Sch o o l o f Grad u ate Stu d ie s

D e p artm e n t o f Pu blic Man age m e n t an d Po licy

Co lle ge o f Man age m e n t, In fo rm atio n an d Eco n o m ic Scie n ce s
Ad d is Ababa U n ive rs ity

BT Co s tan tin o s , Ph D , Le ctu re N o te s

Po licy a n d In s titu tio n al Re fo rm ( MPMP 6 0 6 )

Blo ck Th re e
Th e o rie s o f Go ve rn an ce an d
N e w Pu blic Man age m e n t:
Lin ks to U n d e rs ta n d in g W e lfare Po licy Im p le m e n tatio n

Co n te n ts
1. Introduction
2. Governance
3. Public adm inistration
3.1. Definition
3.2. History
3.3. Core branches
3.4. Decision-m aking m odels
4. Theories of Governance and New Public Managem ent
4.1. New Public Managem ent
4.2. Differences from private sector
4.3. Controversy
4.4. Policy Im plem entation
4.5. Networks in Action
4.6. Moving Beyond Top-Down Bottom -Up Approaches
4.7. Governance and NPM: Integrating Im plem entation Questions
5. The role of the international com m unity
6. References
1. In tro d u ctio n
If Max Weber and Woodrow Wilson were to suddenly appear on the landscape of
m odern public adm inistration, norm ative theories in hand, it is likely they would be un-
able to recognize the field. The com prehensive, functionally uniform , hierarchical organi-
zations governed by strong leaders who are dem ocratically responsible and staffed by
neutrally com petent civil servants who deliver services to citizens (Ostrom , 1973) – to the
extent they ever existed – are long gone. They have been replaced by an ‘organizational
society’ in which m any im portant services are provided through m ulti-organizational
program s. These program s are essentially “interconnected clusters of firm s, govern -
m ents, and associations which com e together within the fram ework of these program s”
(Hjern and Porter, 1981, pp. 212-213).
These im plem entation structures operate within a notion of governance about which
a surprising level of consensus has been reached. There is a pervasive, shared, global per-
ception of governance as a topic far broader than ‘governm ent’; the governance approach
is seen as a “new process of governing, or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new
m ethod by which society is governed” (Stoker, 1998, p. 17). Sim ilarly, in the scholarship
that has followed the ‘Reinventing Governm ent’ them es of public effectiveness, m uch has
been written of New Public Managem ent practices by which governance theory is put
into action (Mathiasen, 1996; Lynn, 1996, 1998; Terry, 1998; Kelly, 1998; Peters and Pierre, 1998).
In this com plex, devolved m ode of service delivery, the unit of analysis for som e stu-
dents of policy im plem entation is the network of non-profit organizations, private firm s
and governm ents. As Milward and Provan note, in policy arenas such as health, m ental
health, and welfare, "...joint production and having several degrees of separation between
the source and the user of governm ent fun ds...com bine to ensure that hierarchies and
m arkets will not work and that networks are the only alternative for collective action"
(20 0 0 , p. 243). The purpose here is to attem pt to set forth a theoretical fram ework for the
study of welfare policy im plem entation by synthesizing the related and theoretically con-
sistent concepts of governance, New Public Managem ent, and networks. I then discuss
how this fram ework can be applied to welfare policy im plem entation. I follow the lead of
scholars who have attem pted to offer coherence and synthesis to a research field that his-
torically has been dom inated by top-down and bottom -up perspectives.
The need to inform im plem entation scholarship is great. As O’Toole concludes in his
review of the literature on m ulti-organization policy im plem entation, the field is com -
plex, without m uch cum ulation or convergence. Few well-developed recom m endations
have been put forward by researchers, and a num ber of proposals are contradic-
tory….Two reasons for the lack of developm ent are analyzed: norm ative disagreem ents
and the state of the field’s em pirical theory. Yet there rem ain num erous possibilities for
increasing the quality of the latter. Efforts in this direction are a necessary condition of
further practical advance. (1986, p. 181).
2 . Go ve rn an ce
Governance is the conscious m anagem ent of regim es with the aim of enhancing the
effectiveness of political authority. Governance can be thought of as the applied realm of
politics, in which political actors seek m echanism s to convert political preferences into
m anaging society. Good governance involves im provem ents in the technical com petence
and efficiency of the public sector as well as m easures to m ake public policy m ore ac-
countable, transparent, and predictable to society at large. The com plexities of transition
to good governance and the assum ptions that are m ade based on perceived necessities or
dem and of societies and states are well beyond the scope of this paper. However, it would
be necessary to deal briefly in trying to identify the m odalities and sources of political
transitions. Two aspects need to be considered.i
Political transitions are initiated at three levels: state-led transitions, civil society initiated
and led transitions and com binations of state led and society led transitions.
Three m ain strategic and processual issues are usually considered in the study and analy-
sis of democratic transitions. The first is the presence of objective conditions for political
 transition in the socio-econom ic structures. The second is contingent political dynam ics -
- good governance is installed as a result of the conscious reform initiatives of individual
leaders, elite factions, and social m ovements. Thirdly, it depends upon the em ergence of
supportive set of rules and political, social, and econom ic institutions.
Public adm inistration has gone a long way. If Max Weber and Woodrow Wilson were
to appear suddenly on the landscape of m odern public adm inistration, norm ative theo-
ries in hand, it is likely they would be unable to recognise the field. The com prehensive,
functionally uniform , hierarchical organisations governed by strong leaders who are de-
m ocratically responsible and staffed by neutrally com petent civil servants who deliver
services to citizens (Ostrom , 1973) – to the extent they ever existed – are long gone. They
have been replaced by an ‘organisational society’ in which m any im portant services are
provided through m ulti-organisational program s. These program s are essentially “inter-
connected clusters of firm s, governm ents, and associations which com e together within
the fram ework of these program s” (Hjern and Porter, 1981, pp. 212-213).
These im plem entation structures operate within a notion of governance about which
a surprising level of consensus has been reached. There is a pervasive, shared, global per-
ception of governance as a topic far broader than ‘governm ent’; the governance approach
is seen as a “new process of governing, or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new
m ethod by which society is governed” (Stoker, 1998, p. 17). Sim ilarly, in the scholarship,
that has followed the ‘Reinventing Governm ent’ them es of public effectiveness; m uch has
been written of New Public Managem ent practices by which governance theory is put
into action (Mathiasen, 1996; Lynn, 1996, 1998; Terry, 1998; Kelly, 1998; Peters and Pierre, 1998).
In this com plex, devolved m ode of service delivery, the unit of analysis for som e stu-
dents of policy im plem entation is the network of non-profit organisations, private firm s,
and governm ents. As Milward and Provan note, in policy arenas such as health, m ental
health, and welfare, "...joint production and having several degrees of separation between
the source and the user of governm ent fun ds...com bine to ensure that hierarchies and
m arkets will not work and that networks are the only alternative for collective action"
(20 0 0 , p. 243). The purpose here is to attem pt to set forth a theoretical fram ework for
the study of welfare policy im plem entation by synthesising the related and theoretically
consistent concepts of governance, New Public Managem ent, and networks. It then dis-
cusses how this fram ework can be applied to welfare policy im plem entation and follow
lead of scholars who have attem pted to offer coherence and synthesis to a research field
that historically has been dom inated by top-down and bottom -up perspectives.
The need to inform im plem entation scholarship is great as the review of the literature
on m ulti-organisation policy im plem entation shows; the field is com plex, without m uch
cum ulation or convergence. Few well-developed recom m endations have been put for-
ward by researchers, and a num ber of proposals are contradictory….Two reasons for the
lack of developm ent are analysed: norm ative disagreem ents and the state of the field’s
em pirical theory. Yet there rem ain num erous possibilities for increasing the quality of
the latter. Efforts in this direction are a necessary condition of further practical advance.
(1986, p. 181).
Although the term “governance” has entered the intellectual discourse in the past
decade in the international arena, now that its reform s are externally driven, the idea has
a long intellectual history. A key distinction, which runs through m uch of in the history of
political theory, is between the stew ardship/ guardianship on the one hand and guid-
ing/ steering responsibilities of the state on the other. Over the centuries, these two im -
ages i.e. the shepherd and the helm sm an - have been at the heart of m any political gov-
ernance controversies. Neither guardianship nor guiding can be discharged effectively in
isolation; som e writers advocate one and others the other as the prim ary responsibility of
the state. Developm entalists em phasise stewardship while neo-classical econom ists au-
gur its guiding functions.ii Today governance has com e to signify political liberalisation
and m arket reform s on the lower scale and dem ocratic developm ent on the upper scale.
 The concept of governance and the issues to be addressed cannot fit into one holistic
definition of governance or even address ram ifications in the recent history of political
theory. Hence, this docum ent addresses the conceptual issues of governance in Ethiopia
as it relates to the role of civil society, political parties, and business com m unity focusing
on civic education, political participation, and conflict m anagem ent, com m unications, in-
form ation m anagem ent and the m edia. It also addresses legislature at the federal and
state levels, enabling environm ent and support to the judiciary, rule of law and access to
justice and the functions of the public sector.
Governance m ust be distinguished from dem ocratic developm ent and political liber-
alisation occurs when a governing elite grants or extends civil and political rights that
had previously been denied. These rights m ay benefit individuals (such as rights of pri-
vacy, speech of m ovem ent) or social groups (such as freedom im portant of association or
assem bly). Dem ocratic Developm ent is a process of rule m aking in which citizens obtain
opportunities for political contestation and political participation. Political contestation
refers to open rivalry and com petition am ong diverse political interests. Political partici-
pation refers to the entitlem ent of citizens, considered as political equals, to be involved
in choosing governm ental leaders and policies. Dem ocracy is a regim e in which the au-
thority to exercise power derives from the will of the people. The use of these definitions
is not a great leap of im agination into the different form s of societal change; but sim ply
what is com ing is the twisting the fam iliar slogan in term s that betray little in their m ean-
ing.
Because possibilities and problem s of dem ocratic developm ent can be grasped in
term s of the related dom ain of ideology, ideological elem ents and constructs m ight be
seen as the very constitutive structure of governance. Ideology will com m only be charac-
terised by a num ber of distinctive and shared additional elem ents, including concepts
and rules of governm ent, national and cultural values, traditions of political discourse
and argum ents, and m odes of representation of specific interests, needs, and issues.
These elem ents, or com plexes of elem ents, will tend to assum e varying form s and to en-
ter shifting relations of com petition, co-operation, and hegem ony during political reform .
Generally, the broader the range of ideological elem ents at play and the m ore varied and
uncertain their relations, the greater the possibilities of process-oriented vision defini-
tion.
Obviously there would be a transition period to which the m ajor foundations to which
they are often tied m ore or less closely, transitional ideological constructs tend to be un-
settled and, at tim es, unsettling. Particularly at the initial stages of transition, they are
m ore likely to be uncertain rather than stable structures of ideas and values. This has the
effect of opening up the reform process, of freeing the process from sim ple dom ination
by any one organised stakeholder or coalition of them . Yet such elem ents and relations
take shape and com e into play within a hierarchy of global and local agencies and groups.
A d e te rm in ate o rd e r o f in s titu tio n s , p o w e rs , in te re s ts an d a ctivitie s o p e rate
th ro u gh co m p le xe s o f id e as a n d va lu e s , fillin g o u t, s p e cifyin g, an ch o rin g
an d , o fte n s h o rt-cu ttin g th e ir fo rm al co n te n t o r m e an in g. Moreover, this m ay
im pose ideological as well as practical lim its on the extent to which and how reform
processes in Ethiopia can be opened up or broadened.
International IDEAiii identifies the convergence and m erging of three agendas: the
security agenda, the econom ic agenda, and the developm ent agenda. This indeed m akes
the m onitoring process m ore com plex. The security agenda has put political governance
and participatory politics at the forefront of international diplom acy and conflict preven-
tion and m anagem ent. The econom ic agenda, after a first wave of structural adjustm ent
program m es aim ed at downsizing and "shrinking the State, and prom oting m arket
econom ies, is rehabilitating the role of the State in its core regulatory functions. The de-
velopm ent agenda is linking sustainable hum an developm ent (econom ic developm ent)
and participatory developm ent (political developm ent). This convergence of agendas re-
flects an em erging consensus on the m utually reinforcing role of political governance and
 developm ent, re-em phasising the im portance of the political context of developm en t.
However, the definition of good governance is im precise partly because different users
use them in different contexts and partly the concept is still evolving. It could also be ar-
gued that the inflation in the definitions of good governance reflects the different con-
stituencies of the institution using it and is som etim es the expression of opposing foreign
policy agenda.iv
UNDP (1999) defines governance is the way in which a society m akes and im ple-
m ents decisions - achieving m utual understanding, agreem ent and action. The policy pa-
per on governance States that governance com prises the com plex m echanism s, proc-
esses and institutions, through w hich citizens and groups articulate their interests, m e-
diate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations.v As such, govern-
ance has social, political, and econom ic dim ensions. In addition, the roles of the State are
being reshaped; civil society is everywhere on the rise; and several global corporations
and m ega-cities are m ore powerful than m any nation-States. The belief and practice of
protecting hum an rights is becom ing the com m on sense of hum anity. The leadership role
of wom en in national and global decision-m aking is becom ing m ore prevalent. The envi-
ronm ental m ovem ent is rallying action to protect the earth’s fragile eco-system . In addi-
tion, a new global m ovem ent to end extrem e poverty is gaining m om entum .
Nevertheless the m ain question here what are the trajectories of change that the
Ethiopia transition has taken, how could the Ethiopian dem ocratic project pursue its
goals consistently in varying contexts, but do so without resorting to a self - defeating,
overly scripted, and stage- m anaged political "play"? In other words, how could dem oc-
ratic transitions com bine im m ediately program m ed intentionality with m ore open, proc-
ess - based purposefulness? In presenting conceptual analysis to help answer this in-
volved question, we m ay wish to start by defining, and distinguishing between, the out-
puts of the political transition in Ethiopia. One can draw a conceptual distinction be-
tween the political liberalisation that has m arked the post Mengistu era and transition to
dem ocracy that has distinctive political, social and econom ic latitudes.
Political liberalisation and openness would relate in part to various conditions or de-
velopm ents in governm ent and civil society, only som e of which m ay be necessary for or
com parable with dem ocratisation. This is illustrated by processes such as decline or lib-
eralisation of authoritarian regim es and/ or ideologies resulting in increased opportuni-
ties for political com petition and popular participation, transform ation of state- society
relations. Dem ocratisation refers to an entire distinctive form of political thought, dis-
course, and practice, which underlies popularly, elected and controlled governm ent. Po-
litical openness m ay or m ay not lead to full-fledged dem ocratisation, but the two are bet-
ter understood as overlapping, possibly m utually supportive, processes, rather than self -
contained transition phases. Thus, in the absence of a widely open political space in
which opposition parties of various ideological persuasions are allowed to exist legally
and to com pete freely and peacefully for state power, dem ocratic elections of truly uncer-
tain freely cannot be held. Nor can form al constitution writing and satisfying efforts led
by incum bent regim es and their intellectual supporters attain broad and deep legitim acy
as dem ocratic activities. Political openness and dem ocratic transition are possibly, not
necessarily m utually supportive. Because a project of dem ocratisation m anaged by a gov-
erning elite m ay also narrow the political playing field below the level where opposition
groups can freely operate, restricting the dim ensions and elem ents of a broadly enabling
transition process by its transition strategy.
3. Pu blic ad m in is tratio n ( PA) vi
PA is a "field of inquiry with a diverse scope” of which the "fundam ental goal...is to
advance m anagem ent and policies so that governm ent can function." ( J ack Rabin, W. Bartley
Hildreth, and Gerard J . Miller. Eds 1989 ) Som e of the various definitions which have been of-
fered for the term are: "the m anagem ent of public program s" ( Robert and J anet Denhardt.
20 0 9 ); the "translation of politics into the reality that citizens see every day" ( Kettl, D and
Fessler J . 20 0 9 ); and "the study of governm ent decision m aking, the analysis of the policies
them selves, the various inputs that have produced them , and the inputs necessary to
produce alternative policies." ( J erom e B. McKinney and Lawrence C. Howard. 1998 ) Public ad-
m inistration is "centrally concerned with the organisation of governm ent policies and
program m es as well as the behaviour of officials (usually non-elected) form ally responsi-
ble for their conduct". ( UN Econom ic and Social Council. 20 0 6 )
Many unelected public servants can be considered to be public adm inistrators, in-
cluding police officers, m unicipal budget analysts, HR benefits adm inistrators, city m an-
agers, Census analysts, and cabinet secretaries. Public adm inistrators are public servants
working in public departm ents and agencies, at all levels of governm ent. ( Ibid ) In the US,
civil servants and academ ics such as Woodrow Wilson prom oted Am erican civil service
reform in the 1880 s, m oving public adm inistration into academ ia ( Wilson, Woodrow. J une,
1887). However, "until the m id-20 th century and the dissem ination of the Germ an soci-
ologist Max Weber's theory of bureaucracy" there was not "m uch interest in a theory of
public adm inistration." ( Public adm inistration, 20 10 ) The field is m ultidisciplinary in charac-
ter; one of the various proposals for public adm inistration's sub-fields sets out five pil-
lars, including hum an resources, organisational theory, policy analysis and statistics,
budgeting, and ethics. ( Shafritz, J .M., A.C. Hyde. 20 0 7)
3.1. Definition: Public adm inistration has no generally accepted definition, because the
scope of the subject is so great and so debatable that it is easier to explain than de-
fine.( Kernaghan, Kenneth. 20 10 ,) Public adm inistration is a field of study (i.e., a disci-
pline) and an occupation. There is m uch disagreem ent about w hether the study of
public adm inistration can properly be called a discipline, largely because it is of-
ten view ed as a subfield of the tw o disciplines of political science and adm inistra-
tive science. (Ibid)
3.2. History
Dating back to Antiquity, Pharaohs, kings and em perors have required pages,
treasurers, and tax collectors to adm inister the practical business of governm ent.
Prior to the 19th century, staffing of m ost public adm inistrations was rife with nepo-
tism , favouritism , and political patronage, which were often referred to as a "spoils
system .” Public adm inistrators have been the "eyes and ears" of rulers until rela-
tively recently. In m edieval tim es, the abilities to read and write, add and subtract
were as dom inated by the educated elite as public em ploym ent. Consequently, the
need for expert civil servants whose ability to read and write form ed the basis for
developing expertise in such necessary activities as legal record-keeping, paying an d
feeding arm ies and levying taxes. As the European Im perialist age progressed and
the m ilitarily powers extended their hold over other continents and people, the need
for a sophisticated public adm inistration grew. vii
Modern Am erican public adm inistration is an extension of dem ocratic govern-
ance, justified by classic and liberal philosophers of the western world ranging from
Aristotle to J ohn Locke viii to Thom as J efferson ( Ryan, M., Mejia, B., and Georgiev, M. (Ed).
20 10 ) In the United States of Am erica, Woodrow Wilson is considered the father of
public adm inistration. He first form ally recognised public adm inistration in an 1887
article entitled "The Study of Adm inistration." The future president wrote, "It is the
object of adm inistrative study to discover, first, what governm ent can properly and
successfully do, and, secondly, how it can do these proper things with the utm ost
possible efficiency and at the least possible cost either of m oney or of energy." ( Wil-
son, W. 1887) Wilson was m ore influential to the science of public adm inistration than
Von Stein, prim arily due to an article Wilson wrote in 1887 in which he advocated
four concepts:
Separation of politics and adm inistration
Com parative analysis of political and private organisations
Im proving efficiency with business-like practices and attitudes toward daily op-
erations
 Im proving the effectiveness of public service through m anagem ent and by train-
ing civil servants, m erit-based assessment
The separation of politics and adm inistration has been the subject of lasting de-
bate. The different perspectives regarding this dichotom y contribute to differenti-
ating characteristics of the suggested generations of public adm inistration.
The separation of politics and adm inistration advocated by Wilson continues to
play a significant role in public adm inistration today. However, the dom inance of
this dichotom y was challenged by second-generation scholars, beginning in the
1940 s. Luther Gulick's fact-value dichotom y was a key contender for Wilson's alleg-
edly im practical politics-adm inistration dichotom y. In place of Wilson's first gen-
eration split, Gulick advocated a "seam less web of discretion and interaction". ( Fry,
Brian R. 1989 )
Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick are two second-generation scholars. Gulick,
Urwick, and the new generation of adm inistrators built on the work of contem po-
rary behavioural, adm inistrative, and organisational scholars including Henri Fayol,
Fredrick Winslow Taylor, Paul Appleby, Frank Goodnow, and William Willoughby.
The new generation of organisational theories no longer relied upon logical assum p-
tions and generalisations about hum an nature like classical and enlightened theo-
rists. Gulick developed a com prehensive, generic theory of organisation that em -
phasised the scientific m ethod, efficiency, professionalism , structural reform , and
executive control. Gulick sum m arised the duties of adm inistrators with an acronym ;
POSD CORB, which stands for planning, organising, staffing, directing, coordinat-
ing, reporting, and budgeting. Fayol developed a system atic, 14-point, treatm ent of
private m anagem ent. Second-generation theorists drew upon private m anagem ent
practices for adm inistrative sciences. A single, generic m anagem ent theory bleedin g
the borders between the private and the public sector was thought to be possible.
With the general theory, the adm inistrative theory could be focused on governm en-
tal organisations.
The m id-1940 s theorists challenged Wilson and Gulick. The politics-
adm inistration dichotom y rem ained the centre of criticism in the third generation.
In addition to this area of criticism , governm ent itself cam e under fire as ineffective,
inefficient, and largely a wasted effort. The som etim es deceptive and expensive in-
terventions along with dom estic scandals are two exam ples of self-destructive gov-
ernm ent behaviour during the third generation. There was a call by citizens for effi-
cient adm inistration to replace ineffective, wasteful bureaucracy. Public adm inistra-
tion would have to distance itself from politics to answer this call and rem ain effec-
tive. Elected officials supported such reform .
In the late 1980 s, yet another generation of public adm inistration theorists be-
gan to displace the last. What was called N ew Public Managem ent was proposed by
David Osborne and Ted Gaebler ( Public Adm inistration Review, 1996,). The new m odel
advocated the use of private sector innovation, resources, and organisational ideas
to im prove the public sector. During the Clinton Adm inistration (1992– 20 0 0 ), Vice
President Al Gore adopted and reform ed federal agencies accordingly. New public
m anagem ent there by becam e prevalent throughout the US bureaucracy. Som e
m odern authors define NPM as a com bination of splitting large bureaucracies into
sm aller, m ore fragm ented ones, com petition betw een different public agencies,
and betw een public agencies and private firm s and incentivisation on m ore eco-
nom ic lines ( Patrick Dunleavy, Helen Margetts et al, Patrick Dunleavy, Helen Margetts et al, 20 0 6 ).
This m odel's chief contribution is a focus on citizens rather than custom ers and
strong interest in the adoption of private sector practices and values (e.g., effi-
ciency). Accordingly, the citizen is expected to participate in governm ent and take
an active role throughout the policy process. No longer are the proprietors consid-
ered an end to a m ean. While this rem ains feasible at the federal, state, and local
levels, where the concept of citizenship is com m only wedded, the em ergence of
'transnational adm inistration' with the growing num ber of international organisa-
 tions and 'transnational executive networks' com plicates the prospects for citizen
engagem ent. ( Diane Stone, 20 0 8) Som e critics argue that the New Public Managem ent
concept of treating people as "custom ers" rather than "citizens" is an inappropriate
borrowing from the private sector m odel, because businesses see custom ers are a
m eans to an end (profit), rather than as the proprietors of governm ent (the owners),
opposed to m erely the custom ers of a business (the patrons). In New Public Man-
agem ent, people are viewed as econom ic units, not dem ocratic participants. Never-
theless, the m odel is still widely accepted at all levels of governm ent and in m any
OECD nations.
In the late 1990 s, J anet and Robert Denhardt proposed a new public service
m odel in response to the dom inance of NPM ( Denhardt , Robert B. and J anet Vinzant Den-
hardt (20 0 0 ). A successor to NPM is d ig it a l e r a g o v e r n a n ce . It focuses on them es
of reintegrating governm ent responsibilities, needs-based holism (executing duties
in cursive ways), and digitalisation (exploiting the transform ational capabilities of
m odern IT and digital storage).One exam ple of this is openforum .com .au, an Aus-
tralian non-for-profit e D e m o cr a cy project which invites politicians, senior public
servants, academ ics, business people and other key stakeholders to engage in high-
level policy debate. Another new public service m odel is what has been called N ew
Public Governance, an approach that includes centralisation of power; an increased
num ber, role and influence of partisan-political staff; personal-politicisation of ap-
pointm ents to the senior public service; an d, the assum ption that the public service
is prom iscuously partisan for governm ents of the day. ( Aucoin, Peter (20 0 8).
3.3. Core branches: In academ ia, the fields of public adm inistration, consists of a num -
ber of sub-fields. Scholars have proposed a num ber of different sets of sub-fields.
One of the proposed m odels uses five "pillars": ( Shafritz and Hyde. 20 0 9 )
Hum an resource m anagement is an in-house structure that ensures that public ser-
vice staffing is done in an unbiased, ethical, and values-based m anner. The basic func-
tions of the HR system are em ployee benefits, em ployee health care, com pensation,
etc.
Organisational Theory in Public Adm inistration is the study of the structure of gov-
ernm ental entities and the m any particulars inculcated in them .
Ethics in public adm inistration serves as a norm ative approach to decision m aking,
Policy analysis serves as an em pirical approach to decision m aking.
Public budgeting is the activity within a government that seeks to allocate scarce re-
sources am ong unlim ited dem ands.
3.4. Decision-m aking m odels: Given the array of duties public adm inistrators find
them selves perform ing, the professional adm inistrator m ight refer to a theoretical
fram ework from which he or she m ight work. Indeed, m any public and private ad-
m inistrative scholars have devised and m odified decision-m aking m odels.
3.4.1. Niskanen's budget-m axim ising: In 1971, William Niskanen proposed a ra-
tional choice variation which he called the "budget-m axim ising m odel" -- ra-
tional bureaucrats will universally seek to increase the budgets of their units
(to enhance their stature), thereby contributing to state growth and increased
public expenditure. Niskanen served on President Reagan's Council of Eco-
nom ic Advisors; his m odel underpinned what has been touted as curtailed
public spending and increased privatisation. However, budgeted expenditures
and the growing deficit during the period is evidence of a different reality. A
range of pluralist authors have critiqued Niskanen's universalist approach.
These scholars have argued that officials tend also to be m otivated by consid-
erations of public interest.
3.4.2. Dunleavy's bureau-shaping: The bureau-shaping m odel, a m odification of
Niskanen, holds that rational bureaucrats only m axim ise the part of their
budget that they spend on their own agency's operations or give to contractors
and interest groups. Groups that are able to organise a "flowback" of benefits
to senior officials would, according to this theory, receive increased budgetary
 attention. For instance, rational officials will get no benefit from paying out
larger welfare checks to m illions of low-incom e citizens because this does not
serve a bureaucrat's goals. Accordingly, one m ight instead expect a jurisdic-
tion to seek budget increases for defence and security purposes in place of
dom estic social program m ing. If we refer back to Reagan once again,
Dunleavy's bureau shaping m odel accoun ts for the alleged decrease in the
"size" of governm ent while spending did not, in fact, decrease. Dom estic enti-
tlem ent program m ing was financially de-em phasised for m ilitary research
and personnel.
3.4.3. As an academ ic field: the academ ic field of public adm inistration draws heav-
ily on political science and law. Scholars such as J ohn A. Rohr write of a long
history behind the constitutional legitim acy of governm ent bureaucracy. In
Europe (notably in Britain and Germ any), the divergence of the field from
other disciplines can be traced to the 1720 s continental university curriculum .
Form ally, official academ ic distinctions were m ade in the 1910 s and 1890 s,
respectively.ix
3.5. Po licy Im p le m e n tatio n :
It would be difficult to find a policy arena in which the sheer num ber of local,
regional, and state organisations involved in the im plem entation of program s and
policies was greater, and in which the organisational interdependencies and dynam -
ics were m ore varied. The com plexity of welfare policy structures, as well as the
variation in these structures, is due in large part to the flexibility given to states.
Perhaps as im portant as these policy changes, m ost legislation gives the states
enorm ous latitude in setting eligibility, benefit, and sanction policy, and it changes
the focus of welfare from a hum an capital m odel em phasising prolonged education
and vocational training to a work-first approach that stresses the im portance of
work and self-sufficiency (Hayward, 1998).
While there are m any m odels of welfare im plem entation, welfare is essentially
adm inistered either at the state level (centralised adm inistration) or at the local or
county level (decentralised adm inistration). Regardless of the adm inistration status,
it needs to bring together public, non-profit, and private agencies that had been
largely autonom ous in their operations and m ore narrowly focused in their organ-
isational m ission. In the current environm ent, local welfare im plem entation in-
volves a host of public and non-profit organisations. Regardless of whether the or-
ganisation is centralised or decentralised, a variety of agencies are contracted with
to provide basic services such as eligibility assessm ent, needs assessm ents, job
training, em ploym ent training, education, transportation, childcare, job retention,
and rehabilitation. In addition, although m ost welfare recipients are children and
their m others, non-custodial parents (usually fathers) are also an im portant if ancil-
lary program m e target.
Im portant goals of welfare program s relate directly to the legislation, and to
state im plem enting regulations. All states are subject to statutory requirem ents
about the percent of welfare clients who m ust be engaged in "countable" work ac-
tivities, am ong other rules, and these requirem ents drive m any of the organisation al
relationships states and localities establish. The bottom line for state and local wel-
fare program s is that they seek to accom plish the following universal goals:
Divert potential clients when other assistance m ay be m ore appropriate;
Move clients into countable work activities as soon as possible and at least as soon as pre-
scribed by state and/ or federal law;
Meet federally m andated work participation rates;
Rem ove barriers such as lack of child care, transportation, appropriate clothing, and so on, so
clients can remain at work;
Assist clients in devising a self-sufficiency plan to m ove off public assistance; and
Apply client sanctions when non-com pliance with program m e rules reaches a critical level.
 This brief review of welfare policy is intended to introduce the requirem ents of
welfare reform and its im plications for organisational structure. To describe the
specific nature of welfare im plem entation arrangem ents, we turn to the literature
on networks.
3.6. N e tw o rks in Actio n : In m eeting program m e goals, welfare agencies m ust estab-
lish both inform al and form al relationships with num erous organisations (Provan and
Milward, 1995; O'Toole, 1997; Agranoff and McGuire, 1998). In m any of these m ulti-
organisational networks of linked agencies and other units, the linkages are not par-
ticularly well established. Rather, they are in a state of continual reform ulation be-
cause of shifts in providers, new program m e em phasis or problem s, or other inter-
nal or external shocks to the environm ent (O'Toole and Meier, 20 0 0 ). The practice of
contracting out governm ent services to networks of non-profit (and som e private)
organisations has been referred to as the "hollow state" (Milward and Provan, 20 0 0 ).
Hierarchical bureaucracies are generally considered m ore predictable and stable
because networks m ust coordinate, negotiate, m onitor, enforce, and hold account-
able a variety of organisations with varying funding stream s and levels of authority
and responsibility. As these authors have noted elsewhere, hum an service system s
that are stable are better perform ers (Provan and Milward, 1995). In addition, they point
out that networks m ay threaten the legitim acy of governance because of the dis-
tance between governm ent and policy action (20 0 0 , p. 242). Another critical issue
is whether network arrangem ents are m andated or em erge as part of the evolution
of program m e im plem entation (Alexander, 1995; Alter and Hage, 1993). In sum , Milward
and Provan note that there are at least four perspectives on evaluating network ef-
fectiveness:
Clients and advocacy groups favour flexible network structures at the level of the service pro-
vider.
Agency m anagers and network adm inistrators favour stability, which presum ably leads to
agency and network growth an d increases in resources.
Local officials and com m unity leaders look for structures that prom ote efficiency, cost reduc-
tions, and the containm ent or reduced visibility of social problem s.
Funding sources and regulators favour network structures that perm it control and m onitoring
and thus reduce the likelihood of their bein g blam ed for poor outcom es. (20 0 0 , p. 255) Re-
search Assum ptions
The prem ise of this paper is that the related concepts of governance, New
Public Managem ent, and network theory can bring som e clarity to the search for
theories of policy im plem entation. It also offers hope for one of the m ost preva-
lent criticism s of im plem en tation research: the lack of parsim ony. In the section
that follows, I review the evolution of im plem entation research from a top-
down/ bottom -up structure to efforts to achieve synthesis. A governance m odel of
im plem entation is then explored as a theoretical alternative that offers the poten-
tial to synthesise disparate m odels and bring networks into the governance para-
digm . Finally, I suggest ways that the governance m odel can be applied to in-
crease our understanding of im plem entation structures in welfare policy.
3 .7. Mo vin g Be yo n d To p -D o w n Bo tto m -U p Ap p ro ach e s :
Policy im plem entation is what happens after policy m akers have decided to do
som ething new, do som ething different, or stop doing som ething, and before the im -
pact of this action. In the study of im plem entation, at least until recently, two con-
flicting analytical perspectives dom inated: top-down and bottom -up views of how
one should study the issue. Bottom -up theorists (Hjern and Porter, 1981; Hjern, 1982; Hull
and Hjern, 1987; Lipsky, 1978) study im plem entation at the street level, concentrating on
service deliverers and policy targets. For top-down theorists (Van Meter and Van Horn
1975, Sabatier and Mazm anian, 1980 , Mazm anian and Sabatier, 1981, 1983, 1989; Sabatier, 1986) the
level of analysis is the relationship between the authorising statute or order, the na-
ture of the problem , and the central actors in the im plem entation process.
 Both perspectives have their critics. As sum m arised by Matland (1995), the top-
down approach suffers from a lack of specificity about im portant sub-national con-
texts, while bottom -up research tends to ignore centralised policy control and is of-
ten so narrowly conceived – in the form of case studies or sm all-n studies – that
variation is described but generalisation is rarely accom plished. O’Toole suggests,
“virtually all analysts have m oved past the rather sterile top down/ bottom -up dis-
pute, and som e helpful proposals for synthetic or contingent perspectives have been
offered” (20 0 0 , p. 267). However, as he notes, consensus has not been reached and the
sheer num ber of explanatory factors has not been m uch reduced. x Efforts to com bine
the two approaches illustrate that both have m erit. Two recent reviews of the synthe-
sis literature offer distinct but related convergence approaches.
In trying to connect top to bottom , researchers either have generally proposed
new m odels, or have developed theories of when one approach is m ore appropriate
(Matland, 1995, p. 150 ). Exam ples of the form er include forward and backward m apping
(Elm ore, 1982, 1985), advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Pelkey, 1987; Sabatier, 1991), and Gog-
gin et al’s com m unications m odel (1990 ). Taking the latter approach, Berm an (1980 )
suggests the top down/ bottom -up dispute can be settled by viewing the specific pol-
icy context: scope of change, validity of technology, institutional environm ent, goal
conflict, and environm ental stability.xi Matland offers an am biguity/ conflict im ple-
m entation m odel which views the level of conflict over policy goals and goal am bigu-
ity as dichotom ous, producing four distinct im plem entation processes with varyin g
reliance on top-down or bottom -up forces.
In O’Toole’s (20 0 0 ) review of advances in im plem entation research, he finds pro-
gress in attem pts to achieve synthesis. In particular, he points to a num ber of studies
that – while outside the form al dom ain of im plem entation literature – have m uch to
contribute to the field. Am ong these are Institutional Analysis and Developm ent,
Governance, and Networks and Network Managem ent. It is his assessm ent of the
governance-im plem entation link that concerns us here. Governance theory high-
lights the m ultivariate character of policy, considers the design and operation of pol-
icy structures and actions, and focuses on the “m ulti-layered structural context of
rule-governed understandings, along with the role of m ultiple social actors in arrays
of negotiation, im plem entation, and service delivery. Addressing governance re-
quires attending to social partners and ideas about how to concert action am ong
them .” (20 0 0 , p. 276). Clearly, governance theory em braces m any im plem entation
them es.
4 . N e w Pu blic Man age m e n t
4.1. N e w Pu blic Ma n age m e n t is a m anagem ent philosophy used by governm ents
since the 1980 s to m odernise the public sector. New Public m anagem ent is a broad
and very com plex term used to describe the wave of public sector reform s through-
out the world since the 1980 s. The m ain hypothesis in the NPM-reform wave is that
m ore m arket orientation in the public sector will lead to greater cost-efficiency for
governm ents, without having negative side effects on other objectives and consid-
erations.
4.2. D iffe re n ce s fro m p rivate s e cto r: J onathan Boston (1996), one of the early
writers of NPM, identified several ways in which public organisations differ from
the private sector:
 degree of m arket exposure—reliance  com plexity of objectives, evaluation

 
on appropriations and decision criteria
legal, form al constraints—courts, authority relations and the role of

 
legislature, hierarchy m anagers

 
subject to political influences organisational perform ance


coerciveness—m any state activities incentives and incentive structures


unavoidable, m onopolistic personal characteristics of employ-


breadth of im pact ees
subject to public scrutiny
 Boston also identifies that reform tends to ignore these differences. ( J . Boston, J .
Martin, J . Pallot, and P. Walsh, 1996 )
4 .3 . Late r D e ve lo p m e n ts :
Som e m odern authors define NPM as a com bination of splitting large bureauc-
racies into sm aller, m ore fragm ented ones, com petition between different public
agencies, and between public agencies and private firm s and incentivization on
m ore econom ic lines. ( Patrick Dunleavy, Helen Margetts et al, 20 0 6 ) Defined in this way
NPM was an intellectual force in public m anagem ent outside the USA from the
early 1980 s to the early 20 0 0 s. NPM, com pared to other public m anagem ent theo-
ries, is m ore oriented towards outcom es and efficiency through better m anagem ent
of public budget. ( Aristovnik, Aleksander & Seljak, J anko, 20 0 9.) It is considered to be
achieved by applying com petition, as it is known in the private sector, to organiza-
tions in the public sector, em phasizing econom ic and leadership principles. New
public m anagem ent addresses beneficiaries of public services m uch like custom ers,
and conversely citizens as shareholders.
4 .4 . Co n tro ve rs y:
Som e authors say NPM has peaked and is now in decline. ( Hughes, Owen 20 0 3 )
Critics like Dunleavy et al. ( Patrick Dunleavy, Helen Margetts et al,) now proclaim that
NPM is 'dead' and argue that the cutting edge of change has m oved on to digital era
governance focusing on reintegrating concerns into governm ent control, holistic (or
joined-up) governm ent and digitalization (exploiting the Web and digital storage
and com m unication within governm ent). In the UK and US NPM has been chal-
lenged since the turn of the century by a range of related critiques such as Third
Way thinking (see Anthony Giddens) and particularly the rise of ideas associated with
Public Value Theory (Mark Moore, Kennedy Business School, J ohn Benington, Warwick Business
School) which have re-asserted a focus on citizenship, networked governance and the
role of public agencies in working with citizens to co-create public value, generate
dem ocratic authorisation, legitim acy and trust, and stress the dom ains within which
public m anagers are working as com plex adaptive system s with characteristics
which are qualitatively different from sim ple m arket form s, or private sector busi-
ness principles. Privatisation of governm ent seem s prom inent still however in Aus-
tralia, Scandinavia, Eastern Europe, and various Asian and Middle Eastern nations.
5 . Go ve rn an ce an d N PM: In te gratin g Im p le m e n tatio n Qu e s tio n s
The (m ostly European) literature on governance and the increasingly international
scholarship on New Public Managem ent xii (NPM) describe two m odels of public service
that reflect a ‘reinvented’ form of governm ent which is better m anaged, and which takes
its objectives not from dem ocratic theory but from m arket econom ics (Stoker, 1998).
While som e use the term s interchangeably (for exam ple, Hood, 1991), m ost of the re-
search m akes distinctions between the two. Essentially, governance is a political theory
while NPM is an organizational theory (Peters and Pierre, 1998). As Stoker describes it,
Governance refers to the developm ent of governing sty les in w hich boundaries betw een
and w ithin public and private sectors have becom e blurred. The essence of governance is its
focus on m echanism s that do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of govern-
m ent….Governance for (som e) is about the potential for contracting, franchising and new
form s of regulation. In short, it is about w hat (som e) refer to as the new public m anage-
m ent. How ever, governance …is m ore than a new set of m anagerial tools. It is also about
m ore than achieving greater efficiency in the production of public services (1998, p. 17-18).
Peters and Pierre agree, saying that govern ance is about process, while NPM is about
outcom es (1998, p. 232). Governance is ultim ately concerned with creating the conditions
for ordered rule and collective action (Stoker, 1998; Peters and Pierre, 1998; Milward and Provan ,
20 0 0 ). As Stoker notes, the outputs of governance are not different from those of govern-
m ent; it is instead a m atter of a difference in processes (1998, p. 17). Governance refers to
the developm ent of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and
private sectors have becom e blurred. The essence of governance, and its m ost trouble-
som e aspect, according to its critics, is a focus on m echanism s that do not rest on re-
course to the authority and sanctions of governm ent (Bekke, et al, 1995; Peters and Pierre, 1998;
Stoker, 1998; Rhodes, 1996, 1997).
Stoker (1998, p. 18) draws five propositions to fram e our understanding of the critical
questions that governance theory should help us answer. He acknowledges that each
proposition im plies a dilem m a or critical issue. Governance refers to institutions and ac-
tors from within and beyond governm ent. (But there is a divorce between the com plex
reality of decision-m aking associated with governance and the norm ative codes used to
explain and justify governm ent). The question, as it relates to policy im plem entation, is
one of legitim acy. The extent to which those with decision-m aking power are seen to be
legitim ate (in the norm ative sense) will directly im pact their ability to m obilize resources
and prom ote cooperation and build and sustain partnerships. Thus, the norm ative di-
lem m a has pragm atic overtones. Beetham suggests that for power to be legitim ate it
m ust conform to established rules; these rules m ust be justified by adherence to shared
beliefs; and the power m ust be exercised with the express consent of subordinates (1991,
p. 19). Governance identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling
social and econom ic issues. This shift in responsibility goes beyond the public-private
dim ension to include notions of com m unitarianism and social capital. (However, blurring of
responsibilities can lead to blam e avoidance or scapegoating).
An interesting research area that has grown in scope and im portance following the
im plem entation of welfare reform is the study of faith-based organizations’ role and im -
pact in service delivery. Public agencies have not m erely endorsed or encouraged this
partnership, but in som e cases have institutionalized these arrangem ents. This suggests a
shift in responsibility beyond the m ore traditional notions of contracting out and privati-
zation. At the sam e tim e, all of these activities contribute to uncertainties on the part of
policy m akers and the public about who is in charge and who can be held accountable for
perform ance outcom es. Im plem entation theory m ust attend to the nature and im pact of
responsibility and accountability.
Governance identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships between
institutions involved in collective action. Organizations are dependent upon each other
for the achievem ent of collective action, and thus m ust exchange resources and negotiate
shared understandings of ultim ate program goals. The im plem entation literature is re-
plete with studies of coordination barriers and im pacts (for exam ple, J ennings and
Ewalt, 1998). (Nonetheless, power dependence exacerbates the problem of unintended consequences for
governm ent because of the likelihood of principal-agent problem s.) For im plem entation scholarship
to contribute to a greater un derstanding of governance relationships, arrangem ents for
m inim izing (and im pacts of) gam e-playing, subversion, cream ing and opportunism m ust
be explored. Governance is about autonom ous self-governing networks of actors. (The
em ergence of self-governing networks raises difficulties over accountability). Governance
networks, in Stoker’s term s, involve not just influencing governm ent policy but taking
over the business of governm ent (1998, p. 23). The “hollow state” that networks have trig-
gered (Milward, 1996; Milward and Provan, 20 0 0 ) raises questions about how governm ent can
m anage public program s when they consist largely of entities outside the public dom ain.
Network theory and governance issues overlap, and they are both directly linked to ques-
tions of im plem entation.
Governance recognizes the capacity to get things done which does not rest on the
power of governm ent to com m and or use its authority. (But even so, governm ent failures
m ay occur.) It is in this proposition that we find a natural progression from the m ore en-
com passing theory of governance to the m ore prescriptive notions of New Public Man-
agem ent. Stoker notes that within governance there is a concerted em phasis on new tools
and techniques to steer and guide. The language is taken directly from reinventing
them es. The dilem m a of governance in this context is that there is a broader concern
with the very real potential for leadership failure, differences am ong key partners in tim e
horizons and goal priorities, and social conflicts, all of which can result in governance
failure. Stoker draws on Goodin as he suggests that design challenges of public institu-
tions can be addressed in part by revisability , robustness, sensitivity to m otivational
com plexity , public defendability , and variability to encourage experim entation (Stoker,
1998, p. 26, quoting from Goodin, 1996, p. 39-43).
W h at, th e n , is N e w Pu blic Ma n age m e n t (NPM)? What is its link to new concep-
tions of governance? And finally, how can one use these heuristics in the study of post-
reform welfare policy im plem entation? While there is m uch consensus about the nature
of NPM, scholars disagree about the usefulness, norm ative and positive contributions of
NPM. According to Lynn, New Public Managem ent is “an ephem eral them e likely to
fade,” just as enthusiasm for innovations such as the planning-program m ing-budgeting
system , zero base budgeting, and m anagem ent by objectives has passed on to newer tools
and strategies (1998, p. 232; see also 1996).
Other scholars are not so quick to dism iss the potential longevity of NPM. Mathiasen
has called NPM a “paradigm shift” and a series of papers released by the Organization for
Econom ic Cooperation and Developm ent (1995a, 1995b) suggest that innovations occur-
ring abroad have dislodged the bureaucratic m odel with a new m anagem ent paradigm .
Whether NPM represents a new paradigm or not, its attem pt to transform the public sec-
tor through organizational reform s that focus on results in term s of efficiency, effective-
ness, and quality of service appears to fit nicely into the larger, political theory of govern-
ance (Stoker, 1998). Kaboolian notes that the characteristic elem ents of the innovations
seem founded on a set of shared principles. Im plem entation system s can be analyzed as
transactions, with attention paid to negotiated contracts, inform ation asym m etries, cap-
ture, rent-seeking, m oral hazards and com pliance m onitoring problem s (1998, p. 190 ). As
Peters and Pierre note, “governance is about m aintaining public-sector resources under
som e degree of political control and developing strategies to sustain governm ent’s capac-
ity to act” in the face of m anagem ent tools that replace highly centralized, hierarchical
structures with decentralized m anagem ent en vironm ents where decisions on resource al-
location and service delivery are m ade closer to the point of delivery (1998, p. 232).
Despite his scepticism about NPM’s ultim ate legacy, Lynn sees the ‘tem porary ex-
citem ent” over NPM as worth exploring, in part because it m ay lead to specific, tested
advances in the field of public m anagem ent. In addition, Lynn sees the study of NPM as
an opportunity to build better theory-based m odels. Indeed, in another work, he and his
co-authors present an argum ent for the “logic of governance” em bodied in NPM prac-
tices, which he sees as a “dynam ic, interactive, and continuous socio-political process
that induces the perform ance of public program s and m ediates the consequences of par-
ticular strategies for change or reform of governm ent activities” (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill,
20 0 0 ) . Lynn argues that the logic of governance is useful because it requires scholars to
m odel policy enactm ent and program im plem entation as “form ally hierarchical, essen-
tially political, and loosely coupled” In short, governance and NPM allow researchers to
explore the determ inants of policy and policy im pacts without becom ing entangled in the
alleged dichotom y between exogenous (top-down) or street-level (bottom -up) explana-
tions of outcom es or perform ance.
Peters and Pierre suggest that NPM tools appear to be found rather broadly, whereas
governance is a process sensitive to its political and cultural environm ent, and thus likely
to “appear in different institutional form s in different national context” (1998, p. 233).
Mathiasen also com m ents on this them e, but he argues that while our inclination m ay be
to view NPM as sim ply a laundry list of best practices, xiii in fact, the applicability and ef-
fectiveness of NPM concepts will vary considerably from one country or jurisdiction to
another. An obvious question for im plem entation theorists is whether the application
and im pact vary in discernible patterns across policy dom ains. There are features com -
m on to both governance and NPM, including a changing view of the role of elected offi-
cials in an increasingly constrained scope of form al governm ent. The theory of govern-
ance “asserts that good governance is when the state retrenches, becom es less powerful,
assum es a low profile, and operates in a network with private interests and groups as a
partner scarcely m ore im portant than the other” (Merrien, 1998, p. 58) . In this context, the
traditional political variables com m only used to explain policy should be less im portant
than the adm inistrative forces em ployed to get things done once leaders have set goals
and priorities. Sim ilarly, in both governance and NPM, “steering” is a key concept. Taken
from Reinventing Governm ent’s prescription that good governm ents ‘keep a hand on the
tiller, rather than doing the rowing,’ it is characterized by a m ove away from centraliza-
tion to decentralization; from redistribution to regulation; and from public services m an-
agem ent to m anagem ent through m arket principles (Merrien, 1998).
In order to apply governance (which offers organizing theories) and NPM (which
provides m ore specific im plem entation strategies) to the field of im plem entation study,
one m ust specify the objectives of NPM. Table 1, which is adapted from Barzelay (1992, p.
119), com pares the traditional “bureaucratic” approach to a “post-bureaucratic” m odel.
Colum n three suggests the factors that should relate em pirically to a governance ap-
proach to im plem entation.
Table 1: Comparison of Bureaucratic and Governance/ NMP Im plem entation
Bu re au cratic actio n Go ve rn an ce / N PM Im p le m e n tatio n Re le van ce
Public Interest Results citizens value Norm ative fram e replaced by pragm atism
Efficiency, equity Quality and value Citizen expectations m ust be m et; target
population treatm ent not necessarily uni-
form
Adm inistration Production Oversight functions; Market com petition
Control Winning adherence to norm s Culture change, com m unication dem ands
Specify functions, author- Identify m ission, services, Incentives, sanctions structures custom ers,
ity, outcom es
J ustify costs Deliver value Funding uncertain; linked to perform ance

Enforce responsibility Build accountability Level of com petition im pacts control; options
Follow rules, procedures Identify, solve problem s Con- Self-regulating partnerships
tinuously im prove process
Operate adm inistrative Separate service from control Hierarchy/ decentralization levels
system s
Expand custom er choice Level of com petition; flexibility
Provide incentives Potential for un intended consequences
Measure, analyze results Outcom es vs. process
Enrich feedback Network com plexity
Peters and Pierre (1998) question why this “arm s-length” approach should work any
better than the Weberian, hierarchical steering of traditional public adm inistration. To
the extent that it does, the answer m ay be due to the fact that the purpose of NPM steer-
ing is quite different than the purpose of Weberian m anagem ent. Traditional public ad-
m inistration em phasized legality and equality. The desired outcom e was the provision of
uniform services to all clients for whom the services were appropriate. While this concern
with m eeting legitim ate citizen needs in an equitable fashion appears to continue in som e
policy venues (m ost notably in the social policy areas of health services and Medicaid in-
surance), the question of whether states are serving equitably all eligible welfare clients is
largely unasked. Instead, as applied to welfare policy, steering appears to be prim arily
designed to support diverse organizational networks that seek to change client behav-
iour, rather than to ensure widespread, com prehensive delivery of benefits (Mead, 1996).
Nonetheless, Peters and Pierre point to a potential organizational problem that the
new m anagerial steering exacerbates. “Although structural organizational changes – such
as decentralization and m oving decision m aking on operative issues downward in the or-
ganization – are very com m on today, the problem s associated with changing the culture
of the organization are often m uch m ore difficult than are the structural changes” (1998,
p. 230 ). As num erous authors have observed, devolution increases the influence adm in-
istrators can exercise over policy developm ents, and as such, they are key participants in
allocation choices (Riccucci and Saidel, 1997).
To sum up then, NPM im plies specific types of m anagem ent tools which operate
within the propositions of governance set forth earlier. Table 2 sum m arizes these rela-
tionships and suggests hypotheses of im plem entation relationships, which can be m od-
elled and em pirically tested.
 Table 2: Governance Structures and NPM Strategies
Go ve rn an ce Stru ctu re s N PM Strate gie s
Institutions, actors from Flexibility to explore alternatives to direct public provisions and
and beyond governm ent regulation that m ight yield m ore cost-effective policy outcom es
Em p irical re latio n s h ip : The lower the level of com petition, the less likely efficiency will be achieved
Blurring boundaries, Replacement of centralized, hierarchical social and econom ic prob-
responsibilities for solv- lem s structures with decentralized environm ents; resource allocation
ing and service delivery decisions m ake closer to point of delivery.
Em p irical re latio n s h ip : The greater the level of decentralization, the m ore difficult it becom es to m atch
service objectives to program goals.
Power dependence in institu- Negotiated allocation and sharing of resources; clear and
tional relationships m easurable outcom e m easures.
Em p irical re latio n s h ip : The greater the interdependence am ong network actors, the greater the likeli-
hood of coordination barriers, gam e-playing, subversion, cream ing and opportunism .
Autonom ous self-governing networks Accountability m echanism s
Em p irical re latio n s h ip : Th e s tro n ge r th e fe e d back lo o p fro m clie n ts an d o th e r in te re s te d
gro u p s , th e be tte r p u blic age n cie s w ill be able to m an age n e tw o rks .
Capacity to act not de- Public institutions’ design of program authority or legitim acy struc-
pendent upon the state tures includes revisability, feedback to citizens, experim entation
Em p irical re latio n s h ip : The greater the reliance on network partnerships beyond the scope of public
institutions, the greater the need for a centralised m onitoring structure with funding and program design
authority.

6 . Th e in te rn atio n al co m m u n ity an d Eth io p ia:

Multilateral, bilateral, and non-governm ental external agencies have in recent years
taken a large num ber of initiatives aim ed directly or indirectly at helping Ethiopia "de-
m ocratise" its way out of econom ic chaos and political instability. In doing so, they rely
on a wide variety of program m es, institutional m echanism s and policies. Indeed, grow-
ing external involvem ent in Ethiopian projects of dem ocratisation and econom ic recov-
ery has resulted in increasingly challenging problem s of conceptualising and under-
standing the role and function of international agencies. The hypothesis to be tested are
6.1. The effectiveness of political conditionality is a function of the dependence of the govern-
m ent on foreign aid to im plem ent essential political projects to m aintain its power hegem -
ony.
6.2. Government com pliance with donor conditions varies with the type of policy reform . Com -
pliance is "high for m easures that can be im plem ented by a sm all num ber of central gov-
ernm ent officials and low for reform s requiring extensive institutional change.”
6.3. The im position by donors of political conditions on aid disbursements is alone insufficient
to effect democratic political transitions, i.e. in the absence of an organised dom estic con-
stituency for political change within the state and within civil society.
6.4. Intervention by international organisations disrupts transitions to the extent that it is per-
ceived as partisan; international intervention contributes m ost to dem ocratic struggle when
it provides neutral arbitration services like support for election adm inistration and election
observing.
The growth of foreign interventions seem s in m arked contrast to the lim ited thought
and effort exerted by dem ocratisers of Ethiopian polity to put the interventions in co-
herent theoretical or strategic perspective. What is the overall rationality or significance
of the great traffic of international program m es and projects of dem ocratisation and de-
velopm ent, the proliferating activities that seem to show little regard for econom y of co-
ordination? This is not to m ention new form s of ` participatory research’ into social en-
gineering that seem to haunt the rural landscape indefinitely? How far and in what ways
do various international agencies, program m es, m echanism s, form s of knowledge and
technical assistance feed on one another in helping set the boundaries of dem ocratic re-
form in Ethiopia? The im portant issues that these questions suggest are not sufficiently
addressed, or even raised, in m uch of the current discussion of political transitions. In-
sofar as the activities of external agencies in Ethiopia are not understood and engaged in
partly as indigenous societal potentialities developing gradually into actual structures,
functions and characteristics of governm ent and societies, their dem ocratic (and devel-
opm ental) im pact m ay dim inish with their proliferation. This can m ean little m ore than
 a weakly co-ordinated m ultiplication of program m es and projects which have im m edi-
ately recognisable or m easurable effects in lim ited areas, but which seem to suspend
rather than serve the ultim ate goals of dem ocratisation of Ethiopian political system s.
The strategic co-ordination of diverse intern ational activities supportive of dem ocratic
transition (and developm ent) in Ethiopia can becom e a challenge both for the interna-
tional agencies involved and for the Governm ents. This is in part because of lim itations
in the individual characteristics of the activities - for exam ple, their narrowly techno-
cratic orientation. It is also because of shortcom ings in the relational and contextual ar-
ticulation of external program m es and projects, their lim ited generalisability and vari-
ability.
External prom oters or supporters of governance often do not efficiently realise in
practice the potential of the ideas and goals they prom ote and that the volum e of their
interventions is not nearly proportional to their im pact. This raises the issue of whether
the ideas in question are fundam entally constrained at the m om ent of their conception
and im plem entation by the very institutions and technocratic structures that ground
their articulation. The explicit concept of capacity building for good governance that cur-
rent international initiatives operate in Ethiopia m ay be consistent with goals of "em -
powerm ent" of indigenous com m unities and individuals, of enhancing local institutional
and hum an capacities.
The initiatives, nevertheless, tend to work toward these goals in narrow econom ic
and technocratic term s. The initiatives seem to equate technocratic rationality and ca-
pacity with totality of institutional purposefulness and strength. However, as im portant
as it is, this is only one context or level of analysis on the breadth and depth of process
on the terrain of self-directed governance. There is another level of analysis. This is con-
cerned with the extent and nature of openness of distinct ideological constructs, with
m odes of articulation of given sets of ideas and values and of representations of specific
issues relative to others. The concern here is not so m uch of the num ber and diversity of
ideas, values, and opinions allowed to gain currency as to m odes their com petitive and
co-operative articulation.
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Endnotes

i Global Coalition for Africa / Africa Leadership Forum . (1993). P. 9 The classification of the ` Trajectories of
Political Transition' has been taken from ALF/ GCA. “Research Design and Methodology”.
ii Recently the discussion has shifted trem endously. We have now governance appended to alm ost all kinds of

political, social and econom ic phenom ena. Som e of the significant once are dem ocratic (political) governance,
econom ic governance, open governance, social governance, environm ental governance, and conflict m anagem ent
and development and m anagem ent governance.
iii International Institute for Dem ocracy and Electoral Assistance: (1998)Dialogue for Dem ocratic Develop-

m ent. IIDEA:Stcockholm
iv Interestingly enough, the study of the policy docum ents of m ajor international agencies perfectly reflects

the convergence and m erging agendas. However, the differences in the term inology used by the different interna-
tional actors (dem ocratic governance, good governance, open governance, etc.) reflects not only divergent foreign
policy but different constituencies: the OAS and IDB were able to im pose "dem ocratic governance because all
their m em ber States were dem ocracies; the World Bank and IMF m ay be not able to do so.
v UNDP (1999) Conceptual notes on Governance. New York
vihttp:/ / en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Public_ adm in istration
vii The eighteenth-century noble, King Frederick William I of Prussia, created professorates in Cam eralism in
an effort to train a new class of public adm inistrators. The universities of Frankfurt an der Oder and University of
Hallewere Prussian institutions em phasising econom ic and social disciplines, with the goal of societal reform .
J ohann Heinrich Gottlob J usti was the m ost well known professor of Cam eralism . Thus, from a Western Euro-
pean perspective, Classic, Medieval, and Enlightenm ent-era scholars form ed the foundation of the discipline that
has com e to be called public adm inistration. Lorenz von Stein, an 1855 Germ an professor from Vienna, is consid-
ered the founder of the science of public adm inistration in m any parts of the world. In the tim e of Von Stein, pub-
lic adm inistration was considered a form of adm inistrative law, but Von Stein believed this concept too restric-
tive. Von Stein taught that public adm inistration relies on m any pre-established disciplines such as sociology,
political science, adm inistrative law, and public finance. He called public adm inistration an integrating science,
and stated that public adm inistrators should be concerned with both theory and practice. He argued that public
adm inistration is a science because knowledge is generated and evaluated according to the scientific m ethod.
viii Second Treatise on Governm ent
ix The goals of the field of public adm inistration are related to the dem ocratic values of im proving equality,
justice, security, efficiency, effectiveness of public services usually in a non-profit, non-taxable venue. Business
adm inistration, on the other hand, is prim arily concerned with taxable profit; built on ill-defined concepts (ac-
countability, governance, decentralisation, clientele), an d typologies often ignore certain aspects of these con-
cepts (Dubois & Fattore 20 0 9). One m inor tradition that the m ore specific term "public m anagem ent" refers to
ordinary, routine or typical m anagement concerns, in the context of achieving public good. Others argue that
public m anagem ent as a new, econom ically driven perspective on the operation of governm ent. This latter view is
often called "new public m anagem ent" by its advocates. New Public Managem ent represents a reform attem pt,
aim ed at reem phasising the professional nature of the field. This will replace the academ ic, m oral, or disciplinary
em phasis. Some theorists advocate a bright line differentiation of the professional field from related academ ic
disciplines like political science and sociology; it rem ains interdisciplinary in nature. As a field, public adm inistra-
tion can be com pared to business adm inistration, and the m aster of public adm inistration (MPA) viewed as sim i-
lar to a m aster of business adm inistration (MBA) for those wishing to pursue governm ental or non-profit careers.
An MPA often em phasises substantially different ethical and sociological criteria that are traditionally secondary
to that of profit for business adm inistrators. The MPA is related to sim ilar governm ent studies including public
affairs, public policy, and political science. Differences often include program m e em phases on policy analysis
techniques or other topical focuses such as the study of international affairs as opposed to focuses on constitu-
tional issues such as separation of powers, adm inistrative law, problem s of governance and power, and participa-
tory dem ocracy. The Doctor of Public Adm inistration (DPA) is an applied-research doctoral degree in the field of
public adm inistration, focusing on practice. The DPA requires a dissertation and significant coursework beyond
the m aster’s level. Upon successful com pletion of the doctoral requirem ents, the title of "Doctor" is awarded and
the post-nom inals of D.P.A. are often added. Public adm inistration theory is the dom ain in which discussions of
the m eaning and purpose of governm ent, bureaucracy, budgets, governance, and public affairs takes place. In
recent years, public adm inistration theory has periodically connoted a heavy orientation toward critical theory
and post-m odern philosophical notions of governm ent, governance, and power. However, m any scholars support
a classic definition of the term em phasising constitutionality, service, bureaucratic form s of organisation, and
hierarchical governm ent.
x O’Toole’s 1986 review of the literature uncovers som e 30 0 key variables that affect policy im plementation .

Meier has quipped, “I propose…any policy implem entation scholar who adds a new variable or a new interaction
should be required to elim inate two existing variables” (1999, p. 5-6).
xi As should be expected, all efforts to synthesize the literature draw from theories found in the separate tra-

ditions. Berm an owes debts to Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, 1976) and Goggin, et al (1990 ), am ong others.
xii See Kaboolian (1998) for a description of reform m ovem ents in the public sector that collectively comprise

“New Public Management” (NPM). I adopt her definition of NPM as a series of innovations that – considered
collectively – em body public choice approaches, transaction-cost relationships, and preferences for efficiency
over equity.
xiii His actual term is “the public m anagem ent equivalent of a cake recipe” (1996, p. 2)