FIRST THREE CASES

Lambino vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 174153             October 25, 2006

FACTS:

On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of
Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at
least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article
VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article
XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution; and

HELD:

1.       The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment” should
be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that
“before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people
should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it around
for signature.”

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be
present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can
sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
“directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the
full text of the proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the
people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature
sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October
2006.

2.       A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution.
There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An
affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court
must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.

MACARIOLA V ASUNCION

FACTS

Reyes siblings filed a complaint for partition against Macariola, concerning the
properties left by their common father, Francisco Reyes. Asuncion was the judge who
rendered the decision, which became final for lack of an appeal. A project of partition
was submitted to Judge Asuncion after the finality of the decision. This project of
partition was only signed by the counsel of the parties, who assured the judge that they
were given authorization to do so.
One of the properties in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into
5 lots. One of these lots (Lot 1184-D) was sold to Anota, a stenographer of the court,
while another (Lot 1184-E) was sold to Dr. Galapon, who later on sold a portion of the
same lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife. A year after, spouses Asuncion and Dr.
Galapon sold their respective shares over the lot to Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries. At the time of the sale, Judge Asuncion and his wife were both stockholders,
with Judge Asuncion as President and his wife as secretary of said company.
A year after the company’s registration with the SEC, Macariola filed a complaint
against Judge Asuncion alleging: • that he violated Art. 1491 (5) of the Civil Code in
acquiring a portion of the lot, which was one of those properties involved in the partition
case; and • that he violated Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA
3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics by associating himself with a private company while he was a judge of
the CFI of Leyte. This case was referred to Justice Palma of the CA for investigation,
report and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice recommended
that Judge Asuncion should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the
complaints filed against him.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code in acquiring by
purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E, which was among those properties involved in the
partition case.

2. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce,
Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics when he associated himself with Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries, Inc., as stockholder and a ranking officer

HELD

1. NO. Although Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code prohibits justices, judges among others
from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court, the SC has ruled, however, that for the prohibition to
operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of
the litigation involving the property. In this case, when Judge Asuncion purchased a
portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in the partition case was already final because none
of the parties filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Thus, the lot in question
was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, Judge Asuncion did NOT buy the lot
directly from the plaintiffs in the partition case but from Dr. Galapon, who earlier
purchased the lot from the plaintiffs. The subsequent sale from Dr. Galapon to Judge
Asuncion is NOT a scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot as a
consideration for the approval of the project of partition. As pointed out by the
Investigating Justice, there is no evidence in the record showing that Dr. Galapon acted
as a mere dummy of Judge Asuncion. In fact, Dr. Galapon appeared to be a respectable
citizen, credible and sincere, having bought the subject lot in good faith and for valuable
consideration, without any intervention of Judge Asuncion.
Although Judge Asuncion did NOT violate Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code, it was
IMPROPER for him to have acquired the lot in question. Canon 3 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics requires that judges’ official conduct should be free from the appearance
of impropriety. It was unwise and indiscreet on the part of Judge Asuncion to have
purchased the property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be
transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of
such transfer. His actuations must not cause doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of
his administration of justice.
2. NO. Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce prohibits justices of the SC, judges and
officials of the department of public prosecution in active service from engaging in
commerce, either in person or proxy or from holding any office or have an direct,
administrative or financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within
the limits of the territory in which they discharge their duties. However, this Code is the
Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, which was extended to the Philippines by a Royal
Decree. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US to the Philippines, Art 14
of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there
is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign are automatically
abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
There appears to be no affirmative act that continued the effectivity of said provision.
Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019 provides for instances when public officers are considered to have
committed corrupt practices, which include having financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in
his official capacity or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from
having any interest. Judge Asuncion cannot be held liable under said provision because
there is no showing that he participated or intervened in his official capacity in the
business or transactions of Traders Manufacturing. In this case, the business of the
corporation in which he participated has obviously no relation to his judicial office.
Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules does NOT apply to members of the
Judiciary, who are covered under RA 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) and Art X (7) of the
1973 Constitution. Under Sec 67 of RA 296, the power to remove or dismiss judges is
vested in the President of the Philippines, not in the CSC, and only on 2 grounds—
serious misconduct and inefficiency. Under the 1973 Constitution, only the SC can
discipline judges of the inferior courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.
Judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees because
the Commissioner of the CSC is not the head of the Judiciary department. Moreover,
only permanent officers in the classified service are subject to the jurisdiction of the
CSC. Judges, however, are not within this classification, as they are considered to be
non-competitive or unclassified service of the government as a Presidential appointee.
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics reminds judges to abstain from making
personal investments in enterprises, which are apt to be involved in litigation in his
court. Judge Asuncion and his wife, however, had withdrawn from the corporation and
sold their shares to third parties only 22 days after its incorporation, which indicates
that Judge Asuncion realized that their interest in the corporation contravenes said
Canon. The Court even commended the spouses for such act.

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, and
THE DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS G. BARRERA, PABLO S.
TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA,
LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors.
GR. NO. L-34150
OCTOBER 16, 1971

FACTS:
A Constitutional Convention was called upon to propose amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines, in which, the delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of
resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The Convention approved
Organic Resolution No. 1, amending section one of article 5 of the Constitution of the Philippines to
lower the voting age to 18. Said resolution also provided in its Section 3 that the partial amendment,
which refers only to the age qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to
other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other
portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the entire Constitution.

The main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing
resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect as laws as far
as they are in contravention to Section 1 Article XV of the Constitution. Under the said provision, the
proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from
each and all of the other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention.

ISSUE:
WON the Resolution approved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention constitutional.

HELD:
NO. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts
and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite, as well as
the resolution of the respondent COMELEC complying therewith are null and void.

The Court is of the opinion that in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has finished, and
separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has been called to formulate, the Convention’s
Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention implementing the same violate
the condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one “election” or plebiscite for the
ratification of all the amendments the Convention may propose. We are not denying any right of the
people to vote on the proposed amendment; We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of
the Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not separately from but together with all the
other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.

Prescinding already from the fact that under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that
no fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what finally will be concomitant
qualifications that will be required by the final draft of the constitution to be formulated by the
Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other considerations which
make it impossible to vote intelligently on the proposed amendment. No one knows what changes in
the fundamental principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To be more
specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any
significant value at all. Who can say whether or not later on the Convention may decide to provide
for varying types of voters for each level of the political units it may divide the country into. The root
of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing
substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the existing social and
political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite
intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions,
which the Convention may establish and of which presently he is not given any idea? Clearly, there
is improper submission.