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Wood KER & AST
Wood KER & AST
EQUITY
EQUITY Analysts: Barbara Zaleska Warsaw: +48 22 222 1547
RESEARCH
RESEARCH E-mail: barbara.zaleska@wood.com Website: www.wood.com
Table of contents
Valuation ......................................................................................................... 3
Companies
Kernel ..................................................................................................... 13
ASTARTA ................................................................................................ 19
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We cut our PTs for Kernel and ASTARTA by 16% and 19%, respectively. This is despite
an upward revision of our forecasts and the positive FX translation effect – as a result of
a recent increase of risk aversion and the weakness of the equity markets, as evidenced by
the broadening CDS spreads and the contracting trading multiples of the peer group.
Share price corrections. The WIG Ukraine index has lost 22% ytd, underperforming the
broad Polish market by 6%. This underperformance was accrued mostly in the first half of
the year – since the markets started to fall at the beginning of August, the WIG Ukraine
has performed in line with the market, losing 16%. The biggest underperformers were
Milkiland and ASTARTA, which, since 31 July, have lost 26% and 39%, respectively. We
note the relatively strong performance of the newest entrants to the WSE, especially
Ovostar and KSG Agro, which have outperformed the general market.
Share price performance
0% 0%
-10% -10%
-20% -20%
-30% -30%
-40% -40%
-50% -50%
-60% -60%
Source: Bloomberg
Contracting multiples. Meanwhile, the consensus estimates for the stocks have improved
since the spring, driven by the market’s strong expectations for the 2011 harvest in
Ukraine and the high level of soft commodity prices in 1H11 (in Kernel’s case, supported
also by its delivery on its M&A pipeline). As a result of: 1) share price corrections; 2)
improving financial estimates for the stocks; and 3) the FX translation effect (as the PLN
contracted has underperformed the USD and the UAH), the financial multiples for the
stocks have significantly contracted.
12
10
Source: Bloomberg
60%
40%
20%
0%
-20%
-40%
-60%
-80%
Source: Bloomberg
This contraction reflects, in our opinion, the increasing macroeconomic risks, something
that we will discuss in more detail in the following chapters of this report and which is
reflected, for example, by the broadening CDS spreads for Ukraine and the correcting soft
commodity prices. Despite a significant contraction in the multiples from 8.0-8.5x
EV/EBITDA to 5.0-5.5x EBITDA for ASTARTA and Kernel, respectively, these two names
still trade at significant premiums to their historical lows. In the midst of the financial
crunch, which was particularly harsh for the Ukrainian economy in late 2008 and early
2009, both names traded at EV/EBITDA multiples below 2x, but we note that this reflected
the substantially higher Ukraine country risk perception than we observe currently.
EV/ EBITDA for Kernel and ASTARTA vs. 10-year CDS spread for Ukraine
10 6000
9
8 5000
7 4000
6
5 3000
4
3 2000
2 1000
1
0 0
Source: Bloomberg
In our opinion, this results from the fact that consensus does not yet reflect the recent soft
commodity price movements in the Ukrainian market.
Premium to peer group median. We also note that, on our and consensus estimates, both
stocks trade at premiums to the peer group median but, in our opinion, there is a
downside risk to the consensus estimates for agricultural producers (such as Agroton, KSG
Agro and IMC). As we have stated above, we believe that consensus does not yet reflect
the recent significant corrections in the Ukrainian prices of grains and oilseeds, especially
sunflower seeds. Due to the high sensitivity of the financial results of the agricultural
companies to soft commodity prices, we believe that such downgrades could affect the
median peer group multiples significantly.
Also, we believe that both rising equity and debt capital will become more difficult and
that it could hinder landbank development plans, bringing potential further downside to
valuations. In the case of Milkiland, we also see downside risk to consensus estimates,
especially in light of the depreciating ruble.
For the above-mentioned reasons, we have decided to reduce the weight we put on the
multiples-derived price targets to 25% from the 50% that we used previously.
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
Dec/08
Dec/09
Dec/10
Jun/08
Jun/09
Jun/10
Jun/11
Oct/08
Oct/09
Oct/10
Oct/11
Nov/08
Nov/09
Nov/10
Jul/08
Jul/09
Jul/10
Jul/11
Apr/08
Apr/09
Apr/10
Apr/11
Sep/08
Feb/09
Sep/09
Feb/10
Sep/10
Feb/11
Sep/11
Mar/08
Mar/09
Mar/10
Mar/11
Jan/00
Jan/08
Jan/09
Jan/10
Jan/11
Aug/08
Aug/09
Aug/10
Aug/11
May/08
May/09
May/10
May/11
Spot 2011 consensus 2012consensus
Sources: Bloomberg
Corn futures and consensus forecasts for 2011E and 2012E, USD per bushel
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Dec/08
Dec/09
Dec/10
Jun/08
Jun/09
Jun/10
Jun/11
Oct/08
Oct/09
Oct/10
Oct/11
Nov/08
Nov/09
Nov/10
Jul/08
Jul/09
Jul/10
Jul/11
Apr/08
Apr/09
Apr/10
Apr/11
Sep/08
Feb/09
Sep/09
Feb/10
Sep/10
Feb/11
Sep/11
Mar/08
Mar/09
Mar/10
Mar/11
Jan/00
Jan/08
Jan/09
Jan/10
Jan/11
Aug/08
Aug/09
Aug/10
Aug/11
May/08
May/09
May/10
May/11
Sources: Bloomberg
From the 1H11 peaks, wheat has already corrected by 29% and corn by 17% but, in our
opinion, the risks are still on the downside, especially in the current environment, of
declining commodity prices and the improving supply outlook following the relatively
strong 2011 harvest: the USDA forecasts that, in 2011, global wheat production could
increase by 4% yoy to 681m tonnes and global corn production by 4% yoy to 860m
tonnes.
Sources: USDA
Sources: USDA
We note that, so far this year, the price corrections in Ukraine have been much steeper
due to state interventions in the market through export quotas (1H11) and duties (since
July 2011), and other internal factors.
Ukraine: wheat prices, USD per tonne
Impact on stocks. In this report, we do not alter our soft commodity price assumptions
significantly for Kernel and ASTARTA, since our expectation that prices could correct has
already been built into our forecasts. The sensitivity, however, remains high. We estimate
that a 10% downward move in our assumptions for grains, oilseeds and sugar prices
1200 14
1000 12
10
800
8
600
6
400
4
200 2
0 0
Source: Bloomberg
Impact on stocks. Higher Ukraine country risk could affect the valuations of all the listed
Ukrainian names negatively. In the table below, we present the sensitivity of our DCF
valuations for Kernel and ASTARTA to changes in the risk free rate for Ukraine, which we
calculate as the 10Y bund yield increased by the 10Y CDS spread for Ukraine.
Sensitivity of our DCF valuations to changes in the risk free rate
Astarta RFR RFR
81 8.0% 9.0% 10.0% 11.0% 12.0% 0 8.0% 9.0% 10.0% 11.0% 12.0%
1.0% 98 87 78 70 63 1.0% 98 87 78 70 63
1.5% 100 89 79 71 64 1.5% 100 89 79 71 64
g 2.0% 103 91 81 73 65 g 2.0% 103 91 81 73 65
2.5% 106 93 83 74 66 2.5% 106 93 83 74 66
3.0% 109 96 85 76 68 3.0% 109 96 85 76 68
CHFUSD NOKUSD UAHUSD SEKUSD GBPUSD EURUSD RUBUSD CZKUSD PLNUSD TRYUSD
Curncy Curncy Curncy Curncy Curncy Curncy Curncy Curncy Curncy Curncy
5%
0%
-5%
-10%
-15%
-20%
1Y Since Jul-31
Source: Bloomberg
The USDUAH exchange rate has remained stable since late 2009, but the CDS spread
remains broad and there could be increasing pressure on the hryvnia. We note that
Ukraine’s international reserves declined by 8.5% in September, and we do not rule out
that this was the result of the National Bank of Ukraine defending the hryvnia. In our
opinion, the depreciation should not be as significant as it was in 2008, when the UAH
lost 60% to the USD – we would expect a 10-12% depreciation to c.9 UAH to the USD.
Impact on stocks. We believe consensus is not pricing in a potential weakening of the
UAH. If this risk materialises, we would overweight exporters such as Kernel, or the
producers of exportable commodities (Agroton, for example). The local currency results of
ASTARTA and MHP, integrated producers of food with a portion of grain sales in their
revenues, should also hold up relatively well, in our opinion, although their valuation
could be diminished because of the FX translation effect. We would avoid, on the other
hand, the un-integrated producers of food, whose results could suffer because of cost
pressures.
4) Financing
Higher Ukraine country risk could also negatively affect Ukrainian companies through
potential problems with debt rollout and higher financing costs. In our opinion, this risk
should not negatively affect Kernel or ASTARTA, as both are quality names.
Due to the nature of its business, Kernel typically has higher leverage, with gearing
cyclically ranging from 1.0-3.0x EBITDA. For the current marketing year, Kernel has
secured the financing already, signing three different contracts, which should meet its
financing needs, especially in light of soft commodity price corrections and the resultant
lower financing needs for grain and sunflower seed purchases.
ASTARTA has relatively low gearing, with a net debt/EBITDA of 1.1x, and has signed an
agreement with EBRD that should help finance its capex.
Moreover, in our opinion, both Kernel and ASTARTA could benefit from the potential
financing problems of smaller companies and accelerate their expansion plans.
5) Regulatory risks
In our opinion, the Ukrainian companies from the agriculture and food sectors operate in
an unstable regulatory environment, with the government often resorting to manual
steering rather than seeking complex solutions. We believe that regulatory risk is key for
Ukrainian enterprises and includes, but is not limited to, export regulations, income tax
EQUITY and VAT regulations, retail price regulations and land market regulations.
RESEARCH
Kernel/ASTARTA 11 WOOD & COMPANY
Export regulations. Following the relatively weak 2010 harvest results and soft
commodities price rally, the Ukrainian government introduced grain export
quotas in order to ensure the availability of grain on the domestic market and to
curb inflation. These quotas were lifted before the start of the 2011 marketing
season, but were replaced by duties on corn (12%), wheat (9%) and barley (14%),
targeted to benefit the state budget from the high level of soft commodity prices.
These duties affected the domestic price level in Ukraine negatively and the
volume of soft commodity exports from the start of the new marketing year. The
parliament voted recently to lift the duties on corn and wheat. The law was
signed by the President and became effective on 19 October, which should be
positive for both the producers of exportable commodities (for example, Agroton,
KSG and IMC) and for traders (such as Kernel). Export regulations remain a risk
factor, however, due to a number of proposals to introduce duties for other soft
commodities, such as sunflower oil, rapeseed and soybeans.
Tax regulations – FAT and VAT. Ukrainian farming companies enjoy Fixed
Agricultural Tax (FAT) treatment, which is far more advantageous than corporate
income tax. The new Tax Code of Ukraine, adopted in December 2010,
prolonged this advantageous tax treatment, but the regulatory environment for the
agricultural sector may be subject to change. As of July 2011, the new Tax Code
cancelled the VAT refunds on grain and oilseed exports, negatively affecting
domestic grain prices.
Retail price regulations. Due to the high level of soft commodity prices in early
2011, the Ukrainian authorities put pressure on domestic producers to self-
regulate the prices of commodities such as sunflower oil or sugar, in order to
prevent inflation in the domestic market. As the prices have started to come
down, we do not expect similar moves in the near future.
Land market reforms. The land sale moratorium in Ukraine is in place until 1
January 2012. So far, the Ukrainian parliament has not adopted any regulations
that would stay in place once the market is opened; hence, there is a high degree
of uncertainty as to how the land market will shape. Risks related to the potential
change in land ownership include the risk of lost lease contracts and higher rents,
as well as increased capex requirements to purchase land.
EQUITY
RESEARCH
Kernel/ASTARTA 12 WOOD & COMPANY
Consumer Staples, Ukraine October 21, 2011
Kernel Buy
Unchanged
Price: PLN 66
Price target: PLN 77
(From: PLN 92)
Back to basics
We remain BUYers of Kernel as upward revisions to our
forecasts outweigh the pricing-in (illustrated by the lower Expected Events
share price) of increased macro risk. We have increased our
EBITDA forecasts for Kernel by 25% to USD 367m for 1Q11/12 Nov 14, 2011
2011/12 and by 17% to USD 359m for 2012/13, reflecting its
delivered M&A transactions and the recent soft commodity
price movements. We have nevertheless cut our price target Key Data
(PT) from PLN 92 to PLN 77, as a result of the higher cost of
risk for Ukraine (terminal WACC up from 12.5% to 15.3%) Market Cap USD 1,692mil
and the weakness of the equity markets (the 2012E median Free Float 62%
EV/EBITDA multiple for its CIS peers has declined from 7.1x Shares Outstanding 79.7 mil
to 4.1x since our last update, dated 1 March). On our new Average daily volume USD 3.9 mil
estimates, Kernel is currently trading at a 2011/12E Major Shareholder Namsen Ltd
EV/EBITDA ratio of 5.6x. Reuters Code KERN.WA
Risk profile. In the current volatile market environment and Bloomberg Code KER PW
the presence of significant macroeconomic risks for the entire WIG Index 39,970
sector, we believe Kernel stands out as the most defensive
name in its peer group. Its prudent soft commodity price risk
management policy should help the company to protect its Price Performance
margins in the sunflower oil and grain trading sector,
supported by a stable flow of revenues from fee-for-service 52-w range (PLN) 58 - 86
businesses, such as the silo network or port terminals. Kernel YTD PLN Performance -12%
also remains hedged against UAH depreciation through its Relative YTD PLN Performance 1%
significant share of export revenues and secured financing for
the current marketing season (by signing loan agreements for Kernel price performance
USD 850m). In our opinion, all these features make Kernel a
good name to hide in amid turbulent times. 100.0
Ukrros, farming company Delco and, last but not least, 20.0
stronger presence in this country and a further source of both Kernel WIG20
Financial forecasts. In this report, we have revised up our forecasts for Kernel, reflecting
its delivered M&A transactions and the recent soft commodity price movements. We have
increased our EBITDA forecasts by 25% to USD 367m for 2011/12 and by 17% to USD
359m for 2012/13. The correction we forecast between 2011/12 and 2012/13 results from
our conservative assumptions on grain and sugar prices. We believe the EBITDA results of
the farming and sugar segment could, as a result, contract by 11%. We note that our
estimates for 2012/13 are below consensus.
Our estimates vs. consensus
As far as capex is concerned, we expect a USD 278m outflow related to the M&A
transactions and the construction of new silos this year, and capex at the level of the D&A
charges afterwards.
We note that our assumptions on the low soft commodity price level reduce Kernel’s
working capital requirements.
DCF valuation. We discount the free cash flow by using a WACC of between 14.8% and
15.3% (up from 12.5%). Our WACC calculations are based on a risk free rate of 10% for
Ukraine (up from 8%) and an equity risk premium of 5.5%. We assume a terminal growth
rate of 20%, which is our long-term expected growth in the production yields of
Ukrainian agriculture – we expect that Kernel will continue to grow with the market, on a
terminal basis. Our DCF model yields a PT of PLN 83 per share.
In the table below, we present the sensitivity of our PT to changes in the terminal gross
rate and RFR. We note that if the RFR for Ukraine increases to 11%, we would be
HOLDers of the stock.
Sensitivity analysis
Kernel RFR RFR
83 8.0% 9.0% 10.0% 11.0% 12.0% 0 8.0% 9.0% 10.0% 11.0% 12.0%
1.0% 94 86 79 73 67 1.0% 94 86 79 73 67
1.5% 97 88 81 74 69 1.5% 97 88 81 74 69
g 2.0% 100 91 83 76 70 g 2.0% 100 91 83 76 70
2.5% 103 93 85 78 72 2.5% 103 93 85 78 72
3.0% 107 96 87 80 73 3.0% 107 96 87 80 73
Up to now, Kernel has not paid any dividends and we have decided not to include
dividends in our forecasts.
BALANCE SHEET
USD mil 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12E 2012/13E 2013/14E 2014/15E 2015/16E
Shareholders equity 397 356 603 964 1,215 1,460 1,724 1,993 2,273
Minorities 44 2 3 23 23 23 23 23 23
Net Debt 167 165 286 301 355 104 (116) (378) (643)
Capital Employed 608 523 892 1,287 1,593 1,587 1,630 1,638 1,653
Non-current assets 378 321 526 743 976 977 978 980 981
Inventories 145 99 148 188 212 209 226 228 233
Trade receivables and prepayments 79 58 161 206 238 235 252 255 261
Trade payables and advances (27) (33) (143) (136) (149) (147) (158) (160) (163)
Other current assets 34 77 200 286 316 313 331 335 341
Working Capital 230 201 366 544 617 610 652 658 672
Capital Employed 609 523 892 1,287 1,593 1,587 1,630 1,638 1,653
CASH FLOW
USD mil 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12E 2012/13E 2013/14E 2014/15E 2015/16E
Net profit 82 132 153 218 251 246 264 269 280
Depreciation 12 23 23 32 45 45 46 46 47
Change in Working Capital (210) (25) (97) (188) (73) 7 (42) (7) (13)
Other (9) (1) 7 (6) 0 0 0 0 0
Net Cash from Operations (126) 129 85 57 223 298 268 309 314
Capex and Acquistions 170 95 126 111 278 47 47 48 48
Free Cash Flow (296) 34 (41) (55) (54) 251 221 261 266
Share issue 235 0 82 141 0 0 0 0 0
Change in net debt 61 -34 -42 -86 54 -251 -221 -261 -266
Dividends paid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
KEY RATIOS
Grain trading volume 0.32 2.26 2.23 1.81 2.50 2.23 2.59 2.49 2.53
Seed crushing volume 0.68 0.73 1.18 1.99 2.70 2.80 2.84 2.88 2.89
Gross margin 23.9% 30.3% 30.6% 24.1% 27.8% 27.8% 27.4% 27.6% 27.6%
EBIT margin 16.8% 15.9% 16.5% 14.5% 15.4% 15.2% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0%
Net margin 12.4% 12.6% 15.0% 11.4% 12.0% 11.9% 11.9% 12.0% 12.2%
Effective tax rate 9.9% -4.0% -0.1% -6.2% 3.0% 5.0% 7.0% 8.0% 8.0%
Dividend payout 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
ROE 35.6% 35.1% 31.8% 27.8% 23.1% 18.4% 16.6% 14.5% 13.1%
Net debt/Equity 42.1% 46.5% 47.4% 31.2% 29.3% 7.1% -6.7% -18.9% -28.3%
Net debt/EBITDA 1.36 0.87 1.50 0.97 0.97 0.29 (0.31) (0.98) (1.64)
ASTARTA Hold
Downgraded from Buy
Price: PLN 68
Price target: PLN 78
(From: PLN 96)
Sugar, we’re going down
Expected Events
We decrease our price target (PT) for ASTARTA from
PLN 96 to PLN 78, offering 14% upside to the current 3Q11 results Nov 10, 2011
share price, and downgrade the stock to HOLD from
BUY. This is despite the fact that we have increased our
estimates for the company on the net profit level, by 3%
for 2011 and 18% for 2012. Key Data
Despite the upward revision of our forecasts, we reduce Market Cap USD 563 mil
our PT for ASTARTA as a result of the growing number of Free Float 32%
risks facing the sector, including the Ukraine country risk Shares Outstanding 25 mil
and lower peer group median multiples, both negatively Average daily volume USD 0.7 mil
affecting our valuation. We note also the company’s high Major Shareholder Viktor Ivanchyk (37%)
sensitivity to soft commodity price risk, as a further 10% Valery Korotkov (26%)
reduction in sugar and grain prices would reduce our Reuters Code ASRH.WA
EBITDA estimates by 27%, and long UAH exposure, Bloomberg Code AST PW
which could harm the valuation in the event of potential WIG Index 39,970
UAH depreciation. Given these risks and the current high
volatility in the markets, we reduce our recommendation
to HOLD, although we maintain our view that ASTARTA Price Performance
is one of the strongest fundamental growth stories on the
market. 52-w range (PLN) 65-102
YTD PLN Performance -18%
The negative scenario for Ukrainian sugar prices has Relative YTD PLN Performance --5%
materialised, as we predicted in our initiation note,
published on 14 April. We expect Ukrainian sugar ASTARTA price performance
production to reach 2.1m tonnes this year, bringing the
market into surplus after four years of deficit. This has 120
80
USD 800 per tonne, in line with our forecast. Grain prices 60
have also corrected but, since ASTARTA delivered strong 40
back of higher-than-expected grain production volumes, Oct-10 Jan-11 Apr-11 Jul-11 Oct-11
we have increased our 2012 net profit estimate for the Astarta WIG20
company by 18% to UAH 728m, down 15% yoy. We ASTARTA: sensitivity of PT to changes in RFR and g
note that this is, however, at an 11% discount to RFR
81 8.0% 9.0% 10.0% 11.0% 12.0%
consensus. 1.0% 98 87 78 70 63
1.5% 100 89 79 71 64
On our estimates, ASTARTA is trading at EV/EBITDA g 2.0% 103 91 81 73 65
2.5% 106 93 83 74 66
multiples of 4.9x on 2011 estimates and at 5.2x at 2012 3.0% 109 96 85 76 68
estimates.
Sales Net Profit EPS EPS P/E EV/EBITDA PBV Dividend ROE
(UAHm) (UAHm) growth (x) (x) (x) yield
2013E 4,314 953 38 30.8% 4.4 4.1 0.9 0.0% 22.3%
2012E 3,571 728 29 -15.4% 5.7 5.2 1.1 0.0% 21.2%
2011E 3,237 861 34 3.1% 4.9 4.7 1.4 0.0% 32.6%
2010E 2,328 835 33 153.0% 5.0 5.1 1.9 0.0% 47.0%
2009 1,481 330 13 n.m. 12.7 9.6 3.1 0.0% 33.3%
EQUITY 2008 971 -89 -4 n.m. n.m. 23.9 6.4 0.0% -12.9%
RESEARCH Analysts: Barbara Zaleska Warsaw: +48 22 222 1547
E-mail: barbara.zaleska@wood.com Website: www.wood.com
Valuation
In this report, we decrease our PT for ASTARTA from PLN 96 to PLN 78 and downgrade
the stock to BUY from HOLD. We value ASTARTA using two valuation methodologies:
DCF and peer group comparative valuation on P/E and EV/EBITDA multiples. Due to the
significant risk that we foresee for the consensus estimates for the peer group, we have
decided to reduce the weight that we assign to our comparative valuation to 25%. Our PT
offers 14% upside potential to the current share price, hence we rate ASTARTA a HOLD.
Valuation summary
Price Weight
DCF 81 75%
Comparative valuation 69 25%
Target price 78
Current share price 68
Upside 14%
Recommendation HOLD
Source: Wood Research
Financial forecasts. In this report, we update our financial model for ASTARTA, reflecting
the most recent developments, including the actual yields on crop and oilseeds,
information about the accelerated landbank development plan, changes in soft
commodity and sugar prices and, last but not least, the changes in VAT reporting.
As a result, we increase our 2011 net profit estimate by 3% and our 2012 net profit
estimate by 18% – the main contributors are the better-than-expected yields on grains,
especially corn. We note that, despite the increase in our 2012 forecasts, our estimates
are still at a double-digit discount to the market consensus.
Our financial forecasts vs. consensus
DCF. Our DCF model yields a PT of PLN 81 per share for ASTARTA. In our financial
forecasts for the company, which we present further on in this report, we estimate that,
between 2010 and 2015, ASTARTA should be able to increase its revenues by 2.5x. The
jump is thanks to the implementation of its expansion plan and improving efficiency. As
far as operating margins are concerned, we expect that, in the longer run, the sustainable
level of EBIT margin is between 23% and 26%.
We have increased our terminal WACC for ASTARTA from 13.4% to 15.5%, as a result of
the higher Ukraine country risk as measured by the CDS spread, which we use in our RFR
calculations (we use the 10Y bund yield increased by the 10Y CDS spread for Ukraine).
We continue to use a beta of 1.1 and a terminal growth rate of 2%.
PV of FCF 3,385
g 2.0%
Terminal WACC 15.5%
PV of terminal value 2,384
Net debt -1169
PV of equity 4,462
Diluted # of shares 25.0
Value per share (UAH) 178
PLN/UAH 2.54
Value per share (PLN) 70
12M target 81
In the table below, we present the sensitivity of our DCF-based PT to changes in the
terminal growth rate and RFR. We note that if the RFR for Ukraine increases to 12%, we
would be SELLers of the stock. If the RFR contracts to 9%, we would be BUYers of
ASTARTA.
ASTARTA: DCF-based PT sensitivity analysis to WACC and terminal growth rates
RFR RFR
81 8.0% 9.0% 10.0% 11.0% 12.0% 0 8.0% 9.0% 10.0% 11.0% 12.0%
1.0% 98 87 78 70 63 1.0% 98 87 78 70 63
1.5% 100 89 79 71 64 1.5% 100 89 79 71 64
g 2.0% 103 91 81 73 65 g 2.0% 103 91 81 73 65
2.5% 106 93 83 74 66 2.5% 106 93 83 74 66
3.0% 109 96 85 76 68 3.0% 109 96 85 76 68
Dividends. Thus far, ASTARTA has not paid any dividends but management has not ruled
out introducing a dividend policy once the company’s liquidity position allows it. In our
model, we assume that the first dividends could be paid out from the 2013E net profit.
BALANCE SHEET
(UAH mil) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E
Shareholders equity 735 648 1,335 2,214 3,075 3,803 4,756 5,753
Minorities 26 44 39 67 93 114 140 172
Net debt 373 980 958 1,169 1,146 933 586 130
Capital Employed 1,134 1,671 2,333 3,450 4,314 4,851 5,482 6,055
Non-current assets 635 941 1,432 1,723 2,045 2,388 2,587 2,690
Inventories 385 623 768 1266 1774 1957 2364 2808
Biological assets 113 164 231 413 413 413 413 413
Receivables 60 74 90 132 186 205 248 295
Payables -40 -92 -45 -60 -80 -88 -106 -126
Other liabilities -18 -39 -142 -24 -24 -24 -24 -24
Working Capital net 500 730 901 1727 2269 2463 2894 3365
Capital Employed 1,134 1,671 2,333 3,450 4,314 4,851 5,482 6,055
CASH FLOW
(UAH mil) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E
Net profit 149 -89 330 835 861 728 953 1236
Depreciation 35 73 93 140 178 207 250 297
Change in Working Capital -98 -231 -171 -826 -542 -194 -431 -470
Other cashflow items -71 195 -94 76 26 21 26 32
Net Cash from Operations 14 -53 158 224 523 763 797 1094
Capex and Acquisitions net -162 -349 -58 -421 -500 -550 -450 -400
Free Cash Flow -148 -402 101 -197 23 213 347 694
Change in Debt 148 402 -98 199 -22 -213 -347 -456
Shares issued 0 0 -3 -2 -1 0 0 0
Dividends paid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -238
Securities Prices
Prices are taken as of the previous day’s close on the home market unless otherwise stated.
# Description
1 The company currently is, or in the past 12 months was, a client of Wood & Co or its affiliated companies for the provision of investment banking services.
2 In the past 12 months, Wood & Co or its affiliated companies have received compensation for Corporate Finance/Investment Banking services from this
company.
3 In the past 12 months, Wood & Co or any of its affiliated companies have been lead manager, co-lead manager or co-manager of a public offering of the
company’s financial instruments.
Research
Head of Research Head of Consumer/Industrials Head of Financials Research Head of Utilities Research
Mark Robinson Patrick Shields Mark MacRae Robert Rethy
+44 20 7647 8010 +44 20 7647 8015 +48 22 222 1548 +420 222 096 369
mark.robinson@wood.com patrick.shields@wood.com mark.macrae@wood.com robert.rethy@wood.com
Romania/Pharma
Ovidiu Fer
+420 222 096 270
ovidiu.fer@wood.cz
Sales
Rupert Wood Peter Kaineder Kristen Andrasko Sebastian Siejko
+44 20 7647 8091 +44 20 7647 8092 +420 222 096 253 +48 22 222 1557
rupert.wood@wood.com peter.kaineder@wood.com kristen.andrasko@wood.cz sebastian.siejko@wood.com