Journey from Scratch - Introduction

The Pakistan Army came into being as a result of the mingling of the Muslim troops of the pre-
independence British Indian Army. On 3 June 1947, British Government declared the plan for
partition between Pakistan and India. Chairman of the Partition Council, Lord Mountbatten,
Viceroy of India, along with the executives of Muslim League and Indian Congress developed
and agreed on the plan of division of armed forces. The ratio for distribution was decided as
64% for India and 46% for Pakistan related to armed forces and other assets but later Pakistan
share reduced to 1/3. The army had less than 50% strength including thirteen tanks with an
ammunition reserve of less than one week[ CITATION Ano21 \l 1033 ]. During a joint defense
meeting, it was assured to Pakistan that in case of war with India, there will be no external help
from Commonwealth countries come to Pakistan.

It was first test on ground for Pakistan army to cope the situation when in 1948 India air-
transported its army in Srinagar. Military skims lasted for six months without any logistic
support and limited supply of arms and services[ CITATION Zai17 \l 1033 ].

Back in August 1947, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, foreseeing the financial and military
difficulties ahead, asked for US economic and military aid. Incidentally, the same request had
also been submitted by New Delhi and Kabul. After an evaluation of Pakistan's strategic location
at the crossroads of South-, Central-and West Asia in proximity to both China and the Soviet
Union, the USA acceded to Pakistan's request under the American Mutual Security Legislation.
In early 1954, Pakistan and the USA signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. Between
1954 -1965, Pakistan received US$650 million in military grants, US$619 million in defense
support assistance, and US$ 55 million in cash or commercial purchases. This aid enhanced
Pakistani defense capability by increasing the firepower and mobility, and improving strategic
facilities as well [ CITATION Ano21 \l 1033 ].

Strategic challenges and Paradox in Musharraf regime

To align Pakistan as front-line state in US-led War on terror immediate after 9/11 was the most
controversial decision of Musharaf regime [ CITATION Ami15 \l 1033 ]. Musharraf regime agreed
to offer un-conditional cooperation to the United States and this decision meant have an
impact on Pakistan’s domestic and external security and interlocked issues.

The decision made by Islamabad proved critical turning point for war on terror towards security
and drove the country into initiating a counter-terrorism policy at the national, regional and
international levels. Theoretically, this decision reaffirms Barry Buzan’s argument that security
is an essential mix of external and internal variables and decisions on one end register their
impact on the other end, whether intentionally or unintentionally [ CITATION Bar081 \l 1033 ].
The consequences of the decision to follow the US lead is the response of an unequal or weak
partner that must make the best of the worst circumstances.

Pakistan opted tactical move of pro-US tilt policy towards Afghanistan and viewed as strategic
necessity of Pakistan to safeguard its national integrity. This narrative strengthens Musharraf’s
rule and fitted well with his declarations [ CITATION Sha10 \l 1033 ]. To join US camp escalated a
challenging phase of rousting and rethinking the national security policy in context of India,
Afghanistan and Kashmir pose strategic implications at the national, regional and international
levels. US gave Pakistan a list of following non-negotiable demands:

 Stop Al-Qaeda operatives coming from Afghanistan to Pakistan, intercept arms

shipments through Pakistan, and end all logistical support for Osama bin Laden;
 Give blanket over-flight and landing rights to U.S. aircraft;
 Give the US access to Pakistani naval and air bases and to the border areas between
Pakistan and Afghanistan;
 Turn over all intelligence and immigration information;
 Condemn the September 11 attacks and curb all domestic expressions of support for
terrorism;
 Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban, and stop Pakistani volunteers from going into
Afghanistan to join the Taliban;
  Note that, should the evidence strongly implicate Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda
network in Afghanistan, and should the Taliban continue to harbor him and his
accomplices, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime, end
support for the Taliban, and assist the U.S. in the ways to destroy Osama and his
network.

General Pervez Musharraf in a public address to the nation on 19 September, 2001 tendered
five reasons for choosing to offer co-operation to the US in its war against terrorism. The five
reasons for choosing this course of action were:

 Secure Pakistan’s strategic assets,

 Safeguard the cause of Kashmir,
 Prevent Pakistan from being declared a terrorist state,
 Prevent an anti-Pakistani government from coming to power in Kabul,
 Have Pakistan re-emerge politically as a responsible and dignified Nation.

Siege Of Lal Masjid

There are three crucial aspects of the Lal Masjid operation that can be considered
independently of the report:

a) the military operation that resulted in clearing the mosque of militants and the death of
many civilians was an institutional decision, not solely that of Gen Musharraf, who was then
army chief;

b) the situation in the capital had been allowed to come to such a pass that a military operation
became necessary;

c) the operation was badly mishandled, resulting in the death of all those who were inside the
complex, not just the militants. True, there was justification for the operation.

The Lal Masjid militants had challenged the writ of the state in the heart of Islamabad. Aside
from the seminary students’ moral policing in the capital, Sharia ‘courts’ were set up inside the
mosque and there were a number of fire-fights with the police, paramilitary and army even
before the military launched its operation [ CITATION Ano13 \l 1033 ] . Heavy weaponry was
stashed inside the place of worship — and later used by militants during the siege.

Bibliography
Amir, Z. a. S., 2015. The national security policy paradox in Pakistan. The dialogue, XII(1), pp. 16-36.

Anonymous, 2013. Not the full picture: Lal Masjid Comission report, s.l.: Dawn.

Anonymous, 2021. Journey from Scratch to nuclear power. [Online]

Available at: https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/journey-scratch-nuclear-power.php
[Accessed 2021].

Buzan, B., 2008. Scurity Studies. London: Routledge.

Fayyaz, S., 2010. Pakistan response towards terrorism, Brimingham: University of Brimingham.

Zaidi, S., 2017. The changing of Guard 1958-1969, s.l.: The Media group.