021. This is a long overdue and welcome move by the Indian government to make social
iii
media platforms more accountable to the laws of the land and follows a growing trend in
this direction by numerous countries.
IN THIS ISSUE
Ramtanu Maitra in his article India Emerges as a Roadblock in China’s March to

the Persian Gulf reviews the causes for the nosedive in bilateral relations between India
and China – a result of deceptions being played out by China since long. He brings out the
deliberate Chinese strategy to keep the border issue simmering to keep India unsettled,
while it keeps expanding its enclaves along the border by “salami-slicing”. He also analyses
how India has been an obstacle in China’s plans in the region.
In the article India’s Failed Diplomatic and Strategic Experiments And A Path
Forward, Ashok Kapur traces the history of India’s diplomatic and strategic policy since
before independence and brings out how they failed in getting a good deal for the country.
This, initially, resulted in the partition of the country, and later was unable to match the
designs of our neighbours, China and Pakistan. The article discusses the reasons for this,
and how these issues are now being addressed to give India its rightful place India in the
world order.
Claude Arpi’s article The Importance of Learning Tibetan Civilization and History
stresses that to understand and tackle the complex relations between India and China,
especially the vexed border issue, it is imperative to know the historical genesis of the
problem. This will also expose the distortions in history introduced by China to suit its
narrative. Even though China occupied Tibet in the early 1950s, its influence continues to
play a major role in bilateral relations. Study of Tibetan civilization and history is imperative
for the forces deployed on the ground as well as the civil services dealing with the issue.
Sanu Kainikara in his article Turkey – The Tempests Ahead analyses the perceptible
drop in Turkey’s relations with the Western powers as the country regressed from being
considered a moderate and secular Islamic democracy to an Islamic autocracy. The article
examines the meandering foreign policy followed by Turkey, which has hurt its relations
even with the Arabs, and has cautioned Russia. This has led to a drop in the economic
indicators of the country, a high rate of inflation and a consequent drop in domestic approval
ratings of the ruling party.
The recent border clashes with China have put the focus back again on the issue of border
management. JK Verma in his article Security Challenges and Management of
India’s International Borders analyses in detail the challenges in managing the long
and varied borders, which comprise both land and maritime boundaries. Many of which
are disputed or even undemarcated, while some remain flash-points between opposing
iv
forces guarding them. The article traces the efforts made toward effective border
management by the government while highlighting the loopholes still existing in the
measures adopted and which need urgent attention.
Turkey has been making news in the recent past; in the second article on the country,
Manabhanjan Meher goes into the background of The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War:
Implications for the Indian Subcontinent and how the conflict played out. One of
the major conflicts of 2020, it changed the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. The article
also brings out the role played by the Turkey-Pakistan-Malaysia axis and its implications
on the geopolitics of the Indian subcontinent.
The recent Maoist attack on the security forces has again raised the long-festering issue of
home-grown terrorism in the country. Shubhra Sanyal in her article Psychodynamics
of Home Grown Terrorism examines the causes leading to this form of terrorism taking
root across large parts of the country and suggests measures that should be taken to alleviate
the problem.
Brigadier Amreshwar Pratap Singh (Retd)

Editor
v
INDIA EMERGES AS A ROADBLOCK IN CHINA’S MARCH TO THE PERSIAN GULF
AGNI pp 1-17
Vol. XXIV, No. I January 2021 - April 2021
BY
RAMTANU MAITRA
W
ithin a relatively short period, bilateral relations between China
and India have taken a nosedive. During the past five years,
the veil of trust that had shrouded the face of rising China and
kept Indian eyes misty and unfocused for the last three decades was
lifted. A set of harsh knocks forced India to look at the real face of Xi
Jinping’s China and accept today’s Beijing as a fierce competitor that
would not hesitate to bend all norms to brush aside India’s concerns
about security, and even sovereignty, to pursue its goals. Coming to
grips with this unpleasant reality and exhibiting the willingness to stand
up to protect its interest based on that reality, India has finally positioned
itself as a formidable obstacle to China’s determined march through
South Asia to West and Central Asia.
Now that India and China are at loggerheads and not the friends they
could have been, a great deal of uncertainty may dog the future of
smaller nations in the South Asian region. To mitigate that uncertainty,
both China and India will have to act based on ground realities. First,
China needs to look at India with clear eyes and accept India’s strengths.
China will have to accept that the days of coercing India from one
defensive position into another through dilatory talks and deceptive
actions are over.
The 2017 stand-off at Doklam – the tri-junction of India, China and

Bhutan – between the Peoples Liberation Army and the Indian Army
should have been an eye-opener for Beijing. India’s firmness led to the
Chinese troops’ withdrawal after more than two months of tense
confrontation/stalemate. But China’s fresh adventure in the frozen plains
Vol. XXIV, No. I 1
Ramtanu Maitra
of Ladakh in May 2020 indicates that Beijing chose to remain in a state

of denial. At the time of this writing, Chinese troops are still holding on
to the ground they encroached in the strategically important Depsang
Plains in the Galwan Valley of eastern Ladakh. Talks to achieve at least
a temporary peace between the two in Ladakh have now been taking
place for months.
CHINA ’ S D IPLOMATIC D ECEPTIONS
After Doklam, Beijing resumed its efforts to convince New Delhi that
such incidents were rare and, essentially, the product of
misunderstandings. In April 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi
flew to Wuhan, China, for a two-day informal one-on-one summit with
Chinese President Xi Jinping, the first of its kind since the Doklam
stand-off ended. The objective was to repair and reenergize the stuttering
Sino-India relationship. Although much of the content of the deliberations
remain confidential, the two heads of state issued a joint statement
afterwards indicating their agreement to push the reset button.
A month later, in May 2018, China’s Ambassador to India Luo Zhaohui

added another layer of spin on the Wuhan Summit in an article in the
Indian daily, The Tribune: “The two leaders further deepened their
understanding with each other and shared similar views on the historical
position, stage and goal of development of China and India. The two
sides viewed each other’s developmental intentions positively and
decided to build a Closer Developmental Partnership in an equal,
mutually beneficial and sustainable manner.” Ambassador Luo Zhaohui
continued: “Prime Minister Modi briefed President Xi on India’s
‘neighbourhood first’ policy and the concept of ‘the world as one,’ which
are quite similar with President Xi’s idea of ‘neighbourhood diplomacy
as high priority’ and ‘to build a community of shared future for mankind.’”
(My Interpretation of Wuhan Summit; The Tribune; May 6, 2018).
China’s effort to keep India’s guard down was given another push in
October 2019 when yet another informal summit between Prime Minister
Modi and President Xi Jinping took place at Mamallapuram, near
Chennai, India. Xi’s objective at that summit was clearly to sidestep
the security and sovereignty-related disputes and assure Modi that he
would work toward narrowing India’s huge trade deficit with China, an
imbalance that troubles India. Xi also assured Modi that China would
2 Vol. XXIV, No. I

take measures to enhance border security, an assurance that turned

out to be wholly disingenuous. For Beijing, the talks at Mamallapuram
were all about optics.
One other apparent bit of Chinese deception centered on Kashmir.

President Xi never mentioned Prime Minister Modi’s August 5, 2019
decision to abrogate sections of the Kashmir-centered Article 370 that
led to the separation of Ladakh as a Union Territory from Jammu and
Kashmir during the Mamallapuram summit. Yet on August 6, more
than two months before the Mamallapuram summit and a day after
Prime Minister Modi’s announcement of the decision, Global Times –
the English-language outlet of the People’s Daily, the mouthpiece of the
Chinese Communist Party – tweeted: “China opposes India putting
Chinese territory in the western section of the border under its
administration, which affects China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
It is ‘unacceptable and void.’” Global Times cited the Chinese Foreign
Ministry office.
Further, on August 6, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua

Chunying noted that India’s decision to “scrape away” Kashmir’s
constitutional status and alter the status of the disputed territories
through its domestic laws is “unacceptable” and does “not have any
legal effect.” Responding to a question on India’s abolition of Kashmir’s
special status, the spokesperson noted, “China is seriously concerned
about the current situation in Jammu and Kashmir.”
It would have been appropriate for China not to have reacted because
Beijing knew that the Indian decision vis-à-vis the state of Jammu and
Kashmir is India’s internal matter and, further, that the abrogation of
Article 370 was done to send a clear signal to Pakistan that their aiding
and abetting of the dissidents within the Indian-administered part of
Jammu and Kashmir was over and that it was time to bid farewell to
any prospect of Kashmir’s secession.
Given that his foreign ministry was expressing deep concern, President
Xi’s silence on the subject in his talks with Prime Minister Modi meant
only one thing: Xi was not interested in hearing the facts, and that the
commander-in-chief of China’s military had already begun planning to
stage a military attack in Ladakh to advance the PLA west of the
mutually agreed-on but non-demarcated Line of Actual Control (LAC).
Vol. XXIV, No. I 3

Ramtanu Maitra
That the PLA’s aggression in Ladakh was premeditated and had the
involvement of the Chinese government at the highest level is a view
shared by other experts. One of them is Ashley J. Tellis, a senior associate
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC,
and earlier a staff member of the US National Security Council serving
as special assistant to the President. In “Hustling in the Himalayas:
The Sino-Indian Border Confrontation,” Tellis addressed China’s Ladakh
aggression: “But this time, there is one important difference: unlike the
discrete and geographically localized confrontations of the past, the latest
encounters are occurring at multiple locations along the LAC in Ladakh
in the eastern section of Jammu and Kashmir, which suggests a high
degree of Chinese premeditation and approval for its military’s activities
from the very top.” (Hustling in the Himalayas: The Sino-Indian Border
Confrontation; Ashely J. Tellis; Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace; June 4, 2020).
Tellis noted that Chinese activity in Ladakh centered on bringing “new

territorial enclaves under Chinese control, were occurring simultaneously
at several different locations, such as on the northern bank of the Pangong
Tso, at Hot Springs, and in the Galwan Valley, north of Pangong Tso,
places that all lie in the LAC in eastern Ladakh. The Chinese military
now appears to have occupied some 40-60 square kilometers of territory
claimed by New Delhi in these areas.” In Pangong Tso, China is
aggressively completing a motorable road, and in the Galwan Valley, it
is reportedly building bunkers and barracks, Tellis added.
Resisted and subsequently pushed back by Indian troops in the Pangong

Tso area, Beijing’s immediate concern now is how to hook up with
Pakistan-administered Gilgit-Baltistan through Ladakh. This is an
important objective for China since it has invested heavily in its Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly in Pakistan, and is setting up a
large port at Gwadar on Pakistan’s Makran coast.
Likely, Gwadar will be converted into a major naval base in the coming
years. Once that naval base is established, China could then become a
formidable gatekeeper of the Straits of Hormuz and emerge as a prime
arbiter of the Persian Gulf oil and gas bounty. President Xi Jinping has
identified BRI as the path on which China will march to global dominance.
Because the stakes are so high, Pakistan has emerged as a key nodal
point for China.
4 Vol. XXIV, No. I

TELL-TALE SIGNS FROM THE PAST
The Doklam stand-off and subsequent violent activities by the PLA in

Ladakh have been cited by some observers as signs of China’s growing
arrogance in its quest to show the world that India remains a pushover
militarily. What is evident to all is that China is trying to take advantage
of a border that remains undemarcated. It is taken for granted that
transgressions can occur in the absence of a mutually defined Line of
Actual Control. However, Beijing’s role over the decades in keeping the
border issues alive is one long tale of deception staged by Chinese
authorities at the highest level – a short history of it is worth repeating
here.
In 1979, visiting Indian Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee was told
by none other than Chairman Deng Xiaoping to set aside the border
dispute for the next generation while working to improve China-India
relations. Deng’s blatantly disingenuous proposal was dished out again
to former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi during his 1988 visit to China
when Deng used the formulation “work hard to create a favourable
climate and conditions for a fair and reasonable settlement of the
boundary question while seeking a mutually acceptable solution to this
question.” (India-China Relations – an introspection: Ambassador
Saurabh Kumar: Centre for China Analysis & Strategy, Sept 2014). In
essence, Deng told the Indian leaders: ‘Thank you, but a border solution
is not on our radar screen.’ Why was he saying that? He wanted to
ensure that India would drop its guard and allow China to make fresh
inroads inside the non-demarcated borders, keeping open the option to
slowly eat up bits and pieces of Indian territory in its westward march.
Deng’s tactic to keep India unsuspecting of China’s real intent was on

exhibit again in 2005 when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India
and proposed the “Agreement on Political Parameters & Guiding
Principles for Settlement of the Boundary Question” to accompany the
announcement of a “Strategic and Cooperative Partnership.” Those
announcements produced euphoria among a section of Indian policy
analysts. Some even declared that China was ready, set and go to drop
their claims in the Eastern sector (covering Arunachal Pradesh) as part
of a package deal involving India’s concessions in the Western sector
(Aksai Chin) and a mutually acceptable settlement of the border dispute.
Vol. XXIV, No. I 5

Ramtanu Maitra
What followed was a fresh dose of reality. In 2006, hardly a year after
Wen’s crowd-pleasing bait and on the eve of President Hu Jintao’s visit
to New Delhi, Chinese Ambassador Sun Yuxi was heard publicly asserting
China’s claim to the whole of Arunachal Pradesh. What that meant,
Ambassador Saurabh Kumar, a Mandarin-speaking Indian diplomat who
served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy of India in Beijing,
pointed out at the time, was that China was not interested in marginal
adjustments of the disputed border but wanted to negotiate a large
chunk of Indian territory in the entire border area. It was yet another
act of bad faith guided from the top since the days of Deng Xiaoping,
and pursued to date by Xi Jinping, with the exclusive agenda to
undermine India’s sovereignty.
Not only was the promise of a “strategic and cooperative partnership”

turn out to be a non-starter, at least two dozen rounds of talks have
taken place since, ostensibly to resolve the border dispute, and that
has led nowhere and resulted in what India encountered in Ladakh in
2020. There was no way for the border talks to progress because the
Chinese refuse to produce maps that could justify their claims. The
reality is that China does not have a map, but it has no dearth of
territorial claims. What New Delhi must accept is that Beijing was never
interested in resolving the border dispute or any part of it, because
that would end its justification for claiming additional territories. That
would end Beijing’s present policy, which is to set up PLA enclaves
within Indian territories, claiming it belongs to China.
WHAT PROMPTS CHINA TO BE AGGRESSIVE IN EASTERN L ADAKH
In Ladakh, China tried the same tactic in the Pangong Tso area, southeast
of Depsang Plains, but Indian forces pushed them back. A formal
disengagement took place in this area subsequently. On February 11,
2021, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh told the Parliament that
India and China will remove forward deployments in a “phased,
coordinated and verified manner.” A day earlier the China’s Defense
Ministry said in a statement that both sides had started a “synchronized
and organized” disengagement. What has come across so far, however,
is a “temporary moratorium on military activities” on the lake’s northern
bank. “Patrolling will be resumed only when both sides reach an
agreement in diplomatic and military talks that would be held
6 Vol. XXIV, No. I

subsequently,” Rajnath Singh said. (India, China begin troop withdrawal

from contested border; Aijaz Hussain; Associated Press; Feb 11, 2021).
As of this writing, no such agreement has been reached in the Depsang

Plains area, where India claims the Chinese-controlled Aksai Chin plateau
as part of Ladakh. According to India, the control line is 3,488 kilometers
(2,167 miles) long; China says it is considerably shorter.
Setting aside the nitty-gritty of where the exact control line is, one
major reason why China chose to act aggressively in the northern part
of Eastern Ladakh and is putting up myriad arguments against reaching
an agreement is because that part of Ladakh has strategic geographical
significance. It acts as a sharp wedge between Gilgit-Baltistan in the
west (Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir), where China has positioned its
security personnel as part of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC), and Aksai Chin in the east. (China’s Adventurism in Eastern
Ladakh – A Strategic Miscalculation; Lt General VK Ahluwalia; Wilson
Center; July 20, 2020).
According to Sarosh Bana, writing for the Begin-Sadat Center for

Strategic Studies (BESA), China’s adventurism in Eastern Ladakh might
be explained by its pique at Delhi’s completion last year of the 255
kilometer-long Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) road, which
improved India’s connectivity along the 1,147 kilometer LAC in Eastern
Ladakh. That road leads to the world’s highest airstrip and to India’s
military base at DBO, which is just 12 kilometers south of the strategic
Karakoram Pass. A mere seven kilometers north is the post of
Shenxianwan, considered the toughest PLA posting in China. (India
Has Few Options to Thwart Chinese Aggression; Sarosh Bana; BESA;
Oct 12, 2020).
According to Henry Boyd and Meia Nouwens of Britain’s International

Institute for Strategic Studies, the PLA has three border defence
companies based close to the areas in question in Aksai Chin. In addition
to the border forces, the PLA has mobilized conventional combat forces,
most likely from the 6th Mechanized Division. This formation is based
far to the northwest, on the southern boundary of the Taklamakan
Desert, and constitutes the Southern Xinjiang Military District’s primary
operational reserve. In the 2017 Doklam confrontation, PLA force
dispositions seemed to follow a similar pattern, with border forces on
Vol. XXIV, No. I 7

Ramtanu Maitra
the frontline, but with regular manoeuver formations deployed further

back as a reserve. (Understanding the military build-up on the China-
India border; Henry Boyd and Meia Nouwens; IISS; June 18, 2020).
CHINA ACTING TO SERVE ITS ALLY, PAKISTAN
Beyond the determined pursuit to expand its security perimeter, there

is another factor that runs through China’s activities – the Pakistan
factor. Historically, China maintained a balanced approach to India-
Pakistan security crises and has routinely advocated de-escalation of
tension and diplomatic negotiations. But that was apparently a diplomatic
posture that disguised China’s longstanding in-place geostrategic plan
to shield and protect Pakistan – the anchor of its balancing strategy on
the subcontinent – and thereby secure open access to that country.
The policy has largely worked.
China has invested heavily in Pakistan, and only a small part of that
investment can be judged in terms of dollars and pounds. The real
importance of Pakistan to China is long-term and geostrategic. Pakistan’s
willingness, if not eagerness, to allow China to use its land to access
Afghanistan and beyond into West Asia was music in China’s ears. This
is exactly what Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative was designed for.
From the outset, while India was unwilling to boost China’s connectivity
projects, Pakistan, by contrast, was enthusiastic; and plans for an
economic corridor between Pakistan and China were announced in the
summer of 2013 when then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met Chinese
Prime Minister Li Keqiang in Beijing.
This project later named the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),

was eventually launched in 2015. China’s stated aim in the CPEC was
to expand its trade links and influence in Pakistan and across Central
and South Asia. These goals blend seamlessly into China’s much broader
Belt and Road Initiative launched in 2016. In 2017, Beijing and Islamabad
re-visited the CPEC project plan and drew up a “Long Term Plan,”
which extended China’s timeline for implementation to 2030. The original
projected cost of US$46 billion was hiked to US$62 billion. The CPEC
had been widely covered in the media, and the geoeconomic and
geostrategic significance of the Gwadar port to China cannot be
overestimated.
8 Vol. XXIV, No. I

Once a small fishing village, Gwadar is now part of Beijing’s grandiose

CPEC hub to link up China’s western Xinjiang province to the Arabian
Sea, east of the Straits of Hormuz. When completed, it will have three
200-meter-long berths and one Ro-Ro (roll on-roll off) facility. The
port is being developed by the China Overseas Port Holding Company
(COPHC), to which it was leased by the Pakistan government for 40
years in April 2017. The final expansion of the port and ancillary systems
will be undertaken by the Chinese. China wants to make Gwadar a
corridor port – a port through which goods will transit between China,
Asia, Europe and Africa more quickly and more easily than currently.
Gwadar port is a crucial part of China’s BRI and the main feature of the
CPEC. Gwadar port will provide an alternative shipping route to the
Malacca Straits, which is frequently patrolled by the United States.
The shipping route from the Middle East to China, via the strait, is
about 12,000 km long. (A Study on Gwadar Port International
Competitiveness using Porter’s Diamond Model; AiMin Deng, Alassane
Yeo, LiHui Du; World Journal of Innovative Research (WJIR) Volume-
4, Issue-1, January 2018).
WHY PAKISTAN WELCOMES A CHINESE P RESENCE ON ITS SOIL
Pakistan has two basic interests in giving China a free hand to construct
the CPEC and to maintain a permanent presence inside the country.
First, the Pakistani military has welcomed China in because it is paranoid
that in future India might try to break up Pakistan further. The Pakistani
military is convinced that the presence of a large number of Chinese
citizens in the country, many of whom could be PLA personnel, will
deter India from making any such move.
Second, China plans to set up a major Chinese colony within Gwadar to

ensure sea-based security of the Pakistani coast. In 2018, Newsweek
magazine reported that Chinese military officials had told the South
China Morning Post that a naval base would be located at Gwadar
because the current port, which caters mostly to merchant ships, is
unable to supply the services and logistical support Chinese warships
needs. China is also reportedly building a military base on Pakistan’s
Jiwani peninsula, which is near Gwadar and close to the border with
Iran. (Why Is China Building a Military Base in Pakistan, America’s
Newest Enemy?; Cristina Maza; Newsweek; Jan 15, 2018).
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Ramtanu Maitra
The establishment of a large China-operated port with a Chinese naval

base alongside would secure the coastal areas of Pakistan and would tie
down China permanently with the responsibility of providing protection
and security to Pakistan against India. The Pakistani military believes
the development of Gwadar port and a naval base, and China’s permanent
presence will prevent the Pakistani Navy from getting bottled up as
happened during the 1971 war with India. In other words, Gwadar port
and a sizable Chinese presence will provide strategic depth to Pakistan’s
meagre marine assets.
Gwadar offers China some other related benefits. For instance, a Chinese
naval presence in the Straits of Hormuz would put a damper on US-
India domination of the Indian Ocean, a prospect that Beijing fears.
Gwadar port will provide the Chinese with a listening post from which
to observe US naval activities in the Persian Gulf, 460 km further west
of Karachi.
Pakistan further advanced its nexus with China when, at Beijing’s behest,
it invited Sri Lanka to join the CPEC. This would involve Sri Lanka, a
South Asian nation and ally of India, in Pakistan under the control of
the main investor, China. This development surfaced during Pakistani
Prime Minister Imran Khan’s two-day visit to Colombo in late February
2021, where he urged Colombo to participate in the CPEC’s projects
involving railways, power plants and the Indian Ocean port of Gwadar.
(Pakistan’s belt and road offer to Sri Lanka stokes India’s China concerns;
SCMP; Pranay Sharma; Mar 3, 2021).
CHINA ’ S I NTEREST IN PAKISTAN I S N OT N EW
China’s interest in Pakistan is huge and has been long-standing,

particularly since 1971 and the dismemberment of Pakistan’s eastern
wing with the formation of a new nation, Bangladesh. It was then that
decisions were taken in Beijing to check what was viewed as India’s
“ambition to control” South Asia. Pakistan became a natural ally of
China as both countries shared a common theme – serious discomfort
in seeing India emerge as a great power.
During the past years of bonhomie – “friendship higher than the

Himalayas, deeper than the Indian Ocean, and sweeter than honey,” in
the words of Chinese President Hu Jintao – China has showered Pakistan
10 Vol. XXIV, No. I

with a steady supply of arms to serve its own needs, the needs of its
Afghan Mujahideen in the 1980s, as well as the present needs of the
Pakistan-controlled Taliban. China has also doled out technological and
military assistance, and intelligence cooperation to Pakistan, all meant
to counter and stymie India’s influence in the region. The arms supplied
by China have also helped to arm the Pakistan-controlled terrorists
operating in Indian Jammu and Kashmir. However, the actual
relationship between the two has not always been smooth. Pakistan’s
inherent security and political instability and its aiding and abetting of
the Uyghur militants years ago has made China uncomfortable from
time to time.
The Sino-Pakistani bilateral relationship was put on an altogether

different footing in 2016 when Xi Jinping, with a grand scheme to expand
China’s physical presence and economic dominance in Western Asia,
laid out the massive Belt and Road Initiative. Pakistan was one of the
key elements in Xi’s planned westward march to South, Central and
West Asia.
CPEC connectivity is very important for China for another reason, and
that is Afghanistan. China’s interest in Afghanistan stems from its desire
to secure access to Afghanistan’s vast mineral reserves. An unstated
plank of the CPEC is Pakistan’s assurance to China to help extend the
CPEC into Afghanistan. Here, the India factor shows up again in a not-
so-subtle way.
It is widely acknowledged that Pakistan wants the Afghan Taliban, who

are determined to set up an Islamic Emirate with Sharia laws, to take
control of Kabul. That would not only keep Pakistan in the driver’s
seat; it would also minimize India’s future presence in Afghanistan.
China endorses this objective of Pakistan wholeheartedly. In fact, Beijing
has maintained direct communication channels with the Taliban since
the 1990s when the group was in power in Afghanistan. In recent years,
Beijing has hosted the group for talks on more than one occasion. Despite
such efforts, China does not have the kind of leverage over the Taliban
that Pakistan has; hence, the reliance on Islamabad.
WHY LADAKH NOW?
One could argue that China saw red in August 2019 when Prime Minister
Narendra Modi abrogated Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir and made
Vol. XXIV, No. I 11

Ramtanu Maitra
Ladakh a Union Territory. Pakistan screamed, and Imran Khan sent

out emissaries to the United Nations, China and the grouping of Islamic
countries (Organization of Islamic Cooperation) to up the ante against
India. China promptly responded, expressing its opposition to “any
unilateral change to the status quo” in Jammu and Kashmir. However,
the OIC rejected Pakistan’s screaming, stating that it considers the
matter India’s internal affair.
China may also have reacted to Indian Home Minister Amit Shah’s
declaration in the Lok Sabha on August 6 that the abrogation of Article
370 is not a political move, but that India is sending a straightforward
message: “Kashmir is an integral part of India. I want to make it
absolutely clear that every single time we say Jammu and Kashmir, it
includes Pak-Occupied Kashmir (including Gilgit-Baltistan) as well as
Aksai Chin.” Gilgit-Baltistan, the Pakistan-controlled part of Jammu
and Kashmir is where China’s CPEC enters Pakistan. Did this statement
rattle the Beijing mandarins?
From Beijing’s perspective, any Indian attempt to take over PoK or

Gilgit-Baltistan would put a monkey-wrench into the CPEC, which is
unacceptable because President Xi has staked his prestige and future
legacy on the initiative. Pakistan reacted publicly to Amit Shah’s
statement, and it is anyone’s guess what role Islamabad played in
convincing Beijing that Modi’s abrogation of Article 370 was part of an
Indian plan to cut off the CPEC.
ARE I NDIA -CHINA RELATIONS BEYOND REPAIR?
As pointed out earlier, China must have realized by now that India is
a growing, confidant nation – a far cry from what it was in 1962. Still,
China refuses to consider India as an equal. As the Co-Director of the
East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson
Center in Washington DC, Yun Sun puts it: “China believes in power
politics and its natural superiority. Beijing’s vision for Asia is strictly
hierarchical – with China at the top – and does not consider India an
equal. Recognizing India’s historical influence in South Asia, its capability
as a regional power, and its global potential, China’s policy toward India
has largely followed a pattern of balancing India in South Asia by propping
up Pakistan and developing ties with small countries in the region.”
12 Vol. XXIV, No. I

(China’s Strategic Assessment of India; Yun Sun: War On the Rocks;

March 25, 2020).
In recent years, China has advanced its pro-Pakistan policy, and it has
gone beyond “balancing India in South Asia by propping up Pakistan”
to virtually incorporating Pakistan into its geostrategic plans and
objectives. Even if meant to balance the power structure in South Asia
for the stability of the region, Beijing’s pro-Pakistan policy has undergone
a sea-change since China began to grow in leaps and bounds in the
second decade of this millennium. China is now economically the second
most powerful nation in the world and wants to dominate the world
scene. Deng Xiaoping led the shift from stay-at-home policies in the
1970s to begin moving out. In subsequent decades China developed
rapidly. During its rise, the West’s conventional wisdom said that China
would act rationally and respect other nations’ interests; as it grew,
China would become more “like us.”
The United States chose to be the lead proponent of this illusion and
acted on this wisdom for decades. One US administration after another
short-changed its population and influenced countries around the world,
preaching that incorporation of a rising China into the established
international order was a prescription for world stability. This failure of
American policymakers was pointed out by James H. Baker, who directs
the Defense Department’s Office of Net Assessment, during a private
talk before a Japanese-US audience in July 2017. It is “not clear that
US elites across the political spectrum understand the danger that China
poses as a competitor,” Baker stated, noting that the Chinese Communist
Party wants to dominate the world. “Comparative military advantage
remains with the United States (and its allies) but is being systematically
undermined by increased Chinese investment, focus, training and basing,”
Baker added. (US ‘being systematically undermined’ by China as ‘radical
tendencies’ go unchallenged; Washington Dailies; Mar 14, 2021).
China’s determination to dominate the world was presented most lucidly

by none other than President Xi Jinping himself. Addressing the 19 th
Party Congress in October 2017, Xi declared that China “has stood up,
grown rich, and is becoming strong,” and that it was now “blazing a new
trail for other developing countries” and offering “Chinese wisdom and
a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind.” By 2049,
Xi promised, China would “become a global leader in terms of composite
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Ramtanu Maitra
national strength and international influence” and would build a “stable

international order” in which China’s “national rejuvenation” could be
fully achieved. (What Does China Really Want? To Dominate the World;
Hal Brands; Bloomberg Opinion; May 20, 2020).
Xi’s words will remain the driving spirit of the risen China. China will
pursue its grandiose plan, the Belt and Road Initiative, and will try to
push off, or even step on, any country that comes in its way. One such
nation China has in its crosshairs is India.
After almost three decades of a nonviolent approach to resolving who

is where on the non-demarcated Line of Actual Control between India
and China, the PLA engaged in a violent clash with Indian army personnel
in Eastern Ladakh in June 2020 for the first time and claimed sovereignty
over the entire Galwan Valley, a claim that China had never made
earlier. The situation stabilized when New Delhi responded quickly.
The temporary peace that prevails now in the Pangong Tso area is
likely to be replicated in Eastern Ladakh. However, that must not be
read as China climbing down from its high horse. China will pursue the
undermining of India’s security, no matter what.
One indication of that can be found in the recently published report by

Recorded Future, a privately-owned cyber security company based in
Massachusetts, USA. The report notes of a campaign conducted by a
China-linked threat activity group it calls ‘RedEcho’, which targeted
the Indian power sector through malware. Recorded Future said the
targeted activity was identified through a combination of large-scale
automated network traffic analytics and expert analysis. (Did Chinese
Hackers Cause Mumbai’s Power Failure in October?; The Wire Staff;
Mar 1, 2021). The February 28 report by Recorded Future suggested
“10 distinct Indian power sector organizations, including 4 of the 5
Regional Load Dispatch Centers (RLDC) responsible for the operation
of the power grid through balancing electricity supply and demand,
have been identified as targets in a concerted campaign against India’s
critical infrastructure. Other targets identified included 2 Indian
seaports.” The report raised questions about a possible link between
the clash and a power blackout that brought India’s financial capital
Mumbai to a standstill in October 2020. However, the Indian government
denied any data breach due to the Chinese malware attack brought to
light by the Recorded Future report.
14 Vol. XXIV, No. I

Nowadays, cyber-attacks can have unanticipated consequences and

cannot be dismissed as insignificant. Cyber-attack is, in fact, a clever
form of aggression. Should China succeed in disrupting India’s power
grid, even for a short period, even if Indian authorities can identify the
origin of the attack, they are powerless to retaliate directly – unlike in
the case of a military strike.
There have also been reports of the presence of PLA personnel at the
forward posts along the Line of Control on the Pakistani side of Kashmir.
The Indian army has reportedly spotted senior PLA officials at the
forward posts opposite the Nowgam sector in North Kashmir. (What is
Chinese army doing at LoC in Pak-occupied Kashmir?; Rediff.com; March
13, 2016). These are obvious danger signals.
SOME ANTIDOTES
India’s realization that China has become increasingly aggressive in

recent years has led New Delhi to adopt certain antidotal measures.
The most notable among them is India’s change in attitude vis-à-vis
participation with Australia, Japan and the United States to bring the
Quad back to life. Alarmed by China’s aggressive approach in the Indo-
Pacific region, these four nations have now committed to engage in
strategic dialogue and to promote security and prosperity in the Indo-
Pacific region.
According to a statement on March 5, 2021, by Australian Prime Minister

Scott Morrison to reporters in Sydney, the new US administration headed
by President Joe Biden has given Quad a central role in maintaining the
“peace, prosperity and stability of the Indo-Pacific.” “The Quad is very
central to the United States and our thinking about the region and
looking at the Indo-Pacific also through the prism of our ASEAN partners
and their vision of the Indo-Pacific,” Morrison said, referring to the 10-
member Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (Biden to Join First-
Ever ‘Quad’ Leaders Meeting, Morrison Says; Jason Scott; Bloomberg;
Mar 5, 2021).
Earlier, on October 27, 2020, the United States and India inked an
important agreement that will help New Delhi get real-time access to
American geospatial intelligence. The Basic Exchange and Cooperation
Agreement (BECA) was a result of the 2+2 ministerial dialogue between
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Ramtanu Maitra
the US and Indian defence and foreign affairs chiefs, following a trend
in recent years of deepening military cooperation geared toward pushing
back on China’s increasingly assertive policies in the region. (Spurred
by China Rivalry, US, India Deepen Strategic Ties; Vikram J. Singh;
USIP; Dec 9, 2020).
In addition, one of India’s allies in the Indian Ocean region, Maldives,

signed a “Framework for US Department of Defense-Maldives Ministry
of Defence Security Relationship” in Philadelphia on September 10, 2020.
The framework sets forth both countries’ intent to deepen engagement
and cooperation in support of maintaining peace and security in the
Indian Ocean and marks an important step forward in a defence
partnership. The Maldives had been heavily courted by China earlier
to set up a naval base.
It is not known when an agreement between Beijing and New Delhi on

respective troop positions in the Depsang Plains will be reached. It is
also a certainty that China will carry on with its two-faced approach
toward India. Having failed to achieve its objective militarily in the
northern part of Eastern Ladakh, Beijing will undertake fresh efforts to
lull New Delhi into trusting it again.
In fact, that process has already begun. On March 7, 2021, the Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Han Chunying put out the bait, saying:
“China and India are each other’s friends and partners, not threats or
rivals. The two sides need to help each other succeed instead of
undercutting each other; we should intensify cooperation instead of
harbouring suspicion at each other.”
On the same day, addressing his annual press conference, China’s State
Controller and Foreign Minister Wang Yi repeated that India and China
should not undercut or be suspicious of each other, adding: “The right
and wrongs of what happened in the border area last year are clear; so
are the stakes involved. It again proves that initiating confrontation
will not solve the problem. Returning to peaceful negotiation is the
16 Vol. XXIV, No. I

right way forward.” (India, China friends, but ‘rights and wrongs’ of
border friction clear; Wang Yi; Sutirtho Patranobis; Hindustan Times;
Mar 7, 2021).
......................................................................................................................................
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Ramtanu Maitra contributes to Executive Intelligence Review (EIR), a

weekly magazine published from Washington, DC, and 21st Century Science
and Technology, a Washington DC - based news quarterly, regularly. He
contributes to Asia Times Online and Nueu Solidaritat, a German weekly
published from Wiesbaden.
**************************
Vol. XXIV, No. I 17

Ashok Kapur
AGNI pp 18-45
INDIA’S FAILED DIPLOMATIC AND

STRATEGIC EXPERIMENTS AND A PATH FORWARD
BY
ASHOK KAPUR
S
tarting with Nehru’s diplomatic and strategic experiments, this
paper covers the period till the present (2021) with relation to
China, Pakistan and the US. A juggling between three alternative
approaches is at play now. First, India has a long tradition of using
bilateral diplomacy to resolve territorial issues. This failed during the
Nehru era and it appears to have come to a dead-end between EAM
Jaishanker and his Chinese counterparts. Still, the approach has not
been abandoned. The recent pullback agreement successfully executed
in the Ladakh sector shows that the new negotiators are not diplomatic
experts of the Ministry of External Affairs but senior military
commanders who operate at the ground level and use military action
to build their negotiating leverage. The second approach is to create
leverage with China and others by forming a political-military US-
India-China/Pakistan strategic triangle. Its vitality now depends in
part on Biden’s inclinations about China compared to Trump’s approach.
A historical precedent of this approach lies in the Kennedy White House
actions undertaken to support India by diplomatic and military means
against China (1962-65). The quick US/UK action established a
temporary triangle which also brought the USSR into play against
China, and China understood the implications should it advance further
into Indian territory; China’s unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal from
Tawang may be studied in this context. The third approach is to build
on the recently developed QUAD mechanism of cooperation in the
Indo-Pacific Region. How robust is this approach if Biden goes soft
on China? What are the pros and cons of each approach and its
18 Vol. XXIV, No. I
INDIA’S F AILED DIPLOMATIC AND STRATEGIC EXPERIMENTS AND A PATH FORWARD
relevance and weight on current Indian actions in the Himalayas and

the IPR? This paper explores Nehru’s and MEA’s false assumptions
about peace-making with China and Pakistan and the character of
the threats they posed; that is, were Chinese and Pakistani calculations
more realistic while Indian ones failed the test of realism? Was the
rejection of Patel’s advice and Sir GS Bajpai’s advice to adopt a realistic
assessment of the China problem, and the need to adopt a balance of
power approach, a core part of the Nehruvian strategic and diplomatic
culture, which has had lingering effects on India’s China policy? Does
India have a diplomatic and strategic roadmap going forward in 2021?
I NTRODUCTION: P AKISTAN P OLICY

WAS NEHRU ’S F IRST F AILED E XPERIMENT
The failures of India’s diplomatic and strategic experiments started in

1947 with Nehru because of many faulty assessments – about the
importance of post-Partition South Asian geopolitics for Pakistan and
the Western powers; the strategic and Islamic nature of Pakistan’s
India and Kashmir policy; Nehru’s (and Patel’s) lack of administrative
experience to deal with the refugees and communal issues; Nehru’s
administrative, diplomatic and military inexperience and a self-inflicted
dependence on the strategic and diplomatic directions of Lord
Mountbatten regarding Kashmir and Pakistan issues; the misreading of
the character of UK/US orientation towards Pakistan and India
concerning Cold War issues; and, towards Middle Eastern international
relations following the referral of the Kashmir issue to the UN Security
Council. How Nehru single-handedly lost control over the Kashmir and
Indo-Pakistan agendas and the international narrative on Kashmir is
striking evidence of leadership failure. This is obvious because Nehru’s
‘Kashmir question’ and his belief in ‘Pakistani aggression’ became the
‘India-Pakistan question’ in the UN Security Council agenda, and the
international narrative about Kashmir changed to indicate equivalence
between India and Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute. By losing the
initiative in controlling the international narrative, Indian diplomacy
was placed in a defensive position. Nehru’s actions reflected a faith in
the fairness of the UN Security Council in dealing with the Indian
complaint. They reflected a belief that the existence of Pakistan was a
short-term issue because of cultural affinities between the Hindus and
Muslims, and because of Pakistan’s economic weakness. And his belief
that management of communal trouble in India was the main issue,
Vol. XXIV, No. I 19

Ashok Kapur
rather than the territorial integrity of India in a post-Partition

environment.
S Gopal, Nehru’s biographer, records the evolution of Nehru’s actions

about Kashmir and Mountbatten’s role as Governor-General of India in
guiding Nehru in matters relating to Kashmir and India-Pakistan (see
his ‘Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. 2, 1947-56’, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
University Press, 1979). Here are the key facts.
 Pakistan was a short-term problem (Gopal, p. 14). Nehru: ‘There
will never be a Pakistan’; and ‘When the British go, there will be no
more communal trouble in India’.
 From March 1947 to April 1948 (Gopal, p. 18), Mountbatten was in
charge of Indian administration at the secret request of Nehru and
Patel. The reason: neither leader had administrative experience.
Mountbatten gained control of the emergency committee and later
the chairmanship of the critical Defence Committee, which took
Indian decisions relating to Pakistan and Kashmir. How extraordinary
is it that having gained independence, Nehru and Patel transferred
administrative power to a British strategist with deep links to British
royalty and former Supreme Allied Commander in SE Asia during
the Second World War.
 (Gopal, p. 21) Mountbatten got Nehru to refer the Kashmir problem
to the UN as an alternative to war, and (p. 23) threatened to leave
the Governor-General’s post if India made war preparations against
Pakistan. Further, earlier (p. 20), Nehru accepted the commitment
to a plebiscite in Kashmir in the context of his reference to the UN
to vacate Pakistani aggression.
 (Gopal, p. 29) Mountbatten urged a ceasefire of military action in
Kashmir but Liaqat Ali Khan linked ceasefire to the conduct of the
plebiscite. Here is an example showing that the initiative to define
the narrative and the agenda had shifted to Pakistan by making the
linkage with a plebiscite and that the Nehru linkage between ‘vacating
aggression’ and a plebiscite was ignored by Pakistan and the UN
community.
 (Gopal, p. 28) Provides the parameters of UN action. The UN
resolution ‘did not recognize the sovereignty of India over Kashmir,
it asked India to agree to a coalition government in Kashmir, it
toned down Pakistan’s obligations to secure the withdrawal of her
troops and tribesmen and vested the plebiscite administrator, to be
20 Vol. XXIV, No. I

appointed by the United Nations, with powers which implied that

India and Pakistan had equal status in Kashmir’.
 (Gopal, p. 24) Mountbatten suggested the partition of Kashmir, and
Gopal further notes (p. 27) that UK/US policy to support Pakistan’s
views on Kashmir was to gain the support of the Islamic world for
Western strategic interests in the Middle East Islamic world and to
offset the Muslim grievances about the Western policy on Palestine
and the creation of Israel. It appears that Western actions at the
UN showed that they recognised Pakistan’s importance as part of
the Western defence against the Soviet Union (p. 33).
Nehru’s self-inflicted errors placed Indian security and diplomacy in a

defensive mode in the UN and the Middle East and it was much later,
in 1972, that Indira Gandhi regained partial control over the agenda.
Nehru’s Pakistan experiments ended up in multiple failures, which had

long-term effects on Indian diplomacy in various arenas. At the UN,
India was on the defensive in the Security Council and it was often
bailed out by the USSR. In the Middle East, it faced a Muslim alignment
with Pakistan, and India had to expend its political capital to lobby with
the Muslim states. In South Asia, the Kashmir issue became Pakistan’s
core issue and it was projected as such among India’s South Asian
neighbours. The Kashmir issue and the rivalries between India and her
neighbours gave China a platform to build a strategic alignment with
Pakistan, and after Pakistan negotiated a territorial transfer to China
in 1961-62, the Kashmir question was no longer an India-Pakistan
question; in reality, it became an India/Pakistan/China question because
of China’s physical presence in northern Kashmir and Pakistan via the
Karakorum highway, the BRI project and Gwadar seaport. China’s refusal
to accept Indian constitutional changes in the Jammu, Kashmir and
Ladakh region in 2020 implies that it reserves the right to expand its
activities in India’s strategic north. Nehru is not directly responsible
for developments after his death but his approach in 1947-48 gave
Pakistan, the Western powers, and later China, the opportunity to exploit
India’s diplomatic vulnerability concerning the Kashmir/India/Pakistan
question.
Nehru was popular with the Indian electorate, he was also India’s Foreign
Minister and because of his control over the MEA and a lack of
competition and internal debate in the Indian Cabinet after Patel’s death,
Vol. XXIV, No. I 21

Ashok Kapur
he did not have to face any public accountability concerning his multiple
strategic/diplomatic errors. His errors concerned the faulty assumptions
he had about Kashmir. He saw the issue through the narrow lens of
‘Pakistani aggression’ and he did not appreciate until it was too late,
the strategic lens of the Cold War and Middle East international relations,
which was the basis of UK/US policy towards Kashmir after 1947/48.
He failed to appreciate the American mistrust of his non-alignment
policy and the faith of the UK/US in Pakistan as part of the inner circle
of Western defence against the USSR, and its value as a diplomatic
partner.
Where did Nehru go wrong?
 Pakistan was viewed as a temporary phenomenon and not as a part

of a strategic design by Jinnah to form a Muslim homeland to guard
against the twin dangers of ‘Hindu’ and Soviet imperialisms. Jinnah
argued with US officials in May 1947 about the danger of Soviet
and Hindu imperialism/expansionism and offered Pakistan’s
availability as a US ally should the US take care of Pakistani interests
and recognise Pakistan’s strategic location and value. The view that
the Muslim minority saw the Hindu majority as a threat and the
view that Pakistan could be a useful partner of the West against the
USSR was pushed by both Pakistan and the UK. Here, Jinnah was
functioning as a pro-active strategist and he enjoyed British and
later US support, in forming a Middle East coalition with Iran and
Turkey to guard against Soviet expansionism. Nehru and the MEA
missed the evolution of this strategic alignment in the late 1940s
and the early 1950s. Pakistan played on its Islamic character and
also gained the support of the Muslim world. Nehru did not realise
that Kashmir was not simply a question of Pakistani aggression, it
became a geopolitical arena for the major powers (the UK, US and
USSR) and Pakistan. The lesson in hindsight is that these Powers
could not leave India alone because of its size, its strategic location
and its non-aligned policy, which was offensive to America’s belief
that if ‘you are not with us you are against us’. Consequently, the
Jinnah line became the basis of US/Pakistan policy and UN Security
Council debates and decisions relating to Kashmir and Indo-Pakistan
relations during the early 1950s and thereafter.
22 Vol. XXIV, No. I

 Nehru’s normative frame concerning Asia was to end the balance of

power policies of the great powers, which had led to wars, and to
replace it with a policy of world reform based on development and
peaceful discourse. This approach required peaceful diplomatic
discourse rather than war preparations. The assumption was that
world reform was possible and desirable as an alternative to geopolitics
and the use of balance of power as the basis of Indian foreign policy,
and this only required the development of a military force that was
adequate to maintain India’s territorial integrity. Had Nehru
recognised that power (hard and soft) is the basis of statecraft and
that power is taken and not given to achieve national security, he
would have realised that Jinnah, with British support, had taken
power, while Nehru with Mountbatten’s nudges had gradually
transferred power to a foreign leader to take decisions on Indian
security matters. Mountbatten set up Nehru for an agenda of no-
war with Pakistan, UN referral, and a plebiscite in Kashmir. In
other words, there were two transfers of power during 1947-48. The
first was from the British government to India and Pakistan; the
second one was from Nehru (and Patel) to Mountbatten to take
decisions on Kashmir and policy towards Pakistan. The second transfer
of power was consequential because it circumscribed India’s freedom
to act on Kashmir and Pakistan affairs in the areas of diplomacy
and military policy.
Nehru sought to chart a new path for a peaceful relationship between

India and Pakistan and between Hindus and Muslims. He failed because
he misunderstood the key fundamentals of modern statecraft. First,
inter-state relations are based on power politics and not moral principles.
The Pakistani political, diplomatic and military establishments operated
on this principle. The UK, US, and the UN too functioned on this basis,
as did China. The second fundamental of international relations is that
power is taken not given. Gandhi and Nehru took power from the British
rulers but then Nehru promptly surrendered it by accepting the
parameters of action Mountbatten set in 1947-48 on Kashmir and
Pakistan affairs. The third fundamental is that independence, freedom
and sovereignty are not merely words; they must be backed up by
developing military and diplomatic options to provide freedom of choice
in the hands of the practitioner. Nehru’s and India’s choices were
circumscribed and not enhanced, following the adoption of the framework
of action in 1947-48. The final fundamental is that signs of weakness
Vol. XXIV, No. I 23

Ashok Kapur
and confusion have other consequences – China and others were watching
the pattern of Nehru’s self-centred/unilateral decision-making. He
ignored the advice of Patel and GS Bajpai and that of his military
commanders in the 1947-48 campaign, and, further, he kept the basis
of his decisions away from public scrutiny that effectively cut him off
from inputs from Indian opinion-makers. Nehru, the advocate of
democracy, himself did not allow internal democracy in the functioning
of the government and the public domain. It appears that he followed
the belief, as a former Indian foreign secretary pointed out in the context
of India-China relations, that ‘Panditji knew best’. This was foreign
policymaking, based on arrogance and self-centeredness and at best his
intuition, rather than professional in-house advice. In contrast, Jinnah
took power with a clear plan to secure partition, to refuse negotiation
with British India on any other basis because he claimed that the Hindu
majority was a threat to the Muslim minority, that it was necessary to
secure equivalence between the two in the British India government
policies and later in UK/India/UN international relations. This became
clear when the UN converted the ‘Kashmir issue’ into an ‘India-Pakistan’
question.
The process to unravel Nehru’s Pakistan and Kashmir mistakes moved

at a fast pace post-Nehru (1964 onwards). The decisions by Nehru’s
successors were consequential but the process was incremental and
reactive. Here are the highlights.
 When Bhutto and the Pakistan military sought to use military force
to take Kashmir in 1965, Prime Minister Shastri acted swiftly.
Rejecting, without a formal declaration, the Nehru-Mountbatten
injunction against ‘no war’ with Pakistan, he ordered the Indian
Army to cross the international border with Pakistan and not limit
itself to the defence of Kashmir, a ‘disputed territory’ as per Pakistani
and UN claims. The appearance of Indian military forces near Lahore
and Sialkot – the political and cultural centres of Pakistan – shook
Pakistani public opinion and the establishment because the action
was unexpected and threatening, and it was against the Nehru-
Mountbatten injunction against war. The war ended in a military
stalemate, presumably because of a shortage of spares, and it resulted
in the Soviet-organised Tashkent agreement. But it nevertheless broke
a psychological barrier against war. It formed the basis for changes
in India’s Pakistan related matters. Three lessons were learnt. First,
Indian political will to go to war at the PM level was necessary.
24 Vol. XXIV, No. I

Second, India had to be self-sufficient in its ability to conduct military

operations for a 2–3 week period before the UN/UK/US machinery
was mobilised to secure a ceasefire, which had kept Indo-Pakistan
relations on a slow boil. Third, the Indian government expressed a
belief about ‘no more Tashkent’s’. This was an implicit message to
the UN and the great powers that Indo-Pakistani ceasefire diplomacy
was no longer an acceptable form of crisis management.
 However, Pakistan also learnt two lessons. First, that it needed
international allies, and a strengthened linkup with China was
necessary against the common enemy. Second, as per General Aslam
Beg, the Kashmiris had to be prepared to revolt against Indian rule
– a line of action still in progress in Pakistani actions in Kashmir;
this course of action has been expanded into interventions between
Pakistan and Indian Punjab by encouraging the Khalistan movement
and drug trade in Punjab.
 The next change to alter Nehru’s failed experiments came in 1971-
72, during the Bangladesh operation. It was based on the diplomatic
and military lessons learnt from the 1965 war. The result of this
operation altered the South Asian geopolitical scene by creating a
new Muslim state in India’s eastern region. This operation showed
the vital importance of political, diplomatic and military intelligence
planning before the war and coordinated execution of the war plan.
The planning started in March 1971, intensified during the summer
and it was executed during the autumn season. It demonstrated
that self-reliance worked successfully with thorough planning and
coordination, that it required quality intelligence about the
motivations and limitations of Pakistani, Chinese and US leaders,
and that a hostile international coalition could be outmanoeuvred
by proactive Indian action with Soviet support. This was a far cry
from Nehru’s approach. This was the first instance of successfully
using Indian coercive diplomacy in the world of major powers. But
India’s success also had consequences. It showed that Pakistan’s
military and political establishment was motivated to seek revenge
for its defeat and it brought to the fore their hurt feelings, that
Muslims had been rulers of Hindustan and they deserved to be treated
as such. China also felt motivated to intensify its opposition to India
by strengthening military-nuclear and missile technology cooperation
with Pakistan.
 The subsequent military-political operations in Siachin, Kargil and
Balakot reinforced the essential point that diplomacy alone was not
Vol. XXIV, No. I 25

Ashok Kapur
enough to settle Indo-Pakistani rivalry and that India needed to

have the means to use her military options when, not if, diplomacy
failed to secure a negotiated settlement. Furthermore, it highlighted
that political action was required to stabilise the political arrangement
in Jammu and Kashmir. The revocation of Article 360 in August
2019 was a step in this direction, along with efforts to cut off the
financing of the mullahs and street fighters in Kashmir. This is a
work in progress and it seems to be working.
N EHRU , R AJIV G ANDHI AND C HINA:

A STUDY IN SYSTEMIC FAILURES OF DIPLOMACY AND D ECISION-M AKING
There were big differences between Nehru’s decision-making regarding

Pakistan and China. In the former case, Nehru acted based on Mountbatten’s
shrewd guidance and once the fix was in, Indian diplomacy and military
policy were trapped in the Mountbatten-Nehru line of action until after
Nehru’s death. In China’s case, Nehru was the sole decision-maker, albeit
under the influence of KM Panikkar and Krishna Menon, but there was no
foreign hand to shape Nehru’s approach to China and Indian defence
policymaking. In both cases, Nehru ignored the warnings of Patel and
others and displayed enormous confidence in his ability to manoeuver vis-
à-vis the Chinese government. Unfortunately for India, Nehru enabled
China’s leaders to expand their area of manoeuvrability in building their
leverage in the Himalayan region by their actions concerning Pakistan,
Kashmir, Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal and Arunachal Pradesh. China used its
strategic initiatives against Indian interests, and PM Rajiv Gandhi’s action
to delink the settlement of the boundary question with a desire to improve
bilateral relations in his 1988 visit to China gave China cover to maintain
its pressure in the Himalayan region. In the instance of both Pakistan/
Kashmir and China, Nehru’s (and later Rajiv Gandhi’s) approach revealed
the danger of leaving national decision-making in the hands of a closed/
secretive top-heavy decision structure that lacked institutional checks and
balances, and which lacked an open public discourse about issues of national
importance. Both these cases indicate a major drawback of the failure to
communicate the basis of strategic and diplomatic planning and the set of
assumptions to guide it. The failure lay in the lack of consultation between
the Prime Minister, the Parliament, his diplomatic and military professionals.
An imperial approach to defence and diplomatic decision-making does not
make sense in a democratic set up such as India’s. It shows a lack of trust
in the different branches of the government and the Indian people.
26 Vol. XXIV, No. I

Where did Nehru go wrong on India-China relations? First, there was a

major disconnect between his public diplomacy in the bilateral and
international spheres, and in his private misgivings about Chinese activities
and intentions as conveyed to BN Mullick, his intelligence chief from 1950-
64. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) was tasked to monitor Chinese activities
in the northern border areas because of fear of infiltration and subversion.
The IB was also tasked to use patrols to assess border incursions. Nehru’s
tools were his personal diplomacy with the Chinese government, his use of
Panikkar (and vice-versa) and his directions to Mullick. The Army
Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence were not involved in the decision-
making until after the crisis in 1959/1962. There were three givens in
Nehru’s narratives. Firstly, China was peaceful and it did not seek war
with India because it valued Indian friendship; secondly, India could not
afford the economic costs of war with China and both countries had
developmental priorities; and thirdly, the McMahon Line was a settled
boundary, map or no map. It was only after the defeat in 1962 that Mullick
revealed Nehru’s view that the conflict between China and India was not
only about territory, but that it was a civilizational battle, and it was
eternal because China saw itself as superior to India. (Mullick, ‘The Chinese
Betrayal’, 1971 p. 454). Instead of preparing Indian public opinion and the
Government about this eternal civilizational conflict, Indians were fed the
view about China’s peaceful rise and the importance of peaceful co-existence.
Generally, Nehru’s agenda was to save the world from the danger of nuclear
war and to act as a bridge-builder between the Cold War warriors. Nehru
projected himself as a peacemaker with a policy of nonalignment. This
approach went against the basic principles of geopolitics and assumptions
based on history – that rivalries were inevitable in a world of multiple
powers and that the big powers inevitably sought to secure their country’s
physical security and respective interests by various means; and that
diplomacy and military strategy aimed to expand a country’s manoeuvrability
and options. This was the historical way to examine a country’s power
politics. But Nehru rejected the idea of power politics and the use of military
and economic strength to define India’s place in a world of hostile powers.
Moreover, he mistrusted the Indian armed forces believing that they
represented a colonial military mentality. Nor did Nehru trust his Cabinet
colleagues and the Parliament in diplomatic and military issues, believing
instead in building a Nehru-centric system in critical areas of external
policymaking.
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Ashok Kapur
His method and approach were to build silos of policy-making apparatuses

with himself at the top, and invariably he was the sole decision-maker.
The pattern of decision-making remained a vertical one; it flowed from
Nehru to his subordinates in each silo. Examples of this approach were
plentiful. He held the Atomic Energy portfolio with Homi J. Bhabha to
advise him and to execute his policy. He held the Foreign Ministry portfolio
and was the sole decision-maker in foreign affairs, including China relations.
The power to appoint ambassadors gave him total leverage over the MEA
and its personnel. The Defence Ministry and Army Headquarters were kept
away from policymaking related to China. In 1947-48, the Indian Army
was under-utilised in the Kashmir campaign because of the Nehru-
Mountbatten policy to have a ceasefire ‘now’ and to reject war with Pakistan.
The Indian armed forces were kept outside the decision-making loop
concerning war and peace issues that faced India and it remained outside
the loop concerning China policy until 1959/62. Shortage of foreign exchange
was the most frequently quoted reason not to sanction resources for building
military capabilities. In this respect, the Finance Ministry was more
important than the Defence Ministry and the Defence Minister. During the
Nehru era, the Defence Ministers lacked clout in the Indian government,
the Minister was often a second-tier politician. Nehru was Chairman of the
Planning Commission and he defined India’s socialist and welfare agenda
with the help of the Deputy Chairman, who was a Nehru appointee. The
Intelligence Bureau was another silo wherein BN Mullik, the IB Director,
answered to Nehru personally and not to the Home Minister, even though
the IB was nominally a part of the Home Ministry.
Even though Nehru was concerned about China’s brutal takeover of Tibet
in 1950, his approach continued to facilitate China’s rise in the diplomatic
world and at the UN. He saw himself as the big brother of China whose
mission was to get China out of its isolation despite US misgivings. Nehru
had a vision to make China and India the twin pillars of post-colonial Asia.
But China did not share his vision and ambition in this regard. Beijing
sought to establish itself as a revolutionary power in world affairs and it
sought not a co-equal status with India but instead sought a bargain with
the US, and it conveyed its aims to the US government before it came to
power in 1949. It indicated that its communism was not a barrier to a
bargain with the US because China was nationalistic, and by implication,
it was not firmly in the Soviet camp. The State Department ignored the
Beijing message until the Nixon/Kissinger team picked it up in 1979, post-
the Sino-Soviet split.
28 Vol. XXIV, No. I

Nehru’s agenda was visionary and Gopal provides the colour of Nehru’s
orientation. I turn now to show Gopal’s views on Nehru’s China policy
orientation and the false assumptions which defined it. Gopal was the head
of the Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs and, as such,
had access to official documents. He was a Nehru supporter, but still had
a scholarly mind and was frank in his assessments of Nehru’s policies.
Here are a few important points made by Gopal in his work on Nehru.
 Nehru’s desire to have an independent foreign policy was vague and
grandiose says Gopal (p. 43). He promoted Indian non-alignment
because of its moral quality (p. 44). Nehru emphasised “Indian-
ness” and Indian values (p. 57).
 He sought close relations among Asian countries, an Asian federation,
with India as the nerve centre. India had a leading role and a special
position in Asia (p. 55-56). The future of Asia was determined by
the future of India, and India was the pivot because of her ‘present
position’, presumably because of her policy and geographical location
in the Indian Ocean area (p. 59).
 India did not face an immediate threat to its security (p. 44).
 China’s communist victory was a world event; it had a strong central
government. The reactions of others would determine China’s
influence on the balance of forces. If it was befriended it could walk
out of the Soviet orbit. For India, the policy implication was to
develop a policy of ‘cautious friendliness towards China’ (p. 64-65).
Nehru did not see a danger of Chinese aggressiveness in the
Himalayan border and claimed that any attempt at aggression against
India or Nepal would be ‘stoutly resisted’ (p. 65). He noted that
India’s strategic frontier lay on ‘the northern side of Nepal’ (p. 68).
Nehru’s view about Chinese intentions was reinforced by his
ambassador KM Panikkar’s view that China wanted ‘friendliest
relations with India’ (p. 105). Nehru believed that the future of
Asia, and to some extent of the world, depended on India-China
friendship. This was his view expressed to Panikkar in early September
1950 (p. 156).
 Gopal notes that Nehru’s view of China was ‘naïve’ (p. 106). He
ignored Patel’s warning about China’s ‘perfidy’ and calls for
preparations against a ‘potential enemy’. Nehru ignored Patel’s
warning and instead asked for an understanding of China’s struggles
and communist success (p. 108).
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Ashok Kapur
Nehru’s experimental thinking about the China-India relationship’s potential,

the importance of Asia and India’s importance in Asia, was based on fantasies
and not on historical realities. History showed that ‘Asia’ was a house
divided between European colonial advances, the contention between Russian
and Chinese imperial expansion in Central Asia, the advance of Japanese
militarism and imperialism in the Far East and SE Asia, the history of
warring kingdoms in India, the tussle between the Persian empire and
Emperor Akbar, the fight between Vietnam and China and the rise of
competitive nationalist movements in Asia during the 1900s. There was no
history of Pan-Asianism during the 19 th and 20th centuries.
Gopal (p. 110) notes that by the end of 1950, Nehru’s diplomacy did not
show results in Korea or Tibet. But his thinking did not change despite the
Chinese takeover of Tibet, even in the light of Mao’s public declarations
about liberating the Himalayan area including northern India and Sikkim,
Bhutan and Nepal. Mao was transparent in projecting the geopolitical view
of China’s ambition towards China’s southern zone (the Himalayan area)
and the use of force, as in Tibet and later in Xinjiang, was the preferred
course of action. Nehru countered this by words of peaceful co-existence,
and by his instructions to IB director Mullick to watch Chinese activities
in the northeast. His diplomatic statecraft was to rely on the mistaken
belief that China welcomed Indian friendship and it was not likely to be
aggressive on the Indian borders and towards India. This false belief directed
Indian diplomacy during the 1950s, even as China was building its
infrastructure in the Aksai Chin area and Tibet. Gopal’s verdict is stunning
– India had poor relations with the US ‘the result mostly of Nehru’s advocacy
of China’s claims, [and] did not have a counter-reward in warm relations
with China’ (p. 138). Although Nehru assumed responsibility for the security
of the northern frontier including Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, he did not
expect an armed attack by China, and because of his insistence that the
McMahon Line was accepted in law and practice he did not make an effort
to secure an overall settlement, says Gopal (p. 176). The 1962 war nullified
these false assumptions and brought into question the future of the
Himalayan kingdoms; from their historical position as a part of British
India, and later Indian orbit, they became a part of the buffers between
China and India. Buffers serve as points of contact and friction between
rival powers and serve as platforms for expansionist activities. In the
Himalayan areas, they emerged to form lines of Chinese pressure against
Indian interests in the entire region. Nehru’s assertion of the desirability of
friendship with China completely missed the point that friendship requires
30 Vol. XXIV, No. I

cooperation between both sides and that one-sided assertions do not create
friendship if the other side operates according to the principles of protracted
psychological war and geopolitics.
THE I MPORTANCE OF STUDYING THE CONTEXT

OF R ELATIONS B ETWEEN W ARRING N ATIONS
My theme is that the history of Sino-Indian relations since their independence

reveals that the context of the two countries – both ambitious seekers of
international stature and influence – was incompatible with the other side’s
interests, values and methods of action. Here are the major differences.
 China came to power through the barrel of the gun and emerged
from a history of internal civil war and foreign threats into a centrally
controlled communist, and an authoritarian government, with pride,
self-confidence and racial and ideological unity. In contrast, India
came to independence through pacifism, discourse with the British
government and a peaceful transfer of power. China was following
the principle that power is taken not given; India was following the
experience that rational discourse could produce a transfer of power
without taking it by force. Secondly, India did not possess racial and
ideological unity; rather it celebrated its diversity and hospitality
towards the communists, socialists, right-wing politicians and various
religions within India. On the other hand, China requires loyalty to
the Communist Party and disallows religious freedom. For China,
India was a negative example, and an opportunity to exploit Indian
political, social (ethnic) and religious divisions. The diplomatic
trajectories of China and India reflected their historical and cultural
differences. For China, revolutionary upheaval and forceful change
were necessary to build China’s international position; for India,
peaceful change and reform of power politics was desirable.
 Regional and international geopolitics were important contextual
elements in China’s diplomacy during the Nehru era but India’s
traditional approach to diplomacy sought to use bilateral talks to
ease tensions and settle controversies. Barring a short period (1950-
56) when China talked about peaceful co-existence, China sought to
build an anti-India coalition as the basis of its bilateral diplomacy
with India. There were reasons for this policy. India was too big to
be left alone in the world and in the regional sphere because its
political and diplomatic model was contrary to Chinese preferences
and interests. India could not be physically defeated but it could be
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Ashok Kapur
harassed taking advantage of her defensive approach to external

policy-development, exploiting the schisms in her social structure,
the lack of an Indian strategic culture, by taking advantage of the
Indo-Pakistani rivalry and her poor relations with the US in the
past.
 Nehru’s faith in Sino-Indian bilateralism failed when China declared
that the border was disputed, that the McMahon Line was not
accepted by China, and that Nehru had to be taught a lesson by war
in 1962 to damage his international prestige in the non-aligned world
and in the eyes of the major powers. By signing a border agreement
with Pakistan in the strategic northern Kashmir region in 1962,
China added another context – developing Pakistan as a common
diplomatic and strategic front against India, and this led to the
creation of a physical line of communication through the Karakoram
highway which linked Tibet to Pakistan and eventually to the Gwadar
seaport and the Arabian sea.
 Then followed the build-up of Pakistan’s nuclear, missile and
conventional military infrastructure whose aim was to ensure an
Indo-Pakistan military and diplomatic balance and equivalence in
international and UN diplomacy. This was followed by the infusion
of Chinese diplomatic and investment capital in India’s neighbourhood
– Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar – which took these
countries out of the Indian orbit and converted them into a buffer
zone, which required competition between China and India in India’s
backyard. These contextual elements have been entrenched in Chinese
diplomacy and military policy towards India during the 1960s-21 st
century period. As such, China’s India policy is to broaden and
consolidate its anti-India context in its regional and international
diplomacy, rather than to seek tranquillity in the Himalayan region
or to settle the border question. Bilateralism no longer works in
Sino-Indian relations until the two powers agree on a common
approach concerning the contextual factors and processes. This is
not likely in the present state of international relations in the Indo-
Pacific region given China’s aggressive stance towards the US, Hong
Kong, Taiwan, India and with its belief that China is rising and the
US is in decline. My theme is that he who shapes the intellectual
and policy context and narrative and has the military and economic
power, has the strategic initiative to ease or raise tensions and
controversies, and currently (2021) China is in the driver’s seat on
this count. Of course, this narrative could change if the Western
32 Vol. XXIV, No. I

world and China’s Asian neighbours take a stance against her

aggressive actions in the Indo-Pacific region. Stay tuned on this
point.
 Recent India-initiated developments in the Himalayan region are
affecting China’s policy community. India’s EAM argued (January
12, 2021, ‘India says that China’s ties profoundly disturbed’ on
upswing with the US’, in Al Jazeera) that Indian trust in China was
‘deeply impaired after the recent border clash’ because ‘bloodshed
had a huge impact on public opinion and politically’. China does not
care for Indian public opinion but the CCP leaders care about the
concerns of their people. Let us put ourselves in Beijing’s shoes and
look at the effects of recent Indian actions on the Chinese elite and
public thinking. (This is not meant to justify Chinese actions but
rather to indicate Chinese uncertainties about the situation in the
Himalayan region). First, the changes in Jammu and Kashmir’s
status by the revocation of Article 370 and its integration into the
Indian Union has tightened India’s grip and cut off the flow of
Pakistani money flows into Kashmir; this had fuelled the stone-
throwing by disgruntled Kashmiri people, which has stopped. Further,
the Indian government marginalised the position of the Abdullah
and Mufti families and the separatists in Kashmir affairs and reduced
their international profile. Pakistan’s influence in Kashmiri politics
has weakened but China is still important in the region. A section
of Kashmiri Muslims has welcomed China’s declaration that it does
not accept the Indian constitutional change; they welcome, as does
Pakistan, China’s involvement in Kashmir affairs. Second, Indian
claims about POK being a part of India poses a threat to China’s
investments in the BRI and Pakistan. Third, India sought at the
rhetorical level to liberate Aksai Chin. Whether or not this is a realistic
prospect, the claim is now on the books of the Sino-Indian
relationship. Fourth, the presence of the Dalai Lama and the
government-in-exile in India is a sore point with the Chinese
authorities because it leaves the Tibet card on the table even though
its use was limited to some activities in the past but not recently.
Still, it exists in Indian hands. Fifthly, the Indo-US relationship is
developing into a robust defence relationship and it is not simply
diplomatic sweet talk. Beijing’s analysts are unsure about its direction
and implications in the context of the organisation of the QUAD
and Biden’s foreign policy and military orientation in the IPR. How
India and others in the Western world develop these areas concerns
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Ashok Kapur
Beijing specialists because there are many clouds over the Sino-US
relationship itself, pending Biden’s desire to develop an allied approach
to the challenges which China is posing to Western interests. Finally,
China’s ‘Global Times’ recently published a timeline of the military
confrontation in Galwan. It argues that India initiated the border
clashes by violating the LAC and China acted with restraint as a
‘wise and kind lion’ in agreeing to the pullback (Global Times, ‘China
reveals truth of Galwan Valley clash after half a year, showing the
country as a ‘lion with wisdom and kindness’ by Liu Xin and Guo
Yuandan, February 19, 2021). In recent Sino-Indian conversations,
China’s leaders have conveyed several subtle points. Leaving aside
the humour in the Chinese conversation of its fierce dragon image
changing into a kind and a wise lion – which begs the question, if
a wolf in sheep’s clothing is still a wolf – several points that have
been conveyed are noteworthy.
- A downturn in relations is an unnecessary drain and loss for both
sides.
- The two countries need to follow the path of mutual trust and
cooperation.
- Urging both sides to move from easy to difficult aspects step by step
and create conditions for further improvement of relations.
- The border issue is not the whole of China-India relations. The PRC
diplomatic lines about improving relations are a decade old song
with a bad history. Trust is no longer the basis of cooperation. Reagan
said: ‘trust but verify’. In India-China relations trust has evaporated,
fighting and preparation to fight are necessary as the Galwan and
Dokhlam experiences show, and pullback agreements are based on
verification, not on trust. Now, the border confrontation has become
a major part of the relationship given the complex context in which
China’s India policy has evolved. If China is keen to return to business
as usual by separating the border question from the bilateral
relationship, the question is why it is keen to do so. With a history
of a rhetorical commitment not to give up an inch of territory and
a habit of teaching countries a lesson, does the Galwan pullback
and the likely stalemate in the military and diplomatic relations
give a sign that China failed to teach India a lesson, and if so, the
recent crisis is not a morale booster for the CCP elite and public
opinion?
34 Vol. XXIV, No. I

In sum, the EAM is right to point out that the recent border clashes
have broken the trust, and without trust – in my view – the implication
is that bilateral diplomacy does not have a future. He is also right to
emphasise that Indian public and political opinion has been seriously
disturbed, and by implication – again my view – it is up to China to
restore trust by pulling back from its aggressive actions. An important
element in this picture is that the loss of trust was the result not only
of the physical confrontation but also the tearing up of the peace and
tranquillity agreements of the 1990s, which had maintained peace
despite periodic prodding. The situation now is that there are new lines
(plural) of control along the entire border including Arunachal Pradesh,
Ladakh and the middle border across Bhutan. The new context for the
Indian armed forces is to view the entire border as a frontier zone that
lacks a common agreement. MEA’s laborious work to put the agreements
and norms in writing in the 1990s has been rubbished by the recent
clashes.
My conclusion is that the 1962 war showed that Nehru’s China diplomatic
experiment failed, and MEA’s 1990s experiment to negotiate LAC agreements
were carried out in good faith but they also failed because China was
pursuing a different path to corner India by developing new points of
pressure, while India was seeking the path of bilateral diplomacy. By
themselves, such agreements have limited use in Chinese diplomacy because
bilateralism is not the basis of China’s India policy but the approach – a
traditional one, which was explained by Premier Zhou en-Lai in the Mao
era – was that diplomacy was a part of propaganda and the driving element
was to form a united front with like-minded partners against a common
enemy. With India as a long-term enemy, China has used a long list of
partners to pressure the Government of India. The list includes Pakistan;
Indian communists; Indian Congress Party under Sonia Gandhi and Rahul
Gandhi, which now seeks to bring down the present dispensation; Nepal’s
political leaders who believe that India has a Big Brother attitude towards
Nepal; and Kashmiri Muslims who resent Indian rule. In this context,
Beijing’s incentive is to strengthen the united front elements against India
as lines of pressure to contain India’s rise, while India’s motivation now
should be to recognise that these elements exist and to counter the Chinese
narrative that it is the wave of the future of Asian international relations.
Although India is late in adopting this approach, there are signs that along
with her strategic and cultural partners in the IPR, it has taken tentative
Vol. XXIV, No. I 35

Ashok Kapur
steps to develop its public diplomacy to exploit Chinese uncertainties about

the future of her international relationships in the IPR world.
 China’s public narrative is that its rise as the global leader is inevitable
because of its governance model and its economic and military power,
but this narrative hides several uncertainties behind it. The first line
of uncertainties is hidden in the current pattern of Sino-US relations.
Yang Wei, ‘China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs urges Biden to ‘clear
mines’, Epoch Times, February 1, 2021, tells the story. The public
narrative is along familiar lines. The US is not great and will not be
great again, it is collapsing; China wants the lifting of sanctions and
tariffs as part of the mine-clearing process. The burden is on the
Biden administration to make the first move to pull back Trump-era
sanctions against CCP leaders because of the human rights situation
of Xinjiang’s Muslim minority Uyghurs population, and the Tibetans.
The counter-narrative about China’s CCP is to undermine its
legitimacy by making a distinction between the ‘good’ Chinese people
and the CCP, in Biden’s words where President Xi Jin Ping does not
have ‘democracy in his bones’ (my summary). Beijing says that the
Biden administration should adopt a stance of no conflict, no
confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. Secretary
of State Blinken notes that China wants to become the leading country
in the world, the rule-maker, the model. To all this, the Biden
administration says that the US is talking to allies and the US Congress
to make the US out-compete China. To China’s effort to pressure
Taiwan into submission, the US Navy sent its ships into the narrow
Taiwan Straits that separate the Chinese mainland from Taiwan,
and it is committed to the Taiwan Relations Act with sales of modern
military arms and other signs of a growing relationship, which Trump
had pushed. Treasury Secretary Janel Yellin noted publicly that China
was the most important strategic competitor, alleging that it was
dumping products, erecting trade barriers, and giving illegal subsidies
to its corporations among other activities. USA’s new Intelligence
Chief also says that the US will devote more resources to deal with
China.
 There are also a few telling tea leaves to show that all is not well
in the China-US relationship. Taiwan’s representative in Washington
attended Biden’s inauguration but not the Chinese ambassador. A
low-level diplomat represented China. The US does not have an
ambassador in China, and as noted earlier, the Biden administration
does not appear to be in a rush to clear the mines as Beijing demands.
36 Vol. XXIV, No. I

The question is that if Beijing leaders believe that the US is in decline

and China is rising then why does it seek to engage the US? To
recognise China’s superiority? To be acknowledged as a co-equal of
the US pending its rise as a global hegemon?
The China-US and India-China relationships in 2021 are fluid and my

suggestion for India is to pause and regroup to address the problems
of a resurgent China. Three developments serve as the background to
my discussion. The first is that the Biden team has embraced rhetorically
the Trumpian view of China as an aggressive force and threat to US
interests. The Biden tone is softer but remains firm on the key issues.
Blinken notes that the US will uphold commitments to Taiwan under
the Taiwan Relations Act; the PRC committed genocide against the
Uyghur minority in Xinjiang, a Pompeo view that the State Department
has embraced; and that China misled the world about the spread of
Coronavirus. The new US defence secretary agrees with Blinken, and
the new US intelligence chief will mobilise more resources against China.
Blinken, however, says that the US can outcompete China. In his two-
hour long call with Xi Jinping, Biden expressed his views on trade and
other issues without acknowledging Trump’s build-up of the conversation
in the US about China’s aggressive tactics, and Biden noted publically
that ‘China will eat our lunch’ if the US does not react. The new element
is that whereas Trump had stopped talking with Xi in March 2020,
Biden and his team have reopened the lines of communications between
the two countries. But China’s demand to take down the ‘landmines’
has not been accepted by the Biden team for the moment. The China
policy is under review and following that it is likely, if the speculation
is correct, it may see changes to pull back from a confrontational stance,
find cooperation on climate change and let the allies and partners fend
for themselves pending Biden’s consultations with them concerning China.
This consultative process is a ‘pause and regroup’ exercise which is the
present theme in Biden’s approach to China and which has implications
for China’s Asian neighbours. Thus far there is no indication that China
has given up anything to Biden other than to urge cooperation. This is
true also about the language in use about the region. For the US it is
the ‘Indo-Pacific region’; for China, it is the ‘Asia-Pacific region’. As
noted earlier, China has demanded that Biden abandon the use of the
Indo-Pacific region term. Such a change is not merely linguistic – it
implies a demand to change the policy lens.
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Ashok Kapur
The second development is that following the military confrontation

between China and India in the Ladakh region and the phased withdrawal
that was recently (February 2021) announced, the two countries are
trying to lower the temperature without necessarily changing the
confrontational aspects. The Sino-Indian relationship has several
significant permanently operating factors. One, there is a unity of purpose
in China’s strategic push since Mao’s declared aim to liberate the
Himalayan region in his writings (pre-1950) and in his public statements
in 1950 at the time of the attack on Tibet. The Chinese nation and
communist party speak with a single voice on this theme of liberation.
Two, the military terrain – Tibet’s plateau – favours the easier movement
of Chinese forces whereas Indian forces must deploy uphill, and since
India is on defence it is challenging for it to maintain a 3:1 ratio in its
favour in war and peacetime. It is a part of Mao’s theory on protracted
war to make a tactical ‘one step’ back in face of opposition but the more
likely pattern is to develop salami tactics, gain ground, then take one
step back and claim it as a sign of goodwill and peace. Three, since
China believes in the use of military initiative and surprise on the
battlefield and India’s pattern of behaviour since 1947 is to react to
‘aggression’, it helps the country with the initiative to take advantage
of the ambiguity of the exact location of the frontier because the LAC
is a notional concept and not a demarcated fact on the ground. Fourth,
on this point, the Indian political system is internally divided. Unlike
China, there are multiple and competing voices on India’s Pakistan and
China policies. Predictably, the political opposition will reject the ruling
party’s actions, and thus far, particularly pre-Modi, there has been
limited unity of purpose and agreement on strategic and diplomatic
tactics between the diplomatic and military practitioners. The training
and orientation of these two branches of government are radically
different. The diplomat lives in a world of negotiations and conferences;
the military, air force, navy and intelligence personnel on the other
hand function in a world of threats and countermeasures and available
resources and training required for the use of force. Such fault lines do
not exist in the Chinese political class, or at least they are not visible,
and they are not open to exploitation by Indian officials. Lastly, it should
be noted on this point that China and Pakistan policies of India have
historically excited North Indians and less so the political class and
public opinion in the South. An exception to this point is that South
Indian scientists have made major contributions to the development of
Indian atomic science and its military applications. The fault line between
38 Vol. XXIV, No. I

Indian diplomatic and military establishments was severe during the

Nehru-Menon years but post-Nehru they have been partially repaired
but they still exist.
I have examined the US-China relationship in the Biden era as a part

of the current context to the India-China relationship. I have noted
above the Biden administration officials’ talking points about China, but
can Biden himself sustain them pending the various inter-agency reviews
taking place in the Department of Defence and other US agencies, given
the deep divisions along partisan lines in the political classes in
Washington DC? And can Biden escape the view that he is soft on China
given the existing and previous links between him and members of his
national security team with the Chinese communist party and big
businesses? The point of tension in US politics and foreign policy
establishment is that Blinken’s (and others) talking points come from
the pattern of Trump/US-Xi/China relations and policy actions since
2017, but Biden’s agenda is to roll back the Trumpian policies. There
is no easy answer whether Biden will clear the mines laid by Trump’s
administration as Beijing demands.
How do China-US dynamics bear upon India-China dynamics? Clearly,

2020 events show that border security management is now in Indian
hands and it is up to India’s armed forces to maintain an eyeball-to-
eyeball contention and to use the period of pause with a phased pullback
to regroup and strengthen its military and intelligence assets. For India,
now its military and economic strength is the tip of its spear, and the
use of diplomatic skills of the MEA and senior military commanders to
negotiate pullbacks is essential, but note that the Indian diplomatic
machinery alone does not have the leverage to get China on the
negotiating table; it must rely on the military arm to build leverage
against China by demonstrating India’s political will and staying power.
India has fewer uncertainties vis-à-vis China in 2021 if the Indian policy
establishment recognises that bilateral diplomacy is mostly at a dead
end because of the complex Sino-Indian context, which was outlined
earlier and is summed up below. Indian bilateral diplomacy works well
in non-critical relationships such as with the UAE, Israel, Saudi Arabia,
Iran, Maldives, Mauritius, and select SE Asian powers like Vietnam. It
has not worked well with Pakistan and China because these countries
lack an inclination to cooperate on a common ground. With them, only
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Ashok Kapur
tactical adjustments are possible without a peace settlement between

them and India. On the other hand, China has shown that it can escalate
tensions at will at a time and place of its choosing, that it has allies in
the Indian political world – in the Congress party and Indian communist
party circles – that India has historically lacked a strategic culture
since Nehru’s time and it’s spill-over (1949-2020), and the build-up of
Indian military and economic strength has been a reactive and
incremental exercise and it is of recent beginnings.
Compared to India, China (not simply Xi Jinping) is an old hand in the

practice of geopolitical diplomacy in the Himalayan region. India is a
relative newcomer, and it lacks a large bench of geopoliticians among
its government departments and its academic and media institutions.
It is a challenge to identify the Indian Chanakyas when the world around
India – in south Asia, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and the Indo
Pacific region – is full of Chanakyas. India lacks even a theory (theories)
of a strategic design(s) to build and project national power in a way
that will alter the other side’s thinking and actions. After 80 years,
India has yet to produce a nationally recognised Indian Sun Tzu.
There are, however, signs of change in India’s awareness in policy circles

that China’s de-recognition of the LAC, even as a notional boundary
line, means that the border region is completely, in the Chinese view,
a part of its frontier zone i.e. as an open arena for military action and
political interventions vis-à-vis the local populations in Arunachal
Pradesh and the Ladakh/Kashmir/Pakistan territorial sphere and in
the global diplomatic sphere. This is a step to claim that it has core
interests not only in Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang but also in the Gilgit/
Baltistan/Kashmir region where the practice of issuing stapled visas to
people from Kashmir (and Arunachal Pradesh) implies that the area is
disputed in China’s views. Thus, India and the world are expected to
acknowledge China’s territorial integrity, but China is not expected to
recognise India’s territorial integrity – with this background it is up to
the Indian authorities to enforce its rights as per international norms
and law. The first step in the India-China discourse is to realise that
ground realities matter; bilateral diplomacy has not worked during the
1949-2020 period and India needs to formulate a credible narrative to
counter China’s conceptions of core interests, diplomatic norms and
military arrangements. The counter-narrative must be so designed that
40 Vol. XXIV, No. I

it affects Chinese risk/reward calculations and are credible in the eyes

of global opinion.
The process to redefine India’s China policy is doable, but it is not an

easy task considering that the Delhi policy establishment has a smug
and reactive mindset without a strategic, time-sensitive road map, which
should be well defined and has domestic support. Nehru indulged in
vague talk about the value of ‘Indian-ness’. India’s current EAM speaks
in this vein about the ‘India way’. These are feel-good ideas, which lack
strategic direction to change ground realities. Indian military actions in
Siachin, Kargil, Balakot, Doklam and Galwan, however, show a plan to
use military action that is based on the principle of the value of ‘danda’
(stick) in the Kautilayan mode, but this line of action should be sustained,
and it should not be muted by vague Delhi-ite talk that highlights Indian
diplomatic skills, a sign of self-serving noise rather than action. ‘Action’
in the sphere of international relations has two main tests. First, can
India absorb and/or deflect China’s power, threats and manipulation
given that China has the military, diplomatic and political initiative to
intervene at will in India’s affairs and national security questions? Second,
can India generate counter-power to affect Chinese thinking, risk/reward
calculations, and to break its advances in specific situations and give it
pause in its activities? At issue here is the status of the Sino-Indian
power equation in the Himalayan sphere, in the South Asian
neighbourhood and the Indian Ocean, and the formulation of a political/
cultural narrative with the backing of the military and economic strength
vis-à-vis China.
Credible narratives are born out of crisis experiences, by an

understanding of the fault lines in Chinese risk/reward calculations and
a definition of success that is not measured by abstractions such as
‘win/win’ rhetoric in press releases. Note that Xi Jinping’s Politburo-
PLA combination functions as a confident united front when the PLA
secures quick victories as in 1962, but a prolonged deployment in the
Himalayas may be problematic in the face of Indian resistance. The
CCP/PLA combination is vulnerable to India’s use of the Maoist formula
of protracted warfare against China. A prolonged confrontation without
an immediate prospect of victory for China that is internationally
recognised creates a diplomatic/military/psychological stalemate.
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Ashok Kapur
Provided the Indian authorities have the means and the will to fight, to
take measured risks, be able to demonstrate Indian staying power in a
crisis and they create a negotiated pathway for the Chinese forces to
pull back from their advanced positions. India does not have to win but
it must avoid a loss. In the Sino-Indian context, a prolonged stalemate
(May 2020-February 2021 in the Galwan case, and earlier in the
Doklam case) is a useful alternative to military defeat, provided a pullback
is followed by a regrouping of resources and strategic plans on the
Indian side.
Minister VK Singh’s recent statement that India has also intruded across
the LAC in the past shows a path forward. Despite his clarification, this
may be a new articulation of the ‘India way’. If the LAC is a notional
line without demarcation, how is one to know whether the line is being
crossed? In this scenario, crossing the LAC first and then meeting post-
facto to sort out the alleged transgression with a pullback seemed to be
the accepted pattern of conduct in the Doklam and Galwan episodes.
Could Minister Singh be hinting that the new ‘India way’ is to maintain
an eyeball-to-eyeball presence in the Himalayas as a pre-condition for
security there? If so, this line of action may be broken into three parts.
(1) Share a cup of tea between Chinese and Indian soldiers and share
their photos when the border is calm; this indicates the prospect of
calm on the border. (2) Build Indian military strength as an ongoing
and relentless process including missiles, strengthen the alignments with
the Quad members and other like-minded powers like Israel, Vietnam,
Taiwan and Central Asian republics and in the ASEAN sphere, keep
strengthening Indo-US defence ties. And (3), fight with sticks and stones
in eyeball-to-eyeball fights. This sends an interesting message to the
world community: two nuclear powers know the danger of escalation
and the theory which US academic and policy wonks peddled that if
India gets nuclear weapons, it is likely to use them, was a bogus one
and intellectually without evidence. That two nuclear powers did not
even fight with tanks and missiles but have them, and that they chose
to de-escalate, and a negotiated pause is a sign that both sides may be
open to recognise the ground realities until the ‘next time’. If this analysis
is correct, recent Sino-Indian military interactions in the context of a
dangerous confrontation suggest that crises can provide a learning curve
but it may be a slow one, and the three conditions noted above are
necessary reference points rather than toothless bilateral diplomacy of
42 Vol. XXIV, No. I

the past. If this line of analysis has merit, then the Biden administration’s
orientation towards India is of limited value, while the new Indian
orientation towards China merits serious review.
SUMMING UP
The Galwan episode has several takeaways.

 The Chinese and the MEA theory of China’s peaceful rise has been
debunked, and it has been replaced by the Maoist theory of protracted
warfare as the norm in international relations. This should be the
new Indian mantra as well.
 The Galwan fight involved 24 sq km of territory (8x3 km). The
agreement to a pullback (despite the stalling in execution) reflects
(i) PRC’s surprise at the fierce Indian resistance, and (ii) the high
casualties on both sides. India admits to 28 or so, China’s ‘wise and
kind lion’ article by Global Times cited above admits to five gallantry
awards but the number of awards is not the same thing as the
number of casualties. TASS reports 40+ on the Chinese side and
Indian reports have a similar estimate. High casualties affect the
Chinese elite and public opinion and their risk/reward calculations.
 At the diplomatic level, China continues to maintain its demands to
the US and India to scale back/abandon their commitment to the
IPR and the Quad and follow China’s guidance about the value of
the Shanghai Cooperation and BRICK arrangements under Chinese
leadership. For India, the message is to first normalise bilateral
relations as per Chinese requirements and then the border settlement
will follow. For India, the decoupling, which PM Rajiv Gandhi
accepted in his 1988 visit to China by placing the boundary question
on the backburner while commercial ties were advanced, is no longer
a sound basis for moving forward. Indian public opinion is now a
mainstream force on the China question, and it is firmly behind the
Government. As such, there is a major fault line between the Chinese
and the Indian worldviews and interests in the bilateral strategic
discourse. Without a strategic convergence between the Chinese and
the Indian ways, the future pathway points to ongoing protracted
warfare at the military and diplomatic levels along with periodic
temporary ceasefires and regrouping of military, economic and
diplomatic forces.
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Ashok Kapur
 A major lesson of the Galwan episode is that only inter-actions

between the two rivals’ matter, not diplomatic talks, except in the
context of dangerous actions. Action is now the language of the
China-India discourse.
 The Galwan episode is a case study of the role of an intense and
potentially dangerous fight where Indian resistance and fighting
capacity surprised China and the alignment of Indian public opinion
with Government policy showed China that Indian resistance had
acquired a national character.
 This episode established a connection between the normalisation of
relations and a border settlement. On this issue, the positions diverge
sharply. China seeks normalisation first and then the border settlement
will follow. India does not accept that position and neither should it.
Rajiv Gandhi’s approach was a major mistake in Indian policy. The
path forward requires that India does not separate its commercial/
economic links with China from the border question; furthermore,
it ought not to de-link Sino-Indian relations from its newfound interest
in building up its position in the Quad and its defence and diplomatic
ties with Japan, US, Australia, UK, France, Taiwan, Vietnam and
Philippines among others. Such strengthened ties enhance the Indian
theory of strategic autonomy. Use the Quad as an arena of military,
intelligence and diplomatic cooperation without endorsing it as a
form of an Asian NATO.
 Messaging is important in the Sino-Indian relationship, to deter and
discourage pointless crises in the bilateral relationship. Indian
messaging is achieved if its forces do not capitulate, they inflict pain
on Chinese ground forces, cause reputational damage to China because
of its aggressive stance and yet maintain the lines of communications
open at the military and diplomatic levels. PRC’s imperial history
shows that it seeks unilateral advantage and its talk of a win-win
situation is a bogus one. A measure of success lies in an ability to
get the other side to seek a negotiated end to the crisis. The Galwan
pullback and Pakistan’s overture to bring calm on the Line of Control
are signs of a willingness to avoid confrontation. But it remains to
be seen if Pakistan’s military government will accept J&K as a part
of India in the future.
 On the military side, India needs to shift from a policy of passive
defence to active defence, recognising that in several ways India is
the heart of Asia. The Nehruvian view of China and India as the
44 Vol. XXIV, No. I

twin pillars of Asian security is redundant because China does not

see India as a peer and instead it sees itself as a peer of the US, or
even as the global hegemon. The Indian challenge is to abandon the
dream of China and India as the Asian twins, and instead maintain
regional deterrence in the South Asian and the Indian Ocean sphere
by keeping regional animosities in check and ensure that the LOC
is where the terrorist camps exist.
......................................................................................................................................
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Ashok Kapur is the Distinguished Professor Emeritus in Political Science,

University of Waterloo, Canada. He is the author of ‘Geopolitics and the Indo-
Pacific Region’ (2020) and numerous other books.
**************************
Vol. XXIV, No. I 45

Claude Arpi
AGNI pp 46-59
BY
CLAUDE ARPI
O
n January 29, 2021, The Times of India (TOI) reported that
the Shimla-based Army Training Command (ARTRAC) was
‘analyzing’ a Tibetology proposal under the Chief of Army Staff’s
directions. The daily added: “Amid the military standoff at LAC in eastern
Ladakh with China, the Indian Army is mulling over a proposal for
officers to study Tibetan history in a bid to counter Beijing’s influence.” 1
Since then, the Indian Army has started implementing a proposal for
its officers to study Tibetan history, culture and language on “both
sides of the Line of Actual Control and the international boundary as
part of the measures being discussed to counter the propaganda and
spread of influence by China”. Whether it will effectively counter China
can be argued, but it is indeed a long overdue requirement for the
Defence Forces (and other Civil Services) to know better about the
borders that they are defending.
The project was apparently initiated during the Army Commanders’

Conference held in October 2020. The TOI quoted an Army official
who remarked, “Army officers are generally well-versed with Pakistan.
But similar expertise about China and the Chinese psyche is lacking.
Officers who understand China are very few. Knowledge of Tibetology
fares even worse. These deficiencies need to be plugged.” He further
added that “just a two-year course in Mandarin would not make an
officer a China expert.” That is obvious.
The seven institutes which will offer postgraduate courses in Tibetology

have been identified by the Government; interestingly, officers can
complete their course while on study leave. The institutes identified for
46 Vol. XXIV, No. I
the purpose are the Department of Buddhist Studies, Delhi University;

the Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Studies, Varanasi; the Nava
Nalanda Mahavihara, Bihar; Visva Bharati, West Bengal; the Dalai Lama
Institute for Higher Education, Bengaluru; the Namgyal Institute of
Tibetology, Gangtok; and the Central Institute of Himalayan Culture
Studies, Arunachal Pradesh. These are indeed some of the best
institutions in India to impart knowledge on Tibetan history and
civilization.
A KINSHIP BETWEEN INDIA AND TIBET
Why should Indian officers learn Tibetan history?
There is a simple answer: it is necessary to know your ‘enemy’ and the

region where he is operating from.
The importance of Tibet in understanding India’s northern frontiers,

which are intricately linked to the Land of Snows, cannot be over-
emphasized. Even if the Government of India presently does not want
to diplomatically play the so-called ‘Tibet Card’, the age-old relationship
between India and Tibet has continued to remain alive. We have seen
it displayed in numerous ways since the beginning of the present crisis
in Ladakh, for example, the emotional outpouring shown by the Indian
public over the death of a Special Frontier Force officer of Tibetan
origin on the Kailash range.
In the 1950s, an ancient civilization disappeared on the other side of

the Himalayas and in the process, India lost a friend, a kind neighbour
and a peaceful border. But the kinship of shared values and history
between India and Tibet has remained; unfortunately, it did not translate
into a coherent policy for the Government, as well as for the Indian
population along the border regions.
The Dalai Lama, the revered Tibetan leader, is more than an honoured
guest in India; his presence symbolizes the continuation of the age-old
relationship between the border areas and Tibet. The Peoples’ Republic
of China has been able to annex the Roof of the World by force, but has
Beijing been able to assimilate Tibetans into their ideology? It is a moot
question, the answer to which the future alone holds.
Vol. XXIV, No. I 47
Claude Arpi
Though many do not realize this today, a solution to the vexed Sino-
Indian border undoubtedly depends on how Tibet’s status will evolve.
PRE-1959 TIBET AND INDIA
After visiting Tibet in September 1957, Apa Pant, the Political Officer
in Sikkim, wrote a long note for the Ministry of External Affairs; he
observed that the Chinese officers were not interested “in harmony
and compassion but in power and material benefit.” Pant spoke about
the confrontation between two different worlds: “The one so apparently
inefficient, so humane and even timid, yet kind and compassionate and
aspiring to something more gloriously satisfying in human life; the other
determined and effective, ruthless, power-hungry and finally intolerant.
I wondered how this conflict could resolve itself, and what was India’s
place in it.”
Some argue that the past should be forgotten, as the world has changed,
and further, that China has become a powerful State. But the fact that
the Communist regime is today trying to dominate the world and impose
its ‘Chinese Dream’ on the planet should be kept in mind when one
deals with border issues. Interestingly, Beijing has started speaking of
reopening the Old Silk Roads, forgetting that for centuries the trade
routes between India and Tibet were based on old kinship and shared
values; ironically, it was China who closed these trade (‘Silk’) routes in
1962.
THE THREE WARFARES
It is necessary to look at the evolving concept of warfare from China’s

perspective. Since 1998, every two years or so, China’s State Council 2
releases a White Paper (WP) on defence; over the years, each WP
provides a distinctive perspective, dealing with a different aspect of
China’s defence.
The first WP was entitled ‘China’s National Defence.’ 3 Two years later,
the second one pointed out a ‘serious security situation’ in the world.
It is not in a WP that China mentioned for the first time the ‘Three
Warfares’ doctrine; it happened in 2003, through a “Notification
Regarding the Regulations on Political Work in the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA),” issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of China (CPC).
48 Vol. XXIV, No. I
The responsibility for ‘wartime political work’ was delegated to the

General Political Department (GPD), then one of the four departments
under the Central Military Commission (CMC), which was given the
task of “conducting public opinion (media) warfare, psychological warfare,
an d l egal w ar f ar e.” T h e 20 0 4 W P 4 dealt with the concept of Revolution
in Military Affairs (RMA). The public was informed about the decision
of the CMC to promote ‘informatisation’. That was an important
reorientation. The ‘Three Warfares’ was thereafter part of the RMA.
Hence, Knowledge Warfare, particularly about ‘history’ will be an

important component of modern conflicts.
THE C OMMUNIST P ARTY ’S PERSPECTIVES
An interesting aspect has been mentioned by Peter Mattis in an article:

“China’s ‘Three Warfares’ in Perspective.” 5
Mattis, an expert on PLA’s intelligence, argued that the PLA has from
the start been associated with the ‘Three Warfares’, “(The PLA) is the
armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party. The PLA is the Party’s
army; the Party is not an extension of the PLA. Unlike a national army
dedicated to the defence of a state and its people, the Chinese military’s
purpose is to create political power for the party.”
Re-writing history is part of this approach.
Mattis argued that through media or public opinion warfare, China

attempts to shape public opinion both domestically and internationally.
“…The PLA believes energizing or mobilizing the Chinese public is useful
for signalling resolve and deterring foreign incursions on Chinese
interests.” This argument should be kept in mind; the ‘Three Warfares’
is a tool of the Party and is meant for internal as well as external
consumption.
An example is the recent craze for war memorials on display on the

occasion of Qingming (Tomb Sweeping Festival) on April 4, 2021.
President Xi Jinping has on many occasions emphasized the importance
of remembering the country’s national heroes and carrying forward
their spirit, said Xinhua. The Chinese media spoke of two million martyrs
in Tibet, most of them being those who died during the invasion of
Vol. XXIV, No. I 49

Claude Arpi
Land of Snows in 1950-51. Of course, the Tibetan heroes who fought

for their freedom are forgotten in the process.
In these circumstances, the need for Indian officers to understand the

history and the dynamics of what has happened on the other side of the
IB/LAC is crucial.
U NRESTRICTED WARFARE
Let us remember the remarkable book Unrestricted Warfare,6 written

by Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, two very brilliant senior
PLA officers. It is a fascinating research into the US’s success against
Saddam Hussein’s army during the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Drawing
lessons from this conflict, Unrestricted Warfare details how a nation
like China can face the technologically advanced US Army and overcome
this disadvantage to defeat the enemy. Blending ancient martial arts
theory with knowledge of the high-tech era, the authors explain how
the strong can be defeated by the weak through merciless unconventional
methods: “The first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no
rules, with nothing forbidden.”
One chapter speaks of “Ten Thousand Methods Combined as One:

Combinations That Transcend Boundaries.” It is the art of combining
different elements of these various forms of warfare.
In this context, Historical Knowledge is bound to play an important role

in future conflicts. Analysts have always been predicting that Information
Warfare (IW) would be an important part of any battle of tomorrow.
Today it is a reality.
A PRACTICAL E XAMPLE
Let us take a practical example of the historical disinformation propagated

by the Chinese State.
The uprising of the Tibetan people in Lhasa in March 1959 was a turning
point for the Land of Snows as well as for India. For the Communist
regime in Beijing, the Tibetan rebellion was probably a military
opportunity (and exercise) to prepare for the ‘Indian’ War in October
1962; the PLA learned tremendously from the fight against the Khampa
50 Vol. XXIV, No. I

rebels in the 1950s and early 1960s, particularly in terms of logistics,

joint operations and acclimatization on the plateau. 7
The firsthand account of the Tibetan Uprising of March 1959 sent two
months later by Maj SL Chibber, the Indian Consul General in Lhasa,
to the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in Delhi, contradicts completely
the Chinese version of Beijing helping the serfs to liberate themselves
from the yoke of the feudal landlords. The 1959 Uprising was a popular
mass movement; the Chinese propaganda will probably continue for
some time to propagate its false narrative. But Chibber’s account 8 will
remain to tell the truth of those momentous events. This narrative has
been largely forgotten in India; it is, however, important to understand
what happened during the following years in the Tibetan plateau. If no
attention is paid to the history of Tibet, in a few years the Chinese
narrative will prevail as an undisputed fact.
A CHANGE OF NEIGHBOUR
Once the Tibetan leader safely reached India, bridges were cut with
China. The situation soon worsened in Tibet, especially after the Dalai
Lama was granted asylum by India and relations reached a point of no
return. Thereafter, no restraint was shown by Mao Zedong’s ruthless
regime to impose so-called reforms on the recalcitrant Tibetans.
Soon after that the Indo-Tibet border became ‘disputed’, with intrusions
taking place in Longju in North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) 9 and
Kongka-la10 in Ladakh, making Delhi suddenly realize that India had a
new neighbour and that the boundary had not been settled, as the
Indian Government had wishfully believed in 1954.
The thousands of letters and notes exchanged between the two countries
(published in the 14 White Papers),11 bear testimony to this. Knowledge
of Tibetan history is crucial to understand the dynamics of the border
‘dispute’ with China.
Unfortunately, post-1962, the history of the border has been buried in

the almirahs of South Block (by both the Ministries of External Affairs
and Defence). Fear to use a non-inexistent ‘Tibet Card’ prevailed; China
should not be provoked became the leitmotiv. It is today necessary to
objectively study the history of not only modern Tibet but also the
Vol. XXIV, No. I 51

centuries-old relations between the sub-continent and the Tibetan
plateau. It has been established by recent archaeological discoveries
that these relations pre-date by several centuries the introduction of
Buddhism on the Tibetan plateau.
1962 W AR WITH INDIA
Another favourite topic of Chinese media propaganda has been the 1962
War with India. Beijing is keen to rewrite that narrative too and sell it
to its citizens visiting the Indian border areas; its idea is to prove that
India attacked China in October 1962.
At the end of October 2017, as an offshoot of the Doklam episode,

Sina.com published an album of photos “to commemorate the 55 th
Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Self-Defense Counterattack.” Note
that for Beijing, it is the ill-equipped and unprepared Indian troops
who attacked the Chinese, leaving China no option but to ‘counterattack’,
killing hundreds of Indian jawans and officers in the process.
One of the main conclusions of our recent study on the relations between
India and Tibet over a fifteen years’ period (1947-62) is that during
this entire period, India failed to look after her interests. It should do
so now while adhering to its ideals of being a peaceful nation, of fighting
against any form of imperialism and of defending the rights of the weaker
people. Further, the government should certainly not take at face value
the declarations of peace by other nations, particularly China.
India faces a country that still believes that power flows out of the
barrel of a gun. Without emulating China, India needs to look after her
interests quietly and forcefully, and be honest, frank and straightforward
about it. Unfortunately, documents like the Henderson-Brooks Bhagat
Report which could be a valuable textbook for the Indian armed forces,
remain classified.
KNOWING H IMALAYAN AND TIBETAN CULTURE
Knowledge of the Indian borders and their relationship with the Tibetan
world is crucial, especially at a time when China promotes the cultures
of the ‘minorities’ of the border areas in Tibet 12 and is still claiming
Arunachal Pradesh as part of Southern Tibet.
It is necessary for the Armed Forces (and all bureaucrats dealing with
China and the borders, in particular Indian Foreign Service officers and
the Central Police Forces deployed on the border) to go deeper into
Tibetan historical and civilizational influence in the border areas.
DIPLOMACY AND B ORDER TRADE
Trade has been an important component of the relations between India

and Tibet for centuries. For this purpose, it is essential to reopen the
trade routes as well as the Indian Consulates General in Lhasa and
Kashgar. Past attempts to reopen the Indian Consulate General in Lhasa
were unsuccessful. One can only hope that the efforts of the Government
will continue in this direction. In the process, the old Consulate in Kashgar
should not be forgotten. Some of the suggestions will have, of course,
to wait for the stabilization of bilateral relations between India and
China post-COVID and post-Ladakh confrontation. But they should not
be forgotten.
It was stated in the 1954 Tibet Agreement that, “inhabitants of the

border districts of the two countries who cross the border to carry on
petty trade or to visit friends and relatives may proceed to the border
districts of the other party as they have customarily done heretofore
and need not be restricted to the passes and route specified (mentioned)
above and shall not be required to hold passports, visas or permits.”
Such agreements have been forgotten and their knowledge is essential
to those involved in border management and participating in cross-
border talks.
Today, China promotes the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), dear to
President Xi Jinping; but by stopping the age-old trade between the
Himalayan belt and the Roof of the World, the Communist regime in
Beijing killed the original silk roads over the Himalayan passes. This
should be told in no uncertain terms to China by the present leadership
in Delhi. It would go a long way to resurrect the centuries-old ‘silk’
roads between India and the Tibetan plateau.
Today, for both India and China, border trade does not seem to be a
priority, though in the Joint Statement issued during Premier Li
Keqiang’s visit to India in May 2013, both parties agreed that “to promote
trade, personnel movement and connectivity across the border, the
Claude Arpi
two sides agreed to consider strengthening border trade through Nathu

La Pass.” When the Nathu La Lass was officially reopened for trade in
July 2006, it also had the effect of ‘fixing’ the border, drastically reducing
tensions in the area. Considering the ‘Nathu-la’ effect, reopening other
routes and land-ports could be an excellent Confidence Building Measure
(CBM) between India and China. In terms of trade, nothing much has
happened since then, however, opening new land ports between India
and Tibet would help stabilize bilateral relations.
Another significant advantage of opening border trade is that it forces

the States involved to precisely delineate their boundaries (or at least
their perceptions of the LAC). At the same time, there is no doubt that
the list of tradeable items should be enlarged.
The names of Demchok or Dumchele in Ladakh, Mana-la or Niti-la in

Uttarakhand, Jelep-la in Sikkim, Bum-la, Tuting or Kibuthu in Arunachal
Pradesh come to mind when one thinks of new land-ports. For the
opening of new trade routes and Himalayan passes (Mana La, Niti La,
Jelep La, Tuting, Kibuthu, etc), China’s concurrence will be necessary;
but there is no harm in putting these issues on the negotiating table.
PILGRIMAGE D IPLOMACY
Though small steps have been made to accommodate more yatris on

the Kailash pilgrimage, another important yatra could be revived,
providing more people-to-people contact, while building deeper trust –
it is the Tsari pilgrimage in Southern Tibet, crossing into India in
Arunachal Pradesh. In the Tibetan psyche, Tsari has always been
synonymous with a ‘sacred place’. With Mount Kailash and the Amye
Machen in eastern Tibet, the pilgrimage around the Dakpa Sheri, the
‘Pure Crystal Mountain’ has, for centuries, been one of the holiest for
the Roof of the World. After crossing the Tibet-India border, the
pilgrimage would proceed southwards along with the Tsari Chu and
then suddenly turn westwards to follow the Subansiri, to finally cross
back into Tibet to reach the first frontier village in Chame county. This
could be re-started.
Yet another possible CBM is to open the Tawang monastery in Arunachal

Pradesh to Buddhist pilgrims from Tibet. This too would have to wait
for the stabilization of bilateral relations.
54 Vol. XXIV, No. I

THE N EXT MOVES
The decision taken by the Army Headquarters to teach ‘Tibetology’ to

Indian officers should be the first step for a better understanding of the
Land of Snows. It should be done holistically, and ultimately relations
should be revived with the population living on the plateau itself. This
decision should be expanded to include the civil services, especially
those dealing with border management/issues, and to the Central Police
Forces deployed in these areas.
Few suggestions in this regard are listed below:
 Introduction of the Bothi language in 8 th Schedule of the Indian

Constitution.
 Better promotion of All Indian Radio (Tibetan language)
broadcasts.
 Promotion of Tibetan and Himalayan culture through films,
international conferences, symposiums, etc.
 Promotion of Sowa Rigpa system of medicine, while providing a
leading role to Mentsekhang (Dharamsala) and the amchis of
Ladakh.
 Promotion of art and culture of the Himalayas and Tibet through
the creation of museums, exhibitions, crafts, etc.
 Encourage Himalayan, Tibetan and Chinese studies by institutions
such as the Institute of Advanced Studies in Shimla, the proposed
Indian National Defence University, Himalayan universities or
any Indian university willing to set up such departments.
 Promoting the culture of Himalayan tribes through TV channels/
cultural programs/festivals – China broadcasts Loba TV to
promote Indian tribes – or organize a Tsangyang Gyatso
Festival,13 though the 6th Dalai Lama was born in Tawang.
 Making and promoting films on important Himalayan figures such
Guru Padma Sambhava, Rinchen Sangpo, Pandit Atisha or
Tsangyang Gyatso, the Sixth Dalai Lama, and eventually have
dedicated museums/study centres on these figures.
 Films on the Himalayan tribes/populations from Ladakh to
Arunachal Pradesh.
Vol. XXIV, No. I 55

Claude Arpi
F URTHER SUGGESTIONS
A few more actions, which could be made to deepen the awareness of

the borders are:
 Better intelligence sharing between India and the Tibetan refugees

living in border areas.
 Training for Indian officers (IFS, IAS, IPS, Defence forces and
CPF deployed on the border) on issues related to the Indo-Tibet
border.
 Promotion of border studies in the courses organized by
institutions such National Defence College, Defence Services Staff
Course, College of Defence Management, Army War College, civil
services academies, etc.
 Intensification of the teaching of Tibetan and Chinese language
in multiple defence and civil service academies, by using the
Taiwan connection, for example.
 The Government of India should keep a tab on the widespread
recruitment of Tibetans in the PLA inside Tibet and should discuss
t h e i ssu e w i t h t h e CT A . 14
These are some of the issues which could improve the situation in the
short term.
COUNTERING CHINESE P ROPAGANDA
As mentioned earlier, the war of tomorrow will be ‘hybrid’ —

‘unrestricted warfare’ in Chinese terminology — and primarily needs a
change of mindset. The Chinese understood this long back.
Remember the Doklam incident of 2017, where India won a battle on

the ridge in western Bhutan by not allowing China to change the status
quo and build a strategic road near the trijunction between Sikkim,
Tibet and Bhutan? But Delhi lost another battle – that of the legitimacy
of its claim. While everyone in India applauded the forces, which
prevented the construction of the road, Delhi was unable to articulate
the background of the standoff although it had strong legal and historical
arguments. The main factor which led to losing the information battle
is the absence of a Historical Division in the Ministry of External Affairs
56 Vol. XXIV, No. I

(MEA). While the Ministry of Defence is getting ready to undertake

bold reforms, the MEA seems lethargic (at least to the external eye).
In the early years after Independence, the Nehru government established

a Historical Division with S Gopal (President Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan’s
son) as its first head. Shivshankar Menon, a former Foreign Secretary
and National Security Advisor, in a book review of Gopal’s Collected
Essays explained: “For reasons I find incredible and incomprehensible,
the Historical Division was wound up by the MEA in the nineties …
some of our present difficulties may indeed be due to a lack of memory.”
Today, the MEA has only a Boundary Cell headed by a Lieutenant
Colonel, while it should be looked after by a Joint Secretary-rank officer
(a Major General with intimate ground knowledge of the boundary).
Why was the Historical Division in the Ministry of External Affairs

closed in the first place?
The Ministry of Defence should also reorganize itself to bring together

all historical records in a well-organized manner – a place where
documents would be available when required for operations, public
information or other purposes – while maintaining their security
classification. To maintain these records, the Ministry would have to
employ a team of professional historians, recruited directly through
lateral entry and who would be given the necessary security clearances.
This move would allow the centralization of all the historical records
kept in different MoD/Service departments. The Directorate of History
and Records (or whatever name the Office is given) would make historical
documents or notes available to the DCOAS (Strategy) or any other
officer requiring them.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, it should be noted that solving the Tibet issue will not
solve the problems of India’s border with China, but the active support
of Tibetan refugees will be very helpful.
Defence is an important link between the Himalayan and Tibetan

populations, therefore, the importance of the first step initiated under
ARTRAC’s supervision and leadership, is most welcome. We can only
hope that further steps will be taken to enlarge the scope of the present
Vol. XXIV, No. I 57

Claude Arpi
initiative, for example, by including the Xinjiang border or by inviting

the Civil Services to join the ‘Himalayan’ courses.
END NOTES
1. Amid LAC standoff, Indian Army eyes Tibetology to ‘counter

China’s influence’, Times of India; see: https://www.timesnownews.com/
india/article/amid-lac-standoff-indian-army-eyes-tibetology-to-counter-
chinas-influence-report/713244.
2. The Chinese Cabinet
3. For WP 1998, see: http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/index.htm
4. For WP 2004, see: http://en.people.cn/whitepaper/defense2004/
defense2004.html
5. Peter Mattis, Three Warfares’ in Perspective, see, https://
warontherocks.com/2018/01/chinas-three-warfares-perspective/
6. Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui,Unrestricted Warfare,
available at: https://andyblackassociates.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/
2015/06/unrestricted.pdf.
7. Summary of the forthcoming book by Jianglin Li, Suppressing
Rebellion in Tibet and the China-India Border War; see:http://
historicaldocs.blogspot.com/2017/12/suppressing-rebellion-in-tibet-
and.html
8. See Claude Arpi, The End of an Era: India Exits Tibet - India
Tibet Relations (1947-1962) - Part 4 (New Delhi, United Service
Institution of India, Vij Books India Pvt Ltd).
9. Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements
Signed Between the Governments of India and China, 1954-1959, White
Paper 2 (Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi,
1959).
10. White Paper, op. cit.
11 . Ibid.
12. See: China promotes ...the Indian tribes: a dangerous move,
see: https://claudearpi.blogspot.com/2017/08/ten-thousand-methods-
to-safeguard.html.
13. Read our article: A Dalai Lama popular in China available at
http://claudearpi.blogspot.com/2013/09/a-dalai-lama-popular-in-
china.html.
58 Vol. XXIV, No. I

14. See our article on the subject: More on the Recruitment of

Tibetans in the PLA, available at http://claudearpi.blogspot.com/2020/
07/more-on-recruitment-of-tibetans-in-pla.html
......................................................................................................................................
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Claude Arpi writes regularly on Tibet, China, India and Indo-French

relations. He is the author of 1962 and the McMahon Line Saga, Tibet: The
Lost Frontier and Dharamsala and Beijing: the negotiations that never were.
**************************
Vol. XXIV, No. I 59

Sanu Kainikara
AGNI pp 60-78
BY
SANU KAINIKARA
T
urkey has been ruled by the Justice and Development Party
(AKP), under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, since 2003.
Under this rule there has been a perceptible decline in Turkey’s
geopolitical influence, both in the region and internationally, mainly
because of Erdogan’s single-minded pursuit of imperial stature, harking
back to the Ottoman Empire. Turkey has immense geo-strategic
locational significance, as it straddles Europe and Asia at a critical location,
although in the past three decades it has failed to convert this positional
advantage to its benefit and political credibility. Currently, Turkey is at
odds with its traditional major power backers – the USA and NATO –
and has also antagonized its neighbours in the Middle East.
Erdogan’s Ottoman Empire fetish was visible last year during the opening
of the parliament in October 2020, when without mincing words, he
claimed the lost non-Turkic part of the erstwhile Ottoman kingdom,
declaring even Jerusalem to be Turkish. Playing to the more
fundamentalist Islamic traditions, he has turned Hagia Sophia in Istanbul
– a 6th century Orthodox Church-turned-mosque-turned-museum –
into a mosque again. He alluded to this decree as paving the way to
‘liberate’ Jerusalem’s Temple Mount and the Al Aqsa mosque, whose
custodianship currently rests with a Jordanian-controlled religious
endowment, called Waqf.
THE N AGORNO-KARABAKH W AR
The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia,

which started on July 12, 2020, saw Turkey being accused of direct
60 Vol. XXIV, No. I

interference in the bilateral conflict over a region that is Armenian

populated but rests within the borders of Azerbaijan. Turkey is alleged
to have sent in more than 4,000 Syrian ‘jihadists’ and a contingent of
Turkish military experts, while also providing Azerbaijan with air support
in the form of Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVS, also called
‘drones’ in some reports). The jihadists had been recruited by the
Turkey-backed Syrian National Army (TNA) from amongst the refugees
in Syria. Perhaps the irony of this situation is lost on both the jihadi
fighters and Erdogan. The jihadis in the militia are all avowed Sunni
Muslims and had been fighting against Bashar-al-Assad and the Shias
in Syria. However, Azerbaijan is a Shia-Turkic majority country aligned
with the jihadist’s main rival in Syria, and now they were fighting on
behalf of the Azeris, against Armenia.
The confusion in this situation is complex. The Azeris are more than 80
per cent Shias and Turkey is a Sunni Muslim state, supporting the
Azeris. On the other hand, Iran, the seat of Shia power, was supporting
Armenia, a majority Christian country. This situation provides a glimpse
of Turkey’s shifting of short- and medium-term goals to align with the
nation’s strategic objectives, which are in turn influenced and shaped
by foreign policy imperatives. The interaction between national strategy
and the shifting goalposts of foreign policy makes for an interesting
analysis. In this conflict in the Caucasus, Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan
is based on ideology, but one of convenience and based on the personal
friendship between Erdogan and Ilham Aliyev, the autocratic ruler of
Azerbaijan.
Even though the intervention pushed the Armenians out of the disputed
region, Turkey’s options were limited by the Russian factor – Armenian
security is guaranteed by Russia that maintains a large military presence
in the country, while Russia has a significant economic influence over
Azerbaijan. Thus, it was that the conflict ended with a Russian-brokered
peace deal.
ERDOGAN’S MILITARISM AND POLITICAL MANOEUVRINGS
Adopting interventionist, hyperactive and expansionist neo-Ottoman

policies requires absolute national cohesion, a strong military power
projection capability, and a vibrant economy. Its success cannot be
assumed based on populist nationalistic emotions that rest on
Vol. XXIV, No. I 61

Sanu Kainikara
fundamentalist religious appeal, which is something that Erdogan has

attempted. National cohesion in Turkey had already been sacrificed at
the altar of Erdogan’s ego that had elicited outrageous revenge after
the failed coup in 2016, which left a bitter aftertaste within the nation.
Since the failed coup in 2016, Erdogan’s megalomaniacal tendencies
have come to the fore – initiating several military initiatives against
actual and perceived adversaries of the nation. It started with actions
against Russia that had so far been more of an ally. On November 24,
2015, Turkey shot down a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 fighter aircraft; the
incident almost blowing up into a full-blown conflict. This was followed
by the assassination of the Russian ambassador to Turkey by an Islamic
State fundamentalist on December 19, 2016.
Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield in August 2016 with the

Turkish military alongside the proxy Syrian militias, facing off against
the US-backed Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces and this continued
till March 2017. In October 2017, Turkey invaded the Idlib region in
North-West Syria on the pretext of creating a de-escalation zone against
the protests from Syria regarding the violation of its sovereignty. A de-
escalation zone in Syrian territory at the common border between the
two countries had been one of Turkey’s demands from the beginning of
the Civil War. In January 2018, Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch
in Afrin against the Kurds. Further, Erdogan dispatched thousands of
Syrian jihadists into Tripoli to oppose the Libyan warlord Khalifa Hafter,
in support of the Libyan government. Hafter was supported by both
Russia and UAE, and Turkey’s efforts to prop up the Libyan government
was directly opposed to Russia’s aims. Turkish proxies were forced to
stand down after an internationally brokered peace process came into
effect.
Jerusalem is another area where Turkey has blundered into, without

considering the complexity of the possible imbroglio and consequences
of its actions. The Palestine Authority felt pushed into a corner when
Israel, UAE and Bahrain normalized mutual relations and established
diplomatic ties. They appealed to Turkey and Qatar for support, and
Erdogan’s rhetoric regarding Jerusalem was the result. Jordan is
concerned that Israel would support Saudi Arabia’s claim to be at least
joint administrator of the holy sites of the Temple Mount and the Al
Aqsa mosque; Israel having already started a public opinion campaign
asserting that Saudi resources would be required to counter Turkish
62 Vol. XXIV, No. I

influence in Jerusalem. Erdogan has made his quest for leadership of

the Islamic world into a three-pronged endeavour – military, nationalistic
and religious. He has not kept them in separate compartments and
mixes and matches them at will. The action regarding Jerusalem brings
Turkey into confrontation with its staunchest rival, Saudi Arabia.
Erdogan has been acting with impunity in trying to dominate the

geopolitical and military spheres in the region. His actions were fuelled
by the tacit support that he was receiving from the then US President
Donald Trump. This was not US institutional support but based on
personal relationships between the two presidents and their families –
Trump’s senior advisor and son-in-law, Jared Kushner and the then
Turkish Finance Minister and Erdogan’s son-in-law, Berat Albayrak,
are business partners. In October 2019, US forces were withdrawn
from Kurdish-held areas in North-East Syria, which facilitated Turkey
to confront and diminish Kurdish control over the region. The US
withdrawal was made at the insistence and personal whim of Donald
Trump, apparently as a favour to Erdogan. This decision has often
been equated to one being made by a novice President with no
understanding of international politics, stroking his ego to project himself
as a ‘strong man’ like Erdogan and other autocrats. The sudden US
withdrawal from the region made it possible for Erdogan to launch
Operation Peace Spring in which Turkish forces pushed into Northern
Syria along a 120-kilometre front and moving 32 kilometers deep
between the towns of Tal Abyad and Ras-al-Ayn.
By recklessly initiating military action into the territory of another

sovereign nation, and taking for granted US inaction, Erdogan overplayed
his hand dangerously and in the eyes of NATO member states, Turkey
became an untrustworthy ally. Turkey’s importance to NATO was diluted,
while its overtures to both Russian and China remained inconclusive.
There were murmurs within the NATO hierarchy that Turkey should
be asked to leave the organization.
Similarly, Erdogan felt snubbed by the European Union (EU) since

Turkey’s attempts at obtaining full membership had so far failed to
elicit any favourable response. The EU had already read the straws in
the wind and refused to entertain Erdogan, having understood his
fundamentalist, expansionist agenda. Further, the OIC-groupings of
Islamic nations also found Erdogan’s actions unpalatable. On being
Vol. XXIV, No. I 63

Sanu Kainikara
isolated in multiple groupings, Erdogan formed a Turkey-Pakistan-

Malaysia nexus along with Qatar to challenge the dominance of Saudi
Arabia in Islamic affairs. The attempt is to drive a wedge between the
Arab monarchies and dilute their unity. This initiative followed a direct
confrontational course with the Arabs, even though it is abundantly
clear that Turkey will not be able to withstand a combined geo-economic
assault by the Arab monarchies. In South Asia, Turkey has been openly
hostile to India, completely alienating the emerging strategic power,
merely to please Pakistan. This action also does not bring any geopolitical
or strategic benefits to Turkey, which has positioned itself alongside
India’s traditional adversaries Pakistan and China.
Over the past few years, Turkey has become a specialist in exporting
foreign fighters, Sunni ‘jihadists’, and outsourcing their conflicts, making
irregular militias an instrument of state foreign policy. The geo-political
downslide of these actions on a once vibrant country is dramatically
visible. By mid-2020 Turkey, once a moderate, secular and democratic
state that was considered the epitome of an Islamic democracy had
regressed to being just an ‘Islamic’ state because of the misguided
initiatives and egotistic autocracy of a single person – Turkey’s President,
Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
REACTIONS TO TURKEY ’S UNILATERAL MOVES
Turkey’s bid to increase its influence in the Caucasus through overt

support for Azerbaijan in the 2020 conflict alarmed all its neighbours.
Russia, the final arbitrator in the Caucasus, wants the region to be
stable and secure. With this basic objective, it has assiduously cultivated
a ‘buffer zone’ of friendly nations in the southern Caucasus region. For
a variety of reasons, Russia values its relationships with both Armenia
and Azerbaijan and therefore the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict went
against all of Russia’s interests in the region. Turkey’s forceful, ill-
advised and one-sided entry into the conflict almost immediately
diminished Russia’s role as the arbitrator in the Caucasus. The situation
forced Russia to reiterate its defence ties with Armenia, although it
refrained from publicly adopting a one-sided approach to the conflict.
Russia is also concerned with the introduction of the jihadi militias into
the region, which is close to its geographical borders – the Syrian Civil
War had come too close for comfort.
64 Vol. XXIV, No. I

Iran shares Russia’s concerns regarding Turkey’s military and diplomatic

initiatives, especially the deployment of Syrian jihadists so close to its
northern borders. The Russian negotiated ceasefire in the 2020 Nagorno
conflict was welcomed by Iran. Although ostensibly Turkey was aiding
Azerbaijan, it was also attempting to instigate Armenian-Azeri civil strife
in Iran, since large diasporas of both communities are resident there.
Similarly, Georgia also has large populations of both communities and
fears a reignition of its civil war and domestic strife. Turkey was aware
of these concerns but went ahead with its agenda, perhaps hoping that
the collateral damage to Russia, Iran and Georgia would be to its
advantage. There is general concern regarding Turkey’s uncalled for
belligerence and its bid to rise as a regional power by flexing its military
muscle.
Unlike its other neighbours who have been diplomatic in their reactions,
France, Turkey’s Mediterranean competitor, has not minced words and
called a spade a spade. France’s President Emanuel Macron has openly
slammed Turkey for its ‘bellicose’ statements and labelled them as
being ‘reckless and dangerous’. The fact that France has made its position
unequivocally clear, has sunk Franco-Turkish relations to a new low.
TURKEY -RUSSIA RELATIONS – THE UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTH
Although they have joined hands on several occasions when it suited

both, the common ground between Turkey and Russia is not broad
enough for them to become real partners and allies. An underlying
compulsion of having to counter Russian initiatives muddies Turkey’s
actions when it comes to dealing with Russia. Russia on the other hand
has shown exemplary patience in dealing with, what can only be termed,
Turkey’s somewhat naïve intransigence.
Over the past decade, Russia has made concerted attempts at increasing
its influence in the Black Sea and the southern Caucasus region. Its
annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent increase in its military
presence in the region has somewhat limited Turkey’s freedom of
manoeuvre in the Black Sea. Similarly, enhanced Russian military
deployments in Georgia’s Russian-occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali
regions have led to further straining of regional tensions. The dichotomy
in the situation is that Turkey and Russia are again cooperating in the
Syrian Civil War after the fiasco of the shooting down of the Russian
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Sanu Kainikara
fighter aircraft in November 2015. At the same time, they continue to

be geopolitical competitors, although there is a clear imbalance in favour
of Russia, created by astute political and military manoeuvring.
Turkey already has close historical ties with Azerbaijan and is now
attempting to redress the balance by increasing its cooperation with
Ukraine and Georgia, with an emphasis on bilateral defence and security
ties. In both these countries, Turkey is attempting to play the benign
and benevolent ‘larger’ economy, assisting with the development of the
defence industrial sector – inking an agreement to start joint production
of UCAVs with Ukraine, and financing the revamp/reform of the military
logistical system in Georgia. Turkish export of military hardware to
Georgia was US$3.9 million in 2019, a 38 per cent increase from the
previous year. In 2012, Turkey had initiated a trilateral military
cooperation alliance between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan. This has
now been extended to 2022, in a slightly expanded form of conducting
joint military exercises on a rotational basis and intelligence sharing.
There is no doubt that Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan share a
discomfort of Russia’s actions in their region. Turkey is leveraging their
helpless frustration as the raison d’etre for grouping together to face
Russia. In addition, it also hopes to increase its military investment in
Georgia and Azerbaijan.
While being at odds with the EU on several issues, Turkey is positioning

itself as the transit hub for the two energy pipelines in the making –
the Trans Adriatic Pipeline and the South Caucasus Pipeline. This move
is based on two objectives: to keep the land corridor to the Caspian Sea
secure, and to align itself with the European strategy to contain Russia.
Turkey seems to have realized that countering Russia and going head-
to-head with it is not a feat that can be accomplished on its own.
Therefore, in a somewhat abrupt about-face of the foreign policy that
it had pursued for the previous decade or so, it has started to attempt
deeper cooperation with the EU. In the foreign minister’s meeting at
Davos, Turkey’s foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu made subtle
suggestions that the enlargement of NATO into the South Caucasus
must be considered, a noticeable change from its previous attitude.
Turkey believes that its Russia-containment strategy, although in its
nascent form currently, could be dove-tailed with the European moves
to achieve the same objective.
66 Vol. XXIV, No. I

Ever since the break-up of the erstwhile Soviet Union, Turkey has
harboured ambitions to create a pan-Turkish alliance under its leadership
consisting of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan –
all nations that Turkey considers to be populated by ethnic kin. However,
Turkey lacks the power, then as now, to counter the economic, military
and diplomatic might of Russia. Further, the post-Soviet Turkic states
themselves did not align with Turkey, preferring to swing towards
Russia. While this unfulfilled ambition continues to be an influential
factor in Turkey’s policy initiatives, Turkey has so far studiously followed
a path that avoids challenging Russia and respecting Russia’s interests
in the South Caucasus, as well as in its relations with the post-Soviet
independent nations. However, in subtle moves it is also striving to
achieve a more balanced and equal standing with Russia in the region
– regional and economic cooperation with Russia is still important to
Turkey. At the same time, Russia is wary of Turkey’s attempts to
attract its Islamic minority through cultural ties.
In its attempt to salvage relations with the West, Turkey has vocally
supported Kiev over the Crimea issue, going so far as to state that
Russia should return the peninsula to Ukraine. This approach was
bolstered by the prospect of selling UCAVs to Ukraine and the possibility
of setting up a joint manufacturing unit. The combination is likely to
upset Russia, which has so far been tactfully restrained in its reactions
to Turkey’s intrigues, attempting to deal with the provocations as being
low profile. However, Russia will not countenance Turkey’s opinions
regarding Crimea – after all, there is always a limit to the patience of
a major power.
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U NITED STATES
In the past two years, Turkey has started attempts to mend broken
ties with the EU and USA. President Biden’s victory in the 2020 elections
has added impetus to these attempts to brighten an otherwise gloomy
future of the US-Turkey relationship. In the new US administration,
both Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defence General
Lloyd Austin have been openly critical of Turkey’s activities in the
Middle East and the Caucasus. Officials have also been critical of Turkey’s
unilateral military operations against the Kurds. There is no doubt that
the US recognizes the strategic importance of Turkey to the interests
of the West. However, Erdogan’s foreign policy initiatives of the past
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Sanu Kainikara
five to six years do not make it easy for the US to reset its relationship
with Turkey.
One of the main factors defining Turkey-US relations in the future will
be the Biden administration’s Iran policy. There is a possibility of the
US initiating tripartite cooperation between themselves, Iraq and Turkey
to increase pressure on Iran. If such an initiative was to come to fruition
in any meaningful way, the US would have to conduct a nuanced balancing
act in its relationship with Turkey. However, with the Biden
administration, such an initiative does not seem to be an easy possibility.
Even though Erdogan and Trump had established personalized dealings
and rapport, this bonhomie had only papered over some fundamental
ideological and structural differences that continue to undermine any
meaningful progress in the US-Turkey relationship. The Biden
administration is much more stringent in its analysis and approach to
Turkey and the differences between the two countries will only get
further exacerbated, deepening an already wide rupture. With Turkey
continuing to be militarily adventuristic, the chances of flashpoints coming
into focus will only increase.
Erdogan’s foreign policy is in direct contravention of the NATO ethos

and has prompted several senior US officials to question whether Turkey
remains a reliable ally. There are three fundamental issues that the
Biden administration will examine and consider when engaging with
Turkey:
• Its recent abuse of human rights, democratic norms and the rule
of law;
• The nation’s strategic alignment, especially vis-à-vis defence
procurement initiatives; and
• Turkey’s demonstrated efforts at revanchism and involvement
in regional conflicts.
 The challenge in attempting to mitigate these differences for
normalizing the relationship is that no overarching strategy will
be able to cover all three issues simultaneously. They will need
to be addressed differently in separate forums, which may not
create a unanimous outcome.
The US wants a stable and democratic Turkey, functioning as a part of

NATO, adhering to the organization’s values and assisting in confronting
and containing Russia. It also hopes for a Turkey that is aligned with
68 Vol. XXIV, No. I

the overall US policy in the Middle East. For the time being at least,
these hopes would have to remain just that, hopes. There is no tangible
evidence to even suggest that Turkey is considering a move away from
its current foreign policy direction. It will require enormous patience
and a sophisticated diplomatic balancing act to get Turkey to move in
the ‘right’ direction and to stop acting like a maverick. The first step in
such an endeavour would be for the US to indicate clear ‘red lines’ that
cannot be crossed at any time and to underline this limit by demonstrated
deterrent capabilities that will be employed, if necessary. Otherwise,
Turkey is unlikely to pull back into line – it will continue to focus on its
narrow agenda at the cost of creating regional instability, which could
have global implications. The best course of action for the US to improve
bilateral relations seems to be to maintain an overall status quo while
institutionalizing contacts and discussions at various levels of government
till such time that tangible improvements become visible in the three
cardinal issues that have been enumerated. Improving relations that
have fallen into disrepair will take twice as long and be doubly difficult
than building a new relationship.
THE MEANDERING F OREIGN POLICY
Barely a decade ago Turkey had a growing economy, a popular and

stable government pursuing a steady foreign policy and had started to
play a leadership role in the region. In 2008, Turkey’s foreign policy
was unofficially touted as having ‘zero problems with neighbours’.
Turkey had cordial relations with all its neighbours and had assumed
the role of the mediator of choice from Afghanistan to the Middle East
and even in easing US-Iran tensions. Turkey was considered a ‘model’
Islamic democracy with the ability to reconcile Islam and democracy in
its political structure and style of government. Turkish businesses were
flourishing and had made inroads across the Arab world, sub-Saharan
Africa and Asia. Domestically, moves were afoot to reconcile long-
simmering political differences with its Kurdish population. However,
ten years is a long time in politics. The 2016 failed coup gave lie to the
narrative that all was well in paradise. The ruthless way the coup was
put down, the revengeful extermination of high-ranking military officers
suspected of taking part in the coup and Erdogan’s handling of domestic
protests showed the harsh truth about AKP and its real intentions.
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Sanu Kainikara
The government stepped up suppression to silence civil society, targeted

political opposition and continued with the purge of inconvenient military
officers and bureaucrats. Human rights and rule of law took a back seat
to political expediency and the grasp for absolute power by a president
unnerved by the attempted coup. The carefully created façade of a
model Islamic democracy was busted. The downward slide into Islamic
autocracy was an easy path to tread. By the last years of the second
decade of this century, hostilities had reignited with the Kurds, the
peace overtures being gleefully discarded along the way. In early 2020,
in the Mediterranean, the Turkish navy was in a state of tense stand-
off with the navies of France, Greece and Cyprus; several Arab states
had started to boycott Turkish goods; the US Congress and Senate,
along with the EU nations were pushing to impose sanctions; and there
was open discussion of the desirability of Turkey remaining within the
folds of NATO. Even the ‘friendly’ out-going Trump administration
imposed a US$500 million defence sanction on Turkey, which was a
major setback and considered by many as the first step in the eventual
expulsion from NATO. At the same time Israel, for the first time, added
Tukey to their threat assessment.
Nations in Europe and the Middle East accuse Erdogan of harbouring

‘Ottoman ambitions’, while the strong man of Turkey seems to have no
intentions of curtailing his destabilizing activities. The list of ill-considered
actions initiated by Erdogan in the post-2016 rampage is long. An
indicative list of Turkey’s destabilizing activities is given below, in brief,
and without explanatory notes.
 Turkey intervened in Libya by sending its proxy jihadist militia

into the country, thereby effectively scuttling the fledging ceasefire
that was being put into effect between the warring factions.
 In the Mediterranean, Turkey has ignored the maritime claims
of both Greece and Cyprus and continues gas exploration in large
swaths of coastal waters that it claims. Turkey is not a signatory
to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and does
not recognize Cyprus as a sovereign nation.
 In Iraq, Turkey unilaterally bombed the rural areas of the Kurds,
and increased the number of Turkish military bases and soldiers
in the country, against the protests of the Iraqi government.
70 Vol. XXIV, No. I

 Turkey invaded Northern Syria and displaced thousands of civilian

Kurds in two separate operations – Afrin in 2018 and Jazira in
2019. Now it threatens to launch a third operation.
 Erdogan’s administration continues to support Islamist proxy
militias in Arab Idlib province, some of whom are former radical
IS fighters.
 Turkey was instrumental in deploying Syrian mercenaries in Libya
and Azerbaijan, purely to destabilize the region and further its
interests.
 Turkey continues to support the discredited Muslim Brotherhood
and aligned groups in the Middle East and North Africa, bringing
it into a confrontation with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE.
 Erdogan entered a war of words with France and its President
after France approved legal measures to prevent the political
use of Islam within the country. This was an internal matter for
France, and Erdogan was attempting to cloak himself with the
title of ‘defender of Islam’ like the bygone Ottoman emperors.
Even a casual observer will notice that Erdogan functions in a semi-

state of megalomania when he is dealing with any issue that contradicts
his viewpoint, which he believes is also that of the country he leads. It
is not surprising that he has used undiplomatic language against any
world leader who has opposed his excesses, especially in foreign policy.
Running parallel to this foreign policy debacle of its own making, Turkey’s
once vibrant economy has started to stagnate. The strong economic
indicators have slowed down, no doubt affected by the global financial
challenges, but mainly because of a lack of foreign investment confidence
brought about because of political turbulence and an increasing number
of terrorist incidents within the country. By the end of December 2020,
the Turkish Lira had sunk to an unprecedented eight to a US dollar,
dropping 30 per cent of its value in just 12 months. Inflation is at 14
per cent and Moody’s downgraded Turkey’s debt rating to junk status,
sparking a fear of a balance-of-payment crisis. A combination of socio-
economic and geo-political factors has made domestic support for
Erdogan’s party to drop below 30 per cent for the first time since its
formation in 2001. Erdogan must undertake urgent measures to salvage
a free-falling economy and a highly volatile unemployed youth sector,
never an easy task, made more difficult by his adventures in the region.
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Sanu Kainikara
Several factors have contributed to this politico-economic downslide in

Turkey. While the indications were there for all to see, the government
had ignored the warning signs till it was too late. First, was the extensive
purge that was conducted after the failed coup in 2016, which completely
de-fanged the once-powerful military, who were the flagbearers of
secularism in the country. Erdogan took this opportunity to change the
domestic and foreign policy directions to support Islamisation of the
country, which had always been his ultimate aim. This also manifested
in the overt support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Second, when the
economy started to slow down, instead of taking concerted steps to
correct the deficiencies, Erdogan assumed the role of ‘defender of Islam’
for two reasons: first, to distract the domestic population from
scrutinizing the worsening economy; and second, to hide his increasing
authoritarianism and vaulting ambition. The war of words with France
was meant to further this agenda. The bombing of Kurdish areas was
also meant to distract the political opposition in Turkey.
THE M ILITARY AS A TOOL OF F OREIGN P OLICY
Erdogan believes that a new world order, in which Turkey will play a
decisive role as a ‘middle power’, will emerge soon. In the revised
international scenario, the military will be the key to ensuring the success
of foreign policy initiatives. Erdogan continually harks back to the Islamic
Army of the Caucasus, created by Enver Pasha, the Ottoman War
Minister during World War I. This army had encroached into Eastern
Europe and the Central Asian part of Russia to create a pan-Turkish
movement meant to unite people of Turkish origin, but it could not
sustain the effort. The intervention last year into Azerbaijan should be
viewed as a continuation of the same historical legacy. Erdogan has
articulated his vision of a new world order where Turkey would have
the leadership of a broad Muslim world, fostered by the Turkish military
that would be deployed far and wide. Harping on the religious card is
also meant to deflect domestic criticism regarding the expenses being
incurred on the peddling of soft power when the economy is in dire
straits. Turkey’s Ministry of Defence is reaching out to Turkic minorities
in neighbouring countries to enhance its soft power.
The coup attempt in 2016 made Erdogan realize that the antipathy
between the secular-rooted military and his Islamist-based regime could
not be bridged easily or in a hurry. After the ruthless purges were
72 Vol. XXIV, No. I

carried out, Erdogan brought back retired officers who had earlier been
cashiered by the Turkish military for their attempts at bringing Islamist
politics into the military. Erdogan thus started the Islamisation of the
military, a gradual process, but the results are already visible. The
reinstated Islamist officers were permitted to create the only private
military consulting firm in the country, and they control the proxy
jihadist army that has been created for employment, without
accountability.
The most important development in employing hard power as a tool of

foreign policy has been the surreptitious establishment of a network of
private militias consisting entirely of Syrian jihadist fighters. They have
been given the role of establishing Tukey’s influence over the territory
of the old Ottoman Empire. These militias have a parallel command
structure to the Turkish military and are accountable – through deniable
links – to the President himself. This arrangement provides Erdogan
with a large pool of trained and easily available group of fighters to use
as a tool of power projection, who are easily disowned as not being
Turkish. These militias are a useful, disposable, deniable group of cannon
fodder. In the past five years, Turkey has initiated armed intervention
into Northern Syria and Iraq, provided materiel support for the Hamas
terror group in the West bank, and provided military support to Qatar,
Azerbaijan and Libya. Most of these interventions have been destabilizing
and disruptive, with the parallel militia playing a crucial role.
The Turkish-backed militia has hastened the descent into chaos of Syria,
Libya, Lebanon and Iraq, while severely weakening the structures that
create formal states. Erdogan’s concept, mainly for domestic consumption,
is to paint Turkey unmistakably as the successor state to the Ottoman
Empire, re-assuming its rightful place in the comity of nations; a position
that it has so far been denied, and the reason why its adversaries are
opposing Turkey’s initiatives. In pursuing this dream, Turkey has
scripted a new Ottoman foreign policy, inter-twined with Islamic
overtures and backed by the military power of the disposable private
militias. Use of the military power of private militias, with only deniable
connections to the state, to further foreign policy initiatives are a step
in the downward slide of the moral and ethical standing of a nation; and
Turkey knows it.
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Sanu Kainikara
THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE
Since November 2020, when the results of the US elections became

clear, Turkey has shown an increased eagerness to revive diplomatic
dialogue with the West. The Trump loss in the elections, combined with
the failing Turkish economy that is on the brink of collapse, seems to
have forced Erdogan to take a step back and review the precarious
situation. The first manifestation of this altered behaviour, indicating a
new phase of foreign policy initiatives, was the resumption of long-
stalled talks with Greece to resolve complex and historical bilateral
territorial disputes. As a further indication of its good intentions, Turkey
also mentioned the need to improve and strengthen ties with the
European Union. The USA, EU and NATO have all bounced back to
being in favour in Ankara, although till a few months ago the state-
controlled media had labelled all attempts at rapprochement with the
EU as being unpatriotic and treacherous.
This somewhat abrupt turnaround also coincides with Erdogan’s initiation

of judicial and economic reforms at home and is also coupled with the
temporary discontinuation of the controversial gas exploration efforts
in disputed Mediterranean waters. An all-out effort to thaw the freeze
with the EU is openly visible. The troubling question is whether this
realignment is genuine and long-term or only a tactical move to buy
time with an eye towards early elections at home. Considering Erdogan’s
history and rhetoric, the move is more likely to be aimed at containing
domestic unrest and to garner a favourable climate to prepone the
elections due in 2023, while increasing the chances of victory and
minimizing the risk of defeat. Erdogan is a canny and pragmatic politician
and is reading the writing on the wall – the support for him and his
party is at an all-time low and needs bolstering.
Both Turkey and the EU have their agendas in attempting to pursue a

more diplomatic approach towards each other. Turkey wants to improve
its tarnished image by being invited to EU summits and meetings, renew
the illegal immigrant deal, and obtain an open visa for its citizens. The
main intent is to contain the increasing domestic frustration regarding
the failing economy, high unemployment, and the arbitrary suspension
of civil liberties. Erdogan’s focus is victory in the next elections and the
rest of the agenda is only window-dressing. EU, on its part, wants to
resume high-level dialogues on customs and illegal migration, and de-
74 Vol. XXIV, No. I

escalate potential flashpoints in the Eastern Mediterranean. However,

it is also clear that the EU does not hold out much hope of achieving
any tangible success in either point of negotiation. This is a situation
that Erdogan welcomes – he wants to play the ‘Trump game’ and reduce
international diplomatic negotiations and relationships to the
transactional level, from which it is easy to step back, while also leveraging
off it.
The cosmetic improvements to Turkey’s democratic institutions, human

rights record and the rule of law being suggested by Erdogan are unlikely
to meet Western expectations, if at all such changes take place and are
not mere lip-service. The initiatives are for international consumption
and unlikely to alter the ground realities at home. Erdogan is far too
much of an autocrat and has been entrenched in power for far too long
to start unravelling the threads that tie up the society and give him
power. In the meantime, the Biden-administration’s determination to
impose sanctions on Turkey, in coordination with the EU has squeezed
Erdogan’s wriggle-room to almost non-existent. It will be interesting to
watch the master manipulator adapt to the changed circumstances –
both domestically and internationally. Leveraging patriotic nationalism
and playing to the religious gallery while assuming the mantle of
‘defender of Islam’ may not be sufficient for Erdogan to get out of the
bind that he is in.
In the final analysis, the rapprochement moves by Turkey lack genuine

intent to improve relationships and it is engaging in a game of make-
belief for both domestic and international audiences. The overtures are
unlikely to improve relations with the USA, EU or NATO. Fundamentally,
Turkey does not have the institutional capacity to carry forward any
meaningful diplomatic dialogue – the Foreign Ministry is completely
side-lined, and foreign policies are formulated on the go by Erdogan
and a small coterie of advisors. Such policies will not serve the nation
in the long term and it is becoming increasingly clear that even short-
term benefits are dubious. The strategic thinking in Erdogan’s Turkey
is limited to winning the next election. Consequently, decision-making
is erratic and smacks of short-termism. The pro-Western overtures of
the past three months is a cynical domestic palliative, aimed at assisting
Erdogan to create an election-winning manoeuvre room. Nothing more,
nothing less.
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Sanu Kainikara
TURKEY – WHERE TO? A C ONCLUDING ANALYSIS
The first question that comes to mind as an analyst is – how did Turkey
go from a friendly country on the upswing to the current unsavoury
situation of being at odds with almost every other nation? What prompts
the autocratic President’s aggressive behaviour and undiplomatic
outbursts?
There are a few fundamental reasons for this abrasive conduct that has
led to the decline in Turkey’s fortunes and status. First, Erdogan’s
inherent ambition to enhance Turkey’s national power to become a
regional power and to be recognized globally as a middle power. Turkey’s
geo-strategic location supports this ambition. However, Erdogan’s
confrontational approach in his dealings with neighbours and even allies,
along with his pan-Islamic stance where he claims the leadership as the
‘defender of Islam’, is viewed by other regional powers as being arrogant
and provocative. The Western world is also wary of this overt Islamic
approach, that too in Turkey which had so far been seen as a model
Islamic democracy.
Second, Erdogan has marked out, at least in his mind, Turkey’s sphere
of influence. He wants to establish a physical presence in this self-
created ‘Ottoman’ region, which is to be achieved through military
intervention and Turkish presence. The initiatives undertaken to achieve
this end-state has so far only destabilized the regions involved, and the
use of proxy jihadist militia has exacerbated the situation. Third, the
Turkish economy is going through one of the worst slumps in decades.
Turkey believes that becoming self-sufficient in hydro-carbon energy
resources would be a step to rebalance the economy. Accordingly, Turkey
has increased gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean and the
Caspian and Black Seas, while ignoring the disputed maritime claims of
other nations. Turkey is using hard power to support a foreign policy,
which is oriented to advance the domestic economy – always a
questionable venture. Fourth, Erdogan appreciates the need to counter
the serious domestic political and economic threats to his rule. The
solution he arrived at was to externally pursue a confrontational and
aggressive foreign policy that combined unpalatable language and
rhetoric aimed at leaders of other nations. Combined with his attempt
to revive the Ottoman legacy and assume the mantle, Erdogan has
76 Vol. XXIV, No. I

managed to antagonize almost all nations with whom Turkey has

interacted.
President Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) has ruled

Turkey since 2003. After the initial few years of honeymoon, the AKP
has been contemptuous of political rights, civil liberties, democratic
principles, and even judicial independence. They have assiduously
pursued a policy of heavy-handed crackdowns in domestic policy,
especially after the failed coup of 2016. Constitutional changes instituted
in 2017, immediately after the coup, concentrated power in the hands
of the President, with almost no counterbalancing checks being instituted.
Since coming to power, Erdogan has been a great influence in domestic
politics. However, the 2019 municipal elections demonstrated his failing
and fading popularity. Instead of analyzing this trend and taking remedial
action, Erdogan’s response has been to provide a new impetus to forcibly
suppress dissent. Given the prevailing conditions in Turkey, forced
suppression of dissent would, at best, be a zero-sum game.
If the current path is followed, it is inevitable that very soon Turkey

will find itself over-extended and isolated both militarily and economically.
The next logical step in this inexorable march of events would be the
Turks blaming Erdogan for the ills being visited on them and finding
that their once proud and prosperous nation has been turned into a
weak non-entity by one man’s megalomania. Perhaps, understanding
the quandary that he has created for himself, Erdogan is attempting to
create a new image for himself. He has started to fawn for support
from the West – the US and EU – in a complete volte-face of his earlier
belligerence – he is no more the ‘defender of Islam’, at least not
vociferously so. This move could be a major letdown for his more
fundamentalist supporters in Turkey and the wider Muslim world. On
the other hand, it may not be sufficient to convince the West of the
veracity of his intentions.
Of his own volition, Erdogan is now straddling two politically diverging

canoes with a foot in each – a political fall seems inevitable. Wily as he
is, Erdogan ignored or discounted the well-known principle of unintended
consequences in flaying about the region with a military that is just
about up to the task being given to it. There is a tempest approaching
Turkey. The question is whether it will blow away the current autocratic,
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Sanu Kainikara
dictatorial regime. If not, turbulence will prevail and spread across the
region, which may be with tragic and ‘unintended’ consequences.
......................................................................................................................................
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Professor Sanu Kainikara is a former fighter pilot of the Indian Air Force
(IAF), a Qualified Flying Instructor and a Fighter Combat Leader. After taking
voluntary retirement, he worked as a senior analyst for a US Training Team
in the Middle East, was a consultant to the Air Operations Division of the
Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG), Australian Defence
Organisation and a lecturer in Aerospace Engineering at the RMIT University,
Melbourne before joining the Australian Public Service. Having authored 23
books on national security and airpower, and on his passion - Indian History,
currently he is an Adjunct Professor in the School of Humanities and Social
Sciences at the University of New South Wales. He is the inaugural
Distinguished Fellow at the Institute for Regional Security, Canberra, and a
Distinguished Fellow of the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. Professor
Kainikara has been a regular Guest Lecturer at the Military colleges of the
USA, Canada, UK, Finland, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Philippines, New Zealand and India.
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78 Vol. XXIV, No. I

SECURITY CHALLENGES AND MANAGEMENT OF INDIA’S INTERNATIONAL BORDERS
AGNI pp 79-106
SECURITY CHALLENGES AND

MANAGEMENT OF INDIA’S INTERNATIONAL BORDERS
BY
J.K. VERMA
T
he effective management of international borders is important
for India as it has a coastline of 7,516.6 km and land borders are
15,106.7 km. Further, India has two hostile neighbours, and our
western neighbour has been waging a low-intensity war since long.
The problems for Delhi are further aggravated as the country’s
progress, which outstrips most of its neighbours, leads to the problem
of mass infiltration, cross-border terrorism, left-wing radicalism,
infiltration of armed terrorists, and smuggling of arms and narcotics.
Foreign countries inimical to India assist secessionist movements and
are involved in instigating minorities. The government has created a
Department of Border Management to manage the complex land and
maritime borders. Collection of intelligence has also become vital. A
major problem is that the land border is not demarcated at several
places and it is divided into the International Border, Line of Control,
Line of Actual Control, Working Boundary, The Actual Ground Position
Line, McMahon Line – which China does not accept – Disputed Border
etc. The Indian coastline has its own set of challenges. Not only is it
long but there are 1,382 islands and 1,376 landing points, and several
landing points are in deserted areas which are difficult to guard. The
government had taken several measures to safeguard the borders
and the creation of five theatre commands would be an important
step to counter threats from China and Pakistan. As assets of other
agencies would also come under the Maritime Theatre Command
(MTC), it would be easier for it to safeguard the maritime boundary.
However, such a single-point arrangement does not exist for the land
borders. Appropriate border guidelines are required, and the principle
Vol. XXIV, No. I 79
J.K. Verma
of single-point control should be implemented for effective management.

The present era is of synergy and technology; hence, what is required
is a synergy of resources and using the latest technology to secure
the diverse borders of the country.
The effective management of international borders is an important task

and for that reason, most countries make enormous investments in
safeguarding them, which includes both land and maritime borders.
India has a coastline of 7,516.6 km and an Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) of 2,305,143 sq. km, which is the 18 th largest EEZ in the world.
India’s EEZ includes the Lakshadweep Islands, Andaman and Nicobar
Islands, borders to the west with Pakistan, to the south by the Maldives
and Sri Lanka, while Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, and
Indonesia are located on the east. India, based on new scientific data,
has appealed to the United Nations to increase its EEZ from 370 km to
648 km. India’s land borders are 15,106.7 km 22 and it is shared with
seven countries including Bangladesh (4,096.7 km), Bhutan (699 km),
China (3,488 km), Myanmar (1,643 km), Nepal (1,751 km), Pakistan
(3,323 km) and a small portion (106 km) with Afghanistan in northern
Ladakh, which is illegally occupied by Pakistan. The multifarious
departments including administrative, defence forces, central police
organisations, police, intelligence, external affairs and legal, have to work
with cohesion to manage such a long and diverse border, which runs
through numerous States. 1, 17 & 20
Efficient management of borders is extremely essential for the safety

and security of a nation. The importance of safeguarding the borders
becomes more important for India as Pakistan has waged a low-intensity
hybrid war against India for long and is involved in cross-border
terrorism. The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan is also
involved in a disinformation campaign in the border areas.
The management of borders has become overly complex because of

several factors including technological advancement, media insurrection
and globalisation, hence, India needs thorough planning to manage its
international borders. India also has to address the apprehensions of
its smaller neighbours while carrying out this task. India has threats
from Pakistan and from China since both these countries have animosity
against India, albeit because of different reasons. Pakistan alleges that
in 1971 it was partitioned because of India and that Delhi has still not
80 Vol. XXIV, No. I

accepted the creation of Pakistan. Islamabad also claims that Kashmir

is an unfinished agenda of the 1947 partition and as it is a Muslim
majority state, it should be merged in Pakistan. On the other hand,
China considers India as its potential adversary, hence, wants to weaken
it. The Chinese Intelligence agency, the Ministry of State Security (MSS),
has created and continues assisting terrorist outfits in the Indian north
eastern states through Myanmar.
MSS also assists and instigates ISI to carry out terrorist activities in
India. ISI is using diverse terrorist outfits, religious institutions,
diplomatic missions, multinational organisations, unscrupulous media
personnel, retired officers of Pakistan defence forces, certain political
leaders and journalists with whom it has friendly relations, for assisting
and in carrying out terrorist activities in India. ISI uses not only the
India-Pakistan borders, but also infiltrates terrorists, weapon smuggling
and fake currency through Bangladesh, Nepal, and Myanmar. Recently,
there are reports that the ISI is also trying to use Sri Lanka and the
Maldives for carrying out terrorist activities in southern India. Hence,
India needs to secure its borders while playing an important role in the
regional as well as in the international arena.
The problems for Delhi are further aggravated as the country’s progress,
which outstrips that of most of its neighbours, leads to the problem of
mass infiltration, cross-border terrorism, left-wing radicalism, infiltration
of armed terrorists, and smuggling of arms and narcotics. 2
The Kargil Review Committee, constituted after the 1991 Pakistan attack
in the Kargil area, had expressed concern about the security and safety
of land borders; the follow-up Group of Ministers (GoM) report wanted
that the review should cover a wider perspective and besides land
borders, the safety of coastal areas and airspace should also be galvanised
as it is equally important. The problem is that maritime boundaries are
also not properly defined and there are disputes at several places along
both the maritime and land borders. The land borders at several places
are man-made artificial borders and not based on natural features like
watersheds or rives, making them easy to cross. 2
Because of the long land borders, several Central Police Organisations,

Army and local police are responsible for safeguarding the borders at
different places. As multiple agencies are involved, in case of any incident
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J.K. Verma
it is difficult to fix accountability. Further, different organisations have

different levels of training, ethos and work cultures, report to different
ministries/departments and this often results in a lack of coordination
at various levels. 2
BORDER MANAGEMENT D EPARTMENT (BMD)
Keeping in view the importance of border management, the Government

of India created a Border Management Department under the Ministry
of Home Affairs in January 2004. The department was constituted to
handle both land and coastal borders. It looks after the policing and
security of the international borders and was also responsible for the
development of the infrastructure in the region. The department also
constituted more than 20 Integrated check Posts (ICPs) along the
borders.
The approach, as employed by the government towards border

management, is categorised into four essential processes. 25
 Guarding the borders.

 Regulation of the borders.
 Development of border areas.
 Constitution of bilateral institutional mechanisms for resolving
disputes and ironing out conflicts with neighbours.
Following are the main responsibilities of the Border Management

Department (BMD).
 The BMD looks after the land borders, excluding the Line of Control
in the J&K Sector. It also manages the coastal borders including
Lakshadweep and Andaman & Nicobar Islands. The department is
responsible for the fencing and fixing of floodlights on the Indo-
Bangladesh, Indo-Pakistan, and Indo-Myanmar borders. The
department also evaluates the requirement of electronic gadgets
including laser-fitted cameras and guns, unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) etc for the protection of the borders.
 The BMD issues directions for improvement in the policing,
surveillance and patrolling of land and seaside frontiers. The BMD
is also responsible to plan the necessity of motorable roads and
82 Vol. XXIV, No. I

improvement of communication systems along the border and in

coastal areas.
 The BMD analyses information received and passes actionable
intelligence to the security agencies. It assists the Ministry of Home
Affairs (MHA) in the demarcation of international borders and helps
in enactment, funding and execution of Border Area Development
Programmes. 3
 The Parliament passed the Land Ports Authority Act in 2010 to pave
the way for a body that oversees Integrated Check Posts (ICP) to be
built at the major entry points along the international border. All
functions associated with the movement of vehicles and people like
immigration, customs and security clearance will be performed by
the ICPs. Thirteen ICPs have been proposed along India’s borders
with Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar.
 Setting up of additional coastal police stations, linked to a common
database to register all private vessels plying Indian waters,
mandatory transponders on all vessels, identity cards for fishermen
and multi-purpose identity cards for the coastal population. 21
For carrying out its responsibilities, the Ministry of Home Affairs has
two Departments, Border Management-I Division and Border
Management-II Division. Essentially, the land borders (except the LOC
in J&K) is managed by the Border Management-I Division, while the
Border Management-II Division has four sections – Coastal Security
Section; Border Areas Development Programme Section; Land Ports
Authority of India Section; and, Perception Management & China Studies
Section.
ROLE OF I NTELLIGENCE IN BORDER M ANAGEMENT
The Indian borders remain volatile, and hence the importance of

intelligence, both tactical and strategic, becomes very significant.
Intelligence can be based on Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT),
Strategic Intelligence (STRATINT), Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT),
Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), Technical
Intelligence (TECHINT), Artificial Intelligence, Signal Intelligence
(SIGINT), or the most important, Human Intelligence (HUMINT). The
method of collection of intelligence is not that important, the basic
requirement is the veracity of information collected and that it is timely
and actionable. Detailed information about the rival’s location, strength,
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J.K. Verma
weapons, defences, logistics, reinforcement plans etc is vital for planning

offensive and defensive operations. Tactical intelligence is essential for
planning surgical strikes or counterinsurgency operations. A foolproof
system has to be developed that after collection of information and
converting it into intelligence, it is quickly passed on to the consumers
so that speedy follow-up action can be taken. 4
The intelligence wings of Central Police Organisations (CPOs), which

are mostly responsible for safeguarding the borders, are in the initial
stages of development. Their officers and staff are being trained but
their funding is limited and needs a review. The CPOs, as well as the
local police, need to have agents at sensitive places because the ISI is
constantly working to create law and order problems in the country.
Besides helping terrorist outfits in J&K, it also keeps raising Khalistan
and Maoist issues at every given opportunity. Even though Indian
security forces have successfully curbed the Khalistan movement, but
few ISI-supported Sikhs continue raising the Khalistan issue in India
and abroad. There are reports that in the latest Kisan (farmers)
movement, Sikh for Justice (SFJ) was involved, and that SFJ supporters
carried Khalistan banners and shouted pro-Khalistan slogans during
protests. There have been occasions when Khalistan supporters have
also been shouting pro-Khalistan slogans in the Golden Temple and at
other places.
Intelligence reports mention that SFJ is financed and supported by the

ISI. SFJ is a US-based pro-Khalistan outfit, and it supports the secession
of Punjab and the creation of Khalistan. Gurpatwant Singh Pannun is
the founder and head of SFJ and although it was banned in India in
2019, it still has supporters in the country.
There are also reports that the Chinese intelligence agency, Ministry of
State Security (MSS), helps Left Wing Extremists (LWE) through Nepal
and Myanmar. The MSS provides training, funds, arms and ammunition
and sometimes safe shelter too. Indian intelligence agencies need to
have high-level assets in these outfits. Regrettably, there is a lack of
cooperation and coordination between various agencies and often
actionable intelligence collected cannot be acted on due to these
administrative drawbacks.
84 Vol. XXIV, No. I

The intelligence agencies also need to gather information on infiltration,

exfiltration, drug smuggling, human trafficking, arms smuggling, the
inflow of fake currency etc. Several mosques and madrassas have
mushroomed in Nepal near the Indo-Nepal border and some of them
are likely being used by the ISI for their activities in India. Hence,
unlawful activities in these religious institutions are also required to be
monitored and curbed. 4
India should mount surveillance radars on hostile terrain along land

borders, which would enhance surveillance and reconnaissance. Israeli
Foliage-Penetrating Radars (FPRs) are highly effective in dense forests
while laser walls are useful in the border areas where wire fencing is
not feasible. Raytheon-made Boomerang Warrior-X, which weighs only
12 ounces and has a range of 900 meters, will warn soldiers about the
fire location of the enemy. Security personnel should also be provided
explosive detection kits and smart tracking rifles. Drones should be
used for the collection of intelligence and surveillance. In the recent
past, Pakistan has started using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for
supplying/dropping arms and ammunition and drugs across the borders
especially in Punjab. 4
THE PRECARIOUS I NDO -PAKISTAN BORDER
The Indo-Pakistan border is 3,323 km long, which includes the Line of

Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab,
and J&K share borders with Pakistan and the Border Security Force
(BSF) guards this border, with some remote sectors and the LoC directly
under the Indian Army. The Indo-Pakistan border crosses different
terrains, which covers urban areas to mountains and barren deserts.
Because of the hostile relations between the two countries, there are
frequent border violations, firings, infiltrations; while three wars have
been fought, excluding the 1999 Kargil incursion by Pakistan. The India-
Pakistan border is one of the most disputed and dangerous borders in
the world. In an attempt to thwart Pakistan’s constant infiltration, India
has erected about 50,000 poles and 150,000 floodlights along the border.
The India-Pakistan border can be divided as the Line of Control (LoC),

which is the de facto boundary between J&K and Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir (POK) after the 1948 and 1971 wars. This is 776 km long and
runs along the districts of Jammu (some parts), Rajouri, Poonch,
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J.K. Verma
Baramula, Kupwara, Kargil and some portions of Leh. The second is the
actual ground position line (AGPL), which is 110 km long and extends
from NJ 9842 to Indira Col in the North. The balance of the boundary
demarcated by Sir Cyril Redcliff during partition and accepted by both
the countries is known as International Boundary (IB), which runs for
24
2,3 0 8 k m .
ISI has constituted a Border Action Team (BAT) which constitutes

commandos of the Special Services Group (SSG) of the Pakistan Army,
as well as terrorists from Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM). The BAT was created to carry out cross-border operations,
threaten Indian patrol parties and dominate the Line of Control. The
BAT over time has not only killed Indian soldiers but mutilated their
bodies, which is a deplorable act for any professional army. BAT gets
full support from the Pakistan security forces; they provide covering
fire to BAT before they launch their border operations. 19
The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is constantly infiltrating terrorists

into India, and hence it was decided to erect new non-cut ‘steel fence’
at sensitive infiltration-prone areas. The 60 km border near Amritsar
in Punjab is one of these sectors. It is a costly project as Rs 2 crore (Rs
20 million) will be spent to cover one-kilometre fencing. Besides this,
‘laser fences’ have also been deployed. The Comprehensive Integrated
Border Management System (CIBMS) is looking after the placement of
smart fences, anti-infiltration alarms and advanced surveillance
equipment. ISI is infiltrating Pakistanis, Afghans, Uzbeks and even
Indians after their training as terrorists in India, hence constant
surveillance and more preventive measures are required. 5
SAFEGUARDING OF INDIA B ANGLADESH BORDER
The India-Bangladesh border, which is 4,096.7 km, is the longest land

border that India shares with any neighbour. The border is guarded by
the Border Security Force and runs along the states of Assam,
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Tripura, and West Bengal. Although the border
was demarcated by the Radcliffe Line, it was not delineated on the
ground. Hence, at several places, it divides villages, while several villages
are located on the zero line. To resolve the day-to-day problems faced
by the locals, Prime Minister Modi and Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh
Hasina signed an agreement in June 2015 under which India got control
86 Vol. XXIV, No. I

of 510 acres of land while Bangladesh got control of 10,000 acres of

land. This agreement has sorted out the problems of enclaves and
overlapping on the border. There are few designated transit points but
because of the porous border, people continue crossing at any point,
which has created the problem of unauthorised trade and large-scale
illegal migration.6 & 7
The uninterrupted migration of Bangladeshis and Rohingya Muslims

through Bangladesh has changed the demography of many districts of
the north-eastern states, West Bengal and Bihar. The illegal migrants
are involved in smuggling while criminal gangs and Islamic extremists
use them for carrying out criminal/terrorist activities. The Government
of India has adopted several measures to curb illegal migration from
Bangladesh; it includes raising and deputing more BSF battalions,
reducing gaps between border posts, increased border patrolling,
augmenting the number of observation posts, border fencing, providing
more sophisticated electronic equipment to the security agencies and
constructing more roads in border areas to improve communication
links. The collection of intelligence has also improved, as has the
involvement of the border population and the local administration.
However, these measures require to be improved and augmented
constantly to match the increasing sophistication in techniques being
used by the lawbreakers as large scale immigration continues. 6
A new electronic surveillance system, namely BOLD-QIT (Border

Electronically Dominated Qu ick Response Team Interception
Technique) under the CIBMS (Comprehensive Integrated Border
Management System) has been installed on a 61 km stretch of the
Bangladesh border, which was difficult to guard because of the
Brahmaputra River and several of its waterways. More sophisticated
electronic gadgets, including day and night cameras, OFC (Optical Fibre
Cables), DMR (Digital Mobile Radio) communication, Microwave
communication etc have also been installed, which give real-time
information to the BSF control room so that immediate action can be
taken. CIBMS offers an all-weather 24-hour surveillance capability
even in riverine border areas. However, despite these measures, the
problem of illegal migration and smuggling has not been plugged as
the system cannot be used optimally because of untrained staff. 1
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J.K. Verma
D EFENDING THE L INE OF C ONTROL W ITH C HINA
China, being an expansionist country, is illegally occupying about

38,000 sq. km of Indian territory and claims several areas including
Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. There was the Sino-Indian War
in 1962, a brief border clash in 1967 and border conflicts in 1987,
2013, 2017 and multiple clashes in 2020. Hence, this border needs
special attention. However, it is guarded by multiple forces including
the Special Frontier Force (SFF) under the Cabinet Secretariat; Indo-
Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) and the
Assam Rifles under Ministry of Home Affairs; and, the Indian army,
which reports to the Defence Ministry. Deployment of multiple forces
goes against the recommendations of the Border Management Task
Force which was constituted after the Kargil war, where it was
mandated to have “One Border One Force” to eliminate the problems
of lack of coordination and command-control issues between different
organisations. This mandate has yet to be implemented despite the
border continuing to remain “active”.
C ONTROL OF I NDO -N EPAL B ORDER
The India-Nepal border, which is 1,751 km long, is an open border.

It was a trouble-free border, but the ISI took advantage of this
situation and started infiltrating terrorists and pumping Indian fake
currency notes (IFCN) through this route. Indian and Nepali nationals
do not require passports to enter each other’s country. India has
established 450 Border Out Posts (BOPs) and the border is guarded
by the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), which was previously under
Cabinet Secretariat but now functions under the Ministry of Home
Affairs. There is a bilateral mechanism between the two countries
under which Home Secretary-level talks can be held, and in addition,
there is a Joint Working Group where Joint Secretary-level talks
are held periodically. Further, there are Border District Coordination
Committee Meetings under which the district officials of both countries
meet. In these meetings, bilateral issues including smuggling, cross-
border crimes etc are discussed. 2
Pro-China and anti-India elements in Nepal allege that the open

border between India and Nepal is partially responsible for the lack
of development of the county and hence it should be closed. On the
88 Vol. XXIV, No. I

other hand, Pakistan is infiltrating terrorists of groups like the

Lashkar-e-Toiba (L-e-T), Jaish-e-Mohammed (J-e-M), Indian
Mujahideen through this border. As 98 per cent border is demarcated,
hence, both countries should resolve the remaining disagreements
and border encroachment disputes at the earliest. Since both countries
are affected by the misuse of the open border by internal as well as
external forces, they should enhance vigil on the borders. India has
posted about 45,000 SSB personnel while Nepal has deputed only
4,500 security personnel at the border. Nepal should enhance the
number of security personnel for making them more effective. Bilateral
meetings of the officials of both the countries should be held regularly
so that any differences can be sorted out amicably and promptly. 8
INDO-B HUTAN BORDER
The Indo-Bhutan border extends 699 km and passes along the Indian
states of Sikkim, West Bengal, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. India
signed a treaty with Bhutan in 1949 by which it recognised Bhutan’s
sovereignty, although it maintained significant influence over its foreign
affairs. Thereafter, the borders were further demarcated during the
1973-1984 period through negotiations between both countries. There
was a minor border dispute, which was sorted out in 2006 and a border
demarcation treaty was signed. Again in 2007, a new friendship and
cooperation treaty was signed between both countries. The number of
border posts and security personnel deployed were enhanced after the
2017 India-China border standoff.
The Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) has deployed about 12 battalions on

this border. The Indo-Bhutan Group meets regularly and resolves any
border management and security issues. It is a useful system as it
assesses the threat perception and stops criminal groups and countries
hostile to India from misusing the open borders.
I NDIA -M YANMAR B ORDER
The India-Myanmar border is 1,643 km long and runs from the tri-
point with China in the north and with Bangladesh in the south. The
tri-point with China is imprecise due to the Sino-India border dispute.
Myanmar shares the border with four Indian states, viz. Arunachal
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J.K. Verma
Pradesh, Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur. Myanmar and India signed
a border agreement in March 1967 which demarcated their boundary
in detail. India and Myanmar follow a Free Movement Regime (FMR)
under which tribes living along the border are allowed to travel 16 km
on either side of the border without visa constraints. There are more
than 250 villages within the 10 km zone abutting the border, in which
more than 300,000 people reside and they regularly cross the border
through 150 border crossing points. However, India wants to increase
its vigil on the border so that ISI and MSS’s assistance to terrorist and
separatist groups in India can be curbed. Further, intelligence agencies
of hostile countries and several criminal and anti-social groups are also
actively involved in drug trafficking, smuggling of Indian Fake Currency
Notes etc across the border. Hence, Indian security agencies need to
keep a check on these activities.
India and Myanmar also have maritime exclusive economic zones in

each other’s vicinity. Landfall Island, India’s northernmost Island in the
Andaman and Nicobar is just 40 km south of Coco Islands belonging to
Myanmar.23
Presently, the Indian security forces have to deal with the large influx
of refugees from Myanmar as a result of the Myanmar Army
overthrowing the elected democratic government of the National League
for Democracy (NLD) on February 1, 2021. The army is brutally
suppressing the protests against the coup. According to a rough estimate,
more than 500 people have been shot dead and the protests are
continuing (at the time of writing). Hence, many Myanmar citizens,
including police officers who refused to fire on the mobs, are trying to
escape to India, as well as to Thailand, for shelter. The Myanmar
authorities have requested India to return all refugees and not to give
shelter to others. 18
The Indian government has to walk a tightrope diplomatically, as it

would not like to annoy a friendly country, however, it is also difficult
to turn away the persecuted refugees.
INDO-S RI LANKA M ARITIME BOUNDARY
India and Sri Lanka are immediate neighbours and a narrow strip of
water, Palk Straits, separates them. However, his strip has been the
90 Vol. XXIV, No. I

cause of security problems for both countries. In the past, Sri Lanka
faced trouble because of the secessionist activities of LTTE but now
India is affected as ISI is trying to use Sri Lanka for carrying out
terrorist activities in the southern states of India. The maritime boundary
between both the countries is divided into three parts – the Bay of
Bengal in the east, Palk Straits in the Middle, and the Gulf of Mannar
in the west. Different agreements between both the countries were
signed in 1970, 1974 and 1976, which resolved their maritime boundary
disputes. Terrorists attempt to utilise the sea for carrying out terrorist
activities while criminals use it for smuggling and other criminal
activities. Hence, cooperation is required between both the countries to
keep such activities in check. Both India and Sri Lanka have dealt with
their boundary issues amicably and the running problems continue to
be resolved through diplomatic channels. 9
INDIA MALDIVES MARITIME B ORDER
India and Maldives share a maritime border and they have a close
strategic, economic, and military relationship. India contributes to the
maintenance of the security of the island nation. Maldives is located to
the south of the Lakshadweep Islands in the Indian Ocean. India and
Maldives signed a treaty in December 1976 under which both countries
agreed on their maritime boundaries. The treaty specified Minicoy island
to be on the Indian side of the border, although in 1982 a minor
diplomatic incident occurred when the brother of the President of
Maldives stated that Minicoy Island was part of Maldives; however,
Maldives denied this subsequently and the matter was resolved
amicably.
PROBLEMS IN B ORDER M ANAGEMENT
The basic problem India faces in the management of its borders is that
they are not demarcated at several places with China and Pakistan,
and a small part with Nepal. With Pakistan, the Indian borders are a
combination of International borders and Line of Control (LOC), which
means that it is not a legally recognised international boundary for
both countries, but a de facto border. In reality, it is a military-controlled
line, which divides Kashmir between India and Pakistan – some portion
of Kashmir being illegally occupied by Pakistan. The disputed areas
include Kashmir, where India had to fight three wars with Pakistan. At
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J.K. Verma
present, India has control of roughly a little over half of Kashmir while
Pakistan is illegally occupying about 30 per cent, while China has control
over 15 per cent of the area. There is also a border dispute between
India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch, where it opens up into the
Arabian Sea between Gujarat and Sindh (Pakistan). A 96 km strip of
water is disputed despite a tribunal set up after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan
War giving its award in 1968 wherein Pakistan got 10 per cent of its
claims. Thereafter, numerous rounds of talks between the two countries
have failed to make any headway.
There is also a Working Boundary between India and Pakistan. It is

about 193 km long in the Sialkot sector. The boundary is not surveyed.
The Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) is about 110 km long in the
Siachen Glacier where troops of both India and Pakistan are deployed.
The peaks in the area are above 6,000 m and temperatures drop to
minus 55 Celsius. India has around 108 forward military outposts and
artillery observation posts in this area. The maintenance of observation
posts in such an inhospitable terrain and climate is an incredible
achievement and indicates the great sacrifice and devotion of the Indian
armed forces. In 1984, the Indian Army re-occupied the Siachen glacier
from Pakistani forces which they were occupying illegally. About 2,600
sq. km area is presently contended by Pakistan. In 2003, a ceasefire
was declared in the area but incidents continue to take place.
With China, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is a hypothetical

demarcation between India and China. The forces of both the countries
occupy the Sino-India border. The term LAC was used for the first
time by Zhou Enlai in a letter written to Jawahar Lal Nehru in 1959.
In 1914, an agreement was signed between Tibet, then a sovereign

nation, and British India at Shimla. Since Henry McMahon was the
foreign secretary and chief negotiator, hence the boundary was called
as McMahon Line. India recognises it as a boundary, but the Chinese
government stopped recognising the McMahon Line before the 1962
War, it also rejects the Shimla Accord. The Chinese government claims
that since Tibet was not a sovereign state, it could not sign a treaty.
Aksai Chin is another area that is illegally occupied by China. Beijing
also claims significant areas of the state of Arunachal Pradesh. Presently,
China claims about 65,000 sq. km of Indian territory.
92 Vol. XXIV, No. I

India also has a disputed border with Nepal. Nepal claims Kalapani
area which is inside India. Under the influence of the Chinese, Nepal
even issued maps claiming Kalapani area as their territory in 2020. 10
The high density of population on both sides of the Indo-Pakistan border

in many areas is also a major issue. At some places on the Indian side,
the population density is about 700-800 persons per sq. km, while on
the Pakistani side it is up to 1000 persons per sq. km. Such high density
and a porous border create several law-and-order problems, including
locating and arresting criminals, smugglers and terrorists. Further, the
ISI continues infiltrating terrorists across the borders into India. 2
To stop cross-border activities, India has constructed fencing on the

borders to prevent infiltration of terrorists, smuggling, escape routes of
criminals, and enhance security along the border areas. There were
numerous hurdles initially in the construction, including difficulty in
acquisition of land, opposition by the local villagers, criminals, smugglers,
and ISI-supported groups also raised opposition. There were also few
shortcomings in the planning and during the implemention of the border
fencing work. Border fencing has been able to restrict the movement of
criminals and terrorists, but it failed to stop it completely as the fencing
needs round the clock vigil which is a difficult task. Further, instances
of digging tunnels under the fencing for infiltration have come to light,
raising alarm in security circles.
The BSF deployment is also thin at several places, which results in

areas that are unmonitored and are used by criminals, smugglers, and
terrorists. Depending on the region, border areas are also susceptible
to snowfall, waterlogging, dense vegetation etc, which is helpful for anti-
national elements and makes the work of security forces difficult.
The latest technique used by Pakistan for supplying arms and

ammunition, and drugs, has been the use of drones or UAVs. This has
added a new dimension to the technology being used for transgression
along the border.
INDIA ’S C OASTAL S ECURITY
As mentioned earlier, India’s coastline is not only long but it is bordering

several countries, some of which are hostile to India. The coastline is
Vol. XXIV, No. I 93

J.K. Verma
7,516 km of which 5,422 km coastline is in the mainland and 2,094 km

coastline borders around 1,382 islands. It passes through four union
territories and nine states including Daman and Diu, Puducherry, Gujarat,
Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh,
Odisha and West Bengal. There are also two island groups namely
Andaman and Nicobar, and Lakshadweep and Minicoy islands. The coast
is very diverse as there are creeks, small islands, swamps, mudflats,
backwaters, rivulets, lagoons etc. Some portions of the coastline are
located in remote areas and hence they remain undefended or poorly
defended and criminals and terrorists take advantage of it. The Andaman
and Nicobar group comprises 572 islands, but only 36 of them are
inhabited, whereas ten of the 36 islands of Lakshadweep archipelago
are inhabited. These places are used for smuggling and covert docking
of arms, ammunition, explosives, drugs and infiltration of terrorists.
According to a report, there are about 1,376 landing points along the
coastline. 15
The 1993 serial blasts in Mumbai occurred because of inadequately

guarded maritime borders which allowed RDX to be brought in by the
sea route. Operation Swan was launched thereafter to rectify the
deficiencies, which envisaged a three-layered security blanket. However,
it could not secure the maritime borders effectively as 10 terrorists
sneaked through on November 11, 2008, and killed more than 150
persons in Mumbai. The infiltrators disguised themselves as fishermen;
India is the 7th largest fishing nation and approximately 4 million
fishermen live near the sea coast. Besides fishing, there are industrial
activities, shipbuilding, oil exploration, scientific research centres, defence
installations etc located in coastal areas. Moreover, besides smuggling,
the safety and security of these vital installations are also important.
The disputed maritime boundaries with Pakistan and Bangladesh pose
additional security challenges. 15
India has adopted a multi-tier security system for maritime security

under the overall umbrella of the Navy to look after the high seas and
EEZ. The Coast Guard has jurisdiction over India’s territorial waters
and its contiguous zone, and it also looks after the EEZ along with the
Navy. The Coast Guard secures Indian interests through vessels and
aerial surveillance, while the State Marine Police jurisdiction extends
up to 12 nautical miles in shallow territorial waters.
94 Vol. XXIV, No. I

For securing the coastline, a multi-layered arrangement of sea-patrols

and surveillance has been put in place. In the first layer, i.e. from the
coast till 5 nautical miles, marine police patrol the sea. In the intermediate
layer, i.e. between 5 nautical miles and 200 nautical miles, the coast
guard is deployed. Beyond that, it is the responsibility of the Indian
Navy. Apart from this, the customs department also patrols the sea 24
nautical miles offshore.
SOME R EMEDIAL MEASURES TAKEN P OST 26/11
 The Navy has been made responsible for the overall maritime security,
including coastal as well as offshore security.
 The Indian Coast Guard has been additionally designated as the
authority responsible for coastal security in territorial waters including
areas to be patrolled by Coastal Police.
 The Coast Guard is to impart specialised training to police personnel
deployed in coastal police stations. Two Marine Police Training
Institute (MPTI), one on the East Coast and another on the West
Coast would train the marine police personnel.
 The National Committee on Strengthening Maritime and Coastal
Security (NCSMCS), which works under the Chairmanship of the
Cabinet Secretary, would monitor and assess the progress of coastal
security. In addition, coastal security exercises are carried out and
are followed by debriefing and sharing of lessons learnt between all
the stakeholders, along with interaction with fishermen and State
agencies through coastal security awareness programs.
 All vessels have to be registered under the Ministry of Shipping, and
biometric Identity Cards to be issued to all fishermen by the
Department of Animal Husbandry.
 Coast Guard to install a chain of radar sensors along the coastline.
 The Navy has set up four joint operation centres at Mumbai,
Visakhapatnam, Kochi, and Port Blair, with the existing Commander-
in-Chiefs as the C-in-Cs Coastal Defence.
 A Sagar Prahari Bal with 1000 personnel with 80 Fast Interceptor
Crafts was raised to safeguard naval bases.
 A Coastal Security Management System which includes surveillance,
identification and command and control has also been installed.
Vol. XXIV, No. I 95

J.K. Verma
Although the government and security agencies have taken several

actions, limitations in coastal security measures persist. These are listed
below.
 Progress on the part of all stakeholders in implementing various

measures.
 It is difficult to detect small boats which are used by terrorists and
smugglers.
 Physical protection of the coast is not feasible.
 Identification of small boats, containers, cargo vessels and personnel
is difficult because of overcrowded coastal waters and the absence
of identity cards.
 These vessels and personnel can be involved in the smuggling of
contraband, explosives, and weapons.
 Major ports are generally secured, it is the other dense/remote
areas that are neglected that will most likely be exploited by
terrorists/non-state actors.
 Integration of all maritime stakeholders continues to remain a key
concern.
 The gathering of information through technical gadgets is important
but it is useful only if it is converted into actionable intelligence.
Hence use of modern technology along with Humint is very
important. 15
STEPS TAKEN BY THE G OVERNMENT

FOR E FFECTIVE B ORDER M ANAGEMENT
Numerous steps have been taken by the government to streamline

border management. The Home Ministry, with the space scientists of
the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) are working on making
satellite maps available of all sensitive areas. The Indian Army and
Central Police Organisations (CPOs) have increased surveillance so that
the illegal border crossings from Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan can
be curbed. The Home Ministry has announced that there will be constant
surveillance on sensitive border areas through satellites. The satellite
imagery can also be zoomed so that the suspicious movements can be
monitored. 11
The ISRO satellite will be exclusively for the Ministry of Home Affairs,
and besides surveillance, it will also improve communications, navigation,
96 Vol. XXIV, No. I

and operational planning along the border areas. The Navy and Air
Force already have dedicated satellites for their use.
The Department of Border Management, in collaboration with State

Governments, has launched the Border Area Development Programme
(BADP) under which they will manage the border and will fulfil the
specific needs of the people residing near the border. The infrastructure
including roads etc will also be developed according to the requirements
of the local population. This will help in improving the living conditions
and getting better cooperation from locals.
T HEATRE C OMMANDS W OULD C OUNTER

T HREATS F ROM C HINA & P AKISTAN
Because of the increased threat from China and Pakistan, India needs
to streamline the functioning of its defence forces, hence, it was
decided that they would be reorganised into five theatre commands.
It is an organisational structure devised to synergise all military
resources in a theatre of war to achieve the best results. In military
parlance, a joint command of Army, Navy and Air Force is called a
‘Theatre Command’. At present India has two functional joint
commands, the Andaman and Nicobar Command and the Strategic
12 & 13
F or ces Com m an d .
The proposal is for the Northern Theatre Command, which will have
headquarters at Lucknow, to look after the Line of Actual Control
(LAC) with China. It will be responsible for the areas between the
Karakoram Pass in Ladakh and the last outpost Kibithu in Arunachal
Pradesh. The Western Theatre Command will be responsible from
Indira Col on the Saltoro Ridge in the Siachen Glacier to the tip of
Gujarat and its headquarters is likely to be at Jaipur. The other
three commands are the Peninsular Command, Air Defence Command
and the Maritime Command. 12 & 13
The Air Defence Command will defend Indian air space by deploying
fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles. In addition, the Air Defence
Theatre Command will augment the airstrike capability and be
responsible to defend Indian airspace. The Air Force will train its
fighter pilots at a single base at Gwalior and its headquarters will be
at Prayagraj. It will control the existing air defence resources of all
Vol. XXIV, No. I 97

J.K. Verma
three services and will protect military assets from airborne attacks.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defence Theatre Command will
be a three-star Indian Air Force officer. 14
MARITIME THEATRE COMMAND
At present there is excellent harmonization between the Coast Guard

and Navy, however, once the Maritime Theatre Command (MTC)
comes into existence the Eastern and Western Naval Commands,
some elements of the Army, Air Force and Coast Guard would come
under its operational control. The Director General of Coast Guard
would continue reporting to the Ministry of Defence and will be
responsible for recruiting and training the Coast Guard personnel.
The MTC, which will be responsible for the safety and security from
seaborne threats, is expected to be operational by 2022 and it will
be headquartered at INS Kadamba in Karwar. The Commander-in-
Chief of MTC will be a three-star officer of the Indian Navy. The
existing Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) will also come under
MTC. 15 & 16
The Pentagon had mentioned in a report that China is modernising

its war-fighting abilities precipitously, while the Indian defence forces
are lagging behind. China’s Western Theatre Command looks after
the security of the complete Indo-China border, while India suffers
from disjointedness as multiple forces are managing this border. Hence,
the creation of unified theatre commands will help remove some of
the existing anomalies in border management. 12 & 13
The Army is in favour of theatre command and considers that there

will be optimal utilisation of existing resources, and further, it will
avoid duplication. The Air Force is against the theatre command
concept and is of the view that India does not have enough fighter
p l an es, m i d - ai r r ef u el l er s an d A i r bor n e W ar n i n g A n d Con t r ol Syst em
( A W A CS) w h i ch can b e d i v i d ed i n t o v ar i o u s t h eat r e com m an d s. T h e
A i r F or ce al so cl ai m s t h at geogr ap h i cal l y I n d i a i s n ot so b i g t h at i t
r eq u i r es t o b e d i v i d ed i n t o v ar i ou s t h eat r es as t h e asset s can easi l y
b e r el ocat ed f r om on e l ocat i on t o an ot h er . T h e N av y i s al so n ot i n
f av o u r o f t h eat r e co m m an d s an d cl ai m s t h at t h e p r esen t N av y
h ead q u ar t er s ar e i d eal l y l o c at ed an d t h at i t p er f o r m s i t s r o l e
p r o f i ci en t l y . B ot h t h e A i r F or ce an d t h e N av y f eel t h at t h ey ar e a
98 Vol. XXIV, No. I

much smaller force in comparison to the Army, hence they may lose
their autonomy and importance. 12 & 13
The Kargil Review Committee and the Shekatkar Committee both

have mentioned that compartmentalised planning is not the ideal
way to deal with internal or external threats, as some ‘jointness’ is
necessary at the top echelons. These committees mention that
disjointed and fragmented planning and execution results in a lack of
synergy during war. In reality, national security has now become
very complicated. Several forces, including cyber and automation,
have to work along with the security forces to face the new challenges.
These challenges cannot be countered through a disjointed force, it
needs a strong and cohesive formation, which takes quick decisions
according to emerging conditions.
REQUIREMENT OF APPROPRIATE BORDER G UIDELINES
A detailed border guideline is required to be chalked out and all border

guarding forces should comply with it, both for the land and maritime
borders. The guidelines should incorporate the principle of single-point
control and ensure cooperation and coordination between all forces with
proper exchange and utilisation of actionable intelligence.
A strong vigil should be maintained of the borders through radar, satellite

and aerial imagery as this will greatly enhance the effectiveness of the
security forces. The deployment of a sizable number of helicopters with
the border forces would help in surveillance and would also add to the
mobility and quick deployment of troops.
THE P RINCIPLE OF ‘S INGLE POINT C ONTROL ’ TO BE IMPLEMENTED
India’s border is diverse, and it has trouble spots at several places.

Pakistan is constantly infiltrating terrorists and carrying out terrorist
activities in India, while China being an expansionist country, claims
several areas of India as its territory and has attacked India more than
once. China also considers India as its potential adversary, hence it is
trying to surround the country through its neighbours. It would be
proper if the Central Police Organisations guard the demarcated borders,
while unsettled and disputed borders like LoC and LAC is under the
control of the defence forces. There are operations in high altitude and
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J.K. Verma
other difficult areas, hence the army has to be deployed in these areas.
At present, besides the Assam Rifles, which is a paramilitary force
officered by regular army officers, several CPOs are also deployed on
the borders which may not be ideal operationally. 2
The Group of Ministers in its report of 2001 had strongly recommended

the principle of “one border one force” for better accountability. It had
also emphasized the imperative of not deploying the border guarding
forces for law and order duties and in counter-insurgency operations.
This issue requires serious attention from the government.
The maritime border management has been able to implement the

principle of a single-point control, with the Indian Navy being designated
as the overall responsible organisation. The establishment of four joint
operations centres has further streamlined the management of the coastal
borders. The Joint Operations Centres at Mumbai, Cochin,
Visakhapatnam and Port Blair play a pivotal role in synergising the
coastal security efforts of over 15 central and state government agencies.
The Navy has gone a step further, with their proposal to establish a
multi-agency integrated body focusing exclusively on maritime
intelligence and data analysis to strengthen coastal security – the
National Maritime Domain Awareness Centre (NMDAC). 26
To review the effectiveness of measures taken, in January 2019 the

Indian Navy conducted the first-of-its-kind exercise Sea Vigil. The large-
scale exercise witnessed participation of more than 70 ships, 700 craft
and 35 aircraft of the Indian Navy, Coast Guard, State Marine Police,
Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and other agencies across all
coastal States and Union Territories. The second edition, Sea Vigil-21,
was held on January 12-13, 2021. The exercise was meant to assess
India’s coastal security preparedness to prevent any “attempt by anti-
national elements to carry out an attack on its territory or against its
citizens by infiltrating through the sea route.” According to
a statement released by the Ministry of Defence, “the scale and conceptual
expanse of the exercise is unprecedented in terms of the geographical
extent, the number of stakeholders involved, the number of units
participating and in terms of the objectives to be met.” 27
However, bringing land border management under a single nodal agency/

organisation has yet to be implemented and it is presently directly
100 Vol. XXIV, No. I

managed by the Home Ministry, with some sectors under the Ministry
of Defence. This will never be able to match the level of coordination
and efficiency which the maritime borders have achieved and the
government should look into replicating this model, with suitable
modifications, for efficient management of the land borders. This is
imperative because they remain “active” almost throughout the year
and there is unlikely to be any let-up in the scenario in the future.
Trying to manage directly from Delhi will never be an ideal solution.
One of the major obstacles in implementing this model, however, will
be the expected turf wars between the Ministries/agencies/organisations
involved. That is another lesson to be learnt from the maritime border
management model – this contentious issue has been overcome there.
The effectiveness of the reorganisation of the Indian Armed Forces into

Theatre Commands, especially those tasked to manage the land borders,
will be greatly enhanced if all organisations deployed on the borders in
peacetime are also incorporated in the command control matrix for
both peace and war scenario. The present reorganisation of Theatre
Commands is apparently silent regarding the other security forces
deployed on the border. For example, one of the major responsibilities
of the Department of Border Management Division is the development
of infrastructure and roads. The Border Roads Organisation is a major
organisation carrying out this task, however, it is not even in the
circulation list for policies issued by the Department, nor is the Ministry
of Defence or the Indian Army – both major stakeholders. This reflects
the compartmentalisation in which the existing system works. 28
The External Affairs Minister in his address at the Sardar Patel Memorial
Lecture 2020 on October 31, 2020, highlighted that safeguarding borders
is a 24×7 exercise and stressed the importance of requisite structures
and systems for national security. However, he also cautioned against
advocating sweeping solutions without adequate groundwork. He also
highlighted that breaking silos and integrated governance, especially in
national security, have been the Government’s areas of focus. The
setting-up of the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) and the proposed
setting-up of theatre commands are examples of this new focus. It is
hoped that this focus of the government to break existing silos will
result in a more efficient structure for the management of land borders.
29
Vol. XXIV, No. I 101

J.K. Verma
ADDITIONAL R ECOMMENDATIONS FOR M ARITIME BORDER M ANAGEMENT
The Government of India and the security agencies have taken several
measures to safeguard the long marine borders of the country, but
there is scope for more improvement. Firstly, more advanced technology
should be used for the recognition of unknown/enemy vessels and in
case required immediate apprehension or elimination. Automatic
Identification System (AIS) should be fitted even in small vessels – at
present AIS is fitted only in vessels of more than 300 tonnage. This is
a big lacuna in the present system.
Distress Alert Transmitter (DAT) should be provided to all Indian vessels

so that they can send a message to the Coast Guard in case of distress,
including any threat from anti-national elements. Indian fishermen should
mandatorily carry their Aadhar Card or some identity document so
that foreigners can be detected.
The security at ports should be enhanced by fitting CCTV camera,

X-ray machines, biometrics etc.
There should be more coordination among different agencies and

between the security agencies of other countries so that a data bank
can be created on terrorists, smugglers, and criminals.
The intelligence agencies should be galvanised so that more

actionable intelligence can be produced. The Joint Operation Centres
and multi-agency coordination mechanism are working presently and
should strive for further efficiency in their functioning. The setting
up of the NMDAC will provide a big boost in maritime border
management.
End Notes
1. RSTV In Depth: Border Surveillance Dated 7 March 2019 by

Insights IAS
https://www.insightsonindia.com/2019/03/07/rstv-in-depth-border-
surveillance/#:~:text=A%20new%20electronic%20surveillance%20
was,border%20surveillance%20a%20tough%20task.

2. Security Challenges and their management in border areas Civil

Services India IAS Guide https://www.civilserviceindia.com/subject/
General-Studies/notes/security-challenges.html
3. Information on Department of Border Management
https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/BMIntro-1011.pdf
https://www.civilserviceindia.com/subject/General-Studies/notes/
security-challenges.html
4. Jai Kumar Verma; Will LOC & LAC Become Easier To Manage If
Our Intelligence Becomes State-Of-The-Art? Dated 11 June 2017;
Aviation and Defence Universe
https://www.aviation-defence-universe.com/will-loc-lac-become-easier-
manage-intelligence-becomes-state-art/
5. India building new ‘steel fence’ along Pakistan, Bangla borders:
officials; Economic Times E Paper dated 10 January 2020. P.T.I https:/
/economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-erecting-new-steel-
fence-along-pakistan-bangla-borders-officials/articlesh ow/
73191397.cms?from=mdr
6. Kanchan Lakshman & Sanjay K Jha; India-Bangladesh: Restoring
Sovereignty on Neglected Bordershttps://www.satp.org/satporgtp/
publication/faultlines/volume14/article7.htm
7. Anchal Vohra; India settles border dispute with Bangladesh as
Narendra Modi signs Land Boundary Agreement with Sheikh Hasina
Dated June 6th, 2015 News 18
https://www.news18.com/news/india/prime-minister-narendra-modi-
signs-land-boundary-agreement-with-bangladesh-pm-sheikh-hasina-
1002466.html
8. Hans Raj Singh asked: What are the major problems on the
Indo-Nepal border and how they can be resolved?
https://idsa.in/askanexpert/majorproblemsontheIndo-Nepalborder
9. Sanath de Silva; Sharing Maritime Boundary with India: Sri
Lankan Experience
h t t p s : / / w w w . g o o g l e . c o m /
search?q=India%E2%80%93Sri+Lanka+maritime+
boundary+troubles&rlz=1C1CHBF_enIN833IN833&oq=India%
E2%80%93Sri+Lanka+maritime+boundary+troubles&aqs=ch
rome..69i57j33i160.5396j0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
10. The Disputed Territories of India; dated 14 September 2020
Seterra Blog
https://online.seterra.com/en/p/india-border-disputes

J.K. Verma
11 . Shaswati Das; Home ministry, ISRO team up to boost internal

security surveillance system Dated 31 Jan 2020, MINT
https://www.livemint.com/news/india/home-ministry-isro-team-up-to-
boost-internal-security-surveillance-system-11580409247559.html
12. Krishna Mohan Mishra and Subhangi Kumari Sing; India to get
5 military theatre commands by 2022 to counter threats from China,
Pakistan; Zee News dated 27 October 2020
https://zeenews.india.com/india/india-to-get-5-military-theatre-
c o mma n d s - b y - 2 0 2 2 - to - c o u n ter- th rea ts - fro m- c h i n a- p ak i s tan -
2320423.html
13. Theatre Command in India; Drishti Internal Security; dated 04
May 2019
Prev https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/
theatre-command-in-india
14. Rahul Singh; India-China border row: Air forces hold formation
in Ladakh; Hindustan Times Dated 31.03.2021
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/indiachina-border-row-
air-forces-hold-formation-in-ladakh-101617138487983.html FROM
15. Pradeep V Kamat; India’s Coastal Security: Perspectives,
Challenges and Prospects; Forum for Integrated National Security.
Journal (FINS) dated 27 June 2019,
https://finsindia.org/journal/indias-coastal-security-perspectives-
challenges-and-prospects/
16. Snehesh Alex Philip; Maritime Theatre Command could bring
Coast Guard ships under its control; The Print Dated 27 November
2020
https://theprint.in/defence/maritime-theatre-command-could-bring-
coast-guard-ships-under-its-control/553228/
17. Exclusive economic zone of India: Wikipedia, the free
encyclopaedia
h t t p s : / / e n . w i k i p e d i a . o r g / w i k i /
Exclusive_economic_zone_of_India#:~:text=India%20has%20the%
2018th%2Dlargest,Bengal%20and%20the%20Andaman%20Sea.
18. Manipur: India state reverses order turning away Myanmar
refugees; BBC Dated on or about 1 April 2021
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-56573888
19. Sidharth Shekhar; BAT squad: All you need to know about
Pakistan’s notorious Border Action Team; TIMESNOWNEWS.COM;
dated August 04, 2019

https://www.timesnownews.com/international/article/bat-squad-all-
you-need-to-know-about-pakistan-s-notorious-border-action-team/
463435
20. Department of Border Management OM dated March 10, 2021,
https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/
BMdiv_I_Annexure_I_12032021.pdf
21. Department of Border Management: Responsibilities http://
ww w.allgov .co m/in di a/dep artmen ts /mini stry -o f- home- affairs/
department-of-border-management?agencyid=7565#
22. Department of Border Management Division-II https://
www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/BM_II_Mandate_18062019.pdf
23. India–Myanmar border https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India–
Myanmar_border#:~:text=India%20and%20Myanmar%20have%20maritime%20e
xclusive%20economic%20zones,nmi%29%20south%20of
%20Coco%20Islands%20belonging%20to%20Myanmar
24. India’s Border Management https://r.search.yahoo.com/
_ylt=Awr9Duovtn1gBrUAqD9XNyoA;_ylu
=Y29sbwNncTEEcG9zAzEEdnRpZAMEc2VjA3Ny/RV=2/
RE=1618880175/RO=10/RU=https%3a%2f%2fidsa
.in%2fsites%2fdefault%2ffiles%2fbook_IndiasBorderManagement.pdf/
RK=2/RS=2Tsv0xG.fAhQHOJPRrfDxWHMLdc-
25. Smart Border Management: An Indian Perspective https://
www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/publications/2016/smart-border-management-
an-indian-perspective.pdf
26. 12 years of 26/11: Multi-agency hub for coastal security in India
soonhttps://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/12-years-of-26-11-multi-
agency-hub-for-coastal-security-in-india-soon-1744445-2020-11-26
27. Sea Vigil: India’s Coastal Security Exercisehttps://
thediplomat.com/2021/01/sea-vigil-indias-coastal-security-exercise/
28. New Guidelines of Border Area Development Programme (BADP),
2020 — regarding, Department of Border Management, Ministry of
Home Affairs OM No. 12/63/2014-BADP(Pt.-1) dated March 11, 2020,
https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/
GuidelinesofBADP_17032020.PDF

J.K. Verma
29. Coastal Security in India: Twelve Years After ‘26/11’, National

Maritime Foundation https://maritimeindia.org/coastal-security-in-
india-twelve-years-after-26-11/
......................................................................................................................................
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

J. K. Verma is a former Director in the Cabinet Secretariat. He is a Pakistan
watcher and has written extensively on the nefarious designs of the ISI,
smuggling of fake Indian currency notes, etc. He is also writing on other SAARC
countries. He has written articles on Islamic terrorism and left-wing
extremism. He is a strategic analyst and delivers lectures at training academies
of paramilitary and intelligence organisations.
**************************

THE SECOND NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIAN SUBCONTINENT
AGNI pp 107-121
THE SECOND NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR:

IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIAN SUBCONTINENT
BY
MANABHANJAN MEHER
T
he Nagorno-Karabakh is a conflict that touches the very core
of Armenian and Azerbaijani national identity. The war from
September 27 to November 10, 2020, resulted in Armenia
becoming the biggest loser. Subsequently, the balance of power
changed in favour of Azerbaijan. For the first time since the collapse
of the Soviet Union, Russian peacekeepers have appeared in Nagorno-
Karabakh. This conflict has brought Azerbaijan, Turkey and Pakistan
closer than earlier, boosting their efforts to create a new strategic
alliance which may perhaps threaten India’s interests in the region.
I NTRODUCTION
On November 9, 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a peace

agreement with the Prime Minister of Armenia and President of
Azerbaijan, ending the recent war in Nagorno-Karabakh. The agreements
between the parties, as well as the deployment of the Russian
peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh, made it possible to stop the
bloodshed, ensure stability in the region and create conditions for a
return to peace. It is obvious that Azerbaijan came out the winner in
the conflict, and Turkey, which supported it, also benefited. Armenia
lost the war, and Russia strengthened its position in the South Caucasus
as a peacemaker.
The Minsk Group (which is authorized by the Organization for Security

and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]), played no role in the recent conflict.

Manabhanjan Meher
Before that, three co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group) dominated the
mediation between the conflicting parties. The Minsk Group is headed
by a co-chairmanship consisting of France, Russia and the United States.
Furthermore, the Minsk Group also includes the following participating
states – Belarus, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Finland, Turkey, as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan. In this conflict,
Turkey, as a regional power, has also gained some leverage while
increasing its influence in the region. The present conflict has its roots
in preparations undertaken by the Azeri government in tandem with
Turkey.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not just a quarrel over territory, but

it touches on the very core of Armenian and Azerbaijani national identity.
Both nations lay claim to this territory and provide their own, often
mutually exclusive, interpretations of the past to justify their historical
rights. To better understand the nature of this conflict, it is essential to
analyze each party’s views and ideas about the past.
This article comprises of two parts; the first part provides a historical
perspective of the violent conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and the
significance of the peace deal. The second part deals with the involvement
of Turkey and Pakistan in the conflict and its wider implications on the
Indian subcontinent in general, and Kashmir in particular.
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE C ONFLICT AND THE R ECENT P EACE DEAL
The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the territory of

Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) goes back a hundred years. Some historians,
politicians, and scholars estimate its genesis being even older, however,
before the year 1918 neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan existed as modern
states. The superficial way to analyze the conflict is to blame Soviet
leader, JV Stalin in particular, and the Soviet Union in general, as most
historians and scholars have done so far without going for an in-depth
study of the events associated with the Karabakh conflicts.
However, the Soviet approach to solving the issue, which guaranteed

the rights of minorities and established autonomous regions within the
republics to remove economic and cultural backwardness and
discrimination should not be overlooked. It would be incorrect to

underestimate the history and ethnic complexities, as well as the current

geopolitics of the region.
When the 1804-1813 war between Russia and Persia came to an end on
October 12, 1813, with the signing of the Treaty of Gulistan, Persia
conceded to Russia almost all Eastern Transcaucasia’s khanates, including
the Karabakh and Gandzak khanates. Nagorno-Karabakh became a part
of Tsarist Russia by the Gulistan Treaty of 1813, and its status was not
disputed until the 1917 October Revolution. The First World War and
the Bolshevik Revolution created a new political-historical situation in
Transcaucasia. On November 15, 1917, the Bolshevik government
adopted a Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, which
among other provisions declared the right of secession and the formation
of independent states within the territory of the Russian Empire.
After the 1917 Russian Revolution and the collapse of the Czarist Russian
Empire, there emerged in 1918 the briefly independent Republics of
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Soon after the Bolshevik takeover in October
1917, the non-Russian people of the former Russian Empire strove for
autonomy and independence.
Although during the Soviet era the government did not attach much
meaning to internal borders and they were generally not considered
important, the republics and regions of the Soviet Union that were
created in the 1920s had fixed administrative borders. The Soviet political
leadership in the early 1920s included the mountainous part of Karabakh
(Nagornyi Karabakh) and Nakhchivan in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist
Republic; Soviet Armenia included the Zangezur district. The Nagorno-
Karabakh was an autonomous region within Soviet Azerbaijan with a
majority Armenian population. Living side by side for centuries, the
relationship between Armenians and Azerbaijanis has been shaped not
only by conflict but also by long periods of peaceful coexistence.
The current phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue started during the

last years of the USSR and turned into a conflict because of the policy
of power adopted by Azerbaijan in response to the implementation of
the right to self-determination by the people of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Exercising its right to self-determination based on Soviet law, on
September 2, 1991, Nagorno-Karabakh adopted a declaration on the
“Independence of Nagorno-Karabakh”, later confirmed by a referendum.

Manabhanjan Meher
This was the outcome of the right that was reflected in the legislation
effective at the time, particularly the law of April 3, 1990, entitled
“Procedure for Decisions about Union Republics leaving the USSR.”
However, the newly independent Azerbaijan Republic did not accept
this resulting declaration.
On August 30, 1991, Azerbaijan declared its secession from the USSR.
Immediately after that, in September 1991, Baku annulled the special
autonomous status of Karabakh (NKAO). Nagorno-Karabakh had the
status of autonomy within Azerbaijan, but later the Azerbaijani
parliament abolished this status, and the territory was divided between
several regions. Nevertheless, by the time the all-out war came to an
end in 1994, Armenia had captured Nagorno-Karabakh and seven
surrounding districts from Azeri forces, which amounted to some 13
per cent of Azerbaijan’s territory. Two peoples who had been living
together in peace for 70 years under the framework of the Soviet Union
were once again on the verge of war.
The open wound in the relations between the two peoples, following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, has festered during the past decades,
as shown by the conflicts in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. This is due
to vested interests of the ruling elites of the two countries, amidst
interventions by other external forces promoting their interests, such
as Turkey, which also intervened militarily on the side of Azerbaijan,
the USA, the EU, and Russia.
From September 27 to November 10, 2020, a war broke out between

Azerbaijan and Armenia over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh
(Artsakh) that received the attention of the whole international
community. It resulted in Armenia losing out and they were left with
no other option than being compelled to accept Azeri terms. The war
has changed the balance of power in the region in favour of Azerbaijan.
Russia could intervene to stop the second Karabakh war through its
mediation and was successful in brokering a historic agreement between
Armenia and Azerbaijan.
According to the statement signed on November 10, 2020, by President

of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan
and President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, Azerbaijani

and Armenian forces halt their operations and keep the positions that
they currently control. The highlights of the declaration is given below.
• The Agdam District shall be returned to the Republic of Azerbaijan

by November 20, 2020.
• The peacemaking forces of the Russian Federation, namely, 1,960
troops with firearms, 90 armoured vehicles and 380 motor vehicles
and units of special equipment, shall be deployed along the contact
line in Nagorno-Karabakh and along the Lachin Corridor.
• The peacemaking forces of the Russian Federation shall be
deployed concurrently with the withdrawal of the Armenian
troops. The peacemaking forces of the Russian Federation will be
deployed for five years, a term to be automatically extended for
a subsequent five-year term unless either Party notifies about
its intention to terminate this clause six months before the
expiration of the current term.
• The Republic of Armenia shall return the Kalbajar District to the
Republic of Azerbaijan by November 15, 2020, and the Lachin
District by December 1, 2020. The Lachin Corridor (5 km wide),
which will provide a connection between Nagorno-Karabakh and
Armenia while not passing through the territory of Shusha, shall
remain under the control of the Russian Federation peacemaking
forces.
• As agreed by the Parties, within the next three years, a plan will
be outlined for the construction of a new route via the Lachin
Corridor, to provide a connection between Nagorno-Karabakh
and Armenia, and the Russian peacemaking forces shall be
subsequently relocated to protect the route.
• The Republic of Azerbaijan shall guarantee the security of persons,
vehicles and cargo moving along the Lachin Corridor in both
directions.
• All economic and transport connections in the region shall be
unblocked. The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the security
of transport connections between the western regions of the
Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic
and to arrange unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and
cargo in both directions. The Border Guard Service of the Russian
Federal Security Service shall be responsible for overseeing the
transport connections. As agreed by the Parties, new transport

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links shall be built to connect the Nakhchivan Autonomous

Republic and the western regions of Azerbaijan.
The above declaration pointed to two major connectivity projects: (i)

corridors between Azerbaijan and the Azeri province of Nakhichevan,
and (ii) the corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. These
two corridors are extremely important for both countries and they will
now be under the control of FSB Border Guards. FSB Director Alexander
Bortnikov noted that “the Federal Security Service has deployed five
additional border posts with the help of the FSB Border Guard
Department in the Republic of Armenia: two posts on the border of
Armenia and the Nakhchivan Republic (Yeraskh and Paruyr Sevak);
two posts on the border between Armenia and Iran (Meghri and Sygyr);
and the fifth post, Tegh, on the border.” It indicates that in strategic
terms, now Russia has an iron grip on the vital strategic artery for both
Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Armenia is considered a formal ally of Russia through its membership

in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In addition to
the Russian Federation and Armenia, this organization includes Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (Serbia and Afghanistan were
granted observer status in 2013). Abandoning Armenia was never a
viable option for Russia. It is an important participant in Moscow’s
integration projects in the South Caucasus. In addition to the CSTO,
this includes the Eurasian Economic Union. Unlike Abkhazia, South
Ossetia or Transnistria, the Russian Federation here has not taken a
position and remains neutral without proposing any solution other than
the application of a ceasefire.
Russia has always tried to keep a military balance between the two
South Caucasus states. Azerbaijan is no less geopolitically important for
the Russian than Armenia. Russia is not interested in a deterioration of
its relations with all the parties involved – Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Turkey. The Russians would benefit from a military presence in a region;
they were virtually non-existent in Azerbaijan. After the implementation
of the peace deal signed by Armenia with Azerbaijan, the only factor
providing security to the remaining Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh
region will be the Russian military presence there.

THE ROLE OF TURKEY AND PAKISTAN IN THE KARABAKH W AR
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is an opportunity for both Turkey and

Pakistan. As President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, during an interaction
with the Turkish A Haber TV channel openly acknowledged, “Turkey
and Pakistan are the first countries to support us. After that, the number
of such countries began to grow. Following this, Afghanistan expressed
its open support. Support was also voiced by Bosnia and Herzegovina
and other countries. Fraternal Turkey provided the biggest support.”
Turkey was also the first country to recognize Azerbaijan’s independence
in 1991. Azerbaijan and Turkey maintain a special relationship defined
by a long history of events, and cultural and ethnic connections.
Azerbaijanis and Turks belong to the same Turkic identity. “We are
one nation, two states” are the thoughts of Azerbaijan’s National Leader
Heydar Aliyev in outlining the philosophy of Azerbaijan-Turkey relations.
Turkey has firmly and unequivocally supported Baku throughout the

three decades of the Armenia–Azerbaijan confrontation. Further,
President Aliyev asserted that “President Erdogan’s constant support
for Azerbaijan not only during the war, but throughout the time he is
President and leader of Turkey played a very important role in the
liberation of Azerbaijani territories. Turkey is our brother. Turkey is
our great ally. And people of Azerbaijan are happy to have such an
ally.” As Turkic states, Turkey and Azerbaijan have developed a close
relationship in the last three decades. This cooperation played a crucial
role in the development of Azerbaijan’s military capacity. The parties
signed the “Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Cooperation”
in 2010, which became the backbone of cooperation in the spheres of
security and economy. Turkey’s interference in the conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh has undoubtedly added a new dimension to the
relationship.
On the other hand, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has not officially
recognized Armenia as a sovereign state and has not established
diplomatic relations with the country because of its disputes with the
Azerbaijani people. This has been one of the major factors in the
successful development of relations between Pakistan and Azerbaijan.
President Ilham Aliyev, on Pakistan Day on March 23, 2021 emphasized
that: “The ties between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan stem from the will of our brotherly peoples bound

Manabhanjan Meher
with common historical, religious and cultural roots. The present high
level of our strategic partnership relations, resting on such a solid
foundation, is very gratifying.” The two countries have been cooperating
in international forums on issues of mutual interest and concern, and
both enjoy close and cordial relations characterized by shared perceptions
on major global and regional issues.
Regarding relations between the two countries, there have been diverse
opinions prevailing among scholars and policymakers. Azerbaijani
academicians Ibrahimov & Huseynov noted that “Although Pakistan
and Azerbaijan are in different geographical regions and have no direct
connection; these states have very strong coordination in following their
international political agenda. Both states tend to support each other’s
position in the international arena on all issues.” On the other hand,
Ahmad Rashid Malik, Senior Research Fellow at Institute of Strategic
Studies, Islamabad, argued that “Unlike Pakistan, Iran and Turkey
have a strong presence in the region being partially the part of the
region. Pakistan’s policy toward the Caucasian region and particularly
toward Azerbaijan has been sharply influenced by its strong
understanding with Turkey and historical perceptions of the Caucasian
region.” Similar perspectives also echoed from the Russian political
scientist, Andrei Serenko, who heads the Center for Contemporary
Afghan Studies, who claimed that “The main reason why Islamabad has
joined the Karabakh game is rooted in the special relations between
Pakistan and Turkey. The Pakistani military leadership has always highly
valued its alliance with Ankara.”
The feeling of complete solidarity with the people and Government of

Azerbaijan is something strongly present among the people and the
Government of Pakistan as well. President Ilham Aliyev during his
speech at the “New Vision for South Caucasus: Post-Conflict Development
and Cooperation” international conference held at ADA University,
acknowledged the moral support from Pakistan during the conflict. He
elaborated that “Pakistan was among the countries which openly
supported Azerbaijan from the first days of the confrontation. Until the
last days, Pakistan was always on our side. We are very grateful to the
Pakistani government and Pakistani people for a very consistent approach
to the issues related to our territorial integrity. Maybe many of our
participants do not know but Pakistan is one of the very few countries
which did not establish diplomatic relations with Armenia because of

their aggression and occupation. There are only very few countries like
Pakistan. So, we are always grateful for that and this is a real sign of
our brotherhood. And probably you know that during the war there
have been many flags of Turkey and Pakistan in our cities and we, of
course, we’re telling who is supporting us. And that was coming from
the hearts of the people.” In course of time, the relations between the
two states have grown to the level of strategic partnership and have
smoothly progressed into a time-tested friendship based on principles
of mutual respects, understanding and cooperation.
Reciprocating Pakistan’s support, Azerbaijan has also been firmly and

unequivocally supporting Pakistan’s effort for the early resolution of
the Kashmir dispute following Pakistan’s point of view.
PARALLEL DRAWN B ETWEEN

NAGORNO-K ARABAKH AND K ASHMIR ISSUE
There is no doubt that the Nagorno-Karabakh and Kashmir disputes

are two very different issues, as both have complicated histories with
very few similarities. The Kashmir problem emerged after the end of
British rule in the Indian subcontinent and the establishment of India
and Pakistan as sovereign nations after the partition. The Maharaja of
J&K, Hari Singh, initially wanted Kashmir to remain independent, but
in October 1947 opted to join India and signed the instrument of accession
with India, in return for help against the invasion of his territory by
tribesmen and rangers from Pakistan. It prompted many to claim that
the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is like that of Kashmir and that perhaps
many in Pakistan urged the government to adopt similar steps as
Azerbaijan has taken.
Azerbaijan has been determinedly and unambiguously supporting

Pakistan’s effort for the early resolution of the Kashmir dispute. There
has been frequent exchange of high-level visits between the states since
the relationship commenced. For instance, during the meeting of the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Contact Group, on June 22,
2020, addressing a virtual meeting on Jammu and Kashmir, the then
Foreign Affairs Minister of Azerbaijan Elmar Mammadyarov argued
that “As a responsible member of the international community,
Azerbaijan supports the peaceful settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir
issue following the norms and principles of international law and relevant

Manabhanjan Meher
UN Security Council resolutions, as well as with full respect for

international humanitarian law. As a result, there is a clear need to
continue efforts that will lead to a lasting solution to the problem. The
peaceful settlement of all unresolved issues related to Jammu and
Kashmir is of particular importance in terms of ensuring peace and
security in the wider South Asian region.” While having a role in the
OIC Kashmir Contact group, Azerbaijan also takes every opportunity
to promote Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir at other international forums.
Furthermore, President Ilham Aliyev during the joint press briefing

with the then Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif on
October 14, 2016, highlighted that “Since that time we have established
very close, friendly relations we always support each other in
international organizations – in United Nations, the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation and other international bodies. We support each
other on the issues of Kashmir and Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan fully
supports the resolution of the Kashmir issue based on the relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions.” Azerbaijan’s support of
Pakistan on the Jammu and Kashmir issue is beyond the norms and
principles of international law and UN Security Council’s resolutions,
which the policymakers in Azerbaijan often claim, but it can be seen
through the prism of “Islamic Solidarity”.
As a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, as well as

other organizations that unite Muslim countries, the Republic of
Azerbaijan has established mutually beneficial relations with the Islamic
world and has acted as the organizer of important global cultural forums.
The President, Ilham Aliyev had declared 2017 as the Year of Islamic
Solidarity in the country. Elaborating his views on the problems faced
by the Muslim world, he argued that “We have to admit that today the
Islamic world is facing serious challenges and numerous problems, which
await solution. The Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
Palestine and Kashmir problems, conflicts in the Middle East states,
refugee crisis, etc. can be singled out among these problems.” Despite
being a secular nation, Azerbaijan has always been very active concerning
Islamic solidarity and has always defended the interests of Muslim
countries in international organizations.
Turkish President Erdogan had raised the issue of Kashmir in the wake
of a lockdown in Jammu and Kashmir at the United Nations General

Assembly (UNGA) 74 th session and criticized the international

community for failing to pay attention to the Kashmir conflict. He asserted
that “The Kashmir conflict, which is also key to the stability and peace
of South Asia, is still a burning issue. Steps taken following the abolition
of the special status of Jammu-Kashmir further complicated the problem.
We are in favour of solving this issue through dialogue, within the
framework of the United Nations resolutions and especially in line with
the expectations of the people of Kashmir.” In retaliation, India slammed
Turkish President Erdogan for his remarks on Kashmir, saying the
latter’s speech constitutes “gross interference” in India’s internal affairs
and is “completely unacceptable”.
P AKISTAN -A ZERBAIJAN -T URKEY T RILATERAL C OOPERATION
The partnership between Pakistan and Turkey dates to the early 1950s
when the two countries came together in the Western-aligned Central
Treaty Organization (CENTO); the history of Azerbaijan’s close
relationship with Pakistan started in the 1990s after Azerbaijan gained
independent statehood. In recent years, cooperation between Azerbaijan,
Pakistan and Turkey has strengthened not just in the political and
diplomatic, but defence, and economic realms as well.
On January 13, 2021, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic

of Azerbaijan, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of
Turkey came together for the second trilateral meeting in Islamabad.
The joint declaration issued subsequently expressed their support for
each other in the crucial challenges faced by them. The statement also
expressed the alignment of their views on the disputes in Cyprus,
Kashmir and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Declaration reads, “In November
2020, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) approved the latest
resolution 10/47-Paul on the Jammu and Kashmir conflict in Niamey
and the OIC Contact Group’s communiqué on Jammu and Kashmir,
and on August 5, 2019, expressed their deep concern at the unilateral
action on gross violations of human rights aimed at change, reiterated
their principled position on the peaceful settlement of the Jammu and
Kashmir conflict within the framework of the relevant UN Security
Council resolutions.” Turkey and Azerbaijan have been vocal supporters
of Pakistan on the long-standing issue of the Kashmir dispute with
India. Both these countries are also part of the OIC Contact Group on
Kashmir, which from time-to-time issues strong statements on Kashmir.

Manabhanjan Meher
The declaration also emphasized the significance of trilateral cooperation

in energy and trade among the three countries, as well as the
development of transport infrastructure highlighting the importance of
trilateral cooperation to enhance rail, road and air connectivity. The
Pakistan-Turkey-Azerbaijan trilateral cooperation officially was launched
in November 2017 when Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Elmar
Mammadyarov held a meeting with his counterparts from Turkey and
Pakistan, Mevlut Cavusoglu and Muhammad Asif, in Baku. A unique
feature of the relationship is the strong support extended to each other
on issues of mutual interest.
INDIA ’S D ILEMMA ON THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH W AR
India has good relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. India
recognized Azerbaijan as an independent country on December 26, 1991,
soon after it proclaimed its independence from the USSR formally in
October 1991. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were
established soon thereafter on February 28, 1992.
India’s Voting at UNGA: The position taken by the Government of

India on Karabakh during a session of UNGA in 2008 certainty
disappointed the Azerbaijan government. The United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 62/243, titled “The Situation in the Occupied
Territories of Azerbaijan”, is a resolution on the situation in Nagorno-
Karabakh, which was adopted on March 14, 2008, at the 62 nd session
of the General Assembly. It became the fifth United Nations document
concerning Nagorno-Karabakh and the first UNGA document on it. The
resolution placed by Azerbaijan states, “The General Assembly demanded
the withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all occupied territories of
the Republic of Azerbaijan. In this regard, Azerbaijan would like to
recall United Nations Security Council resolution 822 (1993), paragraph
1; resolution 853 (1993), paragraph 3; resolution 874 (1993), paragraph
5; and resolution 884 (1993), paragraph 4; demanding immediate
withdrawal of all occupying forces from the occupied areas of Azerbaijan
and remind that the provisions of the said General Assembly resolution
are still being ignored by the Republic of Armenia.” By a recorded vote
of 39 in favour to 7 against (Angola, Armenia, France, India, Russian
Federation, United States, Vanuatu), with 100 abstentions, the Assembly
also reaffirmed the inalienable right of the Azerbaijani population to
return to their homes and reaffirmed that no State should recognize as

lawful the situation resulting from the occupation of Azerbaijan’s

territories, or render assistance in maintaining that situation.
Concerning this voting, Azerbaijan’s Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Ambassador in India Tamerlan Garayev noted that, “Sad moment was
observed in our relations, when India voted against the resolution during
discussion of the UN General Assembly’s resolution ‘On the situation in
Azerbaijan’s occupied territories’, initiated by Azerbaijan in March 2008.
This caused serious concern of the Azerbaijani side.” On the other hand,
Shashi Tharoor who served as the United Nations Under-Secretary-
General for Communications and Public Information and as a former
Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs argued, that “India
attempts to maintain good relations with all countries. We did not think
this particular resolution would serve a useful purpose. But we would
wish to separate our basic relationship from the language of any specific
resolution.”
The Indian government has remained neutral in the war between

Armenia and Azerbaijan. During the recent Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict,
the Indian government in a Press Statement on October 01, 2020,
noted that: “India is concerned over this situation which threatens
regional peace and security. We reiterate the need for the sides to
cease hostilities immediately, keep restraint and take all possible steps
to maintain peace at the border. India believes that any lasting resolution
of the conflict can only be achieved peacefully through diplomatic
negotiations. In this regard, we support OSCE Minsk Group’s continued
efforts for a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan.”
Achal Malhotra, India’s former Ambassador to Armenia and Georgia,

argued that, “At the same time it is difficult for India to publicly endorse
Nagorno-Karabakh’s right for self-determination because of the possible
repercussions it can have for India as its adversaries may misuse it not

Manabhanjan Meher
only by making erroneous connections with Kashmir but also re-ignite

secessionist movement in certain parts of India.” Under these
circumstances, India has adopted a balanced and neutral approach and
taken a politically correct decision.
Ambassador Malhotra brought out that “India does not have a publicly
articulated policy for the South Caucasus — unlike “Neighbourhood
First”, “Act East” or “Central Asia Connect”. The region has remained
on the periphery of its foreign policy radar.” The Indian government
has never moved beyond cultural exchanges and trade relations and
has been lagging Pakistan in this aspect. Based on a shared cultural and
civilizational past, India should diversify and expand close cooperation
in political and diplomatic fronts with Azerbaijan in various international
forums.
CONCLUSION
The collapse of the Soviet Union gave rise to many territorial problems
in former Soviet space, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict being one of
among them. The recent Russian-led peace deal between Azerbaijan
and Armenia has redrawn the map of the South Caucasus. On the other
hand, based on their religious beliefs, and shared ethnic and linguistic
heritage, Turkey played a critical role in Azerbaijan’s victory over
Armenia.
In 2019, weeks after India scrapped Article 370 of the state of Jammu
and Kashmir, it was not only Turkish President Erdogan and Malaysian
Prime Minister Mahathir who had raised the issue of Kashmir at the
74 th UNGA Session, but also Azerbaijan. They had criticized the
international community for failing to address the Kashmir conflict and
asked the Indian Government to work with Pakistan to resolve the
issue. However, in reply, the Indian government has told these nations
repeatedly that Kashmir is an internal matter of India.

Nevertheless, it is a great concern for India that there has been

increasingly vocal support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue on
international platforms such as UNGA, OIC and ECO. The recent
trilateral summit in Islamabad indicates that they may even go further
to help Islamabad. Hence, it is time for India to engage these nations
and diversify the bilateral relationship.
......................................................................................................................................
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr Manabhanjan Meher is Assistant Professor at the Department of

South and Central Asian Studies, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda.
His research interests include society, politics and ethnic conflicts in
post-Soviet republics and Afghanistan. His research has mainly focused
on foreign policy and security issues including CIS, SCO, CSTO and
EAEU.
**************************

Shubhra Sanyal
AGNI pp 122-137
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF HOME GROWN TERRORISM
BY
SHUBHRA SANYAL
W
e are witnessing a constant and continuous disagreement
and disenchantment by small groups of people who believe
in challenging government policies, indulging in violence,
creating riots based on class or creed, attempting to mislead and
indoctrinate young minds who then become rebels and join these
groups. They spread uneasiness and a sense of distrust in the social
system of the country, where the differences are of such a magnitude
that to bring the whole nation under the same roof is a herculean
task, and which has been beyond the comprehension of many parties
and governments at the Centre.
The social system of a country is the base and the centre of growth,
acting as a mirror for the development of the nation and its people.
When a feeling of unrest, dissatisfaction, and the ire of being ignored
spreads from one individual to more people in a similar situation, it
gradually transgresses to bigger groups having a ripple effect on whole
sections of society.
Experts believe that there are many definitions of domestic terrorism,

but none of them is universally accepted. In the United States, there
is no Federal criminal offence designated as ‘domestic terrorism’. In
the USA it is considered as a “premeditated, politically motivated
violence against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or
domestic agents usually intended to influence an audience.”
In India, such disturbances created by small groups and factions against

the majority are witnessed frequently and are successful in unsettling

the harmony of the country. Home-grown terrorists pose a challenge

to Indian law enforcement and intelligence agencies because identifying
an individual who is being radicalized is hard to detect, especially in
the initial stages. The persons undergoing radicalization appear as
ordinary citizens and are not yet under police purview, and the majority
have never been arrested for any unlawful activity. To face these
threats and new challenges it is obvious that India must craft new
tactics, create new organizations and formulate fresh performance
guidelines.
The riots and violence need to be controlled with a firm hand and for
this, the security and paramilitary forces work in coordination, but
the consequences are not to the satisfaction of both parties. Bloodshed
and loss of lives cast a shadow of gloom and unhappiness, particularly
for the family which becomes a direct victim of terror. Waging a war
on terror is not an easy task, and the government must think of
alternative options as to how to maintain peace and harmony in the
mainland and win the trust and loyalty of young minds that are the
main force behind terror groups.
What if we can provide the youth of J&K and states of the North-
Eastern regions reason to progress and grow with their counterparts
in the rest of the country by providing them equal opportunities in
jobs, education and other facilities; the disgruntled groups creating
terror will then weaken in strength, and in their ideologies. Positive
changes are remarkably visible after the abrogation of Article 370 in
Jammu and Kashmir. A sharp decline is noticed in the youth joining
militancy and incidents related to terrorism.
A country on the path of development needs to have a fool-proof plan

to progress uniformly across all states and regions, enjoying equal
resources of income, education and skill development. Only then we
can call ourselves a developed nation.
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF H OME -GROWN TERRORISM
The term home-grown terrorism has gained wide currency in the

literature on terrorism but wide disagreement over its defining
characteristics leaves scholars groping for a universally acceptable
definition of the phenomenon. Important questions need to be discussed

Shubhra Sanyal
and settled before explaining why a sudden wake-up call is given by a

section of the people who take the law in their hands, organize riots,
create terror in which innocent lives are lost and the social fabric gets
disturbed. We need to understand the psyche of the people who challenge
the functioning of the government, develop their ideology and modus
operandi to express their dissatisfaction, dissent and despair by
spreading terror. It is important to take stock of these individuals,
their age, their level of intelligence and their personality characteristics,
which make them different from the rest.
The social system of a country is the baseline and the centre of growth,
and it acts as a mirror for the development of the nation and its people.
In asymmetric social development unrest, dissatisfaction and people’s
ire arising from a perception of being ignored have the unwelcome
potential of building into discontent involving a larger section of society.
Finally, it leads to turbulence, creating not only a divide between regions
and communities but also disrupting social harmony.
The development process is an uphill task for a country like India,

which is beset with obstructive and outdated customs and traditions,
where a large population stay in villages and in rural areas, where
society is divided along class, caste, religious and regional lines, where
every forty miles the language changes, and where rural-urban imbalance
not only persists but continues to grow incessantly. Consequently, this
creates chasms fostering internal turbulence, insurgencies and social
conflicts. We can refer here to what Nobel laureate Prof Amartya Sen
has to say in his article on Development as Capability Expansion. While
discussing progress and growth, Sen says that often we move away
with a misleading concept of progress and prosperity with a subjective
perspective of an individual’s mental condition such as pleasure,
happiness and desire fulfilment, since it fails to reflect a person’s real
deprivation. Sen explains that a thoroughly deprived person leading a
very reduced life might not appear very badly off in terms of the mental
metric of utility because he becomes immune to long-standing deprivation
and learns not only to live with it but also derives pleasures in small
mercies. However, it cannot be ignored that a level of tolerance exists
in the mental state of the person and the moment he becomes aware
of his new needs he resents and fights for his space in society.

People then move away from the mainstream and behave differently,
adopt every means to express their dissatisfaction and rebel against
the existing social norms. They feel that they have been denied the
right to a progressive and prosperous existence, and therefore take to
violence for seeking the attention of the powers-that-be towards their
resentment. Amid this turmoil, social harmony is lost, many lose their
lives, and the economy of the region and the country receives a severe
blow. Children living in a gnawing feeling of rejection and social isolation
grow up to nurture hatred and defiance against authority or social norms
and adopt a criminal career as their goal and means of livelihood.
Discussing the lines of social gaps which are disrupting harmony and
the healthy growth of the country, issues like caste and class divide
need to be projected first. James Heizman and Robert L. Wooden mention
in their study on Caste & Class (1995), that perhaps nowhere else in
the world has inequality been so elaborately constructed as in the Indian
institution of caste. That is an over-reaction and social systems competing
in brutalities with the caste system, and even surpassing it, are not
difficult to find in the history of nations, like, for example, the Black
Lives Matter movement currently raging across the US. However, even
though caste has been deliberately made the infamous and hated culprit,
it requires to be addressed.
The resulting simmering uneasiness, if not contained, explodes into all

forms of social turbulence ranging from class and caste fights, communal
riots, internal turbulence fostering insurgency and separatist attitude
among people in the country. Regional divide further promotes
polarization feeding separatism. These are the consequences of an unequal
distribution of growth, wealth and prosperity; thereafter these gaps,
differences, inequality, become factors that contribute to social
dysfunction and major causes of crimes.
It is said by experts that there are many definitions of home-grown

terrorism but none of them is universally accepted. In the United States,
there is no Federal criminal offence designated as ‘domestic terrorism’.
In the USA it is considered as a “premeditated, politically motivated
violence against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or
domestic agents usually intended to influence an audience.”
There is no doubt that besides the government and the security forces
expressing concern about unforeseen and uncertain sporadic attacks
Shubhra Sanyal
and violence by a specific group of people, the common man also feels
insecure and worries about his safety. As R Bhanukrishnakiran (2012)
observes, home-grown terrorists pose a great challenge to Indian law
enforcement and intelligence agencies because identifying an individual
being radicalized is hard to detect, especially in the initial stages. He
states that persons undergoing radicalization appear as ordinary citizens
and are not under any police purview since the majority have never
been arrested for any unlawful activity. To tackle these threats and
challenges it is obvious that India must craft new tactics, create new
organizations and formulate fresh performance guidelines.
The threat created by indefinable and asymmetrical adversaries

emphasizes the need to reduce the interval between detecting irregular
adversarial activity and rapidly eliminating it. The efficiency of the
Indian strategy will be based on its ability to think like the enemy in
predicting how the terror groups, coupled with religion, operate in an
array of situations, supported by internal and external sources.
A similar view is expressed by Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar that an Indian

response to domestic terrorism needs to reckon with some of its
structural inadequacies to evolve an effective strategy. Primary among
these is the psyche of a multi-ethnic society that is vulnerable to
exploitation by terror elements, which is further accentuated by disparate
economic development in which poverty-stricken youth are often hired
to fight a war they have little to gain from. To challenge this, what is
urgently needed is the appreciation of the fact that in the fight or war
on terror, the society has a more fundamental responsibility to discharge
than just declaring, and on occasions paying tributes to, soldiers felled
by the stealthy sniper’s bullet. It must get involved beyond the point
of no return.
In this article, an attempt has been made to examine the similarities

and prominent characteristics present in home-grown terrorism and
cross-border terrorism. A common element in both is to create terror
and chaos to disrupt the social functioning, security and economy of the
country. Terrorism is a real threat to all nations in the world. Wherever
there are different groups of people, there will be conflicting ideas.
Some of the differences in opinions and beliefs lead radicals to turn to
terrorism, to push their ideas onto others and to send a message that
results in the death or injury of many. While this tactic is frowned upon

by society, it is all too real a danger to ignore. The human cost that
results from terrorist acts are horrifying and the economic impact that
follows can be almost as devastating.
It is often discussed that there is a definite link between the flow of

migrants and the sudden rise in home-grown terrorism. A report
presented in this regard says that due to its trans-border and trans-
national characteristics, international terrorism has come to be seen as
increasingly linked to international migration. There is anecdotal evidence
that immigration might heighten the risk of terrorism. Islamic State
militants planned the November 2015 attacks in Paris from Raqqa´s
stronghold in Syria (AP 2015). The possibility was expressed that at
least one assailant may have entered Europe with the wave of Syrian
refugees. The same group that was involved in the planning and
organization of those attacks also planned the three March 22, 2016,
coordinated suicide bombings that occurred in Brussels – two at the
Zaventem airport, and one at Maalbeek metro station in central Brussels.
Domestic terrorists differ from international terrorists in two critical

ways that vex law enforcement efforts to preempt violence. First,
domestic terrorists, for the most part, don’t operate as physical, named
groups in the way al-Qaeda or the Islamic State have in an international
terrorism context. America’s law enforcement presence and the
operational opportunities of virtual networking result in sub-surface,
distributed networks of domestic terrorists motivated by common violent
ideology, but they generally lack a defined organizational structure or
physical base for their operations.
Secondly, law enforcement pursues domestic terrorists using rules and

laws separate from those employed for international terrorists.
Investigators must pass higher thresholds to initiate investigations and
they have fewer tools and resources at their disposal. In sum, domestic
counterterrorism remains a reactive affair, in which investigators respond
to violent massacres and then pursue criminal cases. Clint Watts in his
report says that with domestic terrorism, threat knowledge comes
anecdotally from the experience of the most seasoned investigators.
Few, if any, personnel and resources are dedicated to establishing a
collective picture of which violent ideologies perpetrate violence, why
they do it, and how they overlap. Indicators of mobilization to violence
are largely unknown or undefined. However, we have extensive data

Shubhra Sanyal
about past perpetrators of violence that we could analyze and use new
technology tools for understanding terrorist sentiment, associations and
mobilization.
According to Clint, home-grown terrorists, at times, appear to be lonely,

but they are not alone in their motivations, and their connections extend
beyond borders. Over the last decade, the government has been worried
about global networking, state sponsorship, and the facilitation of jihadist
terrorism. Today, he said, we should worry equally about foreign
connections and influences on domestic terrorist threats. The social
media posts and manifestos of recent domestic attackers point to
international inspiration and global connections of violent ideologies. A
new concern in recent times for India is the Popular Front of India
(PFI) and its links with Turkey and Al-Qaida. For its activities, the
organization is under close watch by NIA and IB of the country.
These connections extend beyond the internet, leading to physical

movement across international boundaries to attend training or to
execute attacks. Referring to Sweden, he said that two of the three
bombers from the Nordic Resistance Movement received military
training in Russia before returning home to carry out the attacks.
Similarly, the Christchurch mosque attacker was not from New Zealand,
but from Australia.
Terrorism in any form has a definite psychodynamic impact on the

country from where it originates, spreading to neighbouring countries
and endangering their internal harmony and security. No doubt, the
affected government becomes alert and vigilant. A threat of infiltration
becomes an issue for the security forces on the border. Bilateral talks
begin, as usual, between the countries affected, borders get sealed, yet
the dissenting group residing in the country get motivated to recreate
their terror tactics and conduct a new series of activities, which sends
an alarm bell through society.
Throughout history, mankind has seen two ways of bringing about change
– rational discussion and dramatic violent action. Men and women driven
by moral, psychological and cultural perceptions often become impatient
with political processes and the speed at which the wheels of government
turn. Humans, it seems, are blessed with the “gift” of perceiving utopia
– a clear vision of a better world. The implementation of these Utopian

visions has, through the centuries, involved strange combinations of

violent action and peaceful, but painfully slow, political action. Although
humans possess the utopian vision, they often do not possess the patience
or the ability to manage the mechanisms of government to their
advantage. Thus, the terrorist finds opportunities to act. Imperfect
governments call out to the to-be terrorist to choose a more violent
course of action. Another fact history tells is that most terrorist plots
fail and that generally, such failure sets back the cause which was being
so promoted.
If we move from the macro to the micro level of perception and study
home-grown terrorism, we will find unseen links between domestic unrest
and the impact of trans-border violence, terror and war of hate. While
there are many potential definitions of domestic terrorism, it is largely
defined as terrorism in which the perpetrator targets his/her own
country. This is an established and accepted definition of this type of
micro warfare. The term “home-grown terrorism” stems from jihadi
terrorism against Westerners. Wilner and Dobouloz described home-
grown terrorism as “autonomously organized radicalized Westerners
with little direct assistance from transnational networks, usually
organized within the home or host country, and target fellow nationals.”
Home-grown terrorism is not new to the world. Security analysts have

argued that after the end of the Cold War, military conflicts have
increasingly involved violent non-state actors carrying out asymmetric
warfare. The United States has uncovered several alleged terrorist plots
that have been successfully suppressed through domestic intelligence
and law enforcement. Instances of home-grown terrorism, or now named
domestic terrorism, have been experienced by several countries. Mathiu
Guidere said in an interview that homegrown terrorism has both
psychological and ideological motives. The psychological motive is related
to something being wronged, done against something or someone, and
ideological motive is related to hegemony. When one country or one
group feels edged out because of the power and strength of another
country, then proxy terrorism emerges, and a link graduates between
trans-border terrorism and home-grown terrorism; for example, he
mentioned, India versus Pakistan, the USA versus Egypt, and France
against Algeria.

Shubhra Sanyal
The shift is from a direct but simple form of violence to a complicated

and sophisticated pattern of terrorism. The recruits carrying out the
task are well educated and can easily assimilate with the common man
on the road. The target is no longer a specific one. The only goal is to
destabilize the social and financial integrity of the country. Trans-border
terrorism has become a major concern for a nation. A creeping fear and
an uncanny sense of insecurity haunts the minds of one and all. The
brutal effect of a bomb blast leaves its mark on society.
India, as mentioned earlier, has been a continuous victim of domestic

terrorism under the garb of caste, creed, religion, fanaticism,
communalism and religion. According to Indian intelligence sources, 800
terror modules are operating in India at present. These groups
systematically try to develop their ideological motivation, operational
capabilities, safe houses and strategic capabilities – propaganda,
recruitment, funding and procurement of weapons – essential for
conducting terrorist strikes inside India. According to the Ministry of
Home Affairs Annual Report 2011-2012, as many as 60 terror modules
and a major IM module were busted by Indian security agencies.
However, by apprehending or busting some cells, the Indian government

may disrupt an operation, but it may not be successful in preventing
the next targeted attack. Even if one cell operative is arrested, another
cell operative carries the knowledge and experience forward, improving
and advancing the terrorists’ interests. The home-grown terrorist groups
(e.g. IM) are learning and continuously evolving organizations. Any action
by Indian security agencies, whether successful or failed, demonstrates
a continuing level of threat. Terrorist groups adhere to and persuade
their members to stick to the ‘lose and learn’ doctrine.
Despite being India’s most hunted terrorist group, IM has been able to
survive and succeed under different and difficult circumstances only by
learning faster than the security agencies. During their protracted battle
against the government, the terrorist groups know that they will suffer
personnel and infrastructure losses. As there is an inherent risk involved
in planning, preparing and executing terror activities, terror groups
like IM are showing improved tactics in selecting safe houses, recruitment
and planting bombs. For instance, the police always finds it difficult to
identify the bomber in many blasts as the IM always uses paid people,
especially migrant labourers, who are not even remotely connected with

the terror cell and who have neither specific records like voter card,
ration card etc. nor they are on police records, to carry out these attacks.
Likewise, IM has preferred Bihar as a good recruitment place for
operatives, chosen from amongst illegal immigrants and unemployed
youth from extremely poor families, and for safe hideouts to store arms
and ammunition.
Besides IM and other Islamic factions who are not happy with
government policies, or feel marginalized and readily join separatists,
there are Sikh terrorist outfits even today lying low but present in
Punjab and who make sporadic attacks or create terror.
Another concept that is rapidly becoming popular in the public domain

in India is “Urban Mafia.” Sources in the security establishment add
that the CPI (Maoist) give immense importance to its ‘urban movement,’
not just for leadership, but for providing supplies, technology, expertise,
information, logistic support and favourable press/media through
overground activists. The 2004 Maoist document gives more clarity on
this issue. It explains that the focus must be on organizing the working
class, which is “the leadership of our revolution”. And that: “It is the
task of the party in the urban areas to mobilize and organize the
proletariat in performing its crucial leadership role,” the document reads.
Besides, the focus of the Maoists’ urban network is to organize the
masses, including the working class, students, middle-class employees,
intellectuals, women, Dalits and religious minorities. It explains the need
to create front organizations for extending the reach of the organization.
Further, the urban movement engages in sending cadre to the
countryside, supplying arms and ammunition, infiltrating enemy ranks
and carrying out acts of sabotage.
Their movement, no doubt, cannot be underestimated. A FICCI report

says that the Maoist movements are overtaking all other insurgencies
in the country based on certain parameters such as geographical spread,
the extent of fatalities and in terms of coercion Maoists are capable of
exerting on the village people, the reason being their poverty, ignorance,
illiteracy and backwardness.
A closer scrutiny will show that Maoists labelled as Urban Mafia are
groups who are different in their motives, ideologies and modus operandi,
in expressing their discontent and anger towards the policies of the

Shubhra Sanyal
government and its administration but they do not directly indulge in

bomb blasts or killing innocent people; they only provide cover to the
ground-level activists. Besides, the members of such groups, unlike other
outfits, are intelligent, educated, highly sociable and respected
professionals from various fields who venture out under the garb of
purportedly emancipating the downtrodden and the underprivileged.
If we analyze the situation in Kashmir, the security forces are more

concerned about the prospect of home-grown terrorist outfits. According
to a report by the Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society, a federation
of human rights organizations, 217 militants were killed in the state in
2017, the highest in the past eight years. Of these, 84 were Kashmiris,
28 were foreigners and the rest unidentified. In his report, Pradip R.
Sagar mentions a comment by Lt Gen HS Panag, who was the General
Officer Commanding of the Northern and Central Commands of the
Army. He said the religious motivation was a reason for the growing
troubles in the valley, “Public sentiments are not in favour of the Indian
establishment. Successive governments have failed to provide
alternatives to Kashmiri youth and no efforts were made to reach out
to them by the political leadership. All these factors have led to a rise
in militancy, especially teenagers taking up arms against the security
forces. I would say the state of Jammu and Kashmir has reached the
level of Palestine, where youth are well motivated to blow themselves
in the name of religion.”
It must, however, be noted that the removal of Article 370 in 2019 has
brought about a spectacular change in the region of Jammu and Kashmir,
not only in the minds of the people and the youth but also in an erosion
of the feeling of dissatisfaction, escalating unrest, tension and terrorism.
The first time that Jammu & Kashmir sent elected members to the Lok
Sabha was in 1967. Elections were not held in 1990 in Jammu and
Kashmir due to insurgency in the region. The recent successful election
of local bodies in 2020 after the removal of Article 370 reflects the
positive change on the ground. Since the abrogation of Article 370,
there has been a sharp decline in youth joining terrorist groups by 40
per cent. The number of youths who joined militancy fell to 67 between
January 1 and July 1 in 2020, compared to 105 a year ago, while
terrorists related incidents declined to 120 from 188 during this period,
according to data.

Many questions arise as to what the characteristics of the people are

who join the so-called outlawed groups, what is their psyche, what are
their personality profiles, to what extent they are motivated to delineate
themselves from the mainstream, leave their homeland, become suicide
bombers or move away to join outfits like ISI, JeM and Al Qaida.
Somewhere, the feelings of people who join terror groups are similar,
only then youth from the mainland join or are influenced by leaders
from other countries to create proxy war through terror.
Therefore, our attention should accept the fact that poverty is not a
potential motivator for terrorism, rather terrorists with their activities
affect the economic stability of society. The conditions in which terrorism
flourishes are required to be studied to obtain a definite reply. We
must realize that the human condition itself will lead to ideas that
necessitate violence to achieve its goal. According to Newman (2003),
the challenge is not in preventing these ideas from materializing, but
rather to create proactive means by which we can identify and deal
forcibly with terror in its infancy before it gathers the momentum and
means to infect society.
Reflecting on the psychology or the mindset of the people who join or

participate in home-grown terror, I had mentioned in my book,
Terrorism: The Many Dimensions, that all individuals are psychologically
related to any act he or she performs, and it is driven by their perceived
attitudes and beliefs acquired from the environment where they belong.
While one chooses to be the victimizer, the other section in the same
vicinity becomes the known or unknown victim. In the meantime, two
other groups i.e., the masses and the government are both affected by
the terror war and become judgmental in their approach. Their critical
evaluation or condemnation drives the government to formulate policies
to combat the terror. Thus, to understand this war on terror, the act
must be understood by segregating each player in the drama and
studying the psychological dynamics respectively.
It has proved futile to typecast terrorists into one personality trait.

While a few may display psychopathic behaviour, others are motivated
by ideologies. Horgan explained that the terrorist must be viewed from
another angle as a complex and dynamic process. The focus must shift
to the vulnerabilities which motivate them or act as mechanisms to
commit terror. Some of these vulnerabilities have been commonly

Shubhra Sanyal
identified as frustration, distress seeking identity, and the feeling of

belonging to a particular religious group. I fully believe in this newfound
concept that instead of labelling a terrorist as abnormal or psychopathic,
we must relate them with possible proactive dynamics, which make
them vulnerable or otherwise motivated to join a terrorist group.
The need for belongingness is significant in determining a person’s

emotional growth. “Who am I and where do I belong” upholds his sense
of identity, which goes a long way in deciding the route he chooses to
adopt for any action. Crenshaw (1988) argues that for the individuals
who become active terrorists, the initial attraction is often to the group,
or community of believers, rather than to an abstract ideology or
violence. Besides, we all will agree that the pattern of terrorism is
regularly changing, as is the character of the terrorist. The ground
reality is that many researchers have begun to distinguish between
reasons for joining, remaining in, and leaving terrorist organizations;
finding that motivations may be different at each stage, and not even
necessarily related to each other.
Referring to the earlier unrest and sporadic attacks on army camps

and paramilitary forces, military experts said that most of the boys
who were suspected to have joined militancy belonged to middle-class
families. Posting videos on social media flashing Kalashnikovs, these
young men emerged as the new face of terrorism in the valley. “It can
be considered a success for the JeM,” said Khurram Parvej, who works
for Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society. “The terror outfit had
not been getting the support of the Kashmiri people. Now it is producing
suicide bombers.”
The report further unravels that the ISI has changed its strategy and
is no longer spending money on training and logistics of terrorists. “The
ISI has adopted a strategy of recruiting young local militants, as they
come cheap. And they train them only to become suicide attackers. It
does not require training and other logistics,” said a Military Intelligence
officer. The ISI has stopped holding training camps for new recruits
from Kashmir in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. “Suicide attackers are not
battle-hardened militants,” said Panag. “They can make maximum
damage by indiscriminately firing on security forces. With this new
trend of no specialized training, the ISI does not need a Rs 100-crore
annual budget to run insurgency in Kashmir valley.” However, the

scenario after the abrogation of Article 370 has changed, though there
is still a long way to go for government agencies.
Terrorism can bring an economy to its knees because of fear. Businesses

may be afraid to operate normally because of the fear of another attack.
Increased costs on security measures can cause companies to fall on
economically hard times, ultimately decreasing the value of their stocks
and hurting shareholders. One such example of this phenomenon is the
resulting collapse of small or floundering airlines after the September
11th attacks in the US in 2001.
Fear can often lead to erratic stock market behaviour. Those that play
the stock market are looking for predictability and a terrorist attack
provides anything but a stable market. In Jammu & Kashmir, India has
constantly experienced frequent setbacks in tourism, export/import of
priceless and indigenous products like Pashmina shawls, carpets and
the famous apples whenever there is turbulence and proxy war in the
valley.
Unfortunately, this occurs not just occasionally, it happens often in a

planned manner when the tourism season attracts travelers from
different parts of the world. The security agencies no doubt become
extra vigilant during the period, but the underlying threat created by
cross-border terrorist attacks from neighbouring countries like Pakistan
brings everything to a standstill. While it is a great loss for the traders
and the government, it is a definite subversive gain for the groups who
intend to create a feeling of separatism and communal divide in the
country.
If we view holistically, home-grown terrorism not only affects the

economic platform, but it also helps in abetting a sense of “I” feeling in
the minds of youngsters of the minority community, fanned by
destructive media narratives with questions such as – how secure am
I in this country? how am I perceived by people of the majority
community? and, what is my identity? The symbol of Oneness in the
neighbourhood disappears no sooner than Muslim fundamentalists come
out in the open and call for strikes and riots. Trust gives place to distrust,

Shubhra Sanyal
and a sense of loss of a feeling of harmony pervades across the

community. A sharp divide takes place, and political leaders of different
communities further propagate their opinions and emotional aggression.
The role of the media in this process further deteriorates the scenario.
This is enough to destroy the unity and tranquillity of the country.
To maintain harmony and integrity, the need of the hour is to ponder

as to how the Government must follow strategies and policies, not only
to satisfy the rebels but also to curb and control them from causing
further damage and disunity in the country. What is necessary for the
government at the Centre is to have regular meetings with the state
government and apprise them of its policies to combat the increasing
discontent and rebellious mood of some sections of people in the state.
However, it is a known fact that the politics of a state is often seen
involved directly or indirectly in instigating the mood of the rebelliousness
of the masses for political gains.
The government needs to obtain a holistic and practical view of the

sudden tremors of unrest and riots organized by some factions of the
population who are not only disturbing the integrity and image of the
country but also challenging the Constitution of India. For this, the
issues of inequality and discrimination expressed by the rebels are to
be addressed, and adequately publicized, thereby mitigating the cause
of discontent and dissatisfaction. All parties need to be called to a common
table and their ideologies, such as those of Naxalites and Maoists and
other outfits, are cohesively given attention. It is, however, a known
fact that despite the government always trying to get various outfits to
the discussion table, many of them are not inclined to take up the offer
for various reasons and external factors.
The focus is to bring the youngsters who are joining these groups to get
on the path of progress by uplifting their status of education, providing
them jobs, improving their financial condition, and thereafter bringing
them into the mainstream of society. When the youth is satisfied in
their mind, they are likely to spend less time in violence or riots.
However, as mentioned earlier, many terrorists are well-to-do educated
people.

Thus, in conclusion, it can be said that keeping the psychodynamics of

the so-called home-grown terrorism in mind, there can be two forms of
war on terror, (a) force and fear, or (b) love and harmony. Or the use
of a mix of the two.
......................................................................................................................................
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
SHUBHRA SANYAL is former Senior reader NICFS (MHA), consultant

UVCT and research fellow of the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund.
**************************

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VOL. XXIV, No.

I JANUARY 2021 - APRIL 2021

AMB KANWAL SIBAL

VICE ADMIRAL PRADEEP CHAUHAN, AVSM & BAR, VSM, IN (RETD)

AMB KANWAL SIBAL

EDITOR: BRIGADIER AMRESHWAR PRATAP SINGH, SM & BAR, VSM (RETD)

Tel: +91 (0)11- 25720334 (Office)

VOL. XXIV, NO. I JANUARY 2021 - APRIL 2021

INDIA EMERGES AS A ROADBLOCK IN CHINA’S

INDIA’S FAILED DIPLOMATIC AND STRATEGIC

THE IMPORTANCE OF LEARNING TIBETAN CIVILIZATION AND HISTORY

TURKEY – THE TEMPESTS AHEAD

SECURITY CHALLENGES AND MANAGEMENT OF

THE SECOND NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR:

PSYCHODYNAMICS OF HOME-GROWN TERRORISM

Ramtanu Maitra in his article India Emerges as a Roadblock in China’s March to

Brigadier Amreshwar Pratap Singh (Retd)

INDIA EMERGES AS A ROADBLOCK IN CHINA’S MARCH TO THE PERSIAN GULF

The 2017 stand-off at Doklam – the tri-junction of India, China and

of Ladakh in May 2020 indicates that Beijing chose to remain in a state

CHINA ’ S D IPLOMATIC D ECEPTIONS

A month later, in May 2018, China’s Ambassador to India Luo Zhaohui

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take measures to enhance border security, an assurance that turned

One other apparent bit of Chinese deception centered on Kashmir.

Further, on August 6, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua

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Tellis noted that Chinese activity in Ladakh centered on bringing “new

Resisted and subsequently pushed back by Indian troops in the Pangong

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TELL-TALE SIGNS FROM THE PAST

The Doklam stand-off and subsequent violent activities by the PLA in

Deng’s tactic to keep India unsuspecting of China’s real intent was on

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Not only was the promise of a “strategic and cooperative partnership”

WHAT PROMPTS CHINA TO BE AGGRESSIVE IN EASTERN L ADAKH

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subsequently,” Rajnath Singh said. (India, China begin troop withdrawal

As of this writing, no such agreement has been reached in the Depsang

According to Sarosh Bana, writing for the Begin-Sadat Center for

According to Henry Boyd and Meia Nouwens of Britain’s International

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the frontline, but with regular manoeuver formations deployed further

CHINA ACTING TO SERVE ITS ALLY, PAKISTAN

Beyond the determined pursuit to expand its security perimeter, there

This project later named the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),

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Once a small fishing village, Gwadar is now part of Beijing’s grandiose

WHY PAKISTAN WELCOMES A CHINESE P RESENCE ON ITS SOIL

Second, China plans to set up a major Chinese colony within Gwadar to

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The establishment of a large China-operated port with a Chinese naval

CHINA ’ S I NTEREST IN PAKISTAN I S N OT N EW

China’s interest in Pakistan is huge and has been long-standing,

During the past years of bonhomie – “friendship higher than the

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The Sino-Pakistani bilateral relationship was put on an altogether

It is widely acknowledged that Pakistan wants the Afghan Taliban, who

WHY LADAKH NOW?

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Ladakh a Union Territory. Pakistan screamed, and Imran Khan sent

From Beijing’s perspective, any Indian attempt to take over PoK or

ARE I NDIA -CHINA RELATIONS BEYOND REPAIR?