1.

CIVIL LIABILITIES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE

The Civil Code provides for remedies for persons who suffer damages as a result of the

acts of the people around them. As De Leon provided, such provisions on Human Relations

“incorporate not only basic principles of equity and justice but also universal moral precepts not

expressly recognized by specific provisions of law.”1 For brevity, only the provisions that are

relevant to the dissemination of false information will be discussed in this Study by the

proponent.

A. ART. 21 OF THE CIVIL CODE

Art. 21 of the Civil Code provides for damages in the event that a perpetrator

intentionally causes damages to another through an act that is contrary to morals, good customs,

or public policy.2 The provision, including Arts. 19 and 20, requires every individual to “act

fairly and in good faith towards one another.” 3 It “deals with acts contra bonus mores”4 or acts

that are against good morals.

As the Supreme Court pronounced in Global Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. Court of

Appeals, the said article was enacted to “remedy the countless gaps in the statutes, which leave

so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and

moral injury.”5 Art. 21 should, hence, serve as a “vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that

untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for

specifically in the statutes.”6

1
HECTOR DE LEON & HECTOR DE LEON, JR., COMMENTS AND CASES ON TORTS AND DAMAGES 70 (4th ed.
2019).
2
An Act to Ordain and Institute the Civil Code of the Philippines [CIVIL CODE], Republic Act No. 386, §21
(1949).
3
Calatagan Golf Club, Inc. vs. Clemente, 585 SCRA 300 (2009).
4
Albenson Enterprises Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 16 (1993).
5
Global Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778 (1989).
6
Id. at 784.
 As De Leon and De Leon, Jr., place it, liability for damages under this provision may

arise, despite the lack of violation of law, as long as the act that was intentionally committed,

regardless of whether it is an act or an omission, is against morals, good customs, or public

policy.7

B. ART. 26 OF THE CIVIL CODE

Art. 26 of the Civil Code provides for a remedy of damages for those whose rights to

personal dignity, personal security, family relations, social intercourse, privacy, and peace of

mind are violated by someone, regardless of whether the act constitutes a criminal offense or

not.8 The necessity of this provision was for the exaltation of the human personality as there is a

need to protect the sacredness of human personality. 9 Furthermore, the list of acts provided in

Art. 26 is not exclusive, but are mere examples and would not exclude other acts that are similar

in nature.10

The said provision may be applied in similar cases to situations wherein: a person was

accused of an affair, which brought him extreme embarrassment and shame;11 a copy of an

MeTC decision was distributed to homeowners to humiliate the person who the judgment was

not in favor, despite the pendency of the appeal; 12 or where a person was depicted as a

“dangerous person.”13

C. ART. 32 OF THE CIVIL CODE

Art. 32 of the Civil Code provides for the civil liability of public officers and private

individuals who, directly or indirectly, violate the civil and political rights of others, which are

7
HECTOR DE LEON & HECTOR DE LEON, JR., supra note 282, at 82.
8
Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, 599 SCRA 594 (2009).
9
Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 85 (2000).
10
Id. at 94.
11
Id. at 88-89.
12
Manaloto vs. Veloso III, 632 SCRA 347 (2010).
13
Castro vs. People, 559 SCRA 676 (2008).
exclusively listed in the provision.14 For brevity, it is only the freedom of speech15 that is relevant

for this Study. Under this provision, some rights set out in the Bill of Rights may be invoked

against private individuals in an independent civil suit, which invokes this provision of the Civil

Code.

It is not necessary that there is a crime or offense that punishes the violation of these

rights, as this provision was enacted to provide adequate civil remedies when the act does not

constitute a criminal offense.16 Bad faith or malice does not even matter when it comes to this

provision as it was for the purpose of the “effective protection of individual rights.”17

D. ART. 33 OF THE CIVIL CODE

Art. 33 of the Civil Code provides for the independent civil action in cases of defamation,

fraud, and physical injuries.18 Given that it is an independent civil action, it may be filed

independently of criminal prosecutions, and would only require a preponderance of evidence. 19 It

also does not constitute as a prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the criminal

case.20 As De Leon and De Leon, Jr. mentioned in their book, the said article creates an

exception to the general rule that civil actions rising from offenses charged will be suspended

upon the filing of criminal charges.21 They posit that the law recognizes the difference in the

quantum of evidence needed in each case.22

Defamation, as ruled in the case of MVRS Publications, Inc. vs. Islamic Da’Wah Council

of the Philippines, is the “offense of injuring a person’s character, fame or reputation” 23 and thus,
14
CIVIL CODE, art. 32.
15
Id. art. 32(2).
16
Silahis International Hotel, Inc. vs. Soluta, 482 SCRA 660, 668 (2006) citing REPORT, CODE
COMMISSION, 31 (January 26, 1948).
17
Id. at 669.
18
CIVIL CODE, art. 33.
19
Id.
20
Consing vs. People, 701 SCRA 132, 145 (2013).
21
HECTOR DE LEON & HECTOR DE LEON, JR., supra note 282, at 120.
22
Id.
23
MVRS Publications, Inc., supra note 237, at 218.
also “includes libel and slander.”24 It serves to “injure reputation or to diminish the esteem,

respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about

the plaintiff.”25 However, the fact that the words used are insulting would not immediately equate

to a cause of action for defamation.26

<I added RA 3019 and Art. 32 as part of my Accountability sub-chapter>

1. ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019)

Among the punishable acts provided under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it

also penalizes any public officer “causing any undue injury to any party, including the

Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in

the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,

evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.”27

In Cabrera vs. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court has listed down the elements for this

offense:

1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or

official functions; 2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or [gross] inexcusable negligence; and 3) that his action caused any
undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.28

24
Id.
25
Id. at 218-219.
26
Id.
27
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 3019, §3(e) (1960).
28
Cabrera vs. Sandiganbayan, 484 Phil. 350 (2004).
 The Supreme Court highlighted the importance of the second element that the act must

have been performed with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross negligence. 29 It is not

enough that there was undue injury or unwarranted benefit.

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a
breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of
the nature of fraud. Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wil[l]fully and
intentionally with a conscious in difference to consequences in so far as other
persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive
and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property.30

Actual loss or damage must as exist as a fact, though it needs not to be proven with actual

certainty.31 It is enough that it is substantial, and that it is “more than necessary, excessive,

improper, or illegal.”32 Speculative or incidental injury is not considered as sufficient. 33 It must

be “specified, quantified, and proven to the point of moral certainty.”34

This offense, however, was often used in instances where there is manifest impartiality to

bidders,35 illegal or unauthorized disbursement of public funds, 36 and accepting payment for

delivery of lumber without supporting documents as provided by law. 37 Quite notably, this was

used by former Senator Trillanes in his charges against Uson for spreading false information

against him.38

29
Rivera vs. People, 743 SCRA 476 (2014).
30
Id.
31
Cabrera vs. People of the Philippines, 910 SCRA 578 (2019).
32
Id.
33
Llorente, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 287 SCRA 382 (1998).
34
Rivera, supra note 377.
35
Id.
36
Cabrera, supra note 379, Tiongco vs. People of the Philippines, 885 SCRA 480 (2018).
37
Guadines vs. Sandiganbayan, 650 SCRA 422 (2011).
38
Jaymee T. Gamil, Leila B. Salaverria, Era of fake news is over, Mocha told, PHILSTAR (Sept. 23, 2017),
available at https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/932760/trillanes-fake-news-mocha-complaint-hidden-wealth-cyberlibel
(last accessed Aug. 27, 2021).
2. ART. 32 OF THE CIVIL CODE

Art. 32 of the Civil Code provides for the liability of public officers and private

individuals who violate the civil and political rights of individuals. The extent of this provision,

insofar as it is also applicable to private individuals, has already been discussed in Chapter

III.A.4.C.

As De Leon and De Leon, Jr., elaborated, public officers who do their official duties to

the general public may not be held liable for damages that have been done on private

individuals.39 However, there is an exception to such rule, and that is when an individual suffers

from a “particular or special injury on account of the public officer’s improper performance or

non-performance of his public duty.”40 There must be a special and peculiar injury that such an

individual suffers from.41 Thus, an individual have a cause of action against public officers

“without a particular injury or particular fight, which are the grounds upon which all actions are

founded.”42 Clearly, this article is an exception to the general rule that public officers cannot be

held liable for acts done in their official capacity.

39
HECTOR DE LEON & HECTOR DE LEON, JR, supra note 282, at 114.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 115.