Daf Ditty Beitza 2: Introductions

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MISHNA: With regard to an egg that was laid on a Festival (Eduyyot 4:1), Beit Shammai say:
It may be eaten even on that day, and Beit Hillel say: It may not be eaten, as the Gemara will
explain at length. Apropos this exceptional case, in which Beit Shammai are lenient and Beit Hillel
are strict, the mishna cites additional halakhot of the Festivals in which this unusual phenomenon
occurs (Yoma 79b).

Beit Shammai say: Leaven, i.e., dough that has leavened to such an extent that it is no longer
used as food but as a leavening agent for other dough, is prohibited on Passover in the measure of

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an olive-bulk. However, the measure for edible leavened bread is greater, that of a large date-
bulk. And Beit Hillel say: For both this and that, the measure is that of an olive-bulk.

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Furthermore, with regard to one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a bird on a
Festival (Eduyyot 4:2), in which case there is a mitzva from the Torah to cover the blood after
slaughtering:

‫ ַיְק ִריב‬,‫ת ֶלֶחם ָחֵמץ‬Q‫ַח‬-‫יג ַﬠל‬ 13 With cakes of leavened bread he shall present his offering with
.‫ תּוַֹדת ְשָׁלָמיו‬,‫ֶזַבח‬-‫ ַﬠל‬,‫ָק ְרָבּנוֹ‬ the sacrifice of his peace-offerings for thanksgiving.
Lev 7 13

(Leviticus 17:13), Beit Shammai say: He digs earth with a shovel and covers the blood with
that earth ab initio. And Beit Hillel say: He may not slaughter ab initio, unless he had earth
prepared for that purpose while it was still day. But even Beit Hillel concede that if one already
slaughtered the animal or the bird, then he should dig with a shovel and cover the blood.
Additionally, they agree that the ashes of a stove are considered prepared for the use of covering
blood, as will be explained by the Gemara.

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GEMARA: The Gemara inquires: With what case are we dealing in this mishna? If we say that
the mishna is referring to a chicken that is designated for eating, i.e., one planned to slaughter
and eat a chicken that laid an egg, what is the reason that Beit Hillel prohibit eating the egg? It
is food that has been separated [de’ifrat]. The entire chicken is considered food, as it is
designated for eating, and this egg is simply a part that became detached. Just as one may partake
of the chicken itself on a Festival, its egg should likewise be fit for consumption.

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Rather, the mishna must be referring to the case of a chicken designated for laying eggs. Since
the owner of this chicken decided not to eat it on the Festival, it is classified as set-aside [muktze],
and muktze items may not even be moved, let alone eaten. Since the chicken itself is muktze, its
egg is muktze as well.

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The Gemara asks: If so, what is the reason of Beit Shammai for permitting one to eat the egg?
After all, it is muktze. The Gemara expresses surprise at this question: And what is the difficulty?
Perhaps Beit Shammai do not hold that there is a prohibition of muktze? There are different
opinions with regard to the scope of the prohibition of muktze. It is possible that Beit Shammai,
like other tanna’im, maintain that there is no prohibition of this type of muktze. Perhaps this is the
subject of their dispute with Beit Hillel.

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Rav Naḥman said: Actually, the mishna is referring to a chicken designated for laying eggs.
However, our previous assumption was mistaken, as the Sage who holds that there is a prohibition
of muktze in general also holds that there is a prohibition of objects that came into being, while
one who does not hold that there is a prohibition of muktze likewise does not hold that there is a
prohibition of objects that came into being (Shabbat 45b). Consequently, the dispute can be
summed up as follows: Beit Shammai hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon,
who maintains that there is no prohibition of muktze; and Beit Hillel hold in accordance with the
opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who rules that there is a prohibition of muktze.

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Summary

MISHNAH: The Mishnah presents three disputes between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel. The
first one relates to eating an egg that was laid on Yom Tov.1 The second dispute relates to the
quantity of leaven necessary to violate the Biblical prohibition. The last dispute relates the
permissibility to dig up dirt to cover the blood of a slaughtered bird or undomesticated animal.

Clarifying the first dispute

The Gemara questions whether the Mishnah refers to a hen that was designated for eating or a hen
designated to produce eggs. R’ Nachman explains that the Mishnah refers to a hen that was
designated to produce eggs, and Beis Shammai follows R’ Shimon who does not recognize
muktzah restrictions. Beis Hillel follows R’ Yehudah who does recognize muktzah restrictions. A
contradictory statement of R’ Nachman is cited wherein he states that Beis Shammai follows R’
Yehudah and Beis Hillel follows R’ Shimon.

R’ Nachman explains that since there is an anonymous Mishnah regarding Shabbos which follows
R’ Shimon, it is logical to align Beis Hillel with R’ Shimon. Regarding Yom Tov, however, we
find an anonymous Mishnah according to R’ Yehudah, so it is logical to align Beis Hillel with R’
Yehudah. The Gemara questions how there could be differing anonymous Mishnayos concerning
the recognition of the restriction against muktzah. Shabbos is more severe; therefore, there is less
concern that people will treat it disrespectfully and a lenient approach regarding muktzah can be
taken.

1
https://www.dafdigest.org/masechtos/Beitza%20002.pdf

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Yom Tov, on the other hand, is less severe; therefore, there is a concern that people will treat it
disrespectfully and a more strict approach regarding muktzah must be taken. R’ Nachman’s
explanation is successfully refuted.

Rabbah explains that the Mishnah refers to a hen designated for consumption and it also refers
specifically with an egg laid on Yom Tov that followed Shabbos. Beis Hillel prohibits the egg
based upon the principle of preparation (‫ הכנה‬.(Abaye unsuccessfully challenges Rabbah’s
explanation. R’ Yosef explains that the restriction against the use of the egg laid on Yom Tov is a
decree because it resembles a fruit that fell from a tree on Yom Tov. Abaye begins to challenge R’
Yosef’s explanation.

Are we allowed to take an egg from a chicken that has been muktze, set aside (ie. not to be used)
on a Festival or on Shabbat? Beit Hillel says no and Beit Shammai says yes. Usually Beit Shammai
is stringent; why is it lenient regarding a chicken and an egg?2

The rabbis wonder whether the egg is part of the chicken and not its own entity. They wonder
whether or not a chicken can be slaughtered on a Festival or Shabbat. They debate about the status
of objects that are created during a Festival or Shabbat. They compare this situation to one where
items on a table might be moved after the fact. And of course the rabbis remind us of other issues
where Beit Hillel is stringent and Beit Shammai is lenient.

Back to the egg. The rabbis want to understand what we can move, what we can carry, what we
can prepare, what we can consume. We are reminded that we cannot prepare food on Shabbat for
a Festival the next day - and vice versa. An egg moved on Shabbat can't be cooked, of course,
because it is Shabbat. In fact, on Shabbat we are not permitted to use things that have 'fallen' -
even a fruit - that same day that it has fallen. And what if the egg is still in the chicken? This is
very unusual. We know that halachot are not intended to influence unusual situations, so that egg
can be used.

Our rabbis begin Masechet Beitza with interesting, multi-layered concepts that grab the attention
of their students. Although it is not discussed directly, the rabbis touch on the notion
of 'being'. When is an egg a separate being? When is it part of its mother? This debate - and a
similar debate regarding a woman and her fetus - is openly discussed by our ancient
Sages. Amazing that the depth of modern conversation is so meaningless much of the time.

Introduction The first part of the first mishnah of Betzah is about its namesake, an egg born on
Yom Tov. The second part is associated with the first part because both contain debates between
Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel, and in both Bet Hillel rules strictly.3

2
http://dafyomibeginner.blogspot.com/2014/03/
3

https://www.sefaria.org/Beitzah.2a.1?lang=bi&p2=Mishnah_Beitzah.1.1&lang2=bi&p3=English_Explanation_of_Mishnah_Beit
zah.1.1.1-3&lang3=bi

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An egg laid on Yom Tov: Bet Shammai say: it may be eaten [on the same day]; But Bet Hillel
say: it may not be eaten [until the day is over]. According to Bet Shammai, just as it is permitted
to slaughter a chicken on Yom Tov, it is also permitted to eat an egg that is laid on Yom Tov. In
other words, the chicken and everything in it is permitted on Yom Tov. In contrast, Bet Hillel hold
that while the chicken itself is permitted, the egg that is laid is prohibited. The egg is what is called
“nolad” it is born, or new, something that was not there when Yom Tov began and hence was not
set aside for use at the beginning of Yom Tov. This prohibition is similar to muktzeh the idea that
something that was not set aside before Yom Tov to be used on Yom Tov may not be used on Yom
Tov.

Bet Shammai say: [the quantity of] leaven is of the size of an olive and leavened bread is of
the size of a date; But Bet Hillel say: both are of the size of an olive. Exodus 13:7 says, “No
leavened bread shall be seen with you and no leaven shall be found in all your territory.” The verse
mentions two things: the leavening agent (starter dough) and the leavened bread, both of which
are prohibited. According to Bet Shammai the point of the verse is to teach that the two prohibitions
are different. Leaven is prohibited at the size of an olive, whereas leavened bread is prohibited at
a larger amount, the size of a date. Beth Hillel hold that in both cases an olive’s worth is prohibited.
Note that smaller amounts are not permitted either. A smaller amount is still forbidden but one
who consumes a smaller amount has not transgressed the Biblical prohibition of leaven or leavened
bread on Passover.

INTRODUCTION TO MUKTZAH

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:4

One of the central topics of Maseches Beitzah is the topic of Muktzah. The following review of
the basic concepts of Muktzah will facilitate a better understanding of the Gemara's discussions.

(a) MUKTZAH. The word "Muktzah" (from the word "Katzah") literally means "set aside at the
far edge [of one's intentions for use]." The term is used to describe objects that are set aside from
usage on this day, such as wood stacked away in a storage facility (the word for a storage area is
"Muktzah"). In a broader sense, the word "Muktzah" includes any object which a person did not
intend to use, for any reason, at the time of the onset of Shabbos or Yom Tov.

(b) THE DISPUTE OF THE TANA'IM. Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Shimon disagree about the
extent of the application of the laws of Muktzah. The Gemara's statement that Rebbi Shimon "does
not hold of Muktzah" does not mean that Rebbi Shimon maintains that there is no prohibition of
Muktzah whatsoever. Rather, it means that Rebbi Shimon maintains that certain categories of

4
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/beitzah/insites/bt-dt-002.htm

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Muktzah are not prohibited. Some categories of Muktzah are prohibited according to everyone,
including Rebbi Shimon.

The dispute between Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Shimon applies to at least six different categories
of Muktzah:

1. HIKTZEHU MI'DA'ATO ("he set it aside from his mind"). This category of Muktzah refers
to objects which a person did not have in mind before Shabbos (or Yom Tov) to use during Shabbos
(or Yom Tov). According to Rebbi Yehudah, any object one put aside because he did not intend
to use it on Shabbos is Muktzah and is prohibited. According to Rebbi Shimon, even an object one
put aside because he did not intend to use it may be used and does not become Muktzah, as long
as it has a form of use that is permitted on Shabbos (or Yom Tov). Rebbi Shimon prohibits only
an object which a person consciously decided not to use by making it unfit for use on Shabbos
(such as fruit he put out to dry right before Shabbos, which becomes inedible until it is fully dried).
Even if, on Shabbos, the object becomes fit for use (before the time at which he had intended them
to become fit), they still may not be used on Shabbos.

2. NOLAD ("born"). An object which did not exist in its present form during Bein ha'Shemashos
between Friday and Shabbos, but rather was created (or was significantly changed) on Shabbos,
belongs in the category of Muktzah known as Nolad ("born"). Utensils which broke on Shabbos
did not exist in their present form before Shabbos, and thus they are considered Nolad. Date pits
from dates eaten on Shabbos are Nolad because they were considered fruit when Shabbos entered
and emerged as pits only on Shabbos. Rebbi Yehudah prohibits moving such objects because a
person did not have in mind -- before Shabbos, when they did not yet exist -- to use them on
Shabbos. Rebbi Shimon disagrees and maintains that advance, positive intention to use an object
on Shabbos is not necessary.

3. MUKTZAH MACHMAS ISUR ("set aside because of a prohibition"). According to Rebbi

Yehudah, any object that was Muktzah during Bein ha'Shemashos at the onset of Shabbos remains
Muktzah for the duration of Shabbos, even if the cause of its Muktzah status is no longer present.
The operative principle behind this type of Muktzah is called "Migo d'Iskatza'i l'Vein
ha'Shemashos, Iskatza'i l'Chulei Yoma" -- "since it was set aside for Bein ha'Shemashos, it remains
set aside for the entire day." According to Rebbi Shimon, there are times when the principle of
"Migo d'Iskatza'i" does not apply. For example, when an object was Muktzah during Bein
ha'Shemashos and its owner realized that it will probably become usable during Shabbos, he may
use or move the object after it becomes usable (see Shabbos 44a, 46b).

4. MUKTZAH MACHMAS MI'US ("set aside because of repulsiveness"). An object which is

repulsive is automatically considered set aside from usage (Muktzah) according to Rebbi Yehudah.

5. KLI SHE'MELACHTO EINO ELA L'ISUR ("a utensil used exclusively for a prohibited
purpose"). An object which is used almost exclusively for a task which is prohibited on Shabbos
or Yom Tov is considered Muktzah according to Rebbi Yehudah. According to Rebbi Shimon, it
may be used for a permitted purpose (but it may not be moved for its own protection). This
category is not to be confused with "Kli she'Melachto l'Isur," an object which is commonly used
for a prohibited purpose but which is sometimes employed for a permitted use. Even Rebbi

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Yehudah permits one to move a Kli she'Melachto l'Isur in order to use it for a permitted purpose,
or to make room for something else ("l'Tzorech Gufo u'Mekomo"). (TOSFOS to Shabbos 36a,
DH Ha Rebbi Yehudah, and 44a, DH Mitah)

6. MUCHAN L'ADAM EINO MUCHAN L'KELAVIM ("that which is prepared for use of man
is not prepared for dogs"). There are two distinct types of Muktzah included in this category:
a. An object that was designated for human use but cannot be used on Shabbos because of the laws
of Shabbos or Yom Tov. For example, a live animal that was designated to be slaughtered and
prepared as meat for people is not fit for use on Shabbos since it is forbidden to slaughter an animal
on Shabbos. Even though animals that are not properly slaughtered are sometimes fed to dogs,
since this animal was designated to be used for people after Shabbos it is Muktzah on Shabbos
(according to Rebbi Yehudah) and may not be fed to dogs.

b. An object that was fit for human use when Shabbos arrived, but something happened to the
object on Shabbos that renders it unfit for human use. This is a form of Nolad and is comparable
to a pit from a date that was eaten on Shabbos. For example, before Yom Tov a live animal was
fit for man on Yom Tov since it could be slaughtered, cooked, and eaten on Yom Tov. However,
on Yom Tov the animal died and thereby became unfit for man. Rebbi Yehudah prohibits feeding
such an animal to dogs, while Rebbi Shimon permits it.

(c) Other categories of Muktzah are prohibited according to both Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi
Shimon:

1. MUKTZAH MACHMAS GUFO ("set aside because of itself"). This refers to any object
which intrinsically has no use, such as a rock (which was not designated for any useful purpose).

2. HUKTZAH L'MITZVASO ("set aside for its Mitzvah"). An object which is designated for a
Mitzvah may not be used for other purposes which detract from the Mitzvah, even on a weekday.
On Shabbos, such an object is Muktzah and may not be moved as long as it is still fit for the
Mitzvah (if it becomes unfit for the Mitzvah during Shabbos, its status depends on the Halachah
of "Migo d'Iskatza'i," mentioned above in b:3).

3. DAVAR SHE'EINO RA'UY SHE'DECHA'O B'YADAYIM ("an object which is not fit [to
be used on Shabbos] because its owner excluded it from use [by rendering it unfit to be used on
Shabbos]"). An object which a person consciously decided not to use and also performed an action
that rendered it unfit for use throughout Shabbos (such as fruit he put out to dry right before
Shabbos, which becomes inedible until it is fully dried). Even if, on Shabbos, the object becomes
fit for use (before the time at which he had intended for it to become fit), it still may not be used
on Shabbos. (See above, b:1.)

4. DAVAR HE'ASUR BEIN HA'SHEMASHOS SHE'LO CHASHAV SHE'YAVO L'YEDEI

HETER B'SHABBOS. An object which was forbidden to be used Bein ha'Shemashos because an
Isur Shabbos must be transgressed in order to make the object useable (such as produce which was
still attached to the ground) and which one did not think would become permitted on Shabbos
remains prohibited even when the Isur that prohibited the object until now is removed. (See Rashi
24b DH Im Yesh, Tosfos 3a DH Gezeirah.)

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5. MUKTZAH MACHMAS CHISARON KIS. An object which is set aside from use due to its
fragility is Muktzah. (The object will not be used during Shabbos in the way it normally is used,
and to use it in any other way may damage it.) For example, a Mohel's scalpel (after the Bris, or
when there is no eighth-day Bris to perform that Shabbos) is Muktzah.

(d) According to most Rishonim, the prohibition of Muktzah is only mid'Rabanan. The
prohibition was instituted by Nechemyah ben Chachalyah (Shabbos 124b) in order to prevent
people from carrying on Shabbos from Reshus ha'Yachid to Reshus ha'Rabim (Beitzah 37b;
Shabbos 124b). The Rabanan prohibited moving a Kli she'Melachto l'Isur (to protect it) lest a
person use it in a prohibited manner on Shabbos (RAMBAM, Hilchos Shabbos 24:13). Other
reasons are proposed by the Rishonim for the prohibition of Muktzah: so that a person will not
spend the entire Shabbos moving objects around from place to place and not resting, and so that a
person who does not work during the week will have a way to distinguish between Shabbos and a
weekday (Rambam, ibid. 13-14).

RASHI (2b, DH v'Hechinu, and 26b, DH v'Iy), however, appears to maintain that Muktzah is a
Torah prohibition, at least according to Rabah (the prohibition is known as "Hachanah d'Rabah").
However, the Rishonim quote Rashi as saying that only eating Muktzah is prohibited by the Torah
according to Rabah; moving Muktzah is prohibited only mid'Rabanan.5

MUKTZAH ON YOM TOV

Rav Nachman states that the Mishnah in Shabbos (156b) which discusses Muktzah on Shabbos
was compiled by Rebbi in accordance with the view of Rebbi Shimon (who maintains that
Muktzah is permitted) without attributing it to Rebbi Shimon's name. The Mishnah here in Beitzah
which discusses Muktzah on Yom Tov was compiled by Rebbi in accordance with the view of
Rebbi Yehudah (who maintains that Muktzah is prohibited) without attributing it to Rebbi
Yehudah's name.

A general principle in the Mishnayos is that when Rebbi compiled a "Stam" Mishnah (with no
attribution to any particular Tana), this indicates that Rebbi ruled in accordance with that view.
Accordingly, Rebbi seems to contradict himself in the Mishnayos in Shabbos and Beitzah. Rav
Nachman answers that Rebbi ruled like Rebbi Shimon with regard to Muktzah on Shabbos,
because on Shabbos all Melachos are forbidden and thus the day needs no additional rabbinical
safeguards. He ruled like Rebbi Yehudah with regard to Muktzah on Yom Tov, because on Yom
Tov some Melachos are permitted, and thus the day needs additional rabbinical safeguards to
strengthen the observance of Yom Tov.

What is the Halachah with regard to Muktzah on Shabbos and on Yom Tov? Does the Halachah
follow Rav Nachman's explanation of Rebbi's view? (See previous Insight with regard to the

5
These words do not appear in our texts of Rashi, but they are quoted by the note of the SHITAH MEKUBETZES on Rashi,
2a, DH Man d'Shari; by the PRI MEGADIM in his introduction to Hilchos Yom Tov, section on Muktzah; by the CHASAM
SOFER in introduction to Mahadura Tinyana; and by the KOHELES YAKOV OC 509:7

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different types of Muktzah. Here, we discuss only the type of object which is Muktzah because
one did not have in mind to use it at the onset of Shabbos or Yom Tov, or "Hiktzehu mi'Da'ato".)

(a) The RIF, RAMBAM, and other Rishonim rule that the Halachah follows Rebbi as explained
by Rav Nachman: Muktzah is prohibited on Yom Tov as an additional safeguard to the sanctity of
the day. (The RA'AVAD writes that Rebbi maintains that Muktzah is actually permitted even on
Yom Tov. However, Rebbi wrote the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah so that ignorant people who learn
only Mishnah will think that the Halachah follows Rebbi Yehudah on Yom Tov and will treat Yom
Tov with the proper respect. A Talmid Chacham, however, may be lenient with Muktzah on Yom
Tov.)

(b) The BA'AL HA'ME'OR rules like Rebbi as explained by Rav Nachman, but he explains the
Gemara differently. He proposes that it is not logical that the law on Yom Tov should be more
stringent than the law on Shabbos. Rather, when Rebbi ruled that Muktzah is prohibited on Yom
Tov, he referred only to objects which are Muktzah on Shabbos because of a prohibition which
applies to Shabbos (such as cooking); those objects are not Muktzah on Yom Tov because the
prohibition does not apply on Yom Tov. For example, wood should not be Muktzah on Yom Tov
because it may be used as fuel for fire, and making a fire on Yom Tov is permitted. On Shabbos,
though, wood is Muktzah because making a fire on Shabbos is forbidden. Rebbi's ruling prohibits
objects like wood even on Yom Tov in order to safeguard the sanctity of Yom Tov. Safeguarding
the sanctity of Yom Tov ("Lo l'Zilzulei") makes Yom Tov only as stringent as Shabbos, but not
more so. According to the Ba'al ha'Me'or, Rebbi is stringent only with regard to objects which are
used for burning, Shechitah, or cooking (Melachos which are permitted on Yom Tov and
prohibited on Shabbos).

(c) RABEINU CHANANEL (end of Beitzah) rules like Rav Nachman, and the law on Yom Tov
indeed is more stringent than on Shabbos in order to safeguard the sanctity Yom Tov. However,
this stringency on Yom Tov does not apply to normal Muktzah objects ("Hiktzehu mi'Da'ato");
such objects indeed are permitted on Yom Tov just as they are permitted on Shabbos, like the view
of Rebbi Shimon. Rather, the stringency of Yom Tov applies only to objects which are prohibited
as Muktzah because of some other reason (such as "Nolad" or "Muktzah Machmas Isur").

(d) The ROSH (5:14) cites RASHI, RI, and RABEINU TAM who are lenient even with regard
to Yom Tov. They rule that Muktzah is always permitted. They reason that it was only Rav
Nachman who asserted that there is a difference between Yom Tov and Shabbos. He differentiated
between Yom Tov and Shabbos only to explain the opinion of Beis Hillel in the Mishnah (who
says that an egg laid on Yom Tov is prohibited). According to the other Amora'im who conclude
that the egg mentioned in the Mishnah is prohibited not because it is Muktzah but because of other
reasons, there is no reason to differentiate between Yom Tov and Shabbos. Since the Gemara at
the end of Shabbos says that the Halachah follows Rebbi Shimon, his ruling is accepted with regard
to Yom Tov.

There is a slight difference between the view of Rabeinu Tam and that of Rashi and the Ri. Rabeinu
Tam rules that although the law is lenient with regard to Muktzah on Yom Tov, the law is stringent
with regard to Nolad, both on Yom Tov and on Shabbos. Rashi (33a, DH v'Hilchesa) and the Ri

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do not differentiate between Muktzah and Nolad, and they permit both types of Muktzah on Yom
Tov and on Shabbos.

HALACHAH: The SHULCHAN ARUCH (OC 495:4) rules like the Rif and Rambam who
prohibit Muktzah on Yom Tov but not on Shabbos. The REMA, however, rules leniently and
permits Muktzah both on Shabbos and on Yom Tov (like (d) above). However, he accepts
Rabeinu Tam's stringency and does not permit Nolad on either day.

The MISHNAH BERURAH (OC 495:17) cites Acharonim who are even more lenient and
permit Nolad on Shabbos and prohibit it only on Yom Tov (like the opinion of Rabeinu
Chananel in (c) above).

REBBI'S CONTRADICTION
The Gemara asks why Rebbi followed the view of Rebbi Shimon in the Mishnah in Shabbos (156b)
which discusses Muktzah on Shabbos, while he followed the view of Rebbi Yehudah in the Mishnah
here (2a) which discusses Muktzah on Yom Tov. The Gemara answers that Rebbi was concerned that
people might treat the sanctity of Yom Tov lightly because some forms of Melachah are permitted on
Yom Tov, and therefore he was stringent with regard to Muktzah on Yom Tov. Shabbos, however,
which is already more stringent than Yom Tov, needs no additional safeguard.

Why does the Gemara not say simply that Rebbi followed the opinion of Beis Hillel? Beis Hillel rules
leniently with regard to Shabbos and stringently with regard to Yom Tov, according to Rav Nachman's
explanation. The Gemara should have asked why Beis Hillel rules differently with regard to Shabbos
than he rules with regard to Yom Tov.

RABEINU CHANANEL explains that neither Rebbi Shimon nor Rebbi Yehudah argue with Beis
Hillel. One might have assumed that both Beis Shamai and Rebbi Shimon maintain that Muktzah is
permitted, while Beis Hillel and Rebbi Yehudah maintain that it is prohibited. This, however, is not
the intention of the Tana'im. Rather, both Rebbi Shimon and Rebbi Yehudah agree with Beis Hillel,
but they argue about what exactly Beis Hillel said. Rebbi Yehudah maintains that Beis Hillel ruled
stringently and prohibited Muktzah both on Shabbos and on Yom Tov. Rebbi Shimon maintains that
Beis Hillel was lenient both on Shabbos and on Yom Tov.

In Maseches Shabbos, Rebbi quoted Beis Hillel according to Rebbi Shimon's version, and in Beitzah
he quoted Beis Hillel according to Rebbi Yehudah's version. He wrote the Mishnah in each place
"Stam" accordingly. The Gemara therefore asks why Rebbi quoted differing opinions in Beis Hillel in
the two places, and it answers that he made that compromise for the sake of preserving the sanctity of
Yom Tov. (This is also the explanation of the RAMBAN in Milchamos, who describes it in more
detail.)

"HACHANAH D'RABAH" -- RABAH'S PRINCIPLE OF "HACHANAH"

Rabah explains that an egg laid on Yom Tov is forbidden because of "Hachanah," according to Beis
Hillel in the Mishnah. The formation of an egg is completed one day before it is laid. When Yom Tov
immediately follows Shabbos, an egg laid on Yom Tov was completed on Shabbos. Since it is
forbidden to use an object that was prepared on Shabbos for Yom Tov, the egg may not be used.

19
RASHI (DH v'Ein Yom Tov; 26b, DH v'Iy, see PNEI YEHOSHUA) equates the principle of
"Hachanah d'Rabah" with Muktzah; the egg that was prepared on Shabbos for Yom Tov is Muktzah.
Rashi says that one must prepare the Yom Tov meal in advance, because otherwise the food may not
be eaten on Yom Tov, mid'Oraisa (as he learns from Pesachim 47b; see SHITAH MEKUBETZES).
The preparation of the food must be done on a weekday and not on Shabbos or Yom Tov.

It is logical that just as an object prepared on Shabbos for Yom Tov may not be used on Yom Tov, an
object that comes into existence on Yom Tov should be forbidden because it was not prepared for use
on a weekday before Yom Tov. Why, then, does the Gemara say that the case of the Mishnah is when
Yom Tov immediately follows Shabbos, and an egg laid today was completed yesterday? If it is
forbidden to eat something created on Yom Tov, then the Gemara should say that the Mishnah refers
to every Yom Tov, and that an egg is completed on the same day that it is laid. Accordingly, the egg
should be forbidden because it was not properly prepared before Yom Tov.

(a) The ME'IRI (Chidushei ha'Me'iri, p. 4a) writes that according to Rashi the Gemara does not mean
that the egg is forbidden only because it was completed the day before (on Shabbos), and that it would
have been permitted had it been completed the same day on which it was laid (on Yom Tov). Even if
the egg would have been completed on Yom Tov, it would have been forbidden. It was simply a known
fact to the Gemara that an egg does not become completed on the day it is laid, but on the day before
it is laid. Therefore, the Gemara has no choice but to explain that the Mishnah's prohibition applies in
the case of an egg laid on Yom Tov that follows Shabbos.

(b) The PNEI YEHOSHUA writes that if eggs become completed on the same day they are laid, the
opinion of Beis Shamai -- who permits eggs laid on Yom Tov -- would have no basis, because all eggs
born on Yom Tov should be forbidden because they were not prepared on the weekday before Yom
Tov.6

(c) Tosfos and most other Rishonim (see BA'AL HA'ME'OR) disagree with Rashi. They write that
the Isur of Hachanah is not related to Muktzah. The egg is forbidden not because the food was not
properly designated for Shabbos or Yom Tov, but because of a special rule in the Torah that one may
not use an object on Yom Tov that came into being on the Shabbos that immediately precedes it (nor
may one use an object on Shabbos that came into being on the Yom Tov that immediately precedes it).
Consequently, if the egg came into being on Yom Tov, there is nothing wrong with using it on Yom
Tov because the Torah does not prohibit such an object. The Gemara was forced to conclude that
according to Rabah an egg is completed on the day before it is laid.

AN EGG LAID ON SHABBOS

Rabah explains that an egg laid on Yom Tov is forbidden because of "Hachanah," according to Beis
Hillel in the Mishnah. The formation of an egg is completed one day before it is laid. When Yom Tov
immediately follows Shabbos, an egg laid on Yom Tov was completed on Shabbos. Since it is
forbidden to use an object that was prepared on Shabbos for Yom Tov, the egg may not be used.

6
In other words, Rashi preferred the explanation that he gives in order to avoid having to suggest that Beis Shamai argues with
the entire notion of Hachanah according to Rabah.

20
The Gemara questions Rabah's explanation. According to Rabah, why should an egg laid on an
ordinary Shabbos be forbidden? It was completed (and thus prepared) the day before, which was a
weekday.

Why does the Gemara ask that an egg laid on Shabbos should be permitted according to Rabah? Every
hen is Muktzah on Shabbos since it cannot be slaughtered. An egg that comes from the hen has the
same status as the hen and should be prohibited because of Muktzah. Indeed, an egg laid on Yom Tov by
a hen designated for laying eggs (and not for eating) is forbidden (2a) according to Rebbi Yehudah
because of Muktzah and Nolad. Why should the egg that comes from a hen, which is Muktzah on
Shabbos, be permitted according to Rabah?

The BA'AL HA'ME'OR cites "Yesh Mefarshim" who suggest that the Gemara refers to a case of an
egg laid on Shabbos in a home in which there is a very sick person whose life is in danger ("Choleh
she'Yesh Bo Sakanah"). The members of the household planned, before Shabbos, to slaughter the hen
on Shabbos for the sick person. Therefore, the hen is not Muktzah, and thus the egg that comes from
it is not Muktzah.

The Ba'al ha'Me'or rejects this answer, because such a case is very rare (a "Milsa d'Lo Shechicha") and
the Rabanan do not apply their Gezeiros in such cases (as the Gemara itself says). The egg in such a
case indeed should be permitted.

The RA'AVAD (on the Rif) explains that the Gemara understands that there is no prohibition of
Muktzah on Shabbos (like Rebbi Shimon), even Muktzah Machmas Isur (such as a hen, which is
excluded from use at the beginning of Shabbos because of the Isur against slaughtering on Shabbos).

The BA'AL HA'ME'OR proposes a new rule for the laws of Muktzah. He explains that whenever a
person intends to use a certain object which will come into existence (or become permitted to him) on
Shabbos, it is not Muktzah at all, even according to Rebbi Yehudah.
Although the Mishnah in Shabbos says that oil left in a lamp after the flame goes out is Muktzah
according to Rebbi Yehudah, that case is different because one knows that there might not be any oil
left when the flame goes out. Therefore, before Shabbos he did not expect there to be leftover oil and
he did not intend to use any oil that might be left. In this case, though, one expects the item (the egg)
to come into the world and he intends to use it when it does.

The RAMBAN (in Shabbos 144b, and Milchamos to Beitzah 21a) explains that Muktzah Machmas
Isur makes an object prohibited, according to Rebbi Yehudah, only when the person himself made the
object prohibited at the start of Shabbos (for example, by lighting the candle he made the oil
prohibited). In this case, the item (hen or egg) became prohibited by itself when Shabbos entered, and
therefore when the prohibition is removed the object becomes permitted (i.e., the principle of "Migo
d'Iskatza'i" does not apply in such a case). Only when a prohibition actually was performed with an
object on Shabbos does the principle of "Migo d'Iskatza'i" apply, even though the object originally
became prohibited on Shabbos by itself (for example, when an animal is slaughtered on Shabbos in
transgression of the prohibition against slaughtering). (In Milchamos to Pesachim 56b, the Ramban
seems to contradict this ruling. He writes that if detached figs are on top of a tree and are not accessible
unless one climbs the tree on Shabbos, they become Muktzah Machmas Isur and may not be used even
if they fall down from the tree.)

21
The RAN expresses this answer differently. He explains that there is no general rule that an object
which comes from an object of Muktzah is Muktzah. Rather, an egg which comes from a hen
designated for laying eggs is Muktzah and prohibited because it is Nolad. Since the hen is not a food
and the egg is a food, something new has come into the world. The Gemara here, however, is discussing
a hen designated for slaughter (the owner plans to eat it after Shabbos); it is merely the prohibition
against slaughtering on Shabbos (which was not imposed by the owner) which prevents one from eating
the hen. Such a hen is still considered a food, and therefore its egg is "Uchla d'Ifras," a piece of food
that broke off, and it is not Nolad. The fact that the egg came from a hen which is Muktzah does not
make the egg Muktzah; anything which is edible is considered prepared for use on Shabbos, as long as
it is not Nolad.

EGGS FOUND INSIDE OF A HEN THAT WAS SLAUGHTERED ON YOM

TOV

The Gemara asks that eggs found inside a hen that was slaughtered on Yom Tov should be prohibited
because of a Gezeirah of eggs that were laid on Yom Tov (which, Rashi explains, refers to Yom Tov
that immediately follows Shabbos). The eggs found inside a hen, however, should be prohibited for an
entirely different reason. Since there is a doubt whether the eggs that were extracted from the
slaughtered hen were completed yesterday on Shabbos (in which case they are prohibited because of
"Hachanah d'Rabah") or today on Yom Tov (in which case they are permitted according to most
Rishonim; see above, Insights to Beitzah 2:4:c), they should be prohibited out of doubt (a Safek Isur).
Why does the Gemara not rule conclusively that they are prohibited because of this reason?

TOSFOS (DH Milsa) explains that the prohibition of "Hachanah," of having been prepared on
Shabbos for Yom Tov, applies only retroactively after the egg is laid. The RAMBAN (in Milchamos)
explains that this is because only at the moment the egg is laid does one benefit from the completion
of the egg that occurred the day before (on Shabbos), for at that moment it becomes possible to eat the
egg without slaughtering the mother. While the egg is still in the mother, nothing is gained from its
completion.

The RA'AVAD and other Rishonim cite the Yerushalmi which presents a different reason for why the
egg's completion becomes useful only retroactively, after it is laid: Only after it is laid is it fit to develop
into a chick.
Another reason for why its completion is beneficial only retroactively when it is laid is because only
at that moment does it begin to have a good taste. Before it is laid the fact that it has been completed
is of no relevance, and thus it is not called "Hachanah" on Shabbos for Yom Tov.

RA'AVAD, in his explanation of the opinion of RABEINU EFRAIM, says that an egg that is
completed the previous day is laid immediately in the morning. If most of the day has passed when the
egg is removed from the slaughtered hen, it is clear that it was not completed the day before, but today,
and it is therefore permitted.

RABEINU EFRAIM, cited by the Ba'al ha'Me'or, indeed says that eggs found inside a hen are
prohibited because of the doubt that they might have been completed the day before. Although the
Ra'avad (in (b) above) understands that Rabeinu Efraim refers only to eggs found in a hen slaughtered
at night, it is possible that Rabeinu Efraim refers even to eggs from a hen slaughtered during the day,
and he learns the Sugya differently.

22
Perhaps Rabeinu Efraim understands that the Gemara is not discussing a Yom Tov that immediately
follows Shabbos, but rather an ordinary Yom Tov that does not follow Shabbos. When the Gemara
says that the eggs should be prohibited because of a Gezeirah of eggs laid on Yom Tov, it does not
mean a Gezeirah of other eggs laid on Yom Tov, but it means a Gezeirah because of these eggs
themselves: perhaps these eggs themselves were going to be laid today, and thus they should be
included in the normal Gezeirah of eggs laid on Yom Tov! The Gemara answers that the Rabanan did
not enact such a Gezeirah because it is uncommon to eat eggs found inside a hen. However, if a hen is
slaughtered on a Yom Tov which follows Shabbos, since its eggs are prohibited mid'Oraisa the fact
that such eggs are not usually eaten makes no difference; the eggs are prohibited. It is to these eggs
that Rabeinu Efraim refers when he says that the eggs are prohibited because of the doubt that they
might have been completed on the previous day.

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:7

One of the Rabbinic ordinances developed by the Sages to protect the sanctity of Shabbat and
holidays is the rule forbidding moving objects that are considered muktzah – that is, things that a
person puts out of his mind and does not intend on using during Shabbat or Yom Tov. This can be
done either by a conscious act or decision on the part of the person, or alternatively if the object is
not usable for any activities that are permitted on Shabbat.

Apart from this general statement, there are many differences in how muktzeh is defined. Some of
the basic definitions are as follows:

• Raw materials that are in a form that does not allow them to be used on Shabbat
• Utensils whose sole use involves an activity that is forbidden on Shabbat
• Objects that are not used because they are disgusting
• Objects whose value is so great that they are used only for very specific tasks

Other categories of muktzah include things that a person actively sets aside so that they are not
used on Shabbat, and nolad – something that could not have been prepared for use before Shabbat
because it was “born” or came into existence only on Shabbat.

It is this case of nolad that Masechet Beitzah opens with – beitzah she-noldah be-Yom Tov – an
egg that was laid on the holiday and did not exist when Yom Tov began. Is it considered ready for
use on the holiday, or will it be considered muktzeh since it did not exist beforehand?

Beit Shamai and Beit Hillel disagree on this point. Bet Shamai permits the use of the egg on Yom
Tov, while Bet Hillel forbids it. The Gemara offers several different explanations for their
disagreement. Rabbah‘s explanation is that any egg laid today was already in existence the day
before, and that we are discussing a situation where Yom Tov was on Sunday. Thus, Bet Hillel
forbids use of the egg because it was prepared on Shabbat for use on Sunday (he also forbids it

7
https://www.ou.org/life/torah/masechet_beitzah_26/

23
when Yom Tov falls on another day of the week, lest someone mistakenly permit it on Sunday, as
well).

It is not clear when exactly halakha considers an egg to be “completed,” but from a biological
perspective, it takes almost exactly 24 hours from the time that the egg is released from the ovary
of the chicken to the time that it completes the preparation process and is laid. Thus, Rabbah is
correct that every egg that is laid has been prepared from the day before.

Tiferes Yisroel notes that the Achronim have chosen to refer to this Massechta as ‫ ביעה מסכת‬rather
than by its Hebrew name—‫ ביצה‬.8

The Magen Avraham (Orech Chaim 156) writes that the reason for this is that we are instructed to
always avoid speaking words which are unrefined. Apparently, the word ‫ ביצה‬has a connotation
which is negative (it is used in reference to the male anatomy), so it is to be avoided. Yet, Tiferes
Yisroel questions this premise.

How could it be that the word ‫ ביצה‬is considered to be questionable in any manner when it is
commonly used in the Torah? Furthermore, the replacement word ‫ ביעא‬is Aramaic, a language
which the celestial angels do not understand (Gemara Shabbos 12b). How can the letter ‫ צ‬be
objectionable, when it the letter which refers to the perfectly righteous (‫ תמים צדיק‬- (see Shabbos
104a? And why should this special letter be exchanged with the letter ‘‫ ע‬,a letter which is associated
with the evildoers (‫)?רשעים‬

Rather, the reason the name of the Massechta has been altered is due to a story in the Gemara
(Sanhedrin 5b) about a certain student who came to a place and taught that the liquid from an egg
does not enable something to become susceptible to tum’ah ‫ מכשיר( (אינו ביצים מי‬.The people of that
place misunderstood him, and thought that he said ‫ מכשיר אינו בצעים מי‬- that the water from a swamp
does not prepare something for tum’ah.

This was a terrible error, because the truth is that water from a swamp does, in fact, have the ability
to be ‫ מכשיר‬.Due to this unfortunate incident, the wise men decided to use the Aramaic word ‫ביעא‬
when referring to an egg, in order that it never again be confused with the word which refers to a
swamp. Therefore, the name of our Massechta is commonly known as ‫ ביעא‬.

8
https://www.dafdigest.org/masechtos/Beitza%20002.pdf

24
The literal meaning of our Gemara is that the ashes formed on Erev Yom Tov are considered
“prepared” ahead of time. They may therefore be used for the mitzvah of ‫ הדם כיסוי‬on Yom Tov
itself.

The Biala Rebbe, zt”l, would explain this metaphorically: “Why are the ashes considered already
‘prepared’? It is because the most important preparation for prayer is to be completely humble, to
see oneself like dust of the earth and ashes.”

As Avraham Avinu said as he beseeched Hashem, “…and I am merely dust and ashes.”
(Bereishis 18:27) Rav Raphael of Barshad, zt”l, a disciple of Rav Pinchas of Koretz, zt”l, would
always spend many hours preparing for Kol Nidrei on Erev Yom Kippur. Only after an extended
period of intense learning and soul searching would the Rav go to the mikveh. After immersing,
he would prepare himself to daven Minchah and eat the seudas hamafsekes.

After the meal, he would sit again to learn and prepare himself for the tefillah zakah. During the
course of his long day of preparing for Yom Kippur, the Rav was careful not to waste a single
moment of precious time. One year, just as Rav Rafael left the mikveh, he was approached by a
man who clearly wanted to speak.

Unfortunately, this person had all sorts of nonsense on his mind and occupied a great deal of the
Rav’s time with what was essentially an extended monologue without any real substance. It was
literally impossible for the Rav to tear himself away without insulting this other person, and since
he had no choice he remained standing outside the mikveh while the priceless minutes ticked by.

After the gentleman left, the Rav said to himself: “Ramban writes in his famous letter that we
can attain humility by accustoming ourselves to speak all of our words gently to everyone, all
the time. Clearly, this even means someone who is wasting our time talking about nonsense
while we are leaving the mikveh on Erev Yom Kippur!

25
 Adam Kirsch writes:9

Since the current cycle began in August 2012, Daf Yomi readers have been making our way
through Seder Moed, the division of the Talmud devoted to holidays: Shabbat, Pesach, Yom
Kippur, Sukkot. This week, however, we began Tractate Beitzah, which is not the name of a
holiday but, oddly enough, the Hebrew word for “egg.” What sort of holiday is Egg? In fact, the
alternative title for this tractate is simply “Yom Tov,” the generic term for holidays or festivals,
and it covers features of Jewish law that are in force for all the holidays.

The tractate has come to be called Beitzah because that is its very first word, and just as advertised,
the pages we read this week were entirely devoted to eggs. “An egg that is laid on a holiday,”
chapter 1 begins: What is its legal status? As always when the Talmud seems to be focusing on a
trivial issue, the rabbis are not interested in eggs per se, but in the concepts that this particular
question brings to light. In this case, we are dealing with our old friend muktzeh, a legal category
that was dealt with extensively in tractates Shabbat and Eruvin.

Muktzeh means “set aside,” and it designates a kind of object that cannot be moved or used on
Shabbat or a holiday. Muktzeh is a good example of the rabbinic admonition, famous from Pirkei
Avot, to “make a fence around the Torah”: The rabbis would introduce laws of greater strictness
than the Torah’s own in order to reduce the chance that a Torah law might be violated. Thus the
Torah calls for avoiding certain broad categories of work on Shabbat and holidays,
and muktzeh broadens the prohibition to include any object that is not specifically prepared in

9
https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/belief/articles/daf-yomi-78

26
advance for use on the holy day. By avoiding everything “set aside,” we lessen the chance that we
will come to carry an object or do work with it.

One category of muktzeh is the “just born”—something that comes into existence on the holiday
itself. Naturally, such an item cannot possibly have been intended in advance for use on the holiday
since it didn’t exist yet. A newly laid egg would seem to be such an object: Is it muktzeh, or are
you allowed to eat it? (Insofar as I understand the complicated rules of muktzeh, I believe this
question wouldn’t arise on Shabbat, because food preparation is generally forbidden on Shabbat,
while it is permitted on holidays. That is why the egg problem is raised here rather than in Tractate
Shabbat.)

The first mishna on Beitzah 2a gives us the competing answers of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai.
Almost always when these two schools of thought disagree, Shammai is the more stringent and
Hillel the more lenient; but in this case they change places. Beit Hillel rules that an egg laid on a
holiday may not be eaten, while Beit Shammai allows it. The reasons behind this ruling turn out
to be exceptionally complex, and the next six pages of Gemara are devoted to unraveling them.

To answer the egg question, the Gemara turns, logically enough, to a chicken question. What is
the status of the chicken that laid the egg? Here the principle turns out to be rather counter-intuitive.
You might think that if you designate a chicken in advance for laying eggs, and it then lays an egg
on the holiday, you could eat that egg, since it was in a sense expected. In fact, the reverse is true:
If a chicken is designated for laying eggs, then the chicken itself was not intended to be eaten, and
so it is muktzeh. According to Beit Hillel, then, the egg that emerges from it is also muktzeh since
a product shares the status of its producer. Conversely, if the chicken was designated for cooking
and eating, but before it’s slaughtered it happens to lay an egg, that egg is considered merely a
separated portion of the chicken, and so it too is edible.

As often happens in the Talmud, the issue at stake here is how to define a substance: Is the egg its
own entity, or is it part of something else? At what point does it make the transition from one state
to the other? Later in the discussion, the rabbis try to clarify the question by using analogies from
other areas of law. In Tractate Eruvin, for instance, the rabbis rule that fruits that fall from a tree
on Shabbat are “just-born,” and so they are muktzeh. Is an egg that emerges from a chicken like a
fruit that falls from a tree? Not quite, Abaye objects: The point of the fruit rule was not that the
fruit itself shares the status of the tree. Rather, it was a secondary decree, designed by the rabbis
to discourage people from picking fruit on purpose, which is a clear Shabbat violation. But this
logic doesn’t apply in the case of eggs since you can’t pick an egg as you can an apple.

Rabbi Yitzchak raises another analogy: Perhaps the newly laid egg is like juice that seeps from a
fruit, which is also prohibited on a holiday? After all, the Gemara observes, “an egg is enclosed”
inside the hen before it is laid, while “juice is enclosed” inside the fruit before it is squeezed. But
Abaye objects to this analogy for the same reason: The prohibition on drinking juice that seeped
out on a holiday was not issued because the juice itself is prohibited, but rather in order to
discourage people from squeezing fruit to get the juice. Throughout this discussion, much of the
detail is devoted to figuring out exactly which Tanna would have held which position, and how
you can tell, which often requires teasing out the implications of other rulings on very different
subjects.

27
Eventually the Gemara turns to consider a more far-reaching question. In Talmudic times, as today,
Jewish communities in the Diaspora observe the festivals for two days, rather than the biblically
commanded one. The reason for this is explained in the course of a further refinement of the egg
debate. While the Temple stood, the Jewish calendar, which is based on lunar cycles, was
established by observations of the moon in the Temple itself. When the new moon was officially
sighted, this news had to be conveyed to Jewish communities outside the Jerusalem area.

Jewish law is immune to the vagaries of history: The law is the law, and it can be changed only
by due process.

Originally, the Talmud says, this was accomplished nearly instantaneously, by means of a relay of
signal torches. But at some point the Kutim—the Hebrew term for the schismatic Jewish sect we
call Samaritans—began to interfere with the torches, intentionally lighting them at what the
Temple authorities considered the wrong times. So, the Temple had to switch to a messenger
system, dispatching people to outlying areas with news of the new moon. Because a messenger
couldn’t get to everyone before the new month began, Diaspora communities were ordered to start
observing holidays for two days, to make sure that at least one of them would be calendrically
correct.

At a later period, the sages began to calculate the calendar in advance, using astronomical
observations, and the two-day rule became functionally unnecessary, since it was now easy for
even distant Jewish communities to figure out when the holiday was supposed to fall. But the two-
day practice was kept in force as a safeguard. “Be careful to observe the custom of your fathers
that you have received,” the rabbis warned, since a time may again come when Torah study will
be prohibited by the gentile authorities, and uncertainty about the calendar would arise once more.
This precaution speaks volumes about both the rabbis’ reverence for tradition and their dark view
of the conditions of Jewish life.

This account of the origins of the two-day holiday, given on Beitzah 4b, raises a natural question.
Are both days of the holiday actually holy, or is only the first day the “real” holiday, and the second
merely a rabbinic reminder? Once again, the egg problem emerges as a test case. Say that an egg
is laid on the first day of the holiday and is “set aside.” Can’t it then be eaten on the second day,
since the second day is not subject to the same Torah prohibitions as the first? Or do we extend
the prohibition to both days, treating them as equally sacred even though one is a kind of legal
fiction?

There is extensive disagreement about this, in the course of which the Gemara declares a
fundamental principle of Jewish jurisprudence: “Any matter that was established by a vote requires
another vote to permit it.” That is, if an authoritative Jewish court or Sanhedrin made a law, it can
be repealed only by another such court, even if circumstances change in such a way as to render
the law moot—for instance, the destruction of the Temple. In this way, the rabbis render Jewish
law immune to the vagaries of history: The law is the law, and it can be changed only by due
process, whether it is practicable at this moment on earth or not. Torah becomes its own virtual
world, superior to the real world, in which the Jewish people are enclosed and preserved—and the
Talmud itself becomes the key to the Jews’ unlikely survival.

28
 Protecting the Neglected

Rabbi Jay Kelman writes:10

The Rambam, in discussing the prohibition of ba’al toseef (Devarim 4:2), the prohibition of adding
to the Torah rules, said that one violates this Biblical law by claiming a rabbinic law is biblical in
origin (Mamrim 2:9). The Torah gives the Sages the right and obligation to ensure the relevance
of Torah to each generation by making “amendments”; gezerot, protective fences; takanot, social
legislation; and rabbinic mitzvot such as the obligation to light candles on Shabbat (and
Chanukah).

Yet one must distinguish between that which is biblical and divine, and that which is rabbinic and
human. Torah laws are more important and must be treated as such[1]. One of the basic principles
flowing from this idea relates to a situation when one is in doubt regarding the permissibility of an
action: if the issue involves biblical law, we are to be strict; but lenient if the issue before us is of
rabbinic origin. As with all generalizations, there are exceptions.

The opening Mishna of Masechet Beitza groups together three laws relating to Yom Tov where
Beit Shammai is lenient and Beit Hillel strict[2]. The first involves the famous egg laid on Yom
Tov where Beit Shammai allows one to eat it on Yom Tov itself and Bet Hillel forbids it, only
allowing its consumption after Yom Tov. In analyzing this debate, the Talmud is at a loss to explain
what type of chicken we are dealing with. If it is one set aside for eating, there should be no reason
for Beit Hillel to forbid it; the egg should just be seen as a piece of the chicken. But if it is a chicken
being raised to produce eggs, then why is Beit Shammai lenient? Such an egg would be forbidden
to use due to the principle of nolad, a subcategory of muktza, which prohibits one to benefit from
items that came into existence on Shabbat or Yom Tov.

The Gemara explains that the debate between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai echoes an earlier
debate between Rav Yehuda, who upholds the laws of muktza,[3] and Rav Shimon who rejects
the need for such. Beit Shammai, the Gemara claims, follows the lenient view of Rav Shimon,
with Beit Hillel following the stricter view of Rav Yehuda. While neither Rav Yehuda nor Rav
Shimon distinguish between Shabbat and Yom Tov, Rebbe Yehudah Hanassi, in editing the
Mishna, introduces such a distinction, ruling that the laws of muktza apply on Yom Tov, but not
on Shabbat.

The Gemara explains that Shabbat is taken very seriously and thus, we can afford to be lenient in
one area and not worry that people will take unwarranted leniencies elsewhere. However, Yom
Tov is taken lightly by many, and if you allow for a leniency in one area, “people will come to
belittle it” (Beitza 2b) and be lenient elsewhere. Ironically, it is the greater importance and
seriousness of Shabbat that allows for leniency.

This concept also applies to rabbinic law. As we discussed in Masechet Sukkah, the rabbis
arranged our calendar in such a way that Hoshanna Rabba can never fall on Shabbat, whereas Rosh

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https://torahinmotion.org/profile/rabbi-jay-kelman-cpa-ca

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Hashnah and Sukkot can. This means that we may forfeit the biblical commands of shofar blowing
and lulav, but never the “custom” of taking the arava. We need not fear that anyone will stop
coming to shul to hear the shofar it we miss it one year, but we do need to fear the custom
of arava will be neglected if missed in any given year.

It is this fear of possibly belittling mitzvoth that lay behind many of the practices of the second
day of Yom Tov. Since at least Talmudic times, many have protested this second day—which
according to the simple reading of the Gemara (Beitza 4b) is “only” a custom. As such,
no brachot, i.e., neither kiddush nor candle lighting, should be said on this day. Yet had we done
such, we can be certain no one would be keeping the second day of Yom Tov today. Rebbe Yehuda
Hanassi, in editing the Mishna, did not necessarily aim to be consistent; he was sensitive to the
impact of the rulings he choose to codify.

Another aspect of Rebbe’s editing technique is discussed just a few lines later. Once we have
established that we are talking about a chicken being raised to produce eggs, the Gemara wonders
why the Mishna discusses the egg; the same dispute would apply to the chicken itself. Since one
did not initially intend to eat the chicken, it would be muktza, and one could not change one’s mind
and decide to eat it.

The Gemara explains that we prefer to discuss the egg itself to point out that Beit Shammai not
only allows one to eat the chicken but also the egg, as koach d’hetera adif, the power to be lenient
is better[4]. As Rashi explains, “it is good to hear the conviction of one who is lenient, as he relies
on his understanding and is not afraid to allow, but the strength of those who forbid is no proof
because anyone can prohibit, even that which is permissible”.

It takes great wisdom, courage, and understanding to properly apply Jewish law. We must use our
power to search for leniencies, while at the same time guiding the public to uphold the law.

[1] Even within Biblical law, there are varying levels of importance; for example, something written explicitly in the text is of
greater significance than something derived from one of the 13 hermeneutical rules.
[2] The Mishna in Eduyot (Chapters 4 and 5) lists the 41 cases where Beit Shammai is lenient and Beit Hillel strict. That sounds
like a fair bit, until one realizes that there are 316 debates between these two great schools, and in the remainder of the cases, it is
Beit Hillel who is lenient.
[3] While to us, the laws of muktza are so fundamental to Shabbat, they were not universally agreed upon.
[4] The Gemara, on technical grounds having nothing to do with the principles described above, rejects this understanding of the
Mishna and explains that in reality, we are talking about a chicken being raised for eating.

Rachel Scheinerman writes:11

Regarding an egg that was laid on a festival:
Beit Shammai say it may be eaten.
Beit Hillel say it may not be eaten.

Welcome to Tractate Beitzah (literally: egg). The tractate is named for this opening mishnah which
presents three disputes between Hillel and Shammai, including this one about whether an egg laid
on a festival may be consumed. The disputes have two things in common: (1) In each of them,

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Myjewishlearning.com

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Shammai is (uncharacteristically) more lenient than Hillel. (2) They deal with questions of festival
observance.

This tractate also sometimes goes by a more descriptive title: Yom Tov — literally, “good day,”
meaning any festival day on which work is prohibited. These festival days include the first and
last days of Passover, Shavuot, both days of Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur (though, as we saw in
Tractate Yoma, this is really its own special category of festival), the beginning of Sukkot,
and Shemini Atzeret/Simchat Torah. The labor prohibitions of festivals will be our subject now
for the next 39 pages.

If you joined us on our journey through Tractates Shabbat and Eruvin, you will recall that the
Torah prohibits labor on Shabbat, but is a little fuzzy in the details, despite stating a few verboten
activities (lighting a fire and gathering sticks, for example). The rabbis solved much of this
ambiguity by creating a concrete definition of forbidden labor based on 39 primary categories of
work, which are themselves derived from the labors required to build the tabernacle in the
wilderness. As is often the case though, the devil is in the details, which is why Tractates Shabbat
and Eruvin offered us over 250 pages of discussion.

And now we’re back — sort of. Instead of discussing Shabbat’s work prohibition, we’re discussing
the prohibition against working on festival days. This, too, comes from the Torah: You shall do no
occupational work. (Leviticus 23:7, Numbers 29:1 and elsewhere). But the Torah’s prohibition on
festival labor is apparently lighter. For one, the Torah prohibits not melachah (“labor”)
but m’lechet avodah (“occupational labor”). For another, there is an apparent exemption for labor
required to prepare food (Exodus 12:16). Finally, the Torah does not prescribe death as the
punishment for violating a festival, as it does for Shabbat (Exodus 35:2).

Why, though, would some rabbis think it is forbidden to eat an egg laid on a festival? After all, it’s
the chicken that did the “work,” not us. The concern here is that of muktzeh, one of the trickier
concepts in the suite of Shabbat and festival prohibitions. Objects that are designated muktzeh,
which means “set aside,” are not supposed to be touched or moved on a holy day. The sages
disagree about what exactly constitutes muktzeh, but it includes several categories. Objects that
are used for forbidden labor, like a sewing needle or a pen, are one example. These objects may
not be touched because they might tempt us into performing prohibited labor. There are also
objects that are muktzeh because they are disgusting (this kind of muktzeh is not obviously
connected to the work prohibition). And some objects are muktzeh because they came into
existence on the day on which labor is forbidden — such as an egg that is laid on a festival. But
there is widespread disagreement about much of this framework.

This tractate jumps into the discussion of festival prohibitions at the deep end. The first page, and
the second, subjects this debate between Hillel and Shammai to rigorous scrutiny. About what
exactly do they disagree? Is it the type of chicken that lays the egg? Or whether the egg is even
muktzeh at all? And where does the law actually stand?

As we move through this 39-page tractate, and the sages debate the various details distinguishing
Shabbat labor prohibitions from festival labor prohibitions, sometimes they offer comments that
signal larger concerns, as they do on this very first page:

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Shabbat is stringent and therefore people will not come to treat it with contempt … but a festival
is lenient and therefore people will (more likely) come to treat it with contempt.

Will the less stringent prohibitions on a festival, not to mention the less stringent punishment
attached to violation, lead Israel to believe it is unimportant and treat it with contempt? Hopefully
not. After all, festivals are not just about hewing to a strict list of work prohibitions. A primary
commandment on festivals is to rejoice, as Deuteronomy 16:14–15 has it: You shall rejoice in your
festival … you shall be only joyful. This, too, is a priority for the rabbis as they explore and define
the rules for festival days.

Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:12

Almost all of the first daf of Massechet Beitzah (2) deals with the law of ‫( נולד‬literally ‘that which
is born’) - which is the term used with reference to an item or substance that either evolved into
existence on Shabbat or Yom Tov, or assumed a new form that it did not previously have. And
since this item was not available prior to Shabbat or Yom Tov, it is deemed to be ‘mukzeh’ and
may not be used on these days. This is why our Massechet is called Beitzah (egg), because it refers
the classic case of a ‫( נולד‬i.e. when an egg is laid on Shabbat or Yom Tov).
However, as we are just days away from Rosh Hashanah, it is important to distinguish between
the physical case of ‫( נולד‬which is ‘mukzeh’ on Shabbat and Yom Tov), and the spiritual
opportunity of ‫( נולד‬which is encouraged every day – and especially on Shabbat and Yom Tov!) -
which is a core theme in the things that we say and do from Rosh Hashanah until Yom Kippur. Let
me explain:

1. As we find in the Machzor, Rosh Hashanah is known as ‫‘ – היום הרת עולם‬the day of the birthing
of [the culmination of] the world [through the creation of Adam & Chava]’ – which means that a
central message of Rosh Hashanah is the idea of ‫ – נולד‬being born - and being spiritually reborn.
2. This message is further affirmed in the Torah reading and Haftarah of Rosh Hashanah - which
tell us about the ‫ נולד‬- birthing stories - of Sarah and Hannah.
3. Interestingly, one of the more unusual things that we do on the Yamim Noraim is prostrate
ourselves to the ground. As Harav Immanuel Jakobovits explains, by doing this ‘we… return to
the posture we had in the mother’s womb before we were born’. Then, moments afterwards, we
rise up – and in so doing, ‘act out’ being ‫ נולד‬- reborn.
4. It is customary to immerse in the Mikveh on Erev (Rosh Hashanah &) Yom Kippur, which is
often described as representing a form of ‫ נולד‬- rebirth.
5. Finally, in seeking to explain why we recite the Shehecheyanu bracha on Yom Kippur, a creative
solution is posited by the Belzer Rebbe who explains that we do so over our new selves that we
have become (‫)נולד‬.

I shall end with one of the most exquisite ideas found in the writings of Rav Hirsch – and an
especially fitting one having just started a new Massechet - who explains that there is an
etymological connection between the word ‫( הרה‬the process of conception leading to birth) and
‫( תורה‬Torah). This is because what is found in Torah ‘are the teachings of truth and goodness that

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were revealed by God [which] we are to absorb… in our minds and hearts, so that they should
beget in us the awareness of truth and the desire for good’.

On this basis, if we are looking to be ‫נולד‬, we should look to the ‫ תורה‬and reflect on its teachings,
for it contains the spiritual material to guide us in our growth and our journey towards our new
selves.

How a Chicken Lays Her Eggs

Jeremy Brown writes:13

The opening pages of this new tractate, called Beitzah [lit, Egg] deal with the question of whether
an egg that is laid on Yom Tov may be eaten. Perhaps it is mukzeh, that is, forbidden to be touched
or moved because it was produced on a holiday, and not designated as food the day before. In
explaining the opening Mishnah, the Babylonian sage Rabbah (d. 320 C.E.) makes this statement:

13
http://www.talmudology.com/

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Since a lot depends on whether or not this statement is biologically correct, today we are going to
discuss how a chicken actually lays her eggs.

THE BIOLOGY OF EGG PRODUCTION

According to The Poultry Site (“Your poultry knowledge hub”)14 it takes about 25 hours for a
chicken to grow and lay her egg. First, the egg produces an egg from her ovary, and - fun fact- the
chicken, unlike most animals (including us) has only one ovary, instead of the usual two. Here is
a map so that you can follow along:

14
https://delishably.com/dairy/Everything-you-Ever-Wanted-to-Know-About-Chicken-Eggs

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Reproductive organs of the hen.

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 15

First, one of the yolks (of the 4,000 with which the chicken is born) moves out of the ova and into
the infundibulum. If there is a boy chicken around, this is where his sperm would meet the yolk
and fertilize it. (You know that tiny whitish spot you see on every egg yolk? That's a single female
cell called a blastodisc. If it is fertilized by the boy chicken’s sperm, cell division and embryo
development begins there.) But there are no boy chickens around when the goal is to produce eggs
for consumption. So the unfertilized yolk continues on its journey and passes through a section
called the magnum, where the albumen, the white bits of the mature egg, are secreted around the
yolk. The egg is now about 3 hours old. As it approaches the end of its journey along the hen’s
reproductive tract, the inner and outer layers of the shell membranes are added, a process that takes
about another hour.

Now the egg is in the hen’s uterus. This is where the shell, made mostly of calcium carbonate, is
added. It takes about 20 hours to form and perhaps another hour for the color, or pigment, to be
applied to the outer eggshell. This is where the eggshell gets its color, whether blue, white, brown,
or green. Finally, the completed egg in its fully formed shell moves through the hen’s vagina and
into her cloaca. That takes only a minute, and then, pop, out comes a nice fresh egg.

So was Rabbah correct? Kinda, but not really. It takes about 24 hours from start to finish, but once
the egg is “fully formed” it is laid immediately. A fully formed egg does not sit around inside the
chicken, which is what Rabbah seems to have been suggesting. On the other hand, the process of
forming an egg takes a whole day, so in that sense, Rabbah’s egg laying biology was close to what
actually happens.

15
https://www.thepoultrysite.com/publications/egg-quality-handbook/2/formation-of-the-egg

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Daniel Nevins writes:16

Rabbinic law allows cooking food on yom tov [Pesah, Shavu'ot, Rosh Hashanah, and Sukkot], but
only for yom tov. What, then, will one eat on the day immediately following Shabbat? This
Mishnah describes a rabbinic loophole called the “eruv tavshilin” (which is nearly impossible to
translate). An eruvis a legal device that “mixes” different domains so that activities permitted in
one domain can be extended to another domain. In this case, the eruv is a dish of cooked food. By
cooking some food for Shabbat before yom tov [for example, on Thursday, when Friday is yom
tov] and saving that food until Shabbat, any subsequent cooking during yom tov for Shabbat is
viewed as just an enhancement of the already prepared meal. It is a stretch, but it remains Jewish
practice even today!

QUESTIONS

1. Jewish festivals are meant to be extra joyous, which is why cooking is permitted. Why
didn’t that permission extend to Shabbat?
2. How do you understand the mechanism of eruv tavshilin? Since it technically turns all
Shabbat food into leftovers, does that diminish the honor of Shabbat?
3. Does this loophole enhance our awareness of sacred time or trivialize it?

Tractate Beitzah: Synopsis of Subjects17

CHAPTER I.

MISHNA I. Why a new-born thing on a festival must not be used on the same day. The different
opinions for the reason of it. How is the case with the same on the two festival days which are kept
in exile only but not in Palestine? How is the case when a Sabbath falls on one of the two days of
the exile festivals? And how is the law of the same on the two days of New Year, which are kept
in Palestine also-are they considered as one sacredness or two? About a burial on festivals and
New Year. An animal or fowl whose blood must be covered when slaughtered, in which case they
may be slaughtered on a festival. And how is it with a cross which is doubtful if it is considered a
wild or a domestic animal. The ordinance of Rabban Johanan b. Zakkai,

16
https://www.jtsa.edu/beitzah-21
17
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/synopsis-of-subjects-for-tractate-beitzah

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MISHNAS II. to VIII. Concerning the preparing of doves of the cots for the festival, and their
removal from one cot to another. The shutters of shops, may they be removed? If birds have
removed from their prepared place? If one has prepared black pigeons and finds white ones, or
more or less than he has prepared previously. Which utensils are allowed to be used for the purpose
they were made, and for other purposes. If the tallow of the slaughtered on the festival may be
salted. The three things the finishing of which is allowed. What it is allowed to carry on public
ground. If it is lawful to give to the priest the first dough on the festival. The necessary change in
laboring from the week-days, how shall it be done?

MISHNAS IX. to XII. If spices may be pounded on a festival. How about Ptisana? How to pick
pulse on a festival. The custom of the house of Rabban Gamaliel in such cases. How about sending
as presents on a festival, shoes, sandals, phylacteries, etc.,

CHAPTER II.

MISHNAS I. to III. Of what kind of eatables the cooking Erub may be prepared. How it is if one
has forgotten to make it, and how it is with him who has not made it intentionally. About the
purification of vessels on the festival. About bringing peace, vow, and voluntary offerings on the
festival. About the four hundred Zuz which a sick person ordered to give to a certain man, that he
should marry his daughter, and the latter refused. The discussion of the schools
of Shammai and Hillel about laying the hands on the offerings on the festival,

MISHNAS IV. to VII. The three things which R. Gamaliel decided as the school of Shammai. Is
it lawful to paint the eyes on a festival? (See also Appendix on page 45.) About baking thick loaves.
How about putting spice on live coals. The three things which R. Elazar b. Azariah permitted, and
the other sages prohibited. The laws about a pepper hand mill and a child's carriage,

CHAPTER III.

MISHNAS I. to IV. The contradiction between the Tosephta and the Mishna concerning beasts
and fowls. Why a certain bird is called "Durur.”? Why R. Gamaliel did not accept the fish which
a Gentile brought him as a present. If the beasts which are in a garden must be prepared previously,
In what case a man may be carried in a chair. Why R. Na'hman allowed his Yalta to be carried. If
it is lawful to examine the blemish of a first-born animal, and how is the case if the animal is born
with a blemish? About the Amora who was erratic in his teachings (see also footnote). Does the
law of Muktzah exist for the half of a Sabbath?

MISHNAS V. to X. How to buy an animal for the festival. How to buy meat from the butcher and
things from the grocery without naming a price. Is it allowed to measure beverages on the festival
by the seller? and what shall be done to satisfy both the buyer and the seller. About the three
hundred pitchers of wine, and the same number of oil, which were gathered from the froth, and
from the vessels after emptying, which were brought to the treasurer of charity, and his answer.
How to feed the animals when measuring is needed. How the wives of R. Joseph and R. Ashi sifted
their flour on the festival, and of the approval and disapproval of their husbands,

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CHAPTER IV.

MISHNAS I. to VI. How to carry jars of wine from one place to another, and from what stacks
fuel may be taken. If some may be taken from a ruined booth. Also from what kind of beams wood
may be cut for the festival. If it is permitted to make a hole in a tent filled with fruit. How it is
about making a hole in clay for the purpose of using it for a lamp. The six things
which Bar Qappara taught about a wick, There are three men whose life is not called life,

p. xiii MISHNAS VII. to IX. How to roast salted fish. Is it allowed to smear an oven with clay?
The difference of opinion between the Amoraim about Hizra. If broken vessels may be used for
fuel. Branches of spice-trees to enjoy the odor, whether they may be handled. And how to grind
spices. How R. Jehudah used to break twigs off from spice-trees, to supply to his guests. If it is
allowed to make heaps of fuel in the yard. Ovens or hearths standing in the yard, are they
considered as vessels? If the hair of an animal's feet may he removed by fire. If one wishes to
partake of the fruit of a Sabbatical year, what must he previously do? In which case may the same
be used if it is doubtful whether the heave-offering was separated?

CHAPTER V.

MISHNAS I. to VI. The difference between Sabbath and a Festival, in throwing and covering
fruit. About removing fruit from one roof to another. The things which are prohibited on account
of Sh'buth (Sabbath-rest--rabbinically). The things which are prohibited as optional. The legal limit
within which cattle and utensils may be brought for the use of the festival. About a barrel of wine
and an animal which were bought in partnership by two men from different places, what shall be
done, and the different law about these two. What R. Abba prayed when he intended to go to
Palestine, and what he said after he reached there. The five things which have been taught about
burning coals. The Babylonian travelers. Fruit, which is deposited in another's house, who is to be
considered the owner of same concerning the carrying of it. The advice to water an animal before
slaughtering it,

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