Supreme Court of the United States

Arizona v. Gant (2009)

No. 07–542.
Argued October 7, 2008—Decided April 21, 2009
I. Facts of the Case

Two Tucson, Arizona, police officers went to a complaint of potential drug activity at
a residence on August 25, 1999. Rodney Gant was arrested by Arizona state police for
driving with a suspended license. The respondent was then handcuffed, and locked in a
patrol car as police went on to search his vehicle. Upon inspection, police discovered that
Gant had a handgun and plastic bag of cocaine in his car. In court, Grant argued that the
search had been conducted without a warrant which is a violation of the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. Because of this, the
respondent wanted the judge to suppress the evidence found in the vehicle. Declining
Gant’s request, the judge stated that the search was conducted as a result of the
respondent’s arrest due to his suspended license, thereby, indicating that the case was an
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Hence, Gant was convicted on
two counts of cocaine possession.

After Gant’s conviction, the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and argued that the
search was unconstitutional. Concerns for officer safety or evidence preservation must
justify exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, according to the
Supreme Court. Because the respondent left his vehicle voluntarily, the court argued that
the search was not necessarily linked to the arrest, therefore, violating the Fourth
Amendment.. Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard argued that the Arizona Supreme
Court's ruling conflicted with the Court's decision, as well as precedents set forth in various
federal and state courts.

II. Issue

Whether or not the search conducted by police officers was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Rodney Gant's primary attorney, Thomas Frank Jacobs (Tucson, Arizona), argued
the case before the United States Supreme Court on October 7, 2008. Jacobs claimed that
the Supreme Court's 1981 ruling in New York v. Belton had resulted in an excessive
extension of a restricted jurisdiction to inspect cars consequent to arrest. Lower courts,
based on a so-called "if arrest, then search" approach, were permitting searches after the
initial grounds for overturning the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement had
vanished. Jacobs contended, and the Court agreed, that using the Belton exception in this
way led it to "consume the norm," enabling illegal searches.

III. Held

Yes, the search conducted by the police officers was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
 When an arrestee is within reach of the car or it is reasonable to suspect the vehicle
contains evidence of the arrest crime, an officer may perform a vehicle search. When safety
or evidentiary considerations demand it, other known exceptions to the warrant
requirement allow for a vehicle search. For example, an officer may search the passenger
compartment of a car if he has reasonable suspicion that a person, whether or not the
arrestee, is "dangerous" and may obtain instant possession of weapons by entering the
vehicle. If there is reasonable suspicion that a vehicle contains evidence of criminal
conduct, a search of any part of the vehicle where the evidence may be discovered is
permitted. Searches for evidence relevant to offenses other than arrest are permitted, and
the extent of the search permitted is expanded. Finally, there may be additional instances in
which a search is justified due to safety or evidentiary concerns. Together, these exclusions
guarantee that authorities may search a vehicle when serious safety or evidentiary issues
arise during the arrest of a vehicle's most recent passenger.

IV. Final Disposition

According to the Supreme Court, the respondent's car may be inspected after his
arrest for a suspended license only if the court considers the arrestee may have had access
to it at the time of his arrest or the vehicle includes evidence of the offense for which he
was being detained. The Court reasoned that "warrantless searches are per se irrational"
and susceptible only to a few, extremely restricted exceptions, with Justice John Paul
Stevens writing for the majority and supported by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, David H.
Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Mr. Gant was arrested for driving with
a suspended license in this case, thus the narrow exclusions did not apply.
Justice Scalia concurred in a separate letter. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined Justice Samuel A. Alito in
dissension. He contended that the majority erred in overturning its precedent in New York
v. Belton, which said that "where a police officer has conducted a legitimate arrest... he may
search the passenger compartment of the car as a concurrent consequence of that arrest."
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stephen G. Breyer expressed his disappointment
that the court was unable to develop a new controlling rule. Justice Scalia's "reasonable to
believe" phrase probably relates to probable cause rather than a new threshold between
probable cause and reasonable suspicion. Because adopting additional and "subtle
linguistic graduations may confuse rather than illuminate the meaning" of the
"constitutional requirement of reasonableness," this Court has correctly rejected the
invitation to develop such a "third verbal norm."
The Supreme Court recently confirmed Belton's bright-line rule in Thornton v.
United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004), in a factual setting that substantially parallels the
current case. The officer in Thornton approached Thornton shortly after he exited his car,
saw a bulge in Thornton's pocket, and inquired if he was carrying drugs. Thornton
admitted to being a drug dealer and withdrew marijuana and crack cocaine from his
pockets. Ibid. The officer handcuffed him and placed him in a police car, after which he
searched Thornton's vehicle and discovered a handgun.
 Further, Justice Stevens argues that officers inspected the respondent’s car after he
was detained and locked in the back of a patrol cruiser for driving with a suspended
license. Cocaine was discovered in the backseat pocket of a blazer. The Arizona Supreme
Court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest exemption to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement did not apply since Gant could not have reached his car to collect
weapons or evidence at the time of the search, as defined in Chimel v. California, 395 U. S.
752 (1969) , and applied to vehicle searches in New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981) ,
did not justify the search in this case.
References:
Arizona v. Gant - Amicus (Merits). (2014, October 22). OSG | Department of Justice.
https://www.justice.gov/osg/brief/arizona-v-gant-amicus-merits
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). (2009). Justia Law.
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/556/332/