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GOVERNMENT OF INDIA MINISTRY OF RAILWAYS (RAILWAY BOARD) No. 2012/Proj./Chennai Metro/1/11 New Delhi, dated 15.05.2015 Managing Director, Chennai Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., CMRL Depot, Admin Building, Poonamallee High Road, Opposite Danie! Thomas School, Koyambedu, ‘Chennai- 600107. Sub: Introduction of operation of Standard Gauge Chennai Metro Reil Corporation Limited's (CMRL) coaches manufactured by M/s ALSTOM Ltd. with air suspension arrangement at Secondary stage to M/s Alstom's Drawing No. ALS-409-000-1080360 far Driving Motor and Trailer Coaches over Chennai Metro Standard Gauge (SG) system, 62 ‘ one Se oe Ref: () Ministry of Civil Aviation's letter No. Q.19017/01/2016-16-T.W. dated 28.04 2015. (ti) RDSO's Interim speed certificate no. UTHS/38/CMRL at. 16.08.2014 In reference to letter cited above, provisional sanction of Ministry of Railways, Railway Pear 's hereby communicated for running of)Standard Gauge Chennai Metro Rall Corporation gimteds (CMRL) coaches manufactured by M/s ALSTOM Lid. with air. suspension arrangement at secondary stage to Mis Alstom’s Drawing No. ALS-409-000-108086D for Priving Motor and Trailer Coaches over Chennai Metro Standard Gauge (SG) system at Tanximum permissible operating speed of 80 (Eighty) kmph in fully inflated mode and 72 (Seventy two) kmph in deflated mode of air spring. Sanction is further subject to conditions below:- a, It shall be ensured by the CMRL to get all their Maintenance Manuals and Instructions related to Rolling Stock approved by RDSO (Ministry of Railways) and also to develop a mechanism to get their various maintenance practices audited periodically by RDSO. b. Compliance of all conditions stipulated by Ministry of Railways while giving technical Clearance for track structure including the fastening system, Traction and Power Supply ‘System, Signalling/Train Control and Communication System and Design Basis Report shall be ensured by CMRL. ¢. CMRL shall ensure that the limits of Noise and Vibration parameters of the Metro ‘System are within the permissible limits as per legal and statutory requirement of India d. CMRL shall ensure proper maintenance of rolling stock, propulsion equipment, control systems, signalling and interlocking, track, OHE and structures, €. All permanent and temporary speed restrictions in force or which may be imposed from time to time shall be observed. Page 1 of 2 £ Conditions laid down in RDSO's Interim Speed Cerificate and CMRL's Joint Safety Certificate with concomitant Bridge Certificate and Track Certificate shall be observed, 4g. All train operators and station controllers shall be given sufficient training and competency certificates issued by designated Officers. h. Adequate training shall be imparted to staff who maintain the rolling stock, signalling and interlocking, OHE and track. i. At present one crossover has been provided near Ashok Nagar station on a gra of 4 in 291. This is not permitted as per the approved Schedule of Dimension. This infringement should be removed, (He pee (Ruth Changsan) Director/Works Planning Railway Board Ph. 011-23097061 Copy forwarded for information to: (i) The Chief Commissioner of Railway Safety, Ashok Marg, Lucknow-226001 war.t his letter number Q.19017/01/2015-16-T.W. dated 28.04.2016. (ji) Director General, RDSO, Manak Nagar, Lucknow. Page 2 of 2 grt; 0522-2232007, 2292108 PRT eee Oreo y 23-230 are faa AAT ere eee ban 703008, 283087 Fe aa omeretnalco™ (ea wea re) GOVERNMENT OF INDIA MINISTRY OF CIVIL AVIATION (COMMISSION OF RAILWAY SAFETY) gia ta, FH agate RAT 46, qa At, THAS-226001 No. Q.19017/01/2015-16-T.W- ear 4, Fa aa, ag feet fasmintroduction of Corporation Limited’s operation of Standard N.E. Railway, DRM OFFICE CAMPUS 46, Ashok Marg, Lucknow-226 001 Date-28-04-2015 yw? Q- mn ee OY dep os : Soe oofearefeDweel] Gauge Chennai Metro Rall (CMRL) coaches manufactured by M/s. ALSTOM Ltd wwith air suspension arrangement at secondary stage to M/s Alstom drawing ho, ALS-409-000-108036D for Driving Motor and Trailer Coaches over Chennai Metro Standard Gauge (SG) system. a ee 9.16011/1/2014-15/CMRL/O036-40 FI 09.04.2015 The above subjected case, forwarded by Commissioner of Metro Railway Safety (cMRS) & Commissioner of Railway Safety/Southern Circle, reference pertains to sanction Bangalore vide letter under for introduction of operation of ‘subject rolling stock over | Chennai Metro Standard Gauge (SG) system to be operated by CMRL. | CML has processed for operation of the rolling \ gubject at the maximum speed of 80 kmph on its SG sections { Safety Certificate No. Nil (signed on 18-0! stock type mentioned in above ‘on the basis of Joint 8-2014) and Interim Speed Certificate No. UTHS/38/CMRL, Dated 16-08-2014 issued by RDSO- Case is hereby forwarded for necessary action for the xi 9f Hi hin full is h_in defi: mode of _air sprint e above said rolling stock es INTERIM running of with the various conditions/stipulations as mentioned in CMRS/Bangalore’s letter under refernece as well as the following additional conditions/stipulations:- 1. tt shall be ensured by the CMRL to get all their Maintenance Manuals and Instructions related to Rolling Stock approved by RDSO (Ministry of Railways) and also to develop a mechanism to get their various maintenance practices audited periodically by RDSO. 2. Evaluation/scrutiny and safety assessment of subject rolling stock has been done on the basis of various parameters and criterion mentioned in “procedure for Safety Certification and Technical Clearance of Metro Systems by RDSO” issued by the Urban Transport & High Speed Directorate of RDSO in January 2013 and later on modified on several occasions, latest on 10.12.2014. This procedure order has not been approved by Railway Board. The same is required to be approved by the Railway Board and a Copy of the approval sent to the Commission. 3, From the documents submitted, it is not clear what has been approved by Railway Board for (I) Track Structure including the Fastening System, (ii) Traction and Power Supply System, (til) Signalling/Train Control and Communication System and (iv) Dessign Basis Report. Compliance of all the conditions stipulated by Ministry of Railways while giving technical clearance for all the four items mentioned above should be ensured, 4, There is no infringement to any of the dimensions as per approved Schedule of Dimension for Standard Gauge for Chennai Metro Standard Gauge (SG) System. ‘At present one cross over have been provided near Ashok Nagar station on a gradient of 1 in 291. This is not permitted as the approved Schedule of Dimension. This infringement shoul moved. 5, The limits of Noise and Vibration parameters of the Metro System are within the permissible limits as per legal and statutory requirement of India. This issues with the approval of Chief Commissioner of Railway Safety. Parte: RAT | Ag 20 (Ser VITA) ou ta Sear arg (His) me Fea ta Ta siya ge kar seer ort ce a See arg air GRIST, TTR c are FER ann fear WaT Cea eat aerate) GOVERNMENT OF INDIA MINISTRY OF CIVIL AVIATION (COMMISSION OF RAILWAY SAFETY) COMMISSIONER OF RAILWAY SAFETY Rae ae SOUTHERN CIRCLE atk Ae, ister, 7, SESHADRI ROAD, GANDHINAGAR Lihat ae, it : BANGALORE - 560 009 (i) No, (feaizs) Dated : Q.16011/1/2014-15- curt |2028-40 09.04.2015 Railway Board, New Delhi, THROUGH CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF RAILWAY SAFETY, LUCKNOW Sub: Sanction for introduction of Standard Gauge Chennai Metro Coaches thanufactured by M/s Alstom Ltd with air suspension arrangement at sécondary stage from Koyambedu (Ch: 9990) to Alandur (Ch: 20145) section of Corridor-II of Chennai Metro Rail Ltd. 4. An application No. CMRL/SYS/ARE01/405/036/ 2014 dated 18.08.2014, in duplicate, received from Chennai Metro Rail Ltd, requesting for sanction to use above new rolling stock is forwarded herewith. 2. The rolling stock of Chennai Metro Rail Ltd. (CMRL), ATP, signaling and interlocking system of Chennai metro was inspected by the undersigned on 08.04.2015. Trial run of rolling stock was also conducted. 3. RDSO has issued interim speed certificate for above section vide No. UTHS/38/CMRL dated 16.08.2014. 4. EIG sanction for energisation of the OHE has been accorded vide No. CMRL/SYS/CEIG/0001/61/2013 dated 27.05.2014 and CMRL/SYS/CEIG/0000 1/81/2013 dated 17.03.2015. Gompliance report has been given by CMRL for all ElGs vide letter dated 12.03.2015. a> QUESius7 2 Schata Phone : ATETATRT BSNL 22260850 (0) 22265926 (R) teT4 Rly. 56800, 56804 (0) 56801 (R) ‘faa Fax | 080-22260650 (0) €-Het E-mail : crssesbe@swr-ralinet.gov.in 5. Encl: 1) 2) 2 Independent Safety Assessor has given unconditional certificate for signaling and train control vide certificate dated 30.03.2015. In view of above, the introduction of above new rolling stock of Shuena’ Metro’ for public carriage of passengers | is Chemvended for obtaining Central Government sanction subject to following conditions: a) The maximum speed of rolling stock shall be restricted to 80 kmph in air springs inflated mode and 72 kmph in deflated mode as determined by RDSO in its Speed Certificate. b) GMRL shall ensure proper maintenance of rolling stock, propulsion equipment, control systems, signaling and interlocking, track, OHE and structures. 'All permanent and temporary speed restrictions in force or Which may be imposed from time to time shall be observed. Conditions laid down in RDSO's Interim Speed certificate SoU CMRL's Joint Safety Certificate with concomitant Bridge Cortificate and Track Certificate shall be observed. Ril train operators and station controllers shall be given sufficient training and competency certificates issued by designate Officers. 7 f) Adequate training shall be imparted to staff who maintain the rolling stock, signaling and interlocking, OHE and track. GAS yar (Satish Kumar Mittal) Commissioner of Metro Railway Safety and Commissioner of Railway Safety, Southern Circle, Bangalore. °) d e) Application No. CMRLISYS/ARE01/405/036/ 2014 dated 18.08.2014 of CMRL in duplicate Inspection Report dated 09.04.2015 Copy to: The Secretary, Ministry of Urban Development, New Delhi Abbreviations/Terms used in this Report Chennai Metro Rail Ltd. Driving Motor Car Trailer Car = Emergency Braking Distance Electro Dynamic Electro Peumatic kilogram kilogram force [kilometre Metre _ millimetre, kmph/KMPH kilometre per hour | MR Main Reservoir BP Brake Pipe _ The Ton 1D Identity RDSO- Research Designs and Standards Organisation "TNEB zi ‘Tamil Nadu Electricity Board EIG Electrical inspector General ‘OHE ‘Overhead Equipment _ Tss 7 —_[ Traction Sub-Station — ‘ACSR ‘Aluminium Conductor Stes! Reinforced ATO — ‘Automatic Train Operation ‘ATP ‘Automatic Train Protection ‘Ampere kilo Watts: kilo Volt Ampere ‘Mega Ohms. insulation Resistance kilo Newton Traction Brake Controller ‘Station Ashok Nagar ‘Station Arumbakkam Station Alandur SSI Station Ekkattuthangal ‘SKO = Station Koyambedu ‘SVA | Station Vadapalani SCM. - ‘Station Chennai Mofussil Bus Terminus VCD Vigilance Control Device DsD_ Driver's Safety Device —] WSP- ‘Wheel Siip/Slide Protection TOMS - ntrol and Monitoring System [ou — - ‘Driver's Display Unit ‘SOD_ —| Schedule of Dimensions j PEL Passenger Emergency intercom _ LED ‘Light Emitting Diode [ORM Dynamic Route Map cctv Closed Circuit Television HVAC. ___|[ Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioner | vCB —[Wacuum Circuit Breaker PT Potential Transformer AR Automatic Reversal RM —_[ Restricted Mode “| HMI ‘Human Machine Interface - — ‘Occ. Operation Control Centre TO Train Operator a Inspection Report of Commissioner of Metro Rallway Safety, Southern Circle, Bangalore Inspection of Standard Gauge Chennai Metro_Coaches manufactured by M/s Alstom ir sion arrangement at secondary stage” from Koyambedu (Ch: 9990) to Alandur (Ch: 20145) section -I1 of Chennai Metro Rail Ltd. As per directives contained in CCRS letter No. Q.18016/01/2014-15/TW dated 19.03.2015, inspection of above new rolling stock of CMRL was carried out on 06.04.2018. Following are the observations: 1. Unique Transportation code/ldentification number. ‘The Métro Rail Cars of each train set is designated by unique identification number (e.g.Ts#12) SN | Car Type _| Drawing No. Identification No. 1_[pmct ‘ALS-409-000-108036 AN12 -[2_[te1 ‘ALS-409-000-108036 B12 3_|tc2 ‘ALS-409-000-108036 D112 4_|pmc2 ALS-409-000-108036 C12 Configuration: - DMC1+TC1#TC2+DMC2 _ The detail of Train Operator on duty during the Trial / Inspection is as follows: Mr.G.Vivek, Employee ID ~ 5015 ‘Competency Certificate Book No. 025 issued on 2nd April 2015 and valid up to 3 years. ‘The trial was conducted in the section between Koyambedu to Alandur for a distance of 10.15 km. 2 Axle Load, i, Maximum axle load (Design) of DMC = 16.0t. Maximum axle load (Design) of TC = 16.0t. 3. Ride Indox Ride index measured by RDSO as per Oscillation Trial report RDSO report no. RDSO/2014/TG/MT-1357/F, Rev.-0, Amendment — Nil dated 28.07.2014 shows that maximum value of ride index listed under para 6.2 (page 11 to 21) of the said report is 2.28 (Para no. 6.2.1) for vertical riding and 2.33 (Para no. 6.2.2) for lateral riding at speed of 90 kmph in inflated condition as against the criteria of 3.00. The Maximum value of ride index listed under para 6.2 of the said report is 2.77 (Para no. 6.2.1) for vertical riding and 2.72 (Para no. 6.2.2) for lateral riding at speed of 80 kmph in deflated condition as against the teria of 3.00.Peak values of Ride index (verticaVlateral) extracted from the RDSO reports {or various conditions such as tare, loaded, inflated, deflated suspension on up and down line is as detailed below: LF a aya y, ‘Motor Car ‘Trailer Car Up-iine Down-fine Uptine Downing Empty [Loaded | Empty | Loaded | Empty [Loaded | Empty | Loaded Vertical inflated | 2.21(90) | 2.28(80) ton 2.08(80) | 2.19(90) Pee) 2.24(80) | 2.19(90) sanated | ZSOIEH) | 27 H6O) | 2.45(00) [270160) [2.27160) | 2.83160) TIO) | ZED} Tateral inated | 2.19100) | 2.39180) | 2.07(00) | 2.25(00) | 1.99(80) | 2.05000) 4,99(90) ao | 23 .201 . I Denated | 2.5300) | 2.72080) | 23eta0) 3 BIST) VF ratGe) | 20460) | 2.14080) Note: 1 The Values Shown in the bracket correspond to ‘speed in kmph. [ott 2. All Ride Index values mentioned above are maximum values recorded. 4, Tractién Installation Railway ; Chennai Metro Rail Limited | Section; Elevated section from Koyambedu to Alandur Cocation : From 9/44 (Ken 9.900) to 20/5 (Km 20.146) on Up line and From 9/42 (Km 9.900) to 20/6 (20.145) on Down fine Length: 10.15Km Gauge : 1435mm - 4.4. Power and Traction: Electricity is the source of energy for operation of metro system. ‘The electrical energy required for the operation of Metro trains is obtained from ‘TNEB Grid Sub-Station at 110kV level at Koyambedu, which is fed from two diferent sources of Is own did network of the public energy supply. 44.4 Receiving Sub-Station Koyambedu Receiving Sub-Station (RSS) receives 440kV supply from TANGEDGO 23011 10KV Grid Sub-Station. 441.2. At Koyambedu Traction Sub-Station, 110KV supply converted fo 25kv through 2 x 110/27 KV Single Phase, 30/42 MVA Traction Transformers. 4.2. EIG's Approval ElG's approvals for energizing the OHE at 25 KV A= and TSS was obtained vide Chief Electrical Inspector to Government approval no 2s detailed below: S.N_] Description EIG sanction 7 | S/AT to 10/49, 9/42 to 10/20 ‘EMRUSY SICEIGI00001781/2013 dt.17.03.2015 2} 10749 to 10/49, 10/20 to 11/34 CMRUSYSICEIG/O000116 1/2013 1.27.05.2014 Drums 3 __| 1126 to 17/12 CMRUSYSICEIG/00001/53/2013 dt.27.03.2014 4__| 10/49 TO 17/01 CMRUSYSICEIGI00001/47/2013 at. 12.02.2014 5116/55 10 20/05, 17102 to 20706 | CMRUSYSICEIG/00001/64/2013 dt.07.06.2014 6 | Koyambedu TSS, CMRUCEIGIEV2013/20 dt.27.09.2013 & 110/27KV, 30/42MVA CMRUCEIG/EV/2013/9 Traction Transformer -2 No. dt 23.07.2013 4,3, Rolling Stock: Composition 4 Car Train DMC + TC+TC+DMC Maximum Design Speed 90 Kmph ‘Maximum Operational Speed 80 Kmph Maximum Width over body 2896 mm. Maximum Height from rail level 4048 mm. Train Operation ATOIATP 4 Automatic Train Operation! Automatic Train Protective manual mode 5. Power rating. Propulsion and control equipment has been designed for maximum service speed of 80 kmph and maximum Design speed of 90 kmph. The ratings of propulsion equipment are as under () Traction Motor Continuous rating: 275 KW, 137 A Transformer Rated Rated Rated winding capacity voltage current Primary for| 1252 KVA 25000 V 55.47A overhead line Secondary for] 1000 KVA 960V 579A Traction duty Tertiary for] 252 KVA 400V 700 A auxiliary Transformer is designed to deliver the power to the continuous load including the ‘emergency operation and 10% extra above the maximum load for 30 minutes. The following safety features are available in the traction transformer in the train which has been verified during the inspection. a) Transformer oll flow detector b) Temperature sensor EE 3 Spars ©) Pressure release valve 4) Oillevel indicator “The transformer is of oil filled type. Oil used is Silicon oil with flash point 300 °c. CMRL have produced Dielectric test and Insulation Resistance (IR) test report of the catftrain for verification. It is noticed that the value recorded is more than 25 M Ohms as against a minimum requirement of 1 M Ohm of IR value, The dielectric test of roof was conducted for 1 minute at 1275 V AC. The IR values before and after the dielectric test remains invariably same. 6. Hauling capacity Each traction motor has continuous power rating of 275 KW. Therefore, power rating of 4- car Train is 275 KW x 8 (no. of TM in- 4 car train) = 2200 kW at nominal OHE voltage of 22.5 kV. The maximum tractive effort of the 4 car train is 250 kN, which enables the starting acceleration (avg, from standstil to 30 kmph) of 0.62 mis* on level tangent track. Fully loaded train (AWA) with one motor car isolated (50% traction) is capable of starting on 4% gradient and clearing the section. “The tabulation showing the values of axle load, tractive effort and braking force against the values specified in Design Basis Report, is as shown below: S.No| Description DBR values Actual values 4 | Axe load 16 T (clause 3.9.1) 16T 2 | Maximum Braking | 38.4 MT or 384KN (clause | 380.13 KN force for 4 cartrain | 3.9.2.1) 3 | Maximum Tractive | 46.08 MT or 460 KN (clause | 250 kN effort for 4 cartrain | 3.9.2.1) 7. Passenger carrying capacity Metro Rail Car wise (AW4:- 8 persons/m*) Sr.No. Description Seating | ~ Standing Total Capacity | Capacity 7 Driving Motor Car a2 268 310 2 Trailer Car 50 276 328 8. Brake system:- Service Brake, Emergency Brake & Parking Brake wo Service Brake; - Electro pneumatic brake system is electronically controlled system provided with fault diagnosis and fault record function. Application and release of brake is achieved manually through movement of TBC (Traction Brake Controller) or by Automatic Train Operation (ATO) system. During the process of normal service 4 Alay brake, the electric regenerative braking and friction air braking are blended to meet the requirement of brake demand with preference given to electric regenerative braking. If the electro-regenerative braking cannot meet the demand brake force, pneumatic brake compensates for the demand. Brake application with jerk control funetion is to ensure smooth braking operation. (i) Emergency Brake:-Emergency Brake is controlled by Emergency Brake Hard- wired loop all along the train, The breakage in this loop (resulting in emergency electromagnetic valve de-energization) due to any condition, namely, application of emergency brake push button, train parting, Iow pneumatic pressure oF by ‘Automatic ‘rain Protection ete results in application of Emergency Brake inal the Metro Rail Cars, Emergency Brake can be applied through Driver Safety Device (OSD), Driver Brake Valve (OBV) and Emergency Brake Push Button (EBPB). Emergency braking distance trials Were conducted by RDSO. As_ per para 7.0 of RDSO trial report Emergency Braking Distance ( EBD) observed is 168.84 m in empty rake & dry ral condition and 4181.68 m in loaded rake & dry rail condition , observed through application of Master Controller (EP only) at speed of 80 kmph against the requirement of 223 m (max. at speed of 80 kmph under fully loaded condition. As per Report No. - ROSO2014/TG/MT- 1354/F, Rev. — 0 Amendment -NIL dated-18.07.2014 para 7.0 of ROSO Wal report Emergency Braking Distance (EBD) dbserved is as follows Average o a Braking Condition | Condition , sno | Conon | Corea | Mode of Brake apoication Distance at 80 mph (in meters) —V emergency Mode (EP only) 1. | Empty | Dryrail_ | through Emergency Push Button ee —"Emergeney Mode (EP only) 2. | Empty | Wetrail_| through Emergency Push Button coe Emergency Mode (EP only) 3, | Loaded | Dryrail | through Emergency Push Button 181.68 Emergency Mode (EP only) 4, | Loaded | Wetrail | through Emergency Push Button Bi RDSO has authorized maximum operating speed of 80 kmph based on oscilation trial. CMRL claified that braking distance at 25 kmph speed is 29.51 in full service brake application and 23.31 m in emergency brake application.. “The braking distance measured was under the following conditions: 1) Straight, level and dry/wet track at AWO and AWA. b) Minimum brake disk temperature at 120°C before testing. ©) Brake pad bedded-in Brus ° (i) Parking Brake ~ Parking brake is provided on 60 % wheels diagonally in DMC (Driving Motor Car) and TC (Traller Car), Parking brake “ Raps by a) the Automatic Train Protection door release; Prevent the train from starting if train doors are not detected closed, Train starting from a signal stop is automatic, Train starting from a station stop is initiated by the Train Operator. Coded Manual Mode (ATP ) i InCoded Manual Mode the train is driven by the Train Operator, obeying Cab Signals. ji InCoded Manual Mode, the train control and signalling system- Provide cab signals and all other indications necessary to operate the train including current speed; << «Determine continuously the target speed and limit of movement authority: * Prevent train operation in excess of the target speed or limit ‘of movement authority; «Provide audible and visual warning if the train speed exceeds the target speed or the maximum safe speed «Enable train doors when the train is stopped, enabling only the doors on the correct platform side of the train; and + Prevent the train from starting if train doors are not detected closed. «Backward rolling monitoring. Restricted Manual Mode ( RM ) The Restricted Manual Mode is the default mode of operation and is ‘automatically initiated, when the automatic traln contro train borne equipment is fist powered and it remains in operation untl sufficient conditions have been met to allow for a transfer to Coded Manual Mode. The Restricted Manual Mode is used- «To operate trains in depots; Following an emergency brake application on main fine and absence of cab signals; + For entry to and up to exit from the depot, and + Oninstructions from Traffic Controller. In Restricted Manual Mode, the train speed is limited to 25kmph enforced Py on board Automatic Train Protection equipment. ‘The Train doors on the correct side will have to be operated manually by the Train Operator. Cut-out Mode In Cutout Mode, which only operates in the absence of Automatic Train protection signals from the track, the train is driven manually on line of sight and the speed is limited by Rolling stock system to 25 kmph. 15 Slane 28. ATP Principle and details of Trackside ATP Equipments. iit, iv. vii, a. Automatic Train Protection Principles Line is divided into Fixed Blocks with coded Audio frequency track circuits(AFTC) Train ahead causes a series of speed profile for the following train Following train gets reduced target speed as it approaches the train ahead Track side ATP computers give accurate route map information On Board ATP computer calculates the safe speed and distance Train stops assured within the movement authority When the first axle of the train occupies the track circuit, then the train detection happens and the AFTC sends continuously the telegram message to the Train. ‘The same is picked by ATP antennas attached on the under frame of the Train. b, Details of On - board ATP equipment i. ATP antenna ( Pick up coil ) “The sensors are installed in front of the first axle (2 on each end of the train). ‘They detect the signal transmitted in the rails by trackside Track Circuits Odometer “The odometer is located oh the non-powered axle of the bogie. Its function is to acquire speed and displacement information of the train, for electronic processing by the on-board ATC Cubicle. ii, PTlantenna PTI antenna is located on the first bogie of the train. This is used for communication of on-board ATC with way side PSD systems. iv. Cab display (HMI) ‘The cab display is located on the driver desk at each extremity of the train. Its function Is to display on a screen the driver's ATC information, to acquire ‘on the integrated Keyboard, the driver commands (FSB Release), to generate sounds to warn the diver in different situations. v. On-board ATC cubicle The on-board ATC subsystem consists of: ‘An electronic cubicle (one at each end of the train) with sockets, relays and cables; ATP cubicle consist of Two numbers: ‘of ATP racks (hot standby) and ore number of ATO rack. c. Details of Trackside ATC EQUIPMENTS i. Trackside ATC cubicle ‘The trackside ATC is based on 2003 platform. This platform architecture is based on parallelism calculation, Each channel is computing the same application in 16 Bian parallel and a system verifies that at least 2 channels are consistent out of the three existing channels, ii. Synchronization Loops: Sync loop is installed over the track in Platform area This helps the train to fine synchronize the distance information to stop the train accurately within designated stopping window. 29. Failures Scenarios and Degraded operations a, Track circuit failed i, Train in ATP approaching such track, apply Emergency Brake (EB) in case the distance to stop is too tight. ii. TO informs the OCC that EB is triggered by ATP System and seeks Instructions -from OCC. ii, Train Operator chooses "RM" mode using RM push button after obtaining + instruction from OCC. Train is still protected and runs at a speed of 25 kmph. TO runs the train looking ahead for any obstructions. ATP applies EB if the speed of the train exceeds beyond the warming curve above the 25 kmph mark in this case. iv. Train gets back to normal ATP with target speed, as soon as the train clears the failed track circuit and two more ATC enabled functional track circuits. Other trains in the line continue their fhovement, protected by ATP b. Wayside Signal is controlled to “OFF”, but LED is blank i. Signal stopping point will get generated for all trains in ATP mode. Trains will come to a halt in front of the signal. For crossing the Blank signal the TO has to communicate with OCC and take necessary authorization. i. Further to this the TO has to press the RM button and cross the Blank signal in RM mode. ii, For RM trains, TO has to see the signal and stop short of signal. Taking necessary authorization from OCC, RM mode trains can also cross blank signal. c. Synchronization Loop failed i. Trains needs to be driven by the TO with reference to the target distance and speed in the stations and stop at designated point with respect to the marker board. ii, Door authorization will not be available. ii, TO needs to operate the Permissive Door Button and opens the door on platform side. d. Track side ATC failed No impact if one channel out of 3 channels fails. i. Iftwo channels are failed, then all trains in that ATC sector apply EB. v Qyotse ji, TO runs the train in RM. ji, Trains are protected by Interlocking with line side signals iv. Other trains in the adjacent ATC sector continue their movement, protected by ATP. e. On-board ATP failed i. Failure of one ATP rack in the active cabin has no effect on the operations. The second ATP rack available will continue the movement of train in ATP. ji, ATP will not be available in case of failure of both ATPs. ii, Train can run in Cut out mode. This would help the train to reach the next station with Rolling stock monitoring the speed limit and applying EB in case of over speed. f. ATS servers failed in OCC. i, 4 Failure of single sever has no effect on the operations. Failure of both servers can only stop the Automatic Route Setting operations. Trains in ATP are still protected. OCC/Station Controllers can use the OC111 to control the routes. g. Interlocking (CBI) failed i. Failure of one SIMIS computér among the four will not have any effect on the operations. Minimum one Linux and one Windows SIMIS computer is required among the four to keep the functionality alive. ji. In case of failure of Interlocking, trains shall run in RM mode with Points secured ‘on instruction from OCC, Signalling and Train Control System a. Inspected Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) work stations of Chief Controller, Traffic Controller, Fault Management Controller and Signalling system Video wall at OCC ‘Theatre. Action to set a route from the Workstation of traffic controller was shown. .__ Inspected Telecom Equipment Room of OCC building. ©. Inspected Video wall of CCTV system in Security Controller Room, Live video field from stations were shown. d. Inspected Network Management Supervisor (NMS) room. Briefed about the various Telecom Network Management System work stations commissioned. Play back of recording of Radio communication was verified. Banc 18 e. Train run was performed with Train set (TS) no.12 to chet .ck safety of Rolling stock: [redundancy ATP__mode.__In Test Performed Eo Testing Process | Desired Result | Actual Result Soar Meniioang }TZ1H | Door of the Roling [No Recommended | No Recommended speed Stock kept Open. | speed willbe | available in HMI FO tics to etart the | available in HMI | Emergency Brake applied train. Emergency Brake by ATP. by ATP will be applied Gua — speed | THT | TO over apesded |Full Service Brake | FSB acivated. | FSB protection the train above | activation. FSB is| release happened after toraet, speed in| irevocable by the | train attained zero speed Coded mode by 2| system til train | only. ; kmph or minimum | attains zero speed 4 sec or till TO cancels it from HMI Saley Margin | TIM | Train_set__ 74 Emergency Brake | Emergency Brake distance qebled at T223H. | application by ATP | activated by ATP system between two Tap approached | system once train | once the train operator trains in ATP TD23H tin ATP | crosses the safety | tied to cross the ATP mode. mode from SKO | distance. stopping point. Train (Protection from direction and Train Stopped nearly 100m at Train Colision) Operator tries to T221H behind exceed the target Tse 14, distance. Door 7225H |Stop the train | Once the Train | Train ‘stopped outside Door ation |SCM. | approx. 5: meter | stopped outside | stopping window, failyre when | P/F before the Normal | stopping window | Red Indication of “Outside train stopping ‘Stopping Point. Red. Indication of | stopping window’ outside stopping FO to explain the | Outside stopping | appeared on HM window Teason via radio to | window appears on | No door authorization To. and further | HMI. available. Given command move train to | No door | to open the doors. but Normal stopping | authorization is | doors did not open Point. available Door T2035 | Stop train at the | Train will be| Train stopped at the authorization |SAR | Normal Stopping | stopped at Normal Normal Stopping Point. when train| P/F | Point. Stopping Point. {Green Indication of docked in Fots —opening | Green Indication of | "stopping at _norntal Normal stopping indication stopping at normal | stopping window" Point window. Sopeared and stopping window | appeared on HM specs opened by | appears on HMI. | Door authorization on Left the TO. Door authorization | symbol appeared on HM! symbol appears on | TO opened the Left Door. the HM! 70 tied opening the Right TO opens the | door. Right door did not Door. open, Sabon ATP TIEN | Train fo be an In [ATP 2 fo ake over. | Train “continued in’ ATP Train continues to | mode. Ay 19 Test Performed Track Ckt No Testing Process Desired Result Actual Result tunning ATP 1 of the active cab was switched OFF. Tun in ATP mode in HMI the indication for ATP1 vanishes. ATP 2 indication on HMI exists. The indication of ATP 1 disappeared from HMI on switching OFF of ATP 1. ATP 2 Indication was stil available on HMI. Telegram ‘Transmission Failure test. T2215 ‘Track circuit occupied by the train is switched off to cut off Telegram transmission to train from Way Side ATP. Emergency Brake will be activated by the ATC once Telegram has failed. TO to explain the reason to TC and further move ahead in RM mode after exchange of private numbers EB applied on telegram failure. Movement in Restricted Manual (RM) mode. T2235 The train is operated in RM mode. TO exceeds the speed limit of 25 kmph and Emergency Brake applied, Train operator to, explain the reason to TC and further move ahead in RM mode after exchange of private numbers Emergency Brake (EB) by ATP will be applied beyond the warning speed above 25 kmph. Emergency Brake (EB) by ATP applied beyond the warning speed above 25 kmph. Emergency Braking in RM mode because of over speeding. Single Line Operation SAL section TSH 14 parked at 230J. Once TS 12 reached in rear of $203) on T235J, OCC has been instructed to set Route $203J_S201K. OCC was not able to set the route as route setting was rejected by Interlocking Logic. Further Route was set for clearing $2054 for Interlocking Logic should reject the Route setting of. $203J_S201K upon the ‘occupation of Train in T239J. Route should fire once the section is cleared. Route setting §203J_S201K rejected by interlocking due to occupation of TS # 14 on 7239 Route $203J_S201K set, as the section cleared. Fas 20 c Test Performed | aK | Testing Process _| Desired Result | Actual Result TS # 14 to SAN UP platform using crossover 10 203/202 After the clearing of 7239), 1237, 7236) __ Route $203J_8201K has been fired by OCC Temporary T241J | Implementation of| On Driver HMI | The TSR speed of 25 Speed TSR of 25 Kmph | inside Cab, Target | kmph on the track circuit Restriction implemented by | speed of 25 Kmph | displayed on the HMI. (TSR) aoe "Gontroller | should appear and | Train operated in 25 kmph from OCC. the train is allowed | inthis track circuit TO to operate the | to move by ATP train in the present | within this speed. 2 recommended a speed. Rabackieat | THK} Train should be [EB to be tiggered [EB applied | by, ATP Tawed “to. roll| by ATP after 5 m of | because of roll back after back tolling back and roll|5 m. Further attempt of - back stopped. | Roll back after releasing Further roll back | the EB caused EB after after release of | 0.5 moll back. Emergency brake causes EB after 0.5m Gat ut Weds |T2IBK | Train to be moved | Speed mite to |TO over specded the tain demonstration. Wegut out mode.| 28. kmph —by|beyond 25 kmph. | Pyto exceed| Roling Stock | Emergency Brake applied Speed beyond 25| Control System | from Rolling stock kmph RIO Mode }T SISK} Train fs ran ATO [Motoring and [Train operated in ATO ATO trator in | to. SAN | mode by Keeping | braking of the train | mode til SAN Plaors Semone aton | PIF | Traction” Brake |is_ controled by | observing al speed Controller in| ATO according to | restrictions coasting and | the recommended pressing ATO start | speed. button Sigal Passing [THO [Signal Sz00Iis set [Emergency Brake (EB applied nen fee at Danger te Danger. | to. be applied by | crossed Signal stopping TO is instructed to| ATC once train | Point. try passing the | crosses _ signal signal at danger in | stopping Point. ATP mode. Ze ys a Test Performed | Track | Testing Process | Desired Result | Actual Result Ckt_No Demonstration |T 226J| Train operated in | Operational Train Operated in 50 kmph of Skip station | to SKO | ATO mode. Station | stopping Point not | in Platform TCs. P/F | Skip provided by | available at SCM, | HMI showed Skip symbol. OCC to Stations | SVA, SAR. SAR, SVA, SCM. _ | Train to move in 50 kmph on Platform TC. = Station skip symbol _{on HMI | Date: 09.04.2015 CGAH-S,. Si) ‘Gatish Kumar Mittal) Commissioner of Metro Railway Safety and Commissioner of Railway Safety, Southern circle, Bangalore. 22

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