G.R. No.
149114             July 21, 2006 peaceful, in the concept of an owner, continuous and
SPS. TAN SING PAN and MAGDALENA
VERANGA, petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
Decision1 dated February 23, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 55325, as reiterated in
its Resolution2 of July 20, 2001, reversing an earlier
decision of the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
of Atimonan-Plaridel, Quezon, acting as a special land
registration court, which confirmed petitioners' title to Lot
No. 18009 in Cadastral Case No. 67, LRC GLRO Rec.
No. 1026.
The facts:
Sometime in 1931, the Director of Lands, acting for and
in behalf of the Government, instituted with the then
Court of First Instance of Gumaca, Quezon (now Branch
61, Regional Trial Court, Gumaca, Quezon) Cadastral
Case No. 67, LRC GLRO Rec. No. 1026 pursuant to the
government's initiative to place all lands under the
Cadastral System whereby titles for all lands within a
stated area are adjudicated regardless of whether or not
people living within the area desire to have titles.
More than six (6) decades later, or more specifically on
October 14, 1996, herein petitioners – the spouses Tan
Sing Pan and Magdalena S. Veranga – filed their
Answer in Cadastral Case No. 67 over which jurisdiction
was assumed by the 7th MCTC of Atimonan-Plaridel,
Quezon, acting as a special land registration court by
virtue of Supreme Court (SC) Administrative Circular No.
6-93-4 dated November 15, 1995 which was issued
pursuant to Section 34 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as
amended, and SC en banc Resolution dated March 25,
1993 in Administrative Matter No. 93-3-488-0.
In their Answer, petitioners asserted ownership over Lot
No. 18009 (formerly Lot No. 1027-A of the Subd. Plan
Csd-04-015150 of the Atimonan Cadastre) with an area
of 565 square meters, more or less, and located at
Barangay Rizal, Atimonan, Quezon. Petitioners averred
that they acquired the lot in question pursuant to a deed
of sale executed in their favor on July 10, 1978 by the
children of the late Juan Laude who, in turn, inherited the
property from his own deceased father, Leon Laude, the
original claimant thereof. Petitioners alleged that they
have been in possession of the lot for about eighteen
(18) years from the time they purchased it from their
predecessors-in-interest, have paid the realty taxes due
thereon, and that their possession thereof was public,
against the world. Tacking their possession to that of
S. their predecessors-in-interest, petitioners claimed that
they have been in possession of the subject lot for
almost 60 years now.
On October 14, 1996, the 7th MCTC of Atimonan-
Plaridel issued an Order admitting petitioners'
aforementioned Answer, setting it for hearing and
directing the posting of said Order in conspicuous
places. It also directed the notification of all interested
parties. Following the issuance by the branch clerk of
court of a Certification to the effect that the Order had
been posted, the trial court, noting that no opposition
was filed, allowed petitioners to present their
evidence ex parte in the course of which petitioner
Magdalena Veranga testified having complied with all the
jurisdictional requirements by sending notices to all
interested parties thru registered mail.3
On November 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its
decision4 confirming petitioners' title over Lot No. 18009
and directing the issuance of a decree of registration in
their favor, to wit:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves Subdivision
Plan Csd-04-015150 together with its technical
description insofar as Lot No. 1027-A now equals to Lot
No. 18009 of the Atimonan Cadastre is concerned, and
confirming the order of general default previously
entered in this case, all the requirements of the law
having been complied with, this Court hereby
adjudicates Lot No. 18009 before Lot No. 1027-A of
Subdivision Plan Csd-04-015150 of the Atimonan
Cadastre, together with the improvements existing
thereon, in favor of movants-claimants spouses TAN
SING PAN and MAGDALENA VERANGA, both of legal
age, Filipino citizens, and residents of Atimonan,
Quezon, as their conjugal partnership property, free from
liens and encumbrances.
The road, highways, streets, alleys, water courses and
other portions of land not specified as lot located within
the border of the land covered by this case are declared
property of the Republic of the Philippines.
Upon this decision becoming final, let a decree of
confirmation and registration be entered and thereafter
upon payment of the fees required by law, let the
corresponding certificate of title be issued in the name of
the movants-claimants.
SO ORDERED.
In time, the Republic, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, went on appeal to the CA on the sole
jurisdictional issue of whether the trial court erred in
proceeding with the hearing of the case despite
petitioners' failure to prove the publication of the Notice
of Initial Hearing in the Office Gazette.
In the herein assailed Decision dated February 23, 2001,
the CA granted the Republic's appeal and accordingly
reversed and set aside the appealed decision of the trial
court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED and the
appealed decision of the court a quo dated November
25, 1996 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by
the CA in its equally challenged Resolution of July 20,
2001, petitioners are now with this Court via the present
recourse on their principal submission that the CA
committed reversible error in ruling that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the case on account of their
failure to present proof of publication of the Notice of
Initial Hearing.
To petitioners, the jurisdictional requirement of
publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing has been
complied with way back in 1931 when the Director of
Lands, acting for and in behalf of the Government,
instituted Cadastral Case No. 67 because the present
case is merely a continuation thereof. Petitioners insist
that Cadastral Case No. 67 has long been the subject of
court proceedings even before the outbreak of the
Second World War and, consequently, all lots covered
therein have already been included in the required
publication. They also contend that the Republic cannot
raise, and is already estopped from raising, this
jurisdictional issue at this point in time when thousands
of lots have already been adjudicated by the cadastral
court without the need of publication. Petitioners hasten
to add that, since it was the Director of Lands who
initiated the cadastral proceedings, it was incumbent
upon him to show proof of publication of the Notice of
Initial Hearing.
Petitioners' arguments are specious.
To be sure, publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in
the Official Gazette is one of the essential requisites for
a court to acquire jurisdiction in land registration and
cadastral cases, and additional territory cannot be
included by amendment of the plan without new
publication.
Section 7 of the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259) provides:
Sec. 7. Upon the receipt of the order of the court setting
the time for initial hearing of the petition, the Commission
on Land Registration shall cause notice thereof to be
published twice, in successive issues of the Official
Gazette, in the English language. The notice shall be
issued by order of the Court, attested by the
Commissioner of the Land Registration Office, xxx.
In Director of Lands, et al. v. Benitez, et al.,5 the Court
categorically stated that publication is essential to
establish jurisdiction in land registration and cadastral
cases, without which the court cannot acquire jurisdiction
thereon or obtain any authority to proceed therewith.
Here, compliance with the publication requirement is
rendered even more imperative by the fact that the lot
involved was originally surveyed as Lot No. 1027 but
what was adjudicated to petitioners is a portion
designated as "Lot No. 1027-A now equal to Lot No.
18009 of the Atimonan Cadastre."6 So it is that
in Philippine Manufacturing Company v. Imperial,7 the
Court ruled:
Upon consideration of the facts above stated it is quite
obvious that the respondent judge had no jurisdiction
whatever over lot No. 40 in the cadastral case now
pending before him and the adjudication of said lot to the
Cabangis heirs by the decision of July 16, 1925, is a
mere nullity. From the agreed statement it is obvious that
no publication has ever been made except the initial
publication, and this did not include lot No. 40.
Publication of course is one of the essential bases of the
jurisdiction of the court in land registration and cadastral
cases, and the attempt that was here made to
incorporate lot No. 40 into the cadastral was futile.
Before a cadastral survey can be amended so as to
include land in which no publication has been made, new
publication is necessary, - a step essential to the
protection of persons interested in the property which is
intended to be included. But even if the order amending
the cadastral plan had not been wholly void, the facts
above revealed would justify the granting of a new trial
by this court under section 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. However, in view of want of publication, it is
only necessary here to pronounce the order of July 16,
1925, void, and a new trial is not called for.8
Cadastral proceedings, like ordinary registration
proceedings, are proceedings in rem, and are governed
by the usual rules of practice, procedure and evidence. A
cadastral decree and a certificate of title are issued only
after the applicants prove all the requisite jurisdictional
facts: that they are entitled to the claimed lot; that all
parties are heard; and that evidence is considered.
Instructive are the following pronouncements of the
Court in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abural:9
Under the Cadastral System, pursuant to initiative on the
part of the Government, titles for all the land within a
stated area, are adjudicated whether or not the people
living within this district desire to have titles issued. The
purpose, as stated in section one of the Cadastral Act
(No. 2259), is to serve the public interests, by requiring
that the titles to any lands "be settled and adjudicated."
Admitting that such compulsory registration of land and
such excessive interference with private property
constitutes due process of law and that the Acts
providing for the same are constitutional, a question not
here raised, yet a study of the law indicates that many
precautions are taken to guard against injustice. The
proceedings are initiated by a notice of survey. When the
lands have been surveyed and plotted, the Director of
Lands, represented by the Attorney General, files a
petition in court praying that the titles to the lands named
be settled and adjudicated. Notice of the filing of the
petition is then published twice in successive issues of
the Official Gazette in both the English and Spanish
languages. All persons interested are given the benefit of
assistance by competent officials and are informed of
their rights. A trial is had. "All conflicting interests shall
be adjudicated by the court and decrees awarded in
favor of the persons entitled to the lands or the various
parts thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall be the
bases of original certificates of title in favor of said
persons." (Act No. 2259, Sec. 11.) Aside from this, the
commotion caused by the survey and a trial affecting
ordinarily many people, together with the presence of
strangers in the community, should serve to put all those
affected on their guard.
After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken.
The first adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the
claimants. This constitutes the decision – the judgment –
the decree of the court, and speaks in a judicial manner.
The second action is the declaration by the court that the
decree is final and its order for the issuance of the
certificates of title by the Chief of the Land Registration
Office. Such order is made if within thirty days from the
date of receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is
taken from the decision. This again is judicial action,
although to a less degree than the first.
The third and last action devolves upon the General
Land Registration Office. This office has been instituted
"for the due effectuation and accomplishment of the laws
relative to the registration of land." (Administrative Code
of 1917, Sec. 174.) An official found in the office, known
as the chief surveyor, has as one of his duties "to
prepare final decrees in all adjudicated cases."
(Administrative Code of 1917, Sec. 177.) This latter
decree contains the technical description of the land and
may not be issued until a considerable time after the
promulgation of the judgment. The form of the decree
used by the General Land Registration Office concludes
with the words: "Witness, the Honorable (name of the
judge), on this the (date)." The date that is used as
authority for the issuance of the decree is the date when,
after hearing the evidence, the trial court decreed the
adjudication and registration of the land.
The judgment in a cadastral survey, including the
rendition of the decree, is a judicial act. As the law says,
the judicial decree when final is the base of the
certificate of title. The issuance of the decree by the
Land Registration Office is ministerial act. The date of
the judgment, or more correctly stated, the date on which
the defeated party receives a copy of the decision,
begins the running of the time for the interposition of a
motion for a new trial or for the perfection of an appeal to
the Supreme Court. The date of the title prepared by the
Chief Surveyor is unimportant, for the adjudication has
taken place and all that is left to be performed is the
mere formulation of the technical description. If an
unknown individual could wait possibly years until the
day before a surveyor gets around to transcribing a
technical description of a piece of land, the defeated
party could just as reasonably expect the same
consideration for his appeal. As a matter of fact, the so-
called unknown is a party just as much as the known
oppositor for notice is to all the world, and the decree
binds all the world.
As petitioners' themselves concede,10 the filing of an
answer or claim with the cadastral court is equivalent to
an application for registration of title to real property. It is
thus an action in rem11 and the land registration court
acquires jurisdiction over the res by service of processes
in the manner prescribed by the statute.
In this connection, Section 35 of the Land Registration
Decree, PD 1529, provides:
A. ORDER FOR SPEEDY SETTLEMENT AND
ADJUDICATION; SURVEY; NOTICES
SEC. 35. Cadastral Survey prepatory to filing of petition.
–
xxx       xxx       xxx
(b) Thereupon, the Director of Lands shall give notice to
persons claiming any interest in the lands, as well as to
the general public, of the day on which such survey will
begin, giving as fully and accurately as possible the
description of the lands to be surveyed. Such notice shall
be published once in the Official Gazette, and a copy of
the notice in English or the national language shall be
posted in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of
the municipal building of the municipality in which the
lands or any portion thereof is situated. A copy of the
notice shall also be sent to the mayor of such
municipality as well as to the barangay captain and
likewise to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the
Sangguniang Bayan concerned. xxx
It is incumbent upon the petitioners to establish by
positive proof that the publication requirement has been
complied with, what with the fact that they are the ones
who stood to be benefited by the adjudication of the
subject lot. Regrettably, they failed to present proof of
publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing. Their
argument that the instant case is a mere continuation of
the proceedings in Cadastral Case No. 67 whereat the
Director of Lands must have caused the publication of
the notice of initial hearing in the Official Gazette cannot
hold water. For one, and as noted by the CA in the
decision under review:
Unfortunately for the [petitioner], they have not even
proven the initial publication they are claiming. It would
have been too facile to obtain proof of such publication
from the original records of Cadastral Case No. 67 at the
Regional Trial Court in Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 61,
(See Exhibit "J"; Original Record, p. 25; which
inferentially shows the existence of the original records)
and offer it as evidence in the court a quo, but they
seemingly did not care to do so. They have, therefore,
only themselves to blame for their present
predicament.12 (Word in bracket added).

For another, by petitioners' own admission, the filing of

their Answer which they did only after more than six (6)
decades from the time Cadastral Case No. 67 was
initiated by the Director of Lands is equivalent to an
application for registration of title, and hence publication
in the Official Gazette of the notice of initial hearing
thereof is imperative to vest jurisdiction on the 7th MCTC
to proceed with petitioners' application for registration in
the form of their Answer.

All told, there being no indication at all from the records

of the case that notice of the Order for Initial Hearing
was published in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation, without which the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, the
decision rendered by the 7th MCTC of Atimonan-
Plaridel, Quezon, confirming petitioners' title over the
subject lot is void ab initio for having been rendered
without jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed

Decision and Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-47847 : July 31, 1981.]
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner,  vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and MANUELA PASTOR, Respondents.
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J.:
By this petition for review on certiorari, the Director of
Lands seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.G.R. No. 59853-R affirming the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in LRC Case
No. N-893 granting the application for registration under
R.A. 496 of thirteen cranad(13) parcels of land in the
name of herein private respondent Manuela Pastor.
It appears that on May 8, 1974, respondent Manuela
Pastor filed with the Court of First Instance of Batangas
LRC Case No. N-893, an application for confirmation of
imperfect title over thirteen cranad(13) lots situated in
Gulod and Pallocan, Batangas City.
The application shows that seven cranad(7) of the lots,
specifically Lots Nos. 9186-A, 9186-B, 9186-D, 9330-A,
9330-C, 9402-A and 9402-D were allegedly inherited by
respondent Manuela Pastor from her parents Rafael
Pastor and Natalia Quinio who died on July 1, 1938 and
July 12, 1908, respectively. The other six cranad(6) lots,
namely Lots Nos. 9402-B, 9402-E, 9397-B, 9397-D,
9367 and 9360 were allegedly inherited by respondent
from her aunt Rosario Pastor who died on January 13,
1950 without any surviving heir except respondent
herein. In her application, the respondent claims that she
and her predecessors-in-interest had been in
continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and
notorious possession of the lots under claim of
ownership for more than thirty cranad(30) years.
On June 24, 1974 the application was amended to
correct the description of two lots.
The Director of Lands filed an opposition to the
application on the ground that applicant Manuela Pastor
and her predecessors-in-interest neither had title in fee
simple nor imperfect title under Section 48 of the Public
Land Law, as amended, over the lots in question.
No other persons filed opposition to the application.
Accordingly, the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
acting as a land registration court, issued an order of
general default with the exception of the Director of
Lands, and then proceeded to hear the applicant, her
witnesses, and oppositor Director of Lands.
During the hearings, the applicant presented as her
witnesses her nephew Antonio M. Pastor, and Geodetic
Engineer Quirino P. Clemeneo. Applicant Manuela
Pastor testified on her behalf that she has remained the
owner and possessor of the lots in question; that her
possession has been peaceful, public, open, continuous,
adverse against the whole world and in the concept of
owner; that she had paid the taxes thereon; and that the
said lots were planted to sugar cane.
Witness Antonio M. Pastor corroborated in all material
respects the testimony of his aunt Manuela Pastor.
The Geodetic Engineer, Quirino P. Clemeneo, testified
that he conducted the survey of some of the lots and
verified the survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands on
the others. He found that the lots did not encroach upon
private and public lands.
As part of her documentary evidence, applicant Manuela
Pastor presented the certifications of the Treasurer of
Batangas City showing payments of the real estate tax
on the lots from 1965 to 1974 cranad(Exhibits J, J-1, J-2,
J-3, J-4 and J-5) and official receipts of payments of real
estate tax on the same lots for 1975 cranad(Exhibits K,
K-1 and K-2).
Apart from the foregoing, applicant presented, however,
a certification from the Land Registration
Commission cranad(Exhibit L) stating that Lot No. 9330
of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas, Province of
Batangas, was declared public land in Cadastral Case
No. 41, LRC Cad. Record No. 1706. She likewise
submitted another certification from the Land
Registration Commission cranad(Exhibit L-1) to the
effect that Lots Nos. 9186, 9360, 9367, 9397 and 9402
of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas, Province of
Batangas, were the subject of a decision in Cad. Case
No. 43, LRC Cad. Record No. 1712, although no decree
of registration has as yet been issued.
On August 6, 1975 the Court of First Instance of
Batangas rendered a decision pertinent portions of which
read as follows:
“From the evidence presented, it has been established
that as early as in the year 1913, the original owners of
the seven cranad(7) parcels of land located in the barrio
of Gulod, Batangas City, designated as Lots Nos. 9330-
A, 9330-C, 9186-A, 9186-B, 9186-D, 9402-A and 9402-
D, as reflected in the plan Csd-12122 Sheet
1 cranad(Exhibit ‘E’), were spouses Rafael Pastor and
Natalia Quinio. Natalia Quinio died on July 12, 1908.
Since then, Rafael Pastor possessed the said lots
peacefully, openly, continuously, adversely against the
whole world and in the concept of owner up to his death
in 1938. After the death of Rafael Pastor on July 1, 1938,
Manuela Pastor, the applicant herein, being the only
child and sole heiress, came into possession and
ownership thereof by way of inheritance. From 1938
when the applicant inherited the said lots from her
deceased parents and up to the present, she has
remained the owner and possessor thereof; that her
possession over the said lots has been peaceful, public,
open, continuous, adverse against the whole world and
in the concept of owner up to the present; that the
applicant had paid the estate and inheritance taxes
thereon before the Japanese Occupation; that the said
lots were planted with sugar cane, and since the year
1964 there were no tenants but paid workers were
provided with huts for their use therein; that there were
no buildings, houses or other improvements thereon.
The other six cranad(6) lots located in the barrio of
Pallocan, Batangas City, designated as Lots Nos. 9397-
B, 9397-D, 9367, 9360, 9402-B and 9402-E, as reflected
in the plans marked as Exhibits ‘E’, ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘H-1’, ‘H-1-a’
and ‘H-2’, were originally owned by the applicant’s aunt,
Dra. Rosario Pastor; that the latter possessed the said
lots peacefully, openly, continuously, adversely against
the whole world and in the concept of owner up to her
death in 1950; that after the death of Dra. Rosario Pastor
on January 13, 1950, the applicant, Manuela Pastor,
being the only niece and sole heiress, came into
possession and ownership thereof by way of inheritance.
From 1950 when the said applicant inherited the said
lots from her deceased aunt and up to the present, she
has remained the owner and possessor thereof; that her
possession over the said lots has been peaceful, public,
open, continuous, adverse against the whole world and
in the concept of owner up to the present; that the
applicant had paid the estate and inheritance taxes
thereon; that the said lots were planted with sugar cane,
and since the year 1964 there were no tenants but paid
workers were provided with huts for their use therein;
that there were no buildings, houses or other
improvements thereon.
“Evidence further shows that the late Rafael Pastor and
Dra. Rosario Pastor, are brother and sister. Dra. Pastor
died single and without issue; that applicant, Manuela
Pastor, together with her predecessors-in-interest since
the year 1913 and up to the present have been in open,
public, peaceful, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted
possession over the said thirteen cranad(13) lots in
question; that said lots were covered by tax declarations
in the name of herein applicant, as shown in the
Assessment Certificate issued by the City Assessor of
Batangas cranad(Exhibit ‘1’), and the taxes thereon have
been paid by the applicant cranad(Exhibits ‘J’, ‘J-1’, ‘J-5’,
‘K’, ‘K-1’ and ‘K-2’); that there were no lien or
incumbrance affecting said lots. Furthermore, applicant
testified that she did not claim any portion of the road
which bounded the lots in question, nor the portion of the
creeks or river; that any of the said lots were not within
any reservation of any kind.
“As required by this Court, the applicant submitted the
following:
“(a) a certification of the Land Registration Commission
that Lot No. 9330 of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas
Record No. 1706 was declared ‘public land’ in the
decision rendered thereon. It is further certified that copy
of said decision relative to the aforementioned lot is not
available in this Commission cranad(Exhibit
‘L’); cranad(b) a certification of the Land Registration
Commission, that no decrees of registration have as yet
been issued to lots Nos. 9186, 9360, 9367 and 9397 and
9402 of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas cranad(Exh.
‘L-1’); and cranad(c) a certification issued by officer-in-
charge Records Division of the Bureau of Lands to the
effect that the thirteen cranad(13) lots situated in Barrios
Gulod and Pallocan, Batangas City, are not covered by
any kind of public land, application or patent cranad(Exh.
‘M’).
“All the documentary exhibits of applicant were
submitted in evidence as offered, there being no
objection on the part of the oppositor. Oppositor Director
of Lands through City Fiscal of Batangas did not offer
any contradictory evidence.
“Indisputably and by highly credible evidence, the
applicant gave more than ample proof of her rights to the
grant of title over the properties in question. By herself
and through her predecessors-in-interest, the applicant
has been in open, public, peaceful, continuous,
uninterrupted and adverse possession of the
thirteen cranad(13) parcels of land up to the present —
all for the requisite period of time and under a bona fide
claim of ownership which entitle her to confirmation of
title over the properties subject of this application.
“. cra . finding the application for confirmation and grant
to title under Act 496 as amended, to be well-founded
and fully substantiated by evidence sufficient and
requisite under the law, the Court hereby decrees the
registration of:
“x x x
“in favor of applicant, MANUELA
PASTOR . cra .”  chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(pp. 49-60,
Record on Appeal, p. 45, rec.).
Not, satisfied with the decision of the Court of First
Instance, petitioner Director of Lands appealed the same
to the Court of Appeals assigning the following errors:
‘First Assignment of Error
‘THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
APPLICATION OF MANUELA PASTOR FOR
CONFIRMATION OF HER ALLEGED IMPERFECT
TITLE TO LOTS NO. 9330-A AND 9330-C DESPITE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY APPLICANT HERSELF
THAT SAID LOTS WERE DECLARED PUBLIC LAND IN
A PREVIOUS CADASTRAL PROCEEDING.’
‘Second Assignment of Error
‘THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
APPLICATION OF MANUELA PASTOR FOR
CONFIRMATION OF HER ALLEGED IMPERFECT
TITLE TO LOTS NO. 9186-A, 9186-B, 9186-D, 9402-A,
9402-B, 9402-D, 9402-E, 9397-B, 9397-D, 9367 and
9360 DESPITE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY
APPLICANT HERSELF THAT A DECISION
RESPECTING SAID LOTS HAD BEEN RENDERED IN
A PREVIOUS CADASTRAL PROCEEDING.’
‘Third Assignment of Error
‘THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THERE IS ADEQUATE EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED
IMPERFECT TITLE OF MANUELA PASTOR TO THE
THIRTEEN cranad(13) LOTS SUBJECT OF THE
APPLICATION’cralaw cranad(pp. 11-12, rec.).
On February 9, 1978 the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment affirming in toto the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Batangas.
Hence, this petition.
I
Substantially, the same issues, as raised by petitioner in
the Court of Appeals, are brought before US.
Petitioner asserts that the decision rendered in Cadastral
Case No. 41 cranad(Exhibit L) declaring Lot No. 9330 —
from which Lots Nos. 9330-A and 9330-C were derived
— constitutes res adjudicata as to the nature of the lots
in question and therefore, a bar to appellee’s application.
Additionally, petitioner also argued that:
“Lots Nos. 9186-A, 9186-B and 9186-D of the Cadastral
Survey of Batangas, were derived from Lot No. 9186.
Lots Nos. 9402-A, 9402-B, 9402-D and 9402-E were
derived from Lot No. 9402. Lots Nos. 9397-B and 9397-
D were derived from Lot No. 9397.
“As shown by applicant’s Exhibit L-1, Lots Nos. 9186,
9360, 9367, 9397 and 9402 were the subject of a
decision rendered in Cad. Case No. 43, LRC Cad.
Record No. 1712, although no decree of registration has
as yet been issued therein.
“The certificate, Exhibit L-1, is dated June 4, 1975. The
decision of the lower court was rendered more than two
months later, on August 6, 1975. Thus, on the basis of
Exhibit L, the decision of the cadastral court might
already be final when the appealed decision was
rendered. If such be the case, the decision of the
cadastral court constitutes res adjudicata and it is a bar
to the present land registration proceeding under Act No.
496 cranad(Lopez v. Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 589;
Section 1. paragraph cranad(f), Rule 16, Rules of Court).
“Assuming that the decision of the cadastral court was
not yet final when the appealed decision was rendered, it
was nevertheless, litis pendentia which, under Section 1,
paragraph cranad(e), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, is
likewise a bar to the present proceeding for land
registration case under Act No. 496.
“Either way, whether the decision of the cadastral court
in Cad. Case No. 43 had become final or not, the
present proceeding for land registration under Act No.
496 cannot prosper because of the principles of res
adjudicata and litis
pendentia”  chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(pp. 15-16, rec.).
WE find no legal basis to uphold the foregoing
contentions of petitioner. It is clear from the evidence on
record that in the proceedings had before the Court of
First Instance of Batangas, acting as a land registration
court, the oppositor Director of Lands, petitioner herein,
did not interpose any objection nor set up the defense of
res adjudicata with respect to the lots in question. Such
failure on the part of oppositor Director of Lands, to OUR
mind, is a procedural infirmity which cannot be cured on
appeal. Section 2, Rule 9, Revised Rules of Court of
1964, in no uncertain language, provides that:
“SEC. 2. Defenses and objections not pleaded deemed
waived. — Defenses and objections not pleaded either in
a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived;
. cra .”
All defenses therefore not interposed in a motion to
dismiss or in an answer are deemed
waived cranad(Santiago, et al. vs. Ramirez, et al., L-
15237, May 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 157, 162; Torreda vs.
Boncaros, L-39832, January 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 247,
253).
Thus, the defense of res adjudicata when not set up
either in a motion to dismiss or in an answer, is deemed
waived. It cannot be pleaded for the first time at the trial
or on appeal cranad(Phil. Coal Miner’s Union vs.
CEPOC, et al., L-19007, April 30, 1964, 10 SCRA 784,
789).
But granting for a moment, that the defenses, of res
adjudicata was properly raised by petitioner herein, WE
still hold that, factually, there is no prior final judgment at
all to speak of. The decision in Cadastral Case No. 41
does not constitute a bar to the application of respondent
Manuela Pastor; because a decision in a cadastral
proceeding declaring a lot public land is not the final
decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land
Registration Act.
A judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does
not preclude even the same applicant from subsequently
seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same
land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions
of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, and as long as said public land remains
alienable and disposable cranad(now sections 3 and 4,
P.D. No. 1073).
With respect to Cadastral Case No. 43, the evidence on
record is too scanty to sustain the view of the petitioner
that the decision rendered therein constitutes res
adjudicata, or in the absence of finality thereof, litis
pendentia. On the contrary, private respondent has
amply shown that no final decree whatsoever was issued
in connection with said cadastral case, even as it is not
known in whose favor said decision was rendered. As
found by the Court of Appeals:
“Again, we sustain the appellee. There is an ambiguity
as to what was adjudicated in Case No. 43. If the lots in
question were in that case awarded to a third party, the
latter should have intervened in this case. But no private
party has challenged the application for
registration”  chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(p. 30, rec.).
II
Finally, petitioner argues for the first time on appeal that
“there is no substantial evidence to show that
she cranad(private respondent Manuela Pastor) and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
lots sought to be titled for a period of at least
thirty cranad(30) years and in the manner provided in
Section 48, as amended, of the Public Land Law.”
WE find no merit in the foregoing argument of petitioner.
The uncontradicted testimony of private respondent
Manuela Pastor, which was further corroborated by the
testimony of Antonio Pastor, conclusively established
beyond doubt that the respondent, together with her
predecessors-in-interest since the year 1913 and up to
the present, had been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the lots in
question under a bona fide claim of ownership.
Moreover, the documentary evidence submitted by
private respondent also show that the lots have been
declared for taxation purposes in the name of
respondent Manuela Pastor cranad(Exhibit ‘I’), and the
taxes thereon have been paid by said respondent
herein cranad(Exhibits ‘J’, ‘J-1’ to ‘J-5’, ‘K’, ‘K-1’ and ‘K-
2’). And finally, Geodetic Engineer Quirino Clemeneo,
who conducted the survey of some of the lots and
verified the survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands,
testified that the thirteen cranad(13) lots in question did
not encroach upon public or private lands. All these are
unmistakable indicia that respondent Manuela Pastor
has performed and complied with all the conditions
essential to entitle her to a confirmation of her imperfect
title over the thirteen cranad(13) lots subject of her
application.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS IS AFFIRMED, AND THE PETITION IS
HEREBY DISMISSED. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-29596 October 14, 1977
JULIAN JR., SERGIO, PEDRO, LUIS and MONICA, all
surnamed RODRIGUEZ, petitioners,
vs.
SABINA TORENO, TIMOTEO TORENO, GLICERIA
BOCASE ALEJANDRO BOCASE BENJAMIN
CAMPOREDONDO, SIMPLICIA BOCASE PEDRO
DOCASE BERNARDO BIENVENIDO DOCASE
GREGORIA BOCASE and THE FUW DIVISION OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANELA, nts.
CASTRO, C.J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£
This is a review of the decision of the Court of APPEAL
in CAG.R. No. 30053- R, dated August 22, 1968, after
the decision of the Court of First lnstance of Davao City
in Civil Case No. 2718, which (1) adjudicated portions of
a parcel of land in favor of Sabina Toreno, Timoteo
Toreno, Gliceria Bocase the minors Luciana, Alejandro
and Lourdes, off surnamed Bocase who are represented
by their legal guardians Benjamin Camporedondo
Simplica Pedro, Bemardo Bienvenido and Gregoria, all
surnamed Bocase and hereinafter referred to as
respondents; and (2) awarded damages against Julian
Rodriguez, Sr., hereinafter referred to as the petitioner,
now deceased, and substituted in the instant petition by
his children Julian, Jr., Sergio, Pedro, Luis and Monica.
It appears that during her lifetime, one Valentine
Quiñ;ones owned a parcel of land in Davao City with an
area of 39,043 square meters which is designated as Lot
No. 2017, formerly Lot No. 1226-G of the cadastral
survey of Davao. On her death, Valentine was survived
by her children, namely, Maximina, Martiliano, Felix,
Petra Eugenia, Restitute and Ana, all surnamed Bocase
and all of whom are now deceased.
Maximina died in 1940 and was survived by her children
Sabina Toreno and Timoteo Toreno, two of the herein
respondents. Martiliano was survived by his children
Eugenia Simplicia, Pedro, Bernardo and Green, of whom
the latter four are some of the herein respondents. Felix
was survived by his children Gliceria and the three
minors Luciana Alejandro and Lourdes who are likewise
respondents Martiliano Petra died a widow and without
any issue. Eugenia does not appear to have left any
children. Restitute was survived by her 12 children who,
fake Ana's four children, are not parties to the case at
bar.
The land left by the late Valentina Quinones was brought
for tration before a cadastral court in 1922 and the
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-15 was issued on
August 7, 1950 in the name of 26 petition, to wit: the
three arriving children of Valentine, namely Petra
Eugenia and Felix Bocase and their 23 nephews and
nieces. The certificate of title, after its issuance, was
delivered to the petitioner by the respondents' counsel in
the cadastral case, one Atty. Suazo. The petition still had
the said certificate of title in his possession at the tune
the case was comnienoed in the trial court.
On July 9, 1958, the respondents filed with the Court of
First Instance of Davao, a complaint for ejectment and
damages against the petitioner, alleging basically that,
together with their cousins, the children of Restitute and
Ana, they are pro-ndiviso registered owners of the land
covered by O.C.T. No. 0-15; that in or about June 1953,
the petitioner reply maliciously' and by means of force
and intion entered the land in question and occupied
approximately 27,500 square meters thereof, which
portion, prior thereto, was in their possession as their
share pursuant to a partition agreed upon by the co-
owners thereof; and that since June 1953, the petitioner
had been collecting rentals from the owners of houses
built thereon in the total sum of P300.00 a month.
In his answer, the petitioner claimed that the heirs of
Valentine Quinones, with the exception of Restitute and
Ana Bocase had already sold their rights over the land
covered by O.C.T. No. 0-15 to him as early as 1941 and
1950 either through themselves or their successors in
interest, thus making him the rightful and legal owner of
approximately 27,899 square meters thereof; that he had
been in the peaceful, continuous and public ion of the
same; that there was no hen, encumbrance or adverse
claim annotated on O.C.T. No 0-15 so that the series of
sales made in his favor, although not registered and
annotated thereon, are valid and binding between the
parties, the said land not having passed to a third
person; and that he had spent no less than P5,000.00 in
improving the land in question.
On October 31, 1960, after hearing on the merits, the
trial court rendered its decision ordering the petitioner to
vacate the land in question and to pay the respondents
the sum of P750.00, the value of the coconut trees the
petitioner had ordered cut down; P125.00 a month from
July 10, 1958, representing the rentals collected by him
from tenants with their houses built on the questioned
estate; P1,000.00 as attorney's fees; and costs. The trial
court's decision was anchored on the following rationale:
(a) to entertain petitioner's claim that he had bought the
questioned portion of the land covered by O.C.T. No. 0-
15 as shown in evidence 1 before the decree of
registration was issued would virtually re-open the
cadastral proceeding in contravention of the
indefeasibility of Torrens titles; (b) the petitioner, being
the respondents' counsel in the land registration case,
had all the opportunity to have the questioned deeds of
sale annotated on the certificate of title in connection
with the cadatral case but did not do so; (c) petitioner's
failure, despite his having been respondents' counsel to
have his adverse claim brought to the attention of the
cadastral court and to have the supposed deeds of sale
annotated later are proof enough that the alleged deeds
of sale were really contracts of loan.
In due course, the petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals c that the trial court erred in its appreciation of
the facts and the legal aspects of the case, On August
22, 1968, the Court of Appeal rendered its decision
finding the petitioner's claim "to the property in
controversy untenable" and affirming, except for to
P550.00 the value of the coconut trees the petitioner had
to reimburse the respondents (it was found that only 110
trees were faded at P5.00 per tree), the appealed
judgment of the trial court. But, unlike the court, the
Court of Appeals did not resolve the question of whether
the alleged deeds of sale, supra, of the questioned land
were bona fide purchase agreements or mere contracts
of loan. It simply noted that "the alleged sales took place
in 1940 or some years prior to the issuance of the
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-15 ... but none of the
alleged deeds of sale appears to have been annotated
on said certificate of title" and from that observation,
concluded that "Under the Torrens System of
registration, claims and hens of whatever character,
except those mentioned by law, existing against the land
prior to the issuance of the certificate of title, are cut off
by such certificate if not noted thereon, and the
certificate so issued binds the whole world, including the
government."
same however, lost for efficacy upon the reaction of
judgment and of the due of partition in favor of the
respondents. A cadastral caqe is a judge proceeding in
rem which, as such, binds the whole world 3 for judgment
them is limed to have settled the status of the and
subject thereof, if not noted barred under the principles
of res judicata.
In the case at bar, the record suddenly shows that the
petitioner was well aware of the existence of the
cadastral caw over the land in question as he was
engaged by the resents to handle the case for them
although it was another lawyer, Atty. Suazo, who
appears to have actedly assisted the respondents in
court. Indeed, it incontrovertibly appear that Atty. Suazo
delivered the certificate of title to the other after the same
was issued and the petition in "million for until the
complaint was added and the case was tried in the
court a quo. Petitioner's actuation, himself a lawyer,
under the lances in not having the alleged deeds of sale
annotated in the certificate of title, if they were really
sake covenants, is certainly inexpble.
Upon the foregoing the conclusion of the trial court that
the deeds of sale in question were mere contracts of
loan, or properly a at arrangemnt, is not far-fetched. The
Court takes cognizance of the common of individual
money lenders of taking physical possession of the
certificate of title or other not avide ownership of mal
estate by the debtor to ensure his faithfited company
with the obligation to pay the
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 30053-R is hereby affirmed. No costs.

The petitioner in the instant petition raises two issues,

namely (1) whether the existence of a decree of
registration is a bar to an action filed after one year from
the issuance of the decree to compel reconveyance of
the property in question, and (2) whether the unrecorded
deeds of sale between the parties are binding upon them
and their respective heirs.

1. Contrary to the opinion entertained by the courts

below, the prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar
a landowner whose property was wrongfully or
erroneously registered under the Torrens system from
bringing an action, after one year from the issuance of
the decree for the reconveyance of the property in
question 2 Such an action does not aim or purport to re-
open the rginstration Proceeding and set aside the
decree of registration, but only to show that the person
who the registration of the questioned property is not the
real owner thereof.

2. Even if the contracts executed by the respondents and

their over the land question in favor of the respondents
were genuine and bona fide  Purchase covenants, the

G.R. No. 166838               June 15, 2011
STA. LUCIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT,
Inc., Petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF PASIG, Respondent,
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF
RIZAL, Intervenor.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For review is the June 30, 2004 Decision 1 and the
January 27, 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 69603, which affirmed with modification
the August 10, 1998 Decision3 and October 9, 1998
Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 157, in Civil Case No. 65420.
Petitioner Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. (Sta.
Lucia) is the registered owner of several parcels of land
with Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 39112,
39110 and 38457, all of which indicated that the lots
were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of
Pasig5 (Pasig).
The parcel of land covered by TCT No. 39112 was
consolidated with that covered by TCT No. 518403,
which was situated in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan,
Municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal (Cainta). The
two combined lots were subsequently partitioned into
three, for which TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131,
now all bearing the Cainta address, were issued.
TCT No. 39110 was also divided into two lots, becoming
TCT Nos. 92869 and 92870.
The lot covered by TCT No. 38457 was not segregated,
but a commercial building owned by Sta. Lucia East
Commercial Center, Inc., a separate corporation, was
built on it.6
Upon Pasig’s petition to correct the location stated in
TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131, the Land
Registration Court, on June 9, 1995, ordered the
amendment of the TCTs to read that the lots with respect
to TCT No. 39112 were located in Barrio Tatlong
Kawayan, Pasig City.7
On January 31, 1994, Cainta filed a petition8 for the
settlement of its land boundary dispute with Pasig before
the RTC, Branch 74 of Antipolo City (Antipolo RTC). This
case, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3006, is still
pending up to this date.
On November 28, 1995, Pasig filed a
Complaint,9 docketed as Civil Case No. 65420, against
Sta. Lucia for the collection of real estate taxes, including
penalties and interests, on the lots covered by TCT Nos.
532250, 598424, 599131, 92869, 92870 and 38457,
including the improvements thereon (the subject
properties).
Sta. Lucia, in its Answer, alleged that it had been
religiously paying its real estate taxes to Cainta, just like
what its predecessors-in-interest did, by virtue of the
demands and assessments made and the Tax
Declarations issued by Cainta on the claim that the
subject properties were within its territorial jurisdiction.
Sta. Lucia further argued that since 1913, the real estate
taxes for the lots covered by the above TCTs had been
paid to Cainta.10
Cainta was allowed to file its own Answer-in-Intervention
when it moved to intervene on the ground that its interest
would be greatly affected by the outcome of the case. It
averred that it had been collecting the real property taxes
on the subject properties even before Sta. Lucia
acquired them. Cainta further asseverated that the
establishment of the boundary monuments would show
that the subject properties are within its metes and
bounds.11
Sta. Lucia and Cainta thereafter moved for the
suspension of the proceedings, and claimed that the
pending petition in the Antipolo RTC, for the settlement
of boundary dispute between Cainta and Pasig,
presented a "prejudicial question" to the resolution of the
case.12
The RTC denied this in an Order dated December 4,
1996 for lack of merit. Holding that the TCTs were
conclusive evidence as to its ownership and
location,13 the RTC, on August 10, 1998, rendered a
Decision in favor of Pasig:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of [Pasig], ordering Sta. Lucia
Realty and Development, Inc. to pay [Pasig]:
1) ₱273,349.14 representing unpaid real estate taxes
and penalties as of 1996, plus interest of 2% per month
until fully paid;
2) ₱50,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees; and
3) The costs of suit.
Judgment is likewise rendered against the intervenor
Municipality of Cainta, Rizal, ordering it to refund to Sta.
Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. the realty tax
payments improperly collected and received by the
former from the latter in the aggregate amount of ₱358,
403.68.14
After Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed their Notices of Appeal,
Pasig, on September 11, 1998, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the RTC’s August 10, 1998 Decision.
The RTC, on October 9, 1998, granted Pasig’s motion in
an Order15 and modified its earlier decision to include the
realty taxes due on the improvements on the subject
lots:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration is hereby granted.
Accordingly, the Decision, dated August 10, 1998 is
hereby modified in that the defendant is hereby ordered
to pay plaintiff the amount of ₱5,627,757.07 representing
the unpaid taxes and penalties on the improvements on
the subject parcels of land whereon real estate taxes are
adjudged as due for the year 1996.16
Accordingly, Sta. Lucia filed an Amended Notice of
Appeal to include the RTC’s October 9, 1998 Order in its
protest.
On October 16, 1998, Pasig filed a Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal, to which both Sta. Lucia and Cainta
filed several oppositions, on the assertion that there
were no good reasons to warrant the execution pending
appeal.17
On April 15, 1999, the RTC ordered the issuance of a
Writ of Execution against Sta. Lucia.
On May 21, 1999, Sta. Lucia filed a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of
Appeals to assail the RTC’s order granting the
execution. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52874, the
petition was raffled to the First Division of the Court of
Appeals, which on September 22, 2000, ruled in favor of
Sta. Lucia, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED
by this Court. The assailed Order dated April 15, 1999 in
Civil Case No. 65420 granting the motion for execution
pending appeal and ordering the issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal is hereby SET ASIDE and
declared NULL and VOID.18
The Court of Appeals added that the boundary dispute
case presented a "prejudicial question which must be
decided before x x x Pasig can collect the realty taxes
due over the subject properties."19
Pasig sought to have this decision reversed in a Petition
for Certiorari filed before this Court on November 29,
2000, but this was denied on June 25, 2001 for being
filed out of time.20
Meanwhile, the appeal filed by Sta. Lucia and Cainta
was raffled to the (former) Seventh Division of the Court
of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 69603. On
June 30, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision, wherein it agreed with the RTC’s judgment:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of
P50,000.00 attorney’s fees is DELETED.21
In affirming the RTC, the Court of Appeals declared that
there was no proper legal basis to suspend the
proceedings.22 Elucidating on the legal meaning of a
"prejudicial question," it held that "there can be no
prejudicial question when the cases involved are both
civil."23 The Court of Appeals further held that the
elements of litis pendentia and forum shopping, as
alleged by Cainta to be present, were not met.
Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in a
Resolution dated January 27, 2005.
Undaunted, Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate
Petitions for Certiorari with this Court. Cainta’s petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 166856 was denied on April 13,
2005 for Cainta’s failure to show any reversible error.
Sta. Lucia’s own petition is the one subject of this
decision.24
In praying for the reversal of the June 30, 2004 judgment
of the Court of Appeals, Sta. Lucia assigned the
following errors:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING [WITH MODIFICATION] THE DECISION
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN PASIG CITY
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT SUSPENDING THE CASE IN VIEW OF THE
PENDENCY OF THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE WHICH
WILL FINALLY DETERMINE THE SITUS OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTIES
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT HOLDING THAT THE PAYMENT OF REALTY
TAXES THROUGH THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA
WAS VALID PAYMENT OF REALTY TAXES
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT HOLDING THAT IN THE MEANTIME THAT THE
BOUNDARY DISPUTE CASE IN ANTIPOLO CITY
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS BEING FINALLY
RESOLVED, THE PETITIONER STA. LUCIA SHOULD
BE PAYING THE REALTY TAXES ON THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES THROUGH THE INTERVENOR CAINTA
TO PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO.25
Pasig, countering each error, claims that the lower courts
correctly decided the case considering that the TCTs are
clear on their faces that the subject properties are
situated in its territorial jurisdiction. Pasig contends that
the principles of litis pendentia, forum shopping, and res
judicata are all inapplicable, due to the absence of their
requisite elements. Pasig maintains that the boundary
dispute case before the Antipolo RTC is independent of
the complaint for collection of realty taxes which was
filed before the Pasig RTC. It avers that the doctrine of
"prejudicial question," which has a definite meaning in
law, cannot be invoked where the two cases involved are
both civil. Thus, Pasig argues, since there is no legal
ground to preclude the simultaneous hearing of both
cases, the suspension of the proceedings in the Pasig
RTC is baseless.
Cainta also filed its own comment reiterating its legal
authority over the subject properties, which fall within its
territorial jurisdiction. Cainta claims that while it has been
collecting the realty taxes over the subject properties
since way back 1913, Pasig only covered the same for
real property tax purposes in 1990, 1992, and 1993.
Cainta also insists that there is a discrepancy between
the locational entries and the technical descriptions in
the TCTs, which further supports the need to await the
settlement of the boundary dispute case it initiated.
The errors presented before this Court can be narrowed
down into two basic issues:
1) Whether the RTC and the CA were correct in deciding
Pasig’s Complaint without waiting for the resolution of
the boundary dispute case between Pasig and Cainta;
and
2) Whether Sta. Lucia should continue paying its real
property taxes to Cainta, as it alleged to have always
done, or to Pasig, as the location stated in Sta. Lucia’s
TCTs.
We agree with the First Division of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 52874 that the resolution of the
boundary dispute between Pasig and Cainta would
determine which local government unit is entitled to
collect realty taxes from Sta. Lucia.26
The Local Government Unit entitled
To Collect Real Property Taxes
The Former Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals
held that the resolution of the complaint lodged before
the Pasig RTC did not necessitate the assessment of the
parties’ evidence on the metes and bounds of their
respective territories. It cited our ruling in Odsigue v.
Court of Appeals27 wherein we said that a certificate of
title is conclusive evidence of both its ownership and
location.28 The Court of Appeals even referred to specific
provisions of the 1991 Local Government Code and Act.
No. 496 to support its ruling that Pasig had the right to
collect the realty taxes on the subject properties as the
titles of the subject properties show on their faces that
they are situated in Pasig.29
Under Presidential Decree No. 464 or the "Real Property
Tax Code," the authority to collect real property taxes is
vested in the locality where the property is situated:
Sec. 5. Appraisal of Real Property. — All real property,
whether taxable or exempt, shall be appraised at the
current and fair market value prevailing in the
locality where the property is situated.
xxxx
Sec. 57. Collection of tax to be the responsibility of
treasurers. — The collection of the real property tax and
all penalties accruing thereto, and the enforcement of the
remedies provided for in this Code or any applicable
laws, shall be the responsibility of the treasurer of the
province, city or municipality where the property is
situated. (Emphases ours.)
This requisite was reiterated in Republic Act No. 7160,
also known as the 1991 the Local Government Code, to
wit:
Section 201. Appraisal of Real Property. – All real
property, whether taxable or exempt, shall be appraised
at the current and fair market value prevailing in the
locality where the property is situated. The Department
of Finance shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations for the classification, appraisal, and
assessment of real property pursuant to the provisions of
this Code.
Section 233. Rates of Levy. – A province or city or a
municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area shall fix
a uniform rate of basic real property tax applicable to
their respective localities as follows: x x x. (Emphases
ours.)
The only import of these provisions is that, while a local
government unit is authorized under several laws to
collect real estate tax on properties falling under its
territorial jurisdiction, it is imperative to first show that
these properties are unquestionably within its
geographical boundaries.
Accentuating on the importance of delineating territorial
boundaries, this Court, in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections30 said:
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the
territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot
be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for
they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a
local government unit. It can legitimately exercise
powers of government only within the limits of its
territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts
are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the
boundaries of local government units will sow costly
conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which
ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the
evil sought to be avoided by the Local Government Code
in requiring that the land area of a local government unit
must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions.31 (Emphasis ours.)
The significance of accurately defining a local
government unit’s boundaries was stressed in City of
Pasig v. Commission on Elections,32 which involved the
consolidated petitions filed by the parties herein, Pasig
and Cainta, against two decisions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) with respect to the plebiscites
scheduled by Pasig for the ratification of its creation of
two new Barangays. Ruling on the contradictory reliefs
sought by Pasig and Cainta, this Court affirmed the
COMELEC decision to hold in abeyance the plebiscite to
ratify the creation of Barangay Karangalan; but set aside
the COMELEC’s other decision, and nullified the
plebiscite that ratified the creation of Barangay Napico in
Pasig, until the boundary dispute before the Antipolo
RTC had been resolved. The aforementioned case held
as follows:
1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is
DISMISSED for lack of merit; while
2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No.
128663 is GRANTED. The COMELEC Order in UND No.
97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is SET ASIDE and the
plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of
Barangay Napico in the City of Pasig is declared null and
void. Plebiscite on the same is ordered held in abeyance
until after the courts settle with finality the boundary
dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of
Cainta, in Civil Case No. 94-3006.33
Clearly therefore, the local government unit entitled to
collect real property taxes from Sta. Lucia must
undoubtedly show that the subject properties are
situated within its territorial jurisdiction; otherwise, it
would be acting beyond the powers vested to it by law.
Certificates of Title as
Conclusive Evidence of Location
While we fully agree that a certificate of title is conclusive
as to its ownership and location, this does not preclude
the filing of an action for the very purpose of attacking
the statements therein. In De Pedro v. Romasan
Development Corporation,34 we proclaimed that:
We agree with the petitioners that, generally, a certificate
of title shall be conclusive as to all matters contained
therein and conclusive evidence of the ownership of the
land referred to therein. However, it bears stressing that
while certificates of title are indefeasible, unassailable
and binding against the whole world, including the
government itself, they do not create or vest title. They
merely confirm or record title already existing and
vested. They cannot be used to protect a usurper from
the true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud; neither do they permit one to
enrich himself at the expense of other.35
In Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation v. Heirs of
Vicente Coronado,36 we set aside the lower courts’ ruling
that the property subject of the case was not situated in
the location stated and described in the TCT, for lack of
adequate basis. Our decision was in line with the
doctrine that the TCT is conclusive evidence of
ownership and location. However, we refused to simply
uphold the veracity of the disputed TCT, and instead, we
remanded the case back to the trial court for the
determination of the exact location of the property seeing
that it was the issue in the complaint filed before it.37
In City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero,38 this Court
reprimanded the City of Tagaytay for levying taxes on a
property that was outside its territorial jurisdiction, viz:
In this case, it is basic that before the City of Tagaytay
may levy a certain property for sale due to tax
delinquency, the subject property should be under its
territorial jurisdiction. The city officials are expected to
know such basic principle of law. The failure of the city
officials of Tagaytay to verify if the property is within its
jurisdiction before levying taxes on the same constitutes
gross negligence.39 (Emphasis ours.)
Although it is true that "Pasig" is the locality stated in the
TCTs of the subject properties, both Sta. Lucia and
Cainta aver that the metes and bounds of the subject
properties, as they are described in the TCTs, reveal that
they are within Cainta’s boundaries.40 This only means
that there may be a conflict between the location as
stated and the location as technically described in the
TCTs. Mere reliance therefore on the face of the TCTs
will not suffice as they can only be conclusive evidence
of the subject properties’ locations if both the stated and
described locations point to the same area.
The Antipolo RTC, wherein the boundary dispute case
between Pasig and Cainta is pending, would be able to
best determine once and for all the precise metes and
bounds of both Pasig’s and Cainta’s respective territorial
jurisdictions. The resolution of this dispute would
necessarily ascertain the extent and reach of each local
government’s authority, a prerequisite in the proper
exercise of their powers, one of which is the power of
taxation. This was the conclusion reached by this Court
in City of Pasig v. Commission on Elections,41 and by the
First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
52874. We do not see any reason why we cannot
adhere to the same logic and reasoning in this case.
The "Prejudicial Question" Debate
It would be unfair to hold Sta. Lucia liable again for real
property taxes it already paid simply because Pasig
cannot wait for its boundary dispute with Cainta to be
decided. Pasig has consistently argued that the
boundary dispute case is not a prejudicial question that
would entail the suspension of its collection case against
Sta. Lucia. This was also its argument in City of Pasig v.
Commission on Elections,42 when it sought to nullify the
COMELEC’s ruling to hold in abeyance (until the
settlement of the boundary dispute case), the plebiscite
that will ratify its creation of Barangay Karangalan. We
agreed with the COMELEC therein that the boundary
dispute case presented a prejudicial question and
explained our statement in this wise:
To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that
Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the boundary dispute
between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig
presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided
before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays
may be held.
The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question
since the same contemplates a civil and criminal action and
does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the
instant case. While this may be the general rule, this Court has
held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, that, in the
interest of good order, we can very well suspend action on one
case pending the final outcome of another case closely
interrelated or linked to the first.
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that
the areas covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and
Napico are within its territory, it can not deny that portions of
the same area are included in the boundary dispute case
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely,
whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of
Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed
Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the
creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be
properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less
permanent natural boundaries. Precisely because territorial
jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and
unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the
territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be
an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the
way for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays. x x
x.43 (Emphases ours.)
It is obvious from the foregoing, that the term "prejudicial
question," as appearing in the cases involving the parties
herein, had been used loosely. Its usage had been more in
reference to its ordinary meaning, than to its strict legal
meaning under the Rules of Court.44 Nevertheless, even
without the impact of the connotation derived from the term,
our own Rules of Court state that a trial court may control its
own proceedings according to its sound discretion:
POWERS AND DUTIES OF COURTS AND JUDICIAL
OFFICERS
Rule 135
SEC. 5. Inherent powers of courts. – Every court shall have
power:
xxxx
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make
them comformable to law and justice.
Furthermore, we have acknowledged and affirmed this inherent
power in our own decisions, to wit:
The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of
a sound discretion, upon proper application for a stay of that
action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of
another pending in another court, especially where the parties
and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent
in every court to control the disposition of causes (sic) on
its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to
the second action cannot be properly determined until
the questions raised in the first action are settled the
second action should be stayed.
The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power
inherent in every court to control the disposition of the
cases on its dockets, considering its time and effort, that
of counsel and the litigants. But if proceedings must be
stayed, it must be done in order to avoid multiplicity of
suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting
judgments, confusion between litigants and courts. It
bears stressing that whether or not the RTC would
suspend the proceedings in the SECOND CASE is
submitted to its sound discretion.451avvphil
In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Pasig RTC
should have held in abeyance the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 65420, in view of the fact that the outcome of
the boundary dispute case before the Antipolo RTC will
undeniably affect both Pasig’s and Cainta’s rights. In
fact, the only reason Pasig had to file a tax collection
case against Sta. Lucia was not that Sta. Lucia refused
to pay, but that Sta. Lucia had already paid, albeit to
another local government unit. Evidently, had the
territorial boundaries of the contending local government
units herein been delineated with accuracy, then there
would be no controversy at all.
In the meantime, to avoid further animosity, Sta. Lucia is
directed to deposit the succeeding real property taxes
due on the subject properties, in an escrow account with
the Land Bank of the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
June 30, 2004 Decision and the January 27, 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
69603 are SET ASIDE. The City of Pasig and the
Municipality of Cainta are both directed to await the
judgment in their boundary dispute case (Civil Case No.
94-3006), pending before Branch 74 of the Regional
Trial Court in Antipolo City, to determine which local
government unit is entitled to exercise its powers,
including the collection of real property taxes, on the
properties subject of the dispute. In the meantime, Sta.
Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. is directed to deposit
the succeeding real property taxes due on the lots and
improvements covered by TCT Nos. 532250, 598424,
599131, 92869, 92870 and 38457 in an escrow account
with the Land Bank of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 84908 December 4, 1989
SPOUSES FELIX ABAD and ELENA R.
ABAD, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
SPOUSES NEAL DAYAP and PROFETIZA M.
DAYAP, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The decision of the Court of Appeals ** in CA-G.R. CV
No. 09424 which reversed the decision of Branch 101 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No.
Q-35941 is assailed in this petition for review
on certiorari.
A certain piece of real property designated by the
Bureau of Lands as Lot B, VS-04-00182 is the center of
dispute in this case. To fully understand the facts from
which the controversy arose, it is indispensable to
include in Our discussion Civil Case No. Q-27582 which
by supervening events became tightly intertwined with
the case at bar.
To begin, about two decades ago, four persons, namely,
Herminigildo Aquino, Juanito Dichoso, Damian Garcia
and herein petitioner Felix Abad agreed among
themselves to contribute to a certain fund in order to
purchase from Cres Pilias and Narciso Adaya a parcel of
land situated in Diliman, Quezon City described as
follows:
Lot 2-E, Blk. E-1 of Psd-67763, containing an area of
441-6 square meters, more or less at Malaya Avenue,
Subdivision. 1
To conform with the rules and regulations of the People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), Cres Pilias
and Narciso Adaya executed a Deed of Assignment
naming Herminigildo Aquino as the only assignee of the
said parcel of land.
To the end that the rights of all the other co-owners will
be protected, Aquino executed an affidavit on October
10, 1969 stating among others that although he is the
sole assignee in the Deed of Assignment executed
jointly by Cres Pilias and Narciso Adaya, in truth and in
fact, Juanito Dichoso, Damian Garcia and herein
petitioner Felix Abad are also assignees as they have
contributed equally to the amount corresponding to the
payments made on the property; that he voluntarily
recognizes and acknowledges the above-named
persons as his co-owners of the property; and that after
the corresponding transfer certificate of title is issued in
his name, he would execute the necessary deed of
absolute sale to each co-owner .2
On April 18, 1972, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
175968 was finally issued in the name of the Aquino
spouses covering the lot which was purchased by the
four co-owners. In pursuance of his legitimate claim over
the property and as earlier agreed upon by everyone
concerned, petitioner Felix Abad went to see
Herminigildo Aquino to ask the latter to execute the
necessary document (deed of sale) that will cause the
issuance of title in his (petitioner's) name. In violation of
the agreement and in contravention of the affidavit that
he himself signed, Aquino refused. This being the case,
petitioner had to insure that his interest over the property
would be protected by having his adverse claim duly
annotated at the back of TCT No. 175968. Petitioner
Felix Abad also sent letters to Aquino requesting for a
conference so that the document would be executed but
the same were never answered. 3
Hence, petitioner Felix Abad filed Civil Case No. Q-
27582 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to
compel Aquino spouses to execute the requisite
instrument recognizing his co-ownership over the
property and for the Register of Deeds to issue a transfer
certificate of title in his favor over his portion thereof.
On November 29,1982, the Regional Trial Court in Civil
Case No. Q-27582 rendered a decision ordering the
Aquino spouses or, in their default, the Branch Clerk of
Court, to sign, execute and deliver after the judgment
has become final and executory, a registerable deed of
sale in favor of petitioner Felix Abad over the portion
pertaining to him in accordance with the survey
conducted by the Bureau of Lands, that is:
A parcel of land (Lot B, VS-04-000182, L.R.C., record
No.___), situated in the district of Diliman, Quezon City,
island of Luzon. Bounded on the N., along lines 7-1-2 by
old course of Culiat Creek (Now Dried), on the E., along
lines 2-3-4-5 by Lot C, VS-04000182, on the S., along
line 5-6 by Masaya Interior Street, and on the W., along
line 6-7 by Lot A, VS-04-000182. Beginning at a point
marked 'l' on plan, being N., 8 deg. 45'W., 1728.32 m.
from BLIM #10, Quezon City;
thence N., 49 deg. 29'E., 6.06 m. to point 2;
thence S., 12 deg. 11'W., 0.89 m. to point 3;
thence S., 28 deg. 15'W., 4.39 m. to point 4;
thence S., 0 deg. 44'E., 7.88 m. to point 5;
thence N., 83 deg. 38'E., 4.92 m. to point 6;
thence N., 2 deg. 53'W., 8.56 m. to point 7;
thence N., 76 deg. 44'E., 2.95 m. to point of origin;
beginning, containing an area of FIFTY FIVE SQUARE
METERS, all points referred to are indicated on the plan
and are marked on the ground by old P.S. cyl., conc.,
mons., 15 x 60 cm., bearing true date of original survey,
December 1910 to June 1971 to April 3, 1963 and was
approved on November 10, 1981. 4
The Regional Trial Court in the above-mentioned case
(Civil Case No. Q-27582) also ordered the Register of
Deeds to issue in favor of petitioner Felix Abad a transfer
certificate of title over the portion conveyed to him on the
basis of the aforestated deed of sale.
Unfortunately, the contest over the property in question
did not end there. After the decision in Civil Case No. Q-
27582 was rendered, petitioners Abad spouses learned
that private respondents Dayap spouses intended to
build a fence around the area already allocated to the
former by virtue of the above decision. Hence,
petitioners Abad spouses filed another case, Civil Case
No. Q-35941, this time against private respondents
Dayap spouses, for injunction with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction, to enjoin the latter from building
the said fence. In their Answer, private respondents
Dayap spouses admitted the allegations of petitioners
Abad spouses with respect to their act of fencing the
area. However, private respondents claimed that the lot
belonged to them as it was within the property they
bought from Herminigildo Aquino.
Considering that both parties were asserting their right
over the same piece of property, the lower court ordered
the Bureau of Lands to make a survey that would
determine the Identity of the land claimed by each party
based on the titles and other documents of ownership
submitted in court.
After conducting a verification survey, the Bureau of
Lands submitted a report informing the court that the
construction made by the private respondents Dayap
spouses is entirely within Lot B, VS- 04-000182 which
was the same land already assigned to petitioner Felix
Abad by virtue of Civil Case No. Q- 27582 . 5
On February 16, 1984, the lower court rendered a
decision in favor of petitioners Abad spouses with the
following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, premises above-considered, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering defendants and/or their agents
to desist and refrain from making any construction,
interfering or disturbing plaintiffs in their possession of
the subject land afore-described.
With cost against defendants, including the surveyor's
fee.
SO ORDERED.6
In arriving at its decision, the lower court took into
consideration the decision in Civil Case No. Q-27582.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the
lower court was reversed. The appellate court criticized
the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-27582 for
adjudicating to petitioners Lot B, VS-04-000182. The
Court of Appeals went on to say that Civil Case No. Q-
27582 cannot bind private respondents as they were not
included as parties to the case.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari with the
following assignments of error.
First Assignment of Error
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT RENDERED A DECISION BASED ON THE
DECISION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 31, (NOW REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 89) WHICH IS
NOT ON APPEAL BEFORE IT.
Second Assignment of Error
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT IGNORED THE DOCTRINE OF THE LAW OF
THE CASE.
Third Assignment of Error
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT FOUND FOR THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
AND AGAINST THE PETITIONERS. 7
The above-enumerated assignments of error will be
taken up together for being closely related with one
another.
Firstly, petitioners aver that instead of deciding the issue
regarding the propriety of the injunctive relief issued in
Civil Case No. Q-35941 which was the case on appeal
before it, the Court of Appeals erroneously ruled on the
actuations of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.
Q-27582 8 which on the other hand, were not in issue
before it. 9 Petitioners contend that the ruling of the Court
of Appeals was baseless inasmuch as Civil Case No. Q-
35941 was entirely separate from Civil Case No. Q-
27582 and also because the theory on which the
appellate court proceeded involved factual
considerations neither touched upon in the pleadings or
made the subject of evidence at the trial.10
A perusal of the records of this case would reveal that
the Court of Appeals committed a glaring error in ruling
on a case which was not on appeal before it. We find
that the appellate court indeed went beyond its realm of
authority when it criticized the proceedings in Civil Case
No. Q-27582, questioning the assignment of the subject
lot to herein petitioners and even hinted at the
impropriety of the same.11
The pronouncements made by the Court of Appeals
regarding Civil Case No. Q-27582 are uncalled for. As
already mentioned, the case was not on appeal before it
and the Regional Trial Court had its own basis for
arriving at its decision in favor of herein petitioners Abad
spouses as against the defendant in that case,
Herminigildo Aquino. The duty of the Court of Appeals
was to rule on whether or not petitioners were properly
granted their prayer for injunction as against the private
respondents. Whether or not the trial court in Civil Case
No. Q27582 committed a mistake in arriving at its
decision is an issue that is beyond its authority to decide.
What makes the error of the Court of Appeals more
apparent is that the decision in Civil Case No. Q-27582
had long become final and duly executed. The appellate
court need not be reminded of the well-entrenched
principle that a decision, once final and executory, can
no longer be altered or modified even by the court which
rendered it, otherwise there would be no end to
litigation.12 In Litton Mills, Inc. vs. Galleon Trade
Inc., 13 We made it clear that once a judgment has
become final, the issues therein should be laid to rest. If
the trial court itself which rendered the decision which
has become final could no longer reopen the issues that
have already been settled therein, then all the more
should the prohibition apply to an appellate court called
upon to decide on a different case. At this juncture, We
reiterate that the main role of courts of justice is to assist
in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order, by settling justiciable
controversies with finality.14
Nonetheless, private respondents maintain that the only
reason why the Court of Appeals cited Civil Case No. Q-
27582 is that it was also mentioned in the decision of the
lower court in Civil Case No. Q-35941 which was
brought to it on appeal. Private respondents add that
they cannot be bound by the decision in the other case
as they were not parties to it.
In response to the above-written arguments of private
respondents, We note that the word "cite" seems to have
been used to mislead this Court into believing that Civil
Case No. Q-27582 was mentioned by the Court of
Appeals in its decision with less significance than what
appears to be. However, the decision of the Court of
Appeals would itself reflect its clear intention to openly
declare its own finding that the decision in the said case,
not appealed to it, was wrong.
Regarding the point that not only the Court of Appeals
but even the lower court in Civil Case No. Q-35941
included in its decision the other case, We are of the
opinion that the Regional Trial Court had to take into
consideration the decision in Civil Case No. Q-27582
because in deciding whether or not to grant herein
petitioners their prayer for injunction, it had to be
established first whether or not petitioners had a better
right to the property than private respondents did. Civil
Case No. Q-27582 came into the picture as it provided
the answer the court was in search of since by virtue of
that case, petitioners acquired a strong document
(torrens title) evidencing their ownership of the property
as compared to the inconclusive documents offered by
private respondents.
Had the private respondents presented incontestable
proof supporting their claim of ownership over the
property, then the lower court may have decided Civil
Case No. Q-35941 in a different manner, regardless of
the outcome in Civil Case No. Q-27582. However,
weighing all the evidence on hand, the lower court found
it reasonable and fair to decide for petitioners as their
assertion was backed by a torrens title whereas private
respondents miserably failed to convince the court of
their claim. Hence, the lower court said:
. . . Unless defendants could show, which they failed
even to allege indubitably, that they have a better and
stronger right than the plaintiffs over the subject parcel of
land, then the remedy sought by plaintiffs must lie. 15
It is not true that the lower court based its decision
entirely on Civil Case No. Q-27582 though, admittedly,
the outcome in the said case contributed much in
convincing the lower court that petitioners must be
granted their prayer for injunction. Furthermore, there is
nothing in the decision of the lower court which
categorically states that private respondents are bound
by the decision in Civil Case No. Q-27582. To repeat,
the decision was only brought up to prove that
petitioners had a better right to the property, hence, their
prayer for injunction against private respondents who
were planning to make additional constructions, had to
be granted.
As to the other allegations of private respondents-they all
sum up to the claim that they are the rightful owners of
the property. To support their stand, they present the
following: (1) they purchased the lot in question from
Herminigildo Aquino in good faith and for value as
evidenced by the Deed of Sale executed by the latter in
their favor; and (2) they are the ones in possession of
the property.
The issue of ownership having been tackled by the Court
of Appeals and there being a need to settle once and for
all the issue of who has a better right to the property as
between the petitioners and private respondents, We
make the following ruling:
certificate of title covering the disputed lot is now in the
name of petitioner spouses. Such title is entitled to
respect and great weight until somebody else can show
a better right to the lot.
Of course, this Decision is without prejudice to any right
private respondents may have against Herminigildo
Aquino. All constructions built by private respondents in
good faith may be removed by them following the
provisions in the Civil Code on builders in good faith.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 09424 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-35941 is hereby
REINSTATED. The case is hereby remanded to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for immediate
execution. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

With respect to the allegation of private respondents that

they purchased the property in question from
Herminigildo Aquino in good faith and for value in 1972
— We hold that such sale could not have covered a
definite portion of the land under co-ownership. It has
been established on record that from 1969, the property
in question was co-owned by Herminigildo Aquino and
three other persons including petitioner Felix Abad. In
1972, such co-ownership still existed and even the Court
of Appeals does not deny the fact of such co-ownership.
It is well-settled that a co-owner has no right to sell a
divided part, by metes and bounds, of the real estate
owned in common.15a This doctrine was reiterated
in Mercado vs. Liwanag, 16 where it was held that a co-
owner may not convey a physical portion of the land
owned in common. Applying the foregoing principles, We
hold, therefore, that Aquino, a mere co-owner, could not
have validly sold to private respondents a specific part of
the land he owned in common with petitioner and two
others as described in the Deed of Sale executed by him
in favor of private respondents. Private respondents,
therefore, cannot claim title to that definite portion of the
land owned in common, wherein they have made and
were about to begin other constructions at the time the
complaint for injunction was filed by petitioners in the
lower court.

With regard to the contention of private respondents that

they have a better right to the property since they have
occupied and are presently in possession of the same, it
is but proper to reiterate the well-established rule that
mere possession cannot defeat the title of a holder of a
registered torrens title to real property.17 It is indeed
questionable that up to now, private respondents merely
have in their possession a deed of absolute sale
executed way back in 1972 to evidence their claim of
ownership. Petitioners, on the other hand, have the
affidavit proving their right as co-owner of the lot, their
adverse claim annotated at the back of the torrens title of
Aquino, and a final judgment in their favor. The transfer
 This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the
partial reversal of the Decision1 and
2
the Resolution  denying the motion for reconsideration
rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) Second Division
in CA-G.R. CV No. 57148.

This case stemmed from a petition for cancellation of

owner’s duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 7864 of the Registry of Deeds of Misamis
Oriental and recovery of damages filed by the heirs of
Juan and Ines Panganiban, more particularly Erlinda B.
Pacursa, Ernesto P. Baconga, Asito P. Baconga and
Anita B. Fuentes, against Angelina N. Dayrit, respondent
herein, on 3 April 1992.3 The petition was later amended
to add the heirs of Asito P. Baconga as petitioners upon
the latter’s death and to include a prayer for quieting of
title over the property in dispute.4

The undisputed operative facts follow.

The property subject of controversy is a two thousand

twenty-five (2,025)-square meter portion of a lot
denominated as Lot 1436, situated at Kauswagan,
Cagayan de Oro City. It constitutes three-fourths (3/4) of
Lot 1436, one of the three (3) lots covered by OCT No.
7864, the other two being Lots 1441 and 1485. OCT No.
7864 was registered in the names of Juan Panganiban
(Juan) and Ines Panganiban (Ines), father and daughter
respectively, on 17 April 1940.5 Juan died sometime in
June 19426 while Ines, his only child, died in April 1944.7

In the amended complaint filed with the trial court,

petitioners alleged that they are the possessors and
owners of Lot 1436 which they inherited from the late
Juan and Ines. They acknowledge that Lot 1436 was the
only remaining lot covered by OCT No. 7864, Lots 1485
and 1441 having been sold in 1949 to Galo Sabanal and
Pablo Dagbay respectively, by virtue of a deed
denominated as Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
Among Heirs and Sale.8

The owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 covering

Lot 1436 had been lost but upon petition with the trial
G.R. No. 151235 July 28, 2005 court in 1977 by Erlinda B. Pacursa (Erlinda), one of the
heirs of Ines and a petitioner herein, the trial court
granted the petition.9 Accordingly, the Register of Deeds
HEIRS OF JUAN PANGANIBAN & INES
of Misamis Oriental issued an owner’s duplicate
PANGANIBAN, namely: ERLINDA B. PACURSA,
certificate of OCT No. 7864 to Erlinda.10
ERNESTO P. BACONGA, EVELYN BACONGA, AMY
B. BIHAG, SIEGFREDO BACONGA, IMELDA B.
PACALDO, REBECCA B. LI, OFELIA B. OALIVAR, Petitioners further alleged that unknown to them, a
GEMMA BACONGA, MARIE INES BACONGA, certain Cristobal Salcedo (Salcedo) asserted ownership
MELANIE BACONGA, and ANITA over Lot 1436 and believing that it was unregistered,
FUENTES, Petitioners, sold a portion of it to respondent. The latter subsequently
vs. discovered that what she had bought was registered
ANGELINA N. DAYRIT, Respondent. land. Unable to annotate the deed of sale at the back of
OCT No. 7864, respondent fraudulently filed a petition
for issuance of the owner’s copy of said title, docketed
DECISION
as Misc. Case No. 90-018 in March 1990. This petition of
the respondent alleged that the copy issued to Erlinda
Tinga, J.: was lost in the fire that razed Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro
City in 1981. While the petition mentioned Erlinda as the
last one in possession of the alleged lost owner’s
duplicate copy of the title, she was not notified of the
proceedings.11
The petition in Misc. Case No. 90-018 was subsequently
granted and the Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental
issued an owner’s duplicate certificate of OCT No. 7864
to respondent.12 This second duplicate certificate issued
to respondent contained Entry No. 160180, the
annotation of a Notice of Adverse Claim filed by
Erlinda.13 The Notice of Adverse Claim14 dated 24
February 1992 alleged in part that Erlinda is one of the
lawful heirs of Juan and Ines, the registered owners of
the property, and as such, she has a legitimate claim
thereto.
Petitioners further alleged that the newly issued owner’s
duplicate certificate of OCT No. 7864 to respondent was
prejudicial to their previously issued title which is still in
existence. Thus, they prayed among others that they be
declared as the rightful owners of the property in
question and that the duplicate certificate of OCT No.
7864 in their possession be deemed valid and
subsisting.15
In her answer to the amended complaint, respondent
denied all the material allegations of the complaint and
set up affirmative and special defenses. She alleged that
Lot 1436 was actually sold sometime in 1947 by the
petitioners themselves and their father, Mauricio
Baconga. The sale was purportedly covered by a Deed
of Definite Sale. Salcedo then came into ownership,
possession and enjoyment of the property in
question.16 On 14 February 1978, Salcedo sold a portion
of Lot 1436 with an area of two thousand twenty- five
(2,025) square meters, more or less, to respondent.
From then on, the property in question has been in her
actual and physical enjoyment, she added.17
Respondent further alleged that the complaint was
barred by the principles of estoppel and laches by virtue
of the sales executed by petitioners themselves and their
father. The complaint, according to her, also failed to
include as defendants, the heirs of Salcedo who are
indispensable parties.18
On 10 August 1992, upon motion duly granted,
respondent filed a third-party complaint against the heirs
of Salcedo alleging that as such heirs, they carry the
burden of warranting that their predecessors in interest
were the true, legal and rightful owners of the property in
question at the time of the sale. Hence, she prayed
therein that she be maintained in peaceful and legal
ownership, possession and enjoyment of the questioned
property.19
Answering the third-party complaint, the heirs of Salcedo
effectively admitted the existence of the 1978 deed of
sale in favor of respondent by their parents and
considered the sale as within the personal and legal right
of their parents and an act outside their control.20
After due trial and consideration of the documentary and
testimonial evidence adduced by both parties, the trial
court rendered a decision against petitioners and in favor
of respondent. The dispositive portion of the decision
provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. DISMISSING plaintiff’s complaint, for lack of merit and
cause of action;
2. DECLARING defendant as the true and real owner of
the lot in question;
3. DECLARING the owner’s duplicate copy of Original
Certificate of Title No. 7864 (plaintiff’s Exh. "A") null and
void same being obtained by plaintiffs when they were
not owners anymore of Lot 1436;
4. DECLARING the owner’s duplicate copy of Original
Certificate of Title No. 7864 obtained by defendant (Exh.
"1") as the one valid to be given like faith and credit as
the one that was lost and declared null and void; and
5. ORDERING the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro
City to issue a transfer certificate of title to Angela N.
Dayrit, herein defendant, for her 2,025 square meter
portion of Lot 1436; to Anita Baconga Fuentes for her
505 square meter portion of Lot 1436 and to Atty.
Isabelo N. Pacursa or his heirs, he being allegedly dead
already, for his 170 square meter portion of Lot 1436 and
after they shall have presented an approved subdivision
plan and an agreement to partition, to issue to each of
them, their respective transfer certificate of title with an
area according to the respective technical description
corresponding to each of their land.
Defendant’s counterclaim and third-party complaint are
hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.21
The Regional Trial Court Decision was modified by the
CA on appeal by petitioners. The appellate court held
that contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the valid and
subsisting duplicate certificate of OCT No. 7864 was the
one issued to Erlinda, not to respondent, considering
that respondent had failed to comply with the mandatory
jurisdictional requirements of law for the reconstitution of
title under Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 26.22
The CA invoked the doctrine that a trial court does not
acquire jurisdiction over a petition for the issuance of a
new owner’s duplicate certificate of title if the original is
in fact not lost. Citing Strait Times, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,23 the CA held that the reconstituted certificate
is itself void once the existence of the original is
unquestionably demonstrated.24
Nonetheless, the CA affirmed in all other respects the
ruling of the trial court, including the critical holding that
respondent was the owner of the subject property. The
decretal portion of the CA’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to
applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and
evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered granting
partly the instant appeal. Consequently, the decision of
the trial court is MODIFIED so as to order the
cancellation of the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No.
7864 issued to defendant Angelina Dayrit and
declaring the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864
(Exh. "A" and sub-markings with SN No. 014439) to
be still valid for all intents and purposes and to be
given like faith and credit as the original. All other
aspects are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.25 (Emphasis in the original.)
Petitioners now come before this Court seeking the
partial reversal of the decision rendered by the CA. They
contend that the CA erred in finding that the tax
declarations and the alleged adverse possession of
respondent and her predecessor-in-interest are
conclusive proofs of their ownership of Lot 1436. They
further contend that the CA erred when it found them
guilty of laches.26
However, it is apparent that in order that the petition may
be properly resolved, we must ascertain first, who
between petitioners and respondent is the rightful owner
of the property in dispute and second, whether
petitioners’ right to recover the property is barred by
laches assuming they are the rightful owners thereof as
they claim.
The resolution of the foregoing issues hinges on the
question of which owner’s duplicate certificate of title is
valid and subsisting, the one in petitioners’ possession or
the one issued to respondent. What appears on the face
of the title is controlling in questions of ownership since
the certificate of title is an absolute and indefeasible
evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein.27
The CA correctly ruled that the duplicate certificate of
title in petitioners’ possession is valid and subsisting.
This Court had already ruled in Serra Serra v. Court of
Appeals28 that if a certificate of title has not been lost but
is in fact in the possession of another person, the
reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the
decision has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition for
issuance of a new title.29 Since the owner’s duplicate
copy of OCT No. 7864 earlier issued to Erlinda is still in
existence, the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction
over respondent’s petition for reconstitution of title. The
duplicate certificate of title subsequently issued to
respondent is therefore void and of no effect.
The registered owners of OCT No. 7864 on the face of
the valid and subsisting duplicate certificate of title are
still Juan and Ines, petitioners’ predecessors in
interest.30 Per Section 46 of the Land Registration Act,
no title to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. This rule taken in conjunction with
the indefeasibility of a Torrens title leads to the
conclusion that the rightful owners of the property in
dispute are petitioners. They are indisputably the heirs of
the registered owners, both of whom are already dead.
These premises considered, it was error on the part of
the trial court to rule that respondent was the owner of
the subject property and for the CA to have affirmed
such holding. We rule instead that the successors-in-
interest of Juan and Ines are the legal owners of the
subject property, namely petitioners herein.
Petitioners’ ownership of the property having been
established, the question now is whether they are
entitled to its possession. On this point, the Court rules in
the negative. Petitioners are no longer entitled to recover
possession of the property by virtue of the equitable
defense of laches. Thus, petitioners’ argument that
laches is not applicable to them has no merit. By laches
is meant:
…the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done
earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. The defense of laches is an
equitable one and does not concern itself with the
character of the defendant’s title but only with whether or
not by reason of plaintiff’s long inaction or inexcusable
neglect, he should be barred from asserting his claim at
all, because to allow him to do so would be inequitable
and unjust to defendant.31
In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a
registered owner of property may be barred from
recovering possession of property by virtue of
laches.32 Thus, in the case of Lola v. Court of
Appeals,33 this Court held that petitioners acquired title to
the land owned by respondent by virtue of the equitable
principles of laches due to respondent’s failure to assert
her claims and ownership for thirty-two (32) years.
In Miguel v. Catalino,34 this Court said that appellant’s
passivity and inaction for more than thirty-four (34) years
(1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up
the equitable defense of laches in his behalf. Likewise, in
the case of Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia,35 we stated
that while the defendant may not be considered as
having acquired title by virtue of his and his
predecessor’s long continued possession for thirty-seven
(37) years, the original owner’s right to recover
possession of the property and the title thereto from the
defendant has, by the latter’s long period of possession
and by patentee’s inaction and neglect, been converted
into a stale demand.36
In this case, both the lower court and the appellate court
found that contrary to respondent’s claim of possession,
it was Salcedo, respondent’s predecessor-in-interest
who had been in actual possession of the property. In
fact, when the lower court conducted an ocular
inspection on the subject premises sometime on 16
March 1993, the court-appointed Commissioner elicited
from the people residing near the subject property, more
particularly Celso Velez, Nieto Abecia and Paquito Nabe,
that Salcedo was the owner and the one in possession
of the land until 1978 when respondent became the
possessor thereof.37
It was only in 1992 or forty-five (45) years from the time
Salcedo took possession of the property that petitioners
made an attempt to claim it as their own. Petitioners
declared the property for tax purposes, registered their
adverse claim to respondent’s title, and filed the instant
case all in 1992.38 These actuations of petitioners point
to the fact that for forty-five (45) years, they did nothing
to assert their right of ownership and possession over
the subject property.
Given the circumstances in the case at bar, the
application of the equitable defense of laches is more
than justified.
Petitioners claim that prescription and adverse
possession can never militate against the right of a
registered owner since a title, once registered cannot be
defeated even by adverse, open and notorious
possession.39
They are right in that regard. But their cause is defeated
not by prescription and adverse possession, but by
laches.
This Court had occasion to distinguish laches from
prescription in the case of Heirs of Batiog Lacamen v.
Heirs of Laruan.40 It was held therein that:
"Laches" has been defined as "such neglect or omission
to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time
and other circumstances causing prejudice to an
adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity." It is a
delay in the assertion of a right "which works
disadvantage to another" because of the "inequity
founded on some change in the condition or relations of
the property or parties." It is based on public policy
which, for the peace of society, ordains that relief will be
denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a
valid claim. It is different from and applies independently
of prescription. While prescription is concerned with the
fact of delay, laches is concerned with the effect of
delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is
principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to
be enforced, this inequity being founded on some
change in the condition of the property or the relation of
the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not.
Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at
law. Prescription is based on a fixed time, laches is
not.41 (Footnotes are omitted.)
Thus, it is the effect of delay in asserting their right of
ownership over the property which militates against
petitioners, not merely the fact that they asserted their
right to the property too late in the day.
All the four (4) elements of laches prescribed by this
Court in the case of Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et
al.42 and reiterated in the cases of Mejia de Lucas v.
Gamponia,43 Miguel v. Catalino44 and Claverias v.
Quingco45  are present in the case at bar, to wit:
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which
complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a
remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the
defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the right on
which he bases his suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief
is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to
be barred.46
Petitioners’ inaction for forty-five (45) years reduced their
right to recover the subject property into a stale demand.
In Mejia,47 the Court held in essence that the principle of
laches is one of estoppel because it prevents people
who have slept on their rights from prejudicing the rights
of third parties who have placed reliance on the inaction
of the original patentee and his successors in
interest.48 The following pronouncement in the case
of Claverias v. Quingco49 is therefore apropos to the
case at bar:
…Courts cannot look with favor at parties who, by their
silence, delay and inaction, knowingly induce another to
spend time, effort and expense in cultivating the land,
paying taxes and making improvements thereon for 30
long years, only to spring from ambush and claim title
when the possessor’s efforts and the rise of the land
values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at his
expense.50
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as
it ruled that the claim of petitioners is barred by laches.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review1 of the 6 May 20052 and 3

August 20053 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. SP No. 00195. In its 6 May 2005 Resolution, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review filed
by petitioners Melchor and Saturnina Alde (petitioners)
for failure to comply with the Rules of Court. In its 3
August 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

Sometime in 1957, Adriano Bernal (Adriano), father of

respondents Ronald, Olympia, Juanito and Myrna, all
surnamed Bernal (respondents), entered upon, occupied
and cultivated a parcel of land situated in San Antonio
West, Don Carlos, Bukidnon. After a survey in 1992, the
property was designated as Cadastral Lot No. 1123, Cad
1119-D, Case 8 with an area of 8.5043 hectares.

In January 1994, Adriano secured a loan of ₱5,000 from

petitioners and turned over physical possession,
occupation and cultivation of 1.5 hectares of the
property.4 In June 1994, Adriano secured another loan of
₱10,000 from petitioners and used another 1.5 hectares
as security for its payment.5 Petitioners then took
possession and cultivated another 1.5 hectares of the
property.

In September 1994, Adriano informed petitioners that he

could no longer pay the loan obligation and that he was
selling the whole property to petitioners for ₱80,000. The
sale was evidenced by a "Kasabotan sa Palit sa
Yuta"6 dated 22 September 1994, signed by Adriano as
owner of the land, Leona Bernal as Adriano’s wife, with
respondent Ronald Bernal (Ronald), among others, as
witness. Petitioners took possession of the whole
property and continued the cultivation of the land.

On 18 October 1994, Original Certificate of Title No. AO-

72367 (OCT No. AO-7236) in the names of Adriano for
an area of 3 hectares, Ronald for an area of 3 hectares,
and respondent Juanito Bernal (Juanito) for an area of
2.5043 hectares was issued. OCT No. AO-7236
originated from Certificate of Land Ownership Award No.
00073938 (CLOA No. 00073938) issued by the
Department of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Republic Act
G.R. No. 169336               March 18, 2010
No. 6657.8
SPOUSES MELCHOR and SATURNINA
Then, sometime in April 2002, respondents demanded
ALDE, Petitioners,
from petitioners ₱50,000 as additional consideration for
vs.
the property. Respondents also informed petitioners, for
RONALD B. BERNAL, OLYMPIA B. BERNAL,
the first time, of the existence of OCT No. AO-7236.
JUANITO B. BERNAL, and MYRNA D.
Petitioners rejected respondents’ request since they
BERNAL, Respondents.
already bought the entire property in 1994 and requested
that respondents turn-over to them OCT No. AO-7236.
Respondents refused.
On 13 June 2002, respondents filed a complaint for
recovery of ownership and possession of parcels of land
with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory
injunction and damages against petitioners before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Don Carlos-Kitaotao-
Dangcagan, Don Carlos, Bukidnon
(MCTC).9 Respondents claimed that Adriano erroneously
included their shares of the property in the sale. Juanito
claimed that Adriano gave him 2.5043 hectares when he
got married in 1978. While Ronald claimed that Adriano
gave him 3 hectares when he got married in 1987.
In their Answer,10 petitioners declared that they have
been in open, notorious and peaceful occupation,
possession and cultivation of the property in the concept
of an owner since 1994 when they bought the property
from Adriano. Petitioners argued that respondents have
no legal right over the property and that CLOA No.
00073938 issued in respondents’ name is void.
Petitioners also asked that they be declared the absolute
and legal owners of the property.
The Ruling of the MCTC
In its 19 November 2003 Decision,11 the MCTC
dismissed respondents’ complaint. According to the
MCTC, Adriano was the sole owner of the property and
that Adriano sold the whole property to petitioners. The
MCTC found no evidence of the transfer of ownership of
the property from Adriano to Juanito and Ronald.
Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court,
Malaybalay City, Branch 9 (RTC).
The Ruling of the RTC
In its 9 August 2004 Decision,12 the RTC declared that,
from the start until the sale to petitioners, the property
was owned in common by Adriano, Juanito and Ronald.
The dispositive portion of the RTC’s 9 August 2004
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Lower Court is hereby
modified as follows:
1). Declaring the "Kasabutan Sa Palit Sa Yuta" dated
September 22, 1994, to be valid legally and enforceable
and must be adjudged to be owned by the defendants-
appellees only in so far as the same refers to the portion
previously owned by Adriano Bernal.
2). Declaring the plaintiffs-appellants as still the true and
absolute owners of the respective three (3) hectares and
2.5043 hectares as above stated and must be issued
separately [sic] a title therefor.
3). Ordering the defendants-appellees to return and
deliver possession of the properties above mentioned to
the plaintiffs-appellants.
4). Directing the Registry of Deeds to issue separate
Certificate[s] of Title to the plaintiffs-appellants Ronald
Bernal for 3.0000 hectares and Juanito Bernal for 2.5043
hectares and to the defendants-appellees the remaining
portion of three hectares.
5). No award of any damages shall be awarded to any of
the parties and with costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.13
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25
October 2004 Order,14 the RTC denied the motion.
Petitioners filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 6 May 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition on technical grounds. The 6 May
2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals declared:
Upon perusal of the case records, this Court FINDS the
following infirmities that warrants the outright dismissal of
the instant case, to wit:
1. The Regional Trial Court was not furnished with a
copy of the petition, in violation of Section 1 of Rule 42 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Court;
2. There was no proper verification, in violation of
Section 4 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure; and
3. The nature of the case should only be Petition for
Review and not Petition for Review on Certiorari
because the latter would fall under Rule 45, an action
before the Supreme Court.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 3
August 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON
PURELY TECHNICAL GROUNDS DISREGARDING
THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL;
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE MERITS OF THE
CASE WHICH COULD HAVE REVERSED THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT HAD THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW BEEN GIVEN DUE
COURSE.16
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
The Court of Appeals’ dismissal of petitioners’ petition on
purely technical grounds was unwarranted. We agree
with petitioners that the late filing and service of a copy
of the petition to the RTC was not a substantial infirmity
that should cause the outright dismissal of the petition.
Likewise, the verification of a pleading is only a formal,
not jurisdictional, requirement.17 The purpose of requiring
a verification is to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the petition are true and correct, not merely
speculative.18 This requirement is simply a condition
affecting the form of pleadings, and non-compliance
therewith does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective.19
The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is
frowned upon for it is far more better for the courts to
excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review
of the case on the merits to attain the ends of justice.20
Respondents Failed to Prove their Title over the
Property
As to the merits of the case, petitioners argue that,
contrary to the findings of the RTC, respondents failed to
present any evidence to show that they owned parts of
the property in dispute. Petitioners insist that the claim of
Juanito and Ronald that Adriano donated to them their
respective shares in the property is not supported by any
evidence. Petitioners maintain that Juanito and Ronald’s
claims are self-serving and merely fabricated.
As to the "Kasabotan sa Palit sa Yuta," petitioners point
out that it was prepared in the local dialect of which
Adriano and Ronald were conversant. According to
petitioners, Adriano and Ronald cannot just deny
knowledge of the said document and claim that they just
affixed their signatures without reading the document.
Petitioners maintain that Adriano was the sole owner of
the property and that he had the right to sell, transfer,
convey and dispose of the same.
Petitioners aver that they have been in open, public and
peaceful possession, occupation and cultivation of the
property in the concept of an owner since the sale of the
property by Adriano in 1994. Petitioners pray that they
be declared the absolute and legal owners of the
property. Petitioners also pray that respondents be
ordered to turn over CLOA No. 00073938 and OCT No.
AO-7236 to them, the real owners of the property.21
On the other hand, respondents insist that Adriano could
not have sold the entire property because he was no
longer the owner thereof on 22 September 1994.
Respondents maintain that Adriano verbally donated to
them their respective shares in the property way back in
1978 and 1987. Respondents explain that Adriano did
not know that he was selling the whole property and not
just his assigned 3 hectares to petitioners. Ronald also
claims that he did not know the contents of the deed of
sale when he signed it as a witness.
We agree with petitioners that respondents failed to
present any evidence to show that they owned parts of
the property in dispute. First, in the stipulation of facts
during the pre-trial conference before the MCTC,
respondents admitted that the land was owned by
Adriano. While both Juanito and Ronald claimed that
Adriano donated to them their respective portions of the
property when they got married in 1978 and 1987,
respectively, they did not present any deed of donation.
As the MCTC stated in its 19 November 2003 Decision,
"the transfers cannot be by donation because the law
requires that for donation to be effective, it must be in a
public instrument and in this case there is none."22
Second, the tax declaration offered by respondents as
evidence only mentioned Adriano as the owner of the
whole property.23 While tax declarations are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof
of claim of ownership.24 Respondents did not present
any credible explanation why the tax declaration was
only under the name of Adriano.
Third, contrary to Ronald’s claim, the June 1994 deed of
mortgage25 did not clearly show that he was the owner of
the property and that petitioners recognized him as such.
While Ronald’s name appeared in the body of the deed,
the designation as owner of the property under his name
was crossed-out. It was Adriano who signed the deed of
mortgage and the designation as owner of the property
appeared under his name.
Fourth, Ronald was present when the deed of sale was
executed on 22 September 1994 and he even signed as
one of the witnesses. We find it hard to believe that
Ronald and Adriano did not understand the contents of
the deed when it was written in their local dialect.
Moreover, it took respondents more than seven years to
question Adriano’s sale of the whole property to
petitioners.1avvphi1
Lastly, respondents claim ownership of the property
based on OCT No. AO-7236. However, a certificate of
title is not equivalent to title.26 In Lee Tek Sheng v. Court
of Appeals,27 we explained:
By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by
that document [the Original Certificate of Title or the Transfer
Certificate of Title]. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate
with title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the
Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no
longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of
title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of
land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as
conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance of the
certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose
the possibility that the real property may be under co-
ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the
registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have
acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate
of title. To repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but
is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of
ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as
evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeable.28 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, respondents cannot claim ownership over the
disputed portions of the property absent any showing of how
they acquired title over the same.
Accordingly, the property must be reconveyed in favor of
petitioners, the true and actual owners of the property. An
action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy
granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully
or erroneously registered in the name of another for the
purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the
land to him.29
However, since petitioners did not make a direct attack on the
validity of OCT No. AO-7236 and had not asked for the
cancellation of the original certificate of title as required by
Section 4830 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,31 this Court
cannot cancel OCT No. AO-7236 and order the issuance of a
new certificate of title in the name of petitioners. Any direct
attack on the validity of a Torrens certificate of title must be
instituted with the proper Regional Trial Court.32 This case
originated in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Even if we
consider petitioners’ counter-claim as a petition for the
cancellation of OCT No. AO-7236 and, thus, a direct attack on
the certificate of title, the MCTC still does not have jurisdiction
over the cancellation of a Torrens title.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 6
May 2005 and 3 August 2005 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 00195. We REINSTATE the 19
November 2003 Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Don Carlos-Kitaotao-Dangcagan, Don Carlos, Bukidnon.
SO ORDERED .
G.R. No. 213568, July 05, 2016
ALICIA P. LOGARTA, Petitioner, v. CATALINO M.
MANGAHIS, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated December 13,
2013 and the Resolution3 dated June 27, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 98819, which
affirmed the Order4 dated June 27, 2011 and the
Amended Order5 dated December 29, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25 (RTC)
in LRC Case No. B-4122, directing the cancellation of
Entry No. 626131, Entry No. 626132, Entry No. 626133,
and Entry No. 626134 on Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. CLO-763.
The Facts
Respondent Catalino M. Mangahis (respondent) is the
registered owner of a parcel of land in Barangay Malitlit,
Sta. Rosa, Laguna, with an area of 28,889 square
meters, and covered by TCT No. CLO-763 (subject
property).6 He authorized a certain Venancio Zamora
(Zamora) to sell the subject property, who, in turn,
delegated his authority to Victor Peña
(Peña).7chanrobleslaw
On January 23, 2001, Peña entered into a Memorandum
of Agreement8 (MOA) with Carmona Realty and
Development Corporation (Carmona Realty),
represented by petitioner Alicia P. Logarta (petitioner),
for the sale to Carmona Realty of contiguous parcels of
land in Malitlit, Sta. Rosa, Laguna (Malitlit Estate) which
included the subject property. The Malitlit Estate had a
total area of 1,194,427 square meters and Carmona
Realty agreed to deposit in escrow the total
consideration of P1,476,834,000.00 within thirty (30)
days from the execution of the MOA.9 The release of the
escrow deposits was subject to Peña's submission of a
number of documents, among others, the order of
conversion from the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) allowing the use of the Malitlit Estate for
residential, industrial, commercial, or a combination of
the foregoing uses, the transfer of the TCTs and the
Certificates of Land Ownership (CLOAs) in Carmona
Realty's name, and the release waiver and quitclaim
executed by complainants and/or order of dismissal of
pending cases involving any of the lands constituting the
Malitlit Estate.10 The parties also agreed to make the
same effective unless Carmona Realty withdraws from it
by reason of force majeure or fails to make the escrow
deposits within the period specified therein, in which
case the MOA shall be considered automatically null and
void.11chanrobleslaw
On March 28, 2003, the MOA was annotated12 on TCT
No. CLO-763, pursuant to the Sworn Statement to
Request for Annotation13 executed by petitioner and the
Secretary's Certificate14 issued by Marianito R. Atienza,
Carmona Realty's Corporate Secretary. Thus, Entry Nos.
626131-626134 (the subject entries) were made on TCT
No. CLO-763:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Entry No. 626131. Secretary's Certificate
No. 626132. Letter;
No. 626133. Sworn Statement to Request Annotation
of Memorandum of Agreement. Executed by Alicia P.
Logarta on 26 March 2003, ratified before Notary Public
Anthony B. Escobar, as per Doc. No. 499, Page No. 100,
Book No. 1, Series of 2003.
No. 626134. Memorandum of Agreement. Executed by
and between Victor Peña and Carmona Realty and
Development Corporation on 23 January 2001, ratified
before Notary Public Ma. Loreto U. Navarro, as per Doc.
No. 68, Page No. 14, Book No. XVIII, Series of 2001,
filed in Env. No. CLO-213.
Date of instrument: March 26, 2003
Date of inscription : March 28, 2003 at 1:05 p.m.
15
On August 8, 2008, respondent filed a petition  to
cancel the subject entries on the ground that the MOA
was a private document that had no legal effect because
the Notary Public before whom it was acknowledged was
not commissioned as such in the City of Manila for the
year 2001. In the same petition, respondent also sought
the revocation of Zamora's authority to sell the subject
property.16chanrobleslaw
In opposition,17 petitioner contended that the MOA was
duly notarized in Makati City where the Notary Public,
Atty. Loreto Navarro, was commissioned.18 She also
maintained that Peña had the authority to enter into the
MOA at the time it was executed, considering that
respondent expressed his intention to revoke the same
only in the petition.19chanrobleslaw
During the trial, respondent's brother and
authorized20 representative, Emiliano M. Mangahis,
asserted that the subject entries should be cancelled
because the purpose for which they were made is no
longer present since petitioner did nothing to enforce the
MOA.21 On the other hand, petitioner argued that she is
not the proper party to the case as she merely acted as
representative of Carmona Realty in the
MOA.22chanrobleslaw
The RTC Ruling
23
In an Order  dated June 27, 2011, the RTC granted the
petition and ordered the cancellation of the subject
entries. It found that the subject entries are adverse
claims which ceased to be effective 30 days after
registration and should, therefore, be cancelled,
pursuant to Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1529,24 otherwise known as the "Property Registration
Decree," which states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 70. Adverse claim. Whoever claims any part or
interest in registered land adverse to the registered
owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original
registration, may, if no other provision is made in this
Decree for registering the same, make a statement in
writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and
how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number
of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the name
of the registered owner, and a description of the land in
which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall
state the adverse claimant's residence, and a place at
which all notices may be served upon him. This
statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse
claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall
be effective for a period of thirty days from the date
of registration. After the lapse of said period, the
annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon
filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in
interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation, no
second adverse claim based on the same ground shall
be registered by the same claimant.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
The RTC also remarked that the MOA no longer has any
force and effect, considering that Carmona Realty failed
to make the escrow deposits stipulated therein which
rendered the same automatically null and
void.25cralawred It further explained that petitioner has
other remedies which she can pursue if Peña failed to
comply with his obligations under the MOA. In any case,
however, the adverse claim cannot be inscribed on TCT
No. CLO-763 forever.26chanrobleslaw
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for
reconsideration,27 arguing that the subject entries do not
constitute an adverse claim but a voluntary dealing
which is governed by Section 54 of PD 1529.28 She also
contended that the RTC erred in declaring that the MOA
no longer had any force and effect, considering that
there was no such allegation in respondent's petition and
no evidence to such effect was presented during
trial.29chanrobleslaw
In an Amended Order30 dated December 29, 2011, the
RTC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration and
reiterated its directive to cancel the subject entries.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the
CA.31chanrobleslaw
The CA Ruling
In a Decision32 dated December 13, 2013, the CA
dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed the RTC
ruling. It agreed with the trial court that the subject
entries are akin to an annotation of adverse claim which
is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person
over a piece of real property and governed by Section 70
of PD 1529.33 The CA reiterated the RTC's observation
that the MOA no longer had any force and effect, absent
any showing that Carmona Realty had made the escrow
deposits stipulated therein or that there was a mutual
agreement between the parties to extend its
effectivity.34chanrobleslaw
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,35 which was,
however, denied by the CA in its Resolution36 dated June
27, 2014; hence, the present petition.
The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or
not the CA and the RTC erred in ordering the
cancellation of the subject entries.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
An adverse claim is a type of involuntary
dealing37 designed to protect the interest of a person
over a piece of real property by apprising third persons
that there is a controversy over the ownership of the
land.38 It seeks to preserve and protect the right of the
adverse claimant during the pendency of the
controversy,39 where registration of such interest or right
is not otherwise provided for by the Property
Registration Decree.40 An adverse claim serves as a
notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the
disputed land is subject to the outcome of the
dispute.41 Section 70 of PD 1529
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 70. Adverse claim. Whoever claims any part or
interest in registered land adverse to the registered
owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original
registration, may, if no other provision is made in this
Decree for registering the same, make a statement in
writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and
how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number
of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the name
of the registered owner, and a description of the land in
which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall
state the adverse claimant's residence, and a place at
which all notices may be served upon him. This
statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse
claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall
be effective for a period of thirty days from the date
of registration. After the lapse of said period, the
annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon
filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in
interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation, no
second adverse claim based on the same ground shall
be registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in
interest may file a petition in the Court of First Instance
where the land is situated for the cancellation of the
adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy
hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse
claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and
equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid,
the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in
any case, the court, after notice and hearing, shall find
that the 4 adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it
may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one
thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in
his discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the
claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with
the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.
(Emphases supplied)
Thus, before a notice of adverse claim is registered, it
must be shown that there is no other provision in law for
the registration of the claimant's alleged right in the
property.42 In Register of Deeds of Quezon City v.
Nicandro,43 the Court held that where the basis of the
adverse claim was a perfected contract of sale which is
specifically governed by Section 57 of the Land
Registration Act, or Act No. 496, the filing of an adverse
claim was held ineffective for the purpose of protecting
the vendee's right.44 Similarly, in L.P. Leviste &
Company, Inc. v. Noblejas,45 the Court emphasized that
if the basis of the adverse claim is a perfected contract of
sale, the proper procedure is to register the vendee's
right as prescribed by Sections 5146 and 5247 of PD
1529, and not under Section 70 which is ineffective for
the purpose of protecting the vendee's right since it does
not have the effect of a conveyance.48chanrobleslaw
In the case at hand, a cursory perusal of the
MOA49 shows that it is essentially a conditional sale
where Carmona Realty's payment is subject to the
submission of certain documents by Peña, respondent's
authorized representative. Its relevant provisions
state:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WITNESSETH, That:
x x x x
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY represents, that subject
to the payment of an agreed compensation to the CLOA
holders/ARB[s], the Land Bank, and the National
Irrigation Authority, FIRST PARTY is willing and able to
have all titles, rights, interests and claims, transferred,
ceded, conveyed, assigned or waived in favor of the
SECOND PARTY who has accepted the offer to sell and
has agreed to acquire and purchase the property,
subject to the terms and conditions set forth under this
Agreement.
xxxx
III
ESCROW DEPOSIT OF PURCHASE PRICE
3.1 Within thirty (30) days from the execution of this
Memorandum of Agreement, the SECOND PARTY or its
assignee or nominee shall deposit in escrow with a bank
or financial institution which is mutually acceptable to the
Parties, the total amount of x x x. Said amount shall be
subject to release by the escrow agent/bank and/or
withdrawal in favor of the Parties specified in Section II
above, upon presentation of the documents specified
herein below, and as set forth in the Escrow instructions
given by both parties to the Escrow agent/bank.
3.2. To the FIRST PARTY:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryAll releases of the amounts
under escrow in favor of the FIRST PARTY of the full
amount of x x x, shall be subject to the submission by
the FIRST PARTY of the following documents:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1) Order of Conversion x x x
xxxx
IV
TRANSFER OF TITLE TO THE SECOND PARTY
4.1. The SECOND PARTY shall be entitled to have the
subject CLOAs-TCTs cancelled and in lieu of the same,
new TCTs shall be issued in the name of the SECOND
PARTY or its assignee free from any liens or
encumbrances as provided herein,
xxxx
VI
EFFECTIVITY OF THIS AGREEMENT
This Agreement shall take effect upon execution hereof
and shall continue in force unless the SECOND PARTY
withdraws from this Agreement by reason of force
majeure or it fails to make the escrow deposits within the
period as specified herein, in which event, this
Agreement shall be considered automatically null and
void, unless extended by mutual agreement of the
parties.50chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is settled that in a deed of conditional sale, ownership
is transferred after the full payment of the installments of
the purchase price or the fulfillment of the condition
and the execution of a definite or absolute deed of
sale.51 Verily, the efficacy or obligatory force of the
vendor's obligation to transfer title in a conditional sale is
subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain
event, such that if the suspensive condition does not
take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional
obligation had never existed.52 Given the foregoing, the
MOA is essentially a dealing affecting less than the
ownership of the subject property that is governed by
Section 54 of PD 1529,
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 54. Dealings less than ownership, how
registered. No new certificate shall be entered or issued
pursuant to any instrument which does not divest the
ownership or title from the owner or from the transferee
of the registered owners. All interests in registered land
less than ownership shall be registered by filing with the
Register of Deeds the instrument which creates or
transfers or claims such interests and by a brief
memorandum thereof made by the Register of Deeds
upon the certificate of title, and signed by him. A similar
memorandum shall also be made on the owner's
duplicate. The cancellation or extinguishment of such
interests shall be registered in the same
manner. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, being a conditional sale, the MOA is a
voluntary instrument which, as a rule, must be registered
as such and not as an adverse claim. In Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office v. New Dagupan Metro Gas
Corporation,53 the Court explained
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Apart from the foregoing, the more important
consideration was the improper resort to an adverse
claim. In L.P. Leviste & Co. v. Noblejas, this Court
emphasized that the availability of the special remedy of
an adverse claim is subject to the absence of any other
statutory provision for the registration of the claimant's
alleged right or interest in the property. That if the
claimant's interest is based on a perfected contract
of sale or any voluntary instrument executed by the
registered owner of the land, the procedure that
should be followed is that prescribed under Section
51 in relation to Section 52 of P.D. No.
1529. Specifically, the owner's duplicate certificate must
be presented to the Register of Deeds for the inscription
of the corresponding memorandum thereon and in the
entry day book. It is only when the owner refuses or
fails to surrender the duplicate certificate for
annotation that a statement setting forth an adverse
claim may be filed with the Register of
Deeds. Otherwise, the adverse claim filed will not have
the effect of a conveyance of any right or interest on the
disputed property that could prejudice the rights that
have been subsequently acquired by third persons.
What transpired in Gabin is similar to that in Leviste.
In Gabin, the basis of the claim on the property is a deed
of absolute sale. In Leviste, what is involved is a contract
to sell. Both are voluntary instruments that should have
been registered in accordance with Sections 51 and 52
of P.D. No. 1529 as there was no showing of an inability
to present the owner's duplicate of title.
It is patent that the contrary appears in this case. Indeed,
New Dagupan's claim over the subject property is based
on a conditional sale, which is likewise a voluntary
instrument. However, New Dagupan's use of the
adverse claim to protect its rights is far from being
incongruent in view of the undisputed fact that Peralta
failed to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No.
to
52135 despite demands.54 (Emphases supplied; citations
omitted.)
Thus, the prevailing rule is that voluntary instruments
such as contracts of sale, contracts to sell, and
conditional sales are registered by presenting the
owner's duplicate copy of the title for annotation,
pursuant to Sections 51 to 53 of PD 1529.55 The reason
for requiring the production of the owner's duplicate
certificate in the registration of a voluntary instrument is
that, being a willful act of the registered owner, it is to be
presumed that he is interested in registering the
instrument and would willingly surrender, present or
produce his duplicate certificate of title to the Register of
Deeds in order to accomplish such
registration.56 The exception to this rule is when
the registered owner refuses or fails to surrender his
duplicate copy of the title, in which case the claimant
may file with the Register of Deeds a statement setting
forth his adverse claim.57chanrobleslaw
In the case at hand, there was no showing that
respondent refused or failed to present the owner's
duplicate of TCT No. CLO-763, which would have
prompted Carmona Realty to cause the annotation of the
MOA as an adverse claim instead of a voluntary dealing.
On this score, therefore, the RTC and the CA erred in
ordering the cancellation of the subject entries on the
strength of Section 70 of PD 1529 which authorizes
regional trial courts to cancel adverse claims after the
lapse of thirty (30) days from registration. Being a
voluntary dealing affecting less than the ownership of the
subject property, Section 54 of PD 1529 - which states
that the cancellation of annotations involving interests
less than ownership is within the power of the Register of
Deeds - should have been applied. Accordingly, the RTC
and the CA should have dismissed the petition for
cancellation of the subject entries for being the wrong
remedy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated December 13, 2013 and the Resolution dated
June 27, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 98819, which affirmed the Order dated June 27,
2011 and the Amended Order dated December 29, 2011
of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25
in LRC Case No. B-4122 are hereby SET ASIDE. The
Petition to cancel Entry No. 626131, Entry No. 626132,
Entry No. 626133, and Entry No. 626134 on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. CLO-763 filed by respondent
Catalino M. Mangahis is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
G.R. No. 179884               January 25, 2012
DURAWOOD CONSTRUCTION AND LUMBER
SUPPLY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
CANDICE S. BONA, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
94479 dated April 18, 2007 and its Resolution2 dated
September 18, 2007.
On June 3, 2004, petitioner Durawood Construction and
Lumber Supply, Inc. (Durawood) filed an action for sum
of money plus damages with a prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment against LBB
Construction and Development Corporation (LBB
Construction) and its president Leticia Barber (Barber)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo. In said
suit, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-7240,
Durawood prayed for the sum of ₱665,385.50 as
payment for construction materials delivered to LBB
Construction.
On June 14, 2004, the RTC issued an Order granting
Durawood’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of
attachment. On June 16, 2004, the corresponding writ
was issued.
On June 17, 2004, Sheriff Rolando C. Leyva (Sheriff
Leyva) levied on a 344-square meter parcel of land in
Richdale Subdivision, Antipolo City covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. R-17571 in the name of
LBB Construction. A Notice of Levy on Attachment was
annotated in TCT No. R-17571’s Memorandum of
Encumbrances on the same day, June 17, 2004.
On July 13, 2004, respondent Candice S. Bona
(Candice) filed a Motion seeking leave to intervene in
Civil Case No. 04-7240. Attached to said Motion was
Candice’s Answer in Intervention, her Third Party Claim
addressed to Sheriff Leyva, and a copy of TCT No. R-
17571. Candice claimed therein that she is a co-owner of
the property covered by TCT No. R-17571. She alleged
that LBB Construction had sold the property to her and
her siblings, Michael Angelo S. Bona, Diane Sheila S.
Bona, Glenda May S. Bona and Johann Louie Sebastian
S. Bona, through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 2,
2004. Candice asserted that the sale is the subject
of Entry No. 30549 dated June 16, 2004 in the books of
the Registry of Deeds of Antipolo City, while the levy on
attachment is only Entry No. 30590 dated June 17,
2004. What was attached to the Motion was a copy of
TCT No. R-17571, and not a title in Candice and her co-
owners’ names.
On August 11, 2004, the RTC issued an Order granting
Candice’s Motion to Intervene.
LBB Construction and Barber filed their Answer in Civil
Case No. 04-7240, but failed to attend the scheduled
hearings, including the pre-trial. Consequently,
Durawood was allowed to present its evidence ex parte.
On July 21, 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision3 in Civil
Case No. 04-7240 in favor of Durawood. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration,
judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendants, viz:
1. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of Six
Hundred Sixty[-]Five Thousand Three Hundred
Eighty[-]Five Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P665,385.50)
plus two percent (2%) interest per month from May 11,
2004 up to the present;
2. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff twenty-five
percent (25%) of the amount due to the plaintiff by way
of attorney’s fees; and
4 in TCT No. R-17571 ahead and before of the Deed of
3. To pay the costs of suit.
The Decision became final and executory. On
September 12, 2005, Durawood filed a Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Execution. On November 15, 2005,
the RTC issued a Writ of Execution. It was when this
Writ was about to be enforced that Durawood discovered
the cancellation of TCT No. R-17571 and the issuance of
TCT No. R-22522 in the name of Candice and her
siblings.
It would appear from the records that on June 16, 2004,
the supposed Register of Deeds of Antipolo City, Atty.
Randy A. Rutaquio (Atty. Rutaquio), cancelled TCT No.
R-17571 and issued TCT No. R-22522 in the name of
Candice and her co-owners. The parties, however, do
not dispute that said cancellation of the old TCT and
issuance of the new one was antedated, since Atty.
Rutaquio was still the Register of Deeds of Malabon on
said date.5 According to a certification of the Land
Registration Authority,6 it was a certain Atty. Edgar D.
Santos (Atty. Santos) who was the Acting Register of
Deeds of Antipolo City on June 16, 2004.
Durawood filed a Motion to Reinstate Notice of Levy on
Attachment in TCT No. R-22522 and Cite Atty. Randy A.
Rutaquio for Contempt7 on the following grounds:
5. The cancellation of TCT No. R-17571 and the
issuance of TCT No. R-22522 was made by Atty. Randy
A. Rutaquio who, on June 2004, was not the Register of
Deeds of Antipolo City. As evidence of such fact, plaintiff
corporation was issued a certification by LRA Human
Resource Management Officer IV Loreto I. Orense that
Atty. Edgar D. Santos was the Acting Register of Deeds
of Antipolo City from June 1-30, 2004.
6. While the Deed of Sale annotated in TCT No. R-
17571 appears to have been made on June 16, 2004,
the fact of its inscription was made after that of the levy
on attachment as it obviously appears below and next to
it.
7. The records of this case reveal that in the Third Party
Claim filed by Candice Bona sometime in July 2004,
there was never any mention of any recording about a
Deed of Absolute Sale in the Memorandum of
Encumbrances in TCT No. R-17571. It is difficult to
comprehend that Atty. Hernando U. Salvador, Bona’s
lawyer, would miss mentioning that a Deed of Absolute
Sale was inscribed ahead of the notice of levy on
attachment if ever such sale was made on June 16,
2004.
8. Thus, under the circumstances, plaintiff corporation
cannot help speculate that [the] Deed of Sale between
LBB Construction and the Bonas was made to appear to
have been recorded a day before the attachment.
9. While the Notice of Levy on Attachment was inscribed
Sale between LBB Construction Co., Inc. and the Bonas,
the said notice was not carried over in TCT No. R-22522
despite the fact that there was no order coming from this
Honorable Court dissolving the Writ of Preliminary
Attachment dated June 16, 2004.
10. Randy Rutaquio’s unauthorized acts of cancelling
TCT No. R-17571 and issuing TCT No. R-22522 without
inscribing the Notice of Levy on Attachment despite the
absence of a court order dissolving the writ of
Preliminary Attachment constitute improper conduct
tending to directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice.8
Atty. Rutaquio filed a Manifestation alleging that the sale
was entered in the Primary Entry Book prior to the Levy
on Attachment. The two transactions were assigned to
different examiners and it just so happened that the
examiner to whom the levy on attachment was assigned
was able to inscribe the memorandum ahead of the sale,
although the inscription of the sale was entered ahead of
the levy. The levy on attachment was not inscribed on
TCT No. R-22522 because allegedly the sale should
have priority and preference. The cancellation of TCT
No. R-17571 and the issuance of TCT No. R-22522 was
already completed when he took over the position of
Atty. Santos as Acting Register of Deeds and was
therefore already clothed with the authority to issue and
sign TCT No. R-22522.
Atty. Rutaquio also submitted a letter dated June 25,
2004 from Atty. Santos to Land Registration Authority
(LRA) Administrator Benedicto B. Ulep (Administrator
Ulep) consulting the latter as regards the registration of
the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Notice of Levy on
Attachment.9 In said letter received by the LRA on July 1,
2004, Atty. Santos stated that he had not acted on the
Deed of Absolute Sale since the required registration
fees were not paid therefor.10 Administrator Ulep was
able to reply to said letter on October 6, 2004, when Atty.
Rutaquio was already the Acting Register of Deeds.
Administrator Ulep stated that since the Deed of Sale
was considered registered on June 16, 2004, the same
shall take precedence over the Notice of Levy on
Attachment registered on June 17, 2004.11
Acting on the Motion to Reinstate Notice of Levy on
Attachment in TCT No. R-22522 and Cite Atty. Randy A.
Rutaquio for Contempt, the RTC issued an Order12 dated
March 2, 2006, ruling in favor of Durawood. The RTC
gave great weight to the certification by LRA Human
Resource Management Officer IV Loreto I. Orense that
Atty. Santos was the Acting Register of Deeds from June
1-30, 2004, and held that this proves the fact that Atty.
Santos was the only person authorized to sign and
approve all the transactions with the Registry of Deeds
of Antipolo City at the time. Moreover, according to the
RTC, the alienation of LBB Construction in favor of the
Bonas without leaving sufficient property to pay its
obligation is considered by law in fraud of creditor under
Articles 138113 and 138714 of the Civil Code.
The RTC did not rule on Durawood’s prayer to cite Atty.
Rutaquio for contempt. The dispositive portion of the
March 2, 2006 Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion
to reinstate notice of levy on attachment in TCT No. R-
22522 now in the name of the intervenors is hereby
GRANTED its non-inscription therein having been made
without order of this Court.
The Register of Deeds of Antipolo City is directed to
reinstate the notice of levy on attachment in TCT No. R-
22522 in the names of intervenors immediately upon
receipt of this Order.15
Candice filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above
Order. In the meantime, on March 13, 2006, Sheriff
Leyva issued a Notice of Sheriff’s Sale setting the sale of
the property covered by TCT No. R-22522 at public
auction on April 11, 2006 at 10:00 a.m., pursuant to the
November 15, 2005 Writ of Execution. Candice filed an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order the Branch Sheriff to
Desist from the Sale of Intervenor’s Property for Being
Premature, which was granted by the RTC in an Order
dated March 29, 2006.
On March 8, 2006, the new Acting Register of Deeds
Jose S. Loriega, Jr. complied with the March 6, 2006
Order of the RTC by reinstating in TCT No. R-22522 the
Notice of Levy on Attachment in favor of Durawood.
On April 7, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying
Candice’s Motion for Reconsideration. In said Order, the
RTC highlighted its observation that in TCT No. R-
17571, the inscription of the levy on attachment by Atty.
Santos dated June 17, 2004 was in page A (the dorsal
portion) of the title, while the supposedly earlier
inscription of the Deed of Sale by Atty. Rutaquio dated
June 16, 2004 was found in page B (a separate page) of
the title. The RTC found this fact, as well as the above-
mentioned certification that Atty. Santos was the Acting
Register of Deeds of Antipolo City from June 1 to 30,
2004, sufficient proof of the irregularity of the June 16,
2004 inscription of the Deed of Sale.
On April 11, 2006, Sheriff Leyva sold the subject
property at public auction for ₱1,259,727.90 with
Durawood being the lone bidder, and issued the
corresponding Certificate of Sale. The sale was inscribed
in TCT No. R-22522 on the same date.16
Candice filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the March 2, 2006
and April 7, 2006 Orders of the RTC.
On April 18, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed Decision in favor of Candice. According to the
Court of Appeals, the sequence of presentation of the
entries in the TCT cannot control the determination of
the rights of the claimants over a disputed property. It is
the registration in the Primary Entry Book (also referred
to in other cases as the day book) that establishes the
order of reception of instruments affecting registered
land. As explained by Atty. Rutaquio, the entry in the day
book is only the preliminary step in the registration. The
inscription of the levy on attachment on TCT No. R-
17571 (which was made before the inscription of the
Deed of Sale on said title) retroacts to the date of entry
in the Primary Entry Book, which is June 17, 2004.
However, the inscription of the Deed of Sale on TCT No.
R-17571, although made after the inscription of the levy
on attachment, retroacts to the earlier date of entry in the
Primary Entry Book, which is June 16, 2004.
As regards the issuance by Atty. Rutaquio of TCT No. R-
22522 on June 16, 2004 despite the fact that he was not
yet the Register of Deeds of Antipolo City at that time,
the Court of Appeals held that there was substantial
compliance with the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NALTDRA; now the Land
Registration Authority [LRA]) Circular No. 94 on
"Certificates of title and documents left unsigned by
former Register of Deeds," which provides:
It has been brought to the attention of this Registration
that, in some Registries, there are certificates of title with
the full transcriptions and inscriptions, including the
volume and page numbers, the title number, the date
and the name of the former Register of Deeds, already
typewritten thereon but which, for some reasons, cannot
anymore be signed by the former official. In such cases
and to resolve this problem, the present Register of
Deeds may, without changing or altering the
transcriptions and inscriptions, affix his signature below
the name of the former Register of Deeds but placing the
actual date and time of signing enclosed in parenthesis
below his signature.17
The Court of Appeals accepted Atty. Rutaquio’s
manifestation that he signed TCT No. R-22522
subsequent to June 16, 2004, on a date when he was
already the Acting Register of Deeds of Antipolo City.
Since the entry in the Primary Entry Book was made at
the time of the incumbency of Atty. Santos, the name of
the latter still appears on the document. According to the
Court of Appeals, Candice cannot be made to suffer for
the failure of Atty. Rutaquio to affix the date when he
signed the document. Furthermore, a certificate of title,
once registered, cannot be impugned, altered, changed,
modified, enlarged or diminished except in a direct
proceeding permitted by law. Finally, an action for
rescission of contracts entered into in fraud of creditors
cannot be instituted except when the party suffering
damage has no other legal means to obtain reparation
for the same.18
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed
Orders of public respondent judge ordering the
reinstatement of the subject notice of levy on attachment
in TCT No. R-22522 are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. As a result thereof, the public auction sale
carried out pursuant to said levy is also declared null and
void.19
Durawood filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the
same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution dated September 18, 2007.
Durawood filed the instant Petition for Review, with the
following Assignment of Errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE FACT
THAT NON-PAYMENT OF THE REQUIRED
REGISTRATION FEES BY CANDICE S. BONA AND
HER SIBLINGS DID NOT COMPLETE THE
REGISTRATION OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
ON JUNE 16, 2004.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN
IT DISREGARDED THE FACT THAT NALTDRA
CIRCULAR NO. 94 WAS NOT COMPLIED WITH BY
ATTY. RANDY RUTAQUIO.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN
IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE ENTRIES IN TCT
NO. R-17571 (THE PREDECESSOR OF TCT NO. R-
22522) ARE EVIDENCES OF THE FACTS STATED
THEREIN.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT
THAT THE REAL PROPERTY COVERED BY TCT NO.
R-17571 AND SUBSEQUENTLY BY TCT NO. R-22522
HAS ALREADY BEEN ATTACHED BUT WAS
UNILATERALLY RELEASED FROM THE COURT’S
JURISDICTION BY A USURPER.20
All these allegations are specific matters to be resolved
by this Court in determining the overriding issue of the
case at bar: whether the Court of Appeals correctly
granted Candice’s Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
on its finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its March 2, 2006 and April 7, 2006
Orders. In other words, the main issue to be determined
by this Court is whether or not there was grave abuse of
discretion in the RTC’s order to reinstate the notice of
levy on attachment in TCT No. R-22522. "Grave abuse
of discretion" signifies "such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law."21
The Court of Appeals, in considering the date of entry in
the day book of the Registry of Deeds as controlling over
the presentation of the entries in TCT No. R-17571,
relied on Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
which provides that:
SEC. 56. Primary Entry Book; fees; certified copies. –
Each Register of Deeds shall keep a primary entry book
in which, upon payment of the entry fee, he shall enter,
in the order of their reception, all instruments including
copies of writs and processes filed with him relating to
registered land. He shall, as a preliminary process in
registration, note in such book the date, hour and minute
of reception of all instruments, in the order in which they
were received. They shall be regarded as registered
from the time so noted, and the memorandum of
each instrument, when made on the certificate of
title to which it refers, shall bear the same date:
Provided, that the national government as well as the
provincial and city governments shall be exempt from the
payment of such fees in advance in order to be entitled
to entry and registration. (Emphasis supplied.)
The consequence of the highlighted portion of the above
section is two-fold: (1) in determining the date in which
an instrument is considered registered, the reckoning
point is the time of the reception of such instrument as
noted in the Primary Entry Book; and (2) when the
memorandum of the instrument is later made on the
certificate of title to which it refers, such memorandum
shall bear the same date as that of the reception of the
instrument as noted in the Primary Entry Book. Pursuant
to the second consequence stated above, the Court of
Appeals held that Atty. Rutaquio correctly placed the
date of entry in the Primary Entry Book as the date of the
memorandum of the registration of the deed of sale in
TCT No. R-17571.
As regards the first consequence, this Court has applied
the same in several cases. Thus, in the old cases of
Levin v. Bass,22 Potenciano v. Dineros,23 and
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Acting Register
of Deeds of Nueva Ecija,24 as well as in the fairly recent
cases of Autocorp Group v. Court of Appeals,25 Armed
Forces and Police Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v.
Santiago,26 and National Housing Authority v. Basa,
Jr.,27 we upheld the entry of instruments in the Primary
Entry Book to be equivalent to registration despite even
the failure to annotate said instruments in the
corresponding certificates of title.
Based on this alone, it appears that the RTC was in error
when it considered the registration of the Absolute Deed
of Sale on June 16, 2004 inferior to the registration of the
Notice of Levy on Attachment on June 17, 2004 on the
ground that the Attachment was annotated on TCT No.
R-17571 earlier than the Deed of Sale. As discussed in
the above-mentioned cases, the annotation in the
certificate of title is not determinative of the effectivity of
the registration of the subject instrument.
However, a close reading of the above-mentioned cases
reveals that for the entry of instruments in the Primary
Entry Book to be equivalent to registration, certain
requirements have to be met. Thus, we held in Levin
that:
Do the entry in the day book of a deed of sale which was
presented and filed together with the owner's duplicate
certificate of title with the office of the Registrar of Deeds
and full payment of registration fees constitute a
complete act of registration which operates to convey
and affect the land? In voluntary registration, such as a
sale, mortgage, lease and the like, if the owner's
duplicate certificate be not surrendered and presented
or if no payment of registration fees be made within
15 days, entry in the day book of the deed of sale
does not operate to convey and affect the land sold.
x x x.28
Levin, which was decided in 1952, applied Section 56 of
the Land Registration Act29 which provides:
Sec. 56. Each register of deeds shall keep an entry
book in which, upon payment of the filing fee, he
shall enter in the order of their reception all deeds
and other voluntary instruments, and all copies of
writs or other process filed with him relating to
registered land. He shall note in such book the year,
month, day, hour, and minute of reception of all
instruments in the order in which they were
received. They shall be regarded as registered from
the time so noted, and the memorandum of each
instrument when made on the certificate of title to
which it refers shall bear the same date; Provided,
however, That no registration, annotation, or
memorandum on a certificate of title shall be made
unless the fees prescribed therefor by this Act are
paid within fifteen days' time after the date of the
registration of the deed, instrument, order or
document in the entry book or day book, and in case
said fee is not paid within the time above mentioned,
such entry shall be null and void: Provided further,
That the Insular Government and the provincial and
municipal governments need not pay such fees in
advance in order to be entitled to entry or
registration. (Emphasis supplied.)
This provision is the precursor of the aforequoted
Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which
seems to have dispensed with the provision nullifying the
registration if the required fees are not paid:
SEC. 56. Primary Entry Book; fees; certified copies. –
Each Register of Deeds shall keep a primary entry book
in which, upon payment of the entry fee, he shall enter,
in the order of their reception, all instruments including
copies of writs and processes filed with him relating to
registered land. He shall, as a preliminary process in
registration, note in such book the date, hour and minute
of reception of all instruments, in the order in which they
were received. They shall be regarded as registered
from the time so noted, and the memorandum of each
instrument, when made on the certificate of title to which
it refers, shall bear the same date: Provided, that the
national government as well as the provincial and city
governments shall be exempt from the payment of such
fees in advance in order to be entitled to entry and
registration.
In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Acting
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija,30 this Court applied
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and
modified the doctrine as follows:
Current doctrine thus seems to be that entry alone
produces the effect of registration, whether the
transaction entered is a voluntary or an involuntary
one, so long as the registrant has complied with all
that is required of him for purposes of entry and
annotation, and nothing more remains to be done
but a duty incumbent solely on the register of
deeds.31
This pronouncement, which was reiterated in National
Housing Authority v. Basa, Jr.,32 shows that for the entry
to be considered to have the effect of registration, there
is still a need to comply with all that is required for entry
and registration, including the payment of the prescribed
fees. Thus, in Autocorp Group v. Court of Appeals,33 this
Court compared the date when the required fees were
paid with the therein assailed writ of preliminary
injunction:
Petitioners contend that payment of the entry fee is a
condition sine qua non before any valid entry can be
made in the primary entry book. Allegedly, the Court of
Appeals resorted to judicial legislation when it held that
the subsequent payment of the entry fee was curative
and a substantial compliance with the law. Petitioners
claim that the ruling in DBP vs. Acting Register of Deeds
of Nueva Ecija does not apply to this case. As there was
no valid registration, petitioners conclude that the order
of the trial court issuing a writ of preliminary injunction
was proper, considering the irregularities present in the
conduct of the extrajudicial foreclosure x x x.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
First. The objection as to the payment of the requisite
fees is unavailing. There is no question that the fees
were paid, albeit belatedly. Respondent bank presented
the certificate of sale to the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Cebu City for registration on January 21,
1999 at 4:30 p.m. As the cashier had already left, the
Office could not receive the payment for entry and
registration fees, but still, the certificate of sale was
entered in the primary entry book. The following day,
respondent bank paid the requisite entry and registration
fees. Given the peculiar facts of the case, we agree with
the Court of Appeals that the payment of respondent
bank must be deemed to be substantial compliance with
the law; and, the entry of the instrument the day before,
should not be invalidated. In any case, even if we
consider the entry to have been made on January 22,
the important fact is that the entry in the primary entry
book was done prior to the issuance of the writ of
injunction [on February 15, 1999; TRO issued
on January 25, 1999] by the trial court.34 (Emphases
supplied.)
Records in the case at bar reveal that as of June 25,
2004, the date of the letter of Atty. Santos seeking the
opinion of the LRA as regards the registration of the
Deed of Sale and the Notice of Levy on Attachment, the
required registration fees for the Deed of Sale has not
yet been paid:
25 June 2004
[received by the LRA: July 01, 2004]
HON. BENEDICTO B. ULEP
Administrator
This Authority
Sir:
This has reference to the TCT No. R-17571/T-87
registered under the name of LBB Construction and
Development Corporation relative to the Deed of
Absolute Sale with Entry No. 30549, which was sought
to be registered on 16 June 2004 at 11:20 a.m. (a
photocopy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A").
However, on 17 June 2004 at 11:45 a.m. a Notice of
Levy on Attachment (a photocopy of which is hereto
attached as Annex "B") with Entry No. 30590 was filed
and annotated against TCT No. R-17571/T-87.
In view of the foregoing, we are now in a quandary as to
what proper steps should be taken. It should be noted
further that the required registration fees of the
abovementioned sale was not paid the reason for
which the same was not immediately acted upon by
the undersigned.35
Since there was still no compliance of "all that is required
x x x for purposes of entry and annotation"36 of the Deed
of Sale as of June 25, 2004, we are constrained to rule
that the registration of the Notice of Levy on Attachment
on June 17, 2004 should take precedence over the
former. Considering that the Notice of Levy on
Attachment was deemed registered earlier than the
Deed of Sale, the TCT issued pursuant to the latter
should contain the annotation of the Attachment.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the RTC was, in
fact, acting properly when it ordered the reinstatement of
the Notice of Levy on Attachment in TCT No. R-22522.
Since the RTC cannot be considered as to have acted in
grave abuse of its discretion in issuing such Order, the
Petition for Certiorari assailing the same should have
been dismissed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
94479 dated April 18, 2007 and its Resolution dated
September 18, 2007 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
G.R. No. 150091             April 2, 2007

YOLANDA O. ALFONSO, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and PHIL-VILLE
DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING
CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The present controversy traces its roots to the

purportedly irregular issuance of several transfer
certificates of title (TCTs), which has resulted in two sets
of derivative titles, one set bearing the date of
registration of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994
as May 3, 1917; the other, as April 19, 1917. OCT No.
994 is one of five OCTs covering the vast Maysilo estate.

In the midst of this land-titling irregularity, petitioner

Yolanda O. Alfonso (petitioner), then the register of
deeds of Caloocan City, was found administratively liable
for allegedly "acquiescing" to the change of the date of
the registration of OCT No. 994 from May 3, 1917 to
April 19, 1917, and for making it appear that there were
two OCT Nos. 994. Consequently, she was dismissed
from government service for grave misconduct and
dishonesty.

Petitioner has come to this Court to seek a reversal of

the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 of July 27, 2001 and
its Resolution2 of September 21, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 61082, affirming the dismissal ordered by herein
public respondent Office of the President (OP).

From the labyrinthine twists and turns that the facts have
taken, the following are relevant to the disposition of this
administrative case:

OCT No. 994 was issued by the Register of Deeds of

Rizal in the name of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal
pursuant to the December 3, 1912 Decision of then
Judge Norberto Romualdez in C.L.R. Case No. 4429. In
accordance with this decision, the Court of Land
Registration issued on April 19, 1917 Decree No. 36455,
which was received for transcription by the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917. OCT No. 994 covered
34 lots located in Caloocan City with an aggregate area
of 13,312,618.89 square meters.3
In an Order of May 25, 1962, the then Court of First
Instance of Pasig, Rizal, in Civil Case No. 4557, "In Re:
Petition for Substitution of Names," directed the Register
of Deeds of Rizal to cancel the name of Maria de la
Concepcion Vidal in OCT No. 994 and to substitute the
names of her alleged grandchildren/heirs: Bartolome
Rivera, Eleuteria Rivera (Rivera), Josefa R. Aquino,
Gregorio R. Aquino, Rosauro Aquino, Pelagia R.
Angeles, Modesta R. Angeles, Venancio R. Angeles,
Felipe R. Angeles and Fidela R. Angeles.4
An action for partition and accounting was subsequently
filed by the alleged heirs sometime in 1965 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Caloocan City, against
Isabel Gil de Sola, et al. Then RTC Branch 120 Judge
Fernando A. Cruz granted the action for partition in a
Decision of December 29, 1965, which became final and
executory per the court’s certification of June 7, 1966.5
Three commissioners were appointed by the Caloocan
RTC to submit their recommendations on the partition
prayed for. It appeared, though, that the commissioners
failed to comply with their duties, prompting the
registered owners to file a motion to cite them in
contempt of court, on which no action was shown to
have been taken.6
In the meantime, the different lots of OCT No. 994 were
acquired by several persons and/or entities, which led to
the issuance of several TCTs. Three of these titles, TCT
Nos. 270921,7 2709228 and 2709239 covering Lots 1-G-
1, 1-G-2 and 1-G-3, were issued to private respondent
Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation (Phil-
Ville) on September 15, 1993. On Phil-Ville’s TCTs, it
was stated that OCT No. 994 was registered on May 3,
1917, and that the same was a transfer from TCT No. C-
14603/T-73.10
On May 22, 1996, Rivera, one of the substituted owners
of OCT No. 994, filed with the Caloocan RTC, Branch
120, in Civil Case No. C-424, a motion for partition and
segregation of lots 23-A, 24, 25-A, 26, 28, 29 and 31
(covering an area of 1,572,324.45 square meters),
praying that the lots be awarded in her favor and titled in
her name.11
By Order of September 9, 1996, Judge Jaime D. Discaya
approved the recommendation12 made by the court-
appointed commissioners that Lots 23, 28-A-1 and 28-A-
2 be segregated from OCT No. 994, and ordered the
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City "to issue new
certificates of title in the name of Eleuteria Rivera x x
x."13 In the court’s Order of September 17, 1996, the
surrender of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title of
OCT No. 994 "if the same is no longer available, lost or
otherwise" was dispensed with.14
It appears that another order of November 28,
199615 was issued by Judge Discaya directing petitioner
to implement the September 9, 1996 Order for the
issuance of the three new certificates of title in the name
of Rivera.
Petitioner thus issued TCT Nos. C-31453516 for Lot No.
28-A-1, C-31453617 for Lot No. 28-A-2, and C-
31453718 for Lot No. 23, based on the technical
descriptions mentioned in the September 9, 1996 Order,
and all in the name of Rivera. It was uniformly stated in
these TCTs that Rivera’s titles were derived from OCT
No. 994, which was registered on the "19th day of April"
in the year 1917.
Upon learning of this development, Phil-Ville requested
then Land Registration Authority (LRA) Administrator
Reynaldo Y. Maulit to investigate the discrepancies in
the date of registration of OCT No. 994, as reflected in
its TCTs and those of Rivera.19 Phil-Ville invited attention
to petitioner’s letter of September 20, 1996 informing it
that there was only one OCT No. 994, which was
transcribed or registered on May 3, 1917, as well as to
the LRA Administrator’s certification of October 31, 1996
confirming that OCT No. 994 was issued on May 3,
1917.
Phil-Ville maintained that the issuance of the three TCTs
in favor of Rivera was "highly irregular as they cover[ed]
lots already owned by Phil-Ville, LCM Theatrical
Enterprises and Bonifacio Shopping Center, Inc."
Phil-Ville’s letter-complaint led to the conduct of an
inquiry by the Senate Committees on Justice and Human
Rights, and on Urban Planning, Housing and
Resettlement. On May 25, 1998, the joint committees
submitted Senate Committee Report No. 103120 which
found, among other things, that (1) "there is only one
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 and this was
issued or registered on May 3, 1917," (2) OCT No. 994
dated April 19, 1917 is "non-existent" for being "a
fabrication perpetrated by Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr.
[(Vasquez, Jr.)], former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of
Caloocan City," and (3) petitioner "acted maliciously,
fraudulently and in bad faith, when she signed the TCTs
issued in the name of Rivera which bear a wrong date of
registration x x x." The Senate committees
recommended that administrative cases be filed against
petitioner, Vasquez, Jr. and "all those involved in illegal
and irregular land titling."
On the basis of Senate Committee Report No. 1031 and
Phil-Ville’s complaint, the LRA initiated Administrative
Case No. 98-07 for grave misconduct and dishonesty
against petitioner and Vasquez, Jr. who, as directed,
filed separate explanations/comments to the charges
against them.
During the pre-trial conferences, the parties presented
documentary evidence and marked their exhibits, and a
pre-trial Order was issued on September 3, 1998.21
At the scheduled start of the formal hearing on
September 6, 1998, the parties agreed to dispense with
the presentation of oral evidence, in lieu of which they
filed their respective memoranda. The case was then
considered submitted for resolution.
On February 4, 1999, the LRA, through then
Administrator Alfredo R. Enriquez, issued a Decision
adopting in toto the findings and recommendation of LRA
Hearing Officer Atty. Rhandolfo Amansec, as follows:
Consequent to the foregoing findings, the inescapable
conclusion is that the issuance by respondent Norberto
Vasquez, Jr. of the Dimson titles which bear a wrong
date of registration of OCT 994 constitute Grave
Misconduct, and his subsequent insistence that April 19,
1917 is the correct date of registration of OCT 994
constitute[s] Dishonesty in the service. On the other
hand, respondent Atty. Yolanda Alfonso’s acquiescence
in the alteration of the date of registration of OCT No.
994 in the titles of Eleuteria Rivera as well as her act of
deliberately ignoring the safeguards enunciated under
the law, specially her failure to require the presentation
of a subdivision plan duly approved by the Land
Registration Authority or by the Land [M]anagement
Bureau, for the titles of Eleuteria, are sufficient basis to
find her guilty of Grave Misconduct.
Considering the pervasive adverse consequences of
respondents’ acts, which impaired the very integrity of
the Torrens System which they are duty bound to
protect, the extreme penalty of dismissal is hereby
recommended for both respondents Atty. Yolanda O.
Alfonso and Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr.22 (Underscoring
supplied)
Subsequently, the records of Administrative Case No.
98-07 were elevated to the Department of Justice (DOJ)
for review. On June 14, 1999, then Justice Secretary
Serafin R. Cuevas recommended to the OP that
petitioner, a presidential appointee, "be found guilty of
Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty" and be "dismissed
from the service."23 Pertinent portions of the letter-
recommendation read:
Respondent Alfonso maintains that the said alteration of
the date of registration of OCT 994 was the sole
responsibility of respondent Norberto Vasquez, Jr. who
ordered the alteration pursuant to the Supreme Court
decision in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., GR No. 103556,
17 November 1992. She claims that the preparation of
transfer certificates of titles is essentially a mechanical
endeavor with the typist automatically adopting the
entries in the titles to be canceled. To examine the entry
according to her is no different from proof reading which
can be best left to subordinates citing the case of Arias
v. Sandiganbayan [180 SCRA 309]. To further support
her claim of innocence in the alteration, respondent
Alfonso said that upon discovery thereof, she issued
several memoranda requiring her subordinates who
have participated in the Rivera titles to explain why the
alteration was made. It should be noted however that the
memoranda were issued after she signed the Rivera
titles.
It is true that respondent Alfonso could not be faulted for
carrying over to TCT No. 312804 an erroneous date of
registration of OCT 994 inasmuch as the title from which
it was derived from likewise bear the said erroneous date
of registration. However, the mere fact that she
consented to the acquisition of the property by and
signed and issued on 12 August 1996 TCT 312804 in
the name of her children adopting 19 April 1917 as the
date of registration of OCT 994 knowing the same to be
erroneous as shown by her 20 March 1996 referral of
Ms. Roqueta Dimson’s application for issuance of
certificate of title citing therein the LRA Verification
Committee report is a clear case of dishonesty, malice
and bad faith. This is also a clear violation of the Code of
Conduct for Public Officials and Employees prohibiting
government officials and employees from having any
interest in a transaction requiring their approval.
xxxx
Moreover, respondent Alfonso also violated the
provisions of Sections 50, 58 and 92 of P.D. 1529  for
failure to require the presentation of (1) the subdivision
plan duly approved by the Land Registration Authority or
by the Land Management Bureau; and (2) proof of
payment of estate of inheritance tax.
The non-presentation of the owner’s duplicate of OCT
994 has been satisfactorily explained by respondent
Alfonso as the said presentation was dispensed with by
an order of the court.
For her failure to require the presentation of a
subdivision plan for the three titles of Eleuteria Rivera,
respondent Alfonso claims that inasmuch as the
issuance of the titles is pursuant to a court order,
Sections 50 and 58 of P.D. 1529 do not apply. Said
contention of respondent Alfonso is without merit as said
sections apply as long as the title to be issued covers
only a portion of a bigger tract of land. The presentation
of a duly approved subdivision plan is necessary in order
to delineate the particular portion of the lot being covered
by the new title. Had respondent Alfonso required the
presentation of an approved subdivision plan, she could
have discovered the defects in the titling of the Rivera
property and could have manifested the same in court.
As to the question regarding the presentation of proof of
payment of inheritance tax, respondent Alfonso claims
that no inheritance tax is due on the estate simply
because there is no inheritance involved as the titles
were issued pursuant to a court order in a judicial
partition and the adjudicatee Eleuteria Rivera is very
much alive at the time of issuance. Again, this deserves
scant consideration. It does not matter whether Eleuteria
Rivera is alive or not because the subject matter of
inheritance tax is not the estate of Eleuteria Rivera but
the transfer of property covered by the subject titles by
way of inheritance from the predecessor and alleged
parent Maria Concepcion Vidal to the heir who is
Eleuteria Rivera.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On November 29, 1999, the OP issued Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 99,24 ordering the dismissal of
petitioner. It found that petitioner had undermined the
integrity of the Torrens system by disregarding certain
provisions of the law and had virtually compelled certain
individuals holding separate titles to litigate to protect
their rights. In addition, it was noted that petitioner "prima
facie appears to have exacted a substantial sum from
one Danilo Bonifacio to expedite the release [of] a
certificate of title."25
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the
OP but the same was denied by Resolution of
September 8, 2000.26
In due time, petitioner appealed the decision of the OP,
as embodied in A.O. No. 99, to the CA. She contended
that the order of dismissal had no factual and legal
bases and that she was not afforded due process
especially because issues and matters, which were not
agreed upon in the pre-trial conferences and
subsequently embodied in the pre-trial order, were
admitted and considered.
On July 27, 2001, the CA issued the assailed Decision
discrediting petitioner’s claim that she was denied due
process, it noting that during the hearing of her
administrative case before the LRA, she was given the
chance to explain her side, and to submit voluminous
documents in her defense, which documentary evidence
the DOJ and the OP considered in arriving at their
decisions.
Its own examination of the records, the CA added, did
not justify a departure from the rule that factual findings
of lower courts and quasi-judicial bodies command great
respect on appeal. Thus, with a lone dissent, that of CA
Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, it affirmed A.O. No. 99. 27
Hence, this present Petition for review on certiorari.28
Having brought this petition under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, petitioner must be aware that only questions of
law may be considered for resolution.29 It is a well-settled
principle that this Court is not a trier of facts, and that
respect is generally accorded to the determinations
made by administrative bodies,30 especially where, as in
this case, the findings and conclusions of the
administrative and executive offices concerned (the LRA,
the DOJ and the OP) and those of the CA are similar.
However, to lay the matter to rest and in the interest of
justice, this Court shall set aside the procedural barrier to
a re-examination of the facts to resolve the legal issues,
which pertain to (1) the alleged violation of petitioner’s
right to due process and (2) the propriety of the order of
her dismissal.
In deciding this administrative case, this Court deems it
fit, though, to steer clear from discussing or passing
judgment on the validity of the derivative titles of OCT
No. 994, which have spawned a number of
cases.31 Reference to OCT No. 994 is made only to
determine the circumstances surrounding the dismissal
of petitioner.
In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations,32 this Court laid down the cardinal primary
requirements of due process in administrative
proceedings. Foremost of these requisites is the right to
a hearing, including the right to present one’s case and
submit evidence in support thereof.33 The essence of
due process in administrative proceedings is the
opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.34
As aptly observed by the CA, petitioner was given every
opportunity to explain her side and to present evidence
in her defense during the administrative investigation
conducted by the LRA. Records sufficiently show that in
compliance with the "show-cause" letter of the LRA
Administrator, she submitted her written explanation, and
that during the pre-trial conferences, she presented
documentary evidence.
Moreover, petitioner moved without fail for the
reconsideration of the LRA Decision, the DOJ’s
recommendation on review, the OP’s order of dismissal,
and the CA Decision affirming her dismissal from
government service. At no instance, therefore, was she
deprived of the chance to question the assailed
recommendations, order or decision.
Respecting petitioner’s contention that the LRA, the DOJ
and the OP had digressed from the issues and matters
agreed upon during the pre-trial conferences and
thereafter embodied in the pre-trial order, suffice it to
point out that technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings.35 At
any event, these matters and issues were seasonably
addressed by petitioner’s motions for reconsideration.
Hence, the possibility of surprise and maneuvering,
which the rule on pre-trial is designed to prevent,36 has
altogether been obviated.
Now, the quantum of proof required in an administrative
proceeding is only substantial evidence or that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.37 The standard of
substantial evidence is satisfied when there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person indicted
was responsible for the alleged wrongdoing or
misconduct.38
It bears stressing that petitioner stood charged not for
changing the date of registration of OCT No. 994 in TCT
Nos. 314535 to 314537, which was established to have
been made upon the instructions of then Deputy
Register of Deeds Vasquez, Jr. Rather, she was indicted
for acquiescing to the change by (1) issuing conflicting
"certifications" on the date of issuance of OCT No. 994;
and (2) for making it appear that there were two OCT
Nos. 994. Thus, her protestations that she had no hand
in the alteration are unavailing.
Petitioner herself admits that she had signed TCT Nos.
314535 to 314537, which were issued in the name of
Rivera, with the following statement on the lower portion
thereof:
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally
registered on the 19th day of April, in the year nineteen
hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book of the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume A-9,
page 224, as Original Certificate of Title No. 994,
pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C.
________ Record No. 4429, in the name of
__________.
This certificate is a transfer from ORIGINAL Certificate of
Title No. 994, which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so
far as the above-described land is concerned.
xxxx
However, she argued that the so-called "certifications"
were mere entries forming part of the titles. Whether it
was a "certification" or a mere statement that she had
issued is unnecessary as it does not alter the fact that
she signed several TCTs, some reflecting the date of
registration of OCT No. 994 as May 3, 1917 and the
others as April 19, 1917.
The facts on record, moreover, show that petitioner had
knowledge of circumstances that suggested the
existence of an irregularity.
First. On March 20, 1996, petitioner had, by letter,
referred to the LRA Legal Department the application of
Ms. Roqueta Dimson for the issuance of the certificate of
title on Lot 23-A of the Maysilo estate, in which Dimson
had contended that all previously-issued titles which
were derived from OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 were
void ab initio.
In a subsequent letter to the LRA Administrator dated
May 2, 1996,39 she raised serious doubts over Dimson’s
request for annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on the
certificates of titles of Mt. Carmel Farms, Inc., which
were also derived from OCT No. 994. She pointedly
stated in her letter, as follows:
If we allow the registration of the Notice of Lis Pendens
of Dimson, what will prevent her to question all titles
derived from OCT No. 994 issued on May 3, 1917.
To prevent the proliferation of similar request and
nuisance suits, may we request this Authority for its
official stand on OCT No. 994 and the Dimson titles. To
date, the Dimson titles and their derivative titles [are] still
existing and on file at the Registries of Deeds of
Kalookan and Malabon despite the Verification
Committee’s findings that they were issued void ab
initio.40
Second. Petitioner wrote Phil-Ville a letter dated
September 20, 199641 in which she categorically stated
that OCT No. 994 was issued pursuant to Decree No.
36455 dated April 19, 1917, and the date of transcription
of said decree at the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Pasig, Rizal was May 3, 1917.
Third. As CA Justice Agcaoili had correctly observed in
his dissent, "petitioner had previously issued certificates
of title in the names of other individuals reflecting the
true date of issue of OCT No. 994, the mother title, i.e.,
May 3, 1917."42
In light of these facts, it was indeed surprising that
petitioner consented to the acquisition by her children in
July 1996 of a property titled in the name of Norma
Dimson Tirado. As a consequence of this acquisition,
she issued on August 12, 1996 TCT No. 312804, to
which April 19, 1917 was carried over as the date of
registration of OCT No. 994.
Considering the proximity of the issuance of TCT No.
312804 to her letters of March 20, 1996 and May 2,
1996, it is highly inconceivable that petitioner was
unaware of the supposedly altered date of registration of
OCT No. 994 that was reflected in her children’s TCT.
Parenthetically, it was because of the issuance of the
TCT in her children’s favor that petitioner was found by
the DOJ to have additionally violated the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees,43 which prohibits government officials and
employees from having any interest in a transaction
requiring their approval.
Even her contention that she was without a remedy to
correct an erroneous entry that had been carried over to
the derivative TCT was belied by her filing before the
RTC, Branch 120, Caloocan City, in Civil Case No. C-
424, of a Petition dated January 199744 for the correction
of the erroneous entries of "19th" and "April" on the
blank spaces in the "certification" portion of Rivera’s
titles. Invoking Section 10845 of P.D. No. 1529, she
manifested that the correct dates were "3rd" and "May"
because these "are the dates appearing in the original of
OCT No. 994" on file in the registry.
As for petitioner’s next contention that the issuance of
Rivera’s titles merely involved the mechanical procedure
of transferring the dates contained in the derivative titles
which she, as head of office, had every right to rely on
the bona fides of her subordinates, the same deserves
scant consideration.
Unlike in Arias v. Sandiganbayan,46 upon which
petitioner relies for jurisprudential support, petitioner’s
foreknowledge of facts and circumstances that
suggested an irregularity constituted added reason47 for
her to exercise a greater degree of circumspection
before signing and issuing the titles.1awphi1.nét
Arias and the subsequent case of Magsuci v.
Sandiganbayan48 were held inapplicable in Escara v.
People49 because the person indicted therein had
foreknowledge of the existence of an anomaly that
should have put him on guard regarding the transaction.
It may not be amiss to mention that even Justice
Agcaoili, in his dissent to the assailed CA Decision,
observed petitioner’s failure to take precautionary
measures, thus:
x x x Considering the notoriety of the Maysilo estate as
the "mother of all land titling scams," the irregularity
attending the issuance of the titles could have been
avoided had petitioner exercised a little more due care
and circumspection before she affixed her signature [on
the Rivera titles]. The fact that the Maysilo estate has
spawned conflicting claims of ownership which invariably
reached the courts, a fact which petitioner cannot ignore
on account of her long exposure and experience as a
register of deeds, should have impelled petitioner to be
more prudent even to the extent of deliberately holding
action on the papers submitted to her relative to the
estate until she shall have fully satisfied herself that
everything was above board. x x x
xxxx
If petitioner had made further investigation (in the light of
her previous certifications and the notoriety of the
Maysilo estate as a potential breeding ground of titling
irregularities) and, thus, made a timely discovery of the
error in the questioned entry, but still was in doubt on
how to proceed, she could have easily referred the
matter to the LRA Administrator en consulta as
authorized by Section 117 of PD No. 1529 x x
x.50 (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioner’s claim that the issuance of Rivera’s TCTs was
her ministerial duty in accordance with the final and
executory order of the trial court, deserves scant
consideration too insofar as the carrying over of the
technical descriptions contained in Judge Discaya’s
order was concerned.
The date of registration of OCT No. 994, however, was a
different matter. To note, Rivera’s owner’s duplicate
certificates of title were not submitted to the register of
deeds for cancellation as required in Section 5351 of P.D.
No. 1529 because Judge Discaya’s Order of September
17, 1996 had excused the submission of the duplicate
certificates. Hence, it was left to petitioner’s office to
supply the date of registration of OCT No. 994 upon
verification of the copy it had on file.
For this reason, Deputy Register of Deeds Vasquez, Jr.
wrote in pencil the missing information on the blank
spaces, according to clerk Nelda Zacarias.52 Vasquez,
Jr. admitted in his February 21, 1997 reply-memorandum
to petitioner that he had "instructed one of the
employees to change [the date] from May 3, 1917 to
April 19, 1917." 53
The observations of the LRA and the DOJ on petitioner’s
failure to require the presentation of the subdivision plan
for Rivera’s three titles are in keeping with the provisions
of Sections 50 and 58 of P.D. No. 1529, as follows:
SEC. 50. Subdivision and consolidation plans. – Any
owner subdividing a tract of registered land into lots
which do not constitute a subdivision project as defined
and provided for under P.D. 957, shall file with the
Commissioner of Land Registration or with the Bureau of
Lands a subdivision plan of such land on which all
boundaries, streets, passageways and waterways, if
any, shall be distinctly and accurately delineated.
If a subdivision plan, be it simple or complex, duly
approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration or
the Bureau of Lands together with the approved
technical descriptions and the corresponding owner’s
duplicate certificate of title is presented for registration,
the Register of Deeds shall, without requiring further
court approval of said plan, register the same in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration
Act, as amended. x x x1a\^/phi1.net
xxxx
SEC. 58. Procedure where conveyance involves portion
of land. – If a deed of conveyance is for a part of the land
described in a certificate of title, the Register of Deeds
shall not enter any transfer certificate of title to the
grantee until a plan of such land showing all the portions
or lots into which it has been subdivided and the
corresponding technical descriptions shall have been
verified and approved pursuant to Section 50 of this
Decree. x x x
Upon the approval of the plan and technical descriptions,
the original of the plan, together with a certified copy of
the technical descriptions shall be filed with the Register
of Deeds for annotation in the corresponding certificate
of title and thereupon said officer shall issue a new
certificate of title to the grantee for the portion conveyed,
and at the same time cancel the grantor’s certificate
partially with respect only to the said portion conveyed. x
xx
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is clearly evident from the above provisions that for
petitioner- register of deeds to issue a new certificate of
title, she must require the submission of the approved
subdivision plan together with the approved technical
descriptions and the corresponding owner’s duplicate
certificate of title. Therefore, she could not have
dispensed with the submission of the subdivision plan
and relied solely on the technical descriptions provided
in the court’s Order.
Likewise, this Court holds that petitioner should have
required proof of payment of inheritance tax over the
portions that were transferred to Rivera because these
lots were conveyances from the estate of her alleged
grandmother, Maria Consolacion Vidal, in whose name
the lots were originally registered under OCT No. 994.
The following disquisition of the DOJ is thus noted with
approval:
As to the question regarding the presentation of proof of
payment of inheritance tax, respondent Alfonso claims
that no inheritance tax is due on the estate simply
because there is no inheritance involved as the titles
were issued pursuant to a court order in a judicial
partition and the adjudicatee Eleuteria Rivera is very
much alive at the time of issuance. Again, this deserves
scant consideration. It does not matter whether Eleuteria
Rivera is alive or not because the subject matter of
inheritance tax is not the estate of Eleuteria Rivera but
the transfer of property covered by the subject titles by
way of inheritance from the predecessor and alleged
parent Maria Concepcion Vidal to the heir who is
Eleuteria Rivera. (Underscoring supplied)
The alleged iniquity between the penalty of dismissal
meted on petitioner and the one-year suspension of
Vasquez, Jr. is an issue that cannot be resolved in this
petition in the absence of facts concerning the
administrative proceedings against the latter.
A final matter. In light of the Affidavit of Desistance
executed by Danilo Bonifacio54 before the DOJ, the
additional circumstance (which the OP had considered in
its Decision) that petitioner had allegedly accepted
money in exchange for the issuance of a title has
become a non-issue against her.
"Serious misconduct," as a valid cause for the dismissal
of an employee, is improper or wrong conduct; the
transgression of some established and definite rule of
action; a forbidden act or dereliction of duty, which is
willful and intentional neglect and not mere error in
judgment.55 It must be grave and aggravated in character
and not merely trivial or unimportant.56 In addition, it
must be directly related and/or connected to the
performance of official duties.57 Without question, all of
these requisites are present in this case. Petitioner is
thus administratively liable for serious misconduct.
Petitioner is liable too for dishonesty defined in Civil
Service Commission v. Cayobit58 as ". . . the
concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact
relevant to one’s office or connected with the
performance of his duty."
It goes without saying that by failing to prevent the
irregularity that she had reason to suspect all along or to
take immediate steps to rectify it, petitioner had tolerated
the same and allowed it to wreak havoc on our land-
titling system. Sadly, that confusion continues to rear its
ugly head to this day.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102377 July 5, 1996
ALFREDO SAJONAS and CONCHITA
SAJONAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO A. PILARES,
SHERIFF ROBERTO GARCIA OF QUEZON CITY and
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA, respondents.
 
TORRES, JR., J.:p
A word or group of words conveys intentions. When
used truncatedly, its meaning disappears and breeds
conflict. Thus, it is written -- "By thy words shalt thou be
justified, and by thy words shalt thou be condemned."
(Matthew, 12:37)
Construing the new words of a statute separately is
the raison d'etre of this appeal.
Essentially, the case before us is for cancellation of the
inscription of a Notice of Levy on Execution from a
certificate of Title covering a parcel of real property. The
inscription was caused to be made by the private
respondent on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073
of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued in the name
of the spouses Ernesto B. Uychocde and Lucita Jarin,
and was later carried over to and annotated on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of the same registry,
issued in the name of the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and
Conchita H. Sajonas, who purchased the parcel of land
from the Uychocdes, and are now the petitioners in this
case.
The facts are not disputed, and are hereby reproduced
as follows:
On September 22, 1983, the spouses Ernesto Uychocde
and Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a parcel of residential
land located in Antipolo, Rizal to the spouses Alfredo
Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas on installment basis
as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated September 22,
1983. The property was registered in the names of the
Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N-79073 of the
Register of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal. On August 27,
1984, the Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an
adverse claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the
title of the subject property, which was inscribed as Entry
No. 116017. Upon full payment of the purchase price,
the Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale involving the
property in question in favor of the Sajonas couple on
September 4, 1984. The deed of absolute sale was
registered almost a year after, or on August 28, 1985.
Meanwhile, it appears that Domingo Pilares (defendant-
appellant) filed Civil Case No. Q-28850 for collection of
sum of money against Ernesto Uychocde. On June 25,
1980, a Compromise Agreement was entered into by the
parties in the said case under which Ernesto Uychocde
acknowledged his monetary obligation to Domingo
Pilares amounting to P27,800 and agreed to pay the
same in. two years from June 25, 1980. When Uychocde
failed to comply with his undertaking in the compromise
agreement, defendant-appellant Pilares move d for the
issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the decision
based on the compromise agreement, which the court
granted in its order dated August 3, 1982. Accordingly, a
writ of execution was issued on August 12, 1982 by the
CFI of Quezon City where the civil case was pending.
Pursuant to the order of execution dated August 3, 1982,
a notice of levy on execution was issued on February 12,
1985, On February 12, 1985, defendant sheriff Roberto
Garcia of Quezon City presented said notice of levy on
execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and
the same was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073
as Entry No. 123283.
When the deed of absolute sale dated September 4,
1984 was registered on August 28, 1985, TCT No. N-
79073 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. N-
109417 was issued in the name of the Sajonas couple.
The notice of levy on execution annotated by defendant
sheriff was carried over to the new title. On October 21,
1985, the Sajonas couple filed a Third Party Claim with
the sheriff of Quezon city, hence the auction sale of the
subject property did not push through as scheduled.
On January 10, 1986, the Sajonas spouses demanded
the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution upon
defendant-appellant Pilares, through a letter to their
lawyer, Atty. Melchor Flores. Despite said demand,
defendant-appellant Pilares refused to cause the
cancellation of said annotation. In view thereof, plaintiffs-
appellees filed this complaint dated January 11, 1986 on
February 5, 1986.1
The Sajonases filed their complaint2 in the Regional Trial
Court of Rizal, Branch 71, against Domingo Pilares, the
judgment creditor of the Uychocdes. The relevant portion
of the complaint alleges:
7. That at the time the notice of levy was annotated by
the defendant, the Uychocde spouses, debtors of the
defendant, have already transferred, conveyed and
assigned all their title, rights and interests to the plaintiffs
and there was no more title, rights or interests therein
which the defendant could levy upon;
8. That the annotation of the levy on execution which
was carried over to the title of said plaintiffs is illegal and
invalid and was made in utter bad faith, in view of the
existence of the Adverse Claim annotated by the
plaintiffs on the corresponding title of the Uychocde
spouses;
9. That a demand was made by the plaintiffs upon the
defendant Domingo A. Pilares, to cause the cancellation
of the said notice of levy but the latter, without justifiable
reason and with the sole purpose of harassing and
embarrassing the plaintiffs ignored and refused plaintiffs'
demand;
10. That in view of the neglect, failure and refusal of the
defendant to cause the cancellation of the notice of levy
on execution, the plaintiffs were compelled to litigate and
engage the services of the undersigned counsel, to
protect their rights and interests, for which they agreed to
pay attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000 and
appearance fees of P500 per day in court.3
Pilares filed his answer with compulsory
counterclaim4 on March 8, 1986, raising special and
affirmative defenses, the relevant portions of which are
as follows:
10. Plaintiff has no cause of action against herein
defendants;
11. Assuming without however admitting that they filed
an adverse claim against the property covered by TCT
No. 79073 registered under the name of spouses
Ernesto Uychocde on August 27, 1984, the same ceases
to have any legal force and effect (30) days thereafter
pursuant to Section 70 of P.D. 1529;
12 The Notice of Levy annotated at the back of TCT No.
79073 being effected pursuant to the Writ of Execution
dated August 31, 1982, duly issued by the CFI (now
RTC) of Quezon proceeding from a decision rendered in
Civil Case No. 28859 in favor of herein defendant
against Ernesto Uychocde, is undoubtedly proper and
appropriate because the property is registered in the
name of the judgment debtor and is not among those
exempted from execution;
13. Assuming without admitting that the property subject
matter of this case was in fact sold by the registered
owner in favor of the herein plaintiffs, the sale is the null
and void (sic) and without any legal force and effect
because it was done in fraud of a judgment creditor, the
defendant Pilares.5
Pilares likewise sought moral and exemplary damages in
a counterclaim against the Sajonas spouses. The parties
appeared at pre-trial proceedings on January 21,
1987,6 after which, trial on the merits ensued.
The trial court rendered its decision on February 15,
1989.7 It found in favor of the Sajonas couple, and
ordered the cancellation of the Notice of Levy from
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417.
The court a quo stated, thus:
After going over the evidence presented by the parties,
the court finds that although the title of the subject matter
of the Notice of Levy on Execution was still in the name
of the Spouses Uychocde when the same was annotated
on the said title, an earlier Affidavit of Adverse of claim
was annotated on the same title by the plaintiffs who
earlier bought said property from the Uychocdes.
It is a well settled rule in this jurisdiction (Guidote vs.
Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442) that actual notice of an adverse
claim is equivalent to registration and the subsequent
registration of the Notice of Levy could not have any
legal effect in any respect on account of prior inscription
of the adverse claim annotated on the title of the
Uychocdes.
xxx xxx xxx
On the issue of whether or not plaintiffs are buyers in
good faith of the property of the spouses Uychocde even
notwithstanding the claim of the defendant that said sale
executed by the spouses was made in fraud of creditors,
the Court finds that the evidence in this instance is bare
of any indication that said plaintiffs as purchasers had
notice beforehand of the claim of the defendant over said
property or that the same is involved in a litigation
between said spouses and the defendant. Good faith is
the opposite of fraud and bad faith, and the existence of
any bad faith must be established by competent
proof.8 (Cai vs. Henson, 51 Phil 606)
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Pilares,
as follows:
1. Ordering the cancellation of the Notice of Levy on
Execution annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No.
N-109417.
2. Ordering said defendant to pay the amount of P5,000
as attorney's fees.
3. Dismissing the Counterclaim interposed by said
defendant.
Said defendant is likewise ordered to pay the costs.
Dissatisfied, Pilares appealed to the Court of Appeals",
assigning errors on the part of the lower court. The
appellate court reversed the lower court's decision, and
upheld the annotation of the levy on execution on the
certificate of title, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dated
February 15, 1989 is reversed and set aside and this
complaint is dismissed.
Costs against the plaintiffs-appellees. 10
The Sajonas couple are now before us, on a Petition for
Review on Certiorari, 11 praying inter alia  to set aside the
Court of Appeals' decision, and to reinstate that of the
Regional Trial Court
Private respondent filed his Comment 12 on March 5,
1992, after which, the parties were ordered to file their
respective Memoranda. Private respondent complied
thereto on April 27, 1994 13, while petitioners were able
to submit their Memorandum on September 29, 1992. 14
Petitioner assigns the following as errors of the appellate
court, to wit:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RULE ON THE 30-DAY PERIOD FOR ADVERSE
CLAIM UNDER SECTION 70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IS
ABSOLUTE INASMUCH AS IT FAILED TO READ OR
CONSTRUE THE PROVISION IN ITS ENTIRETY AND
TO RECONCILE THE APPARENT INCONSISTENCY
WITHIN THE PROVISION IN ORDER TO GIVE
EFFECT TO IT AS A WHOLE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING
SECTION 70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IN SUCH WISE ON
THE GROUND THAT IT VIOLATES PETITIONERS'
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
Primarily, we are being asked to ascertain who among
the parties in suit has a better right over the property in
question. The petitioners derive their claim from the right
of ownership arising from a perfected contract of
absolute sale between them and the registered owners
of the property, such right being attested to by the notice
of adverse claim 15 annotated on TCT No. N-79073 as
early as August 27, 1984. Private respondent on the
other hand, claims the right to levy on the property, and
have it sold on execution to satisfy his judgment credit,
arising from Civil Case No. Q-28850 16 against the
Uychocdes, from whose title, petitioners derived their
own.
Concededly, annotation of an adverse claim is a
measure designed to protect the interest of a person
over a piece of real property where the registration of
such interest or right not otherwise provided for by the
Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the
Property Registration Decree), and serves a warning to
third parties dealing with said property that someone is
claiming an interest on the same or a better right than
that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice is
registered by filing a sworn statement with the Register
of Deeds of the province where the property is located,
setting forth the basis of the claimed right together with
other dates pertinent thereto. 17
The registration of an adverse claim is expressly
recognized under Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529. *
Noting the changes made in the terminology of the
provisions of the law, private respondent interpreted this
to mean that a Notice of Adverse Claim remains effective
only for a period of 30 days from its annotation, and does
not automatically lose its force afterwards. Private
respondent further maintains that the notice of adverse
claim was annotated on August 27, 1984, hence, it will
be effective only up to September 26, 1984, after which it
will no longer have any binding force and effect pursuant
to Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, the sale in favor of
the petitioners by the Uychocdes was made in order to
defraud their creditor (Pilares), as the same was
executed subsequent to their having defaulted in the
payment of their obligation based on a compromise
agreement. 18
The respondent appellate court upheld private
respondents' theory when it ruled:
The above staled conclusion of the lower court is based
on the premise that the adverse claim filed by plaintiffs-
appellees is still effective despite the lapse of 30 days
from the date of registration. However, under the
provisions of Section 70 of P.D. 1529, an adverse claim
shall be effective only for a period of 30 days from the
date of its registration. The provision of this Decree is
clear and specific.
xxx xxx xxx
It should be noted that the adverse claim provision in
Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) does
not provide for a period of effectivity of the annotation of
an adverse claim. P.D. No. 1529, however, now
specifically provides for only 30 days. If the intention of
the law was for the adverse claim to remain effective
until cancelled by petition of the interested party, then
the aforecited provision in P.D. No. 1529 stating the
period of effectivity would not have been inserted in the
law.
Since the adverse claim was annotated On August 27,
1984, it was effective only until September 26, 1984.
Hence, when the defendant sheriff annotated the notice
of levy on execution on February 12, 1985, said adverse
claim was already ineffective. It cannot be said that
actual or prior knowledge of the existence of the adverse
claim on the Uychocdes' title is equivalent to registration
inasmuch as the adverse claim was already ineffective
when the notice of levy on execution was annotated.
Thus, the act of defendant sheriff in annotating the notice
of levy on execution was proper and justified.
The appellate court relied on the rule of statutory
construction that Section 70 is specific and unambiguous
and hence, needs no interpretation nor
construction. 19 Perforce, the appellate court stated, the
provision was clear enough to warrant immediate
enforcement, and no interpretation was needed to give it
force and effect. A  fortiori, an adverse claim shall be
effective only for a period of thirty (30) days from the
date of its registration, after which it shall be without
force and effect. Continuing, the court further stated;
. . . clearly, the issue now has been reduced to one of
preference -- which should be preferred between the
notice of levy on execution and the deed of absolute
sate. The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on
September 4, 1984, but was registered only on August
28, 1985, while the notice of levy on execution was
annotated six (6) months prior to the registration of the
sale on February 12, 1985.
In the case of Landig vs. U.S. Commercial Co., 89 Phil.
638 Commere it was held that where a sale is recorded
later than an attachment, although the former is of an
earlier date, the sale must give way to the attachment on
the ground that the act of registration is the operative act
to affect the land. A similar ruling was restated
in Campillo vs. Court of Appeals (129 SCRA 513).
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for these rulings may be found in Section 51
of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, which provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Conveyance and other dealings by the registered
owner. -- An owner of registered land may convey,
mortgage, lease, charge, otherwise deal with the same
in accordance with existing laws. He may use such
forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary
instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed,
mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a
will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall
take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall
operate only as a contract between the parties and as
evidence of authority to the Register Deeds to make of
registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to
convey or affect the land in so far as third persons are
concerned and in all cases under the Decree, the
registration shall be made in the office of the Register of
Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
(Emphasis supplied by the lower court.)
Under the Torrens system, registration is the operative
act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien
upon the land. A person dealing with registered land is
not required to go behind the register to determine the
condition of the property. He is only charged with notice
of the burdens on the property which are noted on the
face of the register or certificate of title. 20
Although we have relied on the foregoing rule, in many
cases coming before us, the same, however, does not fit
in the case at bar. While it is the act of registration which
is the operative act which conveys or affects the land
insofar as third persons are concerned, it is likewise true,
that the subsequent sale of property covered by a
Certificate of Title cannot prevail over an adverse claim,
duly sworn to and annotated on the certificate of title
previous to the sale. 21 While it is true that under the
provisions of the Property Registration Decree, deeds of
conveyance of property registered under the system, or
any interest therein only take effect as a conveyance to
bind the land upon its registration, and that a purchaser
is not required to explore further than what the Torrens
title, upon its face, indicates in quest for any hidden
defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his
right thereto, nonetheless, this rule is not absolute. Thus,
one who buys from the registered owner need not have
to look behind the certificate of title, he is, nevertheless,
bound by the liens and encumbrances annotated
thereon. One who buys without checking the vendor's
title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such
failure.22
In PNB vs. Court of Appeals, we held that "the
subsequent sale of the property to the De Castro
spouses cannot prevail over the adverse claim of Perez,
which was inscribed on the bank' s certificate of title on
October 6, 1958. That should have put said spouses on
notice, and they can claim no better legal right over and
above that of Perez. The TCT issued in the spouses'
names on July, 1959 also carried the said annotation of
adverse claim. Consequently, they are not entitled to any
interest on the price they paid for the property. 23
Then again, in Gardner vs. Court of Appeals, we said
that "the statement of respondent court in its resolution
of reversal that 'until the validity of an adverse claim is
determined judicially, it cannot be considered a flaw in
the vendor's title' contradicts the very object of adverse
claims. As stated earlier, the annotation of an adverse
claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a
person over a piece of real property, and serves as a
notice and warning to third parties dealing with said
property that someone is claiming an interest on the
same or has a better right than the registered owner
thereof. A subsequent sale cannot prevail over the
adverse claim which was previously annotated in the
certificate of title over the property. 24
The question may be posed, was the adverse claim
inscribed in the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-
109417 still in force when private respondent caused the
notice of levy on execution to be registered and
annotated in the said title, considering that more than
thirty days had already lapsed since it was annotated?
This is a decisive factor in the resolution of this instant
case.
If the adverse claim was still in effect, then respondents
are charged with knowledge of pre-existing interest over
the subject property, and thus, petitioners are entitled to
the cancellation of the notice of levy attached to the
certificate of title.
For a definitive answer to this query, we refer to the law
itself. Section 110 of Act 496 or the Land Registration
Act reads:
Sec. 110. Whoever claims any part or interest in
registered lands adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if
no other provision is made in this Act for registering the
same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his
alleged right or interest, and how or under whom
acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the
certificate of title of the registered owner, and a
description of the land in which the right or interest is
claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall
state the adverse claimant's residence, and designate a
place at which all notices may be served upon him. The
statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse
claim, and the court, upon a petition of any party in
interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question
of the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such
decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the
claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be
cancelled. If in any case, the court after notice and
hearing shall find that a claim thus registered was
frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant
double or treble the costs in its discretion."
The validity of the above-mentioned rules on adverse
claims has to be reexamined in the light of the changes
introduced by P.D. 1529, which provides:
Sec . 70 Adverse Claim -- Whoever claims any part or
interest in registered land adverse to the registered
owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original
registration, may, if no other provision is made in this
decree for registering the same, make a statement in
writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and
how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number
of certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of
the registered owner, and a description of the land in
which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall
state the adverse claimant's residence, and a place at
which all notices may be served upon him. This
statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse
claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall
be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of
registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation
of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a
verified petition therefor by the party in-
interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation, no
second adverse claim based on the same ground shall
be registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in
interest may file a petition in the Court of First Instance
where the land is situated for the cancellation the
adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy
hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse
claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and
equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid,
the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in
any case, the court, after notice and hearing shall find
that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it
may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one
thousand pesos, nor more than five thousand pesos, in
its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the
claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with
the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.
(Emphasis ours).
In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken
that every part thereof be given effect and a construction
that could render a provision inoperative should be
avoided, and inconsistent provisions should be
reconciled whenever possible as parts of a harmonious
whole. 25 For taken in solitude, a word or phrase might
easily convey a meaning quite different from the one
actually intended and evident when a word or phrase is
considered with those with which it is associated." 26 In
ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscription of
adverse claim, we must read the law in its entirety.
Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D.
1529 provides:
The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty
days from the date of registration."
At first blush, the provision in question would seem to
restrict the effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days.
But the above provision cannot and should not be
treated separately, but should be read in relation to the
sentence following, which reads:
After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse
claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition
therefor by the party in interest.
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim
to ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty
days, then it would not have been necessary to include
the foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For
then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been
automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law
would not have required the party in interest to do a
useless act.
A statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken
separately, but in its relation to the statute's totality. Each
statute must, in fact, be construed as to harmonize it with
the pre-existing body of laws. Unless clearly repugnant,
provisions of statutes must be reconciled. The printed
pages of the published Act, its history, origin, and its
purposes may be examined by the courts in their
construction. 27 An eminent authority on the subject
matter states the rule candidly:
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts sections,
and is animated by one general purpose and intent.
Consequently, each part or section should be construed
in connection with every other part section so as to
produce a harmonious whole. It is not proper to confine
its intention to the one section construed. It is always an
unsafe way of construing a statute or contract to divide it
by a process of etymological dissection, into separate
words, and then apply to each, thus separated from the
context, some particular meaning to be attached to any
word or phrase usually to be ascertained from the as
context. 28
Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the
apparent inconsistency between the portions of the law
such that the provision on cancellation of adverse claim
by verified petition would serve to qualify the provision
on the effectivity period. The law, taken together, simply
means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still
necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the
inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a
lien upon the property. For if the adverse claim has
already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said
period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the
process of cancellation would be a useless ceremony. 29
It should be noted that the law employs the phrase "may
be cancelled", which obviously indicates, as inherent in
its decision making power, that the court may or not
order the cancellation of an adverse claim,
nothwitstanding such provision limiting the effectivity of
an adverse claim for thirty days from the date of
registration. The court cannot be bound by such period
as it would be inconsistent with the very authority vested
in it. A  fortiori, the limitation on the period of effectivity is
immaterial in determining the validity or invalidity of an
adverse claim which is the principal issue to be decided
in the court hearing. It will therefore depend upon the
evidence at a proper hearing for the court to determine
whether it will order the cancellation of the adverse claim
or not. 30
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as
absolute and without qualification limited to thirty days
defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides
for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the
annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to
protect the interest of a person over a piece of real
property where the registration of such interest or right is
not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act
or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing
with said property that someone is claiming an interest or
the same or a better right than the registered owner
thereof. 31
The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the
validity of the adverse claim is to be threshed out is to
afford the adverse claimant an opportunity to be heard,
providing a venue where the propriety of his claimed
interest can be established or revoked, all for the
purpose of determining at last the existence of any
encumbrance on the title arising from such adverse
claim. This is in line with the provision immediately
following:
Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second
adverse claim shall be registered by the same claimant.
Should the adverse claimant fail to sustain his interest in
the property, the adverse claimant will be precluded from
registering a second adverse claim based on the same
ground.
It was held that "validity or efficaciousness of the claim
may only be determined by the Court upon petition by an
interested party, in which event, the Court shall. order
the immediate hearing thereof and make the proper
adjudication a justice and equity may warrant. And it is
only when such claim is found unmeritorious that the
registration of the adverse claim may be cancelled,
thereby protecting the interest of the adverse claimant
and giving notice and warning to third parties". 32
In sum, the disputed inscription of an adverse claim on
the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 was still in
effect on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff
Roberto Garcia annotated the notice of levy on execution
thereto. Consequently, he is charged with knowledge
that the property sought to be levied upon the execution
was encumbered by an interest the same as or better
than that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice of
levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim
inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the
petitioners. This can be deduced from the pertinent
provision of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 16. Effect of levy on execution as to third persons --
The levy on execution shall create a lien in favor of the
judgment creditor over the right, title and interest of the
judgment debtor in such property at the time of the
levy, subject to liens or encumbrances then existing.
(Emphasis supplied)
To hold otherwise would be to deprive petitioners of their
property, who waited a long time to complete payments
on their property, convinced that their interest was amply
protected by the inscribed adverse claim.
As lucidly observed by the trial court in the challenged
decision:
True, the foregoing section provides that an adverse
claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from
the date of registration. Does this mean however, that
the plaintiffs thereby lost their right over the property in
question? Stated in another, did the lapse of the thirty
day period automatically nullify the contract to sell
between the plaintiffs and the Uychocdes thereby
depriving the former of their vested right over the
property?
It is respectfully submitted that it did not. 33
As to whether or not the petitioners are buyers in good
faith of the subject property, the same should be made to
rest on the findings of the trial court. As pointedly
observed by the appellate court, "there is no question
that plaintiffs-appellees were not aware of the pending
case filed by Pilares against Uychocde at the time of the
sale of the property by the latter in their favor. This was
clearly elicited from the testimony of Conchita Sajonas,
wife of plaintiff, during cross-examination on April 21,
1988". 34
ATTY. REYES.
Q Madam Witness, when Engr. Uychocde and his wife
offered to you and your husband the property subject
matter of this case, they showed you the owner's
transfer certificate, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q That was shown to you the very first time that this lot
was offered to you for sale?
A Yes.
Q After you were shown a copy of the title and after you
were informed that they are desirous in selling the same,
did you and your husband decide to buy the same?
A No, we did not decide right after seeing the title. Of
course, we visited. . .
Q No, you just answer my question. You did not Costs against private respondent.
immediately decide?
SO ORDERED.
A Yes.

Q When did you finally decide to buy the same?

A After seeing the site and after verifying from the

Register of Deeds in Marikina that it is free from
encumbrances, that was the time we decided.

Q How soon after you were offered this lot did you verify
the exact location and the genuineness of the title, as
soon after this was offered to you?

A I think it' s one week after they were offered. 35

A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys

property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest in such property and
pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such
purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or
interest of some other person in the property.36 Good
faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from
taking an unconscientious advantage of
another, 3 7 Thus, the claim of the private respondent
that the sale executed by the spouses was made in fraud
of creditors has no basis in fact, there being no evidence
that the petitioners had any knowledge or notice of the
debt of the Uychocdes in favor of the private respondent,
nor of any claim by the latter over the Uychocdes'
properties or that the same was involved in any litigation
between said spouses and the private respondent. While
it may be stated that good faith is presumed, conversely,
bad faith must be established by competent proof by the
party alleging the same. Sans such proof, the petitioners
are deemed to be purchasers in good faith, and their
interest in the subject property must not be disturbed.
[G.R. NO. 146262 : January 21, 2005]
At any rate, the Land Registration Act (Property
Registration Decree) guarantees to every purchaser of
registered land in good faith that they can take and hold HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR., Petitioners, v. HON.
the same free from any and all prior claims, liens an ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as
encumbrances except those set forth on the Certificate Administrator of the Land Registration Authority and
of Title and those expressly mentioned in the ACT as the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA
having been reserved against it. Otherwise, the efficacy CITY, Respondents.
of the conclusiveness of the Certificate of Title which the
Torrens system seeks to insure would be futile and DECISION
nugatory. 38
CARPIO, J.:
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals dated October 17, 1991 is hereby The Case
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court dated February 15, 1989 finding for This is a Petition for Review 1 to reverse the
the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution from Decision2 dated 29 November 2000 of the Court of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 is hereby Appeals ("appellate court") in CA-G.R. SP No. 55993.
REINSTATED. The appellate court affirmed the Resolution3 dated 21
May 1999 issued by the Land Registration Authority
The inscription of the notice of levy On execution on TCT ("LRA") in Consulta No. 2879. The LRA ruled that a
No. N-109417 is hereby CANCELLED.
notice of lis pendens based on a motion is not National Land Titles and Deeds
registrable. Registration Administration

The Facts Entered in the "Registration Book" for Marikina, pursuant

Alfonso Sandoval ("Sandoval") and Roman Ozaeta, Jr.
("Ozaeta") filed an application for registration of title
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152
("land registration court"), docketed as Case No. 2858,
Land Registration Case No. N-18887 ("LRC No. N-
18887"). The land registration court issued an order of
general default and hearings on the application followed.
On 31 May 1966, the land registration court granted the
application. The decision became final and executory,
and the land registration court issued a certificate of
finality dated 8 March 1991.4
The National Land Titles and Deeds Administration (now
LRA) issued on 20 October 1977 Decree Nos. N-217643
and N-217644 in the names of Sandoval and his wife
Rosa Ruiz, and Ozaeta and his wife Ma. Salome Lao.5
On 16 July 1997, petitioners Eugenio Lopez, Jr., Manolo
Lopez, Oscar Lopez, and Presentacion L. Psinakis
("petitioners"), heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., filed a
motion6 in LRC No. N-18887. The motion alleged that
Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the lots subject of the
application to the late Eugenio Lopez, Sr. on 23
September 1970. Petitioners prayed that the court
consider in the land registration case the Deed of
Absolute Sale7 over the lots executed by Sandoval and
Ozaeta and their respective spouses in favor of Eugenio
Lopez, Sr. Invoking Section 22 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 ("PD 1529"),8 petitioners also prayed that the
court issue the decree of registration in their names as
the successors-in-interest of Eugenio Lopez, Sr.
The land registration court gave due course to the
motion and conducted hearings.9
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the
corresponding OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 in favor of
Sandoval and Ozaeta and their spouses only on 18
August 1998.10 The pertinent entries11 in the Decrees
read:
This Decree is issued pursuant to the Decision dated
31st day of May, 1966 of the Hon. Pedro C. Navarro,
Judge of [Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II,
Pasig, Rizal], and the Honorable Briccio C. Ygaña,
this 3rd day of July, 1998.
Issued at the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration, Quezon City, this 20th day
of October, in the year of Our Lord nineteen hundred
and ninety-seven at 8:01 a.m.
(signed)
ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ
ADMINISTRATOR
to the provisions of section 39 of PD No. 1529, on
the 18th day of August nineteen hundred and ninety-
eight, at 1:16 p.m.
(signed)
EDGAR D. SANTOS
Register of Deeds (Emphasis added)
Petitioners filed another motion on 25 November 1998 to
declare void Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 and
Original Certificate of Title ("OCT") Nos. O-1603 and O-
1604. Petitioners pointed out that the OCTs show that
incumbent Administrator Alfredo R. Enriquez signed the
Decrees on 20 October 1997, before he assumed office
on 8 July 1998 and even before Hon. Briccio C. Ygaña
issued the Order of 3 July 1998.12
Petitioners questioned the inconsistencies in the dates
and requested the LRA to recall the decrees. The LRA
Administrator denied the request and explained the
inconsistencies in the dates in a letter13 dated 1
December 1998. The entire letter states:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Justice
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
Quezon City
1 December 1998
Atty. Crisostomo A. Quizon
Quiason Makalintal Barot Torres & Ibarra Law Offices
2nd Floor Benpres Building
Exchange Road corner Meralco Ave.
Ortigas Center, Pasig City
Sir:
This concerns your letter requesting the recall of Decree
Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 issued in Land
Registration Case No. N-2858, LRC Record No. N-
18887, both in the names of Alfonso Sandoval and his
wife, Rosa Ruiz, and Roman Ozaeta, Jr., and his wife,
Ma. Salome Lao.
Records of this Authority show that aforesaid decrees of
registration were prepared on October 20, 1977 pursuant
to the decision of the court dated May 31, 1966 and the
order for issuance of decree dated August 24, 1993.
Said decrees were forwarded to the Office of the
Administrator on August 8, 1998 and was [sic] released
therefrom on August 13, 1998. Consequently, said
decrees were signed sometime between August 8 and
13 1998 and definitely not on October 20, 1997 as what
is reflected thereon because the undersigned
Administrator assumed office only on July 8, 1998.
Apparently, at the time the decrees were signed it was
not noticed, through oversight, that they were dated
October 20, 1977. It is therefore hereby clarified that
Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 were actually
issued sometime between August 8 and 13 1998 and not
on October 20, 1997.
Regarding the claim that these decrees were
prematurely issued as the motion for the issuance of the
decrees in favor of the Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, the
properties involved having been sold to him by the
applicants, is still pending with the court, it is informed
that no copy of said motion nor of the order directing this
Office to comment thereon appears on file in the records
of the case. Hence, these matters could not have been
taken into consideration in the issuance of the decrees.
Had the Administration been apprised of these incidents,
perhaps the issuance of the decrees could have been
held in abeyance until the court has resolved the same.
As to the recall of the decrees of registration, we regret
to inform you that since the certificates of title transcribed
pursuant to said decrees have already been issued and
released by the Registrar of Deeds concerned, it is now
beyond our authority to recall them unless duly
authorized by the court.
We hope that we have satisfactorily disposed of the
concerns raised in your letter.
Very truly yours,
(signed)
ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ
Administrator
On 25 November 1998, petitioners filed with the Register
of Deeds of Marikina City an application to annotate the
notice of lis pendens at the back of OCT Nos. O-1603
and O-1604 on the ground that petitioners have filed with
the land registration court a motion to declare OCT Nos.
O-1603 and O-1604 void.14 Petitioners attached to the
application a copy of the 25 November 1998 motion and
the pertinent OCTs.
In a letter15 dated 15 December 1998, the Register of
Deeds of Marikina City denied the application to
annotate the notice of lis pendens. The entire letter
states:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Justice
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
Registry of Deeds, Marikina City
15 December 1998
Atty. Crisostomo A. Quizon
2nd Floor, Benpres Bldg.
Exchange Road cor. Meralco Avenue
Pasig City
Sir:
This is in connection to [sic] your application to have a
Notice of Lis Pendens [annotated] at the back of OCT
Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 issued in the name of
ALFONSO SANDOVAL AND SPOUSE.
Pursuant to Sec. 76, PD No. 1529[,] the contents of the
notice are the name[s] of the parties, the court where the
action is pending, the date the action was instituted and
a copy of the compalint [sic] in order to determine if the
person named in the title is impleaded.
We regret to inform you that the application, bereft of the
original petition or compaint [sic] upon which this office
will base its action, is DENIED.
If you do not agree with our findings, you can, without
withdrawing the documents you submitted, elevate the
matter en consulta five (5) days from receipt hereof to
the Office of the Administrator, Land Registration
Authority, East Avenue cor. NIA Road, Quezon City.
Very truly yours,
(signed)
EDGAR D. SANTOS
Register of Deeds
On 14 January 1999, three days after receipt of the
letter, petitioners elevated the denial in consulta to the
LRA. The case was docketed as Consulta No. 2879.
The Ruling of the Land Registration Authority
In its resolution16 dated 21 May 1999, the LRA stated
that the sole question for resolution is whether a notice
of lis pendens is registrable based on a motion to
declare void the decrees and titles. The LRA agreed with
the Register of Deeds that a notice of lis pendens based
on a motion is not registrable. Relying on Section 24,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the LRA ruled that only a
party to a case has the legal personality to file a notice
of lis pendens relative to the pending case.
The LRA focused on petitioners' standing in LRC No. N-
18887. The LRA declared that petitioners are not parties
in LRC No. N-18887. Since a land registration case is a
proceeding in rem, an order of general default binds the
whole world as a party in the case. Petitioners are mere
movants whose personality the court has not admitted.
Based on Section 26 of PD 1529, the LRA ruled that
petitioners should have filed a motion to lift the order of
general default. Pertinent portions of the LRA decision
read:
Until and after the Order of General Default in LRC Case
No. 18887 is lifted, petitioners cannot be clothed with
personality as oppositors in said land registration case
by merely filing a motion after a judgement has been
rendered. Such being the case, a notice of lis
pendens on the basis of the motion filed by petitioners
cannot be admitted for registration. To rule otherwise
would preempt the judgment of the Court in so far as the
personalities of the movants as oppositors in the land
registration case is concerned.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Authority is of
the opinion and so holds that the notice of lis pendens is
not registrable.
SO ORDERED.17
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Undaunted, petitioners filed before the appellate court a
Petition for Review of the LRA's decision. Petitioners
filed the petition on the ground of manifest error and
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the LRA
Administrator when he ruled in Consulta No. 2879 that
the notice of lis pendens is not registrable.
The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. The appellate court reiterated the LRA's ruling that
only a party to a case has the legal personality to file a
notice of lis pendens. Petitioners have no legal
personality because they failed to file a motion to lift the
order of general default in the land registration case.
Issues
Petitioners present the following issues for resolution of
this Court:
1. WHETHER PETITIONERS' MOTION TO DECLARE
VOID THE DECREES ISSUED BY THE LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS A PROPER BASIS
FOR FILING THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS, and
2. WHETHER PETITIONERS CAN FILE THE MOTION
TO DECLARE VOID THE DECREES ISSUED BY THE
LAND REGISTRATION COURT IN LRC CASE NO. N-
18887 DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COURT HAS
NOT LIFTED THE GENERAL ORDER OF DEFAULT.18
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
We agree with the observation of the appellate court that
the pleadings filed by petitioners, public respondents and
the Office of the Solicitor General cite "more or less the
same provisions of the laws as applicable in support of
their respective contentions but differ x x x only with
respect to their interpretation thereof."19 With this
observation in mind, we quote the pertinent provisions of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and of PD 1529.
Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
SECTION 14. Notice of lis pendens. - In an action
affecting the title or the right of possession of real
property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative
relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of
the registry of deeds of the province in which the
property is situated a notice of the pendency of the
action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties
and the object of the action or defense, and a description
of the property in that province affected thereby. Only
from the time of filing such notice for record shall a
purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected
thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the
pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against
the parties designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may
be cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper
showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting
the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect
the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Section 76 of PD 1529 states:
SECTION 76. Notice of lis pendens. - No action to
recover possession of real estate, or to quiet title thereto,
or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition
or other proceedings of any kind in court directly
affecting the title to land or the use or occupation thereof
or the buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no
proceeding to vacate or reverse any judgment, shall
have any effect upon registered land as against persons
other than the parties thereto, unless a memorandum or
notice stating the institution of such action or proceeding
and the court wherein the same is pending, as well as
the date of the institution thereof, together with a
reference to the number of the certificate of title, and an
adequate description of the land affected and the
registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and
registered.
Notice of Lis Pendens
Lis pendens literally means a pending suit. The doctrine
of lis pendens refers to the jurisdiction, power or control
which a court acquires over property involved in a suit,
pending the continuance of the action, and until final
judgment.20
The purposes of lis pendens are (1) to protect the rights
of the party causing the registration of the lis pendens,
and (2) to advise third persons who purchase or contract
on the subject property that they do so at their peril and
subject to the result of the pending litigation.21
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect.
First, it keeps the subject matter of the litigation within
the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment
to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive
alienations. Second, it binds a purchaser, bona fide or
not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or
decree that the court will promulgate subsequently.
However, the filing of a notice of lis pendens does not
create a right or lien that previously did not exist.22
Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who
acquires the property after relying only on the certificate
of title is a purchaser in good faith. Against such third
party, the supposed rights of a litigant cannot prevail,
because the former is not bound by the property owner's
undertakings not annotated in the transfer certificate of
title.23 Thus, we have consistently held that -
The notice of lis pendens x x x is ordinarily recorded
without the intervention of the court where the action is
pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an
extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits
thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or
warn, all people who deal with the property that they so
deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they
may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction
are subject to the results of the action, and may well be
inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally
determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of
such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere
incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court
having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its
continuance or removal x x x is not contingent on the
existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily
has no effect on the merits thereof.24
A notice of lis pendens may involve actions that deal not
only with title or possession of a property, but also with
the use or occupation of a property.25 The litigation must
directly involve a specific property which is necessarily
affected by the judgment. Magdalena Homeowners
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 26 enumerated
the cases where a notice of lis pendens is appropriate:
[A] notice of lis pendens is proper in the following
cases, viz:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; andcralawlibrary
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly
affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation
thereof or the buildings thereon.
On the other hand, the doctrine of lis pendens has no
application in the following cases:
a) Preliminary attachments;
b) Proceedings for the probate of wills;
c) Levies on execution;
d) Proceedings for administration of estate of deceased
persons; andcralawlibrary
e) Proceedings in which the only object is the recovery of
a money judgment.27
As decreed by Section 76 of PD 1529, a notice of lis
pendens should contain a statement of the institution of
an action or proceeding, the court where the same is
pending, and the date of its institution. A notice of lis
pendens should also contain a reference to the number
of the certificate of title of the land, an adequate
description of the land affected and its registered
owner.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
The Register of Deeds denied registration of the notice
of lis pendens because "the application was bereft of the
original petition or complaint upon which this office will
base its action."28 In consulta to the LRA, petitioners
pointed out that they have complied with the
requirements for the registration of the notice of lis
pendens, as follows:
7.2.1 The Notice of Lis Pendens contains a statement of
the filing by the Heirs of Eugenio Lopez of a motion to
declare Original Certificates of Title Nos. O-1603 and O-
1604 null and void;
7.2.2 It contains the name of the court wherein the
motion is pending which is "the registration court,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 152, Pasig City." The date
of the filing of the motion is shown on the motion itself
wherein the receipt of said motion by the land
registration court on November 25, 1998 is duly
stamped;
7.2.3 The numbers of the Original Certificates of Title
Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 are clearly indicated in the
notice;
7.2.4 There is adequate description of the land affected
in the Notice of Lis Pendens;
7.2.5 The names of the registered owners are indicated
in Paragraph 4 of the Motion attached to the Notice;
7.2.6 A copy of the motion to declare OCT Nos. O-1603
and O-1604 null and void, dated November 25, 1998
upon which the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Rizal will base its action is attached as Annex "A" of the
Notice of Lis Pendens. (Emphasis in the original)29
Petitioners' enumeration readily reveals that they have
not complied with the requisites. Both the LRA and the
appellate court denied the application for a notice of lis
pendens because petitioners are mere movants, and not
original parties, in LRC No. N-18887. As petitioners are
not parties to an action as contemplated in Section 76 of
PD 1529, they failed to present the requisite pleading to
the Register of Deeds of Marikina City. We hold that the
Register of Deeds correctly denied the application for a
notice of lis pendens.
Reconveyance
Petitioners committed a fatal procedural error when they
filed a motion in LRC No. N-18887 on 16 July 1997. The
remedy of petitioners is an action for reconveyance
against Sandoval, Ozaeta and their spouses.
Reconveyance is based on Section 55 of Act No. 496, as
amended by Act No. 3322, which states that "xxx in all
cases of registration procured by fraud the owner may
pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the
parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the
rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of
title xxx."
An action for reconveyance is an action in
personam available to a person whose property has
been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in
another's name. Although the decree is recognized as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the
registered owner is not necessarily held free from liens.
As a remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as an
ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not
with the land registration court.30 Reconveyance is
always available as long as the property has not passed
to an innocent third person for value.ςηαñrοblεš
νιr†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
A notice of lis pendens may thus be annotated on the
certificate of title immediately upon the institution of the
action in court. The notice of lis pendens will avoid
transfer to an innocent third person for value and
preserve the claim of the real owner.31
Necessity of a Motion to Lift the Order of General
Default
In its comment,32 the LRA states that under Section 26 of
PD 1529 the order of default includes petitioners.
Therefore, petitioners' failure to move to lift the default
order did not give them standing in the case. As long as
the court does not lift the order of general default,
petitioners have no legal standing to file the motion to
declare void the decrees of registration issued to the
applicant. Section 26 of PD 1529 provides thus:
Sec. 26. Order of default; effect. - If no person appears
and answers within the time allowed, the court shall,
upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary
appearing, order a default to be recorded and require the
applicant to present evidence. By the description in the
notice "To All Whom It May Concern", all the world are
made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the
default order.
Where an appearance has been entered and an answer
filed, a default order shall be entered against persons
who did not appear and answer.
Petitioners' justification for filing a motion to annul the
decrees and titles, as opposed to filing a motion to lift the
order of general default, rests on two related
assumptions. First, with the filing of the 16 July 1997
motion and giving of due course to the motion by the
land registration court, petitioners assert that they
acquired legal standing in the registration proceedings.
Second, buyer Eugenio Lopez, Sr. stepped into the
shoes of the sellers-applicants Sandoval and Ozaeta
when applicants sold the property to him. As successors-
in-interest of the buyer, petitioners contend that they are
not strangers to the proceedings.
To justify their two assumptions, petitioners traced the
antecedent of Section 22 of PD 1529 to Section 29 of
Act 49633 and its judicial interpretation in Mendoza v.
Court of Appeals.34
Section 22 of PD 1529 provides:
SECTION 22. Dealings with land pending original
registration. After the filing of the application and before
the issuance of the decree of registration, the land
therein described may still be the subject of dealings in
whole or in part, in which case the interested party shall
present to the court the pertinent instruments together
with the subdivision plan approved by the Director of
Lands in case of transfer of portions thereof, and the
court, after notice to the parties, shall order such land
registered subject to the conveyance or encumbrance
created by said instruments, or order that the decree of
registration be issued in the name of the person to whom
the property has been conveyed by said instruments.
The pertinent portion of Section 29 of Act 496 provides:
SECTION 29. After the filing of the application and
before the issuance of the decree of title by the Chief of
the General Land Registration Office, the land therein
described may be dealt with and instruments relating
thereto shall be recorded in the office of the register of
deeds at any time before issuance of the decree of title,
in the same manner as if no application had been made.
The interested party may, however, present such
instruments to the Court of First Instance instead of
presenting them to the office of the Register of Deeds,
together with a motion that the same be considered in
relation with the application, and the court, after notice to
the parties shall order such land registered subject to the
encumbrance created by said instruments, or order the
decree of registration issued in the name of the buyer or
of the person to whom the property has been conveyed
by said instruments. x x x
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals 35 explains the procedure
in cases of conveyance of the land subject of a
registration proceeding by an instrument executed
between the time of filing of the application for
registration and the issuance of the decree of title.
The law does not require that the application for
registration be amended by substituting the "buyer" or
the "person to whom the property has been conveyed"
for the applicant. Neither does it require that the "buyer"
or the "person to whom the property has been conveyed"
be a party to the case. He may thus be a total stranger to
the land registration proceedings. The only requirements
of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the
court by the interested party together with a motion that
the same be considered in relation with the application;
and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the
case xxx.36 Ï‚ηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω
lιbrαrÿ
Petitioners also assert that they do not dispute the
judgment of the land registration court. However, this
position is in conflict with their 25 November 1998 motion
to have the decree and the titles declared void.
Petitioners now assume the roles of both successors-in-
interest and oppositors. This confusion of roles brought
about petitioners' grave error in procedure.
The land registration court granted the application in
LRC No. N-18887 on 31 May 1966 and issued a
certificate of finality dated 8 March 1991. Petitioners filed
their motion to consider the deed of sale in the
registration on 16 July 1997. Petitioners filed their motion
to have the decrees and the corresponding certificates of
title declared void on 25 November 1998. Petitioners
filed both motions long after the decision in LRC No. N-
18887 became final and executory. Neither petitioners
nor even the applicants from whom they base their claim
presented the Deed of Sale before the land registration
court while the action was pending.
Considering the facts and arguments as presented
above, we hold that the motion filed by petitioners is
insufficient to give them standing in the land registration
proceedings for purposes of filing an application of a
notice of lis pendens. However, we disagree with the
LRA and the appellate court's observation that
petitioners need to file a motion to lift the order of
general default. A motion to lift the order of general
default should be filed before entry of final judgment. The
land registration court granted the application for
registration of title on 31 May 1966 and issued a
certificate of finality on 8 March 1991. Petitioners filed
their motion on 16 July 1997. Thus, even if petitioners
filed a motion to lift the order of general default, the order
of default could not be set aside because the motion was
filed out of time.
In Lim Toco v. Go Fay,37 this Court explained the effect
of an order of default to the party defaulted. A party
declared in default loses his standing in court. As a result
of his loss of standing, a party in default cannot appear
in court, adduce evidence, be heard, or be entitled to
notice. A party in default cannot even appeal from the
judgment rendered by the court, unless he files a motion
to set aside the order of default under the grounds
provided in what is now Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Indeed, in its comment before this Court, the LRA stated
thus:
Under Section 26, PD 1429, petitioners are deemed to
have been included by the default order. Those who did
not file an answer should be considered as having lost
their standing in court from that stage (Republic v. Dela
Rosa, 173 SCRA 12) except when they file a motion to
set aside the order [of] default on the grounds mentioned
in Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court (Toco v. Fay,
80 Phil. 166).
In land registration cases (as in the said LRC No. N-
18887), an order of general default was deemed to have
been issued based on the presumption of regularity in
judicial proceedings (Pascual, et al. v. Ortega, et al., 58
O.G. 12 March 1962 C.A.). Petitioners failed to adduce
any evidence showing that the order of general default
was lifted. Records disclosed that without first filing a
motion to lift the order of general default, petitioners filed
a motion to declare as null and void the decrees and
titles. Until the order of general default is lifted by the
court, petitioner could not be considered as a party to the
action. They are deemed movants whose personality as
far as the case is concerned is not yet admitted by the
court considering that the order of default has not been
lifted.38
One should be careful, however, to distinguish between
movants as mere interested parties prescribed under
Section 22 of PD 1529 and movants as intervenors-
oppositors to the land registration proceedings. It is only
in the latter case that a motion to lift the order of general
default is required. It is only in the latter case that the
doctrine pronounced in Serrano v. Palacio,39 as
repeatedly invoked by the LRA and OSG, is applicable:
x x x [P]etitioners committed an error of procedure when
they filed a motion to intervene in the x x x land
registration case for the proper procedure would have
been for them to ask first for the lifting of the order of
general default, and then, if lifted, to file an opposition to
the application of the applicants. This is so because
proceedings in land registration are in rem, and not in
personam, the sole object being the registration applied
for, and not the determination of any right not connected
with the registration (Estila v. Alvero, 37 Phil. 498).
Petitioners are not mere interested parties in this case.
By filing their motion to have the decrees and the
corresponding certificates of title declared void, they took
the role of oppositors to the application for land
registration.

The appellate court stated that "in as much as it would

want to oblige to the plea of petitioners to hasten or
expedite the proceedings and to avoid further expenses
on the part of the petitioners, however[,] (it) could
not."40 Indeed, it requires a delicate balancing act
between the objective of the Rules of Court to secure a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding41 and the strict requirements for a notice
of lis pendens. The facts in this case show that
petitioners have not complied with the requirements.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
55993 dated 29 November 2000.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-60323               April 17, 1990

MAGDALENA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,

RICARDO CHUNG, JOSE ESTRELLA, LEONCIO
PALANCA, NORBERTO ROBLEZA, J.S. VALBUENA,
GREGORIO CANCIO FRANCISCO BUENCAMINO,
and JESUS TOMACRUZ, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC.,
QUEZON CITY, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS,
QUEZON CITY, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
A Resolution of the Court of Appeals 1 ordering, on
motion, the Register of Deeds to cancel a notice of lis
pendens annotated in several Torrens titles 2 is the
subject of the special civil action of certiorari at bar.
The notice of lis pendens was recorded at the instance
of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-18223 of the Court of
First Instance at Quezon City. 3 The case involved a
dispute regarding the ownership of certain lots within a
subdivision known as Magdalena Rolling Hills which the
residents claimed had been reserved as an "open
space" and therefore could not in any manner be sold,
disposed of or encumbered.
The subdivision was owned by the Magdalena Estate,
Inc. (hereafter simply MEI), located at New Manila,
Quezon City. It originally had a total area of 355,490
square meters. Among the subdivision lots was Lot 15,
Block 18, which had an area of 21,460 square meters. A
part of this Lot 15, measuring 7,100 square meters, had
initially been set aside as the subdivision's "open
space," i.e., reserved for use as a park, playground or
recreational zone.
However, an amendment of the plan of the subdivision
(amended subdivision plan [LRC] Psd-
18617) 4 — substituting the area earlier designated as
open space with an area of 7,100 square meters (being
as aforesaid a portion of Lot 15, Block 18), with several
other lots (Lots 21 to 27 of Block 20) having a combined
area also of 7,100 square meters — was approved by
the City Council of Quezon City. The Council also
authorized the subdivision for disposition to the public of
the former open space. 5 Subsequently, the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City also approved the same
amended subdivision plan [LRC] Psd-18167) in
accordance with Republic Act No. 44, subject to the
condition "that all the roads, alleys, drainage and open
space, dedicated for public use, delineated therein, shall
be made subject to the limitations imposed by law." 6
MEI then had the original open space (a portion of Lot
15, Block 18) result resurveyed and subdivided into
several lots. The new plan, (LRC) Pcs-2299, was
approved in due course by the Land Registration
Commission. 7
Some time afterwards, by virtue of a deed executed by
MEI and accepted by the City Mayor of Quezon City,
MEI donated to the City Government certain lots in its
subdivision for use as parks and playgrounds; and the
donation was ratified by the Council.8
After the donation of the parks and playgrounds just
mentioned, MEI disposed of the entire Lot 15, Block 18
including that part thereof or originally designated as
open space (measuring 7,100 square meters). An area
of' 15,778 square meters within this Lot 15, was
subsequently conveyed to the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) by way of dacion en pago on May 19,
1971. 9 The rest, residential lots with an aggregate area
of 5,688 square meters, were sold to third parties who
thereafter constructed houses thereon. 10
Now, the purchasers of the other subdivision lots, who
had organized themselves into a non-stock corporation
known as the Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc.,
believed that the act of the Quezon City Government of
authorizing the release of said Lot 15 as open space,
after it had been so declared and earlier dedicated as
such — and its substitution by another portion of the
subdivision — was beyond the City Government's
authority. They therefore brought suit against the
Magdalena Estate, Inc. MEI in the Court of First Instance
at Quezon City for the recovery of said Lot 15 as "open
space" for public use of the residents of the
subdivision. 11 The complaint, amended a few months
later to implead the Quezon City Government, 12 prayed
for judgment (1) that MEI pay Quezon City P2,575,200,
representing the market value of Lot 15, Block 18, or
that, alternatively, (2) the transfer certificates covering
Lots 1 to 10, Block 11 (12?), (LRC) Psd-19167, with an
aggregate area of 5,359 square meters i.e., Transfer
Certificates of Title Numbered 166683, 166754 to
166763, inclusive, of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon
City be cancelled and new ones issued in the name of
Quezon City for the use and employment, as parks and
playgrounds, of the residents of the
subdivision. 13 Answers were in due course filed by the
defendants.
While the case was pending, notices of lis
pendens were, at the plaintiffs' instance, inscribed by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City on the Torrens is titles
of all the lots embraced within Block 12 (Numbered
166754 to 166763, inclusive, as well as those titles
numbered 258973, 258974, 266509, 266510, 267304 to
267309, inclusive). 14 These were among the lots
previously conveyed by MEI to the Development Bank of
the Philippines by way of dacion en pago, supra. 15
Judgment was rendered by the Trial Court after due
proceedings, 16 the dispositive portion of which is as
follows:
WHEREFORE, considering that the plaintiffs have no
cause of action against defendant Quezon City
government, the complaint against it is hereby
DISMISSED.
HOWEVER, insofar as the action for recovery of open
space is concerned, judgment is hereby rendered
authorizing the plaintiffs to recover the subject space
from MEI, thereafter to be donated to the Quezon City
government, to maintain and develop the same for the
ultimate use of the common weal.
Not satisfied with this judgment, the petitioners went up
to the Court of Appeals to seek its modification. 17
While the case was pending adjudgment, MEI and DBP
filed separate motions with the Court of Appeals praying
for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated on
the titles of the lots in Block 12 of the
subdivision. 18 These motions were granted by resolution
dated December 10, 1981. Reconsideration was sought
and denied by Resolution dated February 8, 1982.
Hence, the petition at bar, for nullification of the
resolutions of December 10, 1981 and February 8, 1982
on the theory that in promulgating them, the Court of
Appeals had acted with grave abuse of discretion if not
indeed without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
The petitioners' first argument, that the Court of Appeals
had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and grant the
motion to cancel notice of lis pendens because no such
motion had ever been filed in the Court a quo, cannot be
sustained.
According to Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court 19 and Section 76 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, 20 a notice of lis pendens is proper in the following
cases, viz.:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly
affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation
thereof or the buildings thereon.
The notice of lis pendens — i.e., that real property is
involved in an action — is ordinarily recorded without the
intervention of the court where the action is pending. The
notice is but an incident in an action, an extra judicial
one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is
intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all
people who deal with the property that they so deal with
it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire
in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to
the results of the action, and may well be inferior and
subordinate to those which may be finally determined
and laid down therein. 21 The cancellation of such a
precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in
the action, and may be ordered by the Court having
jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or
removal — like the continuance or removal of a
preliminary attachment or injunction — is not contingent
on the existence of a final judgment in the action, and
ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.
In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in virtue of
the perfection of the plaintiffs' appeal.1âwphi1 It
therefore had power to deal with and resolve any
incident in connection with the action subject of the
appeal, even before final judgment. The rule that no
questions may be raised for the first time on appeal have
reference only to those affecting the merits of the action,
and not to mere incidents thereof, e.g., cancellation of
notices of lis pendens, or, to repeat, the grant or
dissolution of provisional remedies.
Now, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon
order of the court, "after proper showing that the notice is
for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it
is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who
caused it to be recorded." 22
The Court of Appeals found as a fact that the case had
dragged on and had been unnecessarily prolonged by
repeated amendments of the complaints by the plaintiffs,
and that the circumstances on record justified the
conclusion that the annotation of the notice of lis
pendens was intended to molest and harass the
defendants. 23
That determination, and the conclusion that Presidential
Decree No. 1529 "authorizes the cancellation of notices
of lis pendens before final judgment upon order of the
Court, upon the grounds previously mentioned," are not
whimsical or capricious, despotic, arbitrary or oppressive
in the premises so as to call for correction by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs
against the petitioners.
IT IS SO ORDERED.