Article II, Section 5.

The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Article III, Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO,

PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA,
BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.

Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a
legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and
petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio
Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4,
1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift
(from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8
A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.

The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent
Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties — parties —

3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass demonstration at
Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated by
the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to
4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;
 4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the
Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de
Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2)
Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin
Pagcu.

5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration
at Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the
union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally
cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained
further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no
quarrel or dispute with Management;

6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO
that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned
the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without
previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are
the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March
4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore,
would be amounting to an illegal strike;

7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked Company
represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino,
Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3,
1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers may
join the Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969
should be excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize the
workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly
Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the
Company shall be dismiss; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be
primarily liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The union panel countered that it
was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacañang demonstration will be held
the following morning; and

8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which
was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows: 'REITERATING
REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.'
(Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)

Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the
pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the
demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6
A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969,
with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift,
charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of
Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The
charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24,
rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T.
Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)

In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because
they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass
demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some
Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed
against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)

After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in
an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein
petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin
Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor
practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent
Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)

Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they
filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for
reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence,
as well as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the
Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )

In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred that
herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September 15),
1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five
(5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for
reconsideration; and that because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly
dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo,1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period
for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp.
61-64, rec.).

Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in
support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).

In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein
petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J",
pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).

At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October 24, 1969 and
addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as
amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within
five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or order of the
C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).

On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from the order dated
October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due to
excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office
clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-
2", rec.).

Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein
petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).

There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by the case at
bar.

(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the
central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an
individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his
person."2

(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision
of those who have no patience with general principles."3

In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials,
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to
free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted
to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual,
not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its
power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise."5

(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the
immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas
that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority
who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen.6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it,
the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are
protected.7

(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights
essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these
freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their
suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The
citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for
redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.

(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized.8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society"
and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,"
they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity."9

Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are
extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government
and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful,
and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they
are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these
liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 11

The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or
rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose — that the law is neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property
rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent
criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and
reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo
in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs.
Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition
for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our
right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the
balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief
Judge Learned Hand, viz. — whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion
of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17

II

The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of
strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners
are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles governing a democratic society,
such conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang
was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm,
said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their right
of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief
Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for
their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of
herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members fro the harassment of local
police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the
cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as
consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein
respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace
for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local
police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the position
of its laborers the alleged oppressive police who might have been all the more emboldened thereby subject its
lowly employees to further indignities.

In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against
alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were
fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled
enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by
reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the
preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference
between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic situation was a
stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the
municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police
of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families.
Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale
and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to
humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on
bruised tissues.

As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition
for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as
a coveted boon — at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-
consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization — becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any
meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all.
To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in
collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal
from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining
agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the
constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19

The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the respondent
Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular working hours." The
strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to
stage mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind
and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated
on such a slender ground.

The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by any
court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally
appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar
concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial
dispute although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45,
rec.).

The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration and
that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in
order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of an effective
demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total
presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but
also immediately action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues
they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators
are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is
diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover,
the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks
which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the
company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have made arrangements
to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day,
especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the
demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company at
9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of
human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from
work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the
mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of
the employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.

III

The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the
respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police
abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional
restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the
respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the
employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards
as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights
guaranteed in Section Three."

We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm on
March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was
interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such common action to better shield
themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the
workers for the morning and regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of
dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech." 22

Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal protection as the concerted
action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president with immorality, nepotism,
favoritism an discrimination in the appointment and promotion of ban employees. 23 We further ruled in the
Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in
relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24

As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court dated
September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right
of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO representatives that
workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for
work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing
CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal
tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees
raised against the local police, were more important to them because they had the courage to proceed with the
demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by
reason of their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer,
more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their
demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But management was adamant in refusing
to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for
redress.

Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers proof of the
truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such
abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and
to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and action
with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.

On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a
large extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not
make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only mean
that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits
for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose
orders could not be filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers
by reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were
damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount
in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such
savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason of
the absence of its workers for only one day.

IV

Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for
redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with
the demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon
the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people,"
which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State
shall afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under
obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working
man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter."
Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to
eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to
self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and
economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the
very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its
avowed mission — its raison d'etre — as ordained and directed by the Constitution.
V

It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the
sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the
finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted
by final judgment through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-
incrimination; 25 or who is denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without
due process of law, 26 even after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years. 27

Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these constitutional immunities
of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which the
aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human
rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it
issued in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public
offices including the courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which
must not be nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely
delegate legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of
these human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not
exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a
continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be
rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of
Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced
to a race for time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because
he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required diligence and zeal,
bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal services. 28-a

VI

The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order or writ should filed
within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within ten
(10) days from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of
procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29

The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September 22,
1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on
September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.

Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the
petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere
Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal
in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The answer
should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic
tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and
regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the
constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed.
Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the
constitutional rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the
petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere
legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the
law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the
aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the
motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of
Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28,
1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned.

It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based on the ground
that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the
hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections
15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the
arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after
the 10-day period required for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for
reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969
dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period
(Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)

It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or where the
arguments in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court of
Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject of29-a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable.
But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and petition were not involved.

It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be specifically
raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is deemed
waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that
the determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case
without the resolution of which no final and complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen
that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case,
the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the
constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged
against them and in their defense to the said charge.

In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most
compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human
rights. 30-a

It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his
concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle and added that

Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without concerning itself about
procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case, without further loss
of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired.
Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words, when all the
material facts are spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it
matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and
there render the appropriate judgment. Is within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it is
perfectly legal and within the power of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in
excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the admit of
its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any error of judgment of a
court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt,
which I do not entertain, on whether or not the errors this Court has found in the decision of the
Court of Appeals are short of being jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this Court would still be on
firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here and now even if such errors can
be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as
to avoid the unnecessary return of this case to the lower court for the sole purpose of pursuing the
ordinary course of an appeal. (Emphasis supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this particular case at bar would
an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein laborers, whose basic
human freedoms, including the right to survive, must be according supremacy over the property rights of their
employer firm which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual
material damage has be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights.

If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative
the suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human rights sanctioned and shielded
with resolution concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that the
application in the instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein
respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the
human rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed
by the record.

The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with reference to the
case at is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the
Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."

On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the
Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al.,  30-e thus:

As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new trial is not
"newly discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for the ordinary courts,
We hold that such criterion is not binding upon the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20
of Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure
and shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided, however,
That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in
exercising any duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity
and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may
deem just and equitable.' By this provision the industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of the
technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not even restricted to the specific relief
demanded by the parties but may issue such orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient for
the purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes.
(Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor,
71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that this provision is ample enough to have enabled
the respondent court to consider whether or not its previous ruling that petitioners constitute a
minority was founded on fact, without regard to the technical meaning of newly discovered
evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578). (emphasis
supplied.)

To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in
effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of
human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel — erroneously believing
that he received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion
for reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late considering that September 28,
1969 was a Sunday.

Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be instruments of justice, for
the attainment of which such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice
Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:

As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The
Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600
 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961,
2 SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts its proper-office as an
aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from
courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has remained committed. The late Justice Recto in
Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the interpretation of
procedural rule should never "sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural laws are no other than
technicalities" view them in their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends themselves for the
compliance with which courts have organized and function, but as means conducive to the
realization the administration of the law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have remained steadfastly
opposed, in the highly rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial rights of a
litigant in altar of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred principles of justice."
(Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put by Justice
Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of the situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379,
Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point promulgated in 1968, (Udan v.
Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice
Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure "are not to
be applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but are intended "to help secure substantial justice."
(Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g

Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the dismissal or
termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence
from work. The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the
dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who participated in the
demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the
Union members who are not officers, were not dismissed and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers
were specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the firm (pp. 16-
20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that not
all the 400 or so employee participated in the demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13)
officers were specifically named in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then
many, if not all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence,
the firm continued in operation that day and did not sustain any damage.

The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all — should have been simply to charge said one-day
absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most
cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as
that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time
strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.

Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:

The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to destroy our
system of Government, but from men of goodwill — good men who allow their proper concerns to
blind them to the fact that what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.

... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however, is
that preservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same
effect whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided
zeal is a constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our
Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another, larger
surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.

... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.

... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
 ... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure because we
belong to a group that is important and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a
code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience must be observe. 31

The case at bar is worse.

Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic
understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police,
It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for
their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism.
Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare
of its employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.

Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed
eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the Bank president demanding
his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination
in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:

It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that the latter
acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless
protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self
organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly
stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of
their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6
A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).

xxx xxx xxx

Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances.

xxx xxx xxx

The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel
in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of self-organization of
employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of
the employer to discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees,
L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise
of the right of the employer to select his employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely
against the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self organization
(Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])...

xxx xxx xxx

In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as an
interference with the employees' right of self-organization or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a
refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and
intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 33

If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings case,
supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and
protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more
imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:

(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated September 15
and October 9, 1969; and

(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their
separation from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized
from other sources during their separation from the service.

With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.

Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, C.J, took no part.

PBM Employees vs PBM

Facts: 
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed
of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and
Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they
decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig police. PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally
cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with
Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that
the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers who
without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed,
because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike.
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the
pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the
demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6
A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first
shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No
Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.

Issue: 
Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated.

Held: 
Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of
a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. This is not present in
the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels
for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence
perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent
employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their
freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local
officialdom, theemployees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival,
utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human
rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their
property rights. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as
they believed they were by thepeace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the
employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to
individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated.
The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in
monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. To regard the
demonstration against policeofficers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining
and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of
the demonstratingemployees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargainingagreement, is "a potent
means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom
of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the Issue raised by
the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of
the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of
disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.

The City Attorney for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

VITUG, J.:

The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into focus in
this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to
prohibit public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et
al. vs. Quimpo, et al."

The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the
petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council
under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and
members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a
grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North
EDSA.1 Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo
that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park".2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their
President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the
petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor
Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores,
and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580.3 On 23 July 1990, the
CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA
pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to
appear before the CHR.4

On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's
own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the
disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to
purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners
to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt
and arrest."6

A motion to dismiss,7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred, among
other things, that:

1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency
Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the
demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;

xxx xxx xxx

3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein refers to
moratorium in the demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;

4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business
entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the
complainants are indeed, vendors;

5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA
corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and

6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether
or not a certain business establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of
Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law
and ordinance.8

During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to
dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would
bring the case to the courts.

On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the
Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and
political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their
privilege to engage in business."9

On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the contempt
charge that had meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on
the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved).10

In an Order,11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition
of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each
of them.
On 1 March 1991,12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to
dismiss, in this wise:

Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over
the complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human
and constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.13

The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger
limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the
power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines . . . ." It added:

The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to dignity. All
these brazenly and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the
same time for the basic rights of women and children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their
actions have psychologically scarred and traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed
to such a violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.

In an Order,14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this recourse.

The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated, however, in
our resolution16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to
"CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580."17

The petitioners pose the following:

Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:

a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were
demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;

b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and

c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.

In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment for public
respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment,18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its
Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who
had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.

The petition has merit.

The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987

Constitution.19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 163,20 issued
on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the
Presidential Committee on Human Rights.21

The powers and functions22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to —

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights;
 (2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for
the primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human
rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of the
members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body.23 This view, however, has not
heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights,24 the Court, through then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated
powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no
way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:

. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another
court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the
latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and, its
is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit
not a few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights
in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has been
propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The participants, representing different sectors of
the society, have given the following varied answers:

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same
in all parts of the world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United
States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .

Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech,
of the press, of religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of law;
political rights, such as the right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form
political associations and engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an education,
employment, and social services.25

Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his
humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only
be recognized and protected by it.26

(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.27

Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his
natural birth, right, innate and inalienable.28

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the
scope of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural,
political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits and
attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights,
encompassing almost all aspects of life.

Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional Commission in
adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in creating an independent commission to safeguard these
rights? It may of value to look back at the country's experience under the martial law regime which may have, in
fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among
those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human
Rights in the Philippines,"29 observes:

But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the
human rights expressed in the International Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the
proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule.
Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and held
for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until ordered released by the
Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to petition for the redress of grievances
became useless, since group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass
media were subjected to censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence and security of tenure,
except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters of resignation and
were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort confessions were practiced as
declared by international bodies like Amnesty International and the International Commission of
Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following discussions
during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:

MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the importance of
human rights and also because civil and political rights have been determined by many
international covenants and human rights legislations in the Philippines, as well as the Constitution,
specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide
territory in area, we might diffuse its impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity
would also be curtailed.

So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most
effective.

MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very broad. The
Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every single right of an individual
involves his civil right or his political right. So, where do we draw the line?

MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the language of
human rights advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses
a number of articles on the right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair and public hearing,
and so on. These are very specific rights that are considered enshrined in many international
documents and legal instruments as constituting civil and political rights, and these are precisely
what we want to defend here.

MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights distinguished this right against torture.

MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights, and there
are other violations of rights of citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts and
authorities.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and, therefore, in
doing that the commission will be authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps
heretofore or at this moment are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and
prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the specific
parameters which cover civil and political rights as covered by the international standards
governing the behavior of governments regarding the particular political and civil rights of citizens,
especially of political detainees or prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced during
martial law which we would now like to safeguard.

MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to
say is, perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all those rights stated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and defined as human rights. Those are the rights that we envision
here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They
are integral parts of that.

MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights
covered by human rights?

MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like to state
that in the past regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime
came out with the defense that, as a matter of fact, they had defended the rights of people to
decent living, food, decent housing and a life consistent with human dignity.

So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that the sense of
the committee, so as not to confuse the issue?

MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.

MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the previous
speaker.

There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively: 1)
protection of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures;
3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other
crimes committed against the religious.

xxx xxx xxx

The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.

I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to
make the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to
future expansion. The coverage of the concept and jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I
was actually disturbed this morning when the reference was made without qualification to the rights
embodied in the universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later on, this was qualified to
refer to civil and political rights contained therein.

If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other
human rights specified in other convention which I do not remember. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?

MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights of which we are signatory.

MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite
possible that there are rights specified in that other convention which may not be specified here. I
was wondering whether it would be wise to link our concept of human rights to general terms like
"convention," rather than specify the rights contained in the convention.

As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the
period of amendments, could specify to us which of these articles in the Declaration will fall within
the concept of civil and political rights, not for the purpose of including these in the proposed
constitutional article, but to give the sense of the Commission as to what human rights would be
included, without prejudice to expansion later on, if the need arises. For example, there was no
definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to marry would be
considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right?

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political rights that
we felt must be envisioned initially by this provision — freedom from political detention and arrest
prevention of torture, right to fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance,
salvagings, hamlettings and collective violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes
precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a specific group of individuals, and therefore, we
are not opening it up to all of the definite areas.

MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his
concept or the concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights
as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring
to an international instrument.

MR. GUINGONA. I know.

MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article therein, but
only to those that pertain to the civil and politically related, as we understand it in this Commission
on Human Rights.

MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between civil and
social rights.

MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The
second covenant contains all the different rights-the rights of labor to organize, the right to
education, housing, shelter, et cetera.

MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those that
the Gentlemen has specified.

MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.

xxx xxx xxx

SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I cannot stress
more on how much we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .

. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept
clients who do not pay. And so, they are the ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is,
 the cases involved are very delicate — torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest,
massacre — and the persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians, men in
the military and big shots. Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must be independent.

I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially for the little
Filipino, the little individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we should
concentrate only on civil and political violations because if we open this to land, housing and
health, we will have no place to go again and we will not receive any response. . . .30 (emphasis
supplied)

The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the
Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).

The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as referring —

(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its
inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of the government. They
include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or,
as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a
state or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being
enforced or redressed in a civil action.

Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable
searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt.32

Political rights,33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of
petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.34

Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates
envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human
rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political
detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of
disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the
enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of
priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take
comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They
have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights
that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation."35

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is
planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City
which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is
not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated
is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the
standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to
conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents
can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the
Constitution.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the
CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or
indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions
provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only
to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial
powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate
with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in
pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance
before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not
possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights,36 the Court, speaking through
Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may
not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of
injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction
is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may
seek from proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of
justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may
only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a
Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection
of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).

The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to
any appropriate agency of government.37

The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors
affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus
standi on the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the
appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.

The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and
academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is
merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act
about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said
Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has
been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that.39

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is hereby
prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for
contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

SIMON VS. COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS

G.R. NO. 100150 JANUARY 05, 1994

Facts:

Petitioner Mayor Simon asks to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating "demolition case" on
vendors of North EDSA.

Issue:
 Whether the CHR is authorized to hear and decide on the "demolition case" and to impose a fine for
contempt.

Ruling:

Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowered the CHR to investigate all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. The demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores and carenderia
cannot fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights".

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity and are the same in all
parts of the world. Human rights include civil rights (right to life, liberty and property; freedom of speech, of
the press, of religion, academic freedom; rights of the accused to due process of law), political rights (right
to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political associations and engage in
politics), social rights (right to education, employment and social services.

G.R. No. 225442

SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN
NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES, and CLARISSA JOYCE
VILLEGAS, minor, for herself and as represented by her father, JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, as represented by
MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, and NAVOTAS CITY, as represented by MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO,,
Respondents,

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the constitutionality of the curfew ordinances issued by the local
governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The petition prays that a temporary restraining order (TRO)
be issued ordering respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of their
respective local governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist from implementing and enforcing these issuances,
pending resolution of this case, and eventually, declare the City of Manila's ordinance as ultra vires for being
contrary to Republic Act No. (RA) 9344,2 or the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act," as amended, and all curfew
ordinances as unconstitutional for violating the constitutional right of minors to travel, as well as the right of
parents to rear their children.

The Facts

Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several
local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through police
operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."3

Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas City,
through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99- 02,4 dated August 26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakdang 'Curfew' ng mga
Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as
amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,5 dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila,
through Ordinance No. 80466 entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the
Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age;
Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated October 14, 2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c)
Quezon City, through Ordinance No. SP- 2301,7 Series of 2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a [sic]
Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M., Providing Penalties for
Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance;
collectively, Curfew Ordinances).8

Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) - an association of young

adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the rights and welfare
of the youth and minors10 - filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional
because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for vagueness
doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew
hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process;
and (d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process.11 In
addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.12

More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers should apprehend and
properly determine the age of the alleged curfew violators.13 They further argue that the law enforcer's
apprehension depends only on his physical assessment, and, thus, subjective and based only on the law
enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged curfew violator.14

While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions indicating the activities exempted from
the operation of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or students with evening class, they
contend that the lists of exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of legitimate activities or reasons as to
why minors would be out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate activities of minors during curfew
hours.15

Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right
to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process;16 and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for
not being narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose.17 They
argue that the prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will not per se protect and promote the social
and moral welfare of children of the community.18

Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 419 thereof, contravenes Section 57-
A20 of RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew provision imposes on minors the penalties of
imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition. They contend that the imposition of penalties contravenes RA 9344's
express command that no penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew violations.21

Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to the parents'
prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that
even if a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are available to achieve the same. In this regard, they
suggest massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTV s (closed-circuit televisions) in public streets, and
regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of protecting children and preventing crimes at
night. They further opine that the government can impose more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental
counseling and education seminars informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that
imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who allowed their children to be out during curfew hours.22

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly granted.

 I.

At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this case. Respondents seek the dismissal of
the petition, questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail
the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners' direct resort to the Court, contrary to the hierarchy
of courts doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual controversy and standing to warrant judicial review.23

A. Propriety of the Petition for

Certiorari and Prohibition.

Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."24 Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then
was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable
and enforceable."25

In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed before the Court "are the
remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the Constitution."27 It was explained that
"[w]ith respect to the Court, x x x the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and
reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by
a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set
right, undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of
Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited above]."28

In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association,
Inc.,29 it was expounded that "[ m ]eanwhile that no specific procedural rule has been promulgated to enforce [the]
'expanded' constitutional definition of judicial power and because of the commonality of 'grave abuse of discretion'
as a ground for review under Rule 65 and the courts' expanded jurisdiction, the Supreme Court - based on its
power to relax its rules - allowed Rule 65 to be used as the medium for petitions invoking the courts' expanded
jurisdiction[. ]"30

In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by the legislative councils of Quezon
City, Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of their delegated legislative powers on the ground that these
ordinances violate the Constitution, specifically, the provisions pertaining to the right to travel of minors, and the
right of parents to rear their children. They also claim that the Manila Ordinance, by imposing penalties against
minors, conflicts with RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits the imposition of penalties on minors for status
offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will
or personal bias. "31 In light of the foregoing, petitioners correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition, although these governmental actions were not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.

B. Direct Resort to the Court.

Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as remedies to assail the constitutionality of legislative
and executive enactments, the next question to be resolved is whether or not petitioners' direct resort to this Court
is justified.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court
exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with the
Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is
allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the
petition[.]"32 This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first
instance [if it] is of paramount importance and immediately affects the social, economic, and moral well-
being of the people,"33 as in this case. Hence, petitioners' direct resort to the Court is justified.

C. Requisites of Judicial Review.

"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law
or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites
for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case."34 In this case, respondents assail the existence of the first
two (2) requisites.

1. Actual Case or Controversy.

"Basic in the exercise of judicial power - whether under the traditional or in the expanded setting - is the presence
of an actual case or controversy."35 "[A]n actual case or controversy is one which 'involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical
or abstract difference or dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."36 According to recent
jurisprudence, in the Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is
simplified "by merely requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed
governmental act."37

"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of the act complained of."38

Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable controversy in this case given the
evident clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the Curfew Ordinances impair the minors' and
parents' constitutional rights, and whether the Manila Ordinance goes against the provisions of RA 9344. Based
on their asseverations, petitioners have - as will be gleaned from the substantive discussions below - conveyed
a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, which perforce impels this Court to exercise its expanded
jurisdiction. The case is likewise ripe for adjudication, considering that the Curfew Ordinances were being
implemented until the Court issued the TRO39 enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat or incidence of
injury is, therefore, not merely speculative or hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.
2. Legal Standing.

"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether those assailing the
governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for adjudication. [Petitioners] must
show that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or are in
immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of the enforcement of the
challenged governmental act."40 "' [I]nterest' in the question involved must be material - an interest that is in
issue and will be affected by the official act- as distinguished from being merely incidental or general."41

"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously
affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."42

As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of two (2) constitutional rights, namely: (1) the
right of minors to freely travel within their respective localities; and (2) the primary right of parents to rear their
children. Related to the first is the purported conflict between RA 9344, as amended, and the penal provisions of
the Manila Ordinance.

Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the
issue affecting the minor's right to travel,43 because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the petition was filed
before this Court,44 and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from
Manila to Quezon City at night after school and is, thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by virtue of the
Curfew Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua,
Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they are all of legal
age, and therefore, beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of the Curfew
Ordinances, for which they could base any direct injury as a consequence thereof.

None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew Ordinances violate the parents'
right to rear their children as they have not shown that they stand before this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s
whose constitutional parental right has been infringed. It should be noted that Clarissa is represented by her
father, Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the petition for himself for the alleged
violation of his parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not question the Curfew Ordinances based on his primary right
as a parent as he only stands as the representative of his minor child, Clarissa, whose right to travel was
supposedly infringed.

As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no legal personality to bring an action
in court.45 Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege that it
was authorized by its members who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on
their behalf.

Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal interest in the controversy. More
particularly, Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the alleged violation of the minors' right to travel, but not on
the alleged violation of the parents' right.

These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing requirement insofar as all the petitioners are
concerned, in view of the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case. "In a number of cases,
this Court has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of legal standing, especially when paramount
interest is involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and take
cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that they have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act."46

This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances is placed under
judicial review. Not only is this Court asked to determine the impact of these issuances on the right of parents to
rear their children and the right of minors to travel, it is also requested to determine the extent of the State's
authority to regulate these rights in the interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of overarching
significance to the public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including, among others, the
standing requirement.

That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this case.

II.

A. Void for Vagueness.

Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel and of parents to rear their children, this
Court must first tackle petitioners' contention that the Curfew Ordinances are void for vagueness.

In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not containing sufficient enforcement
parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out their provisions. They
claim that the lack of procedural guidelines in these issuances led to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and
Mark Leo, even though they were already of legal age. They maintain that the enforcing authorities apprehended
the suspected curfew offenders based only on their physical appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile,
although they conceded that the Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the age of the child, they
submit that nowhere does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or identification of the child
to show his age.47

The arguments are untenable.

"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."48

In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they do not
properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails to
provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act
accordingly.49 The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process considerations, which are
absent from this particular claim. In one case, it was opined that:

[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty," which may involve "procedural due process
uncertainty cases" and "substantive due process uncertainty cases." "Procedural due process uncertainty"
involves cases where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to give adequate warning to those
subject to its prohibitions as well as to provide proper standards for adjudication. Such a definition encompasses
the vagueness doctrine. This perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine with the due process clause, a
necessary interrelation since there is no constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes that are "void-for-
vagueness."50

Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local authorities in the proper
apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the
subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack of enforcement
guidelines. The mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of
policy that are best left for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing
unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must
show that this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that
allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this
regard, that ambiguous provision of law contravenes due process because agents of the government cannot
reasonably decipher what conduct the law permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 51 it was
ratiocinated that:

A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on ad
hoc and subjective basis, and vague standards result in erratic and arbitrary application based on individual
impressions and personal predilections.52

As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew
Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus,
without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the
void for vagueness doctrine.

Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew
violators. While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these parameters, law enforcement
agents are still bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory law when implementing ordinances.
Specifically, RA 9344, as amended, provides:

Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be
based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. (Emphases supplied)

This provision should be read in conjunction with · the Curfew Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that
amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law.53 Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344,
as amended by RA 10630,54 minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances are children at risk and,
therefore, covered by its provisions.55 It is a long-standing principle that "[c]onformity with law is one of the
essential requisites for the validity of a municipal ordinance."56 Hence, by necessary implication, ordinances
should be read and implemented in conjunction with related statutory law.

Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, who was perceived to be a minor
violating the curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond the application of the Curfew Ordinances by simply
presenting any competent proof of identification establishing their majority age. In the absence of such proof, the
law authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a visual assessment of the suspect, which - needless to state -
should be done ethically and judiciously under the circumstances. Should law enforcers disregard these rules, the
remedy is to pursue the appropriate action against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have the ordinances
invalidated.

All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for vagueness is denied.

B. Right of Parents to Rear their

Children.

Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their natural
and primary right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In this regard, they assert that this
right includes the right to determine whether minors will be required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed
to stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is primarily with parents and not with the State, the
latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling.57

Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.

Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights of parents in the
rearing of their children:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic efficiency
and the development of their moral character are characterized not only as parental rights, but also as parental
duties. This means that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their authority over their children;
they are equally obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of this provision is a reflection
of the State's independent interest to ensure that the youth would eventually grow into free, independent, and
well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is during childhood that minors are prepared for additional
obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child for these [obligations] must be read to include the
inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship."58 "This affirmative
process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is essential to the growth of young people into
mature, socially responsible citizens."59

By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over one's
children."60 In Ginsberg v. New York,61 the Supreme Court of the United States (US) remarked that "constitutional
interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the
rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society."62 As in our Constitution, the right and duty of
parents to rear their children is not only described as "natural," but also as "primary." The qualifier "primary"
connotes the parents' superior right over the State in the upbringing of their children. 63 The rationale for
the State's deference to parental control over their children was explained by the US Supreme Court in Bellotti v.
Baird (Bellotti),64 as follows:

[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The
State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring
parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. But an additional and more important
justification for state deference to parental control over children is that "the child is not [a) mere creature
of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when actions concerning the
child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the [Sltate may act to promote
these legitimate interests."66 Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the physical or mental health of the child
or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override
the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their children."67

As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in the exercise of these rights and
duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather, complementary to parental
supervision. In Nery v. Lorenzo,68 this Court acknowledged the State's role as parens patriae in protecting
minors, viz. :

[Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights
of persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other
parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political community to look
after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth
in an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the
supreme power of every State, x x x."69 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral development of
their children,70 and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it
was held that "[I]egal restriction on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to
the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful
and rewarding. Under the Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents and others, teachers
for example, who have the primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of
the laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."71

The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of promoting
their children's well-being. As will be later discussed at greater length, these ordinances further compelling State
interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and the prevention of juvenile crime), which necessarily
entail limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their children. Minors, because of their peculiar
vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more exposed to potential physical harm by criminal elements
that operate during the night; their moral well-being is likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to making
detrimental decisions during this time.72

At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors are not -
whether actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their parents. This serves as an
explicit recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of parental authority and the importance of
parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over their children's conduct during
curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the
Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places without
parental accompaniment during the curfew hours. 73 In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an
over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate their
authority to influence or control their minors' activities.74 As such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a
minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her child.

Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to spend more time at
home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities to take a more active role in their
children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),75 the US court observed that the city
government "was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would promote parental involvement in a child's
upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to protect their children from the perils of the street but
are unable to control the nocturnal behavior of those children."76 Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents who
prefer their children to spend time on their studies than on the streets."77 Reason dictates that these realities
observed in Schleifer are no less applicable to our local context. Hence, these are additional reasons which justify
the impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental rights.

In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for violating the parents' right to rear their
children.

C. Right to Travel.

Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on the minors' right to travel. They
claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the application of the strict
scrutiny test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a compelling State interest, such as the prevention of
juvenile crime and the protection of minors from crime, there are other less restrictive means for achieving the
government's interest.78 In addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances suffer from overbreadth by proscribing
or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.79

Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.

At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners
have not claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition of speech-related conduct.
In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. AntiTerrorism Council(Southern Hemisphere),80 this Court
explained that "the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the
given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases,"81 viz.:

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to
plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly
analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules
of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him
or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights
of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges
are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely
"as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it
more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the
concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous
enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence may cause others not before
the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to
remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.82 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims,
the Court, in at least two [(2)] cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth
doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,83 and that claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v.
Hicks,84 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is
not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by
the 'transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression. "'85

In the more recent case of SpousesImbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it was opined that "[f]acial challenges can only be
raised on the basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness
relates to violations of due process rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the basis of overbreadth
and limited to the realm of freedom of expression."87

That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth analysis in this case, there being no
claimed curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this Court finds proper to examine the assailed
regulations under the strict scrutiny test.

The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right88 under Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other countries or
within the Philippines.89 It is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty.90 Liberty - a birthright of every
person - includes the power of locomotion91 and the right of citizens to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways
and to live and work where they desire or where they can best pursue the ends of life.92

The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other rights, such as the rights
to education, free expression, assembly, association, and religion.93 The inter-relation of the right to travel with
other fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of Maquoketa v. Russell,94 as follows:

Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and association require one to
move about, such movement must necessarily be protected under the First Amendment.
Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that First Amendment Rights cannot be
exercised without violating the law is equivalent to a denial of those rights. One court has eloquently
pointed this out:

We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to freedom of travel
and movement. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to their church, their freedom to worship is
impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to the meeting hall, freedom of assembly is effectively
blocked. If, for any reason, people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the streets of a community,
opportunities for freedom of speech are sharply limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably involved with
freedoms set forth in the First Amendment. (Emphases supplied)

Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made against
fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another, jurisprudence provides that
this right is not absolute.95 As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State96 may impose limitations on the exercise
of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and
(2) are provided by law.97

The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of
juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the minor's movement and
activities within the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived
to reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As
to the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is replete with laws
emphasizing the State's duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610,98 as amended, RA 977599 RA
9262100 RA 9851101RA 9344102 RA 10364103 RA 9211104 RA8980,105 RA9288,106 and Presidential Decree (PD)
603,107 as amended.

Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local government units,
through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. It reads:

Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may prescribe such curfew hours for
children as may be warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew ordinances shall devolve upon
the parents or guardians and the local authorities.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what respondents have done in
this case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory
basis - as required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of the right to travel.

The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally permissible.
In this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights,108 but the exercise
of these rights is not co-extensive as those of adults.109 They are always subject to the authority or custody of
another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State.110 As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to
a certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs concerning the right to
vote,111 the right to execute contracts,112 and the right to engage in gainful employment.113 With respect to the right
to travel, minors are required by law to obtain a clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development before they can travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a person other than their
parents.114 These limitations demonstrate that the State has broader authority over the minors' activities than over
similar actions of adults,115 and overall, reflect the State's general interest in the well-being of minors.116 Thus, the
State may impose limitations on the minors' exercise of rights even though these limitations do not generally apply
to adults.

In Bellotti,117the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the differential treatment of the minors'
constitutional rights. These are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed and mature manner; and third, the importance of the parental role in
child rearing:118

[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally are protected by the same constitutional
guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to
account for children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern, ... sympathy, and ... paternal attention.x x x.

[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the recognition that, during the formative years of
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and
avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. x x x.

xxxx

[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the
freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own
immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. x x x.

xxxx

x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the
child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful
and rewarding.119 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court acknowledged the heightened dangers on the
streets to minors, as compared to adults:

A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full
maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within a
broad range of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such action are the crippling effects of child
employment, more especially in public places, and the possible harms arising from other activities subject to
all the diverse influences of the [streets]. It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to
reach such evils is within the state's police power, whether against the parent's claim to control of the child or one
that religious scruples dictate contrary action.

It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways. But even in such
use streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work or in other
things, this difference may be magnified.121 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of their travel rights,
provided, they are singled out on reasonable grounds.

Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of
classifications.122 The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of
fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect
classes.123 The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes or
fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and
legitimacy.124 Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.125

Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no less by our
Constitution, the strict scrutiny test126 is the applicable test.127 At this juncture, it should be emphasized that minors
enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State has broader authority over minors than over
adults does not trigger the application of a lower level of scrutiny.128 In Nunez v. City of San Diego (Nunez),129 the
US court illumined that:
Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews implicate the fundamental rights of minors,
the parties dispute whether strict scrutiny review is necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that rights are no
less "fundamental" for minors than adults, but that the analysis of those rights may differ:

Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined
age of majority.1âwphi1 Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights. The Court[,] indeed, however, [has long] recognized that the State has somewhat broader
authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults. xxx. Thus, minors' rights are not coextensive with the
rights of adults because the state has a greater range of interests that justify the infringement of minors'
rights.

The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when applicable, warrant differential analysis of the
constitutional rights of minors and adults: x x x. The Bellotti test [however] does not establish a lower level of
scrutiny for the constitutional rights of minors in the context of a juvenile curfew. Rather,
the Bellotti framework enables courts to determine whether the state has a compelling state interest justifying
greater restrictions on minors than on adults. x x x.

x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in regulating minors differently than adults, we do
not believe that [a] lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate to review burdens on minors' fundamental
rights. x x x.

According, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x x.130 (Emphases supplied)

The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances of minors as
enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as parenspatriae to protect and preserve their well-being with the
compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative
classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect
class is presumed unconstitutional.131 Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the classification
(1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.132

a. Compelling State Interest.

Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally declared policies.133 This Court has
ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for them
as parenspatriae constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the State.134 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way. 135 As explained in Nunez,
the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a compelling interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors
than on adults. The limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this compelling interest of the State
to protect and care for their welfare.

In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to
keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally
eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal pressure and influences which
may even include themselves. As denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in
imposing nocturnal curfews on minors, recognizes that:

[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their proper care and guidance, education,
and moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the
risk of committing criminal offenses;

xxxx
[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth, unproductive by-standers, street
children, and member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or meander in public or private roads, streets or
other public places, whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or justification;

xxxx

[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that minor children roaming around, loitering
or wandering in the evening are the frequent personalities involved in various infractions of city ordinances and
national laws;

[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the movement of minor children during night
time by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect, abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their development;

[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is a need to put a restraint on the
tendency of growing number of youth spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face of the
unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident elements of society are not provided with potent
avenues for furthering their nefarious activities[.]136

The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards the information gathered by the City Council to
support its passage of the curfew ordinance subject of that case, may serve as a guidepost to our own eatment of
the present case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court recognized the entitlement of elected bodies to
implement policies for a safer community, in relation to the proclivity of children to make dangerous and
potentially life-shaping decisions when left unsupervised during the late hours of night:

Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew would materially assist its first stated
interest-that of reducing juvenile violence and crime. The City Council acted on the basis of information from
many sources, including records from Charlottesville's police department, a survey of public opinion, news
reports, data from the United States Department of Justice, national crime reports, and police reports from other
localities. On the basis of such evidence, elected bodies are entitled to conclude that keeping
unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night will make for a safer community. The same streets may
have a more volatile and less wholesome character at night than during the day. Alone on the streets at
night children face a series of dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions. Drug dealers may lure
them to use narcotics or aid in their sale. Gangs may pressure them into membership or participation in violence.
"[D]uring the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them." Those who succumb to these
criminal influences at an early age may persist in their criminal conduct as adults. Whether we as judges
subscribe to these theories is beside the point. Those elected officials with their finger on the pulse of their home
community clearly did. In attempting to reduce through its curfew the opportunities for children to come into
contact with criminal influences, the City was directly advancing its first objective of reducing juvenile
violence and crime.138 (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon City and Manila presented
statistical data in their respective pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either
as victims or perpetrators, in their respective localities.139

Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their police
power under the general welfare clause.140 In this light, the Court thus finds that the local governments have not
only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially
with respect to minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of the
Curfew Ordinances.

With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now proceeds to determine if the
restrictions set forth in· the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive means to
address the cited compelling State interest - the second requirement of the strict scrutiny test.
b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.

The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that citizens should not be
hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional rights. While rights may be
restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address
the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn
to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn.  141

Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on minors as they are still
accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious, or civic. 142 Thus, in the
present case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the
minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional rights.143

In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional impliedly for not being narrowly
drawn, resulting in unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to freely exercise their religion and to free
speech.145 It observed that:

The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the local
Roman Catholic Church or Christmas Eve services at the various local Protestant Churches. It would
likewise prohibit them from attending the New [Year's] Eve watch services at the various churches. Likewise it
would prohibit grandparents, uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters from taking their minor relatives of any
age to the above mentioned services. x x x.

xxxx

Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not even attend the city council meetings if
they ran past 10:30 (which they frequently do) to express his views on the necessity to repeal the curfew
ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.

xxxx

[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] very narrowly drawn
ordinance of many pages with eleven exceptions and was very carefully drafted in an attempt to pass
constitutional muster. It specifically excepted [the] exercise of First Amendment rights, travel in a motor
vehicle and returning home by a direct route from religious, school, or voluntary association
activities. (Emphases supplied)

After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon City
Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.

The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew, namely: (a) minors
accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands such as
buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school
students and those who, by virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or outside their residence after
10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night.146

For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those
working at night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in coordination with a specific barangay
office; (d) those traveling towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those running errands under the supervision
of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over them; (j) those involved in accidents,
calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific occasions: Christmas eve,
Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All
Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.147
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate and
therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect
the rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel at night from school or work.148 However, even with
those safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account for
the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably
assemble, and of free expression, among others.

The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample upon protected liberties.
The Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance;
nonetheless, it still provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail below:

First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them from engaging in
legitimate non-school or nonchurch activities in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their freedom
of association is effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in legitimate activities of organizations,
other than school or church, also contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and intellectual development, yet,
such participation is not exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.

Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas day,
it effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night without
accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted in Mosier.149 This legitimate activity done pursuant to the
minors' right to freely exercise their religion is therefore effectively curtailed.

Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or attend
city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble and to free
expression.

Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these activities outside curfew hours, but
the Court finds no reason to prohibit them from participating in these legitimate activities during curfew hours.
Such proscription does not advance the State's compelling interest to protect minors from the dangers of the
streets at night, such as becoming prey or instruments of criminal activity. These legitimate activities are merely
hindered without any reasonable relation to the State's interest; hence, the Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly
drawn. More so, the Manila Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.

In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their exceptions, which are
essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection
of the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary
thereto; as such, they cannot subsist independently despite the presence150 of any separability clause.151

The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the
minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following exceptions:

Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall not be covered by the
provisions of this ordinance;

(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;

(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or other
extra-curricular activities of their school or organization wherein their attendance are
required or otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are out and unable to go home
early due to circumstances beyond their control as verified by the proper authorities
concerned; and

(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as conflagration,
earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]
 (d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to or returning home
from the same place of employment activity without any detour or stop;

(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult in no violation of
this Ordinance;

(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;

(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school, religious,
recreational, educational, social, community or other similar private activity sponsored by
the city, barangay, school, or other similar private civic/religious organization/group
(recognized by the community) that supervises the activity or when the minor is going to or
returning home from such activity, without any detour or stop; and

(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was dismissed from
his/her class/es in the evening or that he/she is a working student.152 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is more
narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to
peaceably assemble, and of free expression.

Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the protection of these
aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of association by enabling minors to attend both
official and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church but also of other legitimate
organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and of free expression are also covered by these items
given that the minors' attendance in the official activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed
during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently
safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by exempting attendance at religious masses even during curfew
hours. In relation to their right to ravel, the ordinance allows the minor-participants to move to and from the
places where these activities are held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in
truth, only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who
publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more prominent.

To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful errands or
engage in legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on this
case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City
Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", as accompaniment should be understood not
only in its actual but also in its constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable construction
of this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic premise that State interference is
not superior but only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes, the
parents' right to rear their children is not only natural but primary.

Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on these ordinances, is dealing with the
welfare of minors who are presumed by law to be incapable of giving proper consent due to their incapability to
fully understand the import and consequences of their actions. In one case it was observed that:

A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the
victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The
State, as parenspatriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their
minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.153

Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full rational capacity, and balancing the
same against the State's compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court finds
that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn
exceptions and hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are in no way limited or restricted, as the
State, in accordance with the lawful exercise of its police power, is not precluded from crafting, adding, or
modifying exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes the parameters of
scrutiny as applied in this case.

D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was raised - to further discuss the validity
of its penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended.

To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parent/s or guardian under Section 8 thereof,154 does
not impose any penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance requires the minor, along with his or
her parent/s or guardian/s, to render social civic duty and community service either in lieu of - should the parent/s
or guardian/s of the minor be unable to pay the fine imposed - or in addition to the fine imposed
therein.155 Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the minor based on the age and
frequency of violations, to wit:

SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this ordinance shall be
sanctioned/punished as follows:

(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a
REPRIMAND for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or
person exercising parental authority.

(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years of age, the
sanction/penalty shall be:

1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;

2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a warning about the

legal impostitions in case of a third and subsequent violation; and

3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten
(10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the
discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint shall be filed by
the PunongBarangay with the office of the City Prosecutor.156 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied).

Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a)
community . service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and
57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses such as
curfew violations, viz.:

SEC. 57. Status Offenses. - Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if committed by an
adult shall not be considered an offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child.

SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances enacted by local governments concerning juvenile

status offenses such as but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and
anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not
limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance,
vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of
children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for said violations, and they shall instead be brought to
their residence or to any barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their
parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be provided for in such ordinances. The child shall also
be recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in conflict with the law." The ordinance shall also provide for
intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance in group activities for children, and for the parents,
attendance in parenting education seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that curtail the conduct of minors, when
the similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what
they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on minors for violations of these regulations. Consequently, the
enactment of curfew ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for violations thereof, is not violative of
Section 57-A.

"Penalty"157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment or

fine";158 "[p ]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits a deliberate or negligent
act."159 Punishment, in tum, is defined as "[a] sanction - such as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property,
right, or privilege - assessed against a person who has violated the law."160

The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the actions of the minor in violation
of the regulations are without legal consequences. Section 57-A thereof empowers local governments to adopt
appropriate intervention programs, such as community-based programs161 recognized under Section 54162 of
the same law.

In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of intervention program that a local
government (such as Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare
of minors. For one, the community service programs provide minors an alternative mode of rehabilitation as they
promote accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and social stigma caused by jail detention.

In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and compliance with the law and legal orders. More
importantly, they give them the opportunity to become productive members of society and thereby promote their
integration to and solidarity with their community.

The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA
9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor.
Admonition is generally defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel or warning against fault or
oversight."163 The Black's Law Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n authoritatively issued warning or
censure";164 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke, warning
or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an expression of authoritative advice or
warning."165 Notably, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our
jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare that "a warning or admonition shall not be considered a
penalty."166

In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and admonition are clearly not penalties
- as they are not punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be
clear, their objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and for the latter to understand, what actions
must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.

A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment imposed by
the City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined as "a severe or formal reproof." 167 The Black's
Law Dictionary defines it as "a mild form of lawyer discipline that does not restrict the lawyer's ability to practice
law";168 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public and formal censure or severe reproof,
administered to a person in fault by his superior officer or body to which he belongs. It is more than just a warning
or admonition."169 In other words, reprimand is a formal and public pronouncement made to denounce the error or
violation committed, to sharply criticize and rebuke the erring individual, and to sternly warn the erring individual
including the public against repeating or committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the erring
individual or violator to unwarranted censure or sharp disapproval from others. In fact, the RRACCS and our
jurisprudence explicitly indicate that reprimand is a penalty,170 hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as provided in our various
criminal and administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently
prohibits.

As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It states that "[n]o penalty
shall be imposed on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the
sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew violations, portions of Section 4 of the
Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand, the impositions of community service programs and admonition
on the minors are allowed as they do not constitute penalties.

CONCLUSION

In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test
- that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile
crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict
scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides for the least restrictive means to achieve
this interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to
freely exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to
achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or
guardian", has also been construed to include parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and
hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the
discretion of the local government unit.

In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the
Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.

For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions imposing reprimand and
fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that
ordinances should always conform with the law, these provisions must be struck down as invalid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLYGRANTED. The Court hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the
local government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang
Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government of Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and,
thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local government of the
Quezon City is declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

SAMAHAN (SPARK) VS QUEZONCITY G.R. No. 225442, August 08, 2017Case Summary by : Kristine Tadique

FACTS: The respondents started strictly implementing their curfew ordinances on minors through police
operations which were publicly known as part of “Oplan Rody.”The petitioners argue that the curfew ordinances
are unconstitutional because the: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus fall under the
voice for vagueness doctrince; (b) suffer from over breadth by proscribing or impairing legitime activities of minors
during curfew hours;(c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive process; (d)
deprive parents of their natural and primary the youth without substantive due process

ISSUE: Whether or not the Judicial Review shall be exercised. YES.

RULING: Judicial Review determines whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 1120-MJ May 5, 1976

DOMINADOR C. BALDOZA, complainant,
vs.
HON. JUDGE RODOLFO B. DIMAANO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

ANTONIO, J.:

In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges
Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse of authority in refusing to allow
employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in
connection with their contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality. Respondent,
in answer to the complaint, stated that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official court records;
that although court records are among public documents open to inspection not only by the parties directly
involved but also by other persons who have legitimate interest to such inspection, yet the same is always subject
to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected. He further asserted that a court
has unquestionably the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its records and the furnishing of copies
therefrom may be refused where the person requesting is not motivated by a serious and legitimate interest but
acts out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private spite or to promote public scandal.

In his answer, the respondent significantly observed:

Restrictions are imposed by the Court for fear of an abuse in the exercise of the right. For fear that
the dirty hands of partisan politics might again be at play, Some of the cases filed and decided by
the Court after the declaration of Martial Law and years after the election still bore the stigma of
partisan politics as shown in the affidavits and testimonies of witnesses.

Without casting aspersion on any particular individual, it is worth mentioning, that the padlocks of
the door of the Court has recently been tampered by inserting papers and matchsticks.

Under the circumstances, to allow an indiscriminate and unlimited exercise of the right to free
access, might do more harm than good to the citizenry of Taal. Disorder and chaos might result
defeating the very essence of their request. The undersigned is just as interested as Mr. Baldoza in
the welfare of the community and the preservation of our democratic principles.

Be that as it may, a request of this magnitude cannot be immediately granted without adequate
deliberation and upon advisement, especially so in this case where the undersigned doubts the
propriety of such request. Hence, it is believed that authority should first be secured from the
Supreme Court, through the Executive Judge, for the formulation of guidelines and policies on this
matter.

The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for investigation and report. At the preliminary
hearing on October 16, 1975, Taal Mayor Corazon A. Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to preserve
harmony and (cooperation among officers in the same municipality. This motion was denied by the Investigating
Judge, but after formal investigation, he recommended the exoneration of respondent. Pertinent portion of his
report reads as follows:
 * * * When this case was heard, complainant Dominador Baldoza informed the Court that he is
aware of the motion to dismiss filed by Mayor Corazon A. Caniza and that he is in conformity with
the dismissal of the administrative charge against Judge Rodolfo Dimaano. The Court asked him if
he could prove his case and he said he can. So, the Court denied his oral motion to dismiss and
required him to present his evidence. Complainant only manifested to the Court that he has no oral
evidence. The only evidence he has are the exchanged communication which were all in writing
and attached to the record between him and the respondent. The Court asked the respondent what
he has to say on the documentary evidence of the complainant. He manifested that all his answers
to the complaint are all embodied in his answers filed with the Court.

A careful perusal, scrutiny, and study of the communications between the complainant and the
respondent, together with the answers filed by the latter, reveal that there is no showing of abuse
of authority on the part of the respondent. The respondent allowed the complainant to open and
view the docket books of the respondent under certain conditions and under his control and
supervision. Complainant admitted that he was aware of the rules and conditions imposed by the
respondent when he went to his office to view his docket books for the purpose mentioned in his
communication. He also agreed that he is amenable to such rules and conditions which the
respondent may impose. Under these conditions, therefore, the Court finds that the respondent
has not committed any abuse of authority.

The complainant was warned to be more cautious in filing any administrative charge against any
public official especially, members of the judiciary, considering that an administrative charge
against a member of the judiciary may expose the latter to public ridicule and scandal thereby
minimizing if not eradicating public trust and

After a careful evaluation of the recommendation, We find that the respondent did not act arbitrarily in the
premises. As found by the Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the
docket books of respondent certain conditions and under his control and supervision. it has not been shown that
the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to public records predicated
on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the
public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. In an earlier case,   this Court held
1

that mandamus would lie to compel the Secretary of Justice and the Register of Deeds to examine the records of
the latter office. Predicating the right to examine the records on statutory provisions, and to a certain degree by
general principles of democratic institutions, this Court stated that while the Register of Deeds has discretion to
exercise as to the manner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine or copy the records in his office may
exercise their rights, such power does not carry with it authority to prohibit. Citing with approval People ex rel.
Title Guarantee & T. Co. vs. Railly,   this Court said:
2

The subject is necessarily committed, to a great degree, 'to his (register of deeds') discretion as to
how much of the conveniences of the office are required to be preserved for the accomodation of
these persons. It is not his duty to permit the office to be thronged needlessly with persons
examining its books of papers, but it is his duty to regulate, govern, and control his office in such a
manner as to permit the statutory advantages to be enjoyed by other persons not employed by him
as largely and extensibly as that consistently can be done * * *. What the law expects and requires
from him is the exercise of an unbiased and impartial judgment, by which all persons resorting to
the office, under legal authority, and conducting themselves in an orderly manner, shall be secured
their lawful rights and privileges, and that a corporation formed in the manner in which the relator
has been, shall be permitted to obtain all the information either by searches, abstracts, or copies,
that the law has entitled it to obtain.

Except, perhaps, when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, Idle
curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern
themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records. It
is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before
public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it
 is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a
remedy. As to the moral or material injury which the publication might inflict on other parties, that is
the publisher's responsibility and lookout. The publication is made subject to the consequences of
the law.

The concurring opinion of Justice Briones predicated such right not on statutory grounds merely but on the
constitutional right of the press to have access to information as the essence of press freedom.  3

The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters of public
concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or
transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law.   The incorporation of this right in the
4

Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be
no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision making if they
are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to
cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information
depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow
inevitably ceases. "   However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access
5

restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of immediate and impending
danger that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.  6

WHEREFORE, the case against respondent is hereby dismissed.

Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14 (1976)

10/31/2020

0 COMMENTS

Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14 (1976)

FACTS:
In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas,
charged Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees of the
Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in
connection with their contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality.
In answer, Dimaano stated that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official court
records; that although court records are among public documents open to inspection not only by the
parties directly involved but also by other persons who have legitimate interest to such inspection, yet the
same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected.
He further asserted that a court has unquestionably the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of
its records and the furnishing of copies therefrom may be refused where the person requesting is not
motivated by a serious and legitimate interest but acts out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify
private spite or to promote public scandal.
The case was then referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for investigation and report.
At the preliminary hearing on 16 October 1975, Taal Mayor Corazon A. Cañiza filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint to preserve harmony and cooperation among officers in the same municipality. This motion
was denied by the Investigating Judge, but after formal investigation, he recommended the exoneration of
Dimaano.

ISSUE:
Whether the rules and conditions imposed by Judge Dimaano on the inspection of the docket books
infringe upon the right of individuals to information.

RULING:
No. Judge Dimaano did not act arbitrarily in the premise. As found by the Investigating Judge, Dimaano
allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of Dimaano under certain conditions and
under his command and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and conditions imposed by
Dimaano were unreasonable. The access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to
acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the public has a legitimate
interest in matters of social and political significance. The New Constitution expressly recognizes that the
people are entitled to information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to
official records, as well as documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such
limitations imposed by law. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the
fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by
the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied
access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope
with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information
depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted,
the flow inevitably ceases." However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law.
Thus, access restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of
immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.

Home
Constitutional Law
Constitutional Law Case: RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL. G.R.
No. 171396
by
Dagitab
-
March 22, 2014
0
RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL. G.R. No. 171396, 171409,
171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424 May 3, 2006

Presidential Proclamation No. 1017

Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of
terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all
programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked
the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along
EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of
the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of
party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and
attempt to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA
whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021
declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari
with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent
questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency powers of
Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.

Issue:
1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
 2.) Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal of KMU
and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were valid?
3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in the petitions?
4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the
proclamation?
5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to
Martial Law are used?

Ruling:

1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions giving the
President express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1,
Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.")
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well
as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in
abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military]; and
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and
unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President,
in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private
business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.
2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of
the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof that these
petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880;
the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless
search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are
declared unconstitutional because there was no clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the
state has a right to prevent.
3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President,
during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is
no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
4.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners
have a locus standi, for they suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search”
committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national emergency, when
the public interest so requires, the President may temporarily take over a privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest only if there is congressional authority or approval. There must
enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and conditions under which the President may
exercise the powers that will serves as the best assurance that due process of law would be observed.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 178552               October 5, 2010

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., on behalf of the South-South Network (SSN)
for Non-State Armed Group Engagement, and ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF
THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 178554

KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), represented by its Chairperson Elmer Labog, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), represented by its National President Joselito V.
Ustarez and Secretary General Antonio C. Pascual, and CENTER FOR TRADE UNION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, represented by its Executive Director Daisy Arago, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, NORBERTO GONZALES, in his capacity
as Acting Secretary of National Defense, HON. RAUL GONZALES, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice,
HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as AFP Chief of Staff, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR
CALDERON, in his capacity as PNP Chief of Staff, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 178581

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), GENERAL ALLIANCE BINDING WOMEN FOR REFORMS,
INTEGRITY, EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP AND ACTION (GABRIELA), KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG
PILIPINAS (KMP), MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (MCCCL),
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
(COURAGE), KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY), SOLIDARITY OF CAVITE WORKERS,
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), ANAKBAYAN, PAMBANSANG LAKAS NG KILUSANG
MAMAMALAKAYA (PAMALAKAYA), ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED TEACHERS (ACT), MIGRANTE, HEALTH
ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY (HEAD), AGHAM, TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., DR. BIENVENIDO LUMBERA,
RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR., SISTER MARY JOHN MANANSAN OSB, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, ATTY.
JOSEFINA LICHAUCO, COL. GERRY CUNANAN (ret.), CARLITOS SIGUION-REYNA, DR. CAROLINA
PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, RENATO REYES, DANILO RAMOS, EMERENCIANA DE LESUS, RITA BAUA, REY
CLARO CASAMBRE, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALES,
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO
TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE
CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR
CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178890

KARAPATAN, ALLIANCE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PEOPLE'S RIGHTS, represented herein by Dr.
Edelina de la Paz, and representing the following organizations: HUSTISYA, represented by Evangeline
Hernandez and also on her own behalf; DESAPARECIDOS, represented by Mary Guy Portajada and also
on her own behalf, SAMAHAN NG MGA EX-DETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT PARA SA
AMNESTIYA (SELDA), represented by Donato Continente and also on his own behalf, ECUMENICAL
MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE (EMJP), represented by Bishop Elmer M. Bolocon, UCCP, and
PROMOTION OF CHURCH PEOPLE'S RESPONSE, represented by Fr. Gilbert Sabado, OCARM, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARTY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ,
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO
TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE
CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR
CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179157

THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), represented by Atty. Feliciano M. Bautista,
COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTY (CODAL), SEN. MA. ANA CONSUELO A.S. MADRIGAL and
FORMER SENATORS SERGIO OSMEÑA III and WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND THE MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL
(ATC), Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179461

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SOUTHERN TAGALOG (BAYAN-ST), GABRIELA-ST, KATIPUNAN

NG MGA SAMAHYANG MAGSASAKA-TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (KASAMA-TK), MOVEMENT OF
CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (MCCCL), PEOPLES MARTYRS, ANAKBAYAN-ST,
PAMALAKAYA-ST, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE-ST), PAGKAKAISA'T UGNAYAN NG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA
LAGUNA (PUMALAG), SAMAHAN NG MGA MAMAMAYAN SA TABING RILES (SMTR-ST), LEAGUE OF
FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), BAYAN MUNA-ST, KONGRESO NG MGA MAGBUBUKID PARA SA
REPORMANG AGRARYO KOMPRA, BIGKIS AT LAKAS NG MGA KATUTUBO SA TIMOG KATAGALUGAN
(BALATIK), SAMAHAN AT UGNAYAN NG MGA MAGSASAKANG KABABAIHAN SA TIMOG
KATAGALUGAN (SUMAMAKA-TK), STARTER, LOSÑOS RURAL POOR ORGANIZATION FOR PROGRESS
& EQUALITY, CHRISTIAN NIÑO LAJARA, TEODORO REYES, FRANCESCA B. TOLENTINO, JANNETTE E.
BARRIENTOS, OSCAR T. LAPIDA, JR., DELFIN DE CLARO, SALLY P. ASTRERA, ARNEL SEGUNE
BELTRAN, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ,
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMEN T SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF FINCANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO
TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE
CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR
CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to
Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act of
2007,1 signed into law on March 6, 2007.

Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,2 petitioner Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network,
Inc., a non-government organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer,
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even date,
petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU),
and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by their respective officers3 who are also
bringing the action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No.
178554.

The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), General Alliance
Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas (KMP), Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for Unity,
Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE), Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap
(KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang
Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), Migrante, Health
Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented by their respective officers,4 and joined by concerned
citizens and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary
John Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos
Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua
and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178581.

On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga
Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace
(EMJP), and Promotion of Church People’s Response (PCPR), which were represented by their respective
officers5 who are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as
G.R. No. 178890.

On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the Defense of Liberty
(CODAL),6 Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio Osmeña III, and Wigberto E. Tañada filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179157.

Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other regional chapters and organizations mostly
based in the Southern Tagalog Region,7 and individuals8 followed suit by filing on September 19, 2007 a petition
for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised in the BAYAN
petition in G.R. No. 178581.

Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council9 composed of, at the time of the
filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as
Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security
Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary
Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen.
Oscar Calderon.

The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the
support agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National
Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-
Money Laundering Center, Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the PNP intelligence and investigative
elements.

The petitions fail.

Petitioners’ resort to certiorari is improper

Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial

functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or
in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the same.

In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be
an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.10

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the
discussion of the last two superfluous.

Petitioners lack locus standi

Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.11

Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary12 summarized the rule on locus standi, thus:

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The
gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must show not
only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully
entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained
of.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected "communist fronts" by the
government, especially the military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental
importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.

While Chavez v. PCGG13 holds that transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement that
petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the
constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation. Compelling
State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct, as will later be elucidated, necessitate a closer
judicial scrutiny of locus standi.

Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. None of them faces any
charge under RA 9372.

KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners in G.R. No. 178890, allege that
they have been subjected to "close security surveillance by state security forces," their members followed by
"suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with military build."
They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies of the [S]tate."14

Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that
petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported "surveillance" and the implementation of RA
9372.

BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT,
Migrante, HEAD and Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial
notice of respondents’ alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National People’s Army (NPA). The tagging, according to
petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law.15 The
petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the same allegations.

The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged "tagging" of petitioners.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what
facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited
to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one
not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questionable.

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men generally
in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind
as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are
of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular
facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice
of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no
constructive knowledge.16 (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners’ apprehension is
insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed
against them, three years after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating
from the so-called tagging.

The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their
supposed "link" to the CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of
RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their organization and members.

While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the United States of
America17 (US) and the European Union18 (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as
foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita
and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of
the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations.19 Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the
courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations
under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to the present,
petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual,
prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.

Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by Party-list Representatives Saturnino

Ocampo, Teodoro Casiño, Rafael Mariano and Luzviminda Ilagan,20 urged the government to resume peace
negotiations with the NDF by removing the impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of designation of
the CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist organizations. Considering the policy statement of the
Aquino Administration21 of resuming peace talks with the NDF, the government is not imminently disposed to ask
for the judicial proscription of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied organizations.

More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and specific interests in the questions
being raised.22 Of recent development is the filing of the first case for proscription under Section 1723 of RA 9372
by the Department of Justice before the Basilan Regional Trial Court against the Abu Sayyaf Group.24 Petitioner-
organizations do not in the least allege any link to the Abu Sayyaf Group.

Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a prosecution under RA 9372 by alluding to
past rebellion charges against them.

In Ladlad v. Velasco,25 the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion charges filed in 2006 against then Party-List
Representatives Crispin Beltran and Rafael Mariano of Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador,
Teodoro Casiño and Saturnino Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also named in the dismissed rebellion charges were
petitioners Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Rita Baua, Emerencia de Jesus and
Danilo Ramos; and accused of being front organizations for the Communist movement were petitioner-
organizations KMU, BAYAN, GABRIELA, PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and COURAGE.26

The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for petitioners. For one, those charges were filed
in 2006, prior to the enactment of RA 9372, and dismissed by this Court. For another, rebellion is defined and
punished under the Revised Penal Code. Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by the enactment
of RA 9372, nor does the enactment thereof make it easier to charge a person with rebellion, its elements not
having been altered.
Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no relation to prospective charges under RA
9372. It cannot be overemphasized that three years after the enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has been
charged.

Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the
Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render assistance to those arrested or
detained under the law.

The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of
its members with standing.27 The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute
revolts against its constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even a
single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.

Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the subject of "political surveillance," also
lacks locus standi. Prescinding from the veracity, let alone legal basis, of the claim of "political surveillance," the
Court finds that she has not shown even the slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372. Similarly lacking in
locus standi are former Senator Wigberto Tañada and Senator Sergio Osmeña III, who cite their being
respectively a human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage of RA 9372. Outside these gratuitous
statements, no concrete injury to them has been pinpointed.

Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also
conveniently state that the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, "which must be settled early" and
are of "far-reaching implications," without mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they have
been charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to
clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury
as a result of the law’s enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as
every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public.

Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is
proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress,28 whereas citizen standing
must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.29

RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its implementation,
while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation
of the law.

It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish
locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.

Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.30 (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 the Court ruled that the power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases or controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination,
not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.32

Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC33 cannot be more emphatic:

[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging. The controversy must be justiciable—definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal
right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other hand; that is, it must concern a real and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City
was held to be premature as it was tacked on uncertain, contingent events.34 Similarly, a petition that fails to
allege that an application for a license to operate a radio or television station has been denied or granted by the
authorities does not present a justiciable controversy, and merely wheedles the Court to rule on a hypothetical
problem.35

The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on Elections36 for failure to cite any
specific affirmative action of the Commission on Elections to implement the assailed resolution. It refused, in
Abbas v. Commission on Elections,37 to rule on the religious freedom claim of the therein petitioners based merely
on a perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim Code and those of the national law, there
being no actual controversy between real litigants.

The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or anticipatory grounds goes on ad infinitum.

The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional
interest suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the
requirement that there must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.38

Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,39 allowed the pre-enforcement
review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of
prosecution" and "should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of
seeking relief."40 The plaintiffs therein filed an action before a federal court to assail the constitutionality of the
material support statute, 18 U.S.C. §2339B (a) (1),41 proscribing the provision of material support to organizations
declared by the Secretary of State as foreign terrorist organizations. They claimed that they intended to provide
support for the humanitarian and political activities of two such organizations.

Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the merits when an anticipatory petition clearly
shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would
then be a justiciable controversy.42

Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA
9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to do. No demonstrable threat has been
established, much less a real and existing one.

Petitioners’ obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being tagged as "communist fronts" in
no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an
advisory opinion, which is not its function.43

Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court
has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both
the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely
theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.44
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the
realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any
power granted by law may be abused.45 Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may
step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.

A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of
constitutional litigation are rightly excepted

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of
terrorism46 under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace"
and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies
with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no
application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates
conduct, not speech.

For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is imperative to outline the schools of thought on
whether the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are equally applicable grounds to assail a penal
statute.

Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea of limiting the application of the two
doctrines to free speech cases. They particularly cite Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan47 and Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan.48

The Court clarifies.

At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word "intervene" in Section 549 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act was intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad. The Court stated that "the overbreadth and
the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases," and are "not appropriate for testing
the validity of penal statutes."50 It added that, at any rate, the challenged provision, under which the therein
petitioner was charged, is not vague.51

While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,52 the Court stated that a facial
invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and
concluded that the therein subject election offense53 under the Voter’s Registration Act of 1996, with which the
therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language.54

The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion55 of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in
the Estrada case, where the Court found the Anti-Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free from
ambiguity respecting the definition of the crime of plunder.

The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two doctrines to the concept of a "facial"
invalidation as opposed to an "as-applied" challenge. He basically postulated that allegations that a penal statute
is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring Opinion
of Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the main Estrada decision, reads:

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech
and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify
allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that
his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society
in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected
speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from
their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the
area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are
inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment."
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims,
if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied
to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a
statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is
clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They
cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute
on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment
context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of
due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis
for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be
applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure
from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete
factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these
deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief
sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions,
whichever way they might be decided.

For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a
statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light
of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.56 (Underscoring supplied.)

The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as
grounds for a facial or as-applied challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of violation of due process of
law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate rights).

To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.57 The overbreadth doctrine,
meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.58

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand
what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected.59

A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied" challenge.

Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants,

a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of
its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. 60

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle61 in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully
mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.

The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on
protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged.62 As reflected earlier, this rationale is
inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring socially harmful conduct.
In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it
refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.63

The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by which a criminal statute may be challenged" and
"underscored that an ‘on-its-face’ invalidation of penal statutes x x x may not be allowed."64

[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge.
The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case
of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an
existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge
against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider
third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack
penal statutes, such a test will impair the State’s ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing
that can hinder an accused from defeating the State’s power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to
third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to
him.65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of
challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas
of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept
by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being
substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules
of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him
or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights
of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges
are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not
merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court
construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the
concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to
bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law’s "very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that
deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.66 (Emphasis in the original omitted; underscoring supplied.)

In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two cases,67 observed that the
US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment,68 and that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by
their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words.69 In Virginia v. Hicks,70 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an
overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-
related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the "transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression."71

Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness
analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent
charge against them

While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the operation of the vagueness test on
the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to the therein petitioner, finding, however, that there was no basis to review the
law "on its face and in its entirety."72 It stressed that "statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular defendant."73

American jurisprudence74 instructs that "vagueness challenges that do not involve the First Amendment must be
examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial validity."

For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants’ claims that criminal statutes are
unconstitutionally vague, developing a doctrine hailed as "among the most important guarantees of liberty under
law."75

In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has been utilized in
examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases,76 the Court brought the doctrine into
play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal
recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2)
of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the
two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the
present case.

There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity

From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may
be culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and
creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is
actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the
element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism77 must necessarily be transmitted through some form of
expression protected by the free speech clause.

The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually
committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the
coercion of the government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first element, any
attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the
unprotected conduct into a protected speech.

Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle
of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the
offender like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or
conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction. An analogy in one U.S. case78 illustrated that the fact that the
prohibition on discrimination in hiring on the basis of race will require an employer to take down a sign reading
"White Applicants Only" hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one regulating speech rather than
conduct.

Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the
law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds
true a fortiori in the present case where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making the
element of coercion perceptible.

[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most instances brought about through
speaking or writing. But it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a
course of conduct illegal merely because the  conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of
speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of
trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society.79 (italics and underscoring
supplied)

Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they merely evidence a prohibited
conduct.80 Since speech is not involved here, the Court cannot heed the call for a facial analysis. 1avvphi1

IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis of the therein subject penal
statute as applied to the therein petitioners inasmuch as they were actually charged with the pertinent crimes
challenged on vagueness grounds. The Court in said cases, however, found no basis to review the assailed penal
statute on its face and in its entirety.

In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute,
challenged on vagueness grounds, since the therein plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of prosecution" and
"should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief."

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of
prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus
legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling
on a statute’s future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed
legislative lobbying in Congress.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Case Digest: Southern Hemisphere vs Anti-terrorism Council

G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010

FACTS:
Six petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known as the Human
Security Act of 2007 for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad. They argue that the definition of
the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving
law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth finds application in RA9372?

RULING:

No, it does not.

A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional
litigation are rightly excepted. RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge
is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially
harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They
are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
G.R. No. 171396             May 3, 2006

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ
BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C.
BOLASTIG, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO
SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO,
CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.

x-------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 171409             May 3, 2006

NIÑEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE PUBLISHING CO., INC., Petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C.
LOMIBAO, Respondents.

x-------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 171485             May 3, 2006

FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO,

MARIO J. AGUJA, SATUR C. OCAMPO, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, JUAN EDGARDO ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL.
GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL JOSEL J. VILLANUEVA, LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE R. MARCOS, RENATO B. MAGTUBO,
JUSTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO, ROILO GOLEZ, DARLENE ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES,
JOSEL G. VIRADOR, RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GILBERT C. REMULLA, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, IMELDA C. NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI JAVIER COLMENARES,
MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY AMADO GAT
INCIONG, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., SECRETARY, DND RONALDO V.
PUNO, SECRETARY, DILG, GENEROSO SENGA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF
PNP, Respondents.

x-------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 171483             May 3, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON ELMER C. LABOG AND SECRETARY
GENERAL JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS – KILUSANG MAYO UNO
(NAFLU-KMU), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C.
PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, MARTIN CUSTODIO, JR., AND ROQUE M.
TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HER EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, EDUARDO ERMITA, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENEROSO
SENGA, AND THE PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO LOMIBAO, Respondents.

x-------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 171400             May 3, 2006

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, LT. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL
ARTURO LOMIBAO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 171489             May 3, 2006

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR M. AMORADO, ALICIA
A. RISOS-VIDAL, FELIMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J.B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L.
DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS AFP
CHIEF OF STAFF, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PNP
CHIEF, Respondents.

x-------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 171424             May 3, 2006

LOREN B. LEGARDA, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; ARTURO
LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP);
GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
(AFP); AND EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid formula are necessary. 1 Superior strength – the
use of force – cannot make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the courts should be vigilant in safeguarding the
constitutional rights of the citizens, specifically their liberty.

Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s philosophy of liberty is thus most relevant. He said: "In cases involving liberty,
the scales of justice should weigh heavily against government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the
marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak." Laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts
"with a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity." 2

These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No.
1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and
preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the
Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.

Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently modern problem. How does the Constitution of a free
people combine the degree of liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny, with the degree of law, without which,
liberty becomes license?3

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo
issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the
Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the)
armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent
or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.

She cited the following facts as bases:

WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the
extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists –
the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State – who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a
concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in
May 2004;

WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President;

WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national
media;

WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State – by obstructing governance including hindering the
growth of the economy and sabotaging the people’s confidence in government and their faith in the future of
this country;

WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;

WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to
intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;

WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic
institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;

WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear
and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;

On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus:

WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the
extreme Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists - the
historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State – and who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a
concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted Government elected in
May 2004;

WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our republican government;

WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media;

WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance, including hindering the
growth of the economy and sabotaging the people’s confidence in the government and their faith in the future of this
country;

WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;

WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify
their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions
and the State the primary duty of Government;

WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear
and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;

WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has been issued declaring a State of National Emergency;

NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under the Constitution
as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the
country;

I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and
PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent
acts of terrorism and lawless violence.

On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions
had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021 which reads:

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, Proclamation No. 1017
dated February 24, 2006, was issued declaring a state of national emergency;

WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and No.6 dated February 24, 2006, which were issued on the basis of
Proclamation No. 1017, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), were
directed to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent and suppress all form of lawless violence as well
as any act of rebellion and to undertake such action as may be necessary;

WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed and quelled the acts lawless violence and
rebellion;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause
behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s
Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. 4 They
considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present
danger.

During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the issuance of
PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from petitioners’ counsels.

The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in
determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that
PP 1017 was without factual bases. While he explained that it is not respondents’ task to state the facts behind the
questioned Proclamation, however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.

On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and
Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in
Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement, they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They
called upon the people to "show and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not
only by going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red bands on our left arms." 5
On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled "Oplan Hackle I " which detailed plans for
bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City. The plot was to
assassinate selected targets including some cabinet members and President Arroyo herself. 6 Upon the advice of her
security, President Arroyo decided not to attend the Alumni Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the
celebration, a bomb was found and detonated at the PMA parade ground.

On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas province. Found in his
possession were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of the meetings between members of the Magdalo Group and
the National People’s Army (NPA), a tape recorder, audio cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive
documents.7 Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced through DZRH that the "Magdalo’s D-Day would be on
February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I."

On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP- Special Action
Force were planning to defect. Thus, he immediately ordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino Franco, Jr.
to "disavow" any defection. The latter promptly obeyed and issued a public statement: "All SAF units are under the
effective control of responsible and trustworthy officers with proven integrity and unquestionable loyalty."

On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory Aquino’s brother,
businessmen and mid-level government officials plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration. Nelly Sindayen
of TIME Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon, longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government official about his
group’s plans if President Arroyo is ousted. Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon identified him as
B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander of the Army’s elite Scout Ranger. Lim said "it was all systems go for the planned
movement against Arroyo."8

B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical
mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on February 24, 2005. According to these two (2)
officers, there was no way they could possibly stop the soldiers because they too, were breaking the chain of command
to join the forces foist to unseat the President. However, Gen. Senga has remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief
and to the chain of command. He immediately took custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return to the
Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.

Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work within the military and the police
establishments in order to forge alliances with its members and key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio "Ka Roger"
Rosal declared: "The Communist Party and revolutionary movement and the entire people look forward to the
possibility in the coming year of accomplishing its immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo regime; of rendering it to
weaken and unable to rule that it will not take much longer to end it."9

On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North Central Mindanao,
publicly announced: "Anti-Arroyo groups within the military and police are growing rapidly, hastened by the economic
difficulties suffered by the families of AFP officers and enlisted personnel who undertake counter-insurgency
operations in the field." He claimed that with the forces of the national democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo
conservative political parties, coalitions, plus the groups that have been reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable that
the President’s ouster is nearing its concluding stage in the first half of 2006.

Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan was
also considered as additional factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an army
outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three (3) soldiers. And also the directive of the Communist Party of the
Philippines ordering its front organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in
mass protests.10

By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and several cabinet members to
assess the gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation. She directed both the AFP and the PNP to account for
all their men and ensure that the chain of command remains solid and undivided. To protect the young students from
any possible trouble that might break loose on the streets, the President suspended classes in all levels in the entire
National Capital Region.
For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th
anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local
governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to the President’s mind were
organized for purposes of destabilization, are cancelled.Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that
"warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented."11

Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters
(members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]),
marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were
already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained policemen
used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and
scatter the massed participants. The same police action was used against the protesters marching forward to Cubao,
Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan Street and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of riot policemen broke up
an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City. 12

According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their
assemblies.

During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a
professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald
Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.

At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The
raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue.
Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the newspaper;
while policemen from the Manila Police District were stationed outside the building.13

A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another
pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.

The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor, is "meant to show a ‘strong presence,’ to tell media
outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government." The PNP warned
that it would take over any media organization that would not follow "standards set by the government during the state
of national emergency." Director General Lomibao stated that "if they do not follow the standards – and the standards
are - if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No.
5 and Proc. No. 1017 – we will recommend a ‘takeover.’" National Telecommunications’ Commissioner Ronald Solis
urged television and radio networks to "cooperate" with the government for the duration of the state of national
emergency. He asked for "balanced reporting" from broadcasters when covering the events surrounding the coup
attempt foiled by the government. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any
broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage when the national security is threatened. 14

Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and
Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his
arrest dated 1985. Beltran’s lawyer explained that the warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed
during the Marcos regime, had long been quashed. Beltran, however, is not a party in any of these petitions.

When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran, they were told they could not be admitted
because of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Two members were arrested and detained, while the rest were dispersed by the
police.

Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the police went after him during a public forum at the
Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. But his two drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were taken into custody.
Retired Major General Ramon Montaño, former head of the Philippine Constabulary, was arrested while with his wife
and golfmates at the Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmariñas, Cavite.

Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo, Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan

Muna Representative Teodoro Casiño and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. Bayan Muna Representative Josel
Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City. Later, he was turned over to the custody of the House of
Representatives where the "Batasan 5" decided to stay indefinitely.

Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the rights of Representatives Beltran, Satur Ocampo, et al.,
are not being raised in these petitions.

On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to
exist.

In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed with this
Court against the above-named respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent.

In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the
emergency powers of Congress; (2) itis a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of
martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.

In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDG’s act of
raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint." They also claimed that the term
"emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no
emergency" that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.

In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one (21) other
members of the House of Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casiño,
Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute "usurpation of legislative powers";
"violation of freedom of expression" and "a declaration of martial law." They alleged that President Arroyo "gravely
abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of
lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity to do so."

In G.R. No. 171483,petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees; (2) their
issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of expression and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble to redress their grievances.

In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 415 of Article II, (b) Sections 1,16 2,17 and 418 of Article III, (c) Section
2319 of Article VI, and (d) Section 1720 of Article XII of the Constitution.

In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an "arbitrary and unlawful
exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers." And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial
Law, petitioners argued that "it amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency powers without congressional
approval." In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017 "goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as
defined under the Revised Administrative Code."

And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424,petitionerLoren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
"unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as freedom of the
press and the right to access to information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of
the 1987 Constitution." In this regard, she stated that these issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her election
protest pending before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

In respondents’ Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General countered that: first, the petitions should be dismissed for
being moot; second,petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485
(Escudero et al.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is not necessary for petitioners to implead
President Arroyo as respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis; and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate
the people’s right to free expression and redress of grievances.

On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral arguments and heard the parties on the above interlocking issues which
may be summarized as follows:

A. PROCEDURAL:

1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.

2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et

al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing.

B. SUBSTANTIVE:

1) Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.

2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.

a. Facial Challenge

b. Constitutional Basis

c. As Applied Challenge

A. PROCEDURAL

First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.

I- Moot and Academic Principle

One of the greatest contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of judicial review enunciated
in Marbury v. Madison.21 This concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation --

The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all political authority. It
confers limited powers on the national government. x x x If the government consciously or unconsciously
oversteps these limitations there must be some authority competent to hold it in control, to thwart its
unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people as expressed in
the Constitution. This power the courts exercise. This is the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial
review.22

But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting capacity." 23 Courts may exercise such
power only when the following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or
controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.24

Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence, we shall limit our discussion thereon.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution. It is "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest;" a real and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief. 25 The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or
controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered "moot and academic" by President Arroyo’s issuance
of PP 1021.
Such contention lacks merit.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, 26 so
that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. 27 Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such
case28 or dismiss it on ground of mootness.29

The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic.
During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal
acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal
acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that "an
unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal
contemplation, inoperative."30

The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution;31 second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved;32 third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public;33 and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 34

All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the instant
petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no
question that the issues being raised affect the public’s interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to
freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar,
and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional
guarantees.35 And lastly, respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to
judicial review.

In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s
Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.36 However, they failed to take into account the Chief Justice’s
very statement that an otherwise "moot" case may still be decided "provided the party raising it in a proper case has
been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance." The present case falls right
within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.

II- Legal Standing

In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the Court deems it imperative to have a more than
passing discussion on legal standing or locus standi.

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."37 In private suits, standing is
governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."38 Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based
on his own right to the relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who
is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or
‘taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he
has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or
"taxpayer.

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was
first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk,39 where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category
from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while
in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court
in People ex rel Case v. Collins:40 "In matter of mere public right, however…the people are the real parties…It is
at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued
and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan41 held that
"the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds
to his injury cannot be denied."

However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he
disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State
Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt,42 later reaffirmed in Tileston v.
Ullman.43 The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an
executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it
is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.

This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera,44 it held that the person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v.
President of the Senate,45 Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente,46 Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works47 and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.48

However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the
exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,49 where the
"transcendental importance" of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor
accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec,50 this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the "far-reaching
implications" of the petition notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file
the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens,
members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws,
regulations and rulings.51

Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been
allowed to sue under the principle of "transcendental importance." Pertinent are the following cases:

(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,52 where the Court ruled that the enforcement of the constitutional
right to information and the equitable diffusion of natural resources are matters of transcendental
importance which clothe the petitioner with locus standi;

(2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, 53 wherein the Court held that "given the transcendental
importance of the issues involved, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to
prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the parties seeking judicial review" of the Visiting Forces
Agreement;

(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,54 while the Court noted that the petitioners may not file suit in their capacity as
taxpayers absent a showing that "Balikatan 02-01" involves the exercise of Congress’ taxing or spending
powers, it reiterated its ruling in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, 55that in cases of transcendental
importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely and standing requirements may be
relaxed.

By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters,
concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:

(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;
 (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance
which must be settled early; and

(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives
as legislators.

Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Court’s attitude toward legal standing.

In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,56 the Court ruled that the status of Kilosbayan as a people’s organization does not give it
the requisite personality to question the validity of the on-line lottery contract, more so where it does not raise any issue
of constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot sue as a taxpayer absent any allegation that public funds are being misused.
Nor can it sue as a concerned citizen as it does not allege any specific injury it has suffered.

In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,57 the Court reiterated the "direct
injury" test with respect to concerned citizens’ cases involving constitutional issues. It held that "there must be a
showing that the citizen personally suffered some actual or threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official act."

In Lacson v. Perez,58 the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not a real
party-in-interest as it had not demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders, members or supporters.

In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,59 the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of Congress have
standing to sue, as they claim that the President’s declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of the emergency
powers of Congress, thus impairing their legislative powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa,
and Social Justice Society, the Court declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them with the LDP in Lacson.

Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.

The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds
true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged "direct injury"
resulting from "illegal arrest" and "unlawful search" committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the
Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.

In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised
the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial
Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their
Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights.

In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,60 Kapatiran Ng Mga
Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,61 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform,62 Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 63 and Tañada v.
Tuvera,64 that when the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in
the execution of the laws.

In G.R. No. 171483, KMU’s assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly may be
deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of their
members.65 We take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and
canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its
members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora,66 the Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an
interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of
the issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi.
In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no
allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence. She can
no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no showing that the
enforcement of these issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has pending
electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has not sufficiently shown
that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But considering once more the transcendental
importance of the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing rules.

It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper
exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the "liberality doctrine" on legal standing. It cannot be
doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the
Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of
this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the "transcendental importance"
doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the "PP 1017 cases." 1avvphil.net

This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.

Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during
his tenure of office or actual incumbency,67 may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if
he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any
form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and
functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which
impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not
accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people 68 but he may be removed from
office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.69

B. SUBSTANTIVE

I. Review of Factual Bases

Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis. Hence, it was not "necessary" for President Arroyo to issue
such Proclamation.

The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the President’s exercise of his Commander-in-Chief
power has reached its distilled point - from the indulgent days of Barcelon v. Baker70 and Montenegro v. Castaneda71 to
the volatile era of Lansang v. Garcia,72 Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,73 and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.74 The tug-of-war always cuts
across the line defining "political questions," particularly those questions "in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." 75 Barcelon and Montenegro were in
unison in declaring that the authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the President and his
decision is final and conclusive on the courts. Lansang took the opposite view. There, the members of the Court
were unanimous in the conviction that the Court has the authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases in order
to determine their constitutional sufficiency. From the principle of separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the
system of checks and balances, "under which the President is supreme, x x x only if and when he acts within
the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is
vested in the Judicial Department, which in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme."76 In 1973, the
unanimous Court of Lansang was divided in Aquino v. Enrile.77 There, the Court was almost evenly divided on the issue
of whether the validity of the imposition of Martial Law is a political or justiciable question. 78 Then came Garcia-Padilla
v. Enrile which greatly diluted Lansang. It declared that there is a need to re-examine the latter case, ratiocinating that
"in times of war or national emergency, the President must be given absolute control for the very life of the
nation and the government is in great peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable only to his conscience, the
People, and God."79

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora 80 -- a recent case most pertinent to these cases at bar -- echoed a
principle similar to Lansang. While the Court considered the President’s "calling-out" power as a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that "this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion."This ruling is mainly a result of the Court’s reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution
which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government." The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial
power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.81 It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.82

As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that "judicial inquiry
can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct," but that "the President did not
act arbitrarily." Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.83 In Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
this Court further ruled that "it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally
bereft of factual basis" and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then "this Court cannot
undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."

Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft
of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed
narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records.
Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the
military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was
also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance
between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.

Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do
nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of
such power or duty must not stifle liberty.

II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5

Doctrines of Several Political Theorists
on the Power of the President in Times of Emergency

This case brings to fore a contentious subject -- the power of the President in times of emergency. A glimpse at the
various political theories relating to this subject provides an adequate backdrop for our ensuing discussion.

John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government, called upon the English doctrine of prerogative to cope with
the problem of emergency. In times of danger to the nation, positive law enacted by the legislature might be inadequate
or even a fatal obstacle to the promptness of action necessary to avert catastrophe. In these situations, the Crown
retained a prerogative "power to act according to discretion for the public good, without the proscription of the
law and sometimes even against it."84 But Locke recognized that this moral restraint might not suffice to avoid abuse
of prerogative powers. Who shall judge the need for resorting to the prerogative and how may its abuse be
avoided? Here, Locke readily admitted defeat, suggesting that "the people have no other remedy in this, as in all
other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to Heaven."85

Jean-Jacques Rousseau also assumed the need for temporary suspension of democratic processes of government in
time of emergency. According to him:

The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adopting themselves to circumstances, may, in certain cases,
render them disastrous and make them bring about, at a time of crisis, the ruin of the State…

It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions as strong as to render it impossible to suspend their operation.
Even Sparta allowed its law to lapse...
If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation, the method is to
nominate a supreme lawyer, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority. In such
a case, there is no doubt about the general will, and it clear that the people’s first intention is that the State shall not
perish.86

Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship or "supreme magistracy" as he termed it. For him, it
would more likely be cheapened by "indiscreet use." He was unwilling to rely upon an "appeal to heaven." Instead, he
relied upon a tenure of office of prescribed duration to avoid perpetuation of the dictatorship. 87

John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of representative government: "I am far from condemning, in cases of
extreme necessity, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship."88

Nicollo Machiavelli’s view of emergency powers, as one element in the whole scheme of limited government, furnished
an ironic contrast to the Lockean theory of prerogative. He recognized and attempted to bridge this chasm in
democratic political theory, thus:

Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be necessary to resort to extra –constitutional measures; for although
they may for a time be beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once established for good
objects, they will in a little while be disregarded under that pretext but for evil purposes. Thus, no republic will ever be
perfect if she has not by law provided for everything, having a remedy for every emergency and fixed rules for applying
it.89

Machiavelli – in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill – sought to incorporate into the constitution a regularized system
of standby emergency powers to be invoked with suitable checks and controls in time of national danger. He attempted
forthrightly to meet the problem of combining a capacious reserve of power and speed and vigor in its application in
time of emergency, with effective constitutional restraints. 90

Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the problem of response to emergency by constitutional
democracies, have employed the doctrine of constitutional dictatorship. 91 Frederick M. Watkins saw "no reason why
absolutism should not be used as a means for the defense of liberal institutions," provided it "serves to protect
established institutions from the danger of permanent injury in a period of temporary emergency and is
followed by a prompt return to the previous forms of political life."92 He recognized the two (2) key elements of the
problem of emergency governance, as well as all constitutional governance: increasing administrative powers of the
executive, while at the same time "imposing limitation upon that power."93 Watkins placed his real faith in a
scheme of constitutional dictatorship. These are the conditions of success of such a dictatorship: "The period of
dictatorship must be relatively short…Dictatorship should always be strictly legitimate in character…Final
authority to determine the need for dictatorship in any given case must never rest with the dictator
himself…"94 and the objective of such an emergency dictatorship should be "strict political conservatism."

Carl J. Friedrich cast his analysis in terms similar to those of Watkins. 95 "It is a problem of concentrating power – in a
government where power has consciously been divided – to cope with… situations of unprecedented magnitude and
gravity. There must be a broad grant of powers, subject to equally strong limitations as to who shall exercise such
powers, when, for how long, and to what end." 96 Friedrich, too, offered criteria for judging the adequacy of any of
scheme of emergency powers, to wit: "The emergency executive must be appointed by constitutional means –
i.e., he must be legitimate; he should not enjoy power to determine the existence of an emergency; emergency
powers should be exercised under a strict time limitation; and last, the objective of emergency action must be
the defense of the constitutional order."97

Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the history of the employment of emergency powers in Great Britain, France,
Weimar, Germany and the United States, reverted to a description of a scheme of "constitutional dictatorship" as
solution to the vexing problems presented by emergency.98 Like Watkins and Friedrich, he stated a priori the conditions
of success of the "constitutional dictatorship," thus:

1) No general regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship should be initiated unless it is
necessary or even indispensable to the preservation of the State and its constitutional order…
 2) …the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in the hands of the man or men who
will constitute the dictator…

3) No government should initiate a constitutional dictatorship without making specific provisions for its
termination…

4) …all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization of the government should be
effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal requirements…

5) … no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no regular procedure altered any more than
is absolutely necessary for the conquest of the particular crisis . . .

6) The measures adopted in the prosecution of the a constitutional dictatorship should never be permanent in
character or effect…

7) The dictatorship should be carried on by persons representative of every part of the citizenry interested in the
defense of the existing constitutional order. . .

8) Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every action taken under a constitutional dictatorship. . .

9) The decision to terminate a constitutional dictatorship, like the decision to institute one should never be in the
hands of the man or men who constitute the dictator. . .

10) No constitutional dictatorship should extend beyond the termination of the crisis for which it was instituted…

11) …the termination of the crisis must be followed by a complete return as possible to the political and
governmental conditions existing prior to the initiation of the constitutional dictatorship… 99

Rossiter accorded to legislature a far greater role in the oversight exercise of emergency powers than did Watkins. He
would secure to Congress final responsibility for declaring the existence or termination of an emergency, and he places
great faith in the effectiveness of congressional investigating committees. 100

Scott and Cotter, in analyzing the above contemporary theories in light of recent experience, were one in saying that,
"the suggestion that democracies surrender the control of government to an authoritarian ruler in time of
grave danger to the nation is not based upon sound constitutional theory." To appraise emergency power in
terms of constitutional dictatorship serves merely to distort the problem and hinder realistic analysis. It matters not
whether the term "dictator" is used in its normal sense (as applied to authoritarian rulers) or is employed to embrace all
chief executives administering emergency powers. However used, "constitutional dictatorship" cannot be divorced from
the implication of suspension of the processes of constitutionalism. Thus, they favored instead the "concept of
constitutionalism" articulated by Charles H. McIlwain:

A concept of constitutionalism which is less misleading in the analysis of problems of emergency powers, and which is
consistent with the findings of this study, is that formulated by Charles H. McIlwain. While it does not by any means
necessarily exclude some indeterminate limitations upon the substantive powers of government, full emphasis is
placed upon procedural limitations, and political responsibility. McIlwain clearly recognized the need to repose
adequate power in government. And in discussing the meaning of constitutionalism, he insisted that the historical and
proper test of constitutionalism was the existence of adequate processes for keeping government responsible.
He refused to equate constitutionalism with the enfeebling of government by an exaggerated emphasis upon
separation of powers and substantive limitations on governmental power. He found that the really effective checks on
despotism have consisted not in the weakening of government but, but rather in the limiting of it; between which there
is a great and very significant difference. In associating constitutionalism with "limited" as distinguished from
"weak" government, McIlwain meant government limited to the orderly procedure of law as opposed to the
processes of force. The two fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all lovers of
liberty must yet fight are the legal limits to arbitrary power and a complete political responsibility of
government to the governed.101
In the final analysis, the various approaches to emergency of the above political theorists –- from Lock’s "theory of
prerogative," to Watkins’ doctrine of "constitutional dictatorship" and, eventually, to McIlwain’s "principle of
constitutionalism" --- ultimately aim to solve one real problem in emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting
increasing areas of discretionary power to the Chief Executive, while insuring that such powers will be
exercised with a sense of political responsibility and under effective limitations and checks.

Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from the fetters of a repressive regime, the 1986
Constitutional Commission, in drafting the 1987 Constitution, endeavored to create a government in the concept of
Justice Jackson’s "balanced power structure." 102 Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the
President, the Congress, and the Supreme Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none has
the monopoly of power in times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon
the other. This system does not weaken the President, it just limits his power, using the language of McIlwain. In
other words, in times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in
the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully
prescribed procedural limitations.

a. "Facial Challenge"

Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its "overbreadth." They claim that its enforcement
encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a "chilling
effect" to the citizens.

A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment cases.103

A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,104 the US
Supreme Court held that "we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the
First Amendment" (freedom of speech).

Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects legitimate state interest
in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless
violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered "harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v.
Oklahoma,105 it was held:

It remains a ‘matter of no little difficulty’ to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face and when ‘such
summary action’ is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth
adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset,
attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from ‘pure
speech’ toward conduct and that conduct –even if expressive – falls within the scope of otherwise valid
criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct.

Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate
only "spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct."106 Here, the incontrovertible
fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state
regulation.

Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly and only as
a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;"107 The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules
governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to
challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations
not before the Court.108 A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual
rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as
applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted
to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules
give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute
"on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized
court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the
concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring
suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law’s "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on
the speech of those third parties.

In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and
pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction
that its very existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression. In Younger v. Harris,109 it was held that:

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies
before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative
remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes,...ordinarily results in
a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be
decided.

And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since
the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners
did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.

Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.

Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is facially invalid if
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."110 It is
subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face
only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is
vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the
meaning and application of PP 1017.

b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017

Now on the constitutional foundation of PP 1017.

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision:

"by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well any act of insurrection or rebellion"

Second provision:

"and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction;"
Third provision:

"as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency."

First Provision: Calling-out Power

The first provision pertains to the President’s calling-out power. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,111 this Court,
through Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution reproduced as follows:

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress
may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if
the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual bases
of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts
or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released.

grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign,
these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to
declare Martial Law. Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,112 the Court ruled that the only criterion for the
exercise of the calling-out power is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces
"to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." Are these conditions present in the instant cases?
As stated earlier, considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017.
Owing to her Office’s vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the
country.

Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence,
invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out
power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He
cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution,
the greater the power, the greater are the limitations.

It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the President’s authority to declare a "state of
rebellion" (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While President Arroyo’s authority
to declare a "state of rebellion" emanates from her powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited
in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:
SEC. 4. – Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or
interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be
promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.

President Arroyo’s declaration of a "state of rebellion" was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is
harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a
state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision
calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article
XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with
public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be
deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas.

Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What
defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her calling-out
power.

The declaration of Martial Law is a "warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called upon by the executive
to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and
punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the
enforcement of law."113

In his "Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice" on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,114 an
authority in constitutional law, said that of the three powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the power to
declare Martial Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties. It is a strong medicine which should not be resorted
to lightly. It cannot be used to stifle or persecute critics of the government. It is placed in the keeping of the President
for the purpose of enabling him to secure the people from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their
individual freedoms. In fact, Section 18, Art. VII, provides:

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts
or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President
to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a
valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and
any act done contrary to its command is ultra vires.

Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public
assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees,
are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of
Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of
President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless
violence.

Second Provision: "Take Care" Power

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is
based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:

SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.

As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, 115 the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws
as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials
and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that
as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, "execute its laws." 116 In the exercise of such function, the
President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces
of the country,117 including the Philippine National Police118 under the Department of Interior and Local Government. 119

Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casiño,
Liza Maza, and Josel Virador argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo the power to
enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in
Congress. They assail the clause "to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction."

Petitioners’ contention is understandable. A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted 120 from Former
President Marcos’ Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon
me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in
Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent
or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.

We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: "to
enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction." Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction."

Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate "decrees"?

PP 1017 states in part: "to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction."

The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative
Code of 1987). She may issue any of the following:

Sec. 2. Executive Orders. — Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in
implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.

Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in
pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.

Sec. 4. Proclamations. — Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or
interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be
promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.

Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. — Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or
temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in
memorandum orders.

Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. — Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the
President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the
Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. — Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.

President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those
issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and
binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the
period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution. 121

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate "decrees." Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1,
Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?

As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void
and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws," she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain
laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the
like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless
violence.

Third Provision: Power to Take Over

The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:

x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a state of
national emergency.

The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call
the military not only to enforce obedience "to all the laws and to all decrees x x x" but also to act pursuant to the
provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:

Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency
and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest.

What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017?

The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the
President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as a product of the "martial law" thinking of the 1971
Constitutional Convention.122 In effect at the time of its approval was President Marcos’ Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated
September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of National Defense to take over "the management, control and
operation of the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, the National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority, the Philippine National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient
Airways . . . for the successful prosecution by the Government of its effort to contain, solve and end the present
national emergency."

Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President Arroyo’s inclusion of
Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislature’s emergency powers.

This is an area that needs delineation.

A distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare "a state of national emergency" and
to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President
such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional
issues arise.

Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall
have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.

It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to "other
national emergency." If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the
authority to declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to
Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly,
they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a "state of national
emergency." The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of
national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment.

But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.

Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated,
different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed
together and considered in the light of each other. 123 Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article
VI, previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the
exercise of emergency powers.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI
authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed
upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet
and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers
to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.124

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private
business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress.
Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may
exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the
reasonable terms thereof. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer,125 held:

It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some provision of the
Constitution. And it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the President. The
contention is that presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution.
Particular reliance is placed on provisions in Article II which say that "The executive Power shall be vested in a
President . . . .;" that "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed;" and that he "shall be Commander-in-
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.

The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President’s military power as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in military
commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war. Such cases need not concern us here. Even though
"theater of war" be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private
property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the nation’s lawmakers, not
for its military authorities.

Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant executive
power to the President. In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the
lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And
the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute.
The first section of the first article says that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States. . ."126

Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term "emergency" under Section 17, Article XII refers to "tsunami,"
"typhoon," "hurricane"and"similar occurrences." This is a limited view of "emergency."

Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing
danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions are the elements of
intensity, variety, and perception. 127 Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in the United Sates since
1933, have been occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal
heads: a) economic,128 b) natural disaster,129 and c) national security.130

"Emergency," as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may include rebellion, economic crisis,
pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect. 131 This is evident
in the Records of the Constitutional Commission, thus:

MR. GASCON. Yes. What is the Committee’s definition of "national emergency" which appears in Section 13, page 5?
It reads:

When the common good so requires, the State may temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest.

MR. VILLEGAS. What I mean is threat from external aggression, for example, calamities or natural disasters.

MR. GASCON. There is a question by Commissioner de los Reyes. What about strikes and riots?

MR. VILLEGAS. Strikes, no; those would not be covered by the term "national emergency."

MR. BENGZON. Unless they are of such proportions such that they would paralyze government service. 132

xxxxxx

MR. TINGSON. May I ask the committee if "national emergency" refers to military national emergency or could this
be economic emergency?"

MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, it could refer to both military or economic dislocations.

MR. TINGSON. Thank you very much.133

It may be argued that when there is national emergency, Congress may not be able to convene and, therefore, unable
to delegate to the President the power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest.

In Araneta v. Dinglasan,134 this Court emphasized that legislative power, through which extraordinary measures are
exercised, remains in Congress even in times of crisis.

"x x x

After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the fact
remains that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to
the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government
have given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its faults, as the
ideal. The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting
periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose
Constitution have been copied in ours, have specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been
surrendered to another department – unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to
prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-
death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of
extreme perils more than in normal circumstances ‘the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial,’ given the
ability to act, are called upon ‘to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively."

Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules
that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The
President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have
ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with
public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of
the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

c. "AS APPLIED CHALLENGE"

One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security, is that military necessity and the
guaranteed rights of the individual are often not compatible. Our history reveals that in the crucible of conflict, many
rights are curtailed and trampled upon. Here, the right against unreasonable search and seizure; the right against
warrantless arrest; and the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and of assembly under the Bill of
Rights suffered the greatest blow.

Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate "direct injury."

In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that, on February 24, 2006, they were arrested without
warrants on their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I. The arresting officers cited PP
1017 as basis of the arrest.

In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. claimed that on February 25, 2006,
the CIDG operatives "raided and ransacked without warrant" their office. Three policemen were assigned to guard their
office as a possible "source of destabilization." Again, the basis was PP 1017.

And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their members were "turned away and
dispersed" when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue, to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I.

A perusal of the "direct injuries" allegedly suffered by the said petitioners shows that they resulted from
the implementation, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, of PP 1017.
Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In general, does
the illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?

Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and
misabused135 and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.136 The validity of a statute or
ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its
effects in a particular case.137 PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the President’s calling-out power. Its general
purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished
the end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the
police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens’ constitutional rights.

Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed illegal
acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential
basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion.138 This is logical. Just
imagine the absurdity of situations when laws maybe declared unconstitutional just because the officers implementing
them have acted arbitrarily. If this were so, judging from the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed
upon by the Court, majority of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would have been declared unconstitutional a
long time ago.

President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General orders are "acts and
commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." They are
internal rules issued by the executive officer to his subordinates precisely for the proper and efficient administration
of law. Such rules and regulations create no relation except between the official who issues them and the official who
receives them.139 They are based on and are the product of, a relationship in which power is their source, and
obedience, their object.140 For these reasons, one requirement for these rules to be valid is that they must
be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious.

G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the "necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."

Unlike the term "lawless violence" which is unarguably extant in our statutes and the Constitution, and which is
invariably associated with "invasion, insurrection or rebellion," the phrase "acts of terrorism" is still an amorphous and
vague concept. Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing acts of terrorism.

In fact, this "definitional predicament" or the "absence of an agreed definition of terrorism" confronts not only our
country, but the international community as well. The following observations are quite apropos:

In the actual unipolar context of international relations, the "fight against terrorism" has become one of the basic
slogans when it comes to the justification of the use of force against certain states and against groups operating
internationally. Lists of states "sponsoring terrorism" and of terrorist organizations are set up and constantly being
updated according to criteria that are not always known to the public, but are clearly determined by strategic interests.

The basic problem underlying all these military actions – or threats of the use of force as the most recent by the United
States against Iraq – consists in the absence of an agreed definition of terrorism.

Remarkable confusion persists in regard to the legal categorization of acts of violence either by states, by armed
groups such as liberation movements, or by individuals.

The dilemma can by summarized in the saying "One country’s terrorist is another country’s freedom fighter." The
apparent contradiction or lack of consistency in the use of the term "terrorism" may further be demonstrated by the
historical fact that leaders of national liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Habib Bourgouiba
in Tunisia, or Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria, to mention only a few, were originally labeled as terrorists by those who
controlled the territory at the time, but later became internationally respected statesmen.

What, then, is the defining criterion for terrorist acts – the differentia specifica distinguishing those acts from eventually
legitimate acts of national resistance or self-defense?
Since the times of the Cold War the United Nations Organization has been trying in vain to reach a consensus on the
basic issue of definition. The organization has intensified its efforts recently, but has been unable to bridge the gap
between those who associate "terrorism" with any violent act by non-state groups against civilians, state functionaries
or infrastructure or military installations, and those who believe in the concept of the legitimate use of force when
resistance against foreign occupation or against systematic oppression of ethnic and/or religious groups within a state
is concerned.

The dilemma facing the international community can best be illustrated by reference to the contradicting categorization
of organizations and movements such as Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) – which is a terrorist group for Israel
and a liberation movement for Arabs and Muslims – the Kashmiri resistance groups – who are terrorists in the
perception of India, liberation fighters in that of Pakistan – the earlier Contras in Nicaragua – freedom fighters for the
United States, terrorists for the Socialist camp – or, most drastically, the Afghani Mujahedeen (later to become the
Taliban movement): during the Cold War period they were a group of freedom fighters for the West, nurtured by the
United States, and a terrorist gang for the Soviet Union. One could go on and on in enumerating examples of
conflicting categorizations that cannot be reconciled in any way – because of opposing political interests that are at the
roots of those perceptions.

How, then, can those contradicting definitions and conflicting perceptions and evaluations of one and the same group
and its actions be explained? In our analysis, the basic reason for these striking inconsistencies lies in the divergent
interest of states. Depending on whether a state is in the position of an occupying power or in that of a rival, or
adversary, of an occupying power in a given territory, the definition of terrorism will "fluctuate" accordingly. A state may
eventually see itself as protector of the rights of a certain ethnic group outside its territory and will therefore speak of a
"liberation struggle," not of "terrorism" when acts of violence by this group are concerned, and vice-versa.

The United Nations Organization has been unable to reach a decision on the definition of terrorism exactly because of
these conflicting interests of sovereign states that determine in each and every instance how a particular armed
movement (i.e. a non-state actor) is labeled in regard to the terrorists-freedom fighter dichotomy. A "policy of double
standards" on this vital issue of international affairs has been the unavoidable consequence.

This "definitional predicament" of an organization consisting of sovereign states – and not of peoples, in spite of the
emphasis in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter! – has become even more serious in the present global power
constellation: one superpower exercises the decisive role in the Security Council, former great powers of the Cold War
era as well as medium powers are increasingly being marginalized; and the problem has become even more acute
since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 I the United States.141

The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or
military. An illustration is when a group of persons are merely engaged in a drinking spree. Yet the military or the police
may consider the act as an act of terrorism and immediately arrest them pursuant to G.O. No. 5. Obviously, this is
abuse and oppression on their part. It must be remembered that an act can only be considered a crime if there is a law
defining the same as such and imposing the corresponding penalty thereon.

So far, the word "terrorism" appears only once in our criminal laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated January 16, 1981
enacted by President Marcos during the Martial Law regime. This decree is entitled "Codifying The Various Laws on
Anti-Subversion and Increasing The Penalties for Membership in Subversive Organizations." The word "terrorism" is
mentioned in the following provision: "That one who conspires with any other person for the purpose of overthrowing
the Government of the Philippines x x x by force, violence, terrorism, x x x shall be punished by reclusion temporal x x
x."

P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines) enacted by
President Corazon Aquino on May 5, 1985. These two (2) laws, however, do not define "acts of terrorism." Since there
is no law defining "acts of terrorism," it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to
determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently,
there can be indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over the media
enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these can be
effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they
violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that the "acts of terrorism" portion of G.O.
No. 5 is unconstitutional.
Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond what are necessary
and appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their authority in pursuing the Order.
Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal.

We first examine G.R. No. 171396 (David et al.)

The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." 142 The plain import of the language of the
Constitution is that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued
search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection given by this provision is that between person
and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search
warrants or warrants of arrest.143

In the Brief Account144 submitted by petitioner David, certain facts are established: first, he was arrested without
warrant; second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the basis of PP 1017; third, he was brought at Camp Karingal,
Quezon City where he was fingerprinted, photographed and booked like a criminal suspect; fourth,he was treated
brusquely by policemen who "held his head and tried to push him" inside an unmarked car; fifth, he was charged with
Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang No. 880145 and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he was detained for seven (7) hours;
and seventh,he was eventually released for insufficiency of evidence.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

x x x.

Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner David’s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for
the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their
observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective "Oust Gloria Now" and their erroneous
assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally. 146 Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his
immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the
subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. Further, he
also stated that there is insufficient evidence for the charge of violation of BP 880 as it was not even known whether
petitioner David was the leader of the rally.147

But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not only was their right against warrantless arrest
violated, but also their right to peaceably assemble.

Section 4 of Article III guarantees:

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

"Assembly" means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It is
a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of speech. As in the case of freedom
of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. In other words, like other rights embraced in the freedom of
expression, the right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the
prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the government authorities except, of course, if the assembly is
intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly itself, may be validly
required.

The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful
assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that
warranted the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from circumstances, the charges of inciting to
sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed
to justify the arresting officers’ conduct. In De Jonge v. Oregon,148 it was held that peaceable assembly cannot be made
a crime, thus:

Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political
action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that
score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly are not to be preserved, is not as to the
auspices under which the meeting was held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether
their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the persons
assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public
peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations of valid laws. But it is a different
matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a
peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.

On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU et
al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacañang’s directive
canceling all permits previously issued by local government units. This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all
permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that "freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to
prevent."149 Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing that an assembly presents a
clear and present danger that the State may deny the citizens’ right to exercise it. Indeed, respondents failed to show
or convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts amounting to lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. With the
blanket revocation of permits, the distinction between protected and unprotected assemblies was eliminated.

Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local government units.
They have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due notice and hearing on the determination
of the presence of clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of
their permits.150 The first time they learned of it was at the time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal defect.
When a person’s right is restricted by government action, it behooves a democratic government to see to it that the
restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to procedure.

G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of the press.
Petitioners’ narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed to refute, established the following: first, the Daily
Tribune’s offices were searched without warrant;second, the police operatives seized several materials for
publication; third, the search was conducted at about 1:00 o’ clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the
search was conducted in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building;
and fifth, policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices.

Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor was quoted
as saying that such raid was "meant to show a ‘strong presence,’ to tell media outlets not to connive or do
anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government." Director General Lomibao further stated
that "if they do not follow the standards –and the standards are if they would contribute to instability in the
government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 – we will
recommend a ‘takeover.’" National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio
networks to "cooperate" with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He warned that his
agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media
coverage during times when the national security is threatened.151
The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of
search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other
premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of
the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person
or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the
day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.

Not only that, the search violated petitioners’ freedom of the press. The best gauge of a free and democratic society
rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos v. Chief of Staff152 this Court held that --

As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the
"We Forum" newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed,
with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.

Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express
themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert
and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum"
newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties.
The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily
Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that officious
functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more
and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey. 153 Undoubtedly,
the The Daily Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government sentiments. This Court
cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom
to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. The motto should
always be obsta principiis.154

Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General admitted that the search of the Tribune’s offices and the
seizure of its materials for publication and other papers are illegal; and that the same are inadmissible "for any
purpose," thus:

JUSTICE CALLEJO:

You made quite a mouthful of admission when you said that the policemen, when inspected the Tribune for the
purpose of gathering evidence and you admitted that the policemen were able to get the clippings. Is that not in
admission of the admissibility of these clippings that were taken from the Tribune?

SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:

Under the law they would seem to be, if they were illegally seized, I think and I know, Your Honor, and these are
inadmissible for any purpose.155

xxxxxxxxx

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

These have been published in the past issues of the Daily Tribune; all you have to do is to get those past issues. So
why do you have to go there at 1 o’clock in the morning and without any search warrant? Did they become suddenly
part of the evidence of rebellion or inciting to sedition or what?
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

Well, it was the police that did that, Your Honor. Not upon my instructions.

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

Are you saying that the act of the policeman is illegal, it is not based on any law, and it is not based on Proclamation
1017.

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

It is not based on Proclamation 1017, Your Honor, because there is nothing in 1017 which says that the police could go
and inspect and gather clippings from Daily Tribune or any other newspaper.

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

Is it based on any law?

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

As far as I know, no, Your Honor, from the facts, no.

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

So, it has no basis, no legal basis whatsoever?

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

Maybe so, Your Honor. Maybe so, that is why I said, I don’t know if it is premature to say this, we do not condone
this. If the people who have been injured by this would want to sue them, they can sue and there are remedies
for this.156

Likewise, the warrantless arrests and seizures executed by the police were, according to the Solicitor General, illegal
and cannot be condoned, thus:

CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

There seems to be some confusions if not contradiction in your theory.

SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:

I don’t know whether this will clarify. The acts, the supposed illegal or unlawful acts committed on the occasion of 1017,
as I said, it cannot be condoned. You cannot blame the President for, as you said, a misapplication of the law. These
are acts of the police officers, that is their responsibility. 157

The Dissenting Opinion states that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional in every aspect and "should result in no
constitutional or statutory breaches if applied according to their letter."

The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Its ratiocination has been exhaustively presented.
At this point, suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the military to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the
military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens’ rights under the Constitution, this Court has to declare
such acts unconstitutional and illegal.
In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s concurring opinion, attached hereto, is considered an integral
part of this ponencia.

SUMMATION

In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 – a supervening event – would have normally rendered
this case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly in
pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued. Already,
there have been media reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed "if the May 1 rallies"
become "unruly and violent." Consequently, the transcendental issues raised by the parties should not be "evaded;"
they must now be resolved to prevent future constitutional aberration.

The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP
to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President
express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not
related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or
any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section
17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public
utility and private business affected with public interest.

In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President – acting as Commander-in-
Chief – addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid
standard – that the military and the police should take only the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures
to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence."But the words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not
been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While
"terrorism" has been denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the
courts, to determine the limits of the AFP’s authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.

On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the warrantless
arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the
KMU and NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4)
the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other
materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5.

Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil, criminal or administrative sanctions on the
individual police officers concerned. They have not been individually identified and given their day in court. The civil
complaints or causes of action and/or relevant criminal Informations have not been presented before this Court.
Elementary due process bars this Court from making any specific pronouncement of civil, criminal or administrative
liabilities.

It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights are ends in
themselves. How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic without unnecessarily
trampling individual rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic state.During emergency,
governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity from normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly
restrain our people’s liberty.

Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied the various competing political philosophies
is that, it is possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises without surrendering the two vital principles of
constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the
government to the governed.158

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as
decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017
declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such
declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest without prior legislation.

G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP
1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined and made punishable by the
Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and
NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts
constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any
form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its
articles for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTICLE XIII
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right
of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments.
Section 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on
freedom of initiative and self-reliance.