Case Digest by DONITA
An order
#1 - [G.R. No. 124320. March 2, 1999]
HEIRS OF GUIDO YAPTINCHAY AND ISABEL YAPTINCHAY vs.
HON. ROY S. DEL ROSARIO, et.al.
FACTS: Petitioners claim that they are the legal heirs of the late Guido
and Isabel Yaptinchay, the owners-claimants of Lot situated in Bancal,
Carmona, Cavite. Petitioners executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of
the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay. Subsequently,
petitioners discovered that a portion, if not all, of the aforesaid
properties were titled in the name of respondent Golden Bay Realty
and Development Corporation (Golden Bay). the discovery of what
happened to subject parcels of land, petitioners filed a complaint for
ANNULMENT and/or DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF TITLE before
Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite.
Upon learning that Golden Bay sold portions of the parcels of land in
question, petitioners filed with the RTC an Amended Complaint to
implead new and additional defendants and to mention the TCTs to be
annulled. But the respondent court dismissed the Amended
Complaint.Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the Order
dismissing the Amended Complaint. The motion was granted by the
which further allowed the herein petitioners to file a Second Amended
Complaint, which they promptly did. The private respondents
presented a Motion to Dismisson the grounds that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action, that plaintiffs did not have a
right of action, that they have not established their status as
heirs, that the land being claimed is different from that of the
defendants, and that plaintiffs claim was barred by laches. The
said Motion to Dismiss was granted. Petitioners interposed a Motion
for Reconsiderationbut to no avail. The same was denied by the RTC.
Undaunted, petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief from
respondent courts Orders under attack.
Petitioners contend that the issue of heirship should first be
determined before trial of the case could proceed. It is petitioner’s
submission that the respondent court should have proceeded with the
trial and simultaneously resolved the issue of heirship in the same
case.
ISSUE: IS THE CONTENTION OF PETITIONER CORRECT?
RULING: NO.
- Petitioners Petition for Certiorari before this Court is an improper
recourse. Their proper remedy should have been an appeal.
of dismissal, be it right or wrong, is a final order, which is subject to
appeal and not a proper subject of certiorariWhere appeal is available
as a remedy, certiorari will not lie.
- The respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the questioned Order dismissing the Second Amended
Complaint of petitioners, as it aptly ratiocinated and ruled:But the
plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it -
except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the
aforementioned Yaptinchays - that they have been declared the legal
heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the
legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of
property. This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance.
The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action
for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then
decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a
special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
[G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005]
# 2 - ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR.,
petitioners, vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, respondent.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo. However, after
few years, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta who gave
birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein
co-petitioner. Meanwhile, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli, herein
respondent. Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights over the estate of their
father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate. In the deed, Portugals
siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a parcel
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of land located in Caloocan in his favor. Thus, the Registry of Deeds for
Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292
covering the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of Jose Q. Portugal,
married to Paz C. Lazo. Paz died. Portugal died intestate. Respondent
executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of
Deceased Person adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land.
TCT No. 34292/T-172 in Portugals name was subsequently cancelled
and in its stead TCT No. 159813[14] was issued by the Registry of
Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent,
Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.Later
getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988
transfer by respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in her
name, petitioners filed before the RTC a complaint against respondent
for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her and the
transfer certificate of title issued in her name. Petitioners alleged that
respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence,
not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she
perjured herself when she made false representations in her Affidavit
of Adjudication.
After trial, the trial court, without resolving the issues defined during
pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground
that petitioners status and right as putative heirs had not been
established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over
the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario. CA
Affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have to institute a special
proceeding to determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify the affidavits of
Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes.
RULING: Yes, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in
court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This
must take precedence over the action for reconveyance. The
respondents have yet to substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of
Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property.
The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed
to prosecute and defend an action in court. A real party in interest is
the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the one entitled to the avails thereof. Such interest, to be
considered a real interest, must be one which is present and
substantial, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future,
contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.
G.R. No. 162956 April 10, 2008
# 3 - FAUSTINO REYES, ESPERIDION REYES, JULIETA C. RIVERA,
and EUTIQUIO DICO, JR., petitioners, vs.PETER B. ENRIQUEZ, for
himself and Attorney-in-Fact of his daughter DEBORAH ANN C.
ENRIQUEZ, and SPS. DIONISIO FERNANDEZ and CATALINA
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
FACTS: The subject matter of the present case is a parcel of land
located in Talisay, Cebu.According to petitioners Faustino Reyes,
Esperidion Reyes, Julieta C. Rivera, and EutiquioDico, Jr., they are the
lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the subject parcel of land
with Anacleto Cabrera. Petitioners executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes (the Extra Judicial
Settlement) involving a portion of the subject parcel of land. The
petitioners and the known heirs of Anacleto Cabrera executed a
Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale (the Segregation
and Confirmation) over the same property. Thus, TCT were issued
respectively.
Respondents Peter B. Enriquez (Peter) for himself and on behalf of his
minor daughter Deborah Ann C. Enriquez (Deborah Ann), also known
as Dina Abdullah Enriquez Alsagoff, on the other hand, alleges that
their predecessor-in-interest Anacleto Cabrera and his wife Patricia
Seguera Cabrera (collectively the Spouses Cabrera) owned ½ pro-
indiviso share in the subject parcel of land. They further allege that
Spouses Cabrera were survived by two daughters – Graciana, who died
single and without issue, and Etta, the wife of respondent Peter and
mother of respondent Deborah Ann – who succeeded their parents’
rights and took possession of the subject parcel of land. During her
lifetime, Graciana sold her share over the land to Etta. Thus, making
the latter the sole owner of the one-half share of the subject parcel of
land. Subsequently, Etta died and the property passed on to
petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann by virtue of an Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate. Later on, Peter and Deborah sold the land
toDionisio and Catalina Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez), also their co-
respondents in the case at bar. After the sale, Spouses Fernandez took
possession of the said area in the subject parcel of land.
When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the subject
land, they discovered that certain documents prevent them from doing
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so. Alleging that the foregoing documents are fraudulent and fictitious, matter is "within the exclusive competence of the court in a special
the respondents filed a complaint for annulment or nullification of the proceeding."
aforementioned documents and for damages. The RTC dismissed the
In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an action
case on the ground that the respondents-plaintiffs were actually
for the "Declaration of Non-Existency, Nullity of Deeds, and
seeking first and foremost to be declared heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
Cancellation of Certificates of Title, etc.," a review of the allegations
since they can not demand the partition of the real property without
therein reveals that the right being asserted by the respondents are
first being declared as legal heirs and such may not be done in an
their right as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who they claim co-owned one-
ordinary civil action, as in this case, but through a special proceeding
half of the subject property and not merely one-fourth as stated in the
specifically instituted for the purpose. CA reversed.
documents the respondents sought to annul.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have to institute a special
The respondents herein, except for their allegations, have yet to
proceeding to determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are,
before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify the disputed
thus, entitled to the subject property. Neither is there anything in the
documents?
records of this case which would show that a special proceeding to
RULING: YES. have themselves declared as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera had been
instituted. As such, the trial court correctly dismissed the case for
An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
there is a lack of cause of action when a case is instituted by parties
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
who are not real parties in interest. While a declaration of heirship was
wrong. A special proceeding, on the other hand, is a remedy by which
not prayed for in the complaint, it is clear from the allegations therein
a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact. The
that the right the respondents sought to protect or enforce is that of an
Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to
heir of one of the registered co-owners of the property prior to the
prosecute and defend an action in court. A real party in interest is the
issuance of the new transfer certificates of title that they seek to
one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit
cancel. Thus, there is a need to establish their status as such heirs in
or the one entitled to the avails thereof. Such interest, to be considered
the proper forum.
a real interest, must be one which is present and substantial, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, Furthermore, it would be superfluous to still subject the estate to
subordinate or consequential interest. A plaintiff is a real party in administration proceedings since a determination of the parties' status
interest when he is the one who has a legal right to enforce or protect, as heirs could be achieved in the ordinary civil case filed because it
while a defendant is a real party in interest when he is the one who appeared from the records of the case that the only property left by the
has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the decedent was the subject matter of the case and that the parties have
plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had already presented evidence to establish their right as heirs of the
violated the legal right of the former. The purpose of the rule is to decedent. In the present case, however, nothing in the records of this
protect persons against undue and unnecessary litigation. It likewise case shows that the only property left by the deceased Anacleto
ensures that the court will have the benefit of having before it the real Cabrera is the subject lot, and neither had respondents Peter and
adverse parties in the consideration of a case. Thus, a plaintiff’s right Deborah Ann presented any evidence to establish their rights as heirs,
to institute an ordinary civil action should be based on his own right to considering especially that it appears that there are other heirs of
the relief sought. Anacleto Cabrera who are not parties in this case that had signed one
of the questioned documents.
In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property
was registered sue to recover the said property through the institution
of an ordinary civil action, such as a complaint for reconveyance and
partition, or nullification of transfer certificate of titles and other deeds
or documents related thereto, the SC has consistently ruled that a
declaration of heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action since the

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Case Digest by Amiel Pascual
G.R. No. 163604             May 6, 2005
# 4 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS (Twentieth Division), HON. PRESIDING
JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTC-BR. 35 and APOLINARIA
MALINAO JOMOC, respondents.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
The RTC of Ormoc City granted the petition "In the Matter of
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P.
Jomoc” petitioned by ApolinariaJomoc on the basis of the Comissioner
report declaring the absentee spouse presumptively dead. Stated
therein is that Clemente left Apolinaria nine years earlier.
Judge Fortunito L. Madrona cited Art. 41, par. 2 of the Family Code,
stating that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present must
institute summary proceedings for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absent spouse.
The Republic appealed the RTC’s order by filing a Notice of Appeal and
insists that the declaration of presumptive death under Art. 41 of the
FC is not a special proceeding involving multiple appeals where a
record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. The petition
for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse is not
included in Rule 109 of the Rules of Court that enumerates the cases
wherein multiple appeals are allowed. Republic contends that a mere
notice of appeal suffices.
RTC disapproved Republic’s Notice of Appeal.
Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA and contended
that declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of
the Family Code is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or
separate appeals requiring a record on appeal reiterating its earlier
argument.
The CA denied the Republic’s Petition for Certiorari. It reasons that
that the instant petition is in the nature of a special proceeding
and not an ordinary action. The petition merely seeks for a
declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee
spouse Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither
does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be
enforced against any person. The instant petition, being in the
nature of a special proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition
to its Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal.
Issue: Is a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a
person in the nature of a special proceeding?
Ruling: No. A petition for declaration of presumptive death is a
summary proceeding under the Family Code and not a special
proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court.
Ratio:
Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the trial court anchored
its grant of the petition for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absent spouse, provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence
of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouses was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a
reappearance of the absent spouse.
Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of
Appeal, invoked by the trial court in disapproving petitioner’s Notice of
Appeal, provides:
Sec. 2.Modes of appeal. -
(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving
a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be
4
required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple
or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In
such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like
manner. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By the trial court’s citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is
gathered that the petition of ApolinariaJomoc to have her absent
spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire
to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for
that purpose is a "summary proceeding," following above-quoted
Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains the following provision,
inter alia:
Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules
in this Title shall applyin all cases provided for in this Codes requiring
summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an
expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
There is no doubt that the petition of ApolinariaJomoc required,
and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code,
not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal
for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a
summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal
from the trial court’s order sufficed.
Also, Republic’s failure to attach to his petition before the appellate
court a copy of the trial court’s order denying its motion for
reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is not
necessarily fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a
technical sense. The CA should’ve directed Republic to comply with the
rule and not dismissed the petition outright.
G.R. No. 157912               December 13, 2007
# 5 - ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, Petitioner, vs.ESTATE OF ALICE O.
SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA-Administratrix, Respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and
issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims
against the estate. In compliance therewith, Alan Sheker filed on
October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him
amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of
certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and the amount of
P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be
incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said
realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker, Victorina Medina,
moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the
grounds that:
(1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a
certification against non-forum shopping; and
(3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money
claim was not filed and served personally.
RTC assailed Order and dismissed the money claim without prejudice
based on the grounds above stated by Medina.
Shekker then filed fpr a Petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Must Shekker’s contingent money claim against the estate be
dismissed for his failure to attach to his motion a certification against
non-forum shopping?
Ratio: No.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate
court is mandatory.
To emphasize..
Special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special
proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall
be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.
The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform;
capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished.4 This means
that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may
be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing
so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the
Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions
are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings.
Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum
shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written
explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of
filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way
5
obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly,
proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person such should expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or
as in the present case. other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to
be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the
On the issue of certification of non-forum shopping:
inefficiency of the postal service.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for
Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling
personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other
that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an
modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever
initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate
personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances
proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for
of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only
allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of
when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other
the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of
modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written
administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent
explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to
are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of
begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court
their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred,
shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case
subject to certain exceptions.5
or the issues involved therein.
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a
In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati
motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into
City, while counsel for respondent and the RTC which rendered the
consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate.
assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and
settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money
since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere claim personally.
contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money
The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates
claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a
of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to
certification against non-forum shopping.
residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of
administration have been paid.
On the issue of filing fees: The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural
rule on the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal
The trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim against an
service, again in the interest of substantial justice.
estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist
her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of
separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on
G.R. No. 16680           September 13, 1920
the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or
the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a # 6- BROADWELL HAGANS, petitioner, vs.ADOLPH WISLIZENUS,
reasonable time.9 After all, the trial court had already assumed Judge of First Instance of Cebu, ET AL., respondents.
jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate.
JOHNSON, J.:
Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against
Original petition for a writ of certiorari.Facts are admitted by
the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim
demurrer.
against the estate.
Judge Adolph Wislizenus argues that the provision of Act No. 190
On the issue of personal service and filing:
permit him to appoint assessors in "special proceedings".

6
BroadwellHagans contends that no authority in law exists for the court or by the law. It is formal pleadings are required, unless the
appointment of assessors in such proceedings. the method of applying statute expressly so provides. The
legal remedies according remedy in special proceedings is
The only provisions of law which authorize the appointment of
to definite established generally granted upon an application or
assessors are the following;
rules. motion. Illustrations of special
(a) Section 57-62 of Act No. 190--appointment of assessors in the court proceedings, in contradistinction to
of justice of the peace. actions, may be given: Proceedings for
the appointment of an administrator,
(b) sections 153-161 of Act No. 190--the only provisions of law
guardians, tutors; contest of wills; to
which could, by any possibility, permit the appointment of
perpetuate testimony; to change the
assessors in "special proceedings
name of persons; application for
(c) section 44 (a) of Act No. 267—applicable to Manila only admission to the bar, etc., etc.
(d) section 2477 of Act No. 2711—applicable to Manila only
Therefore, the demurrer is overruled and the prayer of the petition is
(e) section 2 of Act No. 2369-- appointment of assessors in criminal
granted, and it is ordered and decreed that the order of the Judge
cases only
Wislezenus appointing the assessors described in the petition be and
Section 154 provides that "either party to an action may apply in the same is annulled and set aside.
writing to the judge for assessors to sit in the trial. Upon the filing of
such application, the judge shall direct that assessors be provided, . . .
." Case Digest by CLARISSE
Issue: Is a judge of the CFI, in special proceedings, authorized under
the law to appoint assessors to fix the amount due an
Case No. 7 - Vda. De Manalo vs CA
administrator/executor for his services and expenses in the settlement
of estate of a deceased person?
Ruling: No. FACTS:
Ratio: In proceedings like the present, the judge of the Court of First  Troadio Manalo, a resident of Manila died intestate. He was
Instance is without authority to appoint assessors. survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his11 children who are all of
We find, upon an examination of section 1 of Act No. 190, which gives legal age.
us an interpretation of the words used in said Act, that there is a  Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and
distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding," and that in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and
when the Legislature used the word "action" it did not mean "special style Manalos Machine Shop.
proceeding."  Respondents who are 8 of the surviving children filed a
petitionwith the RTCfor the judicial settlement of the estate of their
late father, Troadio Manalo and for the appointment of their brother,
Action Special Proceeding Romeo Manalo, as administrator.
 ordinary suit in a  every other remedy furnished by  Petitioners filed a motion for outright dismissal of the proceeding
court of justice law contending that the proceeding is actually an ordinary civil action
 formal demand of  defined as an application or involving members of the same family.
one's legal rights in a proceeding to establish the status or  RTC denied the motion for dismissal of the proceeding.
court of justice in the right of a party, or a particular fact.  CA likewise dismissed the petition.
manner prescribed by the  Usually, in special proceedings, no

7

ISSUE:
Whether or not the proceeding is an ordinary civil action.
RULING:
No.
Petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1,
Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222
of the Civil Code (No suit shall be filed or maintained between
members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035) for the dismissal of the
petition.
The Article 222 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear
from the term suit that it refers to an action by one person or persons
against another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff
pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an
injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity.A civil
action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues
another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.
It must be emphasized that the petitioners are not being sued for any
cause of action as in fact no defendant was impleaded. The Petition for
Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of
Estate is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the
petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact.The private respondents merely seek to establish the fact of death
of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the
heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right
to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the
decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the
probate court.
Case No. 8
Natcher vs CA
FACTS:
 Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were
registered owners of a parcel of land.
 Upon the death of Graciana, Graciano together with his 6
children entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana’s estate
adjudicating and and dividing among themselves the real property.
 Graciano married petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their
marriage, Graciano sold the 2nd lot of the property by to his wife
Patricia.
 Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six
children by his first marriage, as heirs.
 Private respondents filed for annulment of title and reconveyance
of the property before the RTC. They alleged that petitioner Natcher,
upon Gracianos death, through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired the property by making it
appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale.
 RTC ruled in favor petitioner Natcher stating that the property is
an advance inheritance of Natcher being a compulsory heir of the
deceased.
 CA reversed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an
action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages,
adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased.
RULING:
No.
There lies a marked distinction between an action and a special
proceeding. An action is a formal demand of ones right in a court of
justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. The term
special proceeding may be defined as an application or proceeding to
establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact.
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment
of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to
settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of
property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific
rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate
of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court
in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.Corollarily, the RTC, acting in
its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication
8
and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of
herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as the civil case for reconveyance
and annulment of title with damages is not the proper vehicle to
thresh out said question. Moreover, the RTC was not properly
constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question
of advancement made by the decedent Graciano to petitioner Natcher.
Case No. 9
Fule vs CA
FACTS:
 Virginia G. Fule filed with the CFI of Laguna, at Calamba a
petition for letters of administration, alleging that Amado G.
Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in
the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in
Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the
Court.CFI judge granted the motion.
 Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition raising that the venue was
improperly laid and for lack of jurisdiction.
 CFI laguna deny the opposition of Garcia.
 CA annulled the proceedings before CFI Laguna for lack of
jurisdiction.
 Fule appealed to the SC.
 Meanwhile, Garcia filed a petition for letters of administration
before the CFI Quezon City over the same intestate estate of
Amado G. Garcia.
 CFI Quezon City granted the motion and appointed Garcia as
special administratix of the estate.
 Fule filed a special appearance to question Venue and
Jurisdiction of the CFI Quezon City.
 CFI Quezon City issued an order granting Garcia’s "Urgent
Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the
payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs
a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings of the CFI
Laguna.
 Fule instituted a petition to annul the proceedings before CFI
Quezon City.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the venue is improperly laid out.
RULING:
Yes.
Section 1, Rule 73 specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in
reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates:
"Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. “ It
could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject
matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure
dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing;
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.
The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate
of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive
of venue.
The term "resides" means the personal, actual or physical habitation of
a person, actual residence or place of abode. The term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant
in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of
time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be
more than temporary. 
The Court rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado
G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City,
and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove
the residence of the decedent at the time of his death.  As it is, the
death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence
by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that
his last place of residence was at Quezon City. Aside from this, the
deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before
his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated
turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the
Deed of Donation, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of
land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of
titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold
documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at
Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the
venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.
Case Digest by JAZZ
9
Case No. 10 - Eusebio vs. Eusebio
In the matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. Eugenio
Eusebio, petitioner and appellee, vs. Amanda Eusebio, Virginia
Eusebio, Juan Eusebio, et al., oppositors and appellants.
December 28, 1956 | Concepcion
Facts:
Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for his
appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres
Eusebio. He alleged that his father, who died on November 28, 1952,
resided in Quezon City. Eugenio’s siblings (Amanda, Virginia, Juan,
Delfin, Vicente and Carlos), stating that they are illegitimate children
of Andres, opposed the petition and alleged that Andres was domiciled
in San Fernando, Pampanga. They prayed that the case be dismissed
upon the ground that venue had been improperly laid.   
The CFI of Rizal granted Eugenio’s petition and overruled his siblings’
objection.
Issue: Whether venue had been properly laid in Rizal?
Held: No. Don Andres Eusebio up to October 29, 1952, was and had
always been domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. He only bought a
house and lot at 889-A Espana Extension, Quezon City because his
son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P.
Florentino St., Quezon City. Even before he was able to transfer to the
house he bought, Andres suffered a stroke and was forced to live in his
son’s residence. It is well settled that “domicile is not commonly
changed by presence in a place merely for one own’s health” even if
coupled with “knowledge that one will never again be able, on account
of illness, to return home. Having resided for over seventy years in
Pampanga, the presumption is that Andres retained such domicile.
Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently. There
is no direct evidence of such intent – Andres did not manifest his
desire to live in Quezon City indefinitely; Eugenio did not testify
thereon; and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was not presented to testify on the
matter. Andres did not part with, or alienate, his house in San
Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his children remained in that
municipality. In the deed of sale of his house at 889 – A Espana Ext.,
Andres gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. The marriage
contract signed by Andres when he was married in articulo mortis to
Concepcion Villanueva two days prior to his death stated that his
residence is San Fernando, Pampanga.
The requisites for a change of domicile include (1) capacity to choose
and freedom of choice, (2) physical presence at the place chosen, (3)
intention to stay therein permanently. Although Andres complied with
the first two requisites, there is no change of domicile because the
third requisite is absent. 
Anent the contention that appellants submitted themselves to the
authority of the CFI of Rizal because they introduced evidence on the
residence of the decedent, it must be noted that appellants specifically
made of record that they were NOT submitting themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of assailing the
same.
In sum, the Court found that Andres was, at the time of his death,
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the CFI of Rizal had no
authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the venue having been laid improperly.
Doctrine: Domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is
gained. It is not changed by presence in a place for one’s own health.
Case No. 11
G.R. No. L-22761
ROSE BUSH MALIG and JOE, THOMAS, and JOHN all surnamed
BUSH, represented in this suit by their attorney-in-fact, ROSE BUSH
MALIG, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIA SANTOS BUSH, defendant-appellee.
On September 19, 1962 the plaintiffs filed the complaint, alleging that
they were the acknowledged natural children and the only heirs in the
direct line of the deceased John T. Bush, having been born of the
common-law relationship of their father with Apolonia Perez from 1923
up to August, 1941;
that said John T. Bush and Apolonia Perez, during the conception of
the plaintiffs, were not suffering from any disability to marry each
other; that the defendant, by falsely alleging that she was the legal wife
of the deceased was able to secure her appointment as administratrix
of the estate of the deceased in Testate Proceedings No. 29932 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila; that she submitted to the court for
approval a project of partition, purporting to show that the deceased
10
left a will whereby he bequeathed his estate to three persons, namely:
Maria Santos Bush, Anita S. Bush and Anna Berger; that the
defendant then knew that the plaintiffs were the acknowledged natural
children of the deceased; and that they discovered the fraud and
misrepresentation perpetrated by the defendant only in July, 1962.
They prayed that the project of partition be annulled on the ground of
fraud and misrepresentation on the part of the defendant, who knew
that herein plaintiffs were the acknowledged natural children of the
decedent;
The defendant moved to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action, res
judicata and statute of limitations. The plaintiffs opposed and the
defendant filed a reply to the opposition. On January 10, 1963 the
lower court denied the motion, “it appearing that the grounds upon
which said motion is based are not indubitable.” In time, the
defendant filed her answer specifically denying all the material
averments of the complaint and invoking laches, res judicata and
statute of limitations as affirmative defenses.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, challenging the jurisdiction of
the court, stating that since the action was one to annul a project of
partition duly approved by the probate court it was that court alone
which could take cognizance of the case, citing Rule 75, Section 1, of
the Rules of Court. On October 31, 1963
TRIAL COURT: granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, not
on the ground relied upon by the defendant but because the action
had prescribed.
The plaintiffs moved to reconsider but were turned down; hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE: May the lower court dismiss an action on a ground not alleged
in the motion to dismiss?
It must be remembered that the first motion to dismiss, alleging lack of
cause of action, res judicata and statute of limitations, was denied
because those grounds did not appear to the court to be indubitable.
The second motion reiterated none of those grounds and raised only
the question of jurisdiction.
In dismissing the complaint upon a ground not relied upon, the lower
court in effect did so motu proprio, without offering the plaintiffs a
chance to argue the point. In fact the court did not even state in its
order why in its opinion the action had prescribed, and why in effect,
without any evidence or new arguments on the question, it reversed its
previous ruling that the ground of prescription was not indubitable.
In Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Ramos, et al., 88 Phil. 94, it
was held:
Section 1 of Rule 8 enumerates the grounds upon which an action may
be dismissed, and it specifically ordains that a motion to this end be
filed. In the light of this express requirement we do not believe that the
court had power to dismiss the case without the requisite motion duly
presented. The fact that the parties filed memoranda upon the court’s
indication or order in which they discussed the proposition that the
action was unnecessary and was improperly brought outside and
independently of the case for libel did not supply the deficiency. Rule
30 of the Rules of Court provides for the cases in which an action may
be dismissed, and the inclusion of those therein provided excludes any
other, under the familiar maxims, inclusio unius est exclusivo
ulterius. The only instance in which, according to said Rules, the court
may dismiss upon the court’s own motion an action is, when the
‘plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial or to prosecute his
action for an unreasonable length of time or to comply with the Rules
or any order of the court.
Although a motion to dismiss had been presented defendant the
resolution of the court granting the same was based upon a ground
not alleged in said motion. But assuming that the lower court could
properly consider the question of prescription anew, the same still did
not appear to be indubitable on the face of the allegations in the
complaint.
The defendant cites Article 137 of the Civil Code, which provides that
an action for acknowledgment of natural children may be commenced
only during the lifetime of the putative parents, except in two
instances not obtaining in this case, and that the present action was
commenced after the death of the putative father of the plaintiffs. The
said provision is not of indubitable application, since the plaintiffs do
not seek acknowledgment but allege as a matter of fact that they “are
the acknowledged natural children and the only heirs in the direct line
of the late John T. Bush.” Whether or not this allegation is true will, of
course, depend upon the evidence to be presented at the trial.
The defendant insists in this instance on the jurisdictional ground
posed in her motion to dismiss, citing Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules
of Court formerly in force (now Rule 73, Section 1), which says:
11
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent
is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court,
so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record
It will be noted that the foregoing rule fixes jurisdiction for purposes of
the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, “so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent,
or of the location of his estate.”The matter really concerns venue, as
the caption of Rule cited indicates, and in order to preclude different
courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule
specifies that “the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts.”
In the final analysis this action is not necessarily one to annul the
partition already made and approved by the probate court, and to
reopen the estate proceeding so that a new partition may be made, but
for recovery by the plaintiffs of the portion of their alleged inheritance
of which, through fraud, they have been deprived.
Without prejudice to whatever defenses may be available to the
defendant, this Court believes that the plaintiffs’ cause should not be
foreclosed without a hearing on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are set aside and the case
remanded for further proceedings. Costs against the defendant-
appellee in this instance.
Case No. 12
TOMAS JIMENEZ vs IAC
FACTS:
Lino Jimenez married consolacion Ungson with whom he begot 4
children, namely; Alberto, Leonardo, Jr., Alejandra Angeles. During
such marriage, Lino acquired 5 parcels of land in Pangasinan. When
Consolacion died, lino contracted a second marriage with Genoveva
Caolboy with whom he begot the 7 petitioners herein. After Lino and
Genoveva's death, Virginia(2nd Marriage) filed a petition before CFI
praying to be appointed as administratix of the properties of the
deceased spouses Lino and Genoveva upon which Leonardo Jimenez,
jr. filed a motion for exclusion of his father's name and those of his
uncle and aunts contending that they have already received their
inheritance consisting of 5 parcels of land. However, the petition of
Virginia wherein she included the said 5 parcels of land in the
inventory of the estate of Sps. Lino & Genoveva.
Consequently, Leonardo moved for the exclusion of those properties
from the inventory contending that such parcels of land were already
adjudicated to his father and to his uncle and aunts. The probate
court ordered the exclusion of 5 parcels of land and denied the motion
for recon. filed by Virginia. The latter went to CA on a petition for
certiarari and prohobition seeking the annulkment of the orders of the
probate court, of which the CA dismissed.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed an amended complaint before the
RTC to recover possession/ownership of the 5 parcels of land as part
of the estate of Lino and Genoveva. Private respondents moved for the
dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the action was barred
by prior judgment and prescription and laches. Thereafter, the Trial
Court dissmied the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
ISSUE:
W/N in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate) the lower court
has jurisdiction to decide on questions of ownership
W/N the petitioners' present action for the recovery of possession and
ownership of the 5 parcels of land is barred by res judicata
RULING:
Petitioners' action was appropriately filed because as a general rule, a
probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. The
Patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the
principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion
or exlusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a
separate action. It has been held that in a special proceeding for the
probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter
which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. This
pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to intestate
proceedings as in the case at bar.
12
Res judicata, does not exist because of the difference in the causes of Issue:
action. The other action was for the settlement of the intestate estate of
Can the creditor sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary
Lino and Genoveva while the other one was an action for recovery of
proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the
possession and ownership of the 5 parcels of land. Moreover, while the
conjugal partnership?
CFI had jurisdiction, the same was merely limited. Any
pronouncement by said court as to title is not conclusive and could
still be attaced in a separate proceeding.
Held:
Indeed, the grounds relied upon by private respondents in their motion
No, It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of
to dismiss do not appear to be indubitable. Res judicata has been
conjugal partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the
shown to be unavailable and the other grounds of prescription and
husband and wife is chargeable against their conjugal partnership and
laches by private respondents are seriously disputed.
it is the partnership which is primarily bound for its repayment. Thus,
when the spouses are sued for the enforcement of an obligation
entered into by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as
Case Digest by DATS
representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent
#13 – PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner,  debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary liability, as between
vs. them, does not apply. But even assuming the contrary to be true, the
COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. JARING, represented by his nature of the obligation involved in this case, is not solidary but rather
Attorney-In-Fact RAMON G. JARING,respondents. merely joint, making imperial still inapplicable to this case.
Fact: It is clear that private respondent cannot maintain the present suit
against petitioner.Rather, his remedy is to file a claim against the
Respondent Romeo Jaring1 was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond
Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of petitioner’s
in Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five
husband or, if none has been commenced, he can file a petition either
years ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he subleased
for the issuance of letters of administration or for the allowance of
the fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses
will, depending on whether petitioner’s husband died intestate or
Placido and PuritaAlipio and the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios
testate. Private respondent cannot short-circuit this procedure by
Manuel. The stipulated amount of rent was P485,600.00, payable in
lumping his claim against the Alipios with those against the Manuels
two installments ofP300,000.00 and P185,600.00, with the second
considering that, aside from petitioner’s lack of authority to represent
installment falling due on June 30, 1989. Each of the four sublessees
their conjugal estate, the inventory of the Alipios’ conjugal property is
signed the contract.
necessary before any claim chargeable against it can be paid. Needless
The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the to say, such power exclusively pertains to the court having jurisdiction
sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance over the settlement of the decedent’s estate and not to any other court.
of P50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply
#14 – IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
with their obligation, so that, on October 13, 1989, private respondent
DECEASED ISMAEL REYES, THE HEIRS OF OSCAR R.
sued the Alipio and Manuel spouses for the collection of the said
REYES, petitioners, 
amount before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Dinalupihan,
vs.
Bataan. In the alternative, he prayed for the rescission of the sublease
CESAR R. REYES, respondent.
contract should the defendants fail to pay the balance.Petitioner
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband, Fact:
Placidoalipio, had passed away. Hence, the case should be filed in the
Spouses Ismael Reyes and FelisaRevita Reyes are the registered
probate court.
owners of parcels of land situated in Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon
City covered by TCT. The spouses have seven children, namely: Oscar,

13
Araceli, Herminia, Aurora, Emmanuel, Cesar and Rodrigo, all
surnamed Reyes.
On April 18, 1973, Ismael Reyes died intestate. Prior to his death,
Ismael Reyes was notified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of
his income tax deficiency which arose out of his sale of a parcel land
located in TandangSora, Quezon City. For failure to settle his tax
liability, the amount increased to about P172,724.40 and since no
payment was made by the heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes, the property
covered by TCT No. 4983 was levied sold and eventually forfeited by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue in favor of the government.
Sometime in 1976, petitioners’ predecessor Oscar Reyes availed of the
BIR’s tax amnesty and he was able to redeem the property covered by
TCT No. 4983 upon payment of the reduced tax liability in the amount
of about P18,000.
On May 10, 1989, private respondent Cesar Reyes, brother of Oscar
Reyes, filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City praying for his appointment as
administrator of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes which estate
included 50% of the Arayat properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and
3598. Oscar Reyes filed his conditional opposition thereto on the
ground that the Arayat properties do not form part of the estate of the
deceased as he (Oscar) had acquired the properties by redemption and
or purchase.
The probate court subsequently issued letters of administration in
favor of Cesar Reyes where the latter was ordered to submit a true and
complete inventory of properties pertaining to the estate of the
deceased and the special powers of attorney executed by the other
heirs who reside in the USA and that of Aurora Reyes-Dayot
conforming to his appointment as administrator. Cesar Reyes filed an
inventory of real and personal properties of the deceased which
included the Arayat properties with a total area of 1,009 sq. meters.
Issue:
Can the probate court determine ownership over the property?
Held:
No, the question of ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter which
the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court may
pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title.
We find that the respondent Court did not err in affirming the
provisional inclusion of the subject properties to the estate of the
deceased Ismael Reyes without prejudice to the outcome of any action
to be brought thereafter in the proper court on the issue of ownership
considering that the subject properties are still titled under the torrens
system in the names of spouses Ismael and FelisaRevita Reyes which
under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been
set aside in the manner indicated in the law. The declaration of the
provisional character of the inclusion of the subject properties in the
inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the
Probate Court.
#15 – HILARIA BAGAYAS, Petitioner, 
vs.
ROGELIO BAGAYAS, FELICIDAD BAGAYAS, ROSALINA BAGAYAS,
MICHAEL BAGAYAS, and MARIEL BAGAYAS, Respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of sale and partition before
the RTC, claiming that Rogelio, Felicidad, Rosalina, Michael, and
Mariel, all surnamed Bagayas (respondents) intended to exclude her
from inheriting from the estate of her legally adoptive parents,
MaximinoBagayas (Maximino) and Eligia Clemente (Eligia), by
falsifying a deed of absolute sale (deed of absolute sale) purportedly
executed by the deceased spouses (Maximino and Eligia) transferring
two parcels of land (subject lands) registered in their names to their
biological children, respondent Rogelio and Orlando
Bagayas(Orlando). Said deed, which was supposedly executed on
October 7, 1974, bore the signature of Eligia who could not have
affixed her signature thereon as she had long been.
Respondents likewise testified in their defense denying any knowledge
of the alleged adoption of petitioner by Maximino and Eligia, and
pointing out that petitioner had not even lived with the
family. Furthermore, Rogelio claimed that after their parents had died,
he and Orlando executed a document denominated as Deed of Extra
judicial Succession (deed of extra judicial succession) over the subject
lands toeffect the transfer of titles thereof to their names. Before the
deed of extra judicial succession could be registered, however, a deed
of absolute sale transferring the subject lands to them was discovered
14
from the old files of Maximino, which they used by “reason of
convenience” to acquire title to the said lands.
In dismissing Civil Case No. 04-42, the RTC declared that petitioner
could not ask for the partition of the subject lands, even though she is
an adopted child, because “she was not able to prove any of the
instances that would invalidate the deed of absolute sale” purportedly
executed by Maximino and Eligia. This conclusion came about as a
consequence of the RTC’s finding that, since the subject lands
belonged exclusively to Maximino, there was no need to secure the
consent of his wife who was long dead before the sale took place. For
this reason, the forgery of Eligia’s signature on the questioned deed
was held to be inconsequential. However, on reconsideration, the RTC
declared that it committed a mistake in holding the subject lands as
exclusive properties of Maximino “since there was already an
admission by the defendants during the pre-trial conference that the
subject properties are the conjugal properties of the spouses
MaximinoBagayas and Eligia Clemente.” Nonetheless, the RTC
sustained its dismissal of Civil Case No. 04-42 on the ground that it
constituted a collateral attack upon the title of Rogelio and Orlando.
Issue:
Is the ordinary court vested with power to determined heirship of an
adopted child?
Held:
No. While the RTC may have made a definitive ruling on petitioner’s
adoption, as well as the forgery of Eligia’s signature on the questioned
deed, no partition was decreed, as the action was, in fact, dismissed.
Consequently, the declaration that petitioner is the legally adopted
child of Maximino and Eligia did not amount to a declaration of
heirship and co-ownership upon which petitioner may institute an
action for the amendment of the certificates of title covering the
subject land. More importantly, the Court has consistently ruled that
the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in an ordinary
civil action, for matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship
must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the
purpose of determining such rights. Therefore, the remedy then of
petitioner is to institute intestate proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse Maximino and Eligia.
Case Digest by DREW
# 16 - URIARTE V. CFI
Short summary: alleged natural child of the deceased filed petition for
settlement of INTESTATE estate of Don Juan Uriarte y Goite in Negros
Occidental Court. PNB was even appointed as special administrator,
but PNB failed to qualified. MTD filed by nephew of Don Juan, alleging
that while he was in Spain, the deceased made a will AND that
petitioner had doubtful interest (proceeding for his recognition as a
natural child not yet done). Pending this, the nephews instituted a
petition for probate of the will of Don Juan in Manila. Alleged natural
son opposed, contending that Negros courts already had exclusive
jurisdiction of the case.But Negros court dismissed the special
proceeding, and the Manila court proceeded to probate the will.
Petitioner contested it. Court held that since the decedent was a non-
resident, both Manila and Negros courts may be proper venues for the
proceedings. But since probate proceedings enjoy priority over
intestate proceedings, action by Manila court proper. Even if the venue
was improper, petitioner considered to have waived the defect by
laches. Lastly, the court held that if ever recognized as the natural
child of the decedent, he could opt to intervene in the probate
proceedings, or to have it opened if already finished. 
Facts:
 Don Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain, left properties both in
Manila and Negros
 The alleged natural son of Don Juan, VICENTE URIARTE, filed
petition for settlement of INTESTATE ESTATE of Don Juan before the
Negros Occidental court. Note that during that time, the proceedings
for compulsory acknowledgment as the natural son of Don Juan was
still pending
 PNB also was appointed as special administrator of the estate,
but PNB failed to qualify
 OPPOSITION TO PETITION by HIGINIO URIARTE (nephew of Don
Juan): 
 Don Juan left a will, executed in Spain, duly authenticated -
submitted before Negros court
 ViCENTE's capacity and interest are questionable
 JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA (di ko alam how related) commenced
SPECPRO for PROBATE OF LAST WILL OF DON JUAN before Manila
courts + MTD in Negros Courts
 Since there's a will, no need for intestate proceedings before
Negros Courts
 Vicente had no legal personality to sue
 OPPOSED by VICENTE: Negros Courts first took cognizance, it
had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the same
15

 NEGROS COURT: DISMISS proceedings before it
 VICENTE filed OMNIBUS MOTION in Manila Court for leave to
intervene + dismissal of petition for probate + annulment  of
proceedings – DENIED
 Manila court admitted to probate the last will
Issue: W/N NEGROS COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE IT?
Ruling: NO.
Decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country (Spain) during the time
of his death, so the courts in the province s where he left property may
take cognizance of settlement of his estate
Here, decedent left properties both in Manila and in Negros
Even if Negros court first took cognizance of the case, still has to give
way to Manila court special proceeding intended to effect the
distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance
with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a
"probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. 
BUT testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for
the same purpose.
So even pending Intestate proceedings, if it is found it hat the
decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the
latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that
stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter
being required to render final account and turn over the estate in
his possession to the executor subsequently appointed.  no. 496.
If will rejected or disproved, proceedings shall continue as intestacy
VICENTE already waived procedural defect of VENUE IMPROPERLY
LAID
He knew that there was a will when a MTD was filed in Negros court,
so he should have filed a MTD in Manila court  earlier: Manila court
already
*appointed an administrator 
*admitted the will to probate more than 5 months earlier
Court would not annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even
if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would
be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of
similar jurisdiction
As to interest of Vicente in the case
Two alternatives for an acknowledged natural child to prove his status
and interest in the estate of the deceased parent: 
(1) to intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open; and 
(2) to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed.
#17 - Rebong vs. Ibanez
Subject:
Liability of Heirs and Distributees
Facts:
 Petitioner Rebong applied for a petition to cancel the annotation on
the certificate of title of a land which he inherited from his parents.
 The annotation was pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court (on settlement of estate) to the effect that the property
is still subject to any claim by creditors and other heirs of his deceased
parents within 2 years from settlement of estate.
 Petitioner based her petition for cancellation on section 112 of Act
 HOWEVER, Respondent Judge denied her petition. She now claims
that Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Issue/Held:
 Whether the petition to cancel annotation should be allowed.
NO
16
Ratio:
 The annotation could NOT be cancelled because the registered
interests have not yet terminated and ceased.
 The two year period required by Rule 74 has not yet lapsed when the
petition for cancellation was filed.
 Neither section 4, Rule 74 nor Act 496 authorizes the substitution of
a bond for a lien or registered interest, whether vested, expedient,
inchoate or contingent, which have not yet terminated or ceased.
#18 - Hernandez v. Andal
Facts:
Cresencia, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez are sisters who inherited
from their father a parcel of land. They partitioned the land verbally.
Afterwards Maria and Aquilina sold their share to Zacarias Andal.
Cresencia tried to repurchase the land sold at P150 but Andal did not
agree. In her supplemental complaint she alleged that she offered to
repurchase it for P860 but Andal asked for an extension but later on
sold the land back to Maria and Aquilina for P970.
During trial, counsel for plaintiff contended that the best evidence was
the document of partition. The trial court ruled that under Rules 74
and 123 of the Rules of Court and Art. 1248 of the CC, parol evidence
of partition is inadmissible hence the resale of Andal to the
Hernandezes was null and void. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
W/N a contract of partition can be proved by parol evidence
Held: YES
There are 2 conflicting views as to whether an agreement of partition
should be in writing under the statute of frauds. Partition is excluded
from the operation of the statute of frauds for the reason that partition
is not a conveyance but simply a separation and designation of that
part of the lands which belongs to each tenant in common.
Rule 74 Sec. 1 provides that when there are no outstanding debts the
heirs may divide the estate by means of a public instrument. Although
it is contended that a verbal partition is entirely void and cannot
be validated by any acts short of the execution of a public
document, there are no indications in the phraseology of the rule
to justify an affirmative answer. Where the law intends a writing
or other formality to be the essential requisite to the validity of
the transaction it says so in clear and unequivocal terms. Sec. 1
Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the
required public instrument is to be constitutive of a contract of
partition.
Likewise, the Rules of Court promulgated by the Judicial department
deals with matters of procedure exclusively. For the Court to prescribe
what is to be a binding agreement between co-heirs in the settlement
of their private affairs which in no way affect the rights of 3 rd parties
would be to transcend its rule-making power.
Case Digest by ROVER
G.R. No. 147468 April 9, 2003
#19 - SPOUSES EDUARDO ARENAS DOMINGO & JOSEFINA
CHAVEZ DOMINGO, petitioners,
Vs.
LILIA MONTINOLA ROCES, CESAR ROBERTO M. ROCES, ANA
INES MAGDALENA ROCES TOLENTINO, LUIS MIGUEL M. ROCES,
JOSE ANTONIO M. ROCES and MARIA VIDA PRESENTACION
ROCES, respondents.
FACTS:
The spouses Cesar and Lilia Roces were the owners of two contiguous
parcels of land, On November 1962, the GSIS caused the annotation of
an affidavit of adverse claim on the titles alleging that the spouses
have mortgaged the same to it.
GSIS wrote a letter to Cesar Roces demanding the surrender of the
owner's duplicates of titles, Spouses Roces failed to comply, GSIS filed
a petition with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,praying that
the owner's duplicates in Roces' possession be declared null and void
and that the Register of Deeds of Pasig be directed to issue new
owner's duplicates to GSIS. CFI of Rizal granted the petition.
17
Cesar died intestate on January 1980, survived by his widow along
with all the respondents in this case.
On July 1992, Montinola a nephew of Lila Rocesexecuted an affidavit
of self-adjudication over the said parcels of land. That the properties
were acquired during the existence of their marriage; that the spouses
left no heirs except the brother of Lilia Roces, who was his father; that
neither of the spouses left any will nor any debts; and that he was the
sole heir of the Roces spouses.
Montinola filed a petition against GSIS with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig,During the trial, GSIS failed to produce any document
evidencing the alleged real estate mortgage by Roces of the properties.
Hence, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Montinola. GSIS
did not appeal the judgment thus became final and executory.
Montinola sold the parcels of land to Spouses Domingo, subject to the
provisions of section 4, rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
When respondents learned of the sale of the property to petitioners,
they filed a complaint against Montinola and petitioners with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig.They argued that the affidavit of self-
adjudication was fraudulent because Montinola was not an heir of the
Roces spouses and it was not true that Lilia Roces was dead.
Petitioners in their answer alleged that they are buyers in good faith
and that the actions of the respondents was barred by estoppel and
laches.
Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent. CA reversed
the decision and ordered Montinola to pay the Petitioners, the title was
reinstated back to the respondents and that all other claims made by
the Petitioners were dismissed.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied hence
this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Petitioners in holding the annotation in the title
regarding SEC. 4, RULE 74 is an encumbrance which disqualifies
them from being innocent purchasers for value
2. Whether the Respondents was barred by Estoppel and Laches
HELD:
1. The foregoing rule clearly covers transfers of real property to any
person, as long as the deprived heir or creditor vindicates his rights
within two years from the date of the settlement and distribution of
estate. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the effects of this provision
are not limited to the heirs or original distributees of the estate
properties, but shall affect any transferee of the properties.
Hence, petitioners cannot be considered buyers in good faith and
cannot now avoid the consequences brought about by the application
of Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
2. Hence, petitioners cannot be considered buyers in good faith and
cannot now avoid the consequences brought about by the application
of Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
Delay is an indispensable requisite for a finding of estoppel by laches,
but to be barred from bringing suit on grounds of estoppel and laches,
the delay must be lengthy and unreasonable.No unreasonable delay
can be attributed to respondents in this case.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition
for review is DENIED. The decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 62473 are AFFIRMED in toto.
G.R. No. 125715 December 29, 1998
#20 - RICARDO F. MARQUEZ, AUREA M. CABEZAS, EXEQUIEL F.
MARQUEZ, SALVADOR F. MARQUEZ, ANTONIO F. MARQUEZ, and
RAFAEL F. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioners,
Vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO F. MARQUEZ and BELEN F.
MARQUEZ, respondents.
FACTS:
During their lifetime, the spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad
Marquez begot twelve children, sometime in 1945, the spouses
acquired a parcel of land, wherein they constructed their conjugal
home.
In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. Thirty years later or in
1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication"
vesting unto himself sole ownership to the property. Thereafter on
December 1983 Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed a "Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos covering the house and lot abovementioned to three of this
children, namely: (1) petitioner Rafael, Jr.; (2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen,
both private respondents herein, to the exclusion of his other children,
18
petitioners herein.TCT No. 33350 was cancelled and TCT No. 47572
was issued in private respondents' name.
From 1983 to 1991, private respondents were in actual possession of
the land. However, when petitioners learned about the existence of
TCT No. 47572, they immediately demanded that since they are also
children of Rafael Marquez, Sr., they are entitled to their respective
shares over the land in question. Private respondents ignored
petitioner’s demands.
Petitioners joined by Rafael Marquez Jr. filed a complaint on May 1991
for "Reconveyance and Partition with Damages" before the trial
courtalleging that both the "Affidavit of Adjudication" and "Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos" were fraudulent since the private respondents
took advantage of the advanced age of their father in making him
execute the said documents.
Private respondents argued that petitioner’s action was already barred
by the statute of limitations that the same should’ve been filed within
4 years.
Trial Court rendered its decision in favor of the Petitioners. Stating
that: Prescription cannot set in because an action to set aside a
document which is void ab initio does not prescribe.Both the "Affidavit
of Adjudication" and the "Donation Inter Vivos" did not produce any
legal effect and did not confer any right whatsoever.
Private respondents appealed to the CA and decision of the RTC was
reversed stating that: In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in
Gerona v. de Guzman, 11 SCRA 143, 157, the action therefor may be
filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud.Such
discovery is deemed to have taken place in the case at bar on June 16,
1982, when the affidavit of self-adjudication was filed with the Register
of Deeds and new certificate of titlewas issued in the name of Rafael
Marquez, Sr.Considering that the period from June 16, 1982, when
TCT No. 33350 was issued in the name of Rafael Marquez Sr., to May
31, 1991, when appellees' complaint was filed in court, is eight (8)
years, eleven (11) months and fifteen (15) days, appellants' action to
annul the deed of self-adjudication is definitely barred by the statute of
limitation.
Petitioners filed a motion of reconsideration but proved unavailing.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether their action for reconveyance had prescribed?
HELD:
It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez died in 1952; thus,
succession to her estate is governed by the present Civil Code. Under
Article 887 thereof, her compulsory heirs are her legitimate children,
petitioners and private respondent therein, and her spouse, Rafael
Marquez, Sr. Now, in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. decided to adjudicate
the entire property by executing an "Affidavit of Adjudication" claiming
that he is the sole surviving heir of his deceased wife Felicidad F.
Marquez.
As such, when Rafael Marquez Sr., for one reason or another,
misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir of
his wife when in fact their children were still alive, and managed to
secure a transfer of certificate of title under his name, a constructive
trust under Article 1456 was established.Constructive trusts are
created in equity in order to prevent unjust enrichment. They arise
contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of
confidence, obtains or holds the legal, right to property which he ought
not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.
In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance
of the Torrens title over the property.For the purpose of this case, the
prescriptive period shall start to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued,
which was on June 16, 1982. Thus, considering that the action for
reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or approximately nine years
later, it is evident that prescription had not yet barred the action.
Cognizant of the fact that the disputed land was conjugal property of
the spouses Rafael, Sr. and Felicidad, ownership of the same is to be
equally divided between both of them.
Prescinding therefrom, can Rafael Marquez Sr., as trustee of his wife's
share, validly donate this portion to the respondents? Obviously, he
cannot, as expressly provided in Art. 736 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41214 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Except as to the award of attorney's fees which is hereby
DELETED, the judgment of the trial court in Civil Case No. 60887 is
REINSTATED. No costs.
G.R. No. L-23638 October 12, 1967
19
#21 - DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES,
petitioners,
Vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. L-23662 October 12, 1967
MARIANO REYES, CESAR REYES, LEONOR REYES and PACIENCIA
REYES, petitioners,
Vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
FACTS:
On January 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted
to the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate of the
purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October
22, 1930, and annexed to the petition. The will instituted the petitioner
as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was set for
hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and
Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and
Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the
decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked. Grounds advanced for
the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel
by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of
conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in
favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were
finally set aside by this Supreme Court in a decision promulgated on
August 3, 1954.
After trial on the formulated issues, the Court of First Instance,
by decision of June 1958, found that the will was genuine and
properly executed; but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel
and revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication
of the properties is opportunely presented."
Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration,
and/or new trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation
be considered and resolved; on July 1959, the Court overruled the
claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask for the probate of the will,
but "reserving unto the parties the right to raise the issue of implied
revocation at the opportune time."
On January 1960, the Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz
as administrator for the sole purpose of submitting an inventory of the
estate, and this was done on February 9, 1960.
On February 1962, after receiving further evidence on the issue
whether the execution by the testatrix of deeds of sale in favor of the
testamentary heir, made in 1943 and 1944, subsequent to the
execution of her 1930 testament, had revoked the latter under Article
957(2) of the 1950 Civil Code (Art. 869 of the Civil Code of 1889), the
trial Court resolved against the oppositors and held the will of the late
Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of
sale." Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals.
The appellate Court held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting
the will to probate, had become final for lack of opportune appeal; that
the same was appealable independently of the issue of implied
revocation; that contrary to the claim of oppositors-appellants, there
had been no legal revocation by the execution of the 1943 and 1944
deeds of sale, because the latter had been made in favor of the legatee
herself, and affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the
will to probate had become final for lack of appeal;
2. Whether the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959,
overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise
become final;
3. Whether the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been
impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of
the proponent on 1943 and 1944.
HELD:
1. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the appellant's stand is
untenable. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and
definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and
the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament,
irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or
otherwise.
As such, the probate order is final and appealable; and it is so
recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109. The rule
expressly enumerates six different instances when appeal may be
taken in special proceedings.
20

There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below
was not appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive.
Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor
review the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal
belatedly lodged against the decree was correctly dismissed.
2. As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs.
Guevara, 98 Phil. 249, that the presentation and probate of a will are
requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the
testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a
consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition
within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of
a will to deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment
prescribed for its violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be a non
sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel.
Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still
appealable or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court
of Appeals correctly so ruled.
3. As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such
change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed
in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that
the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of
the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of
Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances"no consideration
whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the
transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying
the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in
advance with what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an
alteration or departure therefrom”.
Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts below, that
in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.
Not only that, but even if it were applicable, the annulment of the
conveyances would not necessarily result in the revocation of the
legacies, if we bear in mind that the findings made in the decision
decreeing the annulment of the subsequent 1943 and 1944 deeds of
sale were also thatit was the moral influence, originating from their
confidential relationship, which was the only cause for the execution of
the 1943 and 1944 conveyances.
DECISION: In view of the foregoing considerations, the appealed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed. Costs against
appellants Reyes and Fernandez. So ordered.
Case Digest by SALLY
# 22- Rodelas vs. Aranza
No. L-58509. December 7, 1982.*
# 22 - IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL
OF RICARDO B. BONILLA, deceased, MARCELA RODELAS,
petitioner-appellant, vs. AMPARO ARANZA, ET. AL., oppositors-
appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor.
FACTS:
Appellant Marcela Rodelas filed a petition with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B.
Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The
petition was opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla,
Wilferine Bonilla Treyes, Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla
on the ground that lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be
proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills. The lower court
rendered a decision in favor of the oppositors-appellees. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found will be
probated by means of a photostatic copy.
HELD:
Yes, pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic
wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution
has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If
uncontested, at least one identifying witness is required and, if no
witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least
21
three identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic
will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will
cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the
handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a
comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and
the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the
holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with
the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gan vs. Yap, 104
Phil. 509, the Court ruled that “the execution and the contents of a lost
or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony
of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will The will itself must
be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the
document itself as material proof of authenticity.” But, in Footnote 8 of
said decision, it says that “Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic
or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other
similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of
the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court.”
Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed
holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979,
denying appellant’s motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of
the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve the
will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.
# 23 - JAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 128314. May 29, 2002
#23 - RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner (RodolfoJao) and private respondent (PericoJao) were the
only sons of the spouses Ignacio JaoTayag and Andrea V. Jao, who
died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents left real
estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal properties.
Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration
before the RTC of Quezon City, over the estate of his parents. Pending
the appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved that he be
appointed as special administrator. He alleged that his brother,
Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the assets of the estate. More
particularly, Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real properties without
rendering any accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to
their deceased parents and disposing of the cash and valuables
therein.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of
improper venue.He argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in
Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths.
The decedent’s actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where
his late mother used to run and operate a bakery. As the health of his
parents deteriorated due to old age, they stayed in Rodolfo’s residence
in Quezon City, solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment
and hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence
previously executed by the decedents, consisting of income tax
returns, voter’s affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, real
estate tax payments, motor vehicle registration and passports, all
indicating that their permanent residence was in Angeles City,
Pampanga.
Private respondentPerico countered that their deceased parents
actually resided in Rodolfo’s house in Quezon City at the time of their
deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their death
certificates that their last residence before they died was at 61 Scout
Gandia Street, Quezon City. Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry
appearing on the death certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed
his own signature on the said document.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of Perico. The CA affirmed in toto the
trial’s court decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Where should the settlement proceedings be had—in Pampanga, where
the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City,
where they actually stayed before their demise?
HELD:
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled.—If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen
or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
22
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court,
so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled
or letters of administration granted in the proper court located in the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents’
residence at the time of death, over the numerous documentary
evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented
by petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of death, as required
by the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile. In
Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals, we held: x xxxxxxxx the term “resides”
connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as distinguished from “legal
residence or domicile.” This term “resides,” like the terms “residing”
and “residence,” is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules—Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature—residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
“domicile” still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile
in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the
terms “residence” and “domicile” but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term “inhabitant.” In other words, “resides” should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents’
residence at the time of death, over the numerous documentary
evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented
by petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of death, as required
by the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile. In
Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals, we held:
xxxxxxxxx the term “resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual residence”
as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” This term “resides,”
like the terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules—
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature—
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word “domicile” still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms “residence” and “domicile” but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous,
and convey the same meaning as the term “inhabitant.” In other
words, “resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant
in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of
time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be
more than temporary.
Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have
one and the same meaning.At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting
straws when he differentiates between venue in ordinary civil actions
and venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appeals and
Bejer v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions
and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As
thus defined, “residence,” in the context of venue provisions, means
nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. All told,
the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for
the settlement of the decedents’ intestate estate was properly laid in
the Quezon City court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is
AFFIRMED.
#24 - Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals
23

No. L-24742. October 26, 1973.
# 24 - ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL
CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO
MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES.
and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.
FACTS:
Sen. Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his
widow, the herein petitioner, and their 2minor sons, all residing in
Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondents
herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion
CuencoManguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and
Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu, alleging among
other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila; that he was
a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and
personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the
Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April
1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and interested
persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA,
a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.
In the meantime, petitioner Rosa CayetanoCuenco filed a petition with
the CFI of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased’s last will
and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor,
as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and
testament.
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court,
petitioner Rosa filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to
Dismiss, as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of
Special Administrator. Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance
its resolution on petitioner’s motion to dismiss “until after the CFI
Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probateproceedings.
Respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion
to Dismiss,on the groundof lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue,
considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over
the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon
appeal, CA ruled in favor of respondents and issued a writ of
prohibition to CFI Quezon.
ISSUE(s):
1. WoN CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition
2. WoN CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction
over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu’s order
expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over
intestate proceedings
HELD:
The Court finds that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ
of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the
testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and
actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased’s last will
and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof
without bond pursuant to the deceased testator’s express wish.
The Judiciary Act concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all
Courts of First Instance over “all matters of probate, both of testate
and intestate estates.” On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the
Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the
Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the different
courts which otherwise may properly assume; jurisdiction from doing
so, the Rule specifies that “the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.” The cited Rule provides:
“Section 1 1.Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent
is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
Province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of the
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far
as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.” (Rule 73)8
24
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location
of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter
but merely of venue.
It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court
with whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires
exclusive jurisdiction.
A fair reading of the Rule—since it deals with venue and comity
between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction—indicates that
the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise
jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate
of the decedent’s last will has been presented in another court where
the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his
surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of
the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate
may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition
and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the
second court which has before it the petition for probate of the
decedent’s alleged last will.
The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court
did not act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in
declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and instead
deferring to the testate proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner
as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent’s last will,
since the record before it (the petitioner’s opposition and motion to
dismiss) showed the falsity of the allegation in the intestate petition
that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that
respondents never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings
the Cebu court’s order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate
proceedings before the Quezon City court/thus leaving the latter free
(pursuant to the Cebu court’s order of deference) to exercise
jurisdiction and admit the decedent’s will to probate.
For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to
have acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in
admitting the decedent’s will to probate and appointing petitioner as
executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light
of the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay
down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.
Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court’s exercise of its
supervisory authority over all inferior courts, 22 it may properly
determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly
assumed by and transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the
interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon
City court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the
decedent and its admission to probate of his last will and testament
and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond
in pursuance of the decedent’s express will and all its orders and
actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and
authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had
and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu
court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should the
Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the
Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible documentary
evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the
decedent.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by
respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is
ordered dismissed. No costs.
Case Digest by YUMMY
# 25 - BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA, respondent.
FACTS:
In January 1945, TeodoroTolete died intestate. He left 4 lands in San
Manuel, Pangasinan. Heirs left were his widow, Leoncia de Leon and
several nephews and nieces. On July 1946, without any judicial
proceeding, Leoncia executed an affidavit stating that she is the only
heir of the decedent to inherit the said properties. Such affidavit was
registered with the ROD of Pangasinan. On the same day, Leoncia also
executed a deed of sale in favor of Benny Sampilo for 10k which was
also registered in said ROD.
On March, 1950, FelisaSinopera instituted proceedings for the
administration of the estate of the late Teodoro. Meanwhile, on June
17, 1950, Sampilo, in turn, sold the lands to HonoratoSalacup for 50k.
The sale was also registered in the ROD.
25
On June 20, 1950, Sinopera, then as appointed administratrix,
brought this present action against Sampilo and Salacup on the
ground that Leoncia had no right to execute the affidavit. Notice of
lispendens was recorded on the certificates on June 26, 1950.
CFI: in favor of Sinopera; the affidavit was declared null and void;
declared Sinopera owner of ½ of the 4 lands; declared that the
usufructuary rights of Leoncia to said properties are terminated.
CA: modified the judgment; the deeds of sale were void only insofar as
the properties conveyed exceed the portion that corresponds to
Leoncia; Salacup was ordered to deliver to Sinopera ½ of the lands in
the complaint for disposition but reserved his right to secure that part
which belonged to Leoncia and his right to bring an action against
Leoncia and Sampilo for damages.
Sampilo and Salacup appealed to the SC alleging that the action has
already prescribed since it should have been commenced within 2
years and but was only filed 4 years after the registration of the
affidavit.
ISSUE: WON Sinopera's right of action to recover her and her co-heirs'
participation to the lands in question prescribed at the time the action
to recover was filed.
SC RULING: Nope. Not yet. CA decision was affirmed in toto.
The laws governing such case are Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74 (codal
please; saving space).
By the title of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" it indicates the
persons to answer for rights violated by the extrajudicial settlement.
On the other hand, it is also significant that no mention is made
expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons who
did not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof.
There cannot be any doubt that those who took part or had knowledge
of the extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to them, the law
is clear that if they claim to have been in any manner deprived of their
lawful right or share in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they
may demand their rights or interest within the period of two years, and
both the distributees and estate would be liable to them for such rights
or interest.
But as to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no
notice of the death of the decedent or of the settlement, there is no
direct or express provision that they also be required to assert their
claims within the period of two years. To extend the effects of the
settlement to them, to those who did not take part or had no
knowledge thereof, without any express legal provision to that effect,
would be violative of the fundamental right to due process of law.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial
settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any
reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution
would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the death of
the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as
no mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication.
The provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs
from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two
years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only:
(1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of
Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the
persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial
settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.
The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not all
the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement.
26
Moreover, the action is one based on fraud, as the widow of the
deceased owner of the lands had declared in her affidavit of partition
that the deceased left no nephews or niece, or other heirs except
herself. Plaintiff's right which is based on fraud and which has a
period of four years, does not appear to have lapsed when the action
was instituted. Judicial proceedings where instituted in March, 1950
and these proceedings must have been instituted soon after the
discovery of fraud.
# 26 - IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
DECEASED ISMAEL REYES, THE HEIRS OF OSCAR R. REYES,
petitioners,
vs.
CESAR R. REYES, respondent.
FACTS: Spouses Ismael Reyes and FelisaRevita Reyes are the owners
of lands in Cubao, QC. They have 7 children. On April 1973, Ismael
Reyes died intestate.
Prior to his death, Ismael was notified by the BIR of an income tax
deficiency arising from his sale of a land in TandangSora, QC. For
failure to pay, the tax increased to about 172k+ and since his heirs
also did not pay such tax, one of the lands in Cubao was levied, sold
and forfeited in favor of the Government.
In 1976, Oscar Reyes, son of Ismael, availed of the BIR’s tax amnesty
and was able to redeem the property. Also in May, 1982, a notice was
sent to Felisa from the Office of the City Treasurer of QC informing her
that the Cubao properties will be auctioned for her failure to pay the
real estate tax delinquency from 1974-1981. Oscar again settled the
accounts through an amnesty compromise agreement with the City
Treasurer.
In May, 1989, Cesar, brother, filed a petition for issuance of letters of
administration with the RTC of QC praying for his appointment as
administrator of their father’s estate which includes ½ of the Cubao
properties. Oscar opposed on the ground that he had acquired the
properties by redemption and/or purchase.
RTC: in favor of Cesar; properties were provisionally included in the
estate. Oscar appealed but while pending, he died and was substituted
by his heirs.
CA: affirmed, MR denied, hence, present action.
ISSUE: WON the Cubao properties can be included in the estate. WON
the trial court should not determine question on ownership.
SC RULING: Yes.
The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having
to do with the settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of
deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of
administrators, executors, guardians and trustees. The question of
ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter which the Probate Court
cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the
title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and
is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
The subject properties are still titled under the Torrens system in the
names of spouses Ismael and FelisaRevita Reyes which under the law
is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the
manner indicated in the law. The declaration of the provisional
character of the inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory as
stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the Probate Court.
Settled is the rule that the RTC acting as a probate court exercises but
limited jurisdiction, thus it has no power to take cognizance of and
determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person
adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties
27
having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to of the house and lot, be ordered to vacate the property and turn over
the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the possession to her. This was granted.
the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced.
CA reversed such decision for having been issued beyond the RTC’s
limited jurisdiction as a probate court. Hence, appeal by Milagros.
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the
application of the exception to the rule. It bears stress that the
ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction.
purpose why the probate court allowed the introduction of evidence on
ownership was for the sole purpose of determining whether the subject
properties should be included in the inventory which is within the
SC RULING: Yes. The case was to be returned to the probate court for
probate courts competence.
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Teodoro and
LucreciaReselva prior to the settlement of the estate of Teodoro.
There was nothing on record that both parties submitted the issue of
ownership for its final resolution.
The long standing rule is that probate courts, or those in charge of
proceedings whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and which
In fact, the probate court, aware of its limited jurisdiction declared that
are claimed to belong to outside parties. Stated otherwise, "claims for
its determination of the ownership was merely provisional and
title to, or right of possession of, personal or real property, made by the
suggested that either the administrator or the widow Felisa Reyes may
heirs themselves, by title adverse to that of the deceased, or made by
commence the proper action in the Regional Trial Court.
third persons, cannot be entertained by the probate court."

The question of ownership of a property alleged to be part of the estate

In the present case, however, Menandro, who refused to vacate the
must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
house and lot cannot be considered an "outside party" for he is one of
general jurisdiction.
the three compulsory heirs of the former. As such, he is very much
involved in the settlement of Teodoro's estate.
# 27 - MILAGROS A. CORTES, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MENANDRO A. RESELVA, By way of exception to the above-mentioned rule, "when the parties are
respondents. all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the
probate court the question of title to property." Here, the probate court
FACTS: MenandroReselva, Milagros Cortes, and FloranteReselva are
is competent to decide the question of ownership. More so, when the
brothers and sister and children - heirs of the late spouses Teodoro T.
opposing parties belong to the poor stratum of society and a separate
Reselva and Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva, who died on April 11, 1989 and
action would be most expensive and inexpedient.
May 13, 1987, respectively. The parents owned a house and lot (more
or less 100 sq. m.) in Tondo, Manila.
In addition, Menandro's claim is not at all adverse to, or in conflict
with that of, the decedent since the former's theory merely advances
The father executed a holographic will which was probated in July,
co-ownership with the latter. In the same way, when the controversy is
1991 with Milagros as the executrix. Thereafter, she filed a motion
whether the property in issue belongs to the conjugal partnership or
before respondent probate court praying that Menandro, the occupant
exclusively to the decedent, the same is properly within the jurisdiction
of the probate court, which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal

28
partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is
to be distributed among the heirs.
More importantly, the case at bar falls squarely under Rule 73, Section
2 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
RULE 73
SEC. 2.Where estate upon dissolution of marriage. - When the
marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and
liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the
conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either."
Case digest by June
Case No. 28
G.R. No. L-26306 April 27, 1988
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA MARIA
VENTURA, executrix- appellant, MIGUEL VENTURA and JUANA
CARDONA, heirs-appellants,
vs.
GREGORIA VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, EXEQUIEL VICTORIO,
MERCEDES VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, PEDRO D. CORPUZ,
oppositors-appellees.
FACTS:
Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the
deceased Gregorio Ventura while Miguel Ventura and Juana
Cardona are his son and saving spouse who are also the brother
and mother of Maria Ventura. On the other hand, appellees
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the deceased's legitimate
children with his former wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano
(Record on Appeal, p. 122) but the paternity of appellees was
denied by the deceased in his will (Record on Appeal, p. 4).
On December 14,1953, Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the
probate of his will which did not include the appellees and the petition
was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 812 (Record on Appeal, pp. 1-
3). In the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an
illegitimate child, was named and appointed by the testator to be the
executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate (Record on
Appeal, p. 7).
On January 25, 1961, Maria Ventura filed a motion to hold in
abeyance the approval of the accounts of administration or to have
their approval without the opposition of the spouses Mercedes Ventura
and Pedro Corpuz and Gregoria Ventura and ExequielVictorio on the
ground that the question of the paternity of Mercedes Ventura and
Gregoria Ventura is still pending final determination before the
Supreme Court and that should they be adjudged the adulterous
children of testator, as claimed, they are not entitled to inherit nor to
oppose the approval of the counts of administration (Record on
Appeals, pp. 33-36).
Hence, this appeal.
Gregoria and Mercedes Ventura claimed that they are the legitimate
children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife Paulina Simpliciano, who
died in 1943, and asked that one-half of the properties described in
the complaint be declared as the share of their mother in the conjugal
partnership, with them as the only forced heirs of their mother Paulina
(Joint Brief for the Appellants, pp. 53-68).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally
justified.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the removal of Maria Ventura as
executrix is legally justified. In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of
the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin
are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura.
The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled
under the statute of distribution to the decedent's property (Cooper vs.
Cooper, 43 Ind. A. 620, 88 NE 341). It is generally said that "the
nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is
preferred in the choice of administrator. 'Among members of a class
29
the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of
interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred."
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme
Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of
Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore,
as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to
preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely:
Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference
provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed
administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona
and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in
order to represent both interests.
Case No. 29
G.R. No. L-7019             May 31, 1955
In the matter of the intestate estate of the deceased
RosaliaSaquitan. EULOGIO S. EUSEBIO, administrator-appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO VALMORES,oppositor-appellant deceased.
JACINTA SISCAR, widow of deceased,oppositor-appellant.
FACTS:
On July 31, 1952, the above-entitled proceedings were instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, upon petition of Francisco
Valmores, who claims to be the adopted son of the spouses
Domingo Valmores and RosaliaSaquitan. The petition alleges that
RosaliaSaquitan died in Pasig, Rizal on October 1, 1950, without
leaving any decendant or ascendant; that the nearest relatives of said
decedent are the husband, Domingo Valmores, and the petitioner
Francisco Valmores; and that the surviving spouse Domingo Valmores
is more than 80 years of age and physically unfit to discharge the
duties of administrator, so the petitioner recommends the
appointment of EulogioEusebio as administrator. On the same day
of the presentation of the petition, the Clerk of court issued a notice
setting a date (August 29, 1952) for the hearing of the petition and
ordering the publication of the notice in the newspaper "La Opinion."
On the day set for the hearing, no one appeared except counsel for the
petitioner Francisco Valmores. Francisco Valmores himself did not
appear. Counsel for the petitioner proved the publication of the notice
of hearing and, afterwards, presented his witness, one by the name
of RaymundoDelmindo, who declared that he is the brother of
Francisco Valmores that his brother had been adopted by the
spouses Domingo Valmores and RosaliaSaquitan, that
RosaliaSaquitan did not leave any will, that her nearest relative is her
surviving husband who is 80 years of age and incapable of
administering the estate. Thereafter the following proceedings for the
settlement of the estate took place in rapid succession.
On March 23, 1953 the surviving spouse Domingo Valmores presented
an opposition dated March 20, 1953, impugning the appointment of
EulogioEusebio as administrator on the ground that he is a stranger to
the family and to himself, and praying that he be appointed
administrator of the properties of the deceased, and that the case be
set for hearing so that he can present his evidence. On April 4, 1953
he presented an amended opposition, alleging that RosaliaSaquitan
had died more than two years before, that he had been administering
the properties of her deceased wife, that he is now the owner and
possessor of the properties in question, which was valued at P45,914.
Since the pendency of the case before this Court, the following events
have happened: Domingo Valmores died on May 13, 1954. (According
to the certificate of death, he was 85 years old at the time of his death.
It appears that the said oppositor was married for the second time to
Jacinta Siscar on January 6, 1952). Upon being notified of the death of
Domingo Valmores, this Court ordered the widow substituted for the
deceased appellant.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the petitioner can be designated as the
administrator of the estate of the deceased.
2. Whether the notice to the persons having an interest in the
properties of the deceased can be dispense with.
HELD:
The evidence submitted in the hearing does not satisfactorily prove
that the petitioner was legally adopted; hence, he did not have any
interest in the properties of the deceased RosaliaSaquitan.
A study of the records also discloses fatal irregularities in the notice
required to be given. Thus nowhere does it appear from the record that
Domingo Valmores was ever personally notified of the filing of the
petition or of the time and place for hearing the same. His first
opposition shows that he was not aware of the hearing at all. He was
30
notified of the proceedings for the first time when the inventory was
sent him on November 29, 1952. Section 3 of Rule 80 of the Rules of
Court provides:
When a petition for letters of administration is filed in the court having
jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the
petition, and shall causenotice thereof to be given to the known heirs
and creditors of the decedent and to any other persons believed to have
an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in sections 3 and 4 of
Rule 77. (Emphasis supplied.)
The known heir in this case was Domingo Valmores and notice should
have been given him in accordance with Section 3 and 4 of Rule 77.
Section 4 of Rule 77 specially provides:
The Court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place
fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the known heirs, legatees
and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their place of
residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage prepaid at
least twenty days before the hearing, if such places of residence be
known.
. . ..Personal service of copied of the notice at least ten days before the
day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.
Section 5 of the same rule also requires:
At the hearing compliance with the provisions of the last two preceding
sections must be shown before the introduction of testimony in
support of the will. All such testimony shall be taken under oath and
reduced to writing.
The records of the hearing do not show that the notices as above
required had been given to Domingo Valmores or MaximoSaquitan.
We, therefore, find that the error imputed to the trial court in
oppositor-appellant's brief that the court has failed to comply with the
provisions of Section 3 and 5 of Rule 80 had not been complied with,
was actually committed. The requirement as to notice is essential to
the validity of the proceedings in order that no person may be deprived
of his right or property without due process of law. The absence of
notice to heirs becomes the more apparent in the case at bar, where
evidently a stranger has been able to railroad the proceedings in court
without opportunity of the person most interested in the estate of the
deceased to appear and contest in due time the right of the petitioner
or the appointment of the person recommended as administrator.
Case No. 30
G.R. No. L-23372             June 14, 1967
IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE PIO DURAN. CIPRIANO
DURAN and MIGUEL DURAN, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
JOSEFINA B. DURAN, movant-oppositor and appellee.
FACTS:
Pio Duran died without testament on February 28, 1961 in
GuinobatanAlbay. Among his alleged heirs are Josefina Duran, as
surviving spouse; several brothers and sisters; nephews and nieces.
Subsequent to his death, on June 2, 1962, Cipriano Duran, one of the
surviving brothers, executed a public instrument assigning and
renouncing his hereditary rights to the decedent's estate in favor of
Josefina Duran, for the consideration of P2,500.00.
A year later, on June 8, 1963, Cipriano Duran filed in the Court of
First Instance of Albay a petition for intestate proceedings to settle Pio
Duran's estate, further asking that he be named the administrator. An
ex parte motion to be appointed special administrator was also filed by
him.
Against said petition, Josefina Duran filed on August 9, 1963 an
opposition, praying for its dismissal upon the ground that the
petitioner is not an "interested person" in the estate, in view of the
deed of transfer and renunciation the estate, in view of afore-stated,
she asked to be appointed administratrix.
Acting on said motions, on June 3, 1964, the Court of First Instance
issued an order dismissing the petition of Cipriano for his lack of
interest in the estate. Said lack of interest was premised on the deed of
transfer executed by Cipriano, regarding which the court declared
itself without power to examine in said proceedings, collaterally, the
alleged fraud, inadequacy of price and lesion that would render it
rescissible or voidable. And with the petition's dismissal, Miguel's
petition to be joined as co-petitioner was deemed without leg to stand
on.
The Rules of Court provides that a petition for administration and
settlement of an estate must be filed by an "interested person" (See. 2,
Rule 79). Appellants contend that the deed of assignment executed by
31
Cipriano did not operate to render him a person without interest in the As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme
estate. Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of
Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore,
ISSUE: Whether the Petitioner is a person-in-interest in the estate of
as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to
the decedent.
preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely:
HELD: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference
provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed
In the present case, however, the assignment took place when no
administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or
settlement proceedings was pending. The properties subject matter of
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona
the assignment were not under the jurisdiction of a settlement court.
and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in
Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a partition as between
order to represent both interests.
the assignor and assignee, the same does not need court approval to
be effective as between the parties. An extrajudicial partition is valid as
between the participants even if the requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 for
extrajudicial partition are not followed, since said requisites are for
purposes of binding creditors and non-participating heirs only Case Digest by Terelyn
(Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil. 196). Should it be contended that said
Case No. 34
partition was attended with fraud, lesion or inadequacy of price, the
remedy is to rescind or to annul the same in an action for that OCAMPO V. OCAMPO
purpose. And in the meanwhile, assigning heir cannot initiate a
FACTS: 
settlement proceedings, for until the deed of assignment is annulled or
rescinded, it is deemed valid and effective against him, so that he is Petitioners are the surviving wife and the children of Leonardo Ocampo
left without that "interest" in the estate required to petite for who died on January 23, 2004. Leonardo and his siblings,
settlement proceedings. respondents Renato and ErlindaOcampo are the legitimate children
and only heirs of the spouses Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died
intestate. 
ISSUE:
On June 24, 2004, the petitioners initiated a petition for intestate
Whether or not the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally proceedings of the estate of Sps. Vicente Ocampo and Maxima
justified. Mercado Ocampo, and Leonardo M. Ocampo. It alleged that, upon the
death of Vicente and Maxima, respondents and their brother Leonardo
jointly controlled, managed, and administered the estate of their
HELD: parent. However, when Leonardo died, respondents took possession,
control and management of the properties to the exclusion of
The Supreme Court held that the removal of Maria Ventura as
petitioners. The petition prayed for the settlement of the estate of
executrix is legally justified. In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of
Vicente and Maxima and the estate of Leonardo. It, likewise, prayed for
the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin
the appointment of an administrator to apportion, divide, and award
are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura.
the two estates among the lawful heirs of the decedents.
The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled
under the statute of distribution to the decedent's property (Cooper vs. Respondents prayed that they be appointed as special joint
Cooper, 43 Ind. A. 620, 88 NE 341). It is generally said that "the administrators of the estate, and to serve as such without posting a
nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is bond.
preferred in the choice of administrator. 'Among members of a class
the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of
interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred."

32
The RTC Court appointed Dalisay and Renato as special joint
administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses, and required
them to post a bond.
Respondents asserted their priority in right to be appointed as
administrators being the next of kin of Vicente and Maxima, whereas
Dalisay was a mere daughter-in-law of the decedents and not even a
legal heir by right of representation from her late husband Leonardo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of special administrators be governed
by the rules regarding the selection of regular administrators.
HELD:
A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its
supervision and control, expected to work for the best interest of the
entire estate, with a view to its smooth administration and speedy
settlement.When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or
representative of the parties suggesting the appointment.The principal
object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve
the estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to
administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section
2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to
their deceased parents in their appointment as joint special
administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the
appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of
special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the
selection or removal of regular administrators.The probate court may
appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than
those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to
first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the
application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as
would be proper in the case of a regular administrator,  do not
obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and
is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by
higher courts is unwarranted. The appointment or removalof special
administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be
assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
Case No. 35
TAN VS. GEDORIO
FACTS:
Gerardo Tan died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will. Private
respondents, who are claiming to be the children of Gerardo Tan, filed
with the RTC a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration. Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo
Tan, filed an opposition to the petition.
Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special
administrator, asserting the need for a special administrator to take
possession and charge of Gerardos estate until the Petition can be
resolved by the RTC or until the appointment of a regular
administrator. They prayed that their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D.
Lim be appointed as the special administrator. 
Petitioners contendthat they should be given priority in the
administration of the estate since they are allegedly the legitimate
heirs of the late Gerardo, as opposed to private respondents, who are
purportedly Gerardos illegitimate children. Petitioners rely on the
doctrine that generally, it is the nearest of kin, whose interest is more
preponderant, who is preferred in the choice of administrator of the
decedents estate. They also claim that they are more competent than
private respondents or their attorney-in-fact to administer Gerardos
estate. Petitioners claim to have lived for a long time and continue to
reside on Gerardos estate, while respondents are not even in
the Philippines, having long established residence abroad.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator apply to the selection of a special administrator.
HELD:
The Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the
appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the Rules of
Court does not apply to the selection of a special administrator. The
preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next
of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of
a special administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in
the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.
Furthermore, petitioners were not able to sufficiently substantiate
their claim that their co-petitioner Vilma would have been the more
competent and capable choice to serve as the special administratrix of
Gerardos estate. 
33
The Court find it immaterial the fact that private respondents reside
abroad, for the same cannot be said as regards their attorney-in-fact,
Romualdo, who is, after all, the person appointed by the RTC as
special administrator. It is undisputed that Romualdo resides in the
country and can, thus, personally administer Gerardos estate.
The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator
is to preserve the estate until it can pass into the hands of a person
fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs.
Case No. 36
PIJUAN VS.VDA. DE GURREA
FACTS:
In 1932, appellant Manuela Ruiz and Carlos Gurrea were married in
Spain, where they lived together until 1945, when he abandoned her
and came, with their son Teodoro, to the Philippines. Here he lived
maritally with Rizalina Perez by whom he had two children. Having
been informed by her son Teodoro, years later, that his father was
residing in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, Manuela came to the
Philippines in June 1960.
Carlos Gurrea died on leaving a document purporting to be his last will
andtestament, in which he named Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof
and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and their son, Teodoro. Soon thereafter,
Pijuan instituted Special Proceedings with the CFI, for the probate of
said will. Thereafter Pijuan was, upon his ex parte motion, appointed
special administrator of the estate, without bond. Oppositions to the
probate of the will were filed by Mrs. Gurrea, her son and an
illegitimate daughter
On July 16, 1962, Mrs. Gurrea filed a motion alleging that the
aforementioned alimony,pendente lite, of P1,000 a month, had been
suspended upon the death of Carlos Gurrea, and praying that the
Special Administrator be ordered to continue paying it pending the
final determination of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of the deceased should still be made liable
for the support due to Mrs. Gurrea?
HELD:
Due to the absence of proof as regards the status, nature or character
of the property now under the custody of the Special Administrator.
Precisely, however, on account of such lack of proof thereon, we are
bound by lawto assume that the estate of the deceased consists of
property belonging to the conjugal partnership, one-half of which
belongs presumptively to Mrs. Gurrea,aside from such part of the
share of the deceased in said partnership as may belong to her as one
of the compulsory heirs,if his alleged will were not allowed to probate,
or, even if probated, if the provision therein disinheriting her were
nullified.
It is next urged by Mrs. Gurrea, as widow of the deceased, she claims a
right of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of
Court. In the language of this provision, said preference exists "if no
executor is named in the will or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate." None of these conditions obtains. The deceased Gurrea has
left a document purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still pending
probate. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that he has died intestate. Again,
said document names Marcelo Pijuan as executorthereof, and it is not
claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is more, he has not only
not refused the trust, but, has, also, expressly accepted it, by applying
for his appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as special
administrator, has assumed the duties thereof. It may not be amiss to
note that the preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of
the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers to the appoint of a
regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special
administrator, and that the order appointing the latter lies within the
discretion of the probate court, and is not appealable.
Case Digesd by OSHIN
#40 - Vda. De Bacling vs. Laguna
FACTS: Private respondent Hector Laguda is the registered owner of a
residential land where petitioner and her late husband, Dr. Ramon
Bacaling, constructed a residential house. Unable to pay the lease
rental, an action for ejectment was filed by private respondent against
petitioner in her capacity as judicial adminstratrix of the estate of Dr.
Bacaling. The petitioner entered into a compromise agreement on July
29, 1964 with private respondent Laguda. For failure to satisfy the
conditions of the settlement, Laguda moved for execution. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration to which Laguda filed an opposition alleging
that as judicial administratrix as of July 29, 1964, she was legally
authorized to enter into the amicable settlement which was the basis
34
of the decision dated July 30, 1964, of the City Court of Iloilo sought to
be executed and, therefore, her act was binding upon the present
judicial administrator, Atty. Roberto Dineros, who replaced petitioner
upon her discharge as such on November 28, 1964.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the petitioner as judicial
administratrix prior to her discharge or removal are valid and binding
upon her successor.
HELD: Under Section 3, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, petitioner’s
lawful acts before the revocation of her letters of administration or
before her removal shall have the same validity as if there was no such
revocation or removal. It is elementary that the effect of revocation of
letters testamentary or of administration is to terminate the authority
of the executor or administrator, but the acts of the executor or
administrator, done in good faith prior to the revocation of the letters,
will be protected, and a similar protection will be extended to rights
acquired under a previous grant of administration.
# 41 - Ruiz vs. CA (1996)
FACTS: Hilario Ruiz left a holographic will wherein he named as his
heirs his only son, his adoptive daughter and his grandchildren from
his only son. His only son was also named executor of the will. Upon
his death, the only son did not petition for the probate of said will, and
even opposed the probate of the will. The probate court ordered that
support be given to the grandchildren, and that the titles to the two
apartments being rented out be released to the heirs.
HELD: As to the support to be given, the rules of court provides that
ONLY CHILDREN of the deceased (as well as the surviving spouse) are
entitled to support, not the grandchildren. As to the release of the
titles, court held that it was too early to release the titles yet as the
estate has not yet been inventoried and appraised, the charges upon
the estate has not yet been paid, and there is still an issue as to the
intrinsic validity of the will which the court should proceed to
determine first. Finally, court held that the right of an executor or
administrator to the possession and management of the real and
personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only
be exercised “so long as it is necessary of the payment of the debts and
expenses of administration.
# 42 - De Guzman vs. De Guzman-Carillo
FACTS: This case is about the propriety of allowing as administration
expenses certain disbursements made by the administrator of the
testate estate of the late Felix J. de Guzman of Gapan, Nueva Ecija.
One of the properties left by the decedent was a residential house
located in the poblacion which was adjudicated to his eight children,
each one being given a 1/8 proindiviso share in the project of partition.
The administrator submitted four accounting reports for his
disbursements which were objected by the three heirs.
HELD: An executor or administrator is allowed the necessary expenses
in the care, management, and settlement of the estate. He is entitled to
possess and manage the decedent’s real and personal estate as long as
it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of
administration. He is accountable for the whole decedent’s estate
which has come into his possession, with all the interest, profit, and
income thereof, and with the proceeds of so much of such estate as is
sold by him, at the price at which it was sold (Sec. 3, Rule 84; Secs. 1
and 7, Rule 85, Rules of Court).
It should be noted that the family residence was partitioned pro-
indiviso among the decedent’s eight children. Each one of them was
given a one-eight share in conformity with the testator’s will. Five of
the eight co-owners consented to the use of the funds of the estate for
repair and improvement of the family home. It is obvious that the
expenses in question were incurred to preserve the family home and to
maintain the family’s social standing in the community. Obviously,
those expenses redounded to the benefit of all the co-owners. They
were necessary for the preservation and use of the family residence. As
a result of those expenses, the co-owners, including the three
oppositors, would be able to use the family home in comfort,
convenience and security. We hold that the probate court did not err in
approving the use of the income of the estate to defray those expenses.
Case Digest by ARNEL
G.R. No. 74769 September 28, 1990
# 43 -BEATRIZ F. GONZALES, petitioner, 
vs.
35
HON. ZOILO AGUINALDO, Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch
143, Makati, Metro Manila and TERESA F. OLBES, respondents.
FACTS:
 Special Proceedings No. 021 is an intestate proceeding involving
the estate of the deceased Doña Ramona Gonzales Vda. deFavis.
Doña Ramona is survived by her four (4) children who are her only
heirs, namely, AsterioFavis, Beatriz F. Gonzales, Teresa F. Olbes, and
Cecilia Favis-Gomez.
 The court a quo appointed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales and
private respondent Teresa Olbes as co-administratices of the estate.
 While petitioner Beatriz was in the United States accompanying
her ailing husband who was receiving medical treatment in that
country Teresafiled a motion to remove Beatriz as co-administratrix,
on the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust
and had committed acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of the
estate and the heirs.
 In an Order, respondent Judge cancelled the letters of
administration granted to Beatriz and retainedTeresa as the
administratrix of the estate of the late Ramona Gonzales.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the removal of Beatriz as co-administratix of the
estate is valid.
RULING:
 No. Removal of Beatriz as co-administratix of the estate is not
among the ground for removal of administrator.
The rule is that if no executor is named in the will, or the named
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to
give bond, or a person dies intestate, the court must appoint an
administrator of the estate of the deceased who shall act as
representative not only of the court appointing him but also of the
heirs and the creditors of the estate.  In the exercise of its discretion,
the probate court may appoint one, two or more co-administrators to
have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have
different interests represented. 
In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a
deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the
interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.  The
underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap
the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the estate,
or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence
or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential
motive to administer the estate correctly. 
Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their
trust as entitle them to protection from removal without just
cause. Hence, Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides the
legal and specific causes authorizing the court to remove an
administrator. 
While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in
the removal of an administrator, it however must have some fact
legally before it in order to justify a removal. There must be evidence
of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not
conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the
court, which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal
of the administrator. In making such a determination, the court must
exercise good judgment, guided by law and precedents.
In the present case, the court a quo did not base the removal of the
petitioner as co-administratrix on any of the causes specified in
respondent's motion for relief of the petitioner. The court based
the removal of the petitioner on the fact that in the administration of
the estate, conflicts and misunderstandings have existed between
petitioner and respondent Teresa Olbes which allegedly have
prejudiced the estate, and the added circumstance that petitioner had
been absent from the country.
36
Case No 44 proceedings. Despite the utter lack of approval of the probate court in
Manila, the CFI Davao approved the said Amicable Settlement and
G.R. No. L-29407 July 29, 1983
gave the same the enforceability of a court decision.
ESTATE OF AMADEO MATUTE OLAVE, as represented by JOSE S.
MATUTE, Judicial Co-Administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, Court
of First Instance of Manila, petitioner,  ISSUE:
vs.
 Whether or not the Amicable Settlement approved by the CFI
HONORABLE MANASES G. REYES, Presiding Judge of Branch III,
Davao, not the probate court, is valid.
Court of First Instance of Davao, Davao City; SOUTHWEST
AGRICULTURAL MARKETING CORPORATION also known as
(SAMCO); CARLOS V. MATUTE, as another Administrator of the
Estate of AmadeoMatuteOlave, Sp. Proc. No. 25876 CFI, Manila;
and MATIAS S. MATUTE, as former Co-Administrator of the Estate RULING:
of AmadeoMatuteOlave, Sp. Proc. No. 25876, CFI,
Manila, respondents.  No. The Amicable Settlement not approved by the Probate Court
is invalid.
Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, provides that "no action
FACTS: upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
 The petition alleged that the estate of AmadeoMatuteOlave is thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land containing an area of administrator; ..." The claim of private respondent SAMCO being one
293,578 square meters, situated province of Davao. arising from a contract may be pursued only by filing the same in the
administration proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila
 The Court of First Instance of Manila, as the probate court,
(Sp. Proc. No. 25876) for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
issued an order directing the co-administrators, Carlos V. Matute and
AmadeoMatuteOlave; and the claim must be filed within the period
Matias S. Matute, to secure the probate court's approval before
prescribed, otherwise, the same shall be deemed "barred forever."
entering into any transaction involving the seventeen (17) titles of the
(Section 5, Rule 86, Rules of Court).
estate, of which the property described in OCT No. 0-27 is one of
them. The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the
 Private respondent Southwest Agricultural Marketing estate in the probate court is to protect the estate of deceased
Corporation (SAMCO) filed Civil Case No. 4623 with the respondent persons. That way, the executor or administrator will be able to
Court of First Instance of Davao against respondents, Carlos V. examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one which
Matute and Matias S. Matute, as defendants, in their capacities as should be allowed.
co-administrators of the estate of AmadeoMatuteOlave, for the
The primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is to
collection of an alleged indebtedness of P19,952.11. Defendants
apprise the administrator and the probate court of the existence of the
Carlos V. Matute and Matias S. Matute in said Civil Case No. 4623,
claim so that a proper and timely arrangement may be made for its
filed an answer denying their lack of knowledge and questioning the
payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the due course of the
legality of the claim of SAMCO.
administration, inasmuch as upon the death of a person, his entire
 An Amicable Settlementwas submitted to Court of First
estate is burdened with the payment of all of his debts and no creditor
Instance of Davao, whereby the property of the estate covered by OCT
shall enjoy any preference or priority; all of them shag share pro-rata
No. 0-27 of Davao was conveyed and ceded to SAMCO as payment of
in the liquidation of the estate of the deceased.
its claim. The said Amicable Settlement signed by the herein
respondents was not submitted to and approved by the then Court It is clear that the main purpose of private respondent SAMCO in
of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, nor filing Civil Case No. 4623 in the then Court of First Instance of
notice thereof made to the beneficiaries and heirs in said special Davao was to secure a money judgment against the estate which

37
eventually ended in the conveyance to SAMCO of more than twenty-
nine (29) hectares of land belonging to the estate of the deceased
AmadeoMatuteOlave in payment of its claim, without prior authority
of the probate court of Manila, in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, which has the
exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of AmadeoMatuteOlave. It was a
mistake on the part of respondent court to have given due course
to Civil Case No. 4623, much less issue the questioned Order, dated
November 10, 1967, approving the Amicable Settlement.
Case No. 45
G.R. No. L-18936             May 23, 1967
INTESTATE ESTATE OF ENCARNACION ELCHICO Vda. de
FERNANDO, deceased. 
NATIVIDAD E. IGNACIO and LEONOR E.
ALMAZAN, administratrices-appellants,  
vs.
PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY, INC., claimant appellee.
FACTS:
 August 29, 1951. Pampanga Bus Company, Inc. (Pambusco)
lodged its complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against
two (2) defendants Valentin Fernando and EncarnacionElchicoVda.
de Fernando for collection of P105,000.00 upon a contractual
obligation.
 January 23, 1955. EncarnacionElchicoVda. de Fernando died.
By this time, Pambusco in the foregoing civil case had already
presented its evidence and submitted its case.
 March 23, 1955. Intestate proceedings were filed. Notice to the
estate's creditors was given for them to file their claims within six (6)
months from this date, the first publication of the notice.
 December 11, 1958. After trial on the merits, the Court of First
Instance of Manila rendered judgment in the civil case, ordering the
defendants to pay the Pambusco the sum of P93,000.00 together
with the costs of these proceedings.
 February 25, 1959.In Special Proceeding 25256, Intestate
Estate of EncarnacionElchicoVda. Fernando, Pambusco registered
its contingent claim in these special proceedings — for whatever
money judgment may be rendered in his favor in the civil suit.
 January 25, 1961. The judgment in the civil case having
reached finality, the probate court issued an order which allowed said
amount of P46,500.00 to be paid by the heirs and/or the joint
administratrices, but no payment thereof shall be made until after the
administratrices shall have informed the Court in writing as to the
existence of other unsettled money claims against the estate and of the
sufficiency of the assets available for payment of all the debts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pambuso’s claim for payment of indebtness properly
admitted by Probate Court.
RULING:
Yes. It was properly admitted by the probate court.
 Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides: SEC.
21. Where claim does not survive. — When the action is for
recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant
dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall
be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided
in these rules.
 The Philosophy behind the rule which provides for the
dismissal of the civil case is that, upon the death of defendant, all
money claims should be filed in the testate or interstate
proceedings "to avoid useless duplicity of procedure."7 Obviously,
the legal precept just quoted is procedural in nature. It outlines the
method by which an action for recovery of money, debt or interest may
continue, upon the terms therein prescribed. Whether the original suit
for the recovery of money — as here — proceeds to its conclusion, or is
dismissed and the claim covered thereby filed with the probate court,
one thing is certain: no substantial rights of the parties are prejudiced.
 However, at the time of the death of defendant
EncarnacionElchicoVda. de Fernando, plaintiff Pambusco had already
closed its evidence and submitted its case. Her administrator
substituted. By this substitution, the estate had notice of the claim.
The estate was thus represented. The administrator of the
estatetook active steps to protect the interests of the estate. He
went to trial. Defeated in the Court of First Instance, he appealed to
the Court of Appeals. He even elevated that civil case to this Court.
Now that the judgment has become final, the estate cannot be
heard to say that said judgment — reached after a full dress trial
38
on the merits — will now go for naught. The estate has thus waived
its right to have Pambusco's claim re-litigated in the estate
proceedings. For, though presentment of probate claims is imperative,
it is generally understood that it may be waived by the estate's
representative.And, waiver is to be determined from the
administrator's "acts and conduct."Certainly, the administrator's
failure to plead the statute of nonclaims, his active participation, and
resistance to plaintiff's claim, in the civil suit, amount to such
waiver. 
Case Digest by KIM
V. CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATE (RULES 86 & 88)
G.R. No. L-8235            March 19, 1914
# 46 - ISIDRO SANTOS, plaintiff-appellant, 
vs.
LEANDRA MANARANG, administratrix, defendant-appellee.
*statute of non-claims
FACTS:
Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 1906, possessed of
certain real and personal property which, by his last will and
testament dated July 26, 1906, he left to his three children. The fourth
clause of this will reads as follows: I also declare that I have contracted
the debts detailed below, and it is my desire that they may be
religiously paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time
agreed upon with my creditors.
Among the debts mentioned in the list referred to are two in favor of
the plaintiff, Isidro Santos; one due on April 14, 1907, for P5,000, and
various other described as falling due at different dates (the dates are
not given) amounting to the sum of P2,454. The will was duly probated
and a committee was regularly appointed to hear and determine such
claims against the estate as might be presented. This committee
submitted its report to the court on June 27, 1908.
In his petition of July 14, 1909, asking that the committee be
reconvened to consider his claims, plaintiff states that his failure to
present the said claims to the committee was due to his belief that it
was unnecessary to do so because of the fact that the testator, in his
will, expressly recognized them and directed that they should be paid.
The inference is that had plaintiff's claims not been mentioned in the
will he would have presented to the committee as a matter of course;
that plaintiff was held to believe by this express mention of his claims
in the will that it would be unnecessary to present them to the
committee; and that he did not become aware of the necessity of
presenting them to the committee until after the committee had made
its final report.
ISSUE: When and under what circumstances may the committee be
recalled to consider belated claims?
HELD:
Section 689 (civil procedure) provides:
That court shall allow such time as the circumstances of the case
require for the creditors to present their claims the committee for
examination and allowance; but not, in the first instance, more than
twelve months, or less than six months; and the time allowed shall be
stated in the commission. The court may extend the time as
circumstances require, but not so that the whole time shall exceed
eighteen months.
It is strictly confined, in its application, to claims against the estate of
deceased persons, and has been almost universally adopted as part of
the probate law of the United States. It is commonly termed the
statute of nonclaims, and its purpose is to settle the affairs of the
estate with dispatch, so that residue may be delivered to the persons
entitled thereto without their being afterwards called upon to respond
in actions for claims, which, under the ordinary statute of limitations,
have not yet prescribed.
The object of the law in fixing a definite period within which claims
must be presented is to insure the speedy settling of the affairs of a
deceased person and the early delivery of the property of the estate in
the hands of the persons entitled to receive it. (Estate of De Dios, 24
Phil. Rep., 573.)
Due possibly to the comparative shortness of the period of limitation
applying to such claims as compared with the ordinary statute of
limitations, the statute of nonclaims has not the finality of the ordinary
statute of limitations. It may be safely said that a saving provision,
more or less liberal, is annexed to the statute of nonclaims in every
jurisdiction where is found. In this country its saving clause is found
in section 690, which reads as follows:
39
On application of a creditor who has failed to present his claim, if
made within six months after the time previously limited, or, if a
committee fails to give the notice required by this chapter, and such
application is made before the final settlement of the estate, the court
may, for cause shown, and on such terms as are equitable, renew the
commission and allow further time, not exceeding one month, for the
committee to examine such claim, in which case it shall personally
notify the parties of the time and place of hearing, and as soon as may
be make the return of their doings to the court.
If the committee fails to give the notice required, that is a sufficient
cause for reconvening it for further consideration of claims which may
not have been presented before its final report was submitted to the
court. But, this is not the case made by the plaintiff, as the committee
did give the notice required by law. Where the proper notice has been
given the right to have the committee recalled for the consideration of a
belated claim appears to rest first upon the condition that it is
presented within six months after the time previously limited for the
presentation of claims. In the present case the time previously limited
was six months from July 23, 1907. This allowed the plaintiff until
January 23, 1908, to present his claims to the committee. An
extension of this time under section 690 rested in the discretion of the
court. (Estate of De Dios, supra.) In other words, the court could
extend this time and recall the committee for a consideration of the
plaintiff's claims against the estate of justice required it, at any time
within the six months after January 23, 1908, or until July 23, 1908.
Plaintiff's petition was not presented until July 14, 1909. The bar of
the statute of nonclaims is conclusive under these circumstances as
the bar of the ordinary statute of limitations would be.
G.R. No. 88602               April 6, 1990
# 47 - TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the
Estate of the Deceased ALFREDO E. JACOB,petitioner,  ISSUE: whether or not an extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage may
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BICOL SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION, JORGE CENTENERA, AND LORENZO C.
ROSALES, respondents.
FACTS:
Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob was the registered owner of a parcel of land in
Naga City.  Sometime in 1972 Jorge Centenera was appointed as
administrator of Hacienda Jacob until January 1, 1978 when the
Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor by Dr. Jacob was
revoked by the latter. Because of the problem of paying realty taxes,
internal revenue taxes and unpaid wages of farm laborers of the
hacienda, Dr. Jacob asked Centenera to negotiate for a loan. For this
purpose, a special power of attorney was executed and acknowledged
by Dr. Jacob before notary public Lorenzo Rosales.
Consequently, Centenera secured a loan in the amount of P18,000.00
from the Bicol Savings & Loan Association sometime in September
1972. Centenera signed and executed the real estate mortgage and
promissory note as attorney-in-fact of Dr. Jacob. When the loan fell
due in 1975 Centenera failed to pay the same but was able to arrange
a restructuring of the loan using the same special power of attorney
and property as security. Again, Centenera failed to pay the loan when
it fell due and so he arranged for another restructuring of the loan
with the bank on November 23, 1976. Centenera again failed to pay
the loan upon the maturity date forcing the bank to send a demand
letter. A copy of the demand letter was sent to Dr. Jacob but no reply
or denial was received by the bank. Thus, the bank foreclosed the real
estate mortgage and the corresponding provisional sale of the
mortgaged property to the respondent bank was effected.
Petitioner Tomasa Vda. De Jacob contends that the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings and the sale of the property mortgaged under
the amended real estate mortgage after the mortgagor died are null
and void. It is pointed out that Dr. Jacob died on March 9, 1979 and
that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were effected after his
death, that is, the public auction sale was made on May 11, 1979.
Petitioner argues that such extrajudicial foreclosure can only be
prosecuted during the lifetime of Dr. Jacob for the reason that such
kind of foreclosure under Act No. 3135, as amended, is authorized
only because of the special power of attorney inserted in the mortgage
deed; and that said special power of attorney cannot extend beyond
the lifetime of the supposed mortgagor.
proceed even after the death of the mortgagor.
HELD: YES.
Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
Sec. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. — A creditor holding a claim
against the deceased secured by mortgage or other collateral security,
may abandon the security and prosecute claim in the manner provided
40
in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the  * claim of executor against the estate
estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security,
Facts:
by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party
defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of  
the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or
Respondent Ruby J. Henson filed on February 23, 1999 a petition for
other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his
the allowance of the will of her late mother, Luz J. Henson, with the
deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section;
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
or he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone, and
foreclose the same at any time within the period of the statute of  
limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor,
Lilia Henson-Cruz, one of the deceased’s daughters and also a
and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the
respondent in this petition, opposed Rubys petition. She alleged that
estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the executor or
Ruby understated the value of their late mother’s estate and acted with
administrator from redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged, by
unconscionable bad faith in the management thereof. Lilia prayed that
paying the debt for which it is held as security, under the direction of
her mother's holographic will be disallowed and that she be appointed
the court, if the court shall adjudge it to be for the best interest of the
as the Intestate Administratrix.
estate that such redemption shall be made
 
From the foregoing provision of the Rules it is clearly recognized that a
mortgagee has three remedies that may be alternately availed of in Lilia subsequently moved for the appointment of an Interim Special
case the mortgagor dies, to wit: Administrator of the estate of her late mother.
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of  
the mortgagor as an ordinary claim;
The trial court then designated petitioner Atty. George S. Briones as
(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an Special Administrator of the estate. Atty. Briones accepted the
ordinary claim; and; appointment, took his oath of office, and started the administration of
the estate. The significant highlights of his administration are listed
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and foreclose
below:
the same at anytime, before it is barred by prescription, without the
right to file a claim for any deficiency.  
From the foregoing it is clear that the mortgagee does not lose its light xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx  
to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage even after the death of the
5.     On January 8, 2002, Atty. Briones submitted the Special
mortgagor as a third alternative under Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules
Administrators Final Report for the approval of the court. He prayed
of Court.
that he be paid a commission of P97,850,191.26 representing eight
The power to foreclose a mortgage is not an ordinary agency that percent (8%) of the value of the estate under his administration.
contemplated exclusively the representation of the principal by the
 
agent but is primarily an authority conferred upon the mortgagee for
the latter's own protection. That power survives the death of the 6.     The respondents opposed the approval of the final report and
mortgagor.  prayed that they be granted an opportunity to examine the documents,
vouchers, and receipts mentioned in the statement of income and
disbursements. They likewise asked the trial court to deny the Atty.
# 48 - ATTY. GEORGE S. BRIONES, Petitioner, - versus - Briones claim for commission and that he be ordered to refund the
LILIA J. HENSON-CRUZ, RUBY J. HENSO, et.al sum of P134,126.33 to the estate.
G.R. No. 159130 August 22, 2008  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

41

HELD:  (e) constitutes, in the proceedings relating to the settlement of
From an estate proceeding perspective, the Special Administrators
commission is no less a claim against the estate than a claim that
third parties may make. Section 8, Rule 86 of the Rules recognizes this
when it provides for Claim of Executor or Administrator Against an
Estate. Under Section 13 of the same Rule, the action of the court on a
claim against the estate is appealable as in ordinary cases.Hence, by
the express terms of the Rules, the ruling on the extent of the
Special Administrators commission effectively, a claim by the
special administrator against the estate is the lower courts last
word on the matter and one that is appealable.
Under these terms and taking into account the previous discussion of
the nature of the various parts of the Order of April 3, 2002, the lower
courts determination of the special administrators commission is
clearly appealable while the auditors appointment is not. The latter,
under the express terms of the above provision, can be the subject of
an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
 
The petitioner is the special administrator in a settlement of estate, a
special proceeding governed by Rule 72 to 109 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Section 1, Rule 109 in part states:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be
taken. An interested person may appeal in special proceedings
from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First
Instance or a Juvenile Domestic Relations Court, where such
order or judgment:
x x x x x x x x x
(c) allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against
the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on
behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
 
(d) settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or
guardian;
the estate of a deceased person x x x a final determination in
the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that
no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator.
Where multi-appeals are allowed, we see no reason why a separate
petition for certiorari cannot be allowed on an interlocutory aspect of
the case that is separate and distinct as an issue from the aspect of the
case that has been adjudged with finality by the lower court. To
reiterate, the matter appealed matter was the special administrators
commission, a charge that is effectively a claim against the estate
under administration, while the matter covered by the petition
for certiorari was the appointment of an auditor who would pass upon
the special administrators final account. By their respective natures,
these matters can exist independently of one another and can proceed
separately as envisioned by the Rules under Rule 109.
Case Digest by ICE
CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATE (RULES 86 &88)
#49 - ROMUALDEZ V. TIGLAO 24 JULY 1981
GR NO. L-51151
FACTS:
Sometime in March 1960 Paz Romualdez and others sued Antonio
Tiglao and his sureties which includes FelisaTiglao for the payment of
unpaid rentals for the lease of a hacienda and its sugar quota.
The CFI of Rizal rendered a decision in favor of Romualdez adjudging
Tiglao and others liable for the unpaid rentals, damages, attorney’s
fees plus costs.
A writ of attachment has been issued, however, the judgment was not
satisfied.
42
Romualdez sought for the revival of the judgment sometime in 1970 ACTIONS BY OR AGAINST EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR
and during that time Felisa was already dead. Felisa’s estate was (RULES 87 & 89)
represented by the Special AdministratrixManingningTiglao-Naguiat.
Maningning filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that under Sec. 1 of
#50 - RIOFERIO V. CA 13 JANUARY 2004
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, "No action upon a claim for the
GR NO. 129008
recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be
commenced against the executor or administrator.”
The lower court nevertheless granted the revival. FACTS:
Hence, an appeal by the estate of Felisa. AfonsoOrfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and
real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan and Kalookan City.
He also left a widow, the respondent Esperanza Orfinada, whom he
ISSUE/S: had seven children who were also respondents in this case.
Whether or not the action for revival was proper instead of presenting
the claim in the Special Proceeding in the settlement of Felisa’s estate
The decedent also left his paramour and their children, they are
petitioner Teodora Rioferio and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and
Rowena.
HELD:
The action for revival was proper.
On Nov. 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes (legitimate
The appellant argues that the present action is one for the recovery
children of the deceased) discovered that petitioner Teodora and her
of a sum of money so that it is barred by Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the
children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased
Rules of Court and that the remedy of Romualdez and others is to
Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the
present their claim in Special Proc. No. Q-10731 of the Court of First
decedent located in Dagupan City.
Instance of Rizal.
The SC held that the original judgment, which was rendered on May
31, 1960, has become stale because of its non-execution after the Alfonso also filed a Petition for Letters of Administration, as well as
lapse of five years (Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court). filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial
Settlement of Estate.
Accordingly, it cannot be presented against the Estate of FelisaTiglao
unless it is first revived by action. Petitioners raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not
the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O.
This is precisely why Romualdez and others have instituted the second
Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration
suit whose object is not to make the Estate of FelisaTiglao pay the
proceedings.
sums of money adjudged in the first judgment but merely to keep
alive said judgment so that the sums therein awarded can be ISSUE/S:
presented as claims against the estate in Special Proc. No. Q-10731 of
Whether or not the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the
the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
estate pending the appointment of an administrator.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment insofar as the Estate of
FelisaTiglao is concerned, its appeal is hereby DISMISSED with costs
against the appellant. HELD:          

43
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without
doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the
decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New
Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent."
The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the
property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another
or others by his will or by operation of law.
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the
heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been
appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of
advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation namely
Sec. 3, Rule 3 and Sec. 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.
ACTIONS BY OR AGAINST EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR
(RULES 87 & 89)
#51 - DELA CRUZ V. CAMON 30 APRIL 1966
GR NO. L-21034
FACTS:
The estate of Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy was owner of
2/4 share pro-indiviso of Hacienda Rosario in Negros Occidental.
That whole hacienda was held in lease by Emilio Camon since long
before the present intestate proceedings were commenced.
Sometime in Oct. 1962, the administrator of the estate (Dela Cruz)
moved to the court for an order to direct Emilio Camon to pay the
estate’s 2/4 share of the rentals on Hacienda Rosario. Emilio Camon
challenged the probate court’s jurisdiction over his person. The court
ruled that the demand for rentals cannot be made “by mere
motion by the administrator but by independent action.” The
administrator appealed.
The money (rentals) allegedly due is not property in the hands of the
administrator, it is not thus within the effective control of the probate
court. Neither does it come within the concept of money of the
deceased “concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away”, which would
confer upon the court incidental prerogative to reach out its arms to
get it back and, if necessary to cite the possessor thereof in contempt.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the administrator can demand by mere motion.
HELD:
NO. When the demand is in favor of the administrator and the party
against whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the court’s
jurisdiction, the demand can not be by mere motion by the
administrator, but by an independent action against the third
person.
Camon is a third person, hence, the administrator may not pull him
against his will, by motion, into the administration proceedings. We
are fortified in our view that even matters affecting property under
judicial administration may not be taken cognizance of by the court in
the course of intestate proceedings, if the interests of third persons
are prejudiced.
Case Digest by RAYMOND
#55 - Guilas vs judge CFI-Pampanga
Facts:
on 1936 Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro as
her sole heir and executor 
In the year 1953 Juanita Lopez,was declared legally adopted daughter
and legal heir of the spouses Jacinta and Alejandro .After adopting
legally herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, the testatrix Doña Jacinta did
not execute another will or codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as
one of her heirs.
44
 In the Testate Proceedings the will was admitted to probate the
surviving husband, Alejandro Lopez y Siongco, was appointed
executor 
in a project of partition executed by both Alejandro and Juanita, the
right of Juanita to inherit from Jacinta was recognized and 2 lots
where given to Juanita.
the lower court approved the said project of partition and directed that
the records of the case be sent to the archives, upon payment of the
estate and inheritance taxes
on April 1964, herein petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas filed a separate
ordinary action to set aside and annul the project of partitionon the
ground of lesion, perpetration and fraud, and pray further that
Alejandro Lopez be ordered to submit a statement of accounts of all
the crops and to deliver immediately to Juanita lots in the project
partition.
While in the Testate Proceedings No. 1426, Juanita filed a petition
dated July 20, 1964 praying that Alejandro Lopez be directed to deliver
to her the actual possession of said 2 lots as well as the lessees of the
said two lots.
Alejandro oppose the said petition claiming that the testate proceeding
had already been closed and terminated and that he ceased as a
consequence to be the executor of the estate of the deceased; and that
Juanita Lopez is guilty of laches and negligence in filing the petition of
the delivery of her share 4 years after such closure of the estate, when
she could have filed a petition for relief of judgment within sixty (60)
days from December 15, 1960  aforecited doctrines.
In her reply Juanita contends that the actual delivery and distribution
of the hereditary shares to the heirs, and not the order of the court
declaring as closed and terminated the proceedings, determines the
termination of the probate proceedings  the probate court loses
jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment
of all the taxes, and after the remaining estate is delivered to the heirs
entitled to receive the same"); that the executor Alejandro is estopped
from opposing her petition because he was the one who prepared, filed
and secured court approval of, the aforesaid project of partition, which
she seeks to be implemented; that she is not guilty of laches, because
when she filed on July 20, 1964, her petition for he delivery of her
share allocated to her under the project of partition, less than 3 years
had elapsed from August 28, 1961 when the amended project of
partition was approved, which is within the 5-year period for the
execution of judgment by motion.
Issue:
won juanitas contention is correct in stating that the actual delivery
and distribution of the hereditary shares to the heirs, and not the
order of the court declaring as closed and terminated the proceedings,
determines the termination of the probate proceedings
Held:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration
only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate
delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the
approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate
the probate proceeding
as long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated
 because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not
prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided
the prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83
Phil., 137)
Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as worded,
which secures for the heirs or legatees the right to "demand and
recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or
any other person having the same in his possession", re-states the
In the case at bar, the motion filed by petitioner for the delivery of her
share was filed on July 20, 1964, which is just more than 3 years from
August 28, 1961 when the amended project of partition was approve
and within 5 years from April 23, 1960 when the original project of
partition was approved. Clearly, her right to claim the two lots
allocated to her under the project of partition had not yet expired. And
in the light of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of
1964 and the jurisprudence above cited, the order dated December 15,
1960 of the probate court closing and terminating the probate case did
not legally terminate the testate proceedings, for her share under the
project of partition has not been delivered to her.
45
#56 - CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,  The court declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she
vs. sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA the deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE
JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, respondents. JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
Facts :
 Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of
Case involves the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. died a bachelor,
the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr.,
without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or
because she too was an heir of the deceased.  her motion was denied
nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt,
by the court for tardinessInstead of appealing the denial, Concordia
petitioner CeledoniaSolivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother,
filed with the rtc of Iloilo for partition, recovery of possession,
SalustiaSolivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-
ownership and damages.
Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
trial court rendered it judgement in favor of Concordia Javellana-
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his
Villanueva.the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment
aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a
pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and
foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving
accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those
students obtain a college education.Celedonia told Concordia about
orders, Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had
Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after
already been transferred to, and were in the possession of, the
his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping
'SalustiaSolivioVda. deJavellana Foundation." The trial court denied
indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the
her motions for reconsideration.
plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to
Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated April 3, 1978" which she Celedonia appealed to the ca and rendered judgment affirming the
filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, stating that decision of the trial court.
Petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately
preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also the relative of the
deceased within the third degree, she being the younger sister of the
late Esteban Javellana, father of the decedent herein], because prior to ISSUE: 1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to
the filing of the petition they (petitioner CeledoniaSolivio and movant entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of Concordia
Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while
foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) were still pending in
filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house Branch 23 of the same court;
which are not far away for (sic) each other. 
HELD:
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the
SC finds merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial
proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in
Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia
good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977
Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate
Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix
of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No.
of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an
2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of
amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of administration be
the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and
issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that
approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing
after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting,
the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings`
the estate be adjudicated to her.
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring
Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did

46
not toll the end of the proceedings .In view of the pendency of the
probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now
RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring
Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia)
declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of the
deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy
when the court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the
Court of Appeals for review on certiorari. However, instead of availing
of that remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate action for
the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate
action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that
has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
estate.
in the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and
conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not
interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No.
13207 setting aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly
Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia
Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr.,
ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring the administratrix,
Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate, were
improper and officious, to say the least, for these matters he
within the exclusive competence of the probate court.x
# 57 - G.R. No. L-29759 May 18, 1989
NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE ALBERTO, in her individual
capacity and as judicial guardian of the minors ANTONIO
ALBERTO, JR. and LOURDES ALBERTO, petitioners,  complaint . Private respondent, not satisfied with the decision,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO J. ALBERTO, JR.,
assisted by his mother as his natural guardian, ANDREA
JONGCO, respondents.
Facts:
 in 1941 his alleged father, Antonio C. Alberto, and his mother, Andrea
Jongco, lived together as husband and wife and as a result of which,
he was born on September 10, 1942; that during the time that his
alleged father and mother lived together as husband and wife and up
to the time of his birth, both were single and had no legal impediment
to marry each other; that after his birth, his father and mother
continued living together as husband and wife, his father supporting
them and introducing him to the public as his natural child; that even
the family of his father recognized him as such; that on or about the
year 1944, his father and mother separated, and subsequently, his
father married herein petitioner Natividad del Rosario; that as a result
of the marriage, two (2) children were born herein petitioners Lourdes
Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr.
his father died, and without notice to him, petitioner Natividad del
Rosario Vda. de Alberto, on July 17, 1949, instituted before the then
Court of First Instance of Manila an intestate proceedings for the
estate of his deceased father, docketed therein as Special Proceedings
No. 9092; that in the said intestate proceedings, petitioners
deliberately omitted him as one of the heirs and for this reason they
succeeded in having the properties of his deceased father adjudicated
and partitioned among themselves; that the said intestate proceedings
were terminated on November 9, 1953;
having no knowledge of the intestate proceedings and came to know
about it only recently and thereupon made a demand from the
petitioners who refused to give him his share. Accordingly, he prays
that the petitioners be ordered to acknowledge him as the natural
child of Antonio C. Alberto; that his one-fourth share be turned over to
him
petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the cause
of action is barred by prior judgment; and (2) that the cause of action
is also barred by the statute of limitation.  The trial court issued an
Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. But after the respondent filed an
answer to the complaint the Court orders the dismissal of the
appealed to respondent Court, respondent Court reversed the decision
of the trial court.
MR was filed and was denied thus this instant petition.
ISSUE: won THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.'S CAUSE OF ACTION
WAS NOT BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT.
HELD:
Petitioners alleged that the intestate proceedings for the settlement of
estate of the deceased Antonio C. Alberto (Special Proceedings No.
9092) had already been terminated on November 9, 1953 by the order
47
of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled thereto and that in said proceedings the court also
declared who are the heirs of the deceased. Consequently, the instant
case which seeks to secure the recognition of Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. as
an acknowledged natural child of the deceased in order to establish his
rights to the inheritance is already barred by prior judgment
(Petitioners' Brief, p. 47) despite private respondent's insistence that
he had no knowledge or notice of the intestate proceedings of his
alleged natural father  will presented by Tirso Reyes (asguardian of the children of
Petitioners' submission is impressed with merit.
This Court has invariably ruled that insolvency proceedings and
settlement of a decedent's estate are both proceedings in rem which
are binding against the whole world. All persons having interest in the
subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally
bound. The court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested,
through the publication of the notice prescribed ... and any order that
may be entered therein is binding against all of them .It was ruled
further that a final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased
person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees; and
that the only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding
may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason
of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better
practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion
within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action, the
effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for
another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final
and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and
disposed of .
Case digest by Kim and Butsi
# 58 -Reyes vs. Barretto-Datu
Facts:BibianoBarretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their
lifetime, they acquired vast estate (real property inManila, Pampanga
and Bulacan). When Bibiano died (Feb. 18, 1936), he left his share in a
will to SaludBarretto(mother of the minors) and Lucia Milagros
Barretto; and a small portion as legacies to his sisters Rosa Barretto
andFelisaBarretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a
fishpond was reserved for Maria (the widow). Asappointed
administratrix, Maria prepared a project of partition, signed by her in
her own behalf and as guardian ofthe minor Milagros. It was approved,
and the estate was distributed and the shares delivered. Salud took
immediatepossession of her share and secured the cancellation of
OCTs and issuance of new titles in her name. Upon Maria’s death
(Mar. 5, 1948), it was discovered that she executed two wills: in the
first, she instituted Saludand Milagros as her heirs; in the second, she
revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagrosalone.
The later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first
SaludBarretto), the TC held that Salud was not the daughter of the
decedent Maria byher husband Bibiano. The SC affirmed the same. 
TC: The project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of Bibiano is nulland void ab initio (not merely
voidable) because the distributee (Salud), predecessor of Tirsoet. al.,
wasnot a daughter of the Sps. Bibiano and Maria. The nullity of the
project of partition was decreed on thebasis of Art. 1081 (OCC) (A
partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being
so, hasbeen included, shall be null and void). As Milagros was the only
true heir of Bibiano, she was entitled torecover from Salud and her
successors all the properties received by her from Bibiano’s estate, in
view ofArt. 1456 (NCC) which states that property acquired by mistake
or fraud is held by its acquirer in impliedtrust for the real
owner.Having lost the fight for a share in the estate of Maria as her
legitimate heir, Tirso now falls back upon the remnantof the estate of
Bibiano (the fishpond), which was given in usufruct to Maria. Hence,
this action for the recovery ofthe one-half portion thereof.  This action
afforded Milagros an opportunity to set up her right of ownership;
notonly of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties
willed and delivered to Salud, for being aspurious heir, and not
entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano, thereby directly
attacking the validity, not onlyof the project of partition, but of the
decision of the court based thereon as well.
Issues/Held:
(1) W/N the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond in
question is void ab initio and Salud did notacquire valid title to it. No.
(2) W/N Milagros’ action is barred by the statute of limitations. YES.
Ratio (1) Art. 1081 (OCC) is misapplied!  Salud admittedly had been
instituted heir in Bibiano’s last will andtestament together with
Milagros. Hence, the partition had between them could not be one
such had with a partywho was believed to be an heir without really
being one, and was not null and void under Art. 1081. The
48
legalprecept of Art. 1081 does not speak of children, or descendants,
but of heirs (without distinction betweenforced, voluntary or intestate
ones), and the fact that Salud did not happen to be a daughter of the
testator doesnot preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named
in his testament; for Bibiano was at liberty to assign thefree portion of
his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share (½) assigned to
Salud impinged on thelegitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that
reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano. Nor does the
factthat Milagros was allotted in her father’s will a share smaller than
her legitime invalidate the institution of Saludas heir, since there was
no preterition or total omission of a forced heir here.The view that the
partition in question is void for being a compromise on the civil status
of Salud, in violationof Art. 1814 (OCC) is erroneous. A compromise
presupposes the settlement of a controversy through mutual
concessions of the parties; and the condition of Salud as daughter of
the testator Bibiano, while untrue, was atno time disputed during the
settlement of the estate of testator. There can be no compromise over
issues not indispute. While a compromise over civil status is
prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a settlement by the partiesover the
share that should correspond to a claimant to the estate.At any rate,
independently of the project of partition (a mere proposal for
distribution of estate), it is the courtalone that makes the distribution
of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts
to whicheach is entitled. It is that judicial decree of distribution, once
final, that vests title in the distributees.  Where acourt has validly
issued a decree of distribution of the estate, and the same has become
final, the validity orinvalidity of the project of partition becomes
irrelevant.
(2) Milagros contends that as Maria could not have ignored that Salud
was not her child, the act of Maria inagreeing to the partition and
distribution was a fraud on her rights and entitles her to belief. This
contention isunfounded.First, there is no evidence that when Bibiano’s
estate was judicially settled and distributed, Salud knew that shewas
not Bibiano’s child. Thus, if fraud was committed, it was Maria who
was solely responsible; and neitherSalud nor her minor children can
be held liable therefor.Second, granting there was such fraud, relief
therefor can be obtained within 4 years from its discovery, and
therecord shows that this period had elapsed a long time ago. At the
time of distribution, Milagros was only 16. She became of age 5 years
later (1944). On that year, hercause of action accrued to contest on the
ground of fraud the court decree distributing her father’s estateand the
4-year period of limitation started to run, to expire in 1948. Conceding
that Milagros only becameaware of the true facts in 1946, her action
still became extinct in 1950.  Her action was barred in Aug.1956,
when she filed her counterclaim in this case contesting the decree of
distribution of Bibiano’s estate. There is no evidence of an alleged
verbal promise by Tirso to reconvey the properties received by
Salud,which allegedly induced Milagros to delay the filing of the action.
Granting that there was such promise, itwould not bind Tirso’s wards,
who are the real parties-in-interest. An abdicative waiver of rights by
aguardian, being an act of disposition, and not of administration,
cannot bind his wards, being null and voidas to them unless duly
authorized by the proper court
Dispositive: CFI decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE, insofar as it
orders Tirso to reconvey to Milagros theproperties enumerated in said
decision. The same is AFFIRMED, insofar as it denies any right of
Milagros toaccounting. The action for partition of the fishpond must be
GIVEN DUE COURSE.
No. 59 - G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998FE D. QUITA,
petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, *
respondents.
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the
Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with
children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured.
Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing
dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from
each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July
1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks
thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but
their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she
married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont. On 16 April 1972
Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong
filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for
issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of
Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent
BlandinaDandan (also referred to as BlandinaPadlan), claiming to be
the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the
children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the
appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in
favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty.
Cabasal was later replaced by HiginoCastillon. On 30 April 1973 the
49
oppositors (Blandina and Padlanchildren) submitted certified
photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment
of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan,
claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo,
intervened. On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate
declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his estate.
Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors allegedly
committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was
decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules
of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the court
as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases
ISSUE: Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no need because, first, no
legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of
the Padlan children or as to the decedent; and, second, the issue as to
who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the
decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition
based on establish facts and admissions of the parties. We cannot
sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is
clear: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive
shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Ruling: We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the
right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the decedent
because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by
him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo
Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But
controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of
Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to
appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the
motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate,
simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth
of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after
which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of
heirswould be deemed submitted for resolution. We note that in her
comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among
others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit
from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the
U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above
quoted procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a
Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the
divorce that they obtained.12 Reading between the lines, the
implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the
time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial
court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of
a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid
of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of
the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the
lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely
applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.Then in private
respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's
decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in
the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. . We deduce
that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their
marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine
petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce.
# 60 - Emilio Pacioles v. MiguelaChuatoco-Ching
Facts:
1. Miguelita died intestate. She was survived by herhusband
(petitioner) and two minor children.
2. Emilio filed a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate.
3. Miguelita’s mother filed an opposition to the petition for issuance of
letters of administration. That the bulk of the estate is composed of
paraphernal properties. She wishedto be appointed. She also said that
she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half
of her inherited properties to the deceased on condition that they
would undertake a business endeavor as partners.
4. The mother asked that one Emmanuel be appointed.
5. Court appointed Emilio and Emmanuel as joint-administrator.
50
 6. No claims were filed. Thereafter, Emilio filed
inventory.Emmanuel failed to file one.
7. Court declared Emilio and his children as the only compulsoryheirs
of the deceased
8. Emilio then petitioned the court for the payment of estate tax
andthe partition and distribution of the estate.
9. RTC denied the petition as to the partition and distribution. CA
affirmed.
Issue: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass
upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of
the decedent’s estate?
Held:
1. General Rule:
a. jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate
court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the
estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to
the determination of questions of ownership thatarise during the
proceedings.
i. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special
and limited jurisdiction.
b. A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an
intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of
ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property
should be included in the inventoryi. Pastor v. CA
1. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extrataneous matter
which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the
purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should
not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court
may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional,
not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
to resolve title
2. Reliance to Pastor v. CA
a. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in
sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing
on respondent’s claim. Such reliance is misplaced.
b. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose
of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon
an questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a
property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case
show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.
i. First, the inventory was not disputed.
Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s inventory and sought the
exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or considered to
be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory,
taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate
properties.
ii. Second, Emmanuel (respondent’s son) did not file an inventory
1. He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those
properties which respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he
did not endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with
petitioner’s inventory.
2. Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its
jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-
off stance on the matter. It is well- settled in this jurisdiction,
sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a
question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the
estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be
his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate,
such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or
probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction
to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court
in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.
a. Jurisprudence states that:
i. probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to
be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator.
If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties,
the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title because the probate court cannot do so.
3. Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court
of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum
51
for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties
ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate
# 61 - PAULINOGULLAS,  Treasury warrant was immediately paid by him.
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK 
Both parties to this case appealed from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, which sentenced the defendant to return to the
account of the plaintiff the sum of P5098, with legal interest and costs,
the plaintiff to secure damages in the amount of P10,000 more or less,
and the defendant to be absolved totally from the amended complaint.
As it is conceded that the plaintiff has already received the sum
represented by the United States treasury, warrant, which is in
question, the appeal will thus determine the amount, if any, which
should be paid to the plaintiff by the defendant.
The parties to the case are PaulinoGullas and the Philippine National
Bank. The first named is a member of the Philippine Bar, resident in
the City of Cebu. The second named is a banking corporation with a
branch in the same city. Attorney Gullas has had a current account
with the bank.
It appears from the record that on August 2, 1933, the Treasurer of
the United States for the United States Veterans Bureau issued a
Warrant in the amount of $361, payable to the order of Francisco
SabectoriaBacos. PaulinoGullas and Pedro Lopez signed as endorsers
of this check. Thereupon it was cashed by the Philippine National
Bank. Subsequently the treasury warrant was dishonored by the
Insular Treasurer.
At that time the outstanding balance of Attorney Gullas on the books
of the bank was P509. Against this balance he had issued certain
cheeks which could not be paid when the money was sequestered by
the On August 20, 1933, Attorney Gullas left his residence for Manila.
The bank on learning of the dishonor of the treasury warrant sent
notices by mail to Mr. Gullas which could not be delivered to him at
that time because he was in Manila. In the bank's letter of August 21,
1933, addressed to Messrs. PaulinoGulla and Pedro Lopez, they were
informed that the United States Treasury warrant No. 20175 in the
name of Francisco SabectoriaBacos for $361 or P722, the payment for
which had been received has been returned by our Manila office with
the notation that the payment of his check has been stopped by the
Insular Treasurer. "In view of this therefore we have applied the
outstanding balances of your current accounts with us to the part
payment of the foregoing check", namely, Mr. PaulinoGullas P509. On
the return of Attorney Gullas to Cebu on August 31, 1933, notice of
dishonor was received and the unpaid balance of the United States
As a consequence of these happenings, two occurrences transpired
which inconvenienced Attorney Gullas. In the first place, as above
indicated, checks including one for his insurance were not paid
because of the lack of funds standing to his credit in the bank. In the
second place, periodicals in the vicinity gave prominence to the news
to the great mortification of Gullas.lawphil.net
A variety of incidental questions have been suggested on the record
which it can be taken for granted as having been adversely disposed of
in this opinion. The main issues are two, namely, (1) as to the right of
Philippine National Bank, and to apply a deposit to the debt of
depositor to the bank and (2) as to the amount damages, if any, which
should be awarded Gullas.
The Civil Code contains provisions regarding compensation (set off)
and deposit. (Articles 1195 et seq., 1758 et seq. The portions of
Philippine law provide that compensation shall take place when two
persons are reciprocally creditor and debtor of each other (Civil Code,
article 1195). In his connection, it has been held that the relation
existing between a depositor and a bank is that of creditor and debtor
The Negotiable Instruments Law contains provisions establishing the
liability of a general indorser and giving the procedure for a notice of
dishonor. The general indorser of negotiable instrument engages that if
he be dishonored and the, necessary proceedings of dishonor be duly
taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder. (Negotiable
Instruments Law, sec. 66.) In this connection, it has been held a long
line of authorities that notice of dishonor is in order to charge all
indorser and that the right of action against him does not accrue until
the notice is given. (Asia Banking Corporation vs. Javier [1923] 44
Phil., 777; 5 Uniform Laws Annotated.)
As a general rule, a bank has a right of set off of the deposits in its
hands for the payment of any indebtedness to it on the part of a
depositor. In Louisiana, however, a civil law jurisdiction, the rule is
denied, and it is held that a bank has no right, without an order from
or special assent of the depositor to retain out of his deposit an
amount sufficient to meet his indebtedness. The basis of the Louisiana
doctrine is the theory of confidential contracts arising from irregular
deposits, e. g., the deposit of money with a banker. With freedom of
52
selection and after full preference to the minority rule as more in will be modified by sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
harmony with modern banking practice. sum of P250, and the costs of both instances.
Starting, therefore, from the premise that the Philippine National Bank
had with respect to the deposit of Gullas a right of set off, we next
RULE 91
consider if that remedy was enforced properly. The fact we believe is
undeniable that prior to the mailing of notice of dishonor, and without
waiting for any action by Gullas, the bank made use of the money
No. 62 - MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA V.
standing in his account to make good for the treasury warrant. At this
COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE
point recall that Gullas was merely an indorser and had issued in good
faith.
As to a depositor who has funds sufficient to meet payment of a check FACTS: The Municipality of San Pedro, Laguna filed in the CFI a
drawn by him in favor of a third party, it has been held that he has a petition claiming the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan by the right of
right of action against the bank for its refusal to pay such a check in Escheat. Colegio de San Jose, claiming to be the exclusive owner of the
the absence of notice to him that the bank has applied the funds so said hacienda, assailed the petition upon the grounds that the petition
deposited in extinguishment of past due claims held against him. does not allege sufficient facts to entitle the applicants to the remedy
(Callahan vs. Bank of Anderson [1904], 2 Ann. Cas., 203.) The prayed for. Carlos Young, claiming to be a lessee of the hacienda under
decision cited represents the minority doctrine, for on principle it a contract legally entered with Coelegio de San Jose, also intervened in
would seem that notice is not necessary to a maker because the right the case. Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna objected to the
is based on the doctrine that the relationship is that of creditor and appearance and intervention of CdSJ and Carlos Young but such
debtor. However this may be, as to an indorser the situation is objection was overruled. Furthermore the lower court dismissed the
different, and notice should actually have been given him in order that petition filed for by Municipal Council of San Pedro.
he might protect his interests.
We accordingly are of the opinion that the action of the bank was
ISSUE: W/N the petition for escheats should be dismissed?
prejudicial to Gullas. But to follow up that statement with others
proving exact damages is not so easy. For instance, for alleged libelous
articles the bank would not be primarily liable. The same remark could
RULING: YES. According to Sec. 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure
be made relative to the loss of business which Gullas claims but which
(now Sec 1 of Rule 91), the essential facts which should be alleged in
could not be traced definitely to this occurrence. Also Gullas having
the petition, which are jurisdictional because they confer jurisdiction
eventually been reimbursed lost little through the actual levy by the
upon the CFI are:
bank on his funds. On the other hand, it was not agreeable for one to
draw checks in all good faith, then, leave for Manila, and on return 1. That a person died intestate or without leaving any will,
find that those checks had not been cashed because of the action
taken by the bank. That caused a disturbance in Gullas' finances, 2. That he has left real or personal property and he was the owner
especially with reference to his insurance, which was injurious to him. thereof,
All facts and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that 3. That he has not left any heir or person by law entitled to the
Gullas should be awarded nominal damages because of the premature property, and
action of the bank against which Gullas had no means of protection,
and have finally determined that the amount should be P250. 4. That the one who applies for the escheat is the municipality where
deceased has his last residence or in case he should have no residence
Agreeable to the foregoing, the errors assigned by the parties will in the in the country, the municipality where the property is situated.
main be overruled, with the result that the judgment of the trial court

53
Sec. 751 (now Sec 3 of Rule 91) provides that after the publications last residence and the real property to the municipality/ies where they
and trial, if the court finds that the deceased is in fact the owner of are situated.
real and personal property situated in the country and has not left any
Escheat is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a
heir or other person entitled there to, it may order, after payment of
deceased person become the property of the State upon his death
debts and other legal expenses, the escheat and in such case, it shall
without leaving any will or legal heirs. It is not an ordinary action but
adjudicate the personal property to the municipality where the
a special proceeding. The proceeding should be commenced by a
deceased had his last residence and the real property to the
petition and not by a complaint.
municipality/ies where they are situated.
In a special proceeding for Escheat under section 750to 752 (now
Escheat is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a
sec 1 to 3 of Rule 91), the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive
deceased person become the property of the State upon his death
interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or Interest
without leaving any will or legal heirs. It is not an ordinary action but
in the property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested and
a special proceeding. The proceeding should be commenced by a
necessary party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat.
petition and not by a complaint.
When a petition for escheat does not state facts which entitle the
In a special proceeding for Escheat under section 750to 752 (now
petitioner to the remedy prayed for and even admitting them
sec 1 to 3 of Rule 91), the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive
hypothetically, it is clear that there is no ground for the court to
interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or Interest
proceed to the Inquisition provided by law, an interested party should
in the property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested and
not be disallowed from filing a motion to dismiss the petition which is
necessary party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat.
untenable from all standpoint. And when the motion to dismiss is
When a petition for escheat does not state facts which entitle the entertained upon this ground the petition may be dismissed
petitioner to the remedy prayed for and even admitting them unconditionally.
hypothetically, it is clear that there is no ground for the court to
In this case, Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young had a right to
proceed to the Inquisition provided by law, an interested party should
intervene as an alleged exclusive owner and a lessee of the property
not be disallowed from filing a motion to dismiss the petition which is
respectively.
untenable from all standpoint. And when the motion to dismiss is
entertained upon this ground the petition may be dismissed The Municipal base its right to escheat on the fact that the
unconditionally. Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, temporal property of the Father of
the Society of Jesus, were confiscated by the order of the King of
In this case, Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young had a right to
Spain. From the moment it was confiscated, it became the property of
intervene as an alleged exclusive owner and a lessee of the property
the commonwealth of the Philippines. Given this fact, it is evident that
respectively.
the Municipality cannot claim that the same be escheated to them,
The Municipal base its right to escheat on the fact that the because it is no longer the case of real property owned by a deceased
Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, temporal property of the Father of person who has not left any person which may legally claim it (2nd
the Society of Jesus, were confiscated by the order of the King of requirement lacking).
Spain. From the moment it was confiscated, it became the property of
the commonwealth of the Philippines. Given this fact, it is evident that
the Municipality cannot claim that the same be escheated to them, if
the court finds that the deceased is in fact the owner of real and
personal property situated in the country and has not left any heir or
other person entitled there to, it may order, after payment of debts and
other legal expenses, the escheat and in such case, it shall adjudicate
the personal property to the municipality where the deceased had his

54